Codebook: Initiatives Opposing Populist Parties in Europe Dataset

Summary

The dataset describes coding categories used to collect data on Initiatives Opposing Populist Parties in Europe dataset. The dataset is described and analysed in the Bourne, Angela (ed) *Democratic Defence as Normal Politics: Everyday Opposition to Populist Parties in Europe* (2024, Palgrave). It collects data on initiatives opposing Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz), Law and Justice (Poland), Alternative for Germany, Podemos and Vox (Spain), League and Five Star Movement (Italy), Sweden Democrats and Danish People's Party.

Initiatives Opposing Populist Parties (or IoPPs) are defined as acts which seek to delimit the participation of populist parties in the public sphere and/or the impact of their ideas and actions on public policy (Bourne 2023a; Bourne 2023b). Data on IoPPs was collected from samples of newspaper articles and primarily consisted of information about types of IoPPs developed in a typology developed by Bourne (ibid).

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Typology of Initiatives Opposing Populist Parties

The typology categorizes initiatives by three main actor types (public institutions, political parties, and civil society) and two modes of engagement (tolerant and intolerant modes). Tolerant opposition is a form of 'normal' politics. These initiatives observe or uphold the rights, privileges, and respect which political parties would usually enjoy, either by law or in practice, because of their representative role in a democratic society and/or as a governing party in the international sphere. There are three main types of tolerant IoPPs, *ordinary legal controls and pedagogy* by public authorities, *forbearance* by political parties and *adversarialism* by civil society actors. In contrast, intolerant IoPPs implement exceptional treatment of populist parties, suspending or delimiting rights, privileges, and respect usually granted to political parties. Three types of intolerant IoPPs are *rights restrictions* by public institutions, *ostracism* by political parties, and *coercive confrontation* by civil society actors. Most types have several subcategories.

IoPP types and subtypes

IoPP Type	**Subcategories**
Rights restrictions by public authorities	None
Ostracism by political parties	Governmental, parliamentary, electoral and public.
Coercive Confrontation by civil society actors	Damage to property, diffuse threat of violence, political violence, organized armed conflict
Ordinary Legal Controls and Pedagogy by public authorities	Checks and balances, judicial controls, public persuasion
Forbearance by political parties	Policy co-optation, electoral cooperation, governmental cooperation, parliamentary cooperation, public cooperation, oppositional politics, political persuasion
Adversarialism by civil society actors	Classic modes of protest, legal initiatives, challenging speech and communication, appeals for change and intervention, and factual statements, other initiatives

Methods

Data was collected using a method inspired by protest event analysis and political claims analysis, which uses information provided in newspapers (e.g. Koopmans and Rucht 2002, 231; Koopmans and Stratham, 2010; Kreisi et al, 2010; Hutter 2014). These are forms of content analysis drawing on samples of newspaper articles to map occurrences and characteristics of protests and political claim-making in different places, by different actors, and how they might change over time.

Data sources and sampling

Data was collected from the following newspaper sources for each case study.

Hungary	**May 2010 to May 2012** *Népszava and Magyar Nemzet*	**April 2014 to June 2016** *Népszava and Magyar Nemzet*	**June 2018 to May 2020** *Népszava* **January 2019 – December 2019** *Magyar Nemzet*
Poland	**November 2015 to December 2019** *Rzeczpospolita* and *Gazeta Wyborcza*		
Italy	**January 2013 to November 2020** *La Repubblica* and *Corriere della Sera*		
Spain	**June 2014 to December 2021** *El País* and *El Mundo*		
Denmark	**October 1997 to November 2001** *Berlingske* and *Politiken*	**January 2014 to May 2019** *Berlingske* and *Politiken*	
Sweden	**June 2014 to October 2016** *Svenska Dagbladet* and *Dagens Nyheter*	**June 2018 to October 2020** *Svenska Dagbladet* and *Dagens Nyheter*	**June 2022 to March 2023** *Svenska Dagbladet* and *Dagens Nyheter*
Germany	**April 2013 to March 2021** *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*		

The sampling unit was articles published in the national politics section (or equivalent, depending on the publication) on Mondays (Italian, Spain, Swedish, Danish, and German cases) or Wednesdays (Hungarian and Polish cases) in two quality newspapers for each country case study. Sampling periods began according to a different logic depending on type of case, typically a period relevant to a populist party's emergence or breakthrough, a major political turning point, or a period in which it governed. For Hungary and Poland, which were led populist party governments, data collection focused on periods of government. For Hungary, articles were sampled from the first two years of Fidesz-led governments in 2010, 2014 and 2018. For Poland, articles were sampled the entire period of the 2015-2019 Law and Justice-led government. Where parties were relatively new - as in the case of the Alternative for Germany, the Five Star Movement, Podemos and Vox – coding commenced from their emergence. For longer standing parties we adopted different strategies. In the case of League, we began in 2013, when the League transformed itself from a 'northern', regionalist party into a party with nation-wide ambitions. The sampling periods for the two Scandinavian populist parties, the Danish People's Party and the Sweden Democrats, both relatively long-standing parties, sought to capture transitions from outsider parties of opposition to governing partners. Sampling thus begun several months prior to an electoral breakthrough, for the Danish People's Party, or a significant electoral advance, for the Sweden Democrats and for both parties included periods of increasing cooperation with governing coalitions culminating in support party roles. In a number of cases, coding was extended to cover major initiatives. These were the decision of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Federal Intelligence Service) to monitor Alternative for Germany, opposition activity immediately after November 2019 elections bringing Law and Justice another period in government, and incorporation of Sweden Democrats as a support party in a centre-right government.

Data collection and recording

The figure below summarizes procedures used for collection, recording, and checking the data. The procedure was designed to implement a constructivist approach to intercoder reliability, which we deemed the most appropriate approach for this research. A constructivist approach to intercoder reliability prioritises *consistency*, or intercoder agreement (Schreier, 2012; Forman and Damschroder, 2008), rather than statistical measures of intercoder reliability (Lombard et al, 2002, Krippendorff,

2004; Neuendorf, 2017). As Forman and Damschroder argue, constructivist approaches to reliability assume that 'reflexivity and reason-giving are more important aspects of an agreement process than achieving a pre-specified level of agreement independently' (2008, 55). In other words, 'Through discussion, team members are able to explain their perspectives and justifications, how and why it differs from other team members' perspectives and reach consensus on how the data ultimately should be coded' (ibid). In addition, as Schreier argues, constructivist approaches to reliability assume that '[i]f the coders agree, this in itself ensures that the interpretation in question is shared, potentially by all members of a given community' (Schreier, 2012, 174).

Procedure for data collection



Categories and Coding Rules for the IoPP Dataset

Delimitation rules

We delimit one initiative from another with reference to the actors involved and the action type, rather than use what Hutter calls a standard approach based on time and place (2014, 348-9). For example, in our study a protest that lasted several days, was coded as a single initiative if the same actors were involved, even if it took place in different cities. If the same group organized a protest after an interruption of days, weeks, or months, it was coded as another event. A court case or investigation involving several stages and various courts were coded as a single event, even if it lasted several years.

Exclusion rules

The dataset only includes acts of opposition against the conduct of populist parties and their signature policies. That is, we excluded opposition to policies which the relevant populist party had not a) addressed during election campaigns; b) defended during coalition government negotiations; or

c) championed when in government. This exclusion rule mostly related to data for populist parties dominating government in Hungary and Poland.

Internal acts of opposition by current party members were not included in the dataset, while those who had left the party were included. Internal disagreement within coalition governments involving populist parties were not included. Opinion pieces by individual journalists or commentators and press reports about commentary from foreign newspapers were not included. However, editorials that specifically opposed a populist party were included. We also included comments by public intellectuals, well-known professors and celebrities.

Category	Notes
Item no.	Country code plus separate number for each IoPP: e.g. DK001, PL010, DE500. Not necessarily in chronological order
Date IoPP began	Date when IoPP was undertaken, or if precise date unavailable, date when IoPP was recorded in newspaper article.
IoPP type (from Bourne's typology)	a) **Rights restrictions** b) **Ordinary legal controls and pedagogy** c) **Ostracism** d) **Forbearance** e) **Coercive Confrontation** f) **Adversarialism**
IoPP subtype (from Bourne's typology)	Rights restrictions (no subcategories) Ostracism a) **Electoral ostracism** e.g. refusal to cooperate with in an electoral contest, by for example, running on a joint ticket b) **Governmental ostracism** e.g. refusal to cooperate in a coalition government c) **Parliamentary ostracism** e.g. refusal to cooperate in enactment of laws, to appoint a populist party member to parliamentary offices d) **Public ostracism** e.g. refusal to participate in a public event, such as a debate, or refusal to invite a populist party to official events Coding rule: If item shows ostracism is cumulative i.e. entails electoral, governmental, parliamentary, and public ostracism code as governmental opposition (because it is the most consequential form of ostracism). Coercive confrontation a) **damage to property** e.g. Breaking window or fences, damaging electoral material, hacking websites b) **diffuse threat of violence** e.g. physically blocking movement in a public place, throwing fruit or eggs, use of smoke bombs c) **political violence** e.g. assaults on people, assassinations and attempted assassinations, shooting a firearm at an individual or into a crowd, forcible occupation of buildings, rioting, fights with opposing protestors, violence to self such as hunger strikes and self-immolation.

	d) **organized armed combat** e.g. international or civil war, insurrection, terrorism Coding rule: if more than one subtype is observed at a single event, code as the most violent (with i) as least violent and iv) the most violent). Ordinary legal controls and pedagogy a) **Checks and balances** e.g. constitutional court ruling, European Court of Human Rights cases, successful no confidence motions, vetting ministerial appointments. b) **Judicial controls** e.g. investigations, legal proceedings and convictions for corruption, abuse of office, violation of party funding rules, hate crimes, Court of Justice of the EU cases. c) **Public persuasion** e.g. speech by public office holders condemning or demonizing populist parties, dialogue with populist parties Forbearance Coding rule: For a), b), c) and d) below specific acts of collaboration are coded (such as actually contesting elections together, or joining a coalition government), as well as statements declaring a willingness, or implying a willingness, to do so. a) **Electoral cooperation** e.g. contesting an election on a joint ticket. b) **Governmental cooperation** e.g. formal participation in a coalition government Coding rule: Once parties have joined a coalition government with a populist party acts of cooperation, such as jointly agreeing laws etc, are no longer included in the dataset. Nor are cases of disagreement between parties in a coalition government with populist parties. c) **Parliamentary cooperation** e.g. cooperation with a populist parliament in the enactment of laws Coding rule: includes formal cooperation, such as negotiation among parties to support legislative proposals, or de facto or passive cooperation, where one party accepts the support from another without formal negotiation, when this is necessary for obtaining a majority. d) **Public cooperation** e.g. appearing together at a public event Coding rule: Public cooperation includes negotiations for electoral, governmental or parliamentary cooperation which do not end in agreement for such cooperation. e) **Policy co-option** e.g. other parties implementing policies which were initially associated with a populist party. f) **Oppositional politics** e.g. efforts to defeat legislation introduced by a populist government, interpellation of government representatives, initiation of constitutional court case, no confidence motion Coding rule for oppositional politics that end as checks and balances. Some oppositional politics IoPPs such as a motion of no-confidence in the government or a minister, or impeachment, overlap procedurally with *checks and balances,* a subcategory of tolerant IoPPs by public authorities. Such IoPPs can be considered acts of political parties, and thus opposition politics. If they end up acheiving their goal – e.g. successful vote of no confidence, or impeachment - we code *checks and balances*. In other words, a no-confidence motion against a populist

	party in government remains an act of opposition politics until it succeeds in toppling the government, after which it becomes a check on the executive branch. g) **Political persuasion** e.g. statements or symbolic acts condemning or demonizing populist party, dialogue Coding rule: includes public demonstrations and other public acts where political parties are involved, often alongside civil society actors. Adversarialism a) **Classic modes of protest** eg public demonstrations, civil disobedience, petitions, strikes, boycotts or establishing new opposition group or network b) **Legal initiatives** e.g. court cases and administrative proceedings, including those initiated by which fail, and parliamentary acts such as proposing legislation c) **Challenging speech and communication** e.g. incitement to violence or hatred, demonizing discourse, condemnation, symbolic protest, political art, investigation such as media reports or NGO studies, and acts of exclusion d) **Appeals for change and intervention and factual statements** e.g. appeals, dialogue, declarations, or reform proposals e) **Other initiatives** e.g. online initiatives and interventions in election campaigns.
Populist opponnt	a) **Public authority** (state, supranational body or international organization) b) **Party-controlled public authority** (organs of the state run by parties, especially government, prime ministers, presidents, local and regional authorities; parliaments when acting as a collective unit (i.e. when passing a resolution); elected office holders, whether or not they officially belong to a political party, such as independents. c) **Political party** (organs of the party not involved in government, i.e. party on the ground and party in central office) Coding rule: Former heads of state or prime ministers are coded as party members if they undertake acts once they have left office. d) **Movement party** (a political party derived from and controlled by a social movement) e) **Civil society actor** e.g. NGOs, social movements, trade unions, church, universities, business, online and offline publics Coding rule: Former judges, or presidents, or other former public officials that can't be linked to a political party are coded as civil society actors. Government funded, but autonomous organizations such as public television and human rights institutions, are included in the category of civil society actors. f) **Party-linked association** e.g. a civil society organization, or movement attached to /or very closely linked to a political party).
Initiator name	Name of actor undertaking the initiative, e.g. Social Democrats, European Commission, Catholic Church, Constitutional Court

Territorial Category	The territorial unit from which the initiating actor derives from or represents. a) **State** e.g. IoPPs taken by NGOs or other organizations, registered or predominantly undertaking activities within the state, IoPPs by political parties represented in state bodies, or public authorities with jurisdiction primarily within the state. Individuals without official positions are recorded as coming from the state they were born in. b) **International** e.g. IoPPs by governments (both national and local, ministers and leaders of institutions) in one state targeting populist parties in another state; IoPPs undertaken by international organizations or their representatives c) **Transnational** e.g. IoPPs by representatives of political parties or civil society undertaking actions targeting populist parties in another state; IoPPs by Member of the European Parliament or European Parliamentary groups, including those from the country of the targeted populist party; IoPPs by non-governmental organizations operating in several states.
Name of territory	Name of the territorial entity undertaking the IoPP For example, a**) State**: 'Denmark' for action by Danish parliament or Danish NGO b) **International:** Name of state for actions undertaken by government, or minister of a state; EU for action by European Union institutions such as European Parliament, European Commission or European Court of Justice; Europe for regional actors such as Council of Europe, or European Court of Justice; UN for actions of United Nations bodies or agencies; international for extra regional organizations c) **Transnational:** territorial origins of organization undertaking the initiative, e.g. name of state from which parties or civil society actors are derived when they target populist parties in another state; for MEPs name the state where they were elected; for EP party groups record as EU; for non-governmental organizations operating in several states record regional context (Europe, Africa, Middle East) it operates in where relevant, or if transregional, record as international.
IoPP target category	a) **party as a whole** e.g. when the party is named as a target or where this is implicit. b) **party leader(s)** e.g. main party leader, party office holders or influential figures in the party, at both regional and federal level c) **elected representatives** e.g. President, members of parliament, or local councilors. d) **coalition government with populists** e) **party member(s)** f) **party supporter(s)** <u>Coding rule</u>: If cannot determine whether person(s) targeted are party member or supporter, code as supporters g) **youth branch of party** h) **party employee(s)**

	Coding rule: If a mix of elected representatives involved for a single IoPP, code that of most significant target (i.e. leader over member, party member over supporter)
Targeted populist party	Put party initial e.g. AfD, 5SM, PiS. Coding rule: If an action targets the 5SM-League coalition government, code twice, once for each party
Action Type	Coding rule: Code maximum of two action types per IoPP Institutional acts a) **Initiation of legal proceedings** e.g. formal decision of a public authority, political party or civil society actor to challenge the legality of actions of populist party by initiating legal proceedings that may end up in the courts. b) **Initiation of administrative proceedings** e.g. actions of political actors that refer a case to the Ombudsman, an Audit Commission or a regulatory body that is not a court for investigation c) **Investigation** e.g. official (i.e. police, courts, EU) investigations, or unofficial investigations (e.g. by a newspaper or NGO) into a populist party actions Coding rule: For domestic criminal and civil cases, code investigations that don't end up in court as investigation (e.g. where the case was dropped). If an investigation ends up in court, merge items on investigation into an item coded as a court case. For Commission-led stages of EU infringement proceedings code as investigation, even if the case ends up in court, because these early stages of an infringement proceedings can potentially lead to changes in government behaviour. d) **court case** e.g. where state or supranational courts make a rule. Coding rule: Once the case is in a deliberative phase, we code only the final ruling of judges in the highest court of appeal at which the case was decided. For EU infringement proceedings: Infringement proceedings that reach the Court of Justice of the EU are coded as court cases. e) **parliamentary act** e.g. IoPPs proposing, adopting, or rejecting legislation or legislative amendments; agreeing or rejecting parliamentary resolutions; setting up investigatory committees; no confidence votes; initiating debates in parliament; posing questions in parliament f) **executive act** e.g. non-legislative government actions, g) **administrative act** e.g. act of administrative arm of the state, such as a local government department, state bureaucracy, internal security services h) **Presidential act** e.g. Veto or assent to a legislative act. i) **vote** e.g. any other vote involving populist party opponents outside of parliament Acts of opposition in the public sphere (usually for Adversarialism) a) **public demonstration** e.g. people presenting political claims in public demonstrations, typically in the form of rallies or marches, involving many individuals; political festivals; the organized display of

	oppositional political symbols (such as banners from balconies, or satirical pictures); disruption of public performances; and smaller scale protests outside politicians' private dwellings. b) **civil disobedience** e.g. acts of protest that are illegal but not violent, including defiance of public authorities, sit-ins, altering public monuments, unregistered demonstrations or strikes. c) **strike** e.g. withholding labour (or stopping work) to negotiate working conditions or make a political point. d) **symbolic act** e.g. symbolic expression of opposition, such as resigning from a position of public authority, holding of 'mirroring events', such as alternative commemorations of public events, holding a 'minute silence' or equivalent, everyday opposition such as wearing coloured ribbons, or acts of violence (such as setting a car on fire). e) **investigation** (as above) f) **political art** e.g. holding a play or creating a TV series with a critical message directed at a populist party, political graffiti, playing music with texts critical of populist party g) **petitions** e.g. Collection of signatures in support of a cause. h) **boycott** e.g. refusal to participate in a scheduled event or meeting, walking out of a meeting. i) **exclusion** e.g. dismissing someone from their job because of links to a populist party, refusing to rent premises to such a person, refusing to invite them to political events j) **hunger strike** e.g. refusal to eat to communicate a political opinion <u>For coercive confrontation subtypes</u> a) **damage to property** e.g. destruction of (or calls to destroy) election posters, throwing stones at party gathering places, destruction or setting vehicles of party leaders on fire, deliberate damage to property during demonstrations, hacking websites and publication of private material, damage due to forced entry. b) **diffuse threat of violence** e.g. physically blocking movement in a public place, throwing fruit or eggs, use of smoke bombs, images of leaders being subject to violence (such as hanging or assassination) or incitement to violence or hatred c) **political violence** e.g. assaults on people e.g. assassination, shooting at individuals, forcible entry to or occupation of buildings, shooting into a crowd, rioting, fights with opposing protestors, death threats. Includes violence to self like hunger strikes and self-immolation d) **organized armed combat** e.g. international or civil war, insurrection, terrorism <u>Coding rule:</u> if more than one subtype is observed at a single event, code as the most violent (with h) as least violent and k) the most violent). <u>Speech and public communication</u> a) **demonizing discourse** e.g. claims that a party is fascist, nazi, racist, communist

	b) **condemnation** e.g. claims that a party or its actions are incompetent, corrupt, hypocritical, harmful, undemocratic or illiberal c) **appeal** e.g. calls for a populist party to change its behaviour, or for others to oppose populist parties d) **declaration** e.g. a public statement announcing an action or an opinion. e) **reform proposal/proposal** e.g. proposals for alternatives to populist policies or laws, proposals coopting populist policies, proposals initiatives or strategies to oppose populist parties f) **dialogue** eg debate or dialogue in media fora, public events, and international organizations, or negotiations between political parties. g) **agreement** e.g. formal and informal agreements h) **sanctions** e.g. sanctions by foreign countries against individuals from the party, withholding of financial payments, issuing of fines, sacking people or ending contracts. i) **establish new party or coalition** e.g. a new party or coalition competing directly with a populist party, or to better organize opposition to it. j) **establish new opposition group or network** eg a new network of NGOs to campaign against a populist party's signature policies, or the party itself k) **party regulation** eg changes in internal party rules or procedures authorizing IoPPs <u>Other</u> a) **election campaign** e.g. IoPPs undertaken in the course of an election campaign, i.e. once the election date has been formally announced. b) **online initiative** (which does not damage property), e.g. setting up information or organizational hubs, fund-raising, online petitions.
Description of IoPP	Short description of the IoPP, including public justifications for why it was undertaken.
Source	Reference to the documents used to classify the IoPPs.

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