Online Appendix: Robustness Tests

This online Appendix presents the results of the study's robustness tests. Specifically, I conducted robustness tests in the following four ways.

1) Using the likelihood ratio test instead of the Wald test.

2) Using alternative measures for the low-income population in each district.

3) Finer subdivision of the remaining terms of office.

4) Adding other potentially important control variables.

I first used the likelihood ratio test instead of the Wald test to check the statistical significance of the low-income population. When the number of observations is relatively small, as is the case in this study, the likelihood ratio test can be more reliable than the Wald test (Agresti, 2019, 11); therefore, I reexamined the significance of the low-income population applying likelihood ratio tests to compare each model used in the main document with a model excluding the poverty rate. I used logistic regression analysis, but standard errors were not clustered by member of Congress (MC) as they were in the main document, for enabling the likelihood ratio test. Tables A1 and A2 present the results of the reexamination, and these results were identical to the results in the main document using the Wald test.

Table A1. Likelihood-Ratio Tests of Low-Income Population's Effect on Senators' Support for IMF Capital Increases

	All Senators	President's party members	Opposing party members	Less than three years remaining	Three years or more remaining
Poverty rate	0.139 (0.072)*	0.309 (0.161)*	0.130 (0.097)	0.078 (0.108)	0.203 (0.115)*
Median income	0.092 (0.049)*	0.165 (0.103)	0.098 (0.068)	0.114 (0.073)	0.089 (0.082)
Export	−14.513 (8.294)*	1.080 (16.468)	−22.888 (10.530)**	−23.262 (14.832)	−16.136 (12.713)
Import	−4.499 (4.094)	−24.317 (9.655)**	2.123 (5.134)	−6.605 (6.138)	−2.966 (6.135)
Skilled worker	−2.188 (5.786)	−8.145 (11.566)	−2.693 (7.221)	−6.729 (8.606)	4.377 (9.341)
Party	3.580 (1.061)***			1.979 (1.538)	4.832 (1.705)***
DW-NOMINATE	−8.023 (1.452)***	−7.475 (2.326)***	−10.170 (2.141)***	−4.787 (2.019)**	−11.265 (2.465)***
President's party	0.513 (0.427)			0.727 (0.586)	0.765 (0.775)
Remaining term	0.159 (0.110)	−0.038 (0.200)	0.241 (0.142)*	0.150 (0.402)	−0.005 (0.301)
1998	3.468 (0.787)***	−0.132 (1.802)	8.890 (1.940)***	2.933 (1.045)***	5.081 (1.514)***
2009	0.480 (0.469)	−2.260 (1.736)	5.210 (1.605)***	−0.520 (0.704)	1.476 (0.817)*
constant	−5.285 (2.731)*	−2.481 (4.411)	−6.529 (3.977)	−2.527 (4.013)	−7.982 (4.731)*
Likelihood-ratio test	0.048**	0.033**	0.174	0.470	0.062*
Pseudo R^2	0.382	0.466	0.351	0.338	0.493
Area under ROC	0.891	0.913	0.866	0.862	0.934
Log likelihood	−102.284	−32.448	−62.710	−52.047	−44.067
Observations	286	139	147	133	153

Note: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10% significance levels. Standard errors are in parentheses. The Likelihood ratio test row presents the results (prob > chi^2) comparing each model with those excluding the poverty rate. ROC = receiver operating curve.

Table A2. Likelihood-Ratio Tests of Low-Income Population's Effect on Representatives' Support for the IMF Capital Increase

	All Representatives	President's party members (Democrats)	Opposing party members (Republicans)
Poverty rate	−0.018 (0.055)	0.148 (0.076)*	−0.239 (0.139)*
Median income	0.055 (0.039)	0.177 (0.069)**	−0.041 (0.073)
Export	2.346 (3.326)	0.932 (3.655)	6.941 (6.567)
Import	−3.026 (2.493)	−2.125 (3.112)	−6.018 (5.055)
Skilled worker	−2.911 (5.083)	−1.955 (6.771)	−2.958 (10.694)
Party	0.008 (0.963)		
DW-NOMINATE	−5.756 (1.314)***	−1.154 (1.628)	−13.013 (2.788)***
Constant	−0.714 (1.718)	−5.593 (2.740)**	7.744 (3.510)**
Likelihood-ratio test	0.752	0.042**	0.067*
Pseudo R^2	0.542	0.132	0.324
Area under ROC	0.933	0.754	0.886
Log likelihood	−128.199	−69.095	−48.016
Observations	406	191	215

Note: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10% significance levels. Standard errors are in parentheses. The likelihood ratio test row shows the results (prob > chi^2) comparing each model with those excluding the poverty rate. ROC = receiver operating curve.

Second, I applied two different operationalizations of the independent variable examining the size of the low-income population in each district. The first was the Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM). The poverty rate used in the main article is the official poverty measure of the US government and has been widely used; however, the official poverty rate has been considered to have several problems, as it defines households that share a common budget and expenses too narrowly, it considers only pre-tax cash income, and it does not consider geographical differences in the cost of living (Bridges and Gesumaria, 2015, 57–60). The SPM was developed by the Census Bureau and other agencies to solve these identified challenges, with several advantages, as it broadly considers groups of people living together as households; it also considers non-cash income, taxes, transfers, and work expenses; and it includes geographical differences in the cost of living (Bridges and Gesumaria, 2015, 57–60). Therefore, I used the SPM-based poverty rate proposed by Wimer et al. (2022) instead of the official poverty rate and performed logistic regression analysis mirroring that in the main document. The SPM poverty rate has two forms; one is based on the pre-tax and transfer SPM, and the other is based on the post-tax and transfer SPM. Since there is no data on the SPM at the House district level, only Senate votes were reexamined. As shown in Table A3, the results remain the same for both kinds of SPM poverty rates, validating the hypotheses of this study as the results of the main document did.

Table A3. Analysis of Senators' Support for IMF Capital Increases Using the SPM Instead of the Poverty Rate

	All Senators	President's party members	Opposing party members	Less than three years remaining	Three years or more remaining
SPM, pre-tax/transfer	0.109 (0.054)**	0.195 (0.086)**	0.103 (0.078)	0.047 (0.061)	0.185 (0.097)*
SPM, post-tax/transfer					
Median income	0.092 (0.040)**	0.144 (0.077)*	0.099 (0.061)	0.107 (0.055)*	0.111 (0.068)
Export	−14.510 (7.876)*	0.128 (14.510)	−22.808 (10.443)**	−23.222 (11.821)**	−16.161 (10.619)
Import	−3.960 (4.389)	−20.971 (8.561)**	2.510 (5.136)	−6.411 (6.379)	−2.255 (5.533)
Skilled worker	−1.347 (5.601)	−7.506 (9.578)	−1.671 (7.457)	−6.423 (7.524)	6.371 (6.496)
Party	3.530 (1.214)***			1.860 (1.877)	4.739 (1.696)***
DW-NOMINATE	−7.819 (2.057)***	−6.941 (3.416)**	−9.990 (2.358)***	−4.598 (2.982)	−10.933 (3.524)***
President's party	0.526 (0.448)			0.722 (0.561)	0.807 (1.022)
Remaining term	0.151 (0.101)	−0.034 (0.205)	0.234 (0.124)*	0.149 (0.405)	−0.029 (0.269)
1998	3.476 (0.851)***	−0.258 (1.700)	8.869 (2.087)***	2.835 (0.942)***	5.358 (2.195)**
2009	0.447 (0.506)	−2.133 (1.934)	5.148 (1.767)***	−0.512 (0.693)	1.390 (1.052)
constant	−6.280 (2.336)***	−2.851 (3.142)	−7.547 (3.922)*	−2.368 (2.826)	−10.952 (4.423)**
Pseudo R^2	0.384	0.459	0.353	0.338	0.500
Area under ROC	0.891	0.914	0.867	0.860	0.935
Log pseudolikelihood	−102.002	−32.842	−62.525	−52.083	−43.412
Observations	286	139	147	133	153
Clusters	184	113	127	93	115

Note: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10% significance levels. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ROC = receiver operating curve.

Table A3. (Continued)

	All Senators	President's party members	Opposing party members	Less than three years remaining	Three years or more remaining
SPM, pre-tax/transfer					
SPM, post-tax/transfer	0.091 (0.052)*	0.211 (0.092)**	0.086 (0.073)	0.021 (0.064)	0.176 (0.081)**
Median income	0.069 (0.037)*	0.122 (0.078)	0.073 (0.055)	0.093 (0.052)*	0.076 (0.058)
Export	−15.121 (7.844)*	−0.336 (14.938)	−23.151 (10.481)**	−24.187 (11.631)**	−16.479 (10.757)
Import	−2.335 (3.969)	−18.704 (7.848)**	3.787 (4.905)	−5.681 (6.037)	−0.058 (4.973)
Skilled worker	−2.401 (5.545)	−9.451 (10.176)	−2.954 (7.216)	−6.541 (7.532)	2.904 (7.324)
Party	3.557 (1.208)***			1.746 (1.855)	5.083 (1.803)***
DW-NOMINATE	−7.923 (2.050)***	−7.017 (3.474)**	−10.149 (2.333)***	−4.508 (2.959)	−11.426 (3.685)***
President's party	0.507 (0.439)			0.707 (0.560)	0.733 (0.956)
Remaining term	0.162 (0.102)	−0.026 (0.205)	0.242 (0.125)*	0.157 (0.400)	−0.035 (0.271)
1998	3.386 (0.884)***	0.021 (1.618)	8.810 (2.055)***	2.687 (0.981)***	5.293 (2.242)**
2009	1.017 (0.503)**	−0.898 (1.992)	5.773 (1.810)***	−0.344 (0.716)	2.447 (1.156)**
constant	−4.316 (1.957)**	−0.832 (2.638)	−5.468 (3.122)*	−1.035 (2.560)	−7.709 (3.847)**
Pseudo R^2	0.378	0.448	0.348	0.335	0.491
Area under ROC	0.891	0.907	0.864	0.856	0.931
Log pseudolikelihood	−103.083	−33.506	−62.995	−52.274	−44.162
Observations	286	139	147	133	153
Clusters	184	113	127	93	115

Note: *** = 1%, ** = '5%, and *10% significance levels. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ROC = receiver operating curve.

The other operationalization used the simple median household income in each district. It is assumed that a higher the median household income in a district indicates more high-income voters, and the lower the median household income is, the more low-income voters there are. Compared with the poverty rate and SPM, median income is far less rigorous in measuring the size of the low-income population discontented with inequality; however, it has the advantage of providing a more intuitive understanding on the effect of voters' income level on MCs' support for an IMF capital increase. The main document asserts, among low-income voters who are more likely to experience inequality, lower incomes should be associated with a higher likelihood of supporting IMF capital increases *relative to* bilateral lending. Conversely, among middle- and high-income voters who are less likely to recognize inequality, it is predicted that the higher the income, the more likely a voter is to support IMF capital increases. Therefore, the poverty rate is removed from the senator's model, and

replaced by a squared term of median income to represent the reversal of the effect of the income level. Table A4 presents the results, and Figure A1 demonstrates the average probability of supporting an IMF capital increase with the income level changed from the minimum to maximum value and other variables fixed at their observed values. As shown in Figure A1, among the MCs of the president's party or with long remaining terms, the effect of income level was reversed for the low-income population that is more likely to recognize inequality. In contrast, among opposing party MCs with short remaining terms, a reversal of the effect due to blame avoidance was not observed. This result also indicates that "the collapse of the middle class" or income polarization has heightened congressional support for delegation to the IMF.

Table A4. Analysis of Senators' Support for IMF Capital Increases Using the Median Income Instead of the Poverty Rate

	All Senators	President's party or three years or more remaining	Opposing party and less than three years remaining
Median income	−0.415 (0.199)**	−0.615 (0.350)*	−0.177 (0.332)
Median income^2	0.006 (0.003)**	0.008 (0.005)*	0.004 (0.005)
Export	−14.535 (7.701)*	−8.673 (9.753)	−30.179 (14.048)**
Import	−2.363 (3.923)	−4.524 (4.434)	2.669 (6.557)
Skilled worker	−3.391 (5.242)	2.514 (5.466)	−14.185 (10.078)
Party	3.495 (1.196)***	3.678 (1.570)**	3.734 (2.407)
DW-NOMINATE	−7.872 (2.047)***	−7.881 (2.618)***	−8.104 (2.862)***
President's party	0.449 (0.426)	0.303 (0.476)	
Remaining term	0.179 (0.104)*	0.121 (0.184)	0.020 (0.466)
1998	2.147 (0.806)***	1.741 (1.105)	2.931 (1.212)**
2009	0.609 (0.483)	0.822 (0.539)	
constant	6.858 (4.051)*	9.812 (7.102)	4.208 (6.672)
Pseudo R^2	0.379	0.404	0.320
Area under ROC	0.891	0.897	0.854
Log pseudolikelihood	−102.784	−66.796	−33.698
Observations	286	212	74
Clusters	184	152	65

Note: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10% significance levels. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ROC = receiver operating curve.



Figure A1. The Relationship Between Median Income and Support for IMF Capital Increases with 90% Confidence Intervals

Third, I conducted an additional analysis using more finely subdivided data for the remaining terms of office. In the main document, I divided Senate observations into two groups, including those with three or more years remaining and those with less than three years remaining. I further subdivide these observations into two-year segments and reanalyzed the Senate votes. As shown in Table A5, only among MCs with four or more years remaining in their terms did a larger low-income population in their districts lead to significantly higher support for IMF capital increases. This result supports the hypotheses of this study.

Table A5. Low-Income Population's Effect on Senators' Support for IMF Capital Increases by Remaining Term

	Less than two years remaining	Two to three years remaining	Four to five years remaining
Poverty rate	0.075 (0.081)	0.091 (0.112)	0.466 (0.222)**
Median income	0.097 (0.064)	0.126 (0.114)	0.074 (0.065)
Export	−30.755 (16.185)*	−26.382 (19.953)	−23.282 (12.881)*
Import	−10.683 (7.212)	5.572 (9.167)	−14.207 (8.195)*
Skilled worker	−6.266 (8.407)	14.055 (9.854)	−2.908 (8.182)
Party	0.957 (1.947)	−1.807 (2.081)	7.525 (4.379)*
DW-NOMINATE	−3.381 (2.942)	−11.752 (3.810)***	−15.746 (8.239)*
President's party	0.820 (0.579)	8.950 (0.927)***	−0.936 (0.530)*
1998	2.615 (1.025)**	11.960 (2.169)***	5.160 (3.186)
2009	−0.526 (0.674)	9.651 (1.172)***	0.415 (0.757)
constant	−0.434 (2.942)	−11.686 (5.483)**	−7.433 (5.309)
Pseudo R^2	0.336	0.500	0.592
Area under ROC	0.858	0.929	0.956
Log pseudolikelihood	−41.338	−23.829	−22.587
Observations	101	90	97
Clusters	61	61	64

Note: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10% significance levels. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ROC = receiver operating curve.

Finally, I added additional potentially relevant control variables. First, I added the amount of contributions each MC received from economic interest groups through Political Action Committees (PACs). I considered three types of interest groups, which include internationally operating financial institutions, business organizations, and labor unions. Broz (2005; 2011b) suggested that MCs who depend on internationally operating financial institutions or business groups tend to support bailouts, whereas those who depend on labor unions tend to oppose them. However, it is essential to acknowledge the potential for reverse causality, as it is possible that MCs did not support or oppose IMF capital increases as a result of the influence of interest groups, but rather that their attitude toward bailouts increased or decreased contributions from interest groups. Nevertheless, since no other detailed measure of interest groups' influence was yet available, I referenced Broz (2005; 2011b) and used the amount of contributions, obtaining contribution data from Broz (2011a) and OpenSecret (n.d.). For the Senate analysis, I included only contributions from financial institutions because data on contributions from business groups and labor unions for the vote in 1991 were missing.

Next, I added the proportion of Mexican, Thai, and Korean Americans in each district to the House vote in 1998. These countries benefited from bailouts around 1998. Citizens with roots in these countries may have pressured their MCs to support the bailouts. I obtained the data from the US Bureau of the Census (1997).

Tables A6 and A7 present the results, all of which supported the hypotheses. Moreover, Table A8 presents the results of the Senate analysis with the additional control variable and the SPMs in place of the official poverty rate. Although contributions from banks and the proportion of Mexican, Thai, and Korean Americans had a significant effect in some models, the effect of the low-income population remained almost the same and

supported the hypotheses.

Table A6. Analysis of Senators' Support for IMF Capital Increases with Additional Control Variables

	All Senators	President's party members	Opposing party members	Less than three years remaining	Three years or more remaining
Poverty rate	0.140 (0.058)**	0.307 (0.120)**	0.132 (0.082)	0.093 (0.080)	0.201 (0.106)*
Median income	0.093 (0.040)**	0.167 (0.084)**	0.099 (0.060)	0.109 (0.057)*	0.087 (0.065)
Bank PAC	0.007 (0.016)	0.004 (0.028)	0.012 (0.018)	0.061 (0.036)*	−0.031 (0.024)
Export	−14.499 (7.635)*	1.023 (14.525)	−22.868 (10.160)**	−18.904 (11.505)	−15.366 (10.644)
Import	−4.479 (4.234)	−24.187 (9.700)**	2.035 (5.060)	−9.351 (6.703)	−4.023 (5.288)
Skilled worker	−2.185 (5.657)	−8.140 (9.051)	−2.762 (7.571)	−8.689 (7.886)	3.909 (6.905)
Party	3.593 (1.208)***			2.597 (1.902)	5.051 (1.847)***
DW-NOMINATE	−8.060 (2.050)***	−7.480 (3.633)**	−10.281 (2.297)***	−5.761 (3.049)*	−11.410 (3.817)***
President's party	0.528 (0.448)			0.953 (0.552)*	0.666 (0.960)
Remaining term	0.157 (0.103)	−0.043 (0.208)	0.243 (0.127)*	0.553 (0.510)	0.146 (0.300)
1998	3.482 (0.850)***	−0.136 (1.753)	8.968 (2.002)***	2.780 (0.859)***	4.915 (2.372)**
2009	0.432 (0.502)	−2.290 (2.100)	5.172 (1.731)***	−0.556 (0.733)	1.852 (1.002)*
constant	−5.384 (2.030)***	−2.535 (3.066)	−6.661 (3.181)**	−2.995 (2.609)	−8.192 (4.463)*
Pseudo R^2	0.383	0.466	0.353	0.360	0.498
Area under ROC	0.892	0.913	0.869	0.871	0.935
Log pseudolikelihood	−102.205	−32.443	−62.553	−50.314	−43.633
Observations	286	139	147	133	153
Clusters	184	113	127	93	115

Note: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10% significance levels. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ROC = receiver operating curve.

Table A7. Analysis of Representatives' Support for the IMF Capital Increase with Additional Control Variables

	All Representatives	President's party members (Democrats)	Opposing party members (Republicans)	All Representatives	President's party members (Democrats)
Poverty rate	−0.033 (0.057)	0.152 (0.082)*	−0.253 (0.142)*	−0.034 (0.064)	0.153 (0.086)*
Median income	0.046 (0.040)	0.190 (0.073)***	−0.055 (0.084)	0.048 (0.042)	0.180 (0.074)**
Bank PAC	0.040 (0.021)*	0.141 (0.105)	0.037 (0.029)		
Business PAC	0.827 (0.924)	5.006 (3.220)	0.648 (1.333)		
Labor PAC	−1.687 (2.577)	0.185 (3.341)	−11.501 (10.375)		
Export	2.194 (3.567)	−1.417 (4.286)	6.759 (7.227)	2.352 (3.337)	0.921 (3.654)
Import	−2.947 (2.537)	−2.222 (3.433)	−5.938 (5.262)	−2.973 (2.503)	−2.164 (3.125)
Mexican/Thai/Korean				0.850 (1.691)	−0.232 (1.921)
Skilled worker	−2.487 (5.203)	−3.699 (6.994)	−1.434 (12.145)	−2.254 (5.273)	−2.245 (7.162)
Party	−0.097 (0.977)			0.078 (0.974)	
DW-NOMINATE	−6.193 (1.426)***	−2.024 (2.018)	−14.485 (3.159)***	−5.869 (1.338)***	−1.132 (1.639)
Constant	−0.502 (1.787)	−6.887 (3.063)**	8.359 (3.633)**	−0.496 (1.763)	−5.660 (2.799)**
Pseudo R^2	0.553	0.197	0.349	0.542	0.132
Area under ROC	0.937	0.804	0.885	0.934	0.754
Log likelihood	−124.956	−63.905	−46.121	−128.070	−69.087
Observations	405	191	214	406	191

Note: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10% significance levels. Standard errors are in parentheses. ROC = receiver operating curve.

Table A7. (Continued)

	Opposing party members (Republicans)	All Representatives	President's party members (Democrats)	Opposing party members (Republicans)
Poverty rate	−0.386 (0.173)**	−0.055 (0.065)	0.162 (0.092)*	−0.408 (0.179)**
Median income	−0.069 (0.073)	0.035 (0.043)	0.197 (0.078)**	−0.092 (0.083)
Bank PAC		0.041 (0.021)*	0.140 (0.105)	0.043 (0.029)
Business PAC		0.825 (0.929)	5.054 (3.217)	0.702 (1.388)
Labor PAC		−1.622 (2.605)	0.175 (3.334)	−8.990 (10.448)
Export	7.161 (6.770)	2.242 (3.591)	−1.552 (4.328)	7.339 (7.355)
Import	−6.994 (5.177)	−2.895 (2.546)	−2.232 (3.432)	−6.745 (5.276)
Mexican/Thai/Korean	8.134 (4.538)*	1.136 (1.698)	−0.427 (1.877)	8.269 (4.568)*
Skilled worker	−4.340 (10.357)	−1.587 (5.400)	−4.180 (7.271)	−1.663 (11.508)
Party		−0.009 (0.988)		
DW-NOMINATE	−14.459 (3.043)***	−6.334 (1.449)***	−1.997 (2.019)	−15.756 (3.360)***
Constant	10.801 (4.163)***	−0.211 (1.827)	−7.059 (3.167)**	11.298 (4.239)***
Pseudo R^2	0.343	0.553	0.198	0.369
Area under ROC	0.900	0.938	0.802	0.900
Log likelihood	−46.638	−124.727	−63.879	−44.733
Observations	215	405	191	214

Note: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10% significance levels. Standard errors are in parentheses. ROC = receiver operating curve.

Table A8. Analysis of Senators' Support for IMF Capital Increases with Alternative Measures of Low-Income Population and Additional Control Variables

	All Senators	President's party members	Opposing party members	Less than three years remaining	Three years or more remaining
SPM, pre-tax/transfer	0.109 (0.054)**	0.194 (0.086)**	0.104 (0.079)	0.052 (0.066)	0.181 (0.097)*
SPM, post-tax/transfer					
Median income	0.094 (0.041)**	0.148 (0.077)*	0.100 (0.062)	0.099 (0.056)*	0.106 (0.068)
Bank PAC	0.007 (0.015)	0.009 (0.028)	0.012 (0.017)	0.060 (0.036)*	−0.028 (0.024)
Export	−14.514 (7.836)*	0.029 (14.389)	−22.842 (10.377)**	−19.110 (11.590)*	−15.245 (10.855)
Import	−3.945 (4.379)	−20.794 (8.527)**	2.447 (5.091)	−9.044 (6.881)	−3.269 (5.553)
Skilled worker	−1.336 (5.619)	−7.410 (9.520)	−1.743 (7.594)	−8.245 (7.710)	5.900 (6.620)
Party	3.541 (1.205)***			2.414 (1.890)	4.926 (1.765)***
DW-NOMINATE	−7.853 (2.045)***	−6.961 (3.393)**	−10.093 (2.306)***	−5.488 (3.034)*	−11.073 (3.587)***
President's party	0.541 (0.450)			0.940 (0.556)*	0.729 (0.970)
Remaining term	0.148 (0.102)	−0.045 (0.210)	0.237 (0.125)*	0.545 (0.502)	0.104 (0.302)
1998	3.490 (0.851)***	−0.258 (1.684)	8.939 (2.052)***	2.639 (0.882)***	5.204 (2.182)**
2009	0.396 (0.527)	−2.207 (1.906)	5.106 (1.752)***	−0.535 (0.744)	1.743 (1.108)
constant	−6.392 (2.370)***	−3.028 (3.234)	−7.681 (3.991)*	−2.618 (2.874)	−10.946 (4.492)**
Pseudo R^2	0.385	0.460	0.355	0.359	0.504
Area under ROC	0.892	0.913	0.868	0.869	0.937
Log pseudolikelihood	−101.916	−32.819	−62.374	−50.407	−43.047
Observations	286	139	147	133	153
Clusters	184	113	127	93	115

Note: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10% significance levels. Robust standard are errors in parentheses. ROC = receiver operating curve.

Table A8. (Continued)

	All Senators	President's party members	Opposing party members	Less than three years remaining	Three years or more remaining
SPM, pre-tax/transfer					
SPM, post-tax/transfer	0.092 (0.052)*	0.214 (0.094)**	0.086 (0.074)	0.017 (0.064)	0.169 (0.082)**
Median income	0.070 (0.038)*	0.128 (0.079)	0.073 (0.056)	0.082 (0.052)	0.071 (0.057)
Bank PAC	0.007 (0.015)	0.013 (0.028)	0.011 (0.017)	0.060 (0.035)*	−0.027 (0.024)
Export	−15.118 (7.809)*	−0.440 (14.753)	−23.176 (10.429)**	−20.340 (11.346)*	−15.721 (10.996)
Import	−2.305 (3.954)	−18.560 (7.850)**	3.752 (4.858)	−8.154 (6.262)	−1.030 (5.094)
Skilled worker	−2.402 (5.557)	−9.486 (10.156)	−3.046 (7.328)	−8.459 (7.698)	2.561 (7.471)
Party	3.571 (1.201)***			2.274 (1.878)	5.251 (1.879)***
DW-NOMINATE	−7.960 (2.039)***	−7.081 (3.464)**	−10.249 (2.284)***	−5.374 (3.030)*	−11.532 (3.740)***
President's party	0.520 (0.441)			0.918 (0.555)*	0.652 (0.917)
Remaining term	0.159 (0.102)	−0.042 (0.211)	0.244 (0.126)*	0.547 (0.494)	0.096 (0.307)
1998	3.399 (0.887)***	0.020 (1.598)	8.868 (2.027)***	2.443 (0.919)***	5.114 (2.224)**
2009	0.973 (0.513)*	−1.018 (1.971)	5.738 (1.791)***	−0.377 (0.732)	2.752 (1.228)**
constant	−4.409 (1.983)**	−1.085 (2.683)	−5.532 (3.173)*	−0.959 (2.540)	−7.725 (3.950)*
Pseudo R^2	0.378	0.449	0.350	0.356	0.496
Area under ROC	0.890	0.907	0.867	0.867	0.933
Log pseudolikelihood	−103.008	−33.458	−62.865	−50.638	−43.818
Observations	286	139	147	133	153
Clusters	184	113	127	93	115

Note: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10% significance levels. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ROC = receiver operating curve.

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