Supporting Information

Trust in the Judiciary and Partisan Reactions to Judicial Checks: Evidence from Argentina

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A The 2013 Latinobarómetro Survey

A1 Technical Information and Regional Administration of the Survey

The 2013 Latinobarómetro survey in Argentina, conducted by the firm MBC MORI, is a nationally representative survey of 1,200 Argentinean respondents across 14 provinces and 24 cities. The survey employed a modified probability sampling method in three phases, by quotas in the final phase (Latinobarómetro 2013, 86). Information about the quotas employed was not made available by Latinobarómetro. **Table A1.1** below shows the number of respondents in each condition by province and city.

Table A1.1: Total Respondents by Condition and Province-City

Province-City	Control	Lower C.	Supreme C.
Buenos Aires	79	164	194
Buenos Aires-Gran Buenos Aires	70	113	148
Buenos Aires-Bahía Blanca	0	27	13
Buenos Aires-Chapadmalal	7	5	0
Buenos Aires-Mar del Plata	2	19	1
Buenos Aires-Lobos	0	0	32
Capital Federal-Ciudad de Buenos Aires	24	22	60
Chaco-Gran Resistencia	6	13	33
Córdoba	52	3	50
Córdoba-Gran Córdoba	7	3	42
Córdoba-Río Tercero	45	0	8
Corrientes-Goya	0	21	17
Entre Ríos-Gualeguay	2	11	30
Jujuy-San Pedro	0	0	32
La Pampa-General Pico	0	0	30
Mendoza	6	68	4
Mendoza-Gran Mendoza	6	22	4
Mendoza-San Martín-La Colonia	0	46	0
Neuquén	6	9	17
Neuquén-Neuquén	6	9	17
Neuquén-Villa Manzano	12	0	0
Río Negro-Río Colorado	0	16	0
Salta-Gran Salta	0	54	13
Santa Fe	46	56	12
Santa Fe-Gran Rosario	4	28	12
Santa Fe-Arroyo Seco	23	0	0
Santa Fe-Rafaela	19	28	0
Tucumán	8	13	17
Tucumán-Gran S. M. de Tucumán	8	13	7
Tucumán-Santa Rosa de Leales	0	0	10

A2 Variable Information

Table A2.1: Latinobarómetro Variables

Variable	Survey Item	Measurement
Trust in the Judiciary (outcome)	"Please look at this card and tell me how much trust you have in each of the following groups/institutions: Judiciary. Would you say you have a lot (1), some (2), a little (3), or no (4) trust?"	Binary: 1 = "A lot"/"Some"; 0 = "A little"/"None". Ordinal: "None"; "A little"; "Some"; "A lot". Scaled: Reversed and scaled 0–1.
Government Supporter	"Belong to political party." Constructed by Latinobarómetro based on the item "If elections were held this Sunday, which party would you vote for?" (see list of parties in **Table A3.1**).	Binary. 1 = Government party; 0 = Opposition party. See **SI H** for analyses including "non-partisans."
Education	"Respondent Education." 1 = Illiterate; 2 = Incomplete primary; 3 = Complete primary; 4 = Incomplete Secondary, technical; 5 = Complete Secondary, technical 6 = Incomplete high; 7 = Complete high.	Scaled (0–1).
Female	"Gender of the interviewee."	1 = Female; 0 = Male.
Age	"What is your age?"	Min = 18, Max = 90.
Socio-Economic Status (SES)	"Assessment of the interviewee's socio-economic level. Take as reference: Quality of the furniture and the interviewee's general appearance. Very good (1); Good (2); Average (3); Bad (4); Very bad (5)."	Categorical: 1 = Bad/Very bad; 2 = Bad; 3 = Not bad; 4 = Good; 5 = Very good.
Subjective Income	"Does the salary you receive and your total family income allow you to cover your needs in a satisfactory manner? Which of the following statements describes your situation? It's sufficient and we can save (1); It's just sufficient and we don't have major problems (2); It's not sufficient and we have problems (3); It's not sufficient and we have major problems (4).	Categorical.
Class	"People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to a social class. Which social class would you describe yourself as belonging to...? Upper (1); Upper-middle (2); Middle (3); Lower-middle (4); Lower (5).	Categorical. Recoded: 1 = Low; 2 = Lower-middle; 3 = Middle; 4 = Middle/Upper (Upper-middle, Upper)
Religion	"What is your religion?	Categorical. Recoded: 1 = Catholic; 2 = Evangelic (Evangelic without specifications, Baptist, Pentecostal); 3 = Other (Adventist, Jehovah Witness, Mormon, Jewish, Protestant, Believer, not belonging to any church, Other); 4 = Agnostic, Atheist, None, No answer.
Political Knowledge	"Out of the institutions listed on this card, please tell me which you know: Mercosur (Southern Common Market); BID (Inter-American Development Bank); CAF (Development Bank of Latin America); OEA (Organization of American States); PNUD (United Nations Development Program); UNASUR (Union of South American Nations).	For each institution, 1 = Know; 0 = Do Not Know. Then computed the sum of the answers to each institution (min = 0; max = 6) and scaled (0–1).
Political Interest	"How interested would you say you are in politics? Very interested (1); (2) Fairly interested; A little interested (3); Not at all interested (4)."	Reversed.
TV Frequency	"How many hours a day do you generally spend watching television on weekdays?"	Min = 0, Max = 1200 [Recorded in minutes]
Newspaper Frequency	"How many days last week did you read news in a newspaper?"	Min = 0, Max = 7
Internet Use	"Have you ever used e-mail or connected to Internet? Yes, every day (1); Yes, occasionally (2); Yes, rarely (3); No, never (4).	Reversed and scaled (0–1).

A3 Latinobarómetro Respondents' Party Identification

Table A3.1: Latinobarómetro Respondents' Partisan Identification - Survey Question: *"If elections were held this Sunday, which party would you vote for?"*

Party ID	Frequency
Government	350
Frente para la Victoria (FPV)	280
Partido Justicialista (PJ)	68
Nuevo Encuentro (EDE)	2
Opposition	120
Union Cívica Radical (UCR)	41
Movimiento Socialista de los Trabajadores (MST)	17
Propuesta Republicana (PRO)	14
Frente Amplio Progresista (FAP)	6
Frente de Izquierda y los Trabajadores (FIT)	6
Coalicion Cívica (CC)	5
Partido Peronismo Federal	3
Partido Proyecto Sur	2
Other (national and provincial parties)	26
No Party (dropped from main analyses)	730
Does not vote/None	108
Spoil/Blank vote	53
Not registered/Underage	10
Does not know/No answer	559
Total	1,200

B Background Information

B1 Case Selection: Argentina's Institutional and Public Opinion Indicators in Comparative Perspective

Figure B1.1: V-Dem Indicators



Note: The figure plots different indicators from the Varieties of Democracies (V-Dem) project (Coppedge et al. 2024; Pemstein et al. 2024). The dashed line correspond to values of each indicator for Argentina. The other highlighted lines correspond to the mean values of each indicator for different regions worldwide. The light gray background lines correspond to all individual countries with data available for each indicator. The dark red vertical line marks the year 2013, when the *Rizzo* rulings were released.

Figure B1.2: Trust in the Judiciary (Latinobarómetro)





B2 The 2013 Judicial Reform

Article 114 of Argentina's Constitution establishes the Judicial Council, but also delegates to Congress the number of Council members as well as how these members are to be selected to serve in the Council: "The Judicial Council, regulated by a special law passed by an absolute majority of the totality of the members of each Chamber, shall be charged with selecting judges and with the administration of the Judiciary. The Council shall be reconstituted periodically so that an equilibrium is achieved among the representation of popularly elected political organs, judges of all instances, and federally licensed attorneys. It shall also include persons from the academic and scientific fields, of a number and manner of appointment the law shall indicate."

Table B2.1 summarizes the relevant changes to the Judicial Council introduced by the 2013 reform.

Table B2.1: Reform to Argentina's Judicial Council (2013)

Representative	Number of Seats		Appointed by	
	Pre-reform	Reform	Pre-reform	Reform
Judges	3	3	Federal Judges	**Popular Election**
Attorneys	2	**3**	Licensed Attorneys	**Popular Election**
Academics	1	**6**	Law Professors	**Popular Election**
Deputies	3	3	Chamber of Deputies	
Senators	3	3	Senate	
Executive	1	1	President	
Total	13	**19**		

Note: The table summarizes the structure of the Judicial Council before and after its reform. Cells in bold denote changes introduced by the judicial reform passed in May 2013.

B3 Media Coverage of the *Rizzo* Decisions

B3.1 Lower Court Ruling

Figure B3.1: Front Cover of the Three Main Newspapers Nationwide on 6/12/2013

(a) *Página12*: **"The Judicial Resistance."** Source: https://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/principal/diario/index-2013-06-12.html.

(b) *La Nación*: **"The Judicial Council reform is declared unconstitutional."** Source: https://edicionimpresa.lanacion.com.ar/la-nacion/20130612

(c) *Clarín*: **"Servini nullified the election of Council members: Says it is not constitutional."** Source: https://tapas.clarin.com/ (search for the date "12 Junio 2013").

B3.2 Supreme Court Ruling

Figure B3.2: Front Cover of the Three Main Newspapers Nationwide on 6/19/2013

(a) *Página12*: **"You Shall Not Vote."** Source: https://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/principal/diario/index-2013-06-19.html.

(b) *La Nación*: **"Setback for the Government: The Court ruled against the Council reform."** Source: https://edicionimpresa.lanacion.com.ar/la-nacion/20130619

(c) *Clarín*: **"The Court nullified the key law of the judicial reform."** Source: https://tapas.clarin.com/ (search for the date "19 Junio 2013").

B4 Search Interest in the Ruling Courts

Figure 1 in the main text plots Google Trends data and shows search activity on the Judicial Council in Argentina. The data were obtained using the `gtrendsR` package in R (Massicotte and Eddelbuettel 2022). To estimate search interest, Google Trends employs a random (unbiased) sample of the full data on Google searches, which consist of billions of searches per day. Essentially, Google Trends includes a largely unfiltered sample of actual search requests made to Google. The search data are normalized to the time and location of a query, so that such query returns the "search interest for that topic in a given region as a proportion of all searches on all topics on Google in that same place and time" (Rogers 2016). The data are scaled to 0–100, being 100 the maximum search interest for the time and location selected.[1]

Figure B4.1 plots Google Trends data and shows the search activity in Argentina on terms related to both the judicial reform at play and the courts involved. The term "Servini" (orange solid line) refers to the last name of the judge who signed the lower court ruling, and "Supreme Court" (purple two-dash line) refers to the tribunal that issued the June 18th decision. Search interest in the term "Judicial Council" is indicated by the black, dashed line. The figure suggests that people could identify the courts that issued each decision. In fact, search interest for the terms "Servini" and "Judicial Council" increased right after the June 11th ruling, while interest for "Supreme Court" (black line) actually decreased. Similarly, search activity on the topics "Supreme Court" and "Judicial Council" raised after the Supreme Court ruling (June 18th), while interest for "Servini" stayed low. Together with main text's Figure 1, **Figure B4.1** shows that the reform to the Judicial Council was salient during the 2013 Latinobarómetro survey in Argentina and specially so after the court decisions, and that it is very likely that respondents were aware of the judicial rulings as well as able to identify the ruling courts.

Figure B4.1: Google Trends Search Activity



[1] See also Google Trends FAQs at https://support.google.com/trends/answer/4365533?hl=en&dark=1.

C Full Regression Tables

C1 Main Results

Table C1.1: Main Results - Full Table

	Lower Court			Supreme Court		
	OLS (1)	EB+WLS (2)	GM+WLS (3)	OLS (4)	EB+WLS (5)	GM+WLS (6)
Court Ruling	0.054	0.038	−0.033	0.245*	0.265***	0.296***
	(0.126)	(0.082)	(0.071)	(0.108)	(0.073)	(0.068)
Government Supporter	0.463***	0.470***	0.405**	0.464***	0.553***	0.507***
	(0.076)	(0.069)	(0.144)	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.086)
C. Ruling × Gov. Supporter	−0.325**	−0.324***	−0.284*	−0.526***	−0.632***	−0.534***
	(0.110)	(0.085)	(0.125)	(0.128)	(0.107)	(0.079)
Age	−0.001	0.00003	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Female	0.042	0.058	−0.015	−0.040	−0.033	−0.016
	(0.070)	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.064)	(0.061)	(0.064)
Education	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.007	0.008	0.020
	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.039)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.025)
SES (ref.: Bad/Very bad)						
Not bad	0.167	0.112	−0.011	−0.186	−0.170	−0.208*
	(0.137)	(0.170)	(0.130)	(0.121)	(0.145)	(0.091)
Good	0.166	0.086	−0.024	−0.172+	−0.121	−0.098
	(0.164)	(0.161)	(0.146)	(0.091)	(0.133)	(0.085)
Very good	0.106	0.107	−0.089	−0.105	−0.076	−0.021
	(0.214)	(0.183)	(0.221)	(0.150)	(0.179)	(0.105)
Subj. Income (ref.: Insufficient and problems)						
Insufficient	−0.357***	−0.225+	−0.402*	0.125	0.116	0.342***
	(0.074)	(0.131)	(0.188)	(0.114)	(0.160)	(0.069)
Just sufficient	−0.211*	−0.108	−0.278*	0.227+	0.220	0.385***
	(0.092)	(0.140)	(0.132)	(0.121)	(0.143)	(0.065)
Sufficient and save	−0.169	−0.057	−0.205	0.154	0.208	0.326*
	(0.121)	(0.152)	(0.216)	(0.151)	(0.178)	(0.158)
Class (ref.: Lower)						
Middle-lower	−0.152	−0.066	−0.006	0.087	0.031	0.055
	(0.176)	(0.187)	(0.177)	(0.056)	(0.041)	(0.062)
Middle	−0.169	−0.105	−0.096	0.171	0.052	0.146
	(0.191)	(0.211)	(0.199)	(0.110)	(0.096)	(0.101)
Middle-upper	−0.068	−0.016	−0.060	0.352*	0.300	0.318*
	(0.267)	(0.275)	(0.279)	(0.176)	(0.208)	(0.162)
Religion (ref.: Agnostic/Atheist/None/NA)						
Catholic	0.026	0.010	−0.082	0.062	0.060	−0.015
	(0.090)	(0.088)	(0.142)	(0.056)	(0.097)	(0.077)
Evangelical	0.183	0.142	0.137	0.112	0.165	0.060
	(0.160)	(0.154)	(0.147)	(0.116)	(0.131)	(0.050)
Other	−0.325*	−0.342+	−0.118	−0.063	0.011	0.168
	(0.165)	(0.202)	(0.299)	(0.163)	(0.198)	(0.175)
Constant	0.156	0.038	0.392	−0.373*	−0.292	−0.647***
	(0.208)	(0.283)	(0.351)	(0.184)	(0.284)	(0.172)
Mean(Trust)	0.416	0.416	0.449	0.418	0.418	0.408
sd(Trust)	0.494	0.494	0.498	0.494	0.494	0.492
Province FE?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	286	286	372	275	275	348
Adjusted R^2	0.126	0.204	0.164	0.098	0.221	0.237

Note: Outcome: Trust in the Judiciary (0 = "A little"/"None"; 1 = "A lot"/"Some"). Robust standard errors clustered by city and date of survey interview. Models 2 and 4 employ entropy balance weights (Hainmueller 2012). Models 3 and 6 employ multivariate matching (Sekhon 2011) with optimal balance weights computed using the genetic matching algorithm by by Diamond and Sekhon (2013). $^{+}p < 0.1$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

C2 Extended Set of Covariates

Table C2.1: Extended Set of Covariates

	Lower Court			Supreme Court		
	OLS (1)	EB+WLS (2)	GM+WLS (3)	OLS (4)	EB+WLS (5)	GM+WLS (6)
Court Ruling	0.059	−0.106	0.123	0.278*	0.221*	0.279***
	(0.122)	(0.147)	(0.109)	(0.123)	(0.092)	(0.082)
Government Supporter	0.437***	0.263*	0.528***	0.459***	0.483***	0.554***
	(0.077)	(0.107)	(0.142)	(0.057)	(0.080)	(0.116)
C. Ruling × Gov. Supporter	−0.314**	−0.134	−0.400**	−0.538***	−0.570***	−0.555***
	(0.107)	(0.139)	(0.140)	(0.124)	(0.145)	(0.099)
Age	−0.001	0.0001	0.0002	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Female	0.023	0.052	−0.022	−0.068	−0.034	−0.117+
	(0.075)	(0.065)	(0.095)	(0.066)	(0.077)	(0.062)
Education	0.005	−0.015	0.028	−0.009	−0.006	0.072*
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
SES (ref.: Bad/Very bad)						
Not bad	0.163	0.173	0.336	−0.188+	−0.208+	−0.166+
	(0.134)	(0.136)	(0.231)	(0.106)	(0.114)	(0.092)
Good	0.172	0.130	0.254	−0.178*	−0.153+	−0.132*
	(0.172)	(0.145)	(0.240)	(0.084)	(0.082)	(0.066)
Very good	0.137	0.124	0.235	−0.097	−0.150	−0.002
	(0.192)	(0.173)	(0.223)	(0.153)	(0.151)	(0.101)
Subj. Income (ref.: Insufficient and problems)						
Insufficient	−0.359***	−0.350***	−0.401***	0.117	0.072	0.284***
	(0.052)	(0.092)	(0.116)	(0.123)	(0.183)	(0.066)
Just sufficient	−0.209*	−0.255**	−0.222*	0.219+	0.179	0.372***
	(0.097)	(0.089)	(0.107)	(0.128)	(0.157)	(0.062)
Sufficient and save	−0.144	−0.166	−0.052	0.137	0.152	0.239+
	(0.110)	(0.131)	(0.126)	(0.160)	(0.197)	(0.124)
Class (ref.: Lower)						
Middle-lower	−0.148	−0.126	0.041	0.071	0.006	0.116*
	(0.168)	(0.176)	(0.231)	(0.048)	(0.066)	(0.051)
Middle	−0.171	−0.153	−0.013	0.151	0.059	0.154*
	(0.187)	(0.185)	(0.242)	(0.105)	(0.094)	(0.076)
Middle-upper	−0.076	0.003	0.036	0.320+	0.361+	0.361*
	(0.250)	(0.244)	(0.293)	(0.175)	(0.213)	(0.171)
Religion (ref.: Agnostic/Atheist/None/NA)						
Catholic	0.014	−0.051	−0.091	0.069	0.091	−0.026
	(0.084)	(0.094)	(0.143)	(0.067)	(0.107)	(0.067)
Evangelical	0.183	0.123	−0.153	0.127	0.212	0.019
	(0.176)	(0.178)	(0.159)	(0.107)	(0.155)	(0.094)
Other	−0.316+	−0.374+	−0.348	−0.067	0.038	−0.008
	(0.181)	(0.208)	(0.287)	(0.172)	(0.210)	(0.188)
Political Knowledge	−0.025	0.082	−0.150	0.005	0.054	0.109
	(0.108)	(0.151)	(0.156)	(0.033)	(0.043)	(0.090)
Political Interest	0.034	0.007	0.011	0.026	0.001	0.012
	(0.021)	(0.021)		(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.026)
TV Frequency	0.0001	−0.0001	−0.0001	0.0001	0.0001	0.0002
	(0.0001)	(0.0003)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.0002)
Newspaper Frequency	−0.016	−0.019	−0.021	−0.010	−0.009	−0.013
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.009)
Internet Use	−0.041	0.026	−0.082*	0.092	0.093	−0.029
	(0.067)	(0.088)	(0.041)	(0.088)	(0.084)	(0.063)
Constant	0.191	0.405+	0.014	−0.363+	−0.219	−1.026***
	(0.242)	(0.238)	(0.362)	(0.209)	(0.315)	(0.291)
Mean(Trust)	0.413	0.413	0.415	0.425	0.425	0.414
sd(Trust)	0.493	0.493	0.493	0.495	0.495	0.493
Controls?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province FE?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	283	283	366	268	268	336
Adjusted R^2	0.119	0.178	0.244	0.076	0.179	0.287

Note: Outcome: Trust in the Judiciary (0 = "A little"/"None"; 1 = "A lot"/"Some"). Robust standard errors clustered by city and date of survey interview. Models 2 and 4 employ entropy balance weights (Hainmueller 2012). Models 3 and 6 employ multivariate matching (Sekhon 2011) with optimal balance weights computed using the genetic matching algorithm by by Diamond and Sekhon (2013). $^{+}p < 0.1$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

D Moderators of Partisan Effects

D1 Partisanship Strength

Figure D1.1: Supreme Court Ruling Effect by Respondents' Partisanship Strength



Note: The panels show the expected effect of the supreme court ruling on trust in the judiciary across different values of partisanship strength for opposition supporters (gray circles) and government supporters (black triangles). The *Partisanship Strength* survey item asks, "How strongly do you support this political party?" ("Not very strongly"; "Quite strongly"; "Very strongly"). Thick and thin lines correspond to 90% and 95% confidence intervals, respectively.

D2 Newspaper Frequency and Political Interest (Binary)

Figure D2.1: Supreme Court Ruling Effect by Newspaper Frequency and Political Interest



Note: The panels show the expected effect (first difference) of the supreme court ruling on trust in the judiciary across values of *Newspaper Frequency* (left panel) and *Political Interest* (right panel) among opposition supporters (solid line) and government supporters (dotted line). The panels are based on analyses employing genetic matching weights (see **SI E2**) and the extensive set of covariates(see **SI A2**). Lighter and darker shaded areas indicate 95% and 90% confidence intervals, respectively.

E Entropy Balance and Genetic Matching Specifications

E1 Entropy Balance

The entropy balancing models employ entropy balance weights proposed by Hainmueller (2012). Entropy balancing is a data pre-processing method that consists in a "reweighting scheme that directly incorporates covariate balance into the weight function that is applied to the sample units" (Hainmueller 2012, 26). The weights for these models are calculated by balancing on the first moment of the following variables: *Age*, *Female*, *Education*, *Gov. Supporter*, *SES*, *Income*, *Class*, and *Religion*.[2] By using the entropy balance weights, the control and treatment groups are, on average, exactly balanced on covariates. To compute these weights, I employed the `ebal` package in R (Hainmueller 2012). Finally, I fit weighted least squares (WLS) models using the entropy balance weights and covariate bias adjustment.

E2 Genetic Matching

The matching models employ multivariate and propensity score matching (Sekhon 2011) using optimal balance weights computed through the genetic matching algorithm developed by Diamond and Sekhon (2013). I employ the `Matching` package in R (Sekhon 2011) to conduct these analyses.

First, I supply a matrix of covariates (see above) as well as linearized estimated propensity scores to the function `GenMatch()`, which automatically finds balance via a genetic search algorithm and determines the optimal weight to give each covariate. To ensure asymptotic solutions to the optimization problem, I use the following specifications: `pop.size = 5000` and `wait.generations = 50`. `GenMatch` returns a matrix ('weight matrix') whose diagonal corresponds to the weight given to each covariate. Then, I use the function `Match()`, which employs the weight matrix returned by `GenMatch()` and then matches observations on the (weighted) covariates and linearized estimated propensity scores.[3] The result of this procedure is a dataset of matches, along with a new vector of matched-pair weights. Finally, I fit WLS models using the matched dataset and any corresponding weights as well as covariate bias adjustment.

[2]The models using the extended set of (potentially post-treatment) covariates control for the following additional variables: *Political Knowledge*, *Political Interest*, *TV Frequency Newspaper Frequency*, and *Internet Use*.

[3]Matching is done with replacement, and, as recommended by Sekhon (2011), I set `ties = TRUE`. Thus, if one treated unit matches more than one control unit, the matched dataset includes multiple matched control observations for a given treated observation. The matched dataset is weighted to account for the multiple matches, if any.

F Alternative Specifications

F1 Binary, Ordinal, and Scaled Outcome

Table F1.1: Binary Outcome (Logit)

	Lower Court			Supreme Court		
	OLS	EB+WLS	GM+WLS	OLS	EB+WLS	GM+WLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Court Ruling	0.460	0.743	−0.098	1.343*	1.908**	2.059*
	(1.006)	(1.009)	(0.633)	(0.614)	(0.608)	(0.802)
Government Supporter	2.625***	2.991***	2.064**	2.375***	3.257***	3.079***
	(0.763)	(0.773)	(0.723)	(0.388)	(0.434)	(0.175)
C. Ruling × Gov. Supporter	−1.794+	−2.166*	−1.354+	−2.656***	−3.642***	−3.217***
	(1.007)	(1.067)	(0.823)	(0.703)	(0.775)	(0.596)
Constant	−2.253*	−3.700**	−1.323	−4.773***	−5.103***	−20.958***
	(1.138)	(1.428)	(1.685)	(0.563)	(0.632)	(1.177)
Controls?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province FE?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	286	286	372	275	275	348
Log Likelihood	-158.301	-189.815	-205.282	-156.899	-177.640	-171.877
AIC	376.603	439.629	468.564	375.798	417.280	405.754

Note: Outcome: Trust in the Judiciary (0 = "A little"/"None"; 1 = "A lot"/"Some"). Robust standard errors clustered by city and date of survey interview. Controls: *Age*, *Female*, *Education*, *SES*, *Subjective Income*, *Class*, *Religion*. Models 2 and 4 employ entropy balance weights (Hainmueller 2012). Models 3 and 6 employ multivariate matching (Sekhon 2011) with optimal balance weights computed using the genetic matching algorithm by by Diamond and Sekhon (2013).
$^{+}p < 0.1$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

Table F1.2: Ordinal Outcome (Ordered Probit)

	Lower Court			**Supreme Court**		
	OLS	EB+WLS	GM+WLS	OLS	EB+WLS	GM+WLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Court Ruling	0.138	0.370	0.182	0.534*	0.960+	1.075*
	(0.367)	(0.585)	(0.351)	(0.246)	(0.499)	(0.495)
Government Supporter	1.387***	1.708***	1.530***	1.204***	1.679***	1.692***
	(0.195)	(0.384)	(0.282)	(0.089)	(0.273)	(0.382)
C. Ruling × Gov. Supporter	−0.852**	−1.223*	−1.120***	−1.133**	−1.696**	−1.593**
	(0.285)	(0.527)	(0.323)	(0.413)	(0.620)	(0.536)
None | A Little	−0.282	0.713	−0.301	1.167	1.65	2.104
	(0.692)	(1.218)	(1.029)	(0.524)	(0.811)	(0.818)
A Little | Some	0.996	1.962	0.889	2.208	2.627	3.052
	(0.6)	(1.113)	(0.893)	(0.537)	(0.815)	(0.937)
Some | A Lot	2.533	3.53	2.077	3.543	4.158	4.284
	(0.637)	(1.046)	(0.843)	(0.599)	(0.849)	(1.002)
Controls?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province FE?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	286	370	370	275	348	348

Note: Outcome: Trust in the Judiciary ("None"; "A little"; "Some"; "A lot"). Robust standard errors clustered by city and date of survey interview. Controls: *Age*, *Female*, *Education*, *SES*, *Subjective Income*, *Class*, *Religion*. Models 2 and 4 employ entropy balance weights (Hainmueller 2012). Models 3 and 6 employ multivariate matching (Sekhon 2011) with optimal balance weights computed using the genetic matching algorithm by by Diamond and Sekhon (2013). $^{+}p < 0.1$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

Table F1.3: Scaled Outcome (OLS)

	Lower Court			Supreme Court		
	OLS	EB+WLS	GM+WLS	OLS	EB+WLS	GM+WLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Court Ruling	0.027	0.051	0.023	0.123	0.167***	0.206***
	(0.076)	(0.072)	(0.067)	(0.078)	(0.047)	(0.058)
Government Supporter	0.308***	0.357***	0.363***	0.299***	0.365***	0.381***
	(0.033)	(0.044)	(0.084)	(0.043)	(0.036)	(0.064)
C. Ruling × Gov. Supporter	−0.189***	−0.242***	−0.261***	−0.282***	−0.362***	−0.356***
	(0.051)	(0.055)	(0.069)	(0.062)	(0.076)	(0.082)
Constant	0.265+	0.110	0.333	−0.055	−0.064	−0.213
	(0.141)	(0.194)	(0.243)	(0.141)	(0.153)	(0.154)
Mean(Trust)	0.428	0.428	0.461	0.418	0.418	0.4
sd(Trust)	0.283	0.283	0.321	0.311	0.311	0.334
Controls?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
City FE?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	286	286	372	275	275	348
Adjusted R^2	0.163	0.281	0.271	0.148	0.288	0.268

Note: Outcome: Trust in the Judiciary (0 = "None"; 0.33 = "A little"; 0.67 = "Some"; 1 = "A lot"). Robust standard errors clustered by city and date of survey interview. Controls: *Age*, *Female*, *Education*, *SES*, *Subjective Income*, *Class*, *Religion*. Models 2 and 4 employ entropy balance weights (Hainmueller 2012). Models 3 and 6 employ multivariate matching (Sekhon 2011) with optimal balance weights computed using the genetic matching algorithm by by Diamond and Sekhon (2013).
$^{+}p < 0.1$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

F2 Standard Errors

Table F2.1: (Cluster) Bootstrap Standard Errors by City and Date

	Lower Court			Supreme Court		
	OLS	EB+WLS	GM+WLS	OLS	EB+WLS	GM+WLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Court Ruling	0.054	0.038	−0.033	0.245*	0.265***	0.296***
	(0.115)	(0.074)	(0.062)	(0.099)	(0.065)	(0.060)
Government Supporter	0.463***	0.470***	0.405**	0.464***	0.553***	0.507***
	(0.068)	(0.061)	(0.132)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.078)
C. Ruling × Gov. Supporter	−0.325**	−0.324***	−0.284*	−0.526***	−0.632***	−0.534***
	(0.099)	(0.076)	(0.113)	(0.117)	(0.097)	(0.069)
Constant	0.156	0.038	0.392	−0.373*	−0.292	−0.647***
	(0.184)	(0.255)	(0.320)	(0.165)	(0.256)	(0.156)
Controls?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province FE?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	286	286	372	275	275	348
Adjusted R^2	0.126	0.204	0.164	0.098	0.221	0.237

Note: Outcome: Trust in the Judiciary (0 = "A little"/"None"; 1 = "A lot"/"Some"). Robust standard errors clustered by city and date of survey interview using the wild bootstrap procedure suggested by Webb (2014) with `R = 100,000` bootstrap replications. Controls: *Age*, *Female*, *Education*, *SES*, *Subjective Income*, *Class*, *Religion*. Models 2 and 4 employ entropy balance weights (Hainmueller 2012). Models 3 and 6 employ multivariate matching (Sekhon 2011) with optimal balance weights computed using the genetic matching algorithm by by Diamond and Sekhon (2013).
$^{+}p < 0.1$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

Table F2.2: Standard Errors Clustered Only by City

	Lower Court			**Supreme Court**		
	OLS	EB+WLS	GM+WLS	OLS	EB+WLS	GM+WLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Court Ruling	0.054	0.038	−0.033	0.245^{+}	0.265**	0.296***
	(0.144)	(0.104)	(0.095)	(0.132)	(0.091)	(0.079)
Government Supporter	0.463***	0.470***	0.405***	0.464***	0.553***	0.507***
	(0.094)	(0.088)	(0.117)	(0.085)	(0.059)	(0.109)
C. Ruling × Gov. Supporter	−0.325*	−0.324**	−0.284**	−0.526***	−0.632***	−0.534***
	(0.129)	(0.108)	(0.100)	(0.145)	(0.115)	(0.105)
Constant	0.156	0.038	0.392	−0.373^{+}	−0.292	−0.647***
	(0.184)	(0.247)	(0.303)	(0.203)	(0.268)	(0.154)
Controls?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province FE?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	286	286	372	275	275	348
Adjusted R^2	0.126	0.204	0.164	0.098	0.221	0.237

Note: Outcome: Trust in the Judiciary (0 = "A little"/"None"; 1 = "A lot"/"Some"). Robust standard errors clustered by city. Controls: *Age*, *Female*, *Education*, *SES*, *Subjective Income*, *Class*, *Religion*. Models 2 and 4 employ entropy balance weights (Hainmueller 2012). Models 3 and 6 employ multivariate matching (Sekhon 2011) with optimal balance weights computed using the genetic matching algorithm by by Diamond and Sekhon (2013). $^{+}p < 0.1$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

Table F2.3: Standard Errors Clustered Only by Date of Survey Interview

	Lower Court			**Supreme Court**		
	OLS	EB+WLS	GM+WLS	OLS	EB+WLS	GM+WLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Court Ruling	0.054	0.038	−0.033	0.245*	0.265***	0.296**
	(0.089)	(0.075)	(0.098)	(0.097)	(0.077)	(0.106)
Government Supporter	0.463***	0.470***	0.405**	0.464***	0.553***	0.507***
	(0.088)	(0.074)	(0.157)	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.092)
C. Ruling × Gov. Supporter	−0.325**	−0.324***	−0.284+	−0.526***	−0.632***	−0.534***
	(0.107)	(0.097)	(0.162)	(0.125)	(0.120)	(0.125)
Constant	0.156	0.038	0.392	−0.373	−0.292	−0.647**
	(0.267)	(0.303)	(0.383)	(0.250)	(0.325)	(0.251)
Controls?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province FE?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	286	286	372	275	275	348
Adjusted R^2	0.126	0.204	0.164	0.098	0.221	0.237

Note: Outcome: Trust in the Judiciary (0 = "A little"/"None"; 1 = "A lot"/"Some"). Robust standard errors clustered by date of survey interview. Controls: *Age*, *Female*, *Education*, *SES*, *Subjective Income*, *Class*, *Religion*. Models 2 and 4 employ entropy balance weights (Hainmueller 2012). Models 3 and 6 employ multivariate matching (Sekhon 2011) with optimal balance weights computed using the genetic matching algorithm by by Diamond and Sekhon (2013). $^{+}p < 0.1$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

F3 City Fixed Effects

Table F3.1: City Fixed Effects

	Lower Court			Supreme Court		
	OLS	EB+WLS	GM+WLS	OLS	EB+WLS	GM+WLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Court Ruling	0.467***	0.460***	0.446***	0.466***	0.551***	0.509***
	(0.069)	(0.064)	(0.117)	(0.050)	(0.035)	(0.094)
Government Supporter	−0.349**	−0.334***	−0.348***	−0.507***	−0.603***	−0.541***
	(0.116)	(0.078)	(0.093)	(0.120)	(0.103)	(0.082)
C. Ruling × Gov. Supporter	0.174	0.103	0.477	−0.425*	−0.311	−0.674***
	(0.204)	(0.270)	(0.320)	(0.211)	(0.313)	(0.189)
Mean(Trust)	0.416	0.416	0.449	0.418	0.418	0.408
sd(Trust)	0.494	0.494	0.498	0.494	0.494	0.492
Controls?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
City FE?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	286	286	372	275	275	348
Adjusted R^2	0.122	0.214	0.201	0.105	0.233	0.242

Note: Outcome: Trust in the Judiciary (0 = "A little"/"None"; 1 = "A lot"/"Some"). Robust standard errors clustered by city and date of survey interview. Controls: *Age*, *Female*, *Education*, *SES*, *Subjective Income*, *Class*, *Religion*. Models 2 and 4 employ entropy balance weights (Hainmueller 2012). Models 3 and 6 employ multivariate matching (Sekhon 2011) with optimal balance weights computed using the genetic matching algorithm by by Diamond and Sekhon (2013).
$^{+}p < 0.1$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

F4 Removing Respondents Interviewed on June 11th and June 18th

Table F4.1: Removing June 11th and June 18th Respondents

	Lower Court			Supreme Court		
	OLS (1)	EB+WLS (2)	GM+WLS (3)	OLS (4)	EB+WLS (5)	GM+WLS (6)
Court Ruling	0.047	−0.009	−0.126	0.160	0.238**	0.073
	(0.146)	(0.105)	(0.122)	(0.115)	(0.081)	(0.129)
Government Supporter	0.480***	0.485***	0.338**	0.437***	0.525***	0.375***
	(0.122)	(0.111)	(0.110)	(0.087)	(0.069)	(0.041)
C. Ruling × Gov. Supporter	−0.331*	−0.316**	−0.165	−0.461**	−0.574***	−0.429***
	(0.143)	(0.109)	(0.103)	(0.146)	(0.127)	(0.128)
Constant	0.277	−0.003	−0.043	−0.394+	−0.288	0.074
	(0.235)	(0.329)	(0.291)	(0.217)	(0.278)	(0.269)
Mean(Trust)	0.414	0.414	0.424	0.409	0.409	0.466
sd(Trust)	0.494	0.494	0.495	0.493	0.493	0.5
Controls?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province FE?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	222	222	288	252	252	348
Adjusted R^2	0.091	0.214	0.192	0.102	0.233	0.286

Note: Outcome: Trust in the Judiciary (0 = "A little"/"None"; 1 = "A lot"/"Some"). Robust standard errors clustered by city and date of survey interview. Controls: *Age*, *Female*, *Education*, *SES*, *Subjective Income*, *Class*, *Religion*. Models 2 and 4 employ entropy balance weights (Hainmueller 2012). Models 3 and 6 employ multivariate matching (Sekhon 2011) with optimal balance weights computed using the genetic matching algorithm by by Diamond and Sekhon (2013).
$^{+}p < 0.1$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

F5 Only Cities with Respondents in All Conditions

Table F5.1: Only Cities with Respondents in All Conditions

	Lower Court			Supreme Court		
	OLS	EB+WLS	GM+WLS	OLS	EB+WLS	GM+WLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Court Ruling	0.038	0.104	0.001	0.112	0.263*	0.315***
	(0.156)	(0.093)	(0.109)	(0.138)	(0.123)	(0.015)
Government Supporter	0.375*	0.525***	0.433*	0.399**	0.648*	0.803***
	(0.156)	(0.147)	(0.173)	(0.132)	(0.257)	(0.167)
C. Ruling × Gov. Supporter	−0.189**	−0.329***	−0.312**	−0.409*	−0.627***	−0.738***
	(0.063)	(0.046)	(0.100)	(0.167)	(0.164)	(0.112)
Constant	0.266	0.212	0.405	−0.019	−0.002	−0.124
	(0.323)	(0.231)	(0.382)	(0.145)	(0.225)	(0.153)
Mean(Trust)	0.396	0.396	0.468	0.363	0.363	0.439
sd(Trust)	0.491	0.491	0.5	0.482	0.482	0.497
Controls?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province FE?						
Observations	149	149	190	168	168	228
Adjusted R^2	-0.008	0.081	0.112	0.029	0.255	0.305

Note: Outcome: Trust in the Judiciary (0 = "A little"/"None"; 1 = "A lot"/"Some"). Robust standard errors clustered by city and date of survey interview. Controls: *Age*, *Female*, *Education*, *SES*, *Subjective Income*, *Class*, *Religion*. Models 2 and 4 employ entropy balance weights (Hainmueller 2012). Models 3 and 6 employ multivariate matching (Sekhon 2011) with optimal balance weights computed using the genetic matching algorithm by by Diamond and Sekhon (2013).
$^{+}p < 0.1$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

F6 Only Cities with Respondents in All Conditions by Court Model

Table F6.1: Only Cities with Respondents in All Conditions by Court Model

	Lower Court			Supreme Court		
	OLS	EB+WLS	GM+WLS	OLS	EB+WLS	GM+WLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Court Ruling	−0.012	0.089	−0.107	0.175	0.289***	0.260***
	(0.131)	(0.067)	(0.143)	(0.135)	(0.025)	(0.063)
Government Supporter	0.315*	0.470***	0.252	0.451***	0.648***	0.699***
	(0.134)	(0.126)	(0.162)	(0.108)	(0.123)	(0.094)
C. Ruling × Gov. Supporter	−0.108	−0.258***	−0.089	−0.512**	−0.712***	−0.759***
	(0.082)	(0.036)	(0.146)	(0.187)	(0.101)	(0.154)
Constant	0.263	0.017	−0.007	−0.052	0.055	0.025
	(0.195)	(0.221)	(0.381)	(0.152)	(0.213)	(0.133)
Mean(Trust)	0.415	0.415	0.454	0.401	0.401	0.488
sd(Trust)	0.494	0.494	0.499	0.491	0.491	0.501
Controls?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province FE?						
Observations	176	176	218	197	197	240
Adjusted R^2	0.013	0.082	0.079	0.091	0.292	0.335

Note: Outcome: Trust in the Judiciary (0 = "A little"/"None"; 1 = "A lot"/"Some"). Robust standard errors clustered by city and date of survey interview. Controls: *Age*, *Female*, *Education*, *SES*, *Subjective Income*, *Class*, *Religion*. Models 2 and 4 employ entropy balance weights (Hainmueller 2012). Models 3 and 6 employ multivariate matching (Sekhon 2011) with optimal balance weights computed using the genetic matching algorithm by by Diamond and Sekhon (2013).
$^{+}p < 0.1$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

G Robustness Checks

G1 Time Trends

Table G1.1: Time Trends in Control Group Subsample

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Days	0.001			
	(0.019)			
Placebo Tr. Indicator		0.076	0.100	0.339
		(0.089)	(0.064)	(0.213)
Government Supporter			0.436**	0.627***
			(0.133)	(0.156)
Placebo Tr. × Gov. Supporter				−0.300
				(0.267)
Constant	0.531**	0.486***	−0.148	−0.246
	(0.166)	(0.062)	(0.308)	(0.355)
Controls?	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province FE?				
Observations	101	101	101	101
Adjusted R^2	-0.010	-0.005	0.045	0.048

Note: Outcome: Trust in the Judiciary (0 = "A little"/"None"; 1 = "A lot"/"Some"). Robust standard errors clustered by city and date of survey interview. *Days*: number of days before June 11th (date of the lower court ruling). *Placebo Tr. Indicator*: binary indicator split the control group subsample at its empirical median. Controls: *Age*, *Female*, *Education*, *SES*, *Subjective Income*, *Class*, *Religion*. $^{+}p < 0.1$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

Table G1.2: Time Trends

	Lower Court			Supreme Court		
	OLS	EB+WLS	GM+WLS	OLS	EB+WLS	GM+WLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Court Ruling	0.123	0.132^{+}	0.109	0.132	0.307***	0.396*
	(0.075)	(0.072)	(0.080)	(0.102)	(0.069)	(0.171)
Government Supporter	0.467***	0.472***	0.408**	0.472***	0.553***	0.497***
	(0.073)	(0.063)	(0.145)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.090)
Days	−0.010	−0.014	−0.021	−0.014*	−0.003	−0.007
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.010)
C. Ruling × Gov. Supporter	−0.333**	−0.332***	−0.297*	−0.332**	−0.632***	−0.526***
	(0.104)	(0.083)	(0.133)	(0.125)	(0.107)	(0.084)
Constant	0.219	0.128	0.539^{+}	0.128	−0.271	−0.585**
	(0.207)	(0.235)	(0.308)	(0.187)	(0.271)	(0.190)
Mean(Trust)	0.416	0.416	0.449	0.416	0.418	0.408
sd(Trust)	0.494	0.494	0.498	0.494	0.494	0.492
Controls?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province FE?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	286	286	372	286	275	348
Adjusted R^2	0.125	0.205	0.171	0.205	0.218	0.236

Note: Outcome: Trust in the Judiciary (0 = "A little"/"None"; 1 = "A lot"/"Some"). Robust standard errors clustered by city and date of survey interview. *Days*: number of days before June 11th (date of the lower court ruling). Controls: *Age*, *Female*, *Education*, *SES*, *Subjective Income*, *Class*, *Religion*. Models 2 and 4 employ entropy balance weights (Hainmueller 2012). Models 3 and 6 employ multivariate matching (Sekhon 2011) with optimal balance weights computed using the genetic matching algorithm by by Diamond and Sekhon (2013). $^{+}p < 0.1$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

G2 Placebo Tests

Section 5 in the main text presents placebo tests that regress different Latinobarómetro survey items on the court decisions indicators. The specific survey items employed as outcomes in those analyses are the following: *Trust in the armed forces*, *Trust in the church*, *Trust in neighbors*, *Trust in the newspapers*, *Trust in people*, *Trust in the police*, *Trust in the radio*, *Trust in relatives*, and *Trust in the television*. As in the main analyses, I employed a binary version of all these items (0 = "None/A Little;" 1 = "Some/A lot").

G3 Sensitivity Analysis

Section 5 in the main text reports the results of two sets of sensitivity analysis tests. First, I followed the approach to omitted variable bias suggested by Cinelli and Hazlett (2020)

based on partial R^2 values. Cinelli and Hazlett (2020) offer two measures of sensitivity of linear regression coefficients. The first measure, *robustness value* (RV), assesses the overall robustness of a coefficient to unobserved confounders—that is, given a confounder with equal association to the treatment and the outcome, how strong that association must be to reduce the coefficient to zero? The second measure assumes an extreme scenario in which a confounder explained *all* the residual variance of the outcome. This measure is the proportion of variation in the outcome that is uniquely explained by the treatment (that is, the partial R^2 of the treatment with the outcome: $R^2_{Y\sim D|\mathbf{X}}$) and examines how strong the association between the confounder and the treatment must be to eliminate the estimated coefficient.

I conducted these analyses employing the `sensemakr` package in R (Cinelli, Ferwerda, and Hazlett 2020). The estimates under evaluation are the coefficients on the interaction *Court Ruling* × *Gov. Supporter* discussed in the main text. The bounds on the strength of the confounding are given by the *Government Supporter* indicator. **Table G3.1** below presents the results.

Table G3.1: Sensitivity Analysis (Cinelli and Hazlett 2020)

							Bound (1×Gov. Supporter)	
Model	Estimate	s.e.	t-value	$R^2_{Y\sim D\|\mathbf{X}}$	$RV_{q=1}$	$RV_{q=1,\alpha=0.5}$	$R^2_{Y\sim Z\|\mathbf{X},D}$	$R^2_{D\sim Z\|\mathbf{X}}$
Lower Court								
OLS	−0.325	0.110	−2.964	0.033	0.169	0.133	0.145	< 0.001
EB+WLS	−0.324	0.085	−3.797	0.053	0.211	0.177	0.032	0.010
GM+WLS	−0.284	0.125	−2.280	0.015	0.116	0.083	0.023	< 0.001
Supreme Court								
OLS	−0.526	0.128	−4.115	0.065	0.231	0.197	0.447	0.010
EB+WLS	−0.632	0.107	−5.894	0.125	0.313	0.283	0.701	< 0.001
GM+WLS	−0.534	0.079	−6.788	0.127	0.315	0.289	0.109	0.003

The rows represent each of the six models presented in the main text. For each of this original models, **Table G3.1** shows the interaction coefficient estimate, standard error, and t-statistic. Moreover, the column labeled $R^2_{Y\sim D|\mathbf{X}}$ indicates the partial R^2 of the treatment with the outcome, and the following two columns denote (1) the robustness value required to reduce the coefficient estimate to zero ($RV_{q=1}$), and (2) the robustness value beyond which the coefficient estimate would no longer be statistically significant at the 5% level ($RV_{q=1,\alpha=0.5}$). Finally, the last two columns provide bounds on hypothetical unobserved confounding as strong as the *Government Supporter* variable. In particular, the columns indicate the partial R^2 of a hypothetical confounder as strong as *Government Supporter* with the outcome ($R^2_{Y\sim Z|\mathbf{X},D}$) and with the treatment indicator ($R^2_{D\sim Z|\mathbf{X}}$).

Following the interpretation suggested by Cinelli and Hazlett (2020), the table indicates that unobserved confounders that do not explain at least between 11.6-21.1% (*Lower Court*

models) or 23.1-31.5% (*Supreme Court* models) of the residual variance *both* of the treatment and of the outcome are not sufficiently strong to explain away the observed interaction coefficient discussed in the main text—the values must be about 8.3-17.7% (*Lower Court* models) and 19.7-28.9% (*Supreme Court* models) to make the observed interaction coefficients statistically insignificant at the 5% level. Importantly, these analyses also provide bounds on the confounding. Specifically, four models in **Table G3.1** indicate that even confounders as strong as *Government Supporter* (that is, explaining as much variation as that variable) are not sufficient to bring the observed interaction estimates to zero—this is in cases where both bounds $R^2_{Y\sim Z|\mathbf{X},D}$ and $R^2_{D\sim Z|\mathbf{X}}$ are below the robustness value $RV_{q=1}$. In the other two models, a confounder as strong as *Government Supporter* would need to explain about 44.7% or 70.1% of the residual variation of the outcome.

Finally, in the extreme scenario assuming that unobserved confounders explain all of the left-out variance of the outcome, the partial R^2 of the treatment with the outcome ($R^2_{Y\sim D|\mathbf{X}}$) indicates that these unobserved confounders would need to explain at least between 1.5-5.3% (*Lower Court* models) or 6.5-12.7% (*Supreme Court* models) of the residual variance of the treatment to fully explain away the observed interaction effect. Now, note that the bound on *Gov. Supporter* (last column) is smaller than the the partial R^2 of the treatment with the outcome ($R^2_{Y\sim D|\mathbf{X}}$) across all models. This means that even an extreme confounder explaining all residual variation of the outcome and as strongly associated with the treatment as *Government Supporter* would not account for the observed estimated interaction effects in both the Lower Court and Supreme Court models.

Besides sensitivity analyses based on partial R^2 parameterization, I also apply the approach suggested by Frank et al. (2023). I employ the `konfound` package in R (Narvaiz et al. 2024). **Table G3.2** reports the full results.

Table G3.2: Sensitivity Analysis (Narvaiz et al. 2024)

Model	$\hat{\beta}$	$\hat{\beta}$ threshold	% estimate bias to change inference	# of null cases to invalidate inference	Omitted variable correlation	ITCV (Frank 2000)
Lower Court						
OLS	−0.325	−0.216	33.59	96	0.256	−0.066
EB+WLS	−0.324	−0.168	48.15	138	0.347	−0.121
GM+WLS	−0.284	−0.245	13.75	51	0.135	−0.018
Supreme Court						
OLS	−0.526	−0.252	52.16	143	0.377	−0.142
EB+WLS	−0.632	−0.211	66.59	183	0.504	−0.254
GM+WLS	−0.534	−0.155	71.02	247	0.521	−0.271

For example, the column 'Omitted variable correlation' indicates that an omitted variable would have to be correlated with the outcome at about 0.131-0.347 (*Lower Court* models) or 0.377-0.521 (*Supreme Court* models) to make the interaction coefficients statistically insignificant at $\alpha = 0.05$.

H Analyses including 'Nonpartisan' Respondents

In the main text and most of this **SI**, I report analyses that only include "partisan" respondents—that is, respondents who identified as supporters of either the government allied party or an opposition party. This decision resulted in dropping a large number of observations from the statistical analyses: $N_{dropped} = 730$, or $\approx 60.8\%$ of the total sample (see **Table A3.1**). While this decision was based on theoretical considerations (see the discussion in main text's subsection "Partisanship Indicator"), understanding how "nonpartisans" respond to the court rulings has important implications. In this section, I present the results that include nonpartisan respondents and discuss a potential explanation for the main finding.

Using the full sample, I created a categorical partisanship indicator that takes one of three values: "Opposition Supporter," "Government Supporter," and "Nonpartisan." Respondents were coded as nonpartisans if they did not support either an opposition party or a government party. In other words, when asked about which party they would vote for "if elections were held this Sunday," nonpartisan respondents answered any of the following: "do not vote," "spoil/blank vote," "not registered to vote/underage," or "do not know/no answer" (see **Table A3.1**). As in the main analyses, I fit linear probability models for three specifications (OLS, Entropy Balancing, and Genetic Matching). The models include an interaction between the binary treatment indicator and the categorical partisanship indicator. **Figure H1.1** plots the first differences, and **Table H1.1** below reports the full results.

The figure provides three main insights. First, the results reported in the main text remain substantially robust when nonpartisans are included.[4] Second, the effects of the Supreme Court ruling are greatest in magnitude among both government and opposition supporters. This finding aligns with the theory discussed in the main text and reinforces its partisan results.

Third, nonpartisan respondents slightly (but consistently) *decrease* their trust in the judiciary following the *Rizzo* decisions. These effects are statistically significant for all specifications in the Supreme Court ($p < 0.05$) and Lower Court ($p < 0.1$) models. These estimates represent negative changes accounting for about 20-45% of the mean value of the outcome. This provides fairly strong evidence suggesting that judicial checks against the government can negatively impact citizens' trust in the judiciary, even among individuals with no partisan attachment to the incumbent.

While theorizing about this result is outside the scope of this paper, it is an interesting finding. Without partisan alignment, we would expect support for judicial institutions to remain stable. One potential explanation for this result draws on research about judicial

[4]There are, however, a few differences relative to Figure 5 in the main text. In all specifications of **Figure H1.1**, the estimates for the effect of the Supreme Court ruling are larger among government supporters and smaller among opposition supporters. Additionally, in the Genetic Matching specification of **Figure H1.1**, the effect of the Supreme Court decision among opposition supporters is more imprecisely estimated ($p \approx 0.11$) compared to Figure 5 in the main text ($p < 0.001$).

impartiality and "the myth of legality" (Scheb and Lyons 2000). Conventional wisdom suggests that the public subscribes to the idea of the judiciary as a legalistic, "non-political" institution, "different" from the other branches (Gibson and Nelson 2014; Driscoll and Nelson 2023). Research in the United States has demonstrated that citizens' support for judicial institutions decreases when individuals learn that courts have behaved politically (Baird and Gangl 2006; Christenson and Glick 2015; Levendusky et al. 2024). This reasoning can partially explain why nonpartisans trust the judiciary less after the *Rizzo* rulings: upon observing courts decide on a politically salient policy, these citizens may have realized that judicial institutions are not "above politics" and thus reduced their support for the judiciary.

H1 Results

Figure H1.1: Heterogeneous Effects of the Court Rulings (including Nonpartisans)



Note: The panels show the expected effect (first difference) of the lower court (white circle) and supreme court (black triangle) rulings on trust in the judiciary among opposition supporters, nonpartisans, and government supporters. The vertical axis indicates the first difference in the outcome following each judicial ruling. The panels are based on the analyses presented in **Table H1.1**: models 1 and 3 (OLS, left), models 2 and 5 (EB+WLS, middle), and models 3 and 6 (GM+WLS, right). Thick and thin lines correspond to 90% and 95% confidence intervals, respectively.

Table H1.1: Results including Nonpartisans

	Lower Court			**Supreme Court**		
	OLS	EB+WLS	GM+WLS	OLS	EB+WLS	GM+WLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Court Ruling	0.011	0.051	0.130	0.200*	0.243**	0.221
	(0.082)	(0.066)	(0.103)	(0.091)	(0.077)	(0.139)
Government Supporter	0.429***	0.509***	0.637***	0.458***	0.569***	0.640***
	(0.095)	(0.078)	(0.163)	(0.089)	(0.059)	(0.074)
Nonpartisan	0.126*	0.192***	0.262*	0.141*	0.246***	0.241
	(0.051)	(0.039)	(0.115)	(0.062)	(0.058)	(0.147)
C. Ruling × Gov. Supporter	−0.287*	−0.361***	−0.493***	−0.542***	−0.650***	−0.703***
	(0.114)	(0.089)	(0.148)	(0.149)	(0.127)	(0.152)
C. Ruling × Nonpartisan	−0.079	−0.128*	−0.202	−0.309**	−0.394***	−0.370*
	(0.083)	(0.058)	(0.127)	(0.103)	(0.095)	(0.176)
Constant	−0.147	−0.221***	−0.214	−0.157	−0.287***	−0.309
	(0.105)	(0.046)	(0.240)	(0.119)	(0.085)	(0.208)
Mean(Trust)	0.347	0.347	0.362	0.325	0.325	0.368
sd(Trust)	0.476	0.476	0.481	0.469	0.469	0.482
Controls?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province FE?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	674	674	892	717	717	968
Adjusted R^2	0.080	0.122	0.156	0.076	0.129	0.208

Note: Outcome: Trust in the Judiciary (0 = "A little"/"None"; 1 = "A lot"/"Some"). Robust standard errors clustered by city and date of survey interview. Controls: *Age*, *Female*, *Education*, *SES*, *Subjective Income*, *Class*, *Religion*. Models 2 and 4 employ entropy balance weights (Hainmueller 2012). Models 3 and 6 employ multivariate matching (Sekhon 2011) with optimal balance weights computed using the genetic matching algorithm by by Diamond and Sekhon (2013).
$^{+}p < 0.1$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

I Concerns about the *Newspaper Frequency* Measure

In the main text, I present preliminary evidence suggesting that the effect of the Supreme Court ruling increases in magnitude as respondents become more informed about politics. For the analyses displayed in the left panel of Figure 6, I used Latinobarómetro's *Newspaper Frequency* item, which asks respondents, "How many days in the past week did you read news in a newspaper?" However, this indicator raises some validity concerns.

This section outlines two of these concerns and presents analyses that partially mitigate the validity issues identified below. Nevertheless, as I emphasize in subsection **I2.2**, the results presented in Figure 6 should be interpreted as suggestive and preliminary.

I1 Type of News Respondents Read in Newspapers

One concern with the *Newspaper Frequency* measure is that the Latinobarómetro survey does not provide information about the specific type of news that respondents report having read in newspapers. Thus, it is plausible that frequent newspaper readers in the data primarily consumed non-political content, such as sports or finances. If that is the case, then higher values of *Newspaper Frequency* would not reflect more information about politics, which complicates the interpretation of the left panel of Figure 6. While this is a reasonable concern, below I provide evidence suggesting that the *Newspaper Frequency* item is a valid measure of respondents' exposure to *political* newspaper content.

I1.1 Correlates of the *Newspaper Frequency* Measure

If Latinobarómetro respondents who are frequent newspaper consumers systematically read non-political news, then we would not expect a strong or systematic correlation between higher values of *Newspaper Frequency* and other measures of political sophistication. Yet, the correlation tests presented in **Figure I1.1** and **Table I1.1** indicate that *Newspaper Frequency* is positively and significantly associated with *Political Knowledge*, *Education*, *Political Interest*, and *Study Books* (a measure of how frequently respondents read books for professional or study purposes).[5]

Figure I1.1 and **Table I1.1** also display correlations between these indicators and other survey items similar to *Newspaper Frequency*: "How many hours a day do you generally spend watching television on weekdays?" (*TV Frequency*) and "How many hours a day do you generally spend listening to the radio on weekdays?" (*Radio Frequency*). Unlike *Newspaper Frequency*, *TV Frequency* and *Radio Frequency* are only weakly and statistically insignificantly associated with most proxies for political sophistication.[6] This provides some suggestive evidence that the type of content that Latinobarómetro respondents were exposed to when reading newspapers differed substantially from what they watched on TV or listened to on the radio.

[5] $p < 0.0001$ for all of bivariate correlation tests.

[6] **Table I1.1** shows that *TV Frequency* is negatively but insignificantly associated to any variable ($p > 0.14$); *Radio Frequency* is significantly but weakly correlated with *Newspaper Frequency* ($r = 0.009,\ p = 0.047$).

In sum, if measures of political knowledge, education, political interest, and frequency of reading professional or academic books are meaningful indicators of political sophistication, then the significant correlations between these indicators and *Newspaper Frequency* suggest that the latter is a reasonable measure of Latinobarómetro respondents' level of political awareness.

Figure I1.1: Correlation Plot



Table I1.1: Correlation Tests

Variable 1	Variable 2	Pearson's r	p-value
Newspaper Frequency	Political Knowledge	0.361	< 0.001
Newspaper Frequency	Education	0.279	< 0.001
Political Knowledge	Education	0.426	< 0.001
Newspaper Frequency	Political Interest	0.249	< 0.001
Political Knowledge	Political Interest	0.403	< 0.001
Education	Political Interest	0.284	< 0.001
Newspaper Frequency	Study Books	0.255	< 0.001
Political Knowledge	Study Books	0.416	< 0.001
Education	Study Books	0.507	< 0.001
Political Interest	Study Books	0.256	< 0.001
Newspaper Frequency	TV Frequency	-0.051	0.272
Political Knowledge	TV Frequency	-0.018	0.701
Education	TV Frequency	-0.054	0.244
Political Interest	TV Frequency	-0.002	0.972
Study Books	TV Frequency	-0.081	0.084
Newspaper Frequency	Radio Frequency	0.094	0.047
Political Knowledge	Radio Frequency	0.045	0.334
Education	Radio Frequency	0.013	0.786
Political Interest	Radio Frequency	0.055	0.239
Study Books	Radio Frequency	-0.023	0.623
TV Frequency	Radio Frequency	-0.020	0.670

I1.2 Patterns of Newspaper Consumption among Argentines

The conclusions of the previous subsection rely on correlation tests that do not directly scrutinize Latinobarómetro respondents' news consumption—we still do not know what type of news frequent newspaper readers consume. While I cannot answer this empirical question directly using the Latinobarómetro data, I can leverage newspaper consumption patterns from a national poll conducted in the first half of 2013. Specifically, the *2013 Survey on Cultural Consumption and the Digital Environment* (SInCA 2013*b*) provides data on newspaper readership among a sample of 3,574 Argentines aged 13 or older.[7] This study finds that 48% of newspaper consumers reported reading content about politics ("The entire newspaper," "National Politics," or "Opinion articles").[8] Based on my own analysis of the SInCA database, this estimate increases to approximately 52% among adults (18 or older).[9] In

[7]The full report is available at https://back.sinca.gob.ar/download.aspx?id=1213.
[8]In Argentinian newspapers, opinion (Op-ed) articles predominantly focus on politics.
[9]The SInCA database is available at https://datos.cultura.gob.ar/dataset/encuesta-nacional-de-consumos-culturales. I do not directly report the results of this analysis because the SInCA database does not include information about respondents' news consumption types, as reported in the SInCA (2013*b*) study.

contrast, only about 18% and 0.2% of Argentines watch or listen to political programs on TV and radio, respectively (SInCA 2013*a*; 2013*c*).

On the supply side, political content is predominant in Argentinian newspapers (Cabrera and Sotelo 2022). For example, Ardisana and Brítez (2022) analyzed the content of the three most salient, mass-circulation national newspapers in Argentina between 2013 and 2019. Their findings indicate that "politics" was the most significant and consistent thematic focus, accounting for an average of 48-55% of the total coverage (Ardisana and Brítez 2022, 82–85). These estimates were even higher during election years—in 2013, for instance, political news made up as much as 70% of one newspaper's content.

In sum, patterns of newspaper consumption in Argentina, combined with the prevalence of political content in major publications, suggest that newspapers are a key source of *political* information for Argentinian citizens.

I2 Biased Newspaper Coverage

Even if frequent newspaper readers focus on political news, newspapers in Argentina may not always serve as objective sources of information. In particular, media coverage of political events could shape the information to which frequent newspaper readers are exposed to. If this is the case, one might question whether the heterogeneous effects shown in Figure 6 in the main text result from biased media influence.

In this subsection, I first demonstrate that media freedom levels in Argentina are relatively high. I then discuss the possibility that ("biased") media framing influenced the results displayed in Figure 6 and explore its implications for how these findings should be interpreted.

I2.1 Media Freedom in Argentina

Figure I2.1 shows several indicators of freedom of expression and media in Argentina and other parts of the world using V-Dem data. These indicators include the *Freedom of Expression Index*, the extent to which major media represent a wide range of political perspectives (*Media Perspectives*), the degree of media bias against opposition parties or candidates (*Media Bias*), the proportion of major outlets that routinely criticize the government (*Media Critical*), the extent of self-censorship among journalists when reporting on issues that the government considers politically sensitive (*Media Self-Censorship*), and the degree to which the government attempts to censor the media (*Government Censorship Efforts*).[10]

However, while the study does not provide the *number* of respondents in each age cohort—only percentages—the raw database *does* include age cohort information. Using these cohort sizes and the percentages reported in SInCA (2013*b*), I computed more precise estimates of the proportion of adult respondents who reported reading political content in newspapers. The data and code to reproduce this analysis are available in the replication materials.

[10]Higher values indicate higher scores for each metric. For instance, higher *Media Bias* and *Media Critical* scores denote greater bias and criticism, respectively. Similarly, higher *Media Self-Censorship* and *Government Censorship Efforts* values reflect increased self- and government censorship, respectively. For further details about these measures, see V-Dem's Codebook (v14 - March 2024) at https://www.v-dem.net/documents/38/V-Dem_Codebook_v14.pdf.

Figure I2.1: Freedom of Expression and Press in Argentina



Note: The figure plots different indicators about freedom of expression and press from the Varieties of Democracies (V-Dem) project (Coppedge et al. 2024; Pemstein et al. 2024). The dashed line correspond to values of each indicator for Argentina. The other highlighted lines correspond to the mean values of each indicator for different regions worldwide. The light gray background lines correspond to all individual countries with data available for each indicator. The dark red vertical line marks the year 2013, when the *Rizzo* rulings were released.

The figure shows that media freedom in Argentina was relatively high in 2013. These values generally exceed those observed in other regions of the developing world and are often

comparable to those in advanced democracies. Collectively, these results mitigate concerns that newspaper coverage primarily reflects the influence of a co-opted media.

I2.2 Effects of Media Framing

High levels of press freedom and expression do not necessarily imply neutral newspaper coverage. In fact, in 2013, Argentinian newspapers offered varying viewpoints on the *Rizzo* rulings. The front pages shown in **SI B3** feature both positive and negative coverage of the rulings. **Figure I2.1**, in turn, indicates a broad spectrum of political perspectives among major media outlets in 2013. More generally, political news coverage in Argentina has become increasingly polarized over the past decade (Kitzberger 2023).

This raises a potential concern: if citizens tend to read newspapers that reinforce their political views (Kunda 1990; Taber and Lodge 2006; Knobloch-Westerwick, Mothes, and Polavin 2020), it is likely that Latinobarómetro's partisan respondents selected newspapers that either criticized or praised the court decisions. In this scenario, media coverage of the *Rizzo* rulings—rather than the rulings themselves—could influence public trust in the judiciary. Although the Latinobarómetro data do not specify which newspapers respondents engaged with, there is evidence suggesting that Argentines are more likely to read outlets closely aligned with their political preferences (Carimando and Núñez 2022; Ardisana and Brítez 2022). These insights complicate the interpretation of Figure 6 in the main text, making it difficult to disentangle the effect of the ruling from any impact that media framing may have had on respondents.

Unfortunately, data and design limitations prevent me from fully addressing this concern within the scope of this paper. While I recognize the challenges posed by this limitation, I discuss a few theoretical reasons why this issue may not fundamentally undermine the interpretation of Figure 6 proposed in the main text. However, it is important to emphasize that I am ultimately unable to completely isolate the effects of the Court rulings from media influence, and thus, the results presented in Figure 6 should be interpreted as preliminary and suggestive evidence.

First, that ("biased") media coverage could drive partisan reactions to the rulings is not theoretically inconsistent with my argument that judicial checks provide citizens with information about the political alignment of courts (what I refer to as "instrumental" in the main text). If both anti- and pro-government coverage share the characteristic of framing the judicial decisions in partisan terms (i.e., portraying the rulings as either positive or negative), then the information to which newspaper readers are exposed remains instrumental. In this context, concerns about media influence mainly affect the *generalizability* of the results (Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno, and Hernández 2020, 189–190).

Second, the presence of events triggered by the *Rizzo* rulings (such as non-neutral media framing) introduces a problem of imprecise treatment. In this case, the effects shown in Figure 6 can be interpreted as the *joint* effect of the unexpected event and the subsequent reactions (Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno, and Hernández 2020).

In conclusion, there are theoretical and methodological reasons to believe that the results presented in the main text's Figure 6 provide insight into the mechanism proposed in the paper. However, these findings are preliminary and suggestive, and the effects shown in Figure 6 should be interpreted conservatively as the joint effect of the *Rizzo* ruling and any influence of media coverage of the ruling.

J Concerns about the *Trust in the Judiciary* Measure

The Latinobarómetro survey item I use as the outcome variable is "trust" in the judiciary. As shown in **Table A2.1**, the question asks respondents: "*Please look at this card and tell me how much trust you have in each of the following groups/institutions: Judiciary. Would you say you have a lot (1), some (2), a little (3) or no trust (4)?*"

While this item appears as a valid measure of public support for judicial institutions, the measure raises questions about the extent to which respondents are expressing their attitudes about the judiciary writ large, rather than individual courts. This concern is especially relevant in the context of the study, as it is unclear which judicial institutions individuals have in mind amid the political events surrounding the 2013 Latinobarómetro survey in Argentina. In particular, it is possible that the outcome *Trust in the Judiciary* captures respondents' attitudes toward specific courts rather than the broader judiciary.

In this section, I discuss theoretical and empirical grounds that help mitigate concerns regarding the concept and measurement of the outcome variable. In particular, I underscore three key points from this section's discussion:

- Literature on institutional trust suggests that Latinobarómetro's trust in the judiciary item measures citizens' trust in the broader judicial institution ("system trust"), which is conceptually different from trust in specific courts ("organizational trust").
- Empirically, some of the most common measures of trust in the judiciary or justice system are related, but distinct concepts.
- Attitudes about democracy, the political system, and the executive predict trust in both specific courts and the broader judiciary, but only the latter is associated with measures of individuals' interaction with the judicial system. These findings support the idea that Latinobarómetro's trust item taps onto public beliefs about the judiciary writ large.

Unfortunately, data and design limitations prevent me from fully addressing this concern within the paper's design. None of the survey items I leverage in this section are available in the 2013 round of the Latinobarómetro survey in Argentina. Thus, I cannot ultimately empirically rule out the possibility that respondents' expressed trust in the judiciary reflects a spillover from their evaluations of specific courts. Nevertheless, the analyses reported in this section are consistent with the conceptualization proposed in the main text. At any event, readers should keep this concern in mind when evaluating the paper's argument.

J1 The Concept of Public Trust in the Judiciary

Work on trust defines this concept as a relationship between the trustor and the trustee. In the context of judicial institutions, Glavina and van Zimmeren (2025, 169) identify different levels of trustees, where "we can distinguish between individuals as trustees (individual judges, e.g., specific US Supreme Court justices), organisations as trustees (specific (specialised) courts or courts in general), or a system as a trustee (judicial or justice system)."

Glavina and van Zimmeren (2025) further argue that "organizational trust" (i.e., trust in specific courts) refers to the individual organization or institution, its representatives, and its features. "System trust" (i.e., trust in the judicial system) is *broader*, where citizens evaluate the trustworthiness of the system and not of a specific organization or people representing it—such as courts in general or a specific court.

In their meta-analysis of the literature, Glavina and van Zimmeren (2025) employ this conceptual framework to assess a variety of measures of trust in judicial institutions. Along with questions about trust in the legal system and justice system, the authors classify Latinobarómetro's *trust in the judiciary* as a measure of *system trust*—conceptually distinct from items alluding to specific tribunals (such as trust in the supreme or constitutional court) (Glavina and van Zimmeren 2025, 179).

In sum, research on trust in courts and the judicial system offers theoretical reasons to believe that Latinobarómetro's *Trust in the Judiciary* question likely measures respondents' attitudes about the judiciary as the *broader* institution or system. In the next subsection, I provide empirical evidence supporting this claim.

J2 Descriptive Evidence about Trust in the Judiciary/Justice System and Trust in Individual Courts

The conceptual framework discussed above yields two observable implications. First, system trust and organizational trust represent distinct constructs. Second, there should be some differences in the factors theoretically associated with these items. In this subsection, I leverage cross-national data from the Latinobarómetro and AmericasBarometer surveys, which include items measuring trust in both the broader judicial institution (i.e., the judiciary or justice system) as well as specific, individual courts.[11]

Table J2.1 presents bivariate correlations between trust in the judiciary/justice system, on one hand, and trust in specific courts.[12] The table reports Pearson's r by country as well as the pooled estimate. **Table J2.1** reveals two patterns. First, unsurprisingly, there is a positive association between "system" trust and "organizational" trust. Yet, second, despite these correlations, the items are not perfectly collinear—suggesting that the measures are related, but *distinct*.

[11] The data and code to reproduce this section's analyses are available in the replication materials.

[12] The AmericasBarometer "trust" items ask respondents, "To what extent do you trust the [Justice System; Supreme Courtl; Supreme Electoral Tribunal; Public Ministry]?" Answers are measured in a 7-point scale ranging from "Not al all" to "A lot." See questionnaires at https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/.

Table J2.1: Country and Pooled Correlations between Trust Items

	Latinobarómetro	**AmericasBarometer**			
	Judiciary Electoral Court	Justice System Electoral Court	Justice System High Court	Justice System Const. Court	Justice System Public Ministry
Argentina	0.44	0.642	0.65	–	–
Bahamas	–	–	–	–	–
Belize	–	0.522	0.46	–	0.439
Bolivia	0.317	0.508	0.634	0.481	–
Brazil	0.408	0.58	0.519	0.523	0.524
Canada	–	–	0.715	–	–
Chile	0.345	0.46	0.623	–	0.515
Colombia	0.388	0.571	0.528	0.509	0.505
Costa Rica	0.465	0.502	0.562	0.41	0.451
Dominican Republic	0.391	0.42	0.569	–	0.49
Ecuador	0.44	0.563	0.558	0.441	0.524
El Salvador	0.471	0.497	0.54	–	0.554
Grenada	–	–	–	–	–
Guatemala	0.39	0.544	0.523	0.467	0.503
Guyana	–	0.506	0.606	–	0.559
Haiti	–	0.473	0.418	–	0.339
Honduras	0.433	0.553	0.532	–	0.492
Jamaica	–	0.465	0.54	–	0.464
Mexico	0.403	0.507	0.552	0.475	0.669
Nicaragua	0.466	0.559	0.559	–	0.414
Panama	0.349	0.525	0.586	–	0.581
Paraguay	0.454	0.635	0.578	–	0.559
Peru	0.302	0.454	0.554	0.449	0.509
Spain	0.383	–	–	–	–
Suriname	–	0.451	0.555	–	–
Trinidad and Tobago	–	0.516	0.636	–	–
United States of America	–	–	0.617	–	–
Uruguay	0.437	0.556	0.674	–	0.699
Venezuela	0.58	0.644	0.704	–	0.632
Pooled	0.448	0.537	0.6	0.489	0.528

In addition to the bivariate correlations, I employed these data to examine the determinants of trust in the judicial system and specific courts. If citizens' trust in the judiciary and judicial system are conceptually distinct from public trust in specific courts, then we should see some differences in the factors predicting these items. Specifically, given the theoretical discussion above, one would expect that trust in the judiciary/justice system will be associated with similar factors assumed to explain trust in specific courts. Yet, since trust in the broader judicial institutions involves evaluations of the system beyond specific courts, we should also expect some variables to be associated with system trust, but not with organizational trust. One such candidate is individuals' interaction with the judiciary: scholars have suggested that citizens' actual experiences and contact with the judicial system influences their trust in the broader judicial institution Glavina and van Zimmeren (2025); Bühlmann and Kunz (2011); Salzman and Ramsey (2013); De Micheli and Taylor (2024).

Table J2.2 reports the results of estimating linear models where the dependent variable is trust in a broader institution (the judiciary or justice system) or a specific court. The predictors include measures of respondents' interaction with the judiciary and attitudes about the judicial system, as well as measures of individuals' support for democracy, the executive, and the political system.[13] The models include basic demographic controls and compute standard errors clustered by region-survey year.

The table indicates that support for democracy, attitudes about the political system, and approval of the executive are positively and statistically associated with trust in both the judicial system and the specific courts. However, trust in the broader judicial institutions is also related to measures of individuals' experience with the system. For instance, Model 1 indicates that a negative experience involving bribery in the courts is associated with lower trust in the judiciary, compared to individuals with no contact with the justice system. Similarly, experiencing recent contact with courts decreases trust in the justice system, all other things equal (Model 2). Importantly, this coefficient is *not* statistically associated with trust in specific courts.

Other attitudes about the broader judicial system—such as believing that there is equal opportunities for access to justice or that the judicial system punishes the guilty—help explain variation in trust in the judiciary. Finally, individuals who think that courts guarantee a fair trial tend to increase their organizational and system trust, although the relationship is stronger with the latter.

All things considered, there are theoretical and empirical reasons supporting the idea that Latinobarómetro's question about trust in the judiciary measures citizens' meaningful beliefs about the broader judicial institution.

[13]Unfortunately, the judiciary-related items were not asked in the 2013 round of the Latinobarómetro survey, which hinders my ability to use this information to better substantiate these concerns within the paper's design.

Table J2.2: Determinants of Trust in Judiciary/Judicial System and Individual Courts

	Broader Institutions		**Individual Courts**	
	Judiciary	Justice System	High Court	Electoral Court
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democratic Support				
Democracy Preferable	0.029***	0.007	0.008	0.007
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Support for Democracy	0.069***	0.027*	0.076***	0.053***
	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Support for Incumbent				
Approval of Executive	0.137***	0.071***	0.176***	0.070***
	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Evaluation of Political System				
Respect for Political System		0.100***	0.119***	0.109***
		(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Proud of Political System		0.166***	0.104***	0.164***
		(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Support for Political System		0.144***	0.121***	0.168***
		(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Experiential Judgements				
Experience with Courts (ref.: No Contact)				
Bribe	−0.040*			
	(0.017)			
No Bribe	−0.004			
	(0.007)			
Contact with Courts Last 12 Months		−0.027*	−0.013	0.00004
		(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Evaluation of Judicial System				
Equal Access to Justice	0.081***			
	(0.007)			
Judicial System Punishes Guilty	0.129***			
	(0.013)			
Courts Guarantee a Fair Trial		0.398***	0.276***	0.178***
		(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Constant	0.115***	0.035	0.060	0.040
	(0.017)	(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.042)
Demographic Controls?	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	15,011	6,588	6,397	6,457
Adjusted R^2	0.123	0.427	0.343	0.326

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by region-survey year. Demographic Controls: *Age*, *Sex*, *Education*, *Income* (all models), *Race/Ethnicity*, *Size of Place* (models 2-4). $^{+}p < 0.1$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

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