UN Peacekeeping and Democratization in Conflict-Affected Countries

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N.B.: Following APSR production guidelines, only the first 30 pages of the online appendix are available on the APSR website. The rest of the online appendix is available in the replication files. Tables with regression coefficients on all control variables are available in a secondary online appendix, which is also included with the replication files.

A PEMA DATA COLLECTION

We use our original Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) dataset to code whether UN peacekeeping operations are mandated to engage in democracy promotion. PEMA is based on 386 UN Security Council resolutions on 27 peacekeeping operations in Africa.[1] Each resolution was coded twice by two independent coders; any discrepancies between coding decisions were resolved through detailed secondary review of the resolutions themselves. PEMA includes information on 41 different types of tasks that UN missions are mandated to perform. These include security-related tasks such as disarmament and demobilization, peacebuilding-related tasks such as election assistance or legal reform, and tasks that cut across the security and peacebuilding domains, such as human rights promotion. The first column in Table A.1 lists the tasks in PEMA. The second column shows how our categorization compares to the one proposed by Diehl and Druckman (2018).[2]

We use PEMA to code a dummy indicating whether each UN mission in Africa has a mandate for democracy promotion in any given year, focusing on five tasks in particular: voter education; assistance to political parties; assistance to legislatures, parliaments, and other democratic institutions; assistance with the planning and conduct of elections; and provision of security at polling places and other sensitive election-related sites. We treat assistance with the organization of elections and electoral security as a single task in our analyses, as the vast majority of peacekeeping operations are mandated to do both simultaneously. Table A.2 provides examples of excerpts from UN Security Council resolutions that signal a mandate to promote democracy. Our

[1] PEMA covers MINUCI, MINURCA, MINURCAT, MINURSO, MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUA, MONUC, MONUSCO, ONUB, UNAMID, UNAMIR, UNAMSIL, UNAVEM II, UNAVEM III, UNISFA, UNMEE, UNMIL, UNMIS, UNMISS, UNOCI, UNOMIL, UNOMOZ, UNOMSIL, UNOMUR, UNOSOM I, and UNOSOM II.

[2] The only set of tasks (i.e. missions) included in Diehl and Druckman (2018) but not in PEMA is "preventive deployment."

codebook discusses our coding rules and decisions in further detail, and provides examples.[3]

B PACT DATA COLLECTION

We use our original Peacekeeping Activities (PACT) dataset to code whether UN peacekeeping operations actually engage in democracy promotion in the field. PACT is based on 476 UN Secretary-General progress reports (including annexes) on 24 peacekeeping operations in Africa.[4] UN Secretary-General progress reports are publicly available online. Each progress report was first deconstructed into paragraphs. For each paragraph, coders determined whether a UN mission or some other third party engaged in any of 37 different activities during the reporting period. Like PEMA, PACT comprises a combination of security-related, peacebuilding-related, and cross-cutting activities. PEMA and PACT were constructed in parallel, and almost all activities that are included in one are also included in the other, with a few minor exceptions.[5]

While the format of these progress reports varies somewhat across years and missions, they are always structurally similar, facilitating cross-country and over-time comparisons. Coders were randomly assigned progress reports in order to avoid coder fixed effects. Coders also recorded the level of engagement in each activity: monitoring (i.e. investigating, assessing, or following up); outreach (i.e. providing public information or raising awareness); meeting (i.e. engaging in dialogue or attending working groups); advocating (i.e. appealing, demanding, requesting, or pressuring); assisting (i.e. advising, supporting, or strengthening); providing material support (i.e. donating or funding); implementing (i.e. taking over, conducting, or implementing without the government); and sanctioning (i.e. threatening, excluding, punishing, (de-)authorizing, or (de-

[3]The codebook is available at https://sites.google.com/view/pemadata/home.

[4]PACT covers MINURCA, MINURCAT, MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUA, MONUC, MINUSCO, ONUB, UNAMID, UNAMIR, UNAMSIL, UNAVEM I, UNAVEM II, UNAVEM III, UNISFA, UNMIL, UNMIS, UNMISS, UNOCI, UNOMSIL, UNOMOZ, UNOSOM I, UNOSOM II, and UNTAG. Only PACT includes UNAVEM I and UNTAG, while only PEMA includes MINUCI, MINURSO, UNMEE, UNOMIL, and UNOMUR.

[5]The mandated task "state authority extension" in PEMA is split into "state authority" and "state administration assistance" in PACT. The mandated task "use of force" is not included in PACT; neither are "public information," "cultural heritage preservation," "local reconciliation," or "regional reconciliation assistance." (The latter two categories refer to activities with local populations and activities with heads of state in the region of the peacekeepers' host country, respectively.) Finally, power-sharing is included in both PEMA and PACT, but there is no evidence that power-sharing assistance is ever mandated (i.e. it is always coded 0 in PEMA).

)certifying). Our codebook discusses our coding rules and decisions in further detail, and provides examples.[6]

To maximize data quality, roughly 40% of all progress reports (selected at random) were double- or triple-coded. Fortunately, the degree of inter-coder reliability is generally high—86% or greater for the activities in this paper—and many of the remaining discrepancies disappear when we aggregate from the paragraph level to the progress report level, then from the progress report level to the country-year level. Nonetheless, as a robustness check, we create two versions of the dataset, one that features all activities recorded by any coder, and another that features only activities recorded by multiple coders.[7] These two versions of the dataset provide upper and lower bounds on the activities that each mission pursued. For the roughly 60% of progress reports that were single-coded, the two versions are identical. While our analyses in the paper use the first version (which features all activities recorded by any coder), our results are substantively similar regardless.[8]

We focus on five activities in particular: voter education; assistance to political parties, assistance to legislatures, parliaments, and other democratic institutions; assistance with the planning and execution of elections; and provision of electoral security. In our analyses, we group the latter two activities—electoral organization and security—because all but a handful of peacekeeping operations engage in both simultaneously. Table A.3 provides examples of excerpts from UN Secretary-General progress reports that indicate that UN missions pursued each of these democracy promotion activities on the ground. We distinguish activities that engage the host government from those that bypass the host government altogether.

Following our theoretical framework, UN missions engage host states when they provide advice, training, oversight, material assistance, or technical support for democracy promotion ac-

[6]The codebook is available at https://docs.google.com/document/d/16JqivsgzPv8AUu8wCZtuuDUZ2gN3mB34oskqp06BN_o/edit.

[7]For example, if one coder records election assistance but not voter education for a given paragraph, and the other records voter education but not election assistance, the first version of the dataset would record both activities as occurring, while the second would record neither.

[8]The only notable difference is that the correlation between activities that target political parties and the V-Dem electoral democracy index is larger when we use the second version of the PACT dataset.

tivities; they bypass host states when they execute democracy promotion activities with little or no coordination with host state officials or institutions. Coders were asked to draw this distinction for every paragraph of every progress report. In the first panel of Table A.3, for example, we code paragraph 37 of progress report S/2011/656 as an example of engagement because it describes MONUSCO providing training on electoral security for host state police officers; in contrast, we code paragraph 10 of progress report S/2002/267 as an example of bypassing because it describes UNAMSIL executing an electoral security strategy with no apparent coordination with host state security forces in Sierra Leone. (Of course, it is possible that UNAMSIL coordinated with Sierra Leonean security forces without mentioning it in the report. But this strikes us as unlikely: in general, progress reports are very clear when describing their relationships with host states, using phrases like "provide support," "provide training," "assist in," or "coordinate with" to signal engagement.)

Similarly, in the second panel of Table A.3, we code paragraph 35 of S/2011/656 as an example of engagement because it describes MONUC providing "technical and logistical support" to the Congolese electoral commission; in contrast, we code paragraph 37 of S/2008/1 as an example of bypassing because it describes UNOCI establishing a "certification support cell" to assist its own Special Representative, with no apparent host state involvement. (Indeed, as Piccolino and Karlsrud 2011 describe, retaining this certification power was an important component of UNOCI's strategy to oversee the Ivorian election while bypassing the regime of then-President Laurent Gbagbo.) Likewise, in the third panel of Table A.3, we code paragraph 20 of progress report S/1994/1002 as an example of engagement because it describes ONUMOZ "actively working with the Government" to support the National Elections Commission's public education program. In contrast, we code paragraph 54 of progress report S/2006/939 as an example of bypassing because it describes UNOCI conducting public education through its own public information component, again with no apparent coordination with host state institutions.

The examples in the fourth and fifth panels follow a similar logic. Note, however, that activities related to democratic institutions almost by definition engage the host government: of the 476

UN Secretary-General progress reports covered in PACT, only seven (1.5%) mention peacekeepers bypassing the host government in order to strengthen democratic institutions, and even these cases are ambiguous.[9] Our results are substantively similar if we recode all democratic institution-building activities as instances of engagement. Note, too, that in cases where the same UN mission both engages and bypasses the host state in the same country in the same year, we code both dummies as a 1. This reflects the reality that UN missions can simultaneously strengthen the host state's capacity in some areas while weakening it in others by engaging and bypassing at the same time. As we show in Table A.9, our results are substantively similar if we use a more granular measure that captures the number of *distinct* activities (voter education; assistance to political parties; assistance to democratic institutions; and assistance with the planning and execution of elections, including provision of security at polling places) that involve engaging or bypassing the host state in a given year.

C DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Figure A.1 plots the distribution of UN uniformed personnel across sub-Saharan African countries since the end of the Cold War based on data from the International Peace Institute's *Providing for Peacekeeping* (*P4P*) project. Figure A.2 plots the distribution of UN civilian personnel based on annual budget performance reports issued by the UN's Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ); the figure reports results for the nine African countries for which these budget performance reports are available. The top panel of Figure A.3 uses PACT to plot the number of UN missions that engage or bypass the host state in each year; the bottom panel uses PACT to plot the frequency of our four types of democracy promotion activities over time.

Figures A.4 and A.5 plot scores on V-Dem's electoral democracy index over time, with shading to indicate years when a UN mission with a democracy promotion mandate was deployed

[9] In the fifth panel of Table A.3, for example, paragraph 8 of progress report S/2005/777 describes UNAMSIL adding international personnel to the Anti-Corruption Commission, which operates independently of the Sierra Leonean government and exercises investigatorial and prosecutorial authority over Sierra Leonean government officials, but which technically falls under the umbrella of the Ministry of Justice.

(Figure A.4), or when a UN mission pursued democracy promotion activities on the ground (Figure A.5). While most UN missions with democracy promotion mandates pursue democracy promotion activities in the field, there is some slippage between the two: some UN missions do not implement democracy promotion activities even when they are mandated to do so, and some implement democracy promotion activities even when they are not mandated to. (In Rwanda and Somalia, for example, the UN occasionally pursued tasks that supported democratization, despite not having a democracy promotion mandate.)

D Extensions and robustness checks

D.1 Including UN media and civil society assistance in democracy mandates

Table A.4 reports the correlation between V-Dem's electoral democracy index and a dummy indicating whether each UN mission in Africa has a democracy promotion mandate in a given year, including media and civil society assistance in our definition of democracy promotion.

D.2 Including UN media and civil society assistance as democracy activities

Table A.5 reports the correlation between V-Dem's electoral democracy index and a dummy indicating whether each UN mission in Africa actually pursues democracy promotion activities in a given year, again including media and civil society assistance in our definition of democracy promotion.

D.3 USING DIVERSITY AND STABILITY OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION MANDATE COMPONENTS

Table A.6 reports the correlation between V-Dem's electoral democracy index and a continuous measure capturing the diversity of democracy promotion components within each UN mandate in Africa in a given year. To construct this measure, we simply count the number of distinct democracy promotion components (electoral security, electoral organization, voter education, political parties, and democratic institutions) within each UN mandate over time.

As a further extension of this analysis, Table A.7 reports the correlation between the V-Dem index and another continuous measure capturing the stability of democracy promotion components within each UN mandate. To construct this measure, we subtract the number of democracy promotion components in year t from the number of components in year $t-1$. For example, if a UN mandate has three democracy promotion components in one year but four in the next, then our measure of stability would take a 1 in the second year; conversely, if a UN mandate has four democracy promotion components in one year but none in the next, then our measure of stability would take a -4 in the second year. If a UN mandate has the same number of components from one year to the next, then our measure would take a 0. (This includes countries that do not have UN missions with democracy promotion mandates for multiple consecutive years.)

D.4 USING INTENSITY OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION ACTIVITIES

Table A.8 reports the correlation between V-Dem's electoral democracy index and a continuous measure capturing the intensity with each UN mission in Africa actually pursues democracy promotion activities in a given year. This is analogous to our measure for the diversity of democracy promotion mandate components in Section D.3 above. To construct the measure, we simply count the number of distinct democracy promotion activities (electoral security, electoral organization, voter education, political parties, and democratic institutions) that each UN mission pursues in a given year.

Table A.9 replicates this exercise, distinguishing between activities that engage or bypass the host state. For example, if a UN mission engages the host state on electoral security and electoral organization but bypasses it on voter education, then our measure of engagement would take a 2 and our measure of bypassing would take a 1. In some cases a UN mission may simultaneously engage and bypass the host state while pursuing a single democracy promotion activity (for example, by training the host state's electoral commission to educate voters, but also conducting voter education on its own, independently of the host state). These cases would count towards both of our continuous measures.

D.5 Restricting data on uniformed personnel to country-years with data on civilian personnel

Table A.10 reports the correlation between V-Dem's electoral democracy index and the number of uniformed personnel deployed to each UN mission in Africa, subsetting to country-years for which we also have data on UN civilian personnel.

D.6 Using alternative dependent variables

Tables A.11, A.12, A.13, and A.14 replicate the analyses in Tables 2, 4, 5, and 6, respectively, using Polity scores instead of the V-Dem electoral democracy index. Polity scores are continuous; Tables A.15, A.16, A.17, and A.18 instead use dichotomized Polity scores, where countries are coded as democracies if their Polity scores are greater than 0. Tables A.19, A.20, A.21, and A.22 replicate the analyses in Tables 2, 4, 5, and 6, respectively, using Freedom House political rights rankings.[10] For compactness we omit results using Polity scores and Freedom House rankings for our instrumental variables estimators (Tables 3 and 7) and our models that disaggregate democracy

[10]Freedom House produces two scores: one for political rights, one for civil liberties. While the latter includes some components that are relevant to Dahl's conceptualization of democracy—freedom of assembly and the existence of a free and independent media, for example—it also includes several more tangential elements, such as freedom of religion, due process in criminal and civil trials, and a right to own private property. We therefore focus on the political rights index alone.

promotion activities by type (Tables 8 and 9), but they are substantively similar to those reported in the paper (using the V-Dem electoral democracy index).[11]

D.7 Using random effects

Tables A.23, A.24, A.25, and A.26 replicate the analyses in Tables 2, 4, 5, and 6, respectively, using random effects instead of country fixed effects. For compactness we omit results using random effects for our instrumental variables estimators (Tables 3 and 7) and our models that disaggregate democracy promotion activities by type (Tables 8 and 9), but they are substantively similar to those reported in the paper (using fixed effects).

D.8 Including lagged dependent variable

Tables A.27 through A.32 replicate our results including a lagged dependent variable. We omit our results using instrumental variables because our instruments are no longer statistically significant predictors of our endogenous regressors when we include a lagged dependent variable, resulting in a weak first stage. In addition, because fixed effects models with lagged dependent variables can induce inconsistency (Angrist and Pischke 2008; Balgati 2008), in Tables A.33 through A.38 we again replicate our results including a lagged dependent variable but omitting country fixed effects.

D.9 Using instrumental variables in all sub-samples of countries

Tables A.39 and A.40 replicate the analyses in Tables 2 and 6, respectively, including results for the full sample of country-years, a subsample of country-years in which civil war is ongoing, and subsamples of country-years in which peace has lasted for at least one, two, or three years.

[11] The only notable difference is that the correlation between democracy and activities that target democratic institutions is larger when we use Polity scores or (especially) Freedom House rankings.

D.10 Testing UN mandates, composition, and tactics simultaneously

Table A.41 reports the correlation between V-Dem's electoral democracy index and all four of our proxies for UN mandates, composition, and tactics simultaneously. These results should be interpreted with caution, as our four proxies are very highly correlated with one another (with variance inflation factors ranging 4.36 to 10.82). This makes sense: most UN missions with democracy promotion mandates also engage in democracy promotion activities, most UN missions with large uniformed contingents also have large civilian contingents, and most UN missions with large contingents (uniformed or civilian) also have ambitious mandates and pursue equally ambitious activities in the field. Very high levels of multicollinearity render our results in Table A.41 difficult to interpret. To avoid this problem, Tables A.42 through A.47 report the correlation between V-Dem's electoral democracy index and pairs of proxies for UN mandates, composition, and tactics, introduced two at a time.

D.11 Testing for interactions

Tables A.48 through A.53 report the correlation between V-Dem's electoral democracy index and interactions between pairs of proxies for UN mandates, composition, and tactics. While our theory could conceivably imply a quadruple interaction between our four proxies, for tractability and legibility we focus on pairs only. As we discuss in the paper, in general we find little evidence of interactive effects. The only important exception involves civilian personnel. When we interact civilian personnel with uniformed personnel, democracy promotion mandates, or democracy promotion activities, the interaction terms are *negative* and statistically significant. To explore these results further, Figures A.6 through A.12 plot marginal effects for each of these statistically significant interaction terms. (For compactness we omit plots for interaction terms that are not statistically significant.) We discuss these results in the paper.

D.12 TESTING LONGER LAGS OF UN MANDATES, COMPOSITION, AND TACTICS

In the paper we lag our independent variables by two years in order to avoid reverse causality. In Tables A.54 through A.61 we replicate our results lagging our independent variables by three or four years. Our results are substantively similar regardless. They are also substantively similar if we lag by one year (rather than two).

Table A.1: Categories of tasks in PEMA and Diehl & Druckman (2018)

PEMA	**Diehl & Druckman (2018)**
Ceasefire assistance Peace process assistance	2*Traditional
Humanitarian relief Refugees and IDPs	2*Humanitarian assistance
Electoral security **Electoral organization** **Voter education** **Political parties** **Democratic institutions**	5***Election supervision/democratization**
Disarmament and demobilization Reintegration	2*DDR
Arms embargo Offensive operations Use of force	3*Pacification/coercive peacekeeping
Protection of civilians Human rights Children rights Sexual and gender-based violence Gender mainstreaming	5*Human rights protection/Protect threatened groups
Control of small arms and light weapons Demilitarization	2*Local security/Law and order
Police reform Military reform Justice sector reform Transitional justice Prison reform Legal reform Civil society Media Public information	8*Promoting rule of law/Civil society
Border control Resources management State authority Economic development Public health Cultural heritage protection	5*Local governance/Government services
Power sharing Reconciliation Local reconciliation Regional reconciliation	4*Restoration/reconciliation

Table A.2: Democracy promotion tasks in PEMA

Type of task	**Example**
Electoral security	"Decides that the mandate of MINURCA shall include...ensuring the security of electoral materials and equipment during their transport to and at the selected sites, as well as the security of the international electoral observers" (S/RES/1201, 1998).
Electoral organization	"Decides that the mandate of MINURCA shall include support for the Conduct of legislative elections...[including] the transport of electoral materials and equipment to selected sites and to the sous-préfectures" (S/RES/1201, 1998).
Voter education	"Approves the report of the Secretary-General and the recommendation contained therein; decides to establish a United Nations Operations in Mozambique as proposed by the Secretary General" (S/RES/292, 1992). The report of the Secretary-General recommends the peacekeeping operation conduct "a public information campaign about electoral activities" (S/24892, paragraph 35).
Political parties	"[The representative of the Secretary-General in MINURCA is requested] to provide good offices and mediation between the Government and political parties" (S/RES/1159, 1998).
Democratic institutions	"Decides that MONUC will also have the mandate...to provide advice to strengthen democratic institutions and processes at the national, provincial, regional, and local levels" (S/RES/1756, 2007).

Table A.3: Democracy promotion activities in PACT

Type of activity	**Example**
Electoral security...	
... engaging the host government	"MONUSCO continued the specialized training of national police officers at the provincial level on security for the general elections, with a focus on information-gathering and the protection of polling stations. Some 11,099 police officers, including 707 women, have been trained; further training is ongoing" (MONUSCO, S/2011/656, paragraph 37).
... bypassing the host government	"UNAMSIL is currently focused on implementing phase one of its military concept of operations for 2002, the main objective is to ensure effective security for the forthcoming elections. To that end, the Mission has extended its deployment to 39 locations throughout the country to provide umbrella security" (UNAMSIL, S/2002/267, paragraph 10).
Electoral organization...	
... engaging the host government	"The Mission [MONUC] continued to provide technical and logistical support to the electoral commission, including with regard to the deployment of electoral material" (S/2011/656, paragraph 35).
... bypassing the host government	"Consistent with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1765 (2007), UNOCI has established a small certification support cell to assist my Special Representative in fulfilling his certification mandate" (S/2008/1, paragraph 37).

Table A.3: Democracy promotion activities in PACT (cont.)

Type of activity	**Example**
Voter education	
... engaging the host government	"The National Elections Commission is in need of additional assistance in order to establish efficient public education programmes, including by means of radio broadcasts. ONUMOZ is actively working with the Government and potential donors in this regard" (S/1994/1002, paragraph 20).
... bypassing the host government	"UNOCI's public information component also plans to develop a robust sensitization campaign...in its continuing efforts to combat hate media and to sensitize the population on the key processes, including the elections" (S/2006/939, paragraph 54).
Political parties	
... engaging the host government	"On 25 July, the electoral commission, with the support of MONUSCO...convened in Kinshasa the first meeting of the Forum of Political Parties, which was attended by 275 of the over 400 registered political parties. The Forum aims to foster dialogue between the electoral commission and the political parties" (S/2011/565, paragraph 5).
... bypassing the host government	"UNAMSIL...is engaged in promoting interparty dialogue as well as reconciliation and tolerance among the political parties. It has also encouraged the parties to pursue bi-partisan approaches to national issues in the legislature" (S/2005/777, paragraph 6).
Democratic institutions ...	
... engaging the host government	"MONUC will continue to...mobilize the leverage necessary to encourage the ex-belligerents to accept a post-transitional political dispensation that offers prospects of...democratic reform.... MONUC will seek to lay the foundations for a stable post-transition period by helping the Government to draft essential legislation" (S/2004/1034, paragraph 30).
... bypassing the host government	UNAMSIL: "Efforts to strengthen the Anti-Corruption Commission have included the addition of international personnel to the Commission. So far, the Commission has investigated corruption charges against six Cabinet Ministers." (S/2005/777, paragraph 8).

Figure A.1: UN uniformed personnel by country



Notes: UN uniformed personnel numbers based on data from the International Peace Institute's *Providing for Peacekeeping* project. The y-axis is scaled differently for each country for purposes of legibility.

Figure A.1: UN uniformed personnel by country (cont.)



Notes: UN uniformed personnel numbers based on data from the International Peace Institute's *Providing for Peacekeeping* project. The y-axis is scaled differently for each country for purposes of legibility.

Figure A.2: UN civilian personnel by country



Notes: UN civilian personnel numbers based on UN Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) annual budget performance reports. The y-axis is scaled differently for each country for purposes of legibility.

Figure A.2: UN civilian personnel by country (cont.)



Notes: UN civilian personnel numbers based on UN Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) annual budget performance reports. The y-axis is scaled differently for each country for purposes of legibility.

Figure A.3: UN democracy activities disaggregated by host government engagement (top) and type (bottom)





Figure A.4: UN democracy mandates and electoral democracy over time



Notes: Lines represent scores on the V-Dem electoral democracy index. Shaded regions indicate years when a peacekeeping operation with a democracy mandate was in the field.

Figure A.4: UN democracy mandates and electoral democracy over time (cont.)



Notes: Lines represent scores on the V-Dem electoral democracy index. Shaded regions indicate years when a peacekeeping operation with a democracy mandate was in the field.

Figure A.5: UN democracy activities and electoral democracy over time



Notes: Lines represent scores on the V-Dem electoral democracy index. Shaded regions indicate years when a peacekeeping operation implemented democracy activities in the field.

Figure A.5: UN democracy activities and electoral democracy over time (cont.)



Notes: Lines represent scores on the V-Dem electoral democracy index. Shaded regions indicate years when a peacekeeping operation implemented democracy activities in the field.

Table A.4: Electoral democracy and UN democracy mandates including media and civil society assistance

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Democracy-related mandate	0.110***	0.050***	0.183***	0.185***	0.201***
	[0.012]	[0.013]	[0.020]	[0.022]	[0.023]
Observations	834	312	454	389	345
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.5: Electoral democracy and UN democracy activities including media and civil society assistance

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Any democracy-related activities	0.100***	0.038***	0.165***	0.161***	0.164***
	[0.012]	[0.013]	[0.019]	[0.021]	[0.021]
Observations	834	312	454	389	345
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.6: Electoral democracy and intensity of UN democracy mandates

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
# of distinct democracy tasks in mandate	0.041***	0.015**	0.058***	0.054***	0.056***
	[0.005]	[0.006]	[0.008]	[0.009]	[0.009]
Observations	834	312	454	389	345
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.7: Electoral democracy and stability of UN democracy mandates

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Change in # of mandated democracy tasks from previous year	-0.005 [0.008]	0.008 [0.008]	-0.010 [0.011]	-0.009 [0.011]	-0.006 [0.012]
Observations	804	300	444	382	340
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.8: Electoral democracy and intensity of UN democracy activities

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
# of distinct democracy activities	0.031***	0.014***	0.044***	0.040***	0.037***
	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.007]
Observations	834	312	454	389	345
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.9: Electoral democracy and intensity of UN democracy activities

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
# of distinct democracy activities engaging host state	0.037***	0.010	0.054***	0.047***	0.046***
	[0.007]	[0.008]	[0.009]	[0.010]	[0.010]
# of distinct democracy activities bypassing host state	-0.008	0.011	-0.016	-0.013	-0.014
	[0.011]	[0.015]	[0.013]	[0.014]	[0.014]
Observations	834	312	454	389	345
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.10: Electoral democracy and UN uniformed personnel subsetting to country-years with data on UN civilian personnel

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
# of uniformed personnel	0.008^{***}	0.003^{***}	0.015^{***}	0.015^{***}	0.015^{***}
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]
Observations	699	268	388	331	292
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.11: Polity scores and UN democracy mandates

	Polity score (Polity V)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Democracy mandate	3.265***	2.537***	2.954***	2.781***	2.678***
	[0.434]	[0.678]	[0.561]	[0.546]	[0.581]
Observations	829	306	455	389	345
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.12: Polity scores and UN uniformed personnel

	Polity score (Polity V)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
# of uniformed personnel	0.172***	0.056	0.201***	0.183***	0.188***
	[0.035]	[0.049]	[0.050]	[0.048]	[0.050]
Observations	802	295	445	382	340
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.13: Polity scores and UN civilian personnel

	Polity score (Polity V)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
# of civilian personnel	0.842***	0.483*	1.251***	1.304***	1.920***
	[0.200]	[0.246]	[0.378]	[0.447]	[0.540]
Observations	691	260	388	331	292
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.14: Polity scores and UN democracy activities

	Polity score (Polity V)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Any democracy activities	2.785***	1.314*	2.773***	2.475***	2.223***
	[0.432]	[0.670]	[0.535]	[0.510]	[0.517]
Observations	829	306	455	389	345
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.15: Dichotomized Polity scores and UN democracy mandates

	Democracy (Polity V)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Democracy mandate	0.445***	0.452***	0.527***	0.526***	0.493***
	[0.053]	[0.093]	[0.070]	[0.068]	[0.072]
Observations	829	306	455	389	345
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.16: Dichotomized Polity scores and UN uniformed personnel

	Democracy (Polity V)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
# of uniformed personnel	0.028***	0.017**	0.044***	0.043***	0.042***
	[0.004]	[0.007]	[0.006]	[0.006]	[0.006]
Observations	802	295	445	382	340
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.17: Dichotomized Polity scores and UN civilian personnel

	Democracy (Polity V)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
# of civilian personnel	0.137***	0.107***	0.241***	0.278***	0.401***
	[0.027]	[0.038]	[0.049]	[0.057]	[0.069]
Observations	691	260	388	331	292
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.18: Dichotomized Polity scores and UN democracy activities

	Democracy (Polity V)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Any democracy activities	0.402***	0.337***	0.482***	0.460***	0.418***
	[0.052]	[0.092]	[0.067]	[0.064]	[0.064]
Observations	829	306	455	389	345
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.19: Political rights and UN democracy mandates

	Political rights (Freedom House)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Democracy mandate	0.558***	0.329	0.987***	0.820***	0.775***
	[0.143]	[0.212]	[0.209]	[0.210]	[0.225]
Observations	837	314	455	389	345
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.20: Political rights and UN uniformed personnel

	Political rights (Freedom House)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
# of uniformed personnel	0.032***	0.013	0.070***	0.064***	0.059***
	[0.011]	[0.013]	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.019]
Observations	810	303	445	382	340
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.21: Political rights and UN civilian personnel

	Political rights (Freedom House)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
# of civilian personnel	0.201***	0.125**	0.589***	0.601***	0.710***
	[0.058]	[0.063]	[0.131]	[0.151]	[0.185]
Observations	699	268	388	331	292
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.22: Political rights and UN democracy activities

	Political rights (Freedom House)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Any democracy activities	0.424***	0.130	0.824***	0.620***	0.562***
	[0.142]	[0.208]	[0.200]	[0.197]	[0.201]
Observations	837	314	455	389	345
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.23: Electoral democracy and UN democracy mandates using random effects

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Democracy mandate	0.124***	0.059***	0.185***	0.186***	0.200***
	[0.013]	[0.014]	[0.021]	[0.023]	[0.023]
Observations	834	312	454	389	345
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with random effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.24: Electoral democracy and UN uniformed personnel using random effects

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
# of uniformed personnel	0.009***	0.003***	0.017***	0.017***	0.017***
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]
Observations	808	302	444	382	340
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with random effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.25: Electoral democracy and UN civilian personnel using random effects

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
# of civilian personnel	0.036***	0.016***	0.108***	0.133***	0.162***
	[0.005]	[0.004]	[0.013]	[0.016]	[0.018]
Observations	699	268	388	331	292
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with random effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.26: Electoral democracy and UN democracy activities using random effects

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Any democracy activities	0.109***	0.039***	0.161***	0.152***	0.145***
	[0.013]	[0.014]	[0.020]	[0.021]	[0.021]
Observations	834	312	454	389	345
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with random effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.27: Electoral democracy and UN democracy mandates with lagged dependent variable

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Democracy mandate	0.101***	0.061***	0.175***	0.176***	0.186***
	[0.012]	[0.014]	[0.020]	[0.023]	[0.023]
Observations	831	312	451	386	343
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with a lagged dependent variable. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.28: Electoral democracy and UN uniformed personnel with lagged dependent variable

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
# of uniformed personnel	0.007***	0.003***	0.015***	0.015***	0.015***
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]
Observations	805	302	441	379	338
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with a lagged dependent variable. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.29: Electoral democracy and UN civilian personnel with lagged dependent variable

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
# of civilian personnel	0.025***	0.015***	0.084***	0.100***	0.137***
	[0.005]	[0.004]	[0.013]	[0.016]	[0.019]
Observations	697	268	386	329	290
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with a lagged dependent variable. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.30: Electoral democracy and UN democracy activities with lagged dependent variable

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Any democracy activities	0.088***	0.041***	0.147***	0.134***	0.131***
	[0.011]	[0.014]	[0.019]	[0.021]	[0.020]
Observations	831	312	451	386	343
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with a lagged dependent variable. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.31: Electoral democracy and UN democracy activities disaggregated by type of engagement with host state, with lagged dependent variable

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Any democracy engagement with host state	0.066***	0.012	0.116***	0.095***	0.101***
	[0.016]	[0.020]	[0.023]	[0.024]	[0.024]
Any democracy bypassing of host state	0.031	0.048**	0.027	0.040	0.020
	[0.019]	[0.023]	[0.027]	[0.028]	[0.030]
Observations	831	312	451	386	343
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with a lagged dependent variable and no country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.32: Electoral democracy and UN democracy activities disaggregated by type of activity with host state, with lagged dependent variable

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Any democratic institution activities	0.013	0.001	0.030	0.029	0.053*
	[0.019]	[0.024]	[0.027]	[0.028]	[0.029]
Any election activities	0.085***	0.046*	0.105***	0.086***	0.067**
	[0.017]	[0.024]	[0.026]	[0.027]	[0.028]
Any political party activities	-0.013	-0.005	0.011	0.015	0.012
	[0.016]	[0.022]	[0.023]	[0.024]	[0.024]
Any voter activities	0.043**	0.027	0.061**	0.072**	0.064**
	[0.019]	[0.023]	[0.029]	[0.031]	[0.032]
Observations	831	312	451	386	343
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with a lagged dependent variable and no country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.33: Electoral democracy and UN democracy mandates with lagged dependent variable and no country fixed effects

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Democracy mandate	0.078*** [0.012]	0.056*** [0.016]	0.095*** [0.018]	0.091*** [0.020]	0.090*** [0.021]
Observations	831	312	451	386	343
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	No	No	No	No	No
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with a lagged dependent variable and no country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.34: Electoral democracy and UN uniformed personnel with lagged dependent variable and no country fixed effects

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
# of uniformed personnel	0.006*** [0.001]	0.003*** [0.001]	0.010*** [0.002]	0.010*** [0.002]	0.010*** [0.002]
Observations	805	302	441	379	338
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	No	No	No	No	No
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with a lagged dependent variable and no country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.35: Electoral democracy and UN civilian personnel with lagged dependent variable and no country fixed effects

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
# of civilian personnel	0.019***	0.010**	0.034***	0.040***	0.043***
	[0.005]	[0.005]	[0.012]	[0.013]	[0.014]
Observations	697	268	386	329	290
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	No	No	No	No	No
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with a lagged dependent variable and no country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.36: Electoral democracy and UN democracy activities with lagged dependent variable and no country fixed effects

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Any democracy activities	0.069***	0.039**	0.093***	0.094***	0.094***
	[0.011]	[0.016]	[0.018]	[0.019]	[0.020]
Observations	831	312	451	386	343
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	No	No	No	No	No
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with a lagged dependent variable and no country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.37: Electoral democracy and UN democracy activities disaggregated by type of engagement with host state, with lagged dependent variable and no country fixed effects

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Any democracy bypassing of host state	0.094*** [0.015]	0.072*** [0.019]	0.118*** [0.024]	0.126*** [0.026]	0.120*** [0.029]
Observations	831	312	451	386	343
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	No	No	No	No	No
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with a lagged dependent variable and no country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.38: Electoral democracy and UN democracy activities disaggregated by type of activity with host state, with lagged dependent variable and no country fixed effects

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Any voter activities	0.118*** [0.017]	0.073*** [0.022]	0.174*** [0.026]	0.189*** [0.029]	0.171*** [0.030]
Observations	831	312	451	386	343
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	No	No	No	No	No
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with a lagged dependent variable and no country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.39: Electoral democracy and UN democracy mandates using instrumental variables in all sub-samples

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Democracy mandate	1.317***	-10.623	2.638	3.176	2.058
	[0.419]	[108.064]	[2.047]	[3.174]	[1.331]
Observations	834	312	454	389	345
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3
IV	% democracy mandates				
First stage F	15.738	9.395	10.158	5.267	1.368

Notes: Coefficients from two-stage least squares regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). Instrument is the proportion of other UN missions with democracy mandates. We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.40: Electoral democracy and UN democracy activities using instrumental variables in all sub-samples

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Any democracy activities	2.062*	-0.386*	2.383	3.304	2.414
	[1.060]	[0.203]	[1.785]	[3.549]	[1.985]
Observations	834	312	454	389	345
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3
IV	% democracy activities in other missions (2 yr lag)				
First stage F	11.873	8.686999999999999	6.434	4.329	1.248

Notes: Coefficients from two-stage least squares regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). Instrument is the proportion of other UN missions with democracy activities. We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.41: Electoral democracy and all proxies for UN mandates, composition, and tactics simultaneously

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Democracy mandate	0.061***	0.048***	0.056	0.042	0.047
	[0.020]	[0.018]	[0.038]	[0.042]	[0.041]
Any democracy activities	0.011	-0.009	0.036	0.022	0.004
	[0.020]	[0.018]	[0.030]	[0.033]	[0.032]
# of uniformed personnel	0.004*	0.002	0.003	0.004	0.003
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]
# of civilian personnel	0.004	0.003	0.064***	0.079***	0.111***
	[0.010]	[0.010]	[0.017]	[0.022]	[0.028]
Observations	697	267	388	331	292
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.42: Electoral democracy and UN democracy mandates and uniformed personnel simultaneously

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Democracy mandate	0.077***	0.042***	0.090***	0.092***	0.129***
	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.031]	[0.034]	[0.037]
# of uniformed personnel	0.005***	0.002**	0.010***	0.011***	0.008**
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]
Observations	806	301	444	382	340
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.43: Electoral democracy and UN democracy mandates and civilian personnel simultaneously

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Democracy mandate	0.084***	0.045***	0.104***	0.089***	0.072**
	[0.014]	[0.014]	[0.023]	[0.027]	[0.030]
# of civilian personnel	0.019***	0.010**	0.073***	0.092***	0.121***
	[0.006]	[0.005]	[0.015]	[0.020]	[0.026]
Observations	697	267	388	331	292
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.44: Electoral democracy and UN democracy mandates and democracy activities simultaneously

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Democracy mandate	0.095***	0.058***	0.135***	0.151***	0.186***
	[0.020]	[0.020]	[0.031]	[0.033]	[0.034]
Any democracy activities	0.034*	0.000	0.062**	0.043	0.018
	[0.020]	[0.019]	[0.029]	[0.030]	[0.030]
Observations	834	312	454	389	345
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.45: Electoral democracy and UN uniformed personnel and civilian personnel simultaneously

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
# of uniformed personnel	0.008***	0.002	0.009***	0.008***	0.006**
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.003]	[0.003]
# of civilian personnel	-0.004	0.004	0.064***	0.084***	0.125***
	[0.010]	[0.010]	[0.017]	[0.021]	[0.025]
Observations	699	268	388	331	292
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.46: Electoral democracy and UN uniformed personnel and democracy activities simultaneously

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
# of uniformed personnel	0.006***	0.003***	0.012***	0.013***	0.013***
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.003]	[0.003]
Any democracy activities	0.057***	0.015	0.076***	0.060**	0.059**
	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.026]	[0.029]	[0.029]
Observations	806	301	444	382	340
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.47: Electoral democracy and UN democracy activities and civilian personnel simultaneously

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Any democracy activities	0.069***	0.024	0.088***	0.066***	0.040
	[0.014]	[0.014]	[0.021]	[0.024]	[0.026]
# of civilian personnel	0.022***	0.012**	0.082***	0.106***	0.142***
	[0.006]	[0.005]	[0.014]	[0.018]	[0.024]
Observations	697	267	388	331	292
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.48: Electoral democracy and interaction between UN democracy mandates and UN uniformed personnel

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Democracy mandate	0.077***	0.052***	0.075**	0.087**	0.125***
	[0.019]	[0.019]	[0.034]	[0.036]	[0.041]
# of uniformed personnel	0.005***	0.003**	0.005	0.008	0.006
	[0.002]	[0.001]	[0.006]	[0.007]	[0.007]
Democracy mandate × # of uniformed personnel	0.000	-0.001	0.007	0.003	0.002
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.006]	[0.008]	[0.008]
Observations	806	301	444	382	340
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.49: Electoral democracy and interaction between UN democracy mandates and UN civilian personnel

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Democracy mandate	0.097***	0.060***	0.098***	0.097***	0.054
	[0.015]	[0.016]	[0.025]	[0.030]	[0.038]
# of civilian personnel	0.033***	0.020***	0.061**	0.115***	0.104***
	[0.009]	[0.007]	[0.025]	[0.037]	[0.034]
Democracy mandate × # of civilian personnel	-0.020**	-0.015**	0.016	-0.027	0.032
	[0.009]	[0.007]	[0.028]	[0.038]	[0.042]
Observations	697	267	388	331	292
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.50: Electoral democracy and interaction between UN democracy mandates and UN democracy activities

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Democracy mandate	0.081***	0.051*	0.128***	0.149***	0.196***
	[0.028]	[0.027]	[0.039]	[0.042]	[0.046]
Any democracy activities	0.020	-0.006	0.052	0.040	0.028
	[0.027]	[0.025]	[0.043]	[0.043]	[0.041]
Dmocracy mandate × any democracy activities	0.030	0.016	0.018	0.006	-0.021
	[0.040]	[0.039]	[0.058]	[0.060]	[0.061]
Observations	834	312	454	389	345
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.51: Electoral democracy and interaction between UN uniformed personnel and UN civilian personnel

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
# of uniformed personnel	0.006***	0.001	0.010***	0.010***	0.006*
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.003]	[0.004]
# of civilian personnel	0.074***	0.054***	0.096***	0.140***	0.128***
	[0.016]	[0.017]	[0.028]	[0.032]	[0.031]
# of uniformed personnel × # of civilian personnel	-0.003***	-0.002***	-0.003	-0.005**	-0.001
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.004]
Observations	699	268	388	331	292
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.52: Electoral democracy and interaction between UN uniformed personnel and UN democracy activities

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
# of uniformed personnel	0.007***	0.003**	0.010***	0.015***	0.015***
	[0.002]	[0.001]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.004]
Any democracy activities	0.068***	0.023	0.065*	0.071*	0.074**
	[0.020]	[0.020]	[0.034]	[0.036]	[0.037]
# of uniformed personnel × any democracy activities	-0.002	-0.001	0.003	-0.003	-0.003
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.005]	[0.005]	[0.005]
Observations	806	301	444	382	340
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.53: Electoral democracy and interaction between UN democracy activities and UN civilian personnel

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Any democracy activities	0.083***	0.036**	0.089***	0.089***	0.046
	[0.015]	[0.016]	[0.025]	[0.029]	[0.038]
# of civilian personnel	0.038***	0.021***	0.084***	0.140***	0.146***
	[0.009]	[0.007]	[0.024]	[0.031]	[0.029]
Any democracy activities × # of civilian personnel	-0.022**	-0.013*	-0.004	-0.048	-0.009
	[0.009]	[0.007]	[0.028]	[0.036]	[0.039]
Observations	697	267	388	331	292
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Figure A.6: Electoral democracy and interaction between UN democracy mandates and UN civilian personnel, marginal effects



Notes: Marginal effects from column 1 of Table A.49. UN personnel numbers are in units of 1,000.

Figure A.7: Electoral democracy and interaction between UN democracy mandates and UN civilian personnel, marginal effects during conflict



Notes: Marginal effects from column 2 of Table A.49. UN personnel numbers are in units of 1,000.

Figure A.8: Electoral democracy and interaction between UN uniformed personnel and UN civilian personnel, marginal effects



Notes: Marginal effects from column 1 of Table A.51. UN personnel numbers are in units of 1,000.

Figure A.9: Electoral democracy and interaction between UN uniformed personnel and UN civilian personnel, marginal effects during conflict



Notes: Marginal effects from column 2 of Table A.51. UN personnel numbers are in units of 1,000.

Figure A.10: Electoral democracy and interaction between UN uniformed personnel and UN civilian personnel, marginal effects after 2 or more years of peace



Notes: Marginal effects from column 4 of Table A.51. UN personnel numbers are in units of 1,000.

Figure A.11: Electoral democracy and interaction between UN democracy activities and UN civilian personnel, marginal effects



Notes: Marginal effects from column 1 of Table A.53. UN personnel numbers are in units of 1,000.

Figure A.12: Electoral democracy and interaction between UN democracy activities and UN civilian personnel, marginal effects during conflict





Notes: Marginal effects from column 2 of Table A.53. UN personnel numbers are in units of 1,000.

Table A.54: Electoral democracy and UN democracy mandates lagged by one additional period

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Democracy mandate (+1 lag)	0.136***	0.045***	0.186***	0.193***	0.194***
	[0.013]	[0.015]	[0.019]	[0.022]	[0.022]
Observations	807	302	444	382	340
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.55: Electoral democracy and UN democracy mandates lagged by two additional periods

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Democracy mandate (+2 lags)	0.130***	0.044***	0.158***	0.166***	0.179***
	[0.013]	[0.015]	[0.018]	[0.021]	[0.022]
Observations	780	291	435	373	333
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.56: Electoral democracy and UN uniformed personnel lagged by one additional period

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
# of uniformed personnel (+1 lag)	0.009***	0.004***	0.014***	0.016***	0.017***
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]
Observations	781	291	435	373	333
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.57: Electoral democracy and UN uniformed personnel lagged by two additional periods

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
# of uniformed personnel (+2 lags)	0.008***	0.004***	0.012***	0.012***	0.014***
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]
Observations	754	282	423	364	324
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.58: Electoral democracy and UN civilian personnel lagged by one additional period

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
# of civilian personnel (+1 lag)	0.033***	0.014***	0.087***	0.089***	0.132***
	[0.005]	[0.005]	[0.012]	[0.015]	[0.018]
Observations	672	259	376	322	284
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.59: Electoral democracy and UN civilian personnel lagged by two additional periods

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
# of civilian personnel (+2 lags)	0.029***	0.015***	0.072***	0.070***	0.066***
	[0.005]	[0.004]	[0.012]	[0.015]	[0.016]
Observations	645	250	364	312	276
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.60: Electoral democracy and UN democracy activities lagged by one additional period

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Any democracy activities (+1 lag)	0.106***	0.034**	0.150***	0.150***	0.146***
	[0.013]	[0.014]	[0.019]	[0.021]	[0.021]
Observations	807	302	444	382	340
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.61: Electoral democracy and UN democracy activities lagged by two additional periods

	Electoral democracy (V-Dem)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Any democracy activities (+2 lags)	0.095***	0.036**	0.116***	0.117***	0.136***
	[0.013]	[0.014]	[0.019]	[0.021]	[0.022]
Observations	780	291	435	373	333
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years of peace	N/A	0	1	2	3

Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions with country fixed effects. We report results for the full sample (column 1), a sub-sample of countries with ongoing civil wars (column 2), and sub-samples that have been at peace for at least one, two, or three years (columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). We control for population, GDP per capita, foreign aid, literacy, fuel exports, and the number of refugees and IDPs living in the host country. Standard errors are in brackets. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.