Appendix

Divided We Unite:

The Nature of Partyism and the Role of Coalition Partnership in Europe

A Information about the Survey 2

A.1 Ethical Considerations 2

A.2 Summary Statistics 2

B Experimental Design 3

C Construction of Key Variables and Descriptive Statistics 5

D Full Model Results 9

E Additional Analyses 14

E.1 Societal divides 14

E.2 Feeling Thermometer 15

F Robustness 17

F.1 Controlling for Ideological Proximity 17

F.2 The Role of Partisan-Ideological Alignment 18

F.3 Alternative Measure of Country-Level Polarization 20

F.4 The Role of Economic Inequality 21

F.5 The Role of Immigration 222

G Survey Questions 24

References 25

A Information about the Survey

A.1 Ethical Considerations

The study was reviewed and approved by the ethics committee of the University of Mannheim (EC Mannheim 67/2022) and the data were collected in full compliance with the European General Data Protection Regulation. Participation in the survey was completely voluntary and participants were incentivized by monetary compensation (such as gift cards and reward points) whose values range from 1.9 EUR to 3.4 EUR, considering prices, recruitment strategies and costs of each country, for their 15-minute participation.

Before respondents started answering survey questions, they were informed that the survey is part of a scientific project. Through the informed consent document, we provided the information about the researcher (name, affiliation, and contact information), the general purpose of the research, how long on average the survey lasts, and assurance of anonymity of responses and security of the data storage. We also stated that their participation is completely voluntary and that they could withdraw from the survey any time they want. The surveys proceeded only after getting the consent of potential participants. At the end of the survey, we also debriefed them by stating that the content used in the experiments may not be based on facts. The authors affirm, to their best knowledge, that this study adheres to the APSA's *Principles and Guidance on Human Subjects Research*.

A.2 Summary Statistics

TABLE A1: Sample Breakdown by Age

Country	18 to 29		30 to 39		40 to 49		50 to 59		60 plus		Sum	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Austria	207	16.42	201	15.94	258	20.46	292	23.16	303	24.03	1261	100.00
Belgium	243	18.71	140	10.78	201	15.47	265	20.40	450	34.64	1299	100.00
Bulgaria	120	12.27	218	22.29	246	25.15	266	27.20	128	13.09	978	100.00
Croatia	211	17.24	277	22.63	299	24.43	294	24.02	143	11.68	1224	100.00
Czechia	177	15.69	195	17.29	200	17.73	252	22.34	304	26.95	1128	100.00
Denmark	196	16.51	117	9.86	170	14.32	236	19.88	468	39.43	1187	100.00
Estonia	126	13.38	153	16.24	218	23.14	288	30.57	157	16.67	942	100.00
Finland	193	16.75	186	16.15	222	19.27	245	21.27	306	26.56	1152	100.00
France	197	17.33	196	17.24	254	22.34	236	20.76	254	22.34	1137	100.00
Germany	220	18.66	165	13.99	235	19.93	236	20.02	323	27.40	1179	100.00
Greece	128	11.20	301	26.33	379	33.16	234	20.47	101	8.84	1143	100.00
Hungary	112	11.44	176	17.98	190	19.41	187	19.10	314	32.07	979	100.00
Ireland	214	20.52	215	20.61	204	19.56	184	17.64	226	21.67	1043	100.00
Italy	183	15.87	208	18.04	252	21.86	205	17.78	305	26.45	1153	100.00
Latvia	166	14.52	251	21.96	288	25.20	298	26.07	140	12.25	1143	100.00
Lithuania	364	29.00	264	21.04	263	20.96	260	20.72	104	8.29	1255	100.00
Netherlands	199	16.49	136	11.27	205	16.98	237	19.64	430	35.63	1207	100.00
Poland	351	29.52	279	23.47	198	16.65	186	15.64	175	14.72	1189	100.00
Portugal	217	18.42	272	23.09	269	22.84	223	18.93	197	16.72	1178	100.00
Romania	239	16.44	369	25.38	387	26.62	284	19.53	175	12.04	1454	100.00
Slovakia	225	17.40	240	18.56	286	22.12	290	22.43	252	19.49	1293	100.00
Slovenia	169	15.08	236	21.05	244	21.77	258	23.02	214	19.09	1121	100.00
Spain	232	16.90	319	23.23	341	24.84	287	20.90	194	14.13	1373	100.00
Sweden	194	15.65	152	12.26	183	14.76	275	22.18	436	35.16	1240	100.00
UK	205	16.35	174	13.88	228	18.18	220	17.54	427	34.05	1254	100.00
Sum	5088	17.24	5440	18.43	6220	21.08	6238	21.14	6526	22.11	29512	100.00

TABLE A2: Sample Breakdown by Gender

Country	Female		Male		Other		Sum	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Austria	630	49.33	645	50.51	2	0.16	1277	100.00
Belgium	574	43.98	729	55.86	2	0.15	1305	100.00
Bulgaria	518	52.75	463	47.15	1	0.10	982	100.00
Croatia	694	55.97	545	43.95	1	0.08	1240	100.00
Czechia	618	54.45	515	45.37	2	0.18	1135	100.00
Denmark	508	42.33	690	57.50	2	0.17	1200	100.00
Estonia	611	64.72	331	35.06	2	0.21	944	100.00
Finland	567	48.88	586	50.52	7	0.60	1160	100.00
France	594	51.38	562	48.62	0	0.00	1156	100.00
Germany	597	50.25	587	49.41	4	0.34	1188	100.00
Greece	572	49.27	588	50.65	1	0.09	1161	100.00
Hungary	492	49.90	493	50.00	1	0.10	986	100.00
Ireland	577	54.38	481	45.33	3	0.28	1061	100.00
Italy	569	48.55	603	51.45	0	0.00	1172	100.00
Latvia	733	63.85	415	36.15	0	0.00	1148	100.00
Lithuania	803	63.48	462	36.52	0	0.00	1265	100.00
Netherlands	577	47.26	642	52.58	2	0.16	1221	100.00
Poland	658	54.92	540	45.08	0	0.00	1198	100.00
Portugal	593	49.96	593	49.96	1	0.08	1187	100.00
Romania	641	43.31	837	56.55	2	0.14	1480	100.00
Slovakia	746	57.52	550	42.41	1	0.08	1297	100.00
Slovenia	566	49.87	569	50.13	0	0.00	1135	100.00
Spain	718	51.43	677	48.50	1	0.07	1396	100.00
Sweden	602	48.01	648	51.67	4	0.32	1254	100.00
UK	641	50.12	635	49.65	3	0.23	1279	100.00
Sum	15399	51.63	14386	48.23	42	0.14	29827	100.00

B Experimental Design

Before the dictator game, we presented the respondents with the following background information and instruction.

This game is played by pairs of individuals. Each pair is made up of a Player 1 and a Player 2. Each player will have some information about the other player, but you will not be told who the other players are during or after the experiment.

The game is conducted as follows: A sum of 10 tokens will be provisionally allocated to Player 1 at the start of each round. Player 1 will then decide how much of the 10 tokens to offer to player 2. Player 1 could give some, all, or none of the 10 tokens. Player 1 keeps all tokens not given to player 2. Player 2 gets to keep all the tokens Player 1 offers.

You will play this game three times with three different people.

Respondents then received a tabular overview over Player 2:

FIGURE B1: Player 2 Profile Example

	Player 2
Nationality	United Kingdom
Age	18
Party Affiliation	Labour Party (Labour)
Gender	Female
Religion	Muslim
Social Class	Middle Class

So put the number of tokens you wish to keep in the box labeled "Player 1." Put the tokens you wish to go to Player 2 in the box labeled "Player 2."

Player 1 (You)	0 Token(s)
Player 2	0 Token(s)
Total	0 Token(s)

Before the trust game, we presented the following background information and instruction.

This game is played by pairs of individuals. Each pair is made up of a Player 1 and a Player 2. Each player will have some information about the other player, but you will not be told who the other players are during or after the experiment.

Each player will receive 10 tokens. Player 1 then has the opportunity to give a portion of his or her 10 tokens to Player 2. Player 1 could give some, all, or none of the 10 tokens. Whatever amount Player 1 decides to give to Player 2 will be tripled before it is passed on to Player 2. Player 2 then has the option of returning any portion of this tripled amount to Player 1.

Then, the game is over.

Player 1 receives whatever he or she keeps from their original 10 tokens, plus anything returned to him or her by Player 2. Player 2 receives their original 10 tokens, plus whatever he or she keeps after returning any portion of the tripled amount to Player 1.

You will play this game three times, with three different people.

The more tokens you obtain, the more successful you will be.

We will now run through 3 examples to show you how the game might be played.

Example 1
Imagine that Player 1 gives 4 tokens to Player 2. We triple this amount, so Player 2 gets 12 tokens (3 times 4 tokens equals 12 tokens). At this point, Player 1 has 6 tokens. Then Player 2 has to decide whether to give any portion of this tripled amount (12 tokens) back to Player 1, and if so, how much.

Suppose Player 2 decides to return 3 tokens to Player 1. At the end of the game Player 1 will have 9 tokens and Player 2 will have his or her original 10 tokens, plus 9 tokens (the amount Player 2 keeps for himself or herself).

Example 2
Imagine that Player 1 gives 3 tokens to Player 2. We triple this amount, so Player 2 gets 9 tokens (3 times 3 tokens equals 9 tokens). At this point, Player 1 has 7 tokens. Then Player 2 has to decide whether to give any portion of this tripled amount (9 tokens) back to Player 1, and if so, how much.

Suppose Player 2 decides to return 0 tokens to Player 1. At the end of the game Player 1 will have 7 tokens and Player 2 will have his or her original 10 tokens, plus 9 tokens (the amount Player 2 keeps for himself or herself).

Example 3
Imagine that Player 1 gives 10 tokens to Player 2. We triple this amount, so Player 2 gets 30 tokens (3 times 10 tokens equals 30 tokens). At this point, Player 1 has 0 tokens. Then Player 2 has to decide whether to give any portion of this tripled amount (30 tokens) back to Player 1, and if so, how much.

Suppose Player 2 decides to return 3 tokens to Player 1. At the end of the game Player 1 will have 3 tokens and Player 2 will have his or her original 10 tokens, plus 27 tokens (the amount Player 2 keeps for himself or herself).

Again, respondents received information on Player 2 in tabular form (see Figure B1 above).

C Construction of Key Variables and Descriptive Statistics

Randomized profiles are coded according to whether they represent the respondent's in- or out-group, using information that respondent provided before:

Gender: male (female) respondents are coded to perceive a female (male) Player 2 as out-group. Respondents who indicate gender "Other" cannot be coded easily and are "dummied out" with a separate indicator.

Age: we code respondents according to their belonging to five age groups: 18-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60 plus. The age of Player 2 was randomly selected to be 18, 30, 42, 53, or 65 years old. We code in-group when respondents are matched with a Player 2 from the same age bracket, and otherwise out-group.

Class: Respondents indicate their subjective belonging to a social class on a hierarchical scale, covering "The working class of society," "The lower middle class of society," "The middle class of society," "The upper middle class of society" and "The higher class of society." We collapse the three middle categories into "Middle Class," creating a three-fold distinction that parallels the set from which we select Player 2's class, "Lower Class," "Middle Class" or "Upper Class." A Player 2 from the same social class is coded as in-group, from a different social class as out-group.

Religion: Respondents could select from a detailed battery of religious beliefs. The religion of Player 2 was randomly selected from a set including "Catholic," "Protestant," "Muslim," and "No Religion." A Player 2 with the same belief as a Catholic, Protestant or Muslim respondent are coded as in-group. A Player 2 with beliefs different from the respondent are coded as out-group, for example Catholic

respondents matched with a Protestant or Muslim Player 2, or one with "No religion." Respondents that are neither Catholic, Protestant nor Muslim are indicated with a separate dummy ("Other religion"). Similarly, atheist or agnostic respondents, or respondents who "don't know" are indicated with a separate indicator ("Non-believer").

Nationality: For each of the 25 countries in which we fielded the survey, we only allow nationals of that country to participate. Nationality of Player 2 is randomly selected to be co-national (e.g., "Ireland" for respondents in Ireland), EU-national or non-EU national.

Partisanship: Respondents indicate their partisanship by answering a question which party they feel close to. Depending on the answer, we randomly generate the partisanship of Player 2. Randomization was adjusted such that in expectation, there is a 50% chance for Player 2 to have the same partisanship (co-partisan), and 50% chance to be identify with another party from the top 8 parties in the country at that time (out-partisan), based on recent electoral results, polling numbers, and relevance to the research question (Eurosceptic parties).

Table C1 summarizes descriptive information on key variables of the survey experiment.

TABLE C1: Descriptive Overview over Variables from the Survey Experiment

Variable		**N**	**%**
Tokens for Player 2 (DV)	Mean = 3.39, SD = 2.40	178,936	100
Gender	In Group	89,121	49.8
	Out Group	89,563	50.1
	Respondent: Other gender	252	0.1
	Sum	178,936	100
Age	In-Group	35,291	19.7
	Out-Group	143,645	80.3
	Sum	178,936	100
Class	In-Group	57,551	32.2
	Out-Group	113,945	63.7
	Respondent: Don't know	7,440	4.2
	Sum	178,936	100
Religion	In-Group	19,807	11.1
	Out-Group	59,595	33.3
	Respondent: Other religion	35,406	19.8
	Respondent: Non-believer	64,128	38.8
	Sum	178,936	100
Nationality	In-Group	121,927	68.1
	Out-Group	57,009	31.9
	Sum	178,936	100
Partisanship	In-Group	30,835	17.2
	Out-Group	66,766	37.3
	Control-Group (No information provided)	24,326	13.6
	Respondent: Non-partisan	57,009	31.9
	Sum	178,936	100

Note: Level of analysis is respondent-round level

Next, we describe the construction of one key independent variable in the multi-level model: To estimate the effect of coalition partnership (and coalition experience) on the allocation of tokens, we constructed different versions of this measure. When Player 2 shares the respondent's partisan affiliation (co-partisan), we employ measures that identify whether the respondent's party is member of (or has experience of) a coalition government. When Player 2 has a party affiliation different from the respondent's (out-partisan), we employ measures that identify whether the respondent's party is a coalition partner of (or has coalition experience with) that specific out-party.

The distribution of coalition experience is presented in Table C2. It shows the distribution of years that parties spend in coalition governments. The distribution of observations has a clear skew, due to the fact that most parties in our dataset never formed a (coalition) government. For the distribution of years spent with a particular coalition partner, the skew is even more pronounced. This reflects the fact that parties govern with changing coalition partners and some party dyads never formed a coalition government (e.g., the left-wing Podemos and the right-wing Vox in Spain).

TABLE C2: Coalition Partnership of Political Parties

	Years in Coalition Government		Years with Coalition Partner	
Years	Number of Parties		Number of Party-Dyads†	
0-2	233	67.7%	99	32.2%
3-5	46	13.4%	110	35.8%
6-8	21	6.1%	59	19.2%
9-11	22	6.4%	32	10.4%
>=12	22	6.5%	7	2.2%
Sum	344	100%	307	100%

† Note: There are 2490 party-dyads that never formed a coalition government.

Figure C1 allows for a closer inspection of these distributions, plotting the top 25 in terms of parties spending time in coalition government and party-dyads with most time governing together, respectively. The Austrian ÖVP, the Belgian O-VLD and the Estonian ER are among the parties with most coalition experience since 2000. In terms of coalition partners, the Belgian O-VLD and the Mouvement Reformateur spent most time with each other in a government coalition, followed by the O-VLD together with the Parti Socialiste. Note that the order of parties in each dyad is arbitrary. Each dyad is counted only once.

FIGURE C1: Distribution of Coalition Experience since 2000 (Top 25)



Finally, Table C3 offers an overview over dependent and independent variables in the multilevel model.

TABLE C3: Descriptive Information for Dependent and Independent Variables

	Min	Mean	Max	N
Tokens for Player 2	0	3.52	10	77,456
Co-Partisan	0	0.40	1	77,456
Out-Partisan	0	0.40	1	77,456
Coalition Partner (Co-Partisan)	0	0.24	1	77,456
Coalition Partner (Out-Partisan)	0	0.03	1	77,456
Coalition Experience (Co-Partisan, in Years)	0	4.29	19.43	77,456
Experience with Coalition Partner (Out-Partisan, in Years)	0	0.35	14.67	77,456
Average District Magnitude (logged)	0	2.12	5.01	77,456
Effective Number of Parties	2.39	4.73	9.70	77,456
Elite Polarization (Dalton 2008)	2.45	5.21	15.74	77,456
Elite Polarization (Maoz & Somer-Topcu 2009)	0.22	0.37	0.53	77,456
Controls:				
Female	0	0.47	1	77,456
Age	18	47.16	88	76,546
Education	0	21.36	30	74,357
Left-Right Distance (Current)	0	9.01	84.71	64,048
Left-Right Distance (since 2000)	0	8.58	70.18	64,623
Left-Right Partisan-Ideological Alignment	-10	2.26	10	45,718
Population size (in Million)	1.30	21.97	83.10	77,456
GDP per capita (in thousand Euros)	8.78	30.10	72.26	77,456
Gini coefficient	24.2	31.14	40.40	77,456

D Full Model Results

Table D1 shows the full model table underlying Figure 2 in the main manuscript.

Table D1: Effects of Identity Attributes on Allocations to Player 2 (Results of HLMs)

	Dependent variable:	
	Tokens for Player 2	
	Dictator Game	Trust Game
	(1)	(2)
Gender: Out-Group	-0.009 (0.013)	0.003 (0.013)
(Respondent: Other Gender)	0.378 (0.282)	0.068 (0.306)
Age: Out-Group	-0.071** (0.016)	-0.058** (0.017)
Class: Out-Group	-0.118** (0.014)	-0.128** (0.015)
(Respondent: Don't Know Class)	-0.011 (0.054)	-0.079 (0.059)
Religion: Out-Group	-0.435** (0.023)	-0.508** (0.023)
(Respondent: Other Religion)	-0.275** (0.039)	-0.367** (0.042)
(Respondent: Non-Believer)	-0.337** (0.030)	-0.342** (0.032)
Nationality: Out-Group	-0.123** (0.027)	-0.144** (0.028)
Partisanship: Out-Group	-0.986** (0.022)	-1.057** (0.022)
(Respondent: No PID)	-0.074* (0.030)	-0.079* (0.032)
Partisanship: Control Group * (Respondent: No PID)	0.011 (0.043)	-0.009 (0.045)
Partisanship: Out-Group * (Respondent: No PID)	0.134** (0.032)	0.204** (0.033)
Round 2	0.013 (0.014)	-0.014 (0.014)
Round 3	0.057** (0.014)	0.006 (0.014)
Subset Condition 1	-0.022 (0.015)	-0.043** (0.015)
Subset Condition 2	0.511** (0.028)	0.545** (0.029)
Constant	3.924** (0.053)	4.059** (0.053)
SD Respondent-level	1.541	1.706
SD Country-level	0.187	0.176
Conditional R-Squared	0.469	0.504
Observations	89,466	89,470
Respondents	29,826	29,826
Countries	25	25

Notes: SD indicates the estimate of the standard deviation of the random intercept.
$^{+}$ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01

We seek to utilize the whole sample and make generalizable inferences about the relative importance of social divides based on gender, age, class or religion. Roughly two thirds of our respondents report to be partisan (18,937 respondents), while one third reports to be non-partisan (10,890 respondents). Compared to other social divides, the partisan divide is relevant only for partisans. We therefore separate partisan from non-partisan respondents through an interaction effect (e.g., *Partisanship: Out-Group * (Respondent: No PID)*). The main effect of *Partisanship: Out-Group* can be interpreted as the effect of affective polarization among partisans, which is the quantity of interest.

Our models include controls to address the scenarios of interest and the implausible cases. *Subset Condition 1* is a dummy variable that indicates a subset of decision-making games in which respondents receive information about Player 2's group attributes that are the topic of this study. The results reported here were part of a larger data collection effort designed to address political divides in Europe and in a subset of decision-making games where we display Player 2 as an EU national, we randomly display

additional information about Player 2 (EU identity), which is explored in a separate study. *Subset Condition 2* is another dummy indicator for whether partisanship information is shown. As explained in the manuscript, partisanship could only be shown when Player 2 is a co-national. To take into account that respondents play three rounds of decision-making games, we include a respondent-level random intercept and fixed effects for each round.

Table D2 shows the model table underlying Figure 4 in the manuscript. Note that the focus here is on co-national profiles where information about the partisanship of Player 2 may either be shown or not. *Subset Condition 2* therefore is dropped.

Table D2: In-Group Favoritism and Out-Group Derogation (Results of HLMs)

	Dependent variable:	
	Tokens for Player 2	
	Dictator Game	Trust Game
	(1)	(2)
Pl 2: Partisanship In-Group	0.524** (0.033)	0.599** (0.035)
Pl 2: Partisanship Out-Group	-0.470** (0.033)	-0.454** (0.034)
Pl 2 Age: 30	0.085* (0.034)	0.061+ (0.035)
Pl 2 Age: 42	0.079* (0.034)	0.136** (0.035)
Pl 2 Age: 53	0.093** (0.034)	0.112** (0.035)
Pl 2 Age: 65	0.041 (0.034)	0.042 (0.035)
Pl 2: Male	-0.081** (0.021)	-0.102** (0.022)
Pl 2: Low Class	-0.013 (0.026)	-0.008 (0.027)
Pl 2: High Class	-0.118** (0.026)	-0.161** (0.027)
Pl 2: Catholic	-0.028 (0.030)	-0.039 (0.031)
Pl 2: Protestant	-0.136** (0.030)	-0.141** (0.031)
Pl 2: Muslim	-0.619** (0.030)	-0.659** (0.031)
Subset Condition 1	-0.062* (0.025)	-0.120** (0.026)
Round 2	0.025 (0.024)	-0.011 (0.024)
Round 3	0.109** (0.024)	0.034 (0.024)
Constant	3.678** (0.058)	3.795** (0.056)
SD Respondent-level	1.448	1.624
SD Country-level	0.184	0.153
Conditional R-Squared	0.428	0.469
Observations	38,656	38,800
Respondents	18,406	18,402
Countries	25	25

Notes: SD indicates the estimate of the standard deviation of the random intercept.
+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

TABLE D3: In-Group Favoritism and Out-Group Derogation Across Countries

	Dictator Game			Trust Game		
	Difference in tokens (Compared to Control Group)		|Out-group| – |In-group|	Difference in tokens (Compared to Control Group)		|Out-group| – |In-group|
Country	In-Group	Out-Group		In-Group	Out-Group	
Austria	0.28 (-0.06, 0.63)	-0.78 (-1.13, -0.39)	0.49 (-0.16, 1.15)	0.41 (0.05, 0.77)	-0.66 (-1.03, -0.29)	0.25 (-0.43, 0.92)
Belgium	0.59 (0.29, 0.89)	-0.63 (-0.92, -0.35)	0.04 (-0.51, 0.58)	0.70 (0.40, 1.01)	-0.51 (-0.79, -0.23)	-0.19 (-0.71, 0.37)
Bulgaria	0.41 (0.01, 0.84)	-0.29 (-0.66, 0.08)	-0.12 (-0.81, 0.61)	0.73 (0.30, 1.17)	-0.31 (-0.73, 0.11)	-0.42 (-1.23, 0.37)
Croatia	0.15 (-0.21, 0.51)	-0.91 (-1.26, -0.56)	0.76 (0.11, 1.42)	0.58 (0.24, 0.94)	-0.63 (-0.97, -0.30)	0.05 (-0.57, 0.69)
Czechia	0.59 (0.27, 0.91)	-0.76 (-1.06, -0.42)	0.17 (-0.44, 0.74)	0.81 (0.46, 1.16)	-0.44 (-0.81, -0.10)	-0.37 (-1.00, 0.29)
Denmark	0.55 (0.28, 0.82)	-0.28 (-0.56, 0.01)	-0.27 (-0.78, 0.27)	0.52 (0.24, 0.80)	-0.52 (-0.77, -0.25)	0.00 (-0.51, 0.52)
Estonia	0.44 (0.07, 0.82)	-0.36 (-0.70, -0.01)	-0.08 (-0.75, 0.62)	0.53 (0.15, 0.92)	-0.26 (-0.64, 0.12)	-0.27 (-0.98, 0.43)
Finland	0.55 (0.25, 0.86)	-0.32 (-0.61, -0.01)	-0.23 (-0.81, 0.32)	0.72 (0.37, 1.09)	-0.26 (-0.60, 0.09)	-0.47 (-1.13, 0.18)
France	0.88 (0.52, 1.25)	-0.28 (-0.64, 0.07)	-0.60 (-1.27, 0.06)	1.17 (0.81, 1.51)	-0.22 (-0.57, 0.16)	-0.95 (-1.61,-0.32)
Germany	0.28 (-0.04, 0.63)	-0.47 (-0.81, -0.15)	0.19 (-0.46, 0.80)	0.44 (0.08, 0.78)	-0.48 (-0.82, -0.14)	0.04 (-0.59, 0.67)
Greece	0.29 (0.01, 0.58)	-0.60 (-0.90, -0.31)	0.31 (-0.23, 0.83)	0.55 (0.29, 0.83)	-0.62 (-0.88, -0.36)	0.07 (-0.42, 0.53)
Hungary	0.73 (0.39, 1.06)	-0.75 (-1.09, -0.41)	0.02 (-0.62, 0.64)	0.77 (0.42, 1.13)	-0.63 (-1.03, -0.26)	-0.14 (-0.79, 0.56)
Ireland	0.28 (-0.08, 0.66)	-0.34 (-0.69, -0.01)	0.06 (-0.58, 0.77)	0.53 (0.15, 0.90)	-0.23 (-0.59, 0.14)	-0.30 (-0.97, 0.38)
Italy	0.67 (0.38, 0.97)	-0.35 (-0.63, -0.07)	-0.31 (-0.85, 0.22)	0.70 (0.37, 0.99)	-0.39 (-0.71, -0.09)	-0.31 (-0.87, 0.28)
Latvia	0.54 (0.11, 0.97)	-0.37 (-0.77, 0.03)	-0.17 (-0.95, 0.61)	1.08 (0.66, 1.52)	-0.21 (-0.65, 0.23)	-0.87 (-1.66, -0.06)
Lithuania	0.40 (0.03, 0.78)	-0.57 (-0.94, -0.21)	0.18 (-0.50, 0.86)	0.59 (0.21, 0.98)	-0.30 (-0.69, 0.08)	-0.28 (-1.00, 0.38)
Netherlands	0.85 (0.56, 1.14)	-0.27 (-0.57, 0.06)	-0.58 (-1.15, -0.02)	0.86 (0.52, 1.19)	-0.40 (-0.70, -0.08)	-0.46 (-1.04, 0.12)
Poland	0.70 (0.40, 0.99)	-0.25 (-0.55, 0.04)	-0.45 (-0.98, 0.10)	0.51 (0.22, 0.84)	-0.49 (-0.78, -0.21)	-0.02 (-0.55, 0.52)
Portugal	0.49 (0.21, 0.77)	-0.17 (-0.47, 0.11)	-0.33 (-0.83, 0.22)	-0.02 (-0.30, 0.27)	-0.58 (-0.86, -0.31)	0.59 (0.07, 1.09)
Romania	0.63 (0.32, 0.95)	-0.38 (-0.69, -0.07)	-0.25 (-0.82, 0.32)	0.68 (0.37, 1.01)	-0.42 (-0.72, -0.13)	-0.26 (-0.83, 0.31)
Slovakia	0.72 (0.40, 1.04)	-0.42 (-0.72, -0.11)	-0.30 (-0.87, 0.30)	1.01 (0.65, 1.38)	-0.19 (-0.54, 0.16)	-0.83 (-1.46, -0.18)
Slovenia	0.40 (0.07, 0.73)	-0.58 (-0.92, -0.24)	0.19 (-0.42, 0.81)	0.28 (-0.07, 0.61)	-0.52 (-0.87, -0.17)	0.24 (-0.37, 0.88)
Spain	0.54 (0.26, 0.82)	-0.64 (-0.93, -0.37)	0.10 (-0.40, 0.62)	0.23 (-0.06, 0.53)	-0.56 (-0.85, -0.27)	0.33 (-0.21, 0.84)
Sweden	0.46 (0.18, 0.73)	-0.21 (-0.49, 0.06)	-0.25 (-0.76, 0.28)	0.41 (0.11, 0.70)	-0.48 (-0.77, -0.16)	0.07 (-0.50, 0.59)
United Kingdom	0.47 (0.14, 0.80)	-0.60 (-0.93, -0.26)	0.13 (-0.49, 0.75)	0.67 (0.32, 1.02)	-0.43 (-0.77, -0.07)	-0.24 (-0.88, 0.44)

Note: 95% confidence intervals are shown in parentheses.

Tables D4 and D5 show the full models that we presented in abbreviated form in the manuscript (Tables 1 and 2).

Table D4: Current Coalition Partnership (Full Results of HLMs)

	Dependent variable:			
	Tokens for Player 2			
	Dictator Game		Trust Game	
	Co-Partisan	Out-Partisan	Co-Partisan	Out-Partisan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Coalition Partner	-0.196** (0.049)	0.284** (0.088)	-0.210** (0.053)	0.157+ (0.088)
Average District Magnitude (logged)	0.046 (0.041)	0.023 (0.047)	-0.0001 (0.042)	-0.030 (0.044)
Effective Number of Parties	0.043 (0.031)	0.004 (0.036)	0.054+ (0.032)	0.026 (0.033)
Elite Polarization	0.022 (0.018)	-0.011 (0.020)	0.006 (0.018)	-0.020 (0.019)
Wealth (GDP per capita, in thousand Euros)	0.0001 (0.003)	0.007+ (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)
Population size (in Million)	0.004+ (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Female	-0.102* (0.041)	0.042 (0.042)	-0.277** (0.044)	-0.155** (0.045)
Age	-0.008** (0.001)	-0.016** (0.001)	-0.008** (0.001)	-0.019** (0.002)
Education	-0.005 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.007 (0.005)	0.009+ (0.005)
Pl 2 Age: 30 (Reference: 18)	0.106+ (0.055)	0.036 (0.057)	0.020 (0.059)	-0.00003 (0.059)
Pl 2 Age: 42	0.101+ (0.055)	0.048 (0.057)	0.134* (0.059)	0.093 (0.058)
Pl 2 Age: 53	0.104+ (0.055)	0.109+ (0.057)	0.093 (0.060)	0.101+ (0.059)
Pl 2 Age: 65	0.038 (0.055)	0.029 (0.057)	-0.009 (0.060)	0.031 (0.058)
Pl 2 Gender: Male (Reference: Female)	-0.072* (0.035)	-0.070+ (0.036)	-0.111** (0.038)	-0.099** (0.037)
Pl 2 Class: Low (Reference: Middle)	0.018 (0.042)	-0.004 (0.044)	-0.004 (0.046)	0.038 (0.046)
Pl 2 Class: High	-0.069 (0.043)	-0.127** (0.044)	-0.154** (0.046)	-0.117** (0.045)
Pl 2 Religion: Catholic (Reference: Non-Religious)	-0.057 (0.049)	-0.054 (0.051)	-0.188** (0.053)	0.068 (0.053)
Pl 2 Religion: Protestant	-0.158** (0.049)	-0.134** (0.051)	-0.252** (0.053)	-0.058 (0.052)
Pl 2 Religion: Muslim	-0.741** (0.050)	-0.408** (0.051)	-0.887** (0.052)	-0.375** (0.052)
Subset Condition 1	-0.121** (0.037)	-0.003 (0.038)	-0.156** (0.040)	-0.050 (0.039)
Round 2	0.132** (0.040)	-0.073+ (0.042)	0.032 (0.043)	-0.027 (0.042)
Round 3	0.279** (0.040)	0.010 (0.042)	0.131** (0.043)	0.014 (0.042)
Constant	4.699** (0.140)	3.863** (0.144)	4.919** (0.148)	3.929** (0.153)
SD Respondent-level	1.557	1.651	1.72	1.845
SD Country-level	0.172	0.205	0.172	0.186
Conditional R-Squared	0.499	0.506	0.521	0.571
Observations	14,631	14,839	14,656	14,876
Respondents	11,466	11,614	11,464	11,633
Countries	25	25	25	25

Notes: SD indicates the estimate of the standard deviation of the random intercept.
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01

Table D5: Coalition Experience (Full Results of HLMs)

	Dependent variable:			
	Tokens for Player 2			
	Dictator Game		Trust Game	
	Co-Partisan	Out-Partisan	Co-Partisan	Out-Partisan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Coalition Experience	-0.355** (0.086)	0.635** (0.127)	-0.469** (0.093)	0.574** (0.131)
Average District Magnitude (logged)	0.033 (0.041)	0.031 (0.049)	-0.015 (0.042)	-0.023 (0.047)
Effective Number of Parties	0.043 (0.031)	-0.006 (0.037)	0.055+ (0.032)	0.017 (0.036)
Elite Polarization	0.020 (0.018)	-0.009 (0.021)	0.004 (0.018)	-0.019 (0.021)
Wealth (GDP per capita, in thousand Euros)	0.001 (0.003)	0.007+ (0.004)	0.0003 (0.003)	0.004 (0.004)
Population size (in Million)	0.003 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.0004 (0.002)	-0.0004 (0.002)
Female	-0.103* (0.041)	0.040 (0.042)	-0.278** (0.044)	-0.158** (0.045)
Age	-0.008** (0.001)	-0.016** (0.001)	-0.007** (0.001)	-0.019** (0.002)
Education	-0.005 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.007 (0.005)	0.009+ (0.005)
Pl 2 Age: 30 (Reference: 18)	0.108+ (0.055)	0.033 (0.057)	0.021 (0.059)	-0.002 (0.059)
Pl 2 Age: 42	0.102+ (0.055)	0.047 (0.057)	0.135* (0.059)	0.094 (0.058)
Pl 2 Age: 53	0.101+ (0.055)	0.108+ (0.057)	0.093 (0.060)	0.100+ (0.059)
Pl 2 Age: 65	0.038 (0.055)	0.033 (0.057)	-0.008 (0.060)	0.032 (0.058)
Pl 2 Gender: Male (Reference: Female)	-0.071* (0.035)	-0.070+ (0.036)	-0.112** (0.038)	-0.098** (0.037)
Pl 2 Class: Low (Reference: Middle)	0.017 (0.042)	-0.007 (0.044)	-0.006 (0.046)	0.039 (0.046)
Pl 2 Class: High	-0.070 (0.043)	-0.128** (0.044)	-0.155** (0.046)	-0.119** (0.045)
Pl 2 Religion: Catholic (Reference: Non-Religious)	-0.059 (0.049)	-0.057 (0.051)	-0.188** (0.053)	0.066 (0.053)
Pl 2 Religion: Protestant	-0.158** (0.049)	-0.136** (0.051)	-0.253** (0.053)	-0.057 (0.052)
Pl 2 Religion: Muslim	-0.742** (0.050)	-0.405** (0.051)	-0.886** (0.052)	-0.374** (0.052)
Subset Condition 1	-0.121** (0.037)	-0.002 (0.038)	-0.160** (0.040)	-0.051 (0.039)
Round 2	0.132** (0.040)	-0.074+ (0.042)	0.032 (0.043)	-0.027 (0.042)
Round 3	0.279** (0.040)	0.009 (0.042)	0.130** (0.043)	0.014 (0.042)
Constant	4.714** (0.140)	3.851** (0.145)	4.971** (0.148)	3.920** (0.154)
SD Respondent-level	1.557	1.648	1.719	1.843
SD Country-level	0.172	0.217	0.172	0.203
Conditional R-Squared	0.499	0.505	0.521	0.572
Observations	14,631	14,839	14,656	14,876
Respondents	11,466	11,614	11,464	11,633
Countries	25	25	25	25

Notes: SD indicates the estimate of the standard deviation of the random intercept.
+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

E Additional Analyses

E.1 Societal divides

To evaluate the substantive strength of partisan divide, we also compare the magnitude of the average partisan divide relative to some of particularly salient divides such as the Christian-Muslim divide and the upper-lower class divide. For this purpose, we present Table E.1 and Figure E.1 below. Indeed, particularly salient divides such as the Christian-Muslim divide and the upper-lower class divide are greater than the average effects of the broader categories (religion and class), as indicated by increased estimates of the corresponding coefficients. However, the key finding is that the partisan divide continues to be greater than these salient social divides, leading to larger discrimination in the allocation of tokens.

TABLE E.1: Partisan Divide versus Class/Religious Divide

	Dependent variable:			
	Tokens for Player 2			
	Dictator Game	Dictator Game	Trust Game	Trust Game
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Class Divide (Upper v Lower)	-0.33** (0.04)		-0.36** (0.04)	
Religious Divide (Christian v Muslim)		-0.61** (0.02)		-0.68** (0.02)
Partisanship: Out-Group	-1.04** (0.06)	-0.92** (0.04)	-1.00** (0.06)	-0.91** (0.04)
Round 2	0.002 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)
Round 3	0.06 (0.04)	0.05+ (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	0.005 (0.03)
Subset Condition 1	0.03 (0.04)	-0.06* (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)
Subset Condition 2	0.56** (0.08)	0.50** (0.05)	0.55** (0.08)	0.48** (0.05)
Gender: Out-Group	0.09* (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.002 (0.02)
(Respondent: Other Gender)	0.98+ (0.58)	-0.47 (0.73)	0.76 (0.62)	-1.07 (0.77)
Age: Out-Group	-0.003 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.03)
Religion: Out-Group	-0.29** (0.06)		-0.38** (0.07)	
(Respondent: Other Religion)	-0.28** (0.09)		-0.31** (0.10)	
(Respondent: Non-Believer)	-0.33** (0.08)		-0.29** (0.08)	
Class: Out-Group		-0.12** (0.02)		-0.12** (0.03)
(Respondent: Don't Know Class)		-0.04 (0.10)		-0.17 (0.11)
Nationality: Out-Group	-0.20* (0.08)	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.16+ (0.08)	-0.14** (0.05)
(Respondent: No PID)	0.003 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.13 (0.08)	-0.13* (0.05)
Partisanship: Control Group * (Respondent: No PID)	-0.09 (0.12)	0.08 (0.08)	0.13 (0.13)	0.12 (0.08)
Partisanship: Out-Group * (Respondent: No PID)	0.06 (0.09)	0.11+ (0.06)	0.21* (0.09)	0.24** (0.06)
Constant	3.85** (0.11)	3.78** (0.07)	4.00** (0.12)	3.86** (0.06)
SD Respondent-level	1.614	1.492	1.723	1.679
SD Country-level	0.186	0.184	0.211	0.144
Conditional R-Squared	0.484	0.456	0.49	0.508
Observations	13,061	29,858	12,993	29,938
Respondents	6,291	13,034	6,247	13,035
Countries	25	25	25	25

Notes: SD indicates the estimate of the standard deviation of the random intercept.
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01

FIGURE E.1: Partisan Divide versus Class/Religious Divide



Notes: Visualization of the allocation of tokens towards the out-group, showing model predictions (dots) together with their 95% confidence intervals (lines).

E.2 Feeling Thermometer

Analyzing feeling thermometer scores, we find consistent (stronger indeed) evidence to support our original findings. Table E.2.1 and Figure E.2 below show the findings for the pooled 25 countries. While out-parties receive a feeling thermometer score of 33.8 degrees on average, co-parties receive a score of 84.4 degrees on average. Using the baseline of 50 degrees representing a neutral feeling as a reference point, this implies higher levels of in-group favoritism (84.4 degrees – 50 degrees = 34.4 degrees) than out-group derogation (50 degrees – 33.8 degrees = 16.2 degrees). In other words, respondents' feeling about the average out-party is much closer to neutrality than their feeling towards the in-party. Table E.2.2 provides the breakdown by countries, showing that these results are consistent across Europe. In summary, using feeling thermometer provides further evidence that affective polarization in Europe is not driven by out-group derogation. Indeed, in-group favoritism is more consequential on average than out-group derogation.

Table E.2.1: Hierarchical Linear Model – Feeling Thermometer

	Dependent variable:
	Feeling Thermometer Score
Co-Partisan	50.609** (0.219)
Constant	33.793** (0.781)
SD Respondent-level	9.842
SD Country-level	3.865
Conditional R-Squared	0.396
Observations	113,622
Respondents	18,937
Countries	25

Notes: SD indicates the estimate of the standard deviation of the random intercept.
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01

FIGURE E.2: In-Group Favoritism and Out-Group Derogation in the Feeling Thermometer



Notes: Visualization of feeling thermometer scores for co-party and out-parties, showing predicted scores (dots) together with their 95% confidence intervals (lines). Point estimates and confidence intervals obtained by redrawing model coefficients 10.000 times based on model in Table E.2.1.

Table E.2.2: Hierarchical Linear Model – Feeling Thermometer Estimates, by Country

Country	Out-Party Score	In-Party Score	Out-Group Derogation (50 – Out-Party Score)	In-Group Favoritism (In-Party Score – 50)	|Out-group| – |In-group|
Austria	32.8 (31.7, 33.9)	85.4 (83.3, 87.5)	17.2 (16.1, 18.3)	35.4 (33.3, 37.5)	-18.2 (-20.7, -15.6)
Belgium	37.6 (36.6, 38.7)	84.6 (82.5, 86.7)	12.4 (11.3, 13.4)	34.6 (32.5, 36.7)	-22.3 (-24.8, -19.7)
Bulgaria	27.5 (26.0, 28.9)	84.4 (81.7, 86.9)	22.5 (21.1, 24)	34.4 (31.7, 36.9)	-11.8 (-15.1, -8.4)
Croatia	25.8 (24.7, 27)	80.5 (78.2, 82.8)	24.2 (23, 25.3)	30.5 (28.2, 32.8)	-6.4 (-9.2, -3.5)
Czechia	35.0 (34.0, 35.9)	87.3 (85.3, 89.3)	15.0 (14.1, 16.0)	37.3 (35.3, 39.3)	-22.3 (-24.6, -20)
Denmark	39.7 (38.8, 40.5)	85.7 (83.9, 87.5)	10.3 (9.5, 11.2)	35.7 (33.9, 37.5)	-25.4 (-27.5, -23.3)
Estonia	37.3 (36.3, 38.3)	85.3 (83.1, 87.5)	12.7 (11.7, 13.7)	35.3 (33.1, 37.5)	-22.6 (-25, -20.1)
Finland	36.7 (35.7, 37.7)	85.8 (83.8, 87.7)	13.3 (12.3, 14.3)	35.8 (33.8, 37.7)	-22.5 (-24.8, -20.1)
France	31.7 (30.6, 32.8)	82.6 (80.5, 84.7)	18.3 (17.2, 19.4)	32.6 (30.5, 34.7)	-14.4 (-16.9, -11.7)
Germany	33.0 (31.9, 34.1)	84.2 (82.1, 86.3)	17.0 (15.9, 18.1)	34.2 (32.1, 36.3)	-17.2 (-19.8, -14.6)
Greece	23.0 (22.0, 24.0)	82.6 (80.6, 84.5)	27.0 (26.0, 28.0)	32.6 (30.6, 34.5)	-5.6 (-7.9, -3.1)
Hungary	32.0 (30.8, 33.1)	87.6 (85, 90.1)	18.0 (16.9, 19.2)	37.6 (35.0, 40.1)	-19.5 (-22.4, -16.5)
Ireland	40.4 (39.0, 41.8)	79.9 (77.5, 82.3)	9.6 (8.2, 11.0)	29.9 (27.5, 32.3)	-20.3 (-23.4, -17.1)
Italy	33.4 (32.4, 34.4)	84.3 (82.4, 86.2)	16.6 (15.6, 17.6)	34.3 (32.4, 36.2)	-17.7 (-20.0, -15.3)
Latvia	33.3 (31.9, 34.6)	83.7 (80.8, 86.6)	16.7 (15.4, 18.1)	33.7 (30.8, 36.6)	-17 (-20.4, -13.5)
Lithuania	32.2 (30.9, 33.4)	81.9 (79.5, 84.2)	17.8 (16.6, 19.1)	31.9 (29.5, 34.2)	-14.1 (-17.0, -11.1)
Netherlands	38.4 (37.4, 39.4)	83.0 (80.8, 85.2)	11.6 (10.6, 12.6)	33.0 (30.8, 35.2)	-21.4 (-24.0, -18.8)
Poland	37.8 (36.8, 38.8)	85.2 (83.4, 87.1)	12.2 (11.2, 13.2)	35.2 (33.4, 37.1)	-23.1 (-25.4, -20.7)
Portugal	41.6 (40.6, 42.6)	83.0 (81.0, 84.9)	8.4 (7.4, 9.4)	33.0 (31.0, 34.9)	-24.6 (-27.0, -22.1)
Romania	30.3 (29.3, 31.3)	86.3 (84.2, 88.4)	19.7 (18.7, 20.7)	36.3 (34.2, 38.4)	-16.6 (-19.1, -14.1)
Slovakia	33.8 (32.8, 35.0)	86.7 (84.4, 88.9)	16.2 (15.0, 17.2)	36.7 (34.4, 38.9)	-20.5 (-23.2, -17.8)
Slovenia	34.9 (33.8, 36.0)	87.6 (85.4, 89.7)	15.1 (14.0, 16.2)	37.6 (35.4, 39.7)	-22.5 (-25.1, -19.9)
Spain	32.6 (31.9, 33.4)	84.5 (82.7, 86.4)	17.4 (16.6, 18.1)	34.6 (32.7, 36.4)	-17.2 (-19.2, -15.2)
Sweden	33.1 (32.2, 33.9)	87.7 (85.7, 89.5)	16.9 (16.1, 17.8)	37.7 (35.7, 39.5)	-20.7 (-22.8, -18.6)
United Kingdom	31.3 (30.2, 32.4)	79.5 (77.5, 81.5)	18.7 (17.6, 19.8)	29.5 (27.5, 31.5)	-10.9 (-13.4, -8.3)

Notes: 95% confidence intervals are shown in parentheses.

F Robustness

F.1 Controlling for Ideological Proximity

To control for a possible confounder of coalition partnership, we include ideological proximity between the respondent's party and the party of Player 2. We use party positions on the left-right dimension from the Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al 2021). Table F.1 presents the findings. Columns (1) through (4) use the indicator of current Coalition Partnership. In the dictator game, we find that Coalition Partnership still significantly increases the allocation of tokens for out-partisans. In the trust game, the effect just fails to be significant at conventional levels.

Next, we repeat the same for Coalition Experience since 2000. Consistent with the timeframe, we also calculate ideological proximity by taking the difference between average party positions over that period. Columns (5) through (8) in Table F.1 shows that after controlling for ideological proximity, Coalition Experience has a significant effect, both in dictator and trust game.

TABLE F.1: Current Coalition Partnership and Coalition Experience since 2000 (Results of HLMs)

	Dependent variable:							
	Tokens for Player 2							
	Dictator Game		Trust Game		Dictator Game		Trust Game	
	Co-Partisan	Out-Partisan	Co-Partisan	Out-Partisan	Co-Partisan	Out-Partisan	Co-Partisan	Out-Partisan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Coalition Partner	-0.196** (0.049)	0.276** (0.090)	-0.210** (0.053)	0.142 (0.092)				
Coalition Experience					-0.355** (0.086)	0.558** (0.131)	-0.469** (0.093)	0.485** (0.136)
Ideological Proximity		0.011** (0.001)		0.010** (0.002)		0.009** (0.002)		0.009** (0.002)
Average District Magnitude (logged)	0.046 (0.041)	0.031 (0.049)	-0.0001 (0.042)	-0.039 (0.053)	0.033 (0.041)	0.037 (0.049)	-0.015 (0.042)	-0.031 (0.055)
Effective Number of Parties	0.043 (0.031)	-0.015 (0.037)	0.054+ (0.032)	0.012 (0.039)	0.043 (0.031)	-0.011 (0.037)	0.055+ (0.032)	0.009 (0.041)
Elite Polarization	0.022 (0.018)	0.024 (0.022)	0.006 (0.018)	-0.006 (0.024)	0.020 (0.018)	0.004 (0.022)	0.004 (0.018)	-0.021 (0.024)
Wealth (GDP per capita, in thousand Euros)	0.0001 (0.003)	0.012** (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.006 (0.004)	0.001 (0.003)	0.012** (0.004)	0.0003 (0.003)	0.006 (0.004)
Population size (in Million)	0.004+ (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.0004 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)
Female	-0.102* (0.041)	0.004 (0.048)	-0.277** (0.044)	-0.212** (0.051)	-0.103* (0.041)	-0.003 (0.048)	-0.278** (0.044)	-0.212** (0.051)
Age	-0.008** (0.001)	-0.016** (0.002)	-0.008** (0.001)	-0.020** (0.002)	-0.008** (0.001)	-0.016** (0.002)	-0.007** (0.001)	-0.020** (0.002)
Education	-0.005 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)	0.006 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.004)	0.001 (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)	0.006 (0.005)
Pl 2 Age: 30 (Reference: 18)	0.106+ (0.055)	-0.032 (0.065)	0.020 (0.059)	0.008 (0.068)	0.108+ (0.055)	-0.045 (0.065)	0.021 (0.059)	0.011 (0.067)
Pl 2 Age: 42	0.101+ (0.055)	0.024 (0.065)	0.134* (0.059)	0.089 (0.068)	0.102+ (0.055)	0.031 (0.065)	0.135* (0.059)	0.093 (0.067)
Pl 2 Age: 53	0.104+ (0.055)	0.145* (0.066)	0.093 (0.060)	0.084 (0.068)	0.101+ (0.055)	0.147* (0.065)	0.093 (0.060)	0.087 (0.067)
Pl 2 Age: 65	0.038 (0.055)	-0.011 (0.066)	-0.009 (0.060)	0.043 (0.067)	0.038 (0.055)	-0.001 (0.065)	-0.008 (0.060)	0.042 (0.067)
Pl 2 Gender: Male (Reference: Female)	-0.072* (0.035)	-0.054 (0.042)	-0.111** (0.038)	-0.101* (0.043)	-0.071* (0.035)	-0.058 (0.041)	-0.112** (0.038)	-0.101* (0.042)
Pl 2 Class: Low (Reference: Middle)	0.018 (0.042)	0.005 (0.051)	-0.004 (0.046)	0.017 (0.053)	0.017 (0.042)	-0.007 (0.051)	-0.006 (0.046)	0.019 (0.052)
Pl 2 Class: High	-0.069 (0.043)	-0.069 (0.051)	-0.154** (0.046)	-0.118* (0.053)	-0.070 (0.043)	-0.076 (0.051)	-0.155** (0.046)	-0.115* (0.052)
Pl 2 Religion: Catholic (Reference: Non-Religious)	-0.057 (0.049)	-0.036 (0.059)	-0.188** (0.053)	0.084 (0.061)	-0.059 (0.049)	-0.025 (0.059)	-0.188** (0.053)	0.084 (0.060)
Pl 2 Religion: Protestant	-0.158** (0.049)	-0.138* (0.059)	-0.252** (0.053)	-0.052 (0.061)	-0.158** (0.049)	-0.127* (0.058)	-0.253** (0.053)	-0.063 (0.060)
Pl 2 Religion: Muslim	-0.741** (0.050)	-0.446** (0.059)	-0.887** (0.052)	-0.376** (0.060)	-0.742** (0.050)	-0.424** (0.058)	-0.886** (0.052)	-0.375** (0.059)
Subset Condition 1	-0.121** (0.037)	0.002 (0.044)	-0.156** (0.040)	-0.050 (0.045)	-0.121** (0.037)	0.011 (0.044)	-0.160** (0.040)	-0.057 (0.045)
Round 2	0.132** (0.040)	-0.066 (0.048)	0.032 (0.043)	-0.048 (0.049)	0.132** (0.040)	-0.058 (0.048)	0.032 (0.043)	-0.050 (0.048)
Round 3	0.279** (0.040)	0.023 (0.048)	0.131** (0.043)	0.020 (0.049)	0.279** (0.040)	0.028 (0.048)	0.130** (0.043)	0.017 (0.049)
Constant	4.699** (0.140)	4.060** (0.163)	4.919** (0.148)	4.249** (0.176)	4.714** (0.140)	4.001** (0.163)	4.971** (0.148)	4.221** (0.176)
SD Respondent-level	1.557	1.661	1.72	1.891	1.557	1.659	1.719	1.89
SD Country-level	0.172	0.207	0.172	0.223	0.172	0.207	0.172	0.236
Conditional R-Squared	0.499	0.524	0.521	0.601	0.499	0.523	0.521	0.602
Observations	14,631	11,138	14,656	11,214	14,631	11,302	14,656	11,366
Respondents	11,466	9,099	11,464	9,147	11,466	9,218	11,464	9,262
Countries	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25

Notes: SD indicates the estimate of the standard deviation of the random intercept. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01

FIGURE F.1: Effect of Coalition Partnership on In-Group Favoritism and Out-Group Derogation



Notes: Visualization of coalition partnership (upper row) and coalition experience (bottom row) effects. showing predicted allocation of tokens together with their 95% confidence intervals. Predictions for a fixed profile (30 year old, female, middle class, no religion, 1st round), with respondent- and country-characteristics held at median values. Predictions based on Table F.1, Columns (1) – (4) (upper row) and Columns (5) – (8) (lower row).

F.2 The Role of Partisan-Ideological Alignment

In order to control for the effect of partisan-ideological sorting as a potential driver of affective polarization, we use the self-placement of our survey respondents on an 11-point left-right scale, as well as their perceptions of party positions on that same scale. Our Partisan-Ideological Alignment score subtracts the respondent's ideological distance to the in-party (ranging from 0 to 10) from his or her average ideological distance to out-parties (ranging from 0 to 10). This measure produces a scale that ranges from –10 to +10. -10 indicates that distance to his or her own party is much larger than the average distance to the other parties, which represents weak alignment or sorting. +10 indicates that the average distance to the other parties is much larger than distance to the own party, which reflects strong alignment. Values close to zero indicate intermediate levels of alignment. Table F.2, as well as the corresponding figure, show that after controlling for partisan-ideological alignment, Coalition Partnership and Experience continue to be significant.

TABLE F.2: Current Coalition Partnership and Coalition Experience since 2000 (Results of HLMs)

	Dependent variable:							
	Tokens for Player 2							
	Dictator Game		Trust Game		Dictator Game		Trust Game	
	Co-Partisan	Out-Partisan	Co-Partisan	Out-Partisan	Co-Partisan	Out-Partisan	Co-Partisan	Out-Partisan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Coalition Partner	-0.176** (0.062)	0.180+ (0.109)	-0.218** (0.066)	0.200+ (0.109)				
Coalition Experience					-0.245* (0.109)	0.638** (0.156)	-0.389** (0.117)	0.525** (0.161)
Partisan-Ideological Alignment	0.023* (0.010)	-0.077** (0.011)	0.037** (0.011)	-0.091** (0.011)	0.023* (0.010)	-0.076** (0.011)	0.037** (0.011)	-0.091** (0.011)
Average District Magnitude (logged)	0.050 (0.049)	0.049 (0.058)	-0.010 (0.047)	-0.041 (0.057)	0.043 (0.049)	0.058 (0.060)	-0.020 (0.048)	-0.035 (0.060)
Effective Number of Parties	0.017 (0.037)	-0.009 (0.043)	0.030 (0.035)	0.022 (0.043)	0.017 (0.036)	-0.024 (0.045)	0.030 (0.036)	0.013 (0.045)
Elite Polarization	0.021 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.025)	-0.005 (0.020)	-0.025 (0.025)	0.020 (0.021)	0.001 (0.026)	-0.006 (0.020)	-0.023 (0.026)
Wealth (GDP per capita, in thousand Euros)	0.004 (0.004)	0.010* (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	0.010* (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)	0.003 (0.005)
Population size (in Million)	0.003 (0.002)	0.0005 (0.003)	0.0003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.0002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)
Female	-0.135** (0.052)	0.033 (0.055)	-0.267** (0.056)	-0.283** (0.058)	-0.137** (0.052)	0.030 (0.055)	-0.268** (0.056)	-0.285** (0.058)
Age	-0.007** (0.002)	-0.016** (0.002)	-0.009** (0.002)	-0.019** (0.002)	-0.007** (0.002)	-0.016** (0.002)	-0.009** (0.002)	-0.019** (0.002)
Education	-0.013* (0.006)	-0.003 (0.006)	0.006 (0.006)	0.005 (0.006)	-0.012* (0.006)	-0.003 (0.006)	0.006 (0.006)	0.004 (0.006)
Pl 2 Age: 30 (Reference: 18)	0.075 (0.070)	-0.005 (0.075)	0.030 (0.075)	-0.096 (0.078)	0.078 (0.070)	-0.009 (0.075)	0.036 (0.075)	-0.098 (0.078)
Pl 2 Age: 42	0.039 (0.071)	0.063 (0.074)	0.198** (0.075)	0.060 (0.078)	0.040 (0.071)	0.062 (0.074)	0.204** (0.075)	0.061 (0.078)
Pl 2 Age: 53	0.066 (0.071)	0.070 (0.074)	0.089 (0.075)	-0.042 (0.079)	0.064 (0.071)	0.072 (0.074)	0.093 (0.075)	-0.042 (0.079)
Pl 2 Age: 65	0.029 (0.071)	0.058 (0.075)	0.012 (0.076)	-0.036 (0.078)	0.030 (0.071)	0.060 (0.075)	0.017 (0.076)	-0.035 (0.078)
Pl 2 Gender: Male (Reference: Female)	-0.095* (0.045)	-0.021 (0.047)	-0.081+ (0.048)	-0.098* (0.049)	-0.094* (0.045)	-0.021 (0.047)	-0.082+ (0.048)	-0.095+ (0.049)
Pl 2 Class: Low (Reference: Middle)	0.035 (0.054)	-0.003 (0.058)	-0.023 (0.058)	0.040 (0.061)	0.036 (0.054)	-0.007 (0.058)	-0.025 (0.058)	0.041 (0.061)
Pl 2 Class: High	-0.004 (0.055)	-0.095 (0.058)	-0.178** (0.058)	-0.175** (0.060)	-0.006 (0.055)	-0.097+ (0.058)	-0.179** (0.058)	-0.175** (0.060)
Pl 2 Religion: Catholic (Reference: Non-Religious)	-0.150* (0.063)	-0.057 (0.067)	-0.274** (0.067)	0.076 (0.070)	-0.152* (0.063)	-0.057 (0.067)	-0.274** (0.067)	0.071 (0.070)
Pl 2 Religion: Protestant	-0.191** (0.063)	-0.155* (0.067)	-0.312** (0.068)	-0.076 (0.070)	-0.190** (0.063)	-0.155* (0.067)	-0.311** (0.068)	-0.074 (0.070)
Pl 2 Religion: Muslim	-0.750** (0.064)	-0.426** (0.067)	-0.924** (0.067)	-0.373** (0.069)	-0.750** (0.064)	-0.421** (0.067)	-0.922** (0.067)	-0.373** (0.069)
Subset Condition 1	-0.119* (0.047)	0.020 (0.050)	-0.168** (0.050)	-0.048 (0.052)	-0.120* (0.047)	0.020 (0.050)	-0.172** (0.050)	-0.049 (0.052)
Round 2	0.118* (0.052)	-0.100+ (0.054)	0.061 (0.055)	-0.017 (0.056)	0.118* (0.052)	-0.102+ (0.054)	0.060 (0.055)	-0.018 (0.056)
Round 3	0.221** (0.052)	0.047 (0.055)	0.117* (0.055)	0.053 (0.057)	0.221** (0.052)	0.046 (0.055)	0.114* (0.055)	0.052 (0.057)
Constant	4.847** (0.180)	4.095** (0.190)	4.942** (0.187)	4.330** (0.201)	4.852** (0.181)	4.070** (0.190)	4.971** (0.189)	4.321** (0.202)
SD Respondent-level	1.553	1.639	1.676	1.748	1.554	1.634	1.676	1.746
SD Country-level	0.196	0.241	0.175	0.237	0.195	0.257	0.181	0.255
Conditional R-Squared	0.499	0.516	0.508	0.539	0.499	0.516	0.509	0.54
Observations	8,885	8,589	8,963	8,533	8,885	8,589	8,963	8,533
Respondents	6,998	6,824	6,988	6,765	6,998	6,824	6,988	6,765
Countries	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25

Notes: SD indicates the estimate of the standard deviation of the random intercept. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01

FIGURE F.2: Effect of Coalition Partnership on In-Group Favoritism and Out-Group Derogation



Notes: Visualization of coalition partnership (upper row) and coalition experience (bottom row) effects. showing predicted allocation of tokens together with their 95% confidence intervals. Predictions for a fixed profile (30 year

old, female, middle class, no religion, 1st round), with respondent- and country-characteristics held at median values. Predictions based on Table F.2, Columns (1) – (4) (upper row) and Columns (5) – (8) (lower row).

F.3 Alternative Measure of Country-Level Polarization

We employ an alternative measure for country-level polarization in the party system, the measure proposed by Maoz and Somer-Topcu (2010). Our main findings with regards to the effect of Coalition Partnership and Coalition Experience remain unchanged (Table F.3 and Figure F.3).

TABLE F.3: Current Coalition Partnership (Results of HLMs)

	Dependent variable:							
	Tokens for Player 2							
	Dictator Game		Trust Game		Dictator Game		Trust Game	
	Co-Partisan	Out-Partisan	Co-Partisan	Out-Partisan	Co-Partisan	Out-Partisan	Co-Partisan	Out-Partisan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Coalition Partner	-0.187** (0.049)	0.294** (0.088)	-0.204** (0.053)	0.162+ (0.088)				
Coalition Experience					-0.325** (0.086)	0.647** (0.127)	-0.459** (0.094)	0.585** (0.131)
Average District Magnitude (logged)	0.007 (0.031)	0.014 (0.036)	-0.014 (0.038)	-0.022 (0.040)	-0.001 (0.033)	0.019 (0.038)	-0.023 (0.038)	-0.018 (0.042)
Effective Number of Parties	0.093** (0.029)	0.054 (0.034)	0.076* (0.035)	0.051 (0.037)	0.088** (0.031)	0.048 (0.035)	0.070* (0.036)	0.047 (0.039)
Elite Polarization	-1.740** (0.545)	-1.872** (0.619)	-0.782 (0.643)	-1.011 (0.684)	-1.572** (0.570)	-1.976** (0.640)	-0.531 (0.658)	-1.151 (0.720)
Wealth (GDP per capita, in thousand Euros)	-0.004 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.004)
Population size (in Million)	0.005** (0.002)	0.003+ (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)	0.003+ (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Female	-0.099* (0.041)	0.046 (0.042)	-0.276** (0.044)	-0.153** (0.045)	-0.100* (0.041)	0.044 (0.042)	-0.277** (0.044)	-0.156** (0.045)
Age	-0.008** (0.001)	-0.016** (0.001)	-0.008** (0.001)	-0.019** (0.002)	-0.008** (0.001)	-0.016** (0.001)	-0.007** (0.001)	-0.019** (0.002)
Education	-0.006 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.007 (0.005)	0.009+ (0.005)	-0.005 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.007 (0.005)	0.009+ (0.005)
Pl 2 Age: 30 (Reference: 18)	0.105+ (0.055)	0.036 (0.057)	0.020 (0.059)	0.001 (0.059)	0.107+ (0.055)	0.033 (0.057)	0.021 (0.059)	-0.001 (0.059)
Pl 2 Age: 42	0.101+ (0.055)	0.048 (0.057)	0.134* (0.059)	0.094 (0.058)	0.101+ (0.055)	0.046 (0.057)	0.135* (0.059)	0.095 (0.058)
Pl 2 Age: 53	0.104+ (0.055)	0.109+ (0.057)	0.093 (0.060)	0.102+ (0.059)	0.101+ (0.055)	0.108+ (0.057)	0.093 (0.060)	0.100+ (0.059)
Pl 2 Age: 65	0.037 (0.055)	0.029 (0.057)	-0.009 (0.060)	0.032 (0.058)	0.038 (0.055)	0.032 (0.057)	-0.008 (0.060)	0.033 (0.058)
Pl 2 Gender: Male (Reference: Female)	-0.071* (0.035)	-0.071+ (0.036)	-0.111** (0.038)	-0.099** (0.037)	-0.071* (0.035)	-0.070+ (0.036)	-0.112** (0.038)	-0.098** (0.037)
Pl 2 Class: Low (Reference: Middle)	0.018 (0.042)	-0.003 (0.044)	-0.004 (0.046)	0.038 (0.046)	0.018 (0.042)	-0.006 (0.044)	-0.006 (0.046)	0.039 (0.046)
Pl 2 Class: High	-0.068 (0.043)	-0.127** (0.044)	-0.154** (0.046)	-0.117* (0.045)	-0.070 (0.043)	-0.127** (0.044)	-0.155** (0.046)	-0.118** (0.045)
Pl 2 Religion: Catholic (Reference: Non-Religious)	-0.059 (0.049)	-0.055 (0.051)	-0.189** (0.053)	0.068 (0.053)	-0.060 (0.049)	-0.058 (0.051)	-0.188** (0.053)	0.066 (0.053)
Pl 2 Religion: Protestant	-0.159** (0.049)	-0.135** (0.051)	-0.252** (0.053)	-0.058 (0.052)	-0.159** (0.049)	-0.137** (0.051)	-0.253** (0.053)	-0.058 (0.052)
Pl 2 Religion: Muslim	-0.742** (0.050)	-0.409** (0.051)	-0.887** (0.052)	-0.375** (0.052)	-0.743** (0.050)	-0.407** (0.051)	-0.886** (0.052)	-0.374** (0.052)
Subset Condition 1	-0.121** (0.037)	-0.003 (0.038)	-0.156** (0.040)	-0.050 (0.039)	-0.121** (0.037)	-0.002 (0.038)	-0.160** (0.040)	-0.051 (0.039)
Round 2	0.131** (0.040)	-0.073+ (0.042)	0.032 (0.043)	-0.027 (0.042)	0.131** (0.040)	-0.075+ (0.042)	0.031 (0.043)	-0.027 (0.042)
Round 3	0.278** (0.040)	0.010 (0.042)	0.131** (0.043)	0.014 (0.042)	0.279** (0.040)	0.009 (0.042)	0.130** (0.043)	0.014 (0.042)
Constant	5.353** (0.245)	4.560** (0.271)	5.212** (0.280)	4.307** (0.297)	5.301** (0.252)	4.587** (0.278)	5.168** (0.284)	4.351** (0.309)
SD Respondent-level	1.557	1.651	1.72	1.845	1.557	1.648	1.719	1.843
SD Country-level	0.131	0.159	0.164	0.179	0.139	0.167	0.168	0.192
Conditional R-Squared	0.498	0.505	0.521	0.571	0.499	0.504	0.521	0.572
Observations	14,631	14,839	14,656	14,876	14,631	14,839	14,656	14,876
Respondents	11,466	11,614	11,464	11,633	11,466	11,614	11,464	11,633
Countries	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25

Notes: SD indicates the estimate of the standard deviation of the random intercept. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01

FIGURE F.3: Effect of Coalition Partnership on In-Group Favoritism and Out-Group Derogation





Notes: Visualization of coalition partnership (upper row) and coalition experience (bottom row) effects. showing predicted allocation of tokens together with their 95% confidence intervals. Predictions for a fixed (30 year old, female, middle class, no religion, 1st round), with respondent- and country-characteristics held at median values. Predictions based on Table F.3, Columns (1) – (4) (upper row) and Columns (5) – (8) (lower row).

F.4 The Role of Economic Inequality

Furthermore, we control for a measure of economic inequality as a potential cause of affective polarization, using data from the World Bank. Again, our main findings with regards to the effect of Coalition Partnership and Coalition Experience remain unchanged (Table F.4 and Figure F.4).

TABLE F.4: Current Coalition Partnership and Coalition Experience since 2000 (Results of HLMs)

	Dependent variable:							
	Tokens for Player 2							
	Dictator Game		Trust Game		Dictator Game		Trust Game	
	Co-Partisan	Out-Partisan	Co-Partisan	Out-Partisan	Co-Partisan	Out-Partisan	Co-Partisan	Out-Partisan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Coalition Partner	-0.196** (0.049)	0.283** (0.088)	-0.210** (0.053)	0.157+ (0.088)				
Coalition Experience					-0.355** (0.086)	0.635** (0.127)	-0.469** (0.093)	0.575** (0.131)
Average District Magnitude (logged)	0.046 (0.044)	0.042 (0.049)	-0.014 (0.044)	-0.040 (0.048)	0.034 (0.044)	0.051 (0.051)	-0.028 (0.045)	-0.033 (0.051)
Effective Number of Parties	0.043 (0.032)	0.011 (0.036)	0.048 (0.032)	0.022 (0.034)	0.044 (0.032)	0.003 (0.037)	0.049 (0.032)	0.013 (0.037)
Elite Polarization	0.022 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.021)	0.002 (0.019)	-0.024 (0.020)	0.020 (0.019)	-0.003 (0.022)	-0.001 (0.019)	-0.022 (0.022)
Economic Inequality (Gini)	0.001 (0.012)	0.017 (0.014)	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.009 (0.013)	0.001 (0.013)	0.018 (0.014)	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.014)
Wealth (GDP per capita, in thousand Euros)	0.0002 (0.003)	0.008* (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.003 (0.004)	0.001 (0.003)	0.008* (0.004)	-0.0004 (0.003)	0.003 (0.004)
Population size (in Million)	0.004+ (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.0003 (0.002)
Female	-0.102* (0.041)	0.042 (0.042)	-0.278** (0.044)	-0.156** (0.045)	-0.103* (0.041)	0.040 (0.042)	-0.278** (0.044)	-0.158** (0.045)
Age	-0.008** (0.001)	-0.016** (0.001)	-0.008** (0.001)	-0.019** (0.002)	-0.008** (0.001)	-0.016** (0.001)	-0.007** (0.001)	-0.019** (0.002)
Education	-0.005 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.007 (0.005)	0.009+ (0.005)	-0.005 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.007 (0.005)	0.009+ (0.005)
Pl 2 Age: 30 (Reference: 18)	0.106+ (0.055)	0.036 (0.057)	0.020 (0.059)	0.00001 (0.059)	0.108+ (0.055)	0.033 (0.057)	0.021 (0.059)	-0.002 (0.059)
Pl 2 Age: 42	0.101+ (0.055)	0.048 (0.057)	0.134* (0.059)	0.093 (0.058)	0.102+ (0.055)	0.047 (0.057)	0.135* (0.059)	0.094 (0.058)
Pl 2 Age: 53	0.104+ (0.055)	0.109+ (0.057)	0.093 (0.060)	0.101+ (0.059)	0.101+ (0.055)	0.108+ (0.057)	0.093 (0.060)	0.100+ (0.059)
Pl 2 Age: 65	0.038 (0.055)	0.029 (0.057)	-0.009 (0.060)	0.031 (0.058)	0.038 (0.055)	0.032 (0.057)	-0.008 (0.060)	0.032 (0.058)
Pl 2 Gender: Male (Reference: Female)	-0.072* (0.035)	-0.070+ (0.036)	-0.111** (0.038)	-0.099** (0.037)	-0.071* (0.035)	-0.070+ (0.036)	-0.112** (0.038)	-0.098** (0.037)
Pl 2 Class: Low (Reference: Middle)	0.018 (0.042)	-0.004 (0.044)	-0.004 (0.046)	0.038 (0.046)	0.017 (0.042)	-0.007 (0.044)	-0.006 (0.046)	0.039 (0.046)
Pl 2 Class: High	-0.069 (0.043)	-0.128** (0.044)	-0.153** (0.046)	-0.117** (0.045)	-0.070 (0.043)	-0.128** (0.044)	-0.154** (0.046)	-0.119** (0.045)
Pl 2 Religion: Catholic (Reference: Non-Religious)	-0.057 (0.049)	-0.054 (0.051)	-0.189** (0.053)	0.068 (0.053)	-0.059 (0.049)	-0.057 (0.051)	-0.188** (0.053)	0.066 (0.053)
Pl 2 Religion: Protestant	-0.158** (0.049)	-0.134** (0.051)	-0.252** (0.053)	-0.058 (0.052)	-0.158** (0.049)	-0.136** (0.051)	-0.253** (0.053)	-0.057 (0.052)
Pl 2 Religion: Muslim	-0.741** (0.050)	-0.408** (0.051)	-0.887** (0.052)	-0.375** (0.052)	-0.742** (0.050)	-0.405** (0.051)	-0.886** (0.052)	-0.374** (0.052)
Subset Condition 1	-0.121** (0.037)	-0.003 (0.038)	-0.156** (0.040)	-0.050 (0.039)	-0.121** (0.037)	-0.002 (0.038)	-0.160** (0.040)	-0.051 (0.039)
Round 2	0.132** (0.040)	-0.073+ (0.042)	0.032 (0.043)	-0.028 (0.042)	0.132** (0.040)	-0.074+ (0.042)	0.032 (0.043)	-0.027 (0.042)
Round 3	0.279** (0.040)	0.010 (0.042)	0.131** (0.043)	0.014 (0.042)	0.279** (0.040)	0.008 (0.042)	0.130** (0.043)	0.014 (0.042)
Constant	4.698** (0.140)	3.867** (0.144)	4.914** (0.148)	3.927** (0.153)	4.713** (0.140)	3.855** (0.145)	4.966** (0.148)	3.918** (0.154)
SD Respondent-level	1.557	1.651	1.72	1.845	1.557	1.648	1.719	1.843
SD Country-level	0.178	0.201	0.173	0.19	0.179	0.213	0.173	0.208
Conditional R-Squared	0.499	0.506	0.521	0.571	0.499	0.506	0.521	0.572
Observations	14,631	14,839	14,656	14,876	14,631	14,839	14,656	14,876
Respondents	11,466	11,614	11,464	11,633	11,466	11,614	11,464	11,633
Countries	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25

Notes: SD indicates the estimate of the standard deviation of the random intercept. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01

FIGURE F.4: Effect of Coalition Partnership on In-Group Favoritism and Out-Group Derogation



Notes: Visualization of coalition partnership (upper row) and coalition experience (bottom row) effects. showing predicted allocation of tokens together with their 95% confidence intervals. Predictions for a fixed (30 year old, female, middle class, no religion, 1st round), with respondent- and country-characteristics held at median values. Predictions based on Table F.4, Columns (1) – (4) (upper row) and Columns (5) – (8) (lower row).

F.5 The Role of Immigration

Furthermore, we control for the inflow of immigration, using country-level statistics from Eurostat for the year 2018, the year before our survey was fielded. The findings are consistent with our main analysis (Table F.5). Current Coalition Partnership reduces in-group favoritism and out-group derogation in both dictator and trust games (Columns (1) through (4)). Coalition experience since 2000 has similar effects (Columns (5) through (8)).

TABLE F.5: Current Coalition Partnership and Coalition Experience since 2000 (Results of HLMs)

	Dependent variable:							
	Tokens for Player 2							
	Dictator Game		Trust Game		Dictator Game		Trust Game	
	Co-Partisan	Out-Partisan	Co-Partisan	Out-Partisan	Co-Partisan	Out-Partisan	Co-Partisan	Out-Partisan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Coalition Partner	-0.195** (0.049)	0.284** (0.088)	-0.213** (0.053)	0.159+ (0.088)				
Coalition Experience					-0.354** (0.086)	0.636** (0.127)	-0.473** (0.093)	0.576** (0.131)
Average District Magnitude (logged)	0.047 (0.043)	0.034 (0.046)	-0.005 (0.043)	-0.021 (0.044)	0.036 (0.043)	0.042 (0.049)	-0.020 (0.043)	-0.014 (0.047)
Effective Number of Parties	0.041 (0.033)	-0.011 (0.036)	0.061+ (0.033)	0.013 (0.034)	0.041 (0.033)	-0.021 (0.038)	0.062+ (0.033)	0.004 (0.036)
Elite Polarization	0.021 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.021)	0.010 (0.019)	-0.027 (0.020)	0.019 (0.019)	-0.017 (0.021)	0.007 (0.019)	-0.026 (0.021)
Wealth (GDP per capita, in thousand Euros)	0.098 (0.465)	0.747 (0.509)	-0.352 (0.468)	0.639 (0.483)	0.134 (0.465)	0.776 (0.534)	-0.328 (0.469)	0.669 (0.518)
Population size (in Million)	0.0001 (0.003)	0.006+ (0.003)	-0.0004 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.006+ (0.004)	0.001 (0.003)	0.003 (0.004)
Immigration Inflow	0.003 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.006)	0.004 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.006)
Female	-0.102* (0.041)	0.042 (0.042)	-0.277** (0.044)	-0.155** (0.045)	-0.103* (0.041)	0.040 (0.042)	-0.278** (0.044)	-0.158** (0.045)
Age	-0.008** (0.001)	-0.016** (0.001)	-0.008** (0.001)	-0.019** (0.002)	-0.008** (0.001)	-0.016** (0.001)	-0.007** (0.001)	-0.019** (0.002)
Education	-0.005 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.007 (0.005)	0.009+ (0.005)	-0.005 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.007 (0.005)	0.009+ (0.005)
Pl 2 Age: 30 (Reference: 18)	0.106+ (0.055)	0.036 (0.057)	0.020 (0.059)	0.0001 (0.059)	0.108+ (0.055)	0.034 (0.057)	0.021 (0.059)	-0.002 (0.059)
Pl 2 Age: 42	0.101+ (0.055)	0.049 (0.057)	0.134* (0.059)	0.093 (0.058)	0.102+ (0.055)	0.047 (0.057)	0.135* (0.059)	0.094 (0.058)
Pl 2 Age: 53	0.104+ (0.055)	0.109+ (0.057)	0.093 (0.060)	0.101+ (0.059)	0.101+ (0.055)	0.108+ (0.057)	0.093 (0.060)	0.100+ (0.059)
Pl 2 Age: 65	0.038 (0.055)	0.030 (0.057)	-0.009 (0.060)	0.031 (0.058)	0.038 (0.055)	0.033 (0.057)	-0.008 (0.060)	0.032 (0.058)
Pl 2 Gender: Male (Reference: Female)	-0.072* (0.035)	-0.071+ (0.036)	-0.111** (0.038)	-0.099** (0.037)	-0.071* (0.035)	-0.070+ (0.036)	-0.112** (0.038)	-0.098** (0.037)
Pl 2 Class: Low (Reference: Middle)	0.018 (0.042)	-0.003 (0.044)	-0.004 (0.046)	0.038 (0.046)	0.017 (0.042)	-0.006 (0.044)	-0.006 (0.046)	0.039 (0.046)
Pl 2 Class: High	-0.069 (0.043)	-0.127** (0.044)	-0.154** (0.046)	-0.117** (0.045)	-0.070 (0.043)	-0.128** (0.044)	-0.155** (0.046)	-0.119** (0.045)
Pl 2 Religion: Catholic (Reference: Non-Religious)	-0.057 (0.049)	-0.054 (0.051)	-0.188** (0.053)	0.068 (0.053)	-0.059 (0.049)	-0.057 (0.051)	-0.188** (0.053)	0.066 (0.053)
Pl 2 Religion: Protestant	-0.158** (0.049)	-0.134** (0.051)	-0.252** (0.053)	-0.058 (0.052)	-0.158** (0.049)	-0.136** (0.051)	-0.254** (0.053)	-0.057 (0.052)
Pl 2 Religion: Muslim	-0.741** (0.050)	-0.408** (0.051)	-0.887** (0.052)	-0.375** (0.052)	-0.741** (0.050)	-0.405** (0.051)	-0.886** (0.052)	-0.373** (0.052)
Subset Condition 1	-0.121** (0.037)	-0.002 (0.038)	-0.156** (0.040)	-0.049 (0.039)	-0.121** (0.037)	-0.001 (0.038)	-0.160** (0.040)	-0.051 (0.039)
Round 2	0.132** (0.040)	-0.073+ (0.042)	0.032 (0.043)	-0.027 (0.042)	0.132** (0.040)	-0.075+ (0.042)	0.032 (0.043)	-0.027 (0.042)
Round 3	0.279** (0.040)	0.010 (0.042)	0.131** (0.043)	0.014 (0.042)	0.279** (0.040)	0.009 (0.042)	0.130** (0.043)	0.014 (0.042)
Constant	4.679** (0.168)	3.716** (0.176)	4.988** (0.175)	3.804** (0.180)	4.686** (0.168)	3.698** (0.179)	5.035** (0.175)	3.789** (0.184)
SD Respondent-level	1.557	1.651	1.72	1.845	1.557	1.648	1.719	1.843
SD Country-level	0.178	0.197	0.175	0.18	0.178	0.209	0.176	0.198
Conditional R-Squared	0.499	0.506	0.521	0.571	0.499	0.505	0.521	0.572
Observations	14,631	14,839	14,656	14,876	14,631	14,839	14,656	14,876
Respondents	11,466	11,614	11,464	11,633	11,466	11,614	11,464	11,633
Countries	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25

Notes: SD indicates the estimate of the standard deviation of the random intercept. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01

FIGURE F.5: Effect of Coalition Partnership on In-Group Favoritism and Out-Group Derogation



Notes: Visualization of coalition partnership (upper row) and coalition experience (bottom row) effects. showing predicted allocation of tokens together with their 95% confidence intervals. Predictions for a fixed profile (30 year old, female, middle class, no religion, 1st round), with respondent- and country-characteristics held at median values. Predictions based on Table F.5, Columns (1) – (4) (upper row) and Columns (5) – (8) (lower row).

G Survey Questions

Party Identification: *Do you consider yourself to be close to any particular political party? If so, which party do you feel close to?*

- [Party names], Other (fill the blank)
- No, I do not feel close to any political party

Left-right self-placement: *In politics, people often talk about "left" and "right." When you use this scale from 1 to 11, where would you locate yourself, where 1 means "left" and 11 means "right?"*

- Left (1), (2), (3), …, Right (11)
- Don't know

Left-right party placement: *And where would you place the following parties on this scale? Which number from 1 to 11, where '1' means "left" and '11' means "right" best describes each of the following parties?*

- Left (1), (2), (3), …, Right (11)
- Don't know the party
- Don't know where to place the party

Gender: *Please indicate your gender.*

- Male
- Female
- Other

Age: *How old are you?*
[List to select age from]

Nationality: What is your nationality?
[Answer options include choice among European nationalities plus an open answer box for "Other countries"]

Religion: *Do you consider yourself to be…?*

- Catholic (1), Orthodox (2), Protestant (3), Other Christian (4), Jewish (5), Muslim (6), Sikh (7), Buddhist (8), Hindu (9), Atheist (10), Non believer or Agnostic (11), Other (12)
- Don't know

Class: *Do you see yourself and your household belonging to...?*

- The working class of society (1), The lower middle class of society (2), The middle class of society (3), The upper middle class of society (4), The higher class of society (5)
- Don't know

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