Supplementary Appendix for "Insurgent Armies: Military Obedience and State Formation after Rebel Victory"

June 3, 2021

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Table 1: Number of State Security Forces Created by Postwar Regime

	Mean # State Security Forces
All Cases	2.72
Low Threat (1 year threshold)	3.25
High Threat (1 year threshold)	2.43
High Threat (2 years)	2.08
High Threat (3 years)	2.00
Third Party Guarantor == 1	2.125
Multiple Sponsors == 1	2.75
Ideology == 1	2.63
Anti-Colonial == 1	2.75
Ethnic Homogenous == 1	2.3
Single Parent Group == 1	3

Table 2: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Scores

Variable	VIF
War Intensity	1.894
Ideology	1.826
Third Party Guarantor	1.290
Multiple Sponsors	1.990
Ethnically Homogenous	1.308
Anticolonial	2.046
Single Parent Group	1.547
Ln GDP per capita	2.203
Ln Defence expenditure	2.076
Ln Population	1.654

Table 3: Alternate Measures of Threat Intensity (logit)

	Dependent variable:		
	Commander Defection		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
War Intensity (2 years)	−2.529**		
	(1.123)		
War Intensity (3 years)		−2.404*	
		(1.258)	
War Intensity (Rival Group)			−2.519*
			(1.293)
Ideology	1.684	1.213	1.775
	(1.054)	(0.916)	(1.105)
Third Party Guarantor	1.734*	1.169	1.342
	(0.991)	(0.920)	(0.898)
Multiple Sponsors	0.029	0.022	−0.100
	(1.084)	(1.121)	(1.043)
Ethnically Homogenous	−0.356	−0.704	−0.698
	(0.934)	(0.922)	(0.931)
Anti-Colonial	−0.738	−0.790	−1.160
	(1.036)	(1.048)	(1.112)
Single Parent Group	−1.139	−0.852	−1.828**
	(0.983)	(1.012)	(0.928)
Ln GDP per capita	−0.891*	−1.025*	−0.663
	(0.515)	(0.540)	(0.454)
Ln Defence expenditure	0.149	0.373	0.196
	(0.361)	(0.419)	(0.376)
Ln Population	−0.325	−0.203	−0.590
	(0.405)	(0.461)	(0.421)
Intercept	7.721	5.867	9.839**
	(4.798)	(5.115)	(4.872)
Observations	43	43	43

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4: Correlates of War Intensity (logit)

	Dependent variable:					
	War Intensity					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Ln GDP per capita	0.057					
	(0.063)					
Ln Defence expenditure		0.046				
		(0.052)				
Ln Population			0.059			
			(0.058)			
Ideology				0.246		
				(0.150)		
Multiple Sponsors					0.260*	
					(0.149)	
Ethnically Homogenous						0.091
						(0.164)
Intercept	0.259	0.261	0.048	0.450***	0.455***	0.552***
	(0.366)	(0.374)	(0.528)	(0.109)	(0.104)	(0.093)
Observations	43	43	43	43	43	43

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Coding Appendix

Winning Armed Groups, 1946-2019

Common References

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List of Cases

Country	Rebel group	Year	Defection
Costa Rica	NLA	1948	Yes
China	PLA	1949	No
Indonesia	Republican forces	1949	Yes
Bolivia	MNR	1952	Yes
Guatemala	Forces of Castillo Armas	1954	No
Vietnam	Viet Minh	1954	No
Morocco	Morroccan Liberation Army	1956	Yes
Tunisia	Fellagha	1956	No
Cuba	M-26-7	1959	No
Algeria	FLN	1963	Yes
South Yemen	NLF	1967	Yes
Guinea-Bissau	PAIGC	1973	Yes
Ethiopia	Derg	1974	Yes
Mozambique	FRELIMO	1974	Yes
Angola	MPLA	1975	Yes
Cambodia	Khmer Rouge	1975	Yes
Uganda	UNLF	1979	Yes
Nicaragua	FSLN	1979	Yes
Iran	Revolutionary Council	1979	No
Zimbabwe	ZANU	1980	No
Chad	FROLINAT/FAN	1982	Yes
Uganda	NRM	1986	No
Namibia	SWAPO	1989	No
Chad	MPS	1990	Yes
Ethiopia	TPLF	1991	No
Eritrea	EPLF	1991	No
Afghanistan	Jamiyat-i-Islam	1992	No
Azerbaijan	Forces of Suret Husseinov	1993	Yes
Rwanda	RPF	1994	No
South Africa	ANC	1994	No
Afghanistan	Taliban	1996	No
Liberia	NPFL	1997	Yes
Congo Brazzaville	Cobra forces	1997	No
Democratic Republic of Congo	AFDL	1997	Yes
Tajikistan	Popular Front	1997	Yes
Guinea-Bissau	Forces of Ansumane Mané	1999	No
Kosovo	KLA	1999	No
Afghanistan	UIFSA	2001	No
Central African Republic	Forces of Francois Bozizé	2003	Yes
South Sudan	SPLA/M	2005	Yes
Côte d'Ivoire	Forces Nouvelles	2011	Yes
Libya	NTC	2011	Yes
Central African Republic	Séléka	2013	Yes

Costa Rica 1948: NLA

Case Narrative

In 1948, following the annulment of presidential election results, hardline opponents of the regime of President Picado Milchalski in Costa Rica created the National Liberation Army (NLA) under the leadership of Jose Maria Figueres Ferrer, with support from Guatemala and Cuba. The NLA was an alliance of anti-communists, conservatives, and a small social democratic intelligentsia (Lehoucq & Molina 2002). Mercenaries and revolutionaries from other countries in the Caribbean Basin also joined the rebel army (Bowman 2010, p. 109). In March 1948, NLA rebels invaded Costa Rica from Guatemala. NLA rebels fought against military forces loyal to President Picado until April 19, when NLA forces overthrew the Picado government. A new military government headed by Figueres was proclaimed on May 8, 1948, which ruled the country for eighteen months (Ibid).

Following the collapse of the Picado government, the NLA represented the only organized military force in the country (Lehoucq & Molina 2002, p. 225). However, Figueres's ruling junta was constrained by the Constituent Assembly of Costa Rica, which was dominated by more moderate political forces. In December 1948, the Figueres regime suppressed a rebellion by Rafael Calderon Guardia, invading from Nicaragua. Otilio Ulate Blanco became president in 1951, but Figueres reclaimed the presidency in 1953 at the head of the new National Liberation Party (NLP). The Figueres regime battled rebel forces invading from Nicaragua again in 1955.

Defection

Yes. Following the NLA/Figueres victory, most career military officers had fled the country, leaving the national army diminished and disorganized (Bowman 2010). In December 1948, the Figueres regime moved to abolish the military entirely and replace it with a civil guard.

In June 1948, a coup attempt against the Figueres regime led by Frank Marshall, a former "war hero" of the liberation war, was suppressed (Bowman 2010, p. 102). Another, more serious coup attempt occurred in April 1949, when a circle of military officers attempted to depose Figueres after Figueres blocked the promotion of Max 'Tuta' Cortés, one of the founding members of the NLA (Ibid, p. 114).

To suppress the Calderon-led rebellion invading from Nicaragua, Figueres remobilized NLA forces in December 1948. "Figueres also appreciated the value of military superiority and kept a cache of weapons for several decades, just in case arms were deemed necessary to protect his project" (Bowman 2010, p. 111). Costa Rica was flooded with more mercenary and revolutionary forces who wished to train in Costa Rica to fight other dictatorships in the region (Bowman 2010). However, Figueres could not entirely control these forces and sought to demobilize them.

War Intensity

High. The UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level of 2 for 1948.

Rival Group

No.

Ideology

Yes. Figueres and the NLA adhered to a leftist revolutionary political agenda (Bowman 2010; Lecoucq 1991)

Third-Party Guarantor

No.

Multiple Third-Party Sponsors

Yes. Cuba and Guatemala provided military assistance to the NLA beginning in 1947 (Mullenbach, nd).

Anti-Colonial War

No.

Ethnic Cleavages

No.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

Yes. The NLA derived from the Social Democratic Party (Braithwaite & Cunningham 2020).

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China 1949: CPC/PLA

Case Narrative

In 1921, the Communist Party of China (CPC) was founded by Mao Zedong and Ch'en Tu-hsiu. In 1927, communists rebelled against the nationalist forces of the Guomindang (GMD) led by Chiang Kai-shek, then the senior partner in an opposition coalition with the CPC. Communist forces attempted to seize control of rural areas and build its army, known as the Red Army. In 1934 Mao led his rebel forces on the "Long March" to northwestern China. The communists and the Guomindang agreed to a ceasefire in 1936. In November 1945, after the Japanese occupation in China was expelled, the civil war between Mao's communist rebels and Chiang Kai-Shek's nationalist forces – now the recognized government of China – resumed. The CPC's armies in the northwest were renamed as the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in late 1945. The PLA adopted a mixture of conventional and guerrilla warfare strategies against the Guomindang, mostly using light infantry units (Fravel 2018). PLA rebel force operated under a decentralized command-and-control system, with PLA commanders highly independent within their own areas (Ibid, p. 70). In October 1949 the Chinese Civil War ended when PLA troops seized control of the capital of Beijing and proclaimed the People's Republic of China under CPC/PLA control. The PLA became the national army of the PRC.

From 1949 to 1952 the PLA suppressed rump Guomindang forces and recalcitrant warlords across China, known as "bandit suppression" operations (Fravel 2018). The Chiang Kai-Shek regime fled to Taiwan and proclaimed the Republic of China. In 1950, PLA forces entered the Korean War under the guise of the People's Volunteer Army and fought against the United States, and fighting ended by 1953. In 1950, PLA forces invaded the western province of Tibet. PLA forces suppressed armed rebellions in Tibet in the 1950s and 1960s.

Defection

No. The CPC/PLA regime enjoyed a high degree of loyalty from its military field commanders in the first decade of its rule. PLA commanders integrated their forces into the new national army, and fought costly campaigns in Korea and Tibet on behalf of the CPC regime (Fravel 2018; Mullenbach, nd).

Post-war ruling regime control reflected high degree of elite cohesion among political elites and field commanders within the CPC/PLA, who had more than twenty years of experience together on the battlefield. Mao entered the war with tight control over the party, a legacy of the communist movement's internal purges during the Yan'an period. By the time of the PLA's conquest in 1949, leadership institutions were inclusive and collectivized. Mao was said to be less harsh with his generals, in whom "he seems to have had enough confidence to allow them to argue with him with relative impunity" (Lary 2015, p. 9). Fravel (2018) similarly notes that "the party delegated substantial autonomy for military affairs to top military leaders. The party leadership's willingness to delegate such responsibilities has its roots in the civil war" (p. 70). This leadership system permitted PLA commanders significant input into key security policy issues as the PLA transitioned to its new position as an incumbent state army. For instance in September/October 1950 as the CPC leadership debated whether to commit troops to the Korean

war, Mao convened multiple meetings with the political and military leadership to debate the matter (Panstov & Levine 2007).

The most significant episode of civil-military conflict in the first decade of CPC/PLA rule occurred between Mao and Gao Gang and Rao Shushi, PLA commanders with strong ties in northeastern Manchuria area and eastern Shangai area, respectively, who were accused of fomenting factionalism with the CPC. Both commanders were subsequently purged from the regime before committing any open acts of defiance (Pantsov & Levine 2007, pp. 404-405).

War Intensity

High. The UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level of 2 for 1946-1949. During the communists' armed struggle, the CCP faced opponents that were "vastly more powerful" than itself, namely the Japanese and the Nationalists (Kennedy 2008, p. 885). The insurgency grew more hardened and sophisticated in response, and focused on increasing operational effectiveness. "As the communists gained experience fighting the KMT in the summer and autumn of 1946, Mao raised his sights from surviving the Nationalist onslaught to conquering all of China" (Ibid., p. 887).

Rival Group

Yes. The CCP competed with the KMT for territorial control and political support during a joint struggle against Japanese occupation forces (Mullenbach, nd).

Ideology

Yes. The CPC/PLA was a revolutionary communist movement (Pantsov & Levine 2007).

Ethnic Cleavages

No. The PLA was a largely homogenous Han Chinese force (Lary 2015).

Third-Party Guarantor

No. No significant foreign military presence was present in China after the CPC/PLA victory.

Multiple Third-Party Sponsors

No. The Soviet Union was the only major sponsor of the CCP (Mullenbach, nd).

Anti-Colonial War

No.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

Yes. The PLA derived from the Communist Party of China (Braithwaite & Cunningham 2020).

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Indonesia 1949: Republican Forces

Case Narrative

In 1924 the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was formed and attempted to lead a nationalist rebellion against Dutch colonial rule. In 1927, the Indonesian National Party (PNI) was formed under Sukarno. During WWII, Indonesia was occupied by Imperial Japan, which recruited Sukarno and PNI members and created a new military force – Pembaela Tanah Air (Defenders of the Homeland), or Peta. Peta forces recruited over 37,000 members (Vickers 2005, p. 94). In 1945, Sukarno proclaimed Indonesian independence, with Peta serving as his governing army (Republican Forces). The Dutch then attempted to re-occupy Indonesia. PNI and PKI forces fought the Dutch and each other for control of Indonesia. Anti-Dutch militia and "struggle committees" were established on many islands. In 1948, Sukarno's Republican Forces retreated from the major cities to wage guerrilla warfare. By April 1949, the Dutch agreed to negotiate peace. Independence was granted to Indonesia in November 1949, and the Republican Forces became the National Army of Indonesia. Sukarno remained president of the independent Republic until he was overthrown in a military coup in 1965 by General Suharto, a former guerrilla commander in the Republic Forces.

Defection

Yes. At the dawn of the independent Indonesian nation, Republican Forces were a sprawling and diverse mixture of anti-Dutch militias and local struggle groups. Some had been created and trained by the Japanese. Others emerged during the 1945-1949 liberation war. The central government army was initially a mere competitor with these militias (Vickers 2005). The core Republican forces – especially the People's Security Army, led by Sudirman – were mainly recruited from Dutch and Japanese trained officers. The People's Security Army became the nucleus of the National Army, with other struggle groups and militias integrated in subordinate positions (Vickers 2005).

Army factionalism produced a "near-coup" in 1952 against Sukarno (Vickers 2005, p. 140). In 1957, army officers in Sumatra rebelled against Sukarno's Java-based regime. Sukarno's control over the national army became increasingly tenuous. Regional commanders allied with anti-Sukarno officers, throwing the country into a period of instability that ended when General Suharto, a former Republic Forces guerrilla commander, took power in a coup. The coup was precipitated by Sukarno's decision to create a new peasant militia that would counterbalance the National Army and advance leftist revolutionary goals.

War Intensity

Low. UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level 1 for 1946-49.

Rival Group

No.

Ideology

Yes.

Ethnic Cleavages

Yes.

Third-Party Guarantor

No.

Multiple Third-Party Sponsors

No. The Indonesian nationalist forces received only political support from the League of Arab States (Mullenbach, nd).

Anti-Colonial War

Yes.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

Yes. The Republic Forces derived from the PNI, the PKI, and Japanese trained military units (Vickers 2005).

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Bolivia 1952: MNR

Case Narrative

In 1941, the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) was created in Bolivia under the leadership of Victor Paz Estenssoro and Hernan Siles Zuazo. In 1943, Major Gualberto Villarroel staged a military coup and brought the MNR into power. Villarroel was killed during a military rebellion led by the Popular Revolutionary Movement (PIR) in 1946, and the PIR established a military junta under Nestor Gullen. Enrique Hertzog was elected President in 1947 and formed a government at the head of the Socialist Republican Union Party (PURS). The PURS-led government engaged in repression against MNR members, leading to a military rebellion in southern Bolivia in 1949 by the MNR under the leadership of Zuazo, which was suppressed. MNR forces were comprised largely of armed miners who were organized into revolutionary militias (Klein 2011). In May 1950, MNR forces and armed workers launched another rebellion under the leadership of Guillermo Alborta. In presidential elections in 1951, the MNR candidate Victor Paz Estenssoro received 45 per cent of the vote, but a military junta aligned with the incumbent conservative government refused to cede power. Full-scale civil war broke out as the MNR mobilized to take power by force. In April 1952, MNR forces captured La Paz and overthrew the military junta. Estenssoro was inaugurated as president on April 16, 1952. The military of Bolivia, long associated with the conservative landed elite, was disbanded.

Legislative elections in 1956 delivered a strong majority to the MNR, and Hernan Siles Zuazo of the MNR was elected president. Estenssoro was re-elected president again in 1960 and 1964. The MNR regime suppressed a series of right-wing military rebellions from 1957 to 1964. In 1964, Estenssoro was deposed in a coup d'état led by Vice President René Barrientos and army commander Alfredo Ovando.

Defection

Yes. When the MNR took power in April 1952, the national army had collapsed and the streets of La Paz belonged to pro-MNR militias (Kohl 1978). The remnants of the army were re-assembled by the government on a much smaller scale, with effective coercive power in the hands of the street militia: "the MNR civilian militias were better armed than the police and the army and took over all the internal duties that these two forces usually managed" (Klein 2011, p. 213). The head of the worker militias, Juan Léchin, became the Minister of Mines and Petroleum. Léchin demanded the liquidation of the army and its replacement with his militias (Ibid). Léchin organized left-wing opposition to the government in the late 1950s.

However, the Estenssoro/Zuazo leadership of the MNR was reluctant to grant Léchin's paramilitaries power. In his second presidential term from 1960 to 1964, Estenssoro began to rebuild the national army as a counterweight to Léchnin's worker militias (Klein 2011, p. 222). In response Léchin broke firmly from the MNR, leaving Estenssoro to rely on the reconstituted Bolivian military. Left vulnerable without the support of the workers' militias, Estennsoro was deposed by a military coup in 1964, ending this phase of the MNR's revolution.

War Intensity

Low. UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level of 1 for 1952.

Rival Group

No.

Ideology

Yes. Though it had historical roots as a fascist-leaning movement, the MNR came to power as a left-leaning political movement with strong ties to a revolutionary workers agenda (Klein 2011; Kohl 1978).

Third-Party Guarantor

No. There was no major stabilization mission or foreign military intervention in Bolivia following the MNR victory.

Multiple Third-Party Sponsors

No. There is no recorded support for the MNR from external sponsors (Mullenbach nd).

Ethnic Cleavages

Yes. The MNR drew membership from varied ethnic groups in Bolivia, notably whites and Amerindians (Klein 2011; Kohl 1978).

Anti-Colonial War

No.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

Yes. The MNR derived from the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement, a political party (Braithwaite & Cunningham 2020).

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Guatemala 1954: Liberation Army of Castillo Armas

Case Narrative

In 1951, Lt. Colonel Jacobo Arbenz Guzman was elected president of Guatemala. Arbenz's socialist-leaning government received support from the Soviet Union, and was viewed as a communist threat by the United States. Guzman's government suppressed several military rebellions in 1952 and 1953. On June 18, 1954 a rebel force of Guatemalan exiles led by Colonel Castillo Armas – the Liberational army – invaded the country, with support from the United States. Armas's forces initially numbered approximately two hundred highly trained fighters, who had trained together as a paramilitary force for over a year in Honduras (Marks 1990, p. 69). Within days Armas's forces grew to several thousand strong, including armed peasants and ranchers in addition to the trained military specialists (Ibid, p. 70). These forces engaged the government in conventional battles and mobile warfare over a nine-day period of conquest. The extent of actual rebel-government fighting, and the role of the United States, is disputed by historians (Streeter 2000). Arbenz was replaced by a military junta dominated by Liberation army officers on June 29, and Castillo Armas was elected president by the junta on July 8. Castillo Armas was elected president in an uncontested election in October.

The victory of Castillo Armas set in motion a period of instability that eventually culminated in the Guatemalan Civil War. Pro-Armas troops suppressed military rebellions by leftist military officers in 1955. Armas was assassinated by a member of the presidential guard in July 1957. Armas's successor, Vice-President Gonzalez Lopez, was deposed in a military coup led by Colonel Oscar Mendoza Azurdia on October 25, 1957. Clashes between right-leaning and leftist military officers continued until 1962, when communist forces began a guerrilla insurgency and established the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR).

Defection

No. Castillo Armas's control of the Guatemalan military in the aftermath of the Liberation army's victory remained shaky. Streeter (2000) provides the most comprehensive treatment of this period. According to Streeter: "Anti-Communists in Castillo Armas's ranks quarreled constantly with each other, and the armed forces clashed with the Liberation Army for military control of the country… Castillo Armas's troops stationed in Zacapa and Chiquimula threatened to desert unless the president paid them overdue wages" (Streeter 2000, pp. 94, 95.) The US embassy reported: "The foundation of the regime was still very shaky because there was very little support of Castillo Armas in the Armed Forces" and "neither Colonel Monzon nor high officers appointed by the junta were in firm control of the military" (Ibid, p. 100). In August 1954, Armas faced a coup from young army cadets who were unhappy with the army's capitulation. The coup was put down, leaving a handful of fighters dead (Gleijeses 1991, pp. 357-360). After using the Presidential Guard to put down the Cadet Rebellion, Armas agreed to disband the Liberation army and achieve an armistice with the rest of the military (Streeter 1994, pp. 97-98).

Nonetheless, in the three-year period from July 1954 to July 1957, Castillo Armas's ruling regime retained support from the core military leaders of the Liberation army. The ability of Armas to maintain his core military supporters allowed the Armas regime to avoid a major destabilization. Though some of the 'Liberational forces' exacted extra-judicial killings in the aftermath of Castillo Armas's victory, according to Gillin & Silvert (1956), by and large "the new government successfully repressed such violence and restored order throughout the country" (p. 740). The Armas regime also created new state security forces to repress internal enemies. Armas appointed a new board to lead the new National Defense against Communism (CDNCC), an organ which was used for mass arrests of political opponents and suspected communists (Streeter 2000).

War Intensity

Low. UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level of 1 for 1954.

Rival Group

No.

Third-Party Guarantor

No. Though the CIA provided training and arms to Castillo Armas's rebel forces, the US did not intervene with a peacekeeping or stabilization mission in the country.

Multiple Third-Party Sponsors

Yes. The armed group headed by Castillo Armas allegedly received financial support from the governments of the United States, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic (Cullather 1999, p. 28).

Ideology

No. Sources do not indicate that the Castillo Armas regime adhered to any programmatic political ideology.

Ethnic Cleavages

No.

Anti-Colonial War

No.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

No. Pro-Armas forces did not derive from a prior group (Braithwaite & Cunningham 2020).

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Vietnam 1954: Vietminh

Case Narrative

In 1930, the Indochinese Communist Party was created under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh in opposition to French colonial rule in Vietnam. Nationalist forces later coalesced into the League for Independence for Vietnam, or 'Vietminh' under Ho's control. In 1947, violence escalated between French colonial troops and Vietminh forces, who began to organize as a guerrilla army in the Vietnamese mountains. Ho's rebels organized self-defense 'cadres' at the village level and engaged in popular mobilization against the French. After the victory of Chinese Communists in 1949, the conflict in Vietnam drew increased international intervention, and the US began supporting French counterinsurgency efforts against Ho's communists. After being outmanoeuvred and losing a battle to the Vietminh at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, France agreed to recognize an independent Democratic Republic of Vietnam based in Hanoi, controlled by Ho's Vietminh. The Vietminh army – the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) – became the national army of the North. The South remained under the control of a nationalist government headed by Ngo Dinh Diem, supported by the United States.

Defection

No. Ex-guerrilla commanders in the PAVN remained highly loyal to Ho and the Vietminh regime as it consolidated control of North Vietnam and began to wage war in South Vietnam. General Van Tien Dung, a veteran of Vietminh battles against the French, became the army chief of staff. In the initial years of Vietminh control in North Vietnam, the PAVN did little to upgrade beyond an irregular guerrilla force. Increased Soviet aid from 1957 permitted expansion and modernization. Centralized units, official insignia, and formalized ranks and uniforms were introduced (Turley 1969). By the early 1960s the PAVN was a well-equipped and highly institutionalized military, highly modelled on the PLA in China. Turley (1969) provides the following description: "The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) military establishment includes three types of forces, the regular army … the regional forces, and the self-defense militia. The highest Party authority within the army is the General Political Directorate, which supervises and trains the political commissars. As in China, the highest Party policy-making organ in military matters below the Politburo is the Military Affairs Committee" (p. 881).

War Intensity

High. UCDP Dyadic Dataset codes intensity level 2 for 1946-1954.

Rival Group

No.

Ethnic Cleavages

No.

Ideology

Yes.

Third-Party Guaratnor

No. PAVN forces received support from China and the Soviet Union. However no major foreign intervention supported or monitored the reorganization of PAVN forces after 1954.

Multiple Sponsors

Yes. The Viet Minh received external support from China and the Soviet Union (Mullenbach nd)

Anti-Colonial War

Yes.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

Yes. The Viet Minh derived from the Indochinese Communist Party (Ciment & Hill 1999).

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Morocco 1956: Liberation Army

Case Narrative

In 1943, the Istiqlal Party (IP) was established under the leadership of Allal al-Fassi to promote Morocco's independence from French colonial rule. IP nationalists and the Sultan of Morocco formed a political alliance, expanding the appeal of nationalist mobilization (Joffe 1985). In the early 1950s the Moroccan nationalist movement became split between moderates who advocated a diplomatic path to independence, and revolutionaries who advocated armed resistance and guerrilla warfare. The armed wing of the nationalist movement was known as the Moroccan Army of Liberation, which operated as a loosely connected coalition of rural militia that swore loyalty to King Mohammed V (Ashford 1959; 1961), but that also recruited from French trained officers. The Liberation Army also received support from the Algerian Liberation Army.

The Moroccan King fled the country in 1953 and was replaced by a pro-French King, Ben Arafa. Liberation Army rebels and French colonial troops engaged in low-level armed conflict in the Rif Mountains and urban warfare in 1955. Many Istiqlal leaders were arrested or exiled, causing underground lower-ranking militants to gain more prominence over the nationalist movement (Ashford 1961, p. 77). Under pressure from the growing Liberation Army, France agreed to grant independence to Morocco in November of that year.

Morocco became independent on March 2, 1956, and Sultan Mohammed V was restored as King of an independent, constitutional monarchic government. Istiqlal leaders took senior positions in the new government and Crown Council, and controlled the Defense and Interior ministries by 1958 (Ashford 1961). Many Liberation Army units were integrated into the Royal Army, placed under the command of the King's son. In 1957, a High Council for National Defense was created to solidify the military role of the King and Prince (Ashford 1961). Royal forces subdued tribal rebellions in 1957 and 1958.

Defection

Yes. National Liberation units, numbering approximately 10,000 by 1955, resisted demobilization orders and existed outside of central government control in the early years of independence. Parallel armies persisted in Morocco. Efforts to integrate or demobilize Liberational Army units were sometimes carried out coercively. Ashford (1961) writes: "the final dissolution of the urban resistance groups was accomplished by the Moroccan police, but only after many urban resistance cells had been literally shot down after engaging in racketeering and smuggling. Some terrorist and guerrilla leaders were absorbed into the new Moroccan administration, but the elder nationalist leaders in exile and prison returned to take over the more important jobs in the government" (p. 160).

Relations between Liberation Army commanders and the ruling regime deteriorated over the terms of integration, the question of Algerian independence, and the distribution of power within the King's cabinet (Ashford 1961). More and more Liberation Army commanders and units moved to the south, congregating under the leadership of al-Fassi and other leftist nationalists. In

1959, al-Fassi split from the ruling party and became part of an anti-regime rebellion fought by the Sahara Liberation Army.

War Intensity

Low. UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level 1 for 1957-58.

Rival Group

No.

Ideology

No. The Liberation Army was politically heterogenous, but dominated by conservative tribal militia who did not adhere to a revolutionary political ideology (Ashford 1961).

Ethnic Cleavages

Yes. The Liberation Army recruited from multiple ethnic groups and tribes in Morocco (Ashford 1961).

Third-Party Guarantor

Yes. France retained a significant military deployment in Morocco after 1956 and monitored the process of reorganizing the Royal Army.

Multiple Sponsors

No. The Liberation Army received support from rebels in Algeria (Ashford 1961).

Anti-Colonial War

Yes.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

Yes. The Liberation Army derived from the Istaqlal party (Ashford 1961).

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Tunisia 1956: Fellagha / Liberation Army

Case Narrative

In 1934 the Neo-Destour party was established under the leadership of Habib Bourguiba as an independence movement in opposition to French colonial rule in Tunisia. During the wave of anti-French mobilization across North Africa in the early 1950s, nationalist militant groups known as 'Fellagha' launched armed attacks against the French in Tunisia. Village-level Fellagha units acted largely autonomously with limited direct control by Neo-Destour (Abadi 2012, p. 412). Fellagha militia were most highly concentrated in the south, commanded by local leaders with limited military experience (Ibid).

Negotiations between Neo-Destour and France began in 1954. Bourguiba was released from prison in 1955. Tunisia achieved full independence in March 1956, and Bourguiba was elected Prime Minister at the head of a Neo-Destour dominated government. In 1957, the monarchy was abolished and Bourguiba became president of a single-party state. Army of Liberation (Fellagha) commanders participated in transition negotiations, and about 3,000 rebel troops integrated into the Tunisian Army, founded in June 1956 (Abadi 2012, p. 435).

Defection

No. Under the Bourguiba regime, the Tunisian military did not mount a coup or launch a rebellion. No major defections from the army by ex-Fellagha units occurred (Ware 1985). In large part this reflected effective counterbalancing by Bourguiba. Bourguiba invested in the police and created new security services to counterbalance the influence of the military and maintain control over ex-Fellagha forces. The national army was kept small (approximately 6,000 troops) and distanced from the police and internal security organs of the state (Ware 1985). Military officers were banned from participating in party politics and excluded from cabinet level posts (Brooks 2013).

War Intensity

Low. UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level 1 for 1953-56.

Rival Group

No.

Ideology

No. Neo-Destour was not initially a socialist revolutionary party, and Bourguiba's victory over Salah ben Yusuf in 1955 during factional infighting within Neo-Destour signalled the victory of conservative elements in the party. However, Bouguiba later adopted socialism in the 1960s and changed the party name to the Socialist Destourian Party.

Ethnic Cleavages

Yes.

Third-Party Guarantor

No.

Multiple Sponsors

No.

Anti-Colonial War

Yes.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

Yes. The Fellagha derived from the Neo-Destour nationalist party (Abadi 2013).

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Cuba 1959: M-27-7

Case Narrative

In 1952, General Fulgencio Batista took power in Cuba in a military coup and established a US-friendly regime. In 1953, rebel forces led by Fidel Castro rebelled against the Batista regime, attempting to storm military barracks and seize weapons. The rebellion was suppressed, and Castro was imprisoned for two years. In 1956 Castro and his supporters formed the "26th of July Movement" or M-27-7 in memory of the failed 1953 rebellion. Castro resumed rebellion against the Batista regime. M-27-7 consisted of two main wings – an urban intelligentsia of political revolutionaries and anti-Batista civilians, and a rural guerrilla army conducting mobile warfare against the government, operating out of bases in the remote Sierra Maestra mountains (Staten 2003). The socialist revolutionary Ernesto "Che" Guevara joined Castro's rebel forces as second-in-command. After capturing most of the rural countryside by late 1958, the government of President Batista fled the country. Castro and his rebel army arrived in Havana on January 8, 1959.

Castro formed a government dominated by M-27-7 political members and executed hundreds of pro-Batista government and army officials. The Cuban army was reconstituted from Castro's rural guerrilla army, with the officer corps "heavily recruited" from the M-27-7 commanders who fought alongside Castro (Dominguez 1976, p. 285). Anti-Castro exiles with US support rebelled against the Castro regime, unsuccessfully, from 1960 to 1961. The Castro regime established a long-lasting socialist regime that controls the island of Cuba to this day.

Defection

No. Research on the Cuban armed forces after the 1959 revolution is scarce due to the near impossibility of conducting research on internal army matters (Dominguez 1976). Nonetheless, the success of the Cuban military in repressing challenges from rump Batista forces and an external invasion at the Bay of Pigs, and the lack of any serious known military defection or coup attempt, suggests a robust degree of ruling regime control. Dominguez (1976) describes the Cuban military of the 1960s as "highly skilled at political socialization" and notes that "the weight of the Cuban military within the top elites of the party and government is also far greater than in the Soviet Union or China" (p. 283).

This view is consistent with the description of Cuban civil-military relations given by Mora (2002): "By the mid-1960's he [Castro] was the undisputed leader of the revolution. The centrality and indispensability of Fidel Castro, the maximum leader and founder of the Rebel Army, was fostered by political education and indoctrination that made constant reference to the FAR's mythical roots. The internalization of the revolution's assumptions, values, and institutional norms, as defined by leadership, became a critical component of civilian/party control. More significantly, the fusion or symbiotic relationship between civilian and military roles and elites made the relationship less conflict-ridden. Further, the murkiness or low level of differentiation of roles, along with other mechanisms of political control, also ensured the unquestioning loyalty of the FAR to the revolutionary leadership" (p. 194).

Some fractures in the anti-Batista revolutionary force did occur. Huber Matos, a former commander with the M-27-7 rebels, spoke out against the growing communist direction of the Castro regime in July 1959 and resigned from his position as Commander in the Army in the province of Camaguey (Staten 2003, p. 94). Moderate members of Castro's cabinet also saw that power was accumulating in a small circle of revolutionaries around Castro, and resigned. Yet after the failed US-backed invasion by Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, Castro's control over the regime and the army became total.

The one instance of counterbalancing by the Castro regime was the creation of a vast network of pro-government militias in 1960, the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs). These militias mobilized support for the Castro regime and served as an information-gathering network (Staten 2003).

War Intensity

High. The UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level of 1 for 1953, 1956 and 1957, and intensity level of 2 for 1958.

Rival Group

No.

Ideology

Yes. Castro and Guevara adhered to a socialist revolutionary ideology (Staten 2003).

Third-Party Guarantor

No.

Multiple Sponsors

No. The M-27-7 movement received military assistance from the Dominican Republic (Mullenbach nd).

Ethnic Cleavages

Yes. Dominguez (1976) describes Castro's rebel army as "mostly" white, but also recruiting from Cuba's black population.

Anti-Colonial War

No.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

Yes. M-27-7 derived from the Ortodoxo/Cuban People's Party (Braithwaite & Cunningham 2020).

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Algeria 1963: FLN

Case Narrative

In March 1954, the National Liberation Front (FLN) was established in Algeria under the leadership of Mohammed Ben Bella. FLN launched armed rebellion against the French colonial government in November of that year, with the National Liberation Army as the armed wing of the FLN. From 1954 to 1962, FLN insurgents waged guerrilla warfare against the French colonial government using hit-and-run and sabotage tactics, evading French counterinsurgents in mountainous terrain but enduring heavy casualties (Ciment & Hill 1999). Algerian rebels received support from Egypt, Cuba, Yugoslavia, and China (Mullenbach, nd). Algeria voted for independence in July 1962. A transitional government including the FLN took control of the country, with Ben Bella as Prime Minister. The FLN won 196 of 196 legislative seats. Ben Bella was elected president under a new constitution in September 1963. The National Liberation Army was reorganized as the Algerian People's National Armed Forces.

Ben Bella was deposed in a military coup by Colonel Houri Boumédienne in June 1965, who established a military junta called the National Council of the Algerian Revolution (NCAR). Boumédienne was the former chief of staff of the FLN's National Liberation Army, promoted to Defense Minister by Ben Bella and Vice President in 1963. Boumédienne's regime suppressed another military rebellion in December 1967.

Defection

Yes. The Ben Bella regime failed to establish control over the re-organized National Liberation Army, disarm irregular militia around the country, and ultimately fell to a military coup led by FLN field commanders.

Boumédienne's defection from Bella reflected a breakdown in bargaining and trust between the two men since 1962. Fearing the powerful regional FLN commanders, Bella sought to eliminate pro-Boumédienne officers from the new national army (St John 1968). The major factions within the FLN that competed for power from 1962 to 1965 included the provisional government, the *wilaya* commands, and the FLN's external army based in Morocco and Tunisia (Entelis 2016). To help control the army, Ben Bella attempted to strengthen control over independent leftist militias (Ibid). Boumédienne denounced Belle'as moves as dictatorial and framed his coup as a return to "collegial rule."

War Intensity

High. UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level of 1 for 1954, 1962, intensity level of 2 for 1955-1961.

Rival Group

No.

Ethnic Cleavages

Yes. The FLN recruited from diverse clans and tribes (Ciment & Hill 1999).

Third-Party Guarantor

No.

Multiple Sponsors

Yes. The FLN received support from Egypt, Cuba, Yugoslavia, and China (Mullenbach, nd).

Ideology

Yes. The FLN adhered to a socialist revolutionary political ideology.

Anti-Colonial War

Yes.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

Yes. The FLN derived from two prior parties: the MTDL and CRUA (Entelis 2016).

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South Yemen 1967: NLF

Case Narrative

In June 1963, the National Liberation Front (NLF) was formed in South Yemen (then the Federation of South Arabia) under the leadership of Qahtan Muhammed al-Shaabi in opposition to British colonial rule. The NLF also established an underground armed wing, the 'fedayeen', under the leadership of Abdul Fattah Ismail. From 1963 to 1967 the NLF fought against both British troops in South Yemen and their rival nationalist group, the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY). In 1967, British troops withdrew from the country and tried to turn over power to FLOSY. However, NLF forces defeated FLOSY and proclaimed South Yemen's independence in November 1967. Al-Shaabi became South Yemen's first president.

From 1967 to 1969, al-Shaabi's Nasserist faction fought a leadership struggle with more radical leftist forces within the NLF. In June 1969, al-Shaabi was overthrown and placed under house arrest and replaced by a group of NLF radical leftists: Salim Rubai Ali (president), Ismail (party chairman), and Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hassani (Katz 1986). Ali changed the name of the country to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), and the NLF became the Yemen Socialist Party. From 1972, South Yemen fought a low-intensity border war with North Yemen, under the control of conservative Republican Forces.

Defection

Yes. The NLF regime under al-Shaabi from 1967 to 1969 was characterized by instability, ex-rebel commander mutinies, and central limited regime control of the military. The conventional army existed in parallel with the still-mobilized NLF irregular forces, the Liberation Army, and local "people's guards" (Stookey 1982).

In July 1968, Colonel Abdallah Salih Sab'a al-Awlaqi, the commander of the security forces, rebelled against the al-Shaabi regime. In June 1969, al-Shaabi was overthrown and placed under house arrest and replaced by a group of NLF radical leftists: Salim Rubai Ali (president), Ismail (party chairman), and Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hassani (defense minister) (Katz 1986). Infighting continued within this group. In 1978, violent confrontations broke out between forces of Ali and Ismail, and Ali was captured and executed (Ibid).

War Intensity

Low. UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level 1 for 1964-67.

Rival Group

Yes. From 1963 to 1967 the NLF fought against both British troops in South Yemen and their rival nationalist group, the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY).

Ideology

Yes. The NLF espoused a Marxist revolutionary ideology inspired by China and the Soviet Union (Stookey 1982).

Ethnic Cleavages

Yes. According to Stookey (1982), the NLF recruited broadly among South Yemen's tribal groups.

Third-Party Guarantor

No.

Multiple Sponsors

Yes. The NLF was supported by Egypt and the Soviet Union (Mullenbach, nd).

Anti-Colonial War

Yes.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

No. The NLF derived from prior anti-colonial rebels in Southern Yemen (Stookey 1982).

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Guinea-Bissau 1974: PAIGC

Case Narrative

In 1956, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde was established under the leadership of Amilcar Cabral and Luis Cabral, in opposition to Portuguese colonial rule. The PAIGC initiated guerilla warfare against the Portuguese regime in 1962. The PAIGC received support from Guinea, Senegal and Cuba (Mullenbach, nd). Initially staging hit-and-run attacks from cross-border bases, PAIGC guerrillas expanded their territorial presence inside Guinea-Bissau in the 1960s and inflicted significant losses on Portuguese troops (Ciment & Hill 1999). In PAIGC controlled "liberated zones", guerrillas implemented wide-reaching governance reforms and attempted to provide services (Ciment & Hill 1999). Amilcar Cabral was assassinated in 1973, and PAIGC leadership passed to Luis. In September of that year, Guinea-Bissau proclaimed independence as a one-party state controlled by the PAIGC, with Luis Cabral as president. Portuguese troops withdrew the following year. The PAIGC guerilla army became the national army of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde.

Defection

Yes. Forrest (1987) argues that Luis Cabral "lacked a trustworthy base of personal support in either the army or among the peasants," leading him to rely heavily on military and police units recruited from his homeland in Cape Verde (pp. 101-102). According to Forrest (1987), many ex-PAIGC soldiers felt that "the soldiers were not being recompensed for their contribution they had made to the liberation struggle, while highly resented elites were monopolising the benefits of independence" (p. 102). Fearing a potential coup, Cabral dismissed the popular army chief Joao Vieira in 1979 due to his popularity among rank-and-file soldiers and the rural populace (Ibid, p. 104).

In 1980, Luis Cabral was overthrown in a coup by General Joao Vieira, the popular former guerrilla commander in the PAIGC's liberation war. Vieira established a new Revolutionary Council dominated by ex-rebel military officers. As a result of his wartime credentials, Viera was "the most popular guerilla leader in Guinea-Bissau" and commanded allegiance from a significant number of army officers (Chabal 1983, p. 162). Vieira's coup was widely seen as a product of longstanding factionalism within the PAIGC, especially between "Cape Verdeans" and other regional groups, as well grievances within the army over demobilization payouts, food shortages, and promotions (Munslow 1981, p. 111). The problem of "localism" in the PAIGC was recognized early in the liberation war, as guerrilla units would sometimes abandon the struggle after liberating their home areas from Portuguese control (Ciment & Hill 1999).

War Intensity

Low. UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level 1 for 1963-73.

Rival Group

No.

Ideology

Yes. Amilcal Cabral and the PAIGC leadership adhered to a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary political ideology, along with pan-Africanism (Cabral 1970).

Ethnic Cleavages

Yes. The PAIGC army recruited from multiple ethnic groups in Guineau-Bissau (Chabal 1983; Forrest).

Third Party Guarantor

No.

Multiple Sponsors

Yes. The PAIGC received support from Guinea, Senegal and Cuba (Mullenbach, nd).

Anti-Colonial War

Yes.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

Yes. The PAIGC guerrilla army derived from the Movement for the National Independence of Portuguese Guinea (Chalab 1983).

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Ethiopia 1974: The Derg

Case Narrative

In 1974, popular uprisings against the Ethiopian monarchy led to a series of military mutinies by low-ranking soldiers. Between January and June, growing numbers of military units joined the mutineers in calling for regime change under the leadership of a "coordinating committee" (*darg*) of soldiers, and in a few episodes these rebellious soldiers used organized violence against loyalist troops (Zewde 2001). According to Zewde (2001), the Derg "first started as a movement within the capital, [and] was subsequently broadened with the inclusion of representatives of various units from all over the country" (p. 234). By June, the leadership had shifted to Lt Gen Aman Mikael Andom. By September 1974, the Emperor was deposed and the Derg assumed full state power.

Defection

Yes. From 1974 to 1977, the ruling regime in Ethiopia experienced repeated conflict between executive leaders and Derg military commanders. In November 1974 General Andom, chairman of the Derg when it seized power, was killed in a battle when troops were sent to his home to arrest him (Ottaway & Ottaway 1978, p. 61). In 1975 the new government supressed another rebellion by former Derg commanders Neguissie Haile and Debessu Beyene, resulting in dozens or hundreds of arrests and executions (Mullenbach). In 1976 another coup attempt failed, this time led by Brig. General Getachew Nadew (Ibid). In 1977, conflicts between regime leaders and military commanders resulted in Mengistu Haile-Mariam obtaining power. According to Koonings & Krujit (2002): "Colonel Haile-Mariam Mengistu, the first vice-chairman of the Derg, and his supporters staged a palace coup in February 1977, when the then chairman of the PMAC, its secretary-general, the head of the security guard and four other leading Derg members were assassinated by Mengistu supporters who burst into the central committee meeting" (p. 245). Military loyalty and regime stability were secured only after Mengistu and his supporters completed their violent purge of the initial Derg leadership. The regime soon unleashed the Red Terror against Ethiopian civilians, resulting in thousands of deaths.

War Intensity

Low. The Derg experienced relatively little military pressure on its path to power, owing in part to the weakness of the Ethiopian monarchy. Zewde (2001), for example, suggests that it was a mostly bloodless conquest, due to the failure of the emperor to seriously combat the Derg: "As his entire world was collapsing in front of him, the emperor bore everything with a nonchalance that bordered on fatalism" (pp. 229-235).

Rival Group

No.

Ideology

Yes. The Derg appears to have been inspired by Soviet style Marxism-Leninism. According to Young (1996): "Under pressure from popular expectations for radical change aroused by the

students, the Derg adopted a radical ideology and undertook a fundamental transformation of Ethiopian society. Soviet style marxism-leninism provided the ideological framework the Derg utilised to destroy the old social structure, to force the pace of development, to further centralize state power and the militarize its apparatus" (p. 534).

Ethnic Cleavages

No. The Derg was primarily comprised of members of the dominant Amhara ethnic group. According to Young (1996): "The Derg thus fought to maintain not only the integrity of the Ethiopian state against strong challenges by Eritrean, Somali, Oromo, Afar and other dissident ethnic groups. It also strove to forge a totally centralized state and, therefore, it refused to share power with either the politically conscious middle classes or the emerging regional and ethnic elites, and ensured that the state retained its predominately Amhara character" (p. 534).

Third-Party Guarantor

No. There appears to have been no significant third-party involvement in Ethiopia prior to or after the Derg taking power. A limited number of Soviet military trainers arrived in Ethiopia only in 1978 (Mullenbach).

Multiple Sponsors

No. See notes above.

Anti-Colonial War

No. The Derg deposed the Ethiopian monarchy, which was not under colonial control.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

Yes. The Derg derived from the Ethiopian government's armed forces (Zewde 2001).

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Mozambique 1974: FRELIMO

Case Narrative

In 1964, FRELIMO launched a rebellion against the Portuguese colonial regime in Mozambique. The initial leader of FRELIMO, Eduardo Mondale, was killed in 1969, and leadership passed to Samora Machel. FRELIMO used guerrilla warfare against the Portuguese and relied on political mobilization of the peasantry to gain recruits and material support (Opello 1975). FRELIMO took control of the country in September 1974 after the new Portuguese government agreed to transfer power via the Lusaka Accords (Mullenbach). The armed forces of the colonial state were disbanded and FRELIMO fighters were integrated into a new national army as the People's Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique.

Defection

Yes. Within two years of seizing power, the Machel government faced at least one attempted military coup from former FRELIMO forces. According to Decalo (1989): "Following outbreaks of armed unruliness in December 1975, Samora Machel instituted a purge of 'anti-social' elements that removed as many as 25 army leaders and 1,000 troops. The remaining 350 officers and 5,000 troops were compelled to undergo weekly 12-hour 're- education' sessions that included studies in Marxism and auto-criticism. Yet even after such a lengthy and cumbersome politicisation, an attempted putsch was mounted by some 460 troops and officers, thereby triggering in turn further purges (with strong ethnic overtones) and re-education drives" (p. 560). Decalo continues: "In reality, of course, the often unruly and undisciplined Mozambican forces all along retained their original ethnic/regional cleavages, pro forma exploited their base-zones by extracting illegal payments from farmers and passers-by, and were commanded by many inept and certainly non-Marxist officers who retained their 'bourgois' tendencies after independence, to become a major drag on the fledgling Republic's attempt to establish effective mass-elite relationships" (Ibid). The December 1975 military rebellion is also refereced by Mullenbach.

Other sources suggest a relatively high degree of ex-rebel commander loyalty. For instance, Isaacman & Isaacman (1982) note that most ex-FRELIMO guerrilla units were peacefully disbanded by 1979, with the government focusing on building up its conventional army. When the threat from RENAMO rebels supported by South Africa escalated, the FRELIMO government activated former rebel fighters and commanders to wage counterinsurgency operations.

Sumich (2010) also describes the FRELIMO political-military leadership as a cohesive group: "the top ranks of the leadership have historically been dominated by a small colonial elite of southern, urban/peri-urban assimilados, with prominent members from racial minorities; a more rural, mission-educated, aspiring elite from the northern province of Cabo Delgado has dominated the military. The leading group within party structures has proven itself to be extremely cohesive throughout the trials of the civil war. In many ways it demonstrates aspects of what Bayart (1993) has called 'reciprocal assimilation of elites', where similar social backgrounds, aspirations, experiences and ideological orientation form ruling groups that transcend ethnicity or region" (p. 683).

War Intensity

High. UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level of 1 from 1964-1971, intensity level of 2 from 1972-73.

Rival Group

No.

Ideology

Present. FRELIMO leaders ascribed to a Marxist-Leninist vision of social revolution in Mozambique (Machel 1975).

Ethnic Cleavages

Yes. Sumich (2010), Decalo (1989) and Opello (1975) all describe significant ethnic cleavages within FRELIMO. According to Opello (1975): "Over the 1962-69 period the general picture is that middle-educated assimilados predominately from ethnolinguistic groups located in the central and northern districts of the country, primarily Nyanja, Makua-Lomwe, and Makonde, opposed more highly educated mesti4os and assimilados largely from ethnolinguistic groups located in the southern districts, especially the Shangana, for positions of authority within the movement. Although ideological, age, and personality differences played their part, the perception of the importance of ethnolinguistic, regional, class, and racial cleavages in the home society and their use ideologically in elite competition were in large measure responsible for the pattern of internal conflict within FRELIMO and violence during the 1960s. The scope for using such divisions in building up alliances of support within the leadership is suggested by the heterogeneous nature of the highest levels within FRELIMO. Eduardo Mondlane, the president, was born of a chiefly family in Gaza province in the extreme south of Mozambique, attended the Universities of Witwatersrand and Lisbon, and then studied in the United States, receiving his BA from Oberlin and his PhD from Northwestern. Uria Simango, FRELIMO's vice-president, was a protestant pastor from the north of Mozambique and Marcelino dos Santos, the secretary of external affairs, was a mestixo from the northern coastal town of Lumbo" (p. 71).

Third-Party Guarantor

No. There was no significant third-party intervention during the consolidation of FRELIMO power. Cuba provided a limited number of military advisors beginning in 1976, and the Soviet Union provided military assistance to fight RENAMO beginning in 1977 (Mullenbach).

Multiple Sponsors

Yes. Mullenbach (nd) writes that "Algeria, China, Cuba, East Germany, Egypt, Soviet Union, Tanzania, and Zambia provided military assistance (military training, military advisers, weapons) to FRELIMO."

Anti-Colonial War

Yes.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

Yes. FRELIMO derived from three prior nationalist parties in Mozambique (Cabrita 2003).

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Angola 1975: MPLA

Case Narrative

The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) was created in December 1956 to contest the Portuguese colonial regime in Angola, under the leadership of Antonio Agostino Neto. Operating from military bases in Congo-Kinshasa, and later a number of liberated territories, the MPLA and other rebel groups such as UNITA and FNLA waged a guerrilla campaign against the Portuguese colonial state (Brinkman 2003). The MPLA received assistance from the Soviet Union and Cuba. Rebel groups signed a ceasefire agreement with Portugal in January 1975, the *Alvor Agreement.* The MPLA then fought for control of the government against UNITA and the FNLA, gaining control over the capital and proclaiming a MPLA-led government by November 1975. The MPLA-aligned rebel army, the People's Army for the Liberation of Angola (EPLA), was rebranded as the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA). Antonio Neto died in 1979 and was replaced by Jose Eduardo Dos Santos as leader of the MPLA government.

Defection

Yes. Major factional struggles within the MPLA led to an attempted coup led by Nito Alves, a former MPLA zone commander, in May 1977 (Tvedten 1992, p. 37). Alves had become Minister of Interior in the Neto government, and between 1975 and 1977 worked to build his independent influence and networks within the military and Ministry of Interior, including stashing arms caches to be used by Alves supporters in a future conflict with Neto loyalists (Fauvet 1977, pp. 92-96). In response to the threat from Alves, Neto abolished the Interior Ministry. Alves then began to plot against the Neto regime from within the MPLA government, leading to acts of sabotage within the army (Ibid, pp. 95-96). In May 1977 Alves called for an outright coup, but his followers failed to follow orders and "the masses" from the Luanda barrios failed to show up for a popular demonstration (Ibid). Neto prevailed and expelled Alves from the MPLA. According to Leao & Rupiya (2005), the factional struggles related to the failed coup in 1977 caused the government to create new counterbalancing security institutions "similar to those of the colonial regime" (p. 22).

Separately, almost immediately upon assuming control of Luanda and proclaiming an MPLA-led government, the ruling regime was consumed by a civil war against UNITA and the FNLA. The government recruited new members into FAPLA alongside former EPLA fighters, notably up to 7,000 anti-Mobutu Katangese from Congo (Leao & Rupiya 2005, p. 19). By 1976, FAPLA forces (with Cuban assistance) had driven UNITA and FNLA out of most major towns. By 1978 the FNLA was collapsing and some of its soldiers joined FAPLA.

War Intensity

Low. UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level of 1 from 1961-1974.

Rival Group

Yes. The MPLA competed directly with FNLA and UNITA (Mullenbach).

Ethnic Cleavages

No. The MPLA was associated primarily with the Kimbundu ethnic group in Angola, though it also contained a small *mestico* membership.

Third-Party Guarantor

Yes. Cuba and the Soviet Union provided significant military assistance to the MPLA beginning in 1974 and continuing into the period of MPLA rule, including military advising and monitoring.

Multiple Sponsors

Yes. The MPLA received military and non-military assistance from the Soviet Union, Zambia, and Algeria (Mullenbach).

Ideology

Yes. The MPLA adopted a Marxist-Leninist ideology (Pierce 2012).

Anti-Colonial War

Yes.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

Yes. The MPLA derived from two existing underground political parties in Angola (Tvedten 1997).

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Cambodia 1975: Khmer Rouge

Case Narrative

In 1967, the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) and its armed wing the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea – also known as Khmer Rouge – launched a rebellion under the leadership of Saloth Sar (Pol Pot). In 1970, Prince Norodom Sihanouk – the former king of Cambodia – was overthrown in a military coup by General Lon Nol. Sihanouk went into exile and allied with the Khmer Rouge. In 1970 North Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia on the side of the communists, and US and South Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia on the side of the Lon Nol government. US troops withdrew by June 1970, but bombings against communist targets inside Cambodia continued until 1973, causing massive destruction and increased peasant support for the communist-Sihanouk forces (Kiernan 2004). From 1970 to 1975 the Khmer Rouge waged guerrilla insurgency against the Lon Nol government and gained control of large swaths of territory (Ibid). In April 1975, a rebel coalition headed by Khmer Rouge called the National United Front of Cambodia (NUFC) overthrew the Lon Nol regime, commanding twelve divisions of troops (Kiernan 2008, p. 32). Sihanouk was declared head of state of Democratic Kampuchea, with Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge exercising de facto control. Sihanouk resigned in April 1976, and Pol Pot formed a new government as Prime Minister. The Khmer Rouge army became the national army of Democratic Kampuchea.

In 1978 the Pol Pot regime suppressed a rebellion from anti-Khmer Rouge forces under the banner of the National United Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS). In December 1978, South Vietnamese troops intervened on behalf of rebel forces. Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge were overthrown on January 7, 1979 by the KNUFNS. Cambodia remained in a state of civil war until 1991 when warring factions agreed to a power-sharing settlement.

Defection

Yes. The detailed account of Kiernan (2008) suggests that ex-rebel commanders within Khmer Rouge engaged in acts of defiance, such as mutinies and attempted coups, against the Pol Pot regime. To maintain power, the Pol Pot regime engaged in extensive purging of commanders and units suspected of disloyalty. To combat internal and external threats, the Khmer Rouge regime built up its military forces dramatically beginning in 1976, replacing the old-guard communists with those more loyal to Pol Pot.

After the initial takeover of Phnom Penh, Khmer Rouge zonal units operated under separate command structures and divided control of the city (Kiernan 2008, pp. 53-54). Orders from Pol Pot to evacuate major cities were met with some foot-dragging by moderate Khmer commanders. In 1976, hundreds of troops mutinied and demanded to be demobilized and allowed to return home (Ibid., p. 323). In 1975 and 1976, Khmer soldiers engaged in conflict with 'Eastern' communist forces under the control of So Phim. Becker (1986) also notes street battles in Phnom Penh "between soldiers of the Eastern zone and the … Northern zone" (p. 273).

Moderate commanders and units within the Khmer Rouge army – including the northern commander Koy Thuon -- plotted against the central Pol Pot leadership, desiring a return to the

economy of the old regime (Kiernan 2008, p. 317). Other ex-rebel commanders came under suspicion from Pol Pot regime and were purged from the military, including army deputy chief of staff Chan Chakrey (Ibid, p. 320). These plotters allegedly attempted to kill Pol Pot in 1976, but failed. Overall, mass arrests and purges of zone commanders and their subordinates characterized the first two years of Khmer Rouge rule (Kiernan 2008, pp. 313-356). Mistrust and rumors of coup plots swirled constantly. Kiernan (2008) reports that, "At a meeting of Zone and Region secretaries in the capital … Pol Pot announced that of Democratic Kampuchea's fifteen military divisions, only four were 'loyal'" (p. 353).

War Intensity

High. UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level of 2 for 1967 and 1970-1975, intensity level of 1 for 1968-69.

Rival Group

No.

Ideology

Yes. Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge adhered to a hardline Marxist-Leninist political ideology (Kiernan 2004; Chandler 1999).

Ethnic Cleavages

No. Kiernan (2004; 2008) describes the Khmer Rouge as a largely homogenous organization representing the Khmer ethnic group in Cambodia. Non-Khmers were purged from the communist leadership.

Third-Party Guarantor

No. North Vietnam intervened to support the Khmer Rouge rebels, but did not meaningfully assist the process of military reconstruction.

Multiple Sponsors

No. The Khmer Rouge received direct military support from North Vietnam (Mullenbach).

Anti-Colonial War

No.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

Yes. The KR derived from the Indochinese Communist Party (Braithwaite & Cunningham 2020).

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Uganda 1979: UNLF

Case Narrative

In January 1979 Ugandan rebels based in Tanzania and Zambia, along with Tanzanian military forces, invaded Uganda to depose the government of Idi Amin. In March 1979, several rebel factions announced the creation of the Ugandan National Liberation Front (UNLF) under the leadership of Yusuf Lule. By April, UNLF forces and Tanzanian troops had overthrown Amin and Lule was installed as president. Reconstruction of the army was managed by a UNLF-controlled Military Commission, with former UNLF rebel commander Yoweri Museveni as Minister of Defense and Colonel Oyite Ojok as Chief of Staff (Gertzel 1980). The UNLF regime ruled Uganda from April 1979 to December 1980, when the formerly exiled Milton Obote returned to Uganda and won re-election as president.

Defection

Yes. Gertzel (1980) notes that "within a matter of weeks the new rulers were submerged into a political debate that produced a total paralysis of administration, and a struggle for power within their ranks that severely constrained decision-making at the center" (p. 462). Two months after assuming the Presidency, Lule was dismissed by the UNLF's leadership body, the National Consultative Council (NCC). Lule and Museveni clashed over the authority of the president versus the authority of the Liberation Front, which Museveni regarded as the rightful ruling regime of the country. Godfrey Binaisa was appointed president. In November 1979, Binaisai's attempted to take control over the Ministry of Defence, provoking "a renewed clash between Government and Front" (Gertzel 1980, 473). In response to Museveni's ouster, the NCC made Museveni a full member of the UNLF's Military Commission.

Binaisa was in turn deposed in May 1980 by the Military Commission, headed by Paulo Muwanga, who was seen as a loyalist of Milton Obote (Nyeko 1996). To ensure his own survival, Museveni began to expand his own faction in the armed forces as a private network of fighters, especially by recruiting Banyankole, "so that his band of guerrillas grew rapidly into a force of several thousands" (Gertzel 1980, p. 484). By the end of the year, there were rumors of "private armies in the north which threatened to march on Kampala" (Ibid). After Obote's election in December 1980, Museveni heading of a faction of called the Ugandan Patriotic Movement (UPM), claimed that the national elections were fraudulent and rebelled against Obote's government.

In sum, as Nyeko (1996) argues, "the UNLF was unable to establish any stable administration in Uganda following the Amin regime's collapse" (pp. 97-98). Mamdani (1988) offers a similar assessment of Ugandan politics between 1979 and 1985: "There was not one but several armies; not one but several intelligence services. Each responded to a different centre of power. No one in the state could have any idea of the combined numerical strength of these forces" (p. 1159).

War Intensity

Low. UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level of 1 in 1979.

Rival Group

No.

Third-Party Guarantor

Yes. Tanzanian military forces played a major role helping the UNLF to depose Amin and securing control of the country.

Multiple Sponsors

No. The UNLF received support from Tanzania.

Ethnic Cleavages

Yes. Nyeko (1996) describes the UNLF as a movement based on "inter-ethnic alliances" (p. 107).

Ideology

No. Nyeko (1996) describes the UNLF as a movement "without clearly defined political ideologies" (p. 108).

Anti-Colonial War

No.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

Yes. The UNLF derived from existing rebel groups including KM, FRONASA, and Save Uganda Movement (Braithwaite & Cunningham 2020).

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Nicaragua 1979: FSLN

Case Narrative

In 1961, the leftist Sandinista Front for National Liberation (FSLN) was created under the leadership of Carlos Fonseca Amador, Silvio Mayorga and Tomas Borge Martinez in opposition to the government of President Ruiz Samoza Debayle. The FSLN received assistance from the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Libya. Carlos Fonseca Amador died in November 1976, causing the FSLN to split into three factions. In October 1977 the FSLN factions launched an armed rebellion against the Somoza regime. Somoza resigned on July 17, 1979, and an FSLN-controlled junta led by Daniel Ortega Saavedra formed a new regime on July 20. Somoza's much-feared National Guard was disbanded. The Sandinista Popular Army (EPS), constructed out of the guerrilla forces of the FSLN, became the national army of Nicaragua.

Anti-Sandinista rebels under the leadership of Colonel Enrique Bermudez Varela launched an insurgency against the FSLN regime in 1981 as the Nicaraguan Democratic Forces (FDN) – also known as the 'Contras'. Sandinistas won 61 of 96 seats in parliamentary elections in 1984, and Daniel Ortega was elected president. Government and FDN rebels signed a ceasefire in 1988. In 1990, Ortega elections to Violeta Chamorro and the National Opposition Union (UNO).

Defection

Yes. Gorman (1981)'s early account of the Sandinista regime suggests a relatively high level of ex-rebel commander loyalty. Gorman (1981) observed that the Nicaragua's insurgent-ruled state had achieved "a high degree of political stability coupled with, and partially growing out of, the consolidation of power in the hands of a cohesive revolutionary vanguard" (p. 133). The military general staff and Ministry of Interior leadership consisted exclusively of FSLN veterans (Ibid, p. 142-144).

Other accounts also suggest a high degree of ex-FSLN commander loyalty to the Sandinista regime. Ruhl (2003) writes that the EPS officer corps was "highly politicized and loyal to the Sandinista party's socialist ideals" (p. 118). The army leadership and party leadership were merged. For example, Humberto Ortega, one of the nine members of the FSLN's executive National Directorate, became the chief commander of the EPS. The EPS expanded from 5,000 troops to approximately 18,000 by the mid-1980s (Gorman). In 1984 the government implemented a mandatory draft, and the EPS grew to over 60,000 (Walker 1991). According to Horton (1998), recruits to the EPS were drawn from "thousands of young people who joined in the fierce street fighting of the last months of the insurrection against Somoza. Some of these initial recruits formed a core group of mid-level army officers who in a few years would lead counterinsurgency campaigns in Nicaragua's mountainous interior and Atlantic coast" (Horton 1998, p. 120). Horton (1998) writes that "Sandinista leaders did not want to create a traditional 'apolitical' Latin American army, but rather a revolutionary and nationalist armed force. Political training for EPS soldiers emphasized the legitimacy of the FSLN's role as vanguard of the revolutionary process … as well as a responsibility of soldiers to set a moral example for the population" (p. 121).

The major exception was the defection from the Sandinista regime of Eden Pastora. Pastora was a top field commander of the FSLN during the anti-Somoza war, and became vice minister of Interior after the 1979 FSLN victory. In 1981, Pastora defected from the regime and fled to Costa Rica, taking with him a network of ex-FSLN fighters from southern Nicaragua, where he created a new rebel group, the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE). ARDE aligned with Contra forces in the civil war against the Ortega-led Sandinista regime (Miranda & Ratliff 1992).

War Intensity

High. The UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level of 2 for 1978-79, intensity level of 1 for 1977.

Rival Group

Yes. The FNLN faction headed by Daniel Ortega competed with two other former FNLN factions during the civil war (Mullenbach)

Third-Party Guarantor

Yes. Cuba supplied 3,500 military advisers to the Sandinista government in 1980 to help build the EPS (Mullenbach, nd).

Multiple Sponsors

Yes. The FSLN received assistance from the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Libya (Mullenbach)

Ideology

Yes. The FSLN adhered to a Marxist-Leninist ideology (Walker 1991).

Ethnic Cleavages

Yes. The FSLN is described as a multi-ethnic (white, black, mestizo) by Miranda & Rafliff (1994).

Anti-Colonial War

No.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

Yes. The FSLN derived from multiple parties and student organizations, including the Movement for a New Nicaragua (Movimiento Nueva Nicaragua, MNN) OR Nicaraguan Revolutionary Youth (NRY) + NPY, Conservative Party, Nicaraguan Socialist Party (NSP) (Braithwaite & Cunningham 2020).

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Iran 1979: Revolutionary Council

Case Narrative

In 1964, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was exiled from Iran for his involvement in organizing demonstrations against the government of Shah Reza Mohammad Pahlavi, whom Khomeini blamed for straying from *sharia* law and allying too closely with the West. Anti-regime sermons delivered by Khomeini from Iraq and France circulated via cassette tapes. In 1975, the Shah banned political opposition parties. In 1977, the Union of National Front Forces (UNFF) was created in opposition to the Shah. In September 1978, "rebels" attacked government positions in Tabriz (Mullenbach, nd). Anti-government demonstrations invited government crackdowns, resulting in hundreds of deaths. Opposition forces received military support from Libya beginning in November 1978 (Mullenbach, nd). In January 1979, Khomeini created the Revolutionary Islamic Council in opposition to the Shah, who fled the country. Khomeini also called on his supporters to create armed militias to defend the revolution. Pro-Khomeini forces and government troops clashed in January and February, and the Iranian government collapsed on February 11, 1979. Khomeini proclaimed the Islamic Republic of Iran on April 2, 1979 under the leadership of the Revolutionary Council. In May 1979 Khomeini ordered the creation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, or "Pasdaran"), which grouped together a number of existing pro-Khomeini militias.

The new Revolutionary Council-led government suppressed a military rebellion in July 1980. Rebel forces called the Mujaheddin e-Khalq (MEK) rebelled against the Khomeini regime in 1981, starting a decade long insurgency. Iran also fought a war against neighboring Iraq from 1980 to 1988. Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei was elected president of Iran in October 1981, and re-elected in 1985. Khomeini died in 1989 and was replaced as Supreme Leader by Khamenei.

Defection

No. Given the suspect loyalty of the regular Iranian army, the IRGC/Pasdaran served as the principal armed force tasked with guarding the security of the Khomeini regime in the 1980s (Wehrey et at 2009). The proficiency of Pasdaran units in street fighting allowed them to effectively repress leftist insurgents in the 1980s (Ibid). No major coup or rebellion attempt by IRGC/Pasdaran commanders occurred in the first decade of the Revolutionary Council's rule. According to Katzman (1993), the loyalty and institutionalization of the IRGC was a primary reason for the peaceful transfer of power after Khomeini's death in 1989.

Nevertheless, the security landscape in Iran following the revolution was highly fractionalized. IRGC/Pasaran units protected Khomeini and his inner circle's grip on power, but the regular army and a vast network of irregular *komitehs* also existed around the country under separate command chains (Wehrey et al 2009, pp. 22-23). Wehrey et al (2009) write: "the fractious rivalry among the informal paramilitaries that marked the revolution's early days has, in a sense, been institutionalized into a domestic security establishment that is characterized by parallelism, redundancy, and competition for resources" (pp. 23-24).

War Intensity

High. Monica Toft's dataset lists a rebel force size of 50,000, lntotaldeaths of 8.9, deaths-per-year of 3750, COW battle of 7500, civdeaths of 41250, battle deaths of 7500, total deaths of 7500.

Rival Group

No.

Ideology

Yes.

Third-Party Guarantor

No.

Multiple Sponsors

No.

Ethnic Cleavages

No.

Anti-Colonial War

No.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

Yes. The Revolutionary Council derived from religious organizations in Iran, as well as opposition political parties (Ciment & Hill 1999).

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Chad 1982: FAN (Hissene Habré faction)

Case Narrative

In 1965, a mainly Muslim coalition of northern opposition groups rebelled against the southern-based government of Francois Tombalbaye, forming the Front for the National Liberation of Chad (FROLINAT). FROLINAT rebels operated from bases in Darfur and received military training from North Korea. In 1976, FROLINAT split into several factions, including the Forces Armées du Nord (FAN) led by General Hissene Habré. After numerous rounds of war-fighting and peace negotiations between 1976 and 1982, including a period of power-sharing in 1978-79, Habré's FAN forces captured the capital of N'Djamena on June 7, 1982 (Azevedo 1998). Habré became the recognized ruler of Chad, and his rebel army was rebranded as the Forces armées nationales tchaddienes (FANT). Habré ruled the country until he was himself deposed in 1990 by the Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS) led by the former FANT commander-in-chief, Idriss Déby. According to Bercault (2013), during his rule Habré attempted to construct a "dictatorship without precedent" (p. 7).

Defection

Yes. In January 1983 FAN was dissolved and re-organized as the FANT. While the FANT included some former enemies of Habré, senior appointed commanders were exclusively ex-FAN loyalists of Habré (Bercault 2013, p. 59). In 1984, Habré diminished the power of ex-FAN; the political arm of FAN was dissolved and replaced by a new legislative body, the National Union for Independence and the Revolution (UNIR), whose members were nominated by the president (Ibid).

Habré cultivated a large network of informants within the government and created a number of parallel security institutions, including a secret political police force, that reported to him directly (Bercault 2013; Azevedo 1998). When FANT forces were ordered to undertake sensitive tasks in the civil war against rebel forces of the deposed GUNT regime, Habré made sure to place loyalists that he could control in charge of operations, and often participated in front-line combat himself (Bercault 2013, p. 22). Important agents of the state and the army were frequently spied upon by secret police agents (Ibid).

The FANT engaged in significant, costly warfighting on Habré's behalf (Burr & Collins 1998). In the summer of 1982, Habré ordered FAN forces to conquer the south against rebelling "commandos" of the Sara ethnic group. In 1986-87, FANT forces pushed Libyan forces out of northern Chad in intense warfighting in the Aouzou strip.

In 1989, a number of Zaghawa allies of Habré, including the FANT chief of staff, the Minister of Interior, and military advisor Idriss Déby, fled Chad after being accused of participating in a coup plot. The reasons for the breakdown in relations between Habré and these ex-FAN commanders are unclear, but may include illegal arms sales and the fact that Habré was resentful of the prestige accruing to the Zaghawa as a result of FANT victories over Libyan soldiers (Bercault 2013). Déby himself was a close ally of Habré and had served as *chef d'état-major* of

FANT from 1983 to 1985. Déby regrouped with his followers in Sudan and launched a new rebellion against Habré. In late 1990 Déby's forces captured N'Djaména.

In sum, the FAN successfully rebuilt its rebel army as a national military. Habré enjoyed high levels of loyalty from ex-FAN commanders in the FANT even as he waged a costly civil war against other domestic rebel challengers. However, Habré did not rely on the FANT alone to secure his regime, and built extensive parallel security institutions as a coup-proofing tactic. There is little evidence that ex-FAN commanders retained significant private armed networks outside of the FANT. However, when relations deteriorated between Habré and a faction of (Zaghawa) FANT commanders in 1989, the FAN-ruled regime was fatally destabilized.

War Intensity

High. The UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level of 1 for Frolinat from 1966-1970. The group is labelled FAN (Forces Armées du Nord) thereafter. FAN is coded with an intensity level of 1 from 1976-77 and 1981-82, and an intensity level of 2 for 1979 and 1980.

Rival Group

Yes. Following the split of FROLINAT into multiple factions, FAN competed with rump FROLINAT leaders for support among Muslim populations (Mullenbach)

Ideology

No. Available sources do not indicate any clear political ideology behind the FAN.

Third-Party Guarantor

No. The United States and France provided some logistical and material support to the FAN (Farah 2000), but no peacekeeping or monitoring forces assisted the process of military reconstruction.

Multiple Sponsors

Yes. FROLINAT/FAN received support from Libya, North Korea, and Egypt (Mullenbach).

Ethnic Cleavages

Yes. The FAN was a mainly northern/Muslim movement but recruited from multiple ethnic groups including the Zagahwa, Masalit, and Toubou (Burr and Collins 1999, p. 39).

Anti-Colonial War

No.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

Yes. The FAN derived from a existing rebel group, the Second Liberation Army (Braithwaite & Cunningham 2020).

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Uganda 1986: NRM

Case Narrative

In 1981, Yoweri Museveni defected from the regime of Milton Obote and launched a new rebellion. Museveni was a former Ugandan Minister of Defense, and a former commander of the UNLF and of other insurgent movements. The National Resistance Movement (NRM) was founded under the leadership of Museveni, with an armed wing called the National Resistance Army (NRA). The NRA waged a guerrilla insurgency against the elected Obote government until 1985, then fought the military junta of Tito Okello until 1986. On January 26 1986 the NRA took control of Kampala and soon declared a new government under the control of Museveni and the NRM. The NRA became the national army of Uganda. The NRM regime soon faced multiple armed rebellions in the north (including the Holy Spirit Movement and later the Lord's Resistance Army), which were repressed by NRA forces. The NRA was renamed the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDL) in 1995. Museveni remains in power to this day.

Defection

No. Museveni incorporated several challenger armed groups into the NRA after taking power, causing the national army to expand rapidly from 1986 to 1988 (Mamdani 1988). Sources indicate that the NRM regime faced numerous coup attempts from within the NRA, though these attempts were led by factions that had previously fought against Museveni in the 1981-86 civil war. The Center for Systemic Peace lists 4 attempted coups between March 1986 and January 1 1987 in Uganda (Center for Systemic Peace, n.d.). The October 1986 coup plot was alleged to have been led by Panlo Muwanga, a former minister and vice-president under the Obote regime. No details are provided for the remaining plots. Lindemann (2011) also mentions a coup plot from April 7-11 in 1988, but notes that few details are known about its perpetrators. Conversations with Uganda experts indicate that the plot was likely headed by military officers who were not formerly part of the NRA.

To safeguard against these threats, the NRM regime employed extensive counterbalancing within the NRA. According to Lindemann: "Museveni has even created about 30 different security outfits, which are regarded as a key factor in the stability of his regime … The most prominent and privileged paramilitary organisation are the Special Forces that recently grew out of the Presidential Guard Brigade (PGB) and are headed by Museveni's son, Lt Col Muhoozi Kainerugaba" (Lindemann 2011, p. 24).

Despite the presence of factionalism within the expanded NRA and recurrent rebellions in the north and eastern regions of the country, Museveni and the NRM maintained a high degree of loyalty and commitment from the old-NRA core of commanders. Donors lauded the Museveni regime for building a "strong and stable state" and restoring economic growth in Uganda after the chaos of the Amin and Obote regimes (Fisher 2014, p. 326). Kannyo (2004) writes that "Among the NRM's achievements has been the maintenance of civilian control over the military" (p. 138).

War Intensity

High. UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level of 1 for NRM/A for 1981, intensity level of 2 from 1982-86.

Rival Group

Yes. Multiple armed groups also fought the Obote regime during the 1981-1986 period, including the Uganda Freedom Movement and the Uganda Popular Front (Mullenbach).

Ideology

No. Shubert (2006) describes the NRM/A as largely disinterested in Marxist theory or ideology, despite the past statements of leaders like Museveni in support of FRELIMO-style socialism.

Anti-Colonial War

No.

Ethnic Cleavages

Yes. Katumba-Wamala (2000, p. 166) describes the NRA as a multi-ethnic organization, mainly consisting of the Banyankole and Baganda.

Third-Party Guarantor

No. Unlike the UNLF, the NRA seized power without foreign assistance or intervention (Mamdani 1988).

Multiple Sponsors

No. See notes above.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

Yes. The NRM derived from the Ugandan Patriotic Movement, a political party (Braithwaite & Cunningham 2020).

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Namibia 1989: SWAPO

Case Narrative

In 1960, the Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) was created in opposition to the South African government in Namibia under the leadership of Sam Nujoma. In July 1966, SWAPO established an armed wing, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN). From 1966 to 1988, PLAN fought a guerrilla insurgency against the government, operating mainly from bases in Angola. PLAN rebels received assistance from the Soviet Union, Cuba, Algeria, China, North Korea, and Tanzania. In 1988, South Africa agreed to independence for Namibia. In 1989, national elections delivered a SWAPO victory, and South African military forces withdrew from the country.

PLAN forces were integrated into the new Namibian Defence Forces (NDF). The military integration plan called for the demobilization of nearly 50,000 PLAN fighters and the reorganization of the armed forces through a 50-50 power-sharing arrangement between PLAN and ex-SWATF forces within the NDF (Dzinesa & Rupiya 2005). In reality, ex-PLAN members dominated in the new army, and many ex-SWATF officers resigned. The top commander of PLAN, Jerobeam Dimo Hamaambo, was appointed chief of staff of the NDF.

Defection

No. From 1990 to 2000, no significant defections from ex-PLAN commanders occurred within the NDF. Sam Nukoma enjoyed high levels of loyalty from ex-rebel forces. Since 1990 NDF troops have deployed on several peacekeeping missions, as well as to the DRC. NDF troops also suppressed an internal rebellion by the Caprivi Liberation Army. Dzinesa & Rupiya (2005) argued that since 1990, the SWAPO regime has succeeded in using ex-PLAN forces to build an integrated military and foster national cohesion.

War Intensity

High. UCDP Dyadic Dataset codes intensity level 2 for 1978, 1980-83, and 1986-88, and intensity level 1 other years between 1966 and 1989.

Rival Group

No.

Third-Party Guarantor

Yes. In 1989, the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was created to monitor Namibia's ceasefire and assist in the rebuilding of security institutions. UNTAG was involved in disarmament and demobilization of ex-rebel fighters, as well as military restructuring (Rupiya, p. 205). UNTAG was assisted by a British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT), as in Zimbabwe.

Multiple Sponsors

Yes. SWAPO rebels received assistance from the Soviet Union, Cuba, Algeria, China, North Korea, and Tanzania (Mullenbach nd)

Ethnic Cleavages

Yes. SWAPO recruited from multiple ethnic groups in Namibia (Ciment & Hill 1999).

Ideology

Yes. SWAPO adhered to a socialist revolutionary political ideology.

Anti-Colonial War

Yes.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

Yes. SWAPO derived from the Ovamboland People's Organization (Braithwaite & Cunningham 2020).

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Chad 1990: MPS

Case Narrative

In 1989 Idris Déby, a top military advisor to Chadian president Hissene Habré, fled the country after coming under suspicion by Habré for participating in a coup plot. Déby regrouped with a small number of fighters in Sudan and began a rebellion against Habré's regime. In 1990 the Patriotic Movement for Salvation (MPS) was formed under Déby's leadership with support from Libya. After multiple failed invasion attempts, in the fall of 1990 Déby's MPS forces successfully routed pro-Habré forces and seized control of the capital of N'Djaména on December 1. Déby proclaimed himself president two days later.

Like Habré's regime in 1982, the Déby regime in the 1990s faced multiple new center-seeking rebellions in addition to challenges from pre-existing armed groups that controlled territory in Chad's periphery. Nevertheless, Déby retained power through both warfare and diplomacy, winning election in 1996 and 2001.

Defection

Yes. After taking power in 1990, rebel troops aligned with the MPS soon integrated into the national Chadian army (ANT). Other security forces such as the General Direction of the Security Services of State Institutions (DGSSIE), the Republican Guard, and the National Nomatic Guard were also dominated by former MPS rebels seen as loyal to Déby (Tubiana & Debos 2017, pp. 13-14). A small rump of pro-Habré and southern forces were also integrated into the army, mostly at junior positions (Debos 2013, chapter 5).

Within a year of taking power, Déby's regime faced an alleged military rebellion led by interior minister Maldom Bada Abbas on October 13, 1991, which was violently suppressed. At the time of his rebellion, Abbas was the Vice-President of the MPS (Amnesty International 1991). Abbas came from the Hadjerai ethnic group, and was among the first former Habré military leaders to join with Déby and the MPS (Toingar 2014, p. 20). The reasons for the split between Abbas and Déby are unclear. According to Toingar (2014), the conflict likely reflected paranoia on the part of Déby due to Abbas's stature within the MPS and his influence among the Hadjerai tribe, which marked him as a potential threat. Abbas was arrested and sent into exile.

In 1998, the former justice minister and defense minister Yossouf Togoimi, an ethnic Toubou, launched another anti-Déby insurgency, the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT). The MDJT eventually reached a peace agreement with the Déby government. Like Maldom's rebellion in 1991, the reasons for Togoimi's defection remain unclear, but may have been caused by fear of an impending purge by Déby.

Much like Habré's FAN-ruled regime, Déby's MPS regime sustained power amid multiple armed challenges by carefully counterbalancing the armed forces and stacking sensitive positions with co-ethnics, kin members, or other trusted individuals who fought with Déby in previous rounds of Chad's civil wars. Stability and military cooperation remained elusive and contingent on extensive bribery and counterbalancing. Even among his closest loyalists, Tubiana & Debos (2017) write: "Déby does not … have complete faith in the loyalty of his Beri officers" (p. 14).

War Intensity

High. The UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level of 2 for MPS in 1990. Precursor groups including MOSANAT and Revolutionary Forces of 1 April are coded as intensity level of 1 in 1989.

Rival Group

No.

Third-Party Guarantor

No.

Multiple Sponsors

No. The MPS received support from Libya (Mullenbach).

Ethnic Cleavages

Yes. The MPS was dominated by Déby's Beri coethnics, but also included other tribes and ethnic groups (Tubiana & Debos 2017, p. 13).

Anti-Colonial War

No.

Ideology

No. Available sources do not indicate any clear political ideology behind the MPS.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

Yes. The MPS derived from prior rebel groups (MOSANAT, Revolutionary Forces of 1 April) and the Chadian army (Braithwaite & Cunningham 2020).

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Ethiopia 1991: TPLF/EPRDF

Case Narrative:

In February 1975, the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) was formed under the leadership of Gesese Ayyele in the Tigray region of Ethiopia in rebellion against the Derg's military regime. In the late 1970s and 1980s the TPLF waged a guerrilla-style insurgency against the Derg and fought with other rebel groups in Ethiopia. In 1983, Meles Zenawi became the chairman of the TPLF's executive committee. In 1988 the TPLF merged with the Ethiopian People's Defense Movement (EPDM), a largely Amhara-based rebel movement, to form the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). TPLF members remained the core political and military leaders of the EPRDF (Milkias 2003). Meles Zenawi became the chairman of the EPRDF in 1989. On May 28 1991, EPRDF rebels overthrew the Derg and created a transitional government under the presidency of Meles Zenawi. TPLF/EPRDF fighters were integrated into the Ethiopian armed forces. Government forces fought against Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) rebels in the 1990s. A new constitution was instituted in 1995, and Zenawi was elected as Prime Minister at the head of an EPRDF-led government. From 1998-2000, Ethiopian forces fought an intense border war against the newly independent state of Eritrea.

Defection

No. After the collapse of the Derg, the Ethiopian army was disbanded and TPLF/EPRDF forces assumed leadership of the state security forces (Luckham 2002; Adejumobi 2006). In 1993, the irregular guerrilla forces of the rebel movement were demobilized, with command positions in the new national army, the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) dominated by Tigray officers (Library of Congress 2005, pp. 18-19).

Ex-rebel forces were at the forefront of government efforts to crush rebellions in the Oromo region, and in intense fighting against Eritrea from 1998-2000 (Luckham 2002). Despite the intensity and costliness of these military campaigns, there were no significant military defections from within ex-rebel military ranks during the first decade of the TPLF/EPRDF regime. Ex-rebel forces were instrumental to Ethiopia's military victory over Eritrea (Ibid).

The EPRDF government has relied solely on the ENDF and has not created parallel paramilitary forces or secret police to counterbalance against the national army.

War Intensity

High. For the TPLF, the UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level of 1 for 1978-79 and 1986, intensity level of 2 for 1976, 1980-85, 1987-88. The successor group EPRDF is coded as intensity level of 2 for 1989-1991.

Rival Group

Yes. The TPLF competed with other anti-Derg rebel movements in Ethiopia, including the EPDM (Mullenbach).

Ethnic Cleavages

Yes. Young (1996) describes the EPRDF as "a coalition of ethnic political movements" (p. 531). However, Milkias (2003) notes that the TPLF itself received support almost exclusively from the Tigray population in the 1980s (p. 14).

Ideology

Yes. Zewde (2001) and Milkias (2003) describe the TPLF as a Marxist-Leninist movement.

Anti-Colonial War

No.

Third-Party Guarantor

No. Sources do not indicate any significant third-party intervention during or after the TPLF/EPRDF victory.

Multiple Sponsors

No. See notes above.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

Yes. The TPLF derived from the Tigrayan National Organization (TNO) and the Tigrayan University Students' Association (TUSA) (Braithwaite & Cunningham 2020).

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Eritrea 1991: EPLF

Case Narrative

In 1962, Eritrea was annexed by Ethiopia, leading to the formation of several armed independence movements. In 1970, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) was established under the leadership of Issaias Afewerki with assistance from Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Syria. From 1974 to 1991 the EPLF fought against the military Derg regime for control of Eritrea, establishing large "liberated territories" in the rural countryside and sustaining heavy losses (Pool 1993). Following the collapse of the Derg in May 1991, the EPLF created a provisional government to rule all of Eritrea. In 1993 Eritrea held a referendum in favor of independence from Ethiopia, and Afewerki was elected president. The EPLF rebel army formed the core of the Eritrean Defence Force (EDF), created in 1993. In 1994, the EPLF's political wing was formally disbanded and reconstituted as the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), Eritrea's ruling political party. From 1998 to 2000 the EDF fought a border war against the armed forces of Ethiopia. The regime has also faced new multiple rebel challengers since taking power, mostly based in Sudan.

Defection

No. There are no known instances of coup attempts or open military defiance in the first decade of the Afewerki/EPLF regime. According to Kasfir (2004), the PJDF regime ruled Eritrea "with an iron hand" since seizing power in 1991. Pool (2001) similarly describes the post-independence period as a continuation of the EPLF's organizational system of top-down control and cohesion. During the Eritrea-Ethiopia war, the Eritrean military was recognized as an effective fighting force (Global Security, nd).

After winning *de facto* control of Eritrea in 1991, the EPLF maintained a mobilized guerrilla army of approximately 100,000 fighters for two years until *de jure* independence in 1993. Some fighters expressed discontent at this arrangement since most rebel fighters were not paid, though Pool (1993) notes that this discontentment was "short-lived" (p. 392).

Despite the national army's apparent loyalty, the Afewerki regime is reported to engage in counterbalancing tactics, including the creation of three Presidential Guards of about 2,000 troops each (Global Security, nd). Moreover, EDF units are "frequently rotated among the regional commanders to combat the formation of loyalty between soldiers and commanders" (Ibid). The country has no known paramilitary forces (Library of Congress 2005).

War Intensity

High. UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level of 1 for 1973, 1980-81, 1986. All other years from 1975-1991 are intensity level of 2.

Rival Group

Yes. The EPLF competed with the Popular Liberation Front (PLF) during the civil war (Mullenbach).

Ethnic Cleavages

Yes. Pool (2001) describes the EPLF as a group that overcame both religious and ethnic cleavages.

Ideology

Yes. According to Iyob (1995), the EPLF followed "a selective, pragmatic (even eclectic) application of Marxist philosophy adapted to the particular context of Eritrea's national liberation struggle" (p. 124). Pool (2001) also argues that the EPLF was organized around Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

Third-Party Guarantor

No. There were no significant third-party intervention forces in Eritrea after independence.

Multiple Sponsors

Yes. The EPLF received financial and military assistance from Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and Syria (Mullenbach).

Anti-Colonial War

Yes.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

Yes. The EPLF derived from a prior rebel group, the ELF (Braithwaite & Cunningham 2020).

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Afghanistan 1992: Jamiyat-i-Islam (Rabbani-Massoud forces)

Case Narrative

In 1972, Burhanuddin Rabbani became the leader of Jamiat-i-Islam in Afghanistan, a pro-Islam political movement that opposed the Soviet-backed government of Afghanistan. Afghan mujahideen insurgents, including Jamiat-i-Islam, fought a civil war against the Soviet-backed government and Soviet troops from the late 1970s to the late 1980s. Jamiat-i-Islam recruited primarily among ethnic Tajiks. Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, leaving the government of General Sayid Mohammed Najibullah at war with mujahideen factions. On April 15, 1992, the Najibullah regime was overthrown by a coalition of mujahideen rebel forces and defecting units from Najibullah's government. Kabul fell into the hands of a northern coalition of Tajik and Uzbek forces controlled by Shah Massoud and Rashid Dostum. A new broad-based regime called the Islamic Jihad Council (IJC) was formed, and Burhanuddin Rabbani became the president of Afghanistan on June 28, 1992. Massoud served as Rabbani's chief military ally and Minister of Defence. The military forces of the Rabbani regime were dominated by Massoud's mainly-Tajik armed forces, in alliance with Dostum's militias and some former Najibullah units (Rubin 2000; Rubin 1995).

Civil war and combat to control the capital continued. Pashtun and Pakistani-supported mujahideen forces led by Gulboddin Hakmatyar vied for power against the non-Pashtun Rabanni-Massoud government (Rubin 2000). Beginning in 1994, the Rabbani-Massoud regime began fighting against the Taliban insurgency. The Taliban captured Kabul in September 1996. Rabanni and Massoud's government remained international recognized, but controlled only a small portion of Afghanistan. Rabanni and Massoud's forces rallied with the Northern Alliance in 2001 to depose the Taliban government and retake power in Kabul.

Defection

No. The Rabbani-Massoud regime did not suffer significant defections from its own core group of commanders in the 1992-1996 period. The major potential exception is that Rashid Dostum, who had helped the Massoud-Rabbani regime come to power by defeating Najibullah, defected in 1994 to join an anti-Kabul alliance with Hekmatyar (Jalali 2017, p. 437). However, Dostum himself had been a very late joiner to the Massoud-Rabbani forces, defecting from the Najibullah regime only in 1992. Thus, the coding decision for this case largely hinges on whether Dostum is considered as an external ally of the Jamiyat-i-Islam movement that took power in Afghanistan in 1992, or as a member of a broader non-Pashtun movement that included Rabbani, Massoud, and Dostum.

Whether or not the regime maintained ex-rebel commander loyalty, it failed to solidify control over Pashtun areas of the country controlled by rival warlords and mujahideen groups. Jalali writes that "The Tajik-led Kabul administration (1992-1996), under Burhanuddin Rabbani and his military chief, Ahmad Shah Massoud, did not succeed in its attempts to broaden its base. Nor did it, in more than nominal terms, organize a united army that could support the reunification of the state" (p. 437). Nonetheless, the Rabbani-Massoud regime maintained a military force strong enough to hold onto power in Kabul for four years of intense civil war, despite multiple foreign-

backed insurgencies in Afghanistan. This was an impressive feat given the numerically small size of Tajiks in Afghan society.

War Intensity

High. UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level of 1 for 1990-1992, intensity level of 2 for 1979-1989.

Rival Group

Yes. Jamiat-i-Islam competed with other mujahedeen forces during fighting against the Najibullah regime (Mullenbach).

Ethnic Cleavages

No. Rubin (2000) describes the Massoud as relying "almost entirely on Panjsheri Tajiks" (p. 1795).

Ideology

No. The Jamiyat-i-Islam were a non-communist political movement with a moderate brand of political Islam (Rubin 1995).

Third-Party Guarantor

No.

Multiple Sponsors

No. The United States provided material support to Tajik mujahedeen forces in the 1980s (Mullenbach).

Anti-Colonial War

No.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

Yes. Jamiyat-i-Islam derived from Muslim Youth (Braithwaite & Cunningham 2020).

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Tajikistan 1992: Popular Front for Tajikistan (PFT)

Case Narrative

In 1991, Tajikistan declared independence from the Soviet Union under a government led by Rahkmon Nabiyev, leader of the Communist Party and head a political coalition of northern Khojandi families. Anti-government demonstrations occurred in early 1992. The security forces fragmented into competing factions, and a large number of militias formed (Driscoll 2015). In September or October, the Popular Front for Tajikistan (PFT) was established under the leadership of Sangak Safarov, Safareli Kenjayev, Langari Langariev, and Rustam Abdurahimov (Nourzhanov & Bleuer 2013). The PFT was comprised of a mixture of former Soviet leaders and underground criminal bosses, mainly based in the southern Kulobi region (Driscoll 2015). From May to November 1992, competing militias battled for control over Dushanbe, with no ruling government gaining undisputed acceptance. In October, PFT forces captured the capital. The Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan, now under the control of PFT militia leaders, forced Nabiyez to resign and installed Emomali Rakhmonov as head of state. Sangak Safarov, along with other top PFT commanders, took control of Tajik armed forces. Safarov was killed in a shootout in 1993.

From 1993 to 1997 the Rakhmonov regime fought a civil war against the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), a rebel group with a power base in the eastern Pamir region. In 1997 the UTO agreed to a ceasefire and a power-sharing settlement that ended the war.

Defection

Yes. The field commanders of Rakhmonov's PFT/Kulobi militia alliance maintained large private armies for the duration of the Tajik civil war (1992-1997). Driscoll (2015) and Markowitz (2013) provide similar descriptions of Rakhmonov's coup-proofing tactics, which involved establishing several new state security forces headed by personal loyalists, counterbalancing against the national army, and extensive bribery of ex-PFT commanders.

In 1996, a group of ex-PFT commanders led by Ibodullo Boimatov and Mahmud Khudoiberdiyev, who had both helped to install Rakhmonov, rebelled against the Rahkmonov regime (Driscoll 2015, p. 153). The commanders feared that a power-sharing deal with UTO commanders would dilute their control over the security apparatus. The mutineers were bought off, and the rebellion subsided. Later, both Boimativ and Khudoiberdiyez were purged from the ruling coalition (Ibid, p. 154).

War Intensity

Low. The UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level 1 for 1992.

Rival Group

Yes. Multiple armed factions and warlords competed for power in Dushanbe in 1991-1992 (Driscoll 2015).

Ideology

No. The Rakhmonov alliance was best described as a conservative and anti-Islamic political movement (Markowitz 2013).

Third-Party Guarantor

Yes. Russia maintained a significant military presence in Tajikistan after the installation of Rakhmonov, and provided aid and training to rebuild the Tajik armed forces.

Multiple Sponsors

No.

Ethnic Cleavages

Yes. The PFT was an alliance of several ethnic groups in Tajikistan (Garmi, Hissori, Kulobi), though it was dominated by a core Kulobi clan (Driscoll 2015).

Anti-Colonial War

No.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

Yes. The PFT derived from former government forces and underground criminal groups (Nourzhanov & Bleuer 2013).

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Azerbaijan 1993: Forces of Suret Huseynov/Heydar Aliev

Case Narrative

In 1991, Azerbaijan declared its independence from the Soviet Union under the leadership of Ayaz Niyaz Mutalibov. Abdulfaz Ali Elchibey was elected president in 1992 at the head of a new nationalist government, the Popular Front. However, Elchibey's government failed to secure order across Azerbaijan and lost territory in the contested area of Nagorno-Karabakh, leading to the emergence of numerous regional warlords who amassed militia forces and created new political parties (Cornell 2011). Among these warlords who Suret Huseynov, a former factory boss and Azerbaijani military commander in northern Karabakh, and Heydar Aliev, and former communist-era leader. In February 1993, Elchibey fired Huseynov for insubordination. In May, Huseynov and Elchibey's forces clashed over control of Russian armaments. Huseynov turned his troops eastward and engaged in a campaign to capture Baku and remove Elchibey. With his forces in effective control of the capital, Huseynov stripped Elchibey of his power and agreed that the presidency would pass to Heydar Aliev, while Huseynov himself became prime minister, minister of defence and minister of interior. Huseynov's militia units integrated into the official Azerbaijan military. By 1997, Aliev had consolidated his power under a centralized presidency, eliminated rival warlord challengers, and settled the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Defection

Yes. In September 1994, the Huseynov-Aliyez alliance collapsed. Huseynov's forces seized strategic positions in Gandja, his territorial stronghold. Aliyev accused Huseynov of plotting a coup against the government (Cornell 2011, p. 86). Huseynov fled to Russia and joined forces with the ousted former President, Mulatibov.

War Intensity

Low. UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level of 1 for 1993.

Rival Group

No.

Ideology

No. Sources do not indicate that the Huseynov-Aliev alliance was motivated by political ideology.

Third-Party Guarantor

No.

Multiple Sponsors

No.

Ethnic Cleavages

No.

Anti-Colonial War

No.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

Yes. The forces of Suret Husseynov derived from government armed forces (Braithwaite & Cunningham 2020).

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Rwanda 1994: RPF

Case Narrative

In the 1960s and 1970s, ethnic violence in Rwanda drove many Tutsi refugees in Uganda. In 1979, a group of these Tutsi refugees formed the Rwanda Alliance for National Unity (RANU) with the intention of eventually returning to Rwanda. In 1981, when Yoweri Museveni formed the NRA in rebellion against the Ugandan government of Milton Obote, Rwandan Tutsi refugees joined the NRA at the rank-and-file and commander level. Approximately 3,000 Rwandan Tutsi were members of the NRA when it took power in Uganda in 1986 (Prunier 1993, p. 125).

In 1987, RANU renamed itself the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) under the leadership of Fred Rwigyema. In October 1990, RPF troops led by Rwigyema defected from the Uganda military and invaded Rwanda. Rwigyema was soon killed in battle, and Paul Kagame assumed military leadership of the RPF later in the month. The RPF and the Rwandan government of Juvenal Habyarimana alternated between fighting and ceasefires from November 1990 to October 1993, when a power-sharing agreement – the Arusha Agreement – was signed. In April 1994, violence resumed when a hardline faction of the Habyarimana regime launched a genocide against Tutsis in Rwanda. RPF rebels resumed their invasion and captured Kigali in July 1994. The rebels installed a transitional government headed by Pasteur Bizimungu, with Kagame serving as Vice-President and Minister of Defence. The RPF rebel army became the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the national army of Rwanda.

After seizing power in 1994, ex-RPF forces engaged in fighting with Hutu militia forces in northwestern Rwanda and eastern Democratic Republic of Congo from 1995 to 2003 (Mullenbach, nd). The Rwandan military also played an active role in the ongoing civil wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo since 1996. In 2003 the RPA was rebranded as the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF).

Defection

No. Following the seizure of power in 1994, the Rwandan military was rebuilt with a leadership of ex-RPF Tutsi officers and significant numbers of Hutu rank-and-file, including veterans of the pro-Habyarimana Forces Armés Rwandaises (Jowell 2014). Jowell (2014) describes the RPA as a "formidable and cohesive military" (p. 278): "Although there have been some desertions at various levels of the hierarchy, there has not been any instance of mass discontent, mutiny, coup attempt or revolution" (Ibid., p. 279). The military also employs political commissars to monitor military units and officers, particularly at lower command levels (Ibid., 284).

Kuehnel and Wilén (2018) similarly argue that "the link between the military and the political élite remains strong" (p. 156), a link that is reinforced by the strong personal loyalty of many ex-RPF officers to the person of Paul Kagame (pp. 159-161).

War Intensity

High. UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level of 1 for 1991-93, intensity level of 2 for 1990 and 1994.

Rival Group

No.

Ideology

No. Kuperman (2004, p. 67) argues that the RPF "abandoned" its Marxist orientation by 1987. Reed (1996) also describes the RPF as a politically eclectic organization, driven by ethno-nationalism more than any clear programmatic ideology.

Ethnic Cleavages

No. The RPF mainly represented Tutsis (Prunier 1993), though large numbers of Hutus were recruited into the national army after taking power (Jowell 2014).

Third-Party Guarantor

Yes. A United Nations peacekeeping mission (UNAMIR) was present in Rwanda during and after the RPF takeover (Mullenbach, nd).

Multiple Sponsors

No. The RPF received assistance from Uganda security forces (former NRM comrades).

Anti-Colonial War

No.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

Yes. The RPF derived from a political party (RANU) and a prior rebel group, the NRM (Braithwaite & Cunningham 2020).

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South Africa 1994: African National Congress / Umkhonto we Sizwe

Case Narrative

In 1952, the African National Congress (ANC) party launched a campaign of civil disobedience against the ruling National Party to protest apartheid policies. Violence escalated in the 1960s, when police forces violently repressed demonstrations, arrested political protestors, and banned the ANC. In 1961, ANC and South African Communist Party (SACP) leaders created an underground guerrilla army, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), under the leadership of Nelson Mandela (Ellis 2016). MK rebels mainly operated from foreign bases and carried out sabotage attacks on government targets inside South Africa. MK commanders received training in the Soviet Union and German Democratic Republic (Lodge 1987). Political and military leadership were highly intertwined: according to Lodge (1987): "the three most senior Umkhonto officers are all members of the NEC [National Executive Council], and at least a third of NEC members have military experience" (p. 10). In 1963, MK leaders – including Nelson Mandela – were arrested and imprisoned. Following the collapse of white regimes in Angola, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique in the 1970s, opportunities for guerrilla activity increased (Worden 2012), and the MK army was estimated to number 10,000 by the mid-1980s (Lodge 1987, p. 5).

Under pressure from the international community and a faltering economy in the early 1990s, President De Klerk agreed to release Mandela from prison and permit free elections. During the transition period from 1990-1994, the ANC pursued political negotiations and maintained its latent military capacity (Cherry 2011). In 1993, Umkhonto leader Chris Hani was assassinated. In legislative elections in 1994, the ANC won a majority of seats and formed a new government, with Mandela elected as president. MK forces integrated into the new South African National Defence Force (SANDF), and ANC members gained control over defense and police cabinet posts (Beck 2000). MK chief of staff Joe Slovo, became housing minister. Another MK commander, Joe Modise, was appointed minister of defense.

Defection

No. No significant defections occurred among ex-MK commanders from the ANC regime after 1994, or after ex-MK commanders gained control of the SANDF in 1998.

During the 1990-1994 transitional period, government and rebel armed forces were placed under the nominal authority of a Joint Military Coordinating Council, jointly chaired by the MK and SADF. Control of the new integrated SANDF initially remained in the hands of ex-SADF officers; the chief of staff of the reorganized army was General George Meiring, a member of the former De Clerk regime. Other Afrikaner officers also retained their positions, as part of the power-sharing settlement. Demobilization and integration began after the 1994 elections. Similar to the Zimbabwean military integration process, MK forces were called to designated assembly points and screened for inclusion (Cherry 2011, pp. 48-49). By June 1995, nearly 12,000 ex-MK forces had integrated into the SANDF.

The guerrilla army commanded by the ANC was much smaller than the SADF, and did not immediately take firm control of the military. Williams (2002) notes that the 1994-1998 period was characterized by the "absorption" of approximately 22,000 MK members into a rebranded but ex-SADF-controlled force of over 90,000 (p. 20). Afrikaans remained the medium of communication and instruction, and most of the senior command positions were retained by ex-SADF officers (Ibid).

In 1998, however, the "conservative axis" of ex-SADF officers in the SANDF had lost power with the resignation of General George Meiring, and the top command positions shifted to ex-MK members along with moderate ex-SADF officers.

War Intensity

Low. The UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level of 1 for 1981-1988.

Rival Group

Yes. The ANC competed with the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania and its armed wing the Azanian People's Liberation Army, which advocated armed struggle for a black nationalist South African state (Mullenbach)

Ideology

Yes. The ANC and MK adhered to socialist liberation ideology.

Ethnic Cleavages

Yes. The ANC and MK recruited from multiple South African ethnic and linguistic groups (Cherry 2011).

Third-Party Guarantor

No.

Multiple Sponsors

Yes. The ANC received support from the USSR, China, and other liberation movements in southern Africa (Mullenbach)

Anti-Colonial War

Yes.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

Yes. The ANC derived from the South African Native Convention (and probably other political movements), and religious organizations (Braithwaite & Cunningham 2020).

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Afghanistan 1996: Taliban

Case Narrative

In 1994, the Taliban Islamic Movement of Afghanistan was created under the leadership of Mullah Mohammed Omar in rebellion against the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani. The Taliban received support from Pakistan, ascribed to a hardline Islamic political ideology, and recruited primarily from ethnic Pashtuns (Rubin 1995). From 1994 to 1996, the Taliban waged guerrilla and mobile warfare against the Rabbani government and other armed factions in Afghanistan (Jalali 2017). Many local warlords and armed factions rallied with the Taliban as they captured more of the country and became viewed as the conflict winners. In September 1996, the Taliban captured Kabul and proclaimed the founding of a new state, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

From 1996 to 2001, the Taliban regime implemented a theocratic form of rule and continued to wage war against holdout rebel groups, including the Rabbani-Massoud forces in the Panjshir valley region. After the September 11 attacks in 2001 against the United States by al Qaeda, the United States led a military intervention to depose the Taliban regime in alliance with northern Tajik and Uzbek militias. The Northern Alliance captured Kabul on November 13, 2001. The Taliban returned to waging guerrilla warfare against the Western-backed government in Kabul.

Defection

No. Though the Taliban regime did not organize a highly professional military, it did not suffer significant defections among top military commanders during its rule. Jalali (2017) argues that under the Taliban regime, the notion of an organized national army commanded by the state "had ceased to exist" (p. 447). Rather, Taliban forces consisted of militias recruited from the madrassas, comprising "odd assortments of armed groups with varying levels of loyalty, political commitment, professional skill, and organizational integrity", while unit-level commanders (*andiwals*) mostly came from veterans of the insurgency against the Soviets in the 1980s (Ibid). A handful of Pashtun ex-army officers operated the Taliban's small airforce, artillery, and armored vehicle fleet. Senior command positions were held exclusively by Taliban mullahs (Ibid, p. 448). Foreign Islamic fighters from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere also trained in Afghanistan and formed separate fighting units under nominal Taliban control (Ibid). Jalali (2017) notes that the anti-Taliban coalition forces in 2001 were "no match for the highly motivated Taliban fighters" (p. 459).

During the October-November 2001 US-assisted campaign by the Northern Alliance against the Taliban, some local Taliban commanders defected. Jalali (2017) writes that as Northern Alliance forces captured territories in the northern provinces of Samangan, Sari-Pul, and Balkh, local Taliban commanders "either switches sides or were bribed into cooperation" (p. 469). However, these late-stage Taliban defections were largely a product of the local military situation after the US intervention in the war and the dramatic territorial gains of Northern Alliance forces (Giustozzi 2020, pp. 18-19). Defections followed the logic of desertion-by-necessity, rather than a breakdown in bargaining or loyalty between the Taliban political leadership and local field commanders.

War Intensity

High. The UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level of 2 for 1995-96.

Rival Group

Yes. The Taliban competed with multiple armed factions in Afghanistan in 1994-1996 (Mullenbach).

Ethnic Cleavages

No. The Taliban relied heavily on ethnic Pashtuns, who constituted the core of the group (Rubin 1995; Jalali 2017).

Ideology

Yes. The Taliban were motivated by a fundamentalist version of Islamic political ideology (Rubin 1995; Crews & Tarzi 2009).

Third-Party Guarantor

Yes. The Taliban were financed and trained by Pakistani military intelligence, who continued to support the training of Taliban armed forces after 1996, and attempted to transform the Taliban militia into a more organized standing army (Crews & Tarzi 2009, p. 29).

Multiple Sponsors

No. The Taliban were supported by Pakistan (Crews & Tarzi 2009).

Anti-Colonial War

No.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

Yes. The Taliban derived from refugees in madrassas in Pakistan (Braithwaite & Cunningham 2020).

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Liberia 1997: NPFL

In 1984, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) was created under the leadership of Thomas Quiwonkpa, a military commander in the Liberia army. Quiwonkpa's coup attempt failed, and NPFL members fled to Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire (Kieh 2004). In 1989, a group of NPFL fighters led by Charles Taylor launched a new rebellion against the government of Samuel Doe. The rebels recruited primarily from the Gio and Mano ethnic groups (Kieh 2004, p. 68). President Doe was killed by an NPFL faction in 1990. The NPFL took control of large swaths of Liberian territory that year. NPFL rebels and Liberian government alternated between fighting and ceasefires until 1996. National elections were held in 1997, in accordance with the Abuja II Accord. Due to the dominant military position of the NPFL, Taylor's party – the National Patriotic Party – carried the elections and Taylor became the President of Liberia. NPFL rebel forces were integrated into the Liberian military.

In 1999, armed factions including Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) launched a new rebellion against Taylor's government, leading to the Second Liberian Civil War (1999-2003), which ousted Taylor from power.

Defection

Yes. After taking power in July 1997, the Taylor regime placed ex-NPFL forces in charge of more than a half-dozen different security agencies (Reno 2004; Adebajo 2002). These included the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), the Liberia National Police (LNP), the Special Operations Division (SOD), a police paramilitary unit, the Anti-Terrorism Unit (ATU), the Special Security Services (SSS), and the Executive Mansion Special Security Unit (SSU). Added to this, the government relied on many irregular militias with names such as "Wild Geese" and "Jungle Lions" (Cook 2003, p. 15). Many ethnic Krahn officers associated with the old Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) were forcibly retired, while the regular army and the national police were "packed" with NPFL members (Reno 2004). These loyalist ex-rebel forces were used by Taylor's regime to eliminate political rivals and prevent the entry of insurgents from neighboring countries (Call 2013).

Demobilization and disarmament programs did not dismantle ex-NPFL networks, which remained armed and active in resource exploitation in areas of the country that had been rebel-controlled since the early 1990s (Reno 2004). Cook (2003) notes that "Both regular and irregular security units, which often included former members of Taylor's defunct NPFL, frequently operated autonomously and engaged in looting and extortion (p. 15). Several of these units later joined anti-Taylor opposition forces within LURD (Ibid).

In 1999, small scale attacks by LURD rebels against the Liberian government began in Voinjama province. LURD rebels included ex-NPFL fighters in their ranks, though the organization was primarily a reformulation of ULIMO-K, a rebel group that participated in the First Liberian Civil War (Call 2013).

Itano (2003) argues that Taylor's army was in near total disarray for much of the war against LURD. As a result of Taylor's strategy "to centralise power in himself and keep the Liberian military fractured and divided …" he was "unable to mount an appropriate defence against a relatively well-organized LURD" (3). On the frontlines, argues Itano, fighting by government forces "appeared to have been waged with little strategy or order … few of the frontline fighters had any means of communication with their superiors and the highest ranking officers stayed well clear of the fiercest fighting" (2003, p. 4). As the war progressed, "Taylor became increasingly paranoid about his own security and increasingly unwilling to trust his safety to any single group, even the elite ATU [Anti-Terrorism Unit]" (Itano 2003, p. 3). To combat LURD, the Taylor government relied on assistance from ex-RUF combatants from Sierra Leone (Pham, p. 182).

As for the ex-NPFL government forces themselves, available research suggests that while ex-NPFL remained quite devoted to Taylor personally, this did not translate into professionalism or military cohesion. Itano (2003), for example, notes that "marijuana and alcohol use was quite widespread. Many were so stoned and drunk they could barely speak, so that deciphering the hierarchy and structure of government forces was extremely difficult. Nearly every commander at every checkpoint claimed to be a general in charge of thousands of men who had fought for Taylor since his days as a rebel, even if he was clearly only in his teens and would have been a small child at that time" (p. 4).

War Intensity

Low. UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level of 1 for 1989 and 1990.

Rival Group

Yes. The NPLF competed with the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPLF) formed by Prince Johnson and ULIMO-K (Mullenbach).

Ideology

No. Reno (1998, 2004) describes Taylor and the NPFL as largely devoid of any coherent political ideology or program.

Ethnic Cleavages

Yes. Kieh (2004) describes the NPFL as an alliance of Gio and Mano ethnic groups.

Third-Party Guarantor

Yes. A force of approximately 5,000 ECOWAS troops was stationed in the country to help maintain order and train the country's security forces after the Abuja II Accords (Adebajo 2002).

Multiple Sponsors

Yes. The NPLF received support from Libya and Bulgaria (Mullenbach).

Anti-Colonial War

No.

Pre-existing Organization

Yes. The NPLF derived from "Taylor + some exiled Liberians & BF troops" (Braithwaite & Cunningham 2020).

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Congo Brazzaville 1997: Forces of Denis Sassou-Nguesso ("Cobras")

Case Narrative

In 1992, the President of Congo Brazaville, Denis Sassou-Nguesso, was defeated in presidential elections by Pascal Lissouba. From 1993 to 1996, supporters of Sassou-Nguesso clashed with government forces, causing a small number of casualties (Mullenbach, nd). The pro-Sassou-Nguesso militia became known as the "Cobras" and were commanded by former members of Sassou-Nguesso's Presidential Guard and Para-Trooper Guard, with Jean-Marie Tassou serving as Cobras chief-of-staff (Carter 2014, p. 83). The rebels also recruited from defecting northern soldiers in the Congolese military (Ibid). In June 1997 hostilities escalated between the Lissouba government and Cobra rebels aligned with Sassou-Nguesso. After failed peace negotiations, rebel forces overthrew the Lissouba government with assistance from Angolan troops in October 1997. Sassou-Nguesso returned to Brazzaville and was re-installed as President of the Republic of Congo on October 25, 1997. Rebel commanders from the Cobra militia supplied the leadership core of the reorganized *Forces Armées Congolaises* (FAC).

Once installed in power, the Sassou-Nguesso regime immediately faced rebellion from two rival armed factions: the Cocoye militia loyal to the ousted president Lissouba, and the Ninjas militia loyal to Bernard Kolélas. The Sassou-Nguesso regime fought these militia until the early 2000s, when most militia members surrendered.

Defection

No. Upon taking power in 1997, the new Sassou-Nguesso regime ordered Cobra soldiers to integrate into the national army (FAC) or demobilize. These orders appear to have been followed without significant acts of defiance (Carey & Mitchell 2014). According to Global Security.org, some demobilized Cobra soldiers retained weapons and committed acts of banditry in the aftermath of Sassou-Nguesso's victory; however by 2003 the Cobras militias was "largely integrated into the army" (GlobalSecurity.org).

During the armed conflict with rebelling militias from 1997 to 2002, ex-Cobras commanders remained loyal to Sassou-Nguesso and meted out considerable violence on behalf of the regime, especially in the Pool region (Carter 2014, pp. 101-107). The regime used a mixture of economic payoffs to top military commanders and selective staffing of Sassou-Nguesso's "civil war loyalists" to key positions in the security apparatus (Ibid, p. 98).

Sources indicate one alleged instance of an attempted coup d'état against Sassou-Nguesso, headed by the army chief of staff Yves Motando, in December 1998. Motando was a former FAC officer who had defected to join the Cobra militia relatively late during the 1997 civil war (Clark & Decalo, p. 291). The coup plot amounted to little, however, and Motando was placed under house arrest. His relation to the Sassou-Nguesso was partly rehabilitated, and he became a military advisor to the president in the 2000s (Ibid).

War Intensity

High. The UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level of 2 for 1997.

Rival Group

No.

Ethnic Cleavages

Yes. Carter (2014) describes the Cobra militia and Sassou-Nguesso's military apparatus as "heterogenous", though largely staffed by northerners from the Likoula region (p. 107).

Ideology

No. Sources do not indicate that the Cobras ascribed to a programmatic political ideology.

Third-Party Guarantor

No. The Cobras received some logistical support from France and Angola, but there was no major third-party intervention that assisted or oversaw the reconstruction of the FAC (Mullenbach).

Multiple Sponsors

Yes. See notes above.

Anti-Colonial War

No.

Pre-existing Organization

Yes. The Cobras derived from the PCT: Parti Congolais du Travail and assorted small political parties (Braithwaite & Cunningham 2020).

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Democratic Republic of Congo 1997: AFDL

Case Narrative

In 1990 Zaire ended its one-party political system. From 1990 to 1996, ethnic violence in eastern Zaire escalated and several military rebellions occurred against the government of Mobutu Sese Seko. Ethnic Tutsi populations in eastern Zaire organized several armed groups for self-protection and to fight Mobutu's government. On October 1, 1996, the pro-Tutsi Alliance for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) was created under the leadership of Laurent Kabila. The AFDL brought together a number of anti-Mobutu factions, but the rebel army was dominated by ethnic Tutsi (Turner 2001). The AFDL also received military and logistical support from the governments of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. Between October 1996 and May 1997 AFDL rebels advanced across Congolese territory and fought against pro-Mobutu forces. Rebels overthrew Mobutu's government in Kinshasa on May 16. Laurent Kabila became president, and Zaire was renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo. After Mobutu fled the country, his remaining armed forces crumbled. The rebel army of the AFDL was reconstituted as the Congolese national army. Masasu Nindaga, one of the AFDL founders, became the chief of staff of army (Turner 2001).

By 1998, new rebel groups emerged in the east to challenge the AFDL/Kabila regime. The alliance between Kabila and Rwanda/Uganda crumbled, and these countries began to support anti-Kabila challengers. From 1998 to 2002 the DRC experienced a series of complex civil wars among several armed groups for control over territory and resources, mainly in the east, drawing in military interventions from several countries in the region. Laurent Kabila was assassinated by a bodyguard (and a former child-soldier) in 2001 and was succeeded by his son Joseph Kabila. The civil war ended through the formation of a power-sharing government in July 2003. Many armed groups and self-defense militia remained active across the country. Joseph Kabila was elected President in 2006.

Defection

Yes. According to the account of Prunier (2009, p. 150), ex-rebel commanders of the ADFL retained private armed networks outside of the reconstituted Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC), creating a confused command structure over which Kabila could not reliably exercise authority. Kabila's ineffective control over his military counterparts came to a head in 1998 when Jean-Pierre Ondekane, commander of the elite 10th Brigade, declared that he no longer recognized Kabila as the state's president. In the subsequent Second Congo War (1998-2003), the FAC performed poorly on the battlefield against other domestic rebel groups, demonstrating "little skill or recognizable military doctrine" and forcing Kabila's government to rely heavily on private mercenaries and external assistance (Janes Sentinel 2002, p. 284).

Turner (2001) and Reyntjens (2001) also describe the Laurent Kabila regime as a fragile political-military coalition that unraveled between 1998 and 2001 in the face of armed challenges to the government. Boya (2001) notes that from July 1998, Kabila dismissed Tutsi members of the military due to fears of a coup. In response, these ex-AFDL Tutsi officers rebelled against Kabila "for reneging on an arrangement that would have assured their security in Kivu in return

for support" (p. 79). According to Reyntjens (2001): "his [Kabila's] political base shrank to a small group of intimates, many of them family members, and the paranoia that reigned in Kinshasa led to the arrest and detention of ever larger numbers of real or imaginary opponents, accused of subversion. Rumours about planned coups d'état abounded: at the end of October 2000, Commander Masasu Ningda, one of the co-founders of Kabila's AFDL rebel movement, was arrested together with dozens of others from the Kivu region" (p. 214). As a result of the deterioration in relations between Kabila and his military commanders, several former AFDL leaders, in addition to Nindaga, joined with anti-Kabila forces in the 1998-2002 civil war. These included Deogratias Bugeria, the former secretary general of the AFDL (Turner 2001).

Turner (2001) concludes that due to the unreliability of ex-AFDL forces and the instability of his political coalition, Laurent Kabila was "unable to build an effective Congolese army … [and] depended on the support of his allies Angola and Zimbabwe to hold the front" (p. 218).

War Intensity

High. The UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level of 2 for 1996-1997.

However, most accounts suggest that the AFDL encountered relatively little threat or military pressure from Mobutu's forces. According to Turner (2001), for example, during the AFDL's seven month rebel campaign, "the corrupt and demoralized Mobutu army disappeared in the face of their advance" (p. 215).

Rival Group

Yes. Multiple anti-Mobutu armed groups operated in Zaire/DRC in the 1996-1997 period.

Ethnic Cleavages

Yes. Turner (2001, p. 216) describes the AFDL as a multi-ethnic coalition.

Third-Party Guarantor

Yes. The AFDL relied heavily on foreign support from Rwanda and Uganda to defeat the Mobutu regime. After 1998, the Kabila government relied on Zimbabwe and Angolan military assistance (Mullenbach).

Multiple Sponsors

Yes. See notes above.

Ideology

Yes. Turner (2001) describes Kabila as an "old Marxist" with ideological affinity for the regimes of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe and Sam Nujoma in Namibia (p. 216).

Anti-Colonial War

No.

Pre-existing Organization

Yes. The AFDL derived from the multiple political parties (Braithwaite & Cunningham 2020).

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Guinea-Bissau 1999: Forces of Ansumane Mané

Case Narrative

In 1997, General Ansumane Mané led a faction of soldiers in a rebellion against the government of Joao Bernardo Vieira. Fighting between Mané's forces and the government continued at a low level until May 1999, when Vieira was overthrown. Mané's military junta assumed control of Guinea-Bissau, with Mané as interim head of state. National elections in November 2000 brought Kumba Iala to power, and the Mané-led regime was dissolved. Mané came into conflict with Iala, and pro-Iala military forces killed Mané on November 30, 2000.

Defection

No. No coup attempts against Mané occurred between May 1999 and November 2000, the period during which his military junta claimed to exercise sovereignty over Guinea-Bissau.

War Intensity

Low. The UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level of 1 for 1998-1999.

Rival Group

No.

Ideology

No. The Mané-led junta was mainly associated with the old PAIGC ruling party in Guinea-Bissau, which espoused a Marxist political ideology (Havik 2012, p. 66). However, sources do not indicate that Mané himself of his ruling junta attempted to implement any specific programmatic ideology.

Ethnic Cleavages

Yes. Massey (2004) describes Mané's forces as a multi-ethnic coalition.

Third-Party Guarantor

No.

Multiple Sponsors

No.

Anti-Colonial War

No.

Pre-existing Organization

Yes. Mane's forces derived government armed forces (Braithwaite & Cunningham 2020).

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Kosovo 1999: KLA

Case Narrative

In 1996, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was created under the leadership of Adem Jashari in opposition to the Yugoslavian government of Slobodan Milosevic. The KLA primarily represented ethnic Albanians in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo. The KLA initially employed small hit-and-run attacks with lightly armed fighters organized into small cells (Ozerdem 2003). Some KLA members were former Yugoslav army officers. In 1998 and 1999, KLA insurgents and Yugoslav troops engaged in high-intensity armed conflict for control of Kosovo, which included ethnic cleansing against Albanian Kosovars. Jashari was killed in 1998, and Hashim Thaci emerged as the new KLA leader. NATO intervened militarily in support of the KLA beginning in March 1999. In June 1999, Yugoslav troops began to withdraw from Kosovo in accordance with negotiated peace accords. The United Nations and NATO authorized multinational peacekeeping deployments to Kosovo that month. Kosovo became functionally autonomous from Yugoslavia (now Serbia), and was governed as a NATO protectorate.

Members of the KLA insurgent army were integrated as a civil defense militia known as the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). Though Kosovo formally had no national army, the KPC operated and was perceived as the de facto national army (Ozerdem 2003). As of May 1999, the KLA also created a political wing, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), headed by Thaci. From 1999 to 2001, Thaci assumed de facto control over Kosovo and appointed an interim government (Perritt 2008). In 2001 elections, a political coalition headed by Ibrahim Rugova – a longtime Kosovo independence leader – took power, with Rugova serving as president. Thaci and the PDK controlled the office of Prime Minister and remained in power at the local level in many municipalities (Perritt 2008). In 2007, the PDK won elections. As Prime Minister, Thaci announced his intention to seek formal independence for Kosovo, which happened in 2008. Thaci was elected President of Kosovo in 2016.

Defection

No. Ultimately, most KLA commanders remained loyal to the postwar regime in which Thaci remained a dominant political power broker. Sources do not indicate any major incidents of rebellion or coup-plotting.

Ozerdem (2003) notes that the KPC's organizational structure mirrored that of the KLA, and that the KPC inherited the "leaders and loyalties" of the guerrilla army (p. 85). The former KLA chief of staff Agim Ceku, was the top KPC commander before becoming Prime Minister in 2006 (Perritt 2008). Perritt (2008) provides the following description of ex-KLA commanders' paths: "A number, especially KLA unit commanders, became soldiers or officers in the TMK or KPS. Others obtained employment with local service enterprises, NGOs, UNMIK, or OSCE. Some pursued education. Paradoxically, many of the young people who were most actively engaged in postconflict politics were ones who had supported the KLA and had longed to fight but had not. Several of them took positions as political advisers or administrative assistants to the former KLA commanders-turned-politicians. Many of them were the most loyal advocates of KLA values" (p. 165).

War Intensity

High. UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level 2 for 1998 and 1999.

Rival Group

No.

Third-Party Guarantor

Yes. In June 1999, the UN created the United Nations Interim Administration Mission (UNMIK) to maintain low and order and assist with the rebuilding of security institutions (Mullenbach, nd). The NATO KFOR mission also supervised the reconstruction of the KPC (Solana 1999).

Multiple Sponsors

Yes. The KLA received financial and military support from the United States, Albania, Switzerland (Perritt 2008).

Ethnic Cleavages

No. The KLA was dominated by ethnic Albanians (Perritt 2008)

Ideology

No. The KLA was primarily an ethnic nationalist movement, and did not adhere to a revolutionary political ideology (Perritt 2008).

Anti-Colonial War

No.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

Yes. The KLA derived from the Popular League for the Republic of Kosovo/Popular League for Kosovo (LPK) (Braithwaite & Cunningham 2020).

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Afghanistan 2001: Northern Alliance

Case Narrative

After the Taliban capture of Kabul in 1996, forces loyal to Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud's Jamiyat-i-Islam party fled to stronghold regions in northern Afghanistan. From 1996 to 2001 these forces constituted the core of an anti-Taliban rebel coalition (technically still recognized as the legitimate government of Afghanistan by much of the international community), which came to be known as the Northern Alliance. Northern Alliance forces fought guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare against Taliban forces, relying on the same tactics used during the Soviet occupation of the 1980s (Jalali 2017). Massoud was assassinated on September 9, 2011. After the September 11 attacks in 2001 against the United States by al Qaeda, the United States led a military intervention to depose the Taliban regime in alliance with Northern Alliance rebel forces, providing air support and intelligence support. Anti-Taliban Pashtun militia emerged in the south, also supported by the US. Armed forces of the Northern Alliance captured Kabul on November 13, 2001 and attempted to resurrect the Tajik-dominated regime that had been displaced by the Taliban five years earlier (Jalali 2017, p. 485).

Pakistan was concerned that a Northern Alliance-dominated government would align with India, and pressured the United States for a broad-based government with strong Pashtun representation. Understanding that they had no choice but to accept US demands for a broad-based government, Northern Alliance commanders agreed to install Hamid Karzai – a moderate ethnic Pashtun with prior ties to the Rabbani-Massoud regime, and a leader of an anti-Taliban militia that fought briefly in 2001 – as an interim head of state (Jalali 2017, p. 486). The Northern Alliance obtained 16 of 29 cabinet seats, and dominated the military, police, and foreign affairs (Ibid., p. 498).

The Taliban, after being routed by coalition forces and largely pushed into Pakistan in 2002, reorganized and returned to waging guerrilla warfare against the Western-backed government in Kabul by 2003. In 2004, Hamid Karzai was elected president of Afghanistan.

Defection

No. From 2001-2006, the Karzai government and international coalition forces failed to build a cohesive and effective Afghan military. Northern Alliance forces inside the ANA performed poorly in combat against the Taliban and relied heavily on US support (Yonoussi et al 2009). Nevertheless, no major defections from ex-rebel commanders against the new ruling regime occurred in this period.

The new Afghan National Army (ANA) was initially dominated by Northern Alliance commanders who had served the Rabbani-Massoud government in the 1990s (Giustozzi 2007). From 2002 to 2010 the army chief of staff was Bismillah Khan, a Tajik commander and former senior leader of the Northern Alliance. By 2004, 56% of the officer corps remained ethnic Tajiks (Giustozzi 2009). Jalali (2017) writes that "in the absence of an effective central security establishment, the transitional administration depended on the military muscle of factional militias" (p. 499). In 2002 and 2003, commanders from the Northern Alliance who had

integrated into the new Afghan National Army (ANA) began to turn on one another in turf battles. Heavy fighting between General Atta and General Dostum occurred in Balkh Province (Jalali 2017, p. 501). The Northern Alliance selected president, Hamid Karzai, exercised little control over the warlords in charge of the ANA. Official personnel records and organizational hierarchies were often far-removed from the reality of command-chains, which followed ethnic patronage networks (Giustozzi 2009). From 2002 to 2006, morale, discipline, and fighting capabilities within most ANA units remained low, while attrition rates were high (Giustozzi 2007). Individual warlords and militias were often paid directly by the US to assist in missions to hunt down rump Taliban forces (Ibid).

In 2008, Minister of Defense Wardak could count on the loyalty of only "a single brigade commander" (Giustozzi 2009, p. 39). Nevertheless, ANA chief of staff Bismillah Khan controlled a large patronage network inside the army, through which he maintained a minimal degree of control. As Giustozzi (2009) writes, "Thus far Bismillah Khan has been able to control the situation through his network and his manipulation of appointments and promotions" (p. 39).

War Intensity

High. UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level of 1 for 1996, intensity level of 2 for 1997-2001.

Rival Group

Yes. Multiple armed factions in Afghanistan fought against the Taliban in 1997-2001 (Jalali 2007).

Third-Party Guarantor

Yes. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), staffed mainly by NATO allies, deployed to Afghanistan in December 2001 with a mandate to provide security and assist the rebuilding of the Afghan national security forces. International coalition forces numbered over 10,000 by early 2002 (Jalali 2017).

Multiple Sponsors

Yes. The Northern Alliance received support from Russia, Turkey, Iran, the United States, and others (Jalali 2007).

Ethnic Cleavages

Yes. The Northern Alliance was dominated by a Tajik core, but included Uzbek and Hazara militia forces.

Ideology

No. Like its political predecessor, Jamiyat-i-Islam, the Northern Alliance was a non-communist political movement that adopted a moderate brand of political Islam.

Anti-Colonial War

No.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

Yes. The Northern Alliance derived from prior armed groups and parties including Jamiyat-i-Islam and Dostum's militia forces (Jalali 2017).

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Central African Republic 2003: Forces of Francois Bozizé

Case Narrative:

In October 2001, General Francois Bozizé, the Army Chief of Staff of the Central African Republic, was dismissed by President Ange-Félix Patassé on suspicion of participating in a coup plot. Army soldiers loyal to Bozizé defection from the state military, forming a challenger armed group led by Bozizé. Government and rebel troops clashed through the fall of 2001, and Bozizé fled to neighbording Chad to regroup his forces. A regional peacekeeping force with troops from Djibouti, Sudan, and Libya deployed to CAR in February 2002 to help shore up the Patassé government. Fighting between government and rebel forces continued through the summer and fall of 2002. Bozizé's rebel forces included former military loyalists from CAR, as well as combatants from Chad (Debos 2008). In March 2003, pro-Bozizé rebels pushed south and captured the capital of Bangui. Bozizé dissolved the Patassé government and formed a new ruling regime under his leadership. Additional troops from Chad arrived in CAR to help Bozizé's forces shore up control of the country. Regional countries initially condemned Bozizé's conquest, but soon accepted his regime.

After overthrowing Patassé's government, Bozizé reconstituted the armed forces of CAR with his own former rebel army (ICG 2007; Spittaels et al 2009). Within a year, the Bozizé regime faced new armed challengers in the eastern region of the country. The government fought off-and-on with rebel factions in the north and east until late 2012, when an anti-Bozizé coalition – the *Séléka* – overthrew the Bozizé regime.

Defection

Yes. By 2004, several former pro-Bozizé commanders defected from the military with their soldiers and began to attack government targets in reprisals for broken promises of economic compensation (Debos 2008; Giroux, Lanz & Squaitamatti 2009). Many of these combatants later joined anti-Bozizé rebel forces such as the *Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement* (UFDR), a precursor group to the *Séléka* (ICG 2007; Spittaels et al 2014). To compensate for his fractious and disloyal military, Bozizé relied heavily on military assistance from Chad, including for staffing the Presidential Guard unit (Giroux, Lanz & Squaitamatti 2009, p. 8). In fighting with rebel groups in the center and eastern regions of the country, pro-Bozizé military forces displayed little enthusiasm for combat and rarely engaged in high-risk operations (Lombard 2016; Martin 2014).

War Intensity

Low. The UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level of 1 for 2002.

Rival Group

No. Pro-Bozizé forces did not compete with other armed groups other than pro-Patassé incumbent forces (Debos 2008, pp. 228-229).

Ideology

No. Source do not indicate that pro-Bozizé forces held any programmatic political ideology.

Ethnic Cleavages

Yes. According to Debos (2008) and Giroux, Lanz & Squaitamatti (2009), pro-Bozizé rebels included a variety of ethnic groups from CAR and Chad.

Anti-Colonial War

No.

Third-Party Guarantor

No. No significant UN or multi-national peacekeeping force was present in CAR during the initial rebuilding of the armed forces under the Bozizé regime. The UN mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) was established in 2007.

Multiple Sponsors

No. Bozizé received support from Chad (Debos 2008).

Pre-existing Organization

Yes. Bozizé's forces derived government armed forces (Braithwaite & Cunningham 2020).

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South Sudan 2005: SPLM

Case Narrative

In 1983, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) was created under the leadership of Colonel John Garang in rebellion against the Sudanese government. The SPLM included an armed wing – the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). The SPLM/A fought to gain greater independence for southern Sudan and resist efforts to impose sharia law in the south. Fighting between the Sudanese government, the SPLM/A, and other rebel factions in Sudan continued on-and-off in the 1980s and 1990s, with rebels benefitting from cross-border safe havens in Ethiopia. In 2002, the Garang-led SPLM/A merged with the Sudan People's Defense Force (SPDF) led by Riek Machar, himself a former SPLA commander. In 2002, the government of Omar Bashir and SPLM forces began peace negotiations that resulted in a power-sharing government. Garang briefly became Vice-President of Sudan in July 2005, before dying in a helicopter crash later that month. Salva Kiir became leader of the SPLM and Vice-President of Sudan. After Garang's death, the SPLM shifted away from a political agenda focused on democratization within a united Sudan and towards the goal of independence for the south (Arnold & Leriche 2013). In October 2005, South Sudan established an autonomous regional government under SPLM control, the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS). The SPLA remained intact and became the national army of South Sudan. Kiir was elected President of South Sudan in 2010. In January 2011, a popular referendum granted South Sudan formal independence. In 2013, a faction of the SPLM led by Riek Machar split from Kiir's government and launched a rebellion, initiating the South Sudanese Civil War.

Defection

Yes. From 2005 to 2015, the SPLA was characterized by extensive private armed networks controlled by individual commanders, counterbalancing by the Kiir regime to forestall a coup attempt, and a culminating act of defiance in 2013 when commanders loyal to Riek Machar openly defected from the Kiir regime. According to Podder (2014), for example, "opposition to central policies at the state level from local strong men and commanders with strong support bases is a routine feature of the patterns of interaction between national and sub-national leadership" (p. 233). And according to Leriche (2015), the process of military reconstruction in South Sudan created "a market whereby loyalty is a commodity used in the bargaining game between local leaders and the central state. The decision to rebel … [is] a practical tool to assert local influence and garner access to wealth and prestige."

Reluctance from either the regime or commanders to reform the military and create a more coherent security apparatus in South Sudan since 2005 is described by Breitung, Paes and Van de Vondervoort (2016): "the security apparatus in South Sudan has not fundamentally changed over the past decade. Despite their formal hierarchies and command and control structures, the SPLA and SPLA-IO remain an aggregation of clientele networks in which recruitment, and command and control works largely along ethnic lines … Despite their formal integration, the different factions within the SPLA remained just that— factions. Ethnic integration and mixing of units did take place to a certain extent, and there were attempts to relocate former militia leaders to

parts of the country other than those where they would come from, but to little avail. Soldiers would show limited respect for central command as they continued to take orders given by their own leaders, who were also the ones paying out their salaries" (p. 10).

Despite the fragmented state of the military, the Kiir regime maintained a degree of stability from 2005 to 2011 (Arnold & Leriche 2013). The regime purchased peace in this period mainly by offering sufficiently large bribes to a select number of commanders. Breitung et al (2016) explain that "larger, more powerful commanders who threatened core government interests would be accommodated. The logic was that instead of using the SPLA to counter a threat on the battlefield, it was the act of incorporating the rebel commanders and their men that would serve to neutralize the threat… Senior government of Southern Sudan politicians and SPLA commanders would facilitate this form of violence by distributing arms and ammunition to their constituencies in return for cattle and status. Some would use their control over SPLA units as a tool to loot and retaliate against other communities" (p. 17).

War Intensity

High. UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level of 1 for 1993-94, 2003-2004. All other years from 1983-2002 are coded as intensity level of 2.

Rival Group

Yes. The SPLA competed with the SPDF prior to 2002 (Arnold & Leriche 2013).

Third-Party Guarantor

Yes. The UN Security Council established the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in 2005 to help monitor and implement DDR and SSR programs in South Sudan.

Multiple Sponsors

Yes. The SPLA/M received support from Libya and Ethiopia (Mullenbach).

Ideology

Yes. The SPLM published a Marxist manifesto on its founding (Rolandsen 2005), reflecting the group's early affiliation with the Derg regime in Ethiopia.

Anti-Colonial War

No

Ethnic Cleavages

Yes. Rolandsen (2005) describes the SPLM as a multi-ethnic rebel organization.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

Yes. The SPLM/A derived from Anya Nya veterans and defecting Sudanese military officers (Braithwaite & Cunningham 2020).

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Libya 2011: NTC/Anti-Gaddafi rebels

Case Narrative

In February 2011, popular uprisings in Libya against the regime of Muammar Gaddafi led to the formation of an anti-Gaddafi rebellion comprised of defecting military members and armed citizen militia. On February 27, the National Transitional Council (NTC) and its armed wing the National Liberation Army were created in Benghazi under the leadership of Mustafa Abdel Jibril, a former justice minister. In March, Jibril proclaimed that the NTC was the "sole representative over all Libya" (NewsCore 2011). The United States, Britain and France began a military intervention on the side of NTC-led rebels later in March. NATO subsequently took command of anti-Gaddafi military operations. NTC-led rebels took control of Tripoli by August 2011, after armed uprisings in the west destabilized the Qaddafi regime (Chivvis & Martini 2014). In October, rebel forces completed their takeover of the country and proclaimed the liberation of Libya (Mullenbach, nd.). The National Liberation Army became the Libyan National Army along with some remaining pro-Gaddafi elements. Major General Khalifa Haftar, a leader of anti-Gaddafi rebel forces, became the top commander of the new army. The top leadership of the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defence were staffed by anti-Gaddafi revolutionaries (Chivvis & Martini 2014, p. 17).

In August 2012, the NTC handed over power to an elected General National Congress (GNC) led by Prime Minister-elect Mustafa Abu Shagur, a former civilian member of the NTC. Shagur was removed from office in October 2012 and replaced by Ali Zeidan, another former NTC political leader. Zeidan was dismissed by the GNC in March 2014, and Abdullah al-Thani became Prime Minister. Libyan politics became increasingly polarized between Islamist factions loyal to the GNC and non-Islamist factions loyal to the Libyan House of Representatives, leading to the Second Libyan Civil War (2014-present). Since March 2015, the armed forces of the non-Islamist faction have been led by General Haftar.

Defection

Yes. From October 2011 to mid-2014, anti-Gaddafi rebel forces failed to create a coherent or unified state security apparatus. Security sector reform and demobilization of rebels were "impossible" (Chivvis & Martini 2014, p. 10). Many dozens of local militias that emerged during the war remained active after 2011, including Islamist-oriented militias, and the anti-Gaddafi rebel core of fighters did not possess the capacity to subdue these militias by force. In September 2012, the Prime Minister-elect Mustafa Abu Shagur unsuccessfully ordered the disbanding of militias and their submission to government control (Mullenbach 2012). According to Chivvis & Martini (2014), the NTC-led regime could not disarm militias because it had "no reliable military forces – Libyan or international – backing it" (p. 16). The Ministry of Interior created a Supreme Security Committee (SSC) in 2012 with the aim of creating a more coherent command-and-control system of ex-rebel units, but local commanders within this body remained largely independent (Wehrey & Cole 2013).

Haftar and other top commanders of the Libyan National Army struggled to rebuild the armed forces and exert control over various armed brigades that still exercised control around the

country. In 2014 several of these commanders defected from the authority of the GNC, which they viewed as under the control of radical Islamists, and attempted to build their own private army. Haftar urged Libyans to revolt against the GNC. However, Haftar's rebellion against the GNC was not supported by Prime Minister Zeidan. As a result Haftar defected from Zeidan's government, began staging "town hall" meetings across Libya to mobilize political support, and built up his own parallel military forces with other ex-rebel officers (Anderson 2015).

War Intensity

High. The UCDP Dyadic Dataset codes intensity level of 2 for 2011. According to Mullenbach (nd), anti-Gaddafi rebels suffered nearly 6,000 deaths.

Rival Group

No.

Third-Party Guarantor

Yes. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) was created in September 2011 with the objective of supporting disarmament, demobilization, and security sector reform (Mullenbach, nd).

Multiple Sponsors

Yes. The NTC received support from multiple NATO countries (Chivvis 2014).

Ethnic Cleavages

Yes. According to Chivvis & Martini (2014), the anti-Gaddafi rebel brigades were "differentiated by regional and tribal allegiances" (p. 14).

Ideology

No.

Anti-Colonial War

No.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

No. The NTC did not derive from a prior organization (Braithwaite & Cunningham 2020).

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Central African Republic 2013: Séléka

Care Narrative

In 2012, two armed groups operating in eastern CAR – the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP) and the UFDR – merged under the leadership of Michel Djotodia and launched a rebellion against the government of Francois Bozizé. Both the CPJP and UDR had been fighting against the Bozizé regime since the mid-2000s over issues of ethnopolitical exclusion and state repression (Lombard 2016, Spittaels et al 2014). From early December 2012 to March 2013, Séléka rebels waged an offensive campaign against the government, capturing territory across the east and central regions. On March 24, the rebels captured Bangui and overthrew the Bozizé government (Mullenbach, nd). Djotodia proclaimed himself president of CAR on March 25. The top commander of the Séléka armed forces, Major-General Joseph Zoudeiko, became the chief of staff of the national army, the Forces Republicains.

Over the course of 2013, security conditions in CAR deteriorated as Christian self-defence militia (anti-*Balaka*) who supported Bozizé's government continued to clash with the mainly Muslim Séléka forces. Djotodia resigned under foreign pressure on January 10, 2014. Catherine Samba-Panza became CAR's Interim President at the head of a broad-based transitional government. Faustin-Archange Touadéra was elected President in February 2016 in nation-wide elections. Multiple armed groups have remained active in CAR's peripheral areas since 2014, and regime in Bangui has alternated between fighting and accommodating these groups.

Defection

Yes. During the transitional period from 2013 to 2015, many warlords and field commanders associated with Séléka rejected the requests of their nominal political leaders to submit their fighters to disarmament and demobilisation, maintained large private armies beyond the control of political elites in Bangui, and denounced the civilian elites they had installed into power only months previously (ICG 2015, pp. 7-9). By 2014, the Séléka had split into at least four separate groups. Broadly, these factions were divided into hardliners who remained loyal to Djotodia and were hostile to Samba-Panza's transitional government, and moderates who signed a ceasefire agreement with anti-Balaka militias in July 2014. The top field commander of Séléka forces, Major-General Joseph Zoudeiko, rejected the 2014 ceasefire agreement (Harding 2014). Zoudeiko became the commander of a new rebel group, the Popular Front for the Renaissance of the Central African Republic (FPRC).

In addition to conflict over the proper strategy vis-à-vis the anti-Balaka and pro-Bozizé forces, ex-Séléka commanders fought against each other for control of territories containing natural resources, essential for the payment of rank-and-file fighters (ICG 2015). According to the authors of a detailed Crisis Group report on the armed factions present in CAR in 2013-2014: "Once the Séleka came to power in 2013, its different components soon came into conflict with each other and Michel Djotodia failed to impose his leadership" (ICG 2015, p. 9). Ex-rebel forces were also implicated in attacks on civilians, including medical clinics and humanitarian workers (Mullenbach, nd).

War Intensity

Low. The UCDP Dyadic dataset codes intensity level of 1 for 2006, 2012 and 2013. During the 2012-2013 campaign on Bangui, pro-Bozizé forces offered limited resistance (Mullenbach, nd).

Rival Group

Yes. Multiple anti-Bozizé armed groups operated in northern and eastern CAR during the 2012-2013 period (Lombard 2016).

Ideology

No. Sources do not indicate any significant programmatic ideology on the part of Séléka political leaders (ICG 2015).

Ethnic Cleavages

Yes. Though largely Muslim, both the Séléka and its primary predecessor movement – the UFDF – were multi-ethnic groups (Lombard 2016).

Anti-Colonial War

No.

Third-Party Guarantor

Yes. In December 2013, the UN authorized the deployment of the African-Led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (AFISM-CAR), along with French military forces, to help restore order and rebuild the CAR national army. In April 2014, the UN deployed the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).

Multiple Sponsors

No. No reports of external state sponsorship for Séléka rebels were found.

Pre-existing Parent Organization

Yes. The Séléka derived from multiple prior rebel groups in northern and eastern CAR (Lombard 2016).

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