Supplementary Materials to

Authoritarian Nostalgia and Support for (Populist Radical) Right Parties

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A. Descriptive statistics of dependent variables

Table A.1: Descriptive statistics, dichotomous dependent variable (Spain)

Response	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative
Not a VOX supporter	1,144	85.06	85.06
VOX supporter	201	14.94	100
Total	1,345	100	

Table A.2: Descriptive statistics, multinomial dependent variable (Spain)

Response	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative
PP	363	31.24	31.24
PSOE	319	27.45	58.69
VOX	201	17.30	75.99
Sumar	151	12.99	88.98
Junts	21	1.81	90.79
ERC	18	1.55	92.34
PNV	15	1.29	93.63
Other	74	6.37	100
Total	1,162	100	

Table A.3: Descriptive statistics, dichotomous dependent variable (Portugal)

Response	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative
Not a Chega supporter	1,020	78.95	78.95
Chega supporter	272	21.05	100
Total	1,292	100	

Table A.4: Descriptive statistics, multinomial dependent variable (Portugal)

Response	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative
PS	290	24.68	24.68
Chega	272	23.15	47.83
PPD/PSD	259	22.04	69.87
BE	100	8.51	78.38
IL	81	6.89	85.28
Livre	54	4.60	89.87
PAN	51	4.34	94.21
PCP-PEV	50	4.26	98.47
Other	18	1.53	100
Total	1,175	100	

B. Question wording nostalgia items

Table B.1: Items measuring collective and authoritarian nostalgia (Spain)

	Item
1	Desde 1975, los espaoles han perdido los fuertes lazos comunitarios que los unían.
2	Hasta 1975, España era mejor porque se basaba en valores tradicionales e identidades nacionales.
3	Si los políticos españoles siguieran los ideales de Franco, el país recuperaría su lugar en el panorama internacional.
4	Franco fue uno de los mejores líderes políticos de la historia de España.

Note: Answer categories are 5-point Likert scales: 1. Muy en desacuerdo, 2. En desacuerdo, 3. Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo, 4. De acuerdo, 5. Muy de acuerdo.

Table B.2: Items measuring collective and authoritarian nostalgia (Portugal)

	Item
1	Desde 1974 que se foram perdendo os laos de comunidade que uniam os portugueses entre si.
2	Até 1974, Portugal estava melhor porque se apoiava numa identidade nacional e em valores tradicionais.
3	Se os políticos portugueses seguissem os ideias de Salazar, Portugal reconquistaria a sua posição na arena internacional.
4	Salazar foi um dos melhores líderes políticos da história portuguesa.

Note: Answer categories are 5-point Likert scales: 1. Discordo totalmente, 2. Discordo, 3. Nem concordo nem discordo, 4. Concordo, 5. Concordo totalmente.

C. Validity and reliability test of authoritarian nostalgia scale

Table C.1: Polychoric factor analysis results for authoritarian nostalgia scale (Spain)

Number of obs = 1,500
Retained factors = 2
Number of params = 6

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor 1	2.7766	2.7433	1.0677	1.0677
Factor 2	0.0333	0.1244	0.0128	1.0805
Factor 3	-0.0912	0.0270	-0.0351	1.0454
Factor 4	-0.1181	—	-0.0454	1.0000

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Uniqueness
People have lost community ties	0.7198	0.1298	0.4650
Country was better until transition	0.8915	0.0467	0.2030
Country regain status if following [dictator]'s ideas	0.8803	-0.0524	0.2224
[dictator] greatest statesman in history	0.8299	-0.1071	0.2998

Note: LR test: independent vs. saturated: $\chi^2(6) = 4143.32$, $p < 0.0001$; Average inter-item covariance: 0.9512331; Scale reliability coefficient = 0.8731.

Table C.2: Polychoric factor analysis results for authoritarian nostalgia scale (Portugal)

Number of obs = 1,500
Retained factors = 2
Number of params = 6

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor 1	2.4434	2.4388	1.1093	1.1093
Factor 2	0.0045	0.1038	0.0021	1.1114
Factor 3	-0.0992	0.0469	-0.0451	1.0663
Factor 4	-0.1461	—	-0.0663	1.0000

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Uniqueness
People have lost community ties	0.6595	0.0467	0.5628
Country was better until transition	0.8380	0.0216	0.2973
Country regain status if following [dictator]'s ideas	0.8434	-0.0272	0.2880
[dictator] greatest statesman in history	0.7713	-0.0336	0.4040

Note: LR test: independent vs. saturated: $\chi^2(6) = 3084.09$, $p < 0.0001$; Average interitem covariance: 0.7021043; Scale reliability coefficient: 0.8409.

D. Additional information for control variables

D.1 Measurement statistics

AUTHORITARIANISM

Table D.1: Exploratory Factor Analysis - Authoritarianism (Spain)

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor 1	0.93374	0.96527	1.4143	1.4143
Factor 2	-0.03153	0.21045	-0.0478	1.3665
Factor 3	-0.24198	–	-0.3665	1.0000

Variable	Factor 1	Uniqueness
Child is independent/respect for elderly	0.6460	0.5827
Child is curious/good mannered	0.6604	0.5639
Child is self-reliant/obedient	-0.2834	0.9197

Note: Number of observations = 1,500. Retained factors = 1. Number of parameters = 3. LR test: independent vs. saturated: $\chi^2(3) = 603.08$, $p < 0.0001$.

Table D.2: Exploratory Factor Analysis - Authoritarianism (Portugal)

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor 1	1.16177	1.16059	1.2433	1.2433
Factor 2	0.00118	0.22973	0.0013	1.2446
Factor 3	-0.22855	–	-0.2446	1.0000

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Uniqueness
Child is independent/respect for elderly	0.7321	0.0109	0.4640
Child is curious/good mannered	0.7538	-0.0001	0.4318
Child is self-reliant/obedient	-0.2402	0.0326	0.9412

Note: Number of observations = 1,500. Retained factors = 2. Number of parameters = 3. LR test: independent vs. saturated: $\chi^2(3) = 929.80$, $p < 0.0001$.

SOCIAL DOMINANCE

Table D.3: Exploratory Factor Analysis – Social Dominance (Spain)

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor 1	1.26040	1.0938	1.0938	1.5414
Factor 2	0.28098	0.47106	0.1994	1.2932
Factor 3	-0.19009	0.03297	-0.1349	1.1583
Factor 4	-0.22305	–	-0.1583	1.0000

Variable	Factor 1	Uniqueness
Must not consider all groups when setting national priorities	0.7079	-0.2226
Not push for equality of groups	0.3719	0.3588
Not treat all groups as equal	0.7500	-0.1759
Superior groups should dominate inferior groups	0.5826	0.2678

Note: Number of observations = 1,500. Retained factors = 2. Number of parameters = 6. LR test: independent vs. saturated: $\chi^2(6) = 1480.35$, $p < 0.0001$.

Table D.4: Exploratory Factor Analysis – Social Dominance (Portugal)

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor 1	1.33690	1.14571	1.1803	1.1803
Factor 2	0.19119	0.36224	0.1688	1.3491
Factor 3	-0.17105	0.05333	-0.1510	1.1981
Factor 4	-0.22438	–	-0.1981	1.0000

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Uniqueness
Must not consider all groups when setting national priorities	0.7192	-0.1446	0.4619
Not push for equality of groups	0.1899	0.3304	0.8548
Not treat all groups as equal	0.7255	-0.1009	0.4634
Superior groups should dominate inferior groups	0.5072	0.2258	0.6918

Note: Number of observations = 1,500. Retained factors = 2. Number of parameters = 6. LR test: independent vs. saturated: $\chi^2(6) = 1146.43$, $p < 0.0001$.

POPULIST ATTITUDES

Table D.5: Exploratory Factor Analysis - Populist Attitudes (Spain)

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor 1	3.80161	3.52622	1.0380	1.0380
Factor 2	0.27539	0.18790	0.0752	1.1132
Factor 3	0.08749	0.10374	0.0239	1.1371
Factor 4	-0.01626	0.04758	-0.0044	1.1326
Factor 5	-0.06383	0.02942	-0.0174	1.1152
Factor 6	-0.09326	0.05400	-0.0255	1.0897
Factor 7	-0.14726	0.03411	-0.0402	1.0495
Factor 8	-0.18137	–	-0.0495	1.0000

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Uniqueness
Follow will of people	0.6787	-0.0046	-0.2017	0.4986
People decide key issues	0.6397	0.3155	-0.0265	0.4905
Elite-people divide bigger	0.6013	-0.0254	-0.0374	0.6364
Prefer citizen to politician	0.6220	0.2984	0.0216	0.5236
Politicians talk, no action	0.8102	-0.1366	0.0692	0.3201
Compromise = selling out	0.5255	0.0507	0.1986	0.6819
Political class harms welfare	0.7889	-0.1816	0.0020	0.3447
Politicians protect privileges	0.7928	-0.1788	0.0012	0.3396

Note: Number of observations = 1,500. Retained factors = 3. Number of parameters = 21. LR test: independent vs. saturated: $\chi^2(28) = 5268.84$, $p < 0.0001$.

Table D.6: Exploratory Factor Analysis - Populist Attitudes (Portugal)

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor 1	3.23299	3.00696	1.0841	1.0841
Factor 2	0.22603	0.15872	0.0758	1.1599
Factor 3	0.06731	0.11098	0.0226	1.1824
Factor 4	-0.04366	0.01740	-0.0146	1.1678
Factor 5	-0.06106	0.03654	-0.0205	1.1473
Factor 6	-0.09760	0.04019	-0.0327	1.1146
Factor 7	-0.13779	0.06620	-0.0462	1.0684
Factor 8	-0.20399	–	-0.0684	1.0000

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Uniqueness
Follow will of people	0.6260	0.1092	-0.1625	0.5699
People decide key issues	0.6193	0.2956	-0.0159	0.5289
Elite-people divide bigger	0.5797	-0.0200	0.0700	0.6586
Prefer citizen to politician	0.6163	0.1818	0.0432	0.5852
Politicians talk, no action	0.7419	-0.1128	0.0172	0.4365
Compromise = selling out	0.3988	0.0425	0.1728	0.8093
Political class harms welfare	0.7286	-0.2052	-0.0605	0.4234
Politicians protect privileges	0.7081	-0.1915	0.0095	0.4618

Note: Number of observations = 1,500. Retained factors = 3. Number of parameters = 21. LR test: independent vs. saturated: $\chi^2(28) = 3885.54$, $p < 0.0001$.

XENOPHOBIA

Table D.7: Exploratory Factor Analysis – Xenophobia (Spain)

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor 1	2.36427	2.09951	1.0513	1.0513
Factor 2	0.26476	0.29803	0.1177	1.1691
Factor 3	-0.03328	0.12651	-0.0148	1.1543
Factor 4	-0.15979	0.02732	-0.0711	1.0832
Factor 5	-0.18711	–	-0.0832	1.0000

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Uniqueness
Immigrants take social services away	0.7773	0.2055	0.3536
Prioritise natives when jobs are scarce	0.6703	0.3035	0.4586
Better for country not to let in immigrants	0.4566	0.0287	0.7907
Immigration bad for economy	0.7283	-0.2730	0.3950
Cultural life undermined by immigrants	0.7562	-0.2347	0.3730

Note: Number of observations = 1,500. Retained factors = 2. Number of parameters = 9. LR test: independent vs. saturated: $\chi^2(10) = 2812.65$, $p < 0.0001$.

Table D.8: Exploratory Factor Analysis – Xenophobia (Portugal)

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor 1	2.37667	2.17453	1.0772	1.0772
Factor 2	0.20214	0.23068	0.0916	1.1688
Factor 3	-0.02854	0.13326	-0.0129	1.1559
Factor 4	-0.16180	0.02035	-0.0733	1.0826
Factor 5	-0.18216	–	-0.0826	1.0000

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Uniqueness
Immigrants take social services away	0.7923	-0.1816	0.3393
Prioritise natives when jobs are scarce	0.7166	-0.2508	0.4236
Better for country not to let in immigrants	0.4600	-0.0116	0.7882
Immigration bad for economy	0.7334	0.2205	0.4135
Cultural life undermined by immigrants	0.6971	0.2398	0.4565

Note: Number of observations = 1,500. Retained factors = 2. Number of parameters = 9. LR test: independent vs. saturated: $\chi^2(10) = 2772.06$, $p < 0.0001$.

SOCIAL CONSERVATISM

Table D.9: Exploratory Factor Analysis – Social Conservatism (Spain)

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor 1	1.26175	1.27620	1.3836	1.3836
Factor 2	-0.01444	0.14516	-0.0158	1.3678
Factor 3	-0.15960	0.01618	-0.1750	1.1928
Factor 4	-0.17578	–	-0.1928	1.0000

Variable	Factor 1	Uniqueness
Woman should have children	0.6300	0.6031
Abortion never allowed	0.6449	0.5842
Tougher sentences	0.2067	0.9573
No adoption for same sex couples	0.6374	0.5937

Note: Number of observations = 1,500. Retained factors = 1. Number of parameters = 4. LR test: independent vs. saturated: $\chi^2(6) = 919.56$, $p < 0.0001$.

Table D.10: Exploratory Factor Analysis – Social Conservatism (Portugal)

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor 1	1.15453	1.15657	1.4147	1.4147
Factor 2	-0.00204	0.12541	-0.0025	1.4122
Factor 3	-0.12745	0.08149	-0.1562	1.2560
Factor 4	-0.20894	–	-0.2560	1.0000

Variable	Factor 1	Uniqueness
Woman should have children	0.5875	0.6548
Abortion never allowed	0.6520	0.5749
Tougher sentences	0.1670	0.9721
No adoption for same sex couples	0.5969	0.6437

Note: Number of observations = 1,500. Retained factors = 1. Number of parameters = 4. LR test: independent vs. saturated: $\chi^2(6) = 795.86$, $p < 0.0001$.

INSTITUTIONAL TRUST

Table D.11: Exploratory Factor Analysis – Institutional Trust (Spain)

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor 1	3.28273	3.20247	1.0427	1.0427
Factor 2	0.08026	0.06416	0.0255	1.0682
Factor 3	0.01611	0.11712	0.0051	1.0733
Factor 4	-0.10101	0.02888	-0.0321	1.0413
Factor 5	-0.12989	–	-0.0413	1.0000

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Uniqueness
National Parliament	0.8582	-0.1285	0.0445	0.2450
Politicians	0.8754	0.0984	-0.0514	0.2213
Political parties	0.8623	0.1328	-0.0264	0.2380
Media	0.5890	0.0864	0.0982	0.6359
National Government	0.8302	-0.1702	-0.0340	0.2807

Note: Number of observations = 1,500. Retained factors = 3. Number of parameters = 10. LR test: independent vs. saturated: $\chi^2(10) = 5210.12$, $p < 0.0001$.

Table D.12: Exploratory Factor Analysis – Institutional Trust (Portugal)

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor 1	3.30879	3.25120	1.0438	1.0438
Factor 2	0.05759	0.04640	0.0182	1.0619
Factor 3	0.01119	0.09800	0.0035	1.0655
Factor 4	-0.08681	0.03388	-0.0274	1.0381
Factor 5	-0.12069	–	-0.0381	1.0000

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Uniqueness
National Parliament	0.8649	0.1194	-0.0086	0.2376
Politicians	0.8845	-0.1304	-0.0038	0.2007
Political parties	0.8794	-0.1030	0.0386	0.2145
Media	0.5382	0.1158	0.0680	0.6923
National Government	0.8458	0.0477	-0.0706	0.2773

Note: Number of observations = 1,500. Retained factors = 3. Number of parameters = 10. LR test: independent vs. saturated: $\chi^2(10) = 5425.97$, $p < 0.0001$.

INTERNAL EFFICACY

Table D.13: Exploratory Factor Analysis - Internal Efficacy (Spain)

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor 1	1.70744	1.77597	1.1756	1.1756
Factor 2	-0.06854	0.11791	-0.0472	1.1284
Factor 3	-0.18645	–	-0.1284	1.0000

Variable	Factor 1	Uniqueness
Well-qualified to participate in politics	0.7147	0.4893
Good understanding of issues facing country	0.8257	0.3182
As well-informed about politics as others	0.7176	0.4851

Note: Number of observations = 1,500. Retained factors = 1. Number of parameters = 3. LR test: independent vs. saturated: $\chi^2(3) = 1714.79$, $p < 0.0001$.

Table D.14: Exploratory Factor Analysis - Internal Efficacy (Portugal)

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor 1	1.66881	1.79132	1.2104	1.2104
Factor 2	-0.12250	0.04506	-0.0889	1.1215
Factor 3	-0.16757	–	-0.1215	1.0000

Variable	Factor 1	Uniqueness
Well-qualified to participate in politics	0.7042	0.5040
Good understanding of issues facing country	0.7765	0.3971
As well-informed about politics as others	0.7550	0.4300

Note: Number of observations = 1,500. Retained factors = 1. Number of parameters = 3. LR test: independent vs. saturated: $\chi^2(3) = 1609.52$, $p < 0.0001$.

EXTERNAL EFFICACY

Table D.15: Exploratory Factor Analysis - External Efficacy (Spain)

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor 1	1.03479	1.04751	1.3233	1.3233
Factor 2	-0.01271	0.22739	-0.0163	1.3070
Factor 3	-0.24010	–	-0.3070	1.0000

Variable	Factor 1	Uniqueness
Officials don't care what people think	0.6854	0.5303
People don't have a say	0.7065	0.5008
Sometimes politics too complicated	0.2567	0.9341

Note: Number of observations = 1,500. Retained factors = 1. Number of parameters = 3. LR test: independent vs. saturated: $\chi^2(3) = 739.15$, $p < 0.0001$.

Table D.16: Exploratory Factor Analysis - External Efficacy (Portugal)

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor 1	1.09734	1.12539	1.3203	1.3203
Factor 2	-0.02805	0.21008	-0.0338	1.2865
Factor 3	-0.23813	–	-0.2865	1.0000

Variable	Factor 1	Uniqueness
fficials don't care what people think	0.6781	0.5401
People don't have a say	0.7146	0.4893
Sometimes politics too complicated	0.3560	0.8732

Note: Number of observations = 1,500. Retained factors = 1. Number of parameters = 3. LR test: independent vs. saturated: $\chi^2(3) = 798.25$, $p < 0.0001$.

D.2 Descriptive statistics

Table D.17: Descriptive statistics of independent variables (Spain)

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min–Max
Authoritarianism	1,500	2.43	0.86	0.18–3.94
Social dominance	1,500	2.31	0.77	1.11–5.54
Populist attitudes	1,500	4.98	0.81	1.24–6.19
Xenophobia	1,500	3.55	1.05	1.16–5.78
Economic positions	1,500	1.88	1.88	-4.80–6.69
Social conservatism	1,500	2.65	2.38	0–10.54
Trust	1,500	3.05	2.49	0–10.86
Democratic support	1,500	3.85	1.03	1–5
Democratic satisfaction	1,500	4.38	2.81	0–10
VOX danger for democracy	1,500	0.41	0.49	0–1
VOX embodies Franco regime	1,500	3.48	1.38	1–5
Internal efficacy	1,500	3.34	0.94	1.01–5.05
External efficacy	1,500	3.52	0.85	0.95–4.74
Franco best statesman	1,500	2.16	1.23	1–5
Punish members of old regime	1,500	3.42	1.16	1–5
Franco regime passes to history	1,500	2.41	0.66	1–3
Democratic transition passes to history	1,500	1.76	0.66	1–3
Prosecute elites Franco regime	1,500	3.39	1.16	1–5
Colonial empathy	1,500	2.99	1.13	1–5
Lost freedoms since democracy	1,500	2.56	1.26	1–5
Political interest	1,500	2.94	1.17	1–5
Age	1,500	47.75	15.44	18–96
Education	1,500	2.00	0.86	1–3
Gender	1,500	1.51	0.50	1–2
Employment status	1,500	2.71	2.28	1–8
Region	1,500	15.42	4.74	8–26
Household income	1,500	14.81	2.68	11–20
Religiosity	1,500	1.93	0.83	1–4
Generations in household	1,500	1.83	0.78	1–4

Table D.18: Descriptive statistics of independent variables (Portugal)

Variable	**Obs**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min–Max**
Authoritarianism	1,500	3.25	0.84	0.47–4.31
Social dominance	1,500	2.06	0.63	1.07–4.44
Populist attitudes	1,500	4.98	0.75	1.29–6.45
Xenophobia	1,500	3.72	0.96	1.15–5.75
Economic positions	1,500	1.34	1.75	-4.99–6.21
Social conservatism	1,500	2.83	2.33	0–10.42
Trust	1,500	3.65	2.37	0–10.79
Democratic support	1,500	3.90	0.91	1–5
Democratic satisfaction	1,500	4.65	2.54	0–10
Chega danger for democracy	1,500	0.40	0.49	0–1
Chega embodies Estado Novo	1,500	3.09	1.23	1–5
Internal efficacy	1,500	3.42	0.80	1.01–5.06
External efficacy	1,500	3.45	0.81	0.97–4.84
Salazar best statesman	1,500	2.65	1.16	1–5
Punish members old regime	1,500	3.08	0.98	1–5
Estado Novo passes to history	1,500	2.22	0.68	1–3
Democratic transition passes to history	1,500	1.70	0.65	1–3
Celebrate 25 Nov instead of 25 Apr	1,500	2.42	1.00	1–5
Colonial empathy	1,500	3.06	0.96	1–5
Lost freedoms since democracy	1,500	2.68	1.11	1–5
Political interest	1,500	3.23	1.14	1–5
Age	1,500	49.18	14.30	18–83
Education	1,500	1.90	0.83	1–3
Gender	1,500	1.56	0.50	1–2
Employment status	1,500	2.56	2.30	1–8
Region	1,500	2.34	1.38	1–7
Household income	1,500	4.67	2.48	1–10
Religiosity	1,500	2.33	0.89	1–4
Generations in household	1,500	1.82	0.73	1–4

D.3 Correlation matrix of independent variables

Table D.19: Correlation matrix of authoritarian nostalgia items (Spain)

	Variables							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Miss old, glorious days	1.000							
2. Must hold on to values from past	0.106	1.000						
3. Solve problems by looking to past	0.125	-0.120	1.000					
4. Authoritarian nostalgia index	0.635	0.160	0.119	1.000				
5. People lost community ties	0.468	0.120	0.119	0.709	1.000			
6. Country was better before transition	0.600	0.136	0.112	0.922	0.632	1.000		
7. Country could regain status by following Franco	0.564	0.155	0.100	0.904	0.554	0.729	1.000	
8. Franco was one of the best leaders	0.511	0.135	0.088	0.837	0.480	0.678	0.711	1.000

Table D.20: Correlation matrix of authoritarian nostalgia items (Portugal)

	Variables							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Miss old, glorious days	1.000							
2. Must hold on to values from past	0.060	1.000						
3. Solve problems by looking to past	0.120	-0.052	1.000					
4. Authoritarian nostalgia index	0.584	0.010	0.031	1.000				
5. People lost community ties	0.421	0.008	0.059	0.672	1.000			
6. Country was better before transition	0.531	-0.029	0.015	0.885	0.551	1.000		
7. Country could regain status by following Salazar	0.506	0.017	0.001	0.892	0.484	0.683	1.000	
8. Salazar was one of the best leaders	0.460	0.051	0.060	0.812	0.451	0.591	0.651	1.000

E. Graphs of individual authoritarian nostalgia items

Figure E.1: Distribution of authoritarian nostalgia items by party support in Spain



Note: Vertical lines indicate the country average for each item. Partido Popular (PP) is a conservative party. Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) is a social democratic party. VOX is a right-wing populist party. Sumar is a left-wing populist party. Junts per Catalunya (Junts), Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), and Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) are regionalist parties.

Figure E.2: Distribution of authoritarian nostalgia items by party support in Portugal



Note: Vertical lines indicate the country average for each item. Partido Socialista (PS) is a social democratic party. Chega is a right-wing populist party. Partido Social Democrata (PPD/PSD) is a conservative party. Bloco de Esquerda (BE) is a left-wing populist party. Iniciativa Liberal (IL) is a liberal party. Livre and Pessoas-Animais-Natureza (PAN) are green parties. Partido Comunista Português (PCP-PEV) is a communist party.

F. Logistic regressions, full models including control variables

Table F.1: Logistic regressions for PRR support

	VOX support	**Chega support**
Miss old, glorious days	0.192† (0.116)	0.204† (0.108)
Must hold on to values from past	-0.103 (0.096)	-0.066 (0.092)
Solve problems by looking to past	-0.099 (0.095)	-0.160 (0.100)
Authoritarian nostalgia index	0.457* (0.167)	0.654* (0.154)
Authoritarianism (index)	-0.099 (0.129)	-0.157 (0.117)
Social dominance (index)	-0.103 (0.160)	0.363* (0.160)
Populist attitudes (index)	0.135 (0.166)	0.218 (0.155)
Xenophobia (index)	0.219 (0.136)	0.298* (0.111)
Economic item 1	-0.046 (0.047)	-0.017 (0.042)
Economic item 2	-0.063 (0.046)	0.002 (0.036)
Economic item 3	-0.027 (0.033)	0.001 (0.029)
Economic item 4	0.061 (0.037)	-0.015 (0.033)
Economic item 5	-0.011 (0.036)	-0.039 (0.031)
Cultural conservatism (index)	0.135* (0.046)	0.047 (0.043)
Trust (index)	-0.068 (0.062)	-0.083 (0.051)
Democratic support	-0.043 (0.107)	0.032 (0.113)
Democratic satisfaction	-0.029 (0.046)	-0.023 (0.046)
PRR danger for democracy	-1.933* (0.312)	-2.446* (0.225)
PRR embodies dictatorship	-0.484* (0.103)	0.375* (0.088)
Internal efficacy	0.054 (0.132)	0.442* (0.146)
External efficacy	-0.030 (0.143)	0.202 (0.134)
Punish members of old regime	-0.053 (0.118)	-0.159 (0.100)
Dictatorship passes to history	-0.360† (0.197)	-0.144 (0.153)
Democratic transition passes to history	0.070 (0.183)	-0.233 (0.155)
Prosecute elites Franco regime	0.056 (0.108)	—
Portugal celebrate 25 Nov instead of 25 Apr	—	0.080 (0.090)
Colonial empathy	-0.252* (0.114)	-0.186 (0.114)
Lost freedoms since democracy	0.099 (0.118)	0.047 (0.108)
Political interest	0.187† (0.105)	-0.121 (0.100)
Age	-0.426* (0.164)	-0.005 (0.138)
Gender (male = 1)	-0.346 (0.226)	-0.251 (0.205)
Education	-0.237 (0.158)	0.157 (0.134)
Region	-0.045* (0.022)	0.021 (0.064)
Employment status	-0.146* (0.057)	-0.085† (0.047)
Household income	-0.115* (0.047)	-0.060 (0.043)
Religiosity	-0.042 (0.127)	-0.251* (0.111)
Generations in household	0.107 (0.131)	0.038 (0.129)
Constant	1.040 (1.678)	-7.388* (1.579)
Observations	1,345	1,292
LR $\chi^2(36)$	496.20*	514.67*
Pseudo R^2	0.437	0.387

Note: Logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. † $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$.

G. Multinomial models, full models including controls

Table G.1: Multinomial logistic regression for party support

	PP	VOX	Sumar	Junts	ERC	PNV	Other
Miss old, glorious days	0.120 (0.156)	0.270 (0.207)	0.106 (0.149)	-0.534 (0.362)	-1.235* (0.487)	-13.35 (3.778)	-0.234 (0.203)
Must hold on to values from past	0.0557 (0.131)	-0.0244 (0.160)	0.133 (0.123)	-0.0407 (0.338)	-0.133 (0.341)	21.80 (4.599)	-0.00530 (0.170)
Solve problems by looking to past	-0.282* (0.124)	-0.358* (0.156)	-0.123 (0.117)	-0.0757 (0.277)	-0.0973 (0.280)	-14.79 (2.563)	-0.150 (0.150)
Authoritarian nostalgia index	0.555* (0.229)	0.987* (0.281)	-0.183 (0.272)	-0.127 (0.589)	0.788 (0.690)	43.54 (6.042)	-0.147 (0.324)
Authoritarianism (index)	0.158 (0.123)	0.0141 (0.160)	0.0328 (0.121)	0.369 (0.320)	-0.0173 (0.318)	-11.02 (4.118)	-0.197 (0.156)
Social dominance (index)	-0.303† (0.155)	-0.417* (0.192)	-0.218 (0.155)	-0.402 (0.420)	0.535 (0.420)	11.28 (7.684)	-0.225 (0.209)
Populist attitudes (index)	0.573* (0.165)	0.603* (0.208)	0.310* (0.156)	-0.0781 (0.390)	0.120 (0.390)	7.060 (4.287)	0.304 (0.206)
Xenophobia (index)	0.289† (0.153)	0.555* (0.203)	-0.184 (0.157)	0.473 (0.349)	0.425 (0.370)	-0.863 (5.295)	0.123 (0.193)
Economic position item 1	-0.298* (0.141)	-0.482* (0.174)	0.219 (0.167)	-0.690* (0.342)	-0.0306 (0.422)	11.56 (3.829)	-0.193 (0.189)
Economic position item 2	-0.0792 (0.128)	-0.288† (0.165)	0.231† (0.120)	-0.684† (0.364)	-0.0600 (0.339)	-18.85 (4.798)	-0.159 (0.169)
Economic position item 3	-0.241* (0.122)	-0.213 (0.155)	0.162 (0.119)	0.264 (0.293)	-0.169 (0.304)	-22.46 (4.264)	-0.107 (0.154)
Economic position item 4	-0.207 (0.133)	-0.0197 (0.168)	0.0631 (0.125)	-0.208 (0.330)	0.0886 (0.326)	1.135 (2.523)	0.0385 (0.162)
Economic position item 5	-0.175 (0.146)	-0.155 (0.182)	0.225 (0.157)	-0.317 (0.368)	-0.0935 (0.380)	-19.28 (4.732)	0.138 (0.193)
Cultural positions (index)	0.285* (0.140)	0.686* (0.166)	0.116 (0.175)	0.367 (0.371)	0.262 (0.369)	17.11 (3.239)	0.171 (0.216)
Trust (index)	-0.212 (0.151)	-0.407* (0.204)	0.0387 (0.156)	-0.181 (0.431)	-0.360 (0.399)	-41.91 (4.438)	-0.0284 (0.222)
Democratic support	0.0781 (0.151)	-0.0258 (0.176)	-0.375* (0.161)	-0.0228 (0.365)	-0.00573 (0.413)	56.44 (5.370)	-0.174 (0.199)
Democratic satisfaction	-0.803* (0.170)	-0.970* (0.205)	-0.431* (0.182)	-1.254* (0.424)	0.126 (0.459)	30.07 (3.007)	-1.109* (0.226)
VOX danger for democracy	-0.827* (0.138)	-1.443* (0.196)	0.199 (0.235)	0.595 (0.577)	-0.623 (0.447)	34.22 (3.584)	-0.725* (0.205)
VOX embodies dictatorship	-0.603* (0.167)	-1.200* (0.208)	0.0526 (0.222)	-0.378 (0.456)	0.944 (0.682)	-18.22 (5.266)	-0.258 (0.250)
Internal efficacy (index)	0.297† (0.152)	0.320† (0.186)	-0.0784 (0.161)	0.269 (0.426)	-0.0476 (0.466)	-32.74 (3.780)	0.345 (0.211)
External efficacy (index)	0.0998 (0.133)	0.0110 (0.172)	-0.0934 (0.129)	-0.419 (0.345)	-0.281 (0.346)	1.717 (2.744)	-0.0369 (0.176)
Punish members of old regime	-0.421* (0.157)	-0.386† (0.199)	0.155 (0.172)	0.169 (0.394)	-0.530 (0.352)	-7.446 (2.733)	-0.192 (0.204)
Dictatorship passes to history	0.134 (0.144)	-0.161 (0.181)	0.128 (0.195)	-0.560 (0.386)	-0.0746 (0.499)	51.29 (5.992)	0.158 (0.228)
Transition passes to history	-0.108 (0.122)	0.0889 (0.165)	0.145 (0.111)	0.270 (0.265)	0.427 (0.302)	27.19 (3.722)	0.322* (0.148)
Prosecute elites Franco regime	-0.0132 (0.149)	0.0972 (0.183)	-0.0282 (0.152)	0.573 (0.447)	0.865† (0.453)	15.35 (2.811)	0.192 (0.208)
Colonial empathy	0.203 (0.144)	-0.148 (0.188)	-0.245† (0.131)	-0.781* (0.354)	-0.275 (0.347)	-12.07 (2.029)	-0.275 (0.173)
Lost freedoms since democracy	0.0450 (0.183)	0.205 (0.224)	0.240 (0.201)	0.684 (0.443)	-0.575 (0.568)	-49.16 (4.376)	0.311 (0.243)
Political interest	0.0914 (0.149)	0.169 (0.182)	-0.119 (0.159)	0.0427 (0.381)	-0.448 (0.414)	21.53 (4.712)	-0.213 (0.205)
Age	0.0485 (0.133)	-0.253 (0.173)	0.000645 (0.134)	0.107 (0.348)	0.268 (0.361)	1.460 (5.106)	0.477* (0.185)
Gender	0.283* (0.123)	0.0242 (0.159)	0.0209 (0.118)	-0.305 (0.305)	-0.332 (0.333)	-5.396 (2.316)	0.0459 (0.162)
Education	0.105 (0.148)	-0.0644 (0.194)	0.300* (0.147)	0.415 (0.374)	0.636 (0.422)	14.11 (3.170)	0.288 (0.198)
Region of residence	0.0702 (0.121)	-0.135 (0.152)	-0.328* (0.121)	0.0424 (0.346)	0.116 (0.373)	197.5 (9.708)	0.251 (0.169)
Employment status	-0.0264 (0.131)	-0.405* (0.174)	-0.0952 (0.139)	0.509 (0.327)	-0.182 (0.346)	8.353 (3.488)	0.0468 (0.167)
Household income	0.0406 (0.136)	-0.364* (0.177)	0.0588 (0.134)	0.381 (0.332)	0.347 (0.340)	13.73 (2.543)	-0.251 (0.177)
Religiosity	0.0857 (0.125)	0.00967 (0.156)	-0.220 (0.135)	0.138 (0.324)	0.102 (0.385)	24.78 (1.929)	-0.151 (0.185)
Generations in household	-0.178 (0.114)	-0.0809 (0.144)	-0.0406 (0.118)	-0.120 (0.288)	-0.835* (0.387)	2.314 (1.578)	0.0180 (0.155)
Constant	0.731* (0.145)	-1.827* (0.279)	-1.159* (0.238)	-3.648* (0.632)	-4.440* (0.790)	-424.6 (18.010)	-0.947* (0.213)

Note: Multinomial logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. PSOE is the reference category.
† $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$; LR chi2 (252) = 1618.30*; Pseudo R-squared = 0.4206.

Table G.2: Multinomial logistic regression for party support

	Chega	**PPD/PSD**	**BE**	**IL**	**Livre**	**PAN**	**PCP/PEV**	**Other**
Miss old, glorious days	0.227 (0.156)	0.160 (0.125)	-0.156 (0.159)	0.133 (0.183)	-0.163 (0.204)	0.0386 (0.225)	-0.311 (0.206)	-0.553† (0.331)
Must hold on to values from past	-0.136 (0.124)	-0.0460 (0.100)	-0.102 (0.131)	0.0680 (0.150)	-0.0953 (0.176)	-0.0389 (0.186)	-0.243 (0.174)	-0.101 (0.279)
Solve problems by looking to past	-0.0638 (0.125)	0.135 (0.106)	-0.110 (0.126)	0.0595 (0.150)	0.0472 (0.170)	0.000649 (0.178)	0.0278 (0.166)	0.390 (0.305)
Authoritarian nostalgia index	0.891* (0.206)	0.332† (0.170)	0.110 (0.225)	0.354 (0.252)	0.332 (0.290)	0.307 (0.310)	-0.0273 (0.289)	0.549 (0.477)
Authoritarianism (index)	-0.188 (0.134)	0.00430 (0.111)	-0.220 (0.137)	-0.116 (0.159)	-0.197 (0.186)	-0.0688 (0.193)	0.134 (0.189)	-0.322 (0.284)
Social dominance (index)	0.372* (0.142)	0.163 (0.118)	0.0208 (0.154)	0.141 (0.169)	0.169 (0.202)	-0.353 (0.230)	-0.0870 (0.211)	-0.0827 (0.342)
Populist attitudes (index)	0.432* (0.158)	0.196 (0.130)	0.345* (0.169)	0.448* (0.189)	0.361† (0.209)	0.0158 (0.232)	0.0374 (0.220)	0.0766 (0.348)
Xenophobia (index)	0.0952 (0.145)	-0.198 (0.121)	-0.365* (0.151)	-0.431* (0.169)	-0.548* (0.204)	-0.114 (0.206)	-0.214 (0.199)	-0.325 (0.320)
Economic position item 1	-0.167 (0.131)	-0.101 (0.111)	0.165 (0.167)	-0.465* (0.149)	-0.173 (0.192)	0.148 (0.239)	-0.0139 (0.227)	-0.0432 (0.316)
Economic position item 2	-0.0466 (0.132)	-0.0981 (0.110)	0.195 (0.131)	-0.140 (0.161)	0.0230 (0.181)	-0.303† (0.181)	-0.0672 (0.184)	0.180 (0.292)
Economic position item 3	0.284* (0.125)	0.245* (0.107)	0.273* (0.135)	0.320* (0.158)	0.432* (0.189)	0.538* (0.188)	0.528* (0.185)	0.650* (0.311)
Economic position item 4	-0.171 (0.135)	-0.332* (0.111)	0.140 (0.140)	-0.0059 (0.166)	0.215 (0.187)	0.240 (0.196)	0.214 (0.182)	-0.532† (0.307)
Economic position item 5	-0.228† (0.133)	-0.142 (0.114)	-0.0870 (0.146)	-0.374* (0.168)	0.198 (0.199)	0.260 (0.197)	0.0688 (0.194)	-0.425 (0.305)
Cultural positions (index)	0.0475 (0.138)	-0.0335 (0.119)	-0.111 (0.171)	-0.333† (0.192)	0.270 (0.208)	-0.0216 (0.233)	0.121 (0.199)	0.0354 (0.332)
Trust (index)	-0.402* (0.162)	-0.228† (0.136)	-0.215 (0.183)	-0.122 (0.204)	-0.133 (0.223)	-0.0234 (0.265)	0.0744 (0.236)	-0.415 (0.409)
Democratic support	0.0469 (0.151)	0.160 (0.136)	-0.119 (0.165)	0.301 (0.199)	-0.240 (0.197)	-0.257 (0.214)	-0.0221 (0.221)	-0.182 (0.352)
Democratic satisfaction	-0.581* (0.161)	-0.437* (0.137)	-0.365* (0.179)	-0.818* (0.198)	-0.362 (0.225)	-0.697* (0.255)	-0.654* (0.235)	-0.570 (0.393)
Chega danger for democracy	-1.649* (0.146)	-0.647* (0.119)	-0.0888 (0.183)	-0.635* (0.169)	-0.330 (0.206)	-0.546* (0.218)	-0.313 (0.217)	-0.751* (0.310)
Chega embodies dictatorship	0.506* (0.136)	0.104 (0.102)	0.0428 (0.127)	-0.000201 (0.148)	0.357* (0.180)	-0.0237 (0.178)	0.428* (0.180)	0.300 (0.291)
Internal efficacy (index)	0.325* (0.163)	-0.0182 (0.135)	-0.0368 (0.166)	-0.228 (0.185)	0.0887 (0.222)	-0.527* (0.215)	-0.00999 (0.225)	-0.223 (0.332)
External efficacy (index)	0.271† (0.143)	0.110 (0.115)	0.0731 (0.144)	0.0760 (0.166)	-0.0870 (0.184)	0.320 (0.213)	0.219 (0.182)	0.605† (0.347)
Punish members of old regime	-0.270* (0.131)	-0.174 (0.109)	0.199 (0.137)	-0.0893 (0.160)	-0.0248 (0.172)	0.315 (0.201)	0.198 (0.190)	-0.320 (0.300)
Dictatorship passes to history	-0.250† (0.136)	-0.166 (0.111)	0.104 (0.155)	-0.0646 (0.168)	0.173 (0.196)	0.0770 (0.200)	-0.139 (0.200)	-0.349 (0.294)
Transition passes to history	-0.160 (0.131)	0.0416 (0.105)	-0.0607 (0.134)	0.0946 (0.156)	0.00654 (0.172)	-0.359† (0.208)	-0.0825 (0.175)	-0.254 (0.294)
Celebrate 25 Nov instead of 25 Apr	0.353* (0.125)	0.404* (0.107)	0.172 (0.139)	0.515* (0.155)	0.0602 (0.170)	-0.0846 (0.208)	-0.287 (0.193)	0.818* (0.279)
Colonial empathy	-0.251† (0.140)	-0.0833 (0.110)	-0.0209 (0.134)	-0.159 (0.162)	0.115 (0.172)	-0.0636 (0.206)	-0.0652 (0.177)	-0.182 (0.323)
Lost freedoms since democracy	-0.0303 (0.163)	-0.0624 (0.137)	-0.132 (0.187)	-0.118 (0.197)	-0.411† (0.247)	0.167 (0.273)	0.170 (0.245)	-0.250 (0.403)
Political interest	-0.442* (0.155)	-0.201 (0.130)	-0.195 (0.167)	-0.0990 (0.194)	-0.472* (0.212)	-0.406† (0.221)	-0.00126 (0.224)	-0.374 (0.316)
Age	-0.328* (0.145)	-0.252* (0.123)	-0.279† (0.153)	-0.579* (0.169)	-0.516* (0.194)	-0.505* (0.208)	-0.237 (0.207)	-0.182 (0.357)
Gender	0.114 (0.137)	0.269* (0.113)	0.197 (0.145)	0.198 (0.163)	-0.0813 (0.184)	0.926* (0.245)	0.163 (0.195)	-0.0099 (0.315)
Education	0.134 (0.149)	0.0310 (0.122)	-0.175 (0.154)	0.00243 (0.176)	0.00322 (0.204)	0.164 (0.236)	-0.318 (0.211)	-0.0896 (0.341)
Region of residence	0.0654 (0.116)	0.0856 (0.0932)	-0.00106 (0.123)	-0.0858 (0.147)	-0.0323 (0.157)	0.282† (0.166)	-0.104 (0.177)	0.101 (0.285)
Employment status	-0.184 (0.138)	0.0546 (0.105)	-0.103 (0.145)	-0.470* (0.197)	-0.204 (0.198)	-0.131 (0.202)	-0.160 (0.193)	0.330 (0.270)
Household income	-0.0820 (0.143)	0.143 (0.117)	-0.0262 (0.154)	0.309† (0.165)	-0.223 (0.205)	-0.101 (0.220)	0.126 (0.204)	0.262 (0.340)
Religiosity	-0.509* (0.133)	-0.271* (0.109)	-0.240† (0.143)	-0.485* (0.159)	-0.444* (0.184)	-0.843* (0.206)	-0.182 (0.186)	-0.639* (0.313)
Number of generations in household	0.0780 (0.125)	0.0491 (0.103)	0.0587 (0.133)	-0.0700 (0.158)	0.294† (0.155)	0.271 (0.173)	-0.0741 (0.179)	-0.106 (0.301)

Note: Multinomial logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. PS is the reference category. † $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$; LR chi2 (288) = 1202.31*; Pseudo R-squared = 0.271.

H. Structural Equation Models

We recognise that some scholars might remain sceptical about the results from our observational study, even if we have confirmed these results through various model specifications. While some die-hard sceptics would be impossible to sway, we do believe we can further add to the robustness of our findings by presenting the results of a structural equation model (SEM). This provides the additional benefit that it directly combines measurement and structural models into one, rather than engaging in these exercises separately, like we have done above.

For simplicity reasons, we only engage in this exercise for the dichotomous dependent variable, PRR support. Since initial analyses are clear that the collective nostalgia items do not form a consistent factor (across our contexts), we also do not include them in the measurement model but relate them directly to our dependent variable (like in Figure 5). We visualise the results of the SEMs for Spain and Portugal separately (Figures H.1 and H.2, respectively), using a maximum likelihood estimation with missing values, reporting robust standard errors and standardised coefficients.[1]

Figure H.1: SEMs for PRR support in Spain



Note: Point estimates with 95% confidence intervals; For aesthetic purposes, we did not include control variables in the visualisation.

It reassures us that the substantive interpretation of the SEMs aligns very closely with the results from our regression models in Figure 5. We notice that in both countries, the individual authoritarian nostalgia items relate very highly and significantly to their underlying construct. We equally notice that the latent authoritarian nostalgia construct has a positive relationship with PRR support in both Spain and Portugal. This confirms that authoritarian nostalgia mobilises PRR support. As

[1]Model fit analyses also indicate the models considerably improve when we account for the covariance between the three collective nostalgia items. Substantively it makes perfect sense these are correlated with each other, so we also include this in the models.

for our collective nostalgia items, we confirm the modest, yet significant impact of the first item ("miss old, glorious days") has on PRR support in both countries (see Figure 5). The impact of the two other collective nostalgia items remains spurious and ambiguous, at best. Overall, these additional models highlight the robustness of our findings and offer additional evidence that the predictive ability of our empirical models is strong and that it fits the data we put forth.

Figure H.2: Distribution of authoritarian nostalgia items by party support in Portugal



Note: Point estimates with 95% confidence intervals; For aesthetic purposes, we did not include control variables in the visualisation.

I. Logistic regressions, using vote choice as dependent variable

Table I.1: Logistic regressions for PRR vote

	VOX vote	**Chega vote**
Miss old, glorious days	0.017 (0.114)	0.307* (0.134)
Must hold on to values from past	-0.236* (0.096)	-0.016 (0.109)
Solve problems by looking to past	-0.065 (0.093)	-0.176 (0.116)
Authoritarian nostalgia (index)	0.352* (0.164)	0.691* (0.177)
Authoritarianism (index)	-0.116 (0.126)	-0.153 (0.142)
Social dominance (index)	-0.018 (0.159)	0.544* (0.187)
Populist attitudes (index)	0.177 (0.159)	0.088 (0.175)
Xenophobia (index)	0.343* (0.134)	0.342* (0.135)
Economic position item 1	-0.062 (0.046)	-0.022 (0.051)
Economic position item 2	-0.065 (0.046)	-0.047 (0.045)
Economic position item 3	-0.101* (0.033)	0.071* (0.035)
Economic position item 4	0.046 (0.036)	-0.070† (0.041)
Economic position item 5	-0.025 (0.035)	-0.043 (0.036)
Cultural positions (index)	0.119* (0.045)	0.007 (0.053)
Trust (index)	-0.045 (0.061)	-0.071 (0.060)
Democratic support	0.120 (0.107)	-0.201 (0.128)
Democratic satisfaction	0.004 (0.045)	0.028 (0.054)
PRR party danger for democracy	-1.763* (0.303)	-1.672* (0.270)
PRR party embodies dictatorship	-0.412* (0.102)	0.161 (0.099)
Internal efficacy (index)	0.201 (0.133)	0.635* (0.180)
External efficacy (index)	-0.030 (0.142)	0.172 (0.161)
Punish members of old regime	-0.042 (0.114)	-0.304* (0.116)
Dictatorship passes to history	-0.457* (0.195)	0.079 (0.181)
Democratic transition passes to history	0.154 (0.179)	-0.343† (0.182)
Prosecute elites Franco regime	-0.125 (0.104)	–
Celebrate 25 Nov instead of 25 Apr	–	0.053 (0.109)
Colonial empathy	-0.294* (0.112)	-0.270* (0.134)
Lost freedoms since democracy	0.052 (0.116)	0.041 (0.127)
Political interest	0.101 (0.103)	-0.107 (0.117)
Age	-0.277† (0.158)	0.002 (0.162)
Gender	-0.476* (0.220)	-0.573* (0.242)
Education	-0.316* (0.156)	0.222 (0.158)
Region of residence	-0.043* (0.021)	0.243* (0.073)
Employment status	-0.185* (0.060)	-0.103† (0.060)
Household income	-0.091* (0.046)	-0.018 (0.049)
Religiosity	-0.021 (0.125)	-0.237† (0.131)
Generations in household	0.078 (0.128)	0.191 (0.150)
Constant	3.225† (1.657)	-5.943* (1.828)

Note: Logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. † $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$.

J. Logistic regressions, using probability weights

Table J.1: Logistic regressions with probability weights

	VOX support	**Chega support**
Miss old, glorious days	0.165 (0.111)	0.234* (0.114)
Must hold on to values from past	-0.146 (0.103)	-0.072 (0.101)
Solve problems by looking to past	-0.104 (0.099)	-0.133 (0.109)
Authoritarian nostalgia index	0.449* (0.179)	0.593* (0.167)
Authoritarianism (index)	-0.095 (0.138)	-0.179 (0.126)
Social dominance (index)	-0.100 (0.153)	0.421* (0.172)
Populist attitudes (index)	0.179 (0.179)	0.098 (0.169)
Xenophobia (index)	0.192 (0.133)	0.352* (0.122)
Economic position item 1	-0.060 (0.053)	-0.013 (0.047)
Economic position item 2	-0.068 (0.053)	-0.008 (0.042)
Economic position item 3	-0.028 (0.034)	0.027 (0.032)
Economic position item 4	0.056 (0.040)	-0.019 (0.036)
Economic position item 5	-0.002 (0.036)	-0.041 (0.033)
Cultural positions (index)	0.158* (0.047)	0.058 (0.048)
Trust (index)	-0.084 (0.065)	-0.118* (0.057)
Democratic support	-0.078 (0.113)	0.036 (0.134)
Democratic satisfaction	-0.023 (0.051)	-0.061 (0.050)
PRR danger for democracy	-2.027* (0.327)	-2.316* (0.227)
PRR embodies dictatorship	-0.464* (0.107)	0.435* (0.098)
Internal efficacy (index)	0.052 (0.146)	0.516* (0.170)
External efficacy (index)	-0.022 (0.152)	0.210 (0.136)
Punish members of old regime	-0.089 (0.126)	-0.265* (0.113)
Dictatorship passes to history	-0.319 (0.216)	-0.169 (0.176)
Democratic transition passes to history	0.033 (0.200)	-0.277† (0.167)
Prosecute elites Franco regime	0.076 (0.113)	–
Celebrate 25 Nov instead of 25 Apr	–	0.102 (0.098)
Colonial empathy	-0.288* (0.118)	-0.228† (0.133)
Lost freedoms since democracy	0.119 (0.120)	0.113 (0.117)
Political interest	0.182† (0.108)	-0.053 (0.113)
Age	-0.509* (0.162)	-0.009 (0.154)
Gender	-0.364 (0.229)	-0.318 (0.220)
Education	-0.277† (0.155)	0.148 (0.143)
Region of residence	-0.051* (0.022)	0.038 (0.067)
Employment status	-0.146* (0.063)	-0.100† (0.054)
Household income	-0.117* (0.051)	-0.065 (0.047)
Religiosity	0.010 (0.139)	-0.295* (0.115)
Generations in household	0.078 (0.137)	0.009 (0.146)
Constant	3.624* (1.814)	-4.596* (1.755)
Observations	1,345	1,292

Note: Logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. † $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$.

K. Sample information

Sample/Fieldwork description

IPSOS GmbH fielded this project through CAWI (computer assisted web interviewing) methodology. They targeted the general population (18+ years old) following the crossed quotas for age, gender, education, and controlling also for region (see Tables K.1 and K.2). For each quota, the goal was to have minimum half of the target respondents (ratio of 50) and maximum twice as many of the target (ratio 200). This was accomplished, with the only exception of Portuguese women who are over 55 years old and with up to secondary education. Overall, the samples are representative of the general population of the two countries. IPSOS GmbH achieved 1.670 complete interviews in Portugal and 1.700 in Spain. The total sample achieved then went through a quality control and cleaned for bad quality interviews. For these sample sizes they pushed around 10.500 invites per country.

Weighting description

The weight introduced by IPSOS GmbH is the result of the weighting algorithm, where the maximum weight is set not to be higher than 4 and the smallest weight is not lower than 0.3. With weighting IPSOS GmbH lowered the importance of overachieved target groups and increased the importance of underdelivered target groups.

Table K.1: Quotas in Spain (N = 1,650)

Group	N	Target	Ratio
Men	838	810	103.46
Men; 18-34 years	206	204	100.98
Up to secondary	59	71	83.10
Secondary	83	76	109.21
More than secondary	64	57	112.28
Men; 35-54 years	353	310	113.87
Up to secondary	122	123	99.19
Secondary	95	71	133.80
More than secondary	136	116	117.24
Men; 55+ years	279	296	94.26
Up to secondary	138	173	79.77
Secondary	61	51	119.61
More than secondary	80	72	111.11
Women	857	840	102.02
Women; 18-34 years	200	177	112.99
Up to secondary	52	52	100.00
Secondary	60	49	122.45
More than secondary	88	76	115.79
Women; 35-54 years	356	306	116.34
Up to secondary	95	95	100.00
Secondary	90	67	134.33
More than secondary	171	144	118.75
Women; 55+ years	301	356	84.55
Up to secondary	171	237	72.15
Secondary	62	54	114.81
More than secondary	68	64	106.25
Andalucía	319	295	108.14
Aragón	51	46	110.87
Asturias (Principado de)	39	35	111.43
Balears (Illes)	28	41	68.29
Canarias	81	76	106.58
Cantabria	25	20	125.00
Castilla – La Mancha	72	71	101.41
Castilla y Len	91	83	109.64
Cataluña	245	271	90.41
Ceuta (Ciudad autnoma de)	2	3	66.67
Comunitat Valenciana	173	177	97.74
Extremadura	35	36	97.22
Galicia	106	94	112.77
Madrid (Comunidad de)	268	234	114.53
Melilla (Ciudad autnoma de)	2	3	66.67
Murcia (Regin de)	56	53	105.66
Navarra (Comunidad Foral de)	18	23	78.26
País Vasco	79	78	101.28
Rioja (La)	10	12	83.33
Total	1695	1650	102.73

Table K.2: Quotas in Portugal (N=1,650)

Quota Category	**N**	**Target**	**Ratio**
Men	747	773	96.64
Men; 18-34 years	191	179	106.70
Up to secondary	52	51	101.96
Secondary	84	81	103.70
More than secondary	55	47	117.02
Men; 35-54 years	280	269	104.09
Up to secondary	132	131	100.76
Secondary	77	72	106.94
More than secondary	71	66	107.58
Men; 55+ years	276	325	84.92
Up to secondary	198	253	78.26
Secondary	41	39	105.13
More than secondary	37	33	112.12
Women	916	877	104.45
Women; 18-34 years	185	176	105.11
Up to secondary	35	35	100.00
Secondary	77	74	104.05
More than secondary	73	67	108.96
Women; 35-54 years	299	291	102.75
Up to secondary	108	110	98.18
Secondary	84	80	105.00
More than secondary	107	101	105.94
Women; 55+ years	432	409	105.62
Up to secondary	133	324	41.05
Secondary	138	42	328.57
More than secondary	161	44	365.91
Alentejo	72	112	64.28571
Algarve	94	74	127.027
Centro	343	355	96.61972
Lisboa e Vale do Tejo	506	457	110.7221
Norte	592	573	103.3159
Açores	29	38	76.31579
Madeira	34	40	85
Total	1663	1650	100.7879

L. Logistic regressions with authoritarian nostalgia items

Table L.1: Logistic regressions with authoritarian nostalgia items

	VOX support	**Chega support**
Miss old, glorious days	0.194† (0.116)	0.201† (0.108)
Must hold on to values from past	-0.103 (0.096)	-0.065 (0.093)
Solve problems by looking to past	-0.101 (0.095)	-0.158 (0.100)
People have lost community ties	0.100 (0.116)	0.171 (0.126)
Country was better until transition	0.264† (0.140)	0.300* (0.124)
Country could regain status if following [dictator]'s ideas	0.078 (0.130)	0.161 (0.124)
[dictator] was one of the best statesman in history	0.049 (0.115)	0.111 (0.115)
Authoritarianism (index)	-0.108 (0.130)	-0.162 (0.117)
Social dominance (index)	-0.102 (0.161)	0.368* (0.160)
Populist attitudes (index)	0.127 (0.167)	0.202 (0.156)
Xenophobia (index)	0.225† (0.136)	0.280* (0.112)
Economic position item 1	-0.046 (0.047)	-0.020 (0.043)
Economic position item 2	-0.062 (0.046)	-0.002 (0.037)
Economic position item 3	-0.028 (0.033)	0.001 (0.029)
Economic position item 4	0.060 (0.037)	-0.015 (0.034)
Economic position item 5	-0.011 (0.036)	-0.036 (0.031)
Cultural positions (index)	0.133* (0.046)	0.047 (0.043)
Trust (index)	-0.067 (0.062)	-0.082 (0.051)
Democratic support	-0.038 (0.108)	0.035 (0.113)
Democratic satisfaction	-0.025 (0.046)	-0.024 (0.046)
PRR danger for democracy	-1.953* (0.314)	-2.452* (0.225)
PRR embodies dictatorship	-0.486* (0.103)	0.376* (0.089)
Internal efficacy (index)	0.047 (0.132)	0.428* (0.147)
External efficacy (index)	-0.046 (0.144)	0.208 (0.134)
Punish members of old regime	-0.056 (0.118)	-0.165 (0.101)
Dictatorship passes to history	-0.401* (0.202)	-0.152 (0.154)
Democratic transition passes to history	0.081 (0.183)	-0.241 (0.156)
Prosecute elites Franco regime	0.051 (0.108)	–
Celebrate 25 Nov instead of 25 Apr	–	0.080 (0.090)
Colonial empathy	-0.258* (0.115)	-0.201† (0.116)
Lost freedoms since democracy	0.098 (0.119)	0.047 (0.109)
Political interest	0.189† (0.105)	-0.124 (0.099)
Age	-0.436* (0.165)	-0.010 (0.139)
Gender	-0.326 (0.228)	-0.251 (0.205)
Education	-0.244 (0.159)	0.156 (0.134)
Region of residence	-0.045* (0.022)	0.0174 (0.065)
Employment status	-0.147* (0.057)	-0.086† (0.047)
Household income	-0.114* (0.047)	-0.060 (0.043)
Religiosity	-0.040 (0.127)	-0.248* (0.111)
Generations in household	0.105 (0.132)	0.036 (0.130)
Constant	3.095† (1.699)	-4.809* (1.556)
Observations	1,345	1,292

Note: Logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. † $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$.