Latinos Mobilizing Beyond Threats:

The Role of Fear and Hope in Issue Activism

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Short Running Title: Latinos Mobilizing Beyond Threats

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Abstract

Interest groups intent on spurring political participation often highlight potential threats to galvanize audiences into action. However, while loss aversion is typically seen as a strong motivator, it is important not to neglect the motivational effect of hope and reward-seeking behavior as people navigate their political landscape. By drawing on a renewed focus on the simultaneous role of positive and negative emotions when processing risk appraisals, this paper re-assesses the most effective ways to frame threat messages surrounding immigration activism. I test the major claims of this model with two original online survey experiments of Latino adults in the United States (n=1,001; n=1,266), including a vignette and emotion-induction design. The results demonstrate a mobilizing message combining elements of both threat (loss) and opportunity (gain)—primed by negative and positive emotions—is a significant catalyst of various forms of collective action, including informal and formal forms of political participation.

Verification Materials: The materials required to verify the computational reproducibility of the results of the results, procedures, and analyses in this article are available on the *American Journal of Political Science* Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: (https://doi.org/doi:10.7910/DVN/YZIELC). The Cornell Center for Social Sciences verified that the data and replication code submitted to the AJPS Dataverse replicates the numerical results reported in the main text of this article.

Political mobilizers often seek to garner support and encourage participation by sounding the alarms and pointing to looming catastrophes (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Marcus, Neuman and McKuen 2000; Valentino et al. 2008; Miller and Krosnick 2004). However, while such threatening appeals trigger action in some, they may also immobilize others (Phoenix 2019, 2020; Albertson and Gadarian 2015; Vasi and Macy 2003; Miller and Krosnick 2004; Van Zomeren et al. 2004). I rely on general principles of collective action, persuasive communication and the study of fear appeals in social psychology to expand upon the causal and simultaneous effects of threat (loss) and opportunity (gains) frames.

This paper is centered on the effects of immigration issue activism within the Latino community. The focus on grievances and threats in the Latino community reached a climax in the 1990s when California residents witnessed a series of high-profile ballot initiatives, which attacked not only immigrants but the wider Latino community (Pantoja, Ramirez and Segura 2001; Jordán-Wallace et al. 2014; Barreto, Manzano, Ramirez and Rim 2009; Bowler, Nicholson and Segura. 2006). Proposition 187 (1994) denied public services, including healthcare and education, to undocumented immigrants (Pantoja et al. 2001); Proposition 209 (1996) eliminated public-sector affirmative action that could benefit Latinos; and Proposition 227 (1998) eliminated bilingual education. The unprecedented activism of the 1990s was surpassed in 2006 by nationwide protests against a restrictive immigration bill (H.R. 4437 or known as "the Sensenbrenner Bill") passed by the U.S. House of Representatives.[1] In the wake of these historic events, a wave of scholarship focused on the effects

[1] H.R. 4437 aimed to criminalize undocumented immigrants, as well as anyone who knowingly assisted any undocumented immigrant "to reside in or remain" in the U.S. If passed in the U.S. Senate chambers,

of restrictive policies and the mobilizing infrastructure galvanizing collective action among Latino and immigrant communities (Pantoja et al. 2001; Bowler et al. 2006; Okamoto and Ebert 2010; Ramirez 2013; Zepeda-Millán 2017; Jordán-Wallace et al. 2014; Ramirez 2013).

Though a focus on the catalyzing effects of threats in one's environment makes sense in the context of grievance politics and protest behavior (Van Zomermen et al. 2004; Smith et al. 2007; Bowler et al. 2006; Barreto et al. 2009; Benjamin-Alvarado, DeSipio and Montoya 2008; Pantoja, Menjivar and Magaña 2008; Ramirez 2013; Ramakrishnan 2005; Portes and Rumbaut 2006), the existing aggregate focus and cross-sectional survey approach has not captured the individual appraisal Latinos are exposed to within the realm of immigration rhetoric. Threat appraisals do not only consist of one's careful thought-processing of the risk or danger posed by a policy threat, but they also involve an appraisal of the potential gains or material improvements posed by the policy opportunities surrounding highly contested policy domains (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). The contested politics and salience of immigration policy serves as a helpful domain for which to test the simultaneous effect of policies signaling threat and opportunity (Fisher Williamson 2018; Steil and Vasi 2014). Immigration topics often take centerstage during elections, with a special focus on the mixed components and contrasting immigration platforms between presidential candidates (Eshbaugh-Soha, Juenke and Silva 2023). Furthermore, Latinos represent a large immigrant-based community, a community that has felt especially targeted by immigrant legislation and the immigration policy rhetoric in the U.S. at the federal and state level (Okamoto and Ebert 2010; Ramírez 2013; Vargas, Sanchez and Valdez 2017).

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penalties included up to 5 years in prison (e.g. including family members, employers and clergy) (Jordán-Wallace et al. 2014; Barreto et al. 2009).

To clarify threat and opportunity frames within the immigrant rights social movement, immigration *policy opportunities* broaden access, extend protections and make services more inclusive for undocumented immigrants (García 2021). Examples of immigration policy opportunities include proposals for city-wide sanctuary ordinances, access to driver's licenses, and a pathway to citizenship (García 2021; Fisher Williamson 2018). Conversely, prospective immigration *policy threats* are more restrictive and worsen the status quo for undocumented immigrant communities. Examples of threatening immigration policies include plans to increase deportations and revoke driver's license access to undocumented immigrants. Opportunity-framed messages make salient the positive gains on the horizon and they often produce more positive emotions, whereas threat-framed messages highlight the potential losses and trigger more negative emotions (Lazarus 1991; Nabi and Gall Myrick 2018; Marcus et al. 2000).

In an effort to capture the busy citizen's attention, and avoid common free-riding tendencies, organizers often overuse alarmist action alerts at the risk of undermining one's perceived ability to make a difference, creating an inherent efficacy problem (Vasi and Macy 2003). Vasi and Macy (2003) refer to this as the "mobilizer's dilemma." How does one avoid triggering the sporadic effects of threatening (often fear-inducing), messages? Vasi and Macy (2003) overcome the free-rider and efficacy problems through a two-pronged messaging approach, including crisis and empowerment message frames.[2] This aligns with appraisal theorists who

[2] Vasi and Macy (2003) use empowerment messages to empower individuals to continue striving towards a common goal with others. Their empowerment messages remind individuals of previously accomplished goals. My opportunity cue is distinct as it involves prospective policy changes.

suggest both negative and positive emotions boost participation, as they trigger both danger-averting behavior and reward-seeking behaviors, respectively (Gray 1990; Groenendyk and Banks 2014). Negative emotions heighten people's nervous systems and narrow their attention to support specific action tendencies (e.g., fight or flight), positive emotions help people gain a handle on their nervous arousal as they broaden people's attention, thinking, and behavioral repertoires (e.g., risk, explore, and imagine)(Fredrickson et al. 2003; Nabi and Gall Myrick 2018).While potential losses shake a person out of their routine and make one revisit their loyalties (Marcus et al. 2000; Brader 2006; Albertson and Gadarian 2015), the gains posed by hope reinforce one's commitment to collective action goals (Groenendyk and Banks 2014; Nabi and Gall Myrick 2018; Cohen-Chen and Van Zomermen 2018).

Though threat messages can play an important motivating role driving one's political action,[3] rather than only analyze the isolated effect of one policy cue (Chong and Druckman 2007,

[3] In fact, threat may also be a catalyst for opportunity appeals, as seen with a social movement and its countermovement (Tilly 1979). The immigration debate has demonstrated threat does not operate in a vacuum (Barreto et al. 2009; Zepeda-Millán 2017; Ramirez 2013). Ramirez (2013) also finds anti-immigrant threats can at times be framed as mobilizing opportunities to spark more reactive mobilization, seen in an uptick in naturalization and voter turnout rates among large immigrant communities. This increase in legal permanent residents applying for citizenship during hostile immigrant debate is referred to as "defensive naturalization" in response to threats. Ramirez (2013) argues reactive or defensive mobilization would not be feasible without campaigns and organizations engaging in proactive mobilization strategies. These organizations played a central

2010; Druckman 2010; Druckman and Leeper 2012), it is important to capture the competitive nature of policy cues when participants are *simultaneously* exposed to both threat and opportunity appeals. This paper pinpoints the causal impact of broader risk appraisals, specifically focusing on the emotions stirred by simultaneous threat and opportunity frames within immigration policy. Based on two original online survey experiments of Latino adults in the United States (n=1,001; n=1,266), I demonstrate the effect behind immigration policy messages that combine elements of threat and opportunity and their impact on one's political behavior (both informal and formal political participation). This paper expands the realm of possibilities of mobilizing messages and how to best frame threats to activate Latino communities. More broadly, this paper applies a political psychology lens to our understanding of how disadvantaged groups assess simultaneous threats and opportunities in their environment.

Framing Effects: Countering Sporadic Effects of Fear

Due to the prominence of loss aversion in prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), political scientists have narrowed in on the mediating effects of single emotions and single frames, especially centering the mobilizing effects of threat cues and negative emotions (Alberston and Gadarian 2015; Van Zomeren, Spears and Leach 2008; Miller et al. 2009; Gutierrez et al. 2019; McCann and Jones-Correa 2020; Azab and Santoro 2017). However, within the field of negative advertising (Krupnikov 2012; Goldstein and Freedman 2002; Krasno and Green 2008; Ansolabehere et al. 1999), negative ads have varying effects on people's desires to consider new information and mobilize (Krasno and Green 2008). While negative advertising might impact

role in removing barriers, specifically providing immigrant communities with essential information and assistance to become naturalized citizens.

some public opinion and vote choice decisions (Krupnikov 2012), there is often a demobilizing effect of negative advertising on voter turnout (Ansolabehere et al. 1999). Within political science, Groenendyk and Banks (2014), Valentino et al. (2011) and Brader (2006) find the effect of fear on political action is sporadic, and often limited to more conservative and less time-consuming forms of political participation (such as talking about politics and wearing a political button). Similarly, Azab and Santoro (2017) and McCann and Jones-Correa (2020) also find cross-sectional survey evidence of the demobilizing effects among Arab American and Latino communities if they only report experiencing fear during anti-immigrant periods. Fear is often associated with a lack of personal control, vulnerability and uncertainty (Marcus et al. 2000). Among Latinos, anti-immigrant threats in one's environment demobilize Latinos from turning out to vote, unless they are accompanied with formal outreach and mobilization efforts to get-out-the-vote (Reny, Wilcox-Archuleta and Cruz Nichols 2018; Ramirez 2013).

Psychologists and public health scholars who have found similar boomerang effects—fear without efficacy is paralyzing (Witte and Allen 2000; Mewborn and Rogers 1979). Public health scholars frame fear appraisals in an uplifting way to motivate behavioral changes (Nabi and Gall Myrick 2018). This line of work finds people were more likely to comply with the recommended behavior changes when those recommendations were paired with efficacy messages (Rogers and Mewborn, 1976; Witte and Allen 2000). In other words, without a hope-inducing message signaling ways to advance a future opportunity, the fear induced by a potential threat or stressor may paralyze people from taking action (Nabi and Gall Myrick 2018; Klandermans 1997; Lazarus 1991). Thus, it is important not to neglect the motivational effect of hope, *especially* in the face of stress-inducing adversity (Nabi and Gall Myrick 2018; Fredrickson et al. 2003). In fact, McCann and Jones-Correa (2020) find Latino immigrants demonstrate a steadfast commitment to civic

engagement and trust in U.S. society, even as they endure hardships and stress posed by periods of anti-immigrant rhetoric and increased deportation rates.

Emotions Underlying Threats and Opportunities

In more recent scholarship on the role of threats and opportunities, understanding a group's collective disadvantage and the fairness of their surrounding governing institutions shape whether the individuals respond to threat cues in their environment with action, anxiety or resignation (Van Zomeren et al. 2004; Phoenix 2020). Social psychologists find disadvantaged groups respond with resignation when encountering situations they cannot change, particularly when group efficacy is low (Van Zomeren et al. 2004; Cohen-Chen and Van Zomeren 2018; Halperin et al. 2011; Groenendyk and Banks 2014; Lazarus 2001; Phoenix 2020). By contrast, when encountering a positive prospective change, or policy opportunity, there is room to generate motivating effects of hope if the goal appears to be relevant and attainable (Thomas, McGarty and Mavor 2009; Nabi and Gall Myrick 2018; Phoenix 2020). Cohen-Chen and van Zomeren (2018) analyze the often overlooked role of hope within social movements and collective action. They argue that feeling hopeful is a necessary step in the process of imagining a different possibility in the pursuit of social change (Tajfel 1978; Lazarus 1991), positing that hope provides a motivational element to create paths to achieve the desired goal (Cohen-Chen and van Zomeren 2018). Loss frames are often more associated with fear (e.g. avoiding imminent harm) (Nabi and Gall Myrick 2018; McCann and Jones-Correa 2020; Zepeda-Millán 2017), whereas gain frames are most often associated with hope emotions (e.g. congruent with one' prospective goals)(Lazarus 2001; Nabi and Gall Myrick 2018; Phoenix 2020).

Groenendyk and Banks (2014) find that enthusiasm (which is based on both pride and hope), enhances people's willingness to expend scarce resources and promotes approach behavior

and interest. Phoenix (2019, 2020) later finds hope and pride catalyze various formal forms of political participation, particularly among Black and Latino participants. More specifically, hope allows people to envision a future that is distinct from the current context (Phoenix 2020). Pride is based on goals that are being met or existing victories people can count on (Marcus et al. 2000; Valentino et al. 2011; Groenendyk and Banks 2014).

Study 1: *A Priori* Hypotheses

I assert that combining the effects of threat and opportunity signals, generates the danger-averting and reward-seeking behavior necessary to take action. The Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity strategy provides a set of motivators beyond the urgency and cost of the crisis (loss); it is coupled with the enthusiasm around the potential gains posed by the opportunities. I expect the coupled threat-and-opportunity condition will be more likely to boost participation rates, relative to the threat-alone condition (*H1*). The single cue (threat-alone or opportunity-alone conditions) will either be ineffective or discourage respondents from participating in politics, relative to the coupled condition (*H2*).

Study 1: Design and Methods

To test the apriori hypotheses,[4] Study 1 was fielded through Latino Decisions polling firm (now known as BSP Research) from May 21, 2016 through June 1, 2016. For details on how Study 1 compares to national benchmarks and subnational group origins, the weighted demographics can

[4] Study 1 and Study 2 were conducted in compliance IRB policies and deemed exempt by the University of Michigan. The apriori hypotheses are listed in these IRB documents (available upon request). The corresponding IRB project numbers are: HUM00105571 (Study 1) and HUM00127567 (Study 2).

be found in Table A.1. Aside from the average education level, the summary characteristics of this national online convenience sample are similar to those in national Latino samples. The median age of the sample was 32 years. Fifty percent of the sample were women, and 44% of the sample is of Mexican backgrounds.

Participant incentives were based on redeemable points equivalent to $10. All respondents were above the age of 18, living in the U.S., and self-identified as being of non-white Latino or Hispanic origins. Study 1 consists of an online convenience sample of 1,001 Latino adults in the U.S.[5] Within Study 1, 88% took the survey in English, with an average completion time of 16 minutes, and nearly 12% took the survey in Spanish, with an average completion time of 17 minutes. Respondents were evenly distributed across their experimental conditions, amounting to approximately 250 cases per experimental treatment.

Dependent Variables

The two dependent variables include an *informal political participation scale* and an observed measure of *formal political participation*. The *informal political participation scale* is based on 3 measures of participants' self-reported likelihood of engaging in informal forms of behavior related to immigration activism: joining a march, talking politics with friends or family, and volunteering with a political interest group. Respondents rated each item on a five-point scale ranging from 0 ("not at all

[5] Based on an initial group of 1,015 respondents, 14 outliers were dropped from the sample based on screen timer data that suggests they did not fully complete the survey in one sitting. Study 1's total sample size in the analyses includes 1,001 respondents.

likely") to 1 ("extremely likely"). The participation scale combines 3 participation items into a scale to range from 0 to 1 (with 1 meaning they are willing to take part in all the listed activities, and 0 meaning they did not want to take part in any of them).

Finally, Study 1 relied on an observed measure of formal political participation. At the end of the survey, all respondents were given the option to send an electronic postcard to their U.S. senators asking them to vote on one or more immigration proposals. Sending a postcard is a formal form of political participation because it involves sending correspondence to elected officeholders. The postcard measure was coded as a dichotomous outcome, with 0 meaning they "did not send any postcard," and 1 meaning they "sent a postcard." In Study 1, approximately 64% of the sample sent a postcard message to their senators, 33% of the sample chose not to send a postcard, and 2% of the sample chose to skip the measure.

Study 1: Experiment Vignette Treatments

In Study 1, the randomized treatment design consists of three fictional versions of an online action alert sponsored by Reform Immigration for America. Participants were randomized to 1 of 4 conditions (including the control). The treatments can be summarized as 1.) a Control Condition, 2.) a Threat Condition, 3.) an Opportunity Condition, and 4.) a Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition. Subjects assigned to the non-political Control Condition read an article about smartphone messaging apps. Respondents are only randomly assigned to one condition, so the treatments in Study 1 are modeled as dummy variables based on this randomization process. Table 1 provides a

detailed description of each of the vignettes and photographs used to create the action alerts (see A.2).[6]

The fictional experimental treatments mimic a realistic immigration action alert, conveying the Senate would vote on the policy (or policies) within the week. The Threat Condition refers to a policy proposal that eliminates the birthright citizenship of children born to undocumented parents. The Opportunity Condition refers to a proposal that would provide a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants in the U.S. The Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition combines language from each of the single-cue conditions, informing respondents about both the threat of losing birthright citizenship and the opportunity of a new pathway to citizenship. The treatments in Study 1 are modeled as dummy variables based on one's randomly assigned condition.

The design behind the coupled threat-and-opportunity conditions in the vignette-based experiments in Study 1 draw heavily from designs used by Druckman (2010). Druckman (2010) demonstrates that exposure to *simultaneous* cues better captures the competitive nature of various policy frames that respondents may encounter in the real world (Chong and Druckman 2007, 2010;

[6] The final experiment designs and issue topics were determined based on a power analysis and extensive pretesting of the treatments to ensure internal validity and treatment strength. With regard to the vignettes in Study 1, it was important to make sure each policy message was designed with equal strength, so that one message was not overpowering the other (Chong and Druckman 2007, 2010).

Druckman and Leeper 2012). An experimental design allows one to isolate the effects of coupled threat-and-opportunity appeals on immigration issue activism.

Controls

For robustness checks, I use controls for immigration policy opinion (Albertson and Gadarian 2015), immigration issue salience (Albertson and Gadarian 2015), racialized linked fate (Valenzuela and Michelson 2016; Phoenix 2019; Halperin et al. 2011) and partisanship (Groenendyk and Banks 2014). These measures are theoretically relevant given the pro-immigrant nature of the vignettes would impact whether one interprets the vignettes as threatening or promising regarding immigration policy. For more details, with and without these control variables being specified in tables within the Supplementary Information (SI) file (pgs. 4-5, 18). Results hold with or without controlling for these attitude and identity measures.

Table 1: Study 1 Text Description of Randomized Vignette Treatments (English)

Description	Threat condition	Opportunity condition	Coupled threat-and-opportunity condition
Headline	**"Warning! Ending birthright citizenship** is the **wrong** move!"	**"Our time is now! A pathway to citizenship** is the **best** move!"	"**Warning! Ending birthright citizenship is the wrong move!**"
First paragraph	"This week the Senate is going to vote on a bill to **end the U.S.-citizenship for children born of immigrant parents who do not have legal U.S. status.** Before it is too late, let your Senators know that **ending birthright citizenship** would be an **attack** for American and immigrant families everywhere!"	"This week the Senate is going to vote on a bill to **provide a pathway to citizenship for immigrants living in the U.S. without** legal status. Before it is too late, let your Senators know that **providing a pathway to citizenship** would be a **win** for American and immigrant families everywhere!"	"This week the Senate is going to vote on a bill **to end the U.S.-citizenship for children born of immigrant parents who do not have legal U.S. status**. Let your Senators know that **ending birthright citizenship** would be an **attack** for American and immigrant families everywhere!"
Second paragraph			**"…Meanwhile, another bill in the Senate** provides a **pathway to citizenship for immigrants who are living in the U.S. without legal status**. Before it is too late, let your Senators know that providing a **pathway to citizenship** for these immigrants would be a **win** for American and immigrant families everywhere! **Our time is now! Providing a pathway to citizenship is the best move**!"
Closing caption	"Let's take action today!"	"Let's take action today!"	"Let's take action on both of these bills today!"

Notes: The emboldened font highlights minimal changes across the treatment conditions. There was no bold font in the participant's view. The non-political Control Condition (not described

above), describes Smartphone messaging patterns. All screenshots of the vignettes are available in Supplemental Information (pgs. 2-3).

Study 1: Results

The primary hypothesis involves the variation in participatory behavior across experimental conditions, relative to the Threat condition (H1). As stated in Hypothesis 1, I expect the Coupled Condition to be more mobilizing relative to the threat-alone condition. The main models presented in the first set of results are limited to the experimental treatment conditions. Model 1 is based on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression estimates for the 3-item political participation scale (referred to as *informal participation*). Model 2 shifts gears to a logit model for the dichotomous and sent postcard measure (referred to as *formal participation)*. The postcard models are based on odds-ratios for the logit estimates.

For ease of interpretation, Figure 1 below illustrates the predictive margins for both the political participation scale and postcard measures of Study 1. Starting with the Panel (a) regarding political participation, I provide the predictive margins based on estimates for informal forms of participation scale (3-items: talking, marching and volunteering). As expected, the single cue conditions are ineffective in mobilizing respondents to participate in politics relative to the Coupled Condition (H2). Relative to the non-political Control Condition (H3), the effect of the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition also does not emerge as statistically significant. The political context with the majority party in power in the White House, likely disincentivized the need to partake in more insurgent forms (joining a march) and informal forms (talking about politics, volunteering for an organization) captured within the intended forms of political participation. Because this study was in the field when President Obama was still in office, this likely signaled some form of political responsiveness to the majority of Latinos—after all, Latinos

voted for President Obama over Republican nominee Mitt Romney by 71% to 27% in 2012 (Pew Research Center 2012).

Figure 1: Study 1, Predictive Margins of Informal and Formal Political Participation by Treatment



Notes: Predictive margins are derived from the main models effects in Study 1 (n=1,001). For coefficients for the main effects models using either Threat or Control Condition baselines, refer to Supplemental Information file (pg. 4, pg. 5). The predictive margins above control for one's immigration opinion; the results hold with or without controlling for immigration opinion (SI file, pg. 4). The margins include 95% confidence intervals. The "informal participation" (or "participation scale"), as seen in Panel (a), was only based on 3 available participation outcome measures (talking, marching and volunteering). The "formal participation" outcome as seen in Panel (b) is based on sending an electronic postcard to U.S. Senators (1 = sent, 0 = not sent).

The second outcome measure in Figure 1 is based on a formal form of political participation, with a dichotomous measure capturing whether they sent an electronic postcard to their senators (0=not sent; 1=sent). Relative to the Threat Condition, the Coupled condition emerges as statistically significant when sending an electronic postcard to their senators, thus supporting Hypothesis 1. Relative to the Threat-alone conditions, the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity approach has a positive effect—nearly a 10 percentage point boost—on the respondent's probability to send an electronic postcard to their U.S. Senators, as seen in Figure Panel (b). This effect is significant at the .05 level, a pattern that was consistent whether the referent

category was the non-political control condition or if it was either of the single cue conditions. Upon computing the odds-ratio of the reported logistic coefficients for Study 1 (SI file, pg. 4), I find respondents in the Coupled Condition are 1.5 times more likely to send a postcard than those in the Control Condition, Opportunity Condition or Threat Condition. These findings provide the strongest support for Hypothesis 1, which stated the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition will be more mobilizing than the Threat alone condition. Thus, according to Hypothesis 2, the single cue conditions are in fact ineffective in mobilizing participants to send an electronic postcard. The single cue messages of threat and opportunity alone are ineffective in spurring this formal form of political participation. When comparing the treatment effects to the Control Condition, the Coupled Condition's remains positive and statistically significant.

Results from the postcard model in Figure 1 provide the first direct evidence that highlighting both the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity Condition spurs one's likelihood to send a postcard. Expanding on findings from sociology and psychology work, this conclusion is consistent with the implications of Vasi and Macy (2003) and Rogers and Mewborn (1976) and suggests that a coupled condition provides both a promising goal with the urgency of a potential threat, motivating respondents to take action. Sending an electronic postcard to an elected official requires trust in political institutions since it is seen as a formal form of political participation (working within the system). The Coupled Condition likely spurred the formal form of political participation because the majority of participants likely felt more efficacious about expressing more pro-immigrant views at a time when President Obama was in office (Phoenix 2019, 2020; McCann and Jones-Correa 2020). This is further assessed by the role of partisanship and social context analyses below.

Partisanship and Political Context

To better understand who sent a postcard, recall that participants could also write their own message. In fact, 96 participants wrote their own message (nearly 15% of those who sent a message). Some participants wrote messages emphasizing immigrants belongingness to the U.S.: "Immigrants need some help to stay in [the] USA." Some wrote messages that were more restrictive: "Follow our laws, get in line." With a topic as polarizing as immigration, and since Latinos do not share the same views towards immigration (Bowler et al. 2006; Silber Mohamed 2017), it is helpful to account for the political partisan lens from which people are interpreting the threat and opportunity cues.

Groenendyk and Banks (2014) introduce the Emotional Rescue Model to explain how one's party identification shapes the emotions people experience when encountering political stimuli and how this impacts their likelihood to take part in collective action.[7] They find strong partisans are more likely than weak partisans to respond to their political environments with action-inducing emotions. Groenendyk and Banks (2014) and Halperin and colleagues (2011) posit group identity and social context often shape an individual's emotional and behavioral responses to political stimuli. By interpreting threats and risks in one's environment through a group lens like party identification, individuals are less likely to feel overwhelmed and isolated by their political environment (governed by fear)(Groenendyk and Banks 2014). Thus, the political context matters

[7] The Emotional Rescue Model focuses on the behavioral implications of processing discrete positive and negative emotions through a group partisan lens (Groenendyk and Banks 2014). They justify the focus on partisan identity and its link to emotions and political behaviors by integrating prominent emotion theories, including Intergroup Emotion Theory (IET), Affective Intelligence Theory (AIT) and Broaden-and-Build Theory's (BBT).

when considering the avenues people feel most efficacious about when choosing to participate in politics. Ingroup partisans are likely to perceive political institutions to be more responsive to their interests when they share the identity of the majority party in power (Groenendyk and Banks 2014; Phoenix 2019, 2020; McCann and Jones-Correa 2020).

Table 2: Study 1 Vignette Treatment Effects on Informal and Formal Forms of Political Participation, by Partisan Group

	Democrats		Republicans		Independents	
	Participation Scale, 3-item	Sent postcard, OR	Participation Scale, 3-item	Sent postcard, OR	Participation Scale, 3-item	Sent postcard, OR
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat	-	-	-	-	-	-
	-	-	-	-	-	-
Opportunity	-0.051	0.955	-0.012	1.089	0.006	0.863
	(0.049)	(0.239)	(0.073)	(0.422)	(0.082)	(0.350)
Coupled	-0.060	1.626^{+}	0.165*	1.801	-0.031	0.999
	(0.048)	(0.418)	(0.074)	(0.740)	(0.088)	(0.435)
Control	-0.051	0.912	-0.059	1.152	-0.080	0.993
	(0.048)	(0.222)	(0.075)	(0.464)	(0.085)	(0.415)
Immigration opinion	0.138*	1.102	0.223**	0.844	0.038	0.422
	(0.066)	(0.376)	(0.082)	(0.383)	(0.115)	(0.242)
Constant	0.515**	1.800*	0.292**	1.781	0.441**	1.974
	(0.052)	(0.477)	(0.069)	(0.667)	(0.095)	(0.937)
Observations	568	568	238	238	195	195
R-squared	0.011		0.081		0.008	

Notes: Partisan subsets include strong, moderate and leaning partisans. Results still hold when collapsing leaners with independents. The participation scale in Study 1 was only based on 3 available "informal participation" outcome measures (talking, marching and volunteering). The "formal participation" outcome is based on sending an electronic postcard to U.S. Senators (1 = sent, 0 = not sent). The "sent postcard" logit model results are depicted as odds-ratios. The standard errors in parentheses. All *p*-values (using a two-tailed test): $^{+}p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$.

In Table 2, I provide the results for Democrats, Republicans and Independents. For this table, I rely on the 7-point partisanship measure and collapse strong, moderate and leaners for each

respective party. The independents in Table 2 do not include leaners, though the results still hold when I run the model while collapsing leaners and independents.

When analyzing these results by partisanship, the main effect for the postcard measure is driven among Democrats in Panel (b) (Figure 2). Democrats in the Coupled Condition are 13 percentage points more likely to send an electronic postcard, relative to Democrats in the Threat Condition. Those percentage points are closer to approximately 10%, relative to the Opportunity-alone and Control condition.

The treatments do not appear to encourage informal or insurgent forms of political participation for Democrats. Again, these informal forms of participation involve outcomes that signal working outside the political system (e.g. marching, talking politics, volunteering for an organization). It makes sense that Democrats would be more willing to contact an elected official when the President shares their same party identification with them, as seen in 2015 with President Obama in Study 1 (Phoenix 2019, 2020; McCann and Jones-Correa 2020). Thus, working within the system to send a postcard to elected officials may seem to be an efficacious option knowing the President would not veto a Senate bill that is in line with their pro-immigrant stance. As for the informal forms of political participation items, the results may be null there as Democratic respondents see no need to work outside the system when Senators are working on bills (as seen in the hypothetical vignettes) that align with their policy opinions.

Figure 2: Study 1, Predictive Margins of Informal and Formal Forms of Participation by Treatment, among Republicans and Democrats

(a) Republicans



(b) Democrats



Notes: Predictive margins are derived from the main models in Table 2. The margins include 95% confidence intervals. The "informal participation scale" in Panel (a) was only based on 3 available participation outcome measures (talking, marching and volunteering). Panel (a) focuses on the results Among Republicans. The "formal participation" in Panel (b) is based on sending an electronic postcard to U.S. Senators (1 = sent, 0 = not sent). Panel (b) focuses on Democrats within the sample.

For Republicans, relative to the Threat Condition, those in the Coupled Condition are more likely to take part in insurgent and informal forms of political participation (Panel (a) in Figure 2). Republicans in the Coupled Condition are approximately 16 percentage points more likely to take part in informal forms of political participation than those in the Threat Condition. This pattern is also mirrored relative to the Control and Opportunity-Only Condition.

How did the Coupled Condition mobilize Republicans to engage in informal forms of political participation? As they read about the two policy proposals in the Coupled Condition, they likely perceive a pathway to citizenship as a policy they would mobilize against (a threat posing losses), while revoking birthright citizenship is seen as prospective policy signaling more restrictive immigration policy in line with their partisan leanings (an opportunity posing desirable goals). The types of political participation Republican Latinos are more willing to engage in have

more to do with informal forms of political behavior and not engaging with elected officials. Knowing the President at the time did not align with their politics in 2016, Republican participants may have felt it was more necessary to work outside the system for the change they saw fit.

Finally, for Independents, there is no main treatment effects. Relative to the threat condition, there appear to be no statistically distinguishable results for either informal forms of political participation or sending an electronic postcard. Groenendyk and Banks (2014) explain that the virtue of aligning oneself with a party allows individuals to react to their political environment with more action-oriented emotions. Without a political party (a group lens), the independents in my sample are not reacting to the political stimuli in the same motivating ways seen among Democrats and Republicans—they are processing the political environment as individuals and not in a collective manner.

To dispel concerns that the mobilizing effects of the single cue Threat-Only and Opportunity-Only Conditions, while the Coupled Condition contains two issues, additional robustness checks using two-issue (or equal length) treatment designs per condition are in the Supplemental Information (pg. 6). The results remain robust for the mobilizing effect behind the Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity condition, even when the Threat-Only and Opportunity-Only conditions also contain two issues and are equal in word length with the Coupled Condition.

Affective and Cognitive Manipulation Checks

Did participants experience the emotions each vignette was designed to trigger? Did their cognitive appraisal of the political landscape align with the vignette's designs? To address these concerns, I include affective and cognitive manipulations check measures immediately after the

randomized treatments. Based on Figure 3 and 4 below, the results align with the intended the cognitive and affective appraisal expectations behind each vignette design.

For the affective manipulation check (Figure 3), respondents were asked to select whether they felt each emotion a great deal, a lot, a moderate amount, a little or not at all. Based on their relevance in the literature, the emotion options included whether they felt anger, fear, pride and hope (Brader 2006).[8] Figure 3 includes the predictive margins of hope and fear.

Figure 3: Study 1, Predictive Margins of Affective Manipulation Check



Notes: Predictive margins for the emotions or affective manipulation checks for Study 1. The margins include 95% confidence intervals. Study 1 relied on external vignettes for the treatments. These models control for immigration opinion and partisanship (SI file, pg. 24). Panel (a) describes the affective manipulation check for hope, and Panel (b) describes the affective manipulation check for fear.

The hope and fear items are 5-category measures coded from 0 to 1, with 0 meaning "not at all" and 1 meaning "a great deal." We see that though the means for hope and fear are not

[8] Due to page constraints, figures for the pride and anger expressed in the vignettes are available in the SI file (pg. 27).

statistically distinguishable from one another across the treatments, they are nonetheless in the anticipated directions (Figure 3). In fact, when it comes to hope, participants express higher levels of this in the Opportunity Condition and the least amount in the Threat Condition. It also makes sense that this positive emotion would be higher in the baseline control condition where they were assigned to write about anything that made them feel relaxed. Fear is highest in the Threat Condition and lowest in the Coupled Condition. This shows the Coupled Condition helps people manage the level and effect of fear.

For the cognitive perception of threat and opportunity regarding immigration policy (Figure 4), respondents in Study 1 were asked: "Do you think current immigration proposals will make the lives for unauthorized immigrants currently living in the U.S. easier or harder?" The 7-value responses ranged from 0 to 1, with 0 meaning current proposals will make "life a great deal easier" for undocumented immigrants, and 1 meaning current proposals will make "life a great harder" for undocumented immigrants.

Moving on to Figure 4, respondents in the Coupled Condition lie in the midrange and sensed both increased hardship and progress for the lives of undocumented immigrants. This effect is statistically distinguishable from those randomized to the Threat-only Condition and Opportunity-only Condition at the .01 level. Those in the Threat-only and Opportunity-only conditions report more heightened levels of hardship and progress for undocumented immigrants in the expected directions. This cognitive manipulation check demonstrates the vignettes impacted the perceived political landscape, including an accurate assessment of the prospective loss and rewards for immigrant communities.

Figure 4: Study 1, Predictive Margins of Cognitive Manipulation Check



Notes: This figure plots the predictive margins for the cognitive manipulation check in Study 1. These models control for immigration opinion and partisanship (Model 1, SI file on pg. 24). The margins include 95% confidence intervals.

When accounting for the effect of cognitive and affective appraisals in the models (SI file, pgs. 20-21), I find that the cognitive appraisal process is negatively correlated with insurgent and informal forms of political participation—meaning that as people perceive more threats and hardships for undocumented immigrants, they are less likely to take part in a march, talk about politics and volunteer for an organization to advance change. As one experiences more fear, they are less willing to engage in informal forms of participation. Those who experience pride are more motivated to take part in a march, which is evidence of enthusiasm playing an important mobilizing role for communities of color (Phoenix 2019, 2020).

Study 2: *A Priori* Hypotheses

Since I cannot expect an external vignette to trigger a universal emotional response in everyone (Albertson and Gadarian 2015), Study 2 involves a self-generated writing task. In Study 2, respondents are randomized to an emotion-induction task that allows people to write about the named emotion in their own words. Study 2's emotion-induction tasks are known as self-generated or bottom-up manipulation designs (Albertson and Gadarian 2015).

I expect the coupled fear-and-hope condition will be more likely to boost participation rates, relative to fear-alone condition (*H1a*). Based on factor analyses in the literature, pride and hope have often loaded on one singular dimension (Groenendyk and Banks 2014; Valentino et al. 2011). As such, I expect the coupled fear-and-pride condition to have a catalyzing effect relative to the fear-alone condition as well (*H1b*). The single cue (fear-alone or hope-alone conditions) will either be ineffective or discourage respondents from participating in politics, relative to the coupled fear-and-hope condition (*H2*).

Study 2: Design and Methods

Study 2 was fielded with YouGov from October 31st through November 15th 2017. For details on how Study 2 compares to national benchmarks and subnational group origins, the weighted demographics are in the SI file (pg. 8). The average age of the sample was 36 years, which is older than the average age of Latino demographics in the U.S. Fifty percent of the sample were women, and 48% of the sample is of Mexican backgrounds.

Participant incentives were based on redeemable points equivalent to $10. All respondents were above the age of 18, living in the U.S., and self-identified as being of non-white Latino or Hispanic origins. Study 2 consists of a separate online convenience sample of 1,266 Latino adults

through YouGov.[9] Among Study 2 participants, 77% took the survey in English, with an average completion time of 20 minutes, and 23 percent took the survey in Spanish, with an average completion time of 22 minutes. Respondents and their sociodemographic characteristics were evenly distributed across their experimental conditions, amounting to 176 cases (at minimum) per experimental treatment.

Study 2: Emotion-Induction Treatment Designs

The prompt in Study 2 asks participants to think about the debate over future immigration policies in the U.S. (at the state or national level) and write about the aspects that make them feel the assigned emotion(s). I focus on inducing fear, hope, pride and a combination of fear with these positive emotions through an emotion-induction design. The key treatment conditions assign respondents to write about feeling: Fearful, Hopeful, a combination of Fear with Hope (or Pride). The additional conditions allow me to test alternative explanations: whether the ordering of the triggered emotions affect the results (Hope-and-Fear, writing about hope first and fear second) and whether two positive emotions (Hope-and-Pride) are more mobilizing than Fear alone. My non-political Control Condition asks people to write about what makes them feel Relaxed.

The induction writing prompts used in Study 2 are in line with conventional policy-based emotion-induction designs in political science (Valentino et al. 2011; Valentino et al. 2008; Albertson and Gadarian 2015). For affective and cognitive manipulation checks, as well as

[9] Out of a total 1,351 respondents, 85 outliers were dropped from the sample based on if they spent over 15 minutes filling out their emotion-induction responses (the mean time across the conditions was 30 seconds), and if they could not trace their heritage to a country in Latin America.

sentiment analyses through the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) Software, refer to SI file (pg. 26). The affective and cognitive manipulation checks, as well as the LIWC scores, confirm the respondents wrote about the intended emotion assignment.

Dependent Variables

Study 2 utilizes two informal participation scales, including one with the same participation items as in Study 1 and one scale with more participation measures. Within the 3-item participation scale, 30% of the sample was not willing to participate in any of the 3 intended informal political actions, while 20% said they would engage in 1 activity, 14% in 2 activities and 34% in all 3 activities. For this more simplified 3-item participation scale, this includes the intent to march, volunteer for an organization or talk about politics with friends or family. The additional non-electoral forms of participation available in Study 2, include posting in social media, joining a listserv (or action alert list), donating money to an immigrant organization, and joining a boycott. Due to the high Cronbach's alphas and correlation matrix results, I combined these activities into a 7-item participation scale as well. The Cronbach's alpha for the 3-item and 7-item participation scales were .85 and .92, respectively. In Study 2, 30% of the sample did not express willingness to engage in any of the listed activities, while nearly 20% said they would engage in 1 or 2 activities. After creating dummy variables for each of the participation items, I combined them into the 7-item and 3-item participation scale. The higher the value on the scale, the more likely they are to do more than one of these more informal forms of political participation.

Study 2 also includes the electronic postcard for the observed political behavior. In this study, 75% sent postcard, 24% did not send a postcard, and 1% chose to skip the measure. As seen with Study

1, this is an observable and formal form of political participation. I run logit models for the dichotomous sent postcard measure.

Controls

To account for one's immigration opinion in Study 2, two student coders were asked to code the respondent's writing prompts for immigration tone (0=unwelcoming, .5=neutral, 1=welcoming). Given the intercoder reliability between the two student coders (above 80 percent intercoder reliability), I relied on their averaged responses to detect whether participants express welcoming, neutral or unwelcoming opinions towards undocumented immigrant. Results still hold with or without an immigration opinion control (see SI file, pgs. 15-17).

Study 2: Results

Study 2's main effect results are displayed in Table 3. The results for the political participation models are based on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression estimates. The 7-item scale in Model 1 includes posting in social media, joining a listserv (or action alert list), donating money to a pro-immigrant organization, joining a pro-immigrant boycott, joining a march, volunteering, and talking about politics. To compare apples to apples with Study 1, I use a simplified 3-item participation scale, restricted to the intent to march, volunteer for an organization or talk about politics with friends or family in Model 2. Relative to Fear-alone condition as the baseline, respondents are not effectively mobilized by the Coupled Fear-and-Hope condition for either action. The coupled condition does not spur more informal political participation. We see these null effects for the 3-item participation scale (Model 1) as well as the 7-item participation scale (Model 2).

In Model 3 for the sent postcard measure (odds-ratios), a version of the Coupled Condition emerges as statistically significant—respondents who were assigned to write about hope first and fear second report a lower likelihood in sending an electronic postcard to their senators. Persuasive political communication strategies reiterate the need to end on a more empowering note than simply alerting an audience to a crisis (Kern 1989; Henik 2008). For example, Kern (1989) describes how news producers create emotional news sequences known as "get them sick, then get them well" ads. The first portion of the segment is used to establish a negative emotion associated with some threat to the viewer. In the second portion of the segment, the problem is resolved with a positive emotion associated with a story coming to the rescue. Overall, the ordering of the emotions matter, and it is important to account for this in future political communication strategies.

Table 3: Study 2, Emotion-Induction Treatment Effects on Informal and Formal Participation

	Participation Scale, 7-item	Participation Scale, 3-item	Sent Postcard, OR
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Fear condition	-	-	-
	-	-	-
Hope condition	0.000	0.006	0.649
	(0.069)	(0.071)	(0.252)
Fear and hope condition	0.086	0.081	0.660
	(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.245)
Hope and fear condition	-0.038	-0.034	0.385**
	(0.073)	(0.078)	(0.150)
Pride and hope condition	0.039	0.011	0.654
	(0.076)	(0.080)	(0.253)
Fear and pride condition	0.057	0.089	0.690
	(0.072)	(0.077)	(0.276)
Control condition	0.002	0.016	0.696
	(0.067)	(0.074)	(0.258)
Constant	0.431**	0.445**	4.032***

	(0.052)	(0.056)	(1.123)
Observations	1,266	1,266	1,266
R-squared	0.009	0.010	

Notes: The "participation" scale in Study 2 uses informal political participation measures—either 3 (volunteering, talking or marching) or all 7 available survey items (including intended forms of engaging with social media, listservs, donating, and boycotting). The "sent postcard" logit model results are depicted as odds-ratios. The standard errors in parentheses. All *p*-values (using a two-tailed test): $^{+}p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$.

Partisanship and Political Context

To better understand why the Hope-and-Fear condition was more demobilizing for the formal political participation measure (sending a postcard), I unpack what people wrote about by partisanship. Participants do not share the same views when writing about their *hopes* for immigration. A Democratic participant wrote, "I am hopeful about the rule of law, which is the reason my family moved here in the first place. The law is the law, and it appears that the laws will be upheld, at least for the most part. I am also hopeful that the 'dreamers' who have not committed crimes will be able to get visas and have a path to at least permanent residency and hopefully citizenship." Another Democratic participant wrote, "None of the policies being debated actually make me feel hopeful. The only thing that makes me feel hopeful is the pushback from state and local governments against racist immigration policies being proposed by the federal government." By contrast, a Republican participant wrote: "I feel hopeful that we are moving in the direction of having legal immigration. I think that illegals are taking away from the people that are already here and suffering." Another Republican participant wrote: "The President is taking steps to stop illegal immigration to the U.S." The more Democratic participants are focused on immigrant families lives and the hope for either more pathways for citizenship or more resistance to anti-immigrant legislation. The Republican participants are focused on a perceived zero-sum competition between Americans and undocumented immigrants. Additionally, Republican

participants mention a sense of accomplishment with President Trump's efforts to curtail undocumented immigration.

Participants also wrote about different fears depending on their partisan views. One Democratic-leaning participant wrote about feeling *fearful* about the following concerns: "The constant negative rhetoric by the current President towards immigrants." A Republican-learning participants wrote about different issues: "Under the current administration, I really have no fears other than the Democrats continually blocking implementation of programs such as building of the wall, curtailing of NAFTA." Each express very partisan and very diverging fears when it comes to immigration concerns.

When assigned to write in the *Fear-and-Pride* condition, Democratic respondents wrote about the following for their *fears*: "I am afraid dreamers and other immigrants will be forced out by Republicans." This same respondent then continued to write about their *pride*: "I am proud that so many, even some Republicans are speaking out." Another Democratic respondent wrote about the following fears: "I am afraid of friends and family being deported, and I fear for their friends and family as well." This same participant went on to write about pride: "I'm proud that we have taken in the persons that we have." By contrast, a Republican participant wrote, "I feel proud that we finally have a president who is taking immigration seriously and who defends our borders from illegal immigration." Participants often reference very partisan rhetoric surrounding immigration or they reference how they feel about the Republican administration in power in 2017.

The quotes expressed in the open-ended emotion induction design illustrate the polarizing nature of immigration and the need to parse the data by partisan subsets. As seen in Table 4, the positive effect of the Coupled Fear-and-Hope Condition directly supports Hypothesis 1, at least among

Democrats within the sample. The Coupled Fear-and-Hope Condition had positive effects on one's willingness to engage in informal political participation.

Table 4: Study 2, Emotion-Induction Treatment Effects on Informal and Formal Political Participation, by Partisan Group

	Democrats			Republicans			Independents		
	Participation Scale, 7-item	Participation Scale, 3-item	Sent Postcard, OR	Participation Scale, 7-item	Participation Scale, 3-item	Sent Postcard, OR	Participation Scale, 7-item	Participation Scale, 3-item	Sent Postcard, OR
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Fear condition	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hope condition	-0.007	0.027	0.890	0.032	0.034	3.528	-0.054	-0.097	0.233**
	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.567)	(0.066)	(0.075)	(2.748)	(0.114)	(0.129)	(0.144)
Fear and hope condition	0.242*	0.263**	0.524	0.091	0.062	0.782	-0.111	-0.133	0.676
	(0.100)	(0.096)	(0.350)	(0.083)	(0.089)	(0.613)	(0.117)	(0.129)	(0.400)
Hope and fear condition	0.020	0.032	0.459	-0.059	-0.067	0.234*	-0.131	-0.134	0.390
	(0.108)	(0.109)	(0.286)	(0.075)	(0.097)	(0.205)	(0.118)	(0.135)	(0.242)
Pride and hope condition	0.120	0.058	0.885	0.055	0.069	0.760	-0.021	-0.043	0.560
	(0.106)	(0.114)	(0.595)	(0.114)	(0.138)	(0.633)	(0.129)	(0.141)	(0.333)
Fear and pride condition	-0.021	0.022	1.057	0.256*	0.273*	3.945*	0.014	0.048	0.416
	(0.107)	(0.115)	(0.663)	(0.114)	(0.121)	(3.056)	(0.118)	(0.132)	(0.251)
Control condition	0.073	0.082	0.762	0.089	0.160+	0.958	-0.119	-0.121	0.660
	(0.106)	(0.109)	(0.505)	(0.065)	(0.096)	(0.709)	(0.106)	(0.130)	(0.385)
Immigrant tone	-0.057	-0.070	1.346	0.104	0.040	0.620	0.040	0.074	0.771
	(0.078)	(0.076)	(0.796)	(0.106)	(0.109)	(0.438)	(0.103)	(0.105)	(0.343)

Constant	0.488**	0.506**	5.862***	0.125+	0.182*	3.231*	0.512**	0.506**	3.451**
	(0.095)	(0.095)	(3.195)	(0.068)	(0.078)	(2.126)	(0.104)	(0.119)	(1.822)
Observations	629	629	629	247	247	247	390	390	390
R-squared	0.053	0.048		0.094	0.086		0.021	0.030	

Notes: Partisan subsets include strong, moderate and leaning partisans. Results still hold when collapsing leaners with independents. The "participation" scale in Study 2 uses informal forms of political participation—either 3 (volunteering, talking or marching) or all 7 available survey items (including intended forms of engaging with social media, listservs, donating, and boycotting). The "sent postcard" logit model results are depicted as odds-ratios. Results include an immigration opinion control. The standard errors in parentheses. All *p*-values (using a two-tailed test): $^{+}p < .10$; $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$.

Informal Political Participation

The predictive margins for Democrats' informal political participation are plotted in Figure 5 below. Relative to the threat-alone condition (and hope-alone), and among Democrats, the Fear-and-Hope condition has a large positive effect—nearly a 25 percentage point boost—on the respondent's likelihood to participate in various forms of political participation (supporting H1a). The combination of Fear-and-Hope is distinct from that of Fear-and-Pride, showing that hope is unique and more mobilizing when facing adversity (Nabi and Gall Myrick 2018; Phoenix 2020). Phoenix (2020) explains hope allows people to envision a future that is distinct from present circumstances. Because Democrats did not hold power in the presidency or Congress at that time in 2017, they draw upon a sense of hope for a better future amidst the uncertainty. In Study 2, it is the combination of Fear-and-Hope that was most mobilizing for Democrats in 2017 (Figure 5). This was most prominent for informal forms of political participation, and not formal participation (sending a postcard), for Democrats.

Figure 5: Study 2, Predictive Margins of Informal Political Participation (Democrats)



Notes: Predictive margins are derived from the estimated models effects in Study 2 (Table 4, Model 1). Results include an immigration opinion control. The margins include 95% confidence intervals.

For Republicans (Table 4, Models 4 and 5) and their informal forms of political participation, the specific Fear-and-Hope condition does not mobilize Republicans to be more politically active—the results are not distinguishable from zero (no support for H1a). By contrast, pride is based on goals that are being met and existing victories people can count on (Groenendyk and Banks 2014; Valentino et al. 2011; Marcus et al. 2000). Thus, for Republican Latinos, the political context of the Trump Administration in 2017 lent itself to draw upon pride in the Coupled Fear-and-Pride Condition (see Figure 6). Republican participants only experience a catalyzing effect when assigned to the Fear-and-Pride condition (as see in predictive margins in Figure 6). Existing victories like that of having their party

in power allows them to see their team in power; thus, Republican Latinos have no need to draw on hope or an imagined possibility of change. Several Republican respondents wrote about feeling proud of President Trump's handling of the U.S.-Mexican border. As such, the Fear-and-Pride Condition is still theoretically in line with the expectations of the catalyzing effects of the broader Coupled Threat-and-Opportunity approach.

Figure 6: Study 2, Predictive Margins of Informal Political Participation (Republicans)



Notes: Predictive margins derived from the estimated model effects in Study 2 (Table 4, Model 4). Results include an immigration opinion control. The margins include 95% confidence intervals.

Formal Political Participation

Moving onto the odds-ratios for the postcard outcome measure (Models 3, 6, and 9) in Table 4, we see minimal support for Hypothesis 1b, but only among Republicans. Among Republicans, those writing about both Fear-and-Pride, express a higher likelihood in sending a postcard, relative to those in the Fear-alone Condition. This effect is marginally statistically significant. Given they could write about their own sense of fear and pride about immigration policies, we see there is a mobilizing effect behind a Coupled Fear-and-Pride approach.

Furthermore, Republicans may have felt more efficacious (and proud) to send a postcard message to U.S. Senators especially since they held a Republican majority in the Senate. With their party in power, Republican Latinos could rely on this as a source of pride more easily. Democrats may not have felt the urgency to send a message to their U.S. Senators due to the lack of representativeness with a Republican majority-held Congress under the Trump administration in 2017.

Among Independents (Model 9), the Hope-only condition appears to have a negative effect on one's likelihood to send a postcard to their Senators. Hypothesis 2 expected the single cue conditions to be ineffective. This condition appears to be triggering a demobilizing effect as it relates to the predicted likelihood to send a postcard. The lack of like-minded representation in Congress (and in the White House) may be driving this free-riding and demobilizing effect here for Independents. As seen with Groenendyk and Banks (2014), compared to partisans, non-partisans are not privy to the emotional rescue provided when participants identify with a team's aspirations or collective victories.

Reversing the order of a positive and negative emotion does not carry the same weight. When writing about hope first and fear second, there is a demobilizing effect among Republicans and their

reported likelihood to send a postcard. Thus, the ordering of hope and fear does matter–positive cues appear to provide a sense of optimism after writing about a threatening or alarming message (Vasi and Macy 2003; Nabi and Gall Myrick 2018). Ending on thoughts that make them fearful (in the Hope-and-Fear Condition) does not leave participants feeling empowered enough to participate in politics. The null results among Independents (Model 7 and 8) aligns with what the literature expects, especially as those who are more non-partisan feel more ambiguous about their fears and hopes on a very polarizing topic (Albertson and Gadarian 2015).

Conclusion

By focusing so predominantly on the effectiveness of threat appeals, opportunity strategies have often gone understudied. By contrast, this paper lays the groundwork to test the effect of more nuanced political appeals and the role of broader appraisal processes motivating Latino political behavior.

In Study 1, we see the mobilizing effects of the Coupled Condition to send a postcard (Figure 1). Similar to Halperin et al. (2011), I find group identity and social context shape an individual's emotional and behavioral responses. When aligned with the majority party in power, people are more willing to engage with formal forms of political participation (send a postcard to U.S Senator)(Phoenix 2019, 2020; McCann and Jones-Correa 2020). When one's party is not in power, participants are more willing to engage in informal forms of political participation (march, rally, volunteer). As such, the Coupled Condition's postcard results in Study 1 are driven by Democrats, while Republicans are more willing to take part in more informal forms of political participation. In Study 2, partisans who wrote about their own sense of fear-and-hope (Democrats) or fear-and-pride (Republicans), were mobilized to express greater levels of political participation. Again, Study 2 shows group identity and social context are important for one's emotional and

behavioral responses. The fear-and-hope condition spurs Democrats to partake in more informal forms of political participation. The coupled fear-and-pride condition mobilizes Republicans to engage in both forms of political participation.

As seen across the two studies, the Coupled Condition's effect is distinct from that of the single cue (or single emotion conditions). The two signals are not simply additive, canceling out or replicating the effects of single cue conditions. The Coupled Condition paints higher stakes than simply learning things are going well in the Opportunity condition, and it also prevents triggering too much despair as seen in the Threat Condition (Vasi and Macy 2003; Nabi and Gall Myrick 2018). Thus, the distinct persuasive communication strategy behind the Coupled Condition strikes the delicate balance between alerting an individual to take action against a threat and not allowing them to be "scared stiff" (Vasi and Macy 2003; Henik 2008; Klandermans 1997; Hutchings 2001; Valentino et al. 2011). The threat captures the audience's attention (making them more vigilant)(Marcus et al. 2000), and the policy opportunity points to an affirmative and attainable goal that would improve their group's status quo.

The focus on the simultaneity of signals of threat and opportunity adds a new dimension to the motivating effects of appraisal on political behavior. If mobilizers and their calls to action (or crisis communication) are only based on making threat appeals salient, they risk inducing a sense of weariness and resignation through the use of such urgent appeals (Vasi and Macy 2003; Miller and Krosnick 2004; Phoenix 2019, 2020; Van Zomeren et al. 2004). The coupled threat-and-opportunity approach provides temporary reprieve from focusing on grievances alone among disillusioned electorates. I build on scholarship connecting emotions to behavior and persuasive communication strategies to help us better understand the motivating effects of threats and opportunities in contentious political environments, particularly among Latino communities.

Furthermore, previous emotion appraisal studies have largely focused on the role of single emotions on information-seeking and intended forms of political behavior. Just as threats do not operate in a vacuum, neither do emotions. This study narrows in on ways to improve effective messaging strategies as they relate to threat, opportunity, immigration issue activism and political participation among Latinos.

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Supplementary Information

Additional Supporting Information (SI) file may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher's website:

A. Study 1: External Vignettes Design and Robustness Checks
B. Two Issues Per Treatment
C. Study 2: Emotion-Induction Sample, Treatment Design and Robustness Checks
D. Role of Racialized Linked Fate
E. Effects of Cognitive and Affective Appraisals