Military Responsibility for Overseas Interests Security: OSINT Audit Conducting MIL-ORR-5 Computable Closed-Loop Assessment of Dual Responsibilities (External-Internal) Under the Framework of the Overall National Security Concept

—Taking the January 2026 Crisis Window in Venezuela as an Example

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Abstract

This paper undertakes an OSINT accountability audit strictly constrained by publicly verifiable evidence. Its objective is to provide a verifiable, falsifiable, and tiered audit conclusion regarding the Chinese military's external responsibilities (security provision and credibility stabilisation within a partnership context) and internal responsibilities (obligations to safeguard overseas security for its citizens, institutions, and critical assets) concerning the security of China's overseas interests in Venezuela, without invoking any non-public information. The study anchors the boundaries of publicly committed Sino-Venezuelan relations using multilingual authoritative primary sources. Centred on the January 2026 crisis window period, it proposes the MIL-ORR-5 Overseas Interest Security Supply Closed-Loop Audit System, providing scoring methodologies and computable algorithms. This transforms the assessment of 'duty fulfilment' from retrospective attribution to a window-period mechanism output audit. Calculations reveal: within current OSINT-verifiable parameters, state-level diplomatic and financial regulatory actions exhibit clear visibility. However, the military's external-internal security provision loop lacks publicly verifiable evidence meeting the 'minimum auditable threshold,' constituting an attributable gap of 'insufficient mechanism auditability.' Concurrently, crisis windows significantly amplify credibility pressures on partnerships, yet no symmetrical signals of stable 'boundary interpretation-credibility management' mechanisms are discernible in the public domain, creating 'suspicions of substandard cross-departmental lock-in and credibility management.' Regarding specific military-technical system conclusions such as 'air defence system failures,' existing public materials are insufficient to form a performance-level evidence chain, precluding escalation to hard accountability for technical negligence. This paper concludes by proposing a rectification pathway achieving minimal closed-loop visibility without disclosing sensitive capability details, thereby meeting auditable governance requirements for overseas interests security.

Keywords: Comprehensive National Security Outlook; Overseas Interests Security; Military Accountability Audit; OSINT; MIL-ORR-5; ACH; Internal Accountability; Credibility Risk

1. Introduction

The loss of overseas interests does not automatically equate to military negligence; auditable accountability must be determined by whether a security provision loop that is ‘triggerable, interconnected, achievable, and explainable’ was established during the crisis window. The holistic national security approach emphasises systemic thinking, bottom-line thinking, and coordinated management of both domestic and international affairs. Consequently, the auditable expression of ‘due diligence’ should shift from ‘outcome assurance’ to ‘mechanism output’: whether the window period can provide the national decision-making system with deployable risk thresholds, response options, cross-departmental coordination rhythms, and credible boundaries for handling crises. The Venezuela case presents essential conditions for conducting authentic OSINT audits: China and Venezuela publicly elevated bilateral ties to an ‘all-weather strategic partnership’ in 2023, establishing high-commitment boundaries and elevating external expectations; January 2026 witnessed consecutive authoritative reports and Foreign Ministry briefing records, enabling public identification of the crisis window's opening and the state-level response context; Concurrently, the oil-gas-debt-sanctions structure provides a verifiable, materialised conduit for overseas interests to be impacted, facilitating the mapping of ‘losses’ onto an observable process of ‘mechanism chains being severed/rearranged by external forces.’ (Xinhua, 2023; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2026a; Reuters, 2026a; Reuters, 2026c)

2. Boundaries of Responsibility and Auditing Principles: Replacing ‘Outcome Attribution for Accountability’ with ‘Closed-Loop Mechanism Accountability’

This paper adopts the ‘Closed-Loop Mechanism Accountability Principle’: military responsibility is bounded by institutional outputs during the crisis window period, rather than providing unverifiable guarantees based on external outcomes. The rationale lies in the fact that a single entity cannot control the internal political trajectory of partner nations, the efficacy of external actions, commercial repayment flows, or shifts in sanctions structures. Attributing responsibility based on outcomes renders accountability assessments unverifiable and irreproducible, risking misinterpretation of ‘exogenous shocks’ as ‘endogenous negligence.’ Mechanism-Closed Accountability mandates at least five auditable outputs during the window period: risk classification and trigger thresholds;

contingency plans and drills; cross-departmental coordination protocols; emergency accessibility and channel redundancy; and credibility management with boundary clarification. External and internal accountability are highly intertwined during the critical window: an invisible external accountability loop amplifies external narrative gaps and elevates credibility costs in partnerships; an invisible internal accountability loop undermines domestic citizens' and institutions' expectations of ‘evacuation, support, and protection,’ thereby magnifying secondary risks. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' public stance and explicit demands during the window period signify the state's entry into crisis management mode. Should the military's closed-loop lack commensurate minimal visible corroboration, this constitutes structural misalignment and enters the scope of accountability audits. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2026a; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2026b)

3. Methodology: MIL-ORR-5 Closed-Loop System, Evidence Grading, ACH and Computable Scoring Algorithm

3.1 Multilingual OSINT Evidence Grading and Inclusion Rules

To ensure the verifiability of ‘authentic OSINT audits’, this paper categorises evidence into three tiers with defined applications: Tier A comprises original government department/official briefing records/official news agency texts, used to establish institutional factual anchors and commitment boundaries; Tier B comprises primary reports from mainstream international news agencies and high-credibility media, used to establish event timelines and observable institutional actions; Category C comprises secondary media and commentary materials, solely for identifying narrative spillover effects, not for technical/compliance attribution. Multilingual cross-verification mitigates monolingual misinterpretation and relay bias: for instance, escalating relations are anchored by Xinhua's English edition to define commitment boundaries; Portuguese-language mainstream media dissemination of Chinese narratives serves as corroborative evidence for credibility spillover, reflecting partnership narrative diffusion pathways in non-Chinese information spaces. (Xinhua, 2023; RTP, 2026)

3.2 Alternative Hypotheses (ACH)

Three sets of alternative hypotheses constrain inferences:

H1: Substantive deficiencies in closed-loop systems amplify losses;

H2: Closed-loop systems may exist but lack public corroboration, rendering them unauditable;

H3: External narrative spillover dominates, shaping China cooperation effectiveness on the credibility battlefield.

ACH mandates evidence be used to differentiate hypotheses rather than make strong attributions based on insufficient evidence. Particularly for technical assertions such as ‘weapon system malfunction’ or ‘air defence system failure,’ without evidence chains at the contractual, operational, or official disclosure levels, these should be strictly downgraded to ‘narrative risk inputs’ rather than ‘evidence establishing responsibility.’ (USCC, 2026)

3.3 Theoretical Definition of MIL-ORR-5

The Military Overseas Risk Response Five-Ring Strategy (MIL-ORR-5) operationalises the security responsibility for overseas military interests into a five-ring closed-loop system:

Figure 1. MIL-ORR-5 Overseas Interests Security Five-Ring Closed-Loop Framework Diagram

Figure 1 illustrates the Military Overseas Interests Risk-Response Five-Ring (MIL-ORR-5) framework, a closed-loop accountability model for auditing the military's fulfilment of responsibilities regarding the security of overseas interests. This framework comprises five interconnected functional rings:

(1) Early Warning Grading, for risk classification and threshold setting;

(2) Contingency Planning and Exercises, ensuring emergency preparedness and operational feasibility;

(3) Cross-Departmental Coordination, enabling synchronised multi-agency responses;

(4) Emergency Accessibility and Redundant Routes, securing entry capabilities, evacuation pathways and alternative routes;

(5) Reputation Management and Boundary Control, for managing external expectations and clarifying responsibility and capability boundaries.

This circular structure emphasises that overseas interest protection is not a linear reaction process, but rather a continuously operating governance cycle. Responsibilities are operationally defined as a verifiable set of institutional artefacts deliverable within the crisis window period. This enables responsibility assessments to be auditable, quantifiable, and dynamically updated with new evidence.

3.4 Scoring Methods and Algorithms

for each link $j \in \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$, Constructing an evidence set $E_j = \{e_j1, ..., e_{jn}\}$.Each piece of evidence is weighted according to the following criteria: evidence type, authority, independence, specificity, timeliness, and verifiability. Type weighting.： $wT(A) = 1.00$, $wT(B) = 0.80$,$wT(C) = 0.30$。 Authority $w_A \in [0, 1]$, independence $w_I \in (0, 1]$, Concreteness $w_S \in (0, 1]$, Verifiability $w_V \in (0, 1]$

Time-dependent attenuation:

$$w_R = \exp(-\lambda \Delta t), \quad \Delta t = \max(0, \text{Date of evidence release} - t_0)$$

Where t_0 denotes the 'baseline date' of the crisis window. This paper sets t_0 as 5 January 2026 (the date of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs press conference), as it signifies the window period has entered the national-level response context. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2026a)

Circle score:

$$Score_j^{raw} = \sum_{e \in E_j} w_T(e) \cdot w_A(e) \cdot w_I(e) \cdot w_S(e) \cdot w_R(e) \cdot w_V(e)$$

Mapped to 0–5 minutes:

$$Score_j = \min(5, \alpha \,.\, Score_j^{raw})$$

Minimum auditable threshold： $Score_j \geq 3$ 为 Audit-Observable； $1 \leq Score_j < 3$ 为 Weak-Observable； $Score_j < 1$ 为 Non-Observable。Overall Index:

$$MIL_ORR5_Index = \frac{1}{5}\sum_{j=1}^{5} Score_j$$

Determination: At least 3 rings where *Scorej* ≥ 3 and *MIL_ORR5_Index* ≥ 3 shall be deemed Pass; otherwise, if at least 1 ring meets the threshold, it shall be deemed Partial; if all *Scorej* < *3*, it shall be deemed Fail-Observable (insufficient mechanism auditability).

4. Audit Subject: Translating 'Internal Accountability' and 'External Accountability' into Audit-Ready Metrics

The military need not disclose sensitive capability details, but should the window period entirely lack minimum mechanism corroboration, the system will be pushed into an 'unaudit-able zone' and face attributable pressure within the political-financial-security linkage window. This paper establishes 'Minimum Observable Indicators' based on MIL-ORR-5, using Class A/B evidence to determine threshold attainment.

Table 1: MIL-ORR-5 Five-Ring 'Minimum Observable Indicators' (Public Corroborative Evidence Thresholds)

MIL-ORR-5 ring	Minimum observable indicators (mechanism signals that should manifest at the public level)	Verifiable Source Types (Class A/B)	Threshold for determination (necessary condition: Score ≥ 3)	Internal/External Responsibility Orientation
1. Warning Grading	Principles for Risk Classification Criteria and Trigger Thresholds (When to Escalate to Cross-Departmental Resolution)	Class A notification or Class B authoritative citation	Simultaneous occurrence of both "grading and triggering" elements with a localisable window period	Internally: Expectation management; Externally: Minimising narrative gaps
2. Contingency Plan Drill	Evidence of contingency plans existing without detailing specifics (initiated/updated/rehearsed)	Class A notification or Class B authoritative citation	At least one "initiation/update/exercise" can identify the window period.	Internally: Evacuation and emergency support; Externally: Partner credibility and stability
3. Cross-departmental lockdown	Diplomatic-Financial-Corporate-Consular Protection: A synchronised signal of coordinated action	A/B-grade time-alignable materials	At least two departments must synchronise their actions and align with the same processing logic.	Internally: systematic resource allocation; Externally: consistent narrative

4. Reachability and Redundancy	At least one fundamental arrangement such as passage assessment, evacuation alerts, or route backup	Category A Consular Protection/Overseas Advisory or Category B Authoritative Report	When any of the "channel/evacuation/redundancy" signals appear and a locatable window period is available	Domestically: Core Protection of Life and Assets
5. Reputation Management and Boundary Control	A stable interpretative framework for 'boundaries of responsibility versus boundaries of capability' that can be disseminated across languages.	Category A statements or Category B authoritative citations	Reproducible boundary criteria have emerged and spread across multiple languages.	Externally: Partner and third-party expectations; Internally: Clarity of accountability

Table 1 aims to establish minimum publicly auditable thresholds for the MIL-ORR-5 five-ring responsibility loop, transforming the military's duties in safeguarding overseas interests from abstract commitments into observable, verifiable signals of institutional mechanisms. Its core logic is that, without disclosing sensitive capability details, the presence of publicly observable supporting evidence corresponding to principles such as alert grading, contingency planning exercises, cross-departmental coordination, accessibility and redundancy, and credibility and boundary management during crisis windows can demonstrate that the relevant responsibility loop is operational. Conversely, persistent absence of these minimal signals from credible sources indicates the loop's non-auditability at the public level, leading responsibility assessments to conclude systemic gaps exist. The table further distinguishes between domestic and international accountability dimensions, framing overseas interests security both as a matter of managing partnerships and international credibility, and as an institutional obligation to safeguard national personnel and assets. This establishes a clear, verifiable benchmark framework for responsibility auditing.

5. Evidence Chain and Factual Anchors: Commitment Boundaries, Window Period Positioning, and Overseas Interest Materialisation Channels

Regarding commitment boundaries, Xinhua's public reports indicate China and Venezuela elevated their relationship to an ‘all-weather strategic partnership’ in 2023. This elevated commitment threshold implies heightened demands for stable expectations and credible responses during crisis windows. (Xinhua, 2023) Regarding window period positioning, Reuters reported that the January 3,

2026 incident involving the US ‘arrest/removal’ of Maduro triggered significant political and security spillovers, constituting an exogenous trigger point for the crisis window. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs publicly expressed ‘grave concern’ and ‘demanded immediate release’ at a press conference on 5 January 2026, indicating the state had entered crisis management mode. (Reuters, 2026b; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2026a) Regarding the integration of risk spillovers into the national governance agenda, Reuters reported that China's financial regulators directed major banks and policy financial institutions to disclose their exposures to Venezuela and enhance risk monitoring. This constitutes a verifiable institutional action, indicating that the national system has entered a monitoring/resolution phase concerning financial risks. (Reuters, 2026a) Regarding channels for safeguarding overseas interests, Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy noted that US actions would impact oil flows to China, debt repayment arrangements, and the role of Chinese oil companies in Venezuela's upstream operations; Reuters further reported that US control over Venezuela's oil exports and revenue arrangements could trigger potential conflicts over debt restructuring and the priority of Chinese creditors' claims, rendering ‘overseas interest losses’ observable through the mechanism of ‘rearranged oil-gas-debt cash flow chains’. (Downs & Palacios, 2026; Reuters, 2026c) Regarding credibility spillover, mainstream Portuguese-language media coverage of China's continued support for Venezuela demonstrates that partnership narratives possess verifiable dissemination pathways within non-Chinese information spaces, thereby transforming credibility risk from a ‘subjective perception’ into an ‘observable phenomenon’. (RTP, 2026) As a contextual anchor for relationship structures, the USCC's factual inventory materials can serve as structural a priori elements within the ACH framework rather than merely window-period closed-loop score-boosting. (USCC, 2026)

6. MIL-ORR-5 Calculation: Recalculate each Five Rings element using actual publication dates and verifiable weights

Under OSINT conditions, the components termed ‘actual data’ comprise each piece of evidence's source type, actual publication date, verifiability, and its temporal relationship with the window period; whereas wA, wS, wI, wV constitute pre-registered scoring rule parameters (transparently fixed, subject to rebuttal but not arbitrary drift). This section fixes t0 = 5 January 2026 and employs only verifiable Class A/B evidence alongside their actual publication dates for calculation. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2026a)

6.1 Parameter Settings (Fixed for This Calculation)

λ=0.05 (daily), α=2.0. Δt=max(0, publication date - t0); if evidence precedes the baseline date, Δt=0 (no penalty).

6.2 Minimum Evidence Set for Inclusion in Calculations (Categories A/B)

Category A: Ministry of Foreign Affairs press conference (2026-01-05); Ministry of Foreign Affairs press conference (2026-01-06). (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2026a; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2026b)

Category B: Reuters (2026-01-03) on crisis trigger events; Reuters (2026-01-05) on Chinese regulatory disclosure requirements for Venezuelan exposures; Reuters (2026-01-23) on US control of Venezuelan oil exports and conflict risks with Chinese creditors; Reuters (2026-01-23) on Venezuela's debt-for-oil repayment mechanism restructuring with China. (Reuters, 2026a; Reuters, 2026b; Reuters, 2026c; Reuters, 2026d)

Category B (Multilingual Credibility Corroboration): Portuguese mainstream media RTP (2026-01-09) (RTP, 2026)

Note: USCC and CGEP materials serve for mechanism explanation and structural anchoring, and do not enter the scoring evidence pool for ‘military closed-loop visualisation’ to prevent background analysis from inflating closed-loop scores. (Downs & Palacios, 2026; USCC, 2026)

6.3 True Δt and w_R

2026-01-03：Δt=0 → w_R=1.0000

2026-01-05：Δt=0 → w_R=1.0000

2026-01-06：Δt=1 → w_R=exp(-0.05)=0.9512

2026-01-09：Δt=4 → w_R=exp(-0.2)=0.8187

2026-01-23：Δt=18 → w_R=exp(-0.9)=0.4066

6.4 Five-Ring Scoring System (Pre-registration values used for this calculation)

Category A：$w_T = 1.00, w_A = 1.00, w_I = 1.00, w_V = 1.00$

CategoryB：$w_T = 0.80$To avoid mistaking "news coverage/financial actions" for "military closed-loop operations",

Specificity w_S is assigned a conservative value: if evidence directly indicates closed-loop mechanism signals, w_S ∈ [0.60, 0.80];

If only external shocks or actions by non-military departments are presented, then take $w_S \in [0.30, 0.50]$; Category B Verifiability w_V=0.90, independence w_I=0.90–1.00, Authority w_A=0.80–0.90.

6.5 Loop-by-Loop Calculation and Results

Loop 1 Early Warning Grading: Verifiable materials indicate financial regulation has entered the 'disclosure exposure + risk monitoring' phase, though its primary actor is non-military. Specificity conservatively set at 0.40, contribution c ≈ 0.2592, mapped score Score1 ≈ 0.5184, Non/Weak. (Reuters, 2026a)

Loop 2 Contingency Drills: No verifiable mechanism signals ('initiated/updated/drilled') appear in A/B-grade scoring materials. Score2 = 0, Non-Observable.

Loop 3 Cross-Departmental Lock-in: Foreign Ministry briefings (5th and 6th January) establish national response context anchors, yet verifiable corroboration of military closed-loop actions remains absent; Incorporated as a weak signal under 'response context consistency' (wS weighted at 0.70 and 0.60, with second-day signal decay due to timeliness), resulting in a combined Score3 below threshold, classified as Weak-Observable. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2026a; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2026b)

Loop 4 Accessibility and Redundancy: No verifiable mechanism signals such as 'evacuation advisories/channel assessments/redundant pathways' appeared in the scored materials. Score 4 = 0, Non-Observable.

Ring 5 Credibility Management and Boundary Control: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release text provides a stable stance and context for handling, while RTP's Portuguese dissemination offers cross-linguistic diffusion corroboration. However, a stable boundary interpretation framework (repeatable mechanism parameters) addressing 'partnership credibility impacts' remains absent. Consequently, the score falls within the Weak range, failing to meet the threshold. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2026a; RTP, 2026)

Composite Index: None of the five rings attained the minimum auditable threshold of Scorej ≥ 3, and the overall index remains significantly below 3. Consequently, the mechanism is deemed insufficiently auditable (Fail-Observable).

7. Interpretation of Findings and ACH Convergence: Attributable Gaps and Unverifiable Boundaries

The computational results align more closely with ACH in supporting H2+H3: while disposal contexts and financial regulatory actions at the national system level are discernible, the closed-loop core military operations remain inauditable at the OSINT level (H2); Concurrently, US control over Venezuela's oil revenue streams and export routes, coupled with potential debt restructuring priorities, heightens uncertainty surrounding oil repayments to China and creditor claims. Consequently, credibility pressures proliferate across multilingual discourse spaces (H3). The absence of a symmetrical public mechanism for interpreting 'boundaries of responsibility versus capability' facilitates external narrative gaps and undermines internal stability. (Reuters, 2026c; Reuters, 2026d; RTP, 2026; Downs & Palacios, 2026; USCC, 2026)

8. Audit Conclusions: Military Accountability, Attributable Gaps and Unsubstantiated Boundaries

Conclusion 1 (High Confidence, Attributable): During the crisis window, the diplomatic response context and financial regulatory actions exhibited clear visibility. Overseas interest impacts could be tangibly understood through the reordering of the oil-gas-debt cash flow chain; Under these conditions, the military's failure to provide publicly observable closed-loop signals aligned with MIL-ORR-5 constitutes an institutional gap of 'insufficient mechanism auditability'. This gap does not prove internal inaction but rather the inability to fulfil the systemic, verifiable closed-loop security provision for overseas interests required by the overall national security outlook at a publicly verifiable level. Consequently, it elevates the cost of maintaining external credibility while diminishing the predictability of internal protective obligations. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2026a; Reuters, 2026a; Reuters, 2026c)

Conclusion 2 (Medium Confidence, Attributable to Non-Compliance Concerns): High-commitment partnerships amplify external expectations regarding the efficacy of security provision during crisis windows; Without stable signals regarding the interpretation of 'responsibility boundaries versus capability boundaries' and credibility management mechanisms, cross-departmental coordination and credibility management exhibit observable shortcomings, potentially amplifying interpretative costs and secondary risks when partnerships face disruption. (Xinhua, 2023; RTP, 2026)

Conclusion 3 (High Confidence, Not Attributable to Technical Negligence): Regarding technical assertions such as 'air defence system failure/ineffectiveness of systems assisted by China,' currently available verifiable public materials are insufficient to establish a contractual, operational, or officially disclosed chain of evidence for performance fulfilment. Such claims cannot be elevated to definitive

attribution of military technical or performance failure. At most, they may serve as input signals for credibility risks and narrative spillover, not as substantiated grounds for liability. (USCC, 2026)

9. Remediation Pathway: Achieving minimal closed-loop visibility without compromising sensitive capabilities

The core of remediation lies not in disclosing capability specifics, but in providing minimal corroborative evidence of ‘mechanism existence and triggering principles’:

The early warning tiering loop establishes principled thresholds and escalation criteria;

The contingency drill loop retains verifiable evidence of ‘initiation/update/exercise’; The cross-departmental lockdown loop establishes synchronised coordination timelines; The accessibility and redundancy loop generates foundational signals for channel assessment and path backup; The reputation management loop forms a reusable boundary interpretation framework permitting multilingual dissemination. This minimal visibility strategy transforms overseas interest security from a sloganised commitment into an auditable governance artefact without compromising sensitive details.

10. Limitations

This analysis is strictly constrained by OSINT, lacking access to internal exercise records, command chains, or commercial contract specifics. Consequently, the observation of ‘insufficient mechanism auditability’ indicates only that publicly verifiable evidence falls short of the minimum corroborative threshold, not speculative assertions about internal facts. As new public materials emerge, MIL-ORR-5 should be iteratively updated according to this document's methodology to maintain falsifiable and amendable conclusions.

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