Populism for the Ambivalent: Anti-Polarization and Support for Ukraine's *Sluha Narodu* Party

Appendix

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1 Using Discourse Analysis from Hawkins (2009) to Assess whether Sluha Narodu is Populist

To supplement the definition of populism applied in the main article, this section of the appendix employs a modified discourse analysis developed by Hawkins (2009) of two speeches given by Volodymyr Zelensky in the time between his election as president on April 21, 2019 and the elections for the Rada on July 21, 2019.

The two speeches are Zelensky's inauguration speech on May 20, 2019[1] and his speech regarding the attempted television link between Russian and Ukrainian stations on July 8, 2019.[2] While the latter is brief (just under 4 minutes), both provide broad visions that Zelensky and Sluha Narodu offered voters ahead of the elections regarding both Ukrainian politics and other Ukrainian politicians that would be sufficient for determining their compatibility with Hawkins' (2009) populist discourse scale in the two months designated for the campaign for the Rada elections. The scale consists of six categories that each have a "populist" and "pluralist" dimension. It is reproduced on Table 1.

To assess Zelensky's speeches, Hawkins (2009) suggests a holistic grading approach reproduced on Table 2. This approach grades whole speeches as to whether they are populist or not on a three-category two-point scale. While the approach is valuable, we modify the rubric to examine individual elements of populism in a speech, rather than grading the whole speech holistically.

[1]The speech can be found here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=apyYfycEw6I

[2]"Звернення Президента України Володимира Зеленського (Message from President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky) on Zelensky's Youtube channel (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cf1L9H3vLng).

Table 1: Hawkins' (2009) Populist Speech Rubric

Populist	**Pluralist**
It conveys a Manichean vision of the world, that is, one that is moral (every issue has a strong moral dimension) and dualistic (everything is in one category or the other, "right" or "wrong," "good" or "evil"). The implication—or even the stated idea—is that there can be nothing in between, no fence sitting, no shades of gray. This leads to the use of highly charged, even bellicose language.	The discourse does not frame issues in moral terms or paint them in black and white. Instead, there is a strong tendency to focus on narrow, particular issues. The discourse will emphasize or at least not eliminate the possibility of natural, justifiable differences of opinion.
The moral significance of the items mentioned in the speech is heightened by ascribing cosmic proportions to them, that is, by claiming that they affect people everywhere (possibly but not necessarily across the world) and across time. Especially in this last regard, frequent references may be made to a reified notion of "history." At the same time, the speaker will justify the moral significance of his or her ideas by tying them to national and religious leaders that are generally revered.	The discourse will probably not refer to any reified notion of history or use any cosmic proportions. References to the spatial and temporal consequences of issues will be limited to the material reality rather than any mystical connections.
Although Manichaean, the discourse is still democratic, in the sense that the good is embodied in the will of the majority, which is seen as a unified whole, perhaps but not necessarily expressed in references to the "voluntad del pueblo;" however, the speaker ascribes a kind of unchanging essentialism to that will, rather than letting it be whatever 50% of the people want at any particular moment. Thus, this good majority is romanticized, with some notion of the common man (urban or rural) seen as the embodiment of the national ideal.	Democracy is simply the calculation of votes. This should be respected and is seen as the foundation of legitimate government, but it is not meant to be an exercise in arriving at a preexisting, knowable "will." The majority shifts and changes across issues. The common man is not romanticized, and the notion of citizenship is broad and legalistic.
The evil is embodied in a minority whose specific identity will vary according to context. Domestically, in Latin America it is often an economic elite, perhaps the "oligarchy," but it may also be a racial elite; internationally, it may be the United States; or the capitalist, industrialized nations; or international financiers; or simply an ideology such as neoliberalism and capitalism	The discourse avoids a conspiratorial tone and does not single out any evil ruling minority. It avoids labeling opponents as evil and may not even mention them in an effort to maintain a positive tone and keep passions low.
Crucially, the evil minority is or was recently in charge and subverted the system to its own interests, against those of the good majority or the people. Thus, systemic change is/was required, often expressed in terms such as "revolution" or "liberation" of the people from their "immiseration" or bondage, even if technically it comes about through elections.	The discourse does not argue for systemic change but, as mentioned above, focuses on particular issues. In the words of Laclau, it is a politics of "differences" rather than "hegemony"
Because of the moral baseness of the threatening minority, nondemocratic means may be openly justified or at least the minority's continued enjoyment of these will be seen as a generous concession by the people; the speech itself may exaggerate or abuse data to make this point, and the language will show a bellicosity toward the opposition that is incendiary and condescending, lacking the decorum that one shows a worthy opponent.	Formal rights and liberties are openly respected, and the opposition is treated with courtesy and as a legitimate political actor. The discourse will not encourage or justify illegal, violent actions. There will be great respect for institutions and the rule of law. If data is abused, it is either an innocent mistake or an embarrassing breach of democratic standards.

This process allows us to demonstrate which elements led us to determine the score for each speech (and the leader as a whole) and to be maximally transparent at how we arrived at our score.

Table 2: Hawkins' (2009) Populist Speech Rubric Scale

	2	**1**	**0**
Original	A speech in this category is extremely populist and comes very close to the ideal populist discourse. Specifically, the speech expresses all or nearly all of the elements of ideal populist discourse and has few elements that would be considered nonpopulist.	A speech in this category includes strong, clearly populist elements but either does not use them consistently or tempers them by including nonpopulist elements. Thus, the discourse may have a romanticized notion of the people and the idea of a unified popular will but avoid bellicose language or references to cosmic proportions or any particular enemy.	A speech in this category uses few if any populist elements.
Modified	Element of populist fully expresses populist element in question.	Element is either present in the speech, but tempered by non-populist elements or mentions of the element avoid bellicose language or references to any particular enemy.	Populist element not present.

We present our discourse analysis of the inauguration speech on Table 3 and the response to the Russia-Ukraine television link on Table 4. The scores are 1.5 and 1.4, averaging to 1.45. These reflect highly populist rhetoric according to Hawkins (2009), with other populist leaders around the world such as Evo Morales of Bolivia, Juan Peron of Argentina and Aleksandr Lukashenko of Belarus receiving similar scores according to the rubric. We are especially struck by the harshness of the rhetoric in the speech on Table 4 where Zelensky excoriates both pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian politicians for living lavish illicitly-gained lifestyles at the expense of the Ukrainian people, effectively accusing both sides of the traditional Ukrainian political pole of being unpatriotic. On the other hand, Zelensky takes time to valorize the "ordinary" Ukrainian in his inauguration speech, attributing his victory to all Ukrainians and asking them to take responsibility for his presidency as a form of collective governance. Overall, our discourse analysis broadly validates

the conclusions drawn in the article regarding the populist nature of Zelensky and Sluha Narodu's campaign leading up to the July 21, 2019 Rada elections.

Table 3: Hawkins' (2009) Scale Applied to Zelensky's Inauguration Speech

	(2)	**(1)**	**(0)**
Manichean view	"Over the past years, the government did nothing so that [the residents of Crimea and occupied Donbass] felt Ukrainian. They are not foreigners, they are Ukrainians. (Rada deputy Oleh Lyashko of the Radical Party shouts something) Thank you for continuing to divide people, Mr. Lyashko!"		
Moral significance		"I would very much like that you don't have my picture in your offices, because the president is not an idol. Instead, hang pictures of your children and look them in the eyes before each decision."	
Romanticizing "common man"	"After winning the election, my six-year-old son said 'Dad, Zelensky is president – that means I'm also president.' It sounded like a joke, but then I understood that it was truth as each one of us is the president. Not 73 percent who voted for me, but all Ukrainians. It is not mine, it is our common victory, our common chance for which we carry a common responsibility. And it was not just I that just took the oath, but all of us placed their hand of on the constitution and swore their oath to Ukraine"		
Outside evil	"My election demonstrates that the people are tired of experienced, systemic, inflated politicians that in 28 years have created a country of opportunities for embezzlement and kickbacks."		
Need for systemic change		"We will build a country... where everyone is equal before the law, where there are honest and transparent rules for everyone. For this kind of governance, we need those that will serve the people."	
Anti-opposition bellicosity		"I honestly don't understand our current government that can only throw up their hands and say, 'we can't do anything.' This is not true, you can. You can take a piece of paper, a pen and resign your seats so that you are replaced by those that will think about the next generation and not the next election."	
Total: 9/6 = **1.5**	2*3	1*3	0

Table 4: Hawkins' (2009) Scale Applied to Zelensky's Russia-Ukraine Television Bridge Speech

	(2)	**(1)**	**(0)**
Manichean view	"Think, the so-called pro-Europeans and pro-Russians all merrily live next to one another as neighbors in rich suburb outside of Kyiv. And despite their shouting matches on political talk shows they calmly meet behind three-meter high fences and raise glasses filled with expensive whisky; that costs as much as you make in three months. I wonder, to what are they drinking: to Russia or to Europe? Definitely not to Ukraine."		
Moral significance		"I want to turn to Ukrainian journalists, especially the journalists of the responsible channels. Those who own the channels are not you. You are not the collection of Medvedchuk. You are not servants of Rabinovich. You are the fourth estate; also servants of the people."	
Romanticizing "common man"		"I urge you to stay vigilant and not to react to provocations "	
Outside evil	"I speak to all Ukrainians: we do not want to be divided. Once again, you are being manipulated by politicians that only want to get into parliament. There is only one reason for this: (in Russian) ones will steal and (back to Ukrainian) and the others will steal."		
Need for systemic change			Element not present. Only policy change was call for talks with Russian President Putin.
Anti-opposition bellicosity	"Think, the so-called pro-Europeans and pro-Russians all merrily live next to one another as neighbors in rich suburb outside of Kyiv. And despite their shouting matches on political talk shows they calmly meet behind three-meter high fences and raise glasses filled with expensive whisky; that costs as much as you make in three months. I wonder, to what are they drinking: to Russia or to Europe? Definitely not to Ukraine."		
Total: 8/6 = **1.4**	3*2	2*1	1*0

2 Differentiating our Findings from Chaisty and Whitefield (2020)

In this appendix section, we differentiate our study from a prominent existing study of the 2019 Ukrainian parliamentary elections by Chaisty and Whitefield (2020). While the study ultimately reaches a different conclusion about why Zelensky and Sluha Narodu were successful, we see this is an issue of interpretation and that the data from Chaisty and Whitefield's (2020) survey support the assertions we make in our article. We also point to several limitations in the Chaisty and Whitefield (2020) in terms of defining populism, measurement of support of Sluha Narodu and general inference that limit the degree to which conclusions can be drawn from their analysis. We present these limitations, followed by an effort to reproduce our findings using Chaisty and Whitefield's (2020) survey data in the sections that follow.

2.1 Treatment of Populism in Chaisty and Whitefield (2020)

Before touching on the measurement and conclusions of their study, it is important to note that we are not able to engage with Chaisty and Whitefield (2020) on their claims regarding Zelensky and Sluha Narodu's populism. Those claims are confined to a single footnote: "The overt anti-establishment nature of Zelensky's appeal is suggestive of a more broadly populist appeal. We do not discount this, though evidence from a recent expert survey (Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2019) that included all Ukrainian parties suggests that SN was among the least populist parties in the country. While populism may be a thin ideology, we regard it as a complex appeal and leave discussion of its meaning in the Ukrainian context for another paper." In the footnote, Chaisty and Whitefield (2020) acknowledge that Zelensky and Sluha Narodu may very well be populists, but also refer to an expert survey which suggests they are not. In looking at the cited expert survey

study (Whitefield and Rohrschneider, 2019), we could not discern what definition of populism was utilized or what standard was set for scholars to determine whether a party was populist or not based on the article. We reiterate that applying five characteristics from four different populism indices to the behavior of Zelensky and Sluha Narodu and examining Zelensky's discourse preceding the 2019 parliamentary elections showed Zelensky and Sluha Narodu to have presented a highly populist platform based on populist rhetoric to the Ukrainian electorate ahead of their elections. As we return to in detail later in this section, Chaisty and Whitefield (2020) appear to acknowledge the strength that populist appeals served in the victory of Sluha Narodu by pointing to their "anti-establishment appeal" as key to victory (p. 2, 8, 9).

2.2 Measurement Issues in Chaisty and Whitefield (2020)

As noted in footnote 20 of the main article, the percentage of respondents who say they voted for Sluha Narodu in Chaisty and Whitefield's (2020) study is far greater than the actual percentage of respondents that voted for the Sluha Narodu party list. In Table 1 of their article, 64.5 percent of respondents report voting for Sluha Narodu. As some smaller parties are removed from this representation, approximately 60 percent of all respondents who indicated voting for some party said they voted for Sluha Narodu. This stands in contrast to the results from our survey (44.38%) and the party's actual vote share in the party list from the election (43.16%).

There are several potential reasons for this deviation. First, Chaisty and Whitefield's (2020) question, "Which party did you vote for in the elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on 21 July 2019?" differs from ours as it does not specifically ask voters who they voted for in the party list. This creates the possibility that voters who voted for Sluha Narodu's candidates in

single member districts (SMD), but not the party list, could inflate and simultaneously muddle the count. However, this broadly seems unlikely as fewer voters, in the aggregate, supported Sluha Narodu's SMD candidates as compared to the party list (28.13% vs. 43.16%) (Центральна Виборча Комісія, 2019).

A second potential explanation for the disparity in support for Sluha Narodu in Chaisty and Whitefield's (2020) survey and the actual results is bandwagoning. As their survey was administered after the election, it is possible that respondents who had not voted for Sluha Narodu (or at all), but saw the party had won an historic victory, said they had cast their vote for the party. On the other hand, those who voted for other parties may have been hesitant to report their preference given those parties' substandard performance. Were this bandwagoning effect present, a substantial percentage of the respondents reporting having voted for Sluha Narodu would in fact either not be voters or voters for other parties, making Chaisty and Whitefield's (2020) results unreliable and subject to measurement error.

A third potential explanation for the disparity in actual results and the reported votes by respondents in Chaisty and Whitefield's (2020) survey is an unrepresentative sample. While it appears that both our survey and Chaisty and Whitefield's (2020) were carried out similarly, it could be the case that the response rate was skewed toward Sluha Narodu voters. As the results may otherwise appear representative on other observable covariates, it is difficult to assess whether representation was an issue. A solution would be to weigh the survey results to align with the actual results, but given the potential problem of misrepresentation, that may only exacerbate the systematic measurement error that is already present.

Our measure of voter intent avoids the pitfalls faced by Chaisty and Whitefield (2020) in several ways. First, as the survey was carried out before the parliamentary elections, there is unlikely to

be a bandwagon effect from knowledge of the results of the parliamentary election. If there was a bandwagon effect from Zelensky's victory in the presidential elections, it would be reflected in election results, as well as our survey. Second, our survey's question on party support during the elections is specific to the 'party list,' ensuring voters are not focused on their SMD choice. Moreover, the nearly identical percentages for both Sluha Narodu and other parties in our aggregate results to the actual party list results suggest the survey was broadly representative of the electorate. Given the issues we find with Chaisty and Whitefield's (2020) results, we cannot say the same about the reliability of their assessment of voting for Sluha Narodu.

2.3 Reproducing our Findings using Chaisty and Whitefield's (2020) Survey

There are notable differences between our survey and Chaisty and Whitefield's (2020) survey designs that make it impossible to perfectly reproduce our findings using their data. Foremost, the questions asked across both surveys are different. We have already noted the difference in the question on party support in the 2019 election, which we believe may have contributed to the inflated share of self-identified Sluha Narodu voters in Chaisty and Whitefield's (2020) survey data. Second, our question on the European Union involves support for a tangible association rather than aspirational membership. Their question gives respondents two options: "Ukraine should integrate as far as possible with the European Union' OR 'Ukraine should remain isolated as far as possible from the European Union"[3] The aspirational question leads to much more positive responses than our policy question, leaving much less room for ambivalence. Third, Chaisty and Whitefield (2020)

[3]Respondents are asked to respond on a five point Likert scale: "(1) definitely the first opinion, (2) the first opinion rather than the second, (3) neither/nor, (4) the second opinion rather than the first, (5) definitely the second opinion."

ask respondents questions on language politics and the dissolution of the USSR[4] that we do not and we ask respondents about the 2014 Maidan Revolutions that Chaisty and Whitefield (2020) do not. Finally, Chaisty and Whitefield (2020) do not adopt Onuch and Hale's (2018) strategy for asking about language with multiple questions and only ask respondents which language they speak at home – analogous our question about which language respondents speak with their families.

Nevertheless, we feel that reproducing our findings has added value, both in terms of testing our theory using an alternative sample, testing our theory in an unfavorable sample and in testing the assumption made by Chaisty and Whitefield (2020) needed to reach their determination that Sluha Narodu was a "catch-all" party. Much like our main article, we present cross tabs followed by multivariate regression analysis.

We first turn to language – here Chaisty and Whitefield (2020) ask a single question on language preference, "What languages do you use at home?" In addition to this being the only question on language asked of respondents, it is also notable that "Surjik," the Russian-Ukrainian colloquial hybrid was not given as an option to respondents. We report the percentage from each of category as well as the percentage of respondents of each category that reported voting for Sluha Narodu on Table 5. The results show no discernible differences across the three categories in terms of voting for Sluha Narodu. However, it should be noted that the 16.37% Chaisty and Whitefield (2020)[5] report as using both Russian and Ukrainian is much smaller than the 35.18% of Ukrainians we find mixing languages across two questions in our survey or the 38.67% that mixed languages across the

[4]"All minority ethnic groups in this country should have to be taught in Ukrainian," and "the dissolution of USSR was a good thing." Both ask respondents to answer on a 5-point Likert scale from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree.'

[5]The percentage of respondents reporting speaking both Russian and Ukrainian at home is similarly approximately 16% in our survey, but we find an additional 7% report using Surjik at home.

two questions and their choice of language for the survey. In short, while those reporting mixing Russian and Ukrainian at home according to Chaisty and Whitefield's (2020) survey are not more likely to support Sluha Narodu, we view their measure as an undercount of the true number of individuals in their sample who mix Russian and Ukrainian.

Table 5: Stated Language Preference and Support for *Sluha Narodu*

Spoken at home:	Total	Pct. Voted for Sluha Narodu
Russian	347 (27.72%)	63.69
Russian and Ukrainian	205 (16.37%)	65.37
Ukrainian	690 (55.11%)	65.07

Note: Ten voters reporting speaking other languages not shown.
1,252 voters in sample.

We move to the question of membership in the EU. As mentioned, our survey question on this issue differs from that of Chaisty and Whitefield (2020). We ask about the 2015 EU association agreement, while Chaisty and Whitefield (2020) ask about aspirational integration. We view our question as better capturing nuanced attitudes during the 2019 election as it is on a concrete policy, rather than on a hypothetical, potentially distant, future. The results, mirroring Table 3 in the article show a greater percentage of respondents that reported intermediate preferences on integration with the EU were more likely to say they had voted for Sluha Narodu. While the aggregate percentages here are higher, reflecting the disproportionate amount of respondents that report supporting Sluha Narodu in Chaisty and Whitefield's (2020) survey, the lowest percentages of Sluha Narodu respondents remain in the two extreme categories of opinion on EU integration.

There are two additional issues that Chaisty and Whitefield (2020) identify as broadly a part of Ukraine's "frozen cleavage": language policy and the dissolution of the USSR. Similar to Table 6 we array party support along the five point Likert scales from each question on Tables 7 and 8. On both issues, we retain the pattern observed on Table 6 with respondents with extreme opinions

Table 6: Parliamentary Election Vote Share and Support for EU Integration

	Ukraine should integrate as far as possible with the European Union' OR 'Ukraine should remain isolated as far as possible from the European Union				
	Definitely Second	Rather Second	Neither	Rather First	Definitely First
Sluha Narodu	56.47	63.83	67.20	69.64	62.89
Opposition Platform - For Life	36.47	21.28	18.15	3.64	0.59
European Solidarity	0.00	1.06	4.14	9.31	15.82
Fatherland	2.35	5.32	6.05	7.69	6.64
Golos	0.00	1.06	0.64	2.43	6.05
Total Voters	85	94	314	247	512

Note: Only parties that met 5% threshold in national party list voting included in table.

on either teaching Ukrainian or the dissolution of the USSR being those with the lowest shares of support for Sluha Narodu and those with intermediate stances having the highest shares.

Table 7: Parliamentary Election Party List Vote Share and Support for EU Association

	All minority ethnic groups in this country should have to be taught in Ukrainian				
	Strongly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat Agree	Strongly Agree
Sluha Narodu	50.00	73.23	72.37	68.62	60.27
Opposition Platform - For Life	33.85	12.60	10.51	6.55	3.13
European Solidarity	0.77	1.57	5.06	10.00	16.29
Fatherland	5.38	5.51	7.78	4.83	6.92
Golos	0.77	1.57	1.95	2.76	5.36
Total Voters	130	127	257	290	448

Note: Only parties that met 5% threshold in national party list voting included in table.

Table 8: Parliamentary Election Party List Vote Share and Support for EU Association

	The dissolution of USSR was a good thing				
	Strongly Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat Agree	Strongly Agree
Sluha Narodu	29.32	44.53	50.59	52.07	37.79
Opposition Platform - For Life	45.86	18.75	11.46	3.85	3.26
European Solidarity	0.75	1.56	1.19	7.69	23.45
Fatherland	6.02	7.03	11.07	9.17	8.47
Golos	0.75	1.56	5.93	8.88	12.38
Total Voters	133	128	253	338	307

Note: Only parties that met 5% threshold in national party list voting included in table.

We follow our approach from the main article and recode the 5-point scales on USSR dissolution, language in schools and EU integration to make the values 1 and 5, as well as 2 and 4 equal to one another, effectively creating a scale of the extent to which respondents hold intermediate positions on the issue. Table 9 presents our findings using logistic regression models. While language mix is not significant, likely for reasons having to do with its operationalization, we find that respondents holding moderate positions on the dissolution of the USSR, teaching of Ukrainian and EU integration[6] were more likely to have said they voted for Sluha Narodu after the 2019 parliamentary election. We are thus broadly able to reproduce our findings using survey data from Chaisty and Whitefield (2020). In the following section, we discuss how our findings square with their conclusions regarding Sluha Narodu.

2.4 Interpreting Chaisty and Whitefield's (2020) Results

As presented in the previous section, we are able to reproduce our findings using Chaisty and Whitefield's (2020) data. What is then to be made of their claims regarding Sluha Narodu? Instead of ambivalence and new issues in Ukrainian politics, Chaisty and Whitefield (2020) state that Sluha Narodu was successful by offering "a catch-all appeal on a valence issue." Specifically, they note that "Catch-all parties aim to attract voters with very different attitudinal stances, appealing to a very large part of the electorate...shifting their appeal to a valence capacity – political or economic competence, trust in leadership, etc." They claim that corruption is this valence issue for Ukraine, for the simple fact that there cannot be "pro-corruption" parties and there are rarely "pro-corruption" voters. But our findings show that this was not clearly the case. Voters who spoke

[6] Significant at $p<0.1$.

Table 9: Logistic Regression on Voting for Sluha Narodu (Chaisty and Whitefield, 2020)

	(1)	(2)
Dissolution of the USSR Good	0.929	
	(0.054)	
Ukrainian Must Be Taught	0.987	
	(0.055)	
EU Integration	0.982	
	(0.061)	
Dissolution of the USSR Good Moderate		1.239**
		(0.101)
Ukrainian Must Be Taught Moderate		1.369***
		(0.116)
EU Integration Moderate		1.172
		(0.099)
Free Market	1.167*	1.176*
	(0.083)	(0.084)
Democracy	0.940	0.948
	(0.067)	(0.067)
Party Programs All the Same	1.268***	1.275***
	(0.070)	(0.071)
Speak Russian and Ukrainian with Family	0.914	0.871
	(0.156)	(0.150)
Age	0.512***	0.519***
	(0.054)	(0.054)
Standard of Living Better	0.997	0.980
	(0.068)	(0.066)
Religiosity	0.825**	0.843**
	(0.049)	(0.050)
Respondent from Southeast	0.823	0.828
	(0.127)	(0.120)
Constant	9.467***	1.722
	(5.485)	(1.057)
Number of Respondents	1220	1220

Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Odds ratios presented in lieu of coefficients.

a single language, Russian or Ukrainian or who held strong opinions about EU association or the 2014 Revolution were less likely to support Sluha Narodu. If Sluha Narodu pursued a catch-all strategy, which we do not believe to be the case, it was not a successful strategy. As we have presented in quotes from Zelensky's speeches before the Rada election in 2019 in appendix 1, there were numerous examples of direct statement against extreme stances on the issues along which parties were polarized. While Sluha Narodu would have certainly welcomed support from voters whose attitudes aligned with either European Solidarity or Opposition Platform - For Life, they made little effort to win those voters and made statements that likely have antagonized them for agreeing with what Zelensky painted as an irredeemably corrupt political class.

As we mentioned earlier, moderate opinions on EU integration asked in Chaisty and Whitefield's (2020) survey have a notably higher association with voting for Sluha Narodu, yet the distribution of this question makes up one of two key pieces of evidence for the "catch-all" strategy. The second is an "anti-establishment" attitude among Sluha Narodu voters. Specifically, Chaisty and Whitefield (2020) ask their survey respondents to what extent they agree that "all parties in Ukraine offer the same programmes." Sluha Narodu voters are disproportionately more likely to agree and strongly agree with this statement. Chaisty and Whitefield (2020) interpret this finding to mean that "[Sluha Narodu] voters were not ideologically distinct from other parties, since respondents presumably took into account [Sluha Narodu's] position when making judgements about differences among parties." However, as we show in the previous section, Sluha Narodu voters were distinct in their views on the issues Chaisty and Whitefield (2020) identify as being part of Ukraine's "frozen cleavage." What is notable is that Chaisty and Whitefield (2020) interpret that agreeing that all parties have the same programs reflects "cynicism" and "anti-establishment" attitude. We broadly view this association as supporting our assertion that Sluha Narodu pursued a populist strategy.

With "anti-establishment" attitudes being a core pillar of the definition of populism, the finding on "anti-establishment" attitudes among Sluha Narodu voters speaks to the success of this strategy. Moreover, the findings from both ours and Chaisty and Whitefield's (2020) surveys regarding the ambivalent positions of Sluha Narodu voters on key issues along which the Ukrainian political establishment was polarized supports our broader assertions regarding anti-polarization populism.

3 Factor Loading of Efficacy and Nationalism

In this section, we review our loading of the two efficacy and two nationalism factors mentioned in the article. We conducted principal components factor analysis to load answers from four standard questions on political efficacy obtained from Niemi et al. (1991) and Amnå et al. (2004) onto two separate factors. Details from the analysis are reported on Table 10. The first and third question on voicing political opinions and the effectiveness of protest action loaded onto the first factor, which is termed "participation." The second question on personal participation to influence the state, along with the regulation of business question, which tied closely to both ideal points, were loaded onto the second factor, termed "influence."

Table 10: Factor Analysis of Efficacy

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
1	1.29458	0.21697	0.3236	0.3236
2	1.07761	0.25028	0.2694	0.5930
3	0.82734	0.02686	0.2068	0.7999
4	0.80047		0.2001	1.0000

Likelihood Ratio test: independent vs. saturated $chi^2(21) = 158.16$;
Probability greater than chi-squared less than 0.001. Number of observations: 2000

Factor Loadings

Variable	Participation Factor	Influence Factor	Uniqueness
When political questions and problems are discussed, I usually have something to say.	0.7230	0.0899	0.4692
People like me cannot influence what the government is doing.	-0.1349	0.8431	0.2709
When people get together and demand change, the state listens.	0.7297	-0.1946	0.4297
Strict regulation of business is crucial for the defense of the interests of ordinary people.	0.4426	0.5883	0.4580

Table 11 reviews the process for the principal components factor analysis conducted on the six questions respondents were asked to gauge their Ukrainian nationalism. The questions were derived from general questions on ethnocentrism developed by various sources and were adopted

Table 11: Factor Analysis of Nationalism

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
1	1.96518	0.69778	0.3275	0.3275
2	1.26740	0.45370	0.2112	0.5388
3	0.81370	0.05316	0.1356	0.6744
4	0.76054	0.15429	0.1268	0.8011
5	0.60625	0.01932	0.1010	0.9022
6	0.58693		0.0978	1.0000

Likelihood Ratio test: independent vs. saturated $chi^2(21) = 1185.79$;
Probability greater than chi-squared less than 0.001. Number of observations: 1977

Factor Loadings

Variable	Nationalism Factor	Tolerance Factor	Uniqueness
We are no better than other Slavic peoples.	0.3357	0.5310	0.6054
I don't care whether people consider me Russian or Ukrainian	0.2582	0.7192	0.4161
Our people are not ideal, but our culture is richer than the Russians	0.1773	-0.7273	0.4396
The history of the USSR is our history	0.6897	0.2483	0.4627
We should not divide people by the language that they speak	0.7329	0.1990	0.4233
Young Ukrainians must know the history and cultural heritage of their nation.	0.6956	-0.3095	0.4204

to the Ukrainian context by the authors. The question on cultural superiority, for example, came from a Pew survey of European countries (pew, 2018), while most of the others were adapted from Neuliep and McCroskey (1997).

The nationalism factor primarily relates to the last three questions, speaking to a distinct and inclusive national pride, rather than a chauvinism based on speaking a particular language. Given that around 8% of our respondents disagreed with the statement that the history of the USSR is also Ukrainian history, we can speculate that the extreme brand of Ukrainian chauvinism advocated in some circles is not felt by a vast majority of the Ukrainian public. Instead, we find nationalism is reflected more in pride in a collective history, which includes life under the Soviet Union. The tolerance factor primarily equates to anti-chauvinism in viewing Ukrainians as no better than other Slavic peoples, indifference on others' ethnic perception and a rejection of claims that Ukrainian culture is superior to Russian culture.

4 Language Choice on Survey and Voting for Sluha Narodu

In addition to questions about what language respondents spoke with their family members and what language respondents considered their native language, respondents were also also asked about what language they preferred to take the survey in. In 40 instances, respondents that reported speaking Ukrainian at home and considering it their native language asked to take the survey in Russian. In 29 instances, respondents chose to take the survey in Ukrainian despite speaking Russian with their families and considering it their native language. In this section, we add these respondents, if they expressed a voting choice, to the mixed language responses variable discussed in the main article. The regression models are otherwise the same as those in the article. Results are presented in Table 12. The mixed language variable remains a positive and significant predictor of Sluha Narodu support and the direction and significance of moderation on EU Association and the 2014 Revolution remain the same. Effectively, the findings are unchanged from this modification.

Table 12: Logistic Regression on Voting Intent for Sluha Narodu in Party List

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Mixed Language Responses (with Survey Language)	1.744**	1.626*	1.753**	1.648*
	(0.356)	(0.349)	(0.370)	(0.358)
EU Association Moderate		1.467***		1.491***
		(0.163)		(0.175)
Minsk II Moderate		1.136		1.113
		(0.132)		(0.133)
Ukraine's Future in 2004 Moderate			1.189	1.152
			(0.129)	(0.137)
Ukraine's Future in 2014 Moderate			1.401**	1.353*
			(0.183)	(0.177)
Age	0.955***	0.958***	0.962***	0.966***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Female	0.937	0.910	0.925	0.856
	(0.174)	(0.190)	(0.178)	(0.187)
Education	0.847*	0.856*	0.890	0.895
	(0.057)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.069)
Household Expenses	1.146	1.129	1.225*	1.203
	(0.101)	(0.106)	(0.120)	(0.124)
Government Performance	0.803*	0.817*	0.745**	0.751*
	(0.076)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.085)
Army Performance	0.988	0.975	0.988	0.986
	(0.062)	(0.070)	(0.066)	(0.074)
Government Effectiveness	0.968	0.992	1.030	1.076
	(0.083)	(0.096)	(0.094)	(0.109)
Oligarch Effectiveness	0.939	0.987	0.926	0.999
	(0.079)	(0.091)	(0.085)	(0.096)
Army Effectiveness	1.337**	1.330**	1.383***	1.395***
	(0.120)	(0.116)	(0.128)	(0.124)
Volunteer Battalion Effectiveness	0.978	1.012	0.905	0.921
	(0.080)	(0.086)	(0.079)	(0.086)
Political Efficacy: Participation	0.984	1.028	1.057	1.083
	(0.090)	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.118)
Political Efficacy: Influence	0.955	0.953	0.943	0.945
	(0.068)	(0.074)	(0.070)	(0.078)
Nationalism	1.138	1.174	1.160	1.194
	(0.092)	(0.102)	(0.098)	(0.110)
Tolerance	0.871	0.895	0.936	0.960
	(0.088)	(0.097)	(0.093)	(0.105)
Trust in Media	0.995	0.997	0.999	1.000
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Respondent from South or East	1.154	1.316	1.199	1.305
	(0.240)	(0.286)	(0.249)	(0.287)
Respondent from Rural Area	0.956	0.924	0.961	0.955
	(0.208)	(0.208)	(0.205)	(0.206)
Constant	7.025**	1.552	1.169	0.275
	(4.474)	(1.223)	(0.869)	(0.243)
Number of Respondents	985	841	854	742

Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Odds ratios presented in lieu of coefficients. Standard errors clustered at the survey cluster.

5 Explaining Turnout in 2019 Parliamentary Elections based on Survey

We use this section to evaluate the reasons for self-reported respondent turnout in the 2019 parliamentary election. We assess turnout in order to evaluate whether voter ambivalence on language, the EU and the 2014 revolution also influenced individuals not to vote at all. As shown in appendix 6, we asked respondents directly if they were planning to vote and which party they would vote for. However, respondent answers left us with three categories of voters: those that admitted they were not planning to vote, those that said they would vote and which party they would vote for and those that said they would vote, but would not say which party they would vote for. Approximately 18% of our sample said they would not vote, while an additional 22% would not name a party. As mentioned in our main article, only about 50% of Ukrainian citizens voted in the parliamentary election, making it likely that those that did not name a party actually did not vote. Moreover, given our closely matching distribution of party support among respondents that did name a party, we have good reason to believe our survey was representative among those that did say what party they would vote for. As such, we examine both self-reported turnout and self-reported party support as outcome variables in our regression model. Our variables are otherwise identical to those presented on models three through five on Table 5 of the main article. We also largely retain the design, using clustering at the survey cluster level and odds ratios to present results.

Table 13 presents our findings for turnout. The only consistently significant findings are that older respondents, respondents that do not trust the media and respondents that are less moderate on EU association are less likely to intend to vote. These findings are consistent across both of our dependent variable specifications for turnout. Broadly, the result for EU association is relevant

Table 13: Logistic Regression on Voter Turnout in 2019 Parliamentary Election

	DV: Self-Reported Turnout			**DV: Self-Reported Party Support**		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Mixed Language Responses	1.045	1.072	1.062	1.025	1.119	1.096
	(0.176)	(0.183)	(0.196)	(0.137)	(0.153)	(0.149)
EU Association Moderate	0.712**		0.687**	0.754**		0.792*
	(0.084)		(0.086)	(0.076)		(0.085)
Minsk II Moderate	1.041		1.015	1.013		1.008
	(0.122)		(0.138)	(0.095)		(0.103)
Ukraine's Future in 2004 Moderate		1.064	1.165		0.903	0.933
		(0.151)	(0.168)		(0.085)	(0.096)
Ukraine's Future in 2014 Moderate		1.049	1.058		1.036	1.001
		(0.140)	(0.160)		(0.095)	(0.094)
Age	1.012*	1.014**	1.016**	1.013**	1.017***	1.018***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Female	1.156	1.224	1.215	1.224	1.208	1.208
	(0.203)	(0.195)	(0.203)	(0.159)	(0.145)	(0.159)
Education	1.153	1.112	1.106	1.066	1.082	1.061
	(0.085)	(0.082)	(0.085)	(0.063)	(0.066)	(0.068)
Household Expenses	1.196	1.149	1.185	0.998	0.933	0.974
	(0.114)	(0.107)	(0.128)	(0.080)	(0.075)	(0.082)
Government Performance	0.949	0.953	0.931	0.890	0.910	0.903
	(0.105)	(0.103)	(0.117)	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.092)
Army Performance	1.097	1.023	1.077	1.059	1.040	1.080
	(0.105)	(0.096)	(0.112)	(0.080)	(0.074)	(0.089)
Government Effectiveness	1.226	1.237*	1.294*	1.135	1.141	1.174
	(0.142)	(0.125)	(0.138)	(0.109)	(0.094)	(0.107)
Oligarch Effectiveness	1.123	1.049	1.101	1.007	0.995	1.030
	(0.116)	(0.101)	(0.122)	(0.071)	(0.067)	(0.075)
Army Effectiveness	0.831	0.913	0.864	0.849	0.897	0.854
	(0.091)	(0.095)	(0.103)	(0.074)	(0.080)	(0.081)
Volunteer Battalion Effectiveness	1.245*	1.225	1.232	1.137	1.115	1.124
	(0.138)	(0.137)	(0.151)	(0.099)	(0.091)	(0.106)
Political Efficacy: Participation	1.080	1.239*	1.182	1.151*	1.219**	1.191*
	(0.112)	(0.106)	(0.118)	(0.078)	(0.076)	(0.086)
Political Efficacy: Influence	1.127	1.011	1.050	1.000	0.973	0.973
	(0.106)	(0.091)	(0.102)	(0.075)	(0.072)	(0.077)
Nationalism	1.077	1.152	1.151	0.865	0.896	0.896
	(0.103)	(0.091)	(0.103)	(0.070)	(0.068)	(0.074)
Tolerance	1.003	1.051	1.039	0.924	0.982	0.937
	(0.130)	(0.140)	(0.139)	(0.081)	(0.089)	(0.091)
Trust in Media	0.992**	0.990***	0.990**	0.994	0.993*	0.992*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Respondent from South or East	1.015	1.215	1.132	1.347	1.431*	1.303
	(0.212)	(0.259)	(0.272)	(0.234)	(0.250)	(0.238)
Respondent from Rural Area	1.409	1.437	1.295	1.301	1.219	1.301
	(0.339)	(0.332)	(0.333)	(0.261)	(0.232)	(0.275)
Constant	0.573	0.290	0.371	0.820	0.450	0.609
	(0.485)	(0.240)	(0.351)	(0.498)	(0.275)	(0.428)
Number of Respondents	1316	1345	1153	1316	1345	1153

Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Odds ratios presented in lieu of coefficients. Standard errors clustered at the survey cluster.

as it appears that rather than ambivalent voters on the issue being less likely to vote, that voters with stronger views on association, whether positive or negative, were more likely to abstain from the parliamentary elections. This may be because those voters observed their candidates of choice perform poorly during the presidential election, although we cannot provide further evidence to this effect. More broadly, we can say with considerable certainty that ambivalence on language, EU association and the 2014 revolution did not make our respondents more likely to abstain from voting, speaking to both Sluha Narodu's appeal on the issue and the lack of support Sluha Narodu had among respondents that were not ambivalent on these issues.

6 Additional Regional Fixed Effects Specifications

Following the inclusion of a dummy variable for respondents being from the South and East of Ukraine, this section presents models adding additional regional covariates and oblast fixed effects. Apart from the specification changes to model 5 on Table 5, these models are otherwise unchanged. The results are reported on Table 14. In the first column, two additional regional dummies are added: one for the Donbass region - the areas of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts under control of Ukraine in 2019 – which appeared to opposed to Zelensky on Figure 1a of the main article, and residents from Western Ukraine – Lviv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Rivne, Volyn, Chernivtsi and Zakarpattia Oblasts. The second column includes fixed effects for all oblasts.

The results are largely identical to the models on Table 5 of the article in terms of EU association moderates and feelings about the 2014 Revolution moderates, as well as the results from the controls. One notable exception is the association between mixed language responses and voting for Sluha Narodu in Ukraine's 2019 parliamentary election. When adding regional dummies for Donbass and Western Ukraine, the significance of the association is reduced to only less than 0.1. The association loses significance altogether with oblast fixed effects.

What explains the lack of association between voting for Sluha Narodu and mixed language use in the oblast fixed effects model? Looking at the distribution of support for Sluha Narodu across language use in each oblast suggests that the regional concentration of mixed language use tells part of the story. In 12 oblasts,[7] respondents that report mixed language use support Sluha Narodu by a margin of at least 5 percent. In 6 oblasts[8] and Kyiv City, there is no difference across

[7]Chernihiv, Chernivtsi, Donetsk, Luhansk, Lviv, Mykolayv, Odessa, Poltava, Sumy, Vinnitsa, Zaporozhie, and Zhytomyr.

[8]Zakarpattie, Rivne, Kirovhrad, Kyiv Oblast, Kherson, Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk.

Table 14: Logistic Regression on Voting Intent for Sluha Narodu in Party List

	Additional Regions	Oblast Fixed Effects
Mixed Language Responses	1.518	1.341
	(0.352)	(0.321)
EU Association Moderate	1.459**	1.425**
	(0.168)	(0.169)
Minsk II Moderate	1.127	1.156
	(0.133)	(0.147)
Ukraine's Future in 2004 Moderate	1.141	1.103
	(0.143)	(0.144)
Ukraine's Future in 2014 Moderate	1.358*	1.400*
	(0.179)	(0.209)
Age	0.967***	0.964***
	(0.006)	(0.006)
Female	0.844	0.823
	(0.187)	(0.196)
Education	0.893	0.906
	(0.068)	(0.074)
Household Expenses	1.197	1.195
	(0.128)	(0.140)
Government Performance	0.747*	0.726**
	(0.086)	(0.088)
Army Performance	0.987	1.008
	(0.073)	(0.087)
Government Effectiveness	1.096	1.066
	(0.112)	(0.126)
Oligarch Effectiveness	1.002	0.973
	(0.095)	(0.103)
Army Effectiveness	1.379***	1.500***
	(0.121)	(0.148)
Volunteer Battalion Effectiveness	0.919	1.000
	(0.089)	(0.102)
Political Efficacy: Participation	1.092	1.043
	(0.120)	(0.138)
Political Efficacy: Influence	0.936	1.027
	(0.078)	(0.111)
Nationalism	1.173	1.164
	(0.106)	(0.125)
Tolerance	0.956	0.961
	(0.100)	(0.113)
Trust in Media	1.000	1.001
	(0.005)	(0.006)
Respondent from Rural Area	0.944	0.913
	(0.196)	(0.167)
Respondent from South or East except Donbass	1.273	
	(0.287)	
Respondent from Donbass	0.640	
	(0.225)	
Respondent from West	0.714	
	(0.220)	
Constant	0.339	0.455
	(0.300)	(0.499)
Number of Respondents	742	742

Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Odds ratios presented in lieu of coefficients. Standard errors clustered at the survey cluster.

language use in support for Sluha Narodu. In Cherkassy oblast, there is less support for Sluha Narodu among mixed language users. Finally, in four oblasts in Western Ukraine, there are either no mixed language users at all (Ternopil and Volyn) or there are two (Ivano-Frankivsk) or four (Khmelnitskiy) total respondents who indicated mixed language use and none stated they voted for Sluha Narodu.

Figure 1: Distribution of Mixed Language Use across Ukrainian Oblasts



Given this apparent discrepancy in the distribution of mixed language use across Ukrainian regions, we visualize the distribution of mixed language users in Figure 1. We see that Western Ukraine largely lacks mixed language users, with most respondents that use Russian and Ukrainian concentrated in Southern, Eastern and Northern regions of Sumy and Chernihiv as well as Zhytomyr and Chernivtsi. As such, adding regional dummy variables and fixed effects likely creates sub-analyses that are unrepresentative of the whole, with either small amounts of mixed language users in some oblasts or an overwhelmingly large amount in some others, such as Sumy or Zaporozhie. Having this discrepancy may give the impression of an inconsistent association between

mixed language use and voting for Sluha Narodu, but does not necessarily call the association between voting for Sluha Narodu and mixed language use into question. Moreover, the continued consistency of the associations between ambivalence about the 2015 EU association agreement and the 2014 Maidan Revolution and voting for Sluha Narodu reinforces the findings presented in Table 5 of article.

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7 Survey Questions

We present the English-language text of the first 39 questions asked of our survey respondents below. The final part of the survey included randomized components that are analyzed elsewhere and are on unrelated subjects. The instrument was developed by the authors in Russian and then translated through the aid of professional translators to Ukrainian, with a reverse translation back to Russian to verify the fealty of the Russian-Ukrainian translation. The questions below are translated to English by the authors from Russian for presentation purposes.

7.1 Survey Instrument

1. How old are you?
    - OPEN-ENDED
2. (Interviewer identifies) Gender of Respondent:
    - Male
    - Female
3. What is your highest level of education attained?
    - Elementary
    - Incomplete Secondary
    - Secondary
    - Secondary Specialized
    - Incomplete Higher
    - Higher
    - Graduate or Professional
    - I don't know/refuse to answer
4. How long have you been living in this city/village?
    - Less than one year
    - Between one and five years
    - More than five years

- I don't know/refuse to answer

5. What is your family status?
    - Married
    - Divorced
    - Widowed
    - Single
    - I don't know/refuse to answer
6. In what language do you speak with your family?
    - Ukrainian
    - Russian
    - Russian and Ukrainian
    - Surjik
    - Another language (indicate)
    - I don't know/refuse to answer
7. What language do you consider your native language?
    - Ukrainian
    - Russian
    - Russian and Ukrainian
    - Another language (indicate)
    - I don't know/refuse to answer
8. To what extent do you trust the news on TV channels?
    - Completely
    - For the most part
    - Sometimes
    - Rarely
    - Never
    - I don't watch TV news
    - I don't know/refuse to answer
9. Which of these sources would you choose if you would like to receive news from a trusted sources? You may choose more than one.
    - Read a newspaper

- Go to a news site
- Listen to the radio
- Talk to someone who I trust
- Watch the news on TV or go to a news channel site
- Read posts of Facebook or watch a view on YouTube
- I don't know/refuse to answer

10. What percentage of your earnings do you spend on household expenses or food?

    - Over 75%
    - Between 50% and 75%
    - Between 25% and 50%
    - Less than 25%
    - I don't know/refuse to answer

11. How much does your family earn in the average month?

    - Less than 2500 hryvnya
    - 2500 – 5000 hryvnya
    - 5000 – 7500 hryvnya
    - 7500 – 10000 hryvnya
    - 10000 – 15000 hryvnya
    - 15000 – 20000 hryvnya
    - Over 20000 hryvnya
    - I don't know/refuse to answer

12. Please look through this list. Have you served in any of the following armed groupings since 1991? If yes, then which ones.

    - The National Guard
    - The Navy
    - The Army
    - A volunteer battalion
    - No
    - I don't know/refuse to answer

13. Do you have friends or relatives who served in the Ukranian Armed Forces after 2010?

    - Yes, friends
    - Yes, relatives

- Both
- Neither
- I don't know/refuse to answer

Do you personally know anyone why was seriously injured or killed in the Donbass War since 2014?

- Yes, a friend
- Yes, a relative
- Yes, an acquaintance
- No
- I don't know/refuse to answer

14. As a whole, how do you assess the work of the government with respect to the conflict in Donbass starting from 2014?

    - Very well
    - Well
    - Normally
    - Poorly
    - Very Poorly
    - I don't know/refuse to answer

15. As a whole, how well do you think the Ukrainian army has dealt with the conflict in Donbass starting in 2014?

    - Very well
    - Well
    - Normally
    - Poorly
    - Very Poorly
    - I don't know/refuse to answer

16. Ukraine is holding parliamentary elections on July 21, 2019. Will you take part?

    - Yes
    - No
    - I don't know/refuse to answer

    (a) (If yes) What political party would you vote for in the parliamentary elections from the party list?

- OPEN-ENDED

17. Please remember the presidential elections from this year. Would you take part?

    - Yes
    - No
    - I don't know/refuse to answer

    (a) (If yes) Which candidate did you vote for in the first round of this year's presidential elections?

        - OPEN-ENDED

18. It was the right decision for Ukraine to enter into an association agreement with the EU.

    - Strongly Agree
    - Agree
    - Neither Agree nor Disagree
    - Disagree
    - Strongly Disagree
    - I don't know/refuse to answer

19. The Minsk Agreements (Minsk II) in 2015 were the right decision.

    - Strongly Agree
    - Agree
    - Neither Agree nor Disagree
    - Disagree
    - Strongly Disagree
    - I don't know/refuse to answer

20. Please recall the events of the Orange Revolution in December 2004. When this occurred, what future did you think awaited Ukraine?

    - A great one
    - A good one
    - A normal one
    - A poor one
    - A very poor one
    - I don't know/refuse to answer

21. Please recall the events of the the end of 2013/start of 2014. Demonstrations forced president Viktor Yanukovich to resign and leave Ukraine. When this occurred, what future did you think awaited Ukraine?

    - A great one
    - A good one
    - A normal one
    - A poor one
    - A very poor one
    - I don't know/refuse to answer

22. To what extent do you think the following institutions and groups of people are effective in defending the interests of Ukrainian people?

    (a) The government, president and Rada.
    (b) Rich people like Akhmetov, Pinchuk or Kosyuk.
    (c) The Ukrainian Army
    (d) Volunteer battalions such as Aydar, Azov, Dnipro-1, Donbass, Right Sector and others.

    - Very effective
    - Effective
    - Neither effective nor ineffective
    - Ineffective
    - Totally ineffective
    - I don't know/refuse to answer

23. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

    (a) When political questions and problems are discussed, I usually have something to say.
    (b) People like me cannot influence what the government is doing.
    (c) When people get together and demand change, the state listens.
    (d) Strict regulation of business is crucial for the defense of the interests of ordinary people.

    - Strongly Agree
    - Agree
    - Neither Agree nor Disagree
    - Disagree
    - Strongly Disagree
    - I don't know/refuse to answer

Anger	Disappointment	Sympathy	Pleasure
Hatred	Shame	Love	Pride
Contempt	Regret	Delight	Joy
Fear	Sadness	Excitement	Indifference

24. Please choose no more than three emotions that best describe your feelings about Russian people.

25. Please choose no more than three emotions that best describe your feelings about the Russian government.

Anger	Disappointment	Sympathy	Pleasure
Hatred	Shame	Love	Pride
Contempt	Regret	Delight	Joy
Fear	Sadness	Excitement	Ifndifference

26. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

    (a) We are no better than other Slavic peoples.

    (b) I don't care whether people consider me Russian or Ukrainian

    (c) Our people are not ideal, but our culture is richer than the Russians

    (d) The history of the USSR is our history

    (e) We should not divide people by the language that they speak

    (f) Young Ukrainians must know the history and cultural heritage of their nation.

    - Strongly Agree
    - Agree
    - Neither Agree nor Disagree
    - Disagree
    - Strongly Disagree
    - I don't know/refuse to answer