Online Appendix: Uncertain Futures

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- Interview 79, Kris Mitchell, Director of the Boone County WV Development Corporation, West Virginia, November 10, 2022.
- Interview 80, Payton May, Chief Operating Officer of Bit Source and former coal industry worker, November 15, 2022.
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- Interview 83, Senior Official at International Oil Major, November 29, 2022.

2 Samples

Table 1: Overview of populations and samples

Population	Partner	N	Date
National	Qualtrics	1,159	12/2021–4/2022
National	Qualtrics	1,203	12/2021–1/2022
National	CAPS/Harris	2,020	1/2022
National	Qualtrics	2,019	8/2022
National (incl. youth)	Qualtrics	1,136	6-7/2022
National	CAPS/Harris	3,018	8/2022
National	CAPS/Harris	1,002	8/2022
National	CAPS/Harris	2,001	9/2022
National	CAPS/Harris	2,006	10/2022
National	Qualtrics	1,535	11-12/2022
Gulf Coast	Qualtrics	1,008	12/2021–4/2022
Industrial Midwest	Qualtrics	1,006	12/2021–4/2022
SWPA Region	Qualtrics	1,030	12/2021–4/2022
New Mexico	Qualtrics	301	12/2021–4/2022
County Fairs	Gazmararian (2023)	248	7-8/2021
County Fairs	Gazmararian (2022)	358	8/2022
National Local Policymakers	CivicPulse	405	6-10/2022
Fossil Fuel Local Policymakers	CivicPulse	205	8-10/2022
SWPA Middle Schoolers	Vocational School	556	2019
Great Lakes Region Union	Labor Union	77	2020

2.1 Qualtrics

2.1.1 Quotas

National samples. The Qualtrics samples employed quotas for gender, age, education, race, and Hispanic ethnicity, set at proportions from the Census to ensure national representativeness. In one national survey (12/2021–4/2022), Qualtrics erroneously flipped the quota for education, which yielded a higher educated sample than intended. To address this imbalance, we randomly removed a set of these college-educated individuals to achieve the proper quota and produce a final sample of 1,159 respondents. Fortunately, we had simultaneous surveys in the field that asked the same questions as this particular nationally representative sample, so the inferential impact of this administrative error was minimal.

Youth sample. For the national youth sample, we used quotas for gender, age, race, and Hispanic based on Census proportions but do not include a quota for 4-year college education, which is more heterogeneous in the youth population, some of whom are still

students but plan to pursue a bachelor's degree. The quotas were the same across blocks due to the minimal benefit of adding cost and complexity with quotas based on the joint distribution of age within each quota category.

Regional samples. The regional sample used nationally representative quotas for gender, age, race, and education. For each region, there was a target for around one-third to be from urban ZIP codes and two-thirds from non-urban ZIP codes. The book describes how some of the ethnicity quotas had to be relaxed for regional samples.

2.1.2 Quality Checks

We employed standard quality checks: screening respondents who failed instructional manipulation checks, those who completed the survey faster than two-thirds of the median completion time, and those who failed embedded meta-data timer checks.

2.2 County Fair

The county fair surveys employ convenience samples. To enhance their representativeness, we use population data from the 2018 5-year American Community Survey to construct the weights. Specifically, we use the joint distribution of age, education and sex; the joint distribution of age, race, and sex; and the distribution of income to estimate weights with raking. Gazmararian (2022, 2023) contain additional details.

2.3 Local Policymakers

We collaborated with CivicPulse to field the survey of local policymakers. CivicPulse works with scholars to survey local political leaders across the United States. CivicPulse handles the identification of local officials, survey fielding, anonymization when needed, and project management.[1] We used a survey firm rather than contacting local officials ourselves to protect the common pool resource of public officials who are willing to cooperate with researchers. CivicPulse is a nonprofit organization that partners with academics to conduct surveys of local governments. The organization's aim is to generate knowledge that is useful for both scholars and local officials.

Of people in local government, our survey targets policymakers, defined as individuals that are top elected officials or governing board members of their respective level of government. These individuals set the policy agenda and are often directly accountable to voters via elections. CivicPulse creates its sampling frame using the publicly available contact information for government officials at the state and local levels. The national sampling frame covers all townships, municipalities, and counties in the United States with a population exceeding 1,000. Within this frame, we targeted two populations: first, a nationally representative sample ("National"); and second, non-metro areas of top fossil fuel producing states ("Energy Communities"). From the nationally representative sample, we aimed to reach 400 respondents.

[1] Visit `https://www.civicpulse.org` for additional background.

For the Energy Communities sample, we designed a custom frame of counties that are of theoretical and practical relevance. First, this sample includes counties in the top fossil fuel-producing states because these are the places that will incur direct costs from decarbonization and thus are often opponents of climate policy. Second, of counties in the top oil, gas, and coal states, the frame focuses on non-metro areas because such regions tend to have the highest reliance on extractive industries (e.g., Campbell in Wyoming), whereas metro areas have more diversified economies (e.g., Harris County in Texas, home to Houston). We expend considerable resources to over-sample from these areas because these rural fossil fuel-producing locations are otherwise under-represented in national surveys. The target number of responses from this sample was 200.

To determine the top fossil fuel-producing states, we began by classifying counties according to their share of oil, gas, and coal employment relative to the national average. Data came from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW).[2] We used annual figures compiled in 2020. Fossil fuel industries are identified by their North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes: 2121 for coal mining and 2111, 213112, and 213111 for oil and gas. Any county with a location quotient greater than one for either the oil and gas or coal industries qualifies as a fossil fuel county for the purposes of determining states with the most fossil fuel counties. The location quotient is a statistic that compares the concentration of an industry within a specific area to the concentration of that industry nationwide. If a location quotient equals one, then the industry has the same share of its area employment as it does in the nation. A location quotient greater than one indicates that an industry has a larger share of the local area employment than is the case nationwide.[3] Then, we created a subset of all states with five or more fossil fuel counties.[4]

Next, in these top fossil fuel-producing states, we narrowed the data to all non-metro counties. To be expansive, this included some counties that might not have a particularly high share of employment in the fossil fuel industry. Although, there are theoretical reasons to include these counties: they may be adjacent to areas where the industry is strong; workers may commute across counties; and local politicians may perceive a regional economic interest in the fossil fuel industry. Employing this more expansive sample is also necessary to balance cost considerations. To determine which counties are non-metro, we used the 2013 Rural-Urban Continuum Codes from the U.S. Department of Agriculture.[5] These codes divide counties into three metro and six non-metro categories, with their metropolitan status being determined by commuting distance criteria from the 2010 Census and 2006-10 American Community Survey as prescribed by the Office of Management and Budget.

Each sample – National and Energy Communities – is a random sample of the officials within the frames. Recruitment occurs via invitations sent over email. According to CivicPulse, the first-time response rate is 7-8 percent. Of the officials who respond, over 80

[2] `https://www.bls.gov/cew/`

[3] We compare the location quotient with a measure of the proportion of county fossil fuel employment and unsurprisingly find a strong correlation: $r = 0.39$.

[4] We also added Alaska, despite having fewer than 5 fossil fuel counties, due to the relative importance of the oil industry. Other states included in the sampling frame are as follows: Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming.

[5] `https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/rural-urban-continuum-codes/`

percent continue to participate in future surveys. Thus, the local officials taking the survey represent a mix of first-time respondents and people with survey-taking experience. The surveys were administered online using the Qualtrics platform. All survey responses were de-identified to maintain confidentiality. Participants do not receive compensation.

2.4 Sample Descriptions

Table 2: Summary Statistics for National Sample, December 2021–February 2022

		Mean	SD	N	Percent
	Age	48.01	17.29	2362	100.00
	Female	0.54	0.50	2362	100.00
	Hispanic	0.16	0.37	2362	100.00
	Black	0.14	0.34	2362	100.00
	College	0.36	0.48	2362	100.00
	Fossil Fuel Employment	0.05	0.22	2362	100.00
	Full-Time Employed	0.39	0.49	2362	100.00
	Democrat	0.40	0.49	2362	100.00
	Republican	0.27	0.44	2362	100.00
	Liberal	0.28	0.45	2362	100.00
	Conservative	0.30	0.46	2362	100.00
	Climate Change Concern	0.77	0.42	2362	100.00
Income	Less than 29,999			698	29.55
	30,000 - 59,999			715	30.27
	60,000 - 99,999			480	20.32
	100,000 or more			392	16.60
	Prefer not to say			77	3.26

Notes: Sample collected in partnership with Qualtrics.

Table 3: Summary Statistics for Gulf Coast Sample, December 2021–February 2022

		Mean	SD	N	Percent
	Age	45.34	16.83	1008	100.00
	Female	0.52	0.50	1008	100.00
	Hispanic	0.14	0.35	1008	100.00
	Black	0.13	0.34	1008	100.00
	College	0.19	0.39	1008	100.00
	Fossil Fuel Employment	0.17	0.37	1008	100.00
	Full-Time Employed	0.38	0.49	1008	100.00
	Democrat	0.25	0.44	1008	100.00
	Republican	0.39	0.49	1008	100.00
	Liberal	0.18	0.39	1008	100.00
	Conservative	0.37	0.48	1008	100.00
	Climate Change Concern	0.71	0.46	1008	100.00
Income	Less than 29,999			365	36.21
	30,000 - 59,999			297	29.46
	60,000 - 99,999			174	17.26
	100,000 or more			129	12.80
	Prefer not to say			43	4.27

Notes: Sample collected in partnership with Qualtrics.

Table 4: Summary Statistics for Industrial Midwest Sample, December 2021–February 2022

		Mean	SD	N	Percent
	Age	46.98	17.15	1006	100.00
	Female	0.54	0.50	1006	100.00
	Hispanic	0.10	0.31	1006	100.00
	Black	0.10	0.30	1006	100.00
	College	0.28	0.45	1006	100.00
	Fossil Fuel Employment	0.04	0.19	1006	100.00
	Full-Time Employed	0.37	0.48	1006	100.00
	Democrat	0.30	0.46	1006	100.00
	Republican	0.31	0.46	1006	100.00
	Liberal	0.21	0.41	1006	100.00
	Conservative	0.30	0.46	1006	100.00
	Climate Change Concern	0.74	0.44	1006	100.00
Income	Less than 29,999			312	31.01
	30,000 - 59,999			347	34.49
	60,000 - 99,999			188	18.69
	100,000 or more			123	12.23
	Prefer not to say			36	3.58

Notes: Sample collected in partnership with Qualtrics.

Table 5: Summary Statistics for New Mexico Sample, December 2021–February 2022

		Mean	SD	N	Percent
	Age	51.18	17.94	301	100.00
	Female	0.52	0.50	301	100.00
	Hispanic	0.44	0.50	301	100.00
	Black	0.02	0.14	301	100.00
	College	0.39	0.49	301	100.00
	Fossil Fuel Employment	0.06	0.24	301	100.00
	Full-Time Employed	0.29	0.45	301	100.00
	Democrat	0.37	0.48	301	100.00
	Republican	0.27	0.44	301	100.00
	Liberal	0.28	0.45	301	100.00
	Conservative	0.30	0.46	301	100.00
	Climate Change Concern	0.74	0.44	301	100.00
Income	Less than 29,999			118	39.20
	30,000 - 59,999			84	27.91
	60,000 - 99,999			43	14.29
	100,000 or more			47	15.61
	Prefer not to say			9	2.99

Notes: Sample collected in partnership with Qualtrics.

Table 6: Summary Statistics for Southwest Pennsylvania Area Sample, December 2021–February 2022

		Mean	SD	N	Percent
	Age	47.88	16.65	1030	100.00
	Female	0.56	0.50	1030	100.00
	Hispanic	0.07	0.26	1030	100.00
	Black	0.10	0.30	1030	100.00
	College	0.29	0.45	1030	100.00
	Fossil Fuel Employment	0.06	0.24	1030	100.00
	Full-Time Employed	0.36	0.48	1030	100.00
	Democrat	0.34	0.47	1030	100.00
	Republican	0.30	0.46	1030	100.00
	Liberal	0.23	0.42	1030	100.00
	Conservative	0.27	0.44	1030	100.00
	Climate Change Concern	0.75	0.43	1030	100.00
Income	Less than 29,999			359	34.85
	30,000 - 59,999			323	31.36
	60,000 - 99,999			187	18.16
	100,000 or more			121	11.75
	Prefer not to say			40	3.88

Notes: Sample collected in partnership with Qualtrics.

Table 7: Summary Statistics for Local Policymaker Sample

		Mean	SD	N	Percent
	College	0.69	0.46	610	100.00
	Woman	0.31	0.46	610	100.00
	Minority	0.09	0.28	610	100.00
	Democrat	0.39	0.49	610	100.00
	Republican	0.44	0.50	610	100.00
	Conservative	0.35	0.48	610	100.00
	Liberal	0.20	0.40	610	100.00
	Non-Metro County	0.40	0.49	610	100.00
	County Government	0.21	0.41	610	100.00
	Municipal Government	0.63	0.48	610	100.00
	Township Government	0.16	0.37	610	100.00
Sample	Standard			405	66.39
	Targeted			205	33.61

Notes: Sample collected in partnership with CivicPulse.

Table 8: Summary Statistics for 2021 County Fair

		Mean	SD	N	Percent
	Female	0.51	0.50	247	100.00
	White	0.93	0.25	248	100.00
	College	0.27	0.45	248	100.00
	Fossil Fuel Employment	0.50	0.50	248	100.00
	Full-Time Employed	0.55	0.50	247	100.00
	Democrat	0.29	0.46	244	100.00
	Republican	0.50	0.50	248	100.00
	Climate Change Concern	0.57	0.50	248	100.00
Income	Less than 20,000			41	16.53
	20,000 to 39,999			33	13.31
	40,000 to 59,999			37	14.92
	60,000 - 99,999			75	30.24
	100,000 or more			62	25.00
Age	18-24			36	14.52
	25-34			57	22.98
	35-44			47	18.95
	45-54			48	19.35
	55-64			29	11.69
	65 or older			31	12.50

Notes: Sample collected by Gazmararian (2023).

Table 9: Summary Statistics for 2022 County Fair

		Mean	SD	N	Percent
	Age	42.89	16.94	358	100.00
	Female	0.55	0.50	358	100.00
	Non-White	0.03	0.17	358	100.00
	College	0.26	0.44	358	100.00
	Fossil Fuel Employment	0.44	0.50	358	100.00
	Full-Time Employed	0.49	0.50	358	100.00
	Democrat	0.25	0.43	358	100.00
	Republican	0.54	0.50	358	100.00
	Liberal	0.13	0.33	358	100.00
	Conservative	0.41	0.49	358	100.00
Income	Less than 29,999			74	20.67
	30,000 - 59,999			87	24.30
	60,000 - 99,999			100	27.93
	100,000 or more			78	21.79
	Prefer not to say			19	5.31

Notes: Sample collected by Gazmararian (2022).

Table 10: Summary Statistics for August 2022 National Sample

		Mean	SD	N	Percent
	Age	42.86	16.29	3018	100.00
	Female	0.55	0.50	3018	100.00
	Black	0.15	0.35	3018	100.00
	Hispanic	0.15	0.36	3018	100.00
	College	0.37	0.48	3018	100.00
	Democrat	0.46	0.50	3018	100.00
	Republican	0.26	0.44	3018	100.00
	Liberal	0.28	0.45	3018	100.00
	Conservative	0.29	0.46	3018	100.00
Income	100K +			704	23.33
	15K to 35K			677	22.43
	35K to 50K			371	12.29
	50K to 75K			428	14.18
	75K to 100K			313	10.37
	Decline to answer			112	3.71
	Less than 15K			413	13.68

Notes: Sample collected with CAPS/HarrisX.

Table 11: Summary Statistics for August 2022 National Sample (Conducted in Parallel)

		Mean	SD	N	Percent
	Age	43.88	17.09	1002	100.00
	Female	0.55	0.50	1002	100.00
	Black	0.15	0.36	1002	100.00
	Hispanic	0.16	0.37	1002	100.00
	College	0.36	0.48	1002	100.00
	Democrat	0.43	0.50	1002	100.00
	Republican	0.28	0.45	1002	100.00
	Liberal	0.28	0.45	1002	100.00
	Conservative	0.30	0.46	1002	100.00
Income	100K +			194	19.36
	15K to 35K			223	22.26
	35K to 50K			142	14.17
	50K to 75K			173	17.27
	75K to 100K			99	9.88
	Decline to answer			34	3.39
	Less than 15K			137	13.67

Notes: Sample collected with CAPS/HarrisX. Study fielded at the same time as the other August 2022 sample.

Table 12: Summary Statistics for September 2022 National Sample

		Mean	SD	N	Percent
	Age	49.96	18.11	2001	100.00
	Female	0.55	0.50	2001	100.00
	Black	0.12	0.33	2001	100.00
	Hispanic	0.12	0.33	2001	100.00
	College	0.36	0.48	2001	100.00
	Democrat	0.40	0.49	2001	100.00
	Republican	0.30	0.46	2001	100.00
Income	100K +			370	18.49
	15K to 35K			457	22.84
	35K to 50K			283	14.14
	50K to 75K			349	17.44
	75K to 100K			220	10.99
	Decline to answer			81	4.05
	Less than 15K			241	12.04
Rural	Urban			626	31.28
	Suburban			882	44.08
	Rural			493	24.64

Notes: Sample collected with CAPS/HarrisX.

Table 13: Summary Statistics for October 2022 National Sample

		Mean	SD	N	Percent
	Age	44.62	17.36	2006	100.00
	Female	0.54	0.50	2006	100.00
	Black	0.14	0.35	2006	100.00
	Hispanic	0.10	0.30	2006	100.00
	College	0.39	0.49	2006	100.00
	Democrat	0.44	0.50	2006	100.00
	Republican	0.28	0.45	2006	100.00
Rural	Urban			787	39.23
	Suburban			728	36.29
	Rural			491	24.48
Income	100K +			521	25.97
	15K to 35K			447	22.28
	35K to 50K			242	12.06
	50K to 75K			241	12.01
	75K to 100K			198	9.87
	Decline to answer			81	4.04
	Less than 15K			276	13.76

Notes: Sample collected with CAPS/HarrisX.

Table 14: Summary Statistics for Winter 2022 National Sample

		Mean	SD	N	Percent
	Age	48.66	18.68	2019	100.00
	Female	0.52	0.50	2019	100.00
	Black	0.13	0.34	2019	100.00
	Hispanic	0.18	0.38	2019	100.00
	College	0.35	0.48	2019	100.00
	Democrat	0.47	0.50	2019	100.00
	Republican	0.33	0.47	2019	100.00
	Liberal	0.29	0.45	2019	100.00
	Conservative	0.29	0.45	2019	100.00
Income	100,000 or more			335	16.59
	30,000 - 59,999			634	31.40
	60,000 - 99,999			413	20.46
	Less than 29,999			562	27.84
	Prefer not to say			75	3.71

Notes: Sample collected with Qualtrics.

Table 15: Summary Statistics for Youth Sample

		Mean	SD	N	Percent
	Age	20.01	2.59	574	100.00
	Female	0.50	0.50	574	100.00
	Black	0.11	0.31	574	100.00
	Hispanic	0.18	0.38	574	100.00
	College	0.10	0.29	574	100.00
	Democrat	0.34	0.48	574	100.00
	Republican	0.21	0.41	574	100.00
	Liberal	0.35	0.48	574	100.00
	Conservative	0.20	0.40	574	100.00
Income	100,000 or more			79	13.76
	30,000 - 59,999			144	25.09
	60,000 - 99,999			99	17.25
	Less than 29,999			162	28.22
	Prefer not to say			90	15.68

Notes: Sample collected with Qualtrics.

Table 16: Summary Statistics for Adult Block of Youth Sample

		Mean	SD	N	Percent
	Age	50.89	16.67	563	100.00
	Female	0.53	0.50	563	100.00
	Black	0.12	0.32	563	100.00
	Hispanic	0.18	0.38	563	100.00
	College	0.36	0.48	563	100.00
	Democrat	0.44	0.50	563	100.00
	Republican	0.26	0.44	563	100.00
	Liberal	0.29	0.46	563	100.00
	Conservative	0.27	0.45	563	100.00
Income	100,000 or more			72	12.79
	30,000 - 59,999			217	38.54
	60,000 - 99,999			107	19.01
	Less than 29,999			156	27.71
	Prefer not to say			11	1.95

Notes: Sample collected with Qualtrics.

3 Chapter 1

3.1 Industry List for Map

The following NAICS Codes capture fossil fuel industries: 213111, 213112, 211120, 211130, 237120, 486110, 486210, 486910, 424710, 424720, 324110, 324121, 324122, 324191, 324199, 212114, 212115, 213113, 212111, 212112, 212113, 221112. The following NAICS Codes capture internal combustion engine manufacturing: 336310, 336350, 336320, 336390.

4 Chapter 3

4.1 Commitment to Local Economic Development

Table 17 corresponds with the analysis on pp. 81-83.

Table 17: Linear regression of perceptions of government commitment to local economic development

	National	Youth	Policymaker	County Fair
Intercept	4.521***	3.295***	2.979***	4.221***
	(0.112)	(0.519)	(0.221)	(0.336)
Age	−0.018***	−0.022		−0.010*
	(0.002)	(0.025)		(0.005)
Age: 52 to 66 years			−0.077	
			(0.171)	
Age: over 67 years			−0.111	
			(0.193)	
Age: not say			−0.443*	
			(0.269)	
Female	−0.298***	−0.114	0.037	−0.166
	(0.062)	(0.115)	(0.134)	(0.169)
Hispanic	−0.082	0.368**		
	(0.089)	(0.169)		
Black	−0.102	0.308		
	(0.099)	(0.191)		
Minority (=1)			0.532**	0.287
			(0.222)	(0.401)
College (=1)	0.217***	0.211	0.092	−0.387**
	(0.065)	(0.306)	(0.132)	(0.196)
Plans for college (=1)		−0.048		
		(0.217)		
Neither party	−0.535***	0.028	−0.374*	−0.271
	(0.072)	(0.122)	(0.197)	(0.268)
Republican	−0.528***	0.040	−0.697***	−0.637***
	(0.077)	(0.154)	(0.137)	(0.213)
Won't say party			−0.177	
			(0.485)	
Fossil fuel sample			0.072	
			(0.125)	
Fossil fuel employment				−0.116
				(0.170)
Num.Obs.	3018	573	605	358
R2 Adj.	0.099	0.002	0.064	0.038

Notes: Youth sample with Qualtrics, and national sample with CAPS/Harris. HC2 standard errors. Post-stratified weights used in national, policymaker, and county fair samples. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

4.2 Trust and Credibility

Table 18 corresponds with the analysis on pp. 82-84.

Table 18: Linear regression of public perceptions of government commitment to local climate mitigation

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age (normalized)	−0.014	−0.013	−0.005
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Female	−0.012	−0.010	−0.014
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Black	0.130***	0.122***	0.127***
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Hispanic	−0.029	−0.029	−0.016
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Republican	−0.074*	−0.074*	−0.031
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Neither party	−0.074*	−0.080*	−0.061
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
College degree	0.066*	0.077**	0.080**
	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.034)
Employed	0.047	0.053	0.055
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Income Q1		0.022	0.014
		(0.050)	(0.049)
Income Q2		0.026	0.019
		(0.047)	(0.047)
Income Q3		−0.049	−0.056
		(0.050)	(0.049)
Income Not say		−0.030	−0.022
		(0.086)	(0.085)
High income	−0.002		
	(0.037)		
Climate beliefs index	0.149***	0.149***	0.091***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.023)
Intercept	2.775***	2.766***	2.751***
	(0.037)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Num.Obs.	2015	2015	2015
R2 Adj.	0.362	0.362	0.371

Notes: HC2 standard errors. Qualtrics 2022 national sample. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

4.3 Promises Kept

Table 19 corresponds with the analysis on pp. 82-84.

Table 19: Linear regression of history of broken promises

	Local Policymakers:			National:
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	1.858***	1.674***	1.532***	2.269***
	(0.092)	(0.231)	(0.234)	(0.069)
Age				−0.004***
				(0.001)
Age: 52 to 66 years	0.017	0.025	0.032	
	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.066)	
Age: not say	0.015	0.131	0.157	
	(0.112)	(0.116)	(0.118)	
Age: over 67 years	0.024	0.000	0.006	
	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.073)	
Woman	0.104*	0.037	0.032	−0.132***
	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.032)
College (=1)	0.005	−0.023	−0.026	0.144***
	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.035)
Black				−0.040
				(0.052)
Hispanic				−0.068
				(0.056)
Minority (=1)	0.251***	0.145	0.117	
	(0.092)	(0.095)	(0.094)	
Municipality	0.030	0.094	0.087	
	(0.060)	(0.073)	(0.072)	
Township	−0.107	−0.056	−0.063	
	(0.088)	(0.093)	(0.091)	
Fossil fuel sample	−0.058	−0.032	−0.033	
	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.054)	
Neither party		−0.244***	−0.223***	−0.255***
		(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.041)
Won't say party		−0.359*	−0.349*	
		(0.195)	(0.204)	
Republican		−0.306***	−0.265***	−0.381***
		(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.041)
2020 Biden vote share		0.082	0.075	
		(0.195)	(0.200)	
College share		−0.129	−0.099	
		(0.181)	(0.186)	
Population (log)		0.046*	0.042*	
		(0.024)	(0.024)	
Urban share		−0.107	−0.105	
		(0.074)	(0.074)	
Suburban				−0.119***
				(0.039)
Rural				−0.108**
				(0.048)
Num.Obs.	605	598	594	2001
R2 Adj.	0.020	0.077	0.095	0.126

Notes: CivicPulse local policymaker and September 2022 CAPS/Harris samples. Post-stratified weights used. HC2 standard errors. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

4.4 Historical Transitions

4.4.1 Level of Assistance

Table 20 corresponds with the analysis on pp. 83-85.

Table 20: Linear regression of level of aid in past transition

	Coal	Lumber	Steel	Auto	Tobacco	Textile
Age	−0.010***	−0.007***	−0.007***	−0.004**	−0.013***	−0.010***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	−0.138**	−0.158***	−0.186***	−0.053	−0.102*	−0.124**
	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.053)
Black	−0.052	−0.083	−0.138*	−0.059	−0.123	−0.043
	(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.079)	(0.081)
Hispanic	−0.220**	−0.102	−0.148	−0.135	−0.248***	−0.146
	(0.095)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.085)	(0.094)	(0.089)
Republican	−0.285***	−0.220***	−0.178***	−0.156**	−0.113*	−0.195***
	(0.069)	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.063)
Neither party	−0.212***	−0.222***	−0.157**	−0.211***	−0.151**	−0.227***
	(0.069)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.067)	(0.066)
College degree	0.106	0.042	0.115*	0.142**	0.078	0.060
	(0.068)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.067)	(0.063)
Employed	0.109	0.142**	0.083	0.139**	0.182***	0.060
	(0.068)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.066)	(0.064)
Suburban	−0.120*	−0.171***	−0.182***	−0.076	−0.245***	−0.196***
	(0.065)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.062)
Rural	−0.080	−0.130*	−0.125*	−0.089	−0.199***	−0.212***
	(0.076)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.076)	(0.070)
Middle Atlantic	0.194	0.355**	0.342**	0.109	0.131	0.299**
	(0.146)	(0.139)	(0.157)	(0.140)	(0.137)	(0.149)
North Central	0.097	0.367***	0.190	0.086	0.015	0.196
	(0.150)	(0.142)	(0.160)	(0.144)	(0.143)	(0.152)
West North Central	0.169	0.424***	0.394**	0.193	0.076	0.250
	(0.173)	(0.164)	(0.178)	(0.160)	(0.166)	(0.170)
South Atlantic	0.132	0.287**	0.365**	0.129	0.186	0.230
	(0.146)	(0.137)	(0.157)	(0.140)	(0.135)	(0.149)
East South Central	−0.012	0.232	0.213	0.015	−0.047	0.165
	(0.162)	(0.153)	(0.169)	(0.155)	(0.155)	(0.162)
West South Central	0.213	0.456***	0.338**	0.179	0.148	0.355**
	(0.150)	(0.143)	(0.163)	(0.146)	(0.143)	(0.155)
Mountain	0.304*	0.496***	0.306*	0.088	0.023	0.274*
	(0.166)	(0.158)	(0.173)	(0.163)	(0.160)	(0.163)
Pacific	0.297**	0.429***	0.432***	0.192	0.092	0.399***
	(0.148)	(0.140)	(0.159)	(0.140)	(0.138)	(0.149)
Intercept	3.002***	2.734***	2.762***	2.794***	3.172***	2.962***
	(0.182)	(0.174)	(0.186)	(0.174)	(0.175)	(0.179)
Num.Obs.	1534	1555	1570	1607	1575	1552
R2 Adj.	0.174	0.158	0.156	0.111	0.169	0.159

Notes: October 2022 Caps/Harris sample. HC2 standard errors. Excludes respondents who 'Have not heard about this.' Scale runs from 'None at all' (1) to 'A great deal' (4). Reference categories are 'New England' for region, 'urban' for 'rural/suburban. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

4.4.2 Transition Outcomes

Table 21 corresponds with the analysis on pp. 83-86.

Table 21: Linear regression of success of past transitions

	Coal	Lumber	Steel	Auto	Tobacco	Textile
Age	−0.009***	−0.004	−0.005*	−0.001	−0.005*	−0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Female	0.345***	0.338***	0.316***	0.361***	0.334***	0.325***
	(0.089)	(0.083)	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.087)	(0.086)
Black	0.030	−0.157	0.076	−0.058	−0.041	−0.078
	(0.136)	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.126)	(0.128)	(0.123)
Hispanic	0.083	−0.044	0.124	−0.033	−0.004	−0.013
	(0.146)	(0.141)	(0.139)	(0.141)	(0.143)	(0.138)
Republican	−0.318***	−0.331***	−0.328***	−0.297***	−0.221**	−0.338***
	(0.114)	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.109)	(0.109)
Neither party	0.057	0.107	0.026	0.066	0.043	0.055
	(0.108)	(0.101)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.103)	(0.100)
College degree	−0.321***	−0.233**	−0.185*	−0.196*	−0.266**	−0.258**
	(0.110)	(0.103)	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.106)	(0.103)
Employed	0.238**	0.212**	0.168*	0.275***	0.199*	0.187*
	(0.105)	(0.099)	(0.100)	(0.099)	(0.102)	(0.097)
Suburban	−0.002	0.047	0.103	0.014	0.025	0.073
	(0.103)	(0.097)	(0.098)	(0.097)	(0.099)	(0.098)
Rural	−0.041	0.105	0.106	−0.050	−0.074	0.038
	(0.118)	(0.110)	(0.112)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.111)
Middle Atlantic	0.236	0.466**	0.435*	0.439*	0.373	0.359
	(0.253)	(0.237)	(0.257)	(0.247)	(0.251)	(0.251)
North Central	−0.207	0.187	0.144	0.176	0.123	0.183
	(0.258)	(0.243)	(0.260)	(0.251)	(0.257)	(0.253)
West North Central	0.105	0.402	0.209	0.421	0.245	0.247
	(0.294)	(0.269)	(0.293)	(0.281)	(0.292)	(0.287)
South Atlantic	−0.076	0.255	0.123	0.134	0.174	0.145
	(0.248)	(0.233)	(0.252)	(0.244)	(0.248)	(0.245)
East South Central	−0.452*	−0.064	−0.006	0.021	−0.104	−0.167
	(0.270)	(0.256)	(0.272)	(0.265)	(0.268)	(0.267)
West South Central	−0.144	−0.128	−0.119	−0.054	−0.008	0.011
	(0.256)	(0.241)	(0.260)	(0.254)	(0.259)	(0.255)
Mountain	−0.068	−0.024	0.006	0.036	0.098	0.169
	(0.284)	(0.267)	(0.283)	(0.274)	(0.282)	(0.285)
Pacific	−0.022	0.087	0.206	0.173	0.086	0.162
	(0.256)	(0.240)	(0.259)	(0.250)	(0.255)	(0.252)
Intercept	4.054***	3.683***	3.650***	3.496***	3.784***	3.744***
	(0.300)	(0.280)	(0.301)	(0.294)	(0.293)	(0.297)
Num.Obs.	1699	1703	1695	1672	1685	1695
R2 Adj.	0.060	0.048	0.043	0.039	0.043	0.041

Notes: October 2022 Caps/Harris sample. HC2 standard errors. Excludes respondents who 'Have not heard about this.' Scale runs from 'None at all' (1) to 'A great deal' (4). Reference categories are 'New England' for region, 'urban' for 'rural/suburban. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

4.4.3 Expectations of Assistance

Table 22 corresponds with the analysis on pp. 85-87 where we report a null result of the treatment. The question asked: "If you had to change the industry you work in due to {technological or economic changes outside of your control/a government policy impacting your industry}, how much support do you think the federal government would provide to help you transition to your next career? *Significant support; Moderate support; Little support; No support at all.*"

Table 22: Linear regression of expectations of government transition assistance depending on the cause of economic dislocation

	Scale	Binary
Treatment: External Cause of Dislocation	0.010	0.003
	(0.050)	(0.026)
Age	−0.010***	−0.003***
	(0.002)	(0.001)
Female	−0.085	−0.063**
	(0.053)	(0.028)
Black	0.181**	0.083*
	(0.079)	(0.045)
Hispanic	0.177**	0.088**
	(0.071)	(0.038)
Republican	−0.177**	−0.074**
	(0.069)	(0.036)
Neither party	−0.209***	−0.101***
	(0.058)	(0.031)
Plans for college (=1)	0.009	−0.024
	(0.065)	(0.033)
Employed	0.049	0.034
	(0.063)	(0.032)
Income Q1	−0.050	0.010
	(0.087)	(0.045)
Income Q2	−0.084	0.001
	(0.085)	(0.044)
Income Q3	−0.116	−0.043
	(0.088)	(0.046)
Income Not say	0.103	0.049
	(0.114)	(0.059)
Youth sample	−0.198**	−0.129***
	(0.094)	(0.048)
Intercept	2.624***	0.506***
	(0.162)	(0.082)
Num.Obs.	1137	1137
R2 Adj.	0.049	0.027

Notes: Qualtrics youth sample. HC2 standard errors. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

4.5 IRA Support

Table 23 corresponds with the analysis of the following question on pp. 85-87.

> The federal government just passed a law that will make investments in renewable energy like solar and wind. Over the next 10 years, how likely do you think it is that the following groups would try to reverse the law, remain neutral, or continue to support the law? *Very likely to reverse; Somewhat likely to reverse; Likely to remain neutral; Somewhat likely to support; Very likely to support*

The groups included Republicans, Democrats, Fossil fuel companies, Renewable energy companies.

Table 23: Linear regression of likelihood the group supports IRA

	Democrats	Republicans	Independents	FF Companies	RE Companies
Age	0.014***	−0.012***	−0.002	−0.012***	0.009***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	−0.106	0.028	0.007	0.060	−0.086
	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.055)	(0.064)	(0.065)
Black	−0.148	−0.282***	−0.070	0.087	−0.196*
	(0.096)	(0.099)	(0.095)	(0.104)	(0.101)
Hispanic	−0.179*	−0.214**	−0.186**	−0.097	−0.264**
	(0.104)	(0.101)	(0.085)	(0.099)	(0.104)
Republican	−0.672***	0.759***	−0.268***	0.152*	−0.211**
	(0.085)	(0.083)	(0.069)	(0.083)	(0.086)
Neither party	−0.453***	0.362***	−0.054	−0.023	−0.070
	(0.071)	(0.075)	(0.068)	(0.077)	(0.077)
College degree	0.172**	0.020	0.114**	0.017	0.204***
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.057)	(0.070)	(0.069)
Suburban	0.087	−0.331***	−0.101	−0.365***	0.143*
	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.068)	(0.078)	(0.078)
Rural	−0.027	−0.296***	−0.189**	−0.317***	0.029
	(0.095)	(0.092)	(0.080)	(0.094)	(0.093)
Intercept	3.425***	3.074***	3.488***	3.221***	3.328***
	(0.137)	(0.134)	(0.116)	(0.137)	(0.131)
Num.Obs.	2001	2001	2001	2001	2001
R2 Adj.	0.092	0.088	0.023	0.048	0.044

Notes: September 2022 CAPS/Harris sample. HC2 standard errors. Post-stratified weights used. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

5 Chapter 4

5.1 Regional Differences

The materials in this appendix correspond with pp. 101-106. We examine regional differences in beliefs about local economic opportunity using linear regressions that include a battery of individual and regional covariates. The main outcome is the respondent's answer to the future or local jobs question, which we scale along a linear scale from 0 to 1, where higher values indicate more optimistic beliefs. We focus on solar and wind jobs, since these are core renewable energy industries. The control variables include partisan identification; climate change concern; age; college education; employment status; income; whether one works in the coal, oil or gas industries; and indicators for Black and Hispanic. To examine differences across the country, we include a categorical variable for each regional sample. We separate the regional samples based on whether the respondents are in urban or non-urban areas because we calibrated our recruitment strategy to reach rural areas where the economic effects of climate transitions are most acute. The national sample serves as the reference category.

The first model includes measures for individual political and socio-economic characteristics and our sample indicators. The second model adds our measure for concern about global warming. The third model adds controls for local levels of renewable energy generation and level fossil fuel production employment. Renewable energy generation data is drawn from the US Energy Information Agency (EIA). Fossil fuel production employment comes from the County Business Patterns data. We also explored using other estimates of renewable energy with data from Gard-Murray (2022). The fourth model takes the sum of the responses to the healthcare, computer programming, and trucking industries for each outcome variable and then scales them from 0 to 1. This allows us to control for the overall disposition of an individual toward economic opportunity.

5.1.1 Future Jobs

Table 24: Correlates of Beliefs about the Future Growth of Wind and Solar Energy Jobs in One's Region

	Wind:			Solar:		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001***	0.001***	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	−0.043***	−0.043***	−0.039***	−0.029***	−0.029***	−0.024***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Black	−0.052***	−0.053***	−0.056***	−0.023**	−0.023*	−0.028**
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Hispanic	0.024**	0.023**	0.023**	0.017*	0.018*	0.018*
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Republican	−0.045***	−0.045***	−0.046***	−0.020**	−0.020**	−0.022**
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Neither party	−0.045***	−0.045***	−0.038***	−0.028***	−0.028***	−0.020**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)
College degree	−0.001	−0.001	0.001	0.008	0.008	0.010
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Employed	0.014	0.014	0.011	0.002	0.002	−0.003
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Fossil fuel employment	−0.034**	−0.033**	−0.030**	−0.054***	−0.054***	−0.050***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Income Q1	0.002	0.002	0.008	−0.003	−0.003	0.003
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Income Q2	0.006	0.006	0.009	0.004	0.004	0.008
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Income Q4	0.020	0.019	0.020	0.022*	0.022*	0.022*
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Income Not say	−0.013	−0.013	−0.008	−0.005	−0.005	0.000
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.019)
Climate beliefs index	0.090***	0.090***	0.081***	0.083***	0.083***	0.072***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Gulf Coast (Non-Urban)	−0.027**	−0.029**	−0.037***	−0.008	−0.006	−0.018
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Gulf Coast (Urban)	0.054***	0.035*	0.054***	0.012	0.029	0.010
	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.014)
Industrial Midwest (Non-Urban)	0.041***	0.041***	0.049***	−0.004	−0.005	0.004
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Industrial Midwest (Urban)	0.025	0.025	0.028*	−0.018	−0.018	−0.014
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.014)
New Mexico (Non-Urban)	0.081***	0.082***	0.086***	0.037*	0.036*	0.042**
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.018)
New Mexico (Urban)	0.094***	0.095***	0.113***	0.043**	0.041**	0.064***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
SWPA (Non-Urban)	−0.026*	−0.022	−0.025*	−0.049***	−0.050***	−0.046***
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)
SWPA (Urban)	−0.018	−0.018	−0.026	−0.025	−0.024	−0.034**
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Coal presence		−0.006			0.001	
		(0.005)			(0.004)	
Oil/gas presence		0.006			−0.006	
		(0.004)			(0.004)	
Solar presence		0.000			0.002	
		(0.001)			(0.006)	
Wind presence		0.004			−0.001	
		(0.004)			(0.003)	
Future job optimism			0.541***			0.605***
			(0.028)			(0.026)
Intercept	0.716***	0.716***	0.321***	0.743***	0.741***	0.302***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.026)
Num.Obs.	5698	5698	5692	5695	5695	5690
R2 Adj.	0.122	0.122	0.185	0.104	0.104	0.197

Notes: Winter/spring 2022 samples with Qualtrics. HC2 standard errors. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table 25: Correlates of Beliefs about the Future Growth of Oil, Gas, and Coal Jobs in One's Region

	Oil and Gas:			Coal:		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	−0.001***	−0.001***	−0.001***	−0.004***	−0.004***	−0.004***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	0.022***	0.022***	0.028***	0.004	0.003	0.007
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Black	0.047***	0.047***	0.041***	0.094***	0.095***	0.091***
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Hispanic	−0.010	−0.010	−0.010	0.045***	0.046***	0.046***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Republican	0.032***	0.032***	0.030***	0.036***	0.035***	0.035***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Neither party	0.005	0.004	0.014	0.016	0.015	0.020*
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
College degree	−0.026***	−0.026***	−0.024***	−0.019**	−0.019**	−0.018**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Employed	0.022**	0.022**	0.019**	0.016*	0.016*	0.014
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Fossil fuel employment	0.053***	0.053***	0.057***	0.066***	0.063***	0.068***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Income Q1	0.034***	0.034***	0.042***	0.047***	0.046***	0.051***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Income Q2	0.018*	0.018*	0.023**	0.016	0.016	0.018
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Income Q4	0.034***	0.034***	0.034***	0.027**	0.027**	0.027**
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Income Not say	0.036*	0.036*	0.042**	0.005	0.004	0.007
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Climate beliefs index	−0.019***	−0.019***	−0.030***	−0.020***	−0.020***	−0.025***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Gulf Coast (Non-Urban)	0.063***	0.063***	0.053***	−0.008	−0.007	−0.014
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Gulf Coast (Urban)	0.024	0.016	0.024	0.007	0.006	0.006
	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.018)
Industrial Midwest (Non-Urban)	−0.032***	−0.032***	−0.023**	−0.049***	−0.048***	−0.045***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Industrial Midwest (Urban)	0.006	0.006	0.010	0.044***	0.044***	0.046***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
New Mexico (Non-Urban)	0.037	0.035	0.040*	0.002	−0.002	0.007
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)
New Mexico (Urban)	0.013	0.014	0.035	−0.003	0.000	0.008
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
SWPA (Non-Urban)	0.018	0.016	0.020*	0.046***	0.037***	0.048***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)
SWPA (Urban)	0.004	0.003	−0.006	0.053***	0.051***	0.048***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Coal presence		0.002			0.013***	
		(0.004)			(0.004)	
Oil/gas presence		0.003			0.000	
		(0.005)			(0.005)	
Solar presence		−0.001			−0.008	
		(0.002)			(0.007)	
Wind presence		0.001			−0.002	
		(0.004)			(0.003)	
Future job optimism			0.639***			0.318***
			(0.026)			(0.028)
Intercept	0.554***	0.556***	0.088***	0.497***	0.500***	0.264***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.029)
Num.Obs.	5698	5698	5692	5695	5695	5691
R2 Adj.	0.033	0.032	0.136	0.094	0.095	0.115

Notes: Winter/spring 2022 samples with Qualtrics. HC2 standard errors. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table 26: Correlates of Beliefs about the Future Growth of Energy Efficiency and Environmental Clean-Up Jobs in One's Region

	Energy Efficiency:			Environmental Cleanup:		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	0.000	0.000	−0.001***	0.000	0.000	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	−0.013*	−0.013*	−0.007	−0.029***	−0.029***	−0.023***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Black	−0.004	−0.004	−0.008	0.001	0.001	−0.003
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Hispanic	0.009	0.010	0.010	0.012	0.012	0.012
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Republican	−0.017**	−0.017**	−0.018**	−0.016*	−0.016*	−0.017**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Neither party	−0.021**	−0.021**	−0.012	−0.034***	−0.034***	−0.025***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)
College degree	0.009	0.009	0.011	0.005	0.005	0.007
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Employed	0.000	0.000	−0.005	−0.006	−0.005	−0.009
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Fossil fuel employment	−0.024*	−0.023*	−0.021	−0.020	−0.021	−0.017
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Income Q1	−0.026***	−0.026***	−0.019**	−0.005	−0.005	0.003
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Income Q2	−0.011	−0.011	−0.007	0.004	0.004	0.008
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Income Q4	0.002	0.002	0.002	−0.001	−0.001	0.000
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Income Not say	−0.030	−0.030	−0.025	−0.003	−0.003	0.002
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Climate beliefs index	0.052***	0.053***	0.042***	0.059***	0.059***	0.049***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Gulf Coast (Non-Urban)	−0.011	−0.010	−0.022**	0.006	0.006	−0.004
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Gulf Coast (Urban)	0.000	0.020	−0.002	0.014	0.009	0.014
	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.014)
Industrial Midwest (Non-Urban)	−0.011	−0.012	−0.002	−0.024**	−0.024**	−0.015
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Industrial Midwest (Urban)	−0.010	−0.011	−0.007	−0.022	−0.022	−0.018
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)
New Mexico (Non-Urban)	0.026	0.026	0.034**	0.005	0.006	0.010
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.019)
New Mexico (Urban)	0.003	0.001	0.026	0.012	0.012	0.034*
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)
SWPA (Non-Urban)	−0.037***	−0.035***	−0.034***	−0.050***	−0.051***	−0.047***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)
SWPA (Urban)	−0.015	−0.013	−0.025*	−0.025*	−0.026*	−0.035**
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Coal presence		−0.002			0.002	
		(0.004)			(0.004)	
Oil/gas presence		−0.007*			0.002	
		(0.004)			(0.004)	
Solar presence		0.004**			0.001	
		(0.002)			(0.002)	
Wind presence		−0.001			−0.003	
		(0.002)			(0.004)	
Future job optimism			0.641***			0.611***
			(0.025)			(0.026)
Intercept	0.790***	0.787***	0.322***	0.756***	0.756***	0.310***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.026)
Num.Obs.	5696	5696	5693	5695	5695	5691
R2 Adj.	0.059	0.059	0.198	0.061	0.061	0.168

Notes: Winter/spring 2022 samples with Qualtrics. HC2 standard errors. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

5.1.2 Local Jobs

Table 27: Correlates of Beliefs about Local Job Creation from Investments in Wind and Solar Energy in One's Region

	Wind:			Solar:		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	0.000	0.000	−0.001***	0.000	0.000	−0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	−0.032***	−0.032***	−0.027***	−0.031***	−0.031***	−0.025***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Black	−0.001	−0.001	−0.005	−0.009	−0.010	−0.014
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Hispanic	0.005	0.005	0.002	0.004	0.004	0.002
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.009)
Republican	−0.038***	−0.038***	−0.031***	−0.030***	−0.030***	−0.023***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Neither party	−0.029***	−0.029***	−0.009	−0.031***	−0.031***	−0.010
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)
College degree	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Employed	0.024***	0.024***	0.021***	0.011	0.011	0.009
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Fossil fuel employment	0.004	0.004	−0.007	−0.006	−0.006	−0.017
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Income Q1	−0.010	−0.009	−0.007	−0.007	−0.007	−0.004
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.009)
Income Q2	−0.009	−0.009	−0.005	−0.007	−0.006	−0.002
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Income Q4	−0.008	−0.007	−0.008	0.009	0.009	0.009
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Income Not say	0.014	0.014	0.012	0.000	0.000	−0.001
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.016)
Climate beliefs index	0.054***	0.054***	0.042***	0.056***	0.056***	0.043***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Gulf Coast (Non-Urban)	−0.014	−0.014	−0.032***	−0.010	−0.011	−0.029***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Gulf Coast (Urban)	−0.001	−0.010	0.000	0.005	−0.002	0.006
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.013)
Industrial Midwest (Non-Urban)	−0.034***	−0.034***	−0.025**	−0.037***	−0.036***	−0.027***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Industrial Midwest (Urban)	−0.012	−0.011	−0.025*	−0.004	−0.004	−0.017
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)
New Mexico (Non-Urban)	0.005	0.002	0.020	0.001	0.001	0.017
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)
New Mexico (Urban)	0.008	0.009	0.035*	0.041*	0.041	0.069***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.019)
SWPA (Non-Urban)	−0.041***	−0.042***	−0.039***	−0.063***	−0.062***	−0.061***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.010)
SWPA (Urban)	−0.022	−0.022	−0.034**	−0.014	−0.014	−0.027*
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Coal presence		0.001			−0.001	
		(0.004)			(0.004)	
Oil/gas presence		0.003			0.002	
		(0.004)			(0.004)	
Solar presence		0.002			0.004	
		(0.002)			(0.004)	
Wind presence		0.004			0.000	
		(0.003)			(0.004)	
Local job optimism			0.701***			0.731***
			(0.020)			(0.020)
Intercept	0.594***	0.595***	0.155***	0.597***	0.597***	0.138***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.020)
Num.Obs.	5695	5695	5692	5695	5695	5692
R2 Adj.	0.062	0.062	0.235	0.065	0.065	0.259

Notes: Winter/spring 2022 samples with Qualtrics. HC2 standard errors. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table 28: Correlates of Beliefs about Local Job Creation from Investments in Oil, Gas, and Coal in One's Region

	Oil and Gas:			Coal:		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	0.000	0.000	−0.001***	−0.003***	−0.003***	−0.003***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	−0.006	−0.006	0.000	−0.032***	−0.033***	−0.028***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Black	0.027**	0.027**	0.021*	0.028**	0.028**	0.026**
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Hispanic	−0.008	−0.009	−0.009	−0.010	−0.009	−0.011
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Republican	0.006	0.006	0.011	0.008	0.007	0.012
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Neither party	−0.031***	−0.031***	−0.013	−0.007	−0.008	0.005
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
College degree	0.005	0.005	0.005	−0.002	−0.002	−0.003
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Employed	0.018**	0.018**	0.017**	0.017*	0.017*	0.016*
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Fossil fuel employment	0.045***	0.044***	0.036***	0.012	0.008	0.006
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Income Q1	−0.004	−0.004	−0.001	0.010	0.009	0.012
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Income Q2	−0.010	−0.010	−0.006	−0.003	−0.003	0.000
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Income Q4	0.013	0.014	0.014	0.032**	0.033**	0.032**
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Income Not say	0.000	0.001	0.000	−0.031	−0.031	−0.033
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Climate beliefs index	0.002	0.002	−0.009**	0.005	0.004	−0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Gulf Coast (Non-Urban)	0.135***	0.134***	0.118***	−0.020	−0.018	−0.032**
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Gulf Coast (Urban)	0.065***	0.053***	0.065***	−0.024	−0.030	−0.022
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.017)
Industrial Midwest (Non-Urban)	−0.015	−0.015	−0.006	−0.025*	−0.023*	−0.019
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Industrial Midwest (Urban)	−0.001	0.000	−0.010	0.019	0.021	0.012
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)
New Mexico (Non-Urban)	0.074***	0.071***	0.087***	0.044*	0.035	0.054**
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.025)
New Mexico (Urban)	0.042*	0.044*	0.067***	0.002	0.005	0.019
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
SWPA (Non-Urban)	0.018	0.017	0.020*	0.098***	0.085***	0.099***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)
SWPA (Urban)	0.054***	0.054***	0.043***	0.155***	0.153***	0.148***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Coal presence		0.003			0.019***	
		(0.004)			(0.004)	
Oil/gas presence		0.004			0.003	
		(0.005)			(0.005)	
Solar presence		0.000			−0.001	
		(0.004)			(0.002)	
Wind presence		0.005			0.002	
		(0.003)			(0.004)	
Local job optimism			0.650***			0.437***
			(0.022)			(0.026)
Intercept	0.535***	0.537***	0.127***	0.601***	0.605***	0.326***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.026)
Num.Obs.	5697	5697	5691	5692	5692	5690
R2 Adj.	0.038	0.037	0.186	0.050	0.053	0.101

Notes: Winter/spring 2022 samples with Qualtrics. HC2 standard errors. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table 29: Correlates of Beliefs about Local Job Creation from Investments in Energy Efficiency and Environmental Clean-Up in One's Region

	Energy Efficiency:			Environmental Cleanup:		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	0.001***	0.001***	0.000	0.000	0.000	−0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	−0.028***	−0.028***	−0.021***	−0.020***	−0.020***	−0.014**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Black	0.006	0.005	0.001	0.030***	0.030**	0.027**
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Hispanic	0.004	0.003	0.002	0.004	0.004	0.003
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Republican	−0.029***	−0.028***	−0.021***	−0.021**	−0.021**	−0.015*
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Neither party	−0.039***	−0.039***	−0.019**	−0.037***	−0.038***	−0.019**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
College degree	−0.007	−0.007	−0.007	−0.003	−0.003	−0.003
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Employed	0.006	0.006	0.004	0.007	0.007	0.005
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Fossil fuel employment	0.025*	0.026*	0.012	0.009	0.008	−0.002
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)
Income Q1	−0.018*	−0.017*	−0.014	−0.021**	−0.021**	−0.018*
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Income Q2	−0.015	−0.015	−0.010	−0.015	−0.015	−0.010
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Income Q4	0.007	0.007	0.008	−0.012	−0.012	−0.012
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Income Not say	−0.001	−0.001	−0.002	−0.032	−0.032	−0.034*
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.018)
Climate beliefs index	0.039***	0.039***	0.026***	0.044***	0.044***	0.032***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Gulf Coast (Non-Urban)	−0.001	−0.003	−0.020**	0.023**	0.023*	0.005
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Gulf Coast (Urban)	−0.007	−0.027	−0.008	−0.002	−0.020	−0.002
	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.014)
Industrial Midwest (Non-Urban)	−0.028***	−0.028***	−0.018*	−0.027**	−0.026**	−0.018*
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Industrial Midwest (Urban)	0.017	0.018	0.003	0.018	0.018	0.005
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)
New Mexico (Non-Urban)	0.023	0.025	0.041**	0.022	0.020	0.040**
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.020)
New Mexico (Urban)	0.004	0.005	0.032*	−0.004	−0.004	0.022
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.021)
SWPA (Non-Urban)	−0.030***	−0.025**	−0.027***	−0.043***	−0.045***	−0.041***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)
SWPA (Urban)	−0.019	−0.019	−0.031**	−0.006	−0.007	−0.018
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)
Coal presence		−0.006			0.004	
		(0.004)			(0.004)	
Oil/gas presence		0.007			0.007	
		(0.004)			(0.005)	
Solar presence		0.002			0.002	
		(0.003)			(0.003)	
Wind presence		0.002			−0.001	
		(0.003)			(0.003)	
Local job optimism			0.742***			0.696***
			(0.019)			(0.020)
Intercept	0.613***	0.614***	0.147***	0.639***	0.642***	0.201***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.021)
Num.Obs.	5696	5696	5693	5695	5695	5693
R2 Adj.	0.041	0.041	0.265	0.045	0.045	0.222

Notes: Winter/spring 2022 samples with Qualtrics. HC2 standard errors. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

5.2 Within-Subject Comparisons

5.2.1 Future Jobs

Table 30: Correlates of Within-Subject Relative Assessment of Future Jobs from an Investment in Wind/Solar vs. Oil and Gas in One's Region

	Wind:			Solar:		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	0.004***	0.004***	0.005***	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	−0.262***	−0.260***	−0.265***	−0.204***	−0.204***	−0.206***
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.041)
Black	−0.394***	−0.396***	−0.388***	−0.275***	−0.275***	−0.276***
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Hispanic	0.132**	0.129**	0.131**	0.107*	0.110*	0.109*
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)
Republican	−0.308***	−0.307***	−0.307***	−0.208***	−0.208***	−0.209***
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Neither party	−0.203***	−0.203***	−0.210***	−0.130**	−0.129**	−0.135**
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)
College degree	0.099**	0.097**	0.097**	0.133***	0.134***	0.133***
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.045)
Employed	−0.032	−0.033	−0.029	−0.085*	−0.085*	−0.086*
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Fossil fuel employment	−0.346***	−0.340***	−0.348***	−0.426***	−0.421***	−0.427***
	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)
Income Q1	−0.134**	−0.132**	−0.139**	−0.154**	−0.155**	−0.155**
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)
Income Q2	−0.051	−0.050	−0.053	−0.059	−0.059	−0.061
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)
Income Q4	−0.057	−0.058	−0.058	−0.048	−0.046	−0.048
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)
Income Not say	−0.198	−0.197	−0.201*	−0.167	−0.167	−0.168
	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.106)
Climate beliefs index	0.435***	0.435***	0.442***	0.407***	0.408***	0.409***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Gulf Coast (Non-Urban)	−0.367***	−0.373***	−0.359***	−0.286***	−0.281***	−0.283***
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)
Gulf Coast (Urban)	0.121	0.078	0.123	−0.045	0.055	−0.053
	(0.088)	(0.117)	(0.088)	(0.083)	(0.109)	(0.083)
Industrial Midwest (Non-Urban)	0.293***	0.291***	0.288***	0.111*	0.109*	0.110*
	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Industrial Midwest (Urban)	0.076	0.077	0.074	−0.092	−0.096	−0.093
	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)
New Mexico (Non-Urban)	0.180	0.189*	0.183	0.003	0.008	0.007
	(0.112)	(0.113)	(0.112)	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.115)
New Mexico (Urban)	0.325***	0.325***	0.312***	0.121	0.111	0.115
	(0.108)	(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.118)	(0.118)	(0.118)
SWPA (Non-Urban)	−0.176***	−0.153**	−0.180***	−0.262***	−0.258***	−0.262***
	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.066)
SWPA (Urban)	−0.087	−0.085	−0.081	−0.113	−0.105	−0.111
	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.094)
Coal presence		−0.033			−0.006	
		(0.023)			(0.022)	
Oil/gas presence		0.014			−0.036	
		(0.026)			(0.025)	
Solar presence		0.004			0.014	
		(0.009)			(0.027)	
Wind presence		0.011			−0.008	
		(0.025)			(0.021)	
Future job optimism			−0.392***			−0.131
			(0.141)			(0.139)
Intercept	0.650***	0.647***	0.934***	0.754***	0.743***	0.853***
	(0.103)	(0.104)	(0.146)	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.143)
Num.Obs.	5696	5696	5691	5693	5693	5689
R2 Adj.	0.132	0.132	0.133	0.114	0.114	0.114

Notes: Winter/spring 2022 samples with Qualtrics. HC2 standard errors. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table 31: Correlates of Within-Subject Relative Assessment of Future Jobs from an Investment in Wind/Solar vs. Coal in One's Region

	Wind:			Solar:		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	0.016***	0.017***	0.016***	0.018***	0.018***	0.017***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	−0.188***	−0.184***	−0.182***	−0.130***	−0.128***	−0.122***
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Black	−0.584***	−0.591***	−0.590***	−0.465***	−0.469***	−0.477***
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)
Hispanic	−0.085	−0.091	−0.090	−0.111*	−0.111*	−0.113*
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Republican	−0.323***	−0.321***	−0.325***	−0.224***	−0.221***	−0.227***
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Neither party	−0.247***	−0.245***	−0.234***	−0.177***	−0.174***	−0.161***
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)
College degree	0.074	0.071	0.076*	0.108**	0.107**	0.112**
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.045)
Employed	−0.007	−0.007	−0.012	−0.058	−0.058	−0.068
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.045)
Fossil fuel employment	−0.398***	−0.383***	−0.393***	−0.478***	−0.464***	−0.471***
	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.083)
Income Q1	−0.179***	−0.172***	−0.171***	−0.200***	−0.196***	−0.188***
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)
Income Q2	−0.042	−0.038	−0.035	−0.050	−0.046	−0.042
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Income Q4	−0.030	−0.030	−0.031	−0.021	−0.018	−0.021
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)
Income Not say	−0.070	−0.068	−0.063	−0.039	−0.038	−0.029
	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.109)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.109)
Climate beliefs index	0.439***	0.440***	0.424***	0.410***	0.412***	0.390***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Gulf Coast (Non-Urban)	−0.075	−0.086	−0.089	0.005	0.006	−0.012
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.067)
Gulf Coast (Urban)	0.190**	0.118	0.194**	0.023	0.095	0.019
	(0.084)	(0.111)	(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.109)	(0.086)
Industrial Midwest (Non-Urban)	0.362***	0.357***	0.374***	0.179***	0.174***	0.195***
	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.061)
Industrial Midwest (Urban)	−0.077	−0.073	−0.072	−0.246***	−0.246***	−0.238***
	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.083)
New Mexico (Non-Urban)	0.317***	0.334***	0.313**	0.140	0.153	0.139
	(0.122)	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.120)	(0.121)	(0.121)
New Mexico (Urban)	0.389***	0.382***	0.421***	0.184	0.168	0.225*
	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.122)	(0.126)	(0.127)	(0.128)
SWPA (Non-Urban)	−0.290***	−0.236***	−0.289***	−0.380***	−0.345***	−0.374***
	(0.066)	(0.068)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.068)	(0.066)
SWPA (Urban)	−0.283***	−0.276***	−0.297***	−0.310***	−0.297***	−0.328***
	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.094)
Coal presence		−0.076***			−0.048**	
		(0.023)			(0.021)	
Oil/gas presence		0.024			−0.026	
		(0.026)			(0.025)	
Solar presence		0.032			0.043	
		(0.030)			(0.054)	
Wind presence		0.022			0.003	
		(0.024)			(0.018)	
Future job optimism			0.890***			1.157***
			(0.145)			(0.142)
Intercept	0.876***	0.867***	0.229	0.979***	0.961***	0.142
	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.147)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.145)
Num.Obs.	5694	5694	5690	5692	5692	5688
R2 Adj.	0.160	0.162	0.166	0.147	0.149	0.158

Notes: Winter/spring 2022 samples with Qualtrics. HC2 standard errors. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table 32: Correlates of Within-Subject Relative Assessment of Future Jobs from an Investment in Wind/Solar vs. Healthcare in One's Region

	Wind:			Solar:		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	−0.005***	−0.005***	−0.004***	−0.003***	−0.003***	−0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	−0.210***	−0.208***	−0.218***	−0.154***	−0.153***	−0.159***
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Black	−0.134**	−0.135**	−0.128**	−0.019	−0.017	−0.015
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Hispanic	0.070	0.067	0.068	0.047	0.050	0.048
	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.045)
Republican	−0.132***	−0.133***	−0.129***	−0.032	−0.032	−0.031
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Neither party	−0.118**	−0.118**	−0.127***	−0.044	−0.044	−0.053
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)
College degree	−0.038	−0.039	−0.040	−0.003	−0.002	−0.005
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Employed	0.050	0.049	0.058	−0.003	−0.003	0.001
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Fossil fuel employment	−0.047	−0.044	−0.058	−0.133*	−0.131*	−0.137*
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)
Income Q1	0.044	0.046	0.033	0.023	0.022	0.016
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Income Q2	0.014	0.014	0.009	0.006	0.005	0.002
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Income Q4	0.042	0.040	0.041	0.052	0.053	0.051
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)
Income Not say	0.003	0.004	−0.004	0.034	0.034	0.029
	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.088)
Climate beliefs index	0.242***	0.241***	0.258***	0.214***	0.214***	0.224***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Gulf Coast (Non-Urban)	−0.152**	−0.159***	−0.137**	−0.071	−0.066	−0.060
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)
Gulf Coast (Urban)	0.101	0.024	0.111	−0.065	0.001	−0.065
	(0.073)	(0.097)	(0.072)	(0.064)	(0.088)	(0.065)
Industrial Midwest (Non-Urban)	0.220***	0.218***	0.206***	0.040	0.038	0.031
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)
Industrial Midwest (Urban)	0.084	0.088	0.079	−0.083	−0.084	−0.087
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)
New Mexico (Non-Urban)	0.348***	0.348***	0.341***	0.171**	0.166**	0.164**
	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.080)
New Mexico (Urban)	0.301***	0.307***	0.270***	0.096	0.092	0.073
	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)
SWPA (Non-Urban)	−0.106*	−0.089	−0.115**	−0.197***	−0.199***	−0.199***
	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.055)
SWPA (Urban)	−0.169**	−0.171**	−0.155**	−0.195***	−0.190***	−0.185***
	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.071)
Coal presence		−0.023			0.003	
		(0.018)			(0.016)	
Oil/gas presence		0.027			−0.024	
		(0.022)			(0.020)	
Solar presence		−0.007			0.004	
		(0.020)			(0.008)	
Wind presence		0.026			0.007	
		(0.017)			(0.015)	
Future job optimism			−0.901***			−0.641***
			(0.129)			(0.125)
Intercept	−0.130	−0.128	0.524***	−0.024	−0.030	0.445***
	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.128)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.123)
Num.Obs.	5697	5697	5692	5694	5694	5690
R2 Adj.	0.063	0.063	0.072	0.044	0.043	0.049

Notes: Winter/spring 2022 samples with Qualtrics. HC2 standard errors. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

5.2.2 Local Jobs

Table 33: Correlates of Within-Subject Relative Assessment of Local Jobs Created by an Investment in Wind/Solar vs. Oil and Gas in One's Region

	Wind:			Solar:		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	−0.109***	−0.109***	−0.106***	−0.102***	−0.103***	−0.100***
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Black	−0.108*	−0.109*	−0.105*	−0.139**	−0.142***	−0.140***
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)
Hispanic	0.054	0.054	0.048	0.050	0.049	0.048
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Republican	−0.175***	−0.174***	−0.170***	−0.140***	−0.138***	−0.137***
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Neither party	0.010	0.010	0.019	0.003	0.004	0.012
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
College degree	−0.030	−0.030	−0.029	−0.029	−0.030	−0.029
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Employed	0.021	0.021	0.016	−0.032	−0.032	−0.034
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Fossil fuel employment	−0.162**	−0.160**	−0.171**	−0.210***	−0.207***	−0.213***
	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)
Income Q1	−0.019	−0.018	−0.024	−0.011	−0.010	−0.011
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Income Q2	0.007	0.008	0.006	0.016	0.017	0.017
	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Income Q4	−0.082	−0.082	−0.084	−0.016	−0.015	−0.016
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Income Not say	0.056	0.056	0.052	0.000	0.000	−0.001
	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.088)
Climate beliefs index	0.206***	0.206***	0.203***	0.213***	0.214***	0.208***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Gulf Coast (Non-Urban)	−0.597***	−0.597***	−0.602***	−0.580***	−0.580***	−0.589***
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Gulf Coast (Urban)	−0.270***	−0.262**	−0.264***	−0.244***	−0.227**	−0.242***
	(0.075)	(0.102)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.099)	(0.075)
Industrial Midwest (Non-Urban)	−0.077	−0.078	−0.075	−0.086*	−0.086*	−0.082
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Industrial Midwest (Urban)	−0.043	−0.044	−0.059	−0.020	−0.022	−0.025
	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)
New Mexico (Non-Urban)	−0.276***	−0.272***	−0.269***	−0.290***	−0.277***	−0.282***
	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.098)	(0.099)	(0.099)
New Mexico (Urban)	−0.137	−0.140	−0.127	−0.004	−0.011	0.009
	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.112)	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.116)
SWPA (Non-Urban)	−0.236***	−0.231***	−0.235***	−0.324***	−0.315***	−0.323***
	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)
SWPA (Urban)	−0.304***	−0.303***	−0.308***	−0.273***	−0.271***	−0.279***
	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.073)
Coal presence		−0.007			−0.015	
		(0.016)			(0.020)	
Oil/gas presence		−0.003			−0.006	
		(0.022)			(0.022)	
Solar presence		0.007			0.014	
		(0.022)			(0.031)	
Wind presence		−0.004			−0.020*	
		(0.018)			(0.012)	
Local job optimism			0.204**			0.320***
			(0.101)			(0.101)
Intercept	0.235***	0.233***	0.113	0.245***	0.242***	0.046
	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.110)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.107)
Num.Obs.	5693	5693	5690	5693	5693	5690
R2 Adj.	0.067	0.067	0.068	0.070	0.070	0.072

Notes: Winter/spring 2022 samples with Qualtrics. HC2 standard errors. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table 34: Correlates of Within-Subject Relative Assessment of Local Jobs Created by an Investment in Wind/Solar vs. Coal in One's Region

	Wind:			Solar:		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	0.011***	0.011***	0.009***	0.010***	0.010***	0.009***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.003	0.005	0.013	0.000	0.002	0.008
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Black	−0.149**	−0.154***	−0.159***	−0.115*	−0.118**	−0.122**
	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)
Hispanic	0.058	0.055	0.055	0.059	0.055	0.055
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Republican	−0.151***	−0.148***	−0.140***	−0.181***	−0.179***	−0.171***
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.047)
Neither party	−0.093*	−0.091*	−0.061	−0.084*	−0.083*	−0.055
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)
College degree	0.005	0.003	0.004	0.001	0.000	0.001
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Employed	−0.026	−0.026	−0.029	0.026	0.026	0.023
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.042)
Fossil fuel employment	−0.073	−0.056	−0.093	−0.035	−0.020	−0.052
	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)
Income Q1	−0.068	−0.063	−0.061	−0.082	−0.079	−0.077
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)
Income Q2	−0.017	−0.013	−0.008	−0.026	−0.024	−0.019
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Income Q4	−0.095	−0.097	−0.094	−0.160**	−0.161**	−0.159**
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)
Income Not say	0.126	0.126	0.126	0.181*	0.180*	0.179*
	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.098)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)
Climate beliefs index	0.203***	0.204***	0.183***	0.198***	0.199***	0.179***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Gulf Coast (Non-Urban)	0.041	0.032	0.010	0.027	0.018	−0.001
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)
Gulf Coast (Urban)	0.115	0.116	0.114	0.091	0.082	0.092
	(0.079)	(0.098)	(0.078)	(0.084)	(0.107)	(0.083)
Industrial Midwest (Non-Urban)	−0.045	−0.052	−0.030	−0.036	−0.043	−0.022
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.062)
Industrial Midwest (Urban)	−0.094	−0.096	−0.114	−0.128*	−0.129*	−0.146*
	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)
New Mexico (Non-Urban)	−0.172	−0.137	−0.149	−0.154	−0.128	−0.134
	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)
New Mexico (Urban)	0.155	0.144	0.200	0.025	0.018	0.065
	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.125)	(0.123)	(0.124)	(0.119)
SWPA (Non-Urban)	−0.641***	−0.589***	−0.638***	−0.555***	−0.507***	−0.553***
	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.060)
SWPA (Urban)	−0.685***	−0.677***	−0.704***	−0.709***	−0.701***	−0.726***
	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)
Coal presence		−0.078***			−0.071***	
		(0.020)			(0.017)	
Oil/gas presence		−0.003			0.001	
		(0.023)			(0.025)	
Solar presence		0.018			0.011	
		(0.021)			(0.012)	
Wind presence		−0.010			0.006	
		(0.021)			(0.022)	
Local job optimism			1.174***			1.054***
			(0.114)			(0.113)
Intercept	−0.013	−0.028	−0.753***	−0.023	−0.036	−0.685***
	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.123)	(0.098)	(0.099)	(0.124)
Num.Obs.	5691	5691	5689	5691	5691	5689
R2 Adj.	0.069	0.071	0.085	0.061	0.063	0.075

Notes: Winter/spring 2022 samples with Qualtrics. HC2 standard errors. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table 35: Correlates of Within-Subject Relative Assessment of Local Jobs Created by an Investment in Wind/Solar vs. Healthcare in One's Region

	Wind:			Solar:		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	−0.006***	−0.006***	−0.004***	−0.006***	−0.006***	−0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	−0.125***	−0.125***	−0.139***	−0.130***	−0.129***	−0.145***
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.032)
Black	−0.032	−0.032	−0.021	0.002	0.003	0.015
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.052)
Hispanic	0.010	0.012	0.015	0.011	0.013	0.016
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.047)
Republican	−0.095**	−0.094**	−0.111***	−0.127***	−0.127***	−0.143***
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.041)
Neither party	−0.003	−0.001	−0.049	0.005	0.006	−0.043
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.042)
College degree	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.005	0.005	0.005
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Employed	−0.001	0.000	0.005	0.051	0.051	0.055
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.035)
Fossil fuel employment	−0.042	−0.037	−0.017	−0.004	0.000	0.025
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.067)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.069)
Income Q1	0.001	0.002	−0.007	−0.012	−0.012	−0.022
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.047)
Income Q2	0.009	0.010	−0.001	0.000	0.000	−0.012
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.045)
Income Q4	0.042	0.044	0.042	−0.024	−0.023	−0.026
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.053)
Income Not say	−0.021	−0.021	−0.018	0.033	0.033	0.035
	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.081)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.084)
Climate beliefs index	0.125***	0.126***	0.153***	0.118***	0.119***	0.149***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)
Gulf Coast (Non-Urban)	−0.137**	−0.135**	−0.093*	−0.152***	−0.149***	−0.105**
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.052)
Gulf Coast (Urban)	−0.001	0.059	−0.003	−0.025	0.026	−0.025
	(0.068)	(0.089)	(0.066)	(0.072)	(0.091)	(0.070)
Industrial Midwest (Non-Urban)	−0.061	−0.063	−0.084*	−0.053	−0.055	−0.077
	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.051)
Industrial Midwest (Urban)	−0.087	−0.089	−0.058	−0.121*	−0.121*	−0.091
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.068)
New Mexico (Non-Urban)	0.158*	0.165*	0.120	0.175*	0.173*	0.135
	(0.096)	(0.097)	(0.092)	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.097)
New Mexico (Urban)	0.450***	0.442***	0.387***	0.319***	0.315***	0.251***
	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.093)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.093)
SWPA (Non-Urban)	−0.284***	−0.274***	−0.289***	−0.198***	−0.192***	−0.203***
	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.051)
SWPA (Urban)	−0.175**	−0.169**	−0.146**	−0.205***	−0.199**	−0.174**
	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.071)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.074)
Coal presence		−0.014			−0.007	
		(0.017)			(0.018)	
Oil/gas presence		−0.022			−0.018	
		(0.021)			(0.020)	
Solar presence		0.016			0.008	
		(0.022)			(0.013)	
Wind presence		−0.007			0.009	
		(0.020)			(0.019)	
Local job optimism			−1.669***			−1.788***
			(0.093)			(0.094)
Intercept	−0.028	−0.037	1.020***	−0.037	−0.044	1.087***
	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.099)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.100)
Num.Obs.	5693	5693	5692	5694	5694	5692
R2 Adj.	0.037	0.037	0.089	0.036	0.036	0.092

Notes: Winter/spring 2022 samples with Qualtrics. HC2 standard errors. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

5.3 Fairgoer Beliefs About Durability of Green Jobs

Table 36 corresponds with analysis on pp. 105-109. The politician treatment corresponds with the randomized text inside braces.

> Some {politicians/power companies} say the growth of renewable energy like wind and solar will create new well-paying jobs. If these jobs come to your community, for how long do you think they would last? *Very long; Somewhat long; Not very long; Not long at all.*

Table 36: Linear regression of durability of green investment on covariates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
35 to 44 years	−0.402*	−0.410*	−0.317	−0.271
	(0.227)	(0.226)	(0.245)	(0.232)
45 to 54 years	−0.147	−0.184	−0.106	−0.069
	(0.228)	(0.226)	(0.237)	(0.239)
55 to 64 years	−0.698***	−0.748***	−0.620**	−0.554**
	(0.235)	(0.242)	(0.251)	(0.247)
Woman	0.119	0.128	0.069	0.057
	(0.152)	(0.151)	(0.151)	(0.156)
White	−0.056	−0.043	0.020	0.165
	(0.333)	(0.303)	(0.343)	(0.320)
Republican	−0.730***	−0.798***	−0.615***	−0.588***
	(0.169)	(0.170)	(0.185)	(0.193)
Employed		−0.046	−0.065	−0.086
		(0.157)	(0.153)	(0.148)
Fossil fuel employment	−0.059	−0.014	0.009	0.029
	(0.156)	(0.154)	(0.152)	(0.152)
Income: 20,000 to 39,999				−0.007
				(0.253)
Income: 40,000 to 59,999				0.333
				(0.222)
Income: 60,000 to 99,999				−0.091
				(0.178)
Income: Less than 20,000				−0.097
				(0.249)
Climate concern (=1)			0.514***	0.553***
			(0.167)	(0.167)
Politician Treatment (=1)	−0.247	−0.268*	−0.242	−0.188
	(0.163)	(0.159)	(0.158)	(0.164)
Intercept	3.555***	3.718***	3.197***	2.960***
	(0.359)	(0.329)	(0.369)	(0.422)
Num.Obs.	243	243	243	243
R2 Adj.	0.123	0.136	0.185	0.189

Notes: Post-stratified weights used. HC2 standard errors. 2021 county fair sample. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

5.4 Beliefs About Local Business Leader Perceptions of Local Investment Efficacy

The regression estimates in this section correspond with the analysis on pp. 108-112.

Table 37: Linear regression of perceptions of local business leader concern about local jobs created by investment, national sample

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
35 to 54 years	−0.027	−0.033	−0.030	−0.033
	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)
55 years plus	−0.167***	−0.155***	−0.155***	−0.152**
	(0.058)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Female	−0.142***	−0.112**	−0.111**	−0.115**
	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Black	−0.094	−0.078	−0.073	−0.080
	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)
Hispanic	0.008	0.019	0.023	0.014
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Republican	−0.413***	−0.405***	−0.381***	−0.396***
	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.056)
Neither party	−0.542***	−0.514***	−0.505***	−0.509***
	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)
College degree	0.152***	0.067	0.063	0.067
	(0.048)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)
Income: 15,000 to 24,999		0.188**	0.182**	0.189**
		(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.090)
Income: 25,000 to 34,999		0.271***	0.259***	0.269***
		(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.087)
Income: 35,000 to 49,999		0.206**	0.194**	0.209**
		(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)
Income: 50,000 to 74,999		0.250***	0.241***	0.250***
		(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)
Income: 75,000 to 99,999		0.211**	0.198**	0.209**
		(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)
Income: 100,000 to 124,999		0.356***	0.351***	0.354***
		(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.103)
Income: 125,000 to 149,999		0.303***	0.298***	0.301***
		(0.103)	(0.102)	(0.103)
Income: 150,000 to 199,999		0.531***	0.528***	0.530***
		(0.121)	(0.122)	(0.122)
Income: 200,000 to 249,999		0.477***	0.483***	0.473***
		(0.172)	(0.173)	(0.172)
Income: 250,000 or more		0.327**	0.332**	0.324**
		(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.153)
Income: not say		0.194	0.190	0.195
		(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.120)
Environment most important (=1)			0.153**	
			(0.060)	
Overregulation most important				−0.080
				(0.078)
Intercept	3.001***	2.746***	2.718***	2.752***
	(0.062)	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.087)
Num.Obs.	3018	3018	3018	3018
R2 Adj.	0.073	0.082	0.085	0.082

Notes: Post-stratified weights used. HC2 standard errors. CAPS/Harris August 2022 national sample.
*$p < 0.1$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$

Table 38: Linear regression of perceptions of local business leader concern about temporariness of jobs created by investment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
35 to 54 years	−0.097*	−0.103*	−0.102*	−0.103*
	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.053)
55 years plus	−0.278***	−0.245***	−0.245***	−0.244***
	(0.057)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)
Female	−0.196***	−0.156***	−0.156***	−0.157***
	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Black	−0.043	−0.018	−0.016	−0.018
	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)
Hispanic	−0.063	−0.034	−0.032	−0.035
	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)
Republican	−0.303***	−0.289***	−0.279***	−0.287***
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)
Neither party	−0.442***	−0.400***	−0.396***	−0.399***
	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)
College degree	0.215***	0.096*	0.094*	0.096*
	(0.047)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)
Income: 15,000 to 24,999		0.292***	0.290***	0.292***
		(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)
Income: 25,000 to 34,999		0.175*	0.170*	0.174*
		(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.089)
Income: 35,000 to 49,999		0.183**	0.178**	0.183**
		(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Income: 50,000 to 74,999		0.245***	0.241***	0.245***
		(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.081)
Income: 75,000 to 99,999		0.193**	0.187*	0.192**
		(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)
Income: 100,000 to 124,999		0.416***	0.414***	0.415***
		(0.110)	(0.109)	(0.110)
Income: 125,000 to 149,999		0.440***	0.438***	0.440***
		(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.104)
Income: 150,000 to 199,999		0.472***	0.471***	0.472***
		(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.117)
Income: 200,000 to 249,999		0.645***	0.647***	0.644***
		(0.183)	(0.183)	(0.183)
Income: 250,000 or more		0.603***	0.605***	0.602***
		(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.134)
Income: not say		0.175	0.173	0.175
		(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.113)
Environment most important (=1)			0.063	
			(0.062)	
Overregulation most important				−0.018
				(0.078)
Intercept	2.889***	2.603***	2.591***	2.604***
	(0.063)	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.089)
Num.Obs.	3018	3018	3018	3018
R2 Adj.	0.072	0.088	0.088	0.088

Notes: Post-stratified weights used. HC2 standard errors. CAPS/Harris August 2022 national sample.
$^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table 39: Linear regression of perceptions of local business leader concern about the pay of jobs created by investment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
35 to 54 years	−0.005	−0.018	−0.015	−0.018
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)
55 years plus	−0.126**	−0.100*	−0.100*	−0.096*
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Female	−0.153***	−0.115***	−0.114**	−0.119***
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.045)
Black	−0.124*	−0.106	−0.102	−0.108
	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)
Hispanic	−0.083	−0.061	−0.058	−0.068
	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.067)
Republican	−0.428***	−0.416***	−0.397***	−0.405***
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)
Neither party	−0.482***	−0.445***	−0.438***	−0.438***
	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.056)
College degree	0.166***	0.049	0.046	0.049
	(0.047)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.052)
Income: 15,000 to 24,999		0.140	0.135	0.141
		(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)
Income: 25,000 to 34,999		0.245***	0.236**	0.242***
		(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)
Income: 35,000 to 49,999		0.181**	0.171**	0.184**
		(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Income: 50,000 to 74,999		0.232***	0.225***	0.232***
		(0.082)	(0.083)	(0.083)
Income: 75,000 to 99,999		0.217**	0.207**	0.215**
		(0.098)	(0.099)	(0.098)
Income: 100,000 to 124,999		0.299***	0.295***	0.297***
		(0.103)	(0.104)	(0.103)
Income: 125,000 to 149,999		0.314***	0.310***	0.311***
		(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.113)
Income: 150,000 to 199,999		0.562***	0.559***	0.560***
		(0.119)	(0.120)	(0.119)
Income: 200,000 to 249,999		0.490***	0.494***	0.484***
		(0.182)	(0.182)	(0.182)
Income: 250,000 or more		0.607***	0.611***	0.604***
		(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.138)
Income: not say		0.018	0.015	0.019
		(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.122)
Environment most important (=1)			0.122**	
			(0.058)	
Overregulation most important				−0.105
				(0.074)
Intercept	2.999***	2.753***	2.731***	2.761***
	(0.063)	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.090)
Num.Obs.	3018	3018	3018	3018
R2 Adj.	0.069	0.085	0.086	0.085

Notes: Post-stratified weights used. HC2 standard errors. CAPS/Harris August 2022 national sample.
$^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table 40: Linear regression of perceptions of local business leader concerns about a renewable investment, local policymaker sample

	Local	Temporary	Pay
Age: 52 to 66 years	0.120	0.153	0.201
	(0.125)	(0.128)	(0.124)
Age: over 67 years	−0.067	0.090	0.169
	(0.152)	(0.148)	(0.141)
Age: not say	0.263	0.378	0.299
	(0.250)	(0.265)	(0.217)
Woman	0.088	0.100	0.027
	(0.101)	(0.107)	(0.093)
Minority (=1)	0.052	−0.072	0.075
	(0.163)	(0.172)	(0.153)
Republican	−0.114	−0.008	−0.087
	(0.124)	(0.130)	(0.117)
Neither party	−0.259*	−0.028	−0.037
	(0.150)	(0.148)	(0.137)
Won't say party	−1.049**	−0.937*	−0.382
	(0.478)	(0.527)	(0.375)
Ideology: Liberal	0.343**	0.500***	0.269*
	(0.162)	(0.168)	(0.154)
Ideology: Moderate	0.210*	0.326***	0.124
	(0.125)	(0.126)	(0.118)
Ideology: Not Say	−0.118	0.124	−0.843*
	(0.587)	(0.790)	(0.479)
Ideology: Not Sure	−0.004	0.280	0.132
	(0.313)	(0.342)	(0.317)
College (=1)	0.144	0.063	0.061
	(0.108)	(0.109)	(0.096)
Municipality	0.267*	0.149	0.134
	(0.148)	(0.153)	(0.142)
Township	0.181	0.207	0.016
	(0.180)	(0.189)	(0.174)
Fossil fuel sample	0.181*	0.196*	0.188*
	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.100)
2020 Biden vote share	−0.466	−0.431	−0.171
	(0.392)	(0.394)	(0.358)
College share	0.117	−0.433	−0.073
	(0.355)	(0.372)	(0.344)
Population (log)	0.007	0.015	0.014
	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.041)
Urban share	−0.049	0.011	−0.024
	(0.144)	(0.152)	(0.135)
Intercept	2.759***	2.540***	2.680***
	(0.463)	(0.485)	(0.435)
Num.Obs.	588	588	590
R2 Adj.	0.043	0.026	0.010

Notes: Post-stratified weights used. HC2 standard errors. CivicPulse local policymaker sample. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table 41: Linear regression of whether local economic concerns are greater for green investments, local policymaker sample

	(1)	(2)
Age: 52 to 66 years	0.031	0.031
	(0.048)	(0.048)
Age: over 67 years	−0.056	−0.048
	(0.058)	(0.058)
Age: not say	−0.089	−0.094
	(0.091)	(0.091)
Woman	−0.021	−0.020
	(0.041)	(0.042)
Minority (=1)	−0.020	−0.027
	(0.061)	(0.065)
Republican	−0.001	0.013
	(0.061)	(0.062)
Neither party	−0.173***	−0.161***
	(0.059)	(0.059)
Won't say party	0.144	0.187
	(0.211)	(0.208)
Ideology: Liberal	−0.153**	−0.175**
	(0.070)	(0.072)
Ideology: Moderate	−0.001	−0.013
	(0.053)	(0.053)
Ideology: Not Say	0.314	0.304
	(0.265)	(0.272)
Ideology: Not Sure	0.057	0.040
	(0.157)	(0.158)
College (=1)	−0.074*	−0.066
	(0.044)	(0.045)
Municipality	0.113**	0.072
	(0.048)	(0.064)
Township	0.135**	0.076
	(0.065)	(0.073)
Fossil fuel sample	−0.006	0.026
	(0.042)	(0.046)
2020 Biden vote share		0.368**
		(0.155)
College share		−0.129
		(0.159)
Population (log)		−0.018
		(0.021)
Urban share		0.010
		(0.064)
Intercept	0.268***	0.333
	(0.090)	(0.219)
Num.Obs.	598	591
R2 Adj.	0.038	0.042

Notes: Post-stratified weights used. HC2 standard errors. CivicPulse local policymaker sample. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

5.5 Signs of Green Optimism

Table 42 corresponds with analysis on pp. 111-114. The survey item read as follows, with the text inside braces randomized:

> If {solar or wind energy/} companies made an investment in your area, how transparent do you think they would be about the the economic benefits or costs of the investment for your area? *Very transparent; Somewhat transparent; Not very transparent; Not at all transparent*

Table 42: Linear regression of expectations of transparency depending on if the company is in the renewable energy industry

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment: Green Industry	0.072**	0.061**	0.063**	0.063**
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Age		0.000	0.000	0.000
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female		−0.015	−0.015	−0.017
		(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.032)
Black		−0.006	−0.005	−0.005
		(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Hispanic		0.032	0.030	0.029
		(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Republican		−0.219***	−0.215***	−0.211***
		(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.041)
Neither party		−0.169***	−0.167***	−0.172***
		(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.039)
Ideology: Liberal				−0.014
				(0.038)
College degree		0.035	0.035	0.037
		(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.036)
Income: 15,000 to 24,999		−0.010	−0.008	−0.009
		(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)
Income: 25,000 to 34,999		0.041	0.043	0.043
		(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)
Income: 35,000 to 49,999		0.039	0.039	0.039
		(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)
Income: 50,000 to 74,999		0.066	0.067	0.067
		(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)
Income: 75,000 to 99,999		0.122**	0.123**	0.122**
		(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)
Income: 100,000 to 124,999		0.123*	0.124*	0.125*
		(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.069)
Income: 125,000 to 149,999		0.131*	0.133*	0.130*
		(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.079)
Income: 150,000 to 199,999		0.172**	0.174**	0.175**
		(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)
Income: 200,000 to 249,999		0.297***	0.299***	0.304***
		(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.094)
Income: 250,000 or more		0.186**	0.183**	0.182**
		(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.079)
Income: not say		−0.204**	−0.203**	−0.203**
		(0.094)	(0.093)	(0.093)
Intercept	0.623***	0.690***	0.684***	0.694***
	(0.022)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.072)
Ideology: Conservative				−0.024
				(0.039)
Climate most important (=1)			0.036	0.037
			(0.048)	(0.048)
Num.Obs.	1002	1002	1002	1002
R2 Adj.	0.005	0.076	0.075	0.074

Notes: HC2 standard errors. CAPS/Harris national sample from August 2022. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

6 Chapter 5

6.1 Multi-Attribute Policy Experiment

Estimation We estimate the ACME using linear regression with robust standard errors clustered by respondent. We employ an "uniform" AMCE since the profiles are of policies, not candidates, so there does not exist a relevant distribution of real world profiles (de la Cuesta, Egami, and Imai, 2022).

Data Quality Given the nuances of these policy dimensions, we take five steps to ensure respondent comprehension. First, we provide extensive and clear instructions to explain the attributes and tasks. Second, we employ both content and metadata-based attention checks to ensure that subjects understood the instructions and read with care. Third, we limit the number of attributes and tasks to five each, well within the guidance of Bansak et al. (2018), who find that respondents still pay attention and provide quality answers even when designs include up to 30 tasks. Fourth, we optimized the conjoint table to fit mobile screens so respondents could simultaneously view much of the table and answer options. Lastly, we include a slew of interpretation checks after the conjoint tasks.

6.1.1 Interpretation Checks

Reversibility Table 43 reports the results from a regression estimating the effect of institutional constraints on expectations of policy reversibility. The question corresponds with the following survey item:

> Suppose the government establishes tax credits that are supposed to last for 15 years. By law, the tax credits are {not reversible/reversible by the {President / Governor / lawmakers}}. How many years do you think the tax credits will last?
>
> (Responses range from 0 to 15.)

Table 43: Linear regression of expectations of tax credit duration on whether the policy is reversible by the President, Governor, or lawmakers, or not reversible (baseline)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Intercept	11.460***	12.331***	11.933***	11.929***	11.984***
	(0.217)	(0.612)	(0.620)	(0.621)	(0.620)
Treatment: Reversible by Lawmakers	−3.534***	−3.470***	−3.483***	−3.504***	−3.503***
	(0.285)	(0.284)	(0.284)	(0.284)	(0.284)
Treatment: Reversible by the Governor	−3.275***	−3.223***	−3.237***	−3.272***	−3.279***
	(0.353)	(0.351)	(0.347)	(0.346)	(0.346)
Treatment: Reversible by the President	−3.072***	−3.112***	−3.133***	−3.167***	−3.164***
	(0.340)	(0.337)	(0.335)	(0.334)	(0.334)
Age		0.004	0.008	0.008	0.008
		(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Woman		−0.788***	−0.795***	−0.740***	−0.729***
		(0.233)	(0.232)	(0.233)	(0.234)
College (=1)		0.172	0.186	0.118	0.115
		(0.270)	(0.268)	(0.267)	(0.266)
Black		−0.857**	−0.800**	−0.759**	−0.786**
		(0.364)	(0.364)	(0.366)	(0.366)
Hispanic		−0.163	−0.148	−0.189	−0.196
		(0.300)	(0.298)	(0.296)	(0.296)
Neither party		−0.366	−0.125	−0.091	−0.089
		(0.320)	(0.325)	(0.324)	(0.324)
Republican		−0.207	0.277	0.308	0.321
		(0.269)	(0.296)	(0.294)	(0.295)
Employed (=1)		−0.752***	−0.755***	−0.697**	−0.699**
		(0.290)	(0.289)	(0.287)	(0.287)
Climate beliefs (index)			0.462***	0.364**	0.368**
			(0.136)	(0.144)	(0.144)
Green jobs (index)				0.304**	0.296**
				(0.132)	(0.132)
Income: Less than 10,000		−1.102*	−1.106*	−1.089*	−1.095*
		(0.577)	(0.581)	(0.581)	(0.583)
Income: 20,000 - 29,999		−0.722	−0.703	−0.731	−0.742
		(0.475)	(0.475)	(0.475)	(0.475)
Income: 30,000 - 39,999		−0.394	−0.387	−0.351	−0.370
		(0.502)	(0.498)	(0.495)	(0.496)
Income: 40,000 - 49,999		−0.029	−0.054	−0.095	−0.100
		(0.519)	(0.520)	(0.521)	(0.521)
Income: 50,000 - 59,999		−0.037	−0.061	−0.073	−0.100
		(0.530)	(0.527)	(0.528)	(0.530)
Income: 60,000 - 69,999		−0.409	−0.368	−0.368	−0.384
		(0.564)	(0.561)	(0.562)	(0.561)
Income: 70,000 - 79,999		0.439	0.537	0.492	0.463
		(0.626)	(0.625)	(0.630)	(0.631)
Income: 80,000 - 99,999		−0.348	−0.337	−0.350	−0.388
		(0.577)	(0.571)	(0.572)	(0.573)
Income: 100,000 - 119,999		0.119	0.136	0.120	0.091
		(0.699)	(0.686)	(0.684)	(0.686)
Income: 120,000 - 149,999		0.790	0.798	0.693	0.653
		(0.575)	(0.573)	(0.575)	(0.579)
Income: 150,000 - 199,999		0.208	0.181	0.088	0.044
		(0.622)	(0.624)	(0.629)	(0.630)
Income: 200,000 - 249,999		0.771	0.683	0.604	0.560
		(1.096)	(1.124)	(1.129)	(1.127)
Income: 250,000 - 349,999		−0.238	−0.132	−0.270	−0.330
		(1.698)	(1.750)	(1.809)	(1.809)
Income: 350,000 - 499,999		−1.383	−1.549	−1.549	−1.608
		(2.775)	(2.779)	(2.849)	(2.847)
Income: 500,000 or more		0.788	0.933	0.741	0.686
		(1.794)	(1.656)	(1.674)	(1.677)
Income: Prefer not to say		0.393	0.347	0.301	0.263
		(0.665)	(0.660)	(0.659)	(0.662)
Num.Obs.	1203	1203	1203	1201	1201
R2 Adj.	0.134	0.152	0.160	0.166	0.166

Notes: HC2 standard errors. Qualtrics national sample. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

Bipartisanship Table 44 reports the results from estimating beliefs about policy reversibility on the bipartisanship treatment.

> If a government investment policy has {low/high} bipartisan support, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the policy will be reversed in the future?
>
> *Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely*

Table 44: Linear regression of likelihood of investment reversal on low bipartisanship

	Binary:		Scale:	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	0.344***	0.308***	2.331***	2.251***
	(0.069)	(0.072)	(0.131)	(0.135)
Treatment: Low Bipartisanship	0.395***	0.458***	0.720***	0.857***
	(0.026)	(0.037)	(0.049)	(0.070)
Age	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Woman	0.044*	0.043	0.063	0.062
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.049)	(0.049)
College (=1)	0.027	0.028	0.082	0.084
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.057)	(0.056)
Black	−0.017	−0.017	−0.086	−0.085
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.083)	(0.083)
Hispanic	−0.046	−0.040	−0.038	−0.025
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.069)	(0.069)
Neither party	0.038	0.120**	0.055	0.211**
	(0.037)	(0.055)	(0.067)	(0.096)
Republican	−0.005	0.043	−0.074	0.046
	(0.035)	(0.049)	(0.063)	(0.085)
Employed (=1)	0.019	0.017	−0.037	−0.040
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Low bipartisanship x Neither party		−0.165**		−0.312**
		(0.070)		(0.131)
Low bipartisanship x Republican		−0.093		−0.235**
		(0.060)		(0.110)
Climate beliefs (index)	0.019	0.019	0.049	0.049*
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Income: Less than 10,000	−0.043	−0.044	−0.214*	−0.213*
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.126)	(0.126)
Income: 20,000 - 29,999	0.059	0.054	0.062	0.053
	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.099)	(0.099)
Income: 30,000 - 39,999	0.020	0.014	−0.004	−0.015
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.104)	(0.105)
Income: 40,000 - 49,999	−0.046	−0.048	−0.188*	−0.193*
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.112)	(0.111)
Income: 50,000 - 59,999	−0.015	−0.020	−0.079	−0.088
	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.111)	(0.111)
Income: 60,000 - 69,999	0.045	0.037	0.052	0.037
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.120)	(0.120)
Income: 70,000 - 79,999	0.068	0.065	0.076	0.071
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.130)	(0.129)
Income: 80,000 - 99,999	−0.013	−0.015	−0.038	−0.041
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.120)	(0.119)
Income: 100,000 - 119,999	0.091	0.083	0.173	0.156
	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.143)	(0.145)
Income: 120,000 - 149,999	0.074	0.073	0.050	0.046
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.127)	(0.127)
Income: 150,000 - 199,999	0.099	0.098	0.025	0.022
	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.171)	(0.171)
Income: 200,000 - 249,999	−0.079	−0.097	−0.158	−0.196
	(0.139)	(0.140)	(0.232)	(0.232)
Income: 250,000 - 349,999	0.542***	0.553***	0.986***	1.008***
	(0.088)	(0.094)	(0.207)	(0.213)
Income: 350,000 - 499,999	0.140	0.146	0.305	0.319
	(0.306)	(0.305)	(0.394)	(0.370)
Income: 500,000 or more	−0.046	−0.046	−0.108	−0.109
	(0.182)	(0.182)	(0.392)	(0.393)
Income: Prefer not to say	0.052	0.049	−0.038	−0.047
	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.144)	(0.144)
Num.Obs.	1203	1203	1203	1203
R2 Adj.	0.165	0.168	0.169	0.173

Notes: HC2 standard errors. Qualtrics national sample. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

Tax Credits Table 45 reports the results from the effect of tax credit duration on beliefs about the effectiveness of the tax credits. We anticipate that more generous tax credits should signal greater government commitment, which is what we find.

> How effective or ineffective do you think tax credits valued at $15 million per year for {5/10/15} years would be in creating jobs?
>
> *Very effective; Somewhat effective; Somewhat ineffective; Very ineffective*

Table 45: Linear regression of tax credit efficacy on credit duration

	Binary:			Scale:		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intercept	0.960***	0.899***	0.974***	3.368***	3.222***	3.389***
	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.103)	(0.104)	(0.107)
Treatment: 10 year credit	0.060**	0.060**	0.016	0.124**	0.128**	0.063
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.036)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.069)
Treatment: 15 year credit	0.042	0.046	0.050	0.081	0.093*	0.092
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.066)
Age	−0.001*	−0.001	−0.002*	−0.005***	−0.004***	−0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Woman	0.024	0.027	0.024	0.032	0.043	0.032
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.043)
College (=1)	0.022	0.022	0.024	0.002	0.000	0.004
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.049)
Black	0.012	0.026	0.010	0.098	0.134*	0.094
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.071)
Hispanic	−0.021	−0.026	−0.021	0.001	−0.013	0.004
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.058)
Neither party	−0.135***	−0.095***	−0.149***	−0.307***	−0.210***	−0.294***
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.090)
Republican	−0.130***	−0.052*	−0.158***	−0.269***	−0.079	−0.333***
	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.086)
Employed (=1)	−0.050*	−0.046	−0.051*	−0.063	−0.052	−0.061
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.052)
15 years x Neither party			−0.045			−0.160
			(0.081)			(0.137)
15 years x Republican			0.003			0.061
			(0.066)			(0.117)
10 years x Neither party			0.086			0.107
			(0.076)			(0.135)
10 years x Republican			0.084			0.132
			(0.068)			(0.125)
Climate beliefs (index)		0.054***			0.118***	
		(0.016)			(0.027)	
Green jobs (index)		0.041***			0.122***	
		(0.013)			(0.024)	
Income: Less than 10,000	−0.147**	−0.145**	−0.150***	−0.250***	−0.243**	−0.255***
	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.096)	(0.098)	(0.096)
Income: 20,000 - 29,999	−0.096**	−0.087*	−0.096**	−0.172**	−0.148*	−0.176**
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.079)	(0.077)	(0.078)
Income: 30,000 - 39,999	−0.026	−0.021	−0.026	−0.048	−0.035	−0.047
	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.087)	(0.084)	(0.087)
Income: 40,000 - 49,999	0.001	−0.008	0.003	−0.092	−0.118	−0.091
	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.090)	(0.088)	(0.091)
Income: 50,000 - 59,999	−0.037	−0.043	−0.036	−0.082	−0.096	−0.084
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.088)	(0.086)	(0.088)
Income: 60,000 - 69,999	−0.032	−0.025	−0.030	−0.124	−0.108	−0.122
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.098)	(0.096)	(0.098)
Income: 70,000 - 79,999	−0.046	−0.038	−0.043	−0.175*	−0.162*	−0.175*
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.097)	(0.098)	(0.097)
Income: 80,000 - 99,999	−0.062	−0.063	−0.063	−0.093	−0.094	−0.096
	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.100)	(0.097)	(0.100)
Income: 100,000 - 119,999	−0.064	−0.066	−0.066	−0.059	−0.065	−0.063
	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.118)	(0.116)	(0.118)
Income: 120,000 - 149,999	−0.074	−0.090	−0.074	−0.075	−0.122	−0.073
	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.103)
Income: 150,000 - 199,999	0.012	−0.007	0.011	0.074	0.020	0.069
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.127)	(0.129)	(0.128)
Income: 200,000 - 249,999	0.065	0.039	0.066	0.103	0.036	0.111
	(0.076)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.189)	(0.194)	(0.193)
Income: 250,000 - 349,999	0.111**	0.107	0.124**	0.223	0.201	0.233
	(0.053)	(0.071)	(0.053)	(0.261)	(0.314)	(0.260)
Income: 350,000 - 499,999	0.095	0.073	0.097*	−0.170*	−0.220**	−0.169**
	(0.063)	(0.067)	(0.055)	(0.094)	(0.106)	(0.086)
Income: 500,000 or more	−0.019	−0.027	−0.021	−0.053	−0.087	−0.051
	(0.174)	(0.162)	(0.178)	(0.422)	(0.370)	(0.427)
Income: Prefer not to say	−0.165**	−0.178**	−0.157**	−0.216*	−0.250**	−0.196*
	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.112)	(0.110)	(0.112)
Num.Obs.	1203	1201	1203	1203	1201	1203
R2 Adj.	0.034	0.063	0.034	0.052	0.110	0.052

Notes: HC2 standard errors. Qualtrics national sample. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

Costly Signals

> If in addition to the tax credits, the government also {guaranteed $15 million for county schools/gave counties the ability to apply for $20 million for county schools (75 percent receive funds). How committed or uncommitted would you say the government is to creating jobs in the county?
>
> *Very committed; Somewhat committed; Somewhat uncommitted; Very uncommitted.*

The most frequent response in both treatment conditions is that the government is "somewhat committed," so to capture more variation, we analyze an indicator variable for if the government is seen as very committed or not.

We estimate a linear regression of the outcome on the treatment and a set of covariates. We include covariates for gender, race, ethnicity, and 4-year college degree, political party, and rurality. Employment and income have no predictive value, so we trim those covariates for parsimony. We include age as well as a quadratic term since we observe a non-linear relationship in the effect of age.

Table 46 reports the results of estimating the effect of the costly signals treatment on beliefs about the government's commitment to local economic development. Model (5) contains the most relevant result, which shows how there is a positive effect of the treatment for Republicans and Independents, but not for Democrats.

Table 46: Linear regression of belief in government commitment to local economic development on guaranteed school funding

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Intercept	0.259***	0.076	0.109	0.049	−0.034
	(0.045)	(0.090)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.088)
Treatment: Costly Signal	0.032	0.030	0.029	0.033	0.051*
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.026)
Age	0.000	0.008**	0.008**	0.007*	0.007**
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Woman	−0.049**	−0.052**	−0.051**	−0.045*	−0.053**
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)
College (=1)	0.032	0.035	0.025	0.043*	0.032
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.024)
Black	0.096**	0.099**	0.101**	0.131***	0.097**
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.043)
Hispanic	0.063*	0.065**	0.070**	0.078**	0.063*
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.032)
Neither party	−0.128***	−0.130***	−0.128***		
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)		
Republican	−0.129***	−0.131***	−0.128***		
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)		
Employed (=1)		−0.016	−0.008		
		(0.026)	(0.027)		
Costly signal x Democrat					−0.053
					(0.049)
Income: Less than 10,000			0.010	−0.003	
			(0.060)	(0.060)	
Income: 20,000 - 29,999			−0.051	−0.060	
			(0.049)	(0.049)	
Income: 30,000 - 39,999			−0.049	−0.061	
			(0.052)	(0.052)	
Income: 40,000 - 49,999			−0.047	−0.060	
			(0.055)	(0.055)	
Income: 50,000 - 59,999			−0.016	−0.025	
			(0.055)	(0.056)	
Income: 60,000 - 69,999			−0.105*	−0.106*	
			(0.057)	(0.056)	
Income: 70,000 - 79,999			−0.076	−0.083	
			(0.061)	(0.060)	
Income: 80,000 - 99,999			−0.019	−0.027	
			(0.061)	(0.061)	
Income: 100,000 - 119,999			−0.052	−0.059	
			(0.067)	(0.067)	
Income: 120,000 - 149,999			0.007	0.013	
			(0.060)	(0.061)	
Income: 150,000 - 199,999			−0.006	−0.007	
			(0.076)	(0.079)	
Income: 200,000 - 249,999			0.163	0.162	
			(0.127)	(0.127)	
Income: 250,000 - 349,999			0.073	0.099	
			(0.226)	(0.209)	
Income: 350,000 - 499,999			−0.029	0.014	
			(0.311)	(0.311)	
Income: 500,000 or more			−0.079	−0.117	
			(0.160)	(0.145)	
Income: Prefer not to say			−0.071	−0.096	
			(0.062)	(0.063)	
Num.Obs.	1203	1203	1203	1203	1203
R2 Adj.	0.042	0.044	0.041	0.019	0.043

Notes: HC2 standard errors. Qualtrics national sample. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

6.1.2 Heterogeneous Effects by Partisanship



Figure 1: Heterogeneous effects by partisan identification for the multi-attribute policy experiment. Thick and thin bars denote 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals. Standard errors clustered at the respondent level.

6.2 Can Benefits Lock In Support?

6.2.1 Survey Instrument

The treatment vignette read:

> {(Display no text in the first condition.) /
>
> Imagine that because of these tax credits, there will be a new electric vehicle manufacturing plant that opens in your area and creates well-paid jobs. If the federal government ended its incentives for consumers to buy electric vehicles, the manufacturing plant would have to close. /
>
> Imagine that because of these tax credits, there will be a new electric vehicle manufacturing plant that opens in your area and creates well-paid jobs. If the federal government ended its incentives for consumers to buy electric vehicles, the manufacturing plant would have the ability to produce different products. /
>
> Imagine that because of these tax credits, there will be a new electric vehicle manufacturing plant that opens in your area and creates well-paid jobs.}

Outcome measures included:

> {If there was this investment in your area, how/How}...likely would you be to buy an electric vehicle as your next car?
>
> *Very likely; Somewhat likely; Not very likely; Not at all likely*
>
> {If there was this investment in your area, how/How} much would you support or oppose the federal government's incentives for consumers to buy electric vehicles?
>
> *Strongly support; Somewhat support; Somewhat oppose; Strongly oppose*
>
> {If there was this investment in your area, how/How} much would you support or oppose a climate policy to move the country away from fossil fuels and toward renewable energy?
>
> *Strongly support; Somewhat support; Somewhat oppose; Strongly oppose*
>
> {If there was this investment in your area, how/How} likely would you be to vote for a politician who supported the federal government's incentives for consumers to buy electric vehicles?
>
> *Very likely; Somewhat likely; Not very likely; Not at all likely*
>
> {If there was this investment in your area, how/How} worried would you be about the effects on your area of the federal government cutting its incentives for consumers to buy electric vehicles?
>
> *Very worried; Somewhat worried; Not very worried; Not at all worried*

6.2.2 Linear Regression Results

We estimate a linear regression of the outcome on a categorical treatment variable, plus controls for age, gender, Black, Hispanic, partisan identification, college education, employment, rural indicator, reversibility concerns, expected benefits/costs from climate policy, income quintile, and a trust index. We detect heterogeneous effects of party identification by college education, which we account for with an interaction term. We randomized the order of some survey blocks, so we include an indicator for if the lock-in experiment came after the delegation experiment.

Table 47: Linear regression of lock-in experiment outcomes

	Index	Credit	Vote	Purchase	Climate	Worry
Age	−0.008***	−0.005***	−0.006***	−0.011***	−0.006***	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	−0.046	−0.065	−0.011	−0.086	−0.009	−0.079
	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.053)	(0.048)	(0.050)
Black	0.006	−0.032	0.004	0.082	−0.024	0.060
	(0.061)	(0.068)	(0.064)	(0.077)	(0.068)	(0.069)
Hispanic	0.147***	0.088	0.081	0.225***	0.158***	−0.054
	(0.055)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.066)	(0.058)	(0.060)
Republican	−0.911***	−0.817***	−0.770***	−0.738***	−1.015***	0.220***
	(0.064)	(0.069)	(0.067)	(0.074)	(0.069)	(0.068)
Neither party	−0.582***	−0.495***	−0.670***	−0.396***	−0.563***	0.046
	(0.071)	(0.077)	(0.079)	(0.086)	(0.074)	(0.077)
College degree	0.062	0.011	0.102*	0.156**	−0.032	0.031
	(0.056)	(0.061)	(0.058)	(0.070)	(0.057)	(0.066)
Employed	0.025	0.033	0.041	0.078	−0.055	0.018
	(0.052)	(0.056)	(0.053)	(0.063)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Income Q1	−0.012	−0.002	0.063	−0.127	0.009	−0.088
	(0.072)	(0.081)	(0.073)	(0.084)	(0.075)	(0.078)
Income Q2	−0.022	−0.039	0.032	−0.077	−0.001	−0.033
	(0.067)	(0.075)	(0.067)	(0.075)	(0.071)	(0.073)
Income Q3	0.045	0.031	0.103	−0.033	0.057	0.012
	(0.065)	(0.073)	(0.065)	(0.074)	(0.068)	(0.073)
Income Not say	0.128	0.140	0.130	−0.039	0.226*	−0.048
	(0.113)	(0.121)	(0.112)	(0.148)	(0.125)	(0.143)
Rural	−0.161***	−0.152**	−0.094	−0.133**	−0.213***	0.061
	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.066)
Investment: Same level	−0.102**	−0.068	−0.044	−0.215***	−0.061	0.005
	(0.049)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.059)	(0.053)	(0.056)
Investment: Reduce	−0.203***	−0.192***	−0.156***	−0.268***	−0.137**	−0.044
	(0.055)	(0.060)	(0.058)	(0.064)	(0.059)	(0.062)
Climate policy: Increase economic activity	0.357***	0.310***	0.325***	0.296***	0.379***	0.072
	(0.047)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.053)
Climate policy: No economic change	0.134**	0.093	0.109*	0.050	0.234***	0.131**
	(0.054)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.065)	(0.059)	(0.061)
Trust index	0.224***	0.205***	0.233***	0.243***	0.144***	−0.027
	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.027)
Intercept	0.667***	3.457***	3.390***	3.315***	3.636***	2.634***
	(0.115)	(0.130)	(0.121)	(0.141)	(0.119)	(0.128)
Lock-in order	−0.102**	−0.096**	−0.125***	−0.080*	−0.073*	−0.097**
	(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.047)	(0.043)	(0.046)
General benefits treatment	0.119**	0.097*	0.046	0.262***	0.046	−0.403***
	(0.048)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.060)	(0.054)	(0.058)
Specific benefits treatment	0.104*	0.072	0.019	0.260***	0.049	−0.548***
	(0.056)	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.068)	(0.061)	(0.068)
Num.Obs.	1534	1534	1534	1534	1534	1534
R2 Adj.	0.402	0.296	0.337	0.335	0.331	0.054

Notes: HC2 standard errors. Winter 2022 Qualtrics national sample. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

6.2.3 Structural Topic Model Results



Figure 2: Summary of Topic Frequency in Response to Open-Ended Question About Top-of-Mind Considerations After Reading Vignette. The question read, "What is the first thing you thought of when you read the scenario?"

Table 48: Regression of the proportion of each open-ended answer that is about job creation on treatment group status

	(1)
Intercept	0.011*
	(0.006)
General Benefits	0.092***
	(0.009)
Specific Benefits	0.082***
	(0.010)
N	1495

Notes: Global measurement uncertainty using the STM model with the method of composition. Winter 2022 Qualtrics national sample. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

6.2.4 Effects by Partisanship



Figure 3: Heterogeneous Effects of Lock-In Treatment by Partisanship. Thin and thick lines denote 95 and 90 percent confidence intervals.

6.3 Shallow Promises or Deep Laws

Table 49 corresponds with Figure 5.5. For model (1), we interact the treatment with indicators for treatment status from earlier experiments, thus, estimating a "long" saturated regression. For this reason, Figure 5.5 presents the average marginal effect, which is easier to interpret, while these coefficients are more difficult to interpret. We display all of the interactions to provide clarity as to the model specification.

Table 49: Linear regression of belief in government commitment on whether transition assistance is backed by law

	(1)	(2)
Law Treatment	0.182	0.164
	(0.304)	(0.104)
Law Treatment x Climate Policy Increase	−0.358	0.095
	(0.620)	(0.157)
Law Treatment x Climate Policy No Change	0.325	0.152
	(0.505)	(0.168)
Clawback Treatment x Law Treatment	0.329	
	(0.397)	
Clawback Treatment x Transparency Treatment	0.063	
	(0.332)	
Law Treatment x Transparency Treatment	0.279	
	(0.388)	
Clawback Treatment x Climate Policy Increase	−0.020	
	(0.529)	
Clawback Treatment x Climate Policy No Change	0.215	
	(0.428)	
Transparency Treatment x Climate Policy Increase	−0.236	
	(0.569)	
Transparency Treatment x Climate Policy No Change	1.181**	
	(0.499)	
Clawback x Law x Transparency	−0.641	
	(0.532)	
Clawback x Law x Climate Policy Increase	−0.433	
	(0.798)	
Clawback x Law x Climate Policy No Change	0.153	
	(0.712)	
Clawback x Transparency x Climate Policy Increase	0.715	
	(0.802)	
Clawback x Transparency x Climate Policy No Change	−0.329	
	(0.683)	
Law x Transparency x Climate Policy Increase	0.039	
	(0.781)	
Law x Transparency x Climate Policy No Change	−1.579**	
	(0.718)	
Clawback x Law x Transparency x Climate Policy Increase	0.024	
	(1.123)	
Clawback x Law x Transparency x Climate Policy No Change	0.329	
	(1.051)	
Clawback Treatment	−0.066	
	(0.204)	
Transparency Treatment	−0.150	
	(0.239)	
Age		−0.002
		(0.002)
Age: 52 to 66 years	−0.133	
	(0.148)	
Age: over 67 years	−0.253	
	(0.166)	
Age: not say	−0.023	
	(0.347)	
Female		−0.119
		(0.073)
Woman	−0.156	
	(0.114)	
Black		0.348***
		(0.113)
Hispanic		0.182*
		(0.095)
Minority (=1)	0.879***	
	(0.251)	
Republican	−0.530***	−0.054
	(0.149)	(0.082)
Neither party	−0.563***	0.061
	(0.170)	(0.098)
Won't say party	−1.248***	
	(0.429)	
College degree		0.179**
		(0.089)
College (=1)	0.008	
	(0.114)	
Employed		0.125
		(0.089)
Income Q1		−0.057
		(0.124)
Income Q2		−0.059
		(0.117)
Income Q3		−0.160
		(0.113)
Income Not say		0.017
		(0.182)
Rural		0.096
		(0.092)
Investment: Same level		−0.963***
		(0.089)
Investment: Reduce		−1.737***
		(0.099)
Climate policy: Increase economic activity	1.201***	0.245**
	(0.456)	(0.116)
Climate policy: No economic change	0.149	−0.001
	(0.327)	(0.120)
Trust index		0.167***
		(0.039)
Municipality	0.015	
	(0.183)	
Township	−0.367*	
	(0.197)	
Fossil fuel sample	0.182	
	(0.130)	
2020 Biden vote share	0.378	
	(0.433)	
College share	0.498	
	(0.441)	
Population (log)	0.082	
	(0.057)	
Urban share	−0.266	
	(0.171)	
Intercept	1.488**	3.920***
	(0.591)	(0.197)
Num.Obs.	593	1534
R2 Adj.	0.253	0.276

Notes: HC2 standard errors. Model (1) corresponds to CivicPulse sample. Model (2) corresponds to the national sample taken in winter 2022 with Qualtrics. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

6.4 Community Sacrifice for Credible Compensation

Table 50 is the regression that corresponds with Figure 5.6, which presents the average (unadjusted by covariates) estimates. The treatments come from the following vignette.

> Think about the main job-provider in the area where you work. Imagine that the federal government is considering a regulation that will cause layoffs in that industry. The regulation is needed to prevent pollution that will harm human health. To protect workers and communities, the federal government will create an assistance program. The assistance program will include free retraining for workers and grants for local economic development. There is {low / high} bipartisan support for the assistance program. The assistance program is {reversible / not reversible} by a future Congress.

Table 50: Linear regression of support for costly regulations on bipartisanship and institutional constraint treatments

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Bipartisan	0.171***	0.178***	0.185***	0.194***	0.262***	0.276***	0.294***	0.389***
	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.049)	(0.072)	(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.091)
Not Reversible	0.094**	0.100**	0.102***	0.107*	0.133*	0.150**	0.155**	0.234**
	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.055)	(0.076)	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.098)
Bipartisan x Not Reversible	−0.062	−0.077	−0.095*	−0.096	0.003	−0.042	−0.086	−0.190
	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.067)	(0.104)	(0.099)	(0.094)	(0.125)
Bipartisan x Independent				−0.031				−0.138
				(0.094)				(0.178)
Bipartisan x Republican				−0.005				−0.201
				(0.084)				(0.152)
Not Reversible x Independent				−0.009				−0.057
				(0.102)				(0.184)
Not Reversible x Republican				−0.009				−0.207
				(0.088)				(0.160)
Bipartisan x Not Reversible x Independent				0.072				0.226
				(0.134)				(0.248)
Bipartisan x Not Reversible x Republican				−0.039				0.185
				(0.118)				(0.221)
Age		−0.002***	−0.001*	−0.001*		−0.004**	−0.001	−0.001
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female		0.024	0.024	0.024		0.053	0.055	0.057
		(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)		(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Black		0.074**	0.089**	0.090**		0.093	0.128*	0.128*
		(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.038)		(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.074)
Hispanic		0.051	0.051	0.053		0.103	0.100	0.104
		(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.032)		(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Republican		−0.264***	−0.130***	−0.112*		−0.625***	−0.300***	−0.141
		(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.065)		(0.060)	(0.064)	(0.118)
Neither party		−0.147***	−0.082**	−0.075		−0.366***	−0.208***	−0.157
		(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.075)		(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.141)
College degree		0.023	0.024	0.025		0.029	0.030	0.038
		(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.029)		(0.057)	(0.053)	(0.054)
Employed		−0.017	−0.015	−0.016		0.001	0.007	0.003
		(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.031)		(0.061)	(0.059)	(0.059)
Income: Less than 10,000		0.037	0.038	0.038		−0.012	−0.008	−0.007
		(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.061)		(0.121)	(0.119)	(0.119)
Income: 20,000 - 29,999		−0.005	0.001	0.001		−0.048	−0.033	−0.035
		(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.053)		(0.107)	(0.103)	(0.103)
Income: 30,000 - 39,999		−0.035	−0.030	−0.028		−0.068	−0.054	−0.052
		(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.056)		(0.111)	(0.106)	(0.106)
Income: 40,000 - 49,999		−0.050	−0.060	−0.060		−0.080	−0.106	−0.115
		(0.064)	(0.060)	(0.060)		(0.126)	(0.116)	(0.116)
Income: 50,000 - 59,999		−0.014	−0.021	−0.018		0.019	0.002	0.007
		(0.061)	(0.059)	(0.060)		(0.123)	(0.119)	(0.119)
Income: 60,000 - 69,999		−0.091	−0.080	−0.076		−0.212	−0.185	−0.185
		(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.069)		(0.131)	(0.129)	(0.130)
Income: 70,000 - 79,999		0.002	0.027	0.030		−0.083	−0.023	−0.020
		(0.070)	(0.068)	(0.067)		(0.134)	(0.129)	(0.128)
Income: 80,000 - 99,999		−0.023	−0.019	−0.018		−0.020	−0.009	−0.012
		(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.065)		(0.134)	(0.130)	(0.130)
Income: 100,000 - 119,999		−0.033	−0.026	−0.022		0.014	0.032	0.043
		(0.078)	(0.074)	(0.076)		(0.155)	(0.142)	(0.144)
Income: 120,000 - 149,999		−0.023	−0.028	−0.026		−0.082	−0.097	−0.089
		(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.066)		(0.134)	(0.128)	(0.129)
Income: 150,000 - 199,999		0.002	−0.011	−0.008		0.085	0.053	0.050
		(0.077)	(0.074)	(0.075)		(0.158)	(0.149)	(0.149)
Income: 200,000 - 249,999		−0.056	−0.080	−0.080		0.097	0.039	0.035
		(0.107)	(0.100)	(0.100)		(0.206)	(0.184)	(0.185)
Income: 250,000 - 349,999		−0.076	−0.059	−0.058		−0.181	−0.144	−0.126
		(0.215)	(0.202)	(0.205)		(0.291)	(0.301)	(0.304)
Income: 350,000 - 499,999		0.174**	0.116	0.119		0.172	0.024	0.025
		(0.081)	(0.086)	(0.090)		(0.398)	(0.388)	(0.390)
Income: 500,000 or more		0.192	0.212	0.209		0.268	0.307	0.297
		(0.144)	(0.129)	(0.130)		(0.385)	(0.296)	(0.314)
Income: Prefer not to say		−0.070	−0.083	−0.076		−0.242	−0.273*	−0.265*
		(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.083)		(0.147)	(0.142)	(0.142)
Green jobs index			0.019**	0.019*			0.055***	0.053***
			(0.010)	(0.010)			(0.019)	(0.019)
Intercept	0.567***	0.785***	0.676***	0.666***	2.628***	3.053***	2.789***	2.725***
	(0.029)	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.074)	(0.053)	(0.144)	(0.138)	(0.143)
Num.Obs.	1203	1203	1202	1202	1203	1203	1202	1202
R2 Adj.	0.026	0.104	0.161	0.158	0.024	0.127	0.218	0.217

Notes: HC2 standard errors. Winter 2021 Qualtrics sample. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

The interpretation check question asks:

> How likely or unlikely do you think it is that the assistance program would be reversed in the future?
>
> *Very likely; Somewhat likely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely*

The question also provides a reminder of the treatment conditions.

Table 51: Linear regression of reversibility perceptions on bipartisanship and institutional constraint treatments

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Bipartisan	0.129***	0.128***	0.125***	0.222***	−0.296***	−0.285***	−0.277***	−0.388***
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.053)	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.095)
Not Reversible	0.260***	0.258***	0.259***	0.322***	−0.569***	−0.562***	−0.563***	−0.648***
	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.056)	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.104)
Bipartisan x Not Reversible	−0.033	−0.032	−0.031	−0.103	0.050	0.039	0.039	0.165
	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.079)	(0.107)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.150)
Bipartisan x Independent				−0.227**				0.256
				(0.094)				(0.181)
Bipartisan x Republican				−0.150*				0.176
				(0.084)				(0.162)
Not Reversible x Independent				−0.156				0.206
				(0.102)				(0.206)
Not Reversible x Republican				−0.096				0.128
				(0.089)				(0.173)
Bipartisan x Not Reversible x Independent				0.204				−0.291
				(0.145)				(0.298)
Bipartisan x Not Reversible x Republican				0.081				−0.200
				(0.126)				(0.242)
Age		0.001	0.001	0.001		−0.003*	−0.003*	−0.003*
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female		−0.010	−0.007	−0.005		0.019	0.009	0.009
		(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)		(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)
Black		−0.057	−0.056	−0.055		0.136	0.131	0.131
		(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)		(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.090)
Hispanic		0.023	0.022	0.024		−0.047	−0.043	−0.044
		(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)		(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)
Republican		−0.057*	−0.055	0.050		0.096	0.082	−0.020
		(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.060)		(0.063)	(0.069)	(0.122)
Neither party		−0.060	−0.058	0.086		0.070	0.061	−0.098
		(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.067)		(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.136)
College degree		−0.022	−0.022	−0.019		0.038	0.038	0.035
		(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)		(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)
Employed		0.021	0.020	0.016		−0.049	−0.045	−0.042
		(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)		(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)
Income: Less than 10,000		0.102	0.103	0.112		−0.077	−0.080	−0.091
		(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.072)		(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.134)
Income: 20,000 - 29,999		−0.045	−0.043	−0.040		0.116	0.111	0.109
		(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)		(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.109)
Income: 30,000 - 39,999		−0.038	−0.042	−0.040		0.133	0.145	0.144
		(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)		(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)
Income: 40,000 - 49,999		−0.059	−0.060	−0.059		0.115	0.120	0.122
		(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)		(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.130)
Income: 50,000 - 59,999		0.010	0.011	0.020		0.014	0.012	0.007
		(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.064)		(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.125)
Income: 60,000 - 69,999		0.032	0.034	0.040		−0.033	−0.039	−0.043
		(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)		(0.131)	(0.132)	(0.132)
Income: 70,000 - 79,999		−0.008	−0.008	0.000		0.092	0.090	0.085
		(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.077)		(0.145)	(0.145)	(0.145)
Income: 80,000 - 99,999		0.018	0.019	0.021		0.073	0.068	0.066
		(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.073)		(0.138)	(0.139)	(0.140)
Income: 100,000 - 119,999		0.095	0.097	0.114		−0.177	−0.182	−0.195
		(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)		(0.165)	(0.166)	(0.165)
Income: 120,000 - 149,999		−0.067	−0.071	−0.060		0.241*	0.252*	0.243*
		(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.073)		(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.137)
Income: 150,000 - 199,999		−0.122	−0.124	−0.118		0.447**	0.454**	0.450**
		(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.090)		(0.197)	(0.196)	(0.196)
Income: 200,000 - 249,999		−0.197*	−0.198*	−0.206*		0.480*	0.484*	0.490*
		(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.113)		(0.257)	(0.255)	(0.254)
Income: 250,000 - 349,999		−0.277*	−0.282*	−0.260		0.633**	0.650***	0.622**
		(0.158)	(0.159)	(0.159)		(0.252)	(0.249)	(0.248)
Income: 350,000 - 499,999		0.276	0.267	0.282		−0.669	−0.637	−0.642
		(0.285)	(0.281)	(0.254)		(0.525)	(0.516)	(0.490)
Income: 500,000 or more		−0.038	−0.048	−0.066		0.148	0.179	0.196
		(0.201)	(0.201)	(0.205)		(0.428)	(0.433)	(0.437)
Income: Prefer not to say		−0.039	−0.040	−0.025		0.081	0.086	0.076
		(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.086)		(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.144)
Green jobs index			0.011	0.011			−0.037*	−0.037*
			(0.010)	(0.010)			(0.022)	(0.022)
Intercept	0.211***	0.205***	0.204***	0.138*	3.101***	3.109***	3.117***	3.183***
	(0.024)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.079)	(0.048)	(0.146)	(0.149)	(0.152)
Num.Obs.	1203	1203	1202	1202	1203	1203	1202	1202
R2 Adj.	0.074	0.076	0.076	0.078	0.096	0.103	0.105	0.102

Notes: HC2 standard errors. Winter 2021 Qualtrics sample. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

6.5 Shift Expectations and Build Support

Table 52: Linear regression of reversibility perceptions on information about true level of national support for transition assistance

	Binary	Scale	Party
Age	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	−0.060**	−0.066	−0.066
	(0.025)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Black	0.022	0.098	0.097
	(0.036)	(0.061)	(0.061)
Hispanic	0.062**	0.053	0.054
	(0.032)	(0.055)	(0.056)
Republican	−0.073***	−0.172***	−0.193***
	(0.027)	(0.050)	(0.064)
Neither party	−0.076**	−0.110*	−0.133*
	(0.031)	(0.057)	(0.076)
College degree	0.033	0.029	0.029
	(0.029)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Employed	−0.035	−0.067	−0.068
	(0.028)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Income Q1	−0.054	−0.109	−0.110
	(0.041)	(0.074)	(0.074)
Income Q2	−0.040	−0.071	−0.072
	(0.039)	(0.070)	(0.070)
Income Q3	−0.042	−0.094	−0.092
	(0.038)	(0.070)	(0.070)
Income Not say	−0.031	0.060	0.061
	(0.072)	(0.122)	(0.122)
Rural	−0.022	−0.035	−0.036
	(0.029)	(0.058)	(0.058)
Investment: Same level	−0.069**	−0.106*	−0.107*
	(0.031)	(0.055)	(0.055)
Investment: Reduce	−0.213***	−0.416***	−0.417***
	(0.031)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Climate policy: Increase economic activity	0.040	0.113**	0.112**
	(0.027)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Climate policy: No economic change	0.096***	0.197***	0.197***
	(0.030)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Trust index	−0.013	−0.019	−0.019
	(0.013)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Intercept	0.378***	2.251***	2.264***
	(0.062)	(0.112)	(0.114)
Consensus treatment	0.156***	0.278***	0.255***
	(0.022)	(0.041)	(0.058)
Consensus treatment x Independent			0.046
			(0.111)
Consensus treatment x Republican			0.042
			(0.092)
Num.Obs.	1534	1534	1534
R2 Adj.	0.088	0.101	0.100

Notes: HC2 standard errors. Winter 2022 Qualtrics sample. *$p < 0.1$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$

6.6 Can Delegation Do It?

6.6.1 Linear Regression Results

Table 53: Linear regression of delegation experiment outcomes (numeric scale) on the treatment conditions

	Support	Trust	Input	Reverse	Train	Local
Age	−0.005***	−0.003**	−0.007***	0.001	−0.007***	−0.008***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	0.039	0.005	−0.079	0.008	−0.109**	−0.130**
	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.044)	(0.050)	(0.053)
Black	0.140**	0.251***	0.142*	0.134**	0.175**	0.002
	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.080)	(0.061)	(0.071)	(0.075)
Hispanic	0.024	0.031	0.222***	0.074	0.129**	0.052
	(0.060)	(0.063)	(0.072)	(0.055)	(0.064)	(0.066)
Republican	−0.558***	−0.260***	−0.077	−0.020	−0.229***	−0.219***
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.065)	(0.049)	(0.058)	(0.061)
Neither party	−0.376***	−0.290***	−0.137*	0.031	−0.256***	−0.264***
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.072)	(0.056)	(0.066)	(0.070)
College degree	0.037	0.020	0.061	0.031	−0.019	0.106*
	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.065)	(0.050)	(0.058)	(0.063)
Employed	−0.077	0.042	−0.020	−0.098*	−0.035	0.029
	(0.058)	(0.060)	(0.067)	(0.050)	(0.061)	(0.063)
Income Q1	0.090	−0.016	0.064	−0.051	0.013	0.002
	(0.080)	(0.084)	(0.092)	(0.073)	(0.081)	(0.088)
Income Q2	−0.042	−0.107	−0.097	−0.009	−0.014	−0.049
	(0.074)	(0.076)	(0.084)	(0.069)	(0.073)	(0.081)
Income Q3	−0.141*	−0.157**	−0.126	−0.026	−0.150**	−0.142*
	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.085)	(0.066)	(0.073)	(0.079)
Income Not say	−0.028	−0.113	0.132	0.136	−0.094	−0.109
	(0.133)	(0.141)	(0.174)	(0.131)	(0.132)	(0.146)
Rural	−0.105	−0.035	−0.024	0.020	−0.128**	−0.074
	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.071)	(0.057)	(0.062)	(0.066)
Investment: Same level	−0.171***	−0.271***	−0.346***	−0.055	−0.195***	−0.110*
	(0.057)	(0.061)	(0.069)	(0.051)	(0.061)	(0.064)
Investment: Reduce	−0.269***	−0.485***	−0.621***	−0.250***	−0.383***	−0.309***
	(0.061)	(0.065)	(0.073)	(0.054)	(0.066)	(0.067)
Climate policy: Increase economic activity	0.315***	0.181***	0.220***	0.050	0.274***	0.192***
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.063)	(0.047)	(0.057)	(0.058)
Climate policy: No economic change	0.234***	0.102*	0.164**	0.104*	0.120**	0.019
	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.067)	(0.053)	(0.060)	(0.064)
Trust index	0.243***	0.422***	0.389***	−0.001	0.326***	0.377***
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Intercept	2.671***	2.718***	2.635***	2.180***	3.148***	3.013***
	(0.135)	(0.137)	(0.164)	(0.122)	(0.143)	(0.148)
Community delegation	0.251***	0.379***	0.381***	−0.163**	0.148	0.178*
	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.108)	(0.082)	(0.095)	(0.092)
Public input	0.580***	0.358***	0.628***	−0.158*	0.271***	0.247***
	(0.091)	(0.086)	(0.108)	(0.084)	(0.095)	(0.095)
Long-term funding	0.146	0.253***	−0.081	0.097	0.228**	0.209**
	(0.090)	(0.089)	(0.104)	(0.084)	(0.089)	(0.090)
Community delegation x Public input	−0.253**	−0.153	−0.223	0.195*	−0.177	−0.088
	(0.124)	(0.126)	(0.147)	(0.112)	(0.133)	(0.136)
Community delegation x Long-term funding	−0.076	−0.323**	−0.153	0.121	−0.256*	−0.318**
	(0.128)	(0.131)	(0.151)	(0.118)	(0.131)	(0.134)
Public input x Long-term funding	−0.263**	−0.280**	−0.023	0.016	−0.194	−0.149
	(0.127)	(0.126)	(0.144)	(0.116)	(0.129)	(0.133)
Community delegation x Public input x Long-term funding	0.242	0.354*	0.228	−0.126	0.292	0.217
	(0.178)	(0.183)	(0.203)	(0.161)	(0.184)	(0.192)
Num.Obs.	1534	1534	1534	1534	1534	1534
R2 Adj.	0.285	0.327	0.303	0.029	0.246	0.258

Notes: HC2 standard errors. Winter 2022 Qualtrics sample. Fixed effects for the order of the delegation experiment in the survey flow omitted for exposition.
*$p < 0.1$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$

Table 54: Linear regression of delegation experiment outcomes (binary) on the treatment conditions

	Support	Trust	Input	Reverse	Train	Local
Age	−0.003***	−0.001**	−0.002***	0.001	−0.004***	−0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.016	−0.012	−0.026	−0.016	−0.040	−0.063**
	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Black	0.049	0.075**	0.041	0.024	0.040	0.010
	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Hispanic	0.016	0.012	0.063**	0.030	0.081***	0.056*
	(0.030)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.032)
Republican	−0.250***	−0.036	−0.001	0.014	−0.094***	−0.099***
	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Neither party	−0.171***	−0.040	−0.019	0.024	−0.110***	−0.075**
	(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.034)
College degree	−0.007	0.029	0.041*	0.023	−0.006	0.051*
	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Employed	−0.020	0.020	0.010	−0.040	−0.028	0.005
	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Income Q1	0.074*	−0.043	−0.020	−0.061	0.005	0.015
	(0.040)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Income Q2	0.011	−0.055*	−0.057*	−0.038	0.015	−0.014
	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.039)
Income Q3	−0.036	−0.085***	−0.051	−0.039	−0.053	−0.058
	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Income Not say	0.031	−0.053	0.026	0.011	−0.059	−0.085
	(0.066)	(0.051)	(0.061)	(0.076)	(0.071)	(0.067)
Rural	−0.063**	0.001	0.026	0.018	−0.044	−0.046
	(0.032)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.031)
Investment: Same level	−0.096***	−0.136***	−0.151***	−0.009	−0.071**	−0.024
	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.030)
Investment: Reduce	−0.129***	−0.142***	−0.196***	−0.086***	−0.148***	−0.103***
	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.031)
Climate policy: Increase economic activity	0.107***	0.048**	0.049**	0.054*	0.079***	0.037
	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Climate policy: No economic change	0.121***	0.027	0.011	0.067**	0.069**	0.014
	(0.031)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.031)
Trust index	0.099***	0.126***	0.114***	−0.008	0.138***	0.149***
	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Intercept	0.684***	0.262***	0.331***	0.334***	0.729***	0.610***
	(0.069)	(0.055)	(0.059)	(0.074)	(0.072)	(0.072)
Community delegation	0.118***	0.099***	0.061*	−0.096**	0.051	0.051
	(0.046)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.045)
Public input	0.223***	0.086***	0.095**	−0.083*	0.112**	0.105**
	(0.046)	(0.031)	(0.037)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.047)
Long-term funding	0.022	0.071**	−0.011	0.052	0.106**	0.094**
	(0.045)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.046)
Community delegation x Public input	−0.079	−0.066	−0.056	0.069	−0.059	0.000
	(0.063)	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.062)	(0.067)	(0.066)
Community delegation x Long-term funding	−0.062	−0.082*	−0.025	0.068	−0.132**	−0.150**
	(0.066)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.065)
Public input x Long-term funding	−0.084	−0.091**	−0.023	0.008	−0.111*	−0.043
	(0.064)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)
Community delegation x Public input x Long-term funding	0.126	0.107	0.072	−0.049	0.193**	0.103
	(0.090)	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.092)	(0.094)	(0.093)
Num.Obs.	1534	1534	1534	1534	1534	1534
R2 Adj.	0.221	0.201	0.191	0.015	0.168	0.186

Notes: HC2 standard errors. Winter 2022 Qualtrics sample. Fixed effects for the order of the delegation experiment in the survey flow omitted for exposition.
$^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

6.6.2 Interaction Effects



Figure 4: Interactive effect of long-term funding and public input. When there is public input, there is no longer a negative effect of the long-term funding treatment, as reported on pp. 139-142. This indicates how the design features could partly offset each other's disadvantages. Bars denote 95% confidence intervals. Estimates from Table 53.

6.6.3 Structural Topic Model Results



Figure 5: Structural topic model analysis of open-ended top-of-mind responses after reading the delegation experiment vignette.

Table 55: Regression of the proportion of each open-ended answer that is about the lack of credibility on treatment group status

	(1)
Intercept	0.044***
	(0.003)
Community delegation	−0.022***
	(0.003)
Public input	−0.001
	(0.003)
Long-term funding	0.008***
	(0.003)
N	1493

Notes: Global measurement uncertainty using the STM model with the method of composition. Winter 2022 Qualtrics national sample. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

7 Chapter 6

7.1 Advance Notice and Planning Experiment

Table 56: Linear regression of transition effectiveness depending on whether training occurs prior to layoffs

	Scale			Binary		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	−0.005***	0.015**	0.014**	−0.001	0.009**	0.009**
	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Age^2		0.000***	0.000***		0.000***	0.000**
		(0.000)	(0.000)		(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	−0.075*	−0.091**	−0.084*	−0.003	−0.011	−0.006
	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Black	−0.035	−0.017	−0.009	−0.014	−0.005	0.001
	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.036)
Hispanic	−0.201***	−0.178***	−0.168**	−0.088**	−0.077*	−0.078*
	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.041)
Republican	−0.260***	−0.254***	−0.176***	−0.099***	−0.096***	−0.050
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.066)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.037)
Neither party	−0.274***	−0.271***	−0.187***	−0.112***	−0.110***	−0.066*
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.061)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.035)
College degree	0.158***	0.156***	0.275***	0.064**	0.063**	0.129***
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.070)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.039)
College degree x Independent			−0.234**			−0.124**
			(0.109)			(0.059)
College degree x Republican			−0.200**			−0.115**
			(0.100)			(0.055)
Employed	0.193***	0.152***	0.147***	0.077***	0.057*	0.056*
	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Suburban	−0.225***	−0.211***	−0.193***	−0.107***	−0.100***	−0.091***
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Rural	−0.211***	−0.206***	−0.195***	−0.104***	−0.101***	−0.095***
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Middle Atlantic			0.291**			0.106
			(0.114)			(0.065)
North Central			0.231**			0.075
			(0.114)			(0.066)
West North Central			0.262**			0.133*
			(0.131)			(0.076)
South Atlantic			0.291**			0.155**
			(0.114)			(0.065)
East South Central			0.304**			0.103
			(0.127)			(0.073)
West South Central			0.229*			0.099
			(0.120)			(0.068)
Mountain			0.167			0.092
			(0.126)			(0.073)
Pacific			0.368***			0.182***
			(0.116)			(0.066)
Intercept	3.052***	2.627***	2.296***	0.634***	0.427***	0.275**
	(0.098)	(0.171)	(0.198)	(0.055)	(0.096)	(0.114)
Prior training treatment	0.065*	0.071*	0.075**	0.042**	0.045**	0.045**
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Num.Obs.	2006	2006	2006	2006	2006	2006
R2 Adj.	0.214	0.217	0.222	0.123	0.127	0.132

Notes: HC2 standard errors. October 2022 Caps/Harris sample. $^*p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

8 Chapter 7

8.1 Southwest Pennsylvania Youths



Figure 6: Optimal list of preferred occupations by Southwest Pennsylvania area youths. List constructed using the ranking algorithm proposed by Pihur, Datta, and Datta (2007).

8.2 Expected Adjustment Costs

Results in Figure 7 show that most of the national public believes that changing industries would entail a moderate or large adjustment. Breaking the descriptive results down by youth and non-youth, youths are less likely to see industry changes as a large adjustment.



Figure 7: Expected adjustment costs if one were to change careers.

Table 57: Linear regression of adjustment costs for changing careers on socio-demographic covariates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Female		−0.039		−0.135**
		(0.028)		(0.061)
Black		−0.017		0.103
		(0.044)		(0.093)
Hispanic		−0.003		0.040
		(0.036)		(0.074)
Republican		0.027		0.049
		(0.035)		(0.079)
Neither party		−0.003		0.036
		(0.030)		(0.068)
Plans for college (=1)		−0.074**		−0.196***
		(0.032)		(0.071)
Employed		−0.013		−0.053
		(0.030)		(0.065)
Income Q1		0.073		0.138
		(0.045)		(0.099)
Income Q2		0.020		0.006
		(0.042)		(0.093)
Income Q3		0.023		0.028
		(0.046)		(0.102)
Income Not say		−0.006		0.101
		(0.057)		(0.124)
Youth sample	−0.049*	−0.061**	−0.063	−0.127**
	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.058)	(0.062)
Intercept	0.286***	0.302***	2.012***	2.081***
	(0.019)	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.106)
Num.Obs.	1137	1137	1137	1137
R2 Adj.	0.002	0.007	0.000	0.011

HC2 standard errors. National youth sample. Models (1) and (2) use a binary outcome, while (3) and (4) have a linear scale outcome. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

8.2.1 Consequences of Adjustment Costs on Career Choice

We further explore the effect of mobility on individual's relative interest in different industry careers. If one perceives large adjustment costs, this could lead them to prioritize industries seen as more stable and less uncertain. Based on our results from Chapter 4, the healthcare industry is seen as the best paying and most locally beneficial industry, which should correspond with expectations of career stability. By contrast, green jobs like solar, wind, and

energy efficiency, as well as fossil fuel jobs, were viewed with relatively more uncertainty. If anticipated mobility costs influences expectations, then we should expect the least mobile to prefer the most predictable careers.

We estimate the effect of low mobility on within-subject comparisons of interest in industries using multivariate regression with socio-demographic controls. The measure for low mobility takes the value 1 if a respondent thinks that taking a job in a new industry would entail a moderate or large adjustment and 0 if not. The outcome measure takes the difference between a respondent's rating of two industries. We collapse the green and fossil fuel industries into respective indices to reduce measurement error and capture overall perceptions.

Figure 8 presents the regression results. Specifically, the plot shows the coefficient estimates for the low mobility indicator. Positive values indicate that when a respondent has low mobility, she is more likely to be interested in the first industry (e.g., healthcare) than the second industry (e.g., fossil fuels), since the outcome measure takes the difference in ratings of each industry, respectively. Since low mobility is not randomly assigned, we take these results as correlational, not causal.

For the first contrast between healthcare and green industries provides strong evidence that individuals who perceive large adjustment costs to changing careers are more interested in working in healthcare than clean energy jobs. For the second contrast between healthcare and fossil fuel industries, there is suggestive evidence that people with low mobility are more interested in healthcare than fossil fuels. The last contrast compares green and fossil fuel industries. We find a null result: low mobility has no differential effect that is distinguishable from zero. These results illustrate how perceptions of mobility can influence career choice, which could subsequently shape interest in entering workforce programs to train for green jobs. When people perceive themselves as having low mobility, they are more likely to prefer stable and certain careers in industries like healthcare, as opposed to less certain occupations in renewables and fossil fuels. The lack of an effect of low mobility on perceptions of green and fossil energy careers suggests that there is room for clean energy sector jobs to become more attractive to workers, otherwise people with low mobility might be indifferent between training to enter the respective industries.



Figure 8: Effect of low mobility as measured by adjustment costs to switching industries on within-subject comparisons of interest in industries. Outcome measure takes the difference between the respondent's interest in one industry (or index of industries for green and fossil fuels) and another industry. Plot shows the estimate for an indicator for low career mobility from a regression that also includes controls for age, gender, race, party affiliation, education, income, employment, rurality, and youth sampling block. Thin and thick bars denote 95 and 90% confidence intervals.

8.3 The Day After Graduation: Costly Signals Experiment

8.3.1 Survey Instrument

The respondents read the following vignette with the text inside braces randomized.

> Consider a 10 year investment by a state government to expand wind and solar energy. As part of this plan, the state government creates a program to train workers for new wind and solar energy jobs.
>
> The training program provides:
>
> - A monthly stipend for the cost of living.
> - No interest loans for tuition.
> - {If people cannot find wind and solar energy jobs after 5 years because there are not enough available, they do not need to pay back the loan.}
>
> In all, the loans are estimated to be worth {1 / 5} percent of the state budget.

8.3.2 Linear Regression Estimates

We estimate the average treatment effect of the commitment devices on workforce program credibility using a linear regression. The model includes a set of control variables that capture socio-demographic characteristics, political beliefs, and perceptions about green jobs. Controls include gender, race, ethnicity, income, educational attainment, employment status, age, and youth block indicator. We also include an index for views about green jobs constructed by using principal component analysis to reduce the dimensionality of perceptions of the future of solar and wind jobs into a single dimension that explains the most variance of the components (69 percent).[6] Table 58 presents the results of estimating the effect of the conditional loan treatment on beliefs about the future of green jobs and support for the training program. This table corresponds with Figure 7.3 in the book.

[6]Since there was a programming issue with partisan identification in the youth survey wave, we impute answers for the partisan lean question, which is used in constructing the partisanship variable. The imputation procedure uses extreme answers to the ideology question (e.g., very conservative, very liberal) as a proxy for a subject's partisan leaning (e.g., Republican, Democrat) in the instances where individuals do not identify with a party.

Table 58: Linear regression of costly signal experiment outcomes on the conditional loans treatment

	Main Outcomes				Mediation			
	Index	Enroll	Recommend	Find Jobs	Support	Index (M1)	Worth It	Index (M2)
Loan Treatment	0.150*	0.018	0.039	0.175**	0.155**	0.087	0.090**	0.105
	(0.078)	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.083)	(0.067)	(0.074)	(0.038)	(0.076)
Age	−0.015***	−0.008***	−0.003*	−0.012***	−0.007**	−0.012***	−0.004**	−0.014***
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Female	−0.117	−0.094**	−0.045	−0.158*	−0.098	−0.078	−0.049	−0.093
	(0.080)	(0.041)	(0.036)	(0.088)	(0.068)	(0.076)	(0.039)	(0.077)
Black	−0.045	−0.001	−0.033	−0.107	−0.014	−0.039	−0.051	−0.019
	(0.124)	(0.064)	(0.053)	(0.122)	(0.099)	(0.118)	(0.067)	(0.128)
Hispanic	0.124	0.009	0.001	0.039	0.057	0.101	0.065	0.092
	(0.099)	(0.053)	(0.046)	(0.105)	(0.087)	(0.098)	(0.047)	(0.099)
Republican	−0.566***	−0.142***	−0.250***	−0.298***	−0.208**	−0.482***	−0.313***	−0.408***
	(0.108)	(0.053)	(0.048)	(0.109)	(0.093)	(0.100)	(0.052)	(0.104)
Neither party	−0.212**	−0.094**	−0.093**	−0.078	−0.166**	−0.143*	−0.154***	−0.133
	(0.087)	(0.045)	(0.040)	(0.096)	(0.071)	(0.085)	(0.041)	(0.086)
Associate Degree	−0.114	0.104	−0.030	−0.317	−0.039	−0.097	−0.079	−0.073
	(0.177)	(0.103)	(0.084)	(0.201)	(0.144)	(0.161)	(0.100)	(0.170)
Bachelor's Degree	0.027	0.098	0.027	−0.086	−0.052	0.046	−0.028	0.038
	(0.158)	(0.095)	(0.075)	(0.182)	(0.135)	(0.139)	(0.086)	(0.151)
Currently in high school	−0.177	0.030	−0.151	−0.063	−0.247	−0.074	0.022	−0.188
	(0.249)	(0.128)	(0.122)	(0.243)	(0.186)	(0.230)	(0.119)	(0.243)
High School Diploma or GED	−0.064	0.077	−0.007	−0.234	−0.390***	0.099	−0.062	−0.031
	(0.160)	(0.096)	(0.082)	(0.183)	(0.138)	(0.147)	(0.092)	(0.156)
No High School	−0.116	0.071	−0.690***	0.027	−0.716***	0.179	−0.341	0.056
	(0.496)	(0.443)	(0.125)	(0.284)	(0.264)	(0.425)	(0.355)	(0.654)
Some college	−0.067	0.083	−0.029	−0.315*	−0.253*	0.039	−0.083	−0.023
	(0.158)	(0.094)	(0.082)	(0.178)	(0.134)	(0.143)	(0.091)	(0.156)
Some High School	−0.277	0.045	−0.038	−0.419**	−0.133	−0.222	−0.026	−0.264
	(0.203)	(0.120)	(0.104)	(0.206)	(0.161)	(0.195)	(0.105)	(0.200)
Technical Certificate	0.175	0.270**	0.022	−0.368	−0.288	0.296	0.006	0.173
	(0.264)	(0.126)	(0.110)	(0.312)	(0.217)	(0.271)	(0.135)	(0.247)
Employed	−0.015	−0.035	0.037	−0.045	−0.120	0.036	−0.037	0.005
	(0.101)	(0.049)	(0.044)	(0.104)	(0.084)	(0.093)	(0.047)	(0.095)
Green jobs index	−0.248***	−0.073***	−0.064***	−0.198***	−0.136***	−0.191***	−0.033**	−0.231***
	(0.028)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.014)	(0.027)
Small adjustment	0.240	0.226***	0.028	0.177	0.033	0.226	0.022	0.229
	(0.174)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.170)	(0.142)	(0.154)	(0.079)	(0.166)
Moderate adjustment	0.294*	0.163**	0.096	0.328**	0.102	0.252*	0.015	0.286*
	(0.165)	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.156)	(0.127)	(0.144)	(0.072)	(0.157)
Large adjustment	0.234	0.152**	0.113	0.081	0.083	0.198	0.057	0.204
	(0.163)	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.154)	(0.127)	(0.142)	(0.071)	(0.155)
Youth sample	−0.338***	−0.242***	−0.131**	−0.065	−0.288**	−0.220*	−0.121*	−0.277**
	(0.129)	(0.060)	(0.054)	(0.142)	(0.118)	(0.117)	(0.063)	(0.128)
Intercept	0.934***	1.116***	1.068***	0.723**	3.510***	−0.518	1.008***	0.422
	(0.329)	(0.166)	(0.152)	(0.362)	(0.313)	(0.353)	(0.174)	(0.334)
Expect Support (Mediator)						0.415***		
						(0.052)		
Worth It (Mediator)								0.511***
								(0.091)
Num.Obs.	572	573	573	572	573	572	573	572
R2 Adj.	0.213	0.112	0.116	0.150	0.112	0.309	0.088	0.259

Notes: HC1 standard errors. National youth sample. Seventeen category income variable included, but omitted from the table for exposition. The Index (M1) outcome includes the expectation of green jobs program support as the mediator, while the Index (M2) outcome includes the spending is worth it to generate credibility mediator. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

8.3.3 Mediation Analysis

Government Support for Green Jobs Program The mediator for the first analysis comes from the following question, which measures the effect of the treatment on perceptions of the government's credibility.

> How supportive do you think a future government would be of the **program to train workers** for new wind and solar energy jobs?
>
> *Very supportive; Moderately supportive; Slightly supportive; Not at all supportive*

If the conditional loans treatment has the intended hand-tying and costly signaling effect, respondents should believe that a future government would be more likely to support the workforce program, which is what we find.

Figure 9 reports the results from the first mediation analysis using beliefs about the government's support for the green jobs training program as the mediator. Figure 10 presents the results from a sensitivity analysis of the sequential ignorability assumption upon which the mediation analysis rests.



Figure 9: Analysis of the mediating effect of beliefs about government support for green investment on overall perceptions of local investment efficacy from green jobs. Thin and thick bars denote 95 and 90 percent credible intervals.

Spending Worth It For Credibility The mediator for the second analysis comes from the following question, which measures support for higher spending if it enhances the government's credibility.

> Some people believe it is important to spend more money on job training programs to show that the government is serious about creating new jobs. Others worry that spending more money could be bad for the financial health of the government. Do you think it is...
>
> *Better to not spend more money to protect the government's financial health; Better to spend more money to show that the government is serious about jobs*

Figure 11 presents the results, which show that the conditional loans treatment increases willingness to spend money to create credibility, which in turn creates greater expectations



Figure 10: Sensitivity analysis for the sequential ignorability assumption for the mediation analysis with beliefs about government support for the green training program as the mediator. There would have to be an extreme confounder that jointly explains 30 percent of the variance of the outcome and mediator, and is orthogonal to the other covariates in the model, for the ACME to go to zero.

of local benefits from green jobs. Figure 12 presents the results from a sensitivity analysis of the sequential ignorability assumption.



Figure 11: Analysis of the mediating effect of support for spending money to generate credibility on overall perceptions of local investment efficacy from green jobs. Thin and thick bars denote 95 and 90 percent credible intervals.



Figure 12: Sensitivity analysis for the sequential ignorability assumption for the mediation analysis with support for spending to generate credibility. There would have to be an extreme confounder that jointly explains 20 percent of the variance of the outcome and mediator, and is orthogonal to the other covariates in the model, for the ACME to go to zero.

8.3.4 Follow-On Budget Experiment

We conducted a follow-on experiment to analyze our interpretation of the baseline budget condition. The rationale is that respondents are sensitive to the high budget condition, thinking that it might enhance the likelihood of reversal. To validate our interpretation, our follow-on experiment presented the respondent with this vignette:

> If a government program accounted for a {large/small} share of the overall budget, over the next 10 years do you think funding for the program is likely to be:
>
> *reduced, increased, unchanged*

We analyze an indicator for if the respondent thinks the investment is likely to be reduced or not. Table 59 presents the results, which show that when the investment occupies a smaller share of the budget, the public expects that the investment is less likely to be reduced in the future.

Table 59: Linear regression of beliefs about investment reversal on an indicator for if the investment takes a small share of the budget

	(1)	(2)
Small Budget Treatment	−0.058**	−0.059**
	(0.025)	(0.026)
Age		0.000
		(0.001)
Female		−0.016
		(0.027)
Black		0.034
		(0.044)
Hispanic		0.019
		(0.035)
Republican		0.055
		(0.035)
Neither party		0.003
		(0.030)
Associate Degree		0.038
		(0.061)
Bachelor's Degree		0.117**
		(0.057)
Currently in high school		0.050
		(0.080)
High School Diploma or GED		0.090
		(0.056)
No High School		−0.204***
		(0.064)
Some college		0.078
		(0.057)
Some High School		0.033
		(0.068)
Technical Certificate		0.058
		(0.091)
Employed		−0.029
		(0.031)
Green jobs index		0.017*
		(0.009)
Small adjustment		−0.059
		(0.051)
Moderate adjustment		0.020
		(0.047)
Large adjustment		0.022
		(0.047)
Youth sample		0.032
		(0.043)
Intercept	0.268***	0.167
	(0.018)	(0.108)
Num.Obs.	1137	1137
R2 Adj.	0.004	0.006

Notes: HC2 standard errors. National youth sample. Seventeen category income variable included but omitted from the table for exposition. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

9 Chapter 8

9.1 Union and National Survey

The main question of interest on the survey assessed whether these predominately fossil fuel workers would support wind energy if the new jobs were local.

> Which statement best describes your position on wind energy?[7]
>
> *We should stop new wind farm construction to try to protect coal jobs; We should allow new wind farms if the jobs go to local workers; We should allow new wind farms no matter who gets the jobs; Other*

The possible responses include the position that wind farms should be stopped to protect fossil fuel jobs, which is a belief we uncovered using our highly targeted surveys of fossil fuel communities. This zero-sum perspective has consequences for policy. Several counties in North Dakota, such as McLean and Mercer, have passed moratoria against building new wind energy developments because of the concern that renewable energy will push out fossil fuels.[8]

In the national sample, we also evaluated responses to this question, but with solar instead of wind, while randomizing the order of the questions to avoid bias. Figure 13 shows that the answers are comparable.



Figure 13: National views about wind and solar job creation depending on the local benefits. Survey weights employed. National survey from CAPS/Harris in August 2022. $N = 1{,}002$.

[7]The question ended with "in [redacted state name], which we omit for confidentiality."
[8]See Stokes (2016) for a study of electoral backlash to wind permitting.

9.2 Transparency Experiment

9.2.1 National Results

Table 60: Linear regression of perceptions of local investment efficacy (binary outcomes) on the transparency treatment

	Local	Train	Detect	Account	Vote	Index
Transparency Treatment	0.025*	0.016	0.051*	0.039	0.146***	0.180***
	(0.014)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.056)
Age	−0.001	−0.003**	0.000	−0.003**	−0.001	−0.008***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Female	−0.010	−0.119***	−0.064**	−0.028	0.017	−0.087
	(0.015)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.028)	(0.058)
Black	−0.023	0.029	−0.083	0.044	−0.063	−0.050
	(0.024)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.044)	(0.095)
Hispanic	−0.005	0.071*	−0.018	0.016	0.004	−0.008
	(0.019)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.036)	(0.073)
Republican	−0.059***	−0.157***	−0.053	0.017	−0.229***	−0.377***
	(0.019)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.043)	(0.035)	(0.079)
Neither party	−0.044***	−0.106***	−0.072**	0.017	−0.152***	−0.281***
	(0.016)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.032)	(0.064)
Associate Degree	−0.079**	0.002	0.015	−0.046	−0.201***	−0.340**
	(0.038)	(0.075)	(0.072)	(0.080)	(0.071)	(0.155)
Bachelor's Degree	−0.015	0.029	0.002	−0.051	−0.109	−0.222
	(0.036)	(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.072)	(0.067)	(0.152)
Currently in high school	−0.026	−0.075	−0.058	0.118	−0.201**	−0.191
	(0.046)	(0.098)	(0.092)	(0.099)	(0.086)	(0.186)
High School Diploma or GED	−0.013	−0.040	−0.010	−0.014	−0.185***	−0.235
	(0.037)	(0.068)	(0.066)	(0.074)	(0.068)	(0.149)
No High School	0.046	−0.077	−0.176	0.126	−0.131	−0.062
	(0.068)	(0.204)	(0.201)	(0.204)	(0.177)	(0.227)
Some college	−0.047	−0.039	−0.050	−0.037	−0.140**	−0.318**
	(0.037)	(0.070)	(0.067)	(0.074)	(0.067)	(0.150)
Some High School	−0.037	0.003	0.057	0.125	−0.086	−0.065
	(0.042)	(0.085)	(0.079)	(0.087)	(0.080)	(0.169)
Technical Certificate	−0.050	0.018	−0.119	−0.054	−0.102	−0.345*
	(0.049)	(0.112)	(0.108)	(0.115)	(0.103)	(0.208)
Employed	−0.011	0.003	0.084**	−0.017	0.012	0.096
	(0.017)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.040)	(0.033)	(0.065)
Income Q1	−0.036	−0.012	0.040	0.044	−0.002	0.027
	(0.026)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.046)	(0.104)
Income Q2	−0.040*	−0.027	−0.039	0.016	−0.020	−0.130
	(0.024)	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.044)	(0.097)
Income Q3	−0.059**	−0.019	−0.046	−0.001	−0.013	−0.139
	(0.025)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.047)	(0.101)
Income Not say	0.021	−0.043	−0.017	0.000	−0.045	−0.111
	(0.030)	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.068)	(0.056)	(0.123)
Green jobs index	−0.017***	−0.071***	−0.037***	−0.033***	−0.042***	−0.185***
	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.022)
Small adjustment	−0.006	0.053	0.075	0.004	−0.021	0.118
	(0.029)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.050)	(0.122)
Moderate adjustment	0.053**	0.132**	0.111**	0.094	−0.020	0.323***
	(0.027)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.045)	(0.114)
Large adjustment	0.000	0.034	0.095*	0.051	−0.005	0.153
	(0.026)	(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.045)	(0.114)
Youth sample	0.031	0.008	0.013	−0.143**	−0.024	−0.125
	(0.024)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.057)	(0.051)	(0.096)
Intercept	0.501***	0.710***	0.651***	0.621***	0.495***	0.578**
	(0.059)	(0.121)	(0.114)	(0.128)	(0.109)	(0.239)
Num.Obs.	1137	1037	1037	1037	1037	1137
R2 Adj.	0.060	0.088	0.027	0.014	0.097	0.141

Notes: HC2 standard errors. National youth sample. All outcomes are binary except for the index. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table 61: Linear regression of perceptions of local investment efficacy (scale outcomes) on the transparency treatment

	Local	Train	Train (Youth)	Detect	Account	Vote	Index
Transparency Treatment	0.025*	0.039	−0.068	0.057	0.086	0.266***	0.180***
	(0.014)	(0.051)	(0.076)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.051)	(0.056)
Transparency Treatment x Youth			0.198**				
			(0.100)				
Age	−0.001	−0.007***	−0.007***	0.002	−0.005**	−0.006**	−0.008***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Female	−0.010	−0.142***	−0.142***	−0.083	−0.058	0.083	−0.087
	(0.015)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.054)	(0.058)
Black	−0.023	−0.001	0.010	−0.195**	0.052	−0.047	−0.050
	(0.024)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.091)	(0.094)	(0.086)	(0.095)
Hispanic	−0.005	0.143**	0.149**	−0.101	0.055	−0.054	−0.008
	(0.019)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.074)	(0.076)	(0.069)	(0.073)
Republican	−0.059***	−0.266***	−0.264***	−0.076	−0.017	−0.527***	−0.377***
	(0.019)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.073)	(0.079)
Neither party	−0.044***	−0.194***	−0.195***	−0.128*	0.039	−0.291***	−0.281***
	(0.016)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.060)	(0.064)
Associate Degree	−0.079**	−0.109	−0.122	−0.098	−0.143	−0.283**	−0.340**
	(0.038)	(0.140)	(0.141)	(0.138)	(0.158)	(0.134)	(0.155)
Bachelor's Degree	−0.015	−0.056	−0.062	−0.116	−0.134	−0.168	−0.222
	(0.036)	(0.130)	(0.129)	(0.124)	(0.146)	(0.123)	(0.152)
Currently in high school	−0.026	−0.224	−0.242	−0.151	0.115	−0.232	−0.191
	(0.046)	(0.168)	(0.167)	(0.168)	(0.185)	(0.157)	(0.186)
High School Diploma or GED	−0.013	−0.161	−0.173	−0.143	−0.054	−0.386***	−0.235
	(0.037)	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.127)	(0.146)	(0.127)	(0.149)
No High School	0.046	−0.175	−0.191	−0.272	0.165	−0.170	−0.062
	(0.068)	(0.255)	(0.259)	(0.287)	(0.253)	(0.264)	(0.227)
Some college	−0.047	−0.185	−0.198	−0.198	−0.084	−0.296**	−0.318**
	(0.037)	(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.129)	(0.146)	(0.125)	(0.150)
Some High School	−0.037	−0.165	−0.180	0.061	0.188	−0.212	−0.065
	(0.042)	(0.155)	(0.154)	(0.152)	(0.168)	(0.145)	(0.169)
Technical Certificate	−0.050	−0.020	−0.030	−0.350	−0.251	−0.040	−0.345*
	(0.049)	(0.213)	(0.212)	(0.214)	(0.230)	(0.180)	(0.208)
Employed	−0.011	0.058	0.054	0.188***	0.028	0.001	0.096
	(0.017)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.064)	(0.065)
Income Q1	−0.036	0.012	0.012	−0.020	0.057	0.048	0.027
	(0.026)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.092)	(0.104)
Income Q2	−0.040*	−0.053	−0.048	−0.168*	−0.004	−0.040	−0.130
	(0.024)	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.088)	(0.097)
Income Q3	−0.059**	−0.055	−0.056	−0.203**	−0.038	0.011	−0.139
	(0.025)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.089)	(0.101)
Income Not say	0.021	−0.067	−0.056	−0.174	−0.126	−0.001	−0.111
	(0.030)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.120)	(0.121)	(0.108)	(0.123)
Green jobs index	−0.017***	−0.138***	−0.136***	−0.075***	−0.089***	−0.119***	−0.185***
	(0.005)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Youth sample	0.031	−0.034	−0.140	0.079	−0.269***	−0.068	−0.125
	(0.024)	(0.089)	(0.107)	(0.098)	(0.096)	(0.098)	(0.096)
Intercept	0.513***	3.034***	3.108***	3.006***	2.800***	3.462***	0.727***
	(0.053)	(0.187)	(0.194)	(0.196)	(0.212)	(0.199)	(0.217)
Num.Obs.	1137	1037	1037	1037	1037	1037	1137
R2 Adj.	0.060	0.117	0.119	0.035	0.023	0.133	0.141

Notes: HC2 standard errors. National youth sample. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

9.2.2 Moderating Effect of Local Media

Table 62: Moderating effect of local news presence on beliefs about accountability when there is transparency

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Transparency Treatment	−0.033	0.018	0.019
	(0.054)	(0.035)	(0.034)
Transparency Treatment x Local News (Objective)	0.111		
	(0.068)		
Local News (Objective)	−0.065		
	(0.053)		
Transparency Treatment x Local News (Subjective)		0.171	
		(0.105)	
Local News (Subjective)		−0.023	
		(0.075)	
Transparency Treatment x Local News (Objective and Subjective)			0.243**
			(0.118)
Local News (Objective and Subjective)			−0.087
			(0.081)
Age	−0.003	−0.003	−0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	−0.032	−0.019	−0.025
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Black	0.074	0.083	0.079
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)
Hispanic	0.012	0.010	0.010
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Republican	−0.011	−0.005	−0.009
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Neither party	−0.012	−0.008	−0.012
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Associate Degree	−0.075	−0.071	−0.069
	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.087)
Bachelor's Degree	−0.067	−0.063	−0.062
	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.078)
Currently in high school	0.085	0.103	0.102
	(0.108)	(0.107)	(0.107)
High School Diploma or GED	−0.016	−0.007	−0.010
	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.082)
No High School	0.154	0.163	0.156
	(0.215)	(0.212)	(0.213)
Some college	−0.048	−0.041	−0.044
	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)
Some High School	0.115	0.126	0.127
	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)
Technical Certificate	−0.064	−0.040	−0.046
	(0.126)	(0.124)	(0.125)
Green jobs index	−0.033***	−0.034***	−0.034***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Small adjustment	0.014	0.004	0.008
	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)
Moderate adjustment	0.095	0.087	0.090
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Large adjustment	0.055	0.047	0.049
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)
Youth sample	−0.111*	−0.107*	−0.105*
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Intercept	0.596***	0.537***	0.543***
	(0.202)	(0.196)	(0.199)
Num.Obs.	1037	1029	1032
R2 Adj.	0.012	0.015	0.015
State Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Income Control	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: HC1 standard errors. National youth sample. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$

9.2.3 Local Policymaker Results

Table 63: Effect of Transparency on Local Policymaker Beliefs about Green Job Creation

	Above Median (=1)			% Going to Locals		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Transparency Treatment	0.072^{+}	$0.059^{\dagger}$	$0.061^{\dagger}$	$3.177^{\dagger}$	2.464	2.581
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(2.216)	(2.190)	(2.135)
Age: 52 to 66 years		0.060	0.052		5.598^{+}	4.945^{+}
		(0.054)	(0.053)		(2.812)	(2.791)
Age: not say		−0.078	−0.047		−4.082	−4.580
		(0.095)	(0.105)		(5.833)	(6.491)
Age: over 67 years		0.024	−0.013		2.629	0.709
		(0.065)	(0.066)		(3.374)	(3.351)
Woman		0.005	−0.028		2.179	−0.057
		(0.045)	(0.046)		(2.515)	(2.525)
College (=1)		0.093^{+}	0.039		6.839*	4.442^{+}
		(0.045)	(0.047)		(2.315)	(2.419)
Minority (=1)		0.230*	0.157^{+}		9.273^{+}	5.178
		(0.069)	(0.069)		(4.125)	(4.075)
Municipality		−0.056	0.037		−1.232	2.608
		(0.054)	(0.071)		(2.742)	(3.582)
Township		$-0.101^{\dagger}$	0.018		−4.220	−0.032
		(0.072)	(0.078)		(3.978)	(4.233)
Fossil fuel sample	−0.044	−0.040	−0.011	$-3.589^{\dagger}$	−2.936	−1.739
	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.049)	(2.273)	(2.410)	(2.568)
Neither party			−0.185*			−10.879*
			(0.065)			(3.629)
Won't say party			−0.121			−1.459
			(0.145)			(10.983)
Republican			−0.191*			−10.823*
			(0.049)			(2.604)
2020 Biden vote share			−0.130			−6.328
			(0.170)			(9.190)
College share			0.090			9.730
			(0.173)			(9.528)
Population (log)			0.070*			2.970*
			(0.020)			(1.063)
Urban share			−0.036			−3.272
			(0.070)			(3.688)
Intercept	0.467*	0.405*	−0.090	32.737*	24.766*	6.001
	(0.032)	(0.081)	(0.219)	(1.769)	(4.079)	(10.984)
Num.Obs.	596	596	590	596	596	590
R2 Adj.	0.003	0.025	0.070	0.004	0.031	0.073

Notes: HC2 standard errors. p-values from one-sided hypothesis tests. $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$; $^{+}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.01$

10 Clawback Experiment

10.1 National Sample

Table 64: Linear Regression of the National Public's Likelihood of Voting for a Politician on the Clawback Provisions for Green Tax Credits Treatment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Clawback treatment	−0.126***	−0.114***	−0.126***	−0.126***
	(0.028)	(0.036)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Clawback treatment x Independent		−0.061		
		(0.079)		
Clawback treatment x Republican		0.001		
		(0.063)		
Clawback treatment x Green jobs index				−0.019
				(0.028)
Green jobs index	0.414***	0.413***	0.414***	0.424***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.027)
Government trust	0.083***	0.083***	0.074***	0.083***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.017)
Age	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	−0.089***	−0.089***	−0.089***	−0.089***
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Black	−0.032	−0.032	−0.032	−0.032
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.048)
Hispanic	−0.042	−0.042	−0.043	−0.041
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Republican	−0.149***	−0.150***	−0.149***	−0.148***
	(0.039)	(0.048)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Neither party	−0.227***	−0.196***	−0.227***	−0.227***
	(0.042)	(0.057)	(0.042)	(0.042)
College degree	0.041	0.041	0.041	0.041
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Employed	0.029	0.027	0.028	0.028
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Income Q1	−0.039	−0.040	−0.039	−0.038
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Income Q2	−0.043	−0.043	−0.043	−0.043
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Income Q3	−0.075*	−0.075*	−0.074*	−0.075*
	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.044)
Income Not say	−0.083	−0.084	−0.083	−0.083
	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)
Climate beliefs index	0.179***	0.180***	0.179***	0.179***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Intercept	3.275***	3.270***	3.275***	3.276***
	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.074)
Num.Obs.	2019	2019	2019	2019
R2 Adj.	0.509	0.509	0.509	0.509

Notes: HC2 standard errors. Qualtrics August 2022 sample. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$.

10.2 Local Policymaker Sample

Table 65: Linear Regression of Local Policymaker Support for Green Tax Credits on the Clawback Treatment

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Clawback Treatment	−0.166*	−0.147*	−0.139*
	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.084)
Transparency Treatment	−0.036	−0.057	−0.059
	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.083)
Age: 52 to 66 years		−0.025	−0.045
		(0.115)	(0.110)
Age: not say		−0.708***	−0.453*
		(0.207)	(0.239)
Age: over 67 years		0.016	−0.080
		(0.137)	(0.135)
Woman		0.054	−0.059
		(0.095)	(0.095)
College (=1)		0.020	−0.020
		(0.094)	(0.099)
Minority (=1)		0.579***	0.461***
		(0.139)	(0.137)
Municipality		0.006	0.041
		(0.107)	(0.142)
Township		−0.188	−0.116
		(0.151)	(0.169)
Fossil fuel sample	0.063	0.077	0.053
	(0.088)	(0.091)	(0.096)
Neither party			−0.805***
			(0.141)
Won't say party			−0.880**
			(0.357)
Republican			−0.546***
			(0.102)
2020 Biden vote share			−0.437
			(0.357)
College share			−0.117
			(0.351)
Population (log)			0.008
			(0.045)
Urban share			0.042
			(0.141)
Intercept	2.784***	2.779***	3.332***
	(0.083)	(0.178)	(0.455)
Num.Obs.	608	608	601
R2 Adj.	0.002	0.041	0.106

Notes: HC2 standard errors. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$.

11 Chapter 9

11.1 Government Commitment to Climate Finance



Figure 14: National public perceptions of the government's commitment to climate finance for developing countries. The question asked, "If the US Federal government commits to sending resources to developing countries to help combat climate change, how likely is it that they will fulfill this commitment?" Sample of the national public with Qualtrics ($N = 2019$).

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