# Appendices

## Appendix A Supplementary descriptive information

### A.1 Far-right parties

The list in Table A.1 comprises all parties that we coded as far right. Most of them can be classified as radical right parties. The column 'Government' indicates whether the party supported or participated in the country's government at any point in time during our period of analysis (1990-2020). Countries without a far-right party in parliament are not listed in Table A.1. For these, see Table A.2.

Table A.1: List of far-right parties

| Country | Party name | Government |
|---|---|---|
| Austria | Team Stronach | 0 |
| Austria | Freedom Party of Austria | 1 |
| Austria | Alliance for the Future of Austria | 1 |
| Belgium | People's Party | 0 |
| Belgium | Libertarian, Direct, Democratic | 0 |
| Belgium | Flemish Interest | 0 |
| Bulgaria | Attack | 1 |
| Bulgaria | Will | 0 |
| Bulgaria | National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria | 1 |
| Bulgaria | IMRO - National Bulgarian Movement | 1 |
| Bulgaria | Reload Bulgaria | 0 |
| Bulgaria | Order, Law and Justice | 1 |
| Cyprus | National Popular Front | 0 |
| Czech Republic | Action of Dissatisfied Citizens | 0 |
| Czech Republic | Public Affairs | 1 |
| Czech Republic | Dawn-National Coalition | 0 |
| Czech Republic | Freedom and Direct Democracy | 0 |
| Czech Republic | Coalition for Republic | 0 |
| Germany | Alternative for Germany | 0 |
| Denmark | Progress Party | 0 |
| Denmark | The New Right | 0 |
| Denmark | Danish People's Party | 1 |
| Estonia | Estonian Conservative People's Party | 1 |
| Estonia | Estonian Citizens | 0 |
| Finland | Finns Party | 1 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| France | National Front | 0 |
| Greece | Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) | 1 |
| Greece | Political Spring | 0 |
| Greece | Golden Dawn | 0 |
| Greece | Greek Solution | 0 |
| Greece | Independent Greeks | 1 |
| Croatia | Bridge of Independent Lists | 0 |
| Croatia | Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja | 1 |
| Croatia | Croatian Party of Rights | 1 |
| Croatia | Croatian Growth | 1 |
| Hungary | Fidesz | 1 |
| Hungary | Jobbik | 0 |
| Hungary | Christian Democratic People's Party | 1 |
| Hungary | Hungarian Justice and Life Party | 0 |
| Iceland | Centre Party | 0 |
| Iceland | Independence Party | 1 |
| Italy | Brothers of Italy | 0 |
| Italy | Italian Social Movement | 1 |
| Italy | (Northern) League | 1 |
| Lithuania | Lithuanian National Union List | 0 |
| Lithuania | The Way of Courage | 0 |
| Lithuania | Order and Justice | 1 |
| Lithuania | National Resurrection Party | 1 |
| Luxembourg | Alternative Democratic Reform Party | 0 |
| Latvia | Who owns the state? | 1 |
| Latvia | For Fatherland and Freedom | 1 |
| Netherlands | Fortuyn List | 1 |
| Netherlands | Livable Netherlands | 0 |
| Netherlands | Centre Democrats | 0 |
| Netherlands | Party for Freedom | 1 |
| Netherlands | Reformed Political League | 0 |
| Netherlands | Forum for Democracy | 0 |
| Norway | Progress Party | 1 |
| New Zealand | New Zealand First Party | 1 |
| Poland | KORWiN | 0 |
| Poland | Kukiz '15 | 0 |
| Poland | Real Politics Union | 0 |
| Poland | League of Polish Families | 0 |
| Poland | Law and Justice | 1 |
| Poland | Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland | 0 |
| Poland | Christian National Union | 1 |
| Poland | Party X | 0 |
| Romania | Greater Romania Party | 1 |
| Romania | Romanian National Unity Party | 1 |
| Slovakia | We are family | 1 |
| Slovakia | Slovak National Party | 1 |
| Slovakia | Ordinary People | 1 |
| Slovakia | Kotleba - People's Party Our Slovakia | 0 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Slovenia | Slovenian Democratic Party | 0 |
| Slovenia | Slovenian National Party | 0 |
| South Korea | New Frontier Party | 1 |
| Spain | Voice | 0 |
| Sweden | New Democracy | 0 |
| Sweden | Sweden Democrats | 0 |
| Switzerland | Federal Democratic Union of Switzerland | 0 |
| Switzerland | National Action-Swiss Democrats | 0 |
| Switzerland | Ticino League | 0 |
| Switzerland | Geneva Citizens' Movement | 0 |
| Switzerland | Swiss People's Party | 1 |
| Switzerland | Automobile Party | 0 |
| Turkey | Welfare Party | 1 |
| Turkey | Nationalist Action Party (MHP) | 1 |
| United Kingdom | Democratic Unionist Party | 1 |
| United Kingdom | United Kingdom Independence Party | 0 |
| United States of America | Republican Party (Trump)* | 1 |

* The RRP indicator in our main analyses does not code the Republican Party as far right. In section C.1, we re-run our analyses with the Republican Party coded as far right under Trump.

Table A.2 shows the proportion of RRP governments among the country-year observations in our sample. For example, out of Austria's 25 observations in our sample, 32% have been under an RRP government participation. This results in eight years of RRP governments (in total) in Austria during its period of observation in our sample.

Table A.2: Proportion of RRP government observations in sample.

| | **Proportion RRP** | *N* |
|---|---|---|
| Australia | 0.00 | 31 |
| Austria | 0.32 | 25 |
| Belgium | 0.00 | 27 |
| Bulgaria | 1.00 | 1 |
| Canada | 0.00 | 31 |
| Croatia | 0.80 | 5 |
| Czech Republic | 0.90 | 10 |
| Denmark | 0.47 | 30 |
| Estonia | 0.25 | 8 |
| Finland | 0.10 | 31 |
| France | 0.00 | 24 |
| Germany | 0.00 | 23 |
| Greece | 0.26 | 19 |
| Hungary | 1.00 | 7 |
| Iceland | 0.00 | 10 |
| Ireland | 0.00 | 20 |
| Italy | 0.48 | 27 |
| Japan | 0.00 | 17 |
| Latvia | 1.00 | 6 |
| Lithuania | 0.71 | 7 |
| Luxembourg | 0.00 | 19 |
| Malta | 0.00 | 3 |
| Netherlands | 0.07 | 30 |
| New Zealand | 0.30 | 20 |
| Norway | 0.19 | 31 |
| Poland | 0.62 | 8 |
| Portugal | 0.00 | 27 |
| Romania | 0.00 | 7 |
| Slovak Republic | 0.62 | 8 |
| Slovenia | 0.00 | 8 |
| South Korea | 0.60 | 15 |
| Spain | 0.00 | 24 |
| Sweden | 0.00 | 31 |
| Switzerland | 0.97 | 29 |
| Turkey | 0.00 | 3 |
| United Kingdom | 0.10 | 30 |
| United States | 0.00 | 30 |




Figure A.1: Duration and frequency of RRP governments across OECD donors, 1990-2020. Horizontal black bars reflect the timing (and duration) of RRP governments per donor country in our sample. Countries without any horizontal black bar imply that no RRP participated in or supported the government.

In Figure A.2 we use a slightly different coding of the RRP variable. First, we classify the Trump administration (2016-2021) as RRP and Turkey's coalition government between the AKP and MHP as RRP (2016-2020). Second, we also code those RRP governments that lasted less than six months. This adds short-lived governments with RRP participation, such as Greece in 2011 (PASOK-ND-LAOS) to our sample. In section C.1 we re-run our main analysis with these different versions of our RRP indicator.




Figure A.2: Duration and frequency of RRP governments across OECD donors, 1990-2020. The RRP coding now comprises the United States Republican Party (under Trump 2016-2020) and Turkey (2016-2020, AKP MHP coalition). Moreover, it includes also government participation of RRPs below the six months threshold that we adopted for our main analysis.

## A.2 OECD aid sector codes

The OECD differentiates between different sectors of aid activity, including funds allocated to strengthening recipient economies, direct relief and disaster aid, or funding for schools and health care. The OECD has several so-called sector codes that classify for which specific activity donors earmark their commitments. We use these sector codes and cluster them into nine different aid sectors to which varying amounts of monetary commitments are allocated. The nine aid sectors that we define summarize the existing DAC sector codes into larger categories.

The aid sectors we define are the following: Social (health, education, and social security), Political System (all funds for strengthening democratic institutions and civil society, including peacekeeping operations), Economy (all multi-bi aid for strengthening recipients' economy), Public Utilities (includes infrastructure work and energy systems), Assistance (direct relief and emergency funds), Environment (aid to protect the environment, including climate change measures), and Other (all commitments made that the OECD does not further classify into its existing sector codes). We define two new aid sectors—Migration and Human Rights—by aggregating a series of specific sector codes. Migration includes donor costs for refugees along with funds expended for the facilitation of orderly migration and alien registration. Our Human Rights sector comprises activities regarding reproductive health rights and measures, women's right, children's right, and strengthening human rights civil society organizations. With this classification of aid sectors to which earmarked funding flows, we obtain as a unit of observation the country–sector–year construct.

We next inspect the distribution of commitments across aid sectors. Figure A.3 and A.4 plot the average amount of commitments made, in US dollars, per aid sector. Concerning earmarked funding of IOs, donors commit most amounts to the emergency assistance sector, followed by the sector of "Social" aid projects, including health-related projects. Among all sectors, earmarked funding commitments for migration-related measures are the lowest, amounting to around 11 millions USD on average from 1990-2020. This earmarking pattern stands in contrast to the commitments in direct bilateral aid.

There, donors commit most to the "Social" sector, followed by funding of "Public Utilities" projects, measures to strengthen the economy, and assistance. In absolute terms, donors commit on average 400 million US dollars to migration-related direct bilateral projects. Human rights projects receive the lowest amounts in direct bilateral aid.

To better compare the commitments made per funding channel, Table A.3 displays the commitments per aid sector as a share of total commitments in bilateral and earmarked funding channels, respectively.

Table A.4 shows the average amount of earmarked commitments per our nine aid sectors, distinguishing between governments with and without RRPs. We (descriptively) test whether there are any systematic differences using t-tests without further statistical adjustments. Table A.5 does the same for the average amount of direct bilateral commitments per our nine aid sectors.




Figure A.3: Average amount of earmarked commitments per aid sector.




Figure A.4: Average amount of direct bilateral commitments per aid sector.

Table A.3: Commitments per aid sector as a share of total commitments.

| | Bilateral | Earmarked |
|---|---|---|
| Aid sectors | | |
| Social | 24.98 | 19.10 |
| Political system | 13.73 | 10.93 |
| Economy | 13.62 | 9.50 |
| Public Utilities | 12.61 | 3.36 |
| Assistance | 13.45 | 42.71 |
| Migration | 2.50 | 0.48 |
| Environment | 8.47 | 8.20 |
| Human Rights | 2.35 | 3.52 |
| Other | 8.29 | 2.21 |
| Total | 100.00 | 100.00 |

Table A.4: T-tests for difference in average EF commitments for governments without RRPs (No RRP) and with RRPs. Bold cell entries under $t$ indicate significance at $p < 0.05$ level, italicized entries under $t$ indicate significance at $p < 0.10$ level.

| Issue area | EF No RRP | EF RRP | $t$ | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Social | 105.37 | 56.27 | **2.72** | 630 |
| Political System | 60.69 | 38.65 | **2.52** | 612 |
| Economy | 56.54 | 32.14 | **2.31** | 577 |
| Public Utilities | 21.91 | 17.11 | 0.84 | 501 |
| Assistance | 270.28 | 68.38 | **2.86** | 592 |
| Migration | 10.22 | 16.29 | -0.71 | 130 |
| Environment | 45.17 | 36.93 | 0.90 | 592 |
| Human Rights | 23.06 | 14.59 | *1.86* | 515 |
| Other | 15.25 | 7.47 | 1.47 | 518 |

Table A.5: T-tests for difference in average bilateral commitments across aid sectors governments without RRPs (No RRP) and with RRPs. The column labeled $t$ shows t-values. Bold values indicate significance at $p < 0.05$ level.

| Issue area | No RRP | RRP | $t$ | $N$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Social | 934.75 | 242.87 | **4.43** | 630 |
| Political system | 527.30 | 149.73 | **3.97** | 612 |
| Economy | 474.10 | 454.96 | 0.21 | 577 |
| Public Utilities | 552.41 | 281.75 | 1.64 | 501 |
| Assistance | 526.09 | 189.49 | **3.49** | 592 |
| Migration | 433.84 | 194.94 | 1.72 | 130 |
| Environment | 331.99 | 109.46 | **4.74** | 592 |
| Human Rights | 101.96 | 43.52 | **2.57** | 515 |
| Other | 344.90 | 236.02 | **1.96** | 518 |




Figure A.5: Distribution of (logged) EF commitments over time.




Figure A.6: Average EF commitments over time.

## A.3 Descriptive statistics

Table A.6: Descriptive statistics.

| Variable | Mean | SD | Min. | Max. | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EF commitments (million USD) | 67.2 | 278.8 | 0 | 6115.5 | 4667 |
| Log EF commitments | 2.001 | 2.5 | -9.7 | 8.7 | 4532 |
| Bilateral commitments (million USD) | 426.9 | 1014.21 | -994.64 | 11260.1 | 4667 |
| Log bilateral commitments | 4.37 | 2.31 | -5.9 | 9.32 | 4615 |
| RRP | 0.21 | 0.41 | 0 | 1 | 4667 |
| GDP (constant, billion USD) | 1488.7 | 3140.6 | 13.2 | 19929 | 4667 |
| GDP per capita (PPP, constant USD) | 46523.9 | 14814.1 | 21470 | 120647.8 | 4667 |
| Government duration (in months) | 34 | 15 | 7 | 62 | 4667 |
| DAC member | 0.94 | 0.24 | 0 | 1 | 4667 |
| Unemployment | 7.1 | 3.6 | 1.7 | 27.5 | 4667 |
| Parliamentary vs presidential system | 0.8 | 0.4 | 0 | 1 | 4667 |
| OECD membership duration | 41.5 | 14.5 | -8 | 59 | 4667 |
| Austerity | -0.14 | 1.7 | -9.7 | 8.4 | 4595 |
| America | 0.09 | 0.28 | 0 | 1 | 4667 |
| Asia | 0.05 | 0.2 | 0 | 1 | 4667 |
| Europe | 0.78 | 0.4 | 0 | 1 | 4667 |
| Oceania | 0.07 | 0.26 | 0 | 1 | 4667 |
| Social | 0.13 | 0.34 | 0 | 1 | 4667 |
| Political System | 0.13 | 0.34 | 0 | 1 | 4667 |
| Economy | 0.12 | 0.33 | 0 | 1 | 4667 |
| Public Utilities | 0.10 | 0.3 | 0 | 1 | 4667 |
| Assistance | 0.13 | 0.3 | 0 | 1 | 4667 |
| Migration | 0.028 | 0.16 | 0 | 1 | 4667 |
| Environment | 0.13 | 0.33 | 0 | 1 | 4667 |
| Human Rights | 0.11 | 0.31 | 0 | 1 | 4667 |
| Other | 0.11 | 0.31 | 0 | 1 | 4667 |

# Appendix B Main models: additional analyses

In this section, we present additional information and analyses concerning our main MSM. In particular, we first inspect the distribution of our dynamic IPTWs across time and the entire sample to show that they are well-behaved, meeting desired thresholds. Next, we begin our additional regression analyses by varying the set of fixed effects for our MSM by focusing on country-sector fixed effects. Our main results remain intact. Then, we provide findings from an event analysis and plot the dynamic effect of our treatment, RRP government, over time. After showing that there is no evidence for anticipatory effects of our treatment, we re-run our analyses by accounting for country-specific trends. Our effect estimates are robust to this additional test of anticipatory effects and group-specific temporal dynamics. Next, we assess whether RRPs in government are associated with higher stringency in the funding commitments they make. As written in the main text, they are not: far-right governments appear to proceed to cutting earmarked funding, rather than imposing strings on IOs' project decisions. Finally, we run an MSM without any fixed effects, focus only on sector fixed effects, and re-assess our models with region fixed effects, due to strong regional variation in RRP presence.

## B.1 Weights distribution

Figure B.7 shows the distribution of our dynamic IPTW over time. Note that their mean at each point in time should be 1 (or close to it) to dynamically balance treated and untreated observations on treatment and covariate history. As can be seen, the mean is close to 1 over time. At later years, the spread of the IPTW distribution grows. It remains, though, within reasonable ranges (below 10). Table B.7 confirms this pattern. The mean of our weights in the sample is 1, and they range between 0.25 and 3.91.

Table B.7: Descriptive statistics of dynamic IPTWs.

| **Mean** | **SD** | **Min.** | **Max.** | ***N*** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 0.21 | 0.25 | 3.91 | 4667 |




Figure B.7: Distribution of Inverse Probability of Treatment Weights over time.

## B.2 Varying fixed effects

Many donors have a long-term attachment to specific foreign aid goals. For example, Scandinavian donor states were traditionally funding human rights projects. In addition, newer DAC donors may not allocate funding to all sectors equally, but prioritize few sectors more than others. To capture the possibility that unobserved country-specific foreign aid traditions may drive our results, we use country-sector fixed effects. Model 1 in Table B.8 uses country-sector specific effects in an MSM where we regress earmarked funding commitments (logged) on RRP government participation. Model 3 in Table B.8 does the same for bilateral commitments (logged) as dependent variable. In line with our main findings, we find that RRP governments reduce earmarked funding by about 26%, compared to governments without RRPs. By contrast, with respect to bilateral aid, and using country-sector fixed effects, we do not find any difference between RRP and non-RRP governments.

Models 2 and 4 in Table B.8 drop the country-sector fixed effects and include only country fixed effects (along with year fixed effects, as in all other models). We find (almost) identical coefficients estimates on RRP, suggesting that adding country-sector fixed effects does not change much our effect estimates, but improves overall model fit (with a high adjusted $R^2$).

Table B.8: MSMs. Varying fixed effects

| | **Earmarking** | | **Direct bilateral** | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | country-sector | country | country-sector | country |
| RRP | -0.30* | -0.31* | -0.09 | -0.09 |
| | (0.08) | (0.11) | (0.05) | (0.08) |
| Constant | 0.37 | 0.12 | 4.79* | 4.56* |
| | (0.44) | (0.36) | (0.30) | (0.27) |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.70 | 0.48 | 0.88 | 0.69 |
| F | 43.22* | 25.02* | 4.42* | 1.67* |
| N | 4399 | 4399 | 4399 | 4399 |

*Note:* Linear MSMs. All models include year fixed effects. Lagged austerity included as control. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Statistical significance:* * $p < 0.05$.

## B.3 Event plots

In this section, we inspect the temporal dynamics of our main independent variable: RRP government participation. We adopt the event study framework, with the event of interest being an RRP entering or supporting a new government. Because government tenures typically last four years, we choose a temporal window that spans from the predecessor government and that covers the tenure of the RRP government. As a result, we incorporate leads of our main RRP indicator variable as well as lags. This allows us to investigate two things. First, whether our effect estimates are bedeviled by anticipatory effects and, second, for how long the event exerts its influence on the amount of foreign aid commitments, once an RRP enters government. Anticipatory effects would apply, for example, when future values of RRP government participation explain current foreign aid funding decisions. This could be the case, for example, when non far-right governments reduce foreign aid funding because they could reasonably expect that their RRP successors will certainly do so or, as has been suggested, that the far right in opposition already changes government spending on aid (**?**). By including lags of RRP government participation covering the period of government tenure, we can investigate for how long the effect of RRP entry into government on foreign aid funding persists. This helps us to understand the temporal dynamic of RRPs' effect on earmarking and bilateral aid once they form part of a donor's government.

Figure B.8 shows the temporal dynamic of the effect of RRPs on foreign aid funding. The top plot focuses on earmarked funding commitments, while the bottom plot on bilateral commitments. The x-axis displays the event time, with negative values indicating leads of our RRP indicator variable and positive values indicating lags of it. In other words, the anticipatory effects are captured by the negative time values on the x-axis, while the persistent effects by the positive ones. To rule out that the anticipatory effects drive our estimates of RRP effects on earmarked commitments, we test their joint significance. We find that they are insignificant ($F\ (3,\ 204) = 1.17,\ p < 0.321$), providing evidence that anticipatory effects do not bedevil our analysis. We also tested for whether

the effect differs between the pre-event periods, finding no evidence for differential pre-trends or anticipatory effects for different periods.

What about the persistent effects of RRP government participation on earmarked funding commitments? We tested for the joint significance of the post-event periods and found that the effect is statistically significant ($F(4, 204) = 2.67$, $p < 0.03$). This suggest that RRP government entry has effects also in subsequent years, covering the entire period of their government tenure. The combined effect of RRP government participation, from the first to the last year of government tenure, is $-1.41$ (t = -2.67, p<0.008). This would amount to an overall reduction in earmarked funding commitments of almost 76%, distributed over four years, when RRPs participate in government. The effect or RRP also becomes slightly more negative over time for the duration of a typical government tenure.

By contrast, RRP governments do not have anticipatory or persistent effects with respect to bilateral commitments. Neither the pre-event nor the post-event periods of RRP government participation were statistically distinguishable from zero.




Figure B.8: Event plot. The upper plot shows the effect of RRP government on earmarked funding (EF) commitments. The bottom plot shows the effect of RRP government on bilateral aid commitments. 90% confidence intervals.

## B.4 Examining country-specific trends

The models in Table B.9 include country-specific trends, interacting each country with a linear function of time. Model 1 includes country and year fixed effects, in addition to the country-specific trends. Model 2 varies this setup to include aid sector (and year) fixed effects. In both specifications, the coefficient on RRP is close in terms of its effect size, echoing also the estimate from our main Model (1) in Table **??** in the main text. This suggests that the effect of RRP governments on earmarked funding commitments is not sensitive to idiosyncratic country trends.

Table B.9: Linear MSMs with country-specific trends.

| | (1)<br>Country & Year FE | (2)<br>Sector & Year FE |
|---|---|---|
| RRP | -0.303* | -0.312* |
| | (0.12) | (0.14) |
| Constant | 239.154* | 2.623* |
| | (35.35) | (0.36) |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.53 | 0.64 |
| F | 5.93* | 61.35* |
| N | 4435 | 4435 |

*Note:* Linear MSMs with (log) earmarked funding commitments as DV. Lagged austerity included as control. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *Statistical significance:* * $p < 0.05$.

## B.5 Stringency

The earmarked funding data set (EFD) offers another useful indicator to examine how RRP governments may affect international institutions. In particular, the EFD provides information on the conditions that states impose when committing funds to aid activities. States can choose to define geographic, thematic, or project-related criteria, for example, when making decisions about their donations. The EFD systematically measures these criteria and summarizes them, through a weighted additive aggregation procedure, into a stringency index. This index informs about the extent of rules and criteria that donors specify, imposing thereby conditions on international institutions (and often recipients) on how to spend the money. We average the stringency index across our nine issue areas, per state, and year. The original index ranged from 1 to 7, where higher values indicate stronger strings attached by donor states on international agents. We re-scale this indicator to range between zero and six, with zero indicating no to very low strings, and six the maximum possible number of strings. Our sample average of stringency is 2.4 (SD=0.87), indicating that strings are rather moderately distributed in our sample.

In Table B.10, Model 1 shows again our main findings concerning earmarked funding commitments. In Model 2 we examine the relationship between RRP and stringency, finding no systematic association between them. While the coefficient on RRP in Model 2 is negative, it is statistically insignificant. In Model 3, we add the contemporaneous and lagged amount of (logged) earmarked funding commitments as right-hand side variables. This is because past and current earmarking decisions and experiences may make states more sensitive to their correct uses and thus motivate them to impose more strings on IOs. Again, we find no systematic association between RRPs and stringency. While the coefficient is slightly positive, it is far from reaching conventional levels of statistical significance.

It appears that RRPs in government do not invest much time and effort to specify strings for how IOs should spend earmarked funds. Instead, they directly cut earmarked funding of IOs.

Table B.10: MSMs with earmarked funding and stringency.

| | **Earmarked funding** | **Stringency index** | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| RRP | -0.30* | -0.04 | 0.01 |
| | (0.10) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Constant | 2.05* | 2.40* | 2.32* |
| | (0.03) | (0.01) | (0.03) |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.64 | 0.31 | 0.36 |
| F | 7.24* | 0.51 | 3.63* |
| N | 4435 | 4435 | 3890 |

*Note:* Linear MSMs with (log) earmarked funding commitments as dependent variable in Model 1, and the additive stringency index as dependent variable in Models 2 and 3. All models include country, year, and sector fixed effects. Lagged austerity included as control. Model 3 includes the contemporaneous value of earmarked funding commitments (at $t$) and the value of earmarked funding commitments lagged by one year (at $t-1$). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Statistical significance:* * $p < 0.05$.

## B.6 No fixed effects, region fixed effects, and sector fixed effects

In this section, we provide additional analyses to assess the robustness of our main findings. Table B.12 contains results. First, we run an MSM without any fixed effects (Model 1), containing only the baseline values of our time-varying covariates. Excluding all kinds of fixed effects in Model 1, we find that RRPs in government significantly reduce earmarked funding commitments by about 34%. Next, we use aid-sector fixed effects in Models 2 and 3 of Table B.12. Model 2 comprises sector fixed effects without country or year fixed effects, while Model 3 adds to the specification of Model 2 also the lagged time-varying covariates (TVCs) used to balance our sample, including austerity. We do so to further reduce variation in the outcome and possible small residual imbalances across treated and untreated observations. Substantive results are in line with our main findings regarding RRP government participation and earmarked funding. Because the frequency of radical-right parties in government varies across world regions (see Table B.11), we reassess our MSMs with the inclusion of region fixed effects for the UN regions to which DAC-reporting states belong to. For example, 69% of all observations from Eastern Europe have an RRP in government. Models 4-6 in Table B.12 use region fixed effects. Model 5 adds aid-sector fixed effects to Model 4. Model 6 adds also the lagged TVCs. Our results remain substantively similar. We find across all models in Table B.12 that RRP government participation is significantly associated with a reduction in earmarked funding commitments.

While the coefficient size on RRP varies from model to model in Table B.12, suggesting that country and year fixed effects improve overall estimation, the substantive effect of RRP governments on earmarked funding varies within reasonable ranges. In Model 4—using only region fixed effects—we find that RRPs in government are associated with a reduction of earmarked funding commitments by almost 37% (or -0.46 points on the logged dependent variable).[1] Model 4, with sector fixed effects and time-varying covari-

[1] In our main analysis in the main text, we found that RRPs reduce earmarked commitments by about 28%.

ates included, shows a coefficient estimate of −0.30 on RRP. This is the smallest effect we find, amounting to a 26% reduction in earmarked funding commitments when RRPs enter or support donor governments.

Table B.11: Distribution of RRP governments across detailed UN regions classification.

| | RRP | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | mean | sd | count |
| Australia and New Zealand | 0.13 | 0.33 | 349 |
| Eastern Asia | 0.30 | 0.46 | 238 |
| Eastern Europe | 0.69 | 0.47 | 267 |
| Northern America | 0.00 | 0.00 | 414 |
| Northern Europe | 0.18 | 0.38 | 1452 |
| Southern Europe | 0.21 | 0.40 | 685 |
| Western Asia | 0.00 | 0.00 | 4 |
| Western Europe | 0.22 | 0.41 | 1258 |
| Total | 0.21 | 0.41 | 4667 |

Table B.12: MSMs with no, sector, and region fixed effects.

| | | **Sector fixed effects** | | **Region fixed effects** | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| | No FE | Sector | +TVCs | Region | + Sector | +TVCs |
| RRP | -0.42* | -0.39* | -0.30* | -0.46* | -0.44* | -0.38** |
| | (0.25) | (0.23) | (0.16) | (0.25) | (0.22) | (0.16) |
| Constant | 2.18** | 2.78** | 0.08 | 1.50** | 2.15** | -0.71 |
| | (0.41) | (0.43) | (0.41) | (0.72) | (0.60) | (0.51) |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.18 | 0.30 | 0.53 | 0.18 | 0.31 | 0.55 |
| F | 17.75** | 24.71** | 53.13** | 15.42** | 25.41** | 55.27** |
| N | 4435 | 4435 | 4435 | 4435 | 4435 | 4435 |

*Note:* Linear MSMs with (log) earmarked funding commitments as dependent variable. All models include austerity lagged by one year. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *Statistical significance:* * $p < 0.10$ ** $p < 0.05$.

# Appendix C Robustness checks

In this section, we provide additional robustness checks to assess the sensitivity of our main findings to a series of precautions.

First, we exclude some countries from the analysis that have a long-term participation of the far right in government (Switzerland). In the case of Switzerland, the Swiss People's Party (SVP) is the strongest political party, openly rejects multilateral aid, and participates in the country's all-parties government since decades. It thus represents a case with strong RRP governmental participation. Excluding Switzerland, though, does not change our main substantive findings. Similarly, we drop Turkey from the analysis as it is debated whether it constitutes a democracy after the failed coup in 2016. Likewise, we check whether prominent cases of far-right governments in Europe (e.g. Italy or Poland) drive our results. Because donors with far-right governments cluster regionally, with the highest prevalence in Eastern Europe and East Asia, we exclude all country-years from these regions from our analysis. The findings in Table C.13 show that our main results remain intact.

Second, we re-run our main MSM with the lagged dependent variable included. This controls for possible effects of path-dependent funding commitments and captures possible autocorrelation processes. We also compute an alternative set of dynamics IPTWs. These also balance on austerity and its prior history and interactions between different covariates. The distribution of these alternative weights meets expected standards (mean close to one, maximum below 10) as shown in Table C.15. Table C.14 shows findings from models with the lagged dependent variable and the alternative IPTWs ("IPTW 2"). Our substantive findings are robust to these additional measures.

Third, we re-run our main MSMs with variations of our main explanatory variable. We explain the details of these analyses below, but find in Table C.16 that our substantive results remain unaltered.

Finally, we switch the statistical model to examine whether our findings are model dependent. Specifically, we run negative binomial regression models with the amount of

earmarked funding or bilateral commitments in US dollars. In sum, and as suggested by the findings in Table C.17, our results are robust to model choice.

Table C.13: MSM that drop one country at a time.

| | (1) CH | (2) IT | (3) PL | (4) RK | (5) TR | (6) US | (7) E-Eur | (8) E-Asia |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RRP | -0.33* | -0.37* | -0.31* | -0.27* | -0.30* | -0.30* | -0.35* | -0.26* |
| | (0.10) | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| Constant | 1.04* | 0.89* | 1.13* | 1.09* | 1.10* | 0.99* | 1.32* | 1.03* |
| | (0.42) | (0.43) | (0.42) | (0.42) | (0.42) | (0.42) | (0.43) | (0.42) |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.64 | 0.64 | 0.63 | 0.64 | 0.63 | 0.63 | 0.63 | 0.64 |
| F | 72.92* | 77.04* | 78.31* | 77.88* | 78.92* | 75.46* | 80.39* | 75.32* |
| N | 4226 | 4242 | 4380 | 4316 | 4431 | 4296 | 4184 | 4200 |

*Note:* Linear MSMs with (log) earmarked funding commitments as dependent variable. All models include country, year, and sector fixed effects, and lagged austerity as control. Abbreviations: CH = Switzerland; IT = Italy; PL = Poland; RK = Republic of Korea; TR = Turkey; US = United States; E-Eur = Eastern Europe; E-Asia = East Asia. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Statistical significance:* * $p < 0.05$.

Table C.14: MSMs adding lagged dependent variable and using alternative IPTWs.

| | **+Lagged DV** | | **IPTW 2** | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | EF | BI | EF | BI |
| RRP | -0.23* | -0.08 | -0.34* | -0.10 |
| | (0.10) | (0.12) | (0.14) | (0.12) |
| Constant | 0.64 | 5.86* | 2.10* | 4.41* |
| | (0.54) | (0.42) | (0.05) | (0.04) |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.71 | 0.81 | 0.63 | 0.79 |
| F | 90.39* | 9.77* | 5.37* | 6.25* |
| N | 3872 | 3872 | 4399 | 4399 |

*Note:* Linear MSMs with (log) earmarked funding commitments as dependent variable. All models include country, year, and sector fixed effects. Lagged austerity included as control. Model 3 includes the contemporaneous and the value of earmarked funding commitments lagged by one year. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *Statistical significance:* * $p < 0.05$.

Table C.15: Distribution of alternative set of weights (IPTW2) of Model 5.

| **Mean** | **Std. Dev.** | **Min.** | **Max.** | ***N*** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.99 | 0.22 | 0.16 | 3.09 | 4565 |

## C.1 Extended RRP coding

In this section, we re-run our main MSMs adopting each time a slight variation of our main independent variable (RRP government participation). Table C.16 shows results.

First, we refit our model by coding the Trump administration (2016-2021) as RRP as well as Turkey's coalition government from 2016 and on where the AK Party and the extreme-right MHP governed together. We check whether this extended coding of RRP government participation has any effect on the (log) amount of earmarked commitments (EF) and the (log) amount of bilateral commitments (BI), respectively. Model 1 shows that our substantive findings remains unaffected by extending the coding of RRP governments to the US and Turkey. Far-right parties in government contribute to reduce earmarked funding, on average, compared to non far-right governments. The same does not hold in the case of bilateral aid: the extended RRP indicator is not systematically related to the amount of bilateral commitments. This suggests that when it comes to bilateral aid, governments with and without far-right parties do not differ in their commitments made.

Second, Models 2 and 3 in Table C.16 drop the observations of Turkey to focus on the set of donor governments where little doubt exists that they are democratic. There is no change in substantive findings.

Finally, the RRP indicator variable used in the main analyses excludes RRP government tenures below six months. We relax this criterion in Models 5 and 6 of Table C.16. The variable now counts the share of months per year that an RRP party supported or sat in government ("Share RRP months"). Including now also short-lived RRP governments, we find that substantive results remain largely the same as in our main analyses. Interestingly, the coefficient estimate on RRP (-0.39) is larger than in our main analysis (-0.33).

Table C.16: MSMs with varying RRP codings.

| | Extended RRP | | Excluding Turkey | | Share RRP months | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| | EF | BI | EF | BI | EF | BI |
| RRP | -0.29* | -0.11 | -0.29* | -0.11 | -0.39* | -0.07 |
| | (0.09) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.07) | (0.10) | (0.08) |
| Constant | 1.13* | 5.88* | 1.14* | 5.87* | 1.13* | 5.87* |
| | (0.42) | (0.32) | (0.42) | (0.32) | (0.43) | (0.32) |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.63 | 0.79 | 0.63 | 0.79 | 0.64 | 0.79 |
| F | 79.75* | 59.53* | 79.78* | 59.60* | 79.81* | 59.49* |
| N | 4399 | 4399 | 4395 | 4395 | 4399 | 4399 |

*Note:* Linear MSMs with (log) earmarked funding commitments as dependent variable (column label EF) or (log) bilateral commitments (column label BI). All models include country, year, and sector fixed effects. Lagged austerity included as control. Robust SEs in parentheses. *Statistical significance:* * $p < 0.05$.

## C.2 Switching statistical models

Because we logged our outcome variables in our main analyses—to reduce the highly skewed distribution of our data and to increase precision and modeling flexibility—we lose some few observations that had zeroes in their commitments. To guard against the possibility that this affects our results, we use a count model to include those cases that reported zero commitments. Specifically, we fitted a negative binomial model, instead of a Poisson, because the descriptive data already showed a variation considerably larger than the mean. The alternative Poisson model assume equality between the conditional mean and conditional variances of a distribution.

We weigh the negative binomial regression with the dynamic IPTWs to balance our sample. The model includes our main independent variable (RRP), year and sector fixed effects, as well as all time-varying potential confounders at their baseline values. We also include the lag of austerity. Our substantive results remain the same: while RRP governments reduce earmarked funding to IOs, they do not differ from non-RRP governments when it comes to bilateral aid.

Table C.17: Negative binomial models with non-logged outcome variables.

| | Earmarked commitments | Bilateral commitments |
|---|---|---|
| RRP | -0.179** | 0.0655 |
| | (0.07) | (0.11) |
| Constant | 1.464** | 5.386** |
| | (0.42) | (0.23) |
| Log.-Lik. | -19071.57 | -28721.52 |
| AIC | 38235.15 | 57535.04 |
| *N* | 4560 | 4560 |

*Note:* Dynamic IPT-Weighted negative binomial models with amount of earmarked commitments (Model 1) and bilateral commitments (Model 2) in constant USD as dependent variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Models include year and sector fixed effects. All time-varying confounders included at their baseline values. Lagged austerity also included. *Statistical significance:* $^{**}p < 0.05$.