Web Appendix in support of "Testing the Effects of Independent Judiciaries on the Likelihood of Democratic Backsliding"

We use this web appendix to address several issues related to analyses in the manuscript, including robustness checks of our central hypotheses. First, we would like to give interested readers additional information regarding the judicial independence variable by providing a list of cases in Appendix Table 1. Listed in column 1 is the country name, which is followed in succession by the number of years an independent judiciary was recorded in that country, the first year that judicial independence was found, and also the last year of recorded judicial independence. Gaps in the time series are noted in the final column. Countries with entry years of 1960 almost all had independent judiciaries for some time, but we investigated each case for the analyses that differentiate between new and established judiciaries. Countries with exit years of 2000 are almost all right-censored.

Appendix Table 1: Distribution of Judicial Indepence across States, 1960-2000

Country Name	Years of Judicial Independence	First Year†	Last Year†	Interrupted Time Series?
Albania	3	1994	1996	
Argentina	8	1993	2000	
Armenia	1	1998	1998	
Australia	41	1960	2000	
Austria	41	1960	2000	
Belgium	41	1960	2000	
Benin	10	1991	2000	
Botswana	35	1966	2000	
Brazil	13	1960	1993	Yes
Bulgaria	11	1990	2000	
Canada	41	1960	2000	
Chile	24	1960	2000	Yes
Costa Rica	41	1960	2000	
Croatia	1	1999	1999	
Cuba	1	1960	1960	
Cyprus	11	1990	2000	
Czech Republic	8	1993	2000	
Czechoslovakia	4	1968	1992	Yes
Denmark	41	1960	2000	
Dominican Rep	7	1994	2000	
Ecuador	19	1979	1997	
Egypt	7	1994	2000	
Estonia	8	1991	2000	Yes
Finland	41	1960	2000	
France	32	1969	2000	
Gambia	4	1986	1993	Yes

Germany	11	1990	2000	
Germany West	30	1960	1989	
Greece	8	1991	1998	
Guyana	6	1995	2000	
Hungary	12	1989	2000	
Iceland	41	1960	2000	
India	8	1993	2000	
Ireland	41	1960	2000	
Israel	9	1992	2000	
Italy	41	1960	2000	
Japan	41	1960	2000	
Jordan	9	1992	2000	
Kenya	9	1985	1997	Yes
Korea, South	9	1992	2000	
Kuwait	8	1993	2000	
Latvia	10	1991	2000	
Lesotho	5	1993	1997	
Lithuania	10	1991	2000	
Luxembourg	41	1960	2000	
Madagascar	5	1985	1989	
Malawi	6	1995	2000	
Malaysia	33	1960	1998	Yes
Mexico	1	1984	1984	
Moldova	6	1994	2000	Yes
Mongolia	8	1993	2000	
Morocco	9	1992	2000	
Namibia	9	1992	2000	
Netherlands	41	1960	2000	
New Zealand	41	1960	2000	
Nicaragua	6	1995	2000	
Norway	41	1960	2000	
Papua New Guinea	14	1976	1989	
Paraguay	7	1992	1998	
Philippines	6	1994	1999	
Poland	12	1989	2000	
Portugal	27	1974	2000	
Romania	9	1992	2000	
Russia	3	1996	1998	
Singapore	17	1984	2000	
Slovakia	8	1993	2000	
Slovenia	9	1992	2000	
South Africa	3	1994	1996	
Spain	26	1975	2000	

Sri Lanka	3	1995	1997	
Sweden	41	1960	2000	
Switzerland	41	1960	2000	
Taiwan	17	1984	2000	
Tanzania	12	1989	2000	
Thailand	12	1988	2000	Yes
Trinidad	39	1962	2000	
Tunisia	7	1992	1998	
Turkey	8	1992	2000	Yes
Uganda	4	1997	2000	
Ukraine	3	1998	2000	
United Kingdom	41	1960	2000	
United States	41	1960	2000	
Venezuela	40	1961	2000	
Zambia	6	1995	2000	
Zimbabwe	7	1993	1999	

Notes: Countries with 1960 as first year may have had judiciary in prior year; countries with 2000 as last year may have had judicial independence in 2001 and following years.

Interrupted time series cases include any country in which judicial independence was not present for at least one year between the first year of recorded judicial independence and the last year of recorded judicial independence.

An anonymous reviewer questioned whether our reliance on executive constraints from the Polity IV measure was biasing our research design toward confirmation of the importance of judicial independence. Specifically, since the component measures of Polity IV are highly correlated, it may be possible that movements in judicial independence derived in part from the executive constraints measure are actually capturing coordinated movements among the various democracy indicators. To examine whether this was the case, we use Appendix Table 2 to describe two additional models that add the executive constraints component from Polity IV as a control variable to both of the full models described in the text of the manuscript.

Appendix Table 2 demonstrates that the executive constraints component is statistically significant ($p<0.001$) and negative in both estimates. More executive constraints make democratic backsliding less likely. More importantly for our argument, the presence of these executive constraints in the estimation does not substantially alter the relationship between judicial independence and backsliding. Established judiciaries are able to prevent small negative changes in regime score while new judiciaries are correlated with both types of democratic reversion. We believe that this confirms our speculation that the Henisz measure captures well the effects of judicial independence. At the very least, adding the Polity IV component to the model assures that any slippage between the judicial independence concept and its measure is not biasing our research design toward confirming stability. Even after controlling for executive constraints, the remaining judicial constraints still have a strong effect on democratic stability. In fact, our estimates of predicted probabilities suggest that an

independent judiciary is more than twice as important as the maximal measure of executive constraints for assuring democratic stability.

Appendix Table 2: Independent Judiciaries and Regime Reversions, 1960 to 2000

[Logit regression models with standard errors in parentheses.]

Cases Included:	All States		All States	
Dependent Variable:	All Reversions		Large Reversions	
Presence of Independent Judiciary				
Established	-1.762	***	-0.557	
	(0.677)		(1.285)	
Newly Formed	0.837	*	2.362	***
	(0.468)		(0.757)	
Executive Constraints Component of Polity IV	-0.201	***	-1.449	***
	(0.059)		(0.225)	
Economic Variables	-0.059		-0.528	*
Wealth (log of GDP)	(0.144)		(0.297)	
Economic Crisis (<-3% GDP change)	-0.095		-0.250	
	(0.233)		(0.411)	
Democratic History Variables				
Age of Democracy (logged)	0.013	*	0.040	***
	(0.007)		(0.012)	
Past Democratic Reversions Present	0.477	**	0.061	
	(0.231)		(0.061)	
International Threat Variables				
Presence of Territorial Rivalry	0.365		0.577	
	(0.244)		(0.441)	
Highlest level of militarization among neighbors	-0.046		1.299	***
	(0.263)		(0.433)	
Constant	-3.751	**	3.806	
	(1.687)		(3.250)	
Number of cases	3,824		2,320	
LR chi-square	55.79	***	193.43	***
Pseudo R-square	0.068		0.486	

Note: "All Reversions" is defined as any negative change in Polity IV scale; "Large Reversions" include only changes equal to or less than -4 on the Polity IV scale.

****p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10*