Women and Youth in Nonviolent Action Campaigns
Survey Experiments, Pre-Analysis Plan

Introduction

Women and youth participation are both key ingredients of successful nonviolent action campaigns. Women have anchored some of the world's most impactful nonviolent campaigns, from transnational advocacy for their own enfranchisement, to the U.S. civil rights movement, to Latin American mobilization for transitional justice, to the Arab Spring uprisings and beyond.[1] Recent scholarship contends that women's frontline participation spurs broader protest mobilization even as it discourages violent escalation; decreases the risk of violent repression; and ultimately increases the likelihood of movement success.[2] Likewise, youth cohorts are often seen as the lifeblood of protest movements, and youth demands for economic opportunity and political voice are increasingly fueling mass mobilization against geriatric autocracies that have neglected younger generations.[3]

Yet despite the centrality of women and youth to both the past and present of nonviolent action, the literature on both gender and age in civil resistance movements remains underdeveloped.[4] The field is particularly lacking in experimental studies that could validate and add nuance to causal mechanisms proposed in existing qualitative and interpretivist case studies.[5] This project takes aim at this deficiency with three survey experiments on women and youth in nonviolent action campaigns. The first, a conjoint experiment, investigates whether women and youth participation influences how people perceive civil resistance campaigns. The second, a classical vignette experiment, investigates the mechanisms underpinning previously hypothesized relationships between women's participation, repression, and nonviolent discipline. The third, another classical vignette experiment, tests an existing hypothesis that youth cohorts are more willing to participate in diverse social movements that bridge ethnic, religious, and other polarized identity cleavages.

A brief note on sex and gender. This project is primarily interested in the effects of gender—a set of socially constructed expectations or norms of behavior that correlate with, but are not identical to, biological sex. Gender is performed and experienced in widely divergent ways across cultures, though the most common gender structure is a bimodal distribution where most individuals identify as either "men" or "women." As a starting point for research into the effects of gender on nonviolent action, we adopt this pervasive binary construct in our experimental designs. Throughout this document, when we speak of the effects of "women's participation," we are interested in gender as a social identity category, not as a source of biological determinism, unless directly specified.

[1] Indeed, much of the foundational repertoire of nonviolent action was first forged in the fires of early women's activism—see Codur & King (2015).
[2] Principe (2017); Chenoweth (2019); Pinckney and Rivers (2021).
[3] Mampilly (2021); Nordås & Davenport (2013).
[4] Noteworthy exceptions include Asal et al. (2013); Caprioli (2005); Schaftenaar (2017).
[5] For an enlightening review of the positivist study of gender in international relations, see Reiter (2015).

Location

We field our three survey experiments among respondent populations from two countries: Nigeria and India. These countries are appealing venues for research on women and youth in nonviolent action for several reasons. First, both are struggling democracies experiencing democratic backsliding and corresponding social unrest. Nigeria's government is plagued by endemic corruption and increasing restrictions on free civic expression; likewise, India's Hindu-nationalist turn under President Modi has been accompanied by a dramatic increase in politically motivated censorship and prosecutions intended to silence dissent. Concerted nonviolent action campaigns are one of the most important tools citizens have at their disposal to arrest democratic backsliding, and we expect that civic mobilization will prove important for both countries in the years ahead.

Relatedly, India and Nigeria both frequently witness nonviolent action events. In both countries, protests are either currently ongoing or have occurred in the recent past, such as Nigeria's 2020 mobilization against the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), and India's enormous, year-long mobilization against agricultural reforms in 2021. Given both this recent history and the challenges that both countries now face, we expect this trend of frequent nonviolent action to continue. This means that our respondents have likely been exposed to, if not directly participated in, real-world nonviolent action campaigns, adding greater external validity to our experimental results.

Third, Nigeria and India both feature an especially large youth population, a demographic feature of relevance to our interest in youth participation in social movements. According to the World Bank's World Development Indicators, a quarter of the Indian population is younger than 14, as are a staggering 40% of Nigerians—in both countries, at least 50% of the population is younger than 24. Understanding the effects of youth participation on nonviolent action campaigns is a topic of considerable interest for both countries.

Lastly, India and Nigeria vary by geographic region. Working across regions provides in-country variation in gender and cultural norms that likely influence the effects of women's participation in nonviolent action, as well as variation in region-specific factors beyond our scope or anticipation. Running the experiments in India and Nigeria will permit us to explore how these gender and youth dynamics, if any, travel across regional contexts.

Sampling Strategy

We will field our experiments using Premise, an international data company that specializes in fielding digital surveys to populations of Contributors in a variety of developing countries. We chose to field our surveys digitally for several reasons. First, uncertainty and risk imposed by the covid-19 pandemic precluded in-person survey designs. Second, digital survey platforms are especially well suited to conjoint experiments, given the large number of factors to be manipulated and the extensive

randomization requirements, which make phone interviews prohibitively tedious (most modern conjoint experiments are fielded digitally).

Importantly, our population samples are unlikely to be nationally representative of the overall Nigerian and Indian populations. As with social media users, we anticipate that Premise contributors will be younger, better educated, more urban, and more tech savvy than the average citizen. Note that our experiments seek to identify the causal effects of experimental gender and age treatments on protest perceptions, not to make broad descriptive claims about the Nigerian or Indian populations as a whole.

In addition, we do not believe that the underlying causal mechanisms linking gender and age to protest perceptions will fundamentally differ between Premise users and non-users. One might speculate that young Indian and Nigerian urbanites are more culturally progressive, and so less influenced by conservative gender norms. Setting aside the veracity of such a claim, gendered stereotypes and role expectations are pervasive and deeply ingrained social phenomena—we suspect that any urban progressive shift would at most constitute a difference in effect magnitude, and certainly not in direction. If anything, then, oversampling younger urbanites makes our sample a hard test for many of our proposed gender mechanisms.

Furthermore, our skewed sample may have several desirable properties. Contemporary protest participants tend to be younger and more digitally connected, and most major protest movements originate in or escalate into developed urban areas. Thus, sampling from Premise contributors may oversample respondents who are "plausible participants" in nonviolent protest movements. This is beneficial for several of the experiments, which consider what motivates individuals to participate in protests. Regardless, we will at least ensure balance on our key factors of interest by blocking on gender whenever possible.

Experiment 1: Conjoint Analysis of Movement Perceptions

Our first study, a rating-based conjoint experiment, considers how women and youth participation shapes how social movements are perceived by external observers. The experiment is based on the general idea that how movements are perceived matters, as movement framing affects activists' ability to mobilize a broad base of societal support, trigger defections from opposing regime coalitions, generate moral outrage following repression, and ultimately achieve their goals.[6]

Hypotheses

Our primary aim is to measure the effect of women and youth participation on movement perceptions, and to compare any effects to those of other widely recognized factors, such as event size, tactics, goals, and nonviolent discipline. Specifically, we seek to test how respondents perceive three interrelated aspects of civil resistance campaigns:

First, *is this movement peaceful?* Whether a resistance campaign is perceived as nonviolent or violent is an important determinant of public support—nonviolent campaigns generally enjoy broader support.[7] Here, we consider whether perceived peacefulness depends on the movement's gender composition. Violence is often understood through a gendered lens, such that women are perceived to be less violent than men.[8] In turn, movements that prominently feature women may be viewed as less violent than those primarily comprising men. Note that the experiment will directly manipulate movement tactics, permitting us to identify any gender effects independent of the movement's actual nonviolent or violent behavior. Though we do not claim this as a primary hypothesis, we will also explore whether respondents perceive movements focused on "women's issues," such as gender equality, to be more inherently peaceful than movements with other goals.

> **H1:** Movements with predominantly female participants will be perceived as more peaceful than movements lacking prominent women's participation.

> **H1.b (Exploratory):** Movements focused on gender equality will be perceived as more peaceful than those focused on other issues.

Second, *is this movement likely to succeed?* A nonviolent campaign's expected efficacy is likely a key factor for individuals considering participation in costly or high-risk resistance activities, as well as for regime agents considering defection.[9] In turn, perceived efficacy may depend on both gender and age. On

[6] Chenoweth (2020); Kuran (1991); Orazani & Leidner (2018).
[7] Arves, Cunningham, and McCulloch (2019); Chenoweth and Stephan (2011); Huff and Kruszewska (2016).
[8] On the gendered foundations of nationalist violence, see Caprioli (2005). Note that the factual (in)accuracy of the gender essentialist perspective is beyond our scope—we claim merely that people often perceive women to be less inherently violent than men, and that this perception has implications for their beliefs about nonviolent campaigns.
[9] For expected utility models of protest behavior, see Kuran (1991); Pierskalla (2010).

gender, cross-national studies reveal that women's frontline participation increases the odds of movement success.[10] Observers may also intuit this relationship, such that campaigns with clear women's participation are viewed as more likely to succeed. Nonviolent campaigns are also generally more successful than violent ones,[11] so in line with H1, respondents may infer that female-driven movements are more peaceful and thus more likely to succeed. An interesting alternative hypothesis is that women are perceived as ineffectual or non-serious political agents, and that this stereotype might lead respondents to expect that female-driven movements are *less* successful.[12]

> **H2.a:** Movements with predominantly female participants will be perceived as more likely to succeed than movements lacking prominent women's participation. (This effect may be a function of women's movements perceived peacefulness.)

In addition, a central finding in the civil resistance literature is that diverse campaigns that draw support across social strata are more successful.[13] Observers may intuit this relationship as well, and therefore perceive gender and age diverse campaigns as more likely to succeed than campaigns drawing narrowly from a particular gender or age demographic.

> **H2.b:** Movements with age and gender diversity will be perceived as more likely to succeed than movements comprising specific gender or age subgroups.

Third, *is repression appropriate?* A critical strength of nonviolent campaigns is their ability to channel moral outrage at unjust regime repression into increased popular support, a phenomenon known as the backlash effect or "political jiu-jitsu."[14] Here, we consider the gendered aspects of the backlash effect. Repression against predominantly female campaigns may trigger more moral outrage among respondents. Though we do not purport to test each directly, several mechanisms for this effect are plausible. Women may be seen as more peaceful (H1) and thus less deserving of arrest or violent abuse; women may be perceived as less able to defend themselves from physical violence; or men may feel obligated to protect women from such violence.[15]

> **H3:** Violent repression against movements with predominantly female participants will be perceived as less appropriate than repression against movements lacking overt female participation.

Together, we expect that these overlapping perceptions about a resistance campaign's peacefulness, efficacy, and exposure to unjust repression largely determine individual support for that campaign. To

[10] Chenoweth (2019).
[11] Chenoweth and Stephan (2011).
[12] We are indebted to Zoe Marks for this suggestion.
[13] Chenoweth and Stephan (2011).
[14] Hess and Martin (2006); Sharp (1973).
[15] For instance, see Pearlman (2018) for a discussion of how gendered honor norms fueled protest participation in Syria.

the extent that these perceptions are shaped by gender and age, then, we should observe a relationship between gender/age and respondents' self-reported support for movements.

> **H4a:** Movements with predominantly female participants will receive greater self-reported support than movements lacking overt female participation.
>
> **H4b:** Movements with age and gender diversity will receive greater self-reported support than movements comprising specific gender or age subgroups.

Several other notes about our hypotheses and prior expectations are in order. To start, we will also examine several dynamics beyond our baseline hypotheses on gender and movement perceptions. First, we will explore possible interactions between gender and other factors commonly associated with how nonviolent campaigns are perceived. Of particular interest to us here are other salient identify categories such as ethnicity and religion, and especially marginalized group status, which may lead observers to perceive campaigns as more violent and deserving of repression.[16] Second, we will conduct subgroup analyses of the data by respondent age and gender, exploring whether our findings about these factors depend on respondents' own gender and age attributes.

Note also that we do not elucidate specific hypotheses regarding youth-driven movements and perceptions of movement peacefulness, efficacy, or appropriateness of repression. Our uncertainty here reflects the general paucity of both theoretical and empirical literature on youth in nonviolent campaigns—one could make reasonable inferences in either direction about the relationship between youth and each of the three features of interest described above. Nevertheless, because youth participation is a key aspect of many contemporary movements, we include age as an exploratory variable, while focusing our more explicit hypothesis-testing efforts on gender.

Design

To test these hypotheses, we use a ratings-based conjoint experiment, which asks respondents to report their beliefs about a series of hypothetical, randomized protest events in their country. We field this survey experiment online to samples of 900 respondents in both Nigeria and India.

Vignette Factors

Conjoint designs are appealing because they allow researchers to incorporate many randomized factors (e.g., various aspects of a protest event) without sacrificing statistical power.[17] Most conjoint experiments in political science employ choice-based designs, in which respondents repeatedly choose between two randomized profiles, mirroring their real-world choices between policy options. This approach, however, is not appropriate for our purposes—in most cases, the mass public

[16] Manekin and Mitts (2021).
[17] For an excellent review of conjoint experiments in political science, see Bansak et al. (2019).

is not asked to choose their preference between two ongoing resistance campaigns. Instead, we employ a rating-based conjoint design, in which respondents repeatedly evaluate a single profile of a protest event. We randomly vary eight dimensions of this event profile, listed fully in Table 1.

Our primary manipulations of interest are *Participant Gender* and *Participant Age*. To randomize the event's gender attributes, we tell respondents that event participants are either women, men, or both women and men. This manipulation is very subtle (often a one-word difference), so to ensure that respondents pick up on the gender prime, we also include a slogan that again indicates participant gender and uses slight wording variations to visually distinguish conditions. As for Age, respondents learn that event participants are either young adults below the age of 25, or older adults above the age of 25. As stated above, the Age manipulation is primarily intended for exploratory analysis.

In addition to age and gender identity attributes, we also manipulate participants' *Excluded Identity* status. Previous research identifies that nonviolent campaigns fueled by marginalized or politically excluded groups (usually ethnic minorities) are perceived to be more violent than majority group protests.[18] In India, we use Caste, an identity marker that thoroughly permeates Indian society and has historically served to preserve the social status of upper caste members while marginalizing and excluding lower castes (Dalits, formerly "untouchables"). We dichotomize caste, such that protesters belong to either upper castes ("General Castes") lower castes ("Scheduled Castes"), or a diverse mix of upper and lower castes. In the Nigeria sample, we are unable to identify a suitable minority/majority identity marker (Nigeria's ethnic landscape is too complex to dichotomize in this way), and so omit the minority identity manipulation.

Beyond these identity factors, the other five factors capture essential contextual features of nonviolent campaigns. To start, *Movement Goals* controls for the nonviolent campaign's stated motivation. As speculated above, gender equality movements may be perceived as more peaceful than movements with other goals, and respondent will naturally care more about some goals than others. We randomize four levels of movement goals, including reforms to promote gender equality, increase youth representation in politics, protect minority religious rights, and strengthen democratic institutions. Gender equality and youth representation are related to our primary factors of interest, gender and age. Minority religious rights is a contentious and highly salient political issue in both India and Nigeria. Democratic institutions are a generic but common protest issue, and are relevant to our interest in democratic backsliding, a phenomenon affecting both countries.

Next, *Protest Size* is widely understood to be critical for nonviolent campaigns. Larger protests reveal greater popular support and are less vulnerable to repression, stimulating greater turnout. In turn, larger movements are more likely to succeed.[19] We randomize four levels of protest size: the campaign event has hundreds, thousands, tens of thousands, or more than one hundred thousand participants.

[18] Manekin and Mitts (2021).
[19] Chenoweth and Stephan (2011); DeNardo (1985); Kuran (1991); Lohmann (1994).

We then manipulate two aspects of protester behavior. First, *Protest Tactics* determines the type of protest event. We include four levels: a mass demonstration in a central square; a labor strike and mass walkout; a march and blockade of a major road; and a sit-in occupation of a government building. Each nonviolent tactic involves public gatherings in the capital city,[20] but they vary in terms of the degree of confrontation or disruptiveness and may therefore elicit different reactions from observers.

Table 1: Factors and Levels Summary

Factor	Levels	Dist.
Gender	• Participants are men; "India's men are calling for change!" • Participants are women; "The women of India are ready for change!" • Participants both men and women; "The Indian people want change!"	Uniform
Age	• Most protesters are young people below the age of 25 • Most protesters are older adults above the age of 25 • Protesters are both young people and older adults	Uniform
Identity (India only)	• Most protesters identified as members of a General Category Caste • Most protesters identified as members of a Scheduled Caste • Protesters identified as members of both General Category and Scheduled Castes.	Uniform
Goals	• Demand reforms to increase youth representation in politics • Demand reforms to improve gender equality • Demand reforms to protect minority religious rights • Demand reforms to strengthen democratic institutions	Uniform
Tactic	• A mass demonstration in the central square of New Delhi/Abuja • A labor strike and mass walk out in New Delhi/Abuja • A sit-in occupation of a government building in New Delhi/Abuja • A march and blockade of a major road in New Delhi/Abuja	Uniform
Size	• Hundreds of people participated • Thousands of people participated • Tens of thousands of people participated • More than 100,000 people participated	• 50% • 30% • 15% • 5%
NV Disc.	• No reports of property damage or violence caused by protesters. • At one point, a few protesters looted and set fire to a nearby store. • At one point, a few protesters hurled rocks at police and set fire to a police vehicle. • Protesters rioted throughout the day, looting and burning many nearby stores. • Protesters fought skirmishes with police throughout the day, hurling rocks at police and setting fire to police vehicles.	• 50% • 17% • 17% • 8% • 8%

[20] We use only "tactics of concentration" involving public gatherings (Schock 2005). The nonviolent discipline and repression manipulations are less applicable to tactics of dispersion that do not involve public gatherings. Labor strikes can be categorized as "tactics of dispersion," but we add a mass walk out component to engage collective public action.

Repress	• The government took no action to repress the demonstration. • The government ordered police to disperse the demonstration; several protesters were arrested, and several more were injured. • The government ordered police to disperse the demonstration; many protesters were arrested, and many more were injured. • The government ordered police to disperse the demonstration; a dozen protesters were killed, many were arrested, and many more were injured.	• 50% • 20% • 20% • 10%

Second, *Nonviolent Discipline* determines whether the protest event was fully peaceful or instead featured violent episodes, which will likely influence respondents' perceptions of movement peacefulness and the appropriateness of repression. We include five levels for nonviolent discipline, moving from entirely peaceful to varying degrees of unarmed collective violence.[21] We cue unarmed violence—such as looting, property destruction, or fighting with police without firearms—rather than armed violence both because it mirrors the types of violence most commonly observed at real-world protests, and because armed insurgencies are beyond our arguments' scope. We fully vary two aspects of unarmed violence to create four treatment levels: the frequency with which violence occurs (a single episode vs. repeat occurrences) and the target of violence (nearby businesses vs. police).

Finally, in line with our earlier discussion about repression and the backlash effect, we manipulate how the regime responds to the protest event. Specifically, the *Repression* variable determines whether the regime reacts to protests peacefully or represses to varying degrees of severity. We randomize over four levels of repression, including no repression; light non-lethal repression; heavy non-lethal repression; and lethal violence.

Profile Randomizations

Several notes about profile randomization are in order. First, we restrict randomization to prevent protest profiles that are clearly implausible.[22] Specifically, we ensure that regimes respond with at least some amount of repression whenever the Nonviolent Discipline variable is set to one of the "multiple instances of unarmed violence" conditions—regimes almost always make arrests in these circumstances, if only to maintain order. Some of the remaining profile combinations are less common than others (some much less so), yet we do not think that any others are so implausible as to merit exclusion from randomization.

That said, as indicated in Table 1, we do impose further conditions on randomization to ensure that the distribution of protest profiles shown to our respondents better approximates the range of protest events that occur in the real world. Because the Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) identified with conjoint analysis fundamentally depend on the distribution of profiles, it is important

[21] On the relationship between "unarmed violence" and political liberalization, see Kadivar and Ketchley (2018).
[22] Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014).

to weight the randomization scheme to match real-world conditions as much as possible.[23] Although it is usually impossible to know the exact distribution of profiles (in our case, the global distribution of all protest events along the eight dimensions we are manipulating), we can still improve the analysis by independently weighting the marginal distributions of those dimensions for which data is available.

Thus, we draw on existing data on global protest events from NAVCO 3.0[24] to determine randomization weights for three variables. The first and most important of these is protest *Size*—smaller protests are far more likely to occur than protest with greater than 100,000 participants, and larger protests produce some of the least plausible profiles. Table 3 displays the breakdown of NAVCO 3.0 protest events by size; protests with fewer than 1000 participants make up more than half of the sample, and only around 5% of protests have more than 50,000 participants. Based on this data, we assign a 50/30/15/5 weighting scheme to our size manipulation, such that 80% of protests have less than 10,000 participants, and only 5% have greater than 100,000 participants.

Table 2: NAVCO 3.0 Protest Events by Size



Second, NAVCO 3.0 also reports the rate with which protesters resort to violence, which speaks to our *Nonviolent Discipline* manipulation. Here, Table 4 shows that "protest" events in NAVCO 3.0 are overwhelmingly (90%) nonviolent, though we suspect that this data is too coarse to accurately distinguish protests with isolated episodes of unarmed violence from those that were purely nonviolent. To faithfully capture this distribution while also preserving inferential leverage over more extreme episodes of violence, we assign a 50/17/17/8/8 weighting scheme, such that approximately 85% of protests are either fully nonviolent or exhibit a single episode of unarmed violence, leaving 15% of protests characterized by systematic unarmed violence.

[23] de la Cuesta, Egami, and Imai (2021).
[24] Chenoweth, Pinckney, and Lewis (2018).

Table 3: NAVCO 3.0 Protests by Tactical Choice (Nonviolent Discipline)



Lastly, we also incorporate data on *Repression*. Table 4 reveals that most nonviolent protests events (60%) are not met with any form of repression, and that lethal repression is relatively rare (5%). In contrast, violent protests are almost always met with some form of repression (hence our earlier randomization restriction). Unfortunately, the NAVCO 3.0 data has relatively high missingness on repression data, so the provided distributions are not fully reliable. Nevertheless, we modify the repression randomization to a 50/20/20/10 weighting scheme, such that 70% of protests feature either no repression or arrests without injuries, 20% of protests feature arrests with injuries but not fatalities, and 10% of protests feature lethal repression.

Table 4: NAVCO 3.0 Repression by Tactical Choice



The remaining dimensions are randomized uniformly, either because they are key factors of interest (so we wish to maximize variation for purposes of identification) or because we lack sufficiently granular or reliable data to weight them more precisely.

Survey Instrument

After providing informed consent, respondents are told that they will evaluate some examples of hypothetical protest events that could occur in their country. For each protest profile, the above factors are randomized and displayed in a text box, resembling a condensed version of a standard news report about the event. See the sample profile below:

Profile 1

The Event: a mass demonstration in the central square of New Delhi.

- Most protesters belong to General Category castes.
- There were no reports of property damage or violence caused by protesters.
- Protesters sought new laws to increase youth representation in politics.
- The government did not repress the protest.
- Most participants were women. Their slogan was "*The women of India are ready for change!*"
- Most protesters were young people below the age of 25.
- Thousands of people participated.

Best practice for conjoint designs stipulates that the order in which factors are presented to respondents should be randomized, to avoid ordering effects. However, full randomization can result in unnatural or awkward descriptions of events. To balance these competing concerns, we fix the Tactic variable at the top of all profiles (e.g., "a mass demonstration, a sit-in, etc."), as a familiar anchoring point that matches most news coverage of protest events. We then randomize the order of all other variables *across respondents*—to provide consistency, we fix the order of factors across all profiles for each respondent, so that the order remains the same for each of the ten profiles.[25]

After reading each profile, respondents then answer four questions about how they perceive the campaign, corresponding to the hypotheses above. Respondents are asked how much they agree with the following statements, on a seven-point scale:

1) "This campaign is peaceful."
2) "This campaign is going to succeed."
3) "The government's response to this campaign is appropriate."
4) "I would support a campaign like this in India/Nigeria."

The order of these questions is again randomized for each respondent, to mitigate any potential ordering effects. The appendix to this document contains the exact survey text.

[25] On factor ordering, see Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014); Bansak et al. (2019).

Finally, after respondents have completed the conjoint task, we ask several demographic questions not already known to Premise, including respondents' support for the government, their previous participation in nonviolent action campaigns, and their caste (India only).

5) How do you feel about the Indian/Nigerian government? (1-7 scale)
6) Have you, at any time in the past two years, participated in a nonviolent protest? (Y/N)
7) To which caste do you identify? (India only)
    i. General Category
    ii. Scheduled Caste
    iii. Scheduled Tribe
    iv. Other/Most Backwards Class
    v. I am not a member of a caste

Analysis:

The AMCEs for each factor of interest can be estimated via linear regression, using a weighted difference-in-means estimator to account for the non-uniform profile distributions and randomization restrictions described above (we will use R's *factorEx* package to implement this analysis).[26]

We will estimate four primary models, regressing each outcome variable against the full set of eight protest dimensions described above, along with a Tactics*Repression interaction term made necessary by the restricted randomization design. For instance, the regression model for perceived movement peacefulness will be:

Peaceful~B0(Intercept) + B1Gender + B2Age + B3Identity + B4Goals + B5Size + B6NVDisc + B7Tactic + B8Repress + B9Tactic_Repress + ε

To obtain the correct coefficients, we will then compute a weighted average for each coefficient across the known distributions of the Tactic + Repression variables, accounting for the restricted randomization design.

In addition to this primary analysis, we will also conduct two types of secondary exploratory analysis. First, we will re-run our main models after sub-setting our sample by gender and age, mirroring our primary factors of interest. This permits us to assess whether the effects of gender and age strengthen among women and youth subgroups. Second, we will re-run the models with an additional interaction term for Gender*ExcludedIdentity, in order to more directly assess whether any positive effects of gender are attenuated by minority status.

[26] The underlying methodology is described in de la Cuesta, Egami, and Imai (2021).

Power

We conducted a power analysis in R to determine effective sample size, using the *simstudy* package to simulate the data and the *factorEx* package to conduct the simulated analysis. We tested effect sizes of 0.2, 0.1, and 0.05 standard deviations, and sample sizes ranging from 50 to 1,000 respondents. We simulated the analysis at each effect size – sample size combination 1,000 times and calculated statistical power as the proportion of simulated weighted regressions where the p value of the gender coefficient was less than 0.05. For all analyses we assumed 10 tasks per respondent, and a within-respondent intra-cluster correlation of 0.1. We also assumed that major breakdowns in nonviolent discipline would have a significant negative impact (0.5 standard deviations) on the dependent variable, and that marginalized group identity and minor breakdowns in nonviolent discipline would have a moderate negative impact (0.2 standard deviations) on the dependent variable.

Figure 5 summarizes the results of the power analysis. At effect sizes of 0.2 and 0.1 we reach 80% statistical power at 150 and 500 respondents respectively. At an effect size of 0.05 the maximum power achieved is 54% power at 1,000 respondents.

Figure 5: Experiment 1 Power Analysis



Statistical power across sample and effect sizes, with α = 0.05.
Dashed line indicates 80% power.

Given the lack of prior conjoint studies examining the effects of gender and age on nonviolent campaigns, it is difficult to determine which of these simulated effect sizes is most reasonable. We therefore choose to be conservative and maximize our sample size given our resource constraints. 900 respondents in each country will give us nearly 100% power at 0.1 and 0.2 effect sizes, and 50% power at an 0.05 effect size.

Robustness Checks

Lastly, we will conduct a number of standard robustness checks to test some of the assumptions underlying our conjoint design. They include the following:

1) Randomization Check: though this should be guaranteed by design, it is good practice to assess whether randomization procedures actually produced experimental groups that were relatively well balanced. We can do this by comparing the profile distributions given to respondents in different demographic bins (e.g. men vs women, young vs. old, etc.) – they should be roughly identical.

2) No Carryover Effects: we will assess whether there is any spillover between tasks – we should find that respondents' reaction to a particular protest profile stays the same no matter the round in which they view that profile. To do this, we can estimate the ACMEs separately for each round, illustrating that the point estimates are similar across rounds. This will also help us to identify whether there is meaningful degradation in response quality in later rounds – if respondents satisfice in these later rounds, we will observe meaningful differences in those rounds' estimated ACMEs.

3) Attribute Order Effects: we will also look to demonstrate that the effect of a certain attribute does not depend on its position in the vignette (the order of which is randomized for each respondent). To do so, following Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014), we will regress the relevant outcome variable on dummies for the attribute values, dummies for the row number of those attributes, and their interactions.

4) Respondent Fatigue: Lastly, we can check to see whether respondents take significantly less time evaluating profiles at the end of the survey than they did at the beginning. Presumably time-per-task will decrease somewhat as respondents grow accustomed to the vignette and question format, but we should be able to observe if respondents begin to simply skim over later versions of the conjoint task by adding timing markers for each task.

Experiment 2: Women's Participation and Nonviolent Discipline

Our second study—a classical vignette experiment—investigates the mechanisms underpinning the association between women's participation and nonviolent discipline. The experiment is based on the general relationship, established by prior observational research, that women's participation decreases the incidence of violence at protest events.

Hypotheses

Prior scholarship has observed that women's participation in nonviolent action campaigns decreases risk of violence from both regimes and the mass public. Movements featuring women are more likely to eschew violent tactics and maintain nonviolent discipline. At the same time, regimes appear less likely to employ violent repression against movements that prominently feature women.[27]

That said, the mechanisms linking gender and lessened political violence remain unclear and are ripe for experimental analysis.[28] Although we cannot directly investigate the causes of regime behavior, we can examine women's participation and nonviolent discipline from the perspective of potential protest participants. Existing observational studies posit several mechanisms linking women's participation to increased nonviolent discipline. Below, we review these mechanisms, and then identify corresponding observable implications that will help us to determine their relative importance.

1. *Women are inherently peaceful*

First is the possibility – hotly debated in the literature – that women are inherently more peaceful than men, and therefore women-led movements are predisposed towards nonviolence. This general male proclivity for and female aversion to violence could stem from deeply ingrained cultural norms, from women's fear of personal harm from physically stronger opponents (and the corresponding belief that violence is ineffective), or from hormonal or neurological differences across sexes.[29] We cannot fully disentangle these antecedent causes, but we can nevertheless assess the relationship between gender and support for violence.

H1: Women are less supportive of violent resistance than men.

H1 produces two observable implications. First, female respondents should be generally less supportive of violence than men, as revealed through a series of pre-treatment questions on the appropriateness and efficacy of violence. Second, post-treatment questions should reveal that women

[27] On this topic, see Santoro and Broidy (2014); Principe (2017); Chenoweth (2019).
[28] Pinckney and Rivers (2021).
[29] On women and aggression, see Denson et al. (2018).

are less supportive of a hypothetical nonviolent movement adopting violent tactics than men, irrespective of any other details about the campaign or the regime's response to it.

2. *Gendered responses to regime repression*

Another more specific possibility is that women are less prone than men to react to repression with an increased desire for violent retribution. It is known that repression is one of the most consequential drivers of nonviolent campaigns' escalation to violence.[30] Here, we investigate the gender dynamics of this repression-radicalization effect. Relative to women, men may respond to repression with violence, channeling emotional distress into aggression in accordance with masculine norms, evolutionary psychology, or other factors. Put simply, women may be better socialized to process repression without violence.

H2: Women are less prone to violence following repression than men.

H2 produces three observable implications. The most demanding of these is that women who read about a hypothetical nonviolent movement that was violently repressed should be no more supportive of violent tactics than women who read about a movement that was not repressed. A second, less demanding implication is that women who receive the "repression" treatment should exhibit a lesser increase in support for violent tactics than men in the same group, relative to their baseline rates in the "no repression" treatment (repression may increase women's support for violence, but less so than it does for men). Note that **H2** differs from **H1** in that **H1** predicts that women will also be less supportive of violence in the "no repression" treatment, which is not a requirement for **H2**. Third, if women are less susceptible than men to aggressive emotional reactions to violence, then we should find that women are less emotionally affected by the repression treatment, as measured by post-vignette questions gauging anger, desire for retribution, and willingness to forgive regime loyalists.

3. *Women's participation restrains male aggression*

Another purported mechanism is that women's frontline participation makes men less willing to endorse violent tactics. Several explanations are plausible; perhaps men do not wish to risk women's safety by triggering violent conflict; perhaps men perceive women-led protests as peaceful, such that violence is unnecessary; or perhaps women's participation signals that the protest is a form of civic activity in which violence is morally inappropriate. Notably, a competing hypothesis is that regime repression of women generates greater moral outrage than repression of men, which could in turn *increase* male support for violence in those cases. We therefore test both hypotheses.

H3a: Women's frontline participation decreases support for violence among men.
H3b: Women's frontline participation increases support for violence among men when those movements are met with repression.

[30] Pinckney (2016).

The primary observable implication for **H3a** is that men who read about a nonviolent campaign featuring women's frontline participation should be less supportive of violence than men who read about a campaign without women's frontline participation. As **H3b** suggests, this gender effect may interact with repression, so we will also compare male support for violence in the "repression" treatment group across levels of movement gender—it may be that women's participation moderates male support for violent tactics in the "no repression" treatment, but does not (or even exacerbates it) in the "repression" treatment.

4. Women's participation deters regime repression

Lastly, women's participation is thought to decrease violence by deterring repression, in what is known as the "moral shield" effect. Women's participation can create a moral dilemma for both rulers and the security forces tasked with carrying out repression, as cultural norms may disapprove of violence against women perceived as innocent or defenseless victims. And as repression is a major source of opposition radicalization, lessening repression helps movements preserve nonviolent discipline.

Our sampling strategy does not focus on either regime members or soldiers, so we cannot test this mechanism directly. We can, however, assess whether women's participation influences the perceived appropriateness of repression, a feature that is likely to indirectly influence regimes' decision to wield violence against protesters in real-world cases.

H4: Women's frontline participation decreases support for repression

The observable implication of **H4** is straightforward, and easily measured with a post-treatment question about the appropriateness of the regime's response to the hypothetical protest movement.

A final note about hypothesis testing. Though these are not our primary focus of this design, Experiment 2 affords us the opportunity to replicate tests of some of the hypotheses presented in Experiment 1 above, with a new sample and in a different experimental format. These include the link between women's participation and perceptions of movement peacefulness, likelihood of success, and respondent support for the movement. We include and discuss the relevant outcome variable questions for those hypotheses below.

Design

To test these hypotheses, we use a classical vignette experiment, which asks respondents to read about and react to a hypothetical protest event occurring in their country. We field this survey experiment online to a sample of 1500 respondents each in Nigeria and India.

Vignette Factors

The experimental vignette will describe a hypothetical mass demonstration against government corruption occurring in the capital city. This vignette will present a brief "news article" about the event, and will include information common to news reports of protest events, including the protest location, size, tactic employed, and stated goals. Notably, corruption is a salient concern in both Nigeria and India. Pervasive and unchecked corruption is a ubiquitous complaint among Nigerian citizens, which ranks in the bottom quartile of Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index.[31] In India, government corruption is a major political issue, and India boasts the highest rate of public service bribery in Asia.[32]

Beyond these fixed background details, we experimentally manipulate two key factors. Our primary factor of interest is *Gender*, which takes two levels; protesters are described as either men or women. This gender attribute is primed at several points in the vignette, to ensure that the gender manipulation is not so subtle as to be overlooked. In addition to using women/men in the article title, we tell respondents that women/men marched on the frontlines in their peaceful confrontation with police barricades, and that women/men were killed by repression (more on repression below). We further prime gender by manipulating the photo attached to the news article, which includes images of either women or men protesting. These images are generic and relatively abstract, and were designed to clearly cue gender while holding other possible background features constant.

Second, we manipulate regime *Repression* in response to the protest, allowing us to identify interaction effects between gender and repression. This factor again has two levels; the government either does not repress or uses the police to violently disperse the demonstration, causing fatalities. In both conditions, the regime does not offer serious material concessions in response to protesters' demands—the only variation is the degree of violence with which the regime responds to protests.

Survey Instrument

After reading and agreeing to an informed consent protocol, respondents will answer a short set of pre-treatment questions intended to gauge their general beliefs about both the efficacy and appropriateness of violent resistance (**H1**). These will include the following four questions:

- Nonviolence is ____ than violence at achieving change (5 pt. more/less effective)

[31] On corruption in Nigeria, see Page (2018); UN Office on Drugs and Crime (2019).
[32] On corruption in Asia, see Vrushi (2020).

- Sometimes, violence is necessary to achieve change (5 pt. agree/disagree)
- Defacing or otherwise damaging government property is an acceptable form of mass protest (5 pt. agree/disagree)
- Violence is never a morally justifiable response to political oppression (5 pt. agree/disagree)

We also ask several relevant demographic factors not already known to Premise. We ask respondents to report how much they support President Buhari/Modi, likely a key confounding variable for how they would receive a news story about their government's actions. We also ask whether respondents have recently participated in a nonviolent protest, as previous experience with activism likely affects how respondents perceive nonviolent campaigns.

- How do you feel about the Indian / Nigerian government? (1-7 support/oppose)
- Have you, at any time in the past five years, participated in a nonviolent protest? (Y/N)

Following these initial questions, respondents will be asked to read a fictional news article about a hypothetical future protest event in their country. See the Nigeria example vignette below, and the Appendix for the full description of manipulations.

Protests In Abuja as Women March to End Corruption

This Saturday, thousands of women marched through Abuja in a peaceful protest against corruption.

The women took to the streets seeking an end to bribery, a problem that plagues Nigerian politics. Following years of economic hardship, the protesters want the government to stop corrupt public officials from extorting citizens.

The march culminated near the presidential palace, where the women confronted a police barricade, linking arms and chanting anti-corruption slogans. Security forces violently dispersed the demonstration—over 100 protesters were arrested, and five women were killed.

The government has dismissed the protests and made no reforms. Protest leaders insist that they will not back down.

Respondents will then respond to a series of dependent variable questions. We first ask three questions mirroring the dependent variable questions from Experiment 1, which gauge respondents' perceptions of the hypothetical movement's perceived peacefulness and efficacy, the appropriateness of repression, and respondent's support for the movement. We also ask a brief attention check question.

- How much do you agree with the following statements? (5 pt. scale, random order)
  a. "This movement is peaceful."
  b. "This movement is likely to succeed."
  c. "The government's response to the demonstration was appropriate."
  d. "I would support a movement like this."

- In the scenario above, what were people protesting against?
  a. Corruption and bribery by public officials
  b. Climate change
  c. High unemployment

We then turn to our primary outcome of interest, namely, respondents' support for violent tactics. Our primary measure asks respondents to report their level of support for five different tactics that the anti-bribery movement might employ going forward. Two of these tactics are peaceful, but differ in the degree of disruption they would cause. The other three are increasingly violent alternative tactics. We also ask secondary questions exploring whether respondents believe that violence would be morally justified and/or effective given the regime's behavior.

- Going forward, how much would you support the anti-bribery movement taking the following actions? (5 pt. support, random order)
  a. Another peaceful protest at the presidential palace
  b. A peaceful blockade of a major street in the capital
  c. Setting fire to government buildings or police vehicles
  d. Confronting police with stones, clubs, and other improvised tools (excluding firearms)
  e. Confronting police with knives, guns, and other deadly weapons

- How much do you agree with the following statements? (5 pt. agreement)
  a. "The use of violence is a justified response to the government's behavior."
  b. "This movement would be more effective if it adopted more aggressive tactics."

A final set of questions tries to capture respondents' emotional reaction to the regime's response to the protests. Above, we asked respondents whether they believe that the regime's response to the protests was appropriate (in all cases a refusal to offer concessions, and in some cases violent repression). Here, we ask whether respondents feel anger or contempt towards the regime, and whether they are willing to forgive regime loyalists.[33]

- How much do you agree with the following statements? (5 pt. agreement)
  a. "The government's actions make me angry."
  b. "I detest people who condone the government's actions."
  c. "The government should be forgiven for their actions."

[33] These questions are drawn from Tausch et al. (2011).

Analysis

To assess the hypotheses described above, we will run the following linear regression analyses:

H1: Women are more peaceful

I. Regress the pre-vignette questions about support for violence against respondent gender (hereafter *RGender*), controlling for other demographic factors.[34]
II. Regress the post-vignette question about violent tactics (hereafter *Tactic*) against *RGender*, controlling for the *Gender* and *Repression* treatment and other demographic factors.
    a. Secondary analysis will regress the other post-vignette questions—about the efficacy of and moral justifications for violence—against respondent gender, in an effort to determine whether the effect is driven by moral beliefs or beliefs about efficacy.

H2: Women respond to repression differently

I. To assess whether repression increases women's support for violence, regress *Tactic* against *Repression, Gender,* and demographic factors among female respondents. Do the same for men.
II. To compare this effect across genders, regress *Tactic* against *Repression* and *Gender*, controlling for *RGender* and an *RGender*Repression* interaction term. The interaction coefficient can be interpreted as the difference in the effect of the repression treatment across genders.
III. To assess whether men have a more hostile emotional response to repression than women, repeat I and II above, with the post-vignette Emotions questions as the dependent variable.

H3: Women's participation restrains men

I. Regress *Tactic* against an *RGender*Gender* interaction term, controlling for *Repression*, the *Gender*Repression* interaction, *RGender*, and other demographic factors. The interaction coefficient can be interpreted as the gendered effect of women's participation on male respondents.

H4: Women's participation decreases approval for repression

I. Regress post-vignette question about Regime Behavior against *Gender, Repression, RGender*, and other demographic factors.

[34] Unless unavailable from Premise, those demographic controls will include Age, Education, Household Financial Stability, Religion; Urban/Rural, Previous Activism Experience, and Support for Modi/Buhari.

Power

To determine our sample size for this experiment we conducted a power analysis in R. We tested for the power of an interaction effect between a binary demographic factor (*RGender*) and a binary experimental treatment, with uniform distributions of both. This relationship captures both the key term of interest in H2 (*RGender*Repression)* and H3 (*RGender*Gender*), and should be more difficult to identify than a main effect. Thus, if the study is sufficiently powered to identify an interaction, it should similarly be sufficiently powered to identify main effects. We tested interaction effect size of 0.2, 0.3, and 0.5 standard deviations, assuming a small to medium effect size, but a larger reasonable range than in the conjoint experiment, given the greater stimulus from the vignette, and sample sizes from 200 to 2,000 respondents. As with experiment 1, we simulated each effect size – sample size combination 1,000 times. Additional assumptions of the simulation were that repression would have a large negative effect on the dependent variable (0.5 standard deviations) and that the main effect of *RGender* would be double the interaction effect of *RGender* and the treatment.

Figure 6 summarizes the results of the power analysis. We reach 80% power for effect sizes of 0.5 standard deviations and 0.3 standard deviations at sample sizes of 500 and 1,400 respondents respectively, and a maximum power of 58.3% at 2,000 respondents for an effect size of 0.2. Based on the power analysis, we chose to implement the experiment with a sample size of 1,500 respondents in each country, which will give us 80% power for an 0.3 and above interaction effect size, and 50% power for an 0.2 effect size.

Figure 6: Experiment 2 Power Analysis



Statistical power across sample and effect sizes, with α = 0.05.
Dashed line indicates 80% power.

Experiment 3: Youth and Movement Diversity

Our third experiment—another classical vignette experiment—considers the impact of youth participation on nonviolent action campaigns. The experiment is based on the idea that youth are both more willing and more able to forge diverse coalitions in pursuit of social change.

Hypotheses

Youth participation is a central component of many protest movements. Whether because they are highly motivated, risk acceptant, or have more free time for participation, youth often serve as the vanguard of mobilization in high-risk contexts, driving demands for reform and providing the creative spark that fuels successful nonviolent campaigns.

That said, the unique qualities of youth-led movements remain deeply undertheorized. Some scholars argue that youth have "been treated as incidental to the central causes of mobilization and movement development…the elephant in the room."[35] Much of the literature has focused on youth in the United States or other developed democracies, neglecting youth activism in fragile or conflict-affected states.[36] In particular, while many survey experiments draw respondents from student populations, few have focused on youth characteristics as key explanatory variables.[37]

One idea that has emerged from past work is that youth are better at mobilizing diverse coalitions that cut across identity and other societal divides.[38] There is some observational evidence to support this proposition—youth movements are thought to feature more horizontal and pluralistic coordination, and to make good use of digital networking technologies that better link diverse national constituencies.[39] A relationship between youth activism and movement diversity would be of substantive import, as cross-cutting coalitions are key determinants of nonviolent campaign success.[40]

We propose to test this purported relationship along two dimensions. First, at the individual-level, youth activists may be more willing to bridge societal cleavages and identity-based divides. Several mechanisms are plausible. Relative to their older peers, youth activists may be less prejudiced and thus more amenable to out-group collaboration. Youth activists could also be more ideologically committed to pluralism, an attitude reinforced by their experiences with horizontal organizing and flat

[35] Johnston (2019).
[36] For a review of this literature, see Earl, Maher, and Elliott (2017).
[37] For instance, see Tausch and Becker (2013).
[38] Pinckney and Rivers (2021)
[39] For instance, see Juris and Pleyers (2009); della Porta (2019).
[40] Chenoweth and Stephan (2011).

movement hierarchies.[41] Or perhaps youth activists exhibit greater cognitive flexibility, and their creative thinking helps them to transgress seemingly rigid social boundaries.[42]

H1: Younger activists are more willing to support diverse movements that transcend salient societal identity cleavages

Second, at the movement level, movements oriented around youth objectives or that are framed as "youth" movements may attract a more diverse range of participants. Given the general trend of youth disillusionment with institutional politics, observers may perceive youth-led movements to be more cleanly separated from political parties that they believe to be corrupt or otherwise unworthy. Liberated from the confines of partisan politics, youth movements may therefore be better equipped to draw supporters from disparate political factions and identity groups. From a different angle, movements framed around ensuring safety and prosperity for younger generations may evoke particular resonance across societal divides, in that the basic desire to do right by one's children likely transcends such divides.

H2: Youth-centered movements enjoy greater popular support than movements that lack a clear youth framing

In particular, evidence from prior observational research suggests that a movement's framing as a "youth" issue may generate diverse support beyond the movement's primary identity group, as the youth framing is perceived as transcending more narrow identity-based grievances. Mobilizing members of a different identity group is likely to be a challenge for any movement, but youth movements may be better able to overcome this obstacle, thereby forming broader coalitions.

H2a: Youth-centered movements will be more successful at gaining support across identity divides than movements that lack a clear youth framing

Design

To test these hypotheses, we use a classical vignette experiment, which asks respondents to read about and react to a hypothetical protest event occurring in their country. We field this survey experiment online to a sample of 1600 respondents in Nigeria.

Vignette Factors

As in Experiment 2, the experimental vignette will describe a hypothetical mass demonstration occurring in Abuja. This vignette will mirror a brief news article about the event, and will include

[41] El-Sharnouby (2019).
[42] Martin and Rubin (1995).

information common to news reports of protest events, including the protest location, size, and tactic employed. In this case, protesters will mobilize against economic stagnation and specifically high unemployment, which is currently at historically high levels in Nigeria and has been only further exacerbated by the covid-19 pandemic.

Beyond these fixed background details, we experimentally manipulate two key factors. First, *Youth* determines whether the movement is framed in terms of youth participation and goals, or instead lacks this framing. This factor takes two levels. In the treatment condition, respondents learn that the movement is primarily led by youth activists, and the unemployment crisis is framed as an issue specifically concerning youth. Such a framing should prove salient in the Nigerian context, where youth unemployment is a known and serious problem. In contrast, the control condition provides no specific focus on youth and does not describe the movement as oriented around youth concerns. Note that we standardize the unemployment information ("at least 30% unemployed") provided in both conditions – youth unemployment is actually higher than 30%, but the "at least" statement remains factually accurate, and presenting the same percentage in both treatments ensures that we manipulate only youth framing, rather than information about the magnitude of the unemployment crisis.

Second, we manipulate protester *Identity*. Identity is a deeply complex attribute, and we cannot reasonably explore the many dimensions of individual identity in a survey experimental setting. That said, in some societies certain identity cleavages are both stark and politically salient. In Nigeria, the religious landscape is bifurcated between Christianity and Islam, which each represent approximately 50% of Nigerians. Religion is also politicized—northern states with largely Muslim populations implement sharia law while southern, Christian-majority states do not, and religious tensions have fueled frequent violent flareups as well as the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency.

Thus, to manipulate *Identity*, we vary whether protesters hail from the respondents' own religious tradition, or from the opposed religious identity group. This leaves us with three experimental conditions. Hypothetical protesters may comprise members of the respondents' own religious group (InGroup); members of another religious group (OutGroup); or a blend of religious groups (Diverse). Note that this design requires us to randomize the identity treatment conditions based on respondents' own, self-reported religion.

Survey Instrument

Following participants' informed consent, respondents will first answer basic demographic questions. Importantly, we ask respondents about their religious identity pre-treatment, which is necessary for experimental randomization, their employment status, which likely affects how they perceive protests over unemployment, as well as questions that their respondent support for the Nigerian government and previous experience with nonviolent activism.

- In what year were you born?
- What is your gender?
- What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received?
- What is your employment status?
    a) Employed
    b) Self-Employed
    c) Unemployed or looking for work
    d) Retired
    e) Housewife
    f) Student
    g) Military
    h) Other
- Which of these statements comes closest to describing your household income?
    a) Our net household income covers our expenses and we are able to save
    b) Our net household income covers our expenses without notable difficulties
    c) Our net household income does not cover our expenses; we face some difficulties
    d) Our net household income does not cover our expenses; we face significant difficulties
    e) Don't Know
- What is your religion?[43]
    a) Christianity
    b) Islam
    c) Other
    d) I am not religious
- How strongly do you identify with your religion? (5 pt. scale)
- How do you feel about the Nigerian government? (1-7 approval)
- Have you participated in a nonviolent protest within the past five years? (Y/N)

We then ask three questions about *cognitive flexibility*, an individual-level characteristic possibly associated with age that may influence how people respond to protests. Cognitive flexibility is defined by Martin and Rubin (1995) as "(a) awareness that in any given situation there are options and alternatives available, (b) willingness to be flexible and adapt to the situation, and (c) self-efficacy in being flexible." The Martin and Rubin Cognitive Flexibility Scale has 12 items, but for length purposes, we reduce this to three questions based on a factor analysis pre-test conducted prior to survey launch:

[43] Asking about religion pre-treatment may inadvertently prime identity, influencing how respondents react to the vignette. This is an unavoidable aspect of the design, though we do not believe it seriously threatens causal inference. The vignette already deliberately primes religious identity. The additional priming effect may heighten religious salience, further increasing respondents' resistance to out-group collaboration. If anything, this makes our experiment a hard test for the youth encouragement hypotheses—if we observe effects of youth participation on movement support despite strong religious identification, then we can be confident that the effect is genuine.

- "I feel like I never get to make decisions." (6 pt. scale, reverse coded)
- "I have many possible ways of behaving in any given situation." (6 pt. scale)
- "I am willing to listen and consider alternatives for handling a problem." (6 pt. scale)

Lastly prior to treatment, we ask a simple attention check question.

We will also ask a basic attention check question at this point.

- "To show that you are paying attention, please select "Agree" below.

Respondents then read a brief vignette about a hypothetical protest against unemployment in Abuja. See the vignette below (randomizations italicized and in brackets).

Protests In Abuja as *[Nigerians / Nigerian Youth]* March to End Unemployment
August 13, 2022

This Saturday, thousands of *[young]* protesters, *[largely Respondent Religion / largely not Respondent Religion / a mixed group of both Muslims and Christians]*, marched through Abuja in a peaceful protest against high *[youth]* unemployment.

The protesters, organized by a group called *"Nigerians/Nigerian Youth for Change,"* sought relief from the ongoing *[youth]* unemployment crisis. *[Youth]* unemployment is at historically high levels—according to Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics, in December 2020 [*at least 30% of Nigeria's labor force was unemployed / at least 30% of Nigeria's labor force between 15-24 years old was unemployed*].

The government has dismissed the protests and made no reforms. Protest leaders insist that they will not back down until the government provide more career opportunities for Indian *[workers / youth]*.

Respondents will then be presented with our key outcome questions. Both **H1** and **H2** speak to respondents' willingness to support and/or participate in social movements, given certain qualities of those movements. We therefore ask respondents about both, along with an attention check:

- How much do you support this movement? (7pt.)
- If a demonstration like this occurred near you, how likely would you be to participate? (7 pt.)
- In the scenario above, what were people protesting against?
  a. Corruption and bribery by public officials
  b. Police violence
  c. High unemployment

We also measure respondents' opinions about the state of the Nigerian economy, which will allow us to measure any inadvertent differences in perceptions about economic malaise caused by the youth treatment conditions (as a robustness check).

- How would you describe the current economic situation in Nigeria? (7pt. scale)

Lastly, we ask a set of questions intended to capture various mechanisms that could link youth and support for diverse movements. Questions include tolerance, coalition building, persuasion, and compromise, important elements of nonviolent action campaigns that could also be associated with youth. We also ask a country-specific question about religious prejudice.

- *Persuasion*: "When thinking about creating change, it is better to…"
    a) Mobilize people who already support your cause
    b) Persuade people who might disagree with you
    c) Don't know
- *Compromise*: "When thinking about creating change, it is better…"
    a) To compromise on some goals to gain support from other groups
    b) To remain steadfast and resist compromising on goals that you know are right
    c) Don't know

[5 pt. scales]

- *Coalitions*: "Nigeria's problems can only be solved by building broad coalitions across religions."
- *Tolerance*: "I listen to the opinions of people who disagree with me, even on important things."
- *Prejudice*: "Nigerians should marry members of their own religious communities."

Analysis

To assess the hypotheses described above, we will run the following regression analyses:

H1: Youth are more willing than older generations to support diverse movements that transcend salient societal identity cleavages.

I. To assess whether a movement's Identity composition influences respondent Support, regress the post-vignette questions about movement support (*Support)* against the *Youth* and *Identity* treatments, controlling for background demographic factors.[44]

II. To compare this effect across age groups, regress *Support* against *Youth* and *Identity,* controlling for respondent age (*RAge*) and the *RAge*Identity* interaction term, along with demographic factors. The interaction coefficients can be interpreted as the difference in the effect of the Identity treatment across age groups.

III. For a rough exploration of potential mechanisms, we can regress the post-vignette mechanism questions against *RAge*, controlling for the *Youth* and *Identity* treatments along with other demographic factors. Should we find that *RAge* correlates with these mechanism questions, we can subsequently run mediation analysis to determine whether any effect of *RAge* on *Support* is mediated through these particular mechanisms.

H2: Youth-centered movements enjoy greater popular support than movements that lack a clear youth framing

I. The coefficient on *Youth* in the Step I. regression above will reveal whether the youth framing encourages additional movement support.

H2a: Youth-centered movements will be more successful at gaining support across identity divides than movements that lack a youth framing

I. To assess whether a youth framing increases respondent Support even when the respondent's identity differs from the identity of the group described in the vignette, regress post-vignette questions about movement against an interaction term of the *Youth* treatment and a binary indicator of whether the respondent's self-reported identity group differed from that of the group described in the vignette.

[44] Unless unavailable from Premise, those demographic controls will include Age, Education, Household Financial Stability, Religion; Urban/Rural, Previous Activism Experience, and Support for Government.

Power

We conducted a power analysis in R for the above hypotheses, testing effect sizes of 0.5, 0.3, and 0.2 standard deviations and sample sizes of 200 to 2000 respondents, as in the analysis for Experiment 2 above. We tested for two main effects: youth identity and youth framing of the movement, and two interaction effects: *Youth*Identity* and *RAge*Identity*. We tested for power both of identifying any one of the four effects at $\alpha = 0.05$ with a Bonferroni correction for four hypotheses (making the final $\alpha = 0.0125$), and for identifying all four effects at $\alpha = 0.05$. Figure 7 below shows the analysis for identifying any one of the four effects. We reach 80% power for effect sizes of 0.5, 0.3, and 0.2 at sample sizes of 300, 600, and 1,400 respondents respectively.

Figure 7: Power Analysis for Experiment 3



Statistical power for identifying any one of four effects across sample and effect sizes, with $\alpha = 0.05/4$. Dashed line indicates 80% power.

However, correctly identifying all four true effects is much more difficult. Even at an effect size of 0.5 we only achieve 80% statistical power for all four true effects at 900 respondents. Smaller effect sizes never reach 80% statistical power. Given this, we go above the minimum number of respondents necessary to identify a single true effect even at an 0.2 effect size, and opt for 1,600 respondents as our full sample size.

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Appendix

A. Survey Instrument, Experiment 1

Informed Consent

Welcome! This is a survey study organized by the United States Institute of Peace. Respondents will answer questions about hypothetical protest events. Your responses will be used alongside others to produce academic and policy publications that help international organizations like USIP better support civil society development around the world.

Participation in this survey is voluntary, and you are free to decline or end participation at any time, for any reason. Your responses will be anonymous—we will not collect any information that identifies you specifically, and all data will be stored securely. We do not anticipate any personal risk to you for participating in this survey.

The survey should take 10 minutes to complete. Respondents that complete the survey will be compensated by Premise. If you'd like to know more about this study or your rights as a research participant, you may contact the primary researchers Jonathan Pinckney (jpinckney@usip.org) and Matthew Cebul (mcebul@usip.org).

Do you agree to participate in this study? (Yes/No)

Vignette Experiment

Thank you for agreeing to participate in our study!

"You will now read a brief report describing a hypothetical protest event. This event is fictional, but similar protests have occurred in the past and will likely occur again.

We check responses and ask questions to ensure that respondents have read the scenario carefully. ***We will only accept participants who clearly demonstrate that they have read and understood the survey***. Please read carefully, and then answer the questions."

Example Profile 1 (India)

The event: a mass demonstration in the central square of New Delhi

- Most protesters identified as members of a General Category Caste
- There were no reports of violence caused by protesters.
- Participants mobilized to demand new laws to strengthen democratic institutions
- The government did not try to stop the protest.
- Most participants were women, and their slogan was "*The women of India are ready for change!*"
- Most protesters were young people below the age of 25
- Thousands of people participated

How much do you agree with the following statements?

- "This movement is peaceful."
    - Strongly Agree
    - Agree
    - Somewhat Agree
    - Neither Agree nor Disagree
    - Somewhat Disagree
    - Disagree
    - Strongly Disagree

- "This movement is going to succeed."
    - Strongly Agree
    - Agree
    - Somewhat Agree
    - Neither Agree nor Disagree
    - Somewhat Disagree
    - Disagree
    - Strongly Disagree

- "The government's response to this movement is appropriate."
    - Strongly Agree
    - Agree
    - Somewhat Agree
    - Neither Agree nor Disagree
    - Somewhat Disagree
    - Disagree
    - Strongly Disagree

- "I would support a movement like this in India/Nigeria."
    - Strongly Agree
    - Agree
    - Somewhat Agree
    - Neither Agree nor Disagree
    - Somewhat Disagree
    - Disagree
    - Strongly Disagree

[Repeat this process 9 more times, each time randomizing the profile attributes according to Table 1, reprinted below]

Table 1: Factors with All Levels

Factor	Levels	Dist.
Gender	• "Most participants were women. Their slogan was "The women of India are ready for change!"" • "Most participants were men. Their slogan was "India's men are calling for change!"" • "Participants were an even mix of men and women. Their slogan was "The Indian people want change!""	Uniform
Age	• "Most participants were young people below the age of 25." • "Most participants were older adults above the age of 25." • "Participants were an even mix of young people and older adults."	Uniform
Identity (India Only)	• "Most participants belonged to a General Category Caste." • "Most participants belonged to a Scheduled Caste." • "Participants were an even mix of both General Category and Scheduled Castes."	Uniform
Goals	• "Protesters sought new laws to increase youth representation in politics." • "Protesters sought new laws to promote gender equality." • "Protesters sought new laws to protect the rights of religious minorities." • "Protesters sought new laws to strengthen democratic institutions."	Uniform
Tactic	• "Event: a mass demonstration in downtown New Delhi/Abuja." • "Event: a labor strike and mass walk out in New Delhi/Abuja." • "Event: a sit-in occupation of a government building in New Delhi/Abuja." • "Event: a march and blockade of a major road in New Delhi/Abuja."	Uniform
Size	• "Hundreds of people participated." • "Thousands of people participated." • "Tens of thousands of people participated." • "More than 100,000 people participated."	• 50% • 30% • 15% • 5%
NV Disc.	• "There were no reports of violence caused by protesters." • "At one point, a few protesters looted and set fire to a nearby store." • "At one point, a few protesters threw rocks at a police officer and set fire to the officer's vehicle." • "Protesters caused damage throughout the day, looting and burning many nearby stores and businesses." • "Protesters clashed with police throughout the day, throwing rocks at police officers and setting fire to their vehicles."	• 50% • 17% • 17% • 8% • 8%
Repress	• "The government did not try to stop the protest." • "The government sent police to stop the protest. A few protesters were arrested, and a few suffered mild injuries." • "The government sent police to stop the protest. Many protesters were arrested, and many suffered serious injuries." • "The government sent police to stop the protest. A dozen protesters were killed, many were arrested, and many suffered serious injuries."	• 50% • 20% • 20% • 10%

[After respondents view the 5th profile task and answer the outcome questions, display the following attention check question before progressing to the 6th profile task]

- "You're doing great! To show that you are paying attention, please select "Agree" from the options below."
    - Strongly Agree
    - Agree
    - Somewhat Agree
    - Neither Agree nor Disagree
    - Somewhat Disagree
    - Disagree
    - Strongly Disagree

[After respondents have completed all 10 profile tasks, display the following questions]

Almost done! Please answer a few final questions:

- How do you feel about the Indian / Nigerian government?
    - Strongly Approve
    - Approve
    - Somewhat Approve
    - Neither Approve nor Disapprove
    - Somewhat Disapprove
    - Disapprove
    - Strongly Disapprove

- Have you, at any time in the past five years, participated in a nonviolent protest?
    - Yes
    - No

- To which caste do you identify? (India Only)
    - General Category
    - Scheduled Caste
    - Scheduled Tribe
    - Other/Most Backwards Class
    - I am not a member of a caste

Thank you for your participation! To receive payment, please enter the following code into the Premise app. Make sure to copy the code correctly!

B. Survey Instrument, Experiment 2

Informed Consent

Welcome! This is a survey study organized by the United States Institute of Peace. Respondents will answer questions about hypothetical protest events. Your responses will be used alongside others to produce academic and policy publications that help international organizations like USIP better support civil society development around the world.

Participation in this survey is voluntary, and you are free to decline or end participation at any time, for any reason. Your responses will be anonymous—we will not collect any information that identifies you specifically, and all data will be stored securely. We do not anticipate any personal risk to you for participating in this survey.

The survey should take 10 minutes to complete. Respondents that complete the survey will be compensated by Premise. If you'd like to know more about this study or your rights as a research participant, you may contact the primary researchers Jonathan Pinckney (jpinckney@usip.org) and Matthew Cebul (mcebul@usip.org).

Do you agree to participate in this study? (Yes/No)

Survey Instrument

Thank you for agreeing to take our survey!

To start, please answer the following questions.

1. Nonviolence is ____ than violence at achieving change.
    a. Much more effective
    b. Somewhat more effective
    c. Neither more nor less effective
    d. Somewhat less effective
    e. Much less effective
    f. Don't know

2. Sometimes, violence is necessary to achieve change.
    a. Strongly agree
    b. Agree
    c. Neutral / don't know
    d. Disagree
    e. Strongly disagree

3. Violence is never a morally justifiable response to political oppression
    a. Strongly agree
    b. Agree
    c. Neutral / don't know
    d. Disagree
    e. Strongly disagree

4. Defacing or otherwise damaging government property is an acceptable form of mass protest
    a. Strongly agree
    b. Agree
    c. Neutral / don't know
    d. Disagree
    e. Strongly disagree

5. Have you participated in a nonviolent demonstration at any point within the past five years?
    a. Yes
    b. No

6. How do you feel about the Nigerian / Indian government?
    a. Strongly approve
    b. Approve
    c. Neutral / don't know
    d. Disapprove
    e. Strongly disapprove

7. To demonstrate that you are paying attention, please select "Disagree" below.
    a. Strongly agree
    b. Agree
    c. Neutral / don't know
    d. Disagree
    e. Strongly disagree

"You will now read a brief report describing a hypothetical protest event. This event is fictional, but similar protests have occurred in the past and will likely occur again.

We check responses and ask questions to ensure that respondents have read the scenario carefully. ***We will only accept participants who clearly demonstrate that they have read and understood the survey***. Please read carefully, and then answer the questions."

Protests In [Abuja/New Delhi] as *[Men/Women]* March to End Corruption

OR

This Saturday, thousands of *[men/women]* marched through [Abuja/New Delhi] in a peaceful protest against corruption.

The [*men/women*] took to the streets seeking an end to bribery, a problem that plagues [Nigerian/Indian] politics. Following years of economic hardship, the protesters want the government to stop corrupt public officials from extorting citizens.

The march culminated near the presidential palace, where the [*men/women]* confronted a police barricade, linking arms and chanting anti-corruption slogans. *[Security forces violently dispersed the demonstration—over 100 protesters were arrested, and five [men/women] were killed / Security forces monitored the protests without interfering—the demonstration eventually dispersed peacefully, and no [men/women] were injured.]*

The government has dismissed the protests and made no reforms. Protest leaders insist that they will not back down.

How much do you agree with the following statements about the scenario?

8. The movement is peaceful.
    a. Strongly agree
    b. Agree
    c. Neutral / don't know
    d. Disagree
    e. Strongly disagree

9. This movement is likely to succeed.
    a. Strongly agree
    b. Agree
    c. Neutral / don't know
    d. Disagree
    e. Strongly disagree

10. The government's response to the demonstration was appropriate
    a. Strongly agree
    b. Agree
    c. Neutral / don't know
    d. Disagree
    e. Strongly disagree

11. I would support a movement like this one.
    a. Strongly agree
    b. Agree
    c. Neutral / don't know
    d. Disagree
    e. Strongly disagree

12. In the scenario above, what were people protesting against?
    a. Corruption and bribery by public officials
    b. Climate change
    c. High unemployment

Think about the future of the anti-bribery movement. How would you feel about movement activists taking the following actions?

13. Another peaceful protest at the presidential palace.
    a. Strongly approve
    b. Approve
    c. Neutral / don't know
    d. Disapprove
    e. Strongly disapprove

14. A nonviolent blockade of major city streets.
    a. Strongly approve
    b. Approve
    c. Neutral / don't know
    d. Disapprove
    e. Strongly disapprove

15. Setting fire to government buildings or police vehicles.
    a. Strongly approve
    b. Approve
    c. Neutral / don't know
    d. Disapprove

e. Strongly disapprove

16. Confronting police with stones, clubs, and other improvised tools (excluding firearms).
    a. Strongly approve
    b. Approve
    c. Neutral / don't know
    d. Disapprove
    e. Strongly disapprove

17. Confronting police with knives, guns, and other lethal weapons.
    a. Strongly approve
    b. Approve
    c. Neutral / don't know
    d. Disapprove
    e. Strongly disapprove

How much do you agree with the following statements about the scenario?

18. This movement would be more effective if it adopted more aggressive tactics.
    a. Strongly agree
    b. Agree
    c. Neutral / don't know
    d. Disagree
    e. Strongly disagree

19. Violence is a justified response to the government's behavior.
    a. Strongly agree
    b. Agree
    c. Neutral / don't know
    d. Disagree
    e. Strongly disagree

20. The government's actions make me angry.
    a. Strongly agree
    b. Agree
    c. Neutral / don't know
    d. Disagree
    e. Strongly disagree

21. I detest people who condone the government's actions.
    a. Strongly agree
    b. Agree
    c. Neutral/don't know
    d. Disagree
    e. Strongly disagree

22. The government should be forgiven.
    a. Strongly agree
    b. Agree
    c. Neutral/don't know
    d. Disagree
    e. Strongly disagree

"Thank you for your participation! We reiterate that the events depicted in this scenario were fictional, and did not actually occur."

C. Survey Instrument, Experiment 3

Informed Consent

Welcome! This is a survey study organized by the United States Institute of Peace. Respondents will answer questions about a hypothetical protest event. Your responses will be used alongside others to produce academic and policy publications that help international organizations like USIP better support civil society development around the world.

Participation in this survey is voluntary, and you are free to decline or end participation at any time, for any reason. Your responses will be anonymous—we will not collect any information that identifies you specifically, and all data will be stored securely. We do not anticipate any personal risk to you for participating in this survey.

The survey should take 10 minutes to complete. Respondents that complete the survey will be compensated by Premise. If you'd like to know more about this study or your rights as a research participant, you may contact the primary researchers Jonathan Pinckney (jpinckney@usip.org) and Matthew Cebul (mcebul@usip.org).

Do you agree to participate in this study? (Yes/No)

Thank you for agreeing to take our survey! To start, please answer the following questions:

1. In what year were you born?

2. What is your gender?
    a) Male
    b) Female
    c) Non-binary
    d) Prefer not to answer

3. What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received?
    a) No formal education
    b) Some primary / elementary school
    c) Completed primary / elementary school
    d) Some secondary / high school
    e) Completed secondary / high school
    f) Some university
    g) Completed university / bachelor's degree
    h) Master's degree
    i) Professional degree (JD, MD)

4. What is your employment status?
    a) Employed
    b) Self-Employed
    c) Unemployed or looking for work
    d) Retired
    e) Housewife
    f) Student
    g) Military
    h) Other

5. Which of these statements comes closest to describing your household income?
    a) Our net household income covers our expenses and we are able to save
    b) Our net household income covers our expenses without notable difficulties
    c) Our net household income does not cover our expenses; we face some difficulties
    d) Our net household income does not cover our expenses; we face significant difficulties
    e) Don't Know

6. What is your religion?
    a) Islam
    b) Christianity
    c) Other
    d) I am not religious

7. How strongly do you identify with your religion?
    a) Very Strongly
    b) Strongly
    c) Neither Strongly nor Weakly
    d) Weakly
    e) Very Weakly

8. How do you feel about the Nigerian government?
    a) Strongly Approve
    b) Approve
    c) Somewhat Approve
    d) Neither Approve nor Disapprove
    e) Somewhat Disapprove
    f) Disapprove
    g) Strongly Disapprove

9. Have you participated in a nonviolent protest within the past five years?
    a) Yes / No

The following statements deal with your feelings about your own behavior. Please tell us how much you agree with them. *[Randomize order]*

10. "I feel like I never get to make decisions."
    a) Strongly Agree
    b) Agree
    c) Somewhat Agree
    d) Somewhat Disagree
    e) Disagree
    f) Strongly Disagree

11. "I have many possible ways of behaving in any given situation."
    a) Strongly Agree
    b) Agree
    c) Somewhat Agree
    d) Somewhat Disagree
    e) Disagree
    f) Strongly Disagree

12. I am willing to listen and consider alternatives for handling a problem."
    a) Strongly Agree
    b) Agree
    c) Somewhat Agree
    d) Somewhat Disagree
    e) Disagree
    f) Strongly Disagree

13. To show that you are paying attention, select "Somewhat Agree" below.
    a) Strongly Agree
    b) Agree
    c) Somewhat Agree
    d) Somewhat Disagree
    e) Disagree
    f) Strongly Disagree

"You will now read a brief report describing a hypothetical protest event. This event is fictional, but similar protests have occurred in the past and will likely occur again. We check responses and ask questions to ensure that respondents have read the scenario carefully. ***We will only accept participants who clearly demonstrate that they have read and understood the survey***. Please read carefully, and then answer the questions."

Protests In Abuja as *[Nigerians / Nigerian Youth]* March to End Unemployment
August 13, 2022

This Saturday, thousands of *[young]* protesters, *[largely Respondent Religion / largely not Respondent Religion / a mix of both Muslims and Christians]*, marched through Abuja in a peaceful protest against high *[youth]* unemployment.

The protesters, organized by a group called *"Nigerians/Nigerian Youth for Change,"* sought relief from the ongoing *[youth]* unemployment crisis. *[Youth]* unemployment is at historically high levels—according to the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics, in December 2020 [*at least 30% of Nigeria's labor force was unemployed / at least 30% of Nigeria's labor force between 15-24 years old was unemployed*].

The government has dismissed the protests and made no reforms. Protest leaders insist that they will not back down until the government provide more career opportunities for Nigerian *[workers / youth]*.

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14. How much do you support this movement?
    a) Strongly Support
    b) Support
    c) Somewhat Support
    d) Neither Support nor Oppose
    e) Somewhat Oppose
    f) Oppose
    g) Strongly Oppose

15. If a demonstration like this occurred near you, how likely would you be to participate?
    a) Very Likely
    b) Likely
    c) Somewhat Likely
    d) Neither Likely nor Unlikely
    e) Somewhat Unlikely
    f) Unlikely
    g) Very Unlikely

16. In the scenario above, what were people protesting against?
    a) Corruption and bribery by public officials
    b) Police violence
    c) High unemployment

Almost done! These last questions deal with your beliefs about social change in Nigeria.

17. "When thinking about creating change, it is better to…"
    a) Mobilize people who already support your cause
    b) Persuade people who might disagree with you
    c) Don't know

18. "When thinking about creating change, it is better…"
    a) To compromise on some goals to gain support from other groups
    b) To remain steadfast and resist compromising on goals that you know are right
    c) Don't know

19. "I listen to people who disagree with me about Nigerian politics, even on very important matters."
    a) Strongly Agree
    b) Agree
    c) Neither Agree nor Disagree
    d) Disagree
    e) Strongly Disagree

20. "Nigeria's problems can only be solved by building broad coalitions across religions."
    a) Strongly Agree
    b) Agree
    c) Neither Agree nor Disagree
    d) Disagree
    e) Strongly Disagree

21. "Nigerians should marry members of their own religious communities."
    a) Strongly Agree
    b) Agree
    c) Neither Agree nor Disagree
    d) Disagree
    e) Strongly Disagree

Thanks! To receive payment, please enter the following code in the Premise app:

"Thank you for your participation! We reiterate that the events depicted in this scenario were fictional, and did not actually occur."