Supplementary Online Appendix

A Farewell to Arms? Electoral Outcomes and Lasting Peace After Civil War

Table A.1. Correlates of Remilitarization

	(1)	(2)[a]	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
			REINTIATES WAR				
Power upset	5.87***	7.00***					
& War-winner wins election	(1.61)	(1.64)					
Belligerent party vote share			0.00	-0.03	0.01	-0.11***	-0.01
			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Power-sharing		-0.67	0.40				
		(2.20)	(1.14)				
Vote share * Power sharing			0.00				
			(0.02)				
PR system				1.73			
				(0.98)			
Vote share * PR system				-0.00			
				(0.03)			
Election timing		-0.14			0.11		
		(0.14)			(0.07)		
Vote share * Election timing					-0.01**		
					(0.00)		
UN intervention		3.72*				-1.12	
		(1.54)				(0.71)	
Vote share * UN intervention						0.12***	
						(0.03)	
Organizational capacity							0.21
							(0.72)
War duration	0.03	0.10	0.01	-0.00	-0.02	0.00	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Incompatibility	-2.79		-1.26	-0.85	-0.33	-0.38	0.48
	(1.66)		(0.90)	(0.82)	(0.59)	(0.60)	(0.88)
War violence	-0.38	-0.33		0.57*	0.22	0.28	0.40
	(0.57)	(0.57)		(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.27)
Number of vetoes	0.80	0.41	0.54	-0.54	-0.25	-0.19	-0.72
	(0.71)	(0.63)	(0.46)	(0.57)	(0.61)	(0.53)	(0.73)
Per capita GDP (logged)	-1.58**	-0.89		0.02	0.09	0.07	0.38
	(0.60)	(1.64)		(0.44)	(0.46)	(0.41)	(0.53)
Free and fair elections	-11.99	-14.98**	-5.08**	-2.88	-0.76	-1.14	-0.47
	(7.74)	(5.79)	(1.78)	(1.68)	(1.68)	(1.63)	(2.04)
Constant	14.79**	4.19	-0.17	-0.43	-2.14	-1.08	-5.32
	(5.39)	(12.05)	(1.28)	(4.85)	(4.68)	(4.26)	(5.74)
Observations	67	55	103	126	133	133	71

Standard errors in parentheses
Robust standard errors account for country clustering.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
[a] Due to multicollinearity, incompatibility must be dropped from this analysis. The result for *Power upset & War-winner wins election* holds irrespective of which variables are included/excluded from the analysis.

Table A.2 Correlates of Civil War Successor Party Success Around the World

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Rebel Vote Share	Govt Belligerent Vote Share	Rebel Vote Share[a]	Govt Belligerent Vote Share
War outcomes	15.44***	-18.07***	16.33***	-15.57**
	(3.56)	(3.39)	(5.98)	(7.29)
UN intervention	1.55	-8.85	-3.81	-7.70
	(5.47)	(6.58)	(7.10)	(6.60)
Powersharing	-0.97	4.86	-0.35	4.86
	(6.92)	(9.74)	(8.56)	(10.32)
Number of vetoes	-4.56*	-4.49	-3.48	-4.47
	(2.61)	(6.09)	(4.76)	(5.94)
Incompatibility	12.81***	10.57	18.80***	9.50
	(4.76)	(6.51)	(5.97)	(6.42)
War duration	-0.11	-0.54*	-0.10	-0.57*
	(0.18)	(0.27)	(0.23)	(0.29)
Belligerent's atrocities	-3.12	1.61	-5.37	8.42
	(5.48)	(6.28)	(10.64)	(14.94)
Free and fair elections	-3.98	-18.94	-9.38	-15.62
	(12.07)	(12.06)	(13.98)	(12.36)
Popular support			10.81*	3.94
			(5.90)	(4.05)
Rebel governance			1.31	
			(5.49)	
Rebel cohesion			3.99	
			(4.65)	
Rebel finances			-3.57	
			(7.22)	
Constant	-14.21	75.74***	-29.90*	66.21***
	(10.47)	(17.13)	(15.53)	(20.51)
Observations	82	62	74	61
R-squared	0.36	0.41	0.45	0.42

Standard errors in parentheses; Robust standard errors account for country clustering.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
[a] Unfortunately, comparable indicators for wartime public goods provision, financing, and cohesion do not exist for government belligerents.



Figure A.1. Conditional Marginal Effects of Proportional Representation on War Reinitiation



Figure A.2. Conditional Marginal Effects of UN Intervention on War Reinitiation



Figure A.3. The Effect of Electoral Losers' Vote Share on the Probability of Remilitarization

Table A.3. World Value Survey and Founding Election Years

	Year of Founding Election*	Year of World Value Survey
Argentina	1983	1984
Azerbaijan	1996	1997
Bangladesh	2001	2002
Bosnia	1996	2001
Croatia	1995	1996
Egypt	2000	2001
Georgia	1995	1996
Guatemala	1999	2004
Indonesia	2009	2006
Iraq	2010	2012
Libya	2012	2014
Moldova	1994	1996
Peru	1995	1996
Philippines	1998	1996
Russia	2011	2011
South Africa	1994	1996

*See Daly 2021 for discussion of founding election dates.



Figure A.4. Frequency of War Outcomes

Table A.4. Data Sources

Variable	**Data Source**
Power upset & War-winner wins election	Gromes and Ranft 2016 Post–Civil War Power and Compromise data set; vote share data to determine election winner.
Vote share	Print and electronic sources[1]
War outcome	UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset v.2-2015 (Kreutz 2010)
Power-sharing	Hartzell and Hoddie 2015; Högbladh 2011
PR system	Varieties of Democracy variable, *v2elparlel* (Lindberg et al. 2014)
Election timing	The number of years between war termination and the founding elections
UN Intervention	Brancati and Snyder 2012
Orgn. Capacity	Non-State Actor (NSA) Dataset (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, 2012)
War duration	UCDP war start and end dates
Incompatibility	UCDP Dataset
War violence	Stanton 2016
Number of vetoes	Cunningham 2006
Per capita GDP (logged)	Varieties of Democracy indicator, *e_migdppcln* (Lindberg et al. 2014).
Free and fair elections	Varieties of Democracy clean election index, *v2xel_frefair* (Lindberg et al. 2014).
Rebel governance	Huang 2016
Rebel cohesion	NSA Dataset (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, 2012)
Rebel finances	Huang 2016; Rustad and Binningsbø 2012; Fearon 2004

[1] These include Birch 2003; Grotz, Hartmann, and Nohlen 2001; Nohlen 2005a, b; Nohlen, Krennerich, and Thibaut 1999; Nohlen and Stöver 2010; Political Handbook of the World 1999, African Elections Database, Political Database of the Americas, and Parties and Elections in Europe.

Table A.5. Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Reinitiate War	0.14	0.35	0.00	1.00	202
Power upset & War-winner wins election	0.10	0.30	0.00	1.00	69
Vote share	25.80	28.72	0	75.33	180
War outcome	1.58	0.82	0	3	205
War outcome (alternative)	1.26	0.79	0	3	189
Wartime violence	2.62	0.95	1	4	159
Free and fair elections	0.51	0.18	0.22	0.93	194
UN intervention	0.43	0.50	0	1	200
Power-sharing	0.65	0.48	0.00	1.00	113
PR system	0.38	0.49	0	1	182
Election timing	4.36	3.77	0.00	18.00	185
Organizational capacity	1.22	0.62	0	2	97
Number of vetoes	2.24	0.60	2	5	192
Incompatibility	1.59	0.49	1	2	202
War duration	10.21	12.84	0	65	203
Rebel governance	0.45	0.50	0	1	101
Rebel finances	0.52	0.50	0	1	101
Popular support	0.95	0.70	0	2	188
Voter turnout	66.92	16.84	30.35	96.48	150
Per capita GDP	8.00	1.07	5.59	10.47	178

Table A.6 Correlates of Civil War Successor Party Success, Robustness Checks

	(1)	(2)	(5)	(6)
	Rebel Vote Share	Govt Belligerent Vote Share	Rebel Vote Share	Govt Belligerent Vote Share
War outcomes			10.26***	-11.56**
			(3.73)	(5.52)
War outcomes (alternative measure)	25.31***	-21.52***		
	(3.35)	(3.59)		
Belligerent's atrocities	-1.91	2.82	-4.53	1.19
	(3.58)	(5.70)	(5.08)	(6.78)
Free and fair elections	5.99	-24.26*	-8.04	-36.12
	(8.70)	(12.13)	(16.60)	(22.18)
UN	1.74	-8.24	0.29	-11.20
	(4.55)	(6.19)	(6.29)	(7.56)
Power-sharing	-9.07	12.40		
	(5.46)	(9.73)		
Number of vetoes	-1.99	-6.82	-7.10**	-5.00
	(2.33)	(6.43)	(2.92)	(5.82)
Incompatibility	17.26***	7.33	9.49	2.56
	(3.87)	(6.33)	(5.88)	(10.38)
War duration	-0.13	-0.46	-0.19	-0.62*
	(0.17)	(0.28)	(0.15)	(0.34)
Voter turnout			9.95*	10.69
			(5.10)	(7.82)
Per capita GDP			0.24	0.08
			(0.20)	(0.28)
PR system			-0.37	-0.37
			(3.60)	(4.36)
Constant	-36.96***	84.73***	-11.33	85.75
	(9.71)	(15.24)	(41.50)	(57.79)
Observations	82	62	64	48
R^2	0.58	0.41	0.37	0.33

Standard errors in parentheses
Robust standard errors account for country clustering.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.7. Case Studies: Covariates

Variables	**El Salvador**	**Angola**	**Nicaragua**
Power sharing	1	1	1
PR system	1	1	1
Time to election	3	<1 year	<1 year
UN intervention	1	1	1
Organizational capacity	1	2	1
War duration	11	20	8
Incompatibility	2	2	2
Number of vetoes	2	2	2
Per capita GDP	8.29	7.71	7.66
Free and fair elections	0.37	0.18	0.66
Voter turnout	55	87	81
Popular support	Rebels	Equal	Incumbent

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