Partisanship and Political Socialization in Electoral Autocracies

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Supplementary Materials

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Appendix A: Scope Conditions

Table A.1 presents a global list of contemporary electoral autocracies. It includes any country that has been consistently coded as an 'electoral autocracy' by V-Dem's 'Regimes of the World' variable (Coppedge, Michael, et al. 2023) for the past 10 years (2012–2022). Because this is a study of partisanship, I exclude regimes with no formal ruling party or where parties do not last more than one election cycle,[1] as well as those that have experienced regime change[2] within the past 10 years. The table lists the name of the country's ruling party, the year the current regime first began holding multiparty election, the percent of citizens reporting themselves to be ruling party partisans,[3] the percent of the voting-age population who voted for the ruling party in the last presidential election,[4] and the total turnout of the voting age population.[5]

From Algeria to Zimbabwe, there are 33 electoral autocracies with ruling parties around the world that are at least a decade old. They span the continents of Africa, Europe, the Middle East, Asia, Central and South America, though by far the most—19 in total—are found in Africa. Perhaps surprisingly, for most electoral autocracies the percentage of citizens who reported feeling close to the ruling party in public opinion surveys is quite close to the percentage of votes that the ruling party received in the last election—across all electoral autocracies with data, the average for the former is 40.8 percent and the latter is 39.3 percent (with a correlation of 0.68). Nonetheless, there is considerable variation in ruling party partisanship across the universe of electoral autocracies, ranging from feeble, elite-based parties like the *Parti démocratique gabonais* in Gabon (13.5 percent) to much more deeply rooted parties, such as *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* in Tanzania (58.1 percent).

Table A.1: Global List of Contemporary Electoral Autocracies

Country	Ruling Party	Year of First Multiparty Election	Last Election	Percent Ruling Party Partisans	% VAP Voted for Ruling Party	% VAP Turnout
Algeria	*Front de liberation* (FLN)	1988	2019	28.6%	20.3%	34.9%
Angola	*Movimento Popular de Libertaçao de Angola* (MPLA)	1992	2022*	24.2	20.7	40.5
Azerbaijan	*Yeni Azərbaycan Partiyası* (YAP)	1993	2018	40.3	46.3	53.8
Bangladesh	Awami League	1991	2018*	42.0	58.3	78.1
Burundi	*Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie –*	2005	2020	55.4	54.7	76.5

[1] Belarus, Iraq, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, and Morocco.
[2] Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Egypt, Guinea, and Haiti.
[3] Data taken from the World Values Survey (Rwanda, Singapore (Round 6, 2010-14); Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Venezuela, Zimbabwe (Round 7, 2017-22), Afrobarometer (Burundi (Round 6, 2014-15); Mozambique, Tanzania (Round 8, 2019-21); Angola, Cameroon, Gabon, Togo, Uganda (Round 9, 2022)), Arabarometer (Algeria, Mauritania (Wave 7, 2022), and Latinbatometro (Honduras, 2020). The World Values Survey and Latinobarometro asks: "Which party would you vote for if there were a national election tomorrow?" The Afro- and Arabarometer ask: "Which party, if any, do you feel closest to?" (Afrobarometer Data, Round 9 2022; Arabarometer Data, Wave 7 2022; Inglehart et al. 2014)
[4] Parliamentary regimes without presidential elections are noted.
[5] (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA))

	Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD)					
Cambodia	Cambodian People's Party (CPP)	1993	2018*	--	51.0	66.3
Cameroon	*Rassemblement démocratique du people camérounais* (RDPC)	1992	2018	20.4	21.1	29.6
Chad	*Mouvement patriotique du salut* (MPS)	1996	2021	--	45.8	57.8
Comoros	*Convention pour le Renouveau des Comores* (CRC)	2002	2019	--	21.9	36.1
Democratic Republic of Congo	*Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social* (UDPS)	2001	2021	--	55.2	62.4
Republic of Congo	*Parti congolais du travail* (PCT)	1992	2018	--	16.0	41.5
Djibouti	*Rassemblement populaire pour le Progrès* (RPP)	1993	2021	--	26.4	27.1
Equatorial Guinea	*Partido Democrático de Guinea Ecuatorial* (PDGE)	1993	2022	--	41.7	43.0
Ethiopia	Prosperity Party	1995	2021*	47.8	--	63.4
Gabon	*Parti démocratique gabonais* (PDG)	1990	2016	13.5	20.9	41.9
Honduras	*Partido Nacional de Honduras*	2009	2021	15.0	30.5	59.7
Kazakhstan	*Nur Otan; Amanat*	1994	2022	58.5	49.8	61.2
Kyrgyzstan	*Mekenchil*	2010	2021	14.3	28.6	35.8
Malaysia	*Pakatan Harapan*	1955	2022*	39.8	24.2	63.6
Mauritania	*Union pour la République* (UPR); *El Insaf*	2008	2019	31.7	23.0	44.3
Mozambique	*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (FRELIMO)	1994	2019	36.3	37.0	50.3
Nicaragua	*Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional* (FSLN)	1984	2021	29.7	45.8	63.9
Papua New Guinea	Pangu	1975	2017*	--	--	--
Russian Federation	United Russia	1999	2018	47.2	50.2	64.8
Rwanda	Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)	2003	2017	67.7	97.0	98.2
Singapore	People's Action Party (PAP)	1968	2020*	67.9	31.5	51.4
Tajikistan	People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT)	1994	2020	84.6	69.6	75.6
Tanzania	*Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM)	1995	2020	58.1	43.2	51.2
Togo	*Union pour la république* (UNIR)	1994	2020	22.5	52.6	74.3
Turkey	Justice and Development Party (AKP)	1983	2023	46.0	47.6	91.2
Uganda	National Resistance Movement (NRM)	1996	2021	41.9	31.2	53.5
Venezuela	*Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela* (PSUV)	1999	2018	26.9	29.7	43.7
Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe African National Union—Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)	1980	2018	29.6	33.3	64.7
Average				**40.8**	**39.3**	**56.0**
*Parliamentary election						

Appendix B: Description of the Twelve Core Subjects

1) **Anita – RDPC**

- 56-year-old Bassa female. Sells beer, soft drinks, and sundry items.
- Low socioeconomic status; low/medium level of education (3ème année).
- Interviewed in Boumnyebel, where she was born and raised.
- Sister-in-law of the chief of Boumnyebel; divorced with three children.
- Supported the UPC in her youth; switched to the RDPC around 2007 when the UPC splintered into rival faction. Current president of the women's sub-section of RDPC in Boumnyebel.
- 19 people in social network; 18 surveyed: 17 RDPC supporters; 1 nonpartisan.

2) **Martin – UPC**

- 56-year-old Bassa male. Former engineer who is now retired and farms.
- Middle class socioeconomic status; high level of education (post-graduate degree).
- Interviewed in Boumneyebel, his hometown, but he lived his whole life in Yaoundé and Douala; moved back 6-7 years ago.
- Recent widow with two adult children.
- Joined the UPC in 1992 in Yaoundé and supported them ever since. Current president of the central committee for Boumneyebel.
- 19 people in social network; 15 surveyed: 4 RDPC supporters; 1 UPC; 10 nonpartisans.

3) **Jacques – Nonpartisan**

- 56-year-old Bassa male. Builder and handyman.
- Low socioeconomic status; low/middle level of education.
- Interviewed in Boumnyebel, where he has lived his whole life.
- Lives with 20-year partner who sells plums by the road. Four children, 6-18 years old.
- Devoted nonpartisan; votes the person not the party. No political opinions.
- 13 people in social network; 13 surveyed: 5 RDPC supporters; 6 PCRN; 2 UPC; 0 nonpartisans.

4) **Henri – RDPC**

- 43-year-old Banen male. Large-scale cocoa farmer and seller.
- Middle class socioeconomic status; high level of education (post-graduate degree).
- Interviewed in Boumnyebel, from Ndiki (RDPC stronghold), but lived in between Douala and Ndiki his whole life. Moved to Boumnyebel 6 months ago.
- One child by past girlfriend, 14 year-old who lives in Douala; one 9-year-old from current girlfriend living with him in Boumnyebel.
- Supported Kamto in the last election, but lost faith. Supports the RDPC. Hates the opposition.
- 8 people in social network; 6 surveyed: 2 PCRN; 4 nonpartisans.

5) Justo – Nonpartisan

- 55-year-old Bafia male. Director of communications for the mayor of Bafia; former journalist.
- Middle class; high level of education (post-graduate degree).
- Interviewed in Bafia, where he was born. Lived all over growing up (father was in the military). Settled in Yaoundé during university but moved back to Bafia in 2007.
- Married for 17 years with one adult daughter.
- Likes Kamto and sympathetic to opposition, but dogmatically nonpartisan. Hates the RDPC and the current regime.
- 13 people in social network; 13 surveyed: 3 RDPC; 3 UPC; 7 nonpartisans.

6) Patience – RDPC

- 50-year-old Anglophone female (Bambili). Former teacher; displaced by anglophone crisis so now not working but taking care of grandchildren in the house.
- Low socioeconomic status; middling education (went back to school in adulthood to get her O-levels and teaching license).
- Interviewed in Bafia, but born and raised in Bamenda (an opposition stronghold). Fled to Bafia in 2017 due to the crisis.
- Divorced with 3 adult children. Lives with her son and his family.
- Became active in the RDPC in Bamenda in 2015, but has not been active since fleeing to Bafia.
- 16 people in social network; 16 surveyed: 7 RDPC; 1 FSNC; 4 SDF; 1 PCRN; 3 nonpartisans.

7) Bertrand – RDPC

- 44-year-old Bafia male. Mechanic.
- Low socioeconomic status; low level of education (CEP with a technical certificate).
- Interviewed in Bafia where he lived his whole life.
- Married for 15 years with 4 children, aged 6-14.
- Lifelong RDPC supporter; current president of local sub-section
- 10 people in social network; 10 surveyed: 8 RDPC; 2 nonpartisans.

8) Titus – SDF

- 30-year-old Anglophone male (Bambili). Fixed-route taxi driver.
- Low socioeconomic status; low/middling education (one year of secondary school).
- Interviewed in Bafia, but lived in and around Bamenda his whole life; fled to Bafia in 2017 because of the Anglophone crisis.
- Has a 3-year-old in Bamenda.
- Been supporting the SDF for the past five years or so.
- 20 people in social network; 17 surveyed: 2 SDF; 11 nonpartisans; 4 refused.

9) Mireille – FSNC

- 29-year-old Bafia female. Stay at home mom who sometimes sells juice that she makes.
- Low socioeconomic status; middling education (finished her baccalaureat).
- Interviewed in Bafia where she lived her whole life, except when she went to Dschang for secondary school.
- Long term partner for ten years; he owns and drives moto taxis. Two daughters, 4 and 9.
- Has supported the FSNC since 2016, an umbrella party of the RDPC. Partner is the president of the local youth section of the party.
- 16 people in social network; 16 surveyed: 3 RDPC; 4 FSNC; 2 MRC; 8 nonpartisans.

10) Joseph – SDF

- 38-year-old Anglophone male (Nso). Taxi driver.
- Low/medium socioeconomic status; low/middling education (O-levels).
- Interviewed in Yaoundé. From Kumbo but moved to Buea for primary school and settled in Yaoundé for secondary school.
- Married for 18 years with three children, 11-21 years old. Wife is a tailor.
- Supported the SDF for as long as he can remember, but stopped supporting them when they fell apart during the crisis. Says he would support them again if they got serious.
- 13 people in social network; 13 surveyed: 2 RDPC; 2 SDF; 9 nonpartisans.

11) Smart – CPP

- 24-year-old Anglophone male (Bafumen). University student.
- Low socioeconomic status; high level of education (currently getting a post-graduate degree)
- Interviewed in Yaoundé, where he moved during the crisis. Born and raised in Wum.
- Brothers and sisters in Buea and Douala.
- Started going to protests in 2018 and quickly joined the CPP.
- 13 people in social network; 9 surveyed: 1 RDPC; 1 CPP; 1 PAP; 6 nonpartisans.

12) George – RDPC

- 43-year-old Anglophone male (Bafut). Principal and teacher.
- Middle class; high level of education (post-graduate degrees from universities in Italy and Denmark).
- Interviewed in Yaoundé. Born and raised in Bafut. University in Yaoundé and abroad. Returned to Bafut around 2010 but fled during the crisis back to Yaoundé.
- Married 15 years to a school teacher; 4 children aged 6-13 years.
- Not interested in politics until 2011, when he joined the CPDM. Became a sub-section president in Bafut and wanted to run for mayor but fled during the crisis and now tries to stay out of politics because of fear.
- 9 people in social network; 9 surveyed: 1 RDPC; 1 SDF; 5 nonpartisans; 2 refused.

Appendix C: Sampling Design

A total of 1,200 respondents were interviewed from January 20 – February 4, 2021. Table C.1 presents every district sampled in the survey. These areas were sampled on two characteristics. First, whether the *département* historically votes for an opposition political party, the ruling party, or "swings" between the two. Second, variation in urban and rural EAs were created for each of these three subgroups of *départements*.

Table C.1: Sampled Areas

Region	Département	Arrondissement	Number of Surveys
Centre	Lékié Ouest	Evodoula	40
	Mbam et Inoubou	Bokito	20
		Kon-Yambetta	20
		Makenéné	40
		Ndikinimeki	40
	Mfoundi	Yaoundé II	20
		Yaoundé V	20
		Yaoundé VI	20
	Nyong et Kellé	Eséka	40
		Messondo	40
		Ngog-Mapubi	60
Littoral	Nkam	Nord Makombe	60
		Yabassi	20
	Sanaga Maritime	Edéa II	40
		Ngwei	60
	Wouri East	Douala I	40
	Wouri Centre	Douala II	20
	Wouri Sud	Douala III	40
South	Dja et Lobo	Sangmelima	21
		Zoétélé	20
	Mvila	Ebolowa I	39
	Océan	Lokoundjé	20
West	Haut Nkam	Bafang	60
	Haut Plateaux	Baham	60
		Bamendjou	60
		Bangou	60
	Mifi	Bafoussam	40
	Ndé	Bazou	60
	Noun Centre	Foumban	40
		Malentouen	40
		Massangan	40

In urban areas, enumerators stopped at every 5th house. In rural areas, where population densities were too low, enumerators stopped at every available house. Enumerators began at the same randomly chosen location within the enumeration area, walking in opposite directions.

Enumerators interviewed Cameroonian citizens who were twenty years or older, the legal voting age in Cameroon is 20. 138 households were double-sampled, such that two people in one house were interviewed.

Figure C1: Survey sampling map of Cameroon



Appendix D: Full results (including controls) for main findings in Tables 3 & 4

Table D.1: Full results of Table 3

Reported Feeling Close to a Party	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 1c
Network's Partisan Homogeneity	0.419*** (0.015)	0.337*** (0.015)	0.364*** (0.018)
Network Size	0.001	--	0.010
Average Network Education	0.002	--	-0.002
Network's Ethnic Homophily	0.042	--	0.050*
Network's Average level of Community Influence	-0.031***	--	-0.043***
Education	--	-0.004	-0.000
SES Factor Variable	--	-0.037***	-0.034***
R Ever Received Gift	--	-0.007	0.008
Contact Municipal Councilor	--	0.019	0.023
Contact Mayor	--	0.026**	0.022
Believes in logic of Electoral Patronage	--	0.006	0.003
R Ever Intimidated	--	0.146***	0.200***
Political Interest	0.105***	0.099***	0.105***
Age	0.001***	0.002***	0.002***
Gender	0.003	-0.012	-0.014
Muslim	0.123***	0.016	0.037
Catholic	0.151***	0.085***	0.115***
Protestant	0.188***	0.150***	0.197***
Pentecostal	-0.175***	-0.223***	-0.211***
Jehovah's Witness	0.159***	0.292***	0.321***
Traditionalist	-0.187***	-0.245***	-0.103
Other	-0.039	-0.179***	-0.112***
Bamiléké	0.123**	0.120**	0.107***
Bamoun	0.338***	0.345***	0.352***
Bassa	0.204***	0.219***	0.217***
Batanga	0.089	0.064	0.093
Beti-Fang	0.139***	0.089***	0.102***
Bulu	0.133**	0.105***	0.094***
Dibom	0.211***	0.186***	0.188***
Duala	0.099****	0.110***	0.139***
Eton	0.354***	0.330***	0.335***
Ewondo	0.193***	0.199***	0.123***
Mbamois	0.261***	0.263***	0.220***
Sawa	0.144***	0.139***	0.137***
Other	0.254***	0.209***	0.259***
Semi-Urban	-0.088	0.004	-0.014
Urban	-0.128***	-0.040*	-0.040***
Constant	-0.127***	0.100*	0.003
N	606	601	531
R-Squared	0.330	0.349	0.375

Coefficients are reported. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Two-way standard errors clustered at both the level of the enumeration area and the household.
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; p<***0.001

Table D.2: Full Results of Table 4

Reported Feeling Close to an Opposition Party	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 2c
Network's Opposition Partisan Homogeneity	0.377*** (0.024)	0.322*** (0.015)	0.357*** (0.023)
Network Size	-0.007	--	-0.009
Average Network Education	0.017*	--	-0.008
Network's Ethnic Homophily	0.026**	--	0.059***
Network's Average level of Community Influence	-0.023***	--	-0.010
Education	--	0.005	0.010
SES Factor Variable	--	0.005	0.013***
R Ever Received Gift	--	-0.022	-0.033
Contact Municipal Councilor	--	-0.015	-0.025***
Contact Mayor	--	-0.014	-0.004
Believes in logic of Electoral Patronage	--	-0.039***	-0.038***
R Ever Intimidated	--	0.168***	0.172***
Political Interest	0.055***	0.053***	0.061***
Age	-0.001*	-0.001	-0.001
Gender	-0.057***	-0.070***	-0.069***
Muslim	-0.086	-0.123*	-0.134
Catholic	-0.004	-0.010	-0.004
Protestant	-0.059	0.065	0.100
Pentecostal	-0.119	-0.150**	-0.120
Jehovah's Witness	-0.130**	-0.126***	-0.094
Traditionalist	-0.305***	-0.364***	-0.335***
Other	-0.166**	-0.208***	-0.206***
Bamiléké	0.140***	0.145***	0.105***
Bamoun	0.273***	0.380***	0.335***
Bassa	0.198***	0.197***	0.210***
Batanga	-0.148***	-0.161***	-0.140***
Beti-Fang	-0.071**	-0.054***	-0.061***
Bulu	-.080***	-0.058***	-0.076**
Dibom	-0.049**	-0.009	-0.028
Duala	0.042**	0.119***	0.107***
Eton	-0.028	-0.016	-0.013
Ewondo	-0.045**	-0.020	-0.026
Mbamois	-0.022	0.023	0.042
Sawa	-0.137***	-0.170***	-0.201***
Other	0.048**	0.018*	0.029
Semi-Urban	-0.104***	-0.039	-0.060**
Urban	-0.109***	-0.104***	-0.100***
Constant	0.072	0.121***	0.055
N	604	598	529
R-Squared	0.341	0.343	0.379

Coefficients are reported. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Two-way standard errors clustered at both the level of the enumeration area and the household.
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; p<***0.001

Appendix E: Replication of results including only respondents who named two or more discussion partners

Table E.1: Replication of Table 3

Reported Feeling Close to a Party	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 1c
Network's Partisan Homogeneity	0.407***	0.345***	0.365***
	(0.021)	(0.0125)	(0.022)
Network Size	-0.011	--	-0.011
Average Network Education	0.003	--	0.005
Network's Ethnic Homophily	0.060	--	0.074**
Network's Average level of Community Influence	-0.030**	--	-0.037***
Education	--	-0.005*	-0.009
SES Factor Variable	--	-0.031***	-0.025***
R Ever Received Gift	--	-0.008	0.005
Contact Municipal Councilor	--	0.017	0.031
Contact Mayor	--	0.033**	0.033**
Believes in logic of Electoral Patronage	--	0.007*	0.005
R Ever Intimidated	--	0.260***	0.294***
Political Interest	0.110***	0.113***	0.107***
Age	-0.001**	0.000	-0.001
Gender	0.027*	0.009	0.004
Muslim	0.079**	-0.015	-0.030**
Catholic	0.107***	0.075***	0.060**
Protestant	0.152***	0.168***	0.159***
Pentecostal	-0.224***	-0.222***	-0.304***
Jehovah's Witness	-0.027	0.182***	0.168***
Other	-0.106	-0.262***	-0.217***
Bamiléké	-0.017	-0.051	-0.061
Bamoun	0.271***	0.237***	0.233***
Bassa	0.089**	0.124***	0.096***
Batanga	-0.076	-0.108	-0.073
Beti-Fang	0.066	0.040	0.015
Bulu	0.047	-0.001	0.011
Dibom	-0.014	0.081**	-0.048*
Duala	-0.025	-0.075*	-0.006
Eton	0.352***	0.313***	0.328***
Ewondo	0.148***	0.028	0.048
Mbamois	0.191***	0.195***	0.155***
Sawa	0.215**	0.163***	0.192***
Other	0.179***	0.159***	0.166***
Semi-Urban	-0.088	-0.062**	-0.084*
Urban	-0.082**	-0.032	-0.070***
Constant	0.097*	0.208***	0.249***
N	469	412	391
R-Squared	0.313	0.359	0.367

Coefficients are reported. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Two-way standard errors clustered at both the level of the enumeration area and the household.
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table E.2: Replication of Table 4

Reported Feeling Close to an Opposition Party	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 1c
Network's Opposition Partisan Homogeneity	0.450*** (0.036)	0.392*** (0.027)	0.422*** (0.030)
Network Size	-0.010	--	-0.027*
Average Network Education	0.023***	--	0.002
Network's Ethnic Homophily	0.020	--	0.057***
Network's Average level of Community Influence	-0.036***	--	-0.018***
Education	--	0.009	0.004
SES Factor Variable	--	0.008**	0.016***
R Ever Received Gift	--	-0.057***	-0.057***
Contact Municipal Councilor	--	-0.023**	-0.027***
Contact Mayor	--	-0.010	-0.003
Believes in logic of Electoral Patronage	--	-0.031**	-0.036***
R Ever Intimidated	--	0.370***	0.384***
Political Interest	0.069**	0.067**	0.073***
Age	-0.001	0.000	0.000
Gender	-0.050***	-0.053**	-0.061***
Muslim	-0.085	-0.063	-0.099
Catholic	0.005	0.042	0.015
Protestant	0.036	0.124**	0.104
Pentecostal	-0.116	-0.126**	-0.128
Jehovah's Witness	-0.221***	-0.295***	-0.336***
Other	-0.114	-0.162***	-0.171**
Bamiléké	0.120*	0.082*	0.046
Bamoun	0.259***	0.316***	0.281***
Bassa	0.169***	0.172***	0.167**
Batanga	-0.275***	-0.219***	-0.223***
Beti-Fang	-0.053	-0.013	-0.050**
Bulu	-0.071*	-0.092***	-0.087***
Dibom	-0.001	0.041*	-0.006
Duala	0.041	0.080***	0.094**
Eton	-0.009	-0.021	-0.007
Ewondo	-0.064*	-0.066	-0.067
Mbamois	0.003	0.050***	0.047
Sawa	0.061	0.118***	0.123***
Other	0.070**	0.032*	0.015
Semi-Urban	-0.128***	-0.069	-0.094**
Urban	-0.101***	-0.085***	-0.085***
Constant	0.015	0.033	0.037
N	468	411	390
R-Squared	0.351	0.401	0.432

Coefficients are reported. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Two-way standard errors clustered at both the level of the enumeration area and the household.
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; p<***0.001

Appendix F: Correlates of Response Bias in Reporting Social Networks

Unfortunately, there appears to be significant demographic differences between respondents who chose to report their social networks (roughly two-thirds of the full sample) and those who refused (roughly one-third of the sample). The primary deciding factor between reporters and non-reporters appears to be political interest and demographic characteristics that covary with political interest. Table F.1 presents simple t-tests for these demographic factors, showing how responders differ from those who refused to respond. Responders are more likely to be younger, male, to possess higher levels of education, report an interest in politics, and to be partisans. People who are interested in politics—which, in the Cameroonian context, tends to be educated young men—are simply more likely to answer survey questions about politics. However, it is important to note that most of these differences—apart from gender and political interest—are not substantively large. Although women were about ten percent less likely than men to report their social networks, the average difference in age between responders and non-responders was only 3 years, the education gap was about half a point on a nine-point scale, and socioeconomic status only differed, on average, by a third of a point on a ten-point scale. Critically, there was no difference in reporting between ruling party partisans and opposition partisans: both types of partisans opted out of the network portion of the survey at equal rates. This suggests that nonresponse was not driven by fear or social sensitivity, at least not for partisans; if it were, we would expect a higher response rate from ruling party partisans than opposition parties. As a result of these imbalances, I control for these demographic factors in the statistical analyses.

Table F.1 Covariates of Self-Selection into Network Responses

Covariate	(1) Responded	(2) Refused	(3) Difference of Means	(4) *P*-Value
Female	0.46	0.58	0.13	0.000
	(779)	(421)	(0.03)	
Age	36.1	39.1	3.03	0.000
	(779)	(421)	(0.86)	
Education Level	3.97	3.39	0.58	0.000
	(777)	(416)	(0.11)	
Socioeconomic Status	5.57	5.24	0.32	0.004
	(744)	(397)	(0.11)	
Political Interest	1.37	0.74	0.63	0.000
	(769)	(409)	(0.07)	
(Any) Partisan	0.57	0.37	0.20	0.000
(vs. Nonpartisan)	(761)	(403)	(0.03)	
Opposition Partisan	0.42	0.47	0.05	0.285
(vs. RDPC partisan)	(433)	(148)	(0.05)	

Appendix G: Replication of results using multiple imputation to account for response bias

Values were imputed for all variables included in the regression that contained missing values, including the network variables. Only variables included in the regression analyses were used to impute missing values, in addition to the enumeration area (used to cluster the standard errors). Across all models, the highest fraction of missing information (FMI) percentage (Model 1a) was 0.5086, so I used 50 imputations of the dataset. The regression analyses are otherwise identical to the main text (Tables 3 and 4), except that I did not use two-way clustering of the standard errors (because this was not supported in Stata). The results remain nearly identical to the main text: the coefficients on homogeneity never differ by more than 0.05 points and remain statistically significant. Alternatively, the coefficients on the control variables are generally less stable across models.

Table G.1: Replication of Table 3

Reported Feeling Close to a Party	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 1c
Network's Partisan Homogeneity	0.434*** (0.039)	0.373*** (0.039)	0.384*** (0.042)
Network Size	0.017	--	0.015
Average Network Education	-0.002	--	0.000
Network's Ethnic Homophily	0.095*	--	0.040
Network's Average level of Community Influence	-0.024	--	-0.033
Education	--	0.000	0.002
SES Factor Variable	--	-0.020*	-0.026*
R Ever Received Gift	--	0.092*	0.046
Contact Municipal Councilor	--	0.017	0.016
Contact Mayor	--	0.030*	0.040*
Believes in logic of Electoral Patronage	--	0.002	0.009
R Ever Intimidated	--	0.157*	0.151
Political Interest	0.111***	0.104***	0.112***
Age	0.003*	0.002	0.001
Gender	-0.022	-0.022	-0.006
Muslim	0.072	0.063	0.094
Catholic	0.066	0.058	0.079
Protestant	0.115**	0.101*	0.107*
Pentecostal	-0.128*	-0.160*	-0.158*
Jehovah's Witness	-0.075	-0.109	-0.040
Other	-0.064	-0.077	-0.157
Bamiléké	0.169	0.199	0.086
Bamoun	0.155	0.185	0.115
Bassa	0.215*	0.226*	0.138
Batanga	0.135	0.106	0.040
Beti-Fang	0.143	0.121	0.035
Bulu	0.189	0.177	0.081
Dibom	0.243*	0.255*	0.152
Duala	0.168	0.147	0.045
Eton	0.338**	0.335**	0.264*
Ewondo	0.278	0.237	0.172
Mbamois	0.339**	0.319**	0.225*
Sawa	0.170	0.155	0.116
Other	0.251**	0.237*	0.146*
Semi-Urban	-0.024	-0.013	-0.048
Urban	-0.075	-0.043	-0.064
Constant	-0.272*	-0.096	-0.027
N	1,200	1,200	1,200

Coefficients are reported. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the enumeration area. Survey weights included.
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table G.2: Replication of Table 4

Reported Feeling Close to an Opposition Party	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 1c
Network's Partisan Homogeneity	0.314*** (0.045)	0.302*** (0.046)	0.303*** (0.045)
Network Size	0.004	--	-0.001
Average Network Education	0.013	--	0.006
Network's Ethnic Homophily	0.046	--	0.057
Network's Average level of Community Influence	-0.012	--	-0.012
Education	--	0.007	0.006
SES Factor Variable	--	0.004	0.005
R Ever Received Gift	--	-0.009	-0.008
Contact Municipal Councilor	--	-0.014	-0.012
Contact Mayor	--	0.009	0.009
Believes in logic of Electoral Patronage	--	-0.033**	-0.034**
R Ever Intimidated	--	0.102	0.104
Political Interest	0.064***	0.062***	0.062***
Age	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
Gender	-0.064*	-0.065*	-0.065*
Muslim	0.003	0.013	0.020
Catholic	-0.001	0.006	0.007
Protestant	0.043	0.054	0.057
Pentecostal	-0.095*	-0.102*	-0.094*
Jehovah's Witness	-0.129	-0.093	-0.097
Other	-0.079	-0.063	-0.052
Bamiléké	0.087	0.074	0.054
Bamoun	0.113	0.107	0.086
Bassa	0.100	0.088	0.073
Batanga	-0.175	-0.181	-0.164
Beti-Fang	-0.105	-0.141*	-0.149*
Bulu	-0.105*	-0.119*	-0.123*
Dibom	-0.064	-0.075	-0.098
Duala	0.027	0.011	0.003
Eton	-0.098	-0.108	-0.109
Ewondo	-0.097*	-0.130*	-0.127*
Mbamois	-0.056	-0.059	-0.071
Sawa	-0.153	-0.231*	-0.230
Other	-0.023	-0.055	-0.054
Semi-Urban	-0.050	-0.051	-0.055
Urban	-0.070*	-0.082*	-0.088*
Constant	0.019	0.135	0.093
N	1,200	1,200	1,200

Coefficients are reported. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the enumeration area. Survey weights included.
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Appendix H: Full list of questions asked about each discussion partner

- Approximately how old were you when you first met *Name #1*?
- What is the highest level of education that *Name #1* has completed?
- To which ethnic group does *Name #1* belong?
- What is the nature of your relationship with *Name #1*?
- How often would you say the two of you discuss current events or politics together?
- For *Name #1*, would you say that this person is interested in politics?
- When you discuss politics with *Name #1*, would you say that you mostly agree with them about politics or mostly disagree?
- Would you say that you have had an influence on the political beliefs of *Name #1*?
- Would you say that *Name #1* has influenced your thoughts or beliefs about politics?
- Some people really enjoy politics and are active in influencing the ways that other people think about or get involved in politics. Would you say that *Name #1* has an influence on political opinions in their community in general?
- Do you know whether *Name #1* feels close to any particular political party?
- [If yes] Which political party does *Name #1* feel close to?

Appendix I: Full results of statical model presented in Figure 3

Table I.1: Correlates of Opposition Partisanship, Including Only Partners Who Predate Respondent's Partisanship

Reported Feeling Close to an Opposition Party	
Discussion Partner Feels Close to Opposition Party	0.240*** (0.056)
Discussion Partner's Level of Education	-0.011 (0.011)
Discussion Partner is Coethnic	-0.047 (0.064)
Discussion Partner has an Influence on the Community	-0.038 (0.023)
Education	0.024
SES Factor Variable	-0.001
R Ever Received Gift	-0.231***
Contact Municipal Councilor	-0.064
Contact Mayor	0.094***
Believes in Logic of Electoral Patronage	-0.081***
R Ever Intimidated	0.096**
Political Interest	0.098***
Age	-0.002
Gender	-0.199***
Muslim	-0.226
Catholic	-0.039
Protestant	-0.088
Pentecostal	-0.047
Other	0.018
Bamiléké	0.098
Bamoun	0.301*
Bassa	0.072
Batanga	-0.776***
Beti-Fang	-1.063***
Bulu	-0.218**
Dibom	-0.226**
Duala	-0.145
Eton	-0.152*
Ewondo	-0.651***
Mbamois	0.132**
Sawa	-0.914***
Other	-0.361**
Semi-Urban	-0.028
Urban	0.037
Constant	0.555*
N	121
R-Squared	0.594

Coefficients are reported. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Two-way standard errors clustered at both the level of the enumeration area and the household.
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Appendix J: Recruitment and Consent of Research Subjects

The twelve subjects discussed in the qualitative section were recruited through personal connections, in three locations. I sought to find in each location both ruling party and opposition partisans as well as two nonpartisans across all the subjects. I did not select my subjects based on any other criteria.[6] In Boumnyebel, where I had worked for several days in 2014 fielding a public opinion survey, I returned to the house of the chief who I had met during that time, knowing he would likely be willing to assist me. Indeed, his wife, Antoinette, who is extremely well-connected in the community, had run for mayor of Boumnyebel in the 2020 election under the RDPC banner (losing to the PCRN candidate), and was particularly interested in my project. She called people in her social network to identify an RDPC supporter (Anita), an opposition supporter (Martin), a nonpartisan (Jacques), and someone who had moved to Boumnyebel from an RDPC stronghold (Henri).

I used a similar recruitment process in Bafia. My research assistant, Modeste, was originally from Bafia, so before we arrived to conduct the interview, he arranged for his cousin (Mireille) to help us recruit participants. She connected us with people who lived in her neighborhood; a ruling party supporter from Bafia (Bertrand) as well as two anglophone refugees, one of whom supported the ruling party (Patience) and one who supported the SDF (Titus). Mireille, the FSNC supporter, volunteered herself to participate as a research subject. I also recruited a fifth research subject in Bafia (Justo) through the connection of the manager of the survey firm I had worked with, who was also originally from Bafia. He introduced me to his cousin who worked in the mayor's office, who in turn introduced me to a nonpartisan (Justo) who was the fifth subject from Bafia. Finally, the three anglophone subjects in Yaoundé were recruited by the anglophone tutor, Reynolds, of the 15-year-old boy of the family I was staying with in June and July of 2022, when the fieldwork was conducted. I mentioned my work to the family, and they noted that Reynolds was well connected and could help me. He thus located two opposition supporters (Joseph and Smart) and a ruling party supporter (George) for my research.

My research assistant, Modeste, accompanied me for all of the interviews conducted in Boumnyebel and Bafia. Reynolds was present for the interviews in Yaoundé. Though Antoinette and Mireille helped to recruit the research subjects, they were not present for the interviews. Each research subject was paid 10,000 CFA francs (about $15) for their time. To minimize the effect this payment would have on their responses to my questions, I did not tell them I was going to pay them ahead of time, but only provided the payment after the interview was concluded. I also paid the facilitators (Antoinette, Mireille, and Reynolds) a small fee for helping to recruit the subjects. The purpose of the research was explained to each subject, and each of them consented to participate after hearing their rights and the parameters of the interview. All interviews were recorded; no respondent indicated any discomfort with being recorded. The consent script is as follows:

My name is XX and I am a professor at the XX. I do not represent or work for the Cameroonian government or any other government group or organization. I also do not work for any NGO or religious group. I am here on my own as an academic researcher. I'm interviewing Cameroonians because I am working on a book that seeks to explain why some people in

[6] I only 'rejected' two potential subjects. A young man with very little education who struggled to understand me and my questions and an older gentleman in Boumnyebel who supported the UPC--Unfortunately, I had already interviewed a UPC supporter in Boumnyebel.

Cameroon come to support the RDPC, while other people come to support opposition parties, and finally why some people do not support any party and are not interested in politics. I am hoping to learn more about how this happens by interviewing twelve ordinary Cameroonians and getting a full account of their childhoods and adolescence. I want to know how their family and friends talked about politics when they were growing up and what influence that had on their current beliefs about politics. In addition, for each of these twelve research subjects, I want to speak briefly with each of the social contacts in their lives; the people with whom they chat with on a regular basis (at least once a month)—for example, brothers or sisters, friends, acquaintances from church, or aunties and uncles with whom they go to for advice or gossip or news. I then plan to contact each of these people and ask each one a short series of questions. The overall goal is to get a sense of how and why different people in your life may have influenced the way you think about politics. Importantly, when I publish my findings, all of the people I speak with will be completely anonymized. I will change names and any identifying details and also delete all of my recordings so that no one who reads my research will ever have any idea who I interviewed. I will not share your interviews with anyone.

There are a few things I want you to know before you agree to this process. First, although the interview poses no risk to you, it will ask you many personal questions, particularly about your political beliefs. Second, as I mentioned, I would like to contact all of the people in your life with whom you speak to regularly. At the end of the interview, I will ask you for their names and phone numbers. Me or one of my research assistants will then contact them ourselves and ask if they will be willing to answer some short questions, mostly about you—how long you have known each other, how often do you speak, what they think your political beliefs are, and so on. As mentioned, I will completely anonymize the information you and friends and family provide for me, but you may not feel comfortable discussing these things in the first place, and that is fine, but then we should not proceed with this interview. Third, this interview will take at least several hours. We can always stop to take breaks and even meet over the course of a couple of days. But the interview is not worthwhile for my purposes if you skip details or information in order to make the interview go faster. So before you agree to the interview, I want you to know that it will take a long time and may be tedious or boring. Fourth, although I would like you to consider these things before you agree to the interview, you also should know that you are completely free to terminate the interview at any point if you do not wish to proceed for any reason whatsoever. You are also free to not answer questions you are not comfortable answering. But again, if you are not comfortable answering many of the questions, then I may choose to terminate the interview. You are also welcome and encouraged to ask me any questions you'd like, either right now, or throughout the interview process. If you have any questions about your rights as a participant or any concerns or complaints regarding your participation, you can contact me at XX or you may contact XX's IRB at XX or XX. There is no penalty for choosing not to participate. In order to preserve your responses, they will be recorded on an audio recording device. Are you interested in participating in this research project? Do you agree for your interview to be to audio recorded? Finally, if you would like a printed copy of the information I've just read to you, you are welcome to have this one.

The following consent was read to the survey respondents of the large-N survey:

My name is _____ and I am conducting research for Professor Natalie Letsa from research for Professor Natalie Letsa from the University. We are conducting an academic study about political socialization in Cameroon, which will be published for academic purposes only.

We are studying the ways in which ordinary citizens participate in politics and public life in their villages and neighborhoods. We would like to hear your thoughts and opinions on a number of different issues pertaining to your economic, political and social life. I am not in any way affiliated with the Cameroonian government, any foreign government or any NGO. If you agree to be in this study, I will ask you to answer a series of survey questions about your economic, social and political life. Overall, your participation should take approximately 45 minutes in total to complete. I will administer the survey using an electronic hand-held device to document your answers. There are no direct benefits to you from participating in the study.

We will keep your answers as confidential as possible. They will be put together with those of 1,200 other people we are talking to in Cameroon, to get an overall picture. We will not ask your name or other identifying information, and when we present our results, there will be no way to know that you were personally involved with this study. So you should feel free to tell us what you think. To help protect confidentiality, we will store your answers on a password-protected computer. Only the principal investigators of the study will have access to your survey answers. In order to minimize risk of transmission of Covid-19, I will wear a mask during the entire interview, remain two meters away from you, and request that we conduct the interview outside.

Participation in this research is completely voluntary. There is no penalty for refusing to participate, and if you do not wish to answer a question you are free to decline to respond. If you have any questions about this research, please feel free to ask me anything now. If you have questions after we are done talking, please feel free to contact Professor Letsa at nwletsa@ou.edu. Or, you can contact the Institutional Review Board at irb.ou.edu. You are also welcome to contact the survey firm I work with, Cible, at [XX].

By saying yes, you indicate that we have read you the information sheet and you have understood and agreed to it. You also acknowledge that you are above the age of 18. Do you consent to participate?