STATEMENTS

LIBERALIZATION

1 L 1 - Significant public concessions at the level of human rights
2 L 2 - No or almost no political prisoners
3 L 3 - Increased tolerance for dissidence/public opposition
4 L 4 - More than 1 legally recognized independent political party
5 L 5 - At least 1 recognized opposition party in Parliament or constituent assembly
6 L 6 - Trade unions or professional associations not controlled by state agencies or governing parties
7 L 7 - Independent press and access to alternative means of information tolerated by government

DEMOCRATIZATION/ Mode of Transition

8 D 1- Social/political movements opposing the existing regime enter into public negotiations with it
9 D 2 - Open & acknowledged conflicts within administrative apparatus of the state over public policies
10 D 3 - Formal legal changes introduced to limit arbitrary use of powers by regime
11 D 4 - Constitutional or legal changes introduced that eliminate the role of non-accountable powers of veto-groups
12 D 5 - Constitution drafted and ratified that guarantees equal political rights and civil freedoms to all citizens
13 D 6 - Founding elections held
14 D 7 - They have been free and fair
15 D 8 - Their results have been widely accepted

CONSOLIDATION

16 C 1 - No significant political party advocates changes in the existing constitution
17 C 2 - Regular elections held and their outcomes are respected by public authority and major opposition parties
18 C 3 - They have been free and fair
19 C 4 - No significant parties or groups reject previous electoral conditions
20 C 5 - Electoral volatility has diminished significantly
21 C 6 - Elected official & representatives not constrained in their behavior by non-elected veto group within country
22 C 7 - 1st rotation-in-power or significant shift in alliances of parties occurred within the rules established
23 C 8 - 2nd rotation-in-power or significant shift in alliances of parties occurred within the rules established
24 C 9.1 - Agreement, formal and informal, on association formation and behavior
25 C 9.2 - Agreement, formal and informal, on executive format
26 C 9.3 - Agreement, formal and informal, on territorial division of competence
27 C 9.4 - Agreement, formal and informal, on rules of ownership & access to media

QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY

28 Q 1 - Agreements on these partial regimes and constitution itself are effectively applied to all groups & territories

29 Q 2 - Conditions of effective political competition equal for most citizens & groups

30 Q 3 - Effective participatory equality produced greater substantive (income) equality for most citizens & groups

31 Q 4 - Voter turnout decreased or increased significantly, or remained the same over 3 successive national elections

32 Q 5 - Membership in associations & movements increased & extended its coverage to wider range of interests

33 Q 6 - Individuals show an increasing tendency to regard themselves as "politically efficacious"

34 Q 7 - Gender equality has improved

SCALOGRAM SCORING INSTRUCTIONS

1. THE CODING SCHEME

0 = this item does not have this trait/characteristic/condition in this year
0,5 = this item has only some of this trait during this year or has declined in this trait during the year
0 = this item does have this trait/characteristic/condition in this year (and it may have even improved its command of this trait)

2. THE DATING SCHEME

Normally, the trait will be given the same score for the entire year. For events or processes that occur at the very end or beginning of the year, use your judgement and attribute it either to the coming or the past year if you think that it "really" occurred then. Report, if necessary, the specific month in which the event occurred in the 'comments document'.

3. THE POINT OF DEPARTURE

Normally, each trait will be coded (0) until the year in which it is first acquired, either partially (0,5) or fully (1). For traits that were acquired before the process of regime change began –for example, civilian control over the military in Eastern Europe- the positive scores will begin by convention in the year 1974 when the current "wave of democratization" can be said to have begun. Do not code any items before 1974, even though several polities have made previous attempts to democratize at earlier points in time. Without denying the importance of some "memory" of previous democratization (e.g. Chile, Uruguay and Czechoslovakia), our analysis will focus upon the contemporary period and, hence, presume that its patterns and sequences are distinctive –or at least not identical with those of previous periods.

SCALOGRAM CODING BOOK

I. Liberalization

1. The regime makes significant public concessions at the level of human rights
   [NB no change in score if human rights performance improves beyond original concessions. We may be able to tap into Amnesty International on this one, but it is important to retain an element of discretion in the sense that what might be an important concession in one country or type of autocracy – e.g. freedom to travel abroad – may not be elsewhere].

2. The regime has no (or almost no) political prisoners
   [NB difficulty of discriminating between 'terrorists' who have committed acts of violence of theft that would have been prosecuted under criminal law and 'political opponents' who may have violated existing criminal law in expressing their demands]

3. The regime demonstrates increased tolerance for dissidence / public opposition by social groups or formal / informal organizations (e.g. parties, associations or movements)
   [NB no changes in score for further increases in tolerance beyond an initial threshold, only for decreases and subsequent recuperation]

4. There exists more than one legally recognized independent political party
   [NB difficulty in dealing with very minor parties or with parties that are recognized but under the control of the government or governing party. Neither should be counted]

5. There exists at least one recognized opposition party in parliament or constituent assembly
   [NB difficulty in determining when/how a party is 'in opposition'. Simply, not being in government is not equivalent to being in opposition. Must be a non-governing party that aspires to govern and stands some chance of doing so. Should not count extremely small or highly localized parties even though they might be capable of playing a local role]

6. There exist trade unions or professional associations that are not controlled by state agencies or governing parties
   [NB difficulty in classifying 'civic association' and/or 'social movements and separating them from unions and associations. Possible complications due to public financing and other more subtle forms of control, e.g. co-optation]

7. There is an independent press and access to alternative means of information that are tolerated by the government

II. Democratization/ Mode of Transition

8. Social / political movements opposing the existing regime enter into public negotiations with the regime
   [NB that not all transitions including "pacting" and that this indicator introduces a bias in favor of this behavior. Also, note that the unit continues to receive a 1 after the pacting is over, or at least until some attempt to reach an agreement is unsuccessful].

9. There exist open conflicts within the administrative apparatus of the state over public policies and these are acknowledged by the government

10. Formal legal changes are introduced that are intended to limit arbitrary use of powers by regime
    [NB we might specify a list of these changes, e.g. habeas corpus, etc., and differentiate them from the 'full constitutional package' in item 12]

11. Constitutional or legal changes are introduced that eliminate the role of non-accountable powers of veto-groups.
    [NB we should specify the potentially non-accountable powers or veto-groups that we have in mind: the military, the previous ruling party (and its militia), the official Church or clergy, perhaps even the civil service of the previous regime. There is a rather delicate issue here involving the inverse trend, as exemplified by the growing autonomy of Central Banks]

12. A constitution has been drafted and ratified that guarantees equal political rights and civil freedoms to all citizens

13. "Founding elections" have been held

14. They have been free and fair

15. Their results have been widely accepted
    [NB the definition of a 'founding election' as having 1) genuine uncertainty of outcome; 2) multiple competing parties; 3) inclusion of a broad spectrum of political and social groups; 4) high votre turnout; 5) honest counting of the votes; 6) an outcome in terms of distribution of vote and seats that is regarded as an accurate reflection of citizen preferences]

III. Consolidation

16. No significant political party advocates changes in the existing constitution
    [NB need for a definition of 'significant' especially given the contrast between nationally and locally significant, e.g. los Vascos]

17. Regular elections are held and their outcomes are respected by those in positions of public authority and major opposition parties.
    [NB again, what is a 'major' party? And what are the acts of public authority that do not respect the outcomes. What about cases involving individual constituencies or candidacies? Presumably, a negative score indicates a "pattern" of disrespect, not isolated cases of contestation].]

18. They have been free and fair
    [NB here, contrary to item 17, the evaluation rests not upon whether there is a reaction by authorities or opposition parties, but whether outsiders consider that the fairness of elections has declined. Also, note the issue of fairness prior to the actual election in such things as campaign finance and access to media]

19. No significant parties or groups reject the previous electoral conditions

20. Electoral volatility has diminished significantly
    [NB here, we could use a standard statistical indicator such as the SD in results or Rae's Index or Party Fragmentation]

21. Elected officials and representatives are not constrained in their behavior by non-elected veto groups within the country
    [NB in item 11, we asked for the formal prohibition upon this, here, we are looking for informal constraints up to an including plots, coups d'état, boycots, etc.]

22. A 1st rotation-in-power or significant shift in alliances of parties in power has occurred within the rules already established
    [NB the ambiguity in 'significant'. Should a rotation in power at the municipal or provincial level count, even if there is no such change at the national level – eg Italy and Japan ?]

23. A 2nd rotation-in-power or significant shift in alliances of parties in power has occurred within the rules already established
    [NB the ambiguity in 'significant'. Should a rotation in power at the municipal or provincial level count, even if there is no such change at the national level – eg Italy and Japan ?]

24. Agreement, formal and informal, have been reached on the rules governing selected, i.e. major, partial regimes:
    - 24.1. Association formation and behavior (especially the right to strike).
    - 24.2. Executive format
    - 24.3. Territorial division of *compétences*
    - 24.4. Rules of ownership and access to mass media

    [NB Here, obviously, we have to get more specific and probably more parsimonious and select only those partial regimes that we think more crucial for regime consolidation. Also, what about situations in which these partial regimes are inherited from the ancien regime more-or-less unchanged?]

IV. Quality of Democracy

25. These agreements on partial regimes, as well as the constitution, itself, are effectively applied to all groups and territories

26. The conditions of effective political competition are equal for most citizens and groups
    [NB this cannot be an absolute measure or no democracy ever existing would qualify. Perhaps, it should read: 'the conditions…. have become more equal…' in

which case the code-word is 'effective' and, hence, not limited to legal/ constitutional formalities]

27. This effective participatory equality has produced greater substantive (i.e. income) equality for most citizens and groups. The scoring will be 0 = regression; 0.5 = no change; 1 = greater substantive equality.
[NB this is usually measured in terms of family income and a decrease in the corresponding Gini index of its distribution and, hence, may not reflect persistent disparities in the gender distribution of income (Item 30). Also note that this says nothing about differences in the distribution of property and wealth].

28. Vote turnout has decreased significantly (0) or increased significantly (1) or remained the same (0,5) over three successive national elections (use moving average)

29. Membership in associations and movements has tended to increase and extend its coverage to a wider range of interests/passions in the society
[NB the need to survey a wide range of associations and movements and not just the trade unions, professional associations or 'bowling societies' since any one category of civil society may be in rise of decline for reasons having nothing to do with democracy]

30. Individuals, as measured by survey research, show an increasing tendency to regard themselves as "politically efficacious," i.e. believe that their opinions and actions can make some difference in the outcome of public life.
[NB needless to say, not only might this data not be available everywhere, but small difference either in wording or cultural interpretation can make difficult to assess the answers. NB however, that the evaluation is internal – whether individuals feel more or less efficacious over time – not in comparison with another country]

31. Social and/or economic equality between men and women has improved.
[As measured by a decrease in the disparity between male and female unemployment, not female labor force participation ratio. Or could also use decrease in the disparity between earnings of men and women, if available. NB that this would not include increased political equality as measured, for example, by more winning female candidates for national or local offices].

ITEM-SEPCIFIC CLARIFICATIONS OF CODING RULES

Liberalization of Autocracy (LoA)

L6

Even if the autocratic rulers allow some of the interest organizations a certain degree of freedom, the fact that leaders of interest organizations have reasons to fear that they could be severely punished in case they behave wrongly, is enough to code L6 with 0.

L6

This item asks for the *de jure* allowance and de facto and existence of trade unions and professional organizations that are independent from the state and governing parties. Hence, it is of no relevance whether these independent interest organizations are capable of influencing the political process in a decisive way or not. This question came up during the coding of Peru where independent interest organizations exist but are weak. Following the rules, this has to be coded as 1.

L6

Unlike in most of the Latin American cases, in former Communist countries trade unions did exist during the autocratic period. However, the question in L6 is whether they are independent. In the case of former Communist countries, one has to widen the perspective on what could cause the dependence of trade unions. Here, the mechanisms for dependence are not limited to legal or political mechanisms. Instead, one has to add the economic dependence in two ways. First, trade unions might be state funded. Second, they might only exist in State-owned industries. The latter is the case, for instance, in Mongolia until the mid-nineties and it leads to a dependence of the trade union from State agencies.

L6

In former Communist countries, trade unions existed during the autocratic period and most of them survived to a certain extent the transition to democracy. However, the question in item L6 is whether they are independent. One could think that with the expulsion from power of the Communist parties in most former Communist countries, the trade unions gained their independence from the new (non-communist) governments and, thus, L6 should always score 1 where non-communist governments are in place. However, apart from the fact that also non-communist parties in government could establish legal and/or political means of controlling trade unions, there is yet another – economic – source of dependence. If trade unions mainly exist in those sectors of the economy that are (still) not privatized, then their independence from the state is constrained. This, for instance, is the case in Mongolia up to the mid-nineties.

L7

Generally, L7 refers to the press media. However, in case of a country in which the press does not play an important role (due to historical, geographical, infrastructural, or whatever reasons) and therefore the TV is the main source of information, which is accessible for virtually all citizens, the situation of the TV media becomes the relevant

information for coding L7. Notice that what L7 asks for is the free and fair access to alternative information. Hence, the kind of ownership is not *prima facie* relevant since under both, private and public ownership, the conditions of free access can be met.

L7

If there is a de facto accepted access to and a sufficient supply of foreign press, then this item is fulfilled. This applies, for instance, to Slovenia under the communist (Yugoslavian) regime.

L7

This item tries to indicate to what extent a political regime allows for a plurality of information. The question whether media are in public or private hands is one but not the only matter of concern. In addition, notice that the impact of public and private ownership of media on the score for this item changes drastically with the shift from an autocracy to a democracy. In an autocracy, state-owned television and press should always be a reason to have a closer look and check if the autocratic regime abuses the media for manipulation. In a democracy, instead, not only has public TV been the normal case for a long time, but it has also provided for more – not less - access to alternative information.
In sum, the dimension of private – public ownership is only loosely connected to what item L7 is supposed to indicate and a change in scores needs more than a reference to the kind of ownership of the media. It is item C12 where the question of private vs. public ownership issue is more important

L7, C12

In cases where there is threatening and killing of journalists, two items – L7 and C12 – are involved. On L7, the answer to whether to code a case with 0 would depend on who was (allegedly) doing the killing/ intimidation. If it is the government, then the coding is clearly a 0. If it is a rival political force, especially the opposition to the government, then it would not count.
On C12, the answer is a bit more complex since the judgement is not about state/government behavior, but about an agreement about the 'mass media regime' among a broader set of actors. The answer depends on whether the killing and intimidation can be connected to either rules of ownership and/or access. Gangster-like activity aimed at seizing a given newspaper or TV station would not count, but violence/ protest protecting the owners/ managers from government interference (e.g. recently in Prague) would count. A lot of this occurred during the Portuguese 'Revolucao' in 1975-6 and it would be scored negative for that period.

Mode of Transition (Mot)

D1

Item D1 refers to the negotiations between the authoritarian rulers and the democratic opposition. Hence, D1 is only coded as 1 for the year in which such negotiations took place. If the talks are abandoned while the authoritarian regime is still in power, then the score goes back to 0. If again negotiations are started, the score goes back to 1. If there were no significant negotiations going on during a transition, the code for D1 during the subsequent democratic period is 0.

D2

This item asks for the acknowledged conflict within the state apparatus:
The underlying assumption of this item is that conflicts within the autocratic state apparatus indicate a sort of weakness inside the ruling autocratic elite. This is commonly seen as an important condition for the subsequent process of democratization in which, ideal-typically, hard- and soft-liners on the autocratic regime side interact in different forms with reformers and revolutionaries on the democratic opposition side. From this, several coding specifications can be derived:
First, by state apparatus we refer, of course, to the autocratic state apparatus. Hence, the scores for this item remain unchanged from the moment on democracy is in place. That is to say, it carries on the score that has been assigned for the last year of autocracy.
Second, some difficulties arise in those cases of autocracies, in which the ruling autocrats allowed for a relatively wide range of conflict among themselves. The paradigmatic case for this is Mexico, where inner plurality of the ruling party PRI was a constant and outstanding feature of the autocratic regime. One could make the argument that in these cases, inner conflict is a sign of strength instead of weakness and a sign of a starting decline of authority. Put differently, there seem to be cases (like Mexico and, apparently, also Yemen) in which inner conflicts have become institutionalized, or turned into a ritual habit. If one would take this point of view, those kinds of cases would get a 0 for D2 (no conflicts in state apparatus) despite their numerous and publicly admitted disputes.
However, it has been decided not to follow this line of argument for the following reasons: Firstly, the decision of coding D2 with 0 despite gross conflicts rests on an unchecked assumption, namely that in some cases conflicts do not indicate the same as they do in other cases. Secondly, it increases the risk for inter-coder discrepancies because it would not be enough to just check whether conflicts happened. In addition to this, each coder would have to make the difficult judgement of whether the regime belongs to the type of autocracy that has learned to institutionalize conflicts within its apparatus. Thirdly, assigning a 0 for D2 despite conflicts happening regularly leads to the fact that one cannot make a difference between such cases and those in which no conflicts at all were allowed for. Hence, an important information for distinguishing different kinds of autocracies would be lost. Take, for example, Mexico and Chile under Pinochet. They clearly had different kinds of autocratic regimes and this is indicated if D2 is coded 1 in case conflicts happened. In sum, whenever conflicts within the state apparatus do occur and they are publicly admitted, then D2 is scored 1
Third, the term state apparatus refers to all those actors that are vested with the de jure and/ or de facto right to take collectively binding decision by exerting power through physical, financial, legal, and/or administrative means. Hence, the autocratic state apparatus includes members of the executive, the legislative, the judiciary and the military. Not included are actors like university professors, business people etc.

D5

The default coding for D5 prior to the transition period is 0 because, although there might have been a democratic constitution, most of the autocracies based their rule on some legally codified norms – not necessarily specified in the constitution itself. The abolishing of these rules that do not have a constitutional rank, is captured in D4 (1 from the year on in which the norms have been abolished).
D5, instead, scores 1 from the moment on in which a constitution has been drafted and ratified or, and this is important, the old democratic constitution becomes de jure and

de facto effective again. This is usually done by, at least, a publicly known decision to take the old constitution instead of drafting a new one. Hence, the underlying assumption of D5 (young democracies profit from a constitutional momentum) is fulfilled

One exception to the default coding of D5 during the autocratic period might be if the autocracy was an exceptionally soft one that did not base its power on non-democratic legal norms but on subtle, informally based practises of social control and coercion, such as clientilism, and populism (think of, for instance, Mexico). Since in these cases it is commonly difficult to clearly establish the moment in which the autocracy ends and democracy starts, it might be possible to code D5 with 1 (or 0.5) even for those years in which the political regime clearly was not democratic. However, such a coding has to be explicitly and extensively justified.

D6-D8, C2-C5, C7, C8 (items with references to elections)

First, before democracy starts, all items that refer to elections are coded with 0.

Second, once founding election were held the score for the respective items change and, afterwards, stay the same until the next elections are taking place. Hence, the coders are NOT supposed to find information for each single year on these items ... rather, it works the following way:

For the year in which national elections (presidential or parliamentary) were held, you have to find out whether they were free and fair, whether the results were accepted, and whether no one claimed that the conditions under which they were held were heavily biased. (If all answers are yes, the respective items are all coded with 1). The coders then keep on coding the following years - i.e. those in which no national elections were held - with the code you assigned for the year in which the election was held. You do so until the next election takes place and then, of course, you have to assess the respective items again and you keep on coding the following years with the new code!

This principle of keeping on coding a score although the event did not take place in the respective year is important and frequently applied in the scalogram. See, for instance, the questions for the first and second turn over (C7 and C8): They take place only once and in one specific year, however, from this year on, the country then always receives a 1 on this item!

Third, for all election items, the default units of analysis are the national elections. This implies that neither national referenda nor elections at the subnational level should be taken into account. However, in the case of subnational elections, there might be some exceptions: If one can convincingly argue that elections on the subnational level are functionally equivalent to national elections in certain countries and specific situations, these elections should be taken into account. This, for instance, seems to be the case for the regional elections held in Mexico in 1997 and in which, for the first time since more than half a century, the ruling party PRI did not win. However, this seems to be an exceptional case (very long rule of one party, subnational unit was an important one, media paid a lot of attention to it). Any deviation from the default setting (i.e., taking only national elections into account) needs to be justified extensively.

Consolidation of Democracy (CoD)

All CoD items

The default score before democracy is in place (roughly speaking, until item D6 (founding elections) receives a score of 1) for all CoD items is 0.
For most of the CoD items this is straightforward, because they explicitly intend to measure events and processes that, by definition, require the existence of democracy. It is less clear for those items that refer to the partial regimes (C9-C12). However, their default code before D6=1 is also 0. For exceptions, see below.

C1

The text of item C 1: 'No significant political party advocates changes in the existing constitution' seems to be confusing to the reader. The right argument can be made that democratic constitutions undergo a constant process of changes, not all of them are unanimously agreed on in the beginning. Hence, what is important for CoD and what item C1 is intended to measure is whether there are major changes in the constitution that are pushed through against the expressed disagreement of a substantive number of the political parties.

C1

The default coding for all CoD items before D6=1 is 0. The exceptions are the partial regime items C9-C12. However, in the case of Mexico – an outstanding case of a particularly long-lasting transition process – the exception is extended to item C1 (no party advocates changes in the existing constitutions). Not only is it true for Mexico that, in general, the political opposition could express their preferences during the autocratic period, but it is also the case, in particular, that they did so with respect to the existing constitution. In fact, it was the PRI regime itself that argued to be the safeguard of the revolutionary constitution and all opposition forces agreed on what was written in it. The PRI did not use constitutional means to stay in power. Hence, in Mexico C1 can receive the maximum score of 0.5 before the founding elections were held.

C4

The word 'previous' refers to the conditions under which the last elections were held. If, for instance, national elections were held in 1994, the relevant information is whether the relevant actors complain about the way this election was held. Hence, given that no party or group rejects the previous electoral conditions in the way explained above, it is irrelevant for coding this item whether actors keep on complaining about elections held in, say, 1990. Likewise, it is also irrelevant if they already complain about the conditions they foresee for the elections to be held in the future.

C6

Usually, one thinks of the military as one of the most important non-elected veto group. In some cases, however, the existence of tribes or well-organized criminal organizations and their role in the democratic regime can be the reason for coding C6 with a 0.

C6

General strikes do not usually count for C6, unless they are so protracted that they threaten the functioning of a democratic government itself (which is very rare).

C7

From the moment on the first rotation in power has occurred, this item scores1 for the rest of the years in the data set. Notice, however, the following:
a) Always give it a deep thought, what turn-over means: a mere change from one prime minister to another - both being from the same party - is definitely no turn-over. Neither is it one, if the ruling partner changes one of its small partners in coalition. However, it is a turn-over, if a different party leads the government.
b) An exception from the rule to keep on coding with one, once a turn-over has taken place might be, if the government that came to power by this turn-over, is ousted from power through a non-institutional procedure, or if their governing period lasts only for a very short time-period. In both cases, however, good arguments for going back to the score of 0 have to be found.

C7, C8

Generally, rotations in power at the sub-national level are not considered relevant for a change in scores of item C7 and C8. Not only are political systems too different regarding the importance of sub-national systems, but also are the different sub-national units inside one country of different political weight. However, the possibility of interpreting a shift in a regional government as a rotation in power relevant for a change in score of C7 or C8 should not be completely excluded. But, the reasons for doing so have to be extensively explicit and well argued.

C9 - C12 (Partial Regimes)

The default coding for all the partial regime items (C9-C12) prior to the transition to democracy, i.e. during the autocratic regime is 0 because what matters is the consensus on the way partial regimes are organized. The default assumption for the autocratic period is that the ruling autocrats did not ask for compliance and did not allow the expression of dissent. To code 0 is especially important in those cases in which the organization of specific partial regimes formed part of the way the autocracy worked (for instance, the abolishing of competencies of regional government in order to centralize power in the hands of a national military junta).
No default coding exists during the period of transition, i.e. when the old authoritarian rulers are still in power but democratic forces have entered the political picture. If the transition period is relatively short, the problem of coding the partial regime is minor. If it lasts for many years (e.g. Mexico or Brazil), one has to make qualified judgements on each of the items in case one assigns a score other than 0.
However, in the case of 'dictablandas' one might find good arguments that the existing democratic opposition had the possibilities to formulate their own ideas with regard to the different partial regimes and that they explicitly agreed on the way they were organized. This seems to be the case, for instance, in Mexico and the opposition's agreement on the presidential system. In order not to inflate the CoD scores for regimes that are not even full liberal democracies, the maximum score possible for the partial regime items prior to D6=1, is 0.5 and it has to be extensively justified why it is not 0.

C9 - C12 (Partial Regimes)

What matters is the consensus on the way things are organized - this is indicated with the score 1. Even if the actors decide to change the way a partial regime is organized, the appropriate score is still 1. Only in the case that they do not agree on *how* to organize it and keep on arguing about it, the scoring of the respective item goes back to 0.

C9

General strikes do only count for item C9 if the concern of the strike is the right to strike itself or some fundamental rule with regard to associability. Under such conditions, the coding of C9 is 0. That is to say, the general strike would clearly be an indication of non-acceptance by a significant group – unless, of course, a very marginal group calls the general strike and no one obeys it.

C10

This item asks about the agreement on the partial regime 'executive format' and one might wonder whether 'delegative tendencies' are evidence for assigning a score of 0. However, 'delegative tendencies' is a rather vague term. What counts, for example, is not whether the President rules by decree or not, but whether his doing so provokes a reaction from opposing political forces within (e.g. parliament, Constitutional Courts) and outside the government. If the President acts 'delegatively' and there is neither a serious response (i.e. more than grumbling) or a major appeal to the constitution (i.e. demand for a high court decision), then, this would indicate that the regime has a relatively stable set of rules concerning the executive format, even if those rules concentrate power in the executive and even if those are not precisely the rules enshrined in the constitution. In short, the issue is 'type of democracy' (and, eventually, 'quality of democracy'), not whether democracy has been consolidated. Incidentally, the same can be said about corruption. If it is tolerated without serious contestation, then corruption (of whatever origin) is simply part of the consolidated rules (e.g. 'lottizazzione' in Italy for a long time). Cases of the contested corruption of individuals or ruling cliques (e.g. Collor in Brazil) is an indication that the rules exist and people expect them to be applied. Hence, the prosecution of Collor seemed to be a sign that Brazil was following (new) rules that placed greater constraints on executive power – not that Brazil had no rules and was therefore 'unconsolidated'.

C11

This item tries to measure the extent to which the relevant actors agree on how the competencies between the national and the sub-national units of the political regime are distributed, both formally and informally. Disagreements about the formula how to distribute tax revenues are common to even the most consolidated democracies and, as such, no reason to code C11 with 0. It depends on whether behind the issue of money distribution (or, the distribution of any other resource such as legal or administrative ones) a deeper conflict or disagreement is hidden. This, for instance, seems to be the case in Spain were some of the regional governments demand more autonomy in fiscal and other matters. One can argue that these demands are used as a means to change the character of the territorial division of power more profoundly and – what is crucial – in a non-consensual way since neither the central government nor many of the other regions shares the point of view of the Catalans and some other regional governments.

C12

The access has to be free and equal for everyone – not only but first and foremost for political parties.

C12

This item asks for the consensus on the rules of ownership and access to media. One issue to look at is the private–public ownership of the media (predominantly the broadcasting media radio and TV). For each of the two kinds of ownership, the question of monopoly, or, concentration of control is crucial. In the case of private media one important question is: How much of the market do the actors allow to be controlled by a single person (media group)? In the case of public media, the questions are: Who determines the content of the program? Is the opposition in parliament integrated in the process of assigning the leading personnel? Do the regional units of the state have the right to run an own public television? The last issue came up during the coding of Spain where the right to have their own TV and radio was granted to the Basque and the Catalan government in 1983 and not before. However, it has to be always kept in mind that what matters for all the items on the partial regimes (C9 – C12) is the degree of consensus among the actors on the way they organize the respective partial regimes. Hence, if they only want to have privately or publicly owned TV and radio, and everybody agrees on this, the correct score is 1. (Notice that if the way how the media regime is organized leads to insufficient access and plurality of the media, it has to be reflected in L7 not in C12.)