Supplemental material for 'Can Transitional Justice Improve the Quality of Representation in New Democracies?'

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April 2019

Information for `tj_data_panel.csv`

This is an original panel dataset of transitional justice events, specifically those pertaining lustration. Each observation is a country-year. We draw from an original dataset of transitional events, which includes transitional justice events for all former party-based authoritarian countries since World War II. The transitional justice events were gathered using the Keesings Record of World Events, Lexis Nexis Academic Universe, and numerous secondary sources. For each country per year after transition, coders were asked to record all positive and negative transitional events.

Information for `data.csv`

This is a cross-sectional dataset, where each observation is a party within a country.

Variable `severity`

For each country, we report the sum of all positive and all negative lustration events. In addition, we create a score of the *severity* of lustration in each country c: $severity_c = \frac{positive_lustration_events_c}{total_lustration_events_c+1}$

Variables `cosal`

We draw from Kitschelt's DALP data (2013) to operationalize our dependent variable, programaticness (note that information for Serbia is associated with country code code "YUG"). Following their approach, we measure programmaticness with two dimensions: **cohesion** and **salience**. For purposes of minimizing endogeneity, we do not include polarization as a relevant dimensions. We use the dataset provided by them (`cumulative_36partysize.csv`), which reports the survey conducted among experts regarding the characteristics and behavior of specific parties. For both dimensions, we draw from the next set of questions (or issues):

- `d1` Party policy position on social spending on a 1-10 scale
- `d2` Party policy position on the state role in economy on a 1-10 scale
- `d3` Party policy position on public spending on a 1-10 scale
- `d4` Party policy position national identity on a 1-10 scale
- `d5` Party policy position on traditional authority, institutions, customs on a 1-10 scale
- `dw` Overall Left-Right Placement on a 1-10 scale

Cohesion

We measure the **cohesion** for each issue k of party p in country c by calculating the standard deviation of the responses of that issue. The standard deviation of those issues that received less than 5 scores and of those issues that had a higher score than 3.5 are capped at 3.5. This is to avoid outliers resulted from a lack of response. Then, such score was transformed so that higher standard deviation was translated into lower values for cohesion. The resulting number is the score of each issue for each party.

Salience

We measure the **salience** for issue k of party p in country c as the proportion of experts that gave a valid answer in each of the questions.

Issue-specific cosal

We then created a `cosal` score for each issue k, by first normalising the cohesion scores so that will be between 0 and 1. We then interacted both dimensions.

Given that issues `d1`, `d2` and `d3` are somewhat related, we follow Kistchelt's et.al. advice and and take only the maximum value among these three (`greed` score).

cosal_3 and cosal_4

With this, we create two dependent variables. The first one (`cosal_3`) is the average between `greed`, `cosal_d4` and `cosal_d5`. The second measure (`cosal_4`) is the average between `greed`, `cosal_d4`, `cosal_d5`, and `cosal_dw`.

Cosalpo4

For robustness, we also included the variables `cosalpo_4`, and `d1`, `d2`, `d3`, `d4`, and `d5` as provided by Kitschelt et. al. (file: `partylevel_20130907.csv`)

Information on successor parties

In order to identify and include information of successor parties, we obtained a list of all the usable parties in the DALP dataset and manually coded them as a successor or not. We build on Anna Grzymala-Busse and our own coding of countries not included to generate an indicator variable per party of whether said party is a successor of the authoritarian regime. Note that a few countries included in our dataset had successors not listed in DALP, so we also included an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if there is a successor party in that country, and zero otherwise.

Ideological placement of successor parties

In order to approximate our parameter a of the formal model, we include the placement in the 0-10 left to right scale of each successor party per country. For the placement, we report the average responses of `dw` associated with each successor party as provided by the DALP survey experts (`mean_dw`).

Missing successor

We create two variables to handle missingness of the successor parties. In the first one (`dw_miss_1`), those countries with no successor parties code the placement of successor as equal to the mean placement of the parties in that country. The second way of handling missing values is to set missing successor's placement as equal to the mean placement of all successors (`dw_miss_2`).

Distance between party and successor

We create four different measures for the distance between each party and the succesor parties. The first one (`d_party`) is the absolute distance between the mean placement of the successor (`dw_succ`) and the average placement of each party. The second and third one use instead the mean placement of the successor without missing values (`d_party_1` and `d_party_2`). The third one inputs the mean distance between parties and their successors (`d_party_3`).

GDP per capita

We draw from the World Economic Outlook report to include a measure of GDP per capita per country. To make it as close to the dependent variable's measure (which was recorded in 2010), we keep the recorded GDP for 2008 (Gross Domestic Product at Purchasing Power Parity Per Capita, variable `gdppc2008`). For robustness checks, we also keep the first non-missing value of GDP after transition (`gdppc_trans`).

Freedom of the press

We include country-level scores of press freedom as reported by Reporters without Borders in 2013. The original scores range from most free to less free, and to ease interpretation, we transform this variable so that less free corresponds to lower values (`pressfreedom`).

Rule of Law

We include a measure of the Rule of Law index by the World Justice Project in 2015, the year closest to our measurements (`ruleoflaw`).

Opposition parties during authoritarian era

We add information on how relevant the participation of opposition parties using the variable `lparty` provided by Cheibub et. al. We transform the original variable into an indicator variable where 0 means that there is no legislature, its members are nonpartisan, or only members from regime party are allowed, and 1 stands for the presence of multiple parties in the legislature.

This data codes the relevant information during authoritarian times, but some of the countries we are interested in were created as transition took place. Thus, we follow conventional treatment on mapping authoritarian regimes to new states:

- Czech Republic and Slovakia take on the values of the Checoslovakia
- Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine all take on the values of the U.S.S.R.
- Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Slovenia take on the values of Yugoslavia
- Serbia takes on the values of Serbia and Montenegro
- Bosnia takes on the value of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Successor's vote share

For robustness checks, we also include the successor's vote share in the first elections after transition (`succ_vs`) and the margin of victory (`margin`). This data was collected by us. For countries with no successor parties or parties where there were no elections during the democratic spell, we added an indicator variable of missingness (`miss_ele`). We also provide a variable of vote share where missing values are imputted with the mean vote share (`succ_vs_1`) and margin where missing values are imputted with the mean (`margin_1`).

Final considerations

Finally, we exclude from our data all non-successor parties, since our implications cannot explain behavior of successor parties. In addition, we linearly transform variables `d_party`, `d_party_1`, `d_party_2`, `d_party_3`, `n_year` and `pressfreedom` to be between 0 and 1, for ease of interpretation.

References:

- Cheibub, José Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2010. "Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited." Public Choice 143, no. 1: 67–101. At `https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9491-2`, accessed April 2, 2019.
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