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1. List of roll call votes on multilateralism, 1945-62

These include all measures concerning membership, participation, and financial support for multilateral organizations. The set considered here overlaps with that assembled by Charles Lerche (1964, 100-1). He focused on international cooperation rather than multilateralism. I omit the votes he included on immigration and foreign aid. Most of the foreign aid votes concerned bilateral programs, which have different sources of political support than multilateral aid does (Milner and Tingley 2013).

Date	Vote Number	Description
30 April 1945	79th Congress, vote 31	Final passage of H.J. Res. 145, providing for U.S. membership in the UN Food and Agriculture Organization. Passed, 291-25. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
9 May 1945	79th Congress, vote 34	Final passage of H.J. Res. 60, a proposed Constitutional amendment providing that treaties be ratified by a majority vote of the House and the Senate instead of a two-thirds vote of the Senate. Passed, 290-89. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
7 June 1945	79th Congress, vote 46	Motion to recommit H.R. 3314, providing for U.S. participation in the IMF and the World Bank. Rejected, 29-326. "No" vote supports multilateralism.
7 June 1945	79th Congress, vote 47	Final passage of H.R. 3314, providing for U.S. participation in the IMF and the World Bank. Passed, 349-20. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
1 November 1945	79th Congress, vote 91	Brown-Dirksen amendment to H.J. Res. 266. prohibiting the use of U.S. funds allocated to the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in countries where the American press does not have unrestricted access. (Voteview lists this as the Canno amendment, but the Congressional Record indicates otherwise.) Passed, 206-187. "No" vote supports multilateralism.
1 November 1945	79th Congress, vote 92	Final passage of H.J. Res. 266 providing funds for U.S. participation in the activities of the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Passed, 344-21. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
6 December 1945	79th Congress, vote 94	Final passage of H.R. 4649, providing for U.S. participation in the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). Passed, 327-39. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
18 December 1945	79th Congress, vote 100	Final passage of S.1580, providing for the appointment of U.S. representative to the United Nations and its agencies. Passed, 343-15. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
23 May 1946	79th Congress, vote 162	Final passage of H.J. Res. 305, providing for U.S. membership in United Nations Economic, Social, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Passed, 265-42. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
22 June 1950	81st Congress, vote 196	Final passage of H.J. Res. 334, amending certain laws to provide for U.S. membership in certain international organizations. Passed, 209-91. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
7 February 1951	82nd Congress, vote 7	Simpson amendment to H.R. 1612, extending the authority of the President to enter into trade agreements. Amendment inserted "peril point" provision to protect domestic producers. Passed, 225-168. A "no" vote supports multilateralism.
11 October 1951	82nd Congress, vote 99	Motion to recede and concur in Senate amendment no. 103, with an amendment related to U.S. contributions to international organizations. Passed, 238-164. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
18 October 1951	82nd Congress, vote 104	Final passage of S. Con. Res. 36, authorizing the appointment of 14 members of Congress to discuss common problems with representatives of the Council of Europe. Passed, 240-77. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.

18 February 1955	84th Congress, vote 9	Reed motion to recommit H.R. 1, an extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, with instructions to amend the bill requiring the President to comply with the recommendations of the Tariff Commission. Rejected, 199-206. A "no" vote supports multilateralism.
18 March 1955	84th Congress, vote 15	Preston amendment to restore UN aid funds in H.R. 4903, Second Supplemental Appropriation for fiscal 1955. Adopted, 178-107. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
20 June 1955	84th Congress, vote 47	Motion to suspend rules and pass H. Con. Res. 109, authorizing a congressional delegation to attend the NATO Parliamentary Congress. Agreed to, 337-31. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
17 April 1957	85th Congress, vote 30	Amendment to H.R. 6871, Appropriation for State, Justice, and other departments, cutting funds for international organizations. Rejected, 181-220. "No" vote supports multilateralism.
8 August 1957	85th Congress, vote 70	Cole amendment to H.R. 8992, providing for U.S. participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Amendment deleted language requiring congressional approval for transfer of fissionable material to IAEA. Adopted, 298-100. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
11 June 1958	85th Congress, vote 140	Motion to recommit H.R. 12591, providing a five-year extension of the President's authority to enter into trade agreements, without instructions. Rejected, 146-268. A "no" vote supports multilateralism.
25 March 1959	86th Congress, vote 13	Final passage of H.R. 4452, increasing U.S. subscriptions to the IMF and the World Bank. Passed, 316-57. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
27 July 1959	86th Congress, vote 55	Final passage of H.R. 7072, providing for U.S. participation in the Inter-American Development Bank. Passed 240-91. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
24 June 1960	86th Congress, vote 156	Final passage of H.J. Res. 649, the International Health and Medical Research Act. Passed 277-123. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
29 June 1960	86th Congress, vote 159	Final passage of H.R. 11001, providing for U.S. participation in the International Development Association. Passed 251-160. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
24 August 1960	86th Congress, vote 177	Final passage of S.J. Res. 170 authorizing the President to appoint private citizens to an international commission on the NATO alliance to promote greater cooperation. Passed, 294-109. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
19 June 1961	87th Congress, vote 43	Final passage of Fourth Supplemental Appropriation for Fiscal 1961 covers U.S. share of UN mission in the Congo. Passed, 294-64. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
2 April 1962	87th Congress, vote 138	Final passage of H.R. 7712, providing standby authority for the U.S. to lend $2 billion to the International Monetary Fund. Passed, 258-94. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.
4 April 1962	87th Congress, vote 141	Gross motion to recommit H.R. 11038, Second Supplemental Appropriations bill with instructions to limit the U.S. contribution to the UN mission in the Congo. Rejected, 156-238. "No" vote supports multilateralism.
14 September 1962	87th Congress, vote 199	Motion to recommit S.2762, authorizing the president to match up to $100 million in UN bond purchases by other member states. Rejected, 181-229. "No" vote supports multilateralism.
14 September 1962	87th Congress, vote 200	Final passage of S.2762, authorizing the president to match up to $100 million in UN bond purchases by other member states. Passed, 267-144. "Yes" vote supports multilateralism.

2. Aggregating county-level data into congressional districts

The analysis required data on several characteristics of each House member's constituency. Prior to the Supreme Court's 1964 ruling in Wesberry v. Sanders that congressional districts had to be equal in population, congressional districts in most of the country, including nearly all of the South, followed county borders and were revised only irregularly. For instance, those established in Louisiana in 1912 were not revised until 1966.[1] This institutional setup, while far from democratic, makes it possible to aggregate county-level data into congressional districts for the period considered here.

In a few cases, urban counties or cities were divided into multiple districts, sometimes with the addition of one or more of the surrounding counties. In these cases, I divided the population of the city or urban county evenly among the districts. The cases where this happened are as follows:

1. Orleans Parish, Louisiana, is divided between the 1st and 2nd congressional districts for the 63rd through the 90th Congresses.

2. Baltimore City, Maryland, is divided among the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th congressional districts for the 68th through the 82nd Congresses, and among the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 7th congressional districts for the 83rd through 87th Congresses.

3. City of St. Louis, Missouri, is divided among the 11th, 12th, and 13th districts for the 74th through the 82nd Congresses, and among the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd districts for the 83rd through 87th Congresses.

4. Jackson County, Missouri, which contains most of Kansas City, is divided between districts 4 and 5 for the 74th through the 87th Congresses.

5. Harris County, Texas, which contains Houston, was split between districts 8 and 22 during the 86th and 87th Congresses.

In addition to these divided counties, a few states had at-large representatives elected on a statewide basis for certain periods of time. Texas had one at-large representative for the 83rd through the 85th Congresses, in addition to those allocated to specific districts within the state. Alabama elected all eight of its representatives at large during the 88th Congress, though this is after the period examined in this study.

Virginia has separate statistics for independent cities. Not all of them were incorporated for the entire the period considered here. Three cities became independent of their former counties in 1948: Colonial Heights from Chesterfield County, Falls Church from Fairfax County, and Waynesboro from Augusta County. Several more were created between the 1950 and 1960 censuses. All of these remained in the congressional district for the county in which they were located in 1950. The city of Covington was

[1] Martis 1982 lists the counties included in each congressional district for all states for the period considered here, the 79th through 87th Congresses.

created in Allegheny County. The city of Galax was created out of Carroll and Grayson counties in 1953. (Both counties were in the same congressional district.) The city of Norton was created out of Wise County. South Boston was created in Halifax County in 1960. Virginia Beach was created out of Princess Anne County in 1952. In 1963, the remainder of Princess Anne County was merged into the City of Virginia Beach. In the same year, the City of Chesapeake was created through a merger of Norfolk County and the city of South Norfolk. For present purposes, the 1963 changes affect only the 1964 Census of Agriculture, though neither city produced any cotton in 1964.

There were several other changes to cities and counties in Virginia in 1952. Elizabeth City County was merged into the cities of Hampton and Newport News in that year, and so is not included in the 1960 Census of Population or the agricultural censuses after 1950. However, it is mentioned in the 1952 law establishing Congressional districts in the wake of the 1950 Census. Similarly, Warwick County became the city of Warwick in 1952 and was consolidated into the city of Newport News in 1958 while remaining in the same Congressional district.

3. Robustness tests

Table A1 presents several models testing the robustness of the results to changes in the states and roll-call votes included in the analysis. For ease of comparison, the first column repeats the results of the combined model from Table 1 in the main text. First, it is possible that there are statewide political pressures affecting how members of Congress from that state voted on foreign policy issues, such as the positions of Senators, governors, and other state party leaders. The second model adds state fixed effects to control for this possibility. With one exception, the coefficient estimates are nearly identical to those in the baseline from the main text. This exception is textile and apparel employment, which is no longer statistically significant. This result raises questions about the robustness of this variable but not about the others.

Table A1.
Additional Models of Southern Support for Multilateralism on House Roll-Call Votes, 1945-62

	1. Combined model from Table 1 (baseline)	2. State fixed effects	3. Votes on UN excluded	4. Votes on trade excluded
Cotton production (500-pound bales per capita)	0.86*	0.99*	0.80*	0.91*
	(0.33)	(0.41)	(0.35)	(0.35)
Textile and apparel employment (percentage of employed persons in district)	-0.03*	-0.01	-0.04*	-0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Years since 1945	-0.03	-0.02	0.03	-0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
African American population (percentage of district population)	0.05*	0.08*	0.09*	0.05*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
African American population * Years since 1945	-0.005*	-0.005*	-0.007*	-0.004*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Agricultural employment (percentage of employed persons in district)	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Agricultural employment * Years since 1945	-0.001	0.001	-0.003*	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Number of black lynching victims in district, 1877-1950	-0.013*	-0.015*	-0.018*	-0.011*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Number of black lynching victims in district, 1877-1950 * Years since 1945	0.0005	0.0006	0.001*	0.0004
	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Constant	1.85*	2.60*	1.03*	2.32*
	(0.44)	(1.35)	(0.44)	(0.50)
n	3,555	3,555	2,106	3,139

Note: Standard errors adjusted for clustering on the individual member reported in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$

The last two models in Table A1 test whether the composition of the roll calls that comprise the dependent variable makes a difference. One possibility is that Southern opposition to multilateralism was confined to the United Nations, which certainly became a special target of the opponents of multilateralism in later years. The third model drops the votes that directly concern the UN or its subsidiary bodies. Though this sample contains a smaller number of observations, the coefficient estimates are largely unchanged. Similarly, one might suspect that the variables indicating exposure to the international economy are significant only because of the inclusion of roll calls related to international trade. Perhaps these considerations make no difference on non-economic aspects of multilateralism. In fact, the coefficient estimates are essentially identical to the baseline model when the trade-related votes are excluded. Both these models suggest that sentiments about multilateralism tended to hold across specific institutions and issue areas. Domestic opponents of particular multilateral rules tended to become skeptical of this institutional form in general and to turn instead to a foreign policy emphasizing the unilateral application of American power. This tendency fits with their concerns about the interpretation of the rules and their tendency to grow and develop over time.

3. Individual-level influences on Southern support for multilateralism

Broader social forces like those considered in the paper are not the only potential influences on support for multilateralism among Southern members of Congress. The personalities, backgrounds, and ideological commitments of individual members might also have an effect. Because their constituents are likely to select representatives based on these considerations if they really influence how members behave, though, individual-level variables are post-treatment with respect to the characteristics of the constituency. To the extent that they modify the effect of the constituent characteristics, their influence can only stem from their role as intervening variables. For this reason, and because of the limitations of space, individual-level effects are not included in the empirical analysis in the paper. They remain interesting, however. This appendix presents a preliminary analysis intended to address several questions related to these variables.

3.1 Conversion or replacement? The first question concerns the process through which exposure to the international economy and threats to the system of racial hierarchy influenced members' positions on multilateralism. This could occur through the conversion of members who had supported multilateralism earlier in their careers, the replacement of these members by politicians who had not taken this position, or some combination of the two processes.

Table A2 shows the results of three models that compare members who had been present in 1945 with those who had not. The first estimates the combined model from in Table 1 of the main text on a sample restricted to the 81st Congress (1949-50) or later, when both members who were present in 1945 and some elected afterward were present. (There were no votes on multilateralism during the 80th Congress, which met in 1947-48.) The second estimates the same model on a sample further restricted to members who had been present in 1945 when the most important postwar multilateral commitments were made. Southerners nearly unanimously supported these initiatives. To the extent that those present in 1945 were reluctant to change their position later, the effects of social and economic conditions should be smaller than in the first model. The third estimates the model on members who were elected to Congress in 1946 or later. If replacement is the primary mechanism, the effects of social and economic conditions on these members should be larger.

Table A2.
Logit Models of Southern Support for Multilateralism on House Roll-Call Votes, 1950-62
Conversion or Replacement?

	1. All members	2. Members present in 1945	3. Members only after 1945
Cotton production (500-pound bales per capita)	0.67*	0.76	0.55
	(0.33)	(0.54)	(0.47)
Textile and apparel employment (percentage of employed persons in district)	-0.04*	-0.01	-0.05*
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Years since 1945	0.02	0.06	0.07
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.04)
African American population (percentage of district population)	0.06*	0.07*	0.07*
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
African-American population * Years since 1945	-0.005*	-0.008*	-0.005*
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Agricultural employment (percentage of employed persons in district)	0.01	-0.02	0.06*
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Agricultural employment * Years since 1945	-0.003	-0.003	-0.005*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Number of black lynching victims in district, 1877-1950	-0.014*	-0.007	-0.024*
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Number of black lynching victims in district, 1877-1950 * Years since 1945	0.0006	0.0003	0.0011
	(0.0005)	(0.0004)	(0.0007)
Constant	1.06	2.01	0.04
	(0.55)	(1.02)	(0.58)
n	2,473	815	1,658

Note: Standard errors adjusted for clustering on the individual member reported in parentheses. The 80th Congress is not included in the analysis because there were no House roll call votes on multilateralism during those years (1947-48). The first such roll call during the 81st Congress occurred in May 1950.
* $p < 0.05$

The results suggest considerations about the international economy and the defense of white supremacy affected both members who had been in Congress in 1945 and those who entered later. These effects were not the same for both, but that fact that at least some affected both newly entering and longstanding members is inconsistent with the claim that the process worked entirely through replacement.

Members did not have to be replaced to change their views. For example, Rep. Jamie Whitten (D-MS) entered Congress in 1940 and voted along with all other Southern Democrats in favor of the multilateral commitments made in 1945, including joining the

United Nations. Perhaps significantly, he later chaired the House Committee on Agriculture for many years, and so paid special attention to the interests of this sector. He later became quite hostile to the United Nations and to multilateralism in general. Speaking in support of an amendment to cut back a proposed purchase of bonds to support UN peacekeeping activities in 1962, Whitten regarded early support for the United Nations, including his own, as naïve. "But looking back it is easy for me now to believe that many people, with high hopes, must have used shortsighted thinking in saying to the Nation, 'Well, we did not join the League of Nations and we had World War II; therefore it follows if we had joined the League of Nations we would not have had World War II.'"[2] His new view of the organization was both negative and racialized. He argued that the UN forced the United States to run its foreign policy "in such manner as to seek the approval of every single little tribe in Africa" and to "pay for their votes with foreign aid."[3]

3.2 Party and ideology. Party and ideology are not entirely individual-level effects. Members of Congress do not fully control the positions their party takes or those associated with the ideology to which they subscribe. Like truly individual-level considerations, though, they are causally downstream from broader political and economic conditions, and the societal interests that arise from them. Because party and ideology send strong signals about the positions that members are likely to take in Congress, constituents use these considerations to select representatives who will reflect their interests. For this reason, I have not included these variables in the main body of the paper.

Table A3 presents the results of four models examining the effects of these variables. The first adds a variable indicating Republican party affiliation to the main model used in the paper. The vast majority of Southern House members during the 1945-62 period were Democrats. Only the addition of the border states to the sample considered here creates a meaningful number of Republicans. These Republicans were far less supportive of multilateralism than were Democrats during the immediate postwar period. They tended to vote with their conservative co-partisans from the Midwest and West rather than with Republican internationalists from the Northeast. As I noted in the main text, among Southerners, only Republicans voted against the multilateral initiatives of 1945. These differences persisted throughout the sample period. Even in 1962, a Southern Republican from a district with average scores on the other independent variables had only a 0.14 probability of casting a vote to support multilateralism, compared to a 0.54 probability for a Democrat from an identical district.

[2] *Congressional Record*, 14 September 1962, p. 19457.

[3] *Congressional Record*, 14 September 1962, p. 19458.

Table A3.
Logit Models of Southern Support for Multilateralism on House Roll-Call Votes, 1945-62: Party and Ideology

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Republican	-2.00*		1.54*
	(0.26)		(0.38)
DW-NOMINATE score, first dimension		-6.00*	-7.92*
		(0.53)	(0.66)
Cotton production (500-pound bales per capita)	0.75*	0.63*	0.67*
	(0.37)	(0.26)	(0.24)
Textile and apparel employment (percentage of employed persons in district)	-0.04*	-0.03*	-0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Years since 1945	-0.05*	-0.10*	-0.10*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
African American population (percentage of district population)	0.03*	0.02	0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
African American population * Years since 1945	-0.004*	-0.0023*	-0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.0008)	(0.001)
Agricultural employment (percentage of employed persons in district)	-0.01	-0.01	-0.004
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.011)
Agricultural employment * Years since 1945	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Number of black lynching victims in district, 1877-1950	-0.012*	-0.008*	-0.008*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Number of black lynching victims in district, 1877-1950 * Years since 1945	0.0005*	0.0004	0.0003
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Constant	2.75*	2.22*	1.57*
	(0.49)	(0.34)	(0.41)
n	3,555	3,555	3,555

Note: Standard errors adjusted for clustering on the individual member reported in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$

The second model in Table A3 includes the most widely used measure of liberal-conservative ideology, the first dimension of the DW-NOMINATE score.[4] Among Southern Democrats during the 1945-62 period, this score ranged from -0.538 (the most liberal) to 0.616 (the most conservative). Southern Republicans were more conservative on this indicator, with DW-NOMINATE scores ranging from -0.033 to 0.796. Ideology was strongly related to support for multilateralism. In 1962, a liberal Southerner (DW-NOMINATE = -0.25) had a 0.69 probability of voting to support multilateralism. A

[4] Poole and Rosenthal 2011.

conservative Southerner (DW-NOMINATE = 0.25) from an otherwise identical district had only a 0.10 probability of voting this way.

The third model includes both party and ideology. Here, the coefficient on ideology increases, while the sign on Republican Party affiliation flips. This does not mean that Republicans were more supportive of multilateralism than were Democrats. Instead it reflects the fact that Southern Republicans typically had more conservative ideology scores than Democrats. Southern Republicans in the 85th Congress (1957-58) had a mean DW-NOMINATE score of 0.24, while the mean for Democrats from the region was -0.16. The most liberal Southern Republican had a score of 0.11, still well to the right of the average Southern Democrat. In 1962, a Republican with the mean ideology score for the party in the region had a 0.20 probability of voting in support for multilateralism, while an ideologically average Democrat had a 0.58 probability of doing so. The most liberal Southern Republican had only a 0.41 probability of casting such a vote, still far less than the average Democrat.

The inclusion of party and ideology in these models substantially changes some of the coefficients for the other variables compared to the baseline model in the main text. It is important to be clear about what these results mean. The changes reflect the extent to which party and ideology mediate constituency characteristics. Constituents use party and ideology to help them select representatives who reflect their interests. The estimates on these variables indicate the causal effects on roll call voting in addition to those mediated by party and ideology in this way. The fact that most of these direct effects remain statistically significant indicates that members responded to these pressures in ways that their party affiliation and ideological record do not predict. This makes sense because the change in foreign policy outlook was happening mainly among a group of conservative Democrats.

3.3 Member personal background characteristics. While party and ideology are not strictly individual-level variables, some potentially relevant considerations are. Threats to white supremacy and changes in exposure to the global economy put pressure on members of Congress to change the party's longstanding position on multilateralism. However, not all of them would have found it equally easy to embrace this change. Here I will consider three background characteristics that might have contributed to this reluctance.

First, Southern members of Congress who had participated in the 1945 debates surrounding the creation of the major postwar multilateral institutions might find it more difficult to turn away from these institutions than did members who entered Congress later. Nearly all Southerners supported these institutions when they were created. The continuing support for the IMF by Representative Paul Brown (D-GA), quoted in the main text, illustrate the possibility that these early commitments might be sticky. Section 3.1 of this appendix offers evidence that members who were in Congress in 1945 responded to the pressures that changed the overall Southern position on

multilateralism. Even so, it remains possible that those who were present in 1945 were marginally more likely to support multilateralism than those who entered Congress later.

A second, similar possibility is that members with personal ties to agriculture should have found the older positions especially appealing. The landholding elite had a longstanding stake in multilateralist positions, including support for the UN and the League of Nations. Even as postwar changes eroded their position, agriculturalists still had an economic stake as well as a longstanding ideological commitment to free access to global markets. Multilateralism had long been the main means for promoting this access. Members who were personally involved in agriculture should thus arguably be less like to turn against multilateralism. ICPSR and McKibben (1997) provides data on this point.

Finally, there was a broad consensus during the 1950s among elites and the highly educated on the need both for a more ambitious global role for the United States and for international cooperation in the face of the Soviet threat. There was--and still is--a strong association between education and support for an activist foreign policy in the United States.[5] If this pattern held among members of Congress, then more educated members should be less likely to question the legitimacy of the United Nations or the need for multilateral cooperation more generally. This may be why Hero found that the most educated and socially prestigious elements of Southern society--those he aptly labels the "racist cosmopolitans"--were the last to turn against multilateralism.[6] ICPSR and McKibben provide data on whether members went to college.

Table A4 presents the results of four models testing these individual-level effects. As in section 3.1, the sample used to test the effect of being in congress in 1945 is restricted to the 81st Congress or later, when Congress contained both those who had and had not been present then. (There were no roll calls that met the selection criteria during the 80th Congress.) The restricted sample reduces the risk that the overrepresentation of more senior members during the time when Southerners overwhelmingly supported multilateralism will produce a spurious finding that they supported multilateralism more than newer members did at all times. The first includes only the individual-level variables, while the other two introduce control variables that are causally prior to them. The fourth model tests only the hypotheses concerning education and agriculture, permitting use of the entire sample back to 1945.

[5] See, for example, Fordham 2008
[6] Hero 1965, 406-7.

Table A4.
Logit Models of Southern Support for Multilateralism on House Roll-Call Votes, 1945-62: Individual Background Characteristics

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Member in Congress in 1945	0.34	0.35*	0.24	
	(0.22)	(0.16)	(0.15)	
Member's profession linked to agriculture	-0.41	-0.11	0.09	-0.01
	(0.56)	(0.35)	(0.31)	(0.24)
Member attended college	-0.08	0.40	0.33	0.24
	(0.46)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.26)
Republican		2.13*	1.87*	1.53*
		(0.37)	(0.43)	(0.39)
DW-NOMINATE score, first dimension		-8.36*	-8.06*	-7.94*
		(0.70)	(0.73)	(0.67)
Cotton production (500-pound bales per capita)			0.61*	0.65*
			(0.23)	(0.24)
Textile and apparel employment (percentage of employed persons in district)			-0.02*	-0.01
			(0.01)	(0.01)
Years since 1945			0.01	-0.10*
			(0.04)	(0.02)
African American population (percentage of district)			0.07*	0.03*
			(0.02)	(0.01)
African-American population * Years since 1945			-0.006*	-0.002*
			(0.001)	(0.001)
Agricultural employment (percentage of employed persons in district)			0.004	-0.004
			(0.018)	(0.011)
Agricultural employment * Years since 1945			-0.002	-0.002*
			(0.001)	(0.001)
Number of black lynching victims in district, 1877-1950			-0.01	-0.008*
			(0.01)	(0.004)
Number of black lynching victims in district, 1877-1950 * Years since 1945			0.0005	0.0003
			(0.0003)	(0.0002)
Constant	0.68	-0.80*	-0.46	1.33*
	(0.47)	(0.32)	(0.67)	(0.50)
Years included	1950-62	1950-62	1950-62	1945-62
n	2,473	2,473	2,473	3,555

Note: Standard errors adjusted for clustering on the individual member reported in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$

The results provide little support for these individual-level effects. Neither college education nor prior involvement with agriculture predicts greater support for multilateralism in any of the four models. Serving in Congress in 1945 is significant in only one of them. It narrowly misses the threshold for statistical significant in the third model (p=.101), so the possibility that it has some effect cannot be entirely ruled out.

The effect implied in model 2, which produced the largest coefficient, is substantial. A member who was present in 1945 had a 0.49 probability of supporting multilateralism, compared to 0.40 for one who arrived later. The fact that this effect is not robust to different model specifications suggests that it might have been confined to a few members of Congress, perhaps those who had played leadership roles in setting up the multilateral institutions in the first place. It is also possible that some district characteristics not included in the second model also predict longevity in office. Their addition in the last two models might reduce the apparent effect of having been in congress before 1945.

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