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Appendix B:

Code Book for "Hitler's Legionnaires"

I. Summary and Citation.

This codebook describes the operationalization of the variables presented in theory discussed in "Hitler's Legionnaires," and details the variables discussed in the dataset as referenced in the article.

In using this data, please cite:

> Elizabeth M.F. Grasmeder, "Hitler's Legionnaires: Why Modern States Recruit Foreign Soldiers," *International Security* Vol. X, No. Y (Summer 2021), pp. ZZ-ZZ.

II. Operationalizing the Theory's Variables

This section explains how the argument operationalizes and measures the dependent and independent variables presented in the article. It describes key concepts and the types of evidence sought in conducting case research, and distinguishes among the values each variable can take on.

Dependent Variable.

I code new legionnaire recruitment as having occurred in one of two cases: when states initiate policies to enlist foreigners where none previously existed, or when they revise and expand the parameters of an existing policy in order to recruit previously-excluded demographics. Whereas the former manifests as an entirely new policy endeavor, the latter manifests as expanding the types of foreigners targeted for recruitment.

Domestic Constraints.

Internal regime threats, external regime threats within the state, salient sectarian cleavages, or fears about labor tradeoffs can constrain a government's appetite to recruit from the citizenry. I code a government that at any time faces two or more of these issues as *highly* constrained in domestic recruiting. Those that evidence just one factor at a time, but no more, receiving a coding of *moderately* constrained, and those that self-identify as facing none of these four issues receive a coding of *low* constraint. A single government can therefore, over time, face progressively more or less constrained contexts in which to recruit domestically as these factors emerge or fade.

For internal regime threats, I look for indications that a country has recently experienced a coup, attempted coup, or currently uses coup-proofing strategies. Since a leader could fear an internal threat even without such a history, I also look for evidence that a leader actively monitors a rival who has a history of military service or familial connections to senior

commanders, and maintains patronage networks among the broader population, such as via a political party or youth-group.

I measure a threat external to the regime (but internal to the state) first through the presence of recent insurgency or large-scale protest movement within the country. Additionally, I look for government assessments articulating fears that segments of the citizenry—such as former rebels or a political opposition movement—are seeking to use military service to gain skills that they could later turn against the regime, such as in preparation for a future insurrection.

I operationalize politically-salient sectarian cleavages through the existence of a praetorian guard, history of using blocking detachments or robust counter-intelligence monitoring within the military, and employment of quotas in the military—for accessions, recruitment, service and branch selections, or privileged access to weapons, pay, or training.

Finally, I affirm the presence of perceived labor tradeoffs through the existence of production shortages in consumer goods and non-consumer goods, the use of measures to boost output without adding workers (e.g., imposing mandatory overtime or linking pay to production), and the import of foreign workers. Additionally, in reviewing internal government assessments, I look for language indicating officials view recruitment and production in interlinked terms.

External Territorial Threats.

I categorize states as perceiving a *low* territorial threat externally either when they are not engaged in inter-state hostilities and do not anticipate such a near-term occurrence, or when they are engaged in conventional inter-state hostilities but assess that they are winning. In operationalizing and measuring a low-level threat in the former case, I look for internal government references to "détente" with former enemies; confidence in a Great Power's protection; and the diversion of resources out of the defense sector to non-military public goods.

For governments actively engaged in a successful military campaign, I use the following measures to code a state as perceiving a low external threat: private statements anticipating near-term or imminent victory; consistent references to battlefield successes; affirmations that casualty rates are at "acceptable" levels, "minimal," or "better than expected"; and preparations for post-combat operations.

I measure a *high* external threat through recurrent leadership references to consistent territorial losses; statements and assessments that casualty rates are "above acceptable levels," "unsustainable" or that personnel reserves are "exhausted"; pressure on officers to shift tactics or otherwise engineer a "turnabout"; fears about troops' morale or war weariness; and considerations of ceding territory.

I measure a state as perceiving an *existential* threat when it evidences the criteria just identified for high threats, in addition to stated government fears of near-term invasion, annexation of critical contiguous territory, or conquest of a state's capital; and private, as well as public, references to anticipated "invasion," "colonization," or a fight for "life or death" or "survival." Because politicians' statements can be intended to influence popular opinion, as well as inform it, I require private as well as public references to these terms.

III. Dataset and Variables

Policies File

This section defines and describes the variables documented in the case list dataset as described in the article, including attributes of recorded legionnaire policy as referenced in the text.

- ***obs:*** number enumerating all observations included in file.
- ***country:*** name of the country that recruited legionnaires. All entries reflect states listed in the Correlates of War (COW) state membership dataset.
- ***fl****:* a binary variable capturing whether a country recruited legionnaires, either by establishing an entirely new policy or by expanding the parameters of an existing policy. All entries in this file contain an entry value of "1."
- ***start:*** the year the policy authorizing or expanding legionnaire recruitment occurred.
- ***last:*** the year the legionnaire recruitment effort ended. The dataset records the year in which the policy authorizing or expanding legionnaire recruitment expired or was reversed. This year is also recorded if legionnaire recruitment continued to be authorized but if no legionnaire recruitment after this date could be verified.
- ***fldesc:*** brief description of the legionnaire effort, often the name of a specific unit, name of legislation authorizing the recruitment, or description of the foreigners recruited.
- ***skill****:* whether the policy was intended to acquire a specific skill (e.g. languages or area knowledge), technical expertise (e.g. as with pilots or submariners), or special operations experience. The value 1 indicates yes, 0 indicates no.
- ***stateabbr:*** the three letter COW country code abbreviation for the recruiting state.
- ***ccode:*** the COW numerical country code for the recruiting state.
- ***aempire****:* whether a state was an active empire at the time it recruited legionnaires. Applied to states with overseas colonial empires (e.g. Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States), and to contiguous empires (e.g. Austria-Hungary, China, the Ottoman Empire, and Russia).
- ***fempire****:* whether the recruiting state had ever been an empire, as described by *aempire*, even if not at the time it recruited legionnaires.
- ***ahostilities:*** whether the recruiting state was involved in active conflict at the time the legionnaire recruitment effort started, such as during an inter-state war, intra-state war, campaign of imperial conquest, etc.

Country-Year File

This section defines the variables as included in the country-year version of the dataset, containing observations from 1815 through 2020. All variables contained in this list match the definition and inclusion criteria used elsewhere in this document.

- ***obs:*** number enumerating all observations included in file.
- ***stateabbr:*** the three letter COW country code abbreviation for the recruiting state.
- ***ccode:*** the COW numerical country code for the recruiting state.
- ***fl****:* whether for that year a country recruited legionnaires, either by establishing an entirely new policy or by expanding the parameters of an existing policy. The value 1 indicates yes, 0 indicates no.
- ***flc:*** for each country year, how many active legionnaire policies the state had active at a time. Values of 0 indicate that no legionnaire recruitment occurred during that country-year, whereas values of 1 or more enumerate the number of active policies in force.