Appendix of 'Can Argentines be programmatic voters? Assessing the influence of policy preferences in contemporary Argentina using the propensities to vote'

Table OA.1 Juxtaposition of population and survey sample distributions

	Survey sample (Netquest)	**Argentinian population** (Official data)
Age groups (%)		
18-24	11.47	11.47
25-34	22.13	22.33
35-44	21.64	20.21
45-54	17.55	16.03
55-64	15.05	13
65 +	12,16	16.96
Gender (%)		
Male	48.95	49,08
Female	51.05	50,92
Education (%)		
Primary incomplete	8.18	12
Primary complete	14.86	28
High-school (basic and oriented cycle)	56.73	40
College studies (tertiary, university and postgraduate)	20.24	20
Territorial distribution (%)		
Center	35.49	35
AMBA	28.61	30
NOA	13.66	13
NEA	10.17	10
Cuyo	6.98	7
Patagonia	5.08	5

Source: Plaza Colodro, C., Wiesehomeier, N., Boscán, G., Díez, F. G., Sanz, M. D. G., Gómez-Reino, M., … Felipe, P. O. (2021). Populist attitudes and political preferences: Spain (2015), France (2017). Harvard Dataverse. https://doi.org/doi/10.7910/DVN/PNPYA7

Note: The official data on the distribution of the Argentinian population is extracted from the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (INDEC), Report "Estimations and projections of population 2010-2040, based on the results of the 2010 National Population, Households and Housing Census". https://www.indec.gob.ar

Table OA2. Matching, wording and scales of response of policy dimensions at voter (Nequest) and party (PREPPS) level.

Policy dimensions	PREPPS	NETQUEST ARGENTINA
REDISTRIBUTION	Position on redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor. Strongly favors redistribution (1) Strongly opposes redistribution (20)	E.15 The government should apply policies to reduce the income gap by redistributing wealth from the rich to the poor Strongly agree (1) Strongly disagree (5)
DEREGULATION	Favors high levels of state regulation and control of the market. (1) Favors deregulation of markets at every opportunity. (20)	G.1 The state must protect domestic production and industry through import barriers and other incentives G.2 The state must impose taxes on exports to the country's agricultural sector Strongly agree (1) Strongly disagree (5)
TRANSFERS	Supports income transfer policies that guarantee generous benefits to all [NATIONALITY] (1) Supports income transfer policies focused on those people most in need or favors the discretional distribution of transfers to those people. (20)	G.3 The state must implement social policies to assist groups of socio-labor vulnerability Strongly agree (1) Strongly disagree (5)
SOCIAL POLICY *In this question E.3, responses at the voter level were inverted to keep the same preference orientation.	Favors liberal policies on matters such as abortion, homosexuality, divorce and euthanasia. (1) Opposes liberal policies on matters such as abortion, homosexuality, divorce and euthanasia. (20)	E.3 I would be ashamed if a close relative were gay or lesbian* E.4 Gays and lesbians should be free to live as they wish E.24 Women should have the right to decide on the legal interruption of pregnancy E25 Marijuana use and self-cultivation should be decriminalized Strongly agree (1) Strongly disagree (5)

IMMIGRATION *In this dimension, all responses at the voter level were inverted to keep the same preference orientation.	Strongly opposes tough policy against immigration (1) Strongly favors tough policy against immigration (20)	E.5 Argentina's culture is threatened by immigration. E.6 Immigration generates public safety problems in Argentina. E.7 Immigrants make excessive use of public services in Argentina. E.8 Immigrants take jobs that would otherwise go to Argentinean citizens. Strongly disagree (1) Strongly agree (5)
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES *In this dimension, all responses at the voter level were inverted to keep the same preference orientation.	Promotes protection of civil liberties, even when this hampers efforts to fight crime/delinquency, violence and organized crime. (1) Supports tough measures to fight crime/delinquency, violence and organized crime, even when this means curtailing civil liberties. (20)	E.12 People who break the law should be condemned much more harshly than they are now. E.26 In some circumstances (e.g. excessive crime or insecurity) the establishment of an authoritarian regime in the country would be justified. Strongly disagree (1) Strongly agree (5)
PEOPLE-CENTRISM	Refers to the common people as an authentic and homogeneous unit, with which s/he identifies. (1) Refers more generally to citizens with their different interests and values. (20)	F1. The politicians in congress need to follow the will of the people. F2. The people, not the politicians, should make our most important decisions. F3. I would rather be represented by an ordinary citizen than an experienced politician. Strongly agree (1) Strongly disagree (5)

Notes: own elaboration
*Scales of responses for each dimension were standardized to calculate distances between voters and parties' positions.

Table OA.3. OLS regressions explaining party preferences for all parties (1) and individual parties (2-7), with dummies coefficients.

	(1) All parties	(2) PJ	(3) UCR	(4) PRO	(5) CC	(6) FR	(7) FIT
Social policy	0.002	0.050	0.017	-0.014	-0.111**	0.012	-0.073
	(0.0449)	(0.187)	(0.172)	(0.164)	(0.119)	(0.129)	(0.101)
Immigration	-0.056**	-0.033	-0.186***	0.025	-0.044	0.042	-0.048
	(0.0518)	(0.207)	(0.206)	(0.134)	(0.164)	(0.126)	(0.110)
Redistribution	-0.049**	-0.124**	0.068	-0.198***	-0.050	0.010	-0.057
	(0.0573)	(0.194)	(0.208)	(0.166)	(0.192)	(0.160)	(0.107)
Individual liberties	-0.042*	0.092*	-0.048	-0.129**	-0.082	-0.059	-0.113*
	(0.0492)	(0.197)	(0.185)	(0.128)	(0.150)	(0.117)	(0.113)
Deregulation	-0.095***	-0.103**	-0.048	-0.317***	-0.149***	-0.082	-0.099*
	(0.0535)	(0.160)	(0.209)	(0.169)	(0.158)	(0.150)	(0.100)
Transfers	0.106***	0.144***	0.008	-0.043	0.021	-0.026	0.099*
	(0.0457)	(0.201)	(0.174)	(0.135)	(0.151)	(0.132)	(0.107)
People-centrism	0.095***	0.185***	-0.053	0.020	-0.031	0.133**	0.021
	(0.0461)	(0.131)	(0.121)	(0.151)	(0.161)	(0.105)	(0.130)
Social class	0.074***	0.009	0.094*	0.061	0.138***	0.121**	0.107*
	(0.168)	(10.59)	(0.423)	(0.296)	(0.237)	(2.108)	(1.366)
Economic evaluation	0.164***	0.291***	0.060	-0.016	0.056	0.220***	0.095*
	(0.0862)	(0.123)	(0.535)	(0.354)	(0.603)	(0.170)	(0.276)
Incomes	0.027*	0.039	0.003	0.019	-0.021	-0.012	0.076*
	(0.365)	(0.463)	(1.880)	(1.145)	(1.754)	(4.122)	(0.728)

Education	0.054***	0.033	0.030	0.033	0.040	0.078	-0.103*
	(0.225)	(6.896)	(0.897)	(0.372)	(0.416)	(0.940)	(26.86)
Female	0.031*	0.011	0.059	0.016	0.041	-0.037	0.031
	(0.268)	(1.435)	(0.585)	(0.780)	(0.470)	(8.036)	(0.659)
Age	0.125***	0.046	0.162***	0.024	0.152***	0.021	0.168***
	(0.106)	(1.002)	(0.213)	(0.487)	(0.210)	(0.762)	(0.220)
CABA	0.128	-0.118*	0.187***	0.155	0.343***	0.089	0.140
	(0.369)	(0.324)	(0.305)	(0.932)	(0.330)	(0.448)	(0.557)
Buenos Aires	0.141*	-0.051	0.239***	0.131	0.331***	0.131	0.148
	(0.371)	(0.319)	(0.286)	(0.916)	(0.351)	(0.438)	(0.535)
Córdoba	0.072*	-0.032	0.150***	0.021	0.127**	0.063	0.113
	(0.401)	(0.489)	(0.614)	(0.995)	(0.556)	(0.525)	(0.701)
Santa Fe	0.056	-0.036	0.126***	0.009	0.165***	0.023	0.054
	(0.399)	(0.612)	(0.547)	(1.007)	(0.557)	(0.544)	(0.598)
Mendoza	0.098**	-0.046	0.259***	0.082	0.152***	0.021	0.072
	(0.400)	(0.475)	(0.612)	(1.040)	(0.434)	(0.533)	(0.593)
Tucumán	0.048	-0.058	0.075*	0.029	0.082*	0.067	0.097
	(0.390)	(0.485)	(0.495)	(1.041)	(0.420)	(0.537)	(0.654)
Entre Ríos	0.066**	-0.016	0.130***	0.025	0.057	0.068	0.079*
	(0.482)	(0.700)	(0.958)	(1.404)	(0.887)	(0.861)	(0.779)
Salta	0.070*	-0.017	0.106**	0.071	0.088**	0.089	0.097
	(0.393)	(0.571)	(0.471)	(1.022)	(0.419)	(0.534)	(0.678)

Misiones	0.047	-0.002	0.071	0.027	0.072*	0.101	0.082
	(0.408)	(0.690)	(0.680)	(1.124)	(0.435)	(0.633)	(0.691)
Chaco	0.057*	-0.021	0.152***	0.013	0.122***	0.051	0.049
	(0.411)	(0.597)	(0.670)	(1.013)	(0.575)	(0.564)	(0.770)
Corrientes	0.050*	-0.039	0.129***	0.026	0.065*	0.036	0.044
	(0.416)	(0.713)	(0.648)	(1.152)	(0.454)	(0.793)	(0.676)
Santiago del Estero	0.038	-0.042	0.062	0.032	0.119**	0.065	0.032
	(0.449)	(0.872)	(0.718)	(1.279)	(0.849)	(0.845)	(0.718)
Jujuy	0.044	-0.012	0.097	0.056	0.140*	0.009	0.040
	(0.496)	(1.191)	(1.167)	(1.288)	(1.183)	(0.665)	(0.850)
San Juan	-0.010	-0.005	-0.027***	-0.003	0.008	-0.027	-0.016
	(0.501)	(2.056)	(0.290)	(1.142)	(0.342)	(0.991)	(0.700)
Río Negro	0.063**	-0.008	0.093*	0.023	0.124**	0.048	0.108*
	(0.451)	(0.767)	(0.936)	(1.079)	(0.806)	(0.707)	(0.784)
Formosa	0.018	0.063	0.033	0.048	0.048	-0.022	-0.027
	(0.535)	(1.329)	(1.083)	(1.523)	(0.883)	(0.506)	(0.757)
Neuquén	0.011	-0.079*	0.074	0.027	0.019	-0.030	0.064
	(0.479)	(0.959)	(1.258)	(1.248)	(0.542)	(0.486)	(1.072)
Chubut	0.022	-0.012	0.086**	-0.001	0.038	0.082	0.008
	(0.502)	(0.719)	(1.009)	(1.260)	(0.561)	(1.116)	(0.952)
San Luis	0.005	-0.026	0.032	-0.020	0.013	0.037	0.021
	(0.549)	(2.069)	(1.129)	(1.135)	(0.545)	(1.572)	(0.812)

Catamarca	0.007	0.000	0.000	-0.005	0.000	-0.003	0.079***
	(0.732)	(.)	(.)	(0.950)	(.)	(0.446)	(0.573)
La Rioja	-0.015	-0.038**	-0.040***	-0.055*	-0.016	-0.017	-0.006
	(0.536)	(0.571)	(0.453)	(1.161)	(0.387)	(0.533)	(0.656)
La Pampa	-0.014	0.002	-0.021	-0.022	0.007	-0.042*	-0.038
	(0.552)	(2.094)	(0.519)	(1.290)	(0.457)	(0.590)	(0.669)
Santa Cruz	0.000	-0.023	0.030	0.000	0.034	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(1.129)	(1.787)	(.)	(1.148)	(.)	(.)
Tierra del Fuego	-0.002	-0.059**	-0.008	-0.024	-0.014	-0.026	0.005
	(0.571)	(0.818)	(0.840)	(1.358)	(0.406)	(0.564)	(0.914)
N	5175	659	656	651	646	645	651
adj. R^2	0.115	0.212	0.109	0.198	0.131	0.072	0.150

Standardized beta coefficients; Robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table OA.4 OLS regressions explaining party preferences for both coalitions

	(1) Frente de Todos	(2) Juntos por el Cambio
Social policy	0.058*	-0.063**
	(0.119)	(0.0781)
Immigration	-0.018	-0.039
	(0.113)	(0.0932)
Redistribution	-0.079**	-0.055
	(0.130)	(0.102)
Individual liberties	0.028	-0.069**
	(0.112)	(0.0859)
Deregulation	-0.097***	-0.184***
	(0.110)	(0.0991)
Transfers	0.105***	0.077***
	(0.123)	(0.0711)
People-centrism	0.164***	0.019
	(0.0866)	(0.0771)
Social class	0.076**	0.104***
	(2.071)	(0.180)
Economic evaluation	0.280***	0.035
	(0.104)	(0.272)
Incomes	0.047	0.004
	(0.457)	(0.875)
Education	0.071*	0.041
	(0.918)	(0.267)
Female	-0.005	0.037
	(1.384)	(0.340)
Age	0.035	0.122***
	(0.608)	(0.146)
CABA	0.080	0.247***
	(0.598)	(0.232)
Buenos Aires	0.126	0.246***
	(0.594)	(0.228)
Córdoba	0.050	0.111***
	(0.639)	(0.368)
Santa Fe	0.035	0.109***
	(0.676)	(0.352)
Mendoza	0.031	0.182***
	(0.641)	(0.365)
Tucumán	0.042	0.077**
	(0.643)	(0.314)
Entre Ríos	0.043	0.085***
	(0.759)	(0.597)
Salta	0.068	0.095***
	(0.667)	(0.316)
Misiones	0.078	0.073**
	(0.710)	(0.401)
Chaco	0.041	0.104***

	(0.662)	(0.399)
Corrientes	0.027	0.078***
	(0.744)	(0.395)
Santiago del Estero	0.023	0.074**
	(0.796)	(0.501)
Jujuy	0.026	0.101***
	(0.845)	(0.673)
San Juan	0.002	-0.001
	(1.421)	(0.326)
Río Negro	0.038	0.082***
	(0.741)	(0.472)
Formosa	0.048	0.046*
	(1.164)	(0.634)
Neuquén	-0.032	0.043*
	(0.774)	(0.595)
Chubut	0.045	0.044*
	(0.927)	(0.593)
San Luis	0.013	0.010
	(1.399)	(0.536)
Catamarca	0.007	0.000
	(1.043)	(.)
La Rioja	-0.014	-0.032***
	(0.682)	(0.291)
La Pampa	0.010	-0.011
	(1.510)	(0.341)
Santa Cruz	0.000	0.026
	(.)	(0.893)
Tierra del Fuego	-0.030	-0.005
	(0.710)	(0.483)
N	1304	1953
adj. R^2	0.160	0.136

Standardized beta coefficients; Robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Stacked data matrix explanation

In this paper the most important function is to provide us with a dependent variable that is comparable across countries: the propensity to vote for a party. When the data matrix is stacked so that each voter appears as many times as there are parties for which preferences have been measured, the customary question ‘‘why did voters support Party A?’’ can be reformulated as ‘‘what determines party preferences?’’ We already know that voters virtually always vote for the party they most prefer. Thus, an answer to the question ‘‘what determines party preferences?’’ is also an answer to the question ‘‘what determines which party is voted for?’’ This way of analyzing the determinants of party choice has been validated elsewhere (Tillie, 1995; van der Eijk et al., 2006).

The main advantage in the context of the present study is that, even though the question about vote propensities is framed with reference to each particular party, the resulting party preference

variable that appears in the stacked matrix no longer refers to a specific party, but to parties in general. So the stacked data matrices from each country can be readily pooled to obtain a cross-national data set for comparative analyses of party preferences. In such a dataset the unit of analysis is the respondent * party combination, which makes it straightforward to include party characteristics.

Figure 1. Transformation of original datamatrix into a stacked datamatrix

Original datamatrix:

Case #

i	Respondents' characteristics	Variables that relate to party A	Variables that relate to party B	Variables that relate to party C	Variables that relate to party D

i	Respondents' characteristics	Variables that relate to party A
i	Respondents' characteristics	Variables that relate to party B
i	Respondents' characteristics	Variables that relate to party C
i	Respondents' characteristics	Variables that relate to party D

Source: van der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie (2000)

This matrix is derived from a "normal" survey data matrix, in which the unit of analysis is transformed from the respondent to the respondent ∗ party combination, as illustrated in Figure1 and 2, where transformations are indicated by arrows. In this way, each respondent appears as many times as there are parties for which support propensities were measured, and the level of analysis is effectively changed from the individual level to the individual ∗ party level.

Figure 2. Structure of stacked data matrix

Resp-id	Age	Left-right (L/R) position respondent	Perceived L/R-position pty 1	Perceived L/R-position pty 2	Perceived L/R-position pty 3	L/R dist. To party 1	L/R dist. To party 2	L/R dist. To party 3	Vote choice	Support for party 1	Support for party 2	Support for party 3
1	59	4	4	6	7	0	2	3	1	9	5	4
2	40	6	3	7	8	3	1	2	2	5	9	7
3	22	9	3	6	8	6	3	1	3	2	4	7

Stacked Data Matrix

Resp-id	Id-of-party	Age	Left-right (L/R) distance	Vote-choice	Party support
1	1	59	0	1	9
1	2	59	2	1	5
1	3	59	3	1	4
2	1	40	3	2	5
2	2	40	1	2	9
2	3	40	2	2	7
3	1	22	6	3	2
3	2	22	3	3	4
3	3	22	1	3	7

Source: van der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie (2000)

By making the transformation of the original matrix and converting it into a stacked matrix, the scale character of the dependent variable (PTV) is maintained. This allows multivariate analysis to be carried out, and specifically, through OLS linear regression. This strategy, although relatively innovative, has been followed previously by some studies (Ortiz, Ruiz, and González 2021; Van Der Brug and Fennema 2003, 2009; Van Der Brug, Van Der Eijk, and Franklin 2007).

To summarize the above, in this new stacked matrix, the cases or units of analysis are formed by the combination between the respondent and PTV of each party (i.e., respondent*party combination). This makes the new matrix have a much larger N than the original one. The new stacked matrix allows us to study electoral orientations in Argentina jointly for all parties. I

To sum up, the methodological design and analytical strategy can be summarized schematically as follows:



Explanation about the linear transformation of control variables

In such cases, appropriate independent variables for this stacked design can still be constructed by way of an inductive procedure. This procedure predicts the support score for each respondent on the basis of a simple regression analysis for each of the parties in turn in the (unstacked) data matrix, using as the predictor the independent variable of interest. These predicted scores are, of course, measured on the scale of the dependent variable. They can be interpreted as containing two components: a component that consists of the explanatory power of the independent variable in question and a component that reflects the popularity of the party in question that is generated on other grounds than by the independent variable. By eliminating the second component (which is done by centering the predicted scores), the remainders reflect only variations caused by differences in the independent variable. These predicted and centered values (y-hats) are saved and stacked to yield a generic independent variable.

So for each party in turn, in each country in turn, a regression analysis was conducted with social class as the independent variable and support for that party as the dependent variable. The predicted values of each of these regressions (y-hats) were centered, saved, and inserted into the stacked data matrix as new predictors of party support – but now as a single variable pertaining to every respondent ∗ party combination in the stacked dataset, no matter which particular individual or party was concerned.