ONLINE APPENDIX

Table of Contents

1. List of Presidential Attempts

Table 4. Attempts at Constitutional Change

Country (Regime)*	Name	Year	Means	Reform Pursued
Successful				
Argentina (A)	Juan Domingo Perón	1949	Amendment	Indefinite reelection
Argentina (D)	Carlos Menem	1994	Amendment	Immediate reelection
Bolivia (SD)	Gualberto Villarroel	1945	New	Term extension until 1950
Bolivia (SD)	Víctor Paz Estenssoro	1961	New	Immediate reelection
Bolivia (D)	Evo Morales	2009	New	New election and immed. reelection
Brazil (A)	Getúlio Vargas	1934	New	Term extension until 1938
Brazil (A)	Getúlio Vargas	1937	New	Term extension until 1943 and indef. reelection
Brazil (D)	Fernando H. Cardoso	1997	Amendment	Immediate reelection
Chile (A)	Augusto Pinochet	1980	New	Term extension until 1988
Colombia (D)	Álvaro Uribe	2004	Amendment	Immediate reelection
Cuba (A)	Fidel Castro	1976	New	Longer term and indef. reelection
D. Republic (SD)	Joaquín Balaguer	1966	New	Indefinite reelection
D. Republic (D)	Hipólito Mejía	2002	New	Immediate reelection
Ecuador (SD)	Rafael Correa	2008	New	New elec. and immed. reelection
Guatemala (A)	Carlos Castillo Armas	1956	New	Term extension for four years
Honduras (SD)	Tiburcio Carías Andino	1936	New	Term extension until 1943
Honduras (SD)	Tiburcio Carías Andino	1939	Amendment	Term extension until 1949
Honduras (SD)	Oswaldo López Arellano	1965	New	Term extension until 1971
Nicaragua (A)	Anastasio Somoza García	1939	New	Term extension until 1947
Nicaragua (A)	Anastasio Somoza García	1955	Amendment	Immediate reelection
Nicaragua (A)	Anastasio Somoza Debayle	1971	New	Reelection in 1974
Nicaragua (D)	Daniel Ortega	2011	Jud. Review	Immediate reelection
Paraguay (A)	Alfredo Stroessner	1967	New	Immediate reelection
Paraguay (A)	Alfredo Stroessner	1977	Amendment	Indefinite reelection
Peru (SD)	Alberto Fujimori	1993	New	Immediate reelection
Peru (SD)	Alberto Fujimori	1996	Amendment	Second immed. reelection
Venezuela (SD)	Marcos Pérez Jiménez	1953	New	Indefinite reelection
Venezuela (D)	Hugo Chávez	1999	New	Immediate reelection
Venezuela (SD)	Hugo Chávez	2009	Amendment	Indefinite reelection
Unsuccessful				
Argentina (D)	Carlos Menem	1998	Amendment	Second immed. reelection
Colombia (D)	Álvaro Uribe	2010	Amendment	Second immed. reelection
Costa Rica (D)	Miguel Ángel Rodríguez	2001	Amendment	Immediate reelection
El Salvador (A)	Salvador Castañeda Castro	1948	Amendment	Term extension until 1951
Guatemala (SD)	Jorge Serrano Elías**	1993	New	Immediate reelection
Honduras (D)	Manuel Zelaya	2009	New	Immediate reelection
Panama (D)	Ernesto Pérez Balladares	1998	Amendment	Immediate reelection
Paraguay (D)	Nicanor Duarte Frutos	2006	Amendment	Immediate reelection
Paraguay (D)	Fernando Lugo	2011	Amendment	Immediate reelection
Uruguay (SD)	Jorge Pacheco Areco	1971	Amendment	Immediate reelection
Venezuela (SD)	Hugo Chávez	2007	Amendment	Indefinite reelection

SOURCES: the classification of Regime Type is taken from Polity IV (2014). The other entries are author's compilation based on presidential biographies. * Authoritarian, A; Semi-democracy, SD; Democracy, D.
** Serrano Elías did a self-coup and announced the convocation of a constituent assembly. Although he never formally proposed a new constitution, it was widely believed that he wanted to extend his time in office.

2. Presidents Interviewed

Table 5. Interviews

President	Country	Term	Date	Length
Óscar Arias	Costa Rica	1986-1990 2006-2010	8/09/11	34'
Ernesto Pérez Balladares	Panama	1994-1999	8/16/11	30'
Rafael Callejas	Honduras	1990-1994	7/28/11	48'
Manuel Zelaya	Honduras	2006-2009	7/29/11	38'
Miguel A. Rodríguez	Costa Rica	1998-2002	8/12/11	66'
Nicolás Barletta	Panama	1984-1985	8/17/11	65'
Francisco Rodríguez	Panama	1989	8/16/11	45'
Antonio Saca	El Salvador	2004-2009	7/26/11	56'
Roberto Micheletti	Honduras	2009-2010	8/03/11	55'
Rafael Calderón	Costa Rica	1990-1994	8/11/11	55'
Vinicio Cerezo	Guatemala	1986-1991	7/20/11	54'
Armando Calderón Sol	El Salvador	1994-1999	7/25/11	82'
Efraín Ríos Montt	Guatemala	1982-1983	7/19/11	79'
Luis Alberto Monge	Costa Rica	1982-1986	8/09/11	88'
Arnoldo Alemán	Nicaragua	1997-2002	8/06/11	70'
Enrique Bolaños	Nicaragua	2002-2007	8/05/11	80'
Abdalá Bucaram	Ecuador	1996-1997	8/16/11	78'
Abel Pacheco	Costa Rica	2002-2006	8/10/11	57'
Patricio Aylwin	Chile	1990-1994	11/09/11	84'
Ricardo Lagos	Chile	2000-2006	01/18/11	55'
Eduardo Frei	Chile	1994-2000	5/03/12	64'

SOURCE: Presidential Database of the Americas.

3. First-Stage Selection Model

Model 2.7 presented the second stage of the Heckman (1976) estimation procedure conducted to address a potential sample selection bias that could have arisen since it was not possible to find experts to assess 150 presidents. Below is the first stage of the Heckman, which estimated the expected value of the error term (the inverse Mills ratio) that was included as a variable in 2.7.

In the first stage, I run a probit regression model where the dependent variable *Rated* is a dummy that takes the value of one when an American or Latin American president was evaluated in the expert survey and zero otherwise. The independent variables capture factors associated with the likelihood that a head of government will be assessed. Presidents are more likely to be evaluated if they attract more scholarly attention. I measure this idea using four variables. Countries that are geographically bigger or have larger economies call more international attention and tend to host larger populations. Hence, there should be more experts on heads of government from these countries. Presidents who govern for a longer period tend to be more well-known and leave a more enduring legacy, characteristics that are also likely to attract more attention. A final indirect measure of scholarly attention is the number of citations a leader receives in Google Scholar.[1]

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[1] I sought the names of the presidents using at least three identifiers (e.g., the first name and two last names) and chose the combination that presented the largest number of citations. In some cases, depending on how a chief executive is commonly known, I used acronyms instead of full names.

Table 6 shows the results of the probit, including the model estimated with marginal effects and the proportional reduction on error.[2] The probit has a high degree of fit (prob>chi2=0.00), explains 73% of the cases correctly, and reduces the prediction error from merely relying on the modal category by 43%. *Country Size* and *Total Time in Office* are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Once marginal effects are computed, we observe that the likelihood that a president will be rated increases 17% when a country is one million square kilometers bigger and by 33% when a leader governs for one more year, holding all other variables to their mean.

Table 6. Probability that a President will be Assessed

	Probit	Marginal Effects
Country Size (millions of km^2)	0.055*** (0.015)	0.017*** (0.006)
GDP (hundreds of US$ billions)	0.009 (0.013)	0.003 (0.004)
Total Time in Office (years as president)	0.111*** (0.033)	0.033*** (0.012)
Google Mentions (in tens of thousands)	0.072 (0.081)	0.022 (0.023)
Prob > chi2	0.000	
Pseudo R2	0.23	
Observations	315	
Correctly classified	72.70	
PRE	42.67	

Note: Entries in parentheses are standard errors.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

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[2] Sources: *Country Size* is taken from the CIA World Factbook (2013); *GDP* from the Maddison Project (2013) updated with data from World Bank (2014); *Total Time in Office* from the presidents' biographies and *Google Mentions* from http://scholar.google.com/ (retrieved on March 25, 2017).

4. Interaction of Independent Variables and Regime

Figure 4. Predicted Probabilities of Presidential Attempts

5. Table 7. Additional Robustness Checks on Presidential Attempts

	(7.1) Extraversion	(7.2) Combined Inexperience	(7.3) Neither puppets nor interims	(7.4) Early Exit	(7.5) Populist	(7.6) Expected Years Left	(7.7) Inexperience *P. Age	(7.8) Opposition Parties	(7.9) Legislative Constraints	(7.10) Judicial Constraints	(7.11) Raw Materials
Dominance		1.29***	1.19***	1.30***	1.03**	1.20***	1.23***	1.14***	1.18***	1.08***	1.21***
		(0.40)	(0.37)	(0.40)	(0.42)	(0.37)	(0.38)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.34)	(0.37)
Inexperience	0.42**	0.24**	0.43**	0.49**	0.40**	0.44**	0.77*	0.48**	0.36**	0.40**	0.44**
	(0.18)	(0.11)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.44)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.19)
New Variable	0.74**				0.38	0.03	-0.12	0.08*	-0.69	-3.72***	-0.06
	(0.29)				(0.49)	(0.18)	(0.14)	(0.05)	(1.31)	(0.99)	(0.47)
Congress	1.14	1.57	1.54	2.03	1.50	1.50	1.61	1.29		1.60	1.47
	(1.01)	(1.18)	(1.18)	(1.29)	(1.17)	(1.19)	(1.22)	(1.20)		(1.05)	(1.20)
N. of Parties	-0.02	0.05	0.07	0.16	0.02	0.04	0.06		0.05	0.07	0.05
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Party Age (log)	-0.39***	-0.50***	-0.49***	-0.54***	-0.44***	-0.49***	-0.22	-0.45***	-0.50***	-0.45***	-0.49***
	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.34)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Leg. Powers	1.07**	0.96*	0.96*	0.97*	0.93*	0.96*	0.93*	0.81*	1.05**	0.76	0.93*
	(0.49)	(0.52)	(0.51)	(0.54)	(0.50)	(0.51)	(0.51)	(0.48)	(0.51)	(0.47)	(0.54)
Non-Leg. Powers	0.49	1.00	1.08	1.16	0.88	1.09	1.04	1.15	1.07	1.09	1.11
	(0.78)	(0.88)	(0.90)	(1.02)	(0.93)	(0.90)	(0.88)	(0.93)	(0.92)	(0.73)	(0.91)
No Reelection	0.84**	1.13***	1.01**	0.96**	1.00**	1.03**	1.00**	0.71	1.04**	0.97**	1.01**
	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.42)	(0.44)	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.46)	(0.43)	(0.39)	(0.44)
Amendment	0.04	0.11	0.15	0.22	0.10	0.14	0.14	0.22	0.16	0.25**	0.14
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Regime	0.17***	0.18***	0.17***	0.18***	0.16***	0.17***	0.16***	0.17***	0.15***	0.15***	0.17***
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Higher Courts	-0.97***	-0.92***	-0.91***	-0.97***	-0.79***	-0.90***	-0.89***	-0.96***	-0.79***		-0.90***
	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.23)		(0.22)
GDP Per C.	-3.42	-1.51	-1.38	-2.99	-1.81	-1.59	-1.67	-2.50	-1.18	-1.71	-1.52
	(3.64)	(4.00)	(4.01)	(4.49)	(4.00)	(4.02)	(4.05)	(4.12)	(4.01)	(4.06)	(4.03)
Time in Office	1.16***	1.19***	1.20***	1.36***	1.19***	1.22**	1.25***	1.25***	1.17***	1.24***	1.19***
	(0.43)	(0.46)	(0.46)	(0.50)	(0.46)	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.46)	(0.44)	(0.44)	(0.46)
Time in Office2	-0.28**	-0.28**	-0.28**	-0.32***	-0.28**	-0.28**	-0.29**	-0.28**	-0.27**	-0.28***	-0.28**
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Time in Office3	0.02**	0.02**	0.02**	0.02**	0.02**	0.02**	0.02**	0.02**	0.01**	0.01**	0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-7.43***	-10.41***	-9.94***	-11.23***	-9.07***	-9.99***	-10.92***	-10.01***	-8.40***	-7.88***	-9.86***
	(1.79)	(2.52)	(2.32)	(2.77)	(2.49)	(2.41)	(2.76)	(2.21)	(2.02)	(2.08)	(2.37)
Prob > chi2	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01
Observations	543	540	529	475	544	544	544	544	544	544	544
Presidents	110	109	108	91	111	111	111	111	111	111	111

Note: Entries in parentheses are standard errors. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

In Table 7, I conduct additional robustness checks on the theory. To test whether there is construct-related validity evidence for *Dominance*, I ran Model 7.1. In the reigning psychological paradigm, there are five core personality traits. These are known as the "Big Five": neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, conscientiousness, and agreeableness (McCrae, 2009; McCrae and Costa, 1997). Dominance is a facet or a component of extraversion, which is a higher order trait. In this model, I use *Extraversion* instead of *Dominance*. The expectation is that *Extraversion* should retain statistical significance, but the effect size should decrease because the other facets of the personality trait are not expected to be causally related to the presidential attempts. Among these facets are activity, gregariousness, positive emotion, warmth, excitement-seeking, and assertiveness (Herringer, 1998). The variable is taken from the expert survey, which measured the Big Five using the Big Five Inventory (BFI), a scale composed of 44 short phrases (John, Donahue, and Kentle, 1991). Revealingly, *Extraversion* becomes statistically significant, but the effect size decreases by more than a third.

Model 7.2 replaces *Inexperience* with *Combined Inexperience*. This is an index that adds *Inexperience* (which ranges 1-4) and *Years in Politics* (collapsed into four categories, each representing approximately a quarter of the sample: 0-2 years, 3-9 years, 10-19 years, 20-58 years). Therefore, *Combined Inexperience* ranges between two and eight. The purpose is to examine whether an index that combines the formal positions presidents had before taking office and the time they held them shows results different from the benchmark model (2.2). It does not: politically inexperienced leaders are more likely to challenge term limits.

Model 7.3 excludes heads of government who may not have had enough support to reform the constitution because they were either interim (i.e., they served to complete someone else's term) or "puppet" presidents (i.e., they governed under the orders of someone else). This data is

taken from Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013). The results do not meaningfully vary compared to model 2.2.

Model 7.4 addresses the possibility that some heads of government could have challenged their term limits but did not do it because they exited early from office (e.g., because of a coup, an impeachment, early death, etc.). I deleted all the observations for the leaders who did not challenge their term limits and exited early from office. Although the sample loses 20 presidents and 13% of the observations, the results do not meaningfully change.

Models 3.6-3.8 in the text examined whether the age, education, and political ideology of the presidents are associated with the presidential attempts. The purpose was to explore whether other individual-level confounders could simultaneously explain the independent variables and the challenges to term limits. Model 7.5 controls for another characteristic of presidents: whether they are populists or not. *Populism* is included because populists tend to be elected under certain conditions, such as high polarization and weak party systems. Therefore, populists could be both dominant and inexperienced and challenge their term limits. The list of populists for South American and Mexican presidents was taken from Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch (2020). This list was complemented with the Central American presidents identified in the Global Populism Database (2019). This database covers only since 2000. Therefore, it was complemented with a review of scholarly literature for each of the remaining 98 Central American presidents. Revealingly, *Populist* is unrelated to the attempts, and *Dominance* and *Inexperience* retain their effect size, remarking the independence of the three concepts.

Presidents who have little time left in office may inhibit themselves from trying to reform the constitution, given that changes to the charter usually entail a long bargaining process. Model

7.6 adds *Expected Years Left* to control for the time the chiefs of state expect to be in office according to their constitutional term. The variable is unrelated to the presidential attempts.

Model 7.7 interacts *Inexperience* and *Party Age* to explore whether politically inexperienced leaders are conditioned by the level of institutionalization of the ruling party. They are not, highlighting the independent effect of both variables on the presidential attempts.

In 7.8, *Opposition Parties* retests the argument about executive-legislative relations by including the effective number of opposition parties (taken from Pérez-Liñán, Schmidt, and Vairo 2019). The variable becomes statistically significant and positively related to the attempts. Following Lucardi and Almaraz (2017), this may occur because presidents can play "divide-and-conquer" with a fragmented opposition by offering selective payoffs. In 7.9, the inclusion of *Legislative Constraints* (taken from Coppedge et al. 2017) or the extent to which Congress and governmental agencies can investigate and exercise oversight over the executive is not statistically significant. Considering the results from tables 2 and 3 and models 7.8 and 7.9, the support for the argument centered on executive-legislative relations remains mixed.

Tables 2 and 3 showed that the independence of higher courts inhibits overreaching presidents. Model 7.10 includes *Judicial Constraints* on the executive (taken from Coppedge et al., 2017). It corroborates the assertion that strong judiciaries constrain presidents. Model 7.11 includes *Raw Materials* to retest the argument that leaders are more motivated to stay in office as the value of holding the position grows. This variable captures the country's dependence on oil and mineral exports (taken from Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013). As in Tables 2 and 3, the argument is not supported.

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6. Web-based Biographical Sources of Presidents

Table 8. General Sources

https://www.cidob.org/	http://www.ikuska.com
https://www.biografiasyvidas.com/	http://www.nationmaster.com/
http://www.rulers.org/	http://www.worldstatesmen.org
http://www.worldstatesmen.org/	https://elpais.com/
http://www.famousamericans.net/	http://www.elmundo.es/
http://www.nytimes.com	https://www.efe.com/
http://www.washingtonpost.com	https://www.latinamericanpost.com/
http://news.bbc.co.uk	https://www.alainet.org/
https://www.latinnews.com/	http://www.cnn.com

Table 9. Country-Specific Sources

Argentina		
https://www.clarin.com/	https://www.periodismo.com/	https://www.lanacion.com.ar/
https://www.pagina12.com.ar/	http://www.telam.com.ar/	
Bolivia		
http://www1.abi.bo/abi/	http://www.la-razon.com/	http://www.lostiempos.com/
https://www.bolivia.com/	http://www.eldeber.com.bo/	
Brazil		
http://www.agenciaoglobo.com.br/	http://www.jb.com.br/	http://www.folha.uol.com.br/
http://www.bbc.com/portuguese		
Chile		
http://www.emol.com/	http://www.latercera.com/	http://www.elmostrador.cl/
Colombia		
http://www.elpais.com.co/	https://www.elespectador.com/	http://www.eltiempo.com/
Costa Rica		
https://www.nacion.com/	http://www.laprensalibre.cr/	https://www.larepublica.net/
Cuba		
https://www.cubanet.org/	http://www.granma.cu/	http://www.acn.cu/
http://www.juventudrebelde.cu/		
Dominican Republic		
http://elnacional.com.do/	https://elnuevodiario.com.do/	https://www.diariolibre.com/
Ecuador		

http://www.elcomercio.com/	http://www.laprensa.com.ec/	https://www.eluniverso.com/
	http://www.ultimasnoticias.com/	

El Salvador		
https://www.laprensagrafica.com/	http://elmundo.sv/	https://elfaro.net/

Guatemala		
http://www.prensalibre.com/	http://lahora.gt/	https://cerigua.org/
http://s21.gt/		

Honduras		
http://www.elheraldo.hn/	http://www.latribuna.hn/	https://tiempo.hn/

Mexico		
www.eluniversal.com.mx	www.reforma.com	http://www.excelsior.com.mx/
https://heraldodemexico.com.mx/		

Nicaragua		
https://www.laprensa.com.ni/	https://www.lajornadanet.com/	https://www.elnuevodiario.com.ni/
http://www.bolsadenoticias.com.ni/		

Panama		
http://laestrella.com.pa/	https://www.prensa.com/	http://www.thepanamanews.com/
http://elsiglo.com.pa/		

Paraguay		
http://www.abc.com.py	http://www.cronica.com.py/	http://www.ultimahora.com/

Peru		
https://elcomercio.pe/	https://peru21.pe/	https://larepublica.pe/
http://andina.pe/agencia/		

Uruguay		
http://republica.com.uy/	https://www.elpais.com.uy/	www.elobservador.com.uy/
http://www.espectador.com/		

Venezuela		
http://www.ultimasnoticias.com	https://venezuelanalysis.com/	http://www.eluniversal.com/
http://www.el-nacional.com/		

7. Printed Biographical Sources of Presidents

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