Supporting Information for

International Third Parties and the Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreements After Civil War

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All data and code required to reproduce the results in this study are available in a replication package posted at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/jkarreth.

This supplementary document contains:

1 A list of all comprehensive peace agreements used in the analyses
2 A list of all IGOs with high leverage referenced in this study
3 Sources and summary statistics for all variables used in the analyses
4 Full results for all statistical models discussed in the manuscript
5 Full results for robustness tests referenced in the manuscript
6 Detailed information on the illustrative case of Ivory Coast
7 Detailed information on the illustrative case of Rwanda
8 A list of news sources and documents used for case evidence

1 Comprehensive peace agreements

Table A1: List of CPAs

Country	CPA name and date
Angola	Lusaka Protocol, Nov 15 1994
Angola	Luena Memorandum of Understanding, Apr 04 2002
Bangladesh	Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord (CHT), Dec 02 1997
Bosnia	General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nov 21 1995
Burundi	Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement / Pretoria Protocol, Nov 02 2003
Cambodia	Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Oct 23 1991
Congo-Brazzaville	Agreement on Ending Hostilities in the Republic of Congo, Dec 29 1999
Croatia	Erdut Agreement, Nov 12 1995
Djibouti	Accord de paix et de la reconciliation nationale, Dec 26 1994
Djibouti	Agreement for the Reform and Civil Concord, May 12 2001
El Salvador	Chapultepec Peace Agreement, Jan 16 1992
Guatemala	Accord for a Firm and Lasting Peace, Dec 29 1996
Guinea-Bissau	Abuja Peace Agreement, Nov 01 1998
India	Memorandum of Settlement (Bodo Accord), Feb 20 1993
Indonesia	MoU between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement, Aug 15 2005
Ivory Coast	Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA), Mar 04 2007
Lebanon	Taif Accord, Oct 22 1989
Liberia	Accra Peace Agreement, Aug 18 2003
Macedonia	Ohrid Agreement, Aug 13 2001
Mali	National Pact, Jan 06 1991
Mozambique	General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, Oct 04 1992
Nepal	Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Nov 21 2006
Niger	Agreement Between the Republic Niger Government and the ORA, Apr 15 1995
Papua New Guinea	Bougainville Peace Agreement, Aug 30 2001
Philippines	Mindanao Final Agreement, Sep 02 1996
Rwanda	Arusha Accord 4 August 1993, Aug 04 1993
Senegal	General Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Senegal and MFDC, Dec 30 2004
Sierra Leone	Abidjan Peace Agreement, Nov 30 1996
Sierra Leone	Lom Peace Agreement, Jul 07 1999
Sudan	Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Jan 09 2005
Tajikistan	General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan, Jun 27 1997
Timor-Leste (East Timor)	Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on East Timor, May 05 1999
United Kingdom	Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement, Apr 10 1998

2 IGOs

Table A2: List of IGOs with high leverage emanating from a combination of (1) economic leverage and (2) institutional prerequisites. Source: Karreth (2018).

IGO	Economic leverage: Issues covered[1]	Institutional prerequisites: tools available[2]
African Development Bank	1	5
Asian Development Bank	4	4
Caribbean Community	3	3
Common Southern Market	1	1
Commonwealth Secretariat	1	5
Economic Community of West African States	3	4
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	2	5
European Economic Community	2	5
European Investment Bank	2	4
European Union	3	4
World Bank	1	5
International Coffee Organization	4	2
International Fund for Agricultural Development	2	2
International Monetary Fund	1	5
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency	1	4
Southern African Development Community	2	4
West African Economic and Monetary Union	3	4

[1] Numbers: sum of issues covered by the IGO (Trade, Currency, Development, Investment, Production, Resources).
[2] Numbers: features available to the IGO (Financial authority, Decision-making, Bureaucracy, Independence, Use of carrots & sticks).



Figure A1: Counts of memberships in IGOs with high economic leverage for 34 countries (in the year of CPA signing only, for visualization purposes).

3 Detailed information on variables

Table A3: Variable sources

Concept	Variable	Source	Scale
Implementation score	Aggregate Implementation Score (achieved points divided by total possible points)	Joshi, Quinn, and Regan (2015)	0-100
IGO memberships	Memberships in IGOs with high economic leverage	Karreth (2018) and Pevehouse et al. (2020)	Count
	AidData Foreign aid commitments	AidData (2017)	Million USD (constant prices)
	OECD total official flows	OECD (2020)	Million USD (constant prices)
CPA characteristics	Transitional power sharing government	Joshi, Quinn, and Regan (2015)	Binary
	Dispute resolution committee	Joshi, Quinn, and Regan (2015)	Binary
	Female signatories	Krause, Krause, and Bränfors (2018)	Binary
Conflict characteristics	Conflict duration in years	Allansson, Melander, and Themnér (2017)	Logged
	Battle deaths during conflict	Lacina and Gleditsch (2005)	Logged
	Conflict over territory	Allansson, Melander, and Themnér (2017)	Binary
External involvement	Years with mediation	DeRouen, Bercovitch, and Pospieszna (2011) and Melander, Möller, and Öberg (2009)	Logged
	UN PKO before CPA	International Peace Institute (2016)	Binary
Country-level characteristics	New leader (with new support coalition) since CPA	Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza (2009) and Mattes, Leeds, and Matsumura (2016)	
	Population size	Graham and Tucker (2019), World Bank (2015), and Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015)	Logged
	GDP	Graham and Tucker (2019), World Bank (2015), and Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015)	IHS transformation
	Economic growth (GDP growth, annual %)	World Bank (2015)	Percent
	Excluded population relative to the sum of ethnically relevant population	Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009)	0-1
	Natural resources (Oil, diamonds or drugs present)	Lujala (2010)	Binary
	Democratic political institutions (Polity)	Marshall and Jaggers (2009)	Polity score $>= 6$
	GDP per capita before conflict (logged)	Graham and Tucker (2019), World Bank (2015), and Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015)	Logged
	Civil war in neighboring country	Allansson, Melander, and Themnér (2017)	Binary
	Foreign policy similarity with U.S. (alliance scores)	Haege (2011)	Cohen's κ
	Foreign policy similarity with U.S./UK/France (UNGA voting)	Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017)	Continuous
	UNPKO personnel	International Peace Institute (2016)	Logged

Table A4: Summary statistics

Statistic	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Median	Pctl(75)	Max
Aggregate implementation score	66.0	21.7	1.9	51.8	70.0	84.0	95.8
IGOs with high economic leverage	5.3	1.6	2	4	5	6	10
All other IGOs	52.9	15.0	22	42	51	64	96
AidData Foreign aid commitments	1484.8	2294.4	0.1	314.6	657.5	1334.9	14600.2
OECD total official flows	3325.3	3711.1	−1791.7	949.2	2199.8	4126.0	24070.4
Years after conflict	5.4	2.9	1	3	5	8	10
Transitional power sharing government	0.5	0.5	0	0	0	1	1
Dispute resolution committee	0.6	0.5	0	0	1	1	1
Female signatories	0.2	0.4	0	0	0	0	1
Conflict duration in days (logged)	7.6	1.4	4.4	6.8	7.6	8.9	9.5
Battle deaths during conflict (logged)	7.2	1.8	4.3	5.7	7.2	8.7	10.6
Territorial conflict	0.3	0.5	0	0	0	1	1
Years with mediation (logged)	1.5	0.8	0.0	1.1	1.8	2.1	2.8
New leader (with new support coalition) since CPA	0.4	0.5	0	0	0	1	1
Population (logged)	16.3	1.6	13.4	15.2	16.1	17.1	20.8
GDP (IHS transformation, averaged over last 3 years)	23.4	2.1	20.3	21.7	23.1	24.6	28.5
Economic growth	4.2	6.4	−17.5	2.6	4.1	5.7	48.0
Excluded population	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.004	0.1	0.2	0.8
Natural resources	0.7	0.4	0	0	1	1	1
Democracy (binary)	0.5	0.5	0	0	0	1	1
GDP per capita before conflict (logged)	7.1	1.2	5.2	6.1	7.1	7.8	10.0
Civil war in neighboring country	0.5	0.5	0	0	0	1	1
Foreign policy similarity with US	−0.02	0.1	−0.3	−0.1	−0.1	0.01	0.4
UN PKO troops (logged)	1346.4	3837.7	0	0	0	0	35782
UN PKO police (logged)	134.9	405.4	0	0	0	0	2558
Year	2002.3	5.5	1989	1998	2002	2006	2015

4 Regression results referenced in the main text

Table A5: Estimates of the association between IGO memberships and CPA implementation at the post-CPA year level. Implementation scores range from 2 to 95. See text for detailed description of estimators.

	Within-Between random effects for post-conflict periods	Prais-Winsten FGLS with conflict-specific AR(1) autocorrelation and PCSEs	Country FE and robust SEs	HLIGOs instrumented plus country and year FEs
IGOs with high economic leverage (within effect)	18.61*		19.12*	23.72*
	(3.67)		(4.63)	(11.66)
IGOs with high economic leverage (between effect)	−1.09			
	(16.11)			
IGOs with high economic leverage (composite effect)		13.03*		
		(2.85)		
All other IGOs (within effect)	1.26		−0.17	−1.64
	(6.91)		(8.60)	(1.03)
All other IGOs (between effect)	1.31			
	(14.47)			
All other IGOs (composite effect)		−0.15		
		(4.22)		
Years since conflict (logged)	12.22*	14.08*	13.54*	
	(1.10)	(0.62)	(1.71)	
Transitional power sharing government	−3.45	−6.46	21.82*	
	(10.26)	(3.43)	(7.75)	
Dispute resolution committee	14.56	6.26*		
	(10.42)	(3.08)		
Female signatories	8.26	20.48*		
	(19.07)	(4.68)		
Conflict duration (logged)	−1.29	−1.55	−50.30*	
	(4.63)	(2.10)	(3.98)	
Battle deaths during conflict (logged)	0.17	6.06*		
	(4.31)	(1.05)		
Territorial conflict	−8.89	−8.96*		
	(15.06)	(2.79)		
Years with mediation (logged)	−0.08	−11.76*	−60.24*	
	(12.33)	(3.03)	(6.34)	
New leader since CPA	0.96	1.45	1.44	
	(1.93)	(2.08)	(2.59)	
Population (logged)	−1.09	1.81	−19.33	
	(5.59)	(1.73)	(15.01)	
Economic growth	0.09	0.01	0.10	
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	
Excluded population	13.08*	−1.70	12.18*	
	(4.73)	(5.39)	(6.04)	
Natural resources	−14.76	−13.00*		
	(13.77)	(2.98)		
Democracy	2.77	1.68	2.75	
	(2.14)	(2.24)	(2.44)	
GDP per capita before conflict (logged)	3.23	1.05		
	(6.14)	(2.21)		
Civil war in neighboring country	−4.47*	−3.48*	−4.36*	
	(1.41)	(1.37)	(1.66)	
Foreign policy similarity with US	−5.79	13.34*	−6.99	
	(8.41)	(6.60)	(7.62)	
UN PKO personnel (logged)	0.59*	0.53*	0.62*	
	(0.25)	(0.18)	(0.27)	
Region fixed effects (baseline: East Asia)				
Europe & Central Asia	−11.92	−8.88		
	(19.38)	(7.16)		
Latin America & Caribbean	−30.37	−19.02*		
	(31.03)	(8.60)		
Middle East & North Africa	−32.52	−13.80		
	(27.41)	(12.10)		
South Asia	−21.72	−42.87*		
	(31.95)	(9.03)		
Sub-Saharan Africa	−22.31	−20.51*		
	(19.88)	(5.34)		
Intercept	71.65	−2.86		
	(78.16)	(27.00)		
Num. obs.	323	323	323	323

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed test).

Table A6: Estimates of the association between IGO memberships and CPA implementation at the post-CPA year level, **without control variables**. Implementation scores range from 2 to 95. See text for detailed description of estimators.

	Within-Between random effects for post-conflict periods	Prais-Winsten FGLS with conflict-specific AR(1) autocorrelation and PCSEs	Country FE and robust SEs
IGOs with high economic leverage (composite effect)		13.34*	16.12*
		(2.49)	(4.27)
IGOs with high economic leverage (within effect)	13.88*		
	(2.87)		
IGOs with high economic leverage (between effect)	−1.61		
	(8.56)		
Years since conflict (logged)	13.29*	15.47*	14.06*
	(0.79)	(0.56)	(1.10)
Region fixed effects (baseline: East Asia)			
Europe & Central Asia	5.88	−5.37	
	(11.39)	(3.06)	
Latin America & Caribbean	3.09	6.07	
	(14.91)	(11.11)	
Middle East & North Africa	−14.61	−4.29	
	(13.77)	(8.31)	
South Asia	−27.41*	−20.54	
	(13.08)	(11.14)	
Sub-Saharan Africa	−5.53	−8.75*	
	(10.00)	(3.65)	
Intercept	52.94*	26.27*	
	(15.10)	(6.29)	
Num. obs.	323	323	323

Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.05$ (two-tailed test).

Table A7: Regression estimates of the association between prior foreign aid (using aid commitment volumes from AidData) and CPA implementation at the post-CPA year level. Implementation scores range from 2 to 95. See text for detailed description of estimators.

	Within-Between random effects for post-conflict periods	Prais-Winsten FGLS with conflict-specific AR(1) autocorrelation and PCSEs	Country FE and robust SEs	Aid instrumented plus country and year FEs
AidData Foreign aid commitments (within effect)	6.89*		6.90*	13.11*
	(2.47)		(2.73)	(5.05)
AidData Foreign aid commitments (between effect)	44.06*			
	(18.20)			
AidData Foreign aid commitments (composite effect)		6.46*		
		(3.20)		
Years since conflict (logged)	15.88*	15.91*	16.72*	
	(0.97)	(0.69)	(1.61)	
Transitional power sharing government	4.47	−2.96	29.85*	
	(10.50)	(3.97)	(7.63)	
Dispute resolution committee	22.07*	12.03*		
	(10.21)	(2.28)		
Female signatories	10.47	10.81*		
	(18.46)	(5.08)		
Conflict duration (logged)	2.60	0.14	−50.39*	
	(4.72)	(1.76)	(4.33)	
Battle deaths during conflict (logged)	−2.07	1.38		
	(3.92)	(1.22)		
Territorial conflict	−10.03	−10.66*		
	(14.75)	(4.85)		
Years with mediation (logged)	0.77	−4.14	−61.16*	
	(11.24)	(3.95)	(5.92)	
New leader since CPA	−0.43	−0.71	−0.14	
	(1.96)	(2.07)	(2.37)	
Population (logged)	−0.78	−2.84	−10.07	
	(7.43)	(3.51)	(14.26)	
GDP (IHS transformation, lagged)	−12.10*	1.40	−14.06*	
	(3.18)	(3.55)	(3.55)	
Economic growth	0.10	−0.02	0.10	
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	
Excluded population	0.40	−4.24	−0.77	
	(4.28)	(3.89)	(5.04)	
Natural resources	−16.71	−9.04*		
	(13.63)	(2.49)		
Democracy	1.23	0.14	1.19	
	(2.13)	(2.35)	(2.28)	
GDP per capita before conflict (logged)	18.97*	2.39		
	(6.52)	(4.19)		
Civil war in neighboring country	−4.60*	−2.87*	−4.61*	
	(1.41)	(1.35)	(1.73)	
Foreign policy similarity with US	3.18	13.82*	1.07	
	(8.35)	(6.93)	(7.36)	
UN PKO personnel (logged)	0.10	0.25	0.09	
	(0.23)	(0.19)	(0.30)	
Region fixed effects (baseline: East Asia)				
Europe & Central Asia	−7.36	−9.10		
	(19.60)	(5.30)		
Latin America & Caribbean	−22.01	−16.54*		
	(29.98)	(6.75)		
Middle East & North Africa	−42.35	−24.17		
	(25.58)	(13.02)		
South Asia	5.58	−22.99*		
	(29.43)	(9.06)		
Sub-Saharan Africa	−4.92	−7.94		
	(16.89)	(4.75)		
Intercept	191.10*	47.21		
	(90.62)	(27.36)		
Num. obs.	323	323	323	323

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed test).

Table A8: Regression estimates of the association between prior foreign aid (using aid commitment volumes from AidData) and CPA implementation at the post-CPA year level, **without control variables**. Implementation scores range from 2 to 95. See text for detailed description of estimators.

	Within-Between random effects for post-conflict periods	Prais-Winsten FGLS with conflict-specific AR(1) autocorrelation and PCSEs	Country FE and robust SEs
AidData Foreign aid commitments (within effect)	6.67*		7.83*
	(2.57)		(2.54)
AidData Foreign aid commitments (between effect)	3.59		
	(8.87)		
AidData Foreign aid commitments (composite effect)		4.02	
		(2.46)	
Years since conflict (logged)	14.64*	16.25*	15.64*
	(0.64)	(0.55)	(1.11)
Region fixed effects (baseline: East Asia)			
Europe & Central Asia	8.35	−0.51	
	(13.10)	(4.62)	
Latin America & Caribbean	5.68	8.58	
	(16.03)	(9.36)	
Middle East & North Africa	−10.75	−7.69	
	(14.88)	(7.64)	
South Asia	−27.52*	−17.92	
	(12.88)	(11.69)	
Sub-Saharan Africa	−3.56	2.45	
	(11.01)	(3.24)	
Intercept	45.33*	41.33*	
	(11.15)	(3.06)	
Num. obs.	323	323	323

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed test).

5 Robustness tests referenced in the main text

Table A9: Regression estimates of the association between IGO memberships and CPA implementation at the post-CPA year level, **using UNGA voting ideal points as proxy for strategic importance**. Implementation scores range from 2 to 95. See text for detailed description of estimators.

	(1) Within-Between random effects for post-conflict periods	(2) Prais-Winsten FGLS with conflict-specific AR(1) autocorrelation and PCSEs	(3) Country FE and robust SEs
IGOs with high economic leverage (within effect)	18.65*		18.90*
	(3.75)		(4.88)
IGOs with high economic leverage (between effect)	−1.28		
	(15.91)		
IGOs with high economic leverage (composite effect)		15.01*	
		(2.99)	
All other IGOs (within effect)	2.52		2.27
	(6.80)		(8.48)
All other IGOs (between effect)	1.68		
	(14.26)		
All other IGOs (composite effect)		−0.51	
		(3.72)	
Years since conflict (logged)	12.29*	14.42*	13.33*
	(1.06)	(0.74)	(1.79)
Transitional power sharing government	−3.78	−8.75*	22.99*
	(10.12)	(3.80)	(7.54)
Dispute resolution committee	15.48	9.22*	
	(10.28)	(2.55)	
Female signatories	9.07	13.93*	
	(18.81)	(5.06)	
Conflict duration (logged)	−1.23	0.36	−49.97*
	(4.56)	(2.26)	(4.05)
Battle deaths during conflict (logged)	−0.06	3.87*	
	(4.25)	(1.10)	
Territorial conflict	−9.62	−15.39*	
	(14.85)	(6.50)	
Years with mediation (logged)	0.69	−8.22*	−60.45*
	(12.16)	(3.16)	(6.48)
New leader since CPA	0.38	−0.39	0.69
	(1.95)	(1.68)	(2.57)
Population (logged)	−1.57	0.21	−17.02
	(5.48)	(1.39)	(15.48)
Economic growth	0.18	0.09	0.19
	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Excluded population	15.11*	0.38	14.27*
	(4.91)	(5.72)	(6.87)
Natural resources	−14.77	−10.55*	
	(13.58)	(2.58)	
Democracy	3.23	1.96	3.18
	(2.19)	(2.22)	(2.56)
GDP per capita before conflict (logged)	3.37	1.84	
	(6.06)	(1.97)	
Civil war in neighboring country	−5.04*	−4.38*	−4.91*
	(1.47)	(1.41)	(1.84)
Foreign policy similarity with US/UK/France	3.78	1.94	3.77
	(2.81)	(1.76)	(3.13)
Foreign policy similarity with China	1.64	2.25	1.74
	(1.94)	(1.69)	(1.88)
UN PKO personnel (logged)	0.54*	0.47*	0.51
	(0.25)	(0.19)	(0.28)
Region fixed effects (baseline: East Asia)			
Europe & Central Asia	−11.66	−8.75	
	(19.23)	(5.42)	
Latin America & Caribbean	−33.08	−25.07*	
	(30.59)	(5.96)	
Middle East & North Africa	−33.44	−19.26*	
	(26.98)	(9.23)	
South Asia	−18.81	−34.92*	
	(31.53)	(8.44)	
Sub-Saharan Africa	−22.68	−22.63*	
	(19.61)	(4.94)	
Intercept	77.55	12.56	
	(76.91)	(22.76)	
Num. obs.	311	311	311

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed test).

Table A10: Regression estimates of the association between IGO memberships and CPA implementation at the post-CPA year level. Implementation scores range from 2 to 95, **separating between UNPKO troops and police officers**. See text for detailed description of estimators.

	(1) Within-Between random effects for post-conflict periods	(2) Prais-Winsten FGLS with conflict-specific AR(1) autocorrelation and PCSEs	(3) Country FE and robust SEs
IGOs with high economic leverage (within effect)	18.30*		18.85*
	(3.67)		(4.66)
IGOs with high economic leverage (between effect)	−0.94		
	(16.09)		
IGOs with high economic leverage (composite effect)		13.34*	
		(2.80)	
All other IGOs (within effect)	1.47		−0.02
	(6.95)		(8.62)
All other IGOs (between effect)	0.95		
	(14.45)		
All other IGOs (composite effect)		0.56	
		(4.26)	
Years since conflict (logged)	12.15*	14.03*	13.54*
	(1.12)	(0.63)	(1.77)
Transitional power sharing government	−3.29	−8.17*	22.21*
	(10.23)	(3.80)	(7.76)
Dispute resolution committee	14.48	8.30*	
	(10.42)	(3.01)	
Female signatories	8.17	19.84*	
	(19.07)	(4.42)	
Conflict duration (logged)	−1.31	−1.13	−50.47*
	(4.63)	(2.18)	(4.03)
Battle deaths during conflict (logged)	0.22	6.16*	
	(4.31)	(1.05)	
Territorial conflict	−8.63	−8.63*	
	(15.03)	(2.67)	
Years with mediation (logged)	−0.22	−11.92*	−60.44*
	(12.31)	(3.11)	(6.34)
New leader since CPA	1.05	1.51	1.53
	(1.94)	(2.08)	(2.60)
Population (logged)	−0.94	1.24	−19.98
	(5.61)	(1.81)	(15.62)
Economic growth	0.10	0.02	0.12
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Excluded population	12.61*	−1.18	11.64
	(4.69)	(5.53)	(5.95)
Natural resources	−14.62	−13.27*	
	(13.74)	(2.76)	
Democracy	2.87	1.91	2.76
	(2.16)	(2.22)	(2.47)
GDP per capita before conflict (logged)	3.13	1.02	
	(6.14)	(2.21)	
Civil war in neighboring country	−4.44*	−3.42*	−4.32*
	(1.41)	(1.37)	(1.66)
Foreign policy similarity with US	−5.23	13.09*	−6.63
	(8.50)	(6.41)	(7.60)
UN PKO troops (logged)	0.47	0.51*	0.42
	(0.31)	(0.20)	(0.30)
UN PKO police (logged)	0.22	0.18	0.37
	(0.45)	(0.29)	(0.40)
Region fixed effects (baseline: East Asia)			
Europe & Central Asia	−11.53	−6.93	
	(19.37)	(8.05)	
Latin America & Caribbean	−29.31	−17.36*	
	(30.96)	(8.74)	
Middle East & North Africa	−31.41	−12.65	
	(27.41)	(13.18)	
South Asia	−22.22	−41.06*	
	(31.92)	(9.31)	
Sub-Saharan Africa	−22.09	−19.20*	
	(19.84)	(5.89)	
Intercept	69.86	−0.74	
	(78.33)	(28.48)	
Num. obs.	323	323	323

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed test).

Table A11: Regression estimates of the association between prior foreign aid (using aid commitment volumes from AidData) and CPA implementation at the post-CPA year level, **using UNGA voting ideal points as proxy for strategic importance**. Implementation scores range from 2 to 95. See text for detailed description of estimators.

	(1) Within-Between random effects for post-conflict periods	(2) Prais-Winsten FGLS with conflict-specific AR(1) autocorrelation and PCSEs	(3) Country FE and robust SEs
AidData Foreign aid commitments (within effect)	6.67*		6.68*
	(2.43)		(2.82)
AidData Foreign aid commitments (between effect)	41.21*		
	(18.27)		
AidData Foreign aid commitments (composite effect)		7.20*	
		(3.02)	
Years since conflict (logged)	15.43*	15.86*	16.15*
	(1.00)	(0.74)	(1.64)
Transitional power sharing government	3.24	−4.99	28.77*
	(10.54)	(4.85)	(7.32)
Dispute resolution committee	22.40*	13.71*	
	(10.22)	(2.35)	
Female signatories	12.13	10.49*	
	(18.53)	(4.31)	
Conflict duration (logged)	2.40	0.44	−50.04*
	(4.73)	(2.05)	(4.25)
Battle deaths during conflict (logged)	−1.92	0.65	
	(3.93)	(1.27)	
Territorial conflict	−10.59	−13.84	
	(14.79)	(7.23)	
Years with mediation (logged)	0.93	−3.25	−61.75*
	(11.27)	(3.70)	(5.82)
New leader since CPA	−1.12	−2.03	−0.84
	(1.96)	(1.76)	(2.37)
Population (logged)	2.08	−4.43	−4.89
	(7.62)	(3.53)	(14.51)
GDP (IHS transformation, lagged)	−13.70*	2.12	−16.03*
	(3.42)	(3.09)	(3.75)
Economic growth	0.18	0.12	0.18
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Excluded population	4.04	−3.43	2.91
	(4.62)	(4.64)	(5.35)
Natural resources	−17.47	−6.89*	
	(13.68)	(2.48)	
Democracy	1.94	0.57	1.97
	(2.17)	(2.35)	(2.42)
GDP per capita before conflict (logged)	20.24*	1.88	
	(6.64)	(3.20)	
Civil war in neighboring country	−5.26*	−3.68*	−5.25*
	(1.47)	(1.39)	(1.90)
Foreign policy similarity with US/UK/France	−0.20	0.60	−0.14
	(2.78)	(2.18)	(2.99)
Foreign policy similarity with China	−1.30	1.08	−1.50
	(1.92)	(1.74)	(2.01)
UN PKO personnel (logged)	0.11	0.22	0.09
	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.30)
Region fixed effects (baseline: East Asia)			
Europe & Central Asia	−6.11	−7.09	
	(19.76)	(4.99)	
Latin America & Caribbean	−25.78	−19.15*	
	(30.09)	(5.11)	
Middle East & North Africa	−40.92	−23.82*	
	(25.62)	(11.68)	
South Asia	3.72	−19.68*	
	(29.49)	(9.10)	
Sub-Saharan Africa	−6.63	−7.69	
	(16.95)	(5.49)	
Intercept	175.89	60.03*	
	(90.91)	(30.47)	
Num. obs.	311	311	311

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed test).

Table A12: Regression estimates of the association between prior foreign aid (using aid commitment volumes from AidData) and CPA implementation at the post-CPA year level, **separating between UNPKO troops and police officers**. Implementation scores range from 2 to 95. See text for detailed description of estimators.

	(1) Within-Between random effects for post-conflict periods	(2) Prais-Winsten FGLS with conflict-specific AR(1) autocorrelation and PCSEs	(3) Country FE and robust SEs
AidData Foreign aid commitments (within effect)	6.95*		6.94*
	(2.48)		(2.73)
AidData Foreign aid commitments (between effect)	43.34*		
	(18.21)		
AidData Foreign aid commitments (composite effect)		6.67*	
		(3.17)	
Years since conflict (logged)	15.80*	15.92*	16.63*
	(0.98)	(0.70)	(1.64)
Transitional power sharing government	4.23	−3.15	29.54*
	(10.49)	(4.11)	(7.62)
Dispute resolution committee	21.73*	12.15*	
	(10.23)	(2.18)	
Female signatories	10.79	10.49*	
	(18.47)	(4.85)	
Conflict duration (logged)	2.49	0.33	−50.45*
	(4.73)	(1.77)	(4.34)
Battle deaths during conflict (logged)	−1.88	1.36	
	(3.93)	(1.15)	
Territorial conflict	−9.95	−10.59*	
	(14.74)	(4.81)	
Years with mediation (logged)	0.49	−4.28	−61.31*
	(11.24)	(4.09)	(5.92)
New leader since CPA	−0.34	−0.70	−0.05
	(1.97)	(2.07)	(2.36)
Population (logged)	−0.50	−3.06	−9.55
	(7.45)	(3.61)	(14.41)
GDP (IHS transformation, lagged)	−12.00*	1.46	−13.95*
	(3.18)	(3.62)	(3.54)
Economic growth	0.11	−0.00	0.11
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Excluded population	0.49	−4.17	−0.66
	(4.27)	(3.93)	(4.98)
Natural resources	−16.76	−8.71*	
	(13.62)	(2.22)	
Democracy	1.41	0.18	1.36
	(2.16)	(2.34)	(2.28)
GDP per capita before conflict (logged)	18.68*	2.21	
	(6.53)	(4.23)	
Civil war in neighboring country	−4.63*	−2.87*	−4.65*
	(1.41)	(1.35)	(1.74)
Foreign policy similarity with US	3.66	13.25*	1.39
	(8.43)	(6.72)	(7.37)
UN PKO troops (logged)	0.23	0.40	0.19
	(0.32)	(0.21)	(0.29)
UN PKO police (logged)	−0.12	−0.17	−0.07
	(0.45)	(0.30)	(0.35)
Region fixed effects (baseline: East Asia)			
Europe & Central Asia	−7.10	−8.45	
	(19.61)	(5.28)	
Latin America & Caribbean	−22.02	−15.81*	
	(29.96)	(6.35)	
Middle East & North Africa	−41.79	−25.32	
	(25.60)	(13.00)	
South Asia	4.38	−22.87*	
	(29.46)	(9.33)	
Sub-Saharan Africa	−5.21	−7.49	
	(16.88)	(4.73)	
Intercept	186.79*	48.76	
	(90.85)	(27.33)	
Num. obs.	323	323	323

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed test).

Table A13: Regression estimates of the association between prior foreign aid **(using aid commitment volumes from OECD data)** and CPA implementation at the post-CPA year level. Implementation scores range from 2 to 95. See text for detailed description of estimators.

	(1) Within-Between random effects for post-conflict periods	(2) Prais-Winsten FGLS with conflict-specific AR(1) autocorrelation and PCSEs	(3) Country FE and robust SEs
OECD Foreign aid commitments (within effect)	4.43*		4.37*
	(1.72)		(1.96)
OECD Foreign aid commitments (between effect)	27.92		
	(16.91)		
OECD Foreign aid commitments (composite effect)		1.54	
		(1.76)	
Years since conflict (logged)	15.40*	15.61*	16.60*
	(0.95)	(0.73)	(1.62)
Transitional power sharing government	0.22	−5.54	30.30*
	(10.72)	(4.83)	(7.70)
Dispute resolution committee	20.91	10.82*	
	(10.76)	(3.13)	
Female signatories	9.58	14.91*	
	(19.46)	(5.34)	
Conflict duration (logged)	−0.33	−1.78	−50.29*
	(4.68)	(2.02)	(4.29)
Battle deaths during conflict (logged)	−1.06	3.14*	
	(4.06)	(1.25)	
Territorial conflict	−9.29	−11.21*	
	(15.53)	(5.25)	
Years with mediation (logged)	0.82	−4.18	−61.04*
	(11.99)	(4.25)	(5.93)
New leader since CPA	−0.09	−0.26	0.10
	(1.97)	(1.98)	(2.37)
Population (logged)	3.87	0.94	−9.61
	(7.05)	(4.14)	(14.32)
GDP (IHS transformation, lagged)	−11.58*	0.90	−13.67*
	(3.20)	(3.83)	(3.53)
Economic growth	0.09	−0.03	0.09
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Excluded population	0.63	−5.11	−0.67
	(4.30)	(4.09)	(5.06)
Natural resources	−16.98	−10.80*	
	(14.35)	(2.70)	
Democracy	1.10	0.61	0.79
	(2.14)	(2.41)	(2.46)
GDP per capita before conflict (logged)	19.26*	2.88	
	(7.01)	(4.17)	
Civil war in neighboring country	−4.62*	−3.02*	−4.57*
	(1.42)	(1.34)	(1.72)
Foreign policy similarity with US	3.65	13.28	1.96
	(8.39)	(6.83)	(7.23)
UN PKO personnel (logged)	0.10	0.30	0.07
	(0.23)	(0.19)	(0.30)
Region fixed effects (baseline: East Asia)			
Europe & Central Asia	−24.02	−9.66	
	(20.45)	(6.43)	
Latin America & Caribbean	−34.87	−18.17*	
	(31.61)	(7.20)	
Middle East & North Africa	−48.25	−19.72	
	(27.96)	(14.00)	
South Asia	−14.80	−26.88*	
	(30.85)	(11.50)	
Sub-Saharan Africa	−24.61	−10.82	
	(16.18)	(6.12)	
Intercept	135.85	1.33	
	(87.87)	(24.98)	
Num. obs.	323	323	323

Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.05$ (two-tailed test).

Table A14: Regression estimates of the association between prior foreign aid (using aid commitment volumes from AidData, **split up by donor**) and CPA implementation at the post-CPA year level. Implementation scores range from 2 to 95. See text for detailed description of estimators.

	Country fixed effects and robust SEs	Country fixed effects and robust SEs
AidData Foreign aid commitments (all)	5.99*	
	(2.90)	
AidData Foreign aid commitments from United States	−0.03	0.14
	(0.79)	(0.81)
AidData Foreign aid commitments from France	0.06	0.22
	(0.47)	(0.45)
AidData Foreign aid commitments from United Kingdom	1.01	1.08
	(0.60)	(0.59)
Years since conflict (logged)	16.38*	16.18*
	(1.69)	(1.74)
Transitional power sharing government	28.86*	28.70*
	(8.31)	(8.35)
Conflict duration (logged)	−50.15*	−50.44*
	(4.23)	(4.21)
Years with mediation (logged)	−61.70*	−62.31*
	(6.20)	(6.17)
New leader since CPA	−0.49	−0.37
	(2.38)	(2.43)
Population (logged)	−5.76	−4.32
	(14.60)	(14.87)
GDP (IHS transformation, lagged)	−13.93*	−13.87*
	(3.68)	(3.65)
Economic growth	0.07	0.05
	(0.10)	(0.10)
Excluded population	−1.46	−2.28
	(4.78)	(4.97)
Democracy	1.25	1.11
	(2.29)	(2.52)
Civil war in neighboring country	−4.43*	−4.50*
	(1.76)	(1.77)
Foreign policy similarity with US	−0.51	−0.89
	(7.53)	(7.70)
UN PKO personnel (logged)	0.11	0.13
	(0.31)	(0.31)
Num. obs.	317	317

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed test). Only predictors that vary by country are included.

6 Ivory Coast compared to all other cases

As mentioned in the main text, Ivory Coast after 2007 is a "typical" case (Seawright and Gerring 2008) along the key explanatory variables used in this study. Figure A2 shows this in detail. Because Ivory Coast is typical and as such does not rank exceptionally high on other factors that might facilitate implementation, it offers insights into how the influence of IGOs with high economic leverage and prior foreign aid can help overcome obstacles to CPA implementation.

Ivory Coast enters our sample with the March 2007 Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA), ending a civil war that had started in 2002. The agreement was signed by the government of Laurent Gbago and the Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire (MPCI, also known as the Forces Nouvelles de Côte d'Ivoire or FNCI) in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. The accord was truly a comprehensive peace agreement, tackling a multitude of contentious issues and providing a framework for a transition to peace. It covered issues such as the cease fire; power-sharing; transitional government; demobilization; electoral, civil administration, military, police, and citizenship reforms; reintegration; amnesty; and internally displaced persons (S17). Because the CPA covers so many issues, opportunities for stakeholders and potential spoilers to block implementation abound — setting up a useful scenario for learning about how effective incentives can be.



Figure A2: Ivory Coast in the first year of its CPA, compared to all other cases in the data at the same time point, along key variables. Histograms show the distribution of all cases (except Ivory Coast), and dark dots show the value of Ivory Coast on the respective variable. For display purposes, continuous variables are standardized (centered around 0 and divided by one standard deviation).



Figure A3: Foreign aid commitments to Ivory Coast.

7 Rwanda as a "negative" case of implementation

As a contrast to Ivory Coast, Rwanda can be considered "negative" case where a lack of international incentives prohibited more successful implementation: the 1993 Arusha Accords in Rwanda. Of course the genocide in 1994 is a strong indicator for the CPA's failure to prevent conflict recurrence. But also by measuring the rate of CPA provisions that were implemented, we can conclude that the CPA in Rwanda lagged behind other CPAs, especially compared to Ivory Coast. As can be seen from Figure 1 in the main text, implementation of the Arusha Accord differs quite a bit from the speedy implementation of the Ouagadougou Political agreement in Ivory Coast. In Rwanda, the implementation of the August 1993 Arusha Accord got off to a very slow start with an aggregate score of 10.25 by the end of year one. By year end of year three, the aggregate score had increased to 43.5. By contrast, in Ivory coast, the aggregate implementation score for the March 2007 Ouagadougou Political Agreement had reached 51.8 by the end of year one, and 59.2 by the end of year three.

As our argument would suggest, we find that Rwanda ranks lower than Ivory Coast on our key explanatory variables. Overall, Ivory Coast participated in more IGOs with high economic leverage, whereas Rwanda's membership ranks in the 40^{th}-50^{th} percentile. Rwanda also received less aid in the years prior to the CPA than Ivory Coast. This suggests a lesser precedent for credible international incentives and fewer resources that might help overcome early implementation obstacles.

Finally, tracking aid during the first years of implementation, we also find that Rwanda lags behind Ivory Coast. In the year before the Arusha Accord, Rwanda received US$ 349 million in net official development assistance and official aid. In the year the accord was signed, that amount increased only slightly to 353 million. By implementation year two, total aid roughly doubled, peaking at 712 million. Thereafter, donor support dropped dramatically reaching a low of 230 million in 1997, the fourth year of implementation. In Ivory Coast, by contrast, total aid in the year before the 2007 peace agreement was 247 million, lower than in prior years. In implementation year two (2009), this amount had increased to 2.4 billion, nearly a ten-fold increase. Further, there was no dramatic decline: extending out to implementation year 5, total aid was 2.9 billion, nearly a twelve-fold increase in total aid from the year prior to the signing of the accord.

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