Additional Material

Free Movement of People and the Success of Far-Right Parties: Evidence from Switzerland's Border Liberalization

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Contents

B1 Further Details on the Border Opening **1**

B2 Regression Tables for Voting **5**

B2.1 Difference-in-Differences with Controls 5

B2.2 Different Treatment Thresholds 6

B2.3 Effect on Votes for Other Parties 7

B2.4 Robustness to Spatial Dependence 8

B3 Traffic Results **9**

B3.1 Traffic per operative hour excluding highways 9

B3.2 Congestion Index 9

B3.3 Congestion Index Excluding Highways 11

B4 Ticino Parliament Results **13**

B4.1 Alternative specification 13

B4.2 By Region and Far-Right Parties 14

B5 Results from the SHP and VOX Surveys **15**

B6 Referendums in Switzerland **21**

B6.1 List of popular votes 22

B6.2 Figures 25

B6.3 Regression Tables for Referendums 27

B7 Newspaper data **30**

B7.1 Data description 30

B7.2 Findings 31

B7.3 Examples from news articles 33

B7.3.1 Article 1 33

B7.3.2 Article 2 34

B7.3.3 Article 3 35
B7.3.4 Article 4 35

B1 Further Details on the Border Opening

This section summarizes the border opening process discussed in Beerli et al. (2021). The opening of the Swiss labor market for citizens from the EU began when the EU and Switzerland signed bilateral agreements on June 21, 1999. One of these agreements was the "Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons" (AFMP), which facilitated the unrestricted mobility of workers between the participating countries.[2] In late 1998, the federal government informed about the core elements of this agreement. Once signed, the treaty required endorsement of the Swiss electorate through a national referendum, held in May 2000, achieving an approval rate of 67.2%. It also needed approval from each EU member state and the European parliament. Finally, the AFMP was officially implemented in June 2002. Considering the announcement's timing and the reform's implementation, anticipatory effects are unlikely before 1999. The specifics of the reform implementation were not disclosed to the general public until 1998. The outcome of the agreement negotiations remained uncertain until a breakthrough was finally reached that year. Even in early 1998, several members of the Swiss national parliament voiced their skepticism about the negotiations' potential for success.

Table B1, reproduced from Beerli et al. (2021), illustrates how the free-movement policy was implemented step-by-step. The table shows when and how prior barriers to employing foreign workers were lifted in three reform phases (the pre-reform, transition, and free-movement phase) and for two types of immigrant workers: Cross-border workers (CBWs) and resident immigrants. The table's shading reflects the stringent regulation level for each worker category. The table shows that CBWs experienced these policy changes before resident immigrants, specifically between 1999 and 2004. These changes only impacted municipalities in the *border region* (BR) since hiring CBWs remained restricted, as it was before the reform, to firms located in the BR until 2007.

The exact geographical area of the BR was established in earlier bilateral agreements,

[2]The main goal of these bilateral agreements was to achieve harmonization in particular areas, such as agriculture, air and land traffic, research cooperation, and the reduction of non-tariff barriers to trade. The AFMP was a sine-qua-non-condition of the EU and not a request from the Swiss government. The Swiss federal government's initial goal was to circumvent complete unrestricted worker mobility, while the EU remained resolute in upholding this core principle of its single market. The negotiations only progressed when both sides could align on full free mobility with gradual liberalization steps and additional measures allowing temporary reduction of quotas in case immigration inflows grew beyond a certain threshold.

Table B1: Timeline of Free-Movement Introduction

			Cross-border workers		Immigrants
Phase	**Year**	**Event**	*Border region*	*Non-border region*	*Both regions*
Pre-reform	1995		Admission process (priority requirement), further restrictions	No access	Admission process, annual quotas, further restrictions
	1996				
	1997				
	1998	Announcement			
Transition	1999	AFMP signed	Anticipatory effects possible		
phase	2000	Referendum			
	2001				
	2002	AFMP enacted	Abolition of further restrictions		Higher quotas, further changes[1]
	2003				
Free movement	2004	Liberalization	***Free***		Abolition of admission process
phase in border region	2005	in border region			
	2006				
	2007	Full liberalization		***Free***	***Free***
	2008				

[1] Extension of durations of several residency permits. Allowance of family reunion for most permit holders.

Note: Reproduced from Beerli et al. (2021).

signed between 1928 and 1973, between Switzerland and each of its neighboring countries.[3] These agreements defined which Swiss municipalities belonged to the BR and could hire CBWs. Importantly, the border between BR and the non-BR does not coincide with cantonal, cultural, or religious borders other than those related to municipalities.

Policy changes for cross-border workers

For CBWs (holding a G permit), the liberalization of access to the Swiss labor market within the BR occurred in two phases.

During *transition phase* beginning in 1999, cantonal migration offices gained more considerable discretion in their handling of CBWs permit applications and, anecdotally, processed them with more leniency (Beerli et al., 2021). With the start of the AFMP in 2002, the first restrictions were lifted. Firstly, firms in the BR were allowed to hire CBWs residing anywhere in one of the neighboring countries. Previously, the recruitment zone was constrained to CBWs who had resided for at least six months within municipalities close to the borders of Germany, Italy, France, or Austria, as outlined in the bilateral agreements. Secondly, permits for new CBWs were generally valid for five years and no longer tied to a specific job. Before 2002, these permits were formally limited to one year and would end when the work contract terminated, thus limiting the geographical and occupational mobility of CBWs. Thirdly, CBWs were granted the right to reside in Switzerland, allowing them to travel to their home on a weekly

[3]The contract between Germany and Switzerland was signed in 1970; those between Switzerland and France, Italy, and Austria were signed in 1946, 1928, and 1973 respectively. The geographical scope of the BR remained unchanged during the AFMP.

basis.

In mid-2004, starting the *free movement phase*, the bureaucratic admission process for CBW permits was abolished entirely. Firms received unrestricted access to hire CBWs. Before the free movement phase, Swiss firms intending to hire CBWs had to provide evidence that they could not find a suitable resident worker to fill the vacancy within a reasonable period. This regulation was designed to ensure that companies prioritize hiring local workers (referred to as the "priority requirement"). It accomplished this by placing direct recruitment expenses on companies via a lengthy admission process for CBWs. [4] From June 2004, hiring CBWs or Swiss workers became equally accessible in the BR.

Changes for resident immigrants

For resident immigrants (holding B or L permits), the first liberalization steps were on June 1, 2002, with the first phase of the AFMP. Before this date, the Swiss federal government established quotas for new permits across different residency categories. These permits were then distributed to cantonal administrations based on their population sizes. Afterward, these cantonal administrations would provide residency permits to companies looking to employ foreign workers. This was possible if these companies could prove, much like CBWs, that no resident of equivalent qualification was accessible for the specific job, as per the priority requirement.

In 2002, the federal government created two separate quotas, one for immigrant workers from EU17/EFTA and a second quota for immigrants from non-EU-origin countries. These two quotas were larger than the one previously set for both country groups. On June 1, 2004, the priority requirement checks for new residency permits were abolished for immigrants from EU17/EFTA countries, although their quotas remained in place.[5] On June 1, 2007, all quotas were abolished for resident immigrants from EU17/EFTA countries.

For Eastern European (EU8) countries, which became EU members in 2004, the AFMP was implemented on June 1, 2006, with the creation of a separate quota. Before this, they be-

[4] See Beerli et al. (2021, footnote 10) for more details on the administrative process to ensure the prioritization of resident workers.

[5] EU17 countries include Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Finland, Austria, Sweden, Cyprus, and Malta. EFTA countries include Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein.

longed to non-EU states that encountered equivalent qualification restrictions. Quotas for EU8 countries were removed on May 1st, 2011, leading to the establishment of the free movement of workers.[6]

Romania and Bulgaria were granted access to the Swiss labor market following a similar phased approach, beginning on June 1, 2009, following the implementation of a separate quota and the removal of qualification restrictions.

[6]Until April 2014, the Federal Council maintained the authority to reinstate temporary quotas for immigrant workers for EU immigrant workers in case immigration reached specific thresholds. This mechanism was referred to as the *Protection Valve*. The federal government used this clause by implementing quotas for workers from EU8 countries between April 2012 and 2014, as well as for EU17/EFTA countries between April 2013 and 2014.

B2 Regression Tables for Voting

B2.1 Difference-in-Differences with Controls

Table B2: Baseline Political Effects on Support for Anti-Immigrant Parties in Federal Parliamentary Elections. Outcome: Percentage Support for Anti-Immigrant Parties. Sample: Border Region, 1991–2019 Elections. Weights are based on the population size of each municipality.

	Percent Support for Anti-Immigrant Parties			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
0–15 Minutes X Transition	−0.13	2.45	−0.11	2.18
	(0.52)	(1.29)	(0.52)	(1.27)
0–15 Minutes X Free	2.07***	6.11**	2.17***	5.09***
	(0.61)	(2.08)	(0.63)	(1.34)
Log Swiss Population	−6.45**	1.59		
	(2.31)	(3.18)		
Log Central European Population			−0.03	0.06
			(0.25)	(0.34)
Log Former Yugoslav Population			0.00	−0.00
			(0.00)	(0.00)
Log Turkish Population			0.00	0.01***
			(0.00)	(0.00)
Log Others			0.00	−0.00
			(0.00)	(0.00)
Weights	No	Yes	No	Yes
Num. obs.	7944	7944	5958	5958
Num. groups: bfs19	993	993	993	993
Num. groups: year	8	8	6	6

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

B2.2 Different Treatment Thresholds

Table B3: Baseline Political Effects with Varying Times to Border Crossings as Treatment Thresholds. Outcome: Percentage Support for Anti-Immigrant Parties in Federal Parliamentary Elections. Sample: Border Region, Travel Minutes <= 30, 1991–2019 Elections. Weights are based on the population size of each municipality.

	Percent Support for Anti-Immigrant Parties				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
0–5 Minutes X Transition	3.51**				
	(1.25)				
0–5 Minutes X Free	5.22*				
	(2.11)				
0–10 Minutes X Transition		3.39**			
		(1.29)			
0–10 Minutes X Free		7.23***			
		(1.92)			
0–20 Minutes X Transition			2.20		
			(1.45)		
0–20 Minutes X Free			5.00*		
			(2.49)		
0–25 Minutes X Transition				3.18*	
				(1.57)	
0–25 Minutes X Free				5.70	
				(3.03)	
Log (time to border crossing + 1) X Transition					−2.15**
					(0.76)
Log (time to border crossing + 1) X Free					−4.35***
					(1.21)
Weights	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	7944	7944	7944	7944	7944
Num. groups: bfs19	993	993	993	993	993
Num. groups: year	8	8	8	8	8

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

B2.3 Effect on Votes for Other Parties

Table B4: Baseline Political Effects on Support for Other Parties in Federal Parliamentary Elections. Outcome: Percentage Support for Other Parties. Sample: Border Region, Travel Minutes <= 30, 1991–2019 Elections. Weights are based on the population size of each municipality.

	CVP/EVP		GPS/GLP		SP		FDP		Other	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
0–15 Minutes X Transition	−0.07	−0.79*	−0.34	0.01	0.58	−0.03	0.26	−0.76	−0.39	−0.98
	(0.33)	(0.39)	(0.19)	(0.54)	(0.31)	(1.07)	(0.37)	(0.46)	(0.39)	(1.07)
0–15 Minutes X Free	−1.64***	−1.44**	−1.00***	−2.45	−0.34	−0.54	0.34	0.77	0.35	−2.48
	(0.45)	(0.48)	(0.25)	(1.82)	(0.31)	(0.74)	(0.46)	(0.83)	(0.66)	(1.77)
Weights	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Num. obs.	7944	7944	7944	7944	7944	7944	7944	7944	7944	7944
Num. groups: bfs19	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993	993
Num. groups: year	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table B5: Baseline Political Effects on Support for Centrist and Leftist Parties in Federal Parliamentary Elections. Outcome: Percentage Support for Centrist and Leftist Parties. Sample: Border Region, Travel Minutes <= 30, 1991–2019 Elections. Weights are based on the population size of each municipality.

	Center (EVP/CVP/GLP)		Left (GPS/SP)	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
0–15 Minutes X Transition	−0.07	−0.81*	0.24	−0.00
	(0.33)	(0.38)	(0.34)	(1.34)
0–15 Minutes X Free	−2.49***	−4.28***	−0.50	−0.16
	(0.53)	(1.11)	(0.41)	(1.28)
Weights	No	Yes	No	Yes
Num. obs.	7944	7944	7944	7944
Num. groups: bfs19	993	993	993	993
Num. groups: year	8	8	8	8

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

B2.4 Robustness to Spatial Dependence

Table B6: Effects on voting, accounting for spatial dependence. Outcome: Percent support for anti-immigrant parties in federal parliamentary elections. Sample: Border region, travel minutes <= 30, 1991–2019 elections.

	Percent Support for Anti-Immigrant Parties	
	Model 1	Model 2
ρ		0.67***
		(0.01)
λ	0.67***	
	(0.01)	
0–15 Minutes X Transition	0.20	0.66
	(0.36)	(0.60)
0–15 Minutes X Free	1.28***	1.81***
	(0.23)	(0.38)
Model	Spatial Correlation in Error Term	Spatially Lagged DV

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

B3 Traffic Results

B3.1 Traffic per operative hour excluding highways

Figure B1: Effects of Opening Borders on Traffic (Excluding Highways)



Note: This figure displays the impact of border liberalization on the annual traffic (excluding highways) in treated and control municipalities. Panel A depicts annual traffic means per operative hour of car counting stations on Swiss roads located in both types of municipalities. The lines are loess-smoother estimates of the regional time trend, and the shaded areas represent 95% CIs. Panel B displays the estimates (and 95% CIs) from an event study with year and counting station fixed effects and a linear regional trend. It shows the differential change in traffic between treated (< 15 minutes to the border) and untreated (15–30 minutes to the border) municipalities. Panel C presents estimates (and 90% and 95% CIs) from a DID regression including the linear trend interacted with the treated region indicator.

B3.2 Congestion Index

Note that the congestion index is defined as the absolute difference in traffic between the directions of a counting station in an hour divided by the mean traffic per day of the counting station.

Figure B2: Effects of Opening Borders on Congestion



Note: This figure displays the impact of border liberalization on the congestion index in treated and control municipalities. Panel A depicts yearly means of the congestion index within commute distance groups. The lines are loess-smoother estimates of the regional time trend, and the shaded areas represent 95% CIs. Panel B displays the estimates (and 95% CIs) from an event study with year and counting station fixed effects and a linear regional trend. It shows the differential change between treated ($<$ 15 minutes to the border) and untreated (15–30 minutes to the border) municipalities. Panel C presents estimates (and 90% and 95% CIs) from a DID regression including the linear trend interacted with the treated region indicator.

B3.3 Congestion Index Excluding Highways

Figure B3: Effects of Opening Borders on Congestion (Excluding Highways)



Note: This figure displays the impact of border liberalization on the congestion index in treated and control municipalities (excluding highways). Panel A depicts yearly means of the congestion index within commute distance groups. The lines are loess-smoother estimates of the regional time trend, and the shaded areas represent 95% CIs. Panel B displays the estimates (and 95% CIs) from an event study with year and counting station fixed effects and a linear regional trend. It shows the differential change between treated ($<$ 15 minutes to the border) and untreated (15–30 minutes to the border) municipalities. Panel C presents estimates (and 90% and 95% CIs) from a DID regression including the linear trend interacted with the treated region indicator.

Table B7: Effects on Traffic Congestion. Outcome: Congestion Index, defined as the absolute difference in traffic between directions of a counting station per hour, divided by the station's mean daily traffic. Sample: Border Region, Travel Minutes <= 30, 1997–2015. Baseline Year: 1999. Note: All regressions include year and traffic-station fixed effects.

	Traffic Congestion							
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
0–15 Minutes X Transition			−0.01 (0.01)	−0.00 (0.01)			−0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
0–15 Minutes X Free			−0.01 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)*			−0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
0–15 Minutes X 1997	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.01)			−0.03 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.02)		
0–15 Minutes X 1998	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.01)			−0.03 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.02)		
0–15 Minutes X 2000	−0.02 (0.01)	−0.02 (0.02)			−0.04 (0.02)	−0.04 (0.03)		
0–15 Minutes X 2001	−0.01 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.02)			−0.03 (0.02)	−0.03 (0.03)		
0–15 Minutes X 2002	−0.01 (0.01)	−0.00 (0.02)			−0.02 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.03)		
0–15 Minutes X 2003	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.02)			−0.02 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.03)		
0–15 Minutes X 2004	−0.02 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.02)			−0.02 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.03)		
0–15 Minutes X 2005	−0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)			−0.02 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.03)		
0–15 Minutes X 2006	−0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)			−0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.03)		
0–15 Minutes X 2007	0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)			−0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)		
0–15 Minutes X 2008	0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)			−0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)		
0–15 Minutes X 2009	−0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)			−0.02 (0.01)	0.00 (0.03)		
0–15 Minutes X 2010	−0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)			−0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.03)		
0–15 Minutes X 2011	−0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)			−0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.03)		
0–15 Minutes X 2012	0.00 (0.01)	0.03 (0.02)			−0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.03)		
0–15 Minutes X 2013	0.00 (0.00)	0.03 (0.02)			0.00 (0.01)	0.03 (0.04)		
0–15 Minutes X 2014	0.00 (0.00)	0.03 (0.02)			0.00 (0.01)	0.03 (0.04)		
0–15 Minutes X 2015		0.03 (0.02)				0.03 (0.04)		
0–15 Minutes X (year-1997)	0.00 (0.00)		0.00 (0.00)*		0.00 (0.00)		0.00 (0.00)*	
Linear Trend	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Highways Included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Num. obs.	2703	2703	2703	2703	1174	1174	1174	1174
Num.groups: year	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19
Num.groups: traffic station	243	243	243	243	102	102	102	102

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

B4 Ticino Parliament Results

B4.1 Alternative specification

The results reported in the paper show the bills related to immigration in each region as a share of the total number of bills in both regions. Figure B4 shows the bills related to immigration in each region as a share of the number of bills **in the same region**.

Figure B4: Effects of Opening Borders on Immigration-Related Parliamentary Bills in Each Region



Note: Panel A: Points represent yearly means by region for treated (< 15 minutes to the border) and control (15–30 minutes to the border) municipalities within Ticino. Lines are a loess-smoother estimate of the over-time trend; shaded areas denote 95% CIs. Panel B: Regression estimates of the differential change in immigration-related bills between treated and control municipalities. The 1999 election is left out as the baseline. Points are estimates with 95% CI bars. Panel C: Regression estimates of the differential change in the share of immigration-related bills in treated and control municipalities. Points are estimates with 95% CI bars.

B4.2 By Region and Far-Right Parties

One potential issue with the Ticino results is that they do not show whether the immigration-related bills are, in fact, sponsored by the far-right parties. Below, we show the first panel of Figure B4 but also by whether at least one sponsor of each bill belongs to a far-right party.

Figure B5: Relationship between Border Region and Immigration-Related Parliamentary Bills by Far-Right MPs and MPs from Other Parties



Note: Panel A: Points represent yearly means within commute distance groups in Ticino for MPs representing far-right parties. Panel B: Points represent yearly means within commute distance groups in Ticino for MPs representing non-far-right parties. Lines are a loess-smoother estimate of the over-time trend; shaded areas denote 95% CIs.

B5 Results from the SHP and VOX Surveys

Table B8: Effect on Alternative Outcomes. Model 1: Effect on Opinion Toward the Swiss Army (Lower Favors a Strong Army, Higher Favors No Army). Model 2: Effect on Trust in the Federal Government (Higher Indicates More Confidence). Model 3: Effect on Overall Satisfaction with Democracy (Higher Indicates More Satisfaction). Model 4: Effect on Staying Out of the EU (Higher Indicates Preference for Non-membership). Sample: Border Region, Travel Minutes <= 30. Data: The Swiss Household Panel Survey. Regressions Include Individual, Municipality, and Year Fixed Effects.

	Favor no Army	Trust in Government	Satisfaction with Democracy	Favor Staying out of EU
0–15 Minutes X Transition	0.03	−0.01	−0.03	0.05*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)
0–15 Minutes X Free	0.03	−0.01	−0.00	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Weights	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	44665	48533	48570	46823
Num. groups: bfs19	785	789	790	785
Num. groups: year	13	14	14	14
Num. groups: idpers	10175	10238	10280	10171

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table B9: Effects on Financial Satisfaction by Political Awareness Groups in Ticino. Sample: Border region in Ticino, Travel Minutes <= 30. Data: The Swiss Household Panel Survey. Regressions include individual, municipality, and year fixed effects.

	Low awareness		Intermediate awareness		High awareness	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
0–15 Minutes X Transition	-0.81^{*}	-0.64	0.20	0.04	-0.17	-0.04
	(0.38)	(0.42)	(0.27)	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.13)
0–15 Minutes X Free	-1.06^{***}	-0.94^{***}	0.18	0.22	-0.21	-0.15
	(0.22)	(0.26)	(0.18)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.17)
Political awareness groups	Changing	Constant	Changing	Constant	Changing	Constant
Weights	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	1390	1188	1359	1467	1708	1809
Num. groups: bfs19	59	51	66	60	65	59
Num. groups: year	19	19	19	19	19	19
Num. groups: idpers	378	236	423	240	371	252

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table B10: Effects on Unemployment Risk by Political Awareness Groups in Ticino. Sample: Border Region in Ticino, Travel Minutes <= 30. Data: The Swiss Household Panel Survey. Regressions include individual, municipality, and year fixed effects.

	Low awareness		Intermediate awareness		High awareness	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
0–15 Minutes X Transition	0.43	0.59^{*}	0.04	0.37^{*}	0.42	0.10
	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.23)	(0.15)	(0.29)	(0.21)
0–15 Minutes X Free	-0.73^{**}	-0.63^{*}	0.05	0.19	0.19	0.19
	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.23)	(0.16)	(0.40)	(0.28)
Political awareness groups	Changing	Constant	Changing	Constant	Changing	Constant
Weights	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	722	598	719	760	1002	1088
Num. groups: bfs19	50	40	59	53	59	52
Num. groups: year	19	19	19	19	19	19
Num. groups: idpers	247	164	247	158	245	181

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table B11: Effects on Housing Expenses by Political Awareness Groups in Ticino. Sample: Border Region in Ticino, Travel Minutes <= 30. Data: The Swiss Household Panel Survey. Regressions include individual, municipality, and year fixed effects.

	Low awareness		Intermediate awareness		High awareness	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
0–15 Minutes X Transition	0.44	−0.02	0.28	0.40	0.24	0.44
	(0.31)	(0.23)	(0.45)	(0.28)	(0.25)	(0.22)
0–15 Minutes X Free	0.20	0.07	0.55	0.56*	0.34	0.38
	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.35)	(0.26)	(0.31)	(0.22)
Political awareness groups	Changing	Constant	Changing	Constant	Changing	Constant
Weights	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	1336	1369	1338	1694	1677	2045
Num. groups: bfs19	57	49	65	59	63	59
Num. groups: year	19	19	19	19	19	19
Num. groups: idpers	372	232	420	238	367	251

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table B12: Effects on Favoring Better Opportunities for Swiss Citizens by Political Awareness Groups in Ticino Interacted with Cultural Characteristics. Sample: Border region in Ticino, Travel Minutes <= 30. Political awareness groups use measures that vary by survey wave. Missing values for language were imputed using the mean value for each respondent (since it is mostly constant at the respondent level). Data: The Swiss Household Panel Survey. Regressions include individual, municipality, and year fixed effects.

	Low awareness	Intermediate awareness	High awareness
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
0–15 Minutes X Transition	−0.06	1.12**	0.04
	(0.60)	(0.41)	(0.53)
0–15 Minutes X Free	0.36	1.15**	0.63
	(0.72)	(0.38)	(0.55)
Roman Catholic	−0.07	−0.21*	0.14
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.08)
Swiss Nationality	0.21	−0.02	−0.22
	(0.14)	(0.22)	(0.34)
Religious services: at least once a month	−0.09	0.12	−0.20
	(0.09)	(0.29)	(0.25)
0–15 Minutes X Transition X Roman Catholic	0.20	0.37*	0.07
	(0.21)	(0.16)	(0.18)
0–15 Minutes X Transition X Religious services: at least once a month	0.07	−0.23	0.08
	(0.12)	(0.27)	(0.22)
0–15 Minutes X Transition X Swiss Nationality	0.05	−0.54	0.20
	(0.12)	(0.30)	(0.42)
0–15 Minutes X Transition X First Language: Italian	0.08	−0.47*	−0.51
	(0.44)	(0.20)	(0.29)
Weights	Yes	Yes	Yes
Num. obs.	809	773	949
Num. groups: bfs19	66	68	70
Num. groups: year	11	11	11
Num. groups: idpers	263	282	257

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Figure B6: Trends in the VOX outcome: preference for law (peace) and order by treatment region. The outcome is measured on a scale from 1–6, with 6 meaning a strong emphasis on law and order.



B6 Referendums in Switzerland

In this section, we investigate the effect of border proximity on voting patterns in Swiss referendums. This outcome comes from the SFOS covering the period 1994–2017. We categorize immigration-related votes into anti-immigration and pro-immigration votes. We reverse-code the pro-immigration votes so that higher vote shares indicate anti-immigrant sentiment. We recognize that categorizing these votes as either pro- or anti-immigration can be challenging and that some do not neatly fit into these categories. We also removed the November 2010 referendums (Bundesbeschluss über die Aus- und Wegweisung krimineller Ausländerinnen und Ausländer im Rahmen der Bundesverfassung (Gegenentwurf zur Ausschaffungsinitiative)) and (Ausschaffungsinitiative und Gegenvorschlag: Stichfrage). The first one had elements that were both pro- and anti-immigration and the second referendum only makes sense in conjunction with the first one.

Additionally, we included a list of placebo popular votes. Of course, it is difficult to find genuinely placebo popular votes. If border liberalization attracts people to certain anti-immigrant parties, then people may also vote with these parties on other issues. Still, for each year with a popular vote on immigration, we tried to find the referendum that was least related to immigration and included it in the list of placebo votes.

B6.1 List of popular votes

Pro-Immigrant Votes

Date	Vote
1994-06-12	Bundesbeschluss über die Revision der Bürgerrechtsregelung in der Bundesverfassung (Erleichterte Einbürgerung für junge Ausländer) (Federal Decree on the Revision of the Citizenship Regulations in the Federal Constitution (Simplified Naturalization for Young Foreigners))
2004-09-26	Bundesbeschluss über den Bürgerrechtserwerb von Ausländerinnen und Ausländern der dritten Generation (Federal Decree on the Acquisition of Citizenship by Third Generation Foreign Nationals)
2004-09-26	Bundesbeschluss über die ordentliche Einbürgerung sowie über die erleichterte Einbürgerung junger Ausländerinnen und Ausländer der zweiten Generation (Federal Decree on Ordinary Naturalization and on the Simplified Naturalization of Second Generation Young Foreign Nationals)
2005-06-05	Bundesbeschluss über die Genehmigung und die Umsetzung der bilateralen Abkommen zwischen der Schweiz und der EU über die Assoziierung an Schengen und Dublin (Federal Decree on the Approval and Implementation of the Bilateral Agreements between Switzerland and the EU on the Association with Schengen and Dublin)
2005-09-25	Bundesbeschluss über die Ausdehnung des Personenfreizügigkeitsabkommens auf die neuen EU-Staaten und über die Revision der flankierenden Massnahmen (Federal Decree on the Extension of the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons to the New EU States and on the Revision of Accompanying Measures)
2009-02-08	Weiterführung des Freizügigkeitsabkommens zwischen der CH und der EU sowie über die Genehmigung des Protokolls über die Ausdehnung des Abkommens auf Bulgarien und Rumänien (Continuation of the Agreement on Free Movement between Switzerland and the EU and on the Approval of the Protocol on the Extension of the Agreement to Bulgaria and Romania)
2016-06-05	Änderung des Asylgesetzes (AsylG) (Amendment of the Asylum Law (AsylG))
2017-02-12	Bundesbeschluss über die erleichterte Einbürgerung von Personen der dritten Ausländergeneration (Federal Decree on the Simplified Naturalization of Third Generation Foreign Nationals)

Anti-Immigrant Votes

Date	Vote
1994-12-04	Bundesgesetz über Zwangsmassnahmen im Ausländerrecht (Federal Law on Coercive Measures in Foreign Nationals Law)
1996-12-01	Volksinitiative "gegen die illegale Einwanderung" (Popular Initiative 'Against Illegal Immigration)
1999-06-13	Asylgesetz (Asylum Law)
1999-06-13	Bundesbeschluss über dringliche Massnahmen im Asyl- und Ausländerbereich (Federal Decree on Urgent Measures in Context of Asylum and Foreign Nationals)
2000-09-24	Volksinitiative "für eine Regelung der Zuwanderung" (Popular Initiative 'for a Regulation of Immigration')
2002-11-24	Volksinitiative "gegen Asylrechtsmissbrauch" (Popular Initiative 'Against Abuse of Asylum Law')
2006-09-24	Änderung des Asylgesetzes (Amendment of the Asylum Law)
2006-09-24	Bundesgesetz über die Ausländerinnen und Ausländer (Federal Law on Foreign Nationals)
2008-06-01	Volksinitiative "Für demokratische Einbürgerungen" (Popular Initiative 'For Democratic Naturalizations')
2009-11-29	Volksinitiative "Gegen den Bau von Minaretten" (Popular Initiative 'Against the Construction of Minarets')
2010-11-28	Volksinitiative "Für die Ausschaffung krimineller Ausländer" (Popular Initiative 'For the Deportation of Criminal Foreigners')
2013-06-09	Asylgesetz (AsylG) Dringliche Änderungen des Asylgesetzes (Asylum Law (AsylG) Urgent Amendments of the Asylum Law)
2014-02-09	Volksinitiative "Gegen Masseneinwanderung" (Popular Initiative 'Against Mass Immigration')
2014-11-30	Volksinitiative "Stopp der Überbevölkerung–zur Sicherung der natürlichen Lebensgrundlagen" (Popular Initiative 'Stop Overpopulation–Safeguard Our Natural Environment')
2016-02-28	Volksinitiative "Zur Durchsetzung der Ausschaffung krimineller Ausländer (Durchsetzungsinitiative)" (Popular Initiative 'For the Enforcement of the Deportation of Criminal Foreigners' (Enforcement Initiative))

Placebo Votes

Date	Vote
1994-02-20	Luftfahrtgesetz (Aviation Law)
1996-03-10	Bundesbeschluss über die Aufhebung der Pflicht zum Ankauf von Brennapparaten und zur Übernahme von Branntwein (Federal Decree on the Repeal of the Obligation to Purchase Distillation Apparatuses and to Take Over Spirits)
1999-02-07	Bundesbeschluss betreffend die Verfassungsbestimmung über die Transplantationsmedizin (Federal Decree Concerning the Constitutional Provision on Transplant Medicine)
2000-09-24	Volksinitiative für einen Solarrappen (Popular Initiative for a Solar Cent)
2002-09-22	Volksinitiative Überschüssige Goldreserven in den AHV-Fonds (Popular Initiative 'Excess Gold Reserves Into the AHV Fund')
2004-11-28	Bundesgesetz über die Forschung an embryonalen Stammzellen (Federal Law on Research with Embryonic Stem Cells)
2005-11-27	Volksinitiative für Lebensmittel aus gentechnikfreier Landwirtschaft (Popular Initiative for Food from Genetically Modified Organism (GMO)-free Agriculture)
2006-09-24	Volksinitiative Nationalbankgewinne für die AHV (Popular Initiative 'National Bank Profits for the AHV')
2008-11-30	Bundesgesetz über die Betäubungsmittel und psychotropen Stoffe (Federal Law on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances)
2009-05-17	Verfassungsartikel Zukunft mit Komplementärmedizin (Gegenentwurf zur Volksinitiative Ja zur Komplementärmedizin) (Constitutional Article on the Future with Complementary Medicine (Counter-proposal to the Popular Initiative 'Yes to Complementary Medicine'))
2010-03-07	Volksinitiative Gegen Tierquälerei und für einen besseren Rechtsschutz der Tiere (Popular Initiative Against Animal Cruelty and for Better Legal Protection of Animals)
2013-09-22	Volksinitiative Ja zur Aufhebung der Wehrpflicht (Popular Initiative 'Yes to the Abolition of Conscription')
2014-11-30	Volksinitiative Rettet unser Schweizer Gold (Gold-Initiative) (Popular Initiative 'Save our Swiss Gold' (Gold Initiative))
2016-11-27	Volksinitiative Für den geordneten Ausstieg aus der Atomenergie (Popular Initiative 'For an Orderly Exit from Nuclear Energy')
2017-09-24	Bundesbeschluss über die Ernährungssicherheit (Federal Decree on Food Security)

B6.2 Figures

Figure B7: Effects of Opening Borders on Anti-Immigrant Voting in Swiss Referendums and Popular Initiatives



Note: Panel A: Points represent raw yearly means of voting for anti-immigrant referendums and popular initiatives within commuting distance groups (without population weights). Lines are a loess-smoother estimate of the over-time trend; shaded areas denote 95% CIs. Panel B: Regression estimates of differential change in anti-immigrant vote share between treated ($<$ 15 minutes to the border) and untreated (15–30 minutes to the border) municipalities. The 1999 referendums are left out as the baseline. Points are estimates with 95% CI bars. Panel C: DID regression estimates of the effect of border opening on anti-immigrant vote share in referendums and popular initiatives. Points are estimates with cluster-robust 90% (thick) and 95% (thin) CIs.

Figure B8: Effects of Opening Borders on Placebo Voting in Swiss Referendums and Popular Initiatives



Note: Panel A: Points represent raw yearly means of voting on placebo referendums and popular initiatives within commuting distance groups (without population weights). Lines are a loess-smoother estimate of the over-time trend; shaded areas denote 95% CIs. Panel B: Regression estimates of differential change in placebo vote share between treated (< 15 minutes to the border) and untreated (15–30 minutes to the border) municipalities. The 1999 referendum is left out as the baseline. Points are estimates with 95% CI bars. Panel C: DID regression estimates of the effect of border opening on the placebo vote share in referendums and popular initiatives. Points are estimates with cluster-robust 90% (thick) and 95% (thin) CIs.

B6.3 Regression Tables for Referendums

Table B13: Effects on Voting Behavior in Immigration-Related and Placebo Popular Votes. Outcome: Percentage of Support for Anti-Immigrant and Placebo Votes. Sample: Border Region, Travel Minutes <= 30, 1994–2017. Regression models include fixed effects for municipalities and either year or referendum. For the final two models, year and referendum fixed effects are equivalent. Regression weights are based on the electoral size of each municipality.

	Anti-immigrant vote				Placebo vote	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
0–15 Minutes X Transition	0.11	1.25	0.16	1.55	−0.31	−0.85
	(0.35)	(0.82)	(0.32)	(0.88)	(0.60)	(1.21)
0–15 Minutes X Free	1.32***	3.57*	1.56***	4.18*	0.43	0.76
	(0.35)	(1.79)	(0.33)	(1.90)	(0.40)	(1.00)
Weights	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Fixed effects	Referendum	Referendum	Year	Year	Referendum/Year	Referendum/Year
Num. obs.	22113	22113	19019	19019	14422	14422
Num. groups: bfs19	962	962	962	962	962	962
Num. groups: date_topic	23	23				
Num. groups: year			15	15	15	15

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table B14: Event Study of Voting Behavior in Immigration-Related Referendums and Popular Initiatives. Outcome: Percentage Support for Anti-Immigrant Votes in Each Referendum. Sample: Border Region, Travel Minutes <= 30, 1994–2017. The baseline referendum is the June 13, 1999, Bundesbeschluss über dringliche Massnahmen im Asyl- und Ausländerbereich (Federal Decision on Urgent Measures in the Asylum and Foreigners Sector). Weights are based on the electoral size of each municipality.

	Anti-Immigrant Vote at Referendum Level	
	Model 1	Model 2
19941204 ZwangsmassAusl	-1.37 $(0.43)^{**}$	-5.19 $(1.63)^{**}$
19940612 BurgerrechtRev	0.50 (0.84)	0.83 (0.86)
19961201 VolksInitIllegEinw	0.11 (0.67)	-1.70 (1.08)
20000924 VolksInitZuwander	0.33 (0.64)	0.41 (0.84)
20021124 VolksInitAsylMiss	-0.33 (0.62)	-0.34 (1.10)
20040926 BurgErw3Gen	0.22 (0.84)	0.23 (1.39)
20040926 OrdEinb2Gen	-0.01 (0.84)	-0.37 (1.55)
20050925 EUFreizugErw	2.87 $(0.86)^{***}$	4.23 $(1.84)^{*}$
20050605 EUAbkSchengenDublin	2.70 $(0.84)^{**}$	3.99 $(1.71)^{*}$
20060924 AsyGAnd	-0.53 (0.50)	0.09 (1.48)
20060924 AuslG	-0.30 (0.49)	-0.15 (1.13)
20080601 DemEinb	0.52 (0.67)	-0.62 (0.99)
20091129 GegMinarette	0.54 (0.74)	2.83 (2.58)
20090208 FreizugigkEU	2.75 $(0.84)^{**}$	4.44 $(1.97)^{*}$
20101128 VolksInitAusschaff	1.01 (0.69)	3.04 (2.09)
20130609 AsyGAnd	-0.51 (0.45)	-0.91 (1.02)
20141130 UberbevolkStop	1.62 $(0.66)^{*}$	2.90 $(1.28)^{*}$
20140209 GegMassenEinw	2.18 $(0.74)^{**}$	3.66 (2.14)
20160605 AsyGAnd	2.77 $(0.73)^{***}$	5.88 $(2.24)^{**}$
20160228 DurchsetzInit	2.53 $(0.79)^{**}$	4.94 $(2.47)^{*}$
20170212 Einb3Gen	0.91 (0.66)	3.01 (1.77)
Weights	No	Yes
Num. obs.	22113	22113
Num. groups: bfs19	962	962

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table B15: Event Study of Voting Behavior in Immigration-Related Referendums and Popular Initiatives. Outcome: Percentage Support for Anti-Immigrant and Placebo Votes Per Year. Sample: Border Region, Travel Minutes <= 30, 1994–2017. The baseline year is 1999. Weights are based on the electoral size of each municipality.

	Anti-Immigrant Votes		Placebo Votes	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
0–15 Minutes X 1994	−0.52 (0.56)	−2.17 (0.95)*	−1.30 (0.53)*	−0.26 (0.81)
0–15 Minutes X 1996	0.02 (0.68)	−1.68 (1.00)	−1.10 (0.52)*	−1.47 (1.71)
0–15 Minutes X 2000	0.24 (0.65)	0.42 (0.79)	−1.20 (0.55)*	−2.39 (3.76)
0–15 Minutes X 2002	−0.42 (0.62)	−0.32 (1.13)	−1.03 (0.75)	−0.47 (1.33)
0–15 Minutes X 2004	0.02 (0.86)	−0.06 (1.55)	−0.54 (0.61)	0.57 (1.03)
0–15 Minutes X 2005	2.80 (0.82)***	4.15 (1.77)*	−0.27 (0.72)	0.76 (0.94)
0–15 Minutes X 2006	−0.50 (0.49)	−0.02 (1.37)	−0.46 (0.67)	1.66 (1.87)
0–15 Minutes X 2008	0.43 (0.68)	−0.61 (1.03)	−0.53 (0.62)	−1.83 (2.53)
0–15 Minutes X 2009	1.55 (0.75)*	3.63 (2.14)	−1.90 (0.54)***	0.20 (0.79)
0–15 Minutes X 2010	0.92 (0.69)	3.05 (2.15)	0.68 (0.65)	−0.27 (2.91)
0–15 Minutes X 2013	−0.60 (0.44)	−0.90 (1.07)	0.06 (0.51)	−0.19 (3.07)
0–15 Minutes X 2014	1.84 (0.67)**	3.26 (1.54)*	0.55 (0.67)	1.54 (0.86)
0–15 Minutes X 2016	2.53 (0.73)***	5.41 (2.26)*	−0.74 (0.63)	0.26 (2.98)
0–15 Minutes X 2017	0.82 (0.67)	3.01 (1.84)	−0.52 (0.50)	−0.77 (0.63)
Weights	No	Yes	No	Yes
Num. obs.	19019	19019	14422	14422
Num. groups: year	15	15	15	15
Num. groups: bfs19	962	962	962	962

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

B7 Newspaper data

B7.1 Data description

We begin by using Factiva to find news articles and search for the following search terms in each language:

- German: (Dichtestress or überbevölkerung or Überbelegung or Überfüllt) and (einwander* or auslander* or migrant*)
- French: (Surpopulation or Stress de densité or Surpeuplement or Surpeupl*) and (migrant* or etrang* or immigr*)
- Italian: (Stress da densità or sovrappopolazione or Sovraffollato) and (migrant* or stranier*)

To standardize these measures, we also search for the immigration-related terms alone (without those associated with density stress). We then divided the number of articles that mention density stress-related terms and immigration by those that mention immigration-related terms alone.

For the newspapers, we use the following ones, which had the highest circulation according to Wikipedia in March 2024:

Table B16: Newspapers by Language/Region

Language/Region	**Newspapers**
German-Speaking Swiss	Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Switzerland, German Language) 20 Minuten (Switzerland, German Language) Tages Anzeiger (Switzerland, German Language)
French-Speaking Swiss	20 minutes Online (Switzerland, French Language) 24 Heures (Switzerland, French Language) Le Matin Online (Switzerland, French Language)
German	BILD (Germany, German Language) Süddeutsche Zeitung (Germany, German Language) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Germany, German Language)
French	Le Figaro (France, French Language) Le Monde (France, French Language) Les Echos (France, French Language)
Italian	Corriere della Sera (Italy, Italian Language) La Repubblica (Italy, Italian Language)

Additionally, to examine whether coverage of overcrowding and immigrants was associated with far-right parties. Once again, we use Factiva to search for news coverage. Since we also include terms for Swiss far-right parties, we do not limit the coverage to any sources. We use the following search terms in German and French:

- Density Stress
  - German: (Dichtestress or überbevölkerung or Überbelegung or Überfüllt) and (einwander* or auslander* or migrant*) and (SVP or Schweizerische Volkspartei or Liga der Tessiner or Genfer Bürgerbewegung or Schweizer Demokraten or Republikanische Bewegung or Freiheits-Partei der Schweiz or Autopartei or Auto-Partei)

  - French: (Surpopulation or Stress de densité or Surpeuplement or Surpeupl*) and (migrant* or étrang* or immigr*) and (UDC or Union démocratique du centre or Ligue des Tessinois or Mouvement citoyens genevois or Démocrates suisses or Mouvement républicain or Parti des automobilistes or Parti suisse de la liberté)

- Economic threats

  - German: (Lohndumping or (stehl* and job*) or (nehm* and job*)) and (einwander* or auslander* or migrant*) and (SVP or Schweizerische Volkspartei or Liga der Tessiner or Genfer Bürgerbewegung or Schweizer Demokraten or Republikanische Bewegung or Freiheits-Partei der Schweiz or Autopartei or Auto-Partei)
  - French: (((vole* or pren*) and emploi*) or ((vole* or pren*) and job*) or (dump and salaire*)) and (migrant* or étrang* or immigr*) and (UDC or Union démocratique du centre or Ligue des Tessinois or Mouvement citoyens genevois or Démocrates suisses or Mouvement républicain or Parti des automobilistes or Parti suisse de la liberté)

B7.2 Findings

First, we examine the extent to which major newspapers in neighboring countries covered narratives related to overcrowding. The findings are shown in Figure B9. The findings in German-speaking and French-speaking newspapers show that the share of coverage on immigration in Switzerland received much higher terms associated with density stress than that in neighboring countries. For Italian, we were not able to access Italian-speaking Swiss newspapers for these time periods. However, the coverage of these topics in Italian newspapers was much less than in German or French newspapers, as the y-axis shows.

Figure B9: Coverage of Immigration and Overcrowding



Next, we turn to the extent to which coverage of density stress and perceived economic threats was associated with far-right parties in Switzerland. Figure B10 reports the results for the German-speaking and French-speaking news sources, respectively. The figures show that traditional economic threats were more prominent in earlier years. But by the early to mid-2010s, concerns related to overpopulation and density stress overtook them. These narratives decreased later though they have been increasing again in more recent years.

Figure B10: Coverage of Far-Right Parties, Immigration, and Overcrowding or Economic Concerns.



Note: These mentions are standardized by the total number of articles on immigration and far-right parties (the denominator excludes articles on overcrowding and economic concerns).

B7.3 Examples from news articles

We use the following examples of news articles to demonstrate that some of the prominent narratives about immigration focus on people from neighboring countries and not only on distant labor migrants or refugees.

B7.3.1 Article 1

Headline: Die Zuwanderung nimmt leicht zu; 2019 sind unter dem Strich rund 32000 Personen aus Europa in die Schweiz eingewandert

Publication Date: 31 January 2020

Source Name: Neue Zr̈cher Zeitung

Original German: Die Erwerbstätigkeit bleibt der Hauptgrund für die Zuwanderung, wie das SEM schreibt. Rund 78 Prozent der zugewanderten Europäer kamen, um eine Stelle anzutreten. Der Familiennachzug machte 29 Prozent der Zuwanderung für einen Langzeitaufenthalt aus. In absoluten Zahlen waren das gut 40 000 Personen, wobei ein Fünftel von ihnen Angehörige einer Schweizerin beziehungsweise eines Schweizers waren. Insgesamt lebten Ende Dezember gut 2,1 Millionen Ausländerinnen und Ausländer in der Schweiz. Die Hälfte von ihnen stammt aus Italien, Deutschland, Portugal und Frankreich.

Die aktuellen Zahlen werden sicher in den Debatten um die Begrenzungsinitiative Beachtung finden. Das Volksbegehren, mit dem die SVP und die Auns die Beendigung der Personenfreizügigkeit mit der EU verlangen, kommt am 17. Mai vors Volk. Die Ausgangslage vor der Abstimmung unterscheidet sich deutlich von jener vor sechs Jahren, als die Schweizerinnen und Schweizer der Masseneinwanderungsinitiative knapp zustimmten â dies unter dem Eindruck einer hohen Zuwanderung, die die SVP damals mit dem Kampfbegriff “Dichtestress” wirkungsvoll dramatisierte.

English Translation: Employment remains the main reason for immigration, according to SEM. About 78 percent of the European immigrants came to take up a job position. Family reunification accounted for 29 percent of immigration for long-term stays. In absolute numbers, this was just over 40,000 individuals, with a fifth of them being family members of a Swiss person. At the end of December, there were well over 2.1 million foreigners living in Switzerland. Half of them come from Italy, Germany, Portugal, and France.

The current figures will surely be noted in the debates about the limitation initiative. The popular initiative, with which the SVP and the Auns demand the termination of the freedom of movement with the EU, will come to a vote on May 17th. The situation before the vote differs significantly from that of six years ago when the Swiss people narrowly agreed to the mass immigration initiative â this under the impression of high immigration, which the SVP at the time effectively dramatized with the battle cry “density stress”.

B7.3.2 Article 2

Headline: Es braucht den Mut der Gründerjahre

Publication Date: 12 January 2010

Source Name: Tages Anzeiger

Original German: Die Schonzeit war kurz: Während ein paar Monaten waren es nicht die deutschen Zuwanderer, die im Schussfeld standen, sondern es drehte sich alles um den Islam und die muslimische Bevölkerung. Mit dem SVP-Angriff auf den "deutschen Filz" an den Hochschulen ist die Aufmerksamkeit aber wieder auf die Deutschen und die neue Zuwanderung gerichtet. Die hitzige Debatte über die mögliche Islamisierung der Schweiz hatte etwas überdeckt, dass die gegenwärtige Immigration vor allem eine Zuwanderung von Hochschulabgängern und Facharbeitern aus dem nahen, christlich-abendländischen Norden ist.

Der Zuwanderungsdruck aus dem deutschen und französischen Umland ist das beste Zeichen dafür, dass die Schweiz gut aufgestellt ist, um eines der pulsierenden Zentren der flachen Welt des 21. Jahrhunderts zu sein. Obwohl unser Land noch vor wenigen Jahren in einer Strukturkrise steckte und gegenüber anderen Regionen Europas zurückfiel, wird heute der Zuwanderungs- und Wachstumsdiskurs erstaunlich mutlos und defensiv geführt. Dabei steckt in Perioden beschleunigten Bevölkerungswachstums, die nicht ewig anhalten, sehr viel Potenzial. Nicht von ungefähr sind die Jahre des stürmischen Städtewachstums in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts heute noch als Gründerjahre bekannt. Stagnation führt zu Verkrustung; Wachstum und Verdichtung dagegen sind die Grundlagen für Erneuerung und Innovation. Während strukturschwache Regionen mit dem sogenannten Braindrain, der Abwanderung von Talenten, zu kämpfen haben, profitieren dynamische Wachstumszentren vom überdurchschnittlichen Leistungswillen der Zugewanderten. Seit dem 19. Jahrhundert sind es Zuwanderer aus dem Toggenburg, aus Glarus oder dem Emmental, welche die städtischen Zentren mit frischem Blut und Talent versorgen. Mit der Personenfreizügigkeit hat sich das Hinterland der Schweizer Städte nun einfach bis nach Schleswig-Holstein ausgedehnt.

English Translation: The grace period was short: For a few months, it was not the German immigrants who were in the firing line, but everything revolved around Islam and the Muslim population. With the SVP's attack on the "German felt" [German elite networks] at universities, attention has been redirected to the Germans and the new immigration. The heated debate about the possible Islamization of Switzerland had slightly obscured that the current immigration is primarily composed of university graduates and skilled workers from the nearby, Christian-Occidental North.

The immigration pressure from the German and French surrounding areas is the best sign that Switzerland is well positioned to be one of the pulsating centers of the flat world of the 21st century. Although our country was stuck in a structural crisis just a few years ago and fell behind other regions of Europe, today the discourse on immigration and growth is surprisingly timid and defensive. Periods of accelerated population growth, which do not last forever, hold a lot of potential. Not by chance are the years of stormy urban growth in the second half of the 19th century still known as the founding years. Stagnation leads to ossification; growth and densification,

on the other hand, are the foundations for renewal and innovation. While structurally weak regions struggle with the so-called brain drain, the emigration of talent, dynamic growth centers benefit from the immigrantsâ above-average willingness to perform. Since the 19th century, it has been immigrants from Toggenburg, Glarus, or the Emmental who have been supplying the urban centers with fresh blood and talent. With the freedom of movement, the hinterland of Swiss cities has simply extended to Schleswig-Holstein.

B7.3.3 Article 3

Headline: Wer weniger Zuwanderung will, muss länger arbeiten; Bevölkerungswachstum in der Schweiz

Publication Date: 18 January 2023

Source Name: Neue Zürcher Zeitung

Original German: Doch die Schweiz ist nicht zur Untätigkeit verdammt. Sie hat es in der Hand, das Bevölkerungswachstum zumindest zu bremsen â Verträge mit der EU hin oder her. Ein wesentlicher Treiber der Zuwanderung ist die ungünstige Entwicklung der Demografie. Von 2020 bis 2035 gehen die geburtenstarken Babyboomer-Jahrgänge in Pension. Alleine im letzten Jahr haben Zehntausende den Arbeitsmarkt verlassen. Noch nie waren in der Schweiz so viele offene Stellen ausgeschrieben wie Ende 2022. Ohne Zuwanderer aus Deutschland, Frankreich, Italien und anderen EU-Staaten wären es noch viel mehr gewesen.

English Translation: Yet, Switzerland is not doomed to inactivity. It is within its power to at least slow down population growth â EU agreements notwithstanding. A major driver of immigration is the unfavorable demographic development. From 2020 to 2035, the high birth rate baby boomer generation will retire. Last year alone, tens of thousands left the labor market. There have never been as many job vacancies in Switzerland as at the end of 2022. Without immigrants from Germany, France, Italy, and other EU countries, there would have been even more.

B7.3.4 Article 4

Headline: “Die Schweizer haben ein Eigentor geschossen”

Publication Date: 12 February 2014

Source Name: Tages Anzeiger

Original German: Woher weiss ich nun, ob ich zu den Deutschen gehöre, die in der Schweiz willkommen sind, oder bereits zu den Deutschen, die “zu viel” sind? Eines ist jedoch unbestritten: Alle Deutschen in der Schweiz werden dringend gebraucht, kommen gut ausgebildet und tragen von Anfang an zum Wohlstand bei. Auch wenn ihr das nicht gerne hört, liebe Schweizer, so sind wir Deutsche doch denkbar gut kompatibel. Warum ihr nun diese sehr komfortable Situation leichtfertig aufs Spiel gesetzt habt, erschliesst sich mir absolut nicht. Doch wird der Schaden für euch und euer Land viel, viel grösser sein als für uns. Gerade die gut ausgebildeten Deutschen, also die, die ihr braucht, können sich frei auf dem internationalen Arbeitsmarkt bewegen und haben

viele attraktive berufliche Optionen. Wir sind keine Wirtschaftsflüchtlinge und haben in unserem Heimatland viele gute berufliche Angebote. Auch wenn wir jetzt nicht gerade abgeschoben werden, so ist das Leben und Arbeiten in der Schweiz für uns nach dieser Abstimmung nicht mehr so wie vorher. Liebe Schweizer, wenn sich euer Freudentaumel und Jubel gelegt haben wird, werdet ihr sehr ernüchtert feststellen müssen, am letzten Sonntag ein Eigentor geschossen zu haben.

English Translation: How do I know whether I belong to the Germans who are welcome in Switzerland, or already to those Germans who are "too much"? However, one thing is undisputed: All Germans in Switzerland are urgently needed, come well-educated, and contribute to prosperity from the beginning. Even if you do not like to hear it, dear Swiss, we Germans are very well compatible. Why you have carelessly gambled away this very comfortable situation is absolutely beyond my understanding. But the damage for you and your country will be much, much greater than for us. Especially the well-educated Germans, i.e., those you need, can move freely on the international labor market and have many attractive career options. We are not economic refugees and have many good job offers in our home country. Even if we are not exactly being deported right now, life and work in Switzerland for us after this vote will not be the same as before. Dear Swiss, once your euphoria and jubilation have subsided, you will have to soberly realize that you have scored an own goal last Sunday.

References

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