Online Appendix for "Maintaining ethnic dominance: Diversity, power, and violent repression"

Table AI. Summary statistics

	Observations	Mean	Std. Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
CIRI	4255	3.23	2.29	0	8
PTS	4886	2.48	1.14	1	5
Ethic fractional.	5043	0.46	0.26	0.00	0.93
Ethic polar.	5043	0.56	0.24	0.00	0.97
Ethic exclusion	4652	0.19	0.25	0	0.98
Executive const.	4831	4.32	2.29	1	7
GDP/cap. (log)	5016	8.31	1.33	5.08	11.82
Population (log)	5021	9.06	1.57	5.26	14.10
Oil/gas (log)	5055	12.20	10.68	0	27.03
Armed conflict	5054	0.19	0.39	0	1
Dissent, count	5017	1.16	3.43	0	81
Civil lib. rest.	4245	3.33	2.54	0	8

Time coverage is 1977-2010.

Table AII. Correlation matrix

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
(1) CIRI	1											
(2) PTS	0.82	1										
(3) Ethic fractional.	0.27	0.29	1									
(4) Ethic polar.	0.21	0.22	0.66	1								
(5) Ethic exclusion	0.33	0.35	0.35	0.32	1							
(6) Executive const.	-0.39	-0.38	-0.36	-0.19	-0.32	1						
(7) GDP/cap. (log)	-0.45	-0.48	-0.51	-0.22	-0.30	0.49	1					
(8) Population (log)	0.39	0.34	-0.10	-0.13	0.01	0.08	-0.05	1				
(9) Oil/gas (log)	0.08	0.02	-0.16	-0.03	-0.03	0.04	0.46	0.44	1			
(10) Armed conflict	0.55	0.53	0.12	0.10	0.22	-0.09	-0.21	0.28	0.05	1		
(11) Dissent	0.21	0.19	-0.06	-0.02	0.05	0.06	-0.01	0.26	0.10	0.18	1	
(12) Civil lib. rest.	0.51	0.47	0.25	0.18	0.32	-0.71	-0.33	0.13	0.13	0.18	0.02	1

Time coverage is 1977-2010.

Table AIII. CIRI models, ordered-logit estimation

	(1) ELF	(3) Polarization	(5) Exclusion	(7) Control for ELF	(8) Dissent and Civ. Lib.	(9) Autocratic subtypes
Ethno-ling. fract. (ELF)	0.43 (0.29)			0.40 (0.30)		
Ethnic Polarization		0.43 (0.27)				
Ethnic Exclusion$_{t-1}$			0.53* (0.23)	0.48* (0.23)	0.40+ (0.21)	0.82** (0.30)
Executive Constraint$_{t-1}$	-0.25** (0.03)	-0.25** (0.03)	-0.24** (0.03)	-0.24** (0.04)	-0.18** (0.04)	-0.21** (0.06)
GDP/capita$_{t-1}$ (log)	-0.33** (0.10)	-0.34** (0.10)	-0.39** (0.10)	-0.37** (0.10)	-0.39** (0.09)	-0.20+ (0.11)
Population Size$_{t-1}$ (log)	0.50** (0.07)	0.51** (0.06)	0.49** (0.06)	0.50** (0.06)	0.45** (0.06)	0.37** (0.07)
Oil and Gas$_{t-1}$ (log)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.01 (0.01)
Armed Conflict$_{t-1}$	0.95** (0.17)	0.95** (0.17)	0.94** (0.17)	0.94** (0.17)	0.94** (0.18)	0.94** (0.17)
Dissent, count$_{t-1}$					0.03* (0.01)	
Civil Liberty Restrictions$_{t-1}$					0.14** (0.03)	
Military (vs Personalist)$_{t-1}$						-0.18 (0.24)
Monarchy (vs Personalist)$_{t-1}$						-0.93** (0.39)
Party (vs Personalist)$_{t-1}$						-0.05 (0.16)
Fixed-Effects	Region-Year	Region-Year	Region-Year	Region-Year	Region-Year	Region-Year
Observations	3913	3913	3838	3814	3764	1853
Countries	157	157	151	149	151	102

**p<0.01, *p<0.05. +p<0.10. Ordered-logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country). One-year lagged repression included in all models (not shown to save space).

Table AIV. Alternative measurements and controls

	(13) Logged Exclusion	(14) DD	(15) X-polity	(16) Int'l war	(17) Youth Bulge	(18) Judicial Independence
Ethnic Exclusion$_{t-1}$		0.30** (0.09)	0.24** (0.09)	0.24** (0.09)	0.33** (0.11)	0.24** (0.09)
Ethnic Exclusion$_{t-1}$ (log)	0.31** (0.12)					
Democracy-Dictatorship$_{t-1}$		-0.32** (0.05)				
X-polity $_{t-1}$			-0.03** (0.01)			
Executive Constraint$_{t-1}$	-0.09** (0.01)			-0.09** (0.01)	-0.08** (0.02)	-0.08** (0.01)
GDP/capita$_{t-1}$ (log)	-0.17** (0.03)	-0.20** (0.03)	-0.19** (0.03)	-0.17** (0.03)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.16** (0.03)
Population Size$_{t-1}$ (log)	0.18** (0.02)	0.17** (0.02)	0.18** (0.02)	0.18** (0.02)	0.18** (0.02)	0.18** (0.02)
Oil and Gas$_{t-1}$ (log)	0.002 (0.002)	0.004+ (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)
Armed Conflict$_{t-1}$	0.62** (0.06)	0.62* (0.06)	0.58* (0.06)	0.62** (0.06)	0.77** (0.08)	0.63** (0.06)
International War$_{t-1}$				0.06 (0.11)		
Youth Bulge$_{t-1}$					0.02* (0.01)	
Judicial Indep.$_{t-1}$						-0.09** (0.04)
Fixed-Effects	Region-Year	Region-Year	Region-Year	Region-Year	Region-Year	Region-Year
Observations	3838	3786	3838	3838	2495	3838
Countries	151	151	151	151	145	151

**p<0.01, *p<0.05. +p<0.10. CIRI models; OLS coefficients with heteroskedastic, panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. One-year lagged repression included in all models (not shown to save space).