Official Codebook for the Inclusion, Dispersion and Constraints Dataset

Version 2.0

These data are an update to the original Inclusion, Dispersion and Constraint (IDC) data. The original data covered the years 1975-2010; these data cover up through 2019. The original IDC data were introduced in:

Strøm, Kaare, Scott Gates, Benjamin A.T. Graham and Håvard Strand. 2017. "Inclusion, Dispersion, and Constraint: Powersharing in the World's States, 1975-2010." *British Journal of Political Science* 47(1): 165-185.

These updated data are introduced in:

Graham, Benjamin A.T., Alix Ziff, Ashley Abadeer, Nicole Jao, and Clara (Marie) Zaragoza. "De Jure Powersharing 1975-2019: Updating the Inclusion, Dispersion and Constraints Dataset"

Introduction

This codebook documents the Inclusion, Dispersion and Constraint dataset, Version 2.0. Version 1.0 of these data were collected by the Power Sharing, Agency and Civil Conflict project and supported by NSF grant number SES-0819507b. Version 2.0 of these data were collected by the Security and Political Economy (SPEC) Lab at the University of Southern California.

The core purpose of this dataset is to collect extensive data on various forms of power-sharing in contemporary states in order to assess the effects of these institutions on public good provision and civil peace. This project builds on a distinct theory of power sharing institutions, which has informed the coding of this dataset. Users should familiarize themselves with this theoretical background before using the data.

Unlike many other power sharing data collections, this project does not limit the data collection effort to a subset of countries, but aims at a global sample. In practice, we limit our sample to sovereign states with populations larger than than 250,000, similar to and compatible with the international system membership definition of Gleditsch & Ward (2001). Our data cover the years 1975-2019.

De Jure and de Facto Institutions

The variables in this dataset focus primarily on de jure, rather than de facto, institutions. This focus is justified on two grounds. First, variables capturing the nature of the de jure institutions can be more consistently sourced and more objectively coded than de facto arrangements. Second, formal rules of political decision making often continue to matter as baselines, goals, or expectations, even when they are being violated in practice. Even when a country is de facto ruled by various militia groups –Lebanon in the mid-late 1980s for example – the constitution and other written rules can still establish, at the very least, a focal point in the bargaining over what the rules would be if everyone put down their guns, which in turn informs groups' decisions whether to put down their guns.

Sources and Coding Procedures

We distinguish in the coding process between core sources and non-core sources. Core sources are those that are always consulted in order to establish the absence of a particular institutional form. For example, before coding a country-year as a zero for *mveto*, which would indicate that the country has no provisions allowing for minority veto over a particular policy area, the coder checks all the core sources to establish that there is no mention of such a provision. All core sources, as well as the most used non-core sources are listed at the end of the codebook. Additional non-core sources are listed as used in the notes.

Non-core sources are used to supplement core sources whenever 1) Core sources do not provide sufficiently detailed information to allow coders make the necessary coding decisions, and 2) Non-core sources are available. Coders were given a high level of discretion in identifying reliable non-core sources, though material from activist organizations was avoided. Most non-core sources were either academic papers, government documents (often the text of specific laws), or official websites of the governments in question.

The greatest challenge facing coders involved determining the precise dates on which different institutional forms were adopted or abandoned. Constitutional provisions are easy in this regard: there is a date when a constitution enters into force and a date when it is nullified, amended, or superseded. With some rules, however, it is difficult to identify the precise date at which a law was first enacted or the date at which it was superseded.

In all cases of uncertainty, coders were directed to employ a "preponderance of the evidence" standard rather than a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. Instances in which the necessary information to make an informed coding is unavailable are coded as missing. Instances in which information is available but the coder was uncertain were flagged for discussion in regular meetings of the coding team and a group decision was made on how to code the variable.

Intercoder Reliability

Four outside coders were brought in to code a random subset of country-decades already coded by the primary coding team. This data was then compared to the master data to identify problematic variables or coders. This exercise caused one variable to be deleted from the dataset entirely, and several coding rules to be clarified in the codebook.

Implemented vs. Mandated

Several of the core powersharing variables in the dataset have both a mandated and an implemented component. This allows us to capture both the de jure rules and the de facto implementation of the same institution. If the de jure institution does not exist, the de facto implementation of that institution is coded as -44 (NA).

A Note on Variables on the Armed Forces

The information on national armed forces in this dataset captures only mandated institutional arrangements; they do not capture any difference that may exist between mandated institutional arrangements and actual institutional practice. Where coders observed an obvious discrepancy between formal institutions and actual practice, a note is made in the comments. However, such deviations are not incorporated into the data itself. Additionally, our data do not capture regulations that are internal to the military itself. We focus on the constraints placed on the military by the constitution, and not on the constraints the military places on itself or its members. For example, if there is no constitutional provision stating that active members of the armed forces may not serve in the legislature, then no restriction is coded, even if there are rules internal to the armed forces that prevent officers from serving in the legislature.

A Note on the Database of Political Institutions

As part of this project, we have filled in missing values and corrected coding errors for a number of DPI variables. These extended and corrected data are now part of the most recent edition of DPI, as well as this dataset.

Missing Data and Additional Codes

Blank: Data missing (represented as "." in the Stata version)
-44: Not applicable – a value here would be nonsensical
-77: Interregnum. This value is entered for all variables in units of analysis where it is unclear what institutions or individuals govern the polity, or in cases of foreign occupation when the domestic political institutions have been superseded.

Changes Within Calendar Years

While the original IDC data included a country-day version of the day, Version 2.0 is coded on a country-year basis, compatible with most existing cross-national data. Observations are coded as of January 1st in the year indicated. Therefore, if a new institution is introduced in February of 2010, it would first show up in the country-year observation for 2011.

Concept	Short Name	Long Name	Coding	Notes on Sourcing
Institutional Suspensions	constsusp	Constitution suspended	1, if the constitution is suspended. -44, if no constitution (e.g. Israel). 0, otherwise. *Code 1 if any provisions of the constitution are suspended – partial suspensions are coded 1. *If there is military contravention of the constitution, it is considered suspended. *A constitution is no longer considered suspended once a new constitution is adopted, or once the old one is amended and returned to force. *If a constitution is suspended and returned to force within a calendar year, this will be reflected in the polity-unit version of the dataset, but not in the country-year data. *If no constitutional suspension is mentioned in the core sources, a 0 is coded.	These three variables are coded primarily using the history section of the Europa World Yearbook for each country.

	treaty	Treaty	1, if a peace treaty, or similar accord is in effect (in lieu of a constitution) and mandates specific political institutions. If constsusp = 1, this variable is most often 1 as well. ● If a country has a peace treaty in effect, it is common for the country to be coded as 1 for a year or two after the peace treaty is signed before the terms of the treaty are officially enshrined in a constitution. 0, otherwise. *Countries that have no constitution in effect but are not governed by peace treaties (e.g. non-constitutional monarchy, newly independent states which have not yet adopted a constitution) are coded 0. * If a state withdraws from the treaty in question or announces its intention no longer to abide by its terms, code 0 thereafter.	
	martiallaw_binary	Martial law	1, if martial law is in force in all or part of the country. 0, otherwise. *A declaration of a national emergency does not qualify as a code of 1. While a period of national emergency may look like martial law has taken effect, a declaration of national emergency does not always and automatically mean that martial law has been invoked in that country at that time. A declaration of national emergency can serve as an indicator that martial law *may* be in effect. *If no mention of martial law is made in the core sources, code 0.	
Grand Coalition	gcman	Mandated Grand Coalition	1, if there is a constitutional provision (or a provision in a peace accord in the case of transitional governments) requiring representation by all major political parties (or relevant political organizations) in the cabinet. 0, otherwise.	The constitution is obviously the authoritative source for gcman, but such arrangements are also almost always mentioned in the history section of the Europa World Year Book and the "constitution and government" subsection of the Political Handbook of the World.
	gcimp	Grand Coalition Implemented	0 if not implemented 1 if implemented – if all major political parties are indeed represented in the cabinet.	
	gcseats1	Grand Coalition by seats 1	1 if all of the following three things are true: A: the two largest parties are both in government AND B: the government is a majority government AND	These 3 variables are constructed by algorithm based on Database of

		(Two largest parties in government)	C: the legislature is competitive (liec > 6 in Database of Political Institutions); 0 otherwise *Note: We normally date the beginning of a Grand Coalition as the date of election. We deviate from this if there is more than a month between the election and the power sharing or if there are significant intervening events e.g. if election riots power sharing.	Political Institutions seat share data.
	gcseats2	Grand Coalition by seats 2 (Excess party in coalition)	1 if all of the following three things are true: A: a government coalition contains an excess party – i.e. a member without which it would still represents a majority of the seats in the legislature B: the government is a majority government AND C: the legislature is competitive (liec > 6 in Database of Political Institutions) 0 otherwise *Note: If the first 4 parties are required to reach a majority, the raw DPI data does not allow excess parties to be coded. However, this is likely rare. A 4th excess party only occurs in 10 country years in the data and we would expect that a constellation of 4 or more necessary parties AND an extraneous party to be quite rare.	
	gcseats3	Grand Coalition by seats (either)	1 if gcseats1 or gcseats2 = 1 0 otherwise	
Parties	partynoethnic	Ethnic Party Ban	1, if there is a law or constitutional amendment banning ethnically, religiously, or regionally based parties. 0, otherwise or if no evidence of such a policy is found in ~~The Europa World Factbook,~~ The Political Handbook of the World, the Parline database, or the constitution. -44, if no parties or only 1 party is allowed are allowed.	This is rare, and generally noted, if it exists, either in the "electoral system" section of Parline or the "Political Parties" section of the Political Handbook of the World.
Mutual Veto	mveto	Mutual Veto	1, if there is any provision for minority veto over a particular area of policy; e.g. if the approval of an ethnic minority is necessary for any change of language or cultural policy. 0, otherwise or if no evidence of such a policy is found in ~~The Europa World Factbook,~~ The Political Handbook of the World, the Parline database, or the constitution.	These two arrangements are rare, but are generally listed in multiple sources if they exist.

			*Often, mutual veto is not explicitly delineated in the constitution; rather, it is often inferred after considering the reserved seats within a country's legislature (i.e. resseats). If reseats is not 0, i.e. there are seats reserved for minority groups, and vetoes require a certain majority of the legislature (thereby including the entirety of the reserved minority group), then mveto can be coded as a 1.	
Reserved Exec Positions	resman	Reserved Executive Positions (Mandated)	1, if it is mandated that particular executive positions be reserved for members of particular ethnic, linguistic, caste, or religious MINORITY groups; 0, otherwise *This does not include countries, such as Turkmenistan, where all government posts are reserved for members of the dominant ethnic group.	
	resimp	Reserved Executive Positions (Implemented)	1, if the particular executive positions reserved for members of particular ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups are held by members of that group; 0, otherwise. *If reserved positions are mandated, and non-implementation of the mandate isn't noted in ~~The Europa World Yearbook~~, The Political Handbook of the World, or the Parline database, code 1	
Reserved Legislative Seats	resseats	Reserved Legislative seats (Mandated)	1, if a certain number of legislative seats (lower house) are reserved for members of particular ethnic, linguistic, caste, or religious MINORITY groups, then divide the number of seats reserved for minorities by the total number of seats in that house of the legislature. 0, otherwise. *This variable is coded only for the lower house of the parliament. *If seats are reserved for the majority group, but not for minority groups, this is coded 0. For example, Samoa reserves 95% of its seats for ethnic Samoans, who make up 92% of the population. The other two seats are open for any group (including Samoan). Resseats is coded 0 for Samoa.	Parline electoral rules note this. So does the Political Handbook of the World under "constitution and government"
	~~resseats2~~	~~Reserved Legislative seats (mandated)~~	~~1, if greater at least 10% of the seats in the legislature are reserved for minority groups (i.e. reseats ≥ .1)~~ ~~1, if reserved seats exist, but account for less than 10% of total seats (i.e. 0 < resseats < .1~~ ~~0, if no seats are reserved for minority groups (i.e. resseats = 0)~~	~~This is created mechanically~~
	resseatsimp	Reserved Legislative seats (implemented)	1, if the legislative seats reserved for members of particular ethnic, linguistic, or religious group are held by members of that group; 0, otherwise -44, if not mandated	

			If reserved seats are mandated, and non-implementation of the mandate isn't noted in ~~The Europa World Yearbook~~, The Political Handbook of the World, or the Parline database, code 1	
Religion	relestablish	State establishment of religion	0, if the state has no established religion. 1, if the state has multiple established religions. 2, if the state has one established religion. ~~*If the state singles out a single religion for support, this counts as establishment.~~ *De Facto state support of a particular religion is insufficient to code 1 or 2. The constitution must denote a single religion as the religion of the state. If no constitution, code 0.	Fox has this data back to 1990. We code primarily from the constitution, also, Library of Congress case studies.
	~~relestablish_binary~~	~~State Establishment of Religion~~	~~1 the constitution denotes a single religion as the state religion~~ ~~0 otherwise~~ ~~*If multiple religions are given the status of official state religion, code 0.~~ ~~*De Facto state support of a particular religion is NOT sufficient to code 1. The constitution must denote a single religion as the religion of the state.~~	See above.
	relrestrict	State restriction of (minority)[1] religions	0, if no (minority) religions are illegal and there are no significant restrictions on minority religions. 1, if no (minority) religions are illegal but some or all (minority) religions have practical limitations placed upon them or some religions have benefits not given to others due to some form of official recognition or status not given to all religions. 2, if no religions are illegal but some or all (minority) religions have legal limitations placed upon them. 3, if some (minority) religions are illegal. 4, all (minority) religions are illegal. *These guidelines are drawn directly from Jonathan Fox. However, because categories 0 and 1 are not mutually exclusive, we make the following minor clarification: if no religions are illegal or restricted, but benefits ARE given to some religions that are not given to others, code 1. ~~*While Fox's data was consulted in coding this variable, in a significant number of cases our coding differs from his (see coding notes for descriptions of these instances). We have also significantly expanded the coverage of the variable.~~	Fox has this data back to 1990. Freedom House is used to extend it forward. Pre-1990 we have a high level of missing data. See also 2007 State Department Report on International Religious Freedom.

[1] The word "minority" is placed in parentheses in this coding in order to recognize that states with no official of favored religion may discriminate against all religions but states with official or favored religions will discriminate only against minority religions. (Fox 2004 codebook, p. 4)

			~~Recent years of these variables are coded from Freedom House case studies and the 2007 State Department Report on International Religious Freedom, as well as Library of Congress country studies and other core sources. The Freedom House studies are available back to 1979, but in earlier years the studies are often insufficiently detailed to code from. There remains a great deal of missing data prior to 1991, though the information necessary to code is generally available. Coding this variable prior to 1991 has been treated as a low priority, but coding post 1999 was given high priority.~~	
	relconstp	Religion protected (practice)	1, if the freedom of worship or religious practice is guaranteed in the constitution (or peace agreement if no constitution is in place). 0, otherwise. -44, if there is no constitution or constitution is suspended. *If freedom of religious belief or freedom of conscience is protected, score 1. Similarly, if "freedom of religion" is generically protected, score 1. *In many analyses, it makes sense to code this variable as 0 where it is -44	Coded from the constitution
	relconstd	Religion protected (discrimination)	1, if there is a constitutional provision (or provision in a peace agreement if no constitution is in force) against discrimination on the basis of religion. 0, otherwise. -44, if there is no constitution or constitution is suspended. *A provision that all citizens are equal before the law is not sufficient to warrant a score of 1. Religion must be specifically mentioned in a clause on nondiscrimination. Similarly, a genercoic statement of "freedom of religion" or freedom of belief or conscience does NOT justify a score of 1 here. *In many analyses, it makes sense to code this variable as 0 where it is -44	
Federalism	stconst	Regional Constituencies in the Upper House	1, if the states/provinces are the constituencies of a majority of legislators in the upper (or only) house; 0, otherwise (and 0 if no legislature).	These variables are coded by DPI, but we filled in substantial numbers of missing values.
	state	State/provincial governments locally elected	0, if neither legislature or executive is elected at the local level. 1, if the legislature is locally elected but the executive appointed by the central government. 2, if both the legislature and executive are locally elected. *If executive is elected/appointed by a locally elected legislature, then score 2. *If executive power is shared between a locally elected executive and a centrally appointed one, code 1.	

			*If no states/provinces, code 0	
	muni[2]	Municipal governments locally elected	0, if neither legislature nor executive is elected at the local level. 1, if the legislature is locally elected but the executive appointed. 2, if both the legislature and executive are locally elected. *If executive is elected/appointed by a locally elected legislature, then score 2. *If executive power is shared between a locally elected executive and a centrally appointed one, code 1. *If executive is locally elected but legislature is not, code 1.	~~Same as above. Also citymayors.com is a core source used for this variable.~~
	subtax	Sub-national tax authority	1, if state/provincial governments have control to levy their own taxes; 0, otherwise. 0, if no states/provinces or equivalent level of government. *For countries with autonomous regions (auton = 1), this variable is coded for states/provinces/regions OTHER THAN the autonomous region i.e. if the autonomous region levies its own taxes and other regions do not, code 0.	These variables are labor intensive to code. Sub-Police is easy – that comes from the Encyclopedia of World Police and Penal Systems. The other two are drawn from constitutions and articles and books about federalism in particular regions of the world.
	subed	Sub-national education authority	1, if state/provincial governments have control of education policy; ~~.5 if state/provincial governments and the national government share control of education policy~~ 0, otherwise *Control of education policy is distinct from provision of education – if schools are run by the local government but curriculum and other policies are set by the central government, score 0. *Note: For countries with autonomous regions (auton = 1), this variable is coded for states/provinces/regions OTHER THAN the autonomous region i.e. if the autonomous region has the ability to control its own education policy and other regions do not, code 0 (This is extremely rare).	
	subpolice	Sub-national police authority	1, if sub-national governments (municipal or state/regional) have control of local police/paramilitary forces in their area; ~~.5 if sub-national governments and the central government share control of the local police/paramilitary forces in their area.~~ 0, if the central government is in exclusive control of police/paramilitary forces.	

[2] The variables State and Muni can be combined into the 5th component of Brancati's index of decentralization by adding 1 if either State or Muni is coded 1).

			*Note: For countries with autonomous regions (i.e. auton = 1), this is coded for states/provinces/regions OTHER THAN the autonomous region i.e. if the autonomous region has police/paramilitary forces and other regions don't, code 0.	
	fedunits	Change in federal units	1, if there is creation, division, merger, or elimination of any highest order subnational units during the calendar year in question. 0, otherwise. *If highest order subnational units exist only as administrative extensions of the central government i.e. if state = 0 and auton = 0, then fedunits cannot take a score of 1. *If the boundaries of these units is adjusted, but no units are not created, merged, or eliminated, code 0	
	auton	Asymmetric federalism	We use the auton variable from DPI and simply extend it forward to 2010. Following the DPI coding: 1, if there are one or more autonomous regions. 0, otherwise or if no information is available.	There is a fairly low level of missing values in DPI, but we supplemented it where it is missing.
Military				
	milleg	Military legislator ban	1, if there is a constitutional provision (or provision in the peace agreement in the case of transitional governments) against active members of the armed forces holding seats in the legislature, or if the Parline database notes such a restriction in its section on legislative incompatibilities. 0, otherwise -44, if there is no legislature * Coding note: If only full time members of the armed forces or only career officers are banned from holding office, still code 1. Any ban is considered a ban. * If the constitution prohibits the military from "participating" in elections or participating in politics, then milleg, milvote, and milparty all are scored 1.	Coded from the constitution and the "electoral rules" section of Parline.
	miman	Inclusive Military	1 if it is mandated that all major groups (e.g. ethnic, religious, or linguistic groups) be represented in the military or its officer corps, or that the military or its officer corps be representative of different regions; 0 otherwise *This provision is coded 0 if no evidence of such a mandate is found. Due to a lack of good secondary sources for this variable, there are possibly cases for which a mandate is in place, but not recorded.	This is coded primarily from the constitution.

	~~mfound~~	~~Foundational Military~~	~~1 if the military is assigned by the constitution to preserve the constitution from infringement by other political actors.~~ ~~0 otherwise~~	Coded from the constitution (easy)
	milvote	Constitutional provision against military voting	1, if there is a constitutional provision (or provision in a peace agreement if no constitution exists) denying active-duty members of the military the right to vote, or if a ban on voting by members of the military is noted in the Parline database. 0, otherwise. -44, if no military or no elections.	Constitution and Parline
	milparty	Constitutional provision against members of the military belonging to political parties	1, if there is a constitutional provision (or provision in a peace agreement if no constitution exists) banning members of the military from belonging to political parties. 0, otherwise. -44, if no military or no political parties. * If the constitution prohibits the military from "participating" in elections or participating in politics, then milleg, milvote, and milparty all are scored 1.	Code these two from the constitution and "Political Parties" section of Political Handbook. Also Library of Congress country studies.
	milparty2	Mandatory party membership	1, if there is a constitutional provision (or provision in the peace agreement in the case of transitional governments) requiring that military officers belong to a particular party (i.e. the ruling party). 0, otherwise. -44, if no military or no political parties.	
Judiciary (for the highest, constitutionally concerned court)	jtenure	Judicial Tenure	0, if terms are 6 years or less. 1, if terms are longer than 6 years but less than lifelong. 2, if terms are lifelong or until a mandated retirement age. *In countries with a court of constitutional review, we code tenure of these judges. In countries with no court of constitutional review, we code for the highest appellate court -44, if in countries with no appellate courts – this is common the first few years after independence.	These variables were coded from the constituion, or if they're not there (they usually are), then the Library of Congress country studies and/or region-specific sources like the United Nations Development Programme's Program on Governance in the Arab Region
	jcause	Judge removal without cause (Supreme Court)	1, if judges can be removed from office without cause (e.g. serve at the pleasure of the chief executive. 0, otherwise. *In countries with a court of constitutional review, we code rules regarding these judges. In countries with no court of constitutional review, we code for the highest appellate court.	

	japptbr	Judicial appointments	1, if the power to appoint judges to the highest court is divided between branches of govt (e.g. if all justices are nominated by the executive and confirmed by the legislative, or if a certain number of justices are appointed by each branch; or if the exec appoints from a list provided by the legislature or other body) 2, if the power to appoint judges to the highest court is held by the executive branch only 3, if the power to appoint judges is held by the legislative branch only (In countries with a court of constitutional review, code how these judges are appointed. In countries with no court of constitutional review, code for the highest appellate court) 4, if the power to appoint judges is not shared between branches and judges are appointed neither by the legislative nor the executive branch; e.g. appointed by lower court judges, or a special judicial commission. *Note: A 1 is not coded if either appointment is made with the "advice" of "in consultation with" another body, such as a judicial commission, but not necessarily with its consent. A 1 is also not coded if the body with which one branch shares authority is comprised of members appointed by that branch. When it is not known how the members of a body are appointed, it is presumed that the body is not an independent check on appointment authority and a 1 is not coded. *Note: If there is a figurehead executive, then division of power with this individual is not counted and a 1 is not coded.	These two variables were coded from the constitution, or if they're not there (they usually are), then look at Library of Congress country studies and/or region-specific sources like the United Nations Development Programme's Program on Governance in the Arab Region
	~~japptbr_binary~~	~~Judicial Appointments~~	~~1 if the power to appoint judges to the highest court is divided between branches of govt (e.g. if all justices are nominated by the executive and confirmed by the legislative, or if a certain number of justices are appointed by each branch; or if the exec appoints from a list provided by the legislature or other body); or if judicial appointments are made by lower court judges or a special judicial commission (i.e. if japptBr is coded a 1 or a 4).~~ ~~0 if the power to appoint judges rests with a single branch of government (i.e. if japptBr is coded 2 or 3).~~	

	jconst	Judicial constitution	1, if the role of the supreme court or judiciary is specified in the constitution; 0, otherwise *To justify a score of 1, the following items must ALL be specified in the constitution: 1. The jurisdiction of the court 2. The appointment of judges 3. The tenure of judges *If there is no constitution in force, this variable takes a value of 0, rather than -44 This is due to the fact that a court gains power from a constitutional mandate, and that (lack of) mandate is the concept at issue in coding this variable.	Constitution only
	jrevman	Judicial review	1, if the judicial branch has the power to declare the actions of the legislature or executive unconstitutional; 0, otherwise.	Constitution only
Violation of Mandated Powersharing	~~violation~~	~~Dummy for Violation of Mandated Powersharing~~	~~1 if violations if any of the following institutions are mandated and not implemented:~~ ~~Reserved executive positions~~ ~~Reserved legislative seats (for minorities or interest groups)~~ ~~Grand Coalitions~~	Created mechanically