Online Appendix:

Robustness Checks for:

"Trade Balance and Policy Complexity: Explaining Political Elites' Focus on International Trade at the Domestic Level"

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Data Descriptions

Table 1 reports the precise countries and years that, given data limitations, were included in the final analysis reported in the paper. There are fifty-three countries, with election years spanning from 1960 through 2014.

Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the key variables. Tables 3 through 8 then report the descriptive statistics for these variables broken out by decade. These tables help to illustrate how these variables change over time.

Table 1: Country-Years included in the analysis (given data limitations)

Country	Years	Country	Years
Albania	1991–2001	Lithuania	1996–2012
Armenia	1995–2012	Luxembourg	1964–2013
Australia	1961–2013	Macedonia	1994–2014
Austria	1962–2013	Malta	1996–1998
Azerbaijan	1995–2000	Mexico	1961–2012
Belarus	1995	Moldova	1998–2014
Belgium	1961–2010	Montenegro	2006–2012
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1996–2014	Netherlands	1963–2012
Bulgaria	1990–2014	New Zealand	1960–2014
Canada	1962–2011	Norway	1961–2009
Croatia	1995–2011	Poland	1991–2011
Cyprus	1996–2011	Portugal	1975–2011
Czech Republic	1996–2013	Romania	1990–2012
Denmark	1960–2011	Russia	1993–2011
Estonia	1995–2011	Slovakia	1994–2012
Finland	1962–2011	Slovenia	1996–2011
France	1962–2012	South Africa	1994–2014
Georgia	1992–2012	South Korea	1992–2012
Germany	1972–2013	Spain	1977–2011
Greece	1974–2012	Sri Lanka	1960–1977
Hungary	1994–2014	Sweden	1960–2014
Iceland	1960–2013	Switzerland	1963–2011
Ireland	1961–2011	Turkey	1961–2011
Israel	1961–2013	Ukraine	1994–2007
Italy	1963–2013	United Kingdom	1964–2010
Japan	1960–2014	United States	1960–2012
Latvia	1995–2014		

Table 2: Overall descriptive statistics of key variables

Variable	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Overall focus on trade	.70	1.49	0	27.9
Focus on free trade	.26	.84	0	18.18
Focus on protectionism	.44	1.24	0	27.9
Overall trade (percent of GDP)	.55	.31	.03	1.69
Trade surplus (percent of GDP)	-.04	.10	-.68	.39
Trade deficit (percent of GDP)	.04	.10	-.39	.68
Trade policy complexity	1.44	.88	0	3.32
Left-right party ideology	4.90	1.13	1.29	9.59
GDP (ln)	11.48	1.96	5.52	16.74

Table 3: Descriptive statistics of key variables: 1960s

Variable	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Overall focus on trade	1.06	2.22	0	27.9
Focus on free trade	.40	.86	0	4.9
Focus on protectionism	.66	2.11	0	27.9
Overall trade (percent of GDP)	.33	.16	.06	.73
Trade surplus (percent of GDP)	-.02	.03	-.10	.07
Trade deficit (percent of GDP)	.02	.03	-.07	.10
Trade policy complexity	.82	.63	0	1.86
Left-right party ideology	4.67	1.26	1.60	8.57
GDP (ln)	9.55	1.49	5.52	13.76

Table 4: Descriptive statistics of key variables: 1970s

Variable	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Overall focus on trade	.46	1.05	0	8.6
Focus on free trade	.10	.31	0	2.74
Focus on protectionism	.36	1.01	0	8.6
Overall trade (percent of GDP)	.39	.21	.03	.99
Trade surplus (percent of GDP)	-.03	.04	-.10	.05
Trade deficit (percent of GDP)	.03	.04	-.05	.10
Trade policy complexity	.86	.40	0	1.38
Left-right party ideology	4.70	1.20	1.29	9.11
GDP (ln)	10.83	1.42	6.49	14.45

Table 5: Descriptive statistics of key variables: 1980s

Variable	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Overall focus on trade	.47	1.03	0	9.63
Focus on free trade	.22	.76	0	9.63
Focus on protectionism	.25	67	0	4.55
Overall trade (percent of GDP)	.45	.26	.03	1.20
Trade surplus (percent of GDP)	-.01	.04	-.13	.08
Trade deficit (percent of GDP)	.01	.04	-.08	.13
Trade policy complexity	1.01	.41	0	2.16
Left-right party ideology	4.94	1.21	1.79	8.45
GDP (ln)	11.64	1.38	7.91	15.47

Table 6: Descriptive statistics of key variables: 1990s

Variable	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Overall focus on trade	.76	1.43	0	10.72
Focus on free trade	.31	.83	0	7.32
Focus on protectionism	.45	1.12	0	10.64
Overall trade (percent of GDP)	.52	.26	.03	1.46
Trade surplus (percent of GDP)	-.04	.12	-.68	.25
Trade deficit (percent of GDP)	.04	.12	-.25	.68
Trade policy complexity	1.40	.73	0	2.58
Left-right party ideology	5.18	1.02	2.27	9.55
GDP (ln)	11.22	2.00	6.56	15.91

Table 7: Descriptive statistics of key variables: 2000s

Variable	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Overall focus on trade	.57	1.30	0	19.17
Focus on free trade	.22	.57	0	5.33
Focus on protectionism	.35	1.14	0	19.17
Overall trade (percent of GDP)	.66	.29	.18	1.69
Trade surplus (percent of GDP)	-.06	.12	-.37	.37
Trade deficit (percent of GDP)	.06	.12	-.37	.37
Trade policy complexity	2.11	.41	0	23.20
Left-right party ideology	4.84	1.00	1.59	8.63
GDP (ln)	11.88	2.03	7.06	16.50

Table 8: Descriptive statistics of key variables: 2010s

Variable	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Overall focus on trade	.80	1.74	0	18.18
Focus on free trade	.28	.1.17	0	18.18
Focus on protectionism	.52	1.36	0	17.44
Overall trade (percent of GDP)	.79	.38	.24	1.63
Trade surplus (percent of GDP)	-.04	.12	-.52	.39
Trade deficit (percent of GDP)	.04	.12	-.39	.52
Trade policy complexity	2.43	.26	1.37	3.32
Left-right party ideology	4.65	1.01	1.83	9.59
GDP (ln)	12.50	1.82	8.32	16.74

Robustness Checks

Tables 9 through 14, and Figures 1 through 14 report the results of robustness checks of the results discussed in the paper.

Figures 1 and 2 (corresponding to Models 5 and 6 in the paper) illustrate the marginal effects of an increase in a state's trade surplus or trade deficit, respectively. These figures are drawn from the models using country fixed effects in the paper, and correspond to Figures 1 and 2 in the paper.

Models 1A-3A (reported in Table 9) re-run Models 1-3 in the paper including time trend indicators. Figures 3 and 4 then analyze the marginal effects associated with the interactions presented in Models 2A and 3A, respectively.

Models 1B-3B (reported in Table 10) re-run Models 1-3 in the paper using WTO data to measure trade. The measure includes trade in both goods and services. Figures 5 and 6 then analyze the marginal effects associated with interactions presented in Models 2B and 3B, respectively.

Models 1C-3C (reported in Table 11) re-run Models 1-3 in the paper using UN Comtrade data to measure states' level of trade (and surpluses and deficits). The measure includes direct exports and imports of commodities. Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the marginal effects associated with the interaction terms in Models 2C and 3C.

Models 1D-3D (reported in Table 12) re-run Models 1-3 in the paper using an alternative measure of trade policy complexity. This measure draws on the index measure of trade agreement depth coded by the Design of Trade Agreements (DESTA) dataset (Dür, Baccini, and Elsig 2014). This is an additive index that combines seven key provisions that can be included in PTAs. The alternative measure of complexity that we employ here codes the average depth index across a state's trade agreements in a given year. Figures 9 and 10 analyze the marginal effects associated with the interactions presented in Models 2D and 3D, respectively.

Models 1E-3E (reported in Table 13) re-run Models 1-3 in the paper using country and year fixed effects. Figures 11 and 12 report the marginal effects associated with the interactions presented in Models 2E and 3E, respectively.

Models 1F-3F (reported in Table 14) re-run Models 1-3 in the paper using party fixed effects. Figures 13 and 14 show the marginal effects associated with the interactions presented in Models 2F and 3F, respectively.

The results of all of these models and figures provide additional empirical support for the results reported in the paper. As the models corresponding to Model 1 in the paper show, a state's overall level of trade is not positively correlated with the attention dedicated to issues of international trade in elites' party platforms. The models corresponding to Models 2 and 3 in the paper show that the interaction of surpluses with trade policy complexity and deficits with complexity are positively correlated with a focus on free trade and protectionism, respectively. These results are all consistent with those reported in the paper.

The figures provide further support for the results reported in the paper. Across all of the figures reported here that correspond to Figure 1 in the paper (i.e., those analyzing trade surpluses and a free trade focus), at low levels of trade policy complexity (at the left-hand side of the graphs), an increase in a state's trade surplus is not significantly correlated with attention dedicated to free trade. Similarly, across all of the figures reported here that correspond to Figure 2 in the paper (i.e., those analyzing trade deficits and a protectionist focus), an increase in a state's trade deficit is not significantly correlated with attention dedicated to protectionism. However, at higher levels of policy complexity (moving toward the right-hand side of the graphs), these correlations between surpluses and a free trade focus and between deficits and a protectionist focus become positive and statistically significant in all figures. These results are all consistent with those reported in the paper.



Figure 1: Marginal Effects of Increasing *Trade Surplus* on *Free Trade Focus* at Varying Levels of Policy Complexity (derived from Model 5 in the paper, which includes country fixed effects)
*95 percent confidence intervals indicated



Figure 2: Marginal Effects of Increasing *Trade Deficit* on *Protectionist Focus* at Varying Levels of Policy Complexity (derived from Model 6 in the paper, which includes country fixed effects)
*95 percent confidence intervals indicated

Table 9: Explaining the Way Political Elites Focus on Trade (including time trends)

Dependent variable:	**Model 1A** Focus on Trade Overall	**Model 2A** Focus on Free Trade	**Model 3A** Focus on Protectionism
Overall trade (percent of GDP)	-0.16	-0.12*	0.10
	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Trade surplus × complexity	-0.50*	0.37**	
	(0.26)	(0.14)	
Trade deficit × complexity			0.37**
			(0.15)
Trade surplus (percent of GDP)	1.20**	-0.29	
	(0.54)	(0.22)	
Trade deficit (percent of GDP)			-0.33
			(0.24)
Trade policy complexity	-0.16*	0.12**	-0.16**
	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Party left-to-right ideology	0.00	0.04**	-0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)
European Union state	-0.14**	0.02	0.07
	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.05)
GDP (ln)	-0.00	-0.02*	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Time	-0.15**	0.04	-0.02
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Time^2	0.00**	-0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Time^3	-0.00*	0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Percent of manifesto focused on trade		0.28**	0.66**
		(0.03)	(0.04)
Lagged dependent variable	0.37**	0.30**	0.13**
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.05)
Constant	2.93**	-0.60	0.37
	(0.90)	(0.42)	(0.45)
Observations	2602	2602	2602
R^2	0.15	0.40	0.71
Chi-squared	311.67	388.34	4762.09

Panel-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$



Figure 3: Marginal Effects of Increasing *Trade Surplus* on *Free Trade Focus* at Varying Levels of Policy Complexity (derived from Model 2A, which includes time trends)
*95 percent confidence intervals indicated



Figure 4: Marginal Effects of Increasing *Trade Deficit* on *Protectionist Focus* at Varying Levels of Policy Complexity (derived from Model 3A, which includes time trends)
*95 percent confidence intervals indicated

Table 10: Explaining the Way Political Elites Focus on Trade (WTO trade measure)

Dependent variable:	**Model 1B** Focus on Trade Overall	**Model 2B** Focus on Free Trade	**Model 3B** Focus on Protectionism
Overall trade (percent of GDP)	-0.23	-0.12	0.11
	(0.15)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Trade surplus × complexity	-0.14	0.20*	
	(0.22)	(0.11)	
Trade deficit × complexity			0.24**
			(0.09)
Trade surplus (percent of GDP)	0.38	0.23	
	(0.45)	(0.20)	
Trade deficit (percent of GDP)			0.11
			(0.12)
Trade policy complexity	0.04	0.06	-0.09**
	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Party left-to-right ideology	0.01	0.04**	-0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
European Union state	-0.23**	0.07	0.00
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)
GDP (ln)	0.01	-0.04**	0.04*
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Percent of manifesto		0.40**	0.53**
focused on trade		(0.06)	(0.07)
Lagged dependent variable	0.34**	0.26**	0.16**
	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.08)
Constant	0.47	0.21	-0.09
	(0.59)	(0.26)	(0.24)
Observations	1772	1772	1772
R^2	0.12	0.52	0.60
Chi-squared	73.20	188.78	543.91

Panel-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$



Figure 5: Marginal Effects of Increasing *Trade Surplus* on *Free Trade Focus* at Varying Levels of Policy Complexity (derived from Model 2B, which uses WTO trade measure)
*95 percent confidence intervals indicated



Figure 6: Marginal Effects of Increasing *Trade Deficit* on *Protectionist Focus* at Varying Levels of Policy Complexity (derived from Model 3B, which uses WTO trade measure)
*95 percent confidence intervals indicated

Table 11: Explaining the Way Political Elites Focus on Trade (using UNComtrade trade measure)

Dependent variable:	**Model 1C** Focus on Trade Overall	**Model 2C** Focus on Free Trade	**Model 3C** Focus on Protectionism
Overall trade (percent of GDP)	-0.23*	-0.13**	0.15**
	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Trade surplus × complexity	-0.36	0.53**	
	(0.48)	(0.26)	
Trade deficit × complexity			0.43*
			(0.26)
Trade surplus (percent of GDP)	0.86	-0.72	
	(0.99)	(0.56)	
Trade deficit (percent of GDP)			-0.44
			(0.56)
Trade policy complexity	0.05	0.11**	-0.11**
	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Party left-to-right ideology	0.00	0.04**	-0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
European Union state	-0.18**	0.01	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)
GDP (ln)	0.01	-0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Percent of manifesto focused on trade		0.34**	0.61**
		(0.04)	(0.05)
Lagged dependent variable	0.33**	0.21**	0.14**
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.04)
Constant	0.46	-0.13	0.05
	(0.30)	(0.14)	(0.13)
Observations	2440	2440	2440
R^2	0.14	0.42	0.66
Chi-squared	71.41	207.81	706.19

Panel-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$



Figure 7: Marginal Effects of Increasing *Trade Surplus* on *Free Trade Focus* at Varying Levels of Policy Complexity (derived from Model 2C, which uses UN Comtrade trade measure)
*95 percent confidence intervals indicated



Figure 8: Marginal Effects of Increasing *Trade Deficit* on *Protectionist Focus* at Varying Levels of Policy Complexity (derived from Model 3C, which uses UN Comtrade trade measure)
*95 percent confidence intervals indicated

Table 12: Explaining the Way Political Elites Focus on Trade (alternative complexity measure)

Dependent variable:	**Model 1D** Focus on Trade Overall	**Model 2D** Focus on Free Trade	**Model 3D** Focus on Protectionism
Overall trade (percent of GDP)	-0.12	-0.13**	0.13**
	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Trade surplus × complexity	-0.39*	0.24**	
	(0.20)	(0.11)	
Trade deficit × complexity			0.19*
			(0.10)
Trade surplus (percent of GDP)	1.09**	-0.16	
	(0.52)	(0.22)	
Trade deficit (percent of GDP)			-0.05
			(0.19)
Trade policy complexity	0.01	0.06**	-0.07**
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Party left-to-right ideology	-0.01	0.05**	-0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)
European Union state	-0.21**	0.04	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)
GDP (ln)	-0.01	-0.02**	0.02**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Percent of manifesto		0.27**	0.66**
focused on trade		(0.03)	(0.04)
Lagged dependent variable	0.38**	0.30**	0.13**
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.05)
Constant	0.69**	-0.05	0.03
	(0.28)	(0.12)	(0.10)
Observations	2602	2602	2602
R^2	0.15	0.40	0.71
Chi-squared	135.65	342.37	2913.04

Panel-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$



Figure 9: Marginal Effects of Increasing *Trade Surplus* on *Free Trade Focus* at Varying Levels of Policy Complexity (derived from Model 2D, which uses an alternative complexity measure)
*95 percent confidence intervals indicated



Figure 10: Marginal Effects of Increasing *Trade Deficit* on *Protectionist Focus* at Varying Levels of Policy Complexity (derived from Model 3D, which uses an alternative complexity measure)
*95 percent confidence intervals indicated

Table 13: Explaining the Way Political Elites Focus on Trade (with country and year fixed effects)

Dependent variable:	**Model 1E** Focus on Trade Overall	**Model 2E** Focus on Free Trade	**Model 3E** Focus on Protectionism
Overall trade (percent of GDP)	-0.11	-0.12	0.16
	(0.20)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Trade surplus × complexity	-0.31	0.53**	
	(0.31)	(0.19)	
Trade deficit × complexity			0.49**
			(0.19)
Trade surplus (percent of GDP)	1.32**	-0.36	
	(0.65)	(0.28)	
Trade deficit (percent of GDP)			-0.45*
			(0.27)
Trade policy complexity	-0.10	0.14**	-0.16**
	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Party left-to-right ideology	-0.03	0.05**	-0.07**
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)
European Union state	-0.08	-0.07	0.14**
	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.06)
GDP (ln)	-0.07	0.01	0.00
	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Percent of manifesto focused on trade		0.28**	0.67**
		(0.09)	(0.11)
Lagged dependent variable	0.23**	0.28**	0.12**
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.04)
Constant	2.42*	-0.34	0.06
	(1.36)	(0.65)	(0.62)
Observations	2602	2602	2602
R^2	.23	.43	.73
Chi-squared	1656.20	2035.98	10715.50

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$



Figure 11: Marginal Effects of Increasing *Trade Surplus* on *Free Trade Focus* at Varying Levels of Policy Complexity (derived from Model 2E, which uses country and year fixed effects)
*95 percent confidence intervals indicated



Figure 12: Marginal Effects of Increasing *Trade Deficit* on *Protectionist Focus* at Varying Levels of Policy Complexity (derived from Model 3E, which uses country and year fixed effects)
*95 percent confidence intervals indicated

Table 14: Explaining the Way Political Elites Focus on Trade (including party fixed effects)

Dependent variable:	**Model 1F** Focus on Trade Overall	**Model 2F** Focus on Free Trade	**Model 3F** Focus on Protectionism
Overall trade (percent of GDP)	-0.20	-0.09	0.12
	(0.25)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Trade surplus × complexity	-0.41	0.46**	
	(0.33)	(0.21)	
Trade deficit × complexity			0.48**
			(0.20)
Trade surplus (percent of GDP)	1.68**	-0.30	
	(0.66)	(0.26)	
Trade deficit (percent of GDP)			-0.41
			(0.27)
Trade policy complexity	0.05	0.11**	-0.14**
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Party left-to-right ideology	-0.08*	0.06**	-0.06**
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)
European Union state	-0.07	-0.08	0.12**
	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.05)
GDP (ln)	-0.07	0.01	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Percent of manifesto focused on trade		0.33**	0.65**
		(0.11)	(0.12)
Lagged dependent variable	0.13	0.17	0.05*
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.03)
Constant	1.83**	-0.50	0.42
	(0.68)	(0.34)	(0.34)
Observations	2602	2602	2602
R^2	0.10	0.38	0.71
F-statistic	3.41	5.42	13.96

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$



Figure 13: Marginal Effects of Increasing *Trade Surplus* on *Free Trade Focus* at Varying Levels of Policy Complexity (derived from Model 2F, which uses party fixed effects)
*90 percent confidence intervals indicated



Figure 14: Marginal Effects of Increasing *Trade Deficit* on *Protectionist Focus* at Varying Levels of Policy Complexity (derived from Model 3F, which uses party fixed effects)
*90 percent confidence intervals indicated

Models 1G, 1H, and 1I (reported in Table 15) re-run Model 1 from the paper using alternative measures of the level of attention dedicated to trade. These alternative measures do not distinguish a free trade focus from protectionist focus, so only the overall trade model can be analyzed using these data. However, especially given the unexpected findings regarding overall trade attention discussed in the paper (the lack of a positive correlation with a state's overall level of trade), it is important to dig deeper into these results using alternative measures of attention dedicated to trade. Model 1G measures attention to trade by coding the amount of oral comments in the national legislature on trade in a given year. Model 1H measures attention to trade by coding the amount of coverage in the country's major newspaper on trade in a given year. Model 1I measures attention to trade by coding the amount of coverage in the country's major television news on trade in a given year. These data come from the Comparative Policies Agenda project (Dowding, Hindmoor, and Martin 2016).

It is important to note that these models are the least connected to our main analysis, as they do not distinguish between the focus on trade by different parties. They are aggregate state-level measures, and therefore cannot distinguish how different types of elites focus attention on trade in potentially different ways. However, the results can tell us how elites, in the aggregate in each country, are likely to focus attention on trade. The results are thus important to note.

Across all three models, the results show that a state's overall level of trade is not positively correlated with a focus on trade in the legislature, newspapers, or television media. This is consistent with the results reported in the paper. Interestingly, in the models reported here, there even exists a negative correlation between these factors. As discussed in the paper, these non-positive results (either insignificant or negative) are counter-intuitive, and worthy of further investigation.

Table 15: Explaining How Political Elites Focus on Trade (alternative measures of level of focus on trade)

	Model 1G	Model 1H	Model 1I
Dependent variable:	Focus on Trade in Legislative Speeches	Focus on Trade in Newspapers	Focus on Trade in TV News
Overall trade (percent of GDP)	-6.02**	-9.22*	-776.33**
	(2.47)	(5.60)	(184.89)
Trade surplus (percent of GDP)	-91.61	427.99	3748.12**
	(127.19)	(288.99)	(824.57)
Trade policy complexity	2.66	6.01*	-20.53**
	(2.81)	(3.47)	(9.33)
Trade surplus × complexity	81.32	-189.74	-777.97**
	(61.65)	(135.30)	(260.75)
Party left-to-right ideology	0.54	-4.44**	0.22**
	(0.74)	(1.33)	(0.11)
European Union state	2.11	-1.54	1514.54**
	(3.04)	(5.15)	(341.32)
GDP (ln)	0.32	0.17	95.44**
	(1.00)	(1.62)	(20.92)
Lagged dependent variable	0.58**	-0.20	-0.84**
	(0.09)	(0.33)	(0.15)
Constant	-2.28	30.36	-1252.31**
	(12.30)	(21.36)	(276.76)
Observations	456	176	29
R^2	0.38	0.16	0.89
Chi-squared	89.27	31.18	120.47

Panel-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$

Additional Analysis

Models 2J and 3J (reported in Table 16) dig deeper into the correlation between party ideology (a control variable in the models reported in the paper) and a state's level of development. While this is not the focus of our analysis, our data allow us to look deeper into this relationship, so it is interesting to see what the results show. Based on arguments drawing on the Stolper-Samuelson theory, we would expect to see that moving from parties representing labor to those representing capital would be positively associated with a greater focus on free trade in developed states and negatively correlated with a greater focus on free trade in developing states. Conversely, it should be negatively correlated with a greater focus on protectionism in developed states and positively correlated with a greater focus on protectionism in developing states. Based on work in the literature, left-leaning parties are likely to represent the interests of labor, while right-leaning parties are likely to represent the interests of capital (Dutt and Mitra 2005; Milner and Judkins 2004). We therefore expect these correlations to follow when moving from a more left-leaning to a more right-leaning ideology. Following other works in the literature, we use OECD membership to proxy a state's level of development. Corresponding to Model 2 in the paper, Model 2J focuses on the correlation between party ideology and a focus on free trade; corresponding to Model 3 in the paper, Model 3J focuses on the correlation between party ideology and a focus on protectionism. Figure 15 then plots the marginal effects of having a more right-leaning ideology on the level of focus on free trade in developed and developing countries, and Figure 16 plots the marginal effects of having a more right-leaning ideology on the level of focus on protectionism in developed an developing countries. The results are interesting to note.

First, in Figures 15 (the "free trade" analysis), the marginal effect of having a more right-leaning ideology is positive and statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level for both developed and developing countries. In other words, in both developed and developing countries, more right-leaning parties are more likely to focus attention on the benefits of free trade. Second, in Figure 16 (the "protectionist" analysis), the marginal effect of having a more right-leaning ideology is negative and statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level for both developed and developing countries. This shows that in both developed and developing countries, more right-leaning parties are less likely to focus attention on the need for protectionism. In both cases, the

difference between having a more right-leaning ideology in developed versus developing countries is statistically insignificant.

Interestingly, these results are not what we might expect given the arguments in the current literature that build on the Stolper-Samuelson theory. The results are consistent with the findings regarding developed countries – more right-leaning parties, which are assumed to be more representative of the interests of capital, are more likely to focus on free trade and less likely to focus on protectionism. The inverse is thus true for more left-leaning parties, which are assumed to be more representative of the interests of labor. These findings have been documented in the literature (for example, Dutt and Mitra 2005; Milner and Judkins 2004).

However, these same relationships exist in developing countries, where the Stolper-Samuelson would predict the opposite. This is an interesting result, and there are a wide variety of potential explanations for why we might see this relationship in developing countries. For example, it could be the case that right-leaning and left-leaning parties represent different interests in developing countries than they do in developed countries. Parties in developing countries might be focused more on other non-trade issues, and thus the left-right distinction does not necessarily correspond to the labor-capital distinction that we see in developed countries. In addition, it is also the case that the countries in our sample do not include autocracies (as we include only countries where election manifestos have been published). Yet many developing countries are not highly democratic. Focusing on this non-random sample of developing countries may be not be representative of the interests of labor and capital across developing countries, more broadly. The Stolper-Samuelson prediction of the interests of labor and capital in developing countries therefore might not be able to be captured by the ideological distinction between political parties in the same way that it can be captured in developed countries. Overall, regardless of the explanation, the results of these models are interesting and worthy of further investigation to understand how the interests of labor and capital are similar or different in developed and developing countries, and how parties with different ideologies represent these interests.

Table 16: Explaining the Way Political Elites Focus on Trade
(interaction of level of development and right-leaning ideology)

Dependent variable:	**Model 2J** Focus on Free Trade	**Model 3J** Focus on Protectionism
Overall trade (percent of GDP)	-0.12**	0.13**
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Trade surplus (percent of GDP)	-0.28	
	(0.24)	
Trade policy complexity	0.10**	-0.12**
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Trade surplus × complexity	0.31**	
	(0.15)	
GDP (ln)	-0.02**	0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)
European Union state	0.01	0.07*
	(0.04)	(0.04)
OECD state	0.13	-0.04
	(0.13)	(0.12)
Party left-to-right ideology	0.05**	-0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.02)
OECD × party left-to-right ideology	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Percent of manifesto focused on trade	0.28**	0.66**
	(0.03)	(0.04)
Lagged dependent variable	0.30**	0.13**
	(0.09)	(0.05)
Trade deficit (percent of GDP)		-0.24
		(0.23)
Trade deficit × complexity		0.29*
		(0.15)
Constant	-0.13	0.03
	(0.16)	(0.15)
Observations	2602	2602
R^2	0.40	0.71
Chi-squared	342.84	57251.95

Panel-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$



Figure 15: Marginal Effects of Having More *Right-leaning ideology* on *Free Trade Focus* for Developing v. Developed States (Model 2J)
*95 percent confidence intervals indicated



Figure 16: Marginal Effects of Having More *Right-leaning ideology* on *Protectionist Focus* for Developing v. Developed States (Model 3J)
*95 percent confidence intervals indicated

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