Appendix to *The Electoral Costs of Party Agenda Setting*: Supplemental Data Analyses

This appendix investigates whether the empirical results presented in *The Electoral Costs of Party Agenda Control* are robust to inclusion of alternative variables proposed in the literature as explanations for congressional election outcomes. The variables considered are the majority win rate, majority party unity, party polarization, legislative productivity, divided government, macro-partisanship, and public policy mood.

The *majority win rat*e was considered as an independent variable in the work of Lebo et. al. (2007). It is the portion of party votes in which the majority party was on the winning side.

Majority party unity is the portion of majority party members voting with their party on party votes.

Party polarization is the distance between the majority party median and the minority party median in the first dimension of DW Nominate (www.voteview.com).

Legislative productivity is measured using the *legislative productivity index* (Grant and Kelley 2008). *Change in legislative productivity* is the current session legislative productivity index divided by its lagged value.

Divided government equals 1 if at least one chamber is controlled by a party different from the president's party. [1]

Macro partisanship is derived from data made available by Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (1998) and Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson (2008) but transformed to have a consistent positive effect on the vote-share of the majority party (multiplied by -1 when the

[1] Interactions involving a control variable for divided government were also examined but results were statistically insignificant. Interactions included the notion that blocking during periods of unified government might perhaps pose a greater risk to the majority.

majority is Republican). This variable is omitted from the models when inclusion would lead to a substantial number of missing observations.

Public policy mood is the degree to which the policy/ideological positions of the public deviate from the average in favor of the majority party, and is based on the work of Stimson (1999). This variable is omitted from the models when inclusion would lead to a substantial number of missing observations.

Table A.1. Blocking and Majority Seat Share Post-Election

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Size of Majority Blockout Zone	**-0.29 (0.08)***	**-0.30 (0.09)***	**-0.27 (0.08)***	**-0.27 (0.08)***	**-0.27 (0.08)***
Increase in number of issues voted on	**0.13 (0.05)***	**0.14 (0.05)***	**0.14 (0.05)***	**0.16 (0.05)***	**0.14 (0.05)***
Mid-term effect	0.05 (0.02)*	0.05 (0.02)*	0.05 (0.02)*	0.04 (0.02)*	0.05 (0.02)*
Presidential coattails	0.05 (0.02)*	0.05 (0.02)*	0.06 (0.02)*	0.06 (0.02)*	0.06 (0.02)*
Majority party unity	-0.61 (0.16)*				
Majority win rate		-0.07 (0.08)			
Party polarization			-0.06 (0.09)		
Legislative productivity				0.0002 (0.0002)	
Change in LPI				-0.07 (0.04)+	
Divided Government					-.003 (0.03)
Constant	1.04 (0.15)*	0.57 (0.08)*	0.55 (0.08)*	0.48 (0.06)*	0.52 (0.06)*
N	98	103	103	103	103
Adjusted R-squared	0.42	0.30	0.30	0.31	0.30
Durbin-Watson	2.02	2.19	2.15	2.14	2.17

Note: * p<.05 two-tailed. Prais-Winsten AR(1) model.

Table A.2. Blocking and Majority Seat Share Post-Election (Continued)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Portion of issues reported by committee	**0.35 (0.12)***	**0.41 (0.18)***	**0.31 (0.17)+**	**0.48 (0.19)***	**0.37 (0.21)+**	**0.23 (0.21)**	**0.38 (0.20)+**
Mid-term effect	0.03 (0.01)*	0.04 (0.01)*	0.03 (0.01)*	0.03 (0.01)+	0.03 (0.01)*	0.03 (0.01)*	0.03 (0.02)+
Presidential coattails	0.02 (0.01)*	0.01 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)*	0.03 (0.01)*	0.03 (0.01)+	0.04 (0.01)*	0.02 (0.01)+
Macro partisanship	0.005 (0.0001)*						
Public policy mood		0.001 (0.002)					
Majority party unity			-0.37 (0.12)*				
Majority win rate				-0.16 (0.09)+			
Party polarization					-0.06 (0.06)		
Legislative productivity						0.0021 (0.0005)*	
Change in LPI						-0.11 (0.19)	
Divided government							0.006 (0.02)
Constant	0.07 (0.07)	0.33 (0.12)	0.67 (0.18)*	0.38 (0.13)*	0.36 (0.16)*	0.09 (0.13)	0.31 (0.13)
N	29	31	33	33	33	29	33
Adjusted R-squared	0.90	0.46	0.52	0.25	0.29	0.61	0.14
Durbin-Watson	2.05	2.06	1.65	1.70	1.60	1.70	1.74

Note: * p<.05 two-tailed, + p<.01 two-tailed. Prais-Winsten AR(1) model.

Table A.3. Blocking and Loss of Majority Status

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Size of Majority Blockout Zone	**4.89 (2.24)***	**3.89 (2.41)**	**5.11 (2.22)***	**7.74 (2.71)***	**5.16 (2.23)***
Increase in number of issues voted on	**-2.66 (1.39)+**	**-2.65 (1.34)***	**-2.55 (1.31)+**	**-3.08 (1.51)***	**-2.46 (1.31)+**
Mid-term effect	-2.11 (0.70)*	-2.27 (0.71)*	-2.20 (0.69)*	-2.61 (0.87)*	-2.44 (0.60)*
Presidential coattails	-1.56 (0.60)*	-1.81 (0.61)*	-1.70 (0.59)*	-1.98 (0.66)*	-1.64 (0.60)*
Majority party unity	1.51 (4.13)*				
Majority win rate		-3.46 (1.97)+			
Party polarization			-0.80 (1.80)		
Legislative productivity				-0.02 (0.01)*	
Change in LPI				-0.80 (1.21)	
Divided government					0.43 (0.91)
Constant	1.04 (0.15)*	1.47 (2.17)	-0.87 (1.89)	-0.59 (1.76)	-1.73 (1.66)
N	99	104	104	104	104
Pseudo R-squared	0.29	0.30	0.30	0.39	0.30

Note: * p<.05 two-tailed, +p<.10 two-tailed. Logit model.

Table A.4. Blocking and Loss of Majority Status (Continued)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Portion of issues reported by committee	**-3.24 (1.27)***	**-3.00 (0.90)***	**-2.32 (1.06)***	**-2.65 (0.98)***	**-3.11 (1.11)***	**-2.37 (1.34)***	**-2.70 (1.00)***
Mid-term effect	-0.20 (0.08)*	-0.22 (0.07)*	-0.23 (0.08)*	-0.23 (0.08)*	-0.23 (0.08)*	-0.19 (0.09)*	-0.14 (0.11)
Presidential coattails	-0.03 (0.07)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.09 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.13 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.08)
Macro partisanship	0.004 (0.0007)						
Public policy mood		-0.02 (0.01)*					
Majority party unity			0.49 (0.71)				
Majority win rate				0.07 (0.44)			
Party polarization					-0.25 (0.28)		
Legislative productivity						-0.001 (0.003)	
Change in LPI						-0.84 (1.31)	
Divided government							-0.16 (0.15)
Constant	2.45 (0.73)*	0.33 (0.12)	1.22 (1.08)	1.80 (0.68)*	2.31 (0.82)*	1.83 (0.78)*	1.98 (0.65)*
N	29	31	33	33	33	29	33
Adjusted R-squared	0.35	0.46	0.35	0.34	0.34	0.25	0.33
Durbin-Watson	1.92	2.06	1.73	1.72	1.73	1.73	1.66

Note: * p<.05 one-tailed. Prais-Winsten AR(1) model.

Overall, the results reported in Table A1 through Table A4 suggest that the results reported in Tables 1 and Table 2 of the paper are robust to inclusion of a range of control variables. In 32 of 34 analysis, the key variables retain statistical significant at the p<.05 one-tailed level or better. Even the two cases where one of the hypothesized variables was not statistically significant (Table A2 model 6, and Table A3 model 2), had complementary analysis with the other dependent variable (win/loss versus seat share) that did show a statistically significant effect.

Table A1 shows that both the size of the majority party blockout zone and the change in the number of issues considered retain statistical significance as predictors of the post-election

size of the majority party when a series of control variables are included: majority party unity, the majority win rate, party polarization, legislative productivity, change in legislative productivity, and divided government. Similarly in Table A3 these variables remain statistically significant as predictors of majority party defeat when a series of control variables are included: majority party unity, party polarization, legislative productivity and change in legislative productivity, and divided government. One exception is that the size of the majority blockout zone is not statistically significant as a predictor of defeat once a control is included for the majority win rate (p=0.054 one-tailed) which falls short of standard thresholds of statistical significance.

In Table A2 the portion of issues considered retains statistical significance as a predictor of the size of the majority party post-election when controls for macro partisanship, public policy mood, majority party unity, the majority win rate, and party polarization are included. The variable is not statistically significant when controls for legislative productivity are included, which may in part reflect the relatively strong (0.47) correlation between the measures. However, the portion of issues considered retains statistical significance as a predictor of majority party defeat in Table A4 no matter which control variable is included: macro partisanship, public policy mood, majority party unity, majority win rate, party polarization, legislative productivity, change in legislative productivity, or divided government.

Overall, these supplemental analyses suggest that the theoretical predictions made and tested in the paper retain a measure of empirical value in the face of inclusion of a substantial range of control variables postulated in the literature. While hardly definitive, these results lend further credence to the notion that the logic developed in *The Electoral Costs of Party Agenda Control* has empirical relevance.

References

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