How the United Nations Targets Human Rights Public Diplomacy

Online Appendix

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A Summary Statistics

Table A1 reports summary statistics for variables used in the main analysis. Table A2 reports the total number of visits and mean visits per year by individual officials, alongside their official positions. Figure A1 shows temporal trends of visits made by these 12 individuals in our sample.

Table A1: Summary Statistics

	n	mean	sd	min	max
Official Visit	3534	0.07	0.26	0.00	1.00
Physical Integrity Rights	3534	0.55	1.47	-2.56	5.34
Democratic Episode	3534	0.14	0.35	0.00	1.00
Autocratic Episode	3534	0.11	0.32	0.00	1.00
Peacekeepers	3534	0.39	2.17	0.00	25.57
Polyarchy	3534	0.53	0.26	0.01	0.92
Population	3534	16.00	1.69	11.28	21.06
GDP	3534	24.39	2.10	18.72	30.61

Table A2: Total Visits and Mean Visits Per Year by OHCHR Official

Official	Position	Total Visits	Mean Visits per Year
Andrew Gilmour	Assistant Secretary-General	30	7.500
Bertrand Ramcharan	Acting High Commissioner	1	1.000
Bertrand Ramcharan	Deputy High Commissioner	7	3.500
Flavia Pansieri	Deputy High Commissioner	7	2.333
Ivan Simonovic	Assistant Secretary-General	48	8.000
Kate Gilmore	Deputy High Commissioner	34	6.800
Kyung-wha Kang	Deputy High Commissioner	32	4.571
Kyung-wha Kang	High Commissioner	1	1.000
Louise Arbor	High Commissioner	39	7.800
Mary Robinson	High Commissioner	62	12.400
Michelle Bachelet	High Commissioner	25	12.500
Navi Pillay	High Commissioner	74	9.250
Sergio Vieira de Mello	High Commissioner	6	6.000
Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein	High Commissioner	45	9.000



Figure A1: Visits by OHCHR officials over time

B Full Results for Main Models

Table A3 presents the baseline model (Model 1) and full model (Model 2). We use these estimates to produce Figures 3 and 4, as well as the predicted probability plots in Figures 5 and 6.

Table A3: Full Results for Baseline and Full Models

	Dependent variable:	
	Official Visit	
	(1)	(2)
Physical Integrity Rights	−0.216***	−0.186***
	(0.049)	(0.050)
Democratic Episode		0.277***
		(0.086)
Autocratic Episode		0.149
		(0.113)
Peacekeepers		0.029**
		(0.013)
Polyarchy	0.156	0.055
	(0.198)	(0.201)
Population	0.057	0.045
	(0.044)	(0.044)
GDP	−0.014	0.009
	(0.034)	(0.034)
Constant	−2.071***	−2.491***
	(0.434)	(0.441)
Observations	3534	3534
Log Likelihood	-859.1071	-849.8656
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table A4 presents the full results that produce the coefficient plot in Figure 7.

Table A4: Full Results for Conference Visits Model

	Dependent variable:
	Conference Visit
Physical Integrity Rights	0.194^{***}
	(0.073)
Democratic Episode	0.029
	(0.201)
Autocratic Episode	−0.238
	(0.305)
Peacekeepers	0.016
	(0.030)
Polyarchy	0.129
	(0.384)
Population	0.194
	(0.166)
GDP	0.068
	(0.120)
Constant	-7.179^{***}
	(0.822)
Observations	3534
Log Likelihood	-308.183
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C Robustness Checks

C.1 High Commissioner-fixed effects

Table A5 reports the top three visit sites (including tied places) for each official in our dataset. OHCHR officials seem to vary slightly in regional priorities, which may reflect ongoing conflicts during the officials' tenure as well as differences in individuals' preferences. For example, Michelle Bachelet travels widely visiting each country once, whereas repeated travel in the United States and European countries stand out for Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein.

We account for these differences in models that include High Commissioner-fixed effects. Table A6 reports the results, which remain substantively the same.

Table A5: Top 3 Visit Sites (Including Ties) by OHCHR Official

Official	Position	Country Visited	Visits
Andrew Gilmour	Assistant Secretary-General	Kenya	2
Andrew Gilmour	Assistant Secretary-General	Afghanistan	1
Andrew Gilmour	Assistant Secretary-General	Bangladesh	1
Andrew Gilmour	Assistant Secretary-General	Belgium	1
Andrew Gilmour	Assistant Secretary-General	Burkina Faso	1
Andrew Gilmour	Assistant Secretary-General	Canada	1
Andrew Gilmour	Assistant Secretary-General	Central African Republic	1
Andrew Gilmour	Assistant Secretary-General	Colombia	1
Andrew Gilmour	Assistant Secretary-General	Costa Rica	1
Andrew Gilmour	Assistant Secretary-General	Democratic Republic of Congo	1
Andrew Gilmour	Assistant Secretary-General	Denmark	1
Andrew Gilmour	Assistant Secretary-General	France	1
Andrew Gilmour	Assistant Secretary-General	Honduras	1
Andrew Gilmour	Assistant Secretary-General	Ireland	1
Andrew Gilmour	Assistant Secretary-General	Kyrgyzstan	1
Andrew Gilmour	Assistant Secretary-General	Liberia	1
Andrew Gilmour	Assistant Secretary-General	Mali	1
Andrew Gilmour	Assistant Secretary-General	Mauritania	1
Andrew Gilmour	Assistant Secretary-General	Morocco	1
Andrew Gilmour	Assistant Secretary-General	Niger	1
Andrew Gilmour	Assistant Secretary-General	Senegal	1
Andrew Gilmour	Assistant Secretary-General	Somalia	1
Andrew Gilmour	Assistant Secretary-General	South Sudan	1
Andrew Gilmour	Assistant Secretary-General	Switzerland	1
Andrew Gilmour	Assistant Secretary-General	Tajikistan	1
Andrew Gilmour	Assistant Secretary-General	Tunisia	1
Andrew Gilmour	Assistant Secretary-General	United Kingdom	1
Andrew Gilmour	Assistant Secretary-General	United States	1
Andrew Gilmour	Assistant Secretary-General	Yemen	1
Bertrand Ramcharan	Deputy High Commissioner	Azerbaijan	1
Bertrand Ramcharan	Deputy High Commissioner	Ivory Coast	1
Bertrand Ramcharan	Deputy High Commissioner	Kazakhstan	1
Bertrand Ramcharan	Deputy High Commissioner	Kyrgyzstan	1
Bertrand Ramcharan	Acting High Commissioner	Mozambique	1
Bertrand Ramcharan	Deputy High Commissioner	Tajikistan	1
Bertrand Ramcharan	Deputy High Commissioner	Turkmenistan	1
Bertrand Ramcharan	Deputy High Commissioner	Uzbekistan	1
Flavia Pansieri	Deputy High Commissioner	Cambodia	1

Flavia Pansieri	Deputy High Commissioner	Colombia	1
Flavia Pansieri	Deputy High Commissioner	Democratic Republic of Congo	1
Flavia Pansieri	Deputy High Commissioner	Guatemala	1
Flavia Pansieri	Deputy High Commissioner	Moldova	1
Flavia Pansieri	Deputy High Commissioner	Togo	1
Flavia Pansieri	Deputy High Commissioner	Yemen	1
Ivan Simonovic	Assistant Secretary-General	Ukraine	6
Ivan Simonovic	Assistant Secretary-General	Burundi	3
Ivan Simonovic	Assistant Secretary-General	Ethiopia	3
Kate Gilmore	Deputy High Commissioner	Austria	2
Kate Gilmore	Deputy High Commissioner	Belgium	2
Kate Gilmore	Deputy High Commissioner	Canada	2
Kate Gilmore	Deputy High Commissioner	Denmark	2
Kate Gilmore	Deputy High Commissioner	Netherlands	2
Kate Gilmore	Deputy High Commissioner	United Kingdom	2
Kate Gilmore	Deputy High Commissioner	United States	2
Kyung-wha Kang	Deputy High Commissioner	Kenya	2
Kyung-wha Kang	High Commissioner	Kyrgyzstan	2
Kyung-wha Kang	Deputy High Commissioner	Nepal	2
Louise Arbor	High Commissioner	Afghanistan	2
Louise Arbor	High Commissioner	Ethiopia	2
Louise Arbor	High Commissioner	Nepal	2
Louise Arbor	High Commissioner	Russia	2
Louise Arbor	High Commissioner	Sudan	2
Mary Robinson	High Commissioner	China	6
Mary Robinson	High Commissioner	Mexico	3
Mary Robinson	High Commissioner	South Africa	3
Michelle Bachelet	High Commissioner	France	2
Michelle Bachelet	High Commissioner	Australia	1
Michelle Bachelet	High Commissioner	Cameroon	1
Michelle Bachelet	High Commissioner	Canada	1
Michelle Bachelet	High Commissioner	Costa Rica	1
Michelle Bachelet	High Commissioner	Ethiopia	1
Michelle Bachelet	High Commissioner	Germany	1
Michelle Bachelet	High Commissioner	Ireland	1
Michelle Bachelet	High Commissioner	Kenya	1
Michelle Bachelet	High Commissioner	Luxembourg	1
Michelle Bachelet	High Commissioner	Malaysia	1
Michelle Bachelet	High Commissioner	Mexico	1
Michelle Bachelet	High Commissioner	Morocco	1
Michelle Bachelet	High Commissioner	Netherlands	1

Michelle Bachelet	High Commissioner	Panama	1
Michelle Bachelet	High Commissioner	Portugal	1
Michelle Bachelet	High Commissioner	Senegal	1
Michelle Bachelet	High Commissioner	Slovenia	1
Michelle Bachelet	High Commissioner	South Africa	1
Michelle Bachelet	High Commissioner	Spain	1
Michelle Bachelet	High Commissioner	Sweden	1
Michelle Bachelet	High Commissioner	Tunisia	1
Michelle Bachelet	High Commissioner	United States	1
Michelle Bachelet	High Commissioner	Venezuela	1
Navi Pillay	High Commissioner	Belgium	2
Navi Pillay	High Commissioner	Brazil	2
Navi Pillay	High Commissioner	Central African Republic	2
Navi Pillay	High Commissioner	Colombia	2
Navi Pillay	High Commissioner	Germany	2
Navi Pillay	High Commissioner	Indonesia	2
Navi Pillay	High Commissioner	Mexico	2
Navi Pillay	High Commissioner	Netherlands	2
Navi Pillay	High Commissioner	Qatar	2
Navi Pillay	High Commissioner	South Sudan	2
Navi Pillay	High Commissioner	Spain	2
Navi Pillay	High Commissioner	Sweden	2
Sergio Vieira de Mello	High Commissioner	Angola	1
Sergio Vieira de Mello	High Commissioner	Burundi	1
Sergio Vieira de Mello	High Commissioner	Democratic Republic of Congo	1
Sergio Vieira de Mello	High Commissioner	Pakistan	1
Sergio Vieira de Mello	High Commissioner	Spain	1
Sergio Vieira de Mello	High Commissioner	United States	1
Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein	High Commissioner	France	3
Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein	High Commissioner	United States	3
Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein	High Commissioner	Ethiopia	2
Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein	High Commissioner	Germany	2
Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein	High Commissioner	Sweden	2

Table A6: High Commissioner-Fixed Effects Probit with Bias Correction

	Model 1	Model 2
Physical Integrity Rights	-0.243^{***}	-0.213^{***}
	(0.043)	(0.044)
Polyarchy	0.218	0.120
	(0.176)	(0.181)
Population	0.052	0.044
	(0.044)	(0.045)
GDP	−0.019	0.002
	(0.031)	(0.032)
Democratic Episode		0.285^{***}
		(0.089)
Autocratic Episode		0.088
		(0.101)
Peacekeepers		0.023^{**}
		(0.012)
Deviance	1676.828	1661.272
Num. obs.	3534	3534
Num. groups: hc.id	5	5

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

C.2 Potential constraints on OHCHR visit allocation

We consider several possible constraints on where the OHCHR pursues visits. The most repressive states might systematically refuse visits, while the least repressive might never be considered. To test for this nonlinear relationship, we estimate a model that includes the squared term of physical integrity rights, allowing the most and least repressive states to differ from those in the middle. However, the results confirm a monotonic relationship: as physical integrity rights improve, visit probability consistently decreases. While the confidence intervals widen slightly for the least repressive states, our overall conclusion remains unchanged (Table A7, Figure A2).

Table A7 and Figure A2 present the results of a model that includes a squared term for physical integrity rights. Although the squared term is statistically significant, the predicted probability shows a similar pattern to the model without the squared term. There is a small uptick in the probability of a visit for the least repressive states (the high end of the latent variable).

Table A7: Physical Integrity Rights Squared

	Dependent variable:
	Official Visit
Physical Integrity Rights	-0.388^{***}
	(0.122)
Physical Integrity Squared	0.026^{**}
	(0.013)
Democratic Episode	0.280^{***}
	(0.087)
Autocratic Episode	0.163
	(0.113)
Peacekeepers	0.026^{*}
	(0.014)
Polyarchy	0.046
	(0.202)
Population	0.047
	(0.043)
GDP	0.003
	(0.035)
Constant	-1.400^{**}
	(0.576)
Observations	3534
Log Likelihood	-847.9657
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01



Figure A2: Predicted Probability: Physical integrity Rights Squared

Predicted probability of official visits - varying physical integrity rights; 95% confidence interval. Based on Table A7; all other variables at means or modes

Table A8: Zero Inflated Poisson

	Model 1
Count Model:	
Physical Integrity Rights	−0.349***
	(0.080)
Polyarchy	0.133
	(0.334)
Population	0.127
	(0.083)
GDP	−0.003
	(0.060)
Democratic Episode	0.411***
	(0.155)
Autocratic Episode	0.265
	(0.178)
Peacekeepers	0.042***
	(0.016)
Intercept	−4.757***
	(0.807)
Zero model:	
Physical Integrity Rights	−0.178
	(30.466)
Intercept	−10.079
	(87.885)
AIC	1825.770
Log Likelihood	−902.885
Num. obs.	3539

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

We further address potential issues related to whether there are some states that the HC just never considers visiting using zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) models. These allow us to distinguish between two types of non-visits: states the OHCHR considered but chose not to visit, and states never under consideration. The ZIP model's two-stage estimation includes physical integrity rights in the dichotomous stage to test whether better-performing states are systematically excluded from consideration. Table A8 shows no evidence of such exclusion, with inflation-stage findings matching our main results.

To further probe this question, we estimate a model that restricts cases to states below the median on respect for physical integrity rights, ensuring that the findings are not driven by cases outside the OHCHR's scope of attention. Again, these results match our main findings (Table A9), confirming that the relationship holds even among the most problematic human rights performers.

Table A9: Split Sample

	Dependent variable:	
	Official Visit	
	(1)	(2)
Physical Integrity Rights	-0.322^{***}	-0.284^{***}
	(0.078)	(0.082)
Democratic Episode		0.285^{***}
		(0.105)
Autocratic Episode		0.033
		(0.160)
Peacekeepers		0.025^{*}
		(0.015)
Polyarchy	0.492^{**}	0.344
	(0.231)	(0.240)
Population	0.106^{*}	0.104^{*}
	(0.058)	(0.058)
GDP	-0.077^{*}	-0.056
	(0.046)	(0.047)
Constant	-1.612^{**}	-2.082^{***}
	(0.680)	(0.687)
Observations	1766	1766
Log Likelihood	-565.7777	-558.8671
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

C.3 Alternative measures of human rights violations and regime transition

We estimate models that substitute alternative measures of human rights violations and democratic regime transitions. In Table A10, we use a measure of civilian killings from Eck and Hultman 2007 instead of the original latent variable of physical integrity rights violations from Fariss 2014. (Because the civilian killings variable is included in the generation of the latent variable, we do not include both in the same model.) This allows us to evaluate whether this narrower form of violence—one that receives heightened attention from the OHCHR—is associated with official visits. The result for civilian killings matches our main findings on physical integrity rights.

Table A10: Substituting Civilian Killings

	Dependent variable:
	Official Visit
Civilian Killings	0.088***
	(0.028)
Democratic Episode	0.305***
	(0.091)
Autocratic Episode	0.163
	(0.111)
Peacekeepers	0.024*
	(0.014)
Polyarchy	−0.212
	(0.160)
Population	0.139***
	(0.038)
GDP	−0.035
	(0.031)
Constant	−2.915***
	(0.473)
Observations	3534
Log Likelihood	-852.6012
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

We also estimate a model substituting human-coded measures of physical integrity rights, civil and political rights, and women's rights from the CIRIGHTS data (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014; Mark, Filippov, and Cingranelli 2024). Table A11 shows two important findings. First, the coefficient on physical integrity rights remains negative and statistically significant. Second, neither civil and political rights nor women's rights reach statistical significance, suggesting that violations producing bodily harm are the primary driver of OHCHR attention.

Table A11: Alternative Human Rights Measures

	Dependent variable:
	Official Visit
Physical Integrity Rights	−0.061**
	(0.030)
Civil and Political Rights	−0.010
	(0.036)
Women's Rights	0.003
	(0.068)
Democratic Episode	0.283***
	(0.087)
Autocratic Episode	0.157
	(0.116)
Peacekeepers	0.034**
	(0.014)
Polyarchy	−0.050
	(0.275)
Population	0.107**
	(0.044)
GDP	−0.029
	(0.037)
Constant	−2.254***
	(0.601)
Observations	3534
Log Likelihood	-859.1071
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A12 reports two models using alternative measures of democratic transitions from Polity V (Marshall and Gurr 2020). We rely on the 'REGTRANS' variable to identify major and minor democratic transitions, which capture shifts in polity either from autocracy to partial democracy, or from partial democracy to full democracy. Both measures show positive associations with OHCHR visits, consistent with our main V-Dem results.

Table A12: Alternative Regime Transition

	Dependent variable:	
	Official Visit	
	(1)	(2)
Physical Integrity Rights	-0.208^{***}	-0.206^{***}
	(0.048)	(0.049)
Peacekeepers	0.035^{***}	0.035^{***}
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Polyarchy	0.007	0.007
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Population	0.032	0.033
	(0.047)	(0.047)
GDP	0.025	0.025
	(0.035)	(0.035)
Major Democratic Transition	0.605^{***}	
	(0.158)	
Minor Democratic Transition		0.579^{***}
		(0.155)
Negative Regime Change	0.123	0.126
	(0.437)	(0.437)
Constant	-2.632^{***}	-2.642^{***}
	(0.475)	(0.479)
Observations	3172	3172
Log Likelihood	-767.3811	-767.1183
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

C.4 Additional control variables

We estimate several models with additional control variables. Table A13 Model 1 includes a control for ongoing conflict using UCDP data (Pettersson and Öberg 2020). The ordinal measure distinguishes no conflict (0), minor conflict (1), and major conflict (2), allowing us to test whether the peacekeeping-visits association is spurious—driven by conflict states receiving more visits. The conflict coefficient is not statistically significant while peacekeeping remains positive and significant, confirming peacekeeping's independent effect.

We also estimate a spatial lag model testing whether OHCHR visits cluster geographically (Model 2). The spatial lag identifies visits to contiguous countries in the observation year. While this coefficient is positive and statistically significant—suggesting regional clustering of visits—it does not alter our main findings.

Table A13: Additional Controls

	Dependent variable:	
	Official Visit	
	(1)	(2)
Physical Integrity Rights	-0.154^{***}	-0.198^{***}
	(0.056)	(0.051)
Democratic Episode	0.281^{***}	0.284^{***}
	(0.087)	(0.090)
Autocratic Episode	0.148	0.145
	(0.114)	(0.116)
Peacekeepers	0.028^{**}	0.024^{*}
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Polyarchy	0.027	0.227
	(0.207)	(0.196)
Population	0.048	0.021
	(0.043)	(0.046)
GDP	0.006	0.005
	(0.034)	(0.036)
Conflict	0.106	
	(0.089)	
Spatial Lag		0.542^{***}
		(0.083)
Constant	-2.491^{***}	-2.323^{***}
	(0.447)	(0.470)
Observations	3534	3489
Log Likelihood	-848.6288	-810.5375
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

C.5 Alternative specifications of the dependent variable

We consider two alternative operationalizations of the dependent variable. First, we estimate a bivariate probit model treating visit type as a choice between official and conference visits. This two-equation model with linked error terms allows simultaneous modeling of both outcomes. Table A14 shows findings consistent with our main results, with no correlation between the error terms, confirming these are distinct processes.

Second, Table A15 restricts the dependent variable to visits by the High Commissioner alone, excluding the Deputy High Commissioner and ASG. While physical integrity rights and democratization episodes maintain their significance and direction, the peacekeeping coefficient loses statistical significance. This attenuation likely reflects reduced statistical power from the smaller number of High Commissioner-only visits. We maintain that including all senior OHCHR officials better captures the Office's public diplomacy efforts, as Deputies and ASGs conduct similar activities and often travel when the High Commissioner cannot.

Table A14: Biviarate Probit

	Model 1
Official Visits Equation:	
Physical Integrity_Rights	-0.186^{***}
	(0.042)
Democratic Episode	0.277^{***}
	(0.088)
Autocratic Episode	0.149
	(0.099)
Peacekeepers	0.029^{**}
	(0.011)
Polyarchy	0.055
	(0.174)
Population	0.045
	(0.045)
GDP	0.009
	(0.032)
Intercept	-2.491^{***}
	(0.433)
Conference Visits Equation:	
Physical Integrity Rights	0.194^{***}
	(0.066)
Democratic Episode	0.029
	(0.184)
Autocratic Episode	−0.238
	(0.206)
Peacekeepers	0.016
	(0.027)
Polyarchy	0.129
	(0.282)
Population	0.194^{**}
	(0.079)
GDP	0.068
	(0.055)
Intercept	-7.179^{***}
	(0.713)
Log Likelihood	−1157.433
AIC	2348.866
Num. obs.	3534

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table A15: Only High Commissioner Visits

	Dependent variable:
	Official Visit
Physical Integrity Rights	-0.205^{***}
	(0.054)
Democratic Episode	0.374^{***}
	(0.096)
Autocratic Episode	−0.019
	(0.149)
Peacekeepers	0.002
	(0.015)
Polyarchy	0.011
	(0.203)
Population	−0.008
	(0.049)
GDP	0.093^{**}
	(0.037)
Constant	-3.878^{***}
	(0.508)
Observations	3534
Log Likelihood	-609.0722
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

D Interaction Effects

In Table A16, we examine whether need conditions the opportunity for a visit. This allows for the possibility that peacekeeping and democratic episodes matter more when there are observable physical integrity rights abuses. We evaluate this claim with models including interaction terms between physical integrity rights and peacekeeping and between physical integrity rights and democratization episodes. The marginal effects presented in Figure A3 suggest a conditional relationship. Both peacekeeping and democratic episodes are associated with a visit at lower levels of respect for physical integrity rights abuses.



Figure A3: Interaction Term Margianl Effects

Marginal effect of PKOs and democratization episode across levels of physical integrity rights. 95% confidence intervals shown. Based on full model; all other covariates at means or modes.

Table A16: Interaction Results

	Dependent variable:	
	Official Visit	
	(1)	(2)
Physical Integrity Rights	−0.188***	−0.181***
	(0.050)	(0.053)
Democratic Episode	0.273***	0.268***
	(0.085)	(0.090)
Autocratic Episode	0.145	0.150
	(0.113)	(0.113)
Peacekeepers	0.038**	0.029**
	(0.017)	(0.013)
Polyarchy	0.053	0.052
	(0.201)	(0.202)
Population	0.045	0.046
	(0.044)	(0.044)
GDP	0.010	0.008
	(0.034)	(0.035)
PKOxPIR	0.007	
	(0.013)	
PKOxDemEp		−0.027
		(0.064)
Constant	−2.505***	−2.469***
	(0.445)	(0.450)
Observations	3534	3534
Log Likelihood	-849.6778	-849.7976
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

E Other Domestic Signs of Opportunity

Other domestic institutions beyond democratic transitions may also signal opportunity. While our theory focuses on democratic transitions as observable and credible institutional changes, Table A17 examines two additional potential signals. First, we test whether post-conflict transitional justice mechanisms (trials and truth commissions) attract OHCHR visits. Using data from Kitagawa and Bell (2022), we find truth commissions positively predict visits while trials show no significant association.

Second, we examine whether national human rights institutions (NHRIs)—independent government bodies established to monitor and protect human rights domestically—influence visit allocation. States with independent NHRIs, measured using Welch, DeMeritt, and Conrad's (2021)'s classification, are significantly more likely to receive visits.

More careful research is required to parse the mechanisms underlying these patterns, but this initial evidence may indicate that the OHCHR responds to multiple domestic signals of receptivity beyond democratization alone.

Table A17: Other Opportunity Measures

	Dependent variable:	
	Official Visit	
	(1)	(2)
Physical Integrity Rights	−0.169***	−0.198***
	(0.056)	(0.053)
Democratic Episode	0.304***	0.273***
	(0.095)	(0.084)
Autocratic Episode	0.185	0.118
	(0.139)	(0.111)
Peacekeepers	0.033**	0.031**
	(0.014)	(0.013)
Polyarchy	−0.015	−0.031
	(0.214)	(0.206)
Population	0.046	0.019
	(0.048)	(0.045)
GDP	0.023	0.020
	(0.038)	(0.034)
Trial	−0.119	
	(0.169)	
Truth	0.527**	
	(0.265)	
NHRI		0.199**
		(0.078)
Constant	−2.833***	−2.397***
	(0.488)	(0.462)
Observations	3028	3534
Log Likelihood	-728.5469	-845.9704
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Appendix References

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