Online Supplementary Materials

Military Insubordination and International Coercion

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Summary Statistics

Table A1 – Summary statistics

	Count	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Outcome variables					
MID initiation (challenger, including participation)	1599624	.0016085	.0400739	0	1
MID initiation (challenger)	1599624	.0013509	.0367303	0	1
Resistance (target)	2161	.4969921	.5001067	0	1
Monadic (target)					
Military mutiny	1599624	.0328809	.1783248	0	1
Violent mutiny	1599624	.0117715	.1078562	0	1
Large mutiny	1599624	.008717	.0929573	0	1
Mutiny duration (days)	1599624	.039031	.5160345	0	60
Military spending per soldier (logged)	1337819	9.041815	1.54742	.9242589	14.6979
Military size (logged)	1412089	3.565958	1.815037	0	9.433484
Years since the last coup	1599624	16.6748	15.11972	0	69
Conscription	1469433	1.496154	.4999854	1	2
Defense alliance	1599624	.6534436	.4758731	0	1
Dyadic (challenger-target)					
Capability ratio	1599624	.5	.3725214	1.11e-06	.9999989
Both democracy	1599624	.2556851	.4362457	0	1
Major power	1599624	.0730072	.2601483	0	1
Civil conflict	1599624	.1209766	.3261001	0	1
Cold War	1599624	.4400109	.4963884	0	1

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Additional Models: MID Initiation

Logit Models

Table A2 – Logit Models: Alternative MID Measure (Challenger's Original Initiation Only)

(DV: MID)	(All)	(Show Force)	(Use Force)	(All)	(Show Force)	(Use Force)
Monadic (Target)						
Military mutiny	0.499***	0.500***	0.499***			
	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.116)			
Military mutiny (t-1)				0.283***	0.304***	0.491***
				(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.121)
Military spending per soldier (logged)	-0.085***	-0.091***	-0.132***	-0.067***	-0.072***	-0.108***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.023)
Years since last coup	0.007***	0.007***	0.004	0.007***	0.006***	0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Civil conflict	0.566***	0.566***	0.499***	0.595***	0.595***	0.524***
	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.071)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.071)
Defense alliance	-0.231***	-0.214***	-0.164***	-0.247***	-0.230***	-0.181***
	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.059)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.060)
Dyadic (Challenger-Target)						
Capability ratio	0.559***	0.565***	0.362***	0.588***	0.595***	0.411***
	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.072)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.073)
Both democracy	-0.430***	-0.434***	-0.480***	-0.420***	-0.424***	-0.461***
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.083)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.084)
Major power	1.740***	1.735***	1.556***	1.693***	1.686***	1.478***
	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.066)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.066)
Cold War	0.756***	0.747***	0.871***	0.819***	0.813***	0.979***
	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.075)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.075)
Constant	-6.331***	-6.309***	-6.185***	-6.496***	-6.485***	-6.487***
	(0.183)	(0.185)	(0.221)	(0.182)	(0.184)	(0.218)
Observations	1337819	1337819	1337819	1314720	1314720	1314720
Pseudo R^2	0.058	0.057	0.047	0.056	0.056	0.045
Time Polynomials	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Robust SEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A3 – Logit Models: Magnitude of Mutiny and Interstate Conflict (MIDs–At Least Show of Force)

(DV: MID)	(Show Force)	(Show Force)	(Show Force)	(Show Force)	(Show Force)	(Show Force)
Monadic (Target)						
Violent mutiny	0.936***					
	(0.125)					
Violent mutiny (t-1)				0.478***		
				(0.160)		
Large Mutiny (binary)		0.803***				
		(0.151)				
Large Mutiny (binary) (t-1)					0.507***	
					(0.177)	
Mutiny duration			0.353***			
			(0.051)			
Mutiny duration (t-1)						0.174***
						(0.061)
Military spending per soldier (logged)	-0.132***	-0.134***	-0.132***	-0.106***	-0.108***	-0.107***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Years since last coup	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Civil conflict	0.601***	0.601***	0.584***	0.628***	0.630***	0.622***
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)
Defense alliance	-0.280***	-0.287***	-0.282***	-0.315***	-0.316***	-0.315***
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Dyadic (Challenger-Target)						
Capability ratio	0.521***	0.516***	0.522***	0.565***	0.566***	0.567***
	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Both democracy	-0.368***	-0.372***	-0.372***	-0.396***	-0.398***	-0.398***
	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)
Major power	1.862***	1.862***	1.859***	1.790***	1.790***	1.789***
	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Cold War	0.652***	0.648***	0.657***	0.756***	0.753***	0.757***
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Constant	-5.728***	-5.696***	-5.739***	-6.020***	-6.007***	-6.023***
	(0.167)	(0.168)	(0.168)	(0.164)	(0.165)	(0.165)
Observations	1337819	1337819	1337819	1314720	1314720	1314720
Pseudo R^2	0.064	0.064	0.064	0.062	0.062	0.062
Time Polynomials	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Robust SEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A4 – Logit Models: Magnitude of Mutiny and Interstate Conflict (MIDs–At Least Use of Force

(DV: MID)	(Use Force)	(Use Force)	(Use Force)	(Use Force)	(Use Force)	(Use Force)
Monadic (Target)						
Violent mutiny	1.082***					
	(0.140)					
Violent mutiny (t-1)				0.588***		
				(0.184)		
Large Mutiny (binary)		0.712***				
		(0.188)				
Large Mutiny (binary) (t-1)					0.629***	
					(0.202)	
Mutiny duration			0.355***			
			(0.060)			
Mutiny duration (t-1)						0.304***
						(0.066)
Military spending per soldier (logged)	-0.178***	-0.181***	-0.179***	-0.145***	-0.147***	-0.145***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Years since last coup	0.006**	0.006**	0.006**	0.005**	0.006**	0.006**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Civil conflict	0.495***	0.498***	0.479***	0.527***	0.531***	0.515***
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)
Defense alliance	-0.252***	-0.259***	-0.255***	-0.298***	-0.299***	-0.298***
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)
Dyadic (Challenger-Target)						
Capability ratio	0.384***	0.371***	0.378***	0.443***	0.444***	0.449***
	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)
Both democracy	-0.380***	-0.385***	-0.385***	-0.423***	-0.426***	-0.425***
	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.077)
Major power	1.706***	1.712***	1.708***	1.599***	1.599***	1.595***
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)
Cold War	0.796***	0.787***	0.798***	0.957***	0.952***	0.963***
	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)
Constant	-5.583***	-5.529***	-5.576***	-6.008***	-5.991***	-6.032***
	(0.197)	(0.199)	(0.199)	(0.192)	(0.193)	(0.194)
Observations	1337819	1337819	1337819	1314720	1314720	1314720
Pseudo R^2	0.056	0.054	0.055	0.052	0.052	0.053
Time Polynomials	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Robust SEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A5 – Robustness Checks: Mutinies Excluding Defection-like Cases

	DV: MID initiation (challenger)			
Monadic (target)				
Military mutiny	0.371***			
	(0.107)			
Violent mutiny		0.747***		
		(0.153)		
Large mutiny			0.875***	
			(0.167)	
Mutiny duration				0.259***
				(0.0644)
Military spending per soldier (logged)	-0.132***	-0.132***	-0.132***	-0.132***
	(0.0164)	(0.0164)	(0.0164)	(0.0164)
Year since the last coup	0.00610**	0.00626**	0.00607**	0.00614**
	(0.00203)	(0.00204)	(0.00203)	(0.00203)
Defense alliance	-0.289***	-0.287***	-0.293***	-0.288***
	(0.0446)	(0.0445)	(0.0446)	(0.0446)
Dyadic (challenger-target)				
Capability ratio	0.501***	0.502***	0.503***	0.501***
	(0.0546)	(0.0545)	(0.0547)	(0.0546)
Both democracy	-0.360***	-0.358***	-0.359***	-0.361***
	(0.0598)	(0.0598)	(0.0598)	(0.0598)
Major power	1.881***	1.884***	1.881***	1.881***
	(0.0469)	(0.0468)	(0.0469)	(0.0469)
Civil conflict	0.594***	0.601***	0.605***	0.594***
	(0.0531)	(0.0526)	(0.0526)	(0.0530)
Cold War	0.658***	0.659***	0.657***	0.659***
	(0.0558)	(0.0559)	(0.0556)	(0.0558)
Constant	-5.703***	-5.703***	-5.699***	-5.705***
	(0.166)	(0.166)	(0.166)	(0.166)
Observations	1337819	1337819	1337819	1337819
Time Polynomials	✓	✓	✓	✓
Robust SEs	✓	✓	✓	✓

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A6 – Robustness Checks: Additional Controls

	DV: MID initiation (challenger)				
Monadic (target)					
Military mutiny	0.494***	0.493***	0.500***	0.504***	0.528***
	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.091)
Military spending per soldier (logged)	0.008	0.005	-0.006	0.013	-0.022
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Military personnel size (logged)	0.660***	0.658***	0.649***	0.634***	0.495***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Year since the last coup	0.000	0.000	0.002	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Defense alliance	-0.393***	-0.395***	-0.417***	-0.179***	-0.486***
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.052)
Defense alliance (challenger)		-0.139***	-0.150***	0.144***	-0.241***
		(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.051)
Dyadic (challenger-target)					
Capability ratio	2.730***	2.746***	2.753***	2.702***	2.012***
	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.087)
Both democracy	-0.334***	-0.338***	-0.308***	-0.316***	-0.368***
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.060)
Major power	0.741***	0.769***	0.758***	0.953***	0.726***
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.057)
Civil conflict	0.252***	0.253***	0.228***	0.218***	0.186***
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.060)
Foreign policy alignment				2.360***	-0.525***
				(0.179)	(0.128)
Cold War	0.440***	0.442***	0.434***	0.385***	0.371***
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.058)
Minimum distance					-0.001***
					(0.000)
Constant	-10.010***	-9.915***	-9.769***	-11.848***	-6.167***
	(0.211)	(0.213)	(0.218)	(0.252)	(0.244)
Observations	1337819	1337819	1270786	1270786	1153486
Pseudo R^2	0.107	0.107	0.106	0.118	0.211
Time Polynomials	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Robust SEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A7 – Robustness Checks: Additional Controls (Alternative MID Measure: Challenger's Original Initiation Only)

	DV: MID initiation (challenger)				
Monadic (target)					
Military mutiny	0.409***	0.407***	0.405***	0.408***	0.425***
	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.099)	(0.100)	(0.102)
Military spending per soldier (logged)	0.047**	0.040**	0.033*	0.061***	0.026
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Military personnel size (logged)	0.640***	0.635***	0.638***	0.622***	0.465***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Year since the last coup	0.001	0.001	0.002	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Defense alliance	-0.324***	-0.330***	-0.327***	-0.041	-0.370***
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.057)
Defense alliance (challenger)		-0.293***	-0.305***	0.017	-0.397***
		(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Dyadic (challenger-target)					
Capability ratio	2.689***	2.720***	2.739***	2.681***	1.947***
	(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.092)
Both democracy	-0.401***	-0.410***	-0.387***	-0.412***	-0.446***
	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.066)
Major power	0.644***	0.705***	0.688***	0.907***	0.679***
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.061)
Civil conflict	0.247***	0.248***	0.217***	0.204***	0.164**
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.065)
Foreign policy alignment				2.773***	-0.392***
				(0.194)	(0.139)
Cold War	0.518***	0.523***	0.523***	0.466***	0.463***
	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.063)
Minimum distance					-0.001***
					(0.000)
Constant	-10.409***	-10.213***	-10.109***	-12.602***	-6.470***
	(0.231)	(0.232)	(0.238)	(0.277)	(0.265)
Observations	1337819	1337819	1270786	1270786	1153486
Pseudo R^2	0.096	0.097	0.096	0.112	0.210
Time Polynomials	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Robust SEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Difference-in-Differences Models

Table A8 – Two-way Fixed Effects Models: Mutiny and Interstate Conflict

	DV: MID initiation (challenger)			
Monadic (target)				
Military mutiny	0.002***			
	(0.000)			
Violent mutiny		0.003***		
		(0.001)		
Large mutiny			0.002***	
			(0.001)	
Mutiny duration				0.001***
				(0.000)
Military spending per soldier (logged)	-0.000	-0.000*	-0.000*	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Year since the last coup	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Civil conflict	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Defense alliance	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Dyadic (challenger-target)				
Capability ratio	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Both democracy	-0.000**	-0.000**	-0.000**	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Major power	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	0.020***	0.020***	0.020***	0.020***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Observations	1337819	1337819	1337819	1337819
R^2	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Dyad Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Clustered SEs (dyad)	✓	✓	✓	✓

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A9 – Two-way Fixed Effects Models: With Lag and Lead

	DV: MID initiation (challenger)		
Monadic (target)			
Military mutiny (t)	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military mutiny (t-1)	0.000*		0.000
	(0.000)		(0.000)
Military mutiny (t+1)		0.000	0.000
		(0.000)	(0.000)
Military spending per soldier (logged)	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Year since the last coup	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Civil conflict	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Defense alliance	-0.000*	-0.000*	-0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Dyadic (challenger-target)			
Capability ratio	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Both democracy	-0.000***	-0.000**	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Major power	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	0.000	0.010***	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Observations	1314720	1309481	1286398
R^2	0.002	0.002	0.002
Dyad Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓
Clustered SEs (Dyad)	✓	✓	✓

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A10 – Two-way Fixed Effects Models: Target Country as the Unit

	DV: MID initiation (challenger)			
Monadic (target)				
Military mutiny (t)	0.001***	0.001**	0.001**	0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military mutiny (t-1)		0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Military mutiny (t+1)			0.000	0.000
			(0.000)	(0.000)
Military spending per soldier (logged)	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Year since the last coup	0.000*	0.000*	0.000**	0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Defense alliance	-0.000	-0.000**	-0.000	-0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Dyadic (challenger-target)				
Capability ratio	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Both democracy	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Major power	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Civil conflict	0.001**	0.001***	0.001**	0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.017**	0.007***	0.017**	0.007***
	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.002)
Observations	1337819	1314720	1309481	1286398
R^2	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.003
Target Country Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Clustered SEs (Target Country)	✓	✓	✓	✓

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Additional Models: Target's Resistance

Table A11 – Censored Probit Models of Target's Resistance: Alternative MID Measure

	DV: Resistance (target)			
Monadic (target)				
Military mutiny	-0.289**			
	(0.119)			
Violent mutiny		-0.494**		
		(0.207)		
Large mutiny			-0.105	
			(0.259)	
Mutiny duration				-0.150**
				(0.0732)
Military spending per soldier (logged)	-0.109***	-0.118***	-0.121***	-0.112***
	(0.0312)	(0.0297)	(0.0278)	(0.0308)
Years since the last coup	-0.0000116	0.000320	0.000628	0.000133
	(0.00228)	(0.00229)	(0.00232)	(0.00229)
Civil conflict	0.210**	0.223**	0.247**	0.217**
	(0.103)	(0.101)	(0.0974)	(0.103)
Defense alliance	-0.0137	-0.0228	-0.0322	-0.0172
	(0.0679)	(0.0685)	(0.0692)	(0.0684)
Dyadic (challenger-target)				
Capability ratio	0.119	0.124	0.159	0.127
	(0.110)	(0.109)	(0.108)	(0.111)
Both democracy	-0.196**	-0.208**	-0.222**	-0.201**
	(0.0952)	(0.0934)	(0.0912)	(0.0950)
Major power	-0.365*	-0.327	-0.264	-0.348
	(0.176)	(0.185)	(0.205)	(0.183)
Constant	1.799	1.614	1.202	1.689
	(0.955)	(1.000)	(1.105)	(0.993)
athrho	-0.253	-0.174	-0.0485	-0.215
	(0.351)	(0.346)	(0.359)	(0.354)
Observations	1337819	1337819	1337819	1337819
Time Polynomials	✓	✓	✓	✓
Robust SEs	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: Selection equation is not reported due to space and word limit constraints.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$