Bearing the Burden of Peace: Intergroup Attribution Bias and Public Support for Peace Provisions

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A Additional Information on Data Collection

A.1 Sampling Strategy

We recruited participants via a multi-stage and multi-strategy campaign on Facebook. The paid strategy employed both boosted posts and Facebook ads (for information on the difference between boosted posts and Facebook ads, see here), and we combined a so-called "traffic campaign" objective, which aims to send people from Facebook to an URL, with demographic targeting (Boas, Christenson, and Glick 2020). Regarding the latter, we targeted the general adult population in Azerbaijan as well as specific groups at risk of being under-represented (i.e., women and rural respondents). We reached about 500,000 unique Facebook users through our paid strategy, 43,094 of whom clicked on the link that led to our survey. We paid a total of €1,421.34 to reach these users or €0.03 per click. The non-paid strategy consisted of sharing the survey in a widely selected number of Facebook groups and encouraging people to share the survey further (i.e., online snowball sampling). Table A.1 summarizes the recruitment campaign.

Table A.1: Information on Facebook Sampling Strategy and Results, by Post.

Picture	Strategy	Results
(no picture)	• Goal: Launch page • Published: 14 December 2020 at 17:20 • Budget: No paid advertisement • Target: No targeting strategy	• Reach: 772 • Reactions: 13 • Comments: 2 • Shares: 2
	• Goal: Soft-launch survey • Published: 28 December 2020 at 18:00 • Budget: No paid advertisement • Target: No targeting strategy	• Reach: 794 • Reactions: 4 • Comments: 1 • Shares: 0
	• Goal: Launch survey • Published: 5 January 2021 at 15:00 • Budget: €150.00 • Target: Azerbaijan, 18-65+ year	• Reach: 124,291 • Reactions: 464 • Comments: 225 • Shares: 24
	• Goal: Increase rural participation • Published: 11 January 2021 at 19:07 • Budget: €150.00 • Target: Azerbaijan, 18-65+ year, rural respondents	• Reach: 115,470 • Reactions: 139 • Comments: 10 • Shares: 1

Table A.1: continued from previous page

	• Goal: Increase general participation • Published: 21 January 2021 at 14:21 • Budget: €150.00 • Target: Azerbaijan, 18-65+ year	• Reach: 133,554 • Reactions: 461 • Comments: 213 • Shares: 44
(no picture)	• Goal: Public dissemination of ethics and contact information • Published: 22 January 2021 at 10:20 • Budget: No paid advertisement • Target: No targeting strategy	• Reach: 910 • Reactions: 14 • Comments: 4 • Shares: 0
	• Goal: Increase female participation • Published: 4 February 2021 at 15:05 • Budget: €200.00 • Target: Azerbaijan, 18-65+ year, women	• Reach: 125,093 • Reactions: 721 • Comments: 106 • Shares: 39
	• Goal: Increase general participation • Published: 11 February 2021 at 15:33 • Budget: €150.00 • Target: Azerbaijan, 18-65+ year (women added on last day)	• Reach: 126,660 • Reactions: 932 • Comments: 34 • Shares: 40
	• Goal: Increase female participation • Published: 21 February 2021 at 15:02 • Budget: €15.59 + €16.87 • Target: Azerbaijan, 18-65+ year, women + rural respondents	• Reach: 19,320 • Reactions: 44 • Comments: 22 • Shares: 7

Note: Results include both organic and paid results. In addition to boosted posts, we also launched three Facebook ads of €92.15 (general population), €288.01 (targeted at female respondents), and €208.72 (targeted at rural respondents).

Sampling respondents from a specific location on Facebook poses the risk of subjects misrepresenting themselves. To mitigate this, we implemented measures to increase the likelihood that our sample is (at least predominantly) from Azerbaijan, all while preserving respondent anonymity, in accordance with our ethics application and approval.

1. **Geotargeting**: We utilized Facebook's geotargeting features to focus our ads on users within a specific geographic location, such as the country or a specific set of regions within Azerbaijan. This helps narrow down the audience to individuals physically present in the targeted area.

2. **Language and Cultural Cues**: In collaboration with local Azerbaijanis, we designed our ad content, including text and visuals, to reflect the language and cultural signs of the country.

3. **Post Placement**: In addition to using broadly promoted ads, we choose post placements that were likely to be seen by users within the targeted country. This involved posting our survey in various local Facebook pages and groups, encompassing both pro-war, anti-war, and pages and groups unrelated to the conflict. Furthermore, our posts received substantial engagement, with about 400 shares and over 400 comments (predominantly written in Azerbaijani). We assume that people who misrepresent themselves would be less motivated to share or publicly engage with our posts.

4. **Survey Verification and Data Validation**: Unfortunately, due to ethical constraints, we are unable to utilize IP addresses for verifying respondents' locations. Nonetheless, we can employ several self-reported proxies to validate the data. Specifically, participants were asked about their place of birth and current residence. The responses revealed that 81 respondents (5%) were not born in Azerbaijan, 120 respondents (12%) currently live outside the country, and 13 respondents (0.8%) neither were born nor currently live in Azerbaijan. Additionally, participants had the option to take the survey in Azerbaijani or English, and 92% chose Azerbaijani. Excluding those who took the survey in English also does not alter the results (see Table D.3 below).

5. **Compensation**: Due to budget constraints, there was no compensation for participation in our survey. Only two, randomly selected respondents could win a voucher. The incentive for subjects from other countries to take our survey was, therefore, very low.

While we expect these measures to have improved targeting, we acknowledge the possibility of participants providing inaccurate information; however, we believe this proportion to be negligible.

A.2 Summary Statistics

Table A.2: Summary Statistics for Socio-Political Variables.

Statistic	N	NA (%)	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Media exposure	1,649	8 (0.005%)	4.88	1.45	1	7
National pride	1,636	21 (0.013%)	9.71	2.60	1	11
Political trust	1,644	13 (0.008%)	5.99	2.52	1	11
Vote for New Azerbaijan Party	1,616	41 (0.025%)	0.33	0.47	0	1
Outgroup empathy	1,651	6 (0.004%)	2.18	1.17	1	5
Social distance	1,650	7 (0.004%)	3.94	1.03	1	5
Prejudice	1,648	9 (0.005%)	3.49	1.28	1	5
Exposure to 2020 war	1,630	27 (0.016%)	0.64	0.48	0	1
Threat perceptions	1,649	8 (0.005%)	3.53	1.39	1	5
PTSD symptoms	1,613	44 (0.027%)	2.43	0.85	1	5

Note: Question wordings for all variables can be found at https://osf.io/x4trk/.

B Numerical Results

B.1 Question-Wording Experiments at Wave 1

Table B.1: Mean Support per Condition (Corresponding to Figure 1).

	mean	sd	n	se	lower.ci	upper.ci
Panel A: Compansation Experiment						
Control	3.57	1.50	321	0.08	3.41	3.74
Armenia	4.56	0.93	340	0.05	4.46	4.66
Azerbaijan	1.85	1.25	329	0.07	1.72	1.99
Both	3.64	1.50	327	0.08	3.47	3.80
Int. Comm.	3.66	1.38	340	0.07	3.52	3.81
Panel B: Punishment Experiment						
Control	4.66	0.87	409	0.04	4.57	4.74
Armenia	4.90	0.46	417	0.02	4.86	4.95
Azerbaijan	2.52	1.63	413	0.08	2.36	2.67
Both	4.02	1.39	418	0.07	3.89	4.16

Table B.2: Identified Effects of Intergroup Bias on Support for Peace Provisions.

	Dependent variable:			
	compensation	scale(compensation)	punishment	scale(punishment)
Armenia	0.989^{***}	0.621^{***}	0.246^{**}	0.164^{**}
	(0.786, 1.191)	(0.494, 0.748)	(0.086, 0.407)	(0.057, 0.272)
Azerbaijan	-1.722^{***}	-1.081^{***}	-2.140^{***}	-1.427^{***}
	(−1.926, −1.518)	(−1.209, −0.953)	(−2.301, −1.978)	(−1.535, −1.320)
Both	0.063	0.039	-0.631^{***}	-0.421^{***}
	(−0.141, 0.267)	(−0.089, 0.168)	(−0.792, −0.471)	(−0.528, −0.314)
IC	0.091	0.057		
	(−0.111, 0.294)	(−0.070, 0.185)		
Constant	3.573^{***}	0.068	4.655^{***}	0.421^{***}
	(3.428, 3.718)	(−0.023, 0.159)	(4.541, 4.770)	(0.344, 0.497)
Observations	1,657	1,657	1,657	1,657
R^2	0.308	0.308	0.383	0.383
Adjusted R^2	0.306	0.306	0.381	0.381

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Cell entries are OLS coefficients with confidence intervals (CIs) in parentheses.

B.2 Long-term Effects

Table B.3: Mean Support per Condition per Wave (Corresponding to Figure 2).

	Wave 1			Wave 2		
	m	sd	n	m	sd	n
Panel A: Compansation Experiment						
Control	3.95	1.24	75	3.80	1.30	75
Armenia	4.39	0.96	66	4.47	0.93	66
Azerbaijan	1.98	1.32	80	1.98	1.19	80
Both	3.76	1.56	71	3.94	1.32	71
Int. Comm.	3.68	1.26	81	3.83	1.14	81
Panel B: Punishment Experiment						
Control	**4.82**	0.55	101	**4.55**	0.90	101
Armenia	4.85	0.45	85	4.74	0.69	85
Azerbaijan	3.20	1.69	96	3.04	1.67	96
Both	4.40	1.13	91	4.30	1.19	91

Note: The sample was limited to 373 respondents who completed both Waves, resulting in different means and standard deviations compared to Table B.1 above. Means that are significantly different from each other at the 0.05 significance level are indicated in bold.

Table B.4: Do Treatment Effects Change over Time?

	Dependent variable:	
	Compensation	Punishment
Armenia	0.447^{*}	0.025
	(0.209)	(0.167)
Azerbaijan	-1.972^{***}	-1.624^{***}
	(0.199)	(0.161)
Both	-0.186	-0.426^{**}
	(0.205)	(0.164)
IC	-0.268	
	(0.199)	
Time	-0.147	-0.267
	(0.202)	(0.159)
Armenia∗Time	0.222	0.161
	(0.296)	(0.236)
Azerbaijan∗Time	0.147	0.111
	(0.282)	(0.228)
Both∗Time	0.330	0.168
	(0.290)	(0.232)
IC∗Time	0.295	
	(0.281)	
Constant	3.947^{***}	4.822^{***}
	(0.143)	(0.113)
Observations	746	746
R^2	0.322	0.265
Adjusted R^2	0.314	0.258

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is support for peace provision, measured on a 5-point scale. Each of the 373 respondents appears in the sample twice, once in Wave 1 and once in Wave 2. Standard errors are clustered by respondent. The interaction terms are the coefficients of interest to assess long-term effects. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed)

B.3 Conditional Effects

Table B.5: Does Gender Moderate the Treatment Effects?

	Dependent variable:	
	Compensation	Punishment
Armenia	1.097^{***} (0.132)	0.234^{*} (0.105)
Azerbaijan	-1.631^{***} (0.132)	-2.190^{***} (0.103)
Both	0.194 (0.134)	-0.519^{***} (0.105)
IC	0.155 (0.130)	
Female (vs. male)	0.207 (0.160)	−0.093 (0.122)
Armenia∗Female	−0.172 (0.220)	0.009 (0.172)
Azerbaijan∗Female	−0.190 (0.223)	0.155 (0.176)
Both∗Female	−0.227 (0.221)	−0.310 (0.171)
IC∗Female	−0.121 (0.223)	
Constant	3.462^{***} (0.094)	4.707^{***} (0.075)
Observations	1,598	1,598
R^2	0.313	0.387
Adjusted R^2	0.309	0.384
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Table B.6: Does Age Moderate the Treatment Effects?

	Dependent variable:	
	Compensation	Punishment
Armenia	1.018^{***} (0.301)	0.393 (0.239)
Azerbaijan	-1.105^{***} (0.301)	-1.719^{***} (0.235)
Both	−0.154 (0.299)	-0.732^{**} (0.236)
IC	0.674^{*} (0.295)	
Age (vs. male)	0.010^{*} (0.005)	0.005 (0.004)
Armenia∗Age	−0.001 (0.007)	−0.004 (0.005)
Azerbaijan∗Age	-0.015^{*} (0.007)	−0.010 (0.005)
Both∗Age	0.006 (0.007)	0.003 (0.006)
IC∗Age	-0.014^{*} (0.007)	
Constant	3.159^{***} (0.214)	4.472^{***} (0.167)
Observations	1,657	1,657
R^2	0.316	0.385
Adjusted R^2	0.313	0.383
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Table B.7: Does Educational Status Moderate the Treatment Effects?

	Dependent variable:	
	Compensation	Punishment
Armenia	0.991^{***} (0.232)	0.220 (0.195)
Azerbaijan	-1.871^{***} (0.234)	-2.474^{***} (0.195)
Both	0.002 (0.233)	-0.916^{***} (0.196)
IC	0.144 (0.230)	
Bachelor's Degree or Higher	-0.082 (0.180)	0.004 (0.161)
Armenia∗Bachelor's or Higher	-0.002 (0.259)	0.035 (0.215)
Azerbaijan∗Bachelor's or Higher	0.169 (0.261)	0.430^{*} (0.215)
Both∗Bachelor's or Higher	0.088 (0.261)	0.363 (0.216)
IC∗Bachelor's or Higher	-0.061 (0.257)	
Constant	3.638^{***} (0.160)	4.651^{***} (0.148)
Observations	1,653	1,653
R^2	0.311	0.387
Adjusted R^2	0.307	0.385
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Table B.8: Does Unemployment Moderate the Treatment Effects?

	Dependent variable:	
	Compensation	Punishment
Armenia	1.033^{***} (0.173)	0.319^{*} (0.135)
Azerbaijan	-1.785^{***} (0.165)	-2.164^{***} (0.135)
Both	0.082 (0.165)	-0.704^{***} (0.133)
IC	0.169 (0.166)	
Unemployed (vs. male)	-0.104 (0.151)	0.143 (0.121)
Armenia∗Unemployed	-0.038 (0.216)	-0.109 (0.170)
Azerbaijan∗Unemployed	0.113 (0.213)	0.049 (0.170)
Both∗Unemployed	-0.012 (0.213)	0.149 (0.169)
IC∗Unemployed	-0.115 (0.213)	
Constant	3.631^{***} (0.116)	4.564^{***} (0.096)
Observations	1,650	1,650
R^2	0.311	0.387
Adjusted R^2	0.307	0.385
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Table B.9: Does Living in Baku Moderate the Treatment Effects?

	Dependent variable:	
	Compensation	Punishment
Armenia	1.140^{***} (0.170)	0.152 (0.135)
Azerbaijan	-1.585^{***} (0.175)	-2.309^{***} (0.132)
Both	0.302 (0.172)	-0.611^{***} (0.135)
IC	0.291 (0.168)	
Living in Baku	0.230 (0.154)	−0.125 (0.120)
Armenia∗Living in Baku	−0.238 (0.214)	0.152 (0.170)
Azerbaijan∗Living in Baku	−0.216 (0.218)	0.278 (0.169)
Both∗Living in Baku	−0.379 (0.216)	−0.026 (0.170)
IC∗Living in Baku	−0.319 (0.213)	
Constant	3.427^{***} (0.123)	4.732^{***} (0.094)
Observations	1,657	1,657
R^2	0.309	0.384
Adjusted R^2	0.306	0.382
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Table B.10: Does Social Media Usage Moderate the Treatment Effects?

	Dependent variable:	
	Compensation	Punishment
Armenia	−0.312 (1.087)	1.113 (0.838)
Azerbaijan	-3.114^{**} (1.093)	−1.030 (0.834)
Both	−1.058 (1.228)	0.991 (0.875)
IC	−0.772 (1.292)	
Social media usage	−0.191 (0.127)	0.198^{*} (0.082)
Armenia∗Social media	0.186 (0.158)	−0.125 (0.122)
Azerbaijan∗Social media	0.198 (0.159)	−0.155 (0.121)
Both∗Social media	0.159 (0.178)	−0.235 (0.127)
IC∗Social media	0.122 (0.188)	
Constant	4.898^{***} (0.872)	3.293^{***} (0.564)
Observations	1,616	1,616
R^2	0.312	0.372
Adjusted R^2	0.308	0.370
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Table B.11: Does Outgroup Empathy Moderate the Treatment Effects?

	Dependent variable:	
	Compensation	Punishment
Armenia	1.654^{***} (0.215)	0.536^{**} (0.164)
Azerbaijan	-1.747^{***} (0.214)	-3.388^{***} (0.164)
Both	-0.161 (0.220)	-1.149^{***} (0.163)
IC	0.138 (0.218)	
Outgroup Empathy	0.214^{***} (0.064)	0.073 (0.047)
Armenia∗Outgroup Empathy	-0.310^{***} (0.088)	-0.133^{*} (0.066)
Azerbaijan∗Outgroup Empathy	0.011 (0.088)	0.586^{***} (0.067)
Both∗Outgroup Empathy	0.088 (0.089)	0.235^{***} (0.065)
IC∗Outgroup Empathy	-0.029 (0.090)	
Constant	3.117^{***} (0.155)	4.497^{***} (0.117)
Observations	1,651	1,651
R^2	0.332	0.462
Adjusted R^2	0.329	0.460
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

C Assumption Checks

C.1 Balance Checks for Wave 1 Experiments

As one can see in Tables C.1 and C.2, most demographic and attitudinal covariates across the experimental groups in both experiments were well-balanced. There are a few remaining imbalances, however. Therefore, in the robustness section below, we re-run our OLS regressions but now controlling for a range of covariates. Our results remain substantively the same.

Table C.1: Balance Tests for Monetary Compensations Experiment.

	Dependent variable:			
	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Both	Int. Comm.
Gender	0.140	−0.017	0.230	−0.025
	(0.175)	(0.176)	(0.175)	(0.177)
Age	−0.008	−0.004	−0.005	−0.003
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Education	−0.039	0.024	−0.005	0.015
	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Unemployed	0.553**	0.079	0.125	0.251
	(0.183)	(0.177)	(0.179)	(0.179)
Vote	−0.287	−0.135	−0.181	−0.284
	(0.208)	(0.205)	(0.207)	(0.207)
Pol. Trust	−0.046	−0.007	−0.006	0.008
	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Prejudice	0.127	0.064	0.049	0.054
	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.078)
Outgroup Empathy	0.077	0.033	0.126	0.083
	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)
Constant	−0.055	−0.153	−0.240	−0.355
	(0.606)	(0.601)	(0.604)	(0.604)
Observations	1529	1529	1529	1529
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,965.163	4,965.163	4,965.163	4,965.163

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Multinomial logistic regression results.

Table C.2: Balance Tests for War Crime Punishments Experiment.

	Dependent variable:		
	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Both
Gender	−0.042	−0.285	0.014
	(0.155)	(0.158)	(0.153)
Age	0.006	0.002	−0.002
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Education	−0.184*	−0.185*	−0.123
	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.078)
Unemployed	−0.032	0.003	−0.018
	(0.161)	(0.162)	(0.160)
Vote	−0.013	0.011	0.046
	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.185)
Pol. Trust	0.033	0.031	0.030
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Prejudice	0.006	−0.050	0.052
	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)
Outgroup Empathy	0.066	−0.052	0.073
	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.073)
Constant	0.396	1.104*	0.236
	(0.546)	(0.545)	(0.547)
Observations	1529	1529	1529
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,269.249	4,269.249	4,269.249

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Multinomial logistic regression results.

C.2 Attrition Check for Wave 2 Experiments

In what follows, we check attrition—defined as missing outcome data—at Wave 2.[1] Our sampling frame for Wave 2 was restricted to the 1040 subjects who (1) completed the Wave 1 experiments and (2) provided a valid e-mail address. A total of 394 subjects completed the Wave 2 experiments (38%).[2] Thus, a significant proportion did not participate in our follow-up survey which may compromise the validity of the panel study. However, three things mitigate this concern. First, we compare attrition rates across treatment arms. Table C.3 reveals that attrition rates are very similar across treatment arms.

Table C.3: Attrition Rates across Treatment Arms.

	Control	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Both	IC
Panel A: Compansation Experiment					
Attrition	76.64%	80.59%	75.68%	78.29%	76.18%
Observed	23.36%	19.41%	24.32%	21.71%	23.82%
Panel B: Punishment Experiment					
Attrition	75.31%	79.62%	76.76%	78.23%	
Observed	24.69%	20.38%	23.24%	21.77%	

Note: A chi-squared test for independence revealed no significant association between treatment assignment and attrition for monetary compensations ($\chi^2(4,\ N = 1657) = 3.076,\ p = .545$) nor for war crime punishments ($\chi^2(3,\ N = 1657) = 2.458,\ p = .483$).

Next, we explore attrition patterns across treatment arms. Differential attrition patterns across treatment arms related to potential outcomes might lead to biased inferences (Gerber and Green, 2021, Chapter 7). As potential outcomes can never be observed, we explore whether attrition is associated with observed covariates that may proxy potential outcomes, and whether those associations differ between the treatment groups and the control group. We do so by fitting linear probability models with robust standard errors (Tables C.4 and C.5). The first few columns show the results within each experimental treatment arm, while the last column shows the results for the pooled sample with an interaction. Comparing the coefficients in the first few columns gives an indication of differential attrition, while the coefficients on the interaction terms give direct estimates of those differences.

Most broadly, the results suggest that attrition might be unrelated to potential outcomes. Consequently, we report unadjusted regression coefficients in the main text but as a robustness check, we compare those estimates with estimates using inverse probability weighting (Section D.4).

[1] There is almost no attrition at Wave 1. At Wave 1, 39 respondents were exposed to but did not answer their question on monetary compensations and 42 respondents did not answer their assigned question on punishment for war crimes. Attrition rates were very similar across treatment arms, ranging from 0.86% to 3.48% in the monetary compensation conditions and from 1.89% to 3.01% in the war crime punishment conditions. A chi-squared test for independence revealed no significant association between treatment assignment and attrition for monetary compensations ($\chi^2(4,\ N = 1712) = 7.486,\ p = .112$) nor for war crime punishments ($\chi^2(3,\ N = 1712) = 1.577,\ p = .665$).

[2] Due to a coding error in Qualtrics, we were unable to merge the W2 data of 21 respondents with their W1 data. This brings the total number of observations for the panel analysis 373.

Table C.4: Attrition Patterns for Compensation Experiment.

	Attrition Patterns Within and Across Treatment Arms					
	Control	Outgroup	Ingroup	Both	IC	Pooled
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
female	0.04 (0.05)	−0.07 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	−0.04 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)
age	−0.01*** (0.002)	−0.005** (0.002)	−0.004** (0.002)	−0.003 (0.002)	−0.004* (0.002)	−0.01*** (0.002)
education	0.06** (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)
support at W1	0.04* (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	−0.001 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)
pol. trust	−0.01 (0.01)	−0.005 (0.01)	0.003 (0.01)	−0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)
soc. distance	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.05* (0.02)	−0.05* (0.03)	−0.05* (0.02)	−0.10*** (0.02)	−0.04 (0.03)
party ID	−0.10 (0.06)	−0.07 (0.06)	−0.11 (0.06)	−0.04 (0.06)	−0.18** (0.06)	−0.10 (0.06)
Treated: Armenia						0.25 (0.27)
Treated: Azerbaijan						0.16 (0.26)
Treated: Both						0.19 (0.26)
Treated: IC						0.22 (0.27)
female*Armenia						−0.11 (0.07)
female*Azerbaijan						−0.003 (0.07)
female*Both						−0.03 (0.07)
female*IC						−0.08 (0.07)
age*Armenia						0.001 (0.002)
age*Azerbaijan						0.001 (0.002)
age*Both						0.003 (0.002)
age*IC						0.002 (0.002)
education*Armenia						−0.03 (0.03)
education*Azerbaijan						−0.02 (0.03)
education*Both						−0.02 (0.03)
education*IC						0.002 (0.03)
support at W1*Armenia						−0.04 (0.03)
support at W1*Azerbaijan						−0.02 (0.03)
support at W1*Both						−0.04 (0.02)
support at W1*IC						−0.05* (0.02)
pol. trust*Armenia						0.004 (0.02)
pol. trust*Azerbaijan						0.01 (0.02)
pol. trust*Both						−0.01 (0.02)
pol. trust*IC						0.02 (0.02)
soc. distance*Armenia						−0.01 (0.03)
soc. distance*Azerbaijan						−0.01 (0.04)
soc. distance*Both						−0.01 (0.03)
soc. distance*IC						−0.05 (0.03)
party ID*Armenia						0.02 (0.08)
party ID*Azerbaijan						−0.01 (0.08)
party ID*Both						0.06 (0.08)
party ID*IC						−0.08 (0.09)
(intercept)	0.26 (0.19)	0.51** (0.18)	0.42* (0.19)	0.45* (0.17)	0.48* (0.19)	0.26 (0.19)
Observations	293	316	312	308	314	1,543

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Estimates from linear probability models.

Table C.5: Attrition Patterns for Punishment Experiment.

	Attrition Patterns Within and Across Treatment Arms				
	Control	Outgroup	Ingroup	Both	Pooled
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
female	−0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)	−0.04 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.04)
age	−0.004** (0.001)	−0.004** (0.001)	−0.01*** (0.001)	−0.004* (0.001)	−0.004** (0.001)
education	0.05* (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)
support at W1	0.05 (0.03)	−0.05 (0.04)	0.03* (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.05* (0.03)
pol. trust	−0.02 (0.01)	0.003 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	−0.02 (0.01)
soc. distance	−0.06** (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.07** (0.02)	−0.07*** (0.02)	−0.06** (0.02)
party ID	−0.04 (0.06)	−0.17** (0.05)	−0.03 (0.05)	−0.10 (0.05)	−0.04 (0.05)
Treated: Armenia					0.08 (0.32)
Treated: Azerbaijan					0.26 (0.25)
Treated: Both					0.01 (0.24)
female*Armenia					0.03 (0.06)
female*Azerbaijan					0.03 (0.06)
female*Both					−0.03 (0.06)
age*Armenia					−0.0002 (0.002)
age*Azerbaijan					−0.002 (0.002)
age*Both					0.0002 (0.002)
education*Armenia					0.01 (0.03)
education*Azerbaijan					−0.01 (0.03)
education*Both					0.004 (0.03)
support at W1*Armenia					−0.10 (0.05)
support at W1*Azerbaijan					−0.02 (0.03)
support at W1*Both					−0.03 (0.03)
pol. trust*Armenia					0.02 (0.01)
pol. trust*Azerbaijan					0.01 (0.01)
pol. trust*Both					0.03 (0.01)
soc. distance*Armenia					0.05 (0.03)
soc. distance*Azerbaijan					−0.005 (0.03)
soc. distance*Both					−0.01 (0.03)
party ID*Armenia					−0.12 (0.07)
party ID*Azerbaijan					0.01 (0.08)
party ID*Both					−0.06 (0.07)
(intercept)	0.30 (0.19)	0.38 (0.25)	0.56*** (0.17)	0.31* (0.15)	0.30 (0.19)
Observations	378	385	383	397	1,543

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Estimates from linear probability models.

D Robustness Tests

D.1 Replication of Main Results (Wave 1), with Control Variables

We re-run our OLS regressions but now controlling for a set of covariates. In all regressions, we include a set of demographic, political, social, and war-related variables. Demographic variables include gender, age, education, employment status, and a dummy indicating current residency in Baku. Political variables include political trust and party identification. Outgroup empathy is used as a measure of social, intergroup attitudes and social media usage is included given our sampling strategy. Finally, we also examine the role of exposure to violence in the 2020 war and threat perceptions. For more details on the measurement of the covariates, see the questionnaires at https://osf.io/x4trk/.

The results are consistent with those reported in the main paper: Public support for reparations and war crime punishments increases when Armenia (i.e., the outgroup) pays or stand trial but decreases when Azerbaijan (i.e., the ingroup) does so. Tables D.1 further shows some of the correlates of support for reparations and war crime punishments. Older people are more supportive of compensations for victims, whereas more educated respondents are more supportive of punishments for war crimes. Employment status and urbanization are not related to support for any of the peace provisions. Second, voting for the ruling New Azerbaijan Party–the political party of the current President of Azerbaijan–increases support for monetary compensations but decreases support for war crime punishment. Political trust decreases support for monetary compensations. Finally, outgroup empathy increases support for both peace provisions, threat perceptions are correlated with more support for war crime punishment, and conflict exposure is not significantly related to any of the provisions.

Table D.1: replication of Table B.2, Including Controls.

	Dependent variable:			
	compensation	scale(compensation)	punishment	scale(punishment)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Armenia	1.017^{***}	0.639^{***}	0.221^{**}	0.148^{**}
	(0.804, 1.230)	(0.505, 0.773)	(0.057, 0.385)	(0.038, 0.257)
Azerbaijan	-1.710^{***}	-1.074^{***}	-2.063^{***}	-1.376^{***}
	(−1.922, −1.497)	(−1.207, −0.940)	(−2.227, −1.899)	(−1.486, −1.267)
Both	0.109	0.069	-0.600^{***}	-0.400^{***}
	(−0.104, 0.323)	(−0.065, 0.203)	(−0.761, −0.438)	(−0.508, −0.292)
IC	0.116	0.073		
	(−0.097, 0.329)	(−0.061, 0.207)		
Female	0.077	0.048	−0.095	−0.063
	(−0.065, 0.218)	(−0.041, 0.137)	(−0.217, 0.028)	(−0.145, 0.018)
Age (in years)	0.007^{**}	0.004^{**}	0.001	0.001
	(0.002, 0.011)	(0.001, 0.007)	(−0.003, 0.005)	(−0.002, 0.003)
Bachelor's or Higher	−0.016	−0.010	0.084^{**}	0.056^{**}
	(−0.086, 0.054)	(−0.054, 0.034)	(0.024, 0.145)	(0.016, 0.096)
Unemployed	−0.125	−0.079	0.123	0.082
	(−0.273, 0.022)	(−0.171, 0.014)	(−0.004, 0.251)	(−0.003, 0.167)
Live in Baku	−0.003	−0.002	−0.032	−0.022
	(−0.142, 0.137)	(−0.089, 0.086)	(−0.153, 0.088)	(−0.102, 0.059)
Social Media	−0.038	−0.024	0.058	0.038
	(−0.143, 0.068)	(−0.090, 0.043)	(−0.033, 0.149)	(−0.022, 0.099)
Pol. Trust	-0.077^{***}	-0.048^{***}	0.003	0.002
	(−0.109, −0.045)	(−0.068, −0.028)	(−0.024, 0.031)	(−0.016, 0.021)
Party ID	0.242^{**}	0.152^{**}	-0.209^{**}	-0.140^{**}
	(0.071, 0.413)	(0.045, 0.259)	(−0.357, −0.062)	(−0.238, −0.041)
War Exposure	−0.039	−0.025	0.019	0.013
	(−0.179, 0.100)	(−0.112, 0.063)	(−0.101, 0.140)	(−0.067, 0.093)
Threat Perceptions	−0.011	−0.007	0.061^{**}	0.041^{**}
	(−0.061, 0.039)	(−0.038, 0.024)	(0.018, 0.104)	(0.012, 0.070)
Outgroup Empathy	0.171^{***}	0.108^{***}	0.222^{***}	0.148^{***}
	(0.113, 0.230)	(0.071, 0.144)	(0.171, 0.272)	(0.114, 0.182)
(intercept)	3.732^{***}	0.168	3.110^{***}	-0.610^{*}
	(2.906, 4.559)	(−0.351, 0.687)	(2.396, 3.824)	(−1.086, −0.134)
Observations	1,477	1,477	1,477	1,477
R^2	0.349	0.349	0.426	0.426
Adjusted R^2	0.343	0.343	0.421	0.421
Note:				* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

D.2 Replication of Main Results (Wave 1), with Robust Confidence Intervals

Table D.2: Replication of Table B.2, with Robust Confidence Intervals.

	Dependent variable:			
	compensation	scale(compensation)	punishment	scale(punishment)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Armenia	0.989^{***}	0.621^{***}	0.246^{**}	0.164^{**}
	(0.797, 1.181)	(0.151, 0.341)	(0.500, 0.741)	(0.101, 0.228)
Azerbaijan	-1.722^{***}	-1.081^{***}	-2.140^{***}	-1.427^{***}
	(−1.935, −1.509)	(−2.318, −1.961)	(−1.215, −0.948)	(−1.546, −1.308)
Both	0.063	0.039	-0.631^{***}	-0.421^{***}
	(−0.169, 0.295)	(−0.789, −0.473)	(−0.106, 0.185)	(−0.526, −0.316)
IC	0.091	0.057		
	(−0.129, 0.312)	(−0.070, 0.185)		
Constant	3.573^{***}	0.068	4.655^{***}	0.421^{***}
	(3.409, 3.738)	(4.571, 4.739)	(−0.036, 0.171)	(0.365, 0.477)
Observations	1,657	1,657	1,657	1,657
R^2	0.308	0.308	0.383	0.383
Adjusted R^2	0.306	0.306	0.381	0.381
Note:				* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

D.3 Replication of Main Results (Wave 1), without English-Speaking Respondents

Table D.3: Replication of Table B.2, without English-Speaking Respondents.

	Dependent variable:			
	compensation	scale(compensation)	punishment	scale(punishment)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Armenia	1.019^{***}	0.634^{***}	0.265^{**}	0.175^{**}
	(0.109)	(0.068)	(0.086)	(0.057)
Azerbaijan	-1.724^{***}	-1.073^{***}	-2.191^{***}	-1.448^{***}
	(0.109)	(0.068)	(0.086)	(0.057)
Both	0.107	0.067	-0.644^{***}	-0.426^{***}
	(0.110)	(0.068)	(0.085)	(0.056)
IC	0.141	0.088		
	(0.108)	(0.067)		
Constant	3.548^{***}	0.055	4.654^{***}	0.422^{***}
	(0.078)	(0.049)	(0.061)	(0.040)
Observations	1,521	1,521	1,521	1,521
R^2	0.314	0.314	0.394	0.394
Adjusted R^2	0.312	0.312	0.393	0.393
Note:				* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

D.4 Replication of Panel Results, with Inverse Probability Weights

Table D.4: Replication of Table B.4, with Inverse Probability Weights

	Dependent variable:			
	compensation		punishment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Armenia	0.802^{***}	1.123^{***}	0.211	0.373^{*}
	(0.219)	(0.209)	(0.176)	(0.185)
Azerbaijan	-1.796^{***}	-1.800^{***}	-1.441^{***}	-1.868^{***}
	(0.205)	(0.211)	(0.166)	(0.184)
Both	0.187	0.351	−0.237	-0.484^{**}
	(0.209)	(0.210)	(0.168)	(0.184)
IC	0.076	0.061		
	(0.204)	(0.210)		
Time	0.129	0.043	0.284	0.236
	(0.209)	(0.216)	(0.166)	(0.186)
Armenia∗Time	−0.298	−0.150	−0.166	−0.110
	(0.310)	(0.296)	(0.249)	(0.262)
Azerbaijan∗Time	−0.103	−0.003	−0.125	−0.397
	(0.289)	(0.298)	(0.235)	(0.261)
Both∗Time	−0.312	−0.405	−0.184	−0.087
	(0.295)	(0.297)	(0.238)	(0.260)
IC∗Time	−0.295	−0.001		
	(0.289)	(0.297)		
Constant	3.757^{***}	3.566^{***}	4.526^{***}	4.408^{***}
	(0.148)	(0.153)	(0.117)	(0.132)
Weights		✓		✓
Observations	710	710	710	710
R^2	0.324	0.372	0.250	0.365
Adjusted R^2	0.316	0.364	0.243	0.359

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by respondent. Dependent variable is support for peace provision, measured on a 5-point scale. The interaction terms are the coefficients of interest to assess long-term effects. The number of observations slightly differs from the ones in Table B.4 due to missingness on the variables used to predict attrition. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed)

E Qualitative Assessment of Patterns by Provision at Wave 2

Table D.5: Summary of the Experimental Results.

	Feature of Peace Provision			Actor			
Peace provision	Concerns domestic affairs	Implies in-group guilt	Requires mutual trust; common goal	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Burden-sharing	IC
Victims of the war, both Azeris and Armenians, should receive monetary compensations from [Actor]		✓		+	–		
All war crimes committed by [Actor] should be severely punished.		✓		+	–	–	
[Actor] shall invest in a new transport route connecting the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic and Azerbaijan.	✓			–			
[Actor] shall invest in a new route via the Lachin Corridor, to provide a connection between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia.			✓			+	
[Actor] shall initiate trust- and cohesion-building workshops between Armenian and Azerbaijani citizens			✓			+	
[Actor] shall clear towns, villages, roads, and the land around them of mines and unexploded ordnance.	✓			–			–
[Actor] shall provide aid to military personnel left disabled by the war and to the families of those killed.	✓			–			–
[Actor] shall release all prisoners of war, hostages, and other detained persons.			✓			+	
[Actor] displaced during the 1994 and 2020 conflict shall be able to return home safely.	✓		(✓)	–			

F Deviations From and Additions to Preregistration

We registered our research design at Open Science Framework before we started the data collection. Below, we report the full list of deviations from and additions[3] to the preregistration:

F.1 Deviations

- We specified that we would report OLS regressions on the full sample or, in other words, intention-to-treat estimates (ITTs) in the main paper and OLS regressions on a subsample of respondents that passed the manipulation check or, in other words, complier-average causal effects estimates (CACEs) in the appendix. However, we did not have a manipulation check because we embedded our question-wording experiments in larger batteries in which several actors were mentioned. As a result, we were unable to fit and report CACEs.
- We were ambiguous about how to specify outliers on the timing variable. In the pre-analysis plan, we stated that "respondents who rush trough the survey will be excluded (i.e., outliers on the timing variables)." We used the 95% percentile to exclude respondents who rushed through the survey in 1 minutes and 35 seconds or less.
- We were ambiguous about how to analyze the repeated experiments.
- Our main analyses are based on a sample of 1,657 respondents but we aimed to collect 2000 respondents. Yet the pre-registered power calculation was based on a—arguably unreasonably—small effect size of f=0.043.

F.2 Additions

- In the pre-analysis plan, we specified we would report models with adjustment for found imbalances. In Table D.1, we also added several socio-political variables that are not imbalanced but are expected to help predict support for monetary compensations and war crime punishment.[4]
- We did not specify how to deal with attrition. Following Lin, Green, and Coppock (2016), we decided to compare both attrition rates across treatment arms and attrition patterns across treatment arms.
- We did not specify how to deal with missing values on pre-treatment covariates. Since we have very few missings on covariates (Table A.2) as well as very few models using covariates (Tables D.1 and D.4), we opted for list-wise deletion.

[3] For all additions, we relied on the standard operating procedures used at Don Green's lab at Columbia (Lin, Green, and Coppock 2016), which are used to make analytic decisions that have not been made explicit in pre-analysis plans.

[4] Here, we follow footnote 16 in Lin, Green, and Coppock (2016): As Bruhn and McKenzi (2009, 226) emphasize, "greater power is achieved by always adjusting for a covariate that is highly correlated with the outcome of interest, regardless of its distribution between groups."

References

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