Testing the "Dick Cheney" Hypothesis: Do Governments of the Left Attract more Terrorism than Governments of the Right?

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Abstract

Do governments of the left attract more terrorism than governments of the right? We examine how the political orientation of governments affects the probability of states being the target of terrorist attack. We develop a series of related theoretical linkages between partisan orientation, policy choice, and terrorist behavior to explain why governments of the left should be more likely to see higher numbers of terrorist attacks than governments of the right. We test our expectations using two different datasets; the Database of Political Institutions and the Party Manifesto data against the ITERATE terrorism data set between the years 1975 and 1997. The results suggest that governments of the left are more likely to be the targets of terrorism than governments of the right and that the causal mechanisms behind this outcome might be context dependent.

> *It's absolutely essential that eight weeks from today, on Nov. 2, we make the right choice, because if we make the wrong choice then the danger is that we'll get hit again and we'll be hit in a way that will be devastating from the standpoint of the United States.*
>
> *Vice-President Richard Cheney, September 2004*

With these words, Vice President Dick Cheney implied that if the Democratic candidate for President, John Kerry, were elected President of the United States, the country would be more vulnerable to terrorist attack than if George W. Bush retained the office of President. While at first glance this may seem like nothing more than politics as usual or campaign scare tactics at most, there might be truth to his statement. Would a Democratic (Liberal) government be a more likely target of terrorism than a Republican (Conservative) government? Extending this question beyond the realm of the United States, we ask whether governments of the left are more likely to be the targets of international terrorists than governments of the right. This raises what we refer to as the "Dick Cheney" hypothesis; that governments of the left are more likely to be attacked by terrorists than governments of the right.

Current research suggests that there may indeed be some validity to the "Dick Cheney" hypothesis. There is growing evidence about the role of partisanship in foreign policy choices and outcomes in the foreign policy and conflict literatures. This research suggests that because governments of the left are more concerned with domestic issues such as unemployment and welfare, and that their bases of support are usually groups such as labor or minority groups, they are perceived as weaker on issues of national security. Conversely, governments of the right are more concerned with policies such as national security, controlling inflation, and lowering trade barriers. Therefore, governments of the right are more internationalist in their behavior and tend to be perceived as more hawkish on foreign policy issues. The combined effect of who each

party is responsive to in terms of their bases of support and the subsequent perceptions that emerge from their policy choices can make governments of the left appear more vulnerable to terrorist attacks. The combination of concern over domestic issues by these governments and the perception by terrorists of the apparent conciliatory position of governments of the left may make them more likely to attract terrorist attacks.

Using the ITERATE dataset (Mickolus et al.2004) of transnational terrorist incidents and a variety of measures of the political orientation of executives in democratic states, we test whether governments of the left are more likely to be the target of terrorist attacks than governments of the right. The analysis provides support for this hypothesis and suggests that the relationship is even more pronounced for advanced industrial democracies.

Are Democracies more Attractive Targets?

The central focus of this paper is whether the political orientation of government affects the decision making calculus of terrorists and ultimately whether certain types of governments are more likely to be targeted than others. There is already some evidence that democracies, in general are more likely to be the targets of international violence. For example Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) argue that, because democratic leaders face higher domestic political costs for the use of force than do autocrats, states may perceive democracies to be easier targets. The empirical record appears to substantiate this. Rousseau, Gelpi, Reiter, and Huth (1996) point out that democracies are 20 percent more likely to be the targets of militarized disputes than non-democratic states. In addition, Schweller (1992) and others (Mueller 1973, Siverson 1995), suggest that democracies are more prone to war-weariness and are more sensitive to casualties.

Because of these sensitivities non-democratic states may try and target democratic states because they are perceived as less willing to fight and incur casualties.

A similar argument exists with regard to democracy and terrorist attacks. Just as democratic leaders face higher costs and constraints with regard to international conflict than non-democratic leaders, they also face constraints that limit the government's ability to effectively counter terrorism. Democratic leaders, by virtue of their accountability to the public, are responsible for both the safety of the population and the preservation of democratic norms (Wilkinson 1986, 2001, Rosendorff and Sandler 2004).[1] This later argument, about the effect of democratic constraints on the level of terrorism a government is subject to, has several permutations.

First, the counterterrorism capabilities of democratic governments are constrained by the need to protect civil liberties (Crenshaw 1981, Schmid 1992). While the population wants to be protected from terrorist attacks, it may not tolerate a significant reduction in personal freedoms which may be necessary to accomplish this. Therefore, legal constraints presumably put in place, partially, to protect civil liberties, can be viewed as structural constraints on what democratic governments can and cannot do to counter terrorist activity (Li 2005). Thus the institutional constraints within democratic societies may make it less dangerous, less costly, and yield a higher marginal return for a terrorist group to target a democratic state (Ross 1993, Eyerman 1998).

Li (2005) and others (Enders and Sandler 2000, Eubank and Weinberg 1994) posit another reason as to why democracies may also be the more likely targets of terrorists. Because a significant component of a terrorist campaign is the attraction of attention to the terrorist cause, the freedoms afforded to the press may make democracies

[1] This argument is similar to more general arguments about how political constraints make democratic states more attractive targets than non-democratic states in regards to inter-state conflict. For example see Gelpi and Grieco, 2001)

more appealing targets for terrorists than non-democracies. Specifically, if the terrorists believe there to be a greater chance of their acts receiving widespread publicity, they may be more likely to attack.[2]

Finally, Sobek and Braithwaite (2005) argue that democratic states, such as the United States, are more likely to be the targets of terrorism because of their relative power positions in the international system. Specifically, they argue that increases in US dominance has led to an increase in attacks against the US as revisionist actors find it more difficult to alter the status quo through conventional means. More generally then, as states become more powerful in the international system they should become more frequent targets of terrorism. Thus, because most of the advanced industrial economies in the world are democratic, it might be that terrorism, while not necessarily causally related, is at least correlated to democracy.

Partisanship and Foreign Policy

Governments of the left and right mean one thing in the realm of democratic states but implies something entirely different among non-democratic nations. For example authoritarian systems can be either of the left (communist regimes) or of the right (fascist regimes). While both of these regimes represent opposite ends of the political spectrum they are both authoritarian governments that are likely to use force to repress dissent and possibly even terrorize their own societies. Therefore, despite the political orientations of non-democratic governments they are likely to choose a similar

[2] Alternatively, some argue that because democracies afford individuals a greater ability to participate politically, voice descent, and have their grievances addressed by the government without resorting to violence they may be subject to less terrorism than democratic governments. In other words, the inclusiveness of democratic governance reduces the demand for terrorism, thus constraining the terrorist's ability to recruit, fundraise, mobilize, and attack (Crenshaw 1981, Eubank and Weinberg 1994, 2001, Eyerman 1998, Ross 1993, Schmid 1992).

set of policies and are likely to react in similar ways to terrorist attacks. Conversely, among democratic states, political orientation revolves around a set of policies, issues, and ideas which are important to one party or the other. Thus we focus on democracies because the political orientations of governments are often tied to a specific, stable, set of policies (Powell 1981, Schickler and Green 1997) which produces variation in their responses to violence directed against the state.

In this section we present a theory of partisan accountability and foreign policy outcomes. We develop our theory based on the understanding that leaders and governments are held accountable, in terms of their policy performance, in office by some subset of the population (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003). This subset is often referred to as the wining coalition. The winning coalition is the group of supporters who keep the leader in office and subsequently receive some benefit from the leader to ensure their continued support. For example according to the selectorate theory, winning coalitions in authoritarian states receive private goods as payment for their continued support. In democracies, because of the size of the winning coalition, leaders use public goods to satisfy their winning coalition so that they or their party can retain office. While democratic leaders use public goods, this does not mean they enact policies that are preferred by the majority of voters. Executives in democracies are not necessarily responsive to a majority as defined by half plus one of the electorate. Rather, they respond mainly to their party and its partisans or their winning coalition. For example given the first past the post single member district electoral system in Great Britain, leaders are often elected by only one quarter of the country. And there is evidence which suggests that variations in who democratic leaders and legislatures are accountable to, has a profound effect on security policies (Koch and Gartner 2005).

Often, leaders of democratic states need only enact policies that are preferred by their constituency and not necessarily by the entire electorate or even half of the electorate. Therefore leaders implement policies that reflect their own ideological beliefs as well as the beliefs of their supporters. This implies that leaders are constrained by the policy choices preferred by their own partisan supporters and that governments of different orientation will approach similar policy problems differently.[3] Failure to enact policies that are preferred by ones supporters are likely to lead to either defection from the party or defections within the party; both of which can cause governments to fall.[4] Warwick (1992) demonstrates this dynamic with regard to macro economic policies. He demonstrates that there are significant policy differences between governments of the left and right with regard to both the issues they pay attention to as well as the solutions they are likely to attempt. Thus, once in office, parties will enact legislation and pursue policies that are closely in line with their supporters; this is particularly so with regard to domestic economic policy. It seems reasonable then to assume that a similar relationship should exist between party, partisanship, and a leader's security policies.

There is some evidence (Budge and Hofferbert 1990, Fordham 1998, Koch 2002, Palmer, London and Reagan 2004, Russett 1990, Schultz 2001) that suggests parties of the right tend to be more hawkish than parties of the left. Why might this be the case? The winning coalition of a right oriented government is likely to be comprised of supporters that have an internationalist agenda: the support of international businesses, inflation control, free trade, and security. Governments of the left are likely to have their

[3] This is especially true in proportional representation systems with multiple parties. In these systems, parties and politicians choose policies aimed at policy differentiation and not at maximizing the number of votes or at the median voter. Instead, parties focus on gaining the support of a core group of constituents (Cox 1990).

[4] An example of the former would be the splintering and ultimate demise of the RPF in the French Fourth Republic as new right wing parties emerged during the early 50's providing alternatives to conservatives other than the Gaullist Party. An example of the later is the defection of key supporters in the Conservative party that led to the down fall of the Eden government in the United Kingdom after the Suez crisis.

base of support tied to such groups as labor and are more likely to be concerned with issues such as welfare, employment, and health care (van der Brug 2001). Additionally, governments of the left often have policy platforms based on such ideas as collective action, redistribution of resources, and equality.

Palmer, London, and Regan (2004) summarize the relationship between foreign policy and partisan orientation as: "governments made up of right political parties have lower domestic political costs associated with the use of force" (7). That is, governments of the right are associated with more hawkish foreign policy stances than governments of the left. This means that rather than becoming a "critical event" (Lupia and Strom 1995) for governments of the right, conflict or threats to national security jeopardize a government's tenure to a lesser degree than they do for governments of the left. Hawkish governments are often elected to deal with threats to national security. Any policy response, either conflictual or cooperative, by such governments are likely to enhance their electoral prospects given their base of support and the perception that they are the most qualified party to deal with such issues. Dovish parties on the other hand are more likely to face difficult times at the polls because they are either perceived as weak in light of some threat or because using force against some threat could alienate their supporters.

The above differences between governments of the left and right over policy choices has implications for how other actors might perceive the likely response of a given government to a threat or some action that threatens national security. Schultz (2005) specifically explores this when examining whether hawkish or dovish governments are more likely to secure a cooperative outcome from a distrusted adversary in the international system. Using the logic of the two level game, Schultz demonstrates that hawkish governments are more likely, in the long run, to secure cooperation because

they are seen as more credible in following through on threats should the other party defect because of their electoral base. Dovish parties, on the other hand, are likely to only secure short term cooperation but ultimately face defection from the adversary because threats are less credible given their base of support. As Schultz (2005) notes, "Doves want peace, but they may not have the electoral security or credibility to deliver it. Hawks enjoy both electoral security and credibility in attempting cooperation, but they may not want to" (26).

With regard to security, governments of the left then are likely to appear as more attractive targets than are governments of the right. International actors are likely to perceive left oriented governments as dovish, more peaceful and more likely to compromise in their approach to maintaining national security. Ultimately, international actors are likely to interpret this as weakness and see these governments as attractive targets. Conversely, right oriented governments are likely to be perceived as hawkish and more likely to respond to threats and uses of force against the state with corresponding force and are less likely to negotiate or compromise in light of some threat made against the state.

The above provides a theoretical foundation for why terrorists, when examining whether or not they can accomplish their goals, might be more likely to target or escalate violence against governments of the left than governments of the right. Because governments of the left are more likely to emphasize norms of compromise and equality given their ties to labor, minority groups, and social welfare, they are likely to be seen as more dovish. Therefore, goal oriented terrorists should believe they will be more successful in accomplishing their goals by targeting a more left wing government that is

inclined to negotiate rather than targeting a more right wing government which is likely to be more hawkish, less inclined to compromise, and more likely to retaliate.

This leads us to the following hypothesis:

All things being equal, governments of the left are more likely to be targets of transnational terrorism than governments of the right.

In addition to partisanship affecting whether a democratic government is likely to be the target of an attack, the unity of the government may also enter into the terrorist's calculation of who and when to attack. Governments that are ideologically divided are more fragile in terms of how long their tenure in office is likely to be (Warwick 1992). In terms of the use of force abroad these governments are usually more reluctant to use force because conflict can create externalities that can bring down the government (Ireland and Gartner 2001, Koch 2002, Palmer, London, and Reagan 2004). This reluctance to use force and the fragility of the government can exacerbate the perceived weakness of the government.[5] Just as the perceived weakness of governments of the left make them more attractive targets, so to should divisions within government regardless of political orientation. The expectation is that the more divided a government is, the more likely it will be the target of terrorism.

This leads to our second hypothesis:

All things being equal, the more fractionalized a government, the more likely it is to be the target of transnational terrorism.

[5] In many ways this is similar to the argument that Gelpi and Grieco (2001) make about leader tenure and being the target of interstate conflict. They argue that democracies are more likely to be attacked because of the shorter overall duration of tenure of democratic leaders. Specifically democratic leaders are unable to generate reputation affects in the international system because of their short duration and the ease with which leaders can be replaced making them more inviting targets for foreign aggression.

Research Design and Measures

We employ two separate analyses to test the "Dick Cheney" hypothesis. The first analysis examines 68 democratic countries between 1975 and 1997 using the Database of Political Institutions to account for the partisanship of the executive. The Database of Political Institutions codes whether the party of the executive had either a left, center or right political orientation. Orientation is largely determined based on either party name or short descriptions (see Keefer 2002 for a more detailed description). To determine whether the state was democratic we use the Polity 4 (Gurr and Marshall 2003) data to develop a threshold that states must achieve in order to be considered democratic. Any state with a value of 7 or greater on the democracy – autocracy scale we include as one of our democratic nations (Bueno de Mesquita, Koch and Siverson 2004).

The second analysis examines 18 advanced industrial democracies during the same time frame but uses the Party Manifesto data (Budge et al. 2001) to determine the partisan position of the executive. While the number and types of states under investigation is significantly smaller, the Party Manifesto data provide an alternative coding scheme to ensure that the results are robust and not entirely dependent on one coding scheme versus another. In addition the Party Manifesto data provide a continuous measure of political orientation based on policy positions rather than a trichotomous coding scheme that lumps governments together. Finally, with regard to the hypothesis, the countries that comprise the manifesto data are advanced industrial states that are most similar to the United States.

We follow Enders and Sandler (1993, 1999, and 2000) and define terrorism as the premeditated or threatened use of extra-normal violence or force to obtain a political, religious, or ideological objective through the intimidation of a large audience. Following

this definition we include only those terrorist incident that, in a given country, involved victims, perpetrators, targets, or institutions of another country. Thus, our analysis is restricted to terrorist attacks that are initiated by foreign terrorists against some domestic target within a country or committed by domestic terrorists against some foreign target within a country (Li and Schuab 2004 Li 2005).[6] Our dependent variable is a count variable of all such terrorist incidents in a country in a given year. We call this variable ***Incidents***.

The first set of party measures are taken from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI). These measures are labeled ***Left*** and ***Right*** with center being the omitted category. In addition to partisanship, the unity of the government may also enter into the terrorist's calculation of who and when to attack. The expectation is that the more divided a government is, the more likely it will be the target of terrorism. We call this ***Gov-Fract***. This measure is from the DPI and measures the homogeneity of the government. It measures the probability that two deputies, picked at random from among the government parties, will be of different parties. This measure is included to control for the degree to which a government is unified or divided.

We also include a measure designed to capture the level of democracy in each state. We call this measure **Level of Democracy**. We include this measure because partisanship may mean different things depending on how established the party system is within a state. For example in newly democratized states, governments of the left are likely to be pro democratic while governments of the right might be focused more on issues of social or economic stability (Stokes 1999).

[6] We recognize that this does not take into account the magnitude of the terrorist attack. However, for this paper we are interested in whether or not governments, in general, are more likely to be targeted rather than how the political orientation of a government affects the strategy employed by terrorists, which is directly tied to the magnitude of the event. We hope to explore this dynamic in future research.

In addition to the government measures, we control for a number of factors which may contribute to the likelihood of a state being the target of terrorism in any given year. Some states are likely to be more vulnerable to terrorist attacks than other states (Li and Schuab 2004, Sobek and Braithwaite 2005). To account for this, we adopt the model developed by Li and Schaub (2004). They develop a model which explains how a state's economic integration either increases or decreases the risk of a state being the target of an international terrorist attack. Specifically they examine how factors such as economic integration into the global economy, population size and income inequality affects the probability that a state will be the target of a terrorist attack. We agree with Li and Schaub that these relationships are likely to affect whether a state incurs transnational terrorist attacks and control for these factors.

Our primary control for economic integration is ***Trading Development. Trading Development*** is the logged yearly GDP per capita average of the eight largest destination countries of a state's exports. ***Income Inequality*** is measured using the GINI co-efficient of each country.[7] ***Government Capability*** is the amount of resources a government controls that could theoretically be applied to contend with or control terrorist activities. It is an annual composite measure accounting for a state's world share of population, GDP per capita, GDP per energy unit, military manpower, and military expenditures. In addition we also control for whether a country was involved in an international conflict. We call this measure ***Conflict***. This measure is a dichotomous measure which equals one if a state is engaged in conflict using the Upsalla data (Gleditsch et al. 2004).

The statistical method employed is a random effects negative binomial regression with temporal splines and robust standard errors. We employ a negative binomial

[7] For a compete explanation of how the process of economic globalization and integration affects the likelihood of terrorist attacks against a state and for a more in-depth discussion of each measure used see Li and Schuab (2004).

regression model rather than a Poisson model because of over dispersion of the dependent variable (Long 1997).[8] Additionally, because standard negative binomial models assume that regression coefficients are fixed between groups and that error terms are not correlated, these models are inadequate for cross-sectional time-series. Rather than attempting to specify a laundry list of additional country specific factors that may affect the estimates, we employ a panel estimated approach using random effects which controls for country specific effects that are likely to be present in the error term (Wooldridge 2001). We feel that this method is superior to the fixed effects approach because it allows for possible variations within panels while most fixed effects specifications would not.[9] In addition because there may be temporal effects we included a lagged measure of terrorist incidents as well as temporal splines (Beck and Katz 1995).[10]

Results

Table 1 presents the results of the random effects negative binomial regression for 68 democracies between 1975 and 1997. Model 1 presents a baseline model of our key independent variables without any of the control variables. The first thing we note is that the dispersion parameter is statistically significant in all of the models indicating that the negative binomial is the correct model and that the conditional variance of our dependent variable exceeds its conditional mean.

[8] The negative binomial model differs from Poisson regression by the addition of a residual variance parameter that captures over dispersion in the dependent variable (which occurs when the standard deviation is greater than the mean). This random component, therefore, accounts for unexplained variation among cases reflecting differences associated with unobserved predictors (Gardner, Mulvey, and Shaw, 1995)

[9] We also estimated the models using the fixed effects approach rather than the random effects approach. The results do not change substantively, indicating that the results are robust to estimator choice.

[10] We also estimated the models without the lagged dependent variable. Overall the estimates of our coefficients of interest are even more robust without the lagged dependent variable. However because of temporal effects we still include it in the models. Results not shown.

Focusing on the measures of government partisanship, the coefficient accounting for governments of the left is positive and statistically significant; the referent category for model one is governments of the right. As Model 1 demonstrates, the relationship between governments of the left and other types of governments is statistically significant. It appears that at least when compared to governments of the center, governments of the left are more likely to be the targets of terrorist attacks. By calculating the relative change in the incident rate, we see that the number of terrorist attacks that occur under governments of the left (when left =1) is about 1.31 times greater than the number of attacks when the government is of the Right.

In addition to partisanship we also controlled for the fractionalization of the government. It might be the case that some governments are comprised of broad coalitions. These coalitions may be hard to correctly code based on partisanship. It is also likely that the broader the coalition, the more tenuous its hold on office. Therefore in addition to political orientation, we anticipated that more fractionalized governments might also incur a higher frequency of attacks. The measure of government fractionalization is positive and significant confirming this relationship as well

Model 2 of Table 1 presents the full model with governments of the right as the referent category. The results obtained in the naïve model and the full model are strikingly similar. The coefficient for governments of the left is positive and statistically significant. In fact, when we calculate the relative change in the incident rate we get a strikingly similar number with the frequency of attacks against governments of the left being about 1.34 times greater than for governments of the right.

As with the first model we also controlled for the fractionalization of the government. Again the measure of government fractionalization is positive and

significant confirming this relationship. A government that is highly fractionalized (a score of .9) has an incidence rate that is 4.67 times that of unified government (a score of 0).

Turning to the measures of economic integration, most of the control measures are significant. For example the level of development that a country's trading partners' have reached has a large impact on the frequency of terrorist attacks. The more a country's trade is dominated by poorer countries the more likely that country is to be targeted by terrorists. Conversely, the more developed a country's primary trading partners, the fewer terrorist attacks the country can expect to incur. Additionally a country's population size and the dispersion of wealth within a country are positive and statistically significant. The greater a country's population and the greater the inequality of income, the more frequent terrorists attacks are likely to be. Also, the greater the potential amount of resources a country can devote to controlling terrorism, the more likely that country is to be a target of terrorism. Interestingly neither the presence of a military conflict, nor the level of democracy appears to affect whether a state is likely to incur more attacks. Finally, our lagged dependent variable of previous attacks is positive and significant.

The measure of governments of the center is neither positive nor does it approach statistical significance at any conventional levels. It appears that at least when compared to governments of the right, governments of the left are more likely to be the targets of terrorist attacks, there may be little difference between governments of the center and governments of the right.

Model 3 of table 1 presents the same results but with governments of the center now as the referent category. Model 2 only demonstrated that when compared to right

oriented governments, left governments were more likely to see an increased frequency of attacks while governments of the center were statistically indistinguishable from governments of the right. Model 3 demonstrates that the relationship between governments of the left and other types of governments holds. That is, the frequency of attacks against governments of the left is about 1.31 times greater than for governments of the center. The other coefficients remain essentially unchanged. Combined, the results from Models 2 and 3 clearly demonstrate that governments of the left are more likely to incur terrorist attacks than governments of either the center or right.

It might be the case that these results only pertain to the advanced industrialized nations. Newly democratized countries do not necessarily exhibit the same party dynamics as more advanced party systems. For example, recent studies on Latin American democracies indicate that in many countries there is very little party stability related to the types of policies that parties pursue (Mainwaring, Brinks, and Perez-Linan 2001; Stokes 2001). Additionally, while party stability may be problematic in terms of policy, the central tenets of what parties are organized around may be different. In newly democratized countries, the main ideological differences between parties of the left and right may be political stability versus increases in political inclusiveness. In either case we need to see if the results are largely driven by advanced industrialized states or if they are applicable to all democracies. In order to test whether there are differences between more advanced and less advanced democracies relating to the frequency of terrorist events we split the sample between more and less advanced democratic states. We split the sample according to the following criteria. If a democracy scored 8 or better on the combined polity democracy-autocracy measure and the current regime had been in

existence for at least 10 years we considered these stable democratic societies[11]. All others were coded as less advanced or less stable (for a complete list of cases see Appendix 1).

Model 1 of Table 2 presents the results of those democracies that we code as being stable and democratic. The coefficient for governments of the left is still statistically significant at the .05 level and still positive. Government fractionalization is still significant and positive. The measure of how democratic a state is on the polity scale is negative and significant suggesting that highly democratic states see fewer acts of terrorism. This would be consistent with Li and others who suggest that democracies provide alternative avenues to address grievances in the system. The trading partner measure is still significant but the other controls are insignificant. This is likely due to the fact that these governments are more homogenous in terms of population, power and income distribution.

Model 2 of table 2 presents the group of states that we coded as being less democratic or less stable but still advanced enough to be considered democratic. The coefficient for left government is positive and statistically significant. In fact, of the models presented so far, it has the largest coefficient. The relative change in the incident rate is 1.45 times greater than governments of the right. Somewhat surprisingly, divided government is no longer statistically significant. In comparison to the results of the previous model, it appears that divided government may be more important in advanced stable democracies than in newly democratized or less democratic states. Of the other measures, all but past conflict and income inequality are statistically significant, although it is close to significant in a one tailed test. It appears that demographic and international

[11] While we use states with scores of 8 and higher for our advanced democracies, the results are more robust if we use higher overall democracy scores. Interestingly, scores of 8 on the combined index omit a number if years of the French V republic from the advanced category.

interests help drive terrorism in these fledgling democracies. For example states with greater military capacity are more likely to be targeted. It may be that less advanced states may develop these capabilities to directly confront terrorist attacks and civil violence. It is also likely that larger populations are more likely to be heterogeneous allowing for more grievances to develop along ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural lines. From the results of Table 2, we see that while the relationship between government orientation and terrorist attacks appears to hold, it also suggests that some of the political relationships might be more pronounced among advanced industrial democracies while environmental relationships appear to matter more to newer democracies.

Table 3 examines the relationship among advanced industrial democracies but rather than relying on the less precise measures of the DPI project we instead use the party positions of the executive as provided by the Manifesto Party Project (MPP) data. We choose the MPP data for 2 reasons. One is that rather than largely being based on party labels, partisanship is based on actual policy positions of the parties giving us a more refined indicator. Second, by using an additional data source, if the results are confirmed we will have more confidence in the relationship between partisanship and terrorist attacks. In order to determine partisanship, governments headed by a party that scored less than -10 on the manifesto project's left right continuum are coded and labeled ***Left***. Governments that scored greater than 10 on the same scale are labeled ***Right***. The excluded category is the centrist governments.

Model 1 of Table 3 presents the relationship of governments of the left and right compared to more centrist governments. The substantive results do not change when we use the new measure of government partisanship. Governments of the left are likely to be the target of more frequent terrorist attacks than more centrist governments while

governments of the right are indistinguishable from the more centrist governments. The incident rate is similar as well, (1.26) indicating that the number of attacks against left governments is 1.26 times as great as governments of the center. Furthermore government fractionalization is still statistically significant and positive indicting that it may be more important for advanced democracies. When considered alongside the results of Table 1, these results give us greater confidence in the relationship between governments of the left, government unity, and the frequency of terrorist attacks.

Examining the rest of the measures, few of them are statistically significant. Only the measures which account for the economic development of a state's trading partners and population size remain significant. This suggests that one predictor of transnational terrorism is a state's primary trade partners. The more poor states a country trades with, the more it is likely to see an increased frequency in terrorist attacks. Additionally, larger populations are again likely to be heterogeneous meaning that the same cleavages discussed above are more likely to exist. These results are consistent with the results from model 1 of table 2.

Overall the fact that none of the other measures are statistically significant is not that surprising. Because the universe of cases in this model is comprised of 18 advanced industrial democracies rather than the previous 68 democracies, these countries are likely to be more homogenous in such areas as income inequality and the government's military capabilities.

Model 2 of Table 3 compares governments of the left and center to their more right oriented brethren. The relationship found in Model 1 still holds and in fact is slightly stronger. The rest of the results are almost identical to Model 1.

Comparisons of Models 1 and 2 indicate that the further left leaning a government is, the more likely that government is to the target of terrorism. Model 3 of Table 3 examines this proposition by treating government partisan position as a continuum rather than tri-chotomy using the Party Manifesto data. To do this we create a measure called ***Right-Left***. The further to the right the government in power lay on the right-left continuum, the greater the score while the further to the left a government is, the smaller the score. As can be seen from this model, the further to the right a government is, the less frequent terrorist attacks are likely to be. Conversely, this relationship also indicates that the further left a government is in its policy stances, the more frequent terrorist attacks are likely to be. With regard to the rest of the measures, they remain approximately the same in terms of their coefficients but they increase somewhat in their statistical significance.[12]

Discussion:

The statistical results presented support the hypothesis that partisan accountability is linked to the probability of being the target of international terrorism. There also appears to be some variation between "attracting terror" and the level of political development. The results suggest that lesser democracies are more likely to be targeted than more advanced democracies and that ideological orientation may matter more for newer democracies. In addition to orientation, the ideological cohesiveness of government also appears to be an important factor. We demonstrate a strong relationship between the partisan orientation of a government, the partisan divisions within a government, and the frequency with which the government is likely to be the target of

[12] We also tested for whether there was an interactive affect between partisan orientation and the fractionalization of government. The results were negative suggesting that these are some what independent phenomenon.

terrorist attacks. The results are robust to alternative measures of partisanship across a wide variety of democratic states and to a variety of estimators. But what are the implications of this?

The first implication is that it appears that terrorists do take into account the government's likely response to threats and attacks. This is in keeping with studies such as that of Pape (2003) who finds that suicide terrorism follows strategic patterns as we would expect with conventional warfare and Bueno de Mesquita (2005) who posits that crackdowns above or below the level expected by the terrorists will enrage and embolden them respectively, thus raising the net amount of terrorism to which the government is subject.

Second, the results suggest that, as the old axiom goes, "if you want peace you must prepare for war." Our results indicate that an effective from of preparation for a conflict with terrorists is the installation of leaders who are not only likely to take a firm stance against terrorist activities, but are perceived to be firm in their commitment to national security. For democratic states, a good defense against terrorism seems to be a more credible threat of swift retaliation for any attacks which might be inflicted on the state.

Third, the results are also generally consistent with Schultz's (2005) model of partisan stances with regard to hawks, doves, and whether a hawkish party or a dovish party is more likely to obtain sustained cooperation from a competitive actor in the international system. As Schultz suggested "only Nixon could go to China;" it appears that only "Sharon might be able to go to Palestine." While parties of the left may truly want peace, and in fact establish such a policy as part of their platform, these parties appear less likely to achieve it. They are unlikely to achieve a lasting peace because in

the long run belligerents have an incentive to defect against these parties to extract more concessions. Additionally, once sustained defection occurs they are then likely to be replaced in office by a government that appears more hawkish and more firm in its stance on national security issues.

Obviously, not all left and right governments are the same, some are more left or more right than others, some are more homogenous than others while others are more heterogeneous. The implication here is that even a leftist government may be able to curb terrorism by sending strong signals of firm and aggressive anti-terrorism; thus developing a reputation for being more hawkish towards terrorism. One way to establish such a reputation may be to crack down on terrorists and take the offensive immediately after entering office. Depending on how the counterterrorist campaign was executed, such an approach may improve the situation of the government, but it may instead make it worse. Bueno de Mesquita (2005) posits that in such a situation, the level of terrorism could be expected to increase because the terrorists and terrorist sympathizers do not expect a leftist government to behave so aggressively and thus will respond with increased terrorism. Increased terrorism would most likely lead to the electorate replacing the current government again with a government that is already perceived as more hawkish and can solve the problem without generating as much terrorism.

Our findings, when taken with other results on terrorism, suggest that governments of the left are often in a bad position. Specifically, whenever it is not believed possible to eradicate terrorist violence through counterterrorism (which one might argue is most cases), it is difficult to conceive of a lasting peace without compromise; the purported specialty of liberal governments. Yet before reaching that lasting peace, terrorist violence is expected to increase. Left governments may be more likely to settle the

dispute at the cost of an immediate increase in violence, whereas governments of the right may be less likely to resolve the conflict, but more likely to suppress violence in the short term.

Conclusion

Overall, the evidence presented strongly supports the idea that the political orientation of democratic governments has an influence on international interactions, in this case whether governments are likely to be the targets of international terrorism. Governments of the left are more likely to be attacked than governments of the right or even those of the center. The results are robust to various measures of political orientation as well as various statistical specifications. The results are also consistent with previous work on terrorism.

The argument and the results presented above are important not just with regard to terrorism but also have significance for studies of international conflict more broadly. Our results demonstrate that who wins and who loses political contests within democracies has significant importance for understanding not just international conflict but international relations in general. Much of the previous quantitative research examining democracies and foreign policy has focused either on democracy broadly defined or on specific institutions within democratic societies. Our research demonstrates that it is not just the "rules of the game" as determined by the institutions but also who wins and who loses the game. The outcomes of political contests matter not just to voters but to international actors as well. While voters may vote for a party, or parties, to enact certain policies or to address certain problems in society, the outcomes of those contests also matter to actors outside the state in terms of the strategic behavior of these external

actors in trying to achieve their own preferred outcomes. Overall, this research presents a first cut both with regard to our understanding of the strategic behavior of terrorists and with regard to how domestic political outcomes affect international violence and conflict.

Table 1:
Random Effects Negative Binomial Regression
Partisan Orientation of Democratic Governments and Terrorist Incidents using the DPI indicators

	Model 1: Left Center No Controls		***Model 2: Left Center***		***Model 3: Right Left***	
Variable			*Coefficient*	*Z Score*	*Coefficient*	*Z Score*
Left	.267***	3.18	.295***	3.65	.267**	2.43
Center	.206	1.50	.018	.14		
Right					-.034	-.32
Gov. Fraction	.342*	2.01	.529***	3.14	.527***	3.12
Level of Democracy			-.066	-.99	-.064	-.97
Gov. Capability			2.54**	2.40	2.53**	2.42
Trading Development			-.448***	-4.39	-.442**	-4.24
Total Population			.147**	2.53	.148**	2.56
Income Inequality			-.018*	1.82	.018*	1.85
Conflict			-.055	-.35	-.057	-.036
Past Incidents			.006***	3.66	.006***	3.67
Dispersion Parameter	1.237***		1.521***		1.520***	
Log likelihood	-1913.74		-1881.47		-1881.43	
Chi Square	142.54***		214.42***		214.30***	
N =	935 (68)		935 (68)		935 (68)	

Random Effects Negative Binomial Regression with Robust Standard Errors. One tailed tests: * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001. Note: N= total observations with number of countries in parentheses

Table 2:
Random Effects Negative Binomial Regression
Partisan Orientation of Democratic Governments and Terrorist
Established versus Less Established Democracies

	Model 1: Established Democracies		***Model 2: Less Established Democracies***	
Variable	*Coefficient*	*Z Score*	*Coefficient*	*Z Score*
Left	.226**	2.34	.378**	2.68
Center	.056	.33	.002	.01
Gov. Fraction	.468**	2.25	.416	1.36
Level of Democracy	-.422***	-3.35	.037	.43
Gov. Capability	.018	.15	1.38***	3.95
Trading Development	-.408***	-3.13	-.582***	-3.19
Total Population	.000	.00	.307**	2.91
Income Inequality	.015	1,14	.024	1.55
Conflict	.009	.05	-.009	-.03
Past Incidents	.004	2.20	.015	3.07
Dispersion Parameter	1.189		2.48***	
Log likelihood	-1190.05		-666.86	
Chi Square	138.70		120.93***	
N =	599(34)		336(44)	

Random Effects Negative Binomial Regression with Robust Standard Errors. One tailed tests: * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001. Note: N= total observations with number of countries in parentheses

Table 3:
Random Effects Negative Binomial Regression
Partisan Orientation of Democratic Governments and Terrorist Incidents using the MPP indicators

	Model 1: Right Left		***Model 2: Left Center***		***Model 3: Left Right Continuous Measure***	
Variable	*Coefficient*	*Z Score*	*Coefficient*	*Z Score*	*Coefficient*	*Z Score*
Left	.229*	1.71	.248*	2.04	-.008**	-2.76
Right	-.051	-.34				
Center			-.014	-.11		
Gov. Fraction	.569*	1.95	.562*	1.92	.554*	1.94
Gov. Capability	.501	1.38	.501	1.38	.597*	1.67
Trading Development	-.644***	-3.34	-.6.45***	-3.34	-.575**	-2.99
Total Population	.217*	1.86	.2.01*	1.75	.267**	2.38
Income Inequality	.009	.54	.009	.53	.021	.68
Conflict	-.277	-1.16	-.281	-1.17	-.252	-1.06
Past Incidents	.003	1.34	.003	1.37	.003	1.41
Dispersion Parameter	1.301***		1.209***		1.290***	
Log likelihood	-794.63		-794.68		-793.35	
Chi Square	68.66***		68.53***		75.86***	
N =	347 (18)		347 (18)		347(18)	

Random Effects Negative Binomial Regression with Robust Standard Errors. One tailed tests: * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001. Note: N= total observations with number of countries in parentheses

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