Dyadic Results (these will be available on a website)

Supplemental Table 1 presents the results for the first set of dyadic models. The first two models examine the effect of infrastructural institutions on initiation with the following reference categories: Military-Military and Military-Democracy. The results for the regime type variables are in relation to these reference categories. Hypothesis 1 expects that military-military and military-democracy should be two of the regime pairings where we are likely to see a greater probability of initiation. Thus, the other regime variables should be negative and statistically significant. The third and fourth models in this table present the results when looking only at politically relevant dyads. The fifth and sixth models present the results when the dependent variable is the initiation of MIDs where the highest hostility level reached is the use of force (4) or war (5). In model 5, where military-military is the reference category, all of the regime pairings where democracy and party is the first state are negative and statistically significant, showing that *both democracies and party regimes are less likely to initiate a dispute against any other regime type compared to military regimes initiating against other military regimes*, providing evidence for hypothesis 1. This provides evidence that single-party regimes are more pacific than military regimes due to their institutional configuration, not their normative compatibility (Peceny et. al. 2002).

The results from model 6 provide further evidence for the institutional incentive perspective and contest the argument that military regimes focused on internal repression have weak war fighting militaries, making them targets of democracies, who are seeking conflicts against easy opponents. In model 6, where military-democracy is the reference category, democracies and party regimes are less likely to initiate against any other

regime type, indicating that *military regimes are much more likely to initiate against democracies as compared to every other regime pairing except military-military*. These results provide evidence for an institutional explanation of how domestic politics affects the conflict propensity of a state, supporting the finding of Reiter and Stam (2003).

The results of models 7-10 provide confirming evidence that the effects of infrastructural institutions are robust across the selection of cases and the coding of the dependent variable. In model 7, only democracy-democracy and party-party regime pairings are less likely to experience initiation than military-military regime pairings. For politically relevant dyads, mixed regime pairings are just as likely to experience initiation as military-military regime pairings. While the results for models 7 are not as strong as those of model 5, the results for model 8 are as strong as those in model 6. The results of model 8 indicate that for politically relevant dyads, *all other dyad pairings compared to Military-Democracy are less likely to experience initiation of militarized disputes, indicating that military regimes are highly likely to target democracies*. Models 9 and 10 (where the dependent variable is initiations of MIDs that reach a hostility level of 4 (use of force) or 5 (war)) show a similar pattern for the effects of infrastructural institutions on conflict as models 5 and 6, demonstrating that these effects are robust across different specifications of the dependent variable.[i]

Supplemental Table 2 displays the results for the test of hypothesis 2. Here, all four categories of the Slater typology are used to examine if infrastructural institutions play more of a role than despotic institutions in the initiation of a militarized dispute. Model 11 excludes all strongman initiator dyads as the reference category, allowing a comparison between the junta initiators and the boss initiators. Hypothesis 2 predicts that

infrastructural institutions should have more of an influence on the likelihood of conflict. Empirically, this means that juntas should not be statistically different than strongman initiators. The despotic institutional approach, which we argue against, predicts that personalist leaders should uniformly be more violent, predicting that boss initiators should not be statistically different than strongman initiators.

Model 11 provides evidence for hypothesis 2 and against the influence of despotic institutions. Compared to strongman initiators, democracies and single-party regimes (machines and bosses) are significantly less likely to initiate a dispute, while juntas are not significantly less likely to initiate compared to strongmen. This provides evidence for the effectiveness of party institutions in limiting international dispute initiation. *Single-party regimes (whether collective or individual) are less likely to initiate conflict than their military counterparts*. This is the empirical prediction of hypothesis 2 and supports our arguments against the importance of despotic institutions.

Model 12 tests the institutional argument that strongmen (personalist regimes that rely on military institutions) are more likely to initiate against democracies because of their institutional structure, allowing us to compare our results with Reiter and Stam's (2003) findings. When the strongman initiator and democracy target dyads are the reference category, all the other regime pairings are negative and significant with the exception of junta-strongman, strongman-junta, and strongman-strongman. This indicates that *strongmen are significantly more likely to initiate disputes against democracies than the other way around*. This is the opposite of what Peceny et. al. expect (2002), providing evidence for the institutional approach to explaining how domestic politics affects the conflict propensity of states (Reiter and Stam 2003).

Models 13 and 14 replicate models 11 and 12 on politically relevant dyads and Models 15 and 16 examine only initiations that led to uses of force (4) or war (5). Models 13-16 confirm that these results are robust across different research designs. Looking at model 13, for politically relevant dyads, compared to strongman initiators, bossism initiators are less likely to initiate in 2 out of 5 regime pairings while junta initiators are not less likely for any regime pairings. While this evidence is weaker than the all dyads evidence, it still demonstrates that bossism initiators are less conflict prone than juntas, providing support for the influence of infrastructural institutions. The results in model 14 are almost identical to those in model 12, providing additional evidence that strongmen states are more likely to initiate against democracies than other regime types. Models 15 and 16 provide essentially the same findings as model 11 and 12, demonstrating the robustness of our results across different measures of conflict initiation.[ii]

Across all the models, the control variables are fairly consistent. Distance and Military Balance are all significant and in the expected direction. Major power is not significant in the politically relevant models, which is to be expected given that this is a selection criteria for identifying politically relevant dyads. The alliance, Tau B, and trade measures are in the right direction but generally not significant. This differs from other studies that found these to be significant variables (Oneal and Russett 1997; Reed 2000). One reason for the difference is that this data is a set of directed dyads and not non-directed dyads, which is what many other studies analyze (Oneal and Russett 1997; Reed 2000). Finally, because the occurrence of an initiation of a MID (i.e. the dependent variable) is relatively rare compared to the number of observations, these results are also run using a rare events logit (King and Zeng 2001). The results are essentially identical to the results presented in tables 3 and 4.

Supplemental Table 3 presents substantive effects for the statistically significant variables in model 5 of table 3. Changes in predicted probabilities are presented because the general predicted probability of most models of militarized disputes is essentially 0 (MID initiation is a rare event). For example, the predicted probability of initiation in a model where we hold all values at their mean is .00003%. Thus, similar to other studies that use directed dyads (Davies 2002), we present changes in the predicted probabilities. Compared to military-military regime pairings, both democracies and party autocracies have a negative change in their predicted probability of initiating a MID against any other regime type. This change ranges from 62-98%, which is as substantively significant as

the reduction in conflict that is likely to occur going from neighboring states to states that are 10,000 miles apart or from dyads at parity to dyads at extreme disparity. Thus the effect of regime type is not trivial. It is equivalent to the influence of distance and relative military balance.

Supplemental Table 1: Effect of Party-Military Authoritarian Regimes on Dispute Initiation

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Reference Category	Military-Military	Military-Democ	Model 5 PRD only	Model 6 PRD only	Model 5 MID 4or5	Model 6 MID 4or5
Dem-Dem	-.742*** (.129)	-.900*** (.091)	-.483*** (.140)	-.833*** (.101)	-.765*** (.135)	-.950*** (.096)
Dem-Party	-.325** (.109)	-.483*** (.084)	-.040 (.121)	-.390*** (.102)	-.394*** (.118)	-.579*** (.086)
Dem-Mil	-.246* (.129)	-.404*** (.106)	-.043 (.154)	-.393** (.139)	-.336** (.139)	-.521*** (.108)
Party-Party	-.412*** (.102)	-.570*** (.075)	-.277** (.114)	-.627*** (.097)	-.394*** (.111)	-.578*** (.076)
Party-Dem	-.185* (.107)	-.343*** (.070)	.082 (.121)	-.268** (.090)	-.175 (.116)	-.360*** (.072)
Party-Mil	-.249** (.106)	-.407*** (.083)	-.047 (.124)	-.397*** (.112)	-.263* (.115)	-.447*** (.087)
Mil-Mil	--	-.158 (.118)	--	-.350** (.145)	--	-.185 (.125)
Mil-Dem	.158 (.118)	--	.350** (.145)	--	.185 (.125)	--
Mil-Party	-.055 (.105)	-.213** (.077)	.110 (.123)	-.241* (.105)	-.031 (.114)	-.216** (.079)
TauB	-.066 (.052)	-.066 (.052)	-.108* (.064)	-.108* (.064)	-.066 (.055)	-.066 (.055)
Distance	-.0002*** (.00002)	-.0002*** (.00002)	-.0001*** (00002)	-.0001*** (.00002)	-.0002*** (.00002)	-.0002*** (.00002)
Major Power	.857*** (.064)	.857*** (.064)	.040 (.079)	.040 (.079)	.797*** (.061)	.797*** (.061)
Military Balance	-.730*** (.187)	-.730*** (.187)	-1.03*** (.257)	-1.03*** (.257)	-.629*** (.170)	-.629*** (.170)
Trade	-5.28 (5.86)	-5.28 (5.86)	-8.01 (5.70)	-8.01 (5.70)	-1.75 (5.34)	-1.75 (5.34)
Allies	.083 (.051)	.083 (.051)	-.068 (.055)	-.068 (.055)	.067 (.053)	.067 (.053)
Constant	-.772*** (.184)	-.614*** (.189)	-.111 (.648)	.239 (.250)	-.940*** (.177)	-.755*** (.180)
N=558100			N=53937		N=558100	
LL=-5782.32			LL=-3719.4		LL=-4822.7	
Chi2=985.44			Chi2=565.36		Chi2=857.21	

*p<.05, **p<.01,***p<.001 All tests are one-tailed. Standard Errors are in parentheses
The N,LL, and Chi2 are the same for all models
The Splines and Peace Years variables are not displayed.

Supplemental Table 2: Effect of Infrastructural and Despotic Institutions on Dispute Initiation

	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16
Reference Category	Strongman Initiator	Strongman-Democ	Model 11 PRD only	Model 12 PRD only	Model 11 MID 4or5	Model 12 MID 4or5
Dem-Dem	-.816*** (.087)	-.955*** (.093)	-.702*** (.090)	-.867*** (.103)	-.868*** (.090)	-1.01*** (.099)
Dem-Machine	-.425*** (.085)	-.565*** (.099)	-.287*** (.093)	-.447*** (.115)	-.534*** (.89)	-.673*** (.102)
Dem-Boss	-.342*** (.085)	-.483*** (.100)	-.221* (.106)	-.382*** (.125)	-.423*** (.089)	-.563*** (.102)
Dem-Junta	-.588** (.206)	-.727*** (.213)	-.582** (.232)	-.745*** (.241)	-.638*** (.183)	-.777*** (.192)
Dem-Strong	-.256** (.093)	-.396*** (.105)	-.192+ (.123)	-.357** (.140)	-.380*** (.101)	-.520*** (.113)
Mach-Dem	-.289*** (.076)	-.428*** (.088)	-.160* (.089)	-.321** (.107)	-.336*** (.077)	-.475*** (.089)
Mach-Mach	-.593*** (.066)	-.735*** (.085)	-.550*** (.080)	-.719*** (.109)	-.616*** (.070)	-.758*** (.088)
Mach-Boss	-.446*** (.086)	-.589*** (.101)	-.479*** (.095)	-.649*** (.119)	-.468*** (.080)	-.610*** (.095)
Mach-Junta	-.555*** (.180)	-.699*** (.188)	-.621** (.254)	-.798** (.266)	-.574** (.203)	-.718*** (.210)
Mach-Strong	-.476*** (.086)	-.620*** (.101)	-.393*** (.109)	-.567*** (.132)	-.592*** (.114)	-.736*** (.125)
Boss-Dem	-.200** (.069)	-.340*** (.082)	-.105 (.088)	.266** (.106)	-.183** (.071)	-.322*** (.083)
Boss-Machine	-.445*** (.072)	-.589*** (.090)	-.432*** (.094)	-.604*** (.117)	-.443*** (.074)	-.585*** (.090)
Boss-Boss	-.377*** (.080)	-.521*** (.096)	-.462*** (.109)	-.633*** (.130)	-.366*** (.082)	-.509*** (.097)
Boss-Junta	-.304* (.179)	-.449** (.187)	-.274 (.233)	-.449* (.245)	-.341* (.167)	-.486** (.175)
Boss-Strong	-.134* (.082)	-.281** (.098)	-.068 (.110)	-.252* (.136)	-.147* (.085)	-.293*** (.101)
Junta-Dem	-.139 (.122)	-.278** (.119)	-.005 (.151)	-.165 (.150)	-.124 (.128)	-.262* (.126)
Junta-Mach	-.221 (.186)	-.365* (.189)	-.214 (.238)	-.393* (.243)	-.304* (.164)	-.449*** (.169)
Junta-Boss	-.146 (.134)	-.290* (.145)	-.204 (.203)	-.379* (.217)	-.124 (.134)	-.269* (.144)
Junta-Junta	--	--	--	--	--	--
Junta-strong	-.128 (.196)	-.276 (.206)	-.136 (.279)	-.322 (.288)	-.156 (.184)	-.305 (.193)
Strong-Dem	--	--	--	--	--	--

Strong-Mach	--	-.248** (.096)	--	-.213* (.126)	--	-.245** (.101)
Strong-Boss	--	-.220** (.094)	--	-.263* (.132)	--	-.213** (.098)
Strong-Junta	--	-.136 (.203)	--	-.311 (.327)	--	-.084 (.201)
Strong-Strong	--	-.165 (.125)	--	-.377* (.165)	--	-.207 (.136)
TauB	-.098* (.053)	-.082 (.053)	-.156** (.066)	-.125* (.066)	-.102* (.055)	-.083 (.056)
Distance	-.0002*** (.00002)	-.0002*** (.00002)	-.0001*** (.00002)	-.0001*** (.00002)	-.0002*** (.00002)	-.0002*** (.00002)
Major Power	.874*** (.066)	.870 (.065)	.050 (.079)	.046 (.079)	.818*** (.062)	.813*** (.062)
Military Balance	-.729*** (.187)	-.733*** (.187)	-1.02*** (.258)	-1.03*** (.258)	-.626*** (.171)	-.631*** (.170)
Trade	-4.75 (5.70)	-5.03 (5.82)	-7.19 (5.46)	-7.56 (5.60)	-1.14 (5.13)	-1.38 (5.25)
Allies	.106* (.050)	.098* (.051)	-.042 (.055)	-.056 (.057)	.092* (.052)	.082 (.054)
Constant	-.706*** (.176)	-.559** (.190)	.094 (.237)	.274 (.253)	-.847*** (.168)	-.701*** (.181)
	N=557626 LL=-5768.99 Chi2=1027.5	N=557626 LL=-5760.98 Chi2=1031.1	N=59375 LL=-3716.09 Chi2=597.13	N=59375 LL=-3710.06 Chi2=619.22	N=557626 LL=-4804.6 Chi2=906.61	N=557626 LL=-4797.2 Chi2=911.36

*p<.05, **p<.01,***p<.001 All tests are one-tailed. Standard Errors are in parentheses
The Splines and Peace Years variables are not displayed.

Supplemental Table 3: Percent Change in Predicted Probabilities for Statistically Significant
Variables in Table 3, Model 5

Independent Variables	Minimum	Maximum	Percent Change in Predicted Probability of MID Initiation
Democracy-Democracy	0	1	-98%
Democracy-Party	0	1	-82%
Democracy-Military	0	1	-73%
Party-Democracy	0	1	-62%
Party-Party	0	1	-89%
Party-Military	0	1	-73%
Distance	0	10000	-100%
Major Power	0	1	6090%
Military Balance	0.5	1	-84%

Percent Change in Predicted Probability is calculated by taking the predicted probability (PP) of the maximum value-predicted probability of the minimum value divided by the predicted probability of the minimum value times 100: ((PPMax-PPMin)/PPMin)*100
Predicted probabilities are calculated by holding all variables at their mean(continuous) or mode(dichotomous) and setting the value of one variable.

	Model 1	Model 2
	Any MID, Autocs Only, Party is Excluded Category	Any MID, Autocs Only, Machine is Excluded Category
Military	354* (.166)	--
Junta	--	.433* (.244)
Boss	--	.114 (.172)
Strongman	--	.401* (.212)
Total Borders	.090** (.034)	.090** (.034)
Capability	.664 (2.96)	.789 (3.03)
Openness	-.883** (.289)	-.897** (.296)
Total Allies	.005 (.006)	.005 (.006)
Lag DV	.531*** (.104)	.530*** (.105)
Constant	-1.74*** (.242)	-2.14*** (.227)
	N=3375 LL=-1901.4 Chi2=120.5***	N=3375 LL=-1900.7 Chi2=138.3***

[i] We also ran another set of models that examines MIDs of 4 or 5 on politically relevant dyads and the results are the same as those reported for the politically relevant dyads.

[ii] We also ran another set of models that examines MIDs of 4 or 5 on politically relevant dyads and the results are the same as those reported for the politically relevant dyads.