B Dataverse Appendix

Classifying law enforcement candidates and candidates' professional backgrounds

I classify council candidates as law enforcement candidates if their ballot names have one of the following terms (including gender and spelling variations, and abbreviations): `soldado`, `cabo`, `sargento`, `tenente`, `major`, `coronel`, `general`, `comandante`, `delegado`, `capitão`, `policial`, `civil`, `investigador`, `inspetor`, `sub-tenente`, `pm`, `xerife`. Some police officers, mainly *delegados*, are commonly given a title of "*doutor*." For this reason, I classify as law enforcement candidates those candidates who put `doutor` in their ballot name, and at the same time declare their occupation as a police officer.

Candidates' occupation information comes from their self-reported answers to the electoral authority's questionnaire prior to every election. I classify a candidate's professional background as a police officer if the occupation she listed is `polícia civil`, `polícia militar`, or `delegado de polícia`. Armed forces candidates are `militar em geral`, `militar reformado`, `oficiais das forças armadas e forças auxiliares`, `membro das forças armadas`.

When analyzing candidates' occupations it is possible to identify some candidates who were in fact law-and-order candidates, but who either due to typographical errors (`sargente` instead of `sargento` was a recurring one) or due to very short abbreviations (for example `sd` to designate `soldado`) had not been detected using `regex`. These were added manually and made up 6% of all hits.

The social media analysis further validates the use of ballot names to classify law-and-order candidates. In total, 64% of candidates who used ballot names had aliases with law-and-order signaling – even in accounts created before they became politicians. Law enforcement professionals without law-and-order ballot names used law-and-order monikers only 4.7% of the time.

B.1 Graphical representation of discontinuity: Balance tests and different polynomials



Figure B.1: Balance tests – municipal-level covariates (and difference in homicides)



Figure B.2: Balance tests – individual level covariates



(a) Local linear

(b) Second degree polynomial



(c) Third degree polynomial



(d) Fourth degree polynomial

Figure B.3: Discontinuity Plots for Homicide Rates

Graphical representation of the discontinuity and alternative specifications

The figures below show alternate discontinuity plots using different polynomials. They all indicate that the linear models that are presented in the main text are the most conservative. Results are considerably larger in higher-degree polynomials.

B.2 Social media variables

I sampled candidates by the following steps:

1. Select list of 2020 **elected** law-and-order candidates and list of **elected** candidates with a law enforcement occupation (self-reported)
2. (for analysis of police connections) For each list, order candidates alphabetically and extract candidates who listed *Polícia Militar* as their occupation.
3. Bind a vector of random numbers to each group of candidates.
4. Re-order lists in increasing order of random numbers.
5. Make two lists containing the top 80 candidates in each group.
6. For each entry, search for Instagram account. If found, proceed to code variables.
7. Failing to find Instagram account, search for Facebook account. If found, proceed to code variables.
8. If social media is not found, search for social media information in Municipal Council website. If found, proceed to code variables.
9. If social media is not found, report that candidate did not have a social media account

Coding the variables:

1. `Ballot name`: Does the candidate's social media address include a law-and-order name?
2. `Post with police`: Is there a picture of the candidate with patrolling police officers? A picture with a police chief is also a picture with a police officer.
3. `Post with police chief`: Is there a picture of the candidate with a police chief (captain, lieutenant, colonel)? Pictures honoring police chiefs without the candidate together do not count. Old pictures (before the term begins) do not count.
4. `credit claiming`: Is there an attempt at credit claiming for public security in any post? Credit-claiming instances are candidates' initiatives towards public security or any initiative that the candidate claims to be an effort to improve public security. These can be resources for police; cameras in public places; efforts to secure funding for public security with the mayor, and subnational or national politicians.

All coding was performed in February 2022. The examples used in the main text are retrievable at these addresses:

- CCTV systems: https://archive.ph/WOZBK
- Increased the ranks of local police: https://archive.ph/anAKL
- Protested for better wages and conditions for police officers: https://archive.ph/jsOME
- Participated in local security councils: https://archive.ph/wyrAA

B.2.1 Social media examples

B.2.2 Examples: credit claiming

Figure B.4: Sargento Novandir, Goiânia - GO. Receiving commendation at central command for "efforts in public security" `https://archive.ph/snx4R`

Figure B.5: Sargento Marisol, São Lourenço – MG, claiming credit for surveillance cameras `https://archive.ph/URTU2`

B.2.3 Examples: Relationships with active police officers



Figure B.6: Cabo Rubem, Limoeiro do Norte – CE, meeting with police officers. https://archive.ph/anAKL



Figure B.7: Soldado Barbosa, Coronel Vivida – PR, picture with militarized police officers https://archive.ph/URTU2

B.2.4 Examples: relationships with police chiefs

Figure B.8: Sargento Faustino, Andradina – SP, meeting at central command of regional battalion. `https://archive.ph/1GsxB`

Figure B.9: Sub. Tenente Cunha, Natividade – RJ, meeting with police chief `https://archive.ph/Vqutr`

Table B.1: Effect of electing a police law-and-order candidate on strong-arm car robbery

	All municipalities	MSE-optimal	2nd Polynomial	No Previous L&O
Robust Coef.	−96.459	−96.429	−91.272	−24.216
	[64.920]	[76.757]	[88.840]	[86.880]
	(0.137)	(0.209)	(0.304)	(0.780)
Bandwidth	0.4 %	0.43 %	0.45 %	0.28 %
N.obs	39	31	68	32

Note:
Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection, unless noted) with year fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses.

B.3 Effect on crime

The Ministry of Justice provides municipal crime data through the National System of Public Security Statistics and Criminal Justice (SINESPJC).[45] The ministry aggregates all crime data from different state police authorities. The dataset contains crime statistics for four large groups of crimes: car thefts, car robberies, sexual assaults, and robbery homicides. Data for all municipalities is available starting in 2012, and for this reason, the dependent variable for crime is not the difference but levels. In addition, the available data make estimations for subgroups of law-and-order candidates low-powered.

Estimates for crime are not precise, but crime rates appear to decrease after the election of police law-and-order candidates. Since crime data is not available for all years, much less for all municipalities, estimations do not have the same statistical power as other tests.

[45] `http://dados.gov.br/dataset/sistema-nacional-de-estatisticas-de-seguranca-publica`, accessed on 06-10-2018.

Table B.2: Effect of electing a police law-and-order candidate on theft

	All municipalities	MSE-optimal	2nd Polynomial	No Previous L&O
Robust Coef.	−62.731	−75.838	−64.850	29.550
	[109.032]	[115.444]	[131.535]	[150.459]
	(0.565)	(0.511)	(0.622)	(0.844)
Bandwidth	0.29 %	0.4 %	0.35 %	0.28 %
N.obs	29	27	61	27

Note:
Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection, unless noted) with year fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses.

Table B.3: Effect of electing a police law-and-order candidate on sexual assault

	All municipalities	MSE-optimal	2nd Polynomial	No previous L&O
Robust Coef.	10.183	11.083	17.902	17.869
	[14.111]	[13.923]	[18.741]	[21.198]
	(0.471)	(0.426)	(0.339)	(0.399)
Bandwidth	0.3 %	0.31 %	0.44 %	0.34 %
N.obs	37	19	34	33

Note:
Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection, unless noted) with year fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses.

Table B.4: Effect of electing a police law-and-order candidate on robbery homicides

	All municipalities	MSE-optimal	2nd Polynomial	No Previous L&O
Robust Coef.	−33.783	−34.105	−49.811	−61.718
	[32.229]	[32.233]	[44.331]	[56.034]
	(0.295)	(0.290)	(0.261)	(0.271)
Bandwidth	0.43 %	0.43 %	0.46 %	0.4 %
N.obs	26	31	47	19

Note:
Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection, unless noted) with year fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses.

B.4 Full regression results

Table B.5: Support for Law Enforcement Candidates (LEC), Police Activity, and Homicides - TABLE 2 MAIN TEXT

	Variation, 2012-2016					
	Police Activity			Homicides		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Low support	-0.36^{***}	-0.39^{***}	-0.26^{**}	0.18^{***}	0.44^{***}	3.81^{***}
	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.81)
poor	6.74^{***}	5.05^{***}	1.13^{*}	-0.75^{***}	-2.38^{***}	-21.26^{***}
	(2.19)	(1.84)	(0.67)	(0.16)	(0.54)	(1.61)
rich	-1.06^{***}	-1.63^{***}	-1.70^{***}	0.19^{***}	0.43^{**}	-2.15
	(0.19)	(0.45)	(0.14)	(0.07)	(0.19)	(1.59)
prop_nonwhite	6.33^{***}	4.95^{***}	3.83^{***}	1.17^{***}	4.04^{***}	41.71^{***}
	(1.11)	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.09)	(0.21)	(3.77)
prop_local_total_young_men	0.47	0.82	0.32	-0.49^{***}	-1.80^{***}	-8.51^{***}
	(1.24)	(0.54)	(0.29)	(0.07)	(0.15)	(0.81)
total_votes_local	0.0000^{***}	0.0000^{***}	0.0000^{***}	0.0000^{***}	0.0000^{***}	0.0001^{***}
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Constant	-1.56^{***}	-2.45^{***}	-1.11^{***}	-0.18^{***}	-0.55^{***}	-7.94^{***}
	(0.07)	(0.37)	(0.13)	(0.04)	(0.14)	(1.35)
Radius	0.25 km	0.5 km	1.0 km	0.25 km	0.5 km	1.0 km
P.St. controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Munic. FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N. obs	2027	2137	2247	2275	2275	2275
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Models in Table B.6 regress lack of support –binary variable indicating that a polling station did not support a law and order candidate in a municipality where a law and order run for office– and polling station demographics. All models include municipality fixed-effects.

Table B.6: Correlates of (lack of) support for law-and-order candidates in São Paulo state (see Figure 7 in main text).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rich voters	−0.067			
	(0.005)			
Poor voters		0.138		
		(0.010)		
Nonwhite voters			0.124	
			(0.008)	
Young, male voters				0.170
				(0.008)
Num.Obs.	2624	2624	2625	2620

Table B.7: Effect of the election of law-and-order candidates on PAST Homicides - Table A5 in Appendix A

	Benchmark
Robust Coef.	12.735
	[10.463]
	(0.224)
Bandwidth	0.37 %
N.obs	196

Note:
Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection) with year fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses.

Table B.8: Effect of the election of law-and-order candidates on Spending

	Sanitation spending	Education spending
Robust Coef.	−144.792	110.699
	[173.210]	[174.860]
	(0.403)	(0.527)
Bandwidth	0.43 %	0.44 %
N.obs	360	246

Note:
Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection) with year fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses.

Table B.9: Effect of the election of law-and-order candidates on Homicides, Alternate Specifications

	Higher inequality	Lower inequality	Larger munic.	Smaller munic.
Robust Coef.	21.010	3.920	15.419	7.726
	[6.924]	[4.921]	[6.297]	[5.966]
	(0.002)	(0.426)	(0.014)	(0.195)
Bandwidth	0.3 %	0.36 %	0.29 %	0.34 %
N.obs	122	158	137	152

Note:
Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection) with year fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses.

Table B.10: Effect of the election of law-and-order candidates on Homicides of Women (Figure A8)

	Nonwhite women	White women
Robust Coef.	0.554	0.332
	[0.545]	[0.395]
	(0.310)	(0.400)
Bandwidth	0.36 %	0.34 %
N.obs	394	320

Note:
Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection) with year fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses.

Table B.11: Effect of the election of law-and-order candidates on Homicides

	Firearm	Other means
Robust Coef.	10.841	1.987
	[3.641]	[1.576]
	(0.003)	(0.207)
Bandwidth	0.26 %	0.54 %
N.obs	256	372

Note:
Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection) with year fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses.

Table B.12: Effect of the election of law-and-order candidates on Homicides

	undetermined reason	Reporting of police killings
Robust Coef.	2.265	0.024
	[2.072]	[0.079]
	(0.274)	(0.762)
Bandwidth	0.3 %	0.56 %
N.obs	319	475

Note:
Nonparametric estimations (MSE-two selection) with year fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, p-values in parentheses.