A New Indicator of Coalition Size: Tests Against Standard Regime-Type Indicators

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith
Wilf Family Department of Politics
New York University

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Abstract: A new measure for selectorate's theory central concept, winning coalition size, is developed using indicators developed by the V-Dem project (V11.1 March 2021). To demonstrate the measure's efficacy, we examine its ability to account for government provision of public and private goods, a central prediction in selection theory. The winning coalition measure is compared to eight widely-used indicators of regime type in analyses of 30 measures of government policy provision. Based on Vuong tests and Akaike information criteria the new measure generally outperforms the alternative regime measures whether the assessment is across all regimes, within non-democratic regimes or within democratic settings. The new indicator provides an improved tool for testing the nuances of selectorate theory.

List of Files

New_Measure_Coalition_Size_Jan2022 and appendix	Paper with description of project, method and results
NewWmeasure.dta: Organized by COW country code- year	Main data file – most of the variables are direct from V-dem.
NewWmeasure.csv:	CSV file with the institutional measure W4 organized by COW country codes and year
TestingNewW_Jan2022_replication_Short.do	Stata program file that constructs the new W measure from V-DEM data and carries out the analyses in the paper.

Variables: The data are at a nation-year level of analysis and are organized by COW country code (ccode).
The vast majority of variable are from V-Dem. A full description of the variables are available from https://www.v-dem.net/data. The other variables are from common data source so we provide just a quick description.

Variable Name	**Descriptions**
democ	Polity: democracy score
autoc	Polity: autocracy score
polity	Polity: democracy-autocracy
polity2	Polity: Revised Combined Polity Score
xrcomp	Polity: Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment
xropen	Polity: Openness of Executive Recruitment
parcomp	Polity: Political Competition Concept
RegType	Banks CNTS: Type of regime: S20F7, Polit02
LegislativeSelection	Banks CNTS: S22F5, Polit14
dd_Przeworski	Prwezorski et al Democracy measure (Alvarez 1996)
gwf_party	Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright and Erica Frantz. 2014. Single Party Regime

gwf_military	Military Regime
gwf_monarchy	Monarchy
gwf_personal	Personalist regime
gwf_nonautocracy	Democratic regime
wbcode	World Bank WDI country code
electric	WDI: Access to electricity (% of population) (EG.ELC.ACCS.ZS)
lifeExp	WDI: Life expectancy at birth, total (years) (SP.DYN.LE00.IN)
safewater	WDI: SH.H2O.SMDW.ZS /*%safe drinking water*/
hygiene	WDI: SH.STA.HYGN.ZS /*%pop access handwashing facilities soap water*/
secondaryschool	WDI: School enrollment, secondary (% gross) (SE.SEC.ENRR)
measles	WDI: Immunization, measles (% of children ages 12-23 months) (SH.IMM.MEAS)
pressRestrict	Freedom House: restrictions on press freedom
transparencyindex	Hollyer et al. transparency measure
food	FAOSTAT_data_9-2-2020: Average dietary energy supply adequacy (percent) (3-year average)
cpiscore	Corruption Perception index from Tranparency International
popWB	WDI: Population
pop	Banks CNTS: population
POP	Maddison population data
popdeflat	The V-dem population is not available for all years. We create a population deflator to standardize other sources to the V-dem population measure to create a measure for every year.