# Erratum to: Motivated reasoning and policy information: politicians are more resistant to debiasing interventions than the general public

*By Julian Christensen & Donald P. Moynihan, August 23, 2023.*

This is an erratum to: Christensen, Julian & Donald P. Moynihan. 2020. Motivated reasoning and policy information: Politicians are more resistant to debiasing interventions than the general public. Behavioural Public Policy, 1-22. doi:10.1017/bpp.2020.50.

Errors have been detected in Figure 2, in numbers reported on p. 16, and in Supplementary Material S6 of the originally published manuscript – please see corrections below.

We apologize for any confusions caused by the errors.

## Figure 2:

In the original version of Figure 2, the panel titles were switched. Panel A, which was labeled as showing politicians, actually displayed data for the general public, and vice versa for Panel B.

The numbers in the text discussion of Figure 2 were correct (i.e., it was correctly written on pp. 9-10 that: "...among politicians, predicted probabilities of correctly identifying the best-performing supplier range between 57% when the information is most uncongenial and 92% when the information is most congenial. Among non-politicians, predicted probabilities of correctly identifying the best-performing supplier vary between 32% when the information is most uncongenial and 83% when the information is most congenial"), meaning that the error was limited to the panel titles.

***Corrected Figure 2:*** *Uncongeniality of information and expected probabilities of making erroneous judgements in identifying best-performing suppliers*

Panel A: Politicians




Panel B: General public




*Note:* This figure is based on regression analyses reported in the supplemental material's Table S2 (models 3 and 6). The horizontal axis runs from 0 to 1, with higher values corresponding to stronger support for the public sector if the private supplier performs best (group D in experiment) and stronger support for the private sector if the public supplier performs best (group C).

## Numbers reported on p. 16:

In the original article, on p. 16, we wrote that "Among the politicians asked to justify their evaluations, predicted probabilities of correctly identifying the best-performing supplier range between 44% when the information is most uncongenial and 98% when the information is most congenial, meaning that the justification requirement increases the impact of congeniality from 35 (cf. test of H1) to 54 percentage points."

The probability of correctly identifying the best-performing supplier *is* 44% when the information is most uncongenial, but when the information is most congenial, the probability is 97% (not 98%).

In other words, the corrected sentence reads: "Among the politicians asked to justify their evaluations, predicted probabilities of correctly identifying the best-performing supplier range between 44% when the information is most uncongenial and 97% when the information is most congenial, meaning that the justification requirement increases the impact of congeniality from 35 (cf. test of H1) to 53 percentage points."

## Supplementary Material S6:

- In model 1 of Table S6cc, the intercept is -1.62 (not -2.62).

- In model 2 of Table S6cg, the Congeniality coefficient is -0.44 (not -1.44).

- In model 3 of Table S6cg, the intercept is -2.60 (not -2.59).

***Corrected S6cc:*** *Attitude Congeniality and Use of Coding Scheme's Justification Type 2 (Satisfaction-Based Justifications, Not Mentioning Satisfaction Rates) (Logistic Regression Analysis)*

| | Model 1: Recently elected politicians | Model 2: Experienced politicians | Model 3: All non-politicians | Model 4: Attentive non-politicians |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Congeniality | -0.40<br>(0.83) | 0.34<br>(0.74) | -0.01<br>(0.38) | -0.03<br>(0.37) |
| Intercept | -1.62**<br>(0.55) | -2.53***<br>(0.47) | -1.52***<br>(0.22) | -1.42***<br>(0.22) |
| LR $chi^2$ | 0.23 | 0.21 | 0.00 | 0.01 |
| N | 111 | 174 | 563 | 506 |

*Note:* The dependent variable is coded as 0 if value in coding scheme = 1, 3, 4, 5, or 99; 1 if value in coding scheme = 2 (see section S6a). ***;**;*;†: P<0.001; 0.01; 0.05;0.1; two-sided significance tests. Entries are logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.

***Corrected S6cg:*** *Attitude Congeniality and Missing Justification (99 in Coding Scheme) (Logistic Regression Analysis)*

| | Model 1: Recently elected politicians | Model 2: Experienced politicians | Model 3: All non-politicians | Model 4: Attentive non-politicians |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Congeniality | -0.47<br>(0.74) | -0.44<br>(0.50) | 0.11<br>(0.55) | 0.09<br>(0.78) |
| Intercept | -1.24*<br>(0.49) | -1.04***<br>(0.29) | -2.60***<br>(0.33) | -3.29***<br>(0.46) |
| LR $chi^2$ | 0.39 | 0.79 | 0.04 | 0.01 |
| N | 111 | 174 | 563 | 506 |

*Note:* The dependent variable is coded as 0 if value in coding scheme = 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5; 1 if value in coding scheme = 99 (see section S6a). ***;**;*;†: P<0.001; 0.01; 0.05;0.1; two-sided significance tests. Entries are logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.