Pre-Analysis Plan for SNAP Field Experiment in Sudan*

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Contents

1 Motivation and Background **2**

2 Theory **4**

2.1 Main Hypotheses 7

2.2 Secondary Hypotheses 15

3 Experimental Design and Process **18**

3.1 Sudan 20

3.1.1 Steps of Field Experiment 21

4 Measurement Instruments **26**

5 Analysis **31**

5.1 Sudan 31

5.2 General Issues: Spillovers 32

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5.3 General Issues: Multiple Hypothesis Testing 33
5.4 General Issues: Subgroup Analysis 33
5.5 General Issues: Attrition 34
5.6 General Issues: Data Collected and Data Analyzed 34

1 Motivation and Background

Why are some grassroots social movements highly organized, disciplined and resilient while others are uncoordinated, fragmented and violent? Research has pointed to several explanations for movements' organization and resilience, including political opportunities (Kitschelt, 1986, Davenport et al., 2005), regime type (Gupta et al., 1993, Carey, 2015), the pattern of government repression (Moore, 1998, Pinckney, 2016), and the organizational structure of the movement (Sutton et al., 2014) and prior capacity-building to prepare for repression by the movement (McAdam, 1990, Bloch, 2016). All of these factors likely play a role, but only the last is solidly under the control of activists themselves. This project focuses on one of the most important activities that movements engage in to build their organizational capacity: education and training. Training in nonviolent action has been a crucial part of many nonviolent action campaigns, and archetypal thought leaders in nonviolent resistance such as Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr., speak consistently of the importance of training and preparation as part of any nonviolent action campaign (King, 1963, Gandhi, 1966, 1996).

International donors also invest substantial resources in financing local efforts to build organizational capacity among civil society organizations and grassroots social movements. The Albert Einstein Institution, CANVAS, the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, the Leading Change Network, Rhize, RootChange and the United States Institute of Peace are just a few of the organizations conducting such capacity building trainings (Gallo-Cruz, 2012, Pugh, 2020). There is plentiful case study evidence that such trainings are an effective means of building capacity for nonviolent action. Training in so-called "movement schools" popularized nonviolent resistance in the US civil rights movement, and in particular helped bring about the Nashville lunch counter sit-ins (Isaac et al., 2012). Internationally-supported trainings helped jump-start the *Otpor* youth movement in Serbia, which later

played a key role in the peaceful ouster of President Slobodan Milosevic (Jennings, 2009). Leaders of Otpor then went on to disseminate their knowledge throughout Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, facilitating several peaceful uprisings (Bunce and Wolchik, 2011).

However, to date, there has been no rigorous randomized testing of the impact of training in nonviolent action, and we thus have very little knowledge about how these efforts shape nonviolent action participants.[1] This study thus seeks to answer the question: can we discern the effects of capacity-building trainings on how activists and peacebuilders think and behave in their movements?

This is the first study to rigorously evaluate the impact of nonviolent action and peacebuilding trainings, and to do so across different countries. We will compare the effects of the training in authoritarian regimes [removed country names], in democracies with a history of civil war [removed country name] and ethnic tensions [removed country name], and in countries that are at different stages of a democratic transition (Sudan and [removed country names]). This pre-analysis plan excludes [removed country names] for now because we have not planned the field experiments in detail in those localities yet. We will amend this document once we have a clearer understanding of the interventions in these countries.

Our intervention is a training curriculum in nonviolent action and peacebuilding created by the United States Institute of Peace, based on their Synergizing Nonviolent Action and Peacebuilding (SNAP) guide. The SNAP guide developed as a result of a multi-year research project into effective means of external support for nonviolent movements (O'Regan, 2019). Written by two highly-experienced international trainers in nonviolent action and peacebuilding, Nadine Bloch and Lisa Schirch, the SNAP guide provides a strategic framework for activists, peacebuilders, and organizers working to transform violent conflict and advance a just peace. It demonstrates how nonviolent action and peacebuilding approaches can be synergized to mobilize communities, address power imbalances and conflict drivers, and support inclusive, participatory peace processes. An additional goal of the guide is to bridge divisions over preferred methods between nonviolent activists,

[1] Studies on related interventions come from two experiments that focus on peacebuilding education in Liberia (Blattman et al., 2014) and a dialogue intervention in Ethiopia (Svensson and Brounéus, 2013), and one observational medium-N study on nonviolent action (Pugh, 2020).

who rely heavily on contentious activity such as popular mobilization and protests, with peacebuilders who tend to use dialogue and negotiation. SNAP is based on the idea that knowledge and familiarity with both is critical for the effectiveness of social movements.

While we employ slightly different approaches depending on the country, our core training model has two steps. First, we organize an initial SNAP workshop led by experienced international facilitators followed by a Training of Trainers (ToT). Both the workshop and the ToT are done with the same cohort of 20-30 in-country facilitators who have experience in activism and peacebuilding, facilitation, and experiential learning. Second, these in-country facilitators are supported by USIP to replicate SNAP workshops with activists, organizers, and peacebuilders in their country and region. The replication of the workshops involves a random division into treatment and control groups, with slightly different randomization procedures in each country. The participants in these replicate workshops are thus our research subjects provided that they consent.

The first step in this process has taken place in five countries: [removed country names] (June 2019 and February 2020), [removed country name] (October 2019), and Sudan (November 2020). The second step has been initiated in [removed country names] and Sudan, with replication workshops already under way.[2] In [removed country name], workshops will start in April 2021.

2 Theory

Training is a crucial way of building capacity in any organization. Training's most intuitive impact is through imparting specific skills and knowledge to participants that are necessary to effectively fulfill their roles. Yet beyond this "banking" model, in which an instructor simply provides information that a trainee attempts to absorb and remember (Freire, 1970), training can also provide a critical environment for shared learning and the development of common frameworks for action and socialization, as research on violence-producing organizations has shown (Bearman, 1991, Checkel, 2017, Green, 2017). This is particularly the case when pedagogical

[2]In Section 5.6 we describe how we have handled the data that we have received prior to registering the pre-analysis plan and any analyses that we have conducted thus far.

methods encourage active participation and shared understanding.

Just as training in businesses and organizations can be a crucial means of capacity-building, so can training in social movements and other organizations engaged in nonviolent action. For example, so-called "movement schools" played a key role in mobilization during the US Civil Rights Movement (Isaac et al., 2012) Yet while many movements and social movement organizations that engage in nonviolent action have developed training curricula (e.g. Lakey, 1994), most participants in movements still receive little or no training before engaging in nonviolent action.

Why would training in nonviolent action be necessary? At its simplest level, our intuition, building on a longstanding literature, is that nonviolent action is a technique of struggle whose dynamics are not apparent or intuitive to all participants (Sharp, 1973a). Just as soldiers are unlikely to be effective fighters in war without extensive training, activists are unlikely to master nonviolent action without detailed training.

In particular, we identify four key areas in which movements across many contexts typically struggle and would benefit from training.

The first is a lack of synthesis between nonviolent action approaches, which focus on shifting power, and peacebuilding approaches, which focus on resolving conflict. In particular, movements that aim to resolve grievances or transform unjust political structures are often suspicious of peacebuilders, and may see negotiation, dialogue, or compromise as antithetical to their interests. However, in practice, peacebuilding tools are crucial means for building unity within movements while nonviolent action is ongoing and resolving nonviolent conflicts once the peak of mobilization has passed. Almost all transitions initiated through nonviolent action involve significant negotiation processes, and there have been similar findings for transitions initiated through armed insurgencies since the end of the Cold War (Wood, 2000, Howard and Stark, 2018, Dudouet and Pinckney, 2020). Yet, movement leaders often have little experience with how to successfully navigate these processes.

The second is a lack of strategic planning, conflict analysis, or scenario assessment. Activists often lack background in strategic planning concepts and thus, while many may have a clear vision of their ultimate goals, are unclear on the means through which to achieve those goals, how to move from specific tactics to

larger strategic objectives, and how power relationships and interests shape conflict dynamics. This undermines movement effectiveness by causing them to inefficiently allocate their resources or choose tactics that are not the most effective means of achieving their goals.

The third is a lack of understanding of the theory of power that leads to nonviolent action success. The core insight of many of the earliest practitioners and scholars of nonviolent action is that power is fluid and relational, rather than adhering in a single individual or small group of individuals at the top of a power structure (Sharp, 1973a, Gandhi, 1996, Tolstoy, 1987). Power structures are transformed not by directly toppling the figure at the top, but by reconfiguring the network of relationships that constitute them (Nepstad, 2015). Nonviolent action achieves this primarily through increasing the social, psychological, economic, and political costs of remaining in the existing power structure, and encouraging members of that structure to defect (O'Donnell et al., 1986). This insight, while simple, has far-reaching consequences for tactical choice, the importance of maintaining nonviolent discipline, and how movements build alliances.

The fourth is a lack of awareness about historical examples of nonviolent action and recent research findings. Activists frequently feel that their situation is entirely unique, often in ways that preclude the possibility of meaningful or effective action. These ideas can take the form of only looking at their past for historical references (**?**). Activists may also feel that their opponent is uniquely strong, repressive, or brutal, and may have a limited tactical repertoire with which to face that opponent. Increased awareness of historical examples in which movements have successfully faced particularly repressive opponents, and sharing knowledge of a diverse set of tactics, can help inspire activists towards greater creativity and foster innovative thinking on how to address challenging situations. At the same time, learning about research findings on how, why and under what conditions nonviolent action works, also transforms people's perceptions about their own struggles and how to best wage them (RezaeeDaryakenari and Asadzade, 2020).

The 5-day full-immersion SNAP training aims to address these areas. SNAP uses experiential learning methods to teach crucial principles behind nonviolent action and peacebuilding, and provides a framework to synergize the two through conflict analysis and strategic planning. The expectation is that this training will

improve participants' understanding about how nonviolent action works, including methods of protest, non-cooperation and persuasion (Sharp, 1973b, Sharp et al., 2005), how to maintain nonviolent discipline in the face of state repression, and how to conduct conflict analysis and do scenario planning to improve effectiveness. On peacebuilding, the expectation is that participants will better understand how dialogue, mediation, negotiation, and conflict transformation work. The training will also hone participants' skills in these practices by doing role-playing and other activities. To synergize the two, the SNAP training presents tools for conflict analysis, strategic planning and tactical decision-making that illustrate how nonviolent action and peacebuilding can work together to improve effectiveness. The core idea that we expect participants to take away is that in a movement there are moments when power generation is crucial, which necessitates nonviolent action. There are also moments to transform relationships and negotiate, which require a peacebuilding approach, both within the movement and with the target or opponent of the movement.

Finally, throughout the SNAP training we place nonviolent action and peacebuilding in a historical context and summarize key findings in recent scholarship (e.g. Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). Using videos about past campaigns and case studies of nonviolent movements, we also teach about lessons learned and failed attempts. We go over some of the teachings by Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and Mohandas K. Gandhi, and critically assess movements such as Serbia's Otpor against Slobodan Milosevic, the No Campaign in Chile against Pinochet, anti-violence campaigns in Mexico, environmental struggles in the Andean region of Bolivia against coal mining, among many others.

From these core ideas that we impart through the SNAP training curriculum, we have a set of expectations about changes in attitudes, beliefs, behaviors and level of knowledge that we will be able to observe at the individual, group and municipality levels.

2.1 Main Hypotheses

On the use of violence and nonviolent action in movements:
The SNAP training shows how nonviolent action works and can succeed. Partici-

pants learn about nonviolent resistance's superior frequency of success relative to violent resistance (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011), and in particular the importance of nonviolent discipline to reduce the likelihood of state repression (Pinckney, 2016). However, SNAP also points out that high levels of repression make mass protests too dangerous or extremely unlikely to occur (Amat and Braley, 2021), and that we do not yet understand the complex effects that violent and radical flanks have on movements (Chenoweth and Schock, 2015, Kadivar and Ketchley, 2018). The SNAP training also strives to remain agnostic about the morality of nonviolent action and armed struggle, and about whether one needs to fully embody nonviolent action for it to be politically effective. Even activists who participate in primarily nonviolent movements sometimes espouse violent tactics, and think that violence is justified or an effective strategy against the opponent, particularly when the opponent is highly repressive (Trejo, 2012, Thaler, 2019). In addition, even activists who participate actively in primarily nonviolent movements may not think that they are reducing the likelihood of state repression by remaining nonviolent, nor believe that nonviolent action can succeed in the end. If a person holds these views at the start of the training, we expect that after SNAP we will observe a change in these beliefs and behaviors.[3] In particular, we expect that the SNAP training will:

H1-a: Reduce participants' support for the use of violence by movement participants. *(Individual level-attitude)*

H1-b: Make participants less likely to view violence as an effective strategy in movements. *(Individual level-attitude)*

H1-c: Make participants more likely to understand the vicious cycle of violence (that protester violence is likely to lead to more state repression). *(Individual level-attitude)*

H1-d: Increase likelihood of participants perceiving nonviolent action as more effective than armed action.*(Individual level-attitude)*

[3]We use the terms attitudes, beliefs, views and perceptions interchangeably.

H1-e: Reduce participants' willingness to engage in violence in their struggle. *(Individual level-behavior)*

H1-f: Reduce group's condonement of the use violence by protesters in their struggle. *(Group level-behavior)*

H1-g: Reduce violence by activists in protests and other public events. *(Geographic level-behavior)*

We think that observing behavioral changes at the geographic-level is a tall order because it requires community leaders spreading knowledge about the SNAP training, either by conducting workshops themselves or by effectively changing the group dynamics during protests. Observing these changes also requires us being able to measure protester action at a very granular level. We have plenty of anecdotal evidence of participants expressing great interest in taking what they learned to their organizations and communities, as well as of attempts at doing these follow-on activities. We also have anecdotal evidence of attempts to change the dynamics during protests. For example, three of our [removed country name] facilitators mentioned that at a protest they attended, they started screaming to fellow activists, "do not throw rocks," "remember SNAP!", in an attempt to try to make sure that the protest did not devolve into violence. Finally, we think that we may be able to capture at least some of these changes through our social media analysis (especially a qualitative/in-depth look at videos that activists post of their actions) and the daily event datasets. That said, these types of hypotheses (behavioral and especially behavioral at the geographic-level) are still the highest order of difficulty for our experiment to demonstrate an effect.

On political power and conflict transformation: Probably the most important insight about how nonviolent action works has to do with its conception of political power, which is based on consent and non-cooperation (Sharp, 1973a, Sharp et al., 2005, Gandhi, 1996, King, 1963). As Gene Sharp wrote: "The fact is ... that it is not true that violence is the only effective means of action in crucial conflict situations. Throughout history, under a variety of political systems, people

in every part of the world have waged conflict and wielded undeniable power by using a very different technique of struggle–one which does not kill or destroy. That technique is nonviolent action. Although it has been known by a variety of names, its basis has always been the same: the belief that the exercise of power depends on the consent of the ruled who, by withdrawing that consent, can control and even destroy the power of their opponent." (Sharp, 1973a, 4) Activists who engage in nonviolent action are sometimes not able to articulate their source of power and thus fail to exploit its full potential. Activists who understand that their most important source of power lies in organizing the masses (DeNardo, 1985), will prioritize unity and actively work toward minimizing factions.

The other key component of SNAP's conceptual foundation has to do with conflict transformation. Sometimes direct resistance and confrontation in a conflict is unproductive. What is required of the situation is creativity to act in a way that demonstrates a deep understanding of the opponent's interests and that transforms relationships in the conflict (Lederach, 2005). The SNAP training aims to explain this view of political power and conflict transformation to participants, not just theoretically but also by practicing it through experiential learning–i.e., by engaging in role playing, group games, and other hands-on exercises that help in "learning through reflection on doing" (Patrick, 2011). Therefore, we expect that the SNAP training will expand views about power and conflict transformation, which should manifest themselves in a higher likelihood of thinking that citizens can change the status quo. We should also observe more attempts to unify the movement and more success at these efforts. In particular, we expect that the SNAP training will:

H2-a: Increase the likelihood of believing that ordinary people can change the situation in their country.*(Individual level-attitude)*

H2-b: Increase the likelihood that activist and peacebuilder organizations will work to unify factions within the movement.*(Group level-behavior)*

H2-c: Increase the likelihood that activist and peacebuilder organizations will successfully unify factions within the movement.*(Geographic level-behavior)*

Some of the self-reported data will face the challenge of desirability bias. Knowing what the USIP training is about, activists and peacebuilders will feel that they should answer questions in a way that aligns with our expectations and objectives, especially as they relate to the use of violence and nonviolent discipline. This type of bias is especially concerning given that the project is funded by a U.S. organization. Program beneficiaries may assume that answering a certain way will mean a higher chance of receiving funding or benefiting from other programs in the future, even if we explicitly say in the consent form that their participation in the research study is in no way connected to their participation in the program. There are four reasons why we are not as concerned about these effects and expect to be able to capture true attitudes or at least unbiased estimates of their beliefs. First, our research subjects are activists and peacebuilders whose *raison d'être* is speaking truth to power, rarely being shy about expressing their views. These activists and peacebuilders stand up for what they believe even in the context of highly repressive regimes. Second, both the treatment and control groups learn about the topic of the training and read the consent form, which is the only place where USIP is mentioned, before taking the baseline survey. There is little reason to think that the bias in the treatment and control groups would be different, especially given that we are offering the training to the control group a few months after the treatment group. The control group participants know that they will be training in SNAP in the near future.

Third, the role of USIP in funding the trainings is not featured very prominently in the project, which hopefully reduces biases induced by the power dynamics and expectations of future funding. The facilitators certainly know who funds the project, but the research subjects only learn about it when they read the consent form.[4] We would not be surprised if most research subjects in [removed country names] and Sudan did not remember that the SNAP training was a USIP-funded

[4]USIP features much more prominently in the [removed country name] project because we advertised the program publicly on a website and added the USIP logo and links to the online SNAP guide. However, in [removed country names] and Sudan, recruitment is completely through local networks and the materials are almost all logo-free. In addition, our facilitators are native to the country where we are conducting workshops, and are themselves activists and peacebuilders. They organize the workshops and communicate with research subjects through the entire process, which means that there is no direct line and relationships between the research subjects and the U.S.-based USIP.

program or did not have it very present in their mind. We would rather not add a question at the end of the survey asking if they remember this information because we think that it would raise suspicion, especially given the delicate security contexts in which we are working. Fourth, for the question most subject to desirability bias, which asks about the willingness to use violence during protests, in addition to asking the direct question, we also have a list experiment. The list experiment should reduce or eliminate social desirability bias. It will be useful to compare the proportions of people who espouse violence in the direct question and the list experiment to see if social desirability bias is operating in the context where we would most expect it.

There might also be bias in responses to sensitive questions in the survey due to fear. This type of bias is especially a problem in the context of a highly repressive regime, such as [removed country names]. From our conversations with facilitators, we are not too concerned about this bias because there is mutual trust between the research subjects and our facilitators. Recruitment in these two repressive contexts is through personal, professional, and activist/peacebuilding networks; therefore, people know each other. In addition, our facilitators explain to research subjects that they will be taking a survey in a highly secure online platform, as well as that only the research team will have access to the data. Though no data online can be perfectly secure, we are using the Qualtrics system from Stanford University for the surveys, which is IRB-approved for sensitive data.

Organizational success:

Regardless of whether or not a movement is achieving its ultimate political objectives, what does a better performing activist and peacebuilding group look like? We argue that one of the main features of a more organizationally evolved group have to do with their incorporation of strategic planning, preparation and execution of plans. It is a sign of maturity when the organization engages in conflict analysis, assesses different scenarios and risks, maps out contingency plans accordingly, conducts strategic planning to sequence actions, prepares its members to carry out these actions, and executes with precision. If activists and peacebuilders were not engaging in this type of planning and preparation, or using analytic tools to do so, we expect that SNAP will change practices and improve execution. In particular,

we predict that the SNAP training will:

H3-a: Increase the likelihood of activist and peacebuilder engagement in conflict analysis and strategic planning. *(Group level-behavior)*

H3-b: Increase the likelihood that activist and peacebuilder organizations engage in conflict analysis and strategic planning. *(Group level-behavior)*

H3-c: Increase the likelihood that activists and peacebuilders prepare and practice their public actions before carrying them out. *(Individual level-behavior)*

H3-d: Increase the likelihood that activist and peacebuilder organizations prepare and practice their public actions before carrying them out. *(Group level-behavior)*

H3-e: Increase the likelihood that activists and peacebuilders perceive that public actions organized by their movement were carried out with precision. *(Individual level-belief)*

H3-f: Increase the likelihood that the actions that activists and peacebuilders do plan are carried out with more precision. *(Group level-behavior)*

These organizational characteristics, such as strategic planning, preparation, practice, and execution of actions, are going to look different depending on the level of repression. The survey has some general questions related to these practices, but we will pay special attention to them in our qualitative interviews. The reason is that organizational maturity under repression is very different from organizational maturity under a more democratic setting. In more repressive environments, for example, centralized strategic planning may not be wise, nor planning actions too far in advance because it increases chances of leaks. By contrast, in more democratic settings, a centralized strategic planning approach might be expected of a mature group, as well as the planning of actions far enough in advance to train people to execute with precision.

These organizational practices are also sometimes difficult to distinguish and they are part of a very iterative process. Interviews will allow us to develop a more nuanced understanding of whether organizational practices changed in places that received the SNAP training, in what ways, and in which contexts. One key component of conflict analysis and strategic planning is whether activists and peacebuilders reflect on their past actions as a group to learn from mistakes, successes, and government reactions. Innovation and adaptation are crucial to succeed in these changing environments, which means that more organizationally developed groups incorporate routines for frequent conflict analysis, strategic planning, preparation, and practice.

There are also two main changes that we expect to go hand-in-hand when leaders and organizations start incorporating strategic planning. Our assumption is that activist groups that do not engage in strategic planning tend to focus mainly on protests and to engage a narrow set of actors as part of their coalition. Without carefully analyzing how to generate and sustain power, the visibility and allure of protests overshadows other tactics and the need to do the groundwork of community organizing. In addition, coalition-building across sectors is challenging and generally requires significant effort. Activists thus naturally gravitate toward their immediate networks, and do not typically devote time and resources to build ties beyond their circles (Thurber, 2019). On the other hand, in highly repressive environments, protest and contention can serve as the impetus to create civic organizations and the mobilizing structures that strengthen movements. In addition, the building of "unsocial social networks" to avoid highly interconnected networks vulnerable to repression is another purposeful strategy that activits facing extreme repression adopt (Pearlman, 2020, 6).

We think the process of strategic planning will reveal that the groundwork of community organizing and tactical diversity (including the use of peacebuilding tools and not just contentious politics) are important. This process will also bring to the fore the need to build broad coalitions to generate power. Indeed, research shows that the size of the coalition is important but perhaps its diversity is even more so (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). Therefore, we expect to observe a move away from the tactical hegemony of protest. We should also see a diversification of actors with whom the activists and peacebuilders are engaging. If at baseline

activists were primarily focused on protests and on actors within their networks, the process of conflict analysis, actor-mapping, strategic planning and tactical sequencing, will lead them to change these behaviors. The aspect of the training that focuses on dialogue, mediation and negotiation should also make it more likely that the movement will be equipped to act on the imperative to build broader and more inclusive movements. Coalition building requires using these peacebuilding skills. In particular, we expect that the SNAP training will:

H3-g: Increase the diversity of activist and peacebuilder organizations' tactical repertoire. *(Group level-behavior)*

H3-h: Diversify the coalition/alliances of activist and peacebuilder organizations. *(Group level-behavior)*

2.2 Secondary Hypotheses

Feelings of efficacy and fear:
The experience of the training itself, in particular meeting fellow activists and peacebuilders, should increase the likelihood that participants perceive themselves as more efficacious. Receiving the preparation should also increase the likelihood that they believe they can achieve change. The ties that bind people together are powerful after these courses. Solidarity among the group and a sense that the international community is present should also increase confidence and reduce levels of fear (Cebul, 2019, Lynch, 2021)[5]. For those operating in repressive contexts, particularly [removed country names] and to some extent Sudan, we expect that the SNAP training will make people feel more equipped to face the challenges in

[5]In some localities we do not share, unless participants explicitly ask, that this project is funded by USIP to minimize the risk of the social movement losing its legitimacy for having ties to international actors. The consent form that all research subjects have to read and accept before participating in the study, conveys the involvement of a Stanford University scholar and the U.S. Institute of Peace in the program. Otherwise, local activists and peacebuilders organize and run the workshops, and we do not emphasize the role of USIP, especially in [removed country names]. [removed country name] is the only site where the role of USIP is clear from the recruitment process

their movement, including repression. Our facilitators in [removed country name] who have been detained, interrogated and imprisoned have reported being able to remain calm, de-escalate the situation with police officers, and they attribute it to the SNAP dialogue, mediation and negotiation training (Interviewees 43 and 20, December 2020 and January 2021, Zoom and Signal). We thus expect that the SNAP training will:

H4-a: Increase the likelihood of feeling personally more effective as an activist or peacebuilder. *(Individual level-attitude)*

H4-b: Increase the likelihood of feeling that that their nonviolent action or peacebuilding group is more effective. *(Individual level-attitude)*

H4-c: For activists and peacebuilders operating in repressive environments, the SNAP training should decrease the level of fear that the person feels being involved in the movement. *(Individual level-attitude)*

Repression:

An increase in effectiveness and an expansion in the scope of the work of an opposition movement, may elicit increased repression against participants of our training. Indeed, if the government perceives an opponent as a threat, repression is likely to increase whether or not the non-state actor remains nonviolent. On the other hand, conflict analysis, contingency planning, and expecting and preparing for repression should all increase the probability of nonviolent discipline, which, all else equal, should reduce repression. Therefore, overall we think that the net effect of the SNAP training on repression will likely be statistically indistinguishable from zero. That said, if there is a major transformation from using violence to adopting nonviolent discipline, we could observe a lowering of state repression. At the same time, if we see a major shift in effectiveness or an expansion in the scope of the work (more ambitious or maximalist objectives), we could observe an increase in the level of repression. Thus, after the SNAP training we would expect:

H5-a: A decrease in state repression in SNAP-trained localities if there is a

major shift from using violence to adopting nonviolent discipline. *(Geographic level-behavior)*

H5-b: An increase in state repression in SNAP-trained localities if there is a major broadening of the goals of movement (reformist to maximalist objectives, for example). *(Geographic level-behavior)*

Growth of movement:
A byproduct of expanding coalitions and building political power is likely to be growth in the movement. We would thus expect that the organizations will grow in terms of active participants and volunteers, as well as that the numbers of people participating in their public events soars as well. In particular, we expect the SNAP training to:

H6-a: Increase the size of activist and peacebuilder organizations.*(Group level-behavior)*

H6-b: Increase the size of public actions organized by the movement.*(Geographic level-behavior)*

Level of participation and political engagement:
With more tools, training and a deeper understanding of how nonviolent action works, we expect that activists and peacebuilders who take the SNAP training will become more personally involved, thereby increasing participation rates of various kinds of nonviolent actions, such as letter writing, organizing and participating in protests, attending rallies, petitioning, etc. Therefore, we expect that the SNAP training will:

H7-a: Increase the frequency with which those who participated in the SNAP training participate in movement actions. *(Individual level-behavior)*

H7-b: Increase the tactical diversity used by those who participated in the SNAP training. *(Individual level-behavior)*

Political Success:

Ultimately, SNAP intends to improve civic capacity and make activists and peacebuilders more effective in their work for peace, justice, and democracy. If our hypotheses are correct about how nonviolent action works, we should observe an increase in the movement's power and in the likelihood of reaching its goals. However, these outcomes are even more steps removed from the workshop and are highly contingent on how the state responds. In other words, these do not directly depend on the actions that activists and peacebuilders take. We nonetheless expect that the SNAP training will:

H8-a: Increase the probability that the organization or movement engage in negotiations with the opponent.*(Geographic level-behavior)*

H8-b: Increase the probability that the organization or movement gains concessions from the opponent.*(Geographic level-behavior)*

3 Experimental Design and Process

The design of the study varies by country, but, as described in the introduction, maintains some common elements across countries. The core commonality across countries is the model of conducting an initial SNAP workshop with local facilitators (Training of Trainers), who then conduct their own replication SNAP workshops following the randomization procedures for each country-specific study design. There is also an overall data-gathering effort that is common across all countries and field experiments.

We develop our country-specific study designs through a co-design process with the local SNAP facilitators who will be conducting the replication workshops. We consider this co-design process a critical strength of our project, on both ethical and pragmatic grounds. It is ethically crucial that our research is of interest and aligns with the values of our in-country partners who are, at many points, essentially research assistants and enumerators of the project. We have also given them the power to veto research designs that do not work for them, as well as to

change, add and eliminate survey questions. After extensive conversations with the in-country facilitators, we propose a research design that fits the contextual dynamics, constraints and priorities that they conveyed. We have also adapted the design after starting implementation to address facilitator concerns.

Another ethical imperative that affects our program and research is the control group. We did not want to leave anyone who agreed to participate in the study as a control subject to miss the training. Therefore, the control group receives the training at a different time than the treatment group. We also make sure that each participant in the SNAP training understands that receiving the SNAP training does not depend on involvement in the research. There is absolutely no penalty for not consenting to being a research subject.

Pragmatically, the co-design process ensures that the facilitators who will be carrying out our study are full partners in our research, give us invaluable contextual knowledge about how to best implement the program, and are invested in ensuring its successful outcome. Figure 1 below illustrates the process that the research and programmatic elements of the team go through together to implement the project in each country. The following section describes the co-designed randomization procedures in Sudan.

On the data collection effort, we use 5 sources of data for each country study. The first is the **(1) survey**, which we field at three different points for the control and treatment groups. The baseline survey for the treatment and control groups, the post-workshop survey for the treatment and (some time later) for the control group, and a follow-up survey for the treatment group that we field 8-12 months after the training to test for long term effects. The second source of data we use is **(2) social media**. In the survey we ask participants to write the name of their activist or peacebuilding organization, movement or group, and to add their Facebook page and Twitter handle if available. We then scrape data from these two platforms if they are publicly accessible. We do not gather data from individuals' social media pages or from accounts that have any privacy screening or setting (e.g., requiring permission or membership to view).

Third, we gather **(3) daily reported event data** on protests and other public actions by activists and peacebuilders in each locality where we are conducting the study and program. The sources and approach to build these datasets varies,

but the idea is to have systematic evidence from networks of citizen journalists (Sudan) on the daily public actions that the peace, justice and pro-democracy movements are organizing in each locality. Fourth, we ask our facilitators to provide us with documentation about each workshop, including high-level **(4) notes and reflections** on the activities that they did and how participants responded. We also gather their workshop plan for the entire SNAP training, pictures and videos from the workshop, and exit interviews with participants. Finally, the fifth source of data are **(5) semi-structured interviews** with workshop participants, which will be conducted by the research team within 12-20 months after workshop completion.

Figure 1: Program and Research Design Process for Each Country



3.1 Sudan

In Sudan, we randomize at the level of the district (منطقة), with a simple division into treatment and control districts matched on observable characteristics pre-

randomization in order to improve precision, as in matched pair designs (Gerber and Green, 2012). Building on our experience from the prior experiments in [removed country names] we also sought to prioritize locations where our SNAP facilitators had existing personal networks to draw upon in order to maximize workshop potential. Workshops in Sudan are all in-person with extensive Covid-19 precautions. It would not be possible to do online workshops in Sudan given poor connectivity and the lack of access to digital devices.

3.1.1 Steps of Field Experiment

The experiment in Sudan follows these steps:

1. **Co-design process**: Prior to conducting the initial SNAP training and ToT, we held a series of consultations with Sudanese USIP partners on the priority states in Sudan for SNAP workshops, since the size of the country and our limited budget precluded holding workshops nationwide, as in [removed country name]. We and our partners selected priority states based on current conflict dynamics, past relationships with USIP and local partners, and feasibility of conducting workshops. This process resulted in selecting 13 out of Sudan's 18 states: West Darfur, South Darfur, Central Darfur, East Darfur, West Kordofan, North Kordofan, South Kordofan, White Nile, Blue Nile, Kassala, Sennar, Gedaref, and Red Sea. These 13 states have a total of 142 districts. Initial power analysis suggested that to achieve 80% power would require 96 workshops with 20-25 participants. Hence, out of the 142 possible districts across 13 states we sought to identify 96 districts to include in the study. See Appendix D for the power analysis R code.

2. **Pre-randomization matching on observables**: For all districts across these 13 states, we collected data on four measures to use in our matching procedure: population, economic development, levels of violence, and levels of public protest (as a proxy for the underlying strength of local-level civil society). Our data on population came from the Sudan Central Bureau of Statistics, and is their 2020 population projection.[6] Since we were not able to find local-level GDP data for

[6]Sudan's last national census was in 2009.

Sudan, as a proxy for economic development, we used night-time illumination data from the Earth Observation Group's Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite Day-Night Band. Night-time illumination is a well-known proxy that significantly correlates with local-level economic activity (Weidmann and Schutte, 2017). Our data on violence and public protest both came from the Armed Conflict Location Event Data project (ACLED) (Raleigh et al., 2010).

3. **Pre-randomization coding of observables**: During the initial SNAP training and ToT we introduced the proposed design of randomizing at the district level based on matching on observables to the cohort of workshop participants being trained and received their input and feedback. Participants expressed their support for the design.

4. **Selection of localities based on facilitator networks**: After the initial SNAP training and ToT, we distributed a short survey in Arabic to the SNAP facilitators, as well as a number of people who had applied to participate in the initial SNAP workshop but had been excluded due to space limitations. In the survey, we asked the facilitators to indicate the states out of our 13 priority states where they have some knowledge of the local-level feasibility of conducting a SNAP workshop. For each state selected, the survey respondent was then shown a map of the districts in that state, and asked which districts they were able to answer questions about. For each district they selected, they were asked five questions:

1. How dangerous would it be to hold a SNAP workshop in this district?
2. How difficult would it be to hold a SNAP workshop in this district?
3. Do you have any personal connections or professional networks in this district?
4. Should we hold a SNAP workshop in this district?
5. Should this district be combined with other districts?[7]

[7]Informed by our experience in [removed country name], where facilitators asked for some localities to be combined with others

We collected the responses to this survey and excluded any districts where facilitators indicated that we should definitely not hold a workshop, where they indicated that holding a workshop would be extremely dangerous, or where no facilitators had any personal networks.

5. **Matching and randomization**: After excluding these districts, we then perform randomly split the data using the following procedure:[8]

1. Scale all matching variables to the same range using R's built-in "scale" function.

2. Generate a uniformly distributed random variable using the built-in "runif" function.

3. Select the treatment group based on the lowest values of this random number.

4. Select the control group by matching the treatment group with an equally-sized group of districts based on the scaled matching variables using the "MatchIt" package (Ho et al., 2011). We use nearest neighbor matching and extract the mean difference across matching variables between treatment and control.

5. Replicate the matching procedure 10,000 times, each time storing the treatment and control division and the mean difference in matching variables for each treatment-control split.

6. Select the treatment-control split that minimizes the mean difference between treatment and control

6a. **Replication workshop planning and USIP approval**: We share the treatment-control split with the SNAP facilitators. For all districts in the treatment group, facilitators begin outreach and planning for conducting SNAP workshops with 20-25 local activists or civic leaders in those districts. The facilitators submit proposals for each workshop to our USIP Sudan program leaders for approval.

[8] R code to perform this series of functions is available in Appendix D.

6b. **Surveying the control group**: For districts in the control group SNAP facilitators begin conducting outreach to local activists and civic leaders to hold a meeting where they will introduce participants to the SNAP project, the research and evaluation, and the consent form to enter the study. Our facilitators then ask participants to take the baseline survey.

7. **Consent, and pre- and post-surveys**: SNAP facilitators conduct SNAP replication workshops in the treatment districts in the 2-3 months after the initial SNAP kickoff workshop. As of February 2021, our facilitators have conducted a total of 12 workshops in Sudan. Participants in the replication workshops take the SNAP survey before and after participating in the workshop. Given the lack of access to the internet and that few people have their own smartphones or devices to take the survey directly in Qualtrics, we are using paper surveys. Each facilitator prints one copy of the baseline and post-workshop surveys in extra large print to post in front of the room for people to read or for the facilitator to read. Each participant receives a paper answer key and everyone in the room, provided that they agree to the consent form, takes the survey at the same time. The lead facilitator then collects the answer sheets.

Given the low level of education of some of our participants, we are also providing our facilitators with instructions on how to best describe some of the more complicated questions in the survey. That way we are standardizing how our facilitators describe the questions very simply so that people who might not speak Arabic well (because they speak their local dialect) would understand. Finally, in terms of saving and recording the data in a secure manner, our data entry person in Sudan takes a picture of each answer key and saves it in a memory stick. They then input the data of each participant into Qualtrics, and destroys the piece of paper. Our Sudan lead in Khartoum will then receive the memory stick, and the research team will have access to both the pictures of the original answer sheets and the data imported into Qualtrics.

8. **Gathering other data**: We will also be gathering social media data, daily event data, and notes and reflections from our facilitators. We do not foresee social media being a very prominent source of data because outside of major urban

centers people have little access to the internet and smartphones. That said, in the survey we are asking people to write the Facebook page and Twitter handle of the organizations or movements of which they are part. In terms of daily event data, we chose to recruit local rapporteurs after our Sudanese partners indicated that local-level newspaper data would be unlikely to give the necessary level of detail on local activities as in [removed country names]. Therefore, in both treatment and control districts, SNAP facilitators and Sudanese USIP staff and partners began outreach to local activists to identify a district-level rapporteur monitoring nonviolent action and peacebuilding activities in the district during the period of study. Rapporteurs across treatment and control districts will provide monthly updates to USIP staff on the dynamics of nonviolent action and peacebuilding in their districts using a survey that we put together for this purpose.

9. **Follow-up survey**: 8-9 months after the initial SNAP workshop, SNAP facilitators organize workshops in the control group districts with the participants who participated in the original outreach meeting. Participants in these control group SNAP workshops take the SNAP survey prior to going through the SNAP workshop and they take the post-workshop survey after finishing the training.

10. **Semi-structured interviews**: We ask facilitators to put us in touch with research subjects for in-depth, semi-structured interviews. We will recruit people for interviews making sure that we have diversity on the following dimensions: region, urbanization rate, level of repression, and history of protest activity. Our quantitative analysis results from the survey will also inform whom we choose for interviews. Our facilitators will also help us identify individuals whom they think gained a lot from the course and those who did not seem to gain from the course. Appendix D contains the interview protocol we will be using in Sudan. The research team will conduct the interviews with the help of our Sudanese program leads to make sure that we can conduct the interviews in Arabic.

4 Measurement Instruments

The following tables summarize and link each hypothesis with the outcome variable of interest, and the way we operationalize it and measure it in our surveys, social media data, event data, facilitator documents, and whether or not we will examine each hypothesis in qualitative interviews. Appendix E contains the main baseline survey that we are using in [removed country name] and it includes notes of any major change we made to adapt it to the other countries.

For hypotheses that we test with multiple survey questions or indicators from the social media data, we will transform the response function for the questions regarding each hypothesis by adding normalized scores from each of the questions together. That way, we will have a single global test of the hypothesis. Otherwise, it would be difficult to interpret having a mixture of significant and insignificant results for each measure. We will also report individual analyses separately, to illustrate what might be driving effects, without having to do an adjustment.

Table 1: Operationalization via Surveys

Hypothesis	**Outcome Variable**	**Level and type**	**Operationalization (Survey)**
H1-a	Support for the use of violence	Individual-attitude	Q5, Q8, Q10, Q12, Q21, Q33/Q34
H1-b	Views on effectiveness of violence	Individual-attitude	Q5, Q8, Q10, Q17, Q21
H1-c	Does violence beget more viol?	Individual-attitude	Q21
H1-d	Relative effectiveness armed vs. nonviol action	Individual-attitude	Q8, Q9, Q10, Q17, Q20, Q21
H1-e	Willingness to engage in violence	Individual-behavior	Q12, Q33/Q34
H1-f	Condoning use of violence	Group-behavior	N/A
H1-g	Use of violence in protests and public events	Group-behavior	N/A
H2-a	Belief that ordinary people can effect change	Individual-attitude	Q3, Q41-44
H2-b	Attempt to unify factions	Group-behavior	Q77, Q79, Q80, Q81, Q83, Q91
H2-c	Successful unification of factions	Geographic-behavior	Q77, Q79, Q80, Q81, Q83, Q91
H3-a	Individual strategic planning and conflict analysis	Individual-behavior	Q46, Q47, Q48, Q49, Q55, Q56, Q74, Q75
H3-b	Group strategic planning and conflict analysis	Group-behavior	Q55, Q56, Q74, Q75
H3-c	Preparing and practicing public actions (individual)	Individual-behavior	Q74, Q75
H3-d	Preparing and practicing public actions (group)	Group-behavior	Q74, Q75
H3-e	Beliefs about good execution	Individual-belief	Q60-Q75
H3-f	Good execution	Group-behavior	Q60-Q75
H3-g	Tactical diversity	Group-behavior, geog-behavior	Q60, Q62, Q64, Q66, Q68, Q70, Q72, Q74
H3-h	Diversification of alliances	Group-behavior, geog-behavior	Q77, Q79, Q80, Q81, Q83, Q91
H4-a	Self efficacy	Individual-attitude	Q36-39
H4-b	Group efficacy	Individual-attitude	Q41-Q44
H4-c	Fear	Individual-attitude	Q124, Q125
H5-a	State repression and nonviolent discipline	Geographic-behavior	N/A
H5-b	State repression and relationship to goals	Geographic-behavior	N/A
H6-a	Size of orgs	Group-behavior	Q117
H6-b	Size of public actions	Group-behavior	N/A
H7-a	Frequency of personal participation	Individual-behavior	Q60-Q75
H7-b	Engagement in diverse tactics	Individual-behavior	Q60-Q75
H8-a	Negotiations with opponent	Geographic-behavior	Q70, Q71, Q91, Q92,
H8-b	Gains concessions from opponent	Geographic-behavior	N/A

Table 2: Operationalization via Social Media

Hypothesis	Outcome Variable	Operationalization (Social media)
H1-a	Support for the use of violence	N/A
H1-b	Views on effectiveness of violence	N/A
H1-c	Does violence beget more viol?	N/A
H1-d	Relative effectiveness armed vs. nonviol action	N/A
H1-e	Willingness to engage in violence	N/A
H1-f	Condoning use of violence	Text analysis, human coding of videos and posts supporting, promoting or condoning violence
H1-g	Use of violence in protests and public events	Text analysis and human coding of videos and posts showing tactics used
H2-a	Belief that ordinary people can effect change	N/A
H2-b	Attempt to unify factions	RTs and FB posts promoting the work of other orgs/groups within mov.
H2-c	Successful unification of factions	RTs and FB posts about working with other factions within mov
H3-a	Individual strategic planning and conflict analysis	N/A
H3-b	Group strategic planning and conflict analysis	N/A
H3-c	Preparing and practicing public actions (individual)	N/A
H3-d	Preparing and practicing public actions (group)	N/A
H3-e	Beliefs about good execution	N/A
H3-f	Good execution	N/A
H3-g	Tactical diversity	Text analysis and human coding of videos and pictures of actions
H3-h	Diversification of alliances	Networks of groups: followers and followees. RTs and Facebook posts about working with different actors.
H4-a	Self efficacy	N/A
H4-b	Group efficacy	N/A
H4-c	Fear	N/A
H5-a	State repression and nonviolent discipline	Posts about repression at an event and level of nonviol discipline at the event
H5-b	State repression and relationship to goals	Posts about represion at an event and demands advocated/demands of groups involved
H6-a	Size of orgs	FB page likes, Twitter followers, likes and RTs of posts, human coding of videos and pictures of events
H6-b	Size of public actions	RSVPs to public events, human coding of videos and pictures of events
H7-a	Frequency of personal participation	N/A
H7-b	Engagement in diverse tactics	N/A
H8-a	Negotiations with opponent	Human coding of posts relating to negotiations with opponents
H8-b	Gains concessions from opponent	Human coding of posts relating to wins

Table 3: Operationalization via Daily Event Data, Facilitator Documents, and Interviews

Hypothesis	**Outcome Variable**	**Operationalization (Daily event data)**	**Operationalization (Facilitator docs)**	**Test using interviews?**
H1-a	Support for the use of violence	N/A	Testimonials, videos	YES
H1-b	Views on effectiveness of violence	N/A	Testimonials, videos	YES
H1-c	Does violence beget more viol?	N/A	Testimonials, videos	YES
H1-d	Relative effectiveness armed vs. nonviol action	N/A	Testimonials, videos	YES
H1-e	Willingness to engage in violence	N/A	Testimonials, videos	YES
H1-f	Condoning use of violence	N/A	N/A	YES
H1-g	Use of violence in protests and public events	Reports of protester violence	N/A	YES
H2-a	Belief that ordinary people can effect change	N/A	Testimonials, videos	YES
H2-b	Attempt to unify factions	Mentions of coalitions/orgs working together in an event	N/A	YES
H2-c	Successful unification of factions	Mentions of coalitions/orgs working together in an event	N/A	YES
H3-a	Individual strategic planning and conflict analysis	N/A	Testimonials, videos	YES
H3-b	Group strategic planning and conflict analysis	N/A	N/A	YES
H3-c	Preparing and practicing public actions (individual)	N/A	Testimonials, videos	YES
H3-d	Preparing and practicing public actions (group)	N/A	N/A	YES
H3-e	Beliefs about good execution	N/A	Testimonials, videos	NO
H3-f	Good execution	N/A	N/A	YES
H3-g	Tactical diversity	Mentions of tactics used in actions	N/A	YES
H3-h	Diversification of alliances	Mentions of coalitions/orgs working together in an event	N/A	YES
H4-a	Self efficacy	N/A	Testimonials, videos	NO
H4-b	Group efficacy	N/A	Testimonials, videos	NO
H4-c	Fear	N/A	Testimonials, videos	YES

Cont.: Operationalization via Daily Event Data, Facilitator Documents, and Interviews?

Hypothesis	**Outcome Variable**	**Operationalization (Daily event data)**	**Operationalization (Facilitator docs)**	**Test using interviews**
H5-a	State repression and nonviolent discipline	Reported repression at events and tactics used at events	N/A	YES
H5-b	State repression and relationship to goals	Reported repression at events and demands advocated at event/demands of groups involved in event	N/A	YES
H6-a	Size of orgs	Reported numbers at events	N/A	YES
H6-b	Size of public actions	Reported numbers at events	N/A	YES
H7-a	Frequency of personal participation	N/A	Testimonials, videos	YES
H7-b	Engagement in diverse tactics	N/A	Testimonials, videos	YES
H8-a	Negotiations with opponent	Reported negotiations with opponents	Testimonials, videos	YES
H8-b	Gains concessions from opponent	Reports of concessions made	N/A	YES

5 Analysis

5.1 Sudan

We randomized the SNAP training at the district level in Sudan and used pre-treatment covariates, as specified in Section 3.4, to find matched pairs to each district. Then, we randomly assigned half to receive the treatment and the other half to the control group.[9] We will calculate the average treatment effect using a simple OLS model as follows:

$$Y_i = \mu + \theta X_i + e_i \tag{1}$$

where Y_i is the outcome for district i; μ is the intercept, X_i is an indicator of the treatment mode for district i (1=intervention, 0=control), θ is the average treatment effect, and e_i is the error term. We will not be including a q-dimensional vector of pre-treatment covariates in this model because we have already used them for efficiency in the pre-randomization stage.

For the panel data (social media and newspaper analysis), we will use the following model:

$$Y_{ij} = \mu + \theta X_{ij} + \gamma_q \mathbf{Z}_i^q + e_{ij} \tag{2}$$

where Y_{ij} is the outcome of the means of all groups/organizations/movements in district i in time period j, μ is the intercept, X_{ij} is an indicator of the treatment mode in district i at time j (1=intervention, 0=control), $\mathbf{Z}_i^q$ is a q-dimensional vector of pre-treatment covariates measured at the district (i) level, $Z_1, Z_2, ..., Z_q$, specified below, and e_{ij} is the error term. We will cluster standard errors at the district level.

Controls: For the social media analysis (equation (2)), we will use the following pre-treatment covariates: mean type of organizations in each district (group classification from survey, Q119), mean issue that organizations in each district works on (issue classification from survey, Q118), mean age of social media pages

[9] As with all our designs, we will be training the control group in Sudan as well, but approximately 12 months after the last training in the treatment group.

or accounts in each district (from Facebook/Twitter page).

For the citizen journalist event data analysis (equation (2)), we will use the following pre-treatment covariates: number of protests by district during the Sudanese uprising, which took place from December 19, 2018 to September 12, 2019 (source: ACLED), and regime repression during the same period (source: ACLED).

We will conduct and present the analysis with and without the covariates, and covariates will be standardized to have a mean of zero.

5.2 General Issues: Spillovers

We are not very concerned about spillover effects biasing our results, particularly in the cases where we are randomizing the SNAP training at the geographic level ([removed country names] and Sudan). The reason is that the SNAP training is not easily transferable. It is a 5-day training that requires a considerable amount of resources to pass on. Second, given the difficulty of passing on the training, we have expectations about how the training might spread. In fact, our macro-level behavioral measures indicate that we hope that the SNAP training goes beyond the individuals that our facilitators trained. We expect any spillovers to occur within the localities where the community leaders are active, and for the information to be passed on to organizations where they have some leadership role. Therefore, the fact that we randomized at the municipality or state level means that this sort of spillovers would not bias our estimates.

But even in the case of [removed country name], which is at the individual level and spillovers beyond those trained can more easily bias our estimates, we have information to model the spillovers. In particular, we have included in the survey three key questions that we can use to control in the analysis: a continuous variable asking how many trainings the person has received on nonviolent action and/or peacebuilding, and a binary variable asking whether or not a person has received the SNAP training before. We also ask every participant to list the names of the organizations that they work with, volunteer for, and interact with related to their social movement. For each of those organizations or groups, we ask the research subject to indicate the relationship that they have with the organization.

If they play any leadership role in the organization, it is far more likely that the SNAP training could spillover into that organization than in a group of which they are simply a member. These four variables from the survey will allow us to model the spillover effects in [removed country name]. We include these questions in the surveys of all the countries, though we think spillover bias is mainly a concern in the [removed country name] design.

5.3 General Issues: Multiple Hypothesis Testing

To correct for multiple hypotheses testing, we will use the Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) False Discovery Rate correction, defining families of hypotheses in the following way:
Family 1: individual-level views about violence and nonviolent action;
Family 2: individual-level behavioral change;
Family 3: group characteristics (e.g., alliances, size, diversity);
Family 4: internal practices at the group level (e.g., use of strategic planning);
Family 5: external practices at the group level (e.g., tactics).
This simple sequential Bonferroni-type procedure is slightly less punitive than a Bonferroni correction since it focuses exclusively on correcting for the false discovery rate. We will show results with the corrected and uncorrected p-values.[10]

5.4 General Issues: Subgroup Analysis

We will conduct subgroup analysis by number of years of experience in activism and/or peacebuilding, as well as by number of classes that they have participated on the subject. Our expectation is that people who have more experience in this field, and who have received more training, will probably not gain as much from the SNAP workshop.

[10]We draw heavily from Raffler and Platas EGAP August 21, 2015 Pre-Analysis Plan in this section.

5.5 General Issues: Attrition

Attrition is a concern in this study when it comes to the 8-12 month follow-up survey. Our survey takes 45-60 minutes to complete, so we expect it to be difficult to avoid attrition. Given the already complicated ethical concerns in this study, we have wanted to avoid providing monetary incentives for completing the surveys. We think that inserting financial resources in social movements can have deleterious consequences. We will do our best by insisting and following up several times with research subjects, and hope that the in-network recruitment that we are implementing in [removed country names] and Sudan, will help reduce attrition. Finally, we assess the randomness of attrition, or missingness in the post-workshop data, by comparing those who complete the post-workshop survey with those who do not on baseline characteristics.

If attrition ends up being differential across groups, we can do inverse probability weighting analysis, where we estimate a propensity of attrition conditional on observed covariates, and generalize over the respondents who stay in our study.

Fortunately, attrition will not be a concern in the other sources of data, such as social media and newspaper/daily event data.

5.6 General Issues: Data Collected and Data Analyzed

As mentioned in the introduction, we are registering the pre-analysis plan for this series of studies after we have started workshops in some localities and analyzed some of the data. Ideally, we would have registered it before conducting any analysis. However, getting the field experiments off the ground has taken an enormous effort, especially in repressive contexts like [removed country names], and in a country like [removed country name], where the main researchers in the project do not know the language. We would have preferred not to analyze any of the dependent variables prior to PaP registration; however, it was not possible to avoid giving USIP partners, who are financing this project, quarterly reports with preliminary analyses. This section thus details exactly how many workshops have been conducted in each country, and importantly, which data have already been analyzed.

In Sudan, we have so far conducted a total of 25 workshops and we have not

looked at any of the data.

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Appendices

Appendix A

Power Analysis for Sudan Design

Interview Protocol for Activists and Peacebuilders in Sudan

1. Tell us about the history of your activism/peacebuilder work that you have done in Sudan. What kinds of issues do you work on and how?

   Follow up questions: What tactics have you used? How do you plan activities and actions? What do you do after an action? How has the government responded to your actions? How did you manage the state's response? What have you learned in the past year? What has changed in terms of how you (and your organization) do/does your activism work? Why do you think things have changed?

2. Did you participate in the Sudanese Revolution of 2018-2019? How and what was your experience like?

3. Tell us about your activism/peacebuilder work in 2020 during the pandemic and in 2019, before the pandemic. Same follow-up questions as question 1.

4. Tell us about your activism/peacebuilder work in 2021. Same follow-up questions as question 1.

5. Can you tell us about your experience in the SNAP training? How was it, what did you learn, and have you used anything that you learned?

6. Can you describe your organization's most important challenges and obstacles to achieving your goals? Speak about challenges and obstacles internal to the movement or organization, and then those that are external to the movement or organization (i.e., aspects that you have no direct control over, such as state repression)

7. What has your organization done to meet those challenges and obstacles? How has your organization managed these challenges and obstacles in the past (or other challenges and obstacles)?

8. What are your organization's plans for the future? How do you envision the next year? The next 2-5 years? What about the next 10 years?