Supplemental Appendix for *Dominant party rule, elections, and cabinet instability in African autocracies*

This document contains additional information on data coding as well as additional robustness checks that are not included in the main text.

Coding of cabinet instability

The data on cabinets is taken from yearly volumes of Europa Publications Limited (1975–2010). This presents several challenges for empirical analyses. First, Europa records the composition of cabinets once a year, often at irregular intervals. For instance, the composition of Kenya's cabinet may be recorded in May during year t and in September during year $t+1$. My own inspection of the data indicates that cabinet composition is usually measured after events such as elections or coups. However, reshuffles can happen multiple times each year. This is something that my coding of cabinet instability cannot capture.

Similarly, the irregular measuring of cabinet composition introduces assumptions into the coding of dismissals and horizontal reshuffles. A minister is coded as having been dismissed in year t if they were a member of the cabinet in year $t-1$ but are not recorded as part of the cabinet in year t. This coding does not allow for the possibility that the minister actually left the cabinet in the previous year, creating the potential for measurement error. The same problem occurs with the coding of horizontal reshuffles. A minister is coded as being horizontally reshuffled in year t if they are in charge of a different portfolio in year t than they were in year $t-1$. Therefore, the precise timing of minister dismissals and horizontal reshuffles is not known.

The cabinet composition data also present challenges for the measurement of independent variables representing discrete events such as elections and coup attempts. Fortunately, both NELDA (Hyde & Marinov, 2012) and Powell and Thyne (2011) code the dates that elections and coups take place. This information is used when coding these variables to ensure that the month in which an election or coup took place comes before, or is equal to, the month in which the cabinet was recorded. For example, if the cabinet was recorded in March of 1995 and a coup attempt took place in October of 1995, a coup attempt would be recorded in 1996. If the cabinet was recorded in August 2000 and an election occurred in July of 2000, then 2000 would be coded as an election year because the election came before the cabinet measurement.

Technical details and code files for the coding of the raw minister data are available from the author upon request (akroeger2@ucmerced.edu).

Table A1: Summary Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Dismissals	947	6.099	6.519	0	48
Dismissals Reduced	947	5.823	6.195	0	47
Horizontal Shuffles	947	3.166	3.214	0	22
Horizontal Reduced	947	3.045	3.072	0	18
Promotions	947	1.031	1.270	0	8
Demotions	947	0.901	1.135	0	8
Party Regime	947	0.455	0.498	0	1
Personal Regime	947	0.449	0.498	0	1
Military Regime	947	0.096	0.295	0	1
Election	947	0.194	0.396	0	1
Coup Attempt	947	0.031	0.172	0	1
Cabinet Size	947	23.845	8.036	9	66
Senior Partners	947	0.169	0.250	0.000	0.940
Ln(GDP per Capita)	947	6.750	0.853	4.984	9.330
Resource Rents	947	0.548	0.498	0	1
GDP Growth	947	0.049	0.112	−0.517	1.273
Leader Tenure	947	11.917	8.130	1	42
Polity 2	947	−3.765	4.589	−9	9
Multiparty	947	0.436	0.496	0	1
Parliamentary	947	0.061	0.240	0	1

References

Europa Publications Limited. (1975–2010). *Africa south of the Sahara*. London, UK: Author.

Hyde, S., & Marinov, N. (2012). Which elections can be lost? *Political Analysis*, *20*(2), 191–201.

Powell, J., & Thyne, C. (2011). Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010: A new dataset. *Journal of Peace Research*, *48*(2), 249-259.



Figure A1: Average marginal effect of elections with 95% confidence intervals

(Calculated using Models 2 and 4 in Table 1)



Figure A2: Party Regime Estimates from Model 2 (dismissals) in Table 1 After Dropping Individual Leaders

(P-values calculated using standard errors clustered by leader)



Figure A3: Estimates from Model 4 (horizontal reshuffles) in Table 1 After Dropping Individual Countries

(P-values calculated using standard errors clustered by leader)



(a) Dismissals



(b) Horizontal Reshuffles

Figure A4: Extreme bounds analysis

Table A2: Sample of African autocrats

leader	country	cowcode	start	end	regime
Neto	Angola	540	1978	1979	party-based
Dos Santos	Angola	540	1981	2010	party-based
Kerekou	Benin	434	1976	1990	personal
Khama	Botswana	571	1976	1980	party-based
Masire	Botswana	571	1982	1997	party-based
Mogae	Botswana	571	1999	2007	party-based
Ian Khama	Botswana	571	2010	2010	party-based
Lamizana	Burkina Faso	439	1977	1980	personal
Zerbo	Burkina Faso	439	1982	1982	military
Sankara	Burkina Faso	439	1985	1987	personal
Campaore	Burkina Faso	439	1989	2010	personal
Micombero	Burundi	516	1976	1976	party-military
Bagaza	Burundi	516	1978	1987	party-military
Buyoya	Burundi	516	1989	1992	military
Buyoya	Burundi	516	1997	2002	military-personal
Ahidjo	Cameroon	471	1976	1982	party-personal
Biya	Cameroon	471	1984	2010	personal
Bokassa	Central African Republic	482	1976	1979	personal
Dacko	Central African Republic	482	1981	1981	personal
Kolingba	Central African Republic	482	1983	1993	military-personal
Francois Bozize	Central African Republic	482	2004	2010	personal
Malloum	Chad	483	1977	1978	military
Habre	Chad	483	1984	1990	personal
Deby	Chad	483	1992	2010	personal
Mobutu	Congo-Kinshasa	490	1976	1996	personal
Laurent Kabila	Congo-Kinshasa	490	1998	2000	personal
Joseph Kabila	Congo-Kinshasa	490	2002	2010	personal
Ngouabi	Congo-Brazzaville	484	1976	1976	party-military
Nguesso	Congo-Brazzaville	484	1980	1991	party-military
Nguesso	Congo-Brazzaville	484	1999	2010	personal
Mengistu Marriam	Ethiopia	530	1978	1990	military-personal
Meles Zenawi	Ethiopia	530	1992	2010	party-based
Bongo	Gabon	481	1976	2009	party-personal
Jawara	Gambia	420	1976	1993	party-based
Jammeh	Gambia	420	1995	2010	personal
Acheampong	Ghana	452	1976	1978	military
Rawlings	Ghana	452	1983	2000	personal
Toure	Guinea	438	1976	1983	party-based
Conte	Guinea	438	1985	2008	personal
Cabral	Guinea-Bissau	404	1977	1980	party-based
Vieira	Guinea-Bissau	404	1982	1998	personal
Kumba Iala	Guinea-Bissau	404	2003	2003	personal

Table A2: Sample of African autocrats

leader	country	cowcode	start	end	regime
Houphouet-Boigny	Ivory Coast	437	1976	1993	party-based
Konan Bedie	Ivory Coast	437	1995	1999	party-based
Laurent Gbagbo	Ivory Coast	437	2002	2010	personal
Kenyatta	Kenya	501	1976	1978	party-based
Moi	Kenya	501	1980	2002	party-based
Jonathan	Lesotho	570	1976	1985	party-based
Lekhanya	Lesotho	570	1987	1990	military
Ramaema	Lesotho	570	1992	1992	military
Tolbert	Liberia	450	1976	1979	party-personal
Doe	Liberia	450	1981	1990	personal
Taylor	Liberia	450	1998	2002	personal
Ratsiraka	Madagascar	580	1977	1992	personal
Banda	Malawi	553	1976	1993	personal
Traore	Mali	432	1976	1990	personal
Ould Daddah	Mauritania	435	1976	1978	personal
Ould Haidalla	Mauritania	435	1981	1984	personal
Sidi Ahmed Taya	Mauritania	435	1986	2004	personal
Ould Mohamed Vall	Mauritania	435	2006	2006	military
Machel	Mozambique	541	1978	1986	party-based
Chissano	Mozambique	541	1988	2004	party-based
Guebuza	Mozambique	541	2006	2010	party-based
Nujoma	Namibia	565	1992	2004	party-based
Pohamba	Namibia	565	2006	2010	party-based
Kountche	Niger	436	1977	1987	military-personal
Seibou	Niger	436	1989	1991	military-personal
Mainassara	Niger	436	1997	1998	personal
Obasanjo	Nigeria	475	1977	1979	military
Buhari	Nigeria	475	1985	1985	military
Babangida	Nigeria	475	1987	1992	military
Abacha	Nigeria	475	1995	1997	military-personal
Habyarimana	Rwanda	517	1976	1993	military-personal
Paul Kagame	Rwanda	517	1995	2010	party-military

Table A2: Sample of African autocrats

leader	country	cowcode	start	end	regime
Senghor	Senegal	433	1976	1980	party-based
Diouf	Senegal	433	1982	1999	party-based
Stevens	Sierra Leone	451	1976	1985	party-based
Momoh	Sierra Leone	451	1987	1991	party-based
Nimeiri	Sudan	625	1976	1984	personal
Al-Bashir	Sudan	625	1990	2010	personal
Nyerere	Tanzania	510	1976	1985	party-based
Mwinyi	Tanzania	510	1987	1995	party-based
Mkapa	Tanzania	510	1997	2005	party-based
Kikwete	Tanzania	510	2007	2010	party-based
Eyadema	Togo	461	1976	2004	personal
Faure Gnassingbe	Togo	461	2006	2010	personal
Amin	Uganda	500	1976	1978	personal
Obote	Uganda	500	1982	1985	personal
Museveni	Uganda	500	1987	2010	personal
Kaunda	Zambia	551	1976	1991	party-based
Chiluba	Zambia	551	1997	2001	party-based
Levy Mwanawasa	Zambia	551	2003	2008	party-based
Banda	Zambia	551	2010	2010	party-based
Mugabe	Zimbabwe	552	1982	2010	party-based

Table A3: Leader Random Effects

	Dependent variable:			
	Dismissals		Horizontal Moves	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Party Regime	-0.445^{***}	-0.490^{***}	-0.278^{**}	-0.279^{**}
	(0.101)	(0.104)	(0.122)	(0.127)
Election	0.339^{***}	0.345^{***}	0.489^{***}	0.436^{***}
	(0.106)	(0.112)	(0.113)	(0.120)
Party X Election	0.465^{***}	0.462^{***}	0.235	0.288^{*}
	(0.157)	(0.161)	(0.161)	(0.166)
Military		-0.249^{*}		-0.003
		(0.148)		(0.175)
Mil. X Election		-0.159		0.426
		(0.341)		(0.345)
Multiparty	-0.167^{**}	-0.190^{**}	-0.153	-0.150
	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.093)	(0.094)
Coup Attempt	0.286	0.280	0.141	0.149
	(0.179)	(0.179)	(0.187)	(0.187)
Senior Partners	-0.274	-0.298^{*}	0.626^{***}	0.633^{***}
	(0.176)	(0.174)	(0.198)	(0.198)
Resource Rents	0.018	0.006	-0.062	-0.056
	(0.089)	(0.088)	(0.107)	(0.107)
Ln(GDP per Capita)	-0.163^{***}	-0.161^{***}	0.117^{*}	0.116^{*}
	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.070)	(0.070)
Leader Tenure	-0.003	-0.004	-0.006	-0.006
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Constant	-1.270^{***}	-1.200^{***}	-2.112^{***}	-2.119^{***}
	(0.089)	(0.096)	(0.105)	(0.115)
Observations	947	947	947	947
Log Likelihood	$-2{,}623.012$	$-2{,}621.222$	$-2{,}097.330$	$-2{,}096.487$
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,270.024	5,270.443	4,218.660	4,220.975
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	5,328.264	5,338.389	4,276.900	4,288.921

Note: Negative binomial regressions with leader random effects. Models 3 and 4 failed to converge. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A4: Modeling First Order Autocorrelation

	Dependent variable:			
	Dismissals		Horizontal Moves	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Party Regime	-0.529***	-0.558***	-0.336	-0.343
	0.115	0.118	0.180	0.182
Military Regime		-0.221		-0.028
		0.145		0.148
Election	0.351***	0.347***	0.469***	0.418***
	0.076	0.082	0.092	0.101
Party X Election	0.420**	0.430**	0.337*	0.388*
	0.131	0.135	0.169	0.174
Military X Election		-0.076		0.423**
		0.178		0.137
Multiparty	-0.195*	-0.222**	-0.288**	-0.284**
	0.082	0.081	0.098	0.102
Coup Attempt	0.238	0.227	0.203	0.211
	0.144	0.142	0.175	0.174
Senior Partners	-0.206	-0.219	0.768***	0.770***
	0.158	0.160	0.198	0.199
Resource Rents	0.066	0.048	-0.069	-0.063
	0.084	0.081	0.124	0.126
Ln(GDP per Capita)	-0.111	-0.110	0.135	0.135
	0.060	0.060	0.071	0.071
Growth	0.150	0.112	-0.362	-0.358
	0.281	0.284	0.290	0.291
Leader Tenure	0.039	0.036	0.045	0.043
	0.027	0.027	0.032	0.032
Leader Tenure^2	-0.003	-0.003	-0.004	-0.004
	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
Leader Tenure^3	0.000	0.000	0.000*	0.000*
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Constant	-0.617	-0.538	-2.979***	-2.976***
	0.372	0.374	0.485	0.501
Leader tenure polynomial?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	907	907	907	907
Leaders	82	82	82	82
Wald χ^2	163.85	168.65	85.95	163.14

Note: Negative binomial generalized estimating equations regressions with AR(1) working correlation structure and semi-robust standard errors clustered by leader. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table A5: Distinguishing between pure party and hybrid party regimes

	Dependent variable:			
	Dismissals		Horizontal Moves	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Pure Party	-0.551^{***}	-0.577^{***}	-0.292	-0.301
	(0.128)	(0.130)	(0.200)	(0.201)
Hybrid Party	-0.130	-0.169	-0.116	-0.122
	(0.142)	(0.146)	(0.186)	(0.191)
Military		-0.221		-0.038
		(0.145)		(0.145)
Election	0.328^{***}	0.332^{***}	0.413^{***}	0.360^{***}
	(0.076)	(0.082)	(0.093)	(0.103)
Pure Party X Election	0.561^{***}	0.563^{***}	0.283	0.335^{*}
	(0.131)	(0.135)	(0.186)	(0.191)
Hybrid Party X Election	-0.064	-0.058	0.290	0.340
	(0.176)	(0.178)	(0.231)	(0.236)
Military X Election		-0.160		0.415^{***}
		(0.190)		(0.161)
Multiparty	-0.149^{*}	-0.178^{**}	-0.225^{**}	-0.220^{**}
	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.102)	(0.107)
Coup Attempt	0.309^{**}	0.295^{*}	0.187	0.197
	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.176)	(0.175)
Senior Partners	-0.249	-0.268	0.702^{***}	0.705^{***}
	(0.187)	(0.190)	(0.226)	(0.227)
Resource Rents	0.049	0.033	-0.070	-0.065
	(0.087)	(0.085)	(0.119)	(0.121)
Ln(GDP per Capita)	-0.141^{**}	-0.139^{**}	0.106^{*}	0.106^{*}
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.063)	(0.064)
Growth	-0.004	-0.033	-0.396	-0.392
	(0.248)	(0.250)	(0.283)	(0.284)
Constant	-0.408	-0.336	-2.791^{***}	-2.781^{***}
	(0.357)	(0.357)	(0.421)	(0.433)
Cubic Splines?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	947	947	947	947
Log Likelihood	$-2{,}624.289$	$-2{,}622.206$	$-2{,}113.196$	$-2{,}112.472$
θ	1.317^{***}	1.326^{***}	1.306^{***}	1.310^{***}
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,278.579	5,278.412	4,256.393	4,258.944

Note: Pooled negative binomial regressions with standard errors clustered by leader. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A6: Controlling for Polity2

	Dependent variable:	
	Dismissals	Horizontal Moves
	(1)	(2)
Party Regime	-0.486^{***}	-0.224
	(0.111)	(0.170)
Military Regime	-0.235	-0.030
	(0.145)	(0.143)
Election	0.344^{***}	0.343^{***}
	(0.082)	(0.105)
Party X Election	0.426^{***}	0.364^{**}
	(0.134)	(0.172)
Military X Election	-0.168	0.444^{***}
	(0.191)	(0.171)
Multiparty	-0.240^{**}	-0.047
	(0.109)	(0.117)
Polity2	0.003	-0.031^{***}
	(0.012)	(0.011)
Coup Attempt	0.287^{*}	0.202
	(0.153)	(0.177)
Senior Partners	-0.348^{**}	0.620^{***}
	(0.159)	(0.198)
Resource Rents	0.054	-0.064
	(0.080)	(0.119)
Ln(GDP per Capita)	-0.116^{**}	0.115^{*}
	(0.058)	(0.066)
Growth	-0.023	-0.407
	(0.275)	(0.277)
Constant	-0.469	-3.009^{***}
	(0.357)	(0.458)
Cubic Splines?	Yes	Yes
Observations	947	947
Log Likelihood	$-2{,}626.604$	$-2{,}109.513$
θ	1.310^{***} (0.081)	1.326^{***} (0.106)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,285.209	4,251.025

Note: Pooled negative binomial regressions with standard errors clustered by leader. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A7: Controlling for Parliamentary Systems

	Dependent variable:	
	Dismissals	Horizontal Moves
	(1)	(2)
Party Regime	-0.453^{***}	-0.240
	(0.114)	(0.177)
Military Regime	-0.234	-0.044
	(0.145)	(0.144)
Election	0.338^{***}	0.362^{***}
	(0.083)	(0.102)
Party X Election	0.426^{***}	0.340^{**}
	(0.134)	(0.170)
Military X Election	-0.166	0.411^{**}
	(0.193)	(0.162)
Multiparty	-0.191^{**}	-0.229^{**}
	(0.079)	(0.104)
Parliamentary	-0.293	-0.218
	(0.196)	(0.212)
Coup Attempt	0.314^{**}	0.193
	(0.158)	(0.175)
Senior Partners	-0.384^{**}	0.613^{***}
	(0.159)	(0.201)
Resource Rents	0.039	-0.056
	(0.077)	(0.120)
Ln(GDP per Capita)	-0.115^{**}	0.129^{*}
	(0.057)	(0.068)
GDP Growth	0.007	-0.376
	(0.274)	(0.280)
Constant	-0.479	-2.922^{***}
	(0.351)	(0.469)
Cubic Splines?	Yes	Yes
Observations	947	947
Log Likelihood	$-2{,}625.036$	$-2{,}112.414$
θ	1.316^{***} (0.081)	1.311^{***} (0.104)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,282.071	4,256.829

Note: Pooled negative binomial regressions with standard errors clustered by leader. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A8: Removing assistant ministers

	Dependent variable:	
	Dismissals	Horizontal Moves
	(1)	(2)
Party Regime	-0.478^{***}	-0.246
	(0.114)	(0.175)
Military Regime	-0.184	-0.027
	(0.148)	(0.144)
Election	0.326^{***}	0.376^{***}
	(0.080)	(0.100)
Party X Election	0.424^{***}	0.340^{**}
	(0.133)	(0.171)
Military X Election	-0.159	0.417^{***}
	(0.192)	(0.157)
Multiparty	-0.199^{**}	-0.247^{**}
	(0.079)	(0.102)
Coup Attempt	0.308^{**}	0.213
	(0.153)	(0.175)
Senior Partners	-0.323^{**}	0.674^{***}
	(0.156)	(0.197)
Resource Rents	0.042	-0.079
	(0.081)	(0.122)
Ln(GDP per Capita)	-0.133^{**}	0.114^{*}
	(0.053)	(0.064)
GDP Growth	-0.003	-0.428
	(0.271)	(0.277)
Constant	-0.475	-2.869^{***}
	(0.330)	(0.451)
Cubic Splines?	Yes	Yes
Observations	947	947
Log Likelihood	$-2{,}592.494$	$-2{,}085.621$
θ	1.323^{***} (0.083)	1.312^{***} (0.105)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,214.987	4,201.243

Note: Pooled negative binomial regressions with standard errors clustered by leader. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A9: Promotions and Demotions

	Dependent variable:	
	Promotions	Demotions
	(1)	(2)
Party Regime	-0.412^{***}	-0.285^{**}
	(0.147)	(0.138)
Military Regime	-0.204	-0.174
	(0.134)	(0.166)
Election	0.260^{**}	0.298^{**}
	(0.123)	(0.118)
Party X Election	0.385^{**}	0.484^{***}
	(0.174)	(0.156)
Military X Election	0.421^{*}	0.170
	(0.252)	(0.332)
Multiparty	-0.073	-0.143
	(0.111)	(0.105)
Coup Attempt	0.299^{*}	0.336^{*}
	(0.169)	(0.195)
Senior Partners	0.427^{**}	0.121
	(0.183)	(0.200)
Resource Rents	-0.053	0.158
	(0.104)	(0.116)
Ln(GDP per Capita)	0.002	0.104^{*}
	(0.079)	(0.058)
GDP Growth	0.257	-0.090
	(0.300)	(0.284)
Constant	-3.380^{***}	-4.185^{***}
	(0.534)	(0.407)
Cubic Splines?	Yes	Yes
Observations	947	947
Log Likelihood	$-1{,}273.247$	$-1{,}178.925$
θ	2.697^{***} (0.504)	4.166^{***} (1.123)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,576.494	2,387.851

Note: Pooled negative binomial regressions with standard errors clustered by leader. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A10: Effect of Party Regime on Founding and Non-Founding Leaders

	Dependent variable:	
	Dismissals	Horizontal Moves
	(1)	(2)
Party (NFL)	-0.569^{***}	-0.359
	(0.163)	(0.271)
Party (FL)	-0.411^{***}	-0.171
	(0.110)	(0.173)
Military	-0.236	-0.045
	(0.145)	(0.144)
Election	0.342^{***}	0.366^{***}
	(0.084)	(0.102)
Party (NFL) X Election	0.498^{**}	0.487^{**}
	(0.200)	(0.227)
Party (FL) X Election	0.360^{***}	0.150
	(0.129)	(0.218)
Military X Election	-0.158	0.412^{**}
	(0.194)	(0.165)
Multiparty	-0.222^{***}	-0.247^{**}
	(0.082)	(0.103)
Coup Attempt	0.286^{*}	0.174
	(0.154)	(0.169)
Senior Partners	-0.376^{**}	0.626^{***}
	(0.153)	(0.182)
Resource Rents	0.067	-0.044
	(0.078)	(0.135)
Ln(GDP per Capita)	-0.095	0.142^{*}
	(0.065)	(0.076)
GDP Growth	-0.043	-0.441
	(0.282)	(0.280)
Constant	-0.609	-2.998^{***}
	(0.401)	(0.545)
Cubic Splines?	Yes	Yes
Observations	947	947
Log Likelihood	$-2{,}625.870$	$-2{,}111.766$
θ	1.312^{***} (0.081)	1.313^{***} (0.104)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,285.741	4,257.533

Note: Pooled negative binomial regressions with standard errors clustered by leader. Party (NFL) = 1 for party regime leaders who did not found the party. Party (FL) = 1 for party regime leaders who founded the party. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A11: Controlling for Cubic Polynomials of Regime Tenure

	Dependent variable:			
	Dismissals		Horizontal Moves	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Party Regime	-0.365^{***}	-0.455^{***}	-0.162	-0.233
	(0.103)	(0.115)	(0.153)	(0.173)
Military Regime	0.548^{***}	0.345^{***}	0.573^{***}	0.383^{***}
	(0.075)	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.102)
Election	-0.231^{*}	-0.235	0.028	-0.041
	(0.139)	(0.145)	(0.133)	(0.143)
Party X Election		0.439^{***}		0.333^{**}
		(0.136)		(0.168)
Military X Election		-0.143		0.417^{**}
		(0.198)		(0.164)
Multiparty	-0.219^{***}	-0.219^{***}	-0.265^{**}	-0.265^{**}
	(0.083)	(0.085)	(0.108)	(0.109)
Coup Attempt	0.296^{*}	0.283^{*}	0.134	0.151
	(0.158)	(0.154)	(0.154)	(0.155)
Senior Partners	-0.333^{**}	-0.356^{**}	0.652^{***}	0.649^{***}
	(0.151)	(0.158)	(0.197)	(0.197)
Resource Rents	0.057	0.058	-0.043	-0.043
	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.121)	(0.121)
Ln(GDP per Capita)	-0.110^{*}	-0.115^{*}	0.135^{**}	0.130^{**}
	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.065)	(0.064)
GDP Growth	-0.002	-0.014	-0.350	-0.347
	(0.266)	(0.272)	(0.274)	(0.275)
Constant	-0.471	-0.429	-2.865^{***}	-2.815^{***}
	(0.356)	(0.367)	(0.456)	(0.453)
Cubic Splines, Leader?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cubic Splines, Regime	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	947	947	947	947
Log Likelihood	$-2{,}629.615$	$-2{,}625.487$	$-2{,}112.616$	$-2{,}110.535$
θ	1.297^{***} (0.080)	1.313^{***} (0.081)	1.308^{***} (0.104)	1.319^{***} (0.105)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	5,291.230	5,286.974	4,257.232	4,257.070

Note: Pooled negative binomial regressions controlling for both leader tenure and regime tenure cubic polynomials. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A12: Extreme bounds analysis

Variable	Lower Extreme Bound	Upper Extreme Bound	% Signficant (0.05)
Party Regime	-0.941	-0.221	100
Party X Election	0.118	0.764	100
Military Regime	-0.743	0.176	42
Military X Election	-0.595	0.301	0
Election	0.047	0.519	100

Note: Leamer's extreme bounds analysis.