INTERNATIONAL PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTIONS DATASET

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Introduction

This dataset collects information on 54 international parliamentary institutions (IPIs) from 1945 to 2019. The project was funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation, NCCR challenges to democracy in the 21st century, and ETH Zurich. Coding documentation is available on demand.

We constructed this dataset between 2014 and 2017, updated it in 2020. The ETH Zurich, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Free University of Berlin supported the corresponding author at the time of update and revision in 2020. We based ourselves primarily in information about IPIs from their official documentation and communication productions available online. Additionally, we incorporated the findings of previous studies (particularly Kissling 2011 and Cofelice 2018). We also made use of some of the interviews in Schimmelfennig et al. (2020) to obtain information about IPIs, and additionally interviewed officials from the Association of Pacific Island Legislatures (APIL), the Baltic Assembly, Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (CPAR) and the Central American Parliament.

Case selection

From informal associations to the most well-established IPIs, there is a continuum of institutionalization and authority in entities formed by parliamentarians. The count of existing IPIs worldwide depends on the cut-off point that divides them from all other entities like clubs, associations or networks. Some recent publications on IPIs (Giesen 2017; Jancic 2019; Rocabert et al. 2019 Winzen and Rocabert 2020) discuss this diversity and its consequences for the field. To produce this dataset, we adopted a definition of IPIs based on two elements: collegiality and membership. As we say in Schimmelfennig et al. (2020):

> IPIs need to be collegial and have their membership constituted exclusively by (directly or indirectly) elected parliamentarians. The first condition has ruled out regular meetings of parliamentarians, but which are not designed to take decisions collegially, such as the Parliamentary Conference on the WTO. The second condition rules out cases that, because of their level of institutionalization, would otherwise be considered IPIs. This is the case, for instance, of important associations of parliamentarians which have their membership constituted by self-selected parliamentarians that register to the associations, rather than being elected by their parliaments. The Global Legislators Organization (GLOBE International) is a good case in point. This definitional criterion also excludes interparliamentary meetings which, as regularized as they may be, join parliaments as institutions, rather than parliamentarians.

The database includes the IPI of the Eurasian Economic Community until its dissolution in 2014 and the IPI of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) which held one preparatory session in 2010 but has since been idle, along with the IO itself (Los 2018; Paraguassu and Desantis 2018; Parlamento do Mercosul 2010). Most of its values are NA because the formal rules were never approved. For a more detailed discussion on case selection, including cases with particular relationships between IPIs and IOs and other borderline cases, see Winzen and Rocabert (2020).

Structure of the dataset

The file ipi_database_12_10_2020 contains the main dataframe, the unit of observation is the year-ipi. IPIs enter the dataset on the year of their first session (start), even if the formal agreement to create them is prior (start_formal). Version 12.10.2020: 1611 observations of 54 IPIs, 82 variables. The data is organized in five blocks.

- **Basic information:** this contains elements such as year in which the IPI was formally created, when it started to operate or its affiliation to an IO. An IPI may be independent from an IO, be part of its bodies, or be associated with it but not part of its formal structure. We operationalize these recognitions through explicit writing only. An example of a stand-alone IPI is the Inter-Parliamentary Union, while the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe is a prototypical case of an IPI within an IO and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly is only committed to the organization but not part of its structure.
- **Institutional Authority:** this section is dedicated to the influence that the IPI holds over the decision-making of the IO it is affiliated with. This section covers only IPIs which are integrated within an IO. It covers not only the power that the IPI has over IO decisions but also its capacity to influence membership and treaty changes.
- **Institutional Autonomy:** this block measures the influence that the IO holds over the decision-making of the IPI it is affiliated with. This section covers only IPIs which are integrated within an IO. This includes issues self-organization and budgeting.
- **Institutionalization:** This block is divided between indicators of capacity and those of composition. The first include elements such as number of members, committees, and sessions. The seconds describe the IPIs' structure, the number of factions and their logic – whether it is ideological or territorial- as well as the share of directly and indirectly elected members of the IPI.
- **Membership-based characteristics:** the variables in this block are constructed through aggregating indexes of the membership of IPIs, such as democratic levels or size of their population.

The file ipi_membership_12_10_2020 contains country-year observations, with values for the Polity V index of IPI members (Marshall 2020), the electoral democracy index from V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2020), populations in millions and GDP data from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2020). Each IPI is an additional column indicating whether each country-year has membership.

VARIABLE NAME	EXPLANATION		VALUES
Basic information Basic characteristics of the international parliamentary institution (IPI) and its affiliation to an international organization (IO).			
ipi	Name of the IPI in the dataset.	IPI-year is the observation unit	
year	Year.		
ipi_acronym	Acronym of the IPI.		
ipi_name	Complete name of the IPI.		
start	Year in which the IPI held its first session.	This can be the inaugural session or the first formal preparatory session.	
start_formal	Year at which the creation of the IPI was formally agreed.	This is the year in which the foundation of the IPI was decided by its member states or by an IO body, regardless of whether the document establishes a certain number of ratifications to come into force or other time considerations.	
region	Region.	If a significant proportion of the member states of an IPI belong to different categories the classification is Global.	Africa
			Americas
			East Asia & Pacific
			Eastern Europe & Central Asia
			Europe
			Global
			Western Asia & Northern Africa

region_simple	Region.	If a significant proportion of the member states of an IPI belong to different categories the classification is Global.	Africa
			Americas
			East Asia & Pacific
			Europe
			Global
affiliation	Affiliation to an IO.	This describes the relationship between the IPI and an IO. An independent IPI is one which holds no legal or political relationship with an IO. A committed IPI shadows the regional or subject area of an IO but is not recognized by the IO decision-making body (DMB), although it might hold a political relationship with it. An informally recognized IPI is one that has been acknowledged in IO outputs but not in a document approved by the IO decision-making body. A formally recognized IPI is one which appears in documents approved by the IO decision-making body. Finally, an integrated IPI is one of the bodies of an IO.	Independent
			Committed
			Informally recognized
			Formally recognized
			Integrated
io_name	Name of the IO to which the IPI is affiliated.	NA if IPI is not affiliated to an IO.	
io_acronym	Acronym of the IO to which the IPI is affiliated.	NA if IPI is not affiliated to an IO.	
io_start_formal	Year at which the creation of the IO was formally agreed.	NA if IPI is not affiliated to an IO.	
io_purpose	Classification between general-purpose and task-specific IOs.	This variable distinguishes two kinds of IOs, general-purpose and task-specific, based on the classification in Lenz et al. (2015). General-purpose IOs typically engage in international region-building based on open-ended	0. Task-specific

		policy and political mandates. Task-specific IOs typically focus on defined goals in a specific issue area, such as trade or defence, without the ambition of regional community building. NA if IPI is not affiliated to an IO.	1. General-purpose
startgap_ipi	Years between start_formal and start	The number of years between the agreement to create an IPI and its first session.	
startgap_io_ipi	Years between the formal creation of the IO and start_formal.	This can be negative if the IPI was created before the IO. To consider that an IO was formally created we apply the same considerations as in start_formal above. NA if IPI is not affiliated to an IO.	
treaty_change	IO created or reformed its treaty or basic document.	NA if IPI is not affiliated to an IO.	0. No / 1. Yes
treaties	Count of times the IO created or reformed its treaty or basic document.	NA if IPI is not affiliated to an IO.	
institutional_reform	IPI created or reformed its statutes, rules of procedure or other basic documents.	Technical or otherwise not meaningful changes to rules of procedure or statutes are not counted. NA if IPI is not affiliated to an IO. To clarify what entails an institutional_reform of an IPI, consider for instance the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which formally changes its basic documents whenever a member accesses the organization. These changes are not coded. Only the ones which imply changes to the IPIs' organization, authority or any other substantial matter. See for example this change in the PACE's basic rules.	0. No / 1. Yes
ipi_hq_country	The country in which the headquarters of the IPI are located.	This is the country in which the IPI has its permanent facilities, even if that is within the parliament of a member country. This is different in some cases from the country in which the IO has its headquarters.	

Institutional Authority This section refers to the relationship between the IPI and the IO to which it is affiliated with. The values of this section are NA if IPI is independent.			
constitution_agenda_setting	Constitution 1: Agenda-setting	Does the IPI have the right to place proposals for changes to the IO treaties on the agenda of the decision-making body? NA if IPI is not affiliated to an IO.	0. No / 1. Yes
constitution_decision_making	Constitution 2: Decision-making	Does the IPI participate in the decision-making over changes to the IO treaties? NA if IPI is not affiliated to an IO.	0. No
			1. Obligatory consultation
			2. Consultation with a right to a response
			3. Veto rights
			4. Sole decision-making
constitution_membership	Constitution 3: Membership	Does the IPI IPI participate in the decision-making over the accession of new member states to the IO? NA if IPI is not affiliated to an IO.	0. No
			1. Obligatory consultation
			2. Consultation with a right to a response
			3. Veto rights
			4. Sole decision-making
constitution_suspension	Constitution 4: Suspension	Does the IPI participate in the decision-making over the suspension of membership or any rights related to membership of the IO? NA if IPI is not affiliated to an IO.	0. No / 1. Yes
decision	Decision-making	Equivalent to legislative competences, but might not only cover legislation in IOs. This variable captures the level of influence that the IPI exhorts on IO decisions. NA if IPI is not affiliated to an IO.	0. No formal rights
			1. Information about decision-making agenda
			2. Obligatory consultation
			3. Right to a response to consultation
			4. Veto rights
			5. Sole decision-making
decision_ep	Decision-making of the European	Value of decision of the European Parliament on the	

	Parliament	year.	
agenda	Institutional agenda-setting	Another element of legislative competences. Most IPIs can propose something but the right to place an issue on the agenda of other institutions is different in that this issue cannot be ignored. Agenda-setting rights mean that other institutions cannot withhold legislative proposals. NA if IPI is not affiliated to an IO.	0. No formal rights
			1. Right to address resolutions to the DMB
			2. Right to response to resolution of the DMB
			3. Right to place decision proposals on the agenda of the DMB
oversight	Oversight	Oversight refers to the rights of the IPI to examine, or possibly sanction the actions of other actors. NA if IPI is not affiliated to an IO.	1. No formal rights
			2. Right to address questions to the DMB and receive answers
			3. Right to address questions to the organizations bureaucracy and receive answers
			4. Right to summon members of the DMB for hearings
			5. Right to summon members of the bureaucracy for hearings
budget1	Budget 1: Changes to budget sources	Does the IPI have powers related to the budget sources of the IO? Budget sources refers to the way the IO acquires its resources, for instance on the distribution of contributions by member states. NA if IPI is not affiliated to an IO.	0. No formal rights
			1. Information about decision-making agenda
			2. Obligatory consultation
			3. Right to a response to consultation
			4. Veto rights
			5. Sole decision-making
budget2			0. No formal rights

	Budget 2: Changes to distribution	Does the IPI have powers related to the budget distribution of the IO? This refers to the way in which the IO spends its budget. NA if IPI is not affiliated to an IO.	1. Information about decision-making agenda
			2. Obligatory consultation
			3. Right to a response to consultation
			4. Veto rights
			5. Sole decision-making
budget3	Budget 3: Restricted domains	Are parliamentary rights restricted regarding some sections of the budget? NA if IPI is not affiliated to an IO.	0. No / 1. Yes
appointment1	Head of the bureaucracy	Does the IPI participate in the appointment of the leader of the IO bureaucracy (often called the secretary-general but could also be "President" as in the EU, "Director-General" etc.) NA if IPI is not affiliated to an IO.	0. No formal rights
			1. Shared proposal rights
			2. Sole proposal rights
			3. Veto
			NA. No head of bureaucracy
appointment2	Head of the DMB	Does the IPI participate in the appointment of the leader of the IO DMB? NA if IPI is not affiliated to an IO.	0. No formal rights
			1. Shared proposal rights
			2. Sole proposal rights
			3. Veto
			NA. No head of DMB
appointment3	Positions above identical?	Marks when the head of the DMB and the head of the bureaucracy are the same position. NA if IPI is not affiliated to an IO.	0. No / 1. Yes
appointment4	Impeachment head of bureaucracy	Does the IPI have the right to impeach the head of bureaucracy? NA if IPI is not affiliated to an IO.	0. No / 1. Yes
appointment5	Impeachment Head of DMB	Does the IPI have the right to impeach the head of the DMB? NA if IPI is not affiliated to an IO.	0. No / 1. Yes

Institutional Autonomy This section refers to the relationship between the IPI and the IO to which it is affiliated with. The values of this section are NA if IPI is independent.			
control1	Negative agenda-control	Outside actors cannot force consideration of an issue. NA if IPI is not affiliated to an IO.	0. No (Outside actors can force consideration) / 1. Yes
control2	Positive agenda-control	IPI is free to consider all matters it wants. NA if IPI is not affiliated to an IO.	0. No (IPI not free to consider all matters) / 1. Yes
control3	Meeting control	IPI controls the frequency of its meetings. NA if IPI is not affiliated to an IO.	0. No / 1. Yes
control4	Organization control	IPI controls its internal organization. This means that there are no fixed rules on the parliament's internal rules, structures and procedures that the IPI cannot change unilaterally – and no actors that can make such rules, except by rewriting the organizations treaties. NA if IPI is not affiliated to an IO.	0. No / 1. Yes
Institutionalization This section refers to the level of institutional capacity of the IPI.			
		Capacity	
members	Total number of member states (countries)		
seats	Total number of members of the IPI (seats)		
committees	Total number of committees	Not counting temporary or ad-hoc committees.	
committees_coverage_match	Committee coverage	Does the functional scope of the committee system match the functional scope of the organization?	0. No (Clear gaps in coverage) 1. Yes (No clear gaps in coverage)

		Committees-department congruence is important for the capacity of an IPI to participate in the policy-process.	
ipi_finance_unadjusted	Budget unadjusted	Total budget of the IPI, unadjusted by currency.	
ipi_finance _adjusted	Budget adjusted	Total budget of the IPI, in millions of 2019 USD.[1]	
io_finance_unadjusted	IO Budget unadjusted	Total budget of the IO, unadjusted. NA if IPI is not affiliated to an IO.	
io_finance_adjusted	IO Budget adjusted	Total budget of the IO, in millions of 2019 USD. NA if IPI is not affiliated to an IO.	
ipi_currency	Budget currency	Currency of the unadjusted budget of the IPI.	
io_currency	Budget currency	Currency of the unadjusted budget of the IO. NA if IPI is not affiliated to an IO.	
finance_percent	Percentage of IPI budget over IO budget	The percentage of ipi_finance_adjusted over io_finance_adjusted. NA if IPI is not affiliated to an IO.	
sessions	Sessions	The number of weeks in which the IPI is in sessions. This does not mean the number of weeks in which it holds meetings in practice, but instead the time that the IPI documents specify, if any.	

[1] Calculated acording to the CPI for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

factions	Number of factions	Number of institutionalised factions. Institutionalized in this context means stable existence over a sustained period of time. Signs of institutionalisation: consensual recognition in secondary literature, organizational resources and structures, formal recognition in IPI rules, identification in IPI documents / website). Focus on the most encompassing factions, sub-divisions within factions not counted (e.g. EPP rather than German conservatives in the EP).	0 stands for only individual members, otherwise count the number of factions
factions_rules	Fraction logic1	Are there any formal rules regulating fractions, or is it based on informal arrangements?	0 Informal
			1 Formal
factions_logic	Faction logic 2	What is the logic behind factional differentiation?	1. National
			2. Functional
			3. Regional
			4. Ideological
			5. Other
factions_logic_binomial	Faction logic 3		0. National / 1. Ideological
		Composition	
voting	Voting Rules	Which voting rule does the IPI use to pass decisions? This should be explicitly described in IPI documentation.	1. All decisions by unanimity
			2. Most decisions by unanimity
			3. All decisions by qualified majority
			4. Most decisions by qualified majority
			5. All decisions by simple majority
			6. Most decisions by simple majority
elections	Elections	Is there any of the member states that organizes direct elections to select its IPI seats?	0. No / 1. Yes

elections_intention	Aspiration elections. The IPI or the IO formally sets out the goal of having direct elections in the future.	Do the IO or IPI rules explicitly state the goal of direct elections of all seats? This does not include informal political declarations.	0. No / 1. Yes
indirectly_elected	Share of indirectly elected members	Share of indirectly elected members out of all IPI members.	
directly_elected	Share of directly elected members	Share of directly elected members out of all IPI members.	
elections_synchronous	Synchronous elections	Regarding directly/indirectly elected members, do the IPI or organization rules state that elections be held at the same time?	0. No / 1. Yes
elections_rules	Common election rules	Do the IPI or organization rules define common rules for the election of those seats that are directly/indirectly elected?	0. No common rules
			1. Some common rules
			2. Non-binding recommendations
			3. Exhaustive common rules
segmentation	Segmentation 1	Regarding directly/indirectly elected seats, in what kind of sub-units are elections segmented, if any? We considered a sub-unit any entity other than the whole IPI territory that obtains a pre-defined number of seats regardless of the electoral outcome. Equivalent to electoral districts in national parliaments. When sub-units are nested (e.g. provinces within countries), we consider only the highest sub-unit.	1. System-wide elections
			2. Member states
			3. Regions
			4. Groups (e.g. ethnic, socio-economic)
			5. Others
segmentation_logic	Segmentation binomial	Regarding directly/indirectly elected seats, in what kind of sub-units are elections segmented, if any? We considered a sub-unit any entity other than the whole organization's territory that obtains a pre-defined number of seats regardless of the electoral outcome. When sub-units are nested (e.g. provinces within countries), we consider only the highest sub-unit.	0. Member states
			1. Larger units than member states

distribution	Seat distribution	In what way are seats distributed over sub-units? "Degressive proportionality" over-represents small sub-units and under-represents large sub-units.	1. Degressive proportionality
			2. Equal seats per unit
			3. Proportional
distribution_logic	Seat distribution binomial	In what way are seats distributed over sub-units?	0. Equal seats per unit
			1. Proportionally or degressively proportionally
Membership-based characteristics This section derives values from the member states of the IPI.			
polity_binomial_mean	Polity share	Share of IPI members which are democratic according to the Polity V index (Marshall 2020).	
polity_mean	Polity mean	Mean of the Polity V index of IPI members (Marshall 2020).	
polity_sd	Polity sd	Standard deviatioof the Polity V index of IPI members (Marshall 2020).	
polity_n	Polity n	Number of countries on which Polity V statistics are based. NA values for country-years in Polity V might mean the calculation is done with less than the total number of members.	
v2x_polyarchy_mean	V-Dem mean	Mean of the electoral democracy index of IPI members, derived from V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2020)	
v2x_polyarchy_sd	V-Dem sd	Standard deviation of the electoral democracy index of IPI members, derived from V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2020)	
v2x_polyarchy_kurtosis	V-Dem kurtosis	Kurtosis of the electoral democracy index of IPI members, derived from V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2020)	
v2x_polyarchy_n	V-Dem n	Number of countries on which electoral democracy index statistics are based.	
population_mean	Population mean	Mean of the size of the populations of IPIs members, in millions, derived from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2020)	

population_sd	Population sd	Standard deviation of the populations of IPIs members, derived from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2020)	
population_kurtosis	Population kurtosis	Kurtosis of the populations of IPIs members, derived from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2020)	
population_n	Population n	Number of countries on which population statistics are based.	
gdppcap_mean	GDP per capita mean	Mean of the GDP per capita of IPIs members, derived from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2020)	
gdppcap_sd	GDP per capita sd	Standard deviation of the GDP per capita of IPIs members, derived from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2020)	
gdppcap_kurtosis	GDP per capita kurtosis	Kurtosis of the GDP per capita of IPIs members, derived from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2020)	
gdppcap_n	GDP per capita n	Number of countries on which GDP per capita statistics are based.	

International Parliamentary Institutions included in the dataset

Africa (includes Western Asia & Northern Africa)	***Acronym***	***Founded***
African Parliamentary Union	APU	1976
West African Economic and Monetary Union Inter-Parliamentary Committee	UEMOA	1983
Consultative Council of the Arab Maghreb Union	CCAMU	1989
Economic Community of Central African States Community Parliament	CEMAC CP	1994
Southern African Development Community Parliamentary Forum	SADCPF	1996
Pan-African Parliament	PAP	2001
Parliament of Economic Community of West African States	PECOWAS	2001
Legislative Assembly of the East African Community	EALA	2001
Central African Parliamentary Network	REPAC	2002
Association of Senates, Shoora and Equivalent Councils in Africa and the Arab World	ASSECAA	2004
Arab Parliament	Arab	2005
Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic Speaking Countries	TURKPA	2008
IGAD Inter-Parliamentary Union	IGAD IPU	2008

Americas	***Acronym***	***Founded***
Latin American Parliament	Parlatino	1964
Andean Parliament	Parlandino	1979
Central American Parliament	Parlacen	1987
Amazonian Parliament	Parlazonico	1988
MERCOSUR Parliament	Parlasur	1994
Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians	ACCP	1996

Parliamentary Confederation of the Americas	COPA	2000
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Assembly	OECSA	2010
South American Parliament	UNASUR	2011

East Asia & Pacific	***Acronym***	***Founded***
Asean Inter-Parliamentary Assembly	AIPA	1977
Association of Pacific Island Legislatures	APIL	1981
Asia Pacific Parliamentary Forum	APPF	1991
Asian Parliamentary Assembly	APA	2006

Europe (includes Eastern Europe & Central Asia)	***Acronym***	***Founded***
European Parliament	EP	1952
Nordic Council	Nordic	1953
Benelux Consultative Inter-Parliamentary Council	BENELUX	1957
European Free Trade Association Parliamentary Committee	EFTAPC	1977
Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference	BSPC	1991
Baltic Assembly	Baltic	1992
Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of Member Nations of Commonwealth of Independent States	IPA CIS	1992
European Economic Area Joint Parliamentary Committee	EEAJPC	1994
South East European Cooperation Process Parliamentary Assembly	SEECP PA	1997
Parliamentary Dimension of the Central European Initiative	PD CEI	1NA
Parliament of Russia-Belarus Union	Ru-Bl	2000
Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the Eurasian Economic Community	IPA Eur-AsEC	2001
Organization for Democracy and Economic Development	GUAM	2004
Parliamentary Assembly of the Collective Security Treaty Organization	PACSTO	2007

Global	***Acronym***	***Founded***
Inter-Parliamentary Union	IPU	1889
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe	PACE	1949
NATO Parliamentary Assembly	NATOPA	1955
ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly	ACP-EU JPA	1964
Francophone Parliamentary Assembly	Franco	1967
Euro-Latin American Assembly	EUROLAT	1974
Asian Forum of Parliamentarians on Population and Development	AFPPD	1984
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly	OSCE PA	1991
Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region	CPAR	1993
Inter-Parliamentary Assembly on Orthodoxy	Orthodoxy	1994
Parliamentary Assembly of the Union for the Mediterranean	PA UfM	1995
Parliamentary Union of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation Member States	PUIC	1NA
Parliamentary Assembly of Community of Portuguese Language Countries	AP-CPLP	2002
Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean	PAM	2005

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