# Supplementary Appendix to Social Preferences: Measuring Private, Public and Group Preferences through focus groups

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# 1 Ethics, Crime and Punishments

One crime narrative is about rape, another about wife-beating, and another about theft.[1] Each is an example of a crime punishable under Congolese law.

As in any research involving vulnerable populations and particularly on a subject of violence against women, it is important to take precautions to protect human subjects at each stage of the research process. In addition to standard IRB human subjects protocols for participant recruitment, informed consent (with open communication that participants may opt out of the research at any point during the focus group), no deception, and confidentiality; research procedures were built around the following ethical guidelines.

Participants were never asked direct questions about experiences of rape or wife-beating. If discussion of ongoings in the community came up, participants were encouraged to leave the discussion anonymous. All questions about crimes were based on hypothetical rather than real scenarios, formulated to reflect commonly perpetrated crimes in the context.

In addition, the research focus was on punishment and what should be done in communities to respond to such crimes - emphasizing avenues of agency and support rather that the harm or victimhood. The protocols clearly informed the participants of the subject matter prior to their agreement to engage in the study and communicated to respondents that there was always an option to leave/opt out of the focus group or interview (or not respond) at any time.

In accordance with ethical guidelines for research on violence against women, I also chose not to hold focus groups with men and women together. A male enumerator led all discussions

[1] In the few focus groups that enumerators presented the crimes in an order other than the randomization, the order that was actually implemented is coded.

with men and a female enumerator led all discussions with women.

Finally, this research sought to be highly inclusive for recruiting participants. The study is able to incorporate unlettered populations, particularly through the use of images for respondents to use when selecting their responses. Second, village chiefs were specifically tasked with identifying individuals from lower and upper strata of society to be included as potential participants.

Focus group participants were also asked to to keep points raised by other participants during the focus group confidential. Research participants were offered a small refreshment during the focus group, but were not compensated monetarily. This decision reflects standard practice for research in South Kivu DRC, which I discussed in depth with scholars working in this area and with a local professional research organization (organization and individuals recognized in the Acknowledgements of the main paper) that helped to inform this research protocol. Substantial information about ethical decision-making about focus group content is included in the main text of this article.

It should be emphasized that this study uses a highly standard form of inquiry (focus groups) that includes a novel quantitative measurement about hypothetical crimes at the outset from which the quantitative measures described in this study are drawn. This project was approved by the International Review Board (redacted) and conforms to the "Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research" (American Political Science Association 2020) despite having been implemented prior to this specific guidance.

## 2 Village Selection Protocol

The 20 villages in which the 80 focus group took place were selected systematically, based on household surveys and leader surveys administered in 2011 and 2015. The original survey sample was of one of the largest community development programs in eastern DR Congo, notable for its breadth and inclusion of hard to reach villages. Since research efforts

(particularly focus groups) tend to cluster near a few large cities, this study comes closer to the actual distribution of villages in DR Congo.[2]

Despite its breadth, the sample is also weighted more towards villages recently exposed to armed conflict than the typical villages in South Kivu, DR Congo. Because of its relationship to a study designed to compare conflict and non-conflict villages through a matched pair design, an optimal algorithm was employed to match all villages that had been exposed to armed conflict in the past 5 years with villages that had not. 10 matched pairs were then randomly selected from the full set of matched pairs. Thus the selection - while weighted towards more conflict exposed villages - also has a random component that helps to approximate representativeness not often seen in studies with small samples in which focus groups often appear (e.g. or 20 villages).

The following characteristics (as measured in 2011) are summarized at the village level and employed in the matching specification. Several village-level variables relate to the treatment of women: attitudes towards women's equality, attitudes towards mistreatment of women, and levels of domestic and sexual violence (as measured in list experiments). These measures help to account for how gender inequality and gender-related violence might predict armed conflict exposure as well as social sanctioning.[3] Community trust and ethnic fractionalization may indicate pre-existing divisions within communities that increase the likelihood of war exposure and decrease the potential for social sanctioning. I construct local measures of ethnic fractionalization based on local demographic data from the 2011 survey, a local measure based on the extent to which community members trust coethnics, and a comparison measure of trust in non-coethnics. International development programming, widespread in eastern DR Congo, may affect both whether a community is targeted and how communities prefer to

[2]Detailed information on this survey and the sample can be found in Humphreys et al. (2019).

[3]Empirical analyses have suggested that gender inequality and conflict exposure are statistically related (Caprioli 2005).

punish crimes.[4] I include an indicator for whether the village did or did not receive the IRC's (randomly implemented) community driven development program in the matching algorithm. Finally, I incorporate a set of variables that the literature establishes as important predictors of armed conflict such as a locally relevant measures of wealth, security perceptions, exposure to previous war, and proximity to conflict-relevant geography such as mines, forests and mountains.

Covariate balance is achieved or substantively improved along many important dimensions: in terms of violence against women, attitudes towards women, community trust, and several geographic variables. I retain all variables in the original matching algorithm for transparency.

From the set of matched pairs, 10 pairs are randomly selected. The balance table below summarizes the characteristics that villages were matched on and checks for difference on those characteristics between treatment and control villages.

[4]For example, if armed groups know the IRC is working in a village, more repercussions may result from harmful attacks.

Table A.1: 2011 Covariate Means on Matched Variables in Final 20 subset

| | Min | Max | Mean (NC) | Mean (C) | Diff | P(Diff) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gender Attitudes | 1.800 | 3.800 | 2.770 | 3.090 | 0.320 | 0.286 |
| Mistreat Women | 1.800 | 3.800 | 2.535 | 2.737 | 0.202 | 0.460 |
| Tolerate VAW | 1.200 | 3.800 | 2.075 | 2.320 | 0.245 | 0.488 |
| Domestic Violence | -1.333 | 1.500 | -0.055 | 0.192 | 0.247 | 0.473 |
| Sexual Violence | -1.000 | 1.667 | 0.630 | 0.353 | -0.277 | 0.340 |
| No Income | 0.000 | 1.000 | 0.584 | 0.643 | 0.060 | 0.640 |
| Coethnic trust | 0.400 | 2.800 | 1.270 | 1.323 | 0.053 | 0.848 |
| Trust Coethnics More | 0.000 | 1.000 | 0.450 | 0.493 | 0.043 | 0.759 |
| Stolen Bike (security) | 0.333 | 4.000 | 2.038 | 2.078 | 0.040 | 0.942 |
| Wealth PCA1 | -1.280 | 2.190 | 0.264 | 0.405 | 0.140 | 0.774 |
| Wealth PCA2 | -2.605 | -1.012 | -1.778 | -1.561 | 0.217 | 0.323 |
| Wealth PCA3 | -1.536 | 1.378 | -0.238 | -0.273 | -0.035 | 0.921 |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | 0.000 | 0.700 | 0.289 | 0.270 | -0.019 | 0.878 |
| Forest | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | NaN |
| Mountains | 0.000 | 1.000 | 0.600 | 0.700 | 0.100 | 0.660 |
| Mine | 0.000 | 1.000 | 0.100 | 0.100 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
| Tuungane Intervention | 0.000 | 1.000 | 0.100 | 0.400 | 0.300 | 0.138 |

# 3 Descriptive Statistics of Variables

The following control variables are used.

Table A.2: Summary Characteristics of All Participants

| | MIN | MAX | N | MEAN | SD |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Age | 18 | 100 | 995 | 36.67 | 15.60 |
| Education | 0 | 3 | 994 | 1.24 | 1.01 |
| Years in Village (Categorical) | 1 | 4 | 995 | 3.24 | 0.93 |
| Frequency Meeting Others | 1 | 4 | 995 | 3.49 | 0.84 |
| Homogeneous Subgroup | 0 | 1 | 995 | 0.60 | 0.49 |
| Village-level Armed Violence (5 yrs) | 0 | 1 | 995 | 0.51 | 0.50 |
| Rape: Crime Order | 1 | 3 | 995 | 2.06 | 0.83 |
| Domestic Violence: Crime Order | 1 | 3 | 995 | 1.92 | 0.79 |
| Theft: Crime Order | 1 | 3 | 995 | 2.02 | 0.83 |

Table A.3: Summary Characteristics of Female and Male Participants

| | N(F) | MEAN(F) | SD(F) | N(M) | MEAN(M) | SD(M) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Age | 537 | 33.67 | 13.61 | 458 | 40.19 | 17.01 |
| Education | 537 | 0.99 | 0.97 | 457 | 1.54 | 0.96 |
| Years in Village (Categorical) | 537 | 2.89 | 0.93 | 458 | 3.66 | 0.74 |
| Frequency Meeting Others | 537 | 3.36 | 0.97 | 458 | 3.64 | 0.62 |
| Homogeneous Subgroup | 537 | 0.65 | 0.48 | 458 | 0.54 | 0.50 |
| Village-level Armed Violence (5 yrs) | 537 | 0.49 | 0.50 | 458 | 0.53 | 0.50 |
| Rape: Crime Order | 537 | 2.06 | 0.86 | 458 | 2.07 | 0.78 |
| Domestic Violence: Crime Order | 537 | 1.85 | 0.75 | 458 | 1.99 | 0.83 |
| Theft: Crime Order | 537 | 2.09 | 0.82 | 458 | 1.94 | 0.84 |

Table A.4: Preference Variables for All Participants

| | MIN | MAX | N | MEAN | SD |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Punishment Preferences: Rape** | | | | | |
| Private | 1 | 4.00 | 993 | 3.18 | 1.22 |
| Public | 1 | 4.00 | 993 | 3.28 | 1.16 |
| Group | 1 | 4.00 | 993 | 3.55 | 0.97 |
| Post-FG Private | 1 | 4.00 | 993 | 3.33 | 1.15 |
| **Punishment Preferences: Wifebeating** | | | | | |
| Private | 1 | 4.00 | 993 | 1.91 | 1.23 |
| Public | 1 | 4.00 | 993 | 1.93 | 1.25 |
| Group | 1 | 4.00 | 993 | 1.73 | 1.15 |
| Post-FG Private | 1 | 4.00 | 993 | 1.85 | 1.23 |
| **Punishment Preferences: Theft** | | | | | |
| Private | 1 | 4.00 | 993 | 2.92 | 1.24 |
| Public | 1 | 4.00 | 993 | 2.94 | 1.23 |
| Group | 1 | 4.00 | 993 | 3.09 | 1.16 |
| Post-FG Private | 1 | 4.00 | 993 | 2.99 | 1.21 |
| **Preference Distance: Rape** | | | | | |
| Private | 0 | 2.80 | 993 | 0.80 | 0.65 |
| Post-Disc Private | 0 | 2.80 | 993 | 0.64 | 0.65 |
| **Preference Distance: Wifebeating** | | | | | |
| Private | 0 | 2.81 | 993 | 0.86 | 0.65 |
| Post-Disc Private | 0 | 2.80 | 993 | 0.77 | 0.67 |
| **Preference Distance: Theft** | | | | | |
| Private | 0 | 2.81 | 993 | 0.87 | 0.59 |
| Post-Disc Private | 0 | 2.75 | 993 | 0.75 | 0.60 |

Table A.5: Preference Variables for Female and Male Participants

| | N(F) | MEAN(F) | SD(F) | N(M) | MEAN(M) | SD(M) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Punishment Preferences: Rape** | | | | | | |
| Private | 537 | 3.21 | 1.23 | 456 | 3.13 | 1.20 |
| Public | 537 | 3.26 | 1.20 | 456 | 3.31 | 1.11 |
| Group | 537 | 3.55 | 1.01 | 456 | 3.56 | 0.92 |
| Post-FG Private | 537 | 3.36 | 1.16 | 456 | 3.31 | 1.13 |
| **Punishment Preferences: Wifebeating** | | | | | | |
| Private | 537 | 1.79 | 1.21 | 456 | 2.04 | 1.24 |
| Public | 537 | 1.80 | 1.22 | 456 | 2.09 | 1.27 |
| Group | 537 | 1.56 | 1.05 | 456 | 1.94 | 1.23 |
| Post-FG Private | 537 | 1.68 | 1.16 | 456 | 2.05 | 1.28 |
| **Punishment Preferences: Theft** | | | | | | |
| Private | 537 | 2.83 | 1.28 | 456 | 3.03 | 1.19 |
| Public | 537 | 2.85 | 1.28 | 456 | 3.05 | 1.17 |
| Group | 537 | 2.88 | 1.22 | 456 | 3.33 | 1.03 |
| Post-FG Private | 537 | 2.86 | 1.27 | 456 | 3.15 | 1.13 |
| **Preference Distance: Rape** | | | | | | |
| Private | 537 | 0.76 | 0.67 | 456 | 0.85 | 0.62 |
| Post-Disc Private | 537 | 0.59 | 0.66 | 456 | 0.69 | 0.64 |
| **Preference Distance: Wifebeating** | | | | | | |
| Private | 537 | 0.86 | 0.66 | 456 | 0.85 | 0.63 |
| Post-Disc Private | 537 | 0.74 | 0.69 | 456 | 0.80 | 0.65 |
| **Preference Distance: Theft** | | | | | | |
| Private | 537 | 0.85 | 0.59 | 456 | 0.88 | 0.58 |
| Post-Disc Private | 537 | 0.77 | 0.61 | 456 | 0.73 | 0.60 |

# 4 Difference and Polarization by Gender

Figure 7 in the main paper is descriptive and includes no controls. To statistically test for differences between men and women and to account for the group nature in which the data was collected, I conduct an additional analysis where I combine (or stack) data from all outcomes and run one regression with several dichotomous indicators for whether the outcome is a private, a publicly expressed, a group, or a post discussion private preference. The base term for each coefficient is private preferences. When an interaction term is statistically significant, this means that it is statistically different from private preferences. Preferences

for punishing rape, wife-beating, and theft are depicted in Tables A.6-A.8. In each table, Model 1 includes individual-level fixed effects, Model 2 adds a control variable for the gender of the respondent, Model 3 adds an interaction term between the preference type and gender, and Model 4 adds individual-level fixed effects to Model 3.

The models in Table A.6 confirm what was presented descriptively in Figure 7. Publicly expressed, group choice and post discussion preferences for punishment are statistically different and more extreme than private preferences for punishing rape. Whether or not a respondent is male or female is not driving differences in how the public sphere affects private preferences for punishing rape.

Table A.7 confirms that group preferences for punishing wife-beating are statistically more extreme (less severe) than private preferences for punishing wife-beating. Models 2-4 in Table A.7 show that female respondents prefer less punishment for wife-beating across the board, but effects of the public sphere on preferences do not seem to be heterogeneous by gender.[5] Both men and women prefer to punish wife-beating less as groups.

[5]There is also a loss in power when examining the interactions.

Table A.6: Private versus Group Outcomes: Rape

| | Dependent Variable: Punishment Preferences | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Stacked Outcomes | | |
| | Ind.FEs | Female.Ctrl | Female.Het | All |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Public (base=Private) | 0.108** | 0.108** | 0.180*** | 0.180*** |
| | (0.050) | (0.043) | (0.056) | (0.065) |
| Group (base=Private) | 0.379*** | 0.379*** | 0.425*** | 0.425*** |
| | (0.098) | (0.085) | (0.106) | (0.122) |
| PostDisc Private (base=Private) | 0.159*** | 0.159*** | 0.175*** | 0.175** |
| | (0.057) | (0.049) | (0.067) | (0.078) |
| Female | | 0.014 | 0.077 | −0.188*** |
| | | (0.148) | (0.154) | (0.061) |
| Female x Public (base=Private) | | | −0.133 | −0.133 |
| | | | (0.091) | (0.105) |
| Female x Group (base=Private) | | | −0.087 | −0.087 |
| | | | (0.113) | (0.131) |
| Female x PostDisc Private (base=Private) | | | −0.030 | −0.030 |
| | | | (0.096) | (0.111) |
| Constant | 3.589*** | 3.168*** | 3.134*** | 3.805*** |
| | (0.041) | (0.106) | (0.109) | (0.046) |
| Indiv. Fixed Effects? | Yes | No | No | Yes |
| Observations | 3,972 | 3,972 | 3,972 | 3,972 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.495 | 0.014 | 0.014 | 0.495 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)

Table A.7: Private versus Group Outcomes: Wifebeating

| | Dependent Variable: Punishment Preferences | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Stacked Outcomes | | |
| | Ind.FEs | Female.Ctrl | Female.Het | All |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Public (base=Private) | 0.029 | 0.029 | 0.053 | 0.053 |
| | (0.041) | (0.035) | (0.047) | (0.054) |
| Group (base=Private) | −0.172** | −0.172** | −0.101 | −0.101 |
| | (0.080) | (0.069) | (0.099) | (0.114) |
| PostDisc Private (base=Private) | −0.053 | −0.053 | 0.011 | 0.011 |
| | (0.069) | (0.060) | (0.064) | (0.073) |
| Female | | −0.326*** | −0.252** | −2.926*** |
| | | (0.123) | (0.123) | (0.068) |
| Female x Public (base=Private) | | | −0.043 | −0.043 |
| | | | (0.074) | (0.086) |
| Female x Group (base=Private) | | | −0.132 | −0.132 |
| | | | (0.121) | (0.140) |
| Female x PostDisc Private (base=Private) | | | −0.119 | −0.119 |
| | | | (0.097) | (0.112) |
| Constant | 1.049*** | 2.081*** | 2.042*** | 4.009*** |
| | (0.043) | (0.124) | (0.119) | (0.049) |
| Indiv. Fixed Effects? | Yes | No | No | Yes |
| Observations | 3,972 | 3,972 | 3,972 | 3,972 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.504 | 0.021 | 0.021 | 0.505 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)

Table A.8: Private versus Group Outcomes: Theft

| | Dependent Variable: Punishment Preferences | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Stacked Outcomes | | |
| | Ind.FEs | Female.Ctrl | Female.Het | All |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Public (base=Private) | 0.021 | 0.021 | 0.022 | 0.022 |
| | (0.034) | (0.029) | (0.060) | (0.069) |
| Group (base=Private) | 0.164** | 0.164** | 0.298*** | 0.298*** |
| | (0.083) | (0.072) | (0.067) | (0.078) |
| PostDisc Private (base=Private) | 0.070 | 0.070 | 0.125** | 0.125** |
| | (0.055) | (0.047) | (0.051) | (0.058) |
| Female | | −0.282** | −0.194 | −0.662*** |
| | | (0.144) | (0.135) | (0.069) |
| Female x Public (base=Private) | | | −0.001 | −0.001 |
| | | | (0.102) | (0.117) |
| Female x Group (base=Private) | | | −0.248** | −0.248** |
| | | | (0.109) | (0.126) |
| Female x PostDisc Private (base=Private) | | | −0.101 | −0.101 |
| | | | (0.070) | (0.080) |
| Constant | 3.186*** | 3.076*** | 3.029*** | 3.889*** |
| | (0.035) | (0.091) | (0.095) | (0.041) |
| Indiv. Fixed Effects? | Yes | No | No | Yes |
| Observations | 3,972 | 3,972 | 3,972 | 3,972 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.533 | 0.015 | 0.016 | 0.535 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)

# 5 Determinants of Post-Discussion Preferences

Table A.9: Determinants of Post Discussion Private Preferences

| | Dependent Variable: Punishment Preferences | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Rape | Wifebeating | Theft |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Rape: Private | 0.466*** | | |
| | (0.163) | | |
| Rape: Private x Group | −0.050 | | |
| | (0.049) | | |
| Rape: Group | 0.479*** | | |
| | (0.132) | | |
| DV: Private | | 0.149** | |
| | | (0.069) | |
| DV: Private x Group | | 0.053** | |
| | | (0.026) | |
| DV: Group | | 0.271** | |
| | | (0.105) | |
| Theft: Private | | | 0.242* |
| | | | (0.131) |
| Theft: Private x Group | | | 0.015 |
| | | | (0.034) |
| Theft: Group | | | 0.375*** |
| | | | (0.088) |
| Female | −0.064 | 0.229 | −0.896*** |
| | (0.111) | (0.223) | (0.154) |
| Education | 0.038 | 0.050 | −0.070* |
| | (0.025) | (0.045) | (0.041) |
| Freq. of Meeting others | 0.001 | 0.029 | 0.081 |
| | (0.044) | (0.099) | (0.089) |
| Homogenous Subgroup | 0.099** | −0.121 | 0.073 |
| | (0.041) | (0.095) | (0.087) |
| Years in Village (Categorical) | −0.024 | −0.010 | −0.042 |
| | (0.036) | (0.051) | (0.043) |
| Armed Conflict in Village (5 yrs) | 1.152*** | −0.217** | 0.054 |
| | (0.113) | (0.110) | (0.064) |
| Crime Order: Rape | 0.409*** | | |
| | (0.044) | | |
| Crime Order: DV | | 0.078 | |
| | | (0.072) | |
| Crime Order: Theft | | | 0.536*** |
| | | | (0.029) |
| Focus Group Fixed Effects? (N=79) | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 992 | 992 | 992 |
| $R^2$ | 0.528 | 0.478 | 0.554 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.484 | 0.429 | 0.513 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the Village level (20)

Table A.10: Determinants of Post Discussion Private Preferences (Divided Data)

| | Dependent Variable: Punishment Preferences | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Rape | | Wifebeating | | Theft | |
| | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Rape: Private | 0.598*** | 0.386* | | | | |
| | (0.180) | (0.226) | | | | |
| Rape: Private x Group | −0.069 | −0.046 | | | | |
| | (0.049) | (0.064) | | | | |
| Rape: Group | 0.584*** | 0.449** | | | | |
| | (0.114) | (0.178) | | | | |
| DV: Private | | | 0.332*** | 0.036 | | |
| | | | (0.120) | (0.072) | | |
| DV: Private x Group | | | −0.011 | 0.095*** | | |
| | | | (0.041) | (0.036) | | |
| DV: Group | | | 0.392** | 0.201* | | |
| | | | (0.154) | (0.108) | | |
| Theft: Private | | | | | 0.466** | 0.155 |
| | | | | | (0.190) | (0.153) |
| Theft: Private x Group | | | | | −0.025 | 0.016 |
| | | | | | (0.052) | (0.046) |
| Theft: Group | | | | | 0.468*** | 0.385*** |
| | | | | | (0.154) | (0.135) |
| Education | 0.022 | 0.051 | 0.049 | 0.057 | −0.040 | −0.088** |
| | (0.045) | (0.054) | (0.088) | (0.044) | (0.065) | (0.035) |
| Freq. of Meeting others | 0.085 | −0.047 | 0.209 | −0.054 | 0.194 | 0.005 |
| | (0.065) | (0.050) | (0.157) | (0.119) | (0.130) | (0.093) |
| Homogenous Subgroup | 0.095 | 0.124 | −0.236 | −0.020 | 0.098 | 0.046 |
| | (0.069) | (0.091) | (0.146) | (0.107) | (0.099) | (0.120) |
| Years in Village (Categorical) | −0.006 | −0.036 | 0.044 | −0.037 | −0.043 | −0.044 |
| | (0.064) | (0.054) | (0.088) | (0.060) | (0.083) | (0.057) |
| Armed Conflict in Village (5 yrs) | 0.090** | 1.261*** | 0.193 | −0.325* | 0.248* | 0.039 |
| | (0.037) | (0.151) | (0.169) | (0.166) | (0.129) | (0.079) |
| Crime Order: Rape | 0.349*** | 0.391*** | | | | |
| | (0.054) | (0.043) | | | | |
| Crime Order: DV | | | 0.229*** | 0.233** | | |
| | | | (0.070) | (0.094) | | |
| Crime Order: Theft | | | | | −0.165* | 0.587*** |
| | | | | | (0.093) | (0.039) |
| Focus Group Fixed Effects? (N=79) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 455 | 537 | 455 | 537 | 455 | 537 |
| $R^2$ | 0.512 | 0.551 | 0.519 | 0.430 | 0.559 | 0.552 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.458 | 0.509 | 0.467 | 0.377 | 0.511 | 0.510 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the Village level (20)

# 6 Determinants of Preference Convergence

Table A.11: Private versus Post-FG Preference Distance: Rape

| | Dependent Variable: Distance from Mean FG Preference | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Stacked Outcomes | | | |
| | Ind.FEs | All.Ctrl | Female.Het.1 | Female.Het.2 |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| PostDisc Private (base=Private) | −0.162*** | −0.164*** | −0.155** | −0.159*** |
| | (0.059) | (0.041) | (0.076) | (0.053) |
| Female x PostDisc Private (base=Private) | | | −0.013 | −0.009 |
| | | | (0.105) | (0.074) |
| Female | | −0.114 | −0.668*** | −0.101 |
| | | (0.084) | (0.157) | (0.136) |
| Armed Conflict in Village (5 yrs) | | −0.077 | | −0.077 |
| | | (0.122) | | (0.122) |
| Education | | −0.070*** | | −0.070*** |
| | | (0.026) | | (0.026) |
| Freq. of Meeting others | | 0.033 | | 0.033 |
| | | (0.053) | | (0.053) |
| Homogenous Subgroup | | −0.045 | | −0.045 |
| | | (0.032) | | (0.032) |
| Years in Village (Categorical) | | 0.009 | | 0.009 |
| | | (0.030) | | (0.030) |
| Crime Order | | −0.063 | | −0.063 |
| | | (0.050) | | (0.050) |
| Constant | 0.709*** | 1.163*** | 1.386*** | 1.156*** |
| | (0.088) | (0.271) | (0.114) | (0.283) |
| Indiv. Fixed Effects? | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Observations | 1,986 | 1,984 | 1,986 | 1,984 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.470 | 0.041 | 0.470 | 0.041 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)

Table A.12: Private versus Post-FG Preference Distance: Wifebeating

| | Dependent Variable: Distance from Mean FG Preference | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Stacked Outcomes | | | |
| | Ind.FEs | All.Ctrl | Female.Het.1 | Female.Het.2 |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| PostDisc Private (base=Private) | −0.086 | −0.086* | −0.055 | −0.054 |
| | (0.067) | (0.048) | (0.065) | (0.046) |
| Female x PostDisc Private (base=Private) | | | −0.057 | −0.058 |
| | | | (0.105) | (0.075) |
| Female | | −0.037 | −0.314** | 0.050 |
| | | (0.065) | (0.158) | (0.106) |
| Armed Conflict in Village (5 yrs) | | −0.073 | | −0.073 |
| | | (0.113) | | (0.113) |
| Education | | 0.011 | | 0.011 |
| | | (0.023) | | (0.023) |
| Freq. of Meeting others | | −0.042 | | −0.042 |
| | | (0.043) | | (0.043) |
| Homogenous Subgroup | | 0.002 | | 0.002 |
| | | (0.040) | | (0.040) |
| Years in Village (Categorical) | | −0.011 | | −0.011 |
| | | (0.024) | | (0.024) |
| Crime Order | | 0.026 | | 0.026 |
| | | (0.064) | | (0.064) |
| Constant | 0.229** | 1.113*** | 0.583*** | 1.066*** |
| | (0.101) | (0.163) | (0.097) | (0.161) |
| Indiv. Fixed Effects? | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Observations | 1,986 | 1,984 | 1,986 | 1,984 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.377 | 0.009 | 0.377 | 0.009 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)

Table A.13: Private versus Post-FG Preference Distance: Theft

| | Dependent Variable: Distance from Mean FG Preference | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Stacked Outcomes | | | |
| | Ind.FEs | All.Ctrl | Female.Het.1 | Female.Het.2 |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| PostDisc Private (base=Private) | −0.111** | −0.111*** | −0.144** | −0.144*** |
| | (0.048) | (0.034) | (0.068) | (0.048) |
| Female x PostDisc Private (base=Private) | | | 0.062 | 0.062 |
| | | | (0.086) | (0.061) |
| Female | | −0.016 | −0.006 | −0.108 |
| | | (0.060) | (0.129) | (0.089) |
| Armed Conflict in Village (5 yrs) | | −0.104 | | −0.104 |
| | | (0.064) | | (0.064) |
| Education | | −0.021 | | −0.021 |
| | | (0.019) | | (0.019) |
| Freq. of Meeting others | | 0.003 | | 0.003 |
| | | (0.049) | | (0.049) |
| Homogenous Subgroup | | 0.006 | | 0.006 |
| | | (0.037) | | (0.037) |
| Years in Village (Categorical) | | −0.023 | | −0.023 |
| | | (0.026) | | (0.026) |
| Crime Order | | −0.075** | | −0.075** |
| | | (0.032) | | (0.032) |
| Constant | 1.100*** | 1.275*** | 1.063*** | 1.325*** |
| | (0.072) | (0.179) | (0.102) | (0.188) |
| Indiv. Fixed Effects? | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Observations | 1,986 | 1,984 | 1,986 | 1,984 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.359 | 0.027 | 0.360 | 0.027 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)

# 7 Focus Group Crimes and Punishments

## 7.1 Crime Construction and Comparability

All feature hypothetical local men (from the village) as perpetrators. To avoid the crime of rape being understood as a mistake by a disadvantaged youth, perpetrators of rape and wife-beating were both identified as married men. Theft and the crime of rape were also rendered comparable. Reflecting the context, two goats are stolen in the theft scenario, which is a low but accepted bride price; this is similar in value to a reparations payment owed to a family whose unmarried daughter is raped. The victimized woman is hospitalized in the stories about rape and wife-beating, suggesting that both acts resulted in physical harm. The families also bring forward the complaints.

## 7.2 Punishment Construction and Context

The "fellow villager" giving counsel is usually a male or female "elder" or "sage" in the community, an informal counsel that assists the village chief with local advising and conflict resolution. Village chiefs must work with police to send perpetrators of these crimes to jail, but 20 years is the official legal punishment for rape and is often pursued. Vigilante justice such as expulsion from the community and beating to death do occur. One role that several village chiefs describe is that they protect criminals from beating to death by angered populations.

# 8 References

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