Supporting Information for "External Engagement: Explaining the Spread of Electoral Participation Provisions in Civil Conflict Settlements

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More Summary Statistics on the Inclusion of EPPs

Figure A0: Peace Agreements and EPPs by 5 Year-Period

[1] Please note that figures and tables in this supporting information are also used in Aila M. Matanock. 2017. "Bullets for Ballots: Electoral Participation Provisions and Enduring Peace after Civil Conflict." *International Security* 41(4): 93-132, and Aila M. Matanock. 2017. *Electing Peace: From Civil Conflict to Political Participation*. Cambridge U.K.: Cambridge University Press. The supporting information for those publications, which overlap with this supporting information, also may be useful for readers. Coding notes by case, as well as code for various robustness checks, can also be provided by the author upon request.

Peace agreement provisions (1975-1980)
Settlement but No EPPs
No Conflict

Peace agreement provisions (1980-1985)
Settlement but No EPPs
No Conflict

Peace agreement provisions (1985-1990)
Settlement but No EPPs
No Conflict

Peace agreement provisions (1990-1995)
Settlement but No EPPs
Settlement with EPPs
No Conflict

Peace agreement provisions (1995-2000)
Settlement but No EPPs
Settlement with EPPs
No Conflict

Peace agreement provisions (2000-2005)
Settlement but No EPPs
Settlement with EPPs
No Conflict

Evidence on External Engagement after EPPs

Table A0: External Engagement in First Post-Conflict Elections

	Post-Conflict Elections after Settlements with EPPs	Post-Conflict Elections after Other Types of Termination
International Election Observers	94% (15)	53% (56)
None	6% (1)	47% (41)
Fisher's Exact=0.01		
Democracy and Governance Aid as a Percent of Development Aid (Logged, 2-Yr Avg.)	5.75	3.53
Fisher's Exact=0.17		
Conditionality or Pressure before Elections	77% (10)	44% (26)
None	23% (3)	56% (33)
Fisher's Exact=0.06		

Additional Detail on Measurement of the Main Variables

Dependent Variable of Interest: I list the dependent variable of interest for all of the clustered peace agreements based on the universe of cases drawn from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset. The complete set of coding rules and the coding notes on each case are also available from the author upon request. An independent coder re-coded the data based on the coding rules, and the coding decisions differed only on the territorial cases (which are coded each different way as a robustness check). Several less clear coding decisions are noted in these data and the text, and the analysis is run with the opposite coding of these as a robustness check. Each country was also dropped in turn as an additional robustness check, so not an individual case is producing the results. The results held with each of these robustness checks (and the results, or the files to run them if preferred, are also available from the author upon request).

Table A1: Data on Electoral Participation Provisions

Government, Militant Group, Year of Agreement:	Electoral Participation Provisions:
Afghanistan HIII 1993	Yes
Afghanistan HII 1993	Yes
Afghanistan HII 1993	Yes**
Afghanistan HII 1996	No
Angola UNITA 1989	No
Angola UNITA 1991	Yes
Angola UNITA 1994	Yes
Angola UNITA 2002	Yes
Bangladesh (Chittagong Hill Tracts) JSS/SB 1997	No
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Croat) Croat 1994	No++
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Serb) Serb 1995	Yes
Burundi CNDD 2000	Yes
Burundi FROLINA 2000	Yes
Burundi CNDD-FDD 2003	Yes
Burundi PALIPEHUTU 2000	Yes
Cambodia KR 1991	Yes
Cambodia KPNLF 1991	Yes
Cambodia FUNCINPEC 1991	Yes
Chad FAN 1978	No
Chad FAN 1978	No*
Chad FAN 1979	No
Chad FAP 1979	No
Chad FNT 1992	No
Chad CNR 1993	No
Chad FNT 1994	No
Chad CSNPD 1994	No
Chad MDD 1995	No
Chad CDR or FNT 1997	Yes
Chad FARF 1998	Yes

Chad	MDD	1999	No
Chad	MDJT	2002	No
Chad	MDJT	2005	Yes
Colombia	EPL	1991	Yes
Colombia	FARC	1999	No
Colombia	FARC	2002	No
Comoros (Anjouan)	MPA	2000	No
Comoros (Anjouan)	MPA	2001	Yes*
Comoros (Anjouan)	MPA	2003	Yes*
Congo	Cocoyes	1999	No++
Congo	Ninjas	1999	No++
Congo	Ntsiloulous	1999	No++
Croatia (Serb)	Krajina	1995	No
Democratic Republic of Congo	MLC	1999	No+
Democratic Republic of Congo	RCD	1999	No+
Democratic Republic of Congo	MLC	2003	Yes
Democratic Republic of Congo	RCD	2003	Yes
Democratic Republic of Congo	RCD-ML	1999	No+
Democratic Republic of Congo	RCD-ML	2003	Yes
Djibouti	FRUD	1994	Yes
Djibouti	FRUD-AD	2001	Yes
El Salvador	FMLN	1992	Yes
Georgia (Abkhazia)	Abkhazia	1994	No
Guatemala	URNG	1991	No
Guatemala	URNG	1996	Yes
Guinea Bissau	junta	1998	Yes
Haiti	military	1993	No
India (Bodoland)	ABSU	1993	No
India (Tripura)	ATTF	1993	No
India (Tripura)	TNV	1988	No
Indonesia (Aceh)	GAM	2002	No
Indonesia (Aceh)	GAM	2005	Yes+++
Israel (Palestine)	PLO/Fatah	1995	No
Israel (Palestine)	PLO/Fatah	1999	No
Israel (Palestine)	PNA	1999	No
Ivory Coast	MJP	2003	No
Ivory Coast	MJP	2003	No*
Ivory Coast	MPCI	2003	No
Ivory Coast	MPCI	2003	No**
Ivory Coast	MPIGO	2003	No
Ivory Coast	MPIGO	2003	No**
Ivory Coast	MJP	2004	Yes*
Ivory Coast	MPCI	2004	Yes*

Ivory Coast	MPIGO	2004	Yes*
Ivory Coast	FN	2005	Yes
Liberia	INPFL	1991	No
Liberia	NPFL	1991	No
Liberia	NPFL	1993	Yes*
Liberia	NPFL	1994	Yes*
Liberia	NPFL	1995	Yes*
Liberia	NPFL	1996	Yes*
Liberia	LURD	2003	Yes
Liberia	MODEL	2003	Yes
Macedonia	UCK	2001	Yes
Mali (Azawad)	MPA	1991	No*
Mali (Azawad)	MPA	1992	No+
Mauritania (Western Sahara)	POLISARIO	1979	No
Mexico	EZLN	1996	No
Moldova (Dniestr)	PMR	1997	No
Mozambique	RENAMO	1992	Yes
Mozambique	RENAMO	1984	No
Niger	FLAA	1993	No
Niger (Air and Azawad)	CRA	1995	No+
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	BRA	1991	No
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	BRA	1994	No
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	BRA	2001	Yes+++
Philippines	military faction	1995	No
Philippines (Mindanao)	MILF	2001	No
Philippines (Mindanao)	MNLF	1996	Yes+++
Philippines (Mindanao)	MNLF	1976	No
Philippines (Mindanao)	MNLF	1987	No
Rwanda	FPR	1993	Yes
Senegal (Casamance)	MFDC	2004	No
Sierra Leone	RUF	1996	No
Sierra Leone	RUF	1999	Yes
Sierra Leone	RUF	2000	Yes
Somalia	SPM or USC	1993	No
Somalia	USC/SNA	1997	No
Somalia	USC/SNA	1994	No
South Africa	ANC	1993	Yes
South Africa (Namibia)	SWAPO	1978	No
Sudan (Southern Sudan)	SPLM/A	2005	Yes
Sudan	NDA	2005	Yes
Sudan	SPLM/A	1988	No
Tajikistan	UTO	1997	Yes
Uganda	UNRF II	2002	No

Uganda	UPDA	1988	No
Uganda	NRA	1985	No
UK (Northern Ireland)	PIRA	1998	Yes
Yugoslavia (Kosovo)	Kosovo	1999	No
Yugoslavia (Slovenia)	Slovenia	1991	No
Zimbabwe	PF	1979	No+
Zimbabwe	ANC	1975	No

+Also coded as yes under a more inclusive coding of expectations of electoral participation that anticipates that all groups will be allowed to participate.
++Also coded as yes under a more inclusive coding of expectations of electoral participation for all parties that participated before the conflict.
+++Also coded as no under a less inclusive coding of no expectations of electoral participation for territorial militant groups in regional transitional bodies.
*Coded in the conflict data as dropping since these are renegotiations of previous agreements without a return to conflict in between.
**These cases drop in the conflict data's multinomial logistic regression analysis only (but not in the alternative competing risks analysis) because each is signed after another has failed in the same year (and note that they always have the same provisions).

The conflict and peace agreement data do not perfectly match each other in their coding by UCDP/PRIO, and so the following differences exist in the conflict data compared to the peace agreement data: some of the peace agreements are followed by continued fighting, and so they were not initially included by Kreutz 2010, who requires a year with the conflict below the 25 battle death threshold in order to code a conflict as terminated. In addition, some peace agreements follow periods in which the conflict drops below the battle death threshold due to a ceasefire or a petering out of fighting.[2] In these cases, I consider the dyad to continue to be a candidate for a peace agreement for eight years—the furthest out of any peace agreements seen in the dataset.

First, there are some additional peace agreements in the conflict data compared to the peace agreement data (since the conflict data code these cases as terminating through peace agreements but they are not listed in the peace agreement data).

- Bosnia and Herzegovina: Croatian and Serbian irregulars enter as an additional PAs because they also terminate in the same year with an agreement (and so we coded them the same as the Serbian force, "8," and the Croatian force, "1," respectively).
- Cambodia: FUNCINPEC is coded as signing an additional deal in 1997 is not in the PA data (coded in the CT data as a "1").
- Colombia: M-19 is coded as signing a deal in 1989 is not in the PA data (coded in the CT data as a "8").
- Croatia: Serbian irregulars enter as an additional PAs because they also terminate in the same year with an agreement (and so we coded them the same as the Serbian force, "1," although 1994 not 1995*).
- Indonesia: Fretilin is coded as signing a deal in 1999 is not in the PA data (coded in the CT data as a "1").
- Israel: Fatah in 1999 is not considered active in the CT data between 1995 and 1999, so that agreement is missing in the CT set compared to the PA set.
- South Africa: SWAPO is coded as signing a deal in 1988 is not in the PA data (coded in the CT data as a "1").

[2] In addition, Kreutz 2010 codes one case a victory in which a peace agreement follows within a month (FAP in Chad in 1979), so I also include that one, although dropping Chad does not change the results of the analyses.

In addition, there are a few peace agreements in which multiple militant groups sign, but only one active one does, which must be specified in the conflict data.

- Chad: FNT is coded as signing the 1997 agreement since it is either them or CDR in the PA data (which ended with a "4" in 1987 according to the CT data). Note: this perhaps should be treated as a renegotiation since FNT also signed a prior peace agreement, but it is included because the identity of the group is ambiguous.
- Somalia: SPM is coded as signing the 1993 agreement since it is either them or USC (which ended with a "4" in 1991 according to the CT data).

Next, there is one case in which no conflict is ongoing when the peace agreement is signed, and so this case is only present in the peace agreement data but not in the conflict data.

- Haiti: Military faction (forces of Raol Cedras) is not active in UCDP after 1991 termination with a victory ("4"). Later Haiti PA in 1993 is not included.

Finally, there are cases dropped in the multinomial logistic regression analysis only (but not in the alternative competing risks analysis) because each is signed after another has failed in the same year (but note that they always have the same provisions).

- Afghanistan HII 1993
- Ivory Coast MPCI 2003
- Ivory Coast MPIGO 2003

Independent Variables of Interest: Beyond the description of the independent variables of interest in the text, and the justification made there for using them, this section provides more information on the distribution and features of the democracy promotion variables, as well as alternative coding of them. Both variables are well-distributed across the ranges that they cover, from 0-100 percent for observation and 0-20 percent for aid. These regional electoral observation and regional democracy and governance assistance percentages correlate highly, as expected and described. Each variable increases over time across regions, but regional democracy and governance aid deviates less from a direct time trend than does regional electoral observation (and it is only available after the end of the Cold War), so the latter provides greater explanatory leverage (see Figure A1).

I also considered alternative specifications of these measures. First, legislative elections are the most comparable measures across cases, so I use these in the main analysis. Several cases had legislative elections that were technically unmonitored in the relevant years, but other elections in the same states are monitored in the same years (typically presidential elections taking place in another month). Since most of these cases worked against my hypotheses, I counted these as monitored. The results hold in either case. I include all elections in an alternative specification—the variables are similar in these data (correlated at 0.95)—and smooth over multiple years (two-year lags, lags and the current year): the effects are positive and substantively similar. The lagged variable is preferable because it captures when the combatants are likely assessing international actors' ability and willingness to neutrally engage through elections. Like studies of international election observation, I drop "mature" democracies from regional calculations (Hyde 2011; Kelley 2012).

I follow Hyde 2011 in adopting five regions, but also code alternative specifications (UCDP-defined regions, regional intergovernmental organization-defined zones, sub-regions, etc.), which produce similar results but are slightly weaker with certain regional groupings.

All results, as well as the supporting files for the quantitative analysis, are available from the author upon request.

Figure A1: Democracy Promotion Variables over Time by Region



Data are from Hyde 2010, 1960-2010



Data are from Finkel et al. 2007 (using USAID and non-U.S. Official Development Aid).

The following table then shows the average for the dependent variable across these independent variables, split at their medians, which shows that participation provisions are associated with regional democracy promotion variables, as expect.

Table A2: Electoral Participation Provisions with Expectations of External Engagement

	Cold War (1975-1988)	Post (1989-2005)
Participation Provisions	**0%(0)**	**48%(51)**
None	100% (15)	52% (56)

Fisher's exact=0.000

	Low Regional Election Observation	High Regional Election Observation
Participation Provisions	**25%(15)**	**59%(36)**
None	75% (46)	41% (25)

Fisher's exact=0.000

	Low Regional Democracy Aid	High Regional Democracy Aid
Participation Provisions	**40%(21)**	**56%(30)**
None	60% (32)	44% (24)

Fisher's exact=0.072

Implementation across Settlements

The findings about the determinants of electoral participation provisions in peace agreements suggest support for the external engagement theory in the most relevant comparison. It is, however, also possible that combatants under particular circumstances sign peace agreements with electoral participation provisions but without planning to implement them. The external engagement theory allows noncompliance in certain cases, but it assumes that the reneging side is punished for its noncompliance. But it is possible that the predictors of provisions are not the same as those of implementation due to a selection effect. These provisions could be strategically chosen but without any expectations of implementation in certain agreements. Therefore, I discuss some analysis of when these provisions are actually implemented among the cases with peace agreements.

In order to test the implementation of electoral participation provisions, I collected new data forming the Militant Group Electoral Participation (MGEP) set, which examines when militant groups participate as political parties in national legislative elections.[3] I generated the dataset by compiling non-state actors in civil conflicts from the existing sources and then vetting each organization to ensure that it meets certain standards to qualify as a militant group. Specifically, I assessed whether each used violence and had political aims. Once the universe of militant groups was identified, I determined whether each participated in national legislative elections by running candidates under the banner of a political party, while fighting or in the ten years after fighting ended.[4] MGEP includes almost 700 militant groups, covering 1970-2010. Most instances of militant groups participating, more than half of the cases, occur after it has signed a peace agreement with the government, often with these specific provisions for this electoral participation.

The analysis is thus now taking account of whether the government followed through on the agreement to actually hold elections within 10 years, and whether the militant group actually participated in those elections. Such implementation occurs in 34 cases among the peace agreements with electoral participation provisions, as noted.

Examining the implementation of, rather than provisions for, electoral participation shows that the same correlations hold. The regional democracy promotion variables are positively associated with election participation, while the indicators of special and strategic relationships are negatively associated with it. Most of the statistical significance is the same, although the relationship with democracy aid, as well as oil production and military aid, drops below the standard levels. Most of the results on the controls are also similar. Measuring some variables after the peace agreement is signed, but others before it is signed, is problematic. Those that are measured afterward reflect many other aspects of implementation that are only captured in the cases of peace agreements with electoral participation provisions but not in other cases, as without those provisions, so that it is clear that they should not be included.

[3] Complete coding description and rules, as well as the data themselves, are available upon request.

[4] I only identified three additional groups by using ten rather than five years—the CNDD in Burundi, the MPA in the Comoros, the SPLM/A in the Sudan—and the empirical patterns hold with or without their inclusion.

Table A3: *Implementation* of Electoral Participation Provisions after Peace Agreements (*Inclusion* is shown in the body of the paper)

	1a	2a	3a	4a	5a	Average Marginal Effects^
Regional Election Observation (Percent, Lagged)	2.32*			3.88**		0.62***
	(1.37)			(1.51)		(0.22)
Regional Democracy/Governance Assistance (Percent Development Aid, Lagged 2-year average)		5.08			11.16*	
		(5.41)			(6.07)	
Oil Production Indicator (Lagged)			-0.84	-0.88	-1.27**	-0.14
			(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.51)	(0.09)
U.S. Military Aid Indicator (Lagged)			-0.91	-0.92	-0.80	-0.15
			(0.57)	(0.59)	(0.58)	(0.09)
Former British Colony			-1.06	-1.73**	-1.26*	-0.28**
			(0.84)	(0.80)	(0.74)	(0.13)
Former French Colony			-1.55**	-2.19***	-1.89**	-0.35***
			(0.75)	(0.83)	(0.81)	(0.10)
Number of Observations	107	107	107	107	107	
Pseudo R-Squared	0.04	0.01	0.14	0.22	0.18	
Log Pseudo Likelihood	-64.04	-65.94	-57.80	-52.10	-54.84	

Note: Method is logistic regression analysis. DV is peace agreement with versus without electoral participation (implemented). Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors, clustered by state (maximum number of clusters is 41). Cold War indicator always included and perfectly predicts success/failure (so 15 observations drop in all models). * $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$.

^For Average Marginal Effects: These are based on Model 4a. Table presents dx/dy, which, for factor level variables, is the discrete change from the base level. Numbers in parentheses are delta-method standard errors (robust).

As discussed, measuring electoral participation provisions is a more convincing measure than implementation because it does not incorporate ex-post success into the analysis of whether ex-ante expectations of external engagement affect the strategic calculus to use this mechanism in peace agreement design. Nonetheless, the fact that the same determinants hold when examining implementation of these provisions suggests that there is not a selection effect occurring in which different factors drive whether provisions for electoral participation are included in a peace agreement compared to whether those provisions are then implemented.

Competing Risks Models

Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis in More Depth: The following tables show the full models for the multinomial logistic regression analysis. In this analysis, the hazard probability that conflict *i* ends in a peace agreement with electoral provisions (*ep*) is:

$$\lambda_{ik} = \frac{ep^{X_i\beta_{ep}}}{\sum_k^K ep^{X_i\beta_k}}$$

Where *K* corresponds to all possible ways of conflict termination (*k*), *X* is a vector of covariates for conflict *i*, β_{ep} are the event-specific coefficients for conflicts that ended with electoral provisions, and the baseline event is continued conflict in the models presented in the analysis.

Other Approaches to Competing Risks Models: There are different approaches to estimate competing risks models, which vary depending on the nature of the time variable, the characteristics of the data, and even the size of the dataset. The approach that is used frequently in the literature is the multinomial logit (recently see Fortna 2015, Leiras et al. 2015). As described, in this context, this analysis would approximate asking in each year whether the combatants are deciding to stay in conflict, provided that they can end conflict through different types of termination. Fine and Gray's (1999) subdistribution hazard would more closely approximate asking what the probability is of the conflict ending through electoral participation provisions given that it has not yet ended and can do so through different types of termination (directly related to the cumulative incidence). Multinomial logit entails making several assumptions, including the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), but Fortna (2015) in using the same method notes that Dow and Endersby (2004) explain that this is not a serious concern when the set of choices is stable. Subdistribution hazard requires other assumptions, including the proportional subhazards assumption. Dow and Endersby (2004) state that the multinomial logit is preferable without a large dataset, and the model makes more sense for the way that I think of this analysis (as essentially discrete data) (Jenkins 2005). Thus, following Fortna (2015), I triangulate between methods, modeling alternative methods as robustness checks (and the results of the analyses remain substantively similar).

Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis Results: I show the full results of the multinomial logit models below (which are also summarized in the tables in the main text: Table 3 shows the results for one outcome only—peace agreement with electoral participation provisions, outcome="8" in the tables that follow—whereas Table A4 shows all of the outcomes). The analysis in Table A5 models time dependence using three terms, as discussed in the text, and then, following Dafoe (2013), the Table A4.1 presents the results with no time controls, and Table A4.2 presents the results with a logarithmic transformation of duration of conflict.

In this analysis, conflicts may also end in different outcomes—e.g. peace agreements without electoral participation provisions (outcome="1" in the tables that follow), victory by either side (outcome="4"), alliance (outcome="7"), or the conflict petering out (outcome="10")—and I show each as the baseline in Table A4.3 to demonstrate that different predictors are significant for termination through peace agreements with electoral participation provisions than termination through other outcomes.

Table A4.0: Conflict Termination through Electoral Participation Provisions (Multinomial Logistic—Relative to Ongoing Conflict and Accounting for Other Outcomes—Duration, Duration Squared, Duration Cubed Variables Included)

VARIABLES	(1) Splines	(2) Splines	(3) Splines	(4) Splines	(5) Splines
Peace Agreements without EPPs ("1")					
Cold War	-0.71*		-0.85**	-0.82**	
	(0.37)		(0.34)	(0.38)	
Regional Election Observation	0.23			0.067	
	(0.46)			(0.46)	
Regional Democracy & Governance Assistance		-0.01			-0.02
		(0.02)			(0.02)
Oil Production			-0.28	-0.28	-0.09
			(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.41)
U.S. Military Aid			-0.44	-0.44	-0.42
			(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.45)
Former British Colony			0.01	0.01	-0.48
			(0.43)	(0.44)	(0.45)
Former French Colony			0.99**	0.99**	0.81*
			(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.49)
Conflict Duration	-0.17*	-0.31***	-0.16*	-0.16*	-0.28***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Conflict Duration^2	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.012
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Conflict Duration^3	-7.30e-05	-0.00	-6.90e-05	-6.98e-05	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-2.63***	-1.96***	-2.38***	-2.43***	-1.75***
	(0.42)	(0.30)	(0.45)	(0.56)	(0.42)
Victories/Defeats ("4")					
Cold War	0.01		0.19	-0.06	
	(0.38)		(0.34)	(0.38)	
Regional Election Observation	-0.58			-0.58	
	(0.46)			(0.43)	
Regional Democracy & Governance Assistance		0.01			0.02
		(0.03)			(0.03)
Oil Production			-0.30	-0.31	-0.50
			(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.34)
U.S. Military Aid			-0.13	-0.14	-0.25
			(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.38)
Former British Colony			-0.13	-0.16	-0.66
			(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.46)
Former French Colony			0.41	0.39	-0.46
			(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.51)
Conflict Duration	-1.48***	-1.60***	-1.47***	-1.44***	-1.56***
	(0.24)	(0.34)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.35)
Conflict Duration^2	0.13***	0.15***	0.13***	0.13***	0.15***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Conflict Duration^3	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-0.02	-0.42	-0.19	0.13	0.15
	(0.40)	(0.51)	(0.47)	(0.46)	(0.54)

Alliances (“7”)					
Cold War	1.44*		1.74***	1.47*	
	(0.85)		(0.54)	(0.86)	
Regional Election Observation	-0.94			-0.78	
	(1.14)			(1.17)	
Regional Democracy & Governance Assistance		0.08			0.08*
		(0.05)			(0.05)
Oil Production			-0.18	-0.18	-0.05
			(0.58)	(0.59)	(0.83)
U.S. Military Aid			-0.18	-0.11	0.27
			(0.58)	(0.60)	(0.86)
Former British Colony			0.69	0.65	1.08
			(0.64)	(0.63)	(0.83)
Former French Colony			0.76	0.71	-12.29***
			(0.69)	(0.65)	(1.18)
Conflict Duration	-0.78***	-2.01	-0.77***	-0.76***	-2.02
	(0.22)	(1.38)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(1.42)
Conflict Duration^2	0.07***	0.25	0.07***	0.07***	0.25
	(0.02)	(0.19)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.19)
Conflict Duration^3	-0.00***	-0.01	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.01
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Constant	-3.52***	-3.65**	-4.21***	-3.86***	-4.09
	(1.06)	(1.85)	(0.77)	(1.03)	(3.44)
Peace Agreements with EPPs (“8”)					
Cold War	-15.43***		-16.62***	-15.54***	
	(0.47)		(0.32)	(0.46)	
Regional Election Observation	2.45***			2.20***	
	(0.75)			(0.66)	
Regional Democracy & Governance Assistance		0.05*			0.07**
		(0.03)			(0.03)
Oil Production			-0.48	-0.44	-0.73*
			(0.44)	(0.40)	(0.38)
U.S. Military Aid			-1.09***	-1.12***	-1.39***
			(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.39)
Former British Colony			-1.22*	-1.16*	-1.16**
			(0.64)	(0.59)	(0.58)
Former French Colony			0.15	0.11	0.14
			(0.59)	(0.59)	(0.66)
Conflict Duration	0.09	0.04	0.10	0.12	0.07
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Conflict Duration^2	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Conflict Duration^3	9.10e-05	8.68e-05	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-5.27***	-3.77***	-2.53***	-4.15***	-2.69***
	(0.74)	(0.41)	(0.56)	(0.78)	(0.56)

No definitive end (likely no or low fighting) within eight years ("10")					
Cold War	-0.29		-0.24	-0.17	
	(0.34)		(0.28)	(0.31)	
Regional Election Observation	0.31			0.19	
	(0.43)			(0.39)	
Regional Democracy & Governance Assistance		0.07**			0.08***
		(0.03)			(0.03)
Oil Production			-0.86***	-0.84***	-1.03***
			(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.31)
U.S. Military Aid			0.40	0.39	0.01
			(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.41)
Former British Colony			0.23	0.24	0.06
			(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.37)
Former French Colony			1.10***	1.11***	1.27***
			(0.41)	(0.42)	(0.35)
Conflict Duration	1.09***	0.99***	1.16***	1.17***	1.10***
	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.18)
Conflict Duration^2	-0.05***	-0.047***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Conflict Duration^3	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-9.20***	-8.93***	-9.70***	-9.83***	-9.53***
	(0.51)	(0.59)	(0.78)	(0.74)	(0.92)
Observations	2,655	1,498	2,632	2,632	1,488

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A4.1: Conflict Termination through Electoral Participation Provisions (Multinomial Logistic—Relative to Ongoing Conflict and Accounting for Other Outcomes—No Duration Variables Included)

VARIABLES	(1) None	(2) None	(3) None	(4) None	(5) None
Peace Agreements without EPPs ("1")					
Cold War	-0.65*		-0.83**	-0.75**	
	(0.38)		(0.35)	(0.38)	
Regional Election Observation	0.35			0.18	
	(0.49)			(0.48)	
Regional Democracy & Governance Assistance		-0.01			-0.02
		(0.03)			(0.03)
Oil Production			-0.38	-0.37	-0.16
			(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.48)
U.S. Military Aid			-0.38	-0.38	-0.41
			(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.51)
Former British Colony			-0.01	-0.00	-0.55
			(0.46)	(0.47)	(0.49)
Former French Colony			1.16**	1.16**	1.06*
			(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.56)
Constant	-3.48***	-3.09***	-3.11***	-3.22***	-2.80***
	(0.32)	(0.27)	(0.43)	(0.55)	(0.46)
Victories/Defeats ("4")					
Cold War	-0.11		0.12	-0.18	
	(0.37)		(0.34)	(0.36)	
Regional Election Observation	-0.66			-0.75	
	(0.51)			(0.49)	
Regional Democracy & Governance Assistance		0.00			0.01
		(0.03)			(0.03)
Oil Production			-0.59*	-0.63*	-0.55
			(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.36)
U.S. Military Aid			0.10	0.12	-0.20
			(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.37)
Former British Colony			-0.14	-0.18	-0.84*
			(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.46)
Former French Colony			0.79**	0.76**	-0.05
			(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.53)
Constant	-3.05***	-3.58***	-3.26***	-2.84***	-2.92***
	(0.33)	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.34)	(0.32)
Alliances ("7")					
Cold War	1.22		1.65***	1.30	
	(0.90)		(0.52)	(0.89)	
Regional Election Observation	-1.06			-0.93	
	(1.26)			(1.25)	
Regional Democracy & Governance Assistance		0.08			0.09
		(0.06)			(0.07)
Oil Production			-0.18	-0.18	0.01
			(0.60)	(0.60)	(1.04)
U.S. Military Aid			-0.04	0.02	0.30
			(0.61)	(0.62)	(0.89)
Former British Colony			0.73	0.68	1.20

			(0.63)	(0.63)	(1.12)
Former French Colony			0.79	0.73	-11.67***
			(0.66)	(0.62)	(1.23)
Constant	-4.96***	-6.53***	-5.83***	-5.36***	-7.42**
	(0.89)	(0.71)	(0.56)	(0.95)	(2.92)
Peace Agreements with EPPs ("8")					
Cold War	-15.19***		-15.87***	-14.79***	
	(0.46)		(0.31)	(0.46)	
Regional Election Observation	2.51***			2.22***	
	(0.75)			(0.63)	
Regional Democracy & Governance Assistance		0.05*			0.08***
		(0.03)			(0.03)
Oil Production			-0.57	-0.51	-0.82**
			(0.46)	(0.39)	(0.38)
U.S. Military Aid			-1.08***	-1.12***	-1.42***
			(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.39)
Former British Colony			-1.20*	-1.15*	-1.16**
			(0.64)	(0.60)	(0.58)
Former French Colony			0.24	0.15	0.22
			(0.56)	(0.55)	(0.61)
Constant	-5.16***	-3.86***	-2.42***	-3.88***	-2.64***
	(0.59)	(0.36)	(0.41)	(0.52)	(0.40)
No definitive end (likely no or low fighting) within eight years ("10")					
Cold War	-0.52*		-0.45	-0.51	
	(0.32)		(0.29)	(0.33)	
Regional Election Observation	-0.13			-0.14	
	(0.34)			(0.34)	
Regional Democracy & Governance Assistance		0.06***			0.07***
		(0.02)			(0.02)
Oil Production			-0.34	-0.35	-0.70**
			(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.31)
U.S. Military Aid			0.10	0.10	-0.13
			(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.31)
Former British Colony			0.19	0.18	0.18
			(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.38)
Former French Colony			0.33	0.32	0.35
			(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.37)
Constant	-3.06***	-3.65***	-3.13***	-3.04***	-3.33***
	(0.23)	(0.30)	(0.24)	(0.32)	(0.44)
Observations	2,655	1,498	2,632	2,632	1,488

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A4.2: Conflict Termination through Electoral Participation Provisions (Multinomial Logistic—Relative to Ongoing Conflict and Accounting for Other Outcomes—Logged Duration Variable Included)

VARIABLES	(1) Logged	(2) Logged	(3) Logged	(4) Logged	(5) Logged
Peace Agreements without EPPs ("1")					
Cold War	-0.69*		-0.84**	-0.79**	
	(0.38)		(0.35)	(0.38)	
Regional Election Observation	0.27			0.11	
	(0.46)			(0.47)	
Regional Democracy & Governance Assistance		-0.01			-0.02
		(0.02)			(0.02)
Oil Production			-0.30	-0.30	-0.09
			(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.42)
U.S. Military Aid			-0.43	-0.43	-0.43
			(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.46)
Former British Colony			0.01	0.01	-0.49
			(0.44)	(0.45)	(0.46)
Former French Colony			1.03**	1.03**	0.86*
			(0.51)	(0.51)	(0.50)
Conflict Duration (Logged)	-0.41***	-0.56***	-0.35***	-0.35***	-0.50***
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Constant	-2.80***	-2.27***	-2.56***	-2.64***	-2.06***
	(0.35)	(0.28)	(0.42)	(0.53)	(0.43)
Victories/Defeats ("4")					
Cold War	-0.028		0.16	-0.10	
	(0.40)		(0.35)	(0.40)	
Regional Election Observation	-0.60			-0.61	
	(0.47)			(0.43)	
Regional Democracy & Governance Assistance		0.01			0.02
		(0.03)			(0.03)
Oil Production			-0.29	-0.29	-0.50
			(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.34)
U.S. Military Aid			-0.13	-0.14	-0.26
			(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.37)
Former British Colony			-0.13	-0.17	-0.67
			(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.46)
Former French Colony			0.40	0.38	-0.48
			(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.51)
Conflict Duration (Logged)	-1.72***	-1.52***	-1.67***	-1.66***	-1.49***
	(0.19)	(0.30)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.29)
Constant	-1.36***	-1.94***	-1.53***	-1.18***	-1.31***
	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.32)	(0.34)	(0.35)

Alliances (“7”)					
Cold War	1.21		1.65***	1.32	
	(0.93)		(0.53)	(0.92)	
Regional Election Observation	-1.01			-0.87	
	(1.24)			(1.24)	
Regional Democracy & Governance Assistance		0.08			0.09
		(0.06)			(0.07)
Oil Production			-0.01	-0.02	0.04
			(0.51)	(0.52)	(0.97)
U.S. Military Aid			-0.08	-0.03	0.28
			(0.60)	(0.60)	(0.94)
Former British Colony			0.73	0.68	1.23
			(0.61)	(0.60)	(1.08)
Former French Colony			0.70	0.65	-13.10***
			(0.66)	(0.62)	(1.41)
Conflict Duration (Logged)	-0.34	-0.20	-0.34	-0.33	-0.33
	(0.32)	(0.71)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.65)
Constant	-4.43***	-6.19***	-5.36***	-4.91***	-6.90*
	(1.10)	(1.64)	(0.75)	(1.15)	(3.70)
Peace Agreements with EPPs (“8”)					
Cold War	-15.76***		-16.18***	-15.10***	
	(0.46)		(0.31)	(0.46)	
Regional Election Observation	2.48***			2.23***	
	(0.75)			(0.65)	
Regional Democracy & Governance Assistance		0.05*			0.07***
		(0.03)			(0.03)
Oil Production			-0.56	-0.50	-0.81**
			(0.45)	(0.39)	(0.37)
U.S. Military Aid			-1.08***	-1.12***	-1.41***
			(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.38)
Former British Colony			-1.19*	-1.15*	-1.14**
			(0.63)	(0.60)	(0.57)
Former French Colony			0.20	0.15	0.18
			(0.58)	(0.59)	(0.65)
Conflict Duration (Logged)	-0.06	-0.19	-0.09	0.01	-0.10
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.21)
Constant	-5.04***	-3.55***	-2.27***	-3.90***	-2.48***
	(0.67)	(0.34)	(0.47)	(0.68)	(0.47)

No definitive end (likely no or low fighting) within eight years ("10")					
Cold War	-0.28		-0.22	-0.25	
	(0.33)		(0.26)	(0.30)	
Regional Election Observation	0.08			-0.09	
	(0.42)			(0.37)	
Regional Democracy & Governance Assistance		0.07**			0.07**
		(0.03)			(0.03)
Oil Production			-0.99***	-1.00***	-1.18***
			(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.32)
U.S. Military Aid			0.34*	0.35*	-0.04
			(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.30)
Former British Colony			0.20	0.20	0.21
			(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.30)
Former French Colony			1.01***	1.00***	1.25***
			(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.32)
Conflict Duration (Logged)	1.23***	1.14***	1.59***	1.59***	1.56***
	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.29)
Constant	-5.91***	-6.18***	-6.59***	-6.55***	-6.79***
	(0.57)	(0.47)	(0.74)	(0.77)	(0.77)
Observations	2,655	1,498	2,632	2,632	1,488

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A4.3: Conflict Termination through Electoral Participation Provisions (Multinomial Logistic—Relative to Ongoing Conflict and Accounting for Other Outcomes—All Different Outcomes Used as the Baseline)

VARIABLES	BASE IS: Non-terminated Conflicts ("0")	BASE IS: Peace Agreements without EPPs ("1")	BASE IS: Victories/Defeats ("4")	BASE IS: Alliances ("7")	BASE IS: No definitive end (likely no or low fighting) within eight years ("10")
Cold War	-15.54***	-14.72***	-15.48***	-17.00***	-15.37***
	(0.46)	(0.46)	(0.46)	(0.97)	(0.52)
Regional Election Observation	2.20***	2.13***	2.78***	2.98**	2.01***
	(0.66)	(0.74)	(0.77)	(1.41)	(0.71)
Oil Production	-0.44	-0.17	-0.14	-0.26	0.40
	(0.40)	(0.44)	(0.49)	(0.65)	(0.55)
U.S. Military Aid	-1.12***	-0.68	-0.98*	-1.01	-1.51***
	(0.39)	(0.49)	(0.51)	(0.69)	(0.51)
Former British Colony	-1.16*	-1.17**	-1.00	-1.81**	-1.40*
	(0.59)	(0.57)	(0.70)	(0.86)	(0.76)
Former French Colony	0.11	-0.87	-0.28	-0.59	-1.00
	(0.59)	(0.65)	(0.60)	(0.88)	(0.87)
Conflict Duration	0.12	0.28	1.56***	0.88***	-1.05***
	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.20)
Conflict Duration^2	-0.01	-0.01	-0.14***	-0.08***	0.044***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Conflict Duration^3	0.00	0.00	0.00***	0.00***	-0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	-4.15***	-1.72**	-4.28***	-0.29	5.68***
	(0.78)	(0.83)	(0.87)	(1.28)	(1.06)
Observations	2,632	2,632	2,632	2,632	2,632

Base = "0," on-going conflict, is the baseline used in the analysis presented in the body of the paper. The important thing to note here is that similar predictors separate electoral participation provisions from any of these outcomes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Measures of Main Variables and Controls

The following tables show the summary statistics for all of the main variables and controls discussed in the paper's text. The codebook that follows shows the sources and additional measures that were also considered.

Table A5.0: Summary Statistics*

	Mean	Stan. Dev.	Obs.
Electoral Participation Provisions(=1)[a]	0.42	0.50	122
External Engagement(Independent Variables of Interest)			
Cold War(=1)	0.12	0.33	122
Regional Election Observation(Percent, Lagged)(=0-1)	0.61	0.31	122
Regional Democracy & Governance Assistance (Percentage of Development Aid, Lagged 2-year average) (=0.01-0.19)	0.08	0.06	107
Oil Production Indicator (Lagged)(=1)	0.44	0.50	122
U.S. Military Aid Indicator (Lagged)(=1)	0.43	0.50	122
Former British Colony(=1)	0.21	0.41	122
Former French Colony(=1)	0.34	0.48	122
*Control Variables**			
Escape, Enjoinder, Emulation (Other International Aid and Ties)			
U.N. Peacekeeping Mission(Present Prior to Agreement)(=1)	0.23	0.42	122
Regional Democracy Level (Lagged)(=0.07-0.88)	0.31	0.21	122
Post-9/11(=1)	0.22	0.42	122
Aid as a Share of GDP (Lagged)(=0-0.26)	0.05	0.05	120
Trade as a Share of GDP (Lagged)(=1.62-197.93)	54.69	32.03	122
Member of GATT or WTO (Lagged)(=1)	0.65	0.48	122
Explanations of Settlements Broadly (Duration and Battle Deaths)			
Conflict Duration (Dyad)(=0-38)	6.98	7.49	122
Major Conflict Indicator (Based on Battle Deaths, Used as Alternative)(=1)	0.71	0.45	122
Explanations of Settlements Broadly (Government Capacity)			
Balance between Group and Government Capacity(=0 “parity,”1 “stronger,”2 “much stronger”)	1.04	0.67	120
Government Military Personnel (1000s, Logged, Lagged)(=0-7.14)	3.46	1.40	115
Rebel Fighters (Logged, During Conflict)(=0.20-62.50)	8.76	1.43	108
Population in 1000s (Lagged)(=0.53-870.11)	40.19	132.52	122
Real GDP per 1000 Inhabitants (Lagged)(=0.16-27.02)	2.34	4.21	122
Explanations of Settlements Broadly (Agreement Difficulty)			
Past Agreement(s)(=0-4)	0.48	0.79	122
Factions Fighting(=1-10)	2.90	2.43	121
Emulation and Explanations of Settlements Broadly (Regime Type, Governance Quality)			
Regime Type(Lagged)(=0-4)	2.79	1.21	122
Democracy Level(Lagged)(=9-10)	0.34	4.81	122
Ever Democracy (since 1945)(=1)	0.56	0.50	122
Change in Democracy over Past 5 Years(=-1-1)	0.00	0.34	122
Corruption (Lagged)(=0-5)	2.27	1.11	78
Bureaucratic Quality (Lagged)(=0-4)	1.04	1.26	78
Law and Order (Lagged)(=0-6)	2.18	1.16	78
Emulation and Explanations of Settlements Broadly (Stakes or Rebel Aims)			
Territorial Conflict(=1)	0.30	0.46	122
Identity Conflict(=1)	0.79	0.41	121
Marxist Conflict(=1)	0.16	0.36	122
Militant Groups with Total Goals(=1)	0.74	0.44	121

*: Summary statistics are shown for the settlement data; those for the conflict data are in the table subsequent to this one.
a: In both datasets, the distinction is between those with and those without provisions in settlement to hold elections and allow both sides to participate as political parties, not actual participatory elections (although implementation is assessed in this Appendix).
NOTE: Alternatives measures are discussed in the controls section; more detail on all measures and their sources is in the Codebook.

Table A5.1: Summary Statistics (Continued)**

	Mean	Stan. Dev.	Obs.
External Engagement (Independent Variables of Interest)			
Cold War(=1)	0.39	0.49	3266
Regional Election Observation(Percent, Lagged)(=0-1)	0.41	0.35	3266
Regional Democracy & Governance Assistance (Percentage of Development Aid, Lagged 2-year average) (=0.01-0.19)	7.35	5.94	1498
Oil Production Indicator (Lagged)(=1)	0.62	0.48	3255
U.S. Military Aid Indicator (Lagged)(=1)	0.63	0.48	3243
Former British Colony(=1)	0.43	0.50	3266
Former French Colony(=1)	0.13	0.34	3266
Control Variables			
Escape, Enjoinder, Emulation (International Aid and Ties)			
U.N. Peacekeeping Mission(Present Prior to Agreement)(=1)	0.06	0.24	3266
Regional Democracy Level (Lagged)(=0.07-0.88)	0.31	0.20	3197
Post-9/11(=1)	0.20	0.40	3266
Aid as a Share of GDP (Lagged)(=0-0.26)	0.03	0.04	2694
Trade as a Share of GDP (Lagged)(=1.62-197.93)	51.00	37.81	2844
Member of GATT or WTO (Lagged)(=1)	0.61	0.49	3266
Explanations of Settlements Broadly (Duration and Battle Deaths)			
Conflict Duration (Dyad)(=0-38)	N/A	N/A	N/A
Major Conflict Indicator (Based on Battle Deaths, Used as Alternative)(=1)	0.72	0.45	3210
Explanations of Settlements Broadly (Government Capacity)			
Balance between Group and Government Capacity(=0 “parity,”1 “stronger,”2 “much stronger”)	1.42	0.61	3183
Government Military Personnel (1000s, Logged, Lagged)(=0-7.14)	4.69	1.48	3113
Rebel Fighters (Logged, During Conflict)(=0.20-62.50)	8.31	1.46	2622
Population in 1000s (Lagged)(=0.53-870.11)	116.67	266.54	2868
Real GDP per 1000 Inhabitants (Lagged)(=0.16-27.02)	3.95	5.72	2844
Explanations of Settlements Broadly (Agreement Difficulty)			
Past Agreement(s)(=0-4)	0.10	0.38	3266
Factions Fighting(=1-10)	2.18	1.77	3266
Emulation and Explanations of Settlements Broadly (Regime Type, Governance Quality)			
Regime Type(Lagged)(=0-4)	2.62	1.47	3258
Democracy Level(Lagged)(=9-10)	-0.33	6.68	3090
Ever Democracy (since 1945)(=1)	0.74	0.44	3197
Change in Democracy over Past 5 Years(=-1-1)	0.02	0.33	3197
Corruption (Lagged)(=0-5)	2.46	1.07	1859
Bureaucratic Quality (Lagged)(=0-4)	1.64	1.24	1863
Law and Order (Lagged)(=0-6)	2.83	1.33	1863
Emulation and Explanations of Settlements Broadly (Stakes or Rebel Aims)			
Territorial Conflict(=1)	0.47	0.50	3064
Identity Conflict(=1)	0.71	0.45	2910
Marxist Conflict(=1)	0.30	0.46	3118
Militant Groups with Total Goals(=1)	0.54	0.50	3241

**: Summary statistics are shown for the conflict dataset; those for the settlement dataset are in the table prior to this one.
NOTE: Alternatives measures are discussed in the controls section; more detail on all measures and their sources is in the Codebook.

Codebook Describing the Variables in the Conflict and/or Peace Agreement Datasets

Items in "[]'s" indicate alternative variables used in robustness checks (not included in these data).
Additional information on sources, etc. available from the author upon request.

Identification variables:
region: Region [only as a robustness check in the Conflict data]
ccode: Correlates of War state code [only as a robustness check in the Conflict data]
conflictid: UCDP conflict ID [only in the Peace Agreement data]
iden: Conflict period ID for each dyad (dyad id + year conflict started + year conflict ended) [only in the Conflict data]
nsideb: Opposition actor(s) in the conflict carried forward from Kreutz 2010 [only in the Conflict data]
state: State
paname: Peace agreement name from UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset [only in the Peace Agreement data]
payear: Year
pamg: Rebel group signing the peace agreement [only in the Peace Agreement data]
yrdum: Decade indicator (1975-1984, 1985-1994, 1995-2005) [only in the Peace Agreement data]
coldwar: Following Fortna 2008, I code all agreements before January 1, 1989 as Cold War
p911: Indicator of post-9/11

[Other regional indicators:
regionc: Continental regions (7)
regionu: UCDP regions (6)
regioncow: COW regions (9)
regionorg: Organizational coverage regions (OAS, AU, etc.) (7)
regionsub: Sub-regions based on Hensel and Diehl's 1994 shatterbelt data (9)]

Electoral variables:
outcome_a_first: Indicator of conflict termination using first negotiated peace agreement when multiple agreements occur without a resumption of conflict [only in the Conflict data]
Note: outcome_a_first==8 is the same as "propart" in the peace agreement dataset with a few exceptions noted in supplementary document. It indicates a peace agreement with electoral participation provisions. A value of "1" is a peace agreement without electoral participation provisions. A value of "10" means no definitive end with 8 years of active fighting. All other end values are the same as those used by UCDP/PRIO conflict termination dataset ("4" is victory/defeat; "7" is alliance)
altcensor1: Indicator of whether multiple peace agreements occur without a resumption of conflict. Equal to 1 if observation not included in outcome_a_first. Equal to 2 if observation included in outcome_a_first [only in the Conflict data]
propart: Indicator of electoral participation provisions (with renegotiations without a return to conflict dropped) [only in the Peace Agreement data]
propartNC: Indicator of electoral participation provisions [only in the Peace Agreement data]
[**propartMT:** Cases with missing text in the peace agreement coded as missing]
[**maxpropart:** Indicator coded by peace agreement rather than dyad]
proapart: Indicator of electoral participation provisions and participation [only in the Peace Agreement data]
censored: Indicator that the dyadic peace agreement ended without failure, either due to the end of the data collection or a renegotiation of the peace agreement (without a return to conflict) [only in the Peace Agreement data]
allelec: Indicator of any regular elections, or provisions for elections, coded from Hyde and Marinov 2012 [only in the Peace Agreement data]
elections1: Codes any elections in the deal, differentiating between none, propart (=1), and all others (=2) [only in the Peace Agreement data]
[**otherelec:** Indicator of another electoral provision]
[**transition:** Indicator of electoral participation provisions only after a transitional government]

Peace variables:
mbreak: Years of peace following the peace agreement from UCDP (assuming it fails in first month) [only in the

Peace Agreement data]
failure: Peace fails within five years (including allies) [only in the Peace Agreement data]
f10: Peace fails within ten years (including allies) [only in the Peace Agreement data]
anyh5: Peace holds for all UCDP rebel group for five years [only in the Peace Agreement data]

Conflict variables:
duration: Length of dyadic conflict in years (minimum of 1) [only in the Conflict data]
mgduration: Years the militant group fought coded from UCDP [only in the Peace Agreement data]
cduration: Years that the conflict lasted coded from UCDP [only in the Peace Agreement data]
[**kbtech:** Type of conflict (insurgency, conventional, or symmetric non-conventional) hand matched from Kalyvas and Balcells 2010 (missing many groups because they do not produce 1000 battle deaths)]
[**rebpolwing1:** Indicator of a rebel wing during prior period of the conflict from Cunningham et al. 2009, which I carry forward up to 8 years unless a new conflict in the dyad breaks out (1 is alleged, acknowledged, or established) (missing groups because they are not coded in Cunningham et al. 2009)]
[**rebpolwinglegal1:** Indicator of a legal rebel wing during prior period of the conflict from Cunningham et al. 2009, which I carry forward up to 8 years unless a new conflict in the dyad breaks out (1 is legal) (missing groups because they are not coded in Cunningham et al. 2009)]
[**rebstrength1:** Estimate of rebel strength during prior period of the conflict from Cunningham et al. 2009, which I carry forward up to 8 years unless a new conflict in the dyad breaks out (- is weaker, + is stronger) (missing groups because they are not coded in Cunningham et al. 2009)]
[**rebest1:** rebel best estimate during prior period of the conflict from Cunningham et al. 2009, which I carry forward up to 8 years unless a new conflict in the dyad breaks out (missing groups because they are not coded in Cunningham et al. 2009)]
lrebest: Logged "rebest" (missing groups because they are not coded in Cunningham et al. 2009)
balance1: Based on Cunningham et al. 2009 "rebstrength," but in this case, 0 means parity, 1 means either side somewhat stronger, and 2 means either side much stronger; 2005 cases coded by hand (missing groups because they are not coded in Cunningham et al. 2009, but did add 2005 cases based on author's own notes, which are in the variable creation notes on the PA data)
cumint: Major war reaching 1000+ battle deaths up to that point (including current year) coded from UCDP, which I carry forward up by conflict (missing groups because a few additional cases are in the Conflict Dataset based on Kreutz 2010's coding, which are not in UCDP, or are missing in the Lacina at al. 2005 data)
[**totalbd:** Battle deaths (maximum) up to that point (including current year) from Lacina et al. 2005 v3.0, which I carry forward up by conflict (missing groups because a few additional cases are in the Conflict Dataset based on Kreutz 2010's coding, which are not in UCDP, or are missing in the Lacina at al. 2005 v3.0 data)]
ltot: Logged "totalbd" (missing groups because a few additional cases are in the CR set based on Kreutz 2010's coding, which are not in UCDP, and due to a few cases of long gaps) [only as a robustness check in the Conflict data]
lmilper: Logged "ulmilper"
[**ulmilper:** Troops coded from Singer et al. 1972 replacing "-9" with missing, lagged]
[**lmilexpc:** "lmilex" per capita]
[**lmilperpc:** "lmilper" per capita]
[**lmilex:** Military expenditure (% of central government expenditure) coded from Singer et al. 1972 replacing "-9" with missing, lagged]
[**lcinc:** COW capability scores, including military expenditure, disputes, power status and distance between states from Singer et al. 1972, lagged]
[**mtnest:** Estimated % mountainous terrain from Fearon and Laitin 2003 (missing "micro-states")]
lmtnest: Logged "mtnest" (missing "micro-states") [only as a robustness check in the Conflict data]
[**conflict_border:** Indicator of a boarder country with at least one active conflict from UCDP. Indicator of a border country with at least one active conflict from UCDP. Borders are defined by Correlates of War Project, using the "Direct Contiguity Data, 1816-2006. Version 3.1," available online at http://correlatesofwar.org]

Aims variables:
terr: Center-seeking or territorial conflict coded from UCDP (interestingly Sudan is coded differently in the UCDP conflict sets and in the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset, so mine diverge on this coding, as well).
totalg: Indicator of non-total goals based on Walter 2004 from Kreutz 2010, which I carry forward by conflict (because there is no variation across groups within conflicts in these data (missing groups not coded by Kreutz 2010

since he is focused on terminated conflicts for this set, but did add peace agreement cases PA based on author's own notes, which are noted by the "flag" variable in the PA data)
contraband: Evidence of significant contraband financing of rebels hand coded from Fortna 2008 and supplemented by Fearon and Laitin 2003 and author's own notes (see variable creation notes on the PA data, but still missing groups in the CR data) [only as a robustness check in the Conflict data]
identity1/ethnic_eck: Indicator of ethnic mobilization from Eck 2009, which I carry forward by conflict (missing groups because they are not coded in Eck 2009)
kbmarx/marxist: Hand matched from Kalyvas and Balcells 2010 [only as a robustness check in the Conflict data]
[**ethfrac:** Ethnic fractionalization based on Soviet Atlas plus estimates for missing in 1964 from Fearon and Laitin 2003 (missing "micro-states")]
[**ef:** Ethnic fractionalization based on Fearon 2002 from Fearon and Laitin 2003 (missing "micro-states")]
[**plural:** Share of largest ethnic group based on Fearon 2002 from Fearon and Laitin 2003 (missing "micro-states")]
[**second:** Share of second largest ethnic group based on Fearon 2002 from Fearon and Laitin 2003 (missing "micro-states")]
[**numlang:** Number languages in Ethnologue greater than at a minimum 1% of the population, 1million from Fearon and Laitin 2003 (missing "micro-states")]
[**relfrac:** Religious fractionalization from Fearon and Laitin 2003 (missing "micro-states")]
[**plurrel:** Size of largest confession from Fearon and Laitin 2003 (missing "micro-states")]
[**minrelpc:** Size of second largest confession from Fearon and Laitin 2003 (missing "micro-states")]
[**muslim:** Percent Muslim from Fearon and Laitin 2003 (missing "micro-states")]
[**off:** Binary indicator of conflicts in which the majority ethnic group has more than 49 percent and the minority has more that 7 percent based on "plural" and "second" (missing "micro-states")]
[**roff:** Binary indicator of conflicts in which the majority religious group has more than 49 percent and the minority has more that 7 percent based on "plurrel" and "minrelpc" (missing "micro-states")]

Agreement variables:
pastagree: Number of prior peace agreements (failed)
allfac: Number of all active rebel groups (those that have not definitively ended and are within 8 years of fighting registered in UCDP)
[**pafacnum**: Number of active militant groups that sign the peace agreement from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset as "no_dyad"]
nosignfac: Number of active militant groups that do not sign [only in the Peace Agreement data]
morenegs: Indicator that more negotiations were to occur [only in the Peace Agreement data]
[misstxt: Indicator of missing full text]
sharegov: "shargov" from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset [only in the Peace Agreement data]
interim: "interrim" from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset [only in the Peace Agreement data]
ssr: "intarmy" from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset [only in the Peace Agreement data]
patype: "pa_type" from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset [only in the Peace Agreement data]
cease ssr ddr withd pp intgov intciv elections interim natalks sharegov aut fed ind ref shaloc regdev cul demarcation locgov amn pris recon reaffirm co_impl outlin justice_prov mil_prov pol_prov terr_prov pko ended dyvi05 pafacnum: Additional provisions from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (including renamed ones above) [only in the Peace Agreement data]
[**part_kreutz:** Indicator of conflicts that ended in partition from Kreutz 2010, which I carry forward by conflict (because there is no variation across groups within conflicts in these data) (missing groups not coded by Kreutz 2010 since he is focused on terminated conflicts for this set)]
[**partv2:** Indicator that a conflict prior to that date had resulted in a partition based on Sambanis 2000; updated using Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis 2009]

Regional legislative election observation variables (based on Hyde and Marinov 2012):
nexlem: Regional percentage of elections observed excluding the state in question (lagged)
lelec: Number of elections in the region in the past year (lagged) [only as a robustness check in the Conflict data]
[**plelecmon:** Regional percentage of elections observed including the state in question (lagged)]
[**nexem:** Regional percentage of elections observed excluding the state in question]
[**pelecmon:** Regional percentage of elections observed including the state in question]
[**elec:** Number of elections in the region in the past year]

[**nexllem:** Regional percentage of elections observed excluding the state in question (lagged 2 years)]
[**pllelecmon:** Regional percentage of elections observed including the state in question (lagged 2 years)]
[**llelec:** Number of elections in the region in the past year (lagged 2 years)]
[**all3ex:** All three variables (nexem, nexlem and nexllem)]
[**lag2ex:** Both lagged variables (nexlem and nexllem)]
[In addition "r" denotes an alternative coding from NELDA that includes ALL elections, adding presidential and constitutional.]

Regional democracy and governance assistance variables:
regdg: Regional percentage of bilateral assistance devoted to democracy and governance in the region (calculated using the same regions as for international election observation, millions 2000 $, lagged 2-year mean because source database reported actual appropriations but disbursements may have occurred in the year following the appropriation, so 1991 covers Oct. 1, 1989 to Sept. 30, 1990) from Finkel et al. 2008 (missing all years before 1991 and after 2005, given the lag)*
*Note: regional estimate is missing Angola in 1989 (because set begins in 1990), but I replace it with the value from 1990 since they overlap in the PA data given how small the sample is.

Strategic and special relationship variables:
milaidd: Binary indicator of any U.S. military aid ("usmilaid" so also lagged)
oild: Binary indicator of a positive value of oil production ("oil_value_2000"), lagged*
*Note: value is missing for Senegal, but presumably positive based on author's research, so replaced as such in the PA data given how small the sample is
[**oil_value_2000:** Value of oil production (volume multiplied by the world price for oil or gas) based on 1932 to 1969, the US Geological Survey *Minerals Yearbook,* 1970-2000, World Bank's 'Wealth of Nations' database, and 2001-2009, the US Energy Information Administration website for international energy statistics from Ross 2011 (2000 dollars), lagged (missing states because missing in Ross 2011, or not clear which state in that set for early Yemen years)]
colbrit: British colony from Fearon and Laitin 2003 with hand code of micro states.
colfra: French colony from Fearon and Laitin 2003 with hand code of micro states.
[**usmilaid:** U.S. military aid coded from the Greenbook in constant dollars, lagged (with missing coded as no aid since USAID, which keeps the Greenbook, notes that "no data available" means that none was provided through that program in that year, except for the U.S. and North and South Yemen, which were not clear in the data)]
[**lusmilaid:** Logged "usmilaid"]
[**oilres:** Oil reserves from Lujala et al. 2007*
*Note: all of the missing values were coded as no reserves, except post-2005, when all had reserves based on the author's research.]
[**col45:** colonies as of 1945 coded from Stein no date.]
[**USally:** Indicator of an alliance with the U.S. from Leeds et al. 2005 (missing years 2005 and on)]
[**USallyod:** Indicator of an offense-defense alliance with the U.S. from Leeds et al. 2005 (missing years 2005 and on)]
[**lmp5ally:** Indicator of an alliance with any of the permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council from Leeds et al. 2005 (missing years 2005 and on)]
[**lmp5allyod:** Indicator of an offense-defense alliance with any of the permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council from Leeds et al. 2005 (missing years 2005 and on)]
[**mpally:** Indicator of an alliance with any of the major powers during this time period (the U.S., the U.K., France, Germany after 1990, Russia, China, and Japan) from Leeds et al. 2005 (missing years 2005 and on)]
[**mpallyod:** Indicator of an offense-defense alliance with any of the major powers during this time period (the U.S., the U.K., France, Germany after 1990, Russia, China, and Japan) from Leeds et al. 2005 (missing years 2005 and on)]

Peacekeeping variables:
unpkIN: Indicator of UN peacekeeping mission on the ground when the agreement is signed based on Nygard et al 2011, and adding from World Bank data (extending Sierra Leone and Cambodia). The cases match the U.N.'s list of Peacekeeping Operations (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/operationslist.pdf), which do not include "political missions" as in Guatemala pre-1997. I drop all primarily interstate peacekeeping and apply the Kosovo mission to Serbia and the East Timor mission to Indonesia until independence. These are all coded by country, but

this changes the coding in almost no cases.
pastun: Indicator of any past UN peacekeeping mission from the same sources as "pk" [only as a robustness check in the Conflict data]
ds_enforce: Alternative indicator of Chapter VII missions coded by Doyle and Sambanis 2000 [only as a robustness check in the Conflict data]
troopsum1000: Number of personnel in UN peacekeping missions—troops—from the World Bank data (1000s) (missing for all cases not coded as U.N. missions by the World Bank data) [only in the Peace Agreement data]
[**unpk:** Indicator of UN peacekeeping mission on the ground or mandated when the agreement is signed from the same sources as "unpkIN"]
[**postpa:** Indicator of indicator of whether the UN peacekeeping mission was on the ground only after the peace agreement was signed]
[**pk:** Indicator of any peacekeeping mission is coded based on Mullenbach 2005, but examined qualitatively by the author where data is missing]
[**unc7:** Indicator of Chapter VII missions coded based on Fortna 2008, also applying the Kosovo mission to Serbia and the East Timor mission to Indonesia until independence.]
[**ms_guar:** Indicator of an enforcement guarantee following the Mattes and Savun 2009 coding of enforcement, which incorporates Fortna 2008 + their own additional cases outside of the U.N.]

Democracy variables:
polity2: Democracy variable (-10 through 10) from Marshall et al. 2006 (Polity 2), lagged (missing values when Polity 2 is coded as missing or prior to state's existence)
[**lpolity2:** Democracy variable (-10 through 10) from Marshall et al. 2006 (Polity 2), lagged to before the conflict (missing values when Polity 2 is coded as missing or prior to state's existence)]
polity2demo45: Indicator of past "democracy_polity" at any time from 1945 to date.
regdemo_p: Regional percentage of democracies out of all states, "democracy_polity," using the same regions as for regional election observation
[**mean_polity_demo:** Regional average "polity2" score for all countries in the region using the same regions as for regional election observation]
mag5_change1: Absolute change in "polity2" compared to the five years ago [only in the Peace Agreement data]
change5: Dummy variable indicating whether the country experienced a change in regime type compared to the five years ago

$$\text{change5} = \begin{Bmatrix} 1 \text{ if changed from autocracy to democracy} \\ 0 \text{ if there was no regime change} \\ -1 \text{ if changed from democracy to autocracy} \end{Bmatrix}$$

[**mag_change1:** Absolute change in "polity2" compared to the past year]
[**change1:** Indicator of whether the country experienced a change in regime type compared to the past year]
[**polity2_border:** Average polity score of neighboring countries. Borders are defined by Correlates of War Project, using "Direct Contiguity Data, 1816-2006. Version 3.1," available online at http://correlatesofwar.org. Polity2 score comes from the Marshall et al. 2006 database]
ldemocracy: Indicator of democracy from Cheibub et al. 2009, lagged (missing values when prior to state's existence)
[lcdemocracy: Indicator of democracy variable coded from Cheibub et al. 2009, lagged to before the conflict (missing values when prior to state's existence)]
[anydemo_45: Indicator of past "ldemocracy" at any time from 1945 to date]
lregime: Regime variable (0=Parliamentary democracy, 1=Mixed (semi-presidential) democracy, 2=Presidential democracy, 3=Civilian dictatorship, 4=Military dictatorship, 5=Royal dictatorship, so most to least inclusive) from Cheibub et al. 2009, lagged (missing values when prior to state's existence)
[igo_d: This variable corresponds to the maximum average polity score among all IGOs to which the country is member of in that year. This variable comes from Pevehouse 2002 database. NOTE: average polity scores for all IGOs do not take into account the polity score in the corresponding country]
[igo_dsd: This variable corresponds to the standard deviation of the polity scores to which the country is member of in that year]

Socio-economic variables:
Penn World Table Version 7.1. Missing values correspond to data not available in original database—

pop_penn7_1: Population (lagged)
rgdpch7_1: PPP Converted GDP Per Capita (Chain Series), at 2005 constant prices (lagged)
openk: Total trade as a percentage of GDP (lagged)
[growth1_7_1: Growth of GDP (t-1 to t) (lagged)]
WDI. Missing values correspond to data not available in original dataset—
inf_mortality: Infant mortality (per 1,000 births) [only as a robustness check in the Conflict data]
l_inf_mortality2: Lagged growth Infant mortality (from t-2 to t-1) [only as a robustness check in the Conflict data]
Aid Data (missing values correspond to data not available in original dataset; when a country has no records in AidData, the following variables are equal to zero)—
share_aid: Share of ODA in total GDP in US 2005 constant prices
[oda_aidta: ODA in constant US 2009 dollars]
Other—
member: Member of either GATT or WTO (=1 Yes)
ICRG variables (the following countries do not appear in the original ICRG data set: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Central Africa, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Georgia, Laos, Lesotho, Macedonia, Mauritania, Nepal, Rwanda, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan; missing values in the remaining countries correspond to i) years outside the period of time covered by the original dataset 1984-2011 (e.g., Colombia 1973-1983); or ii) data not available for that year (e.g., Croatia 1991-1994))—
corruption: Corruption
bureaucratic: Bureaucratic quality
laworder: Law and order

Correlation with Other Provisions

The correlations between electoral participation provisions and other provisions may be able to speak to whether electoral participation provisions are simply included in easier settlements, as discussed. The measures of conflict difficulty and state strength are not statistically significant in most specifications. The direction of their correlations is often opposite from that expected if these were easier conflicts (see Table A7 and A8). And this is consistent in that electoral participation provisions sometimes provide substitutes and sometimes complements to other settlement provisions coded by the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset. They positively correlate with disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, as well as somewhat with force integration, which are often linked to the electoral calendar. However, they negatively correlate with alternative mechanisms for overcoming the commitment problem, especially territorial division, as well as the implementation of partitions (Sambanis 2000), for instance. They also negatively correlate with what may be an alternative mechanism for regulating center-seeking incompatibilities that do not code aspects of them: the variable identifying agreements that call for more negotiations that do not obtain as part of a peace process, as well as the UCDP-coded provisions to hold national talks as a mechanism for resolving the conflict. They are minimally correlated with integration into the government or into the civil service.

Table A6: Correlation of Electoral Participation Provisions and Other Provisions

Military Provisions	
Ceasefire	0.08
Security Sector Reform	0.27
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration	0.41
Withdrawal of Foreign Forces	0.19
Political Provisions	
Political Party Formation	0.42
Government Integration	0.10
Civil Service Integration	0.03
Electoral Reform	0.46
Interim Government	0.26
National Talks	-0.21
Power-Sharing	0.21
Territorial Provisions	
Autonomy	-0.06
Federalism	0.01
Independence	-0.11
Referendum	0.24
Local Power-Sharing	-0.12
Regional Development	-0.19
Cultural Freedoms	0.06
Local Government	-0.04
Justice Provisions	
Amnesty	0.09
Release of Prisoners	0.14
National Reconciliation	0.33

Overall, electoral participation provisions are correlated with certain other sets of provisions that either code aspects of them – as well as having had a political wing while fighting (Cunningham, et al. 2009) – or that are often linked to the electoral calendar, in particular. But they are not simply included across all agreements that are expected to be stronger.[5] These are all expected correlations under the external engagement theory.

[5] There are two "process" variables that are correlated with the dependent variable and that, when included, cause the regional election observation effect not to achieve statistical significance: the type of peace agreement (process, partial, full) and the number of outstanding issues. The inclusion of the electoral participation provisions is likely to affect these mediating variables, however, and they are, of course, coded post hoc in ways that may be influenced by factors such as successful implementation.

Additional Tables Showing the Results of the Controls

The following tables show the results considering the standards control variables that I discuss in the paper's text. Additional control variables are described in the codebook that comes prior to this.

Table A7: Inclusion of Electoral Participation Provisions in Peace Agreements—Controls

VARIABLES	*Int'l Alts 1*	*Int'l Alts 2*	*Int'l Alts 3*
Regional Election Observation	3.44***	3.61***	3.65**
	(3.07)	(2.89)	(2.57)
Oil Production	-1.26**	-1.28**	-1.28**
	(2.33)	(2.14)	(2.28)
U.S. Military Aid	-1.10**	-1.08**	-1.38***
	(2.17)	(2.11)	(3.36)
Former British Colony	-2.01**	-2.06***	-1.65**
	(2.12)	(2.58)	(2.30)
Former French Colony	-1.44***	-2.08***	-1.84***
	(2.88)	(3.71)	(2.94)
U.N. Peacekeeping Mission	1.30		
	(1.58)		
Regional Democracy Level		-1.13	
		(0.92)	
Post-9/11		0.67	
		(0.98)	
Aid as a Share of GDP			2.53
			(0.36)
Trade as Share of GDP			0.01
			(0.93)
Member of GATT or WTO			0.08
			(0.12)
Additional Controls			
Constant	-0.90	-0.21	-1.13
	(1.04)	(0.20)	(1.02)
N	107	107	106

See Table 2 notes. Numbers in parentheses are z-scores in these tables. * $p<0.1$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$

Table A7: Inclusion of Electoral Participation Provisions in Peace Agreements—Controls (Cont.)

VARIABLES	*Others 1 (Duration & Deaths)*	*Others 2 (Gov't Capacity)*	*Others 3 (Gov't Capacity)*	*Others 4 (Agreement Difficultly)*
Regional Election Observation	4.57***	4.67***	4.71***	3.40**
	(3.49)	(3.56)	(2.89)	(2.43)
Oil Production	-1.29***	-1.38***	-2.20***	-1.65***
	(2.64)	(3.04)	(3.27)	(2.82)
U.S. Military Aid	-1.44***	-1.48***	-1.68***	-1.79***
	(3.20)	(3.21)	(3.04)	(2.88)
Former British Colony	-2.13**	-2.16**	-2.59*	-2.33***
	(2.28)	(2.27)	(1.88)	(2.63)
Former French Colony	-1.58***	-1.74***	-1.84**	-1.50**
	(2.93)	(2.98)	(2.13)	(2.51)
Conflict Duration	-0.29	-0.44	-1.11	
	(0.46)	(0.68)	(1.01)	
Major Conflict Indicator	-0.06	-0.08	-0.09	
(Based on Battle Deaths)	(0.89)	(1.18)	(0.99)	
Population	0.00			
	(0.37)			
Balance between Group and		0.31		
Government Capacity		(1.07)		
Government Military Personnel			-0.07	
			(0.19)	
Rebel Fighters			0.05	
			(0.23)	
Real GDP per 1000 Inhabitants	0.12	0.12	0.15	
	(1.33)	(1.44)	(1.07)	
Past Agreement				1.49***
				(2.62)
Factions Fighting				-0.24
				(1.54)
Constant	-1.55	-1.76*	-0.58**	0.14
	(1.53)	(1.74)	(0.29)	(0.13)
N	107	107	77	101

See Table 2 notes. Numbers in parentheses are z-scores in these tables. * $p<0.1$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$

Table A7: Inclusion of Electoral Participation Provisions in Peace Agreements—Controls (Cont.)

VARIABLES	*Emulation or Other 1 (Regime)*	*Emulation or Other 2 (Regime)*	*Emulation or Other 3 (Regime)*	*Emulation or Other 4 (Gov. Qual.)*	*Emulation or Other 5 (Aims)*	*Time and Region*
Regional Election Observation	3.87***	3.97***	4.69***	5.25***	4.14***	4.64***
	(2.88)	(3.14)	(3.31)	(3.39)	(3.07)	(3.00)
Oil Production	-1.05**	-1.62***	-0.93*	-0.54	-1.17**	-1.02
	(1.99)	(2.66)	(1.74)	(0.71)	(2.41)	(1.79)*
U.S. Military Aid	-1.36***	-1.36***	-1.03**	-1.79**	-1.18**	-1.23**
	(3.00)	(2.69)	(1.96)	(2.25)	(2.12)	(2.18)
Former British Colony	-1.60*	-1.88**	-1.72**	-2.02**	-1.65	-2.56***
	(1.76)	(2.42)	(2.09)	(2.15)	(1.89)*	(2.92)
Former French Colony	-1.75***	-2.10***	-1.85***	-3.99***	-2.13***	-2.40***
	(3.67)	(3.20)	(4.34)	(3.67)	(4.48)	(3.96)
Territorial Conflict					-0.57	
					(0.60)	
Identity Conflict					-0.73	
					(1.74)*	
Marxist Conflict					0.21	
					(0.26)	
Rebels with Total Goals					0.08	
					(0.09)	
Regime Type	0.28					
	(0.84)					
Democracy Level	0.07					
	(0.92)					
Ever Democracy		-1.14*				
		(1.65)				
Change in Democracy in Past 5 Years			-2.54**			
			(1.99)			
Corruption				0.86*		
				(1.88)		
Bureaucratic Quality				-0.24		
				(0.61)		
Law and Order				-0.24		
				(0.91)		
						Region, Five-Year Indicators, Interaction Included
Constant	-1.65	0.04	-1.57	-2.64**	-0.29	-2.27
	(1.20)	(0.04)	(1.47)	(2.24)	(0.23)	(1.45)
N	107	107	107	73	106	101

See Table 2 notes. Numbers in parentheses are z-scores in these tables. * $p<0.1$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$

Table A8: Conflict Termination through Electoral Participation Provisions (Multinomial Logistic—Relative to Ongoing Conflict and Accounting for Other Outcomes)—Controls

Outcome of Termination through Electoral Participation Provisions (8) Only Shown Here

VARIABLES	*Int'l Alts 1*	*Int'l Alts 2*	*Int'l Alts 3*
Cold War	-14.27***	-15.42***	-15.89***
	(0.50)	(0.47)	(0.54)
Regional Election Observation	1.95***	2.16***	2.10***
	(0.69)	(0.66)	(0.77)
Oil Industry	-0.63*	-0.61*	-0.26
	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.46)
U.S. Military Aid	-0.92**	-1.03***	-1.37***
	(0.40)	(0.38)	(0.39)
Former British Colony	-1.09**	-1.31**	-0.83
	(0.54)	(0.57)	(0.52)
Former French Colony	0.39	-0.12	0.02
	(0.58)	(0.63)	(0.67)
Conflict Duration	0.19	0.09	0.11
	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Conflict Duration (Squared Term)	-0.01	0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Conflict Duration (Cubed Term)	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
U.N. Peacekeeping Mission	1.48***		
	(0.47)		
Regional Democracy Level		-0.05	
		(0.77)	
Post-9/11		0.70	
		(0.43)	
Aid as a Share of GDP			7.80**
			(3.05)
Trade as Share of GDP			0.00
			(0.01)
Member of GATT or WTO			0.22
			(0.47)
Constant	-4.69***	-3.99***	-4.69***
	(0.89)	(0.85)	(0.96)
N	2,632	2,580	2,286

See Table 3 notes. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.* $p<0.1$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$

Table A8: Conflict Termination through Electoral Participation Provisions (Multinomial Logistic—Relative to Ongoing Conflict and Accounting for Other Outcomes)—Controls (Cont.)

Outcome of Termination through Electoral Participation Provisions (8) Only Shown Here

VARIABLES	*Others 1 (Duration & Deaths)*	*Others 2 (Gov't Capacity)*	*Others 3 (Gov't Capacity)*	*Others 4 (Agreement Difficultly)*
Cold War	-15.37***	-15.18***	-15.71***	-15.41***
	(0.46)	(0.47)	(0.49)	(0.46)
Regional Election Observation	2.28***	2.43***	1.34**	1.93***
	(0.61)	(0.64)	(0.58)	(0.74)
Oil Production	0.02	-0.15	-0.18	-0.84*
	(0.42)	(0.41)	(0.47)	(0.49)
U.S. Military Aid	-1.04***	-1.10***	-0.97**	-1.08***
	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.43)	(0.37)
Former British Colony	-0.82	-0.90*	-1.02**	-1.06*
	(0.51)	(0.51)	(0.51)	(0.55)
Former French Colony	0.18	0.44	-0.05	0.10
	(0.53)	(0.51)	(0.74)	(0.58)
Conflict Duration	0.18	0.20	0.18	0.16
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.14)
Conflict Duration (Squared)	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Conflict Duration (Cubed)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Major Conflict Indicator	0.95	-0.00	0.05	
(Based on Battle Deaths)	(0.60)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
Population	-0.01			
	(0.01)			
Balance between Group and		-0.58**		
Government Capacity		(0.27)		
Government Military Personnel			-0.54***	
			(0.15)	
Militant Group Fighters			0.31**	
			(0.15)	
Real GDP per 1000 Inhabitants	-0.02	0.75	0.09	
	(0.03)	(0.53)	(0.57)	
Past Agreements				1.03***
				(0.26)
Factions Fighting				-0.02
				(0.09)
Constant	-5.05***	-4.60***	-4.68**	-4.30***
	(0.92)	(0.89)	(1.87)	(0.97)
N	2,336	2,274	1,867	2,632

See Table 3 notes. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.* $p<0.1$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$

Table A8: Conflict Termination through Electoral Participation Provisions (Multinomial Logistic—Relative to Ongoing Conflict and Accounting for Other Outcomes)—Controls (Cont.)

Outcome of Termination through Electoral Participation Provisions (8) Only Shown Here

VARIABLES	*Emulation or Other 1 (Regime)*	*Emulation or Other 2 (Regime)*	*Emulation or Other 3 (Regime)*	*Emulation or Other 4 (Gov. Qual.)*	*Emulation or Other 5 (Aims)*
Cold War	-16.11***	-15.39***	-15.35***	-14.11***	-14.51***
	(0.50)	(0.46)	(0.43)	(0.54)	(0.63)
Regional Election Observation	1.59**	2.25***	2.27***	2.15**	2.43***
	(0.67)	(0.67)	(0.66)	(0.94)	(0.69)
Oil Production	-0.26	-0.51	-0.36	-0.78	-0.26
	(0.40)	(0.42)	(0.41)	(0.70)	(0.42)
U.S. Military Aid	-1.47***	-1.12***	-1.10***	-1.24***	-1.12***
	(0.38)	(0.39)	(0.38)	(0.41)	(0.36)
Former British Colony	-0.68	-0.89	-0.98*	-1.40**	-1.53***
	(0.52)	(0.57)	(0.54)	(0.66)	(0.52)
Former French Colony	0.02	-0.08	-0.02	-2.04	0.00
	(0.54)	(0.61)	(0.58)	(1.33)	(0.51)
Conflict Duration	0.19	0.18	0.17	0.02	0.17
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.21)	(0.16)
Conflict Duration (Squared)	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Conflict Duration (Cubed)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Territorial Conflict					-1.14
					(1.53)
Identity Conflict					0.87**
					(0.42)
Marxist Conflict					0.33
					(0.49)
Militant Group with Total Goals					0.82
					(1.57)
Real GDP per 1000 Inhabitants	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02		
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)		
Regime Type	0.54**				
	(0.27)				
Democracy Level	0.14**				
	(0.06)				
Ever Democracy		-0.30			
		(0.41)			
Change in Democracy in Last 5 Years			-0.15		
			(0.39)		
Corruption				-0.01	
				(0.25)	
Bureaucratic Quality				0.25	
				(0.32)	
Law and Order				-0.44***	
				(0.14)	
Constant		-3.92***	-4.15***	-2.41*	-5.44**
		(0.84)	(0.81)	(1.30)	(2.19)
N		2,321	2,321	1,571	2,255

See Table 3 notes. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.* $p<0.1$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$