Online Appendix for "Fighting for Peace? The Direct and Indirect Effects of Women's Participation in Rebel Groups on Peace Negotiations"

I. Female Membership Data

We introduce an expanded yearly dataset on women's membership in African rebel groups that participated in a civil conflict from 1989-2014. To identify the sample, we rely on Uppsala Conflict Data Program's (UCDP) Dyadic Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) v. 20.1 (Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen 2008), including any African rebel group in the UCDP dataset from 1989-2014. This yields a sample of 126 unique rebel groups. The resultant dyad-year dataset includes an observation for each year of conflict between a given rebel group and government, resulting in at least 25 battle-related deaths.

To code female membership, we use a process similar to Thomas and Bond's (2015). We relied on Thomas and Bond's coding procedures and initial data because, although the WARD (Wood and Thomas 2017) dataset provides comprehensive information on the scope of female combat participation within rebel groups, it has a much narrower inclusion criteria than what we require. Many rebel groups in the ACD have female membership but do not utilize women in fighting roles. Yet, we contend it's important to consider women's involvement in rebel organizations broadly, rather than narrowing in on specific roles (e.g., combatants) for several reasons. Non-fighting members may influence an organization's belief about the necessity, value, and fruitfulness of compromise which could explain women's direct influence on the peace process and affect perceptions of organizations. Relatedly, individuals who are responsible for recruitment and diplomatic relations—crucial functions for an organization—may be classified as occupying support roles. Women in these roles, however, may have an outsized effect on an organization's outlook on cooperation.

To code women's yearly membership, we use Thomas and Bond's stratified sample to identify an initial set of rebel groups with female members. Next, we collect data on female membership for rebel groups not included in Thomas and Bond's original sample.[1] Finally, we code yearly data for all the rebel groups identified as having women members at any point during an active armed rebellion.

We code yearly data on women's membership in rebel groups, but this should not be equated with data on the onset of women's recruitment. Since the ACD only records years in which a conflict reached 25 battle-related deaths and not all of the years of a rebel groups' existence, our data do not always record the year in which women were first recruited. For example, our dataset would not record data on the first instance of women's participation for groups that recruit female members prior to the onset of an active armed conflict. We do, however, have data on the onset of women's participation for groups that recruited women during or after the first year of armed conflict.

Figure 1. Conflict-Year and Women's Recruitment



[1] We expanded these data for a longer temporal domain (from 2011 to 2014) and to maximize geographic coverage to include all African rebel groups coded in the ACD 20.1.

Figure 1 shows the variation in women's membership within rebel groups in the sample across time. For the majority of rebel groups, (75 percent), women members were already present in the first year of civil conflict. In the remaining 25 percent of rebel groups in the sample, women joined the organization after the conflict began, with most of this subset of groups deciding to recruit women between years 2 and 5 of civil conflict. In only one case were women recruited ten years into the conflict.

We rely on a variety of sources to code these data, including academic research, policy reports, Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) reports, academic books and articles, and news sources accessed through Lexis Nexis. The availability of information on women's participation varied significantly, with some sources offering detailed accounts of when women joined organizations and others having limited mentions of the timeframe of their participation. To the extent possible, we relied on sources that identified the exact years in which women joined the group. When we were unable to locate such sources, we used news and media sources that covered the conflict to code women's membership based on the first mention of a woman member in these groups. We then assume that after the first year of women's membership, at least one woman maintained membership until the end of the conflict. In our research, we came across no groups where women joined a rebel organization but were later entirely removed or left as a group. Thus we believe that this is a reasonable assumption on which we base our coding decisions.

Figure 2 Coding Sources for All Observations



Figures 2 and 3 identify the coding sources (e.g., historical account, first mention) used throughout the dataset. Figure 2 shows the number of observations that were coded based on the first mention of women's participation in key sources as opposed to the exact year women joined according to historical accounts. Figure 3 aggregates the types of coding used for a group's observations, distinguishing how many groups were coded based only on first mention in news sources versus historical accounts or a combination of the two. In 18 groups, coding for observations relied solely on first mention in media, while the observations for 23 groups were coded using both first mentions and historical accounts to discern the first year of women's inclusion in the group.

Figure 3 Coding Sources for Groups



Though the approach of relying on first mention may limit the overall accuracy of our coding, we believe it is likely to yield a conservative estimate of women's participation, as it is most likely to underreport women's participation. If errors in coding the explanatory variables remain uncorrelated with the dependent variable—as we suspect—such measurement error is likely to result in attenuation bias; coefficient estimates will tend toward zero, underestimating the effect of women members on negotiation incidence and demands. Therefore, any effects we find with these data are likely to be greater in the absence of measurement error.

Figure 4 breaks down the sources used for observations that are coded as having no women within their organization for the duration of the sample. This coding relies on prior research done by Thomas and Bond (2014) and Henshaw (2016), as well as an absence of evidence to suggest that women were otherwise members. Overall, our sample included 66 rebel groups that did not include

women within the temporal scope. In 20 of the organizations included in the sample, either Thomas and Bond (2014) and Henshaw (2016) previously coded these organizations as having no women in the organization. In the remaining 46 groups, we found no evidence to suggest that these organizations ever had women within their organizations during the war.

Figure 4. Coding Sources for Cases with No Women Members



II. Causal Mediation Models

In the causal mediation model, the observed outcome (Y_i) is equal to $Y_i(T_i, M_i(T_i))$, where T is the binary treatment variable and M is a potential mediator. We use this model to estimate three primary quantities of interest: the average direct effect, average causal mediation effect and the total effect. To estimate the average direct effects (ADE), we hold the mediator variable constant while varying the treatment variable. Thus, we examine the effect of female rebels, holding the values of terrorism and external support at the values that would have been observed in the absence of women's participation. Conversely, the indirect effect or average causal mediation effect (ACME) captures the expected change in the outcome that would result from changing the values of the mediator from those observed under the control condition to those witnessed in the face of the treatment (Imai et

al. 2019). Therefore, to obtain the indirect effect, we hold the treatment—Female Members —constant while examining the effect of changes to the mediating variable(s). Finally, the total effect of the treatment, which represents the composite effect of adding women to a group, is calculated by aggregating together the models' ADE and ACME estimates.

The causal mediation models in Table 1 analyze the effect of the Number of Terror Attacks on negotiation incidence using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. Table 2 examines the effect of the Rebel External Support mediator using logistic regression. Below, we also examine several other indicators of violence against civilians. In addition to terror incidents measured by Polo and Gleditsch (2016), we also examine terror incidents linked to rebel groups from Thomas (2014) and Fortna et al (2020) in Tables 3 and 4. Next, in Table 5 we examine civilian victimization as an alternate conceptualization of the power to hurt using UCDP's one-sided violence data (Petterson et al 2019). Scholars (Wood and Kathman 2014) have found civilian victimization influence's the probability of settlements. In Table 6, we examine whether women boost a rebel group's relative strength, which may increase their attractiveness as a bargaining partner. Finally, as alternate ways to examine women member's effect on rebel legitimacy, we consider whether rebels adopt inclusive governance institutions (Breslawski 2021) in Table 7 and whether they amass domestic ethnic support (Wucherpfennig et al. 2012) in Table 8. We also show the substantive effects of these models in Figures 5-12.

1. Statistical Tables for Causal Mediation Analysis

Table 1: Causal Mediation Analyses Examining the Effect of Female Rebels as Mediated Through Terrorism (Polo and Gleditsch 2016); Replication for Figure 3 in Manuscript and Figure 5A in Appendix				
	Negotiation Incidence	# Rebel Terrorist Attacks	Negotiation Demand	# Rebel Terrorist Attacks
	Figure 3A	Figure 3A	Figure 5A Appendix	Figure 5A Appendix
	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS
Female Members	1.100***	-0.318	0.863**	-0.318
	(0.365)	(2.08)	(0.425)	(2.08)
Number of Rebel Terror Attacks	-0.00405		0.00301	
	(0.00859)		(0.00601)	
Democracy	3.655***	-18.31	-1.645	-18.31
	(1.403)	(15.97)	(2.065)	(15.97)
Political Terror Scale Average	0.0428	-0.332	0.454	-0.332
	(0.274)	(1.530)	(0.414)	(1.530)
# Mediation Attempts	0.888	0.325	0.183	0.325
	(0.574)	(0.468)	(0.117)	(0.468)
Government Battle Deaths	0.144	1.050**	0.0460	1.050**
	(0.107)	(0.527)	(0.118)	(0.527)
Rebel Battle Deaths	0.000592	1.186*	0.204*	1.186*
	(0.100)	(0.618)	(0.118)	(0.618)
Relative Rebel Strength	0.678**	-2.475	0.131	-2.475
	(0.311)	(1.870)	(0.350)	(1.870)
Rebel Leadership Change	-0.382	-0.871	1.344**	-0.871

	(0.562)	(1.708)	(0.601)	(1.708)
Government Leadership Change	0.477	5.193	1.168***	5.193
	(0.396)	(5.480)	(0.427)	(5.480)
Leftist Rebel Ideology	0.656	-6.992 *	-0.320	-6.992 *
	(0.742)	4.034	(0.747)	4.034
Religious Rebel Ideology	-0.850*	7.122**	-0.0293	7.122**
	(0.448)	(3.336)	(0.610)	(3.336)
Ethnic Conflict	-0.254	-2.435	0.617	-2.435
	(0.354)	(1.990)	(0.438)	(1.990)
Number of Rebel Groups	0.0764	-2.80	-0.301	-2.80
	(0.181)	(1.252)	(0.189)	(1.252)
Territorial Control	-0.0175***	.0199	-0.00741	.0199
	(0.00667)	(0.0185)	(0.0149)	(0.0185)
Rebel External Support	-0.112	-3.271	-0.176	-3.271
	(0.317)	(2.123)	(0.533)	(2.123)
Rebel One-Sided Violence	-0.108	0.338	-0.00825	0.338
	(0.0780)	(0.327)	(0.0651)	(0.327)
Constant	-3.160**	12.934	-4.894**	12.934
	(1.380)	(11.931)	(2.094)	(11.931)
Observations	293	293	293	293
Standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses; $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$				

Table 2: Causal Mediation Analyses Examining the Effect of Female Rebels as Mediated Through Terrorism (Polo and Gleditsch 2016); Replication for Figure 3 in Manuscript and Figure 5A in Appendix				
	Negotiation Incidence	External Support	Negotiation Demand	External Support
	Figure 3B Manuscript	Figure 3B Manuscript	Figure 5B Appendix	Figure 5B Appendix
	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS
Female Members	1.100***	0.335	0.863**	0.335
	(0.365)	(0.573)	(0.425)	(0.573)
Rebel External Support	-0.112		-0.176	
	(0.317)		(0.533)	
Democracy	3.655***	-8.736***	-1.645	-8.736***
	(1.403)	(2.815)	(2.065)	(2.815)
Political Terror Scale Average	0.0428	0.171	0.454	0.171
	(0.274)	(0.427)	(0.414)	(0.427)
# Mediation Attempts	0.888	0.0470	0.183	0.0470
	(0.574)	(0.140)	(0.117)	(0.140)
Government Battle Deaths	0.144	0.262**	0.0460	0.262**
	(0.107)	(0.126)	(0.118)	(0.126)
Rebel Battle Deaths	0.000592	-0.033	0.204*	-0.033
	(0.100)	0.111	(0.118)	0.111
Relative Rebel Strength	0.678**	-0.179	0.131	-0.179
	(0.311)	(0.419)	(0.350)	(0.419)
Rebel Leadership Change	-0.382	-0.371	1.344**	-0.371
	(0.562)	(0.535)	(0.601)	(0.535)
Government Leadership Change	0.477	0.967**	1.168***	0.967**

	(0.396)	(0.435)	(0.427)	(0.435)
Leftist Rebel Ideology	0.656	2.254	-0.320	2.254
	(0.742)	(1.08)	(0.747)	(1.08)
Religious Rebel Ideology	-0.850*	0.887	-0.0293	0.887
	(0.448)	(0.653)	(0.610)	(0.653)
Ethnic Conflict	-0.254	-0.422	0.617	-0.422
	(0.354)	(0.566)	(0.438)	(0.566)
Number of Rebel Groups	0.0764	-0.185	-0.301	-0.185
	(0.181)	(0.213)	(0.189)	(0.213)
Territorial Control	-0.0175***	-0.017	-0.00741	-0.017
	(0.00667)	(0.012)	(0.0149)	(0.012)
Number of Rebel Terror Attacks	-0.00405	-0.015	0.00301	-0.015
	(0.00859)	(0.010)	(0.00601)	(0.010)
Rebel One-Sided Violence	-0.108	0.093	-0.00825	0.093
	(0.0780)	(0.104)	(0.0651)	(0.104)
Constant	-3.160**	0.400	-4.894**	0.400
	(1.380)	(1.799)	(2.094)	(1.799)
Observations	293	293	293	293
Standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses; $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$				

Figure 5: Causal Mediation Models Examining the Effect of Rebel Women Members, as Mediated by *Rebel Terrorism* and *External Support*, on the Probability of Negotiation Demands



Table 3: Causal Mediation Analyses Examining the Effect of Female Rebels on Negotiation Incidence as Mediated Through Terrorism-- Alternate Indicators

	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS
	Fortna et al. 2020	Fortna et al. 2020	Thomas 2014	Thomas 2014
	Negotiation Incidence	Number of Rebel Terror Attacks	Negotiation Incidence	Number of Rebel Terror Attacks
Female Members	1.177***	0.394	1.134***	-0.212
	(0.347)	(0.770)	(0.368)	(1.426)
Number of Terror Attacks	-0.0682*	--	-0.000565	--
	(0.0364)	--	(0.00850)	--
Democracy	3.095**	-2.743	3.596**	-15.627
	(1.568)	(5.446)	(1.415)	(11.921)
Political Terror Scale Average	0.0232	0.009	0.0115	-0.630
	(0.277)	(0 .413)	(0.285)	(1.264)
# Mediation Attempts	0.828	-0.083	0.868	0.395
	(0.579)	(0.108)	(0.544)	(0.386)
Government Battle Deaths	0.135	0.168	0.139	0.561
	(0.110)	(0.157)	(0.109)	(0.399)
Rebel Battle Deaths	0.0186	0.170	-0.00515	0.893 *
	(0.106)	(0.143)	(0.101)	(0.516)
Relative Rebel Strength	0.544*	-1.101*	0.638**	-2.040
	(0.294)	(0.632)	(0.317)	(1.464)
Rebel Leadership Change	-0.365	-0.671	-0.348	-1.255
	(0.570)	(0.550)	(0.557)	(1.355)
Government Leadership Change	0.382	-1.284**	0.500	0.262
	(0.409)	(0.593)	(0.387)	(1.214)

Leftist Rebel Ideology	0.556	-1.336	0.662	-5.679
	(0.707)	(1.080)	(0.739)	(3.511)
Religious Rebel Ideology	-0.834*	2.329***	-0.955**	3.170
	(0.433)	(0.925)	(0.446)	(2.404)
Ethnic Conflict	-0.291	0.032	-0.265	-1.225
	(0.349)	(0.602)	(0.344)	(1.480)
Number of Rebel Groups	0.0682	-0.534	0.0288	-1.718*
	(0.181)	(0.381)	(0.196)	(1.000)
Territorial Control	-0.0172**	0.003	-0.0178***	.0148
	(0.00682)	(0.008)	(0.00673)	(0.013)
Rebel External Support	-0.116	-0.839	-0.156	-1.118
	(0.322)	(1.064)	(0.306)	(1.551)
Rebel One-Sided Violence	-0.0508	0.648***	-0.105	0.260
	(0.0766)	(0.195)	(0.0789)	(0.203)
Constant	-2.759*	2.978509	-2.817*	10.50
	(1.410)	3.198136	(1.464)	(9.655)
Observations	281	281	288	288
Standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses; $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$				

Table 4: Causal Mediation Analyses Examining the Effect of Female Rebels on Negotiation Demand as Mediated Through Terrorism-- Alternate Indicators				
	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS
	Fortna et al. 2022	Fortna et al. 2022	Thomas 2014	Thomas 2014
	Negotiation Demand	Number of Rebel Terror Attacks	Negotiation Demand	Number of Rebel Terror Attacks
Female Members	0.840*	0.394	0.875**	-0.212
	(0.480)	(0.771)	(0.427)	(1.426)
		--		
Number of Terror Attacks	0.0201	--	0.007	--
	(0.0498)		(0.007)	--
Democracy	-1.007	-2.743	-1.715	-15.627
	(2.028)	(5.446)	(2.086)	(11.921)
Political Terror Scale Average	0.480	0.009	0.434	-0.630
	(0.444)	(0.413)	(0.427)	(1.264)
# Mediation Attempts	0.211*	-0.083	0.175	0.395
	(0.114)	(0.108)	(0.119)	(0.386)
Government Battle Deaths	0.0540	0.168	0.0465	0.561
	(0.120)	(0.157)	(0.119)	(0.399)
Rebel Battle Deaths	0.227*	0.170	0.203*	0.893 *
	(0.123)	(0.143)	(0.116)	(0.516)
Relative Rebel Strength	0.211	-1.101*	0.151	-2.040
	(0.388)	(0.632)	(0.359)	(1.464)
Rebel Leadership Change	1.127*	-0.671	1.317**	-1.255
	(0.620)	(0.550)	(0.608)	(1.355)

Government Leadership Change	1.222***	-1.284**	1.177***	0.262
	(0.458)	(0.593)	(0.430)	(1.214)
Leftist Rebel Ideology	-0.224	-1.336	-0.283	-5.679
	(0.789)	(1.080)	(0.769)	(3.511)
Religious Rebel Ideology	0.00185	2.329***	0.00886	3.170
	(0.652)	(0.925)	(0.647)	(2.404)
Ethnic Conflict	0.651	0.032	0.650	-1.225
	(0.475)	(0.602)	(0.461)	(1.480)
Number of Rebel Groups	-0.346*	-0.534	-0.282	-1.718*
	(0.201)	(0.381)	(0.200)	(1.000)
Territorial Control	-0.00446	0.003	-0.00805	.0148
	(0.0140)	(0.008)	(0.0150)	(0.013)
Rebel External Support	-0.0114	-0.839	-0.192	-1.118
	(0.552)	(1.064)	(0.527)	(1.551)
Rebel One-Sided Violence	-0.0161	0.648***	-0.0166	0.260
	(0.0697)	(0.195)	(0.0675)	(0.203)
Constant	-5.500**	2.979	-4.856**	10.50
	(2.249)	(3.198)	(2.211)	(9.655)
Observations	281	281	288	288
Standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses; $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$				

Figure 6: Causal Mediation Models Examining the Effect of Rebel Women Members, as Mediated by *Terrorism* (Fortna et al. 2020) , on the Probability of Negotiation Incidence and Negotiation Demands



Figure 7: Causal Mediation Models Examining the Effect of Rebel Women Members, as Mediated by *Terrorism* (Thomas 2014) , on the Probability of Negotiation Incidence and Negotiation Demands



Table 5: Causal Mediation Analyses Examining the Effect of Female Rebels on Negotiation Incidence as Mediated Through Rebel One-sided (Petterson et al 2019)				
	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS
	Negotiation Incidence	Rebel One-Sided Violence	Negotiation Demand	Rebel One-Sided Violence
Female Members	1.100***	1.492***	0.863**	1.492***
	(0.365)	(0.502)	(0.425)	(0.502)
Rebel One-Sided Violence	-0.108	--	-0.00825	--
	(0.0780)	--	(0.0651)	--
Democracy	3.655***	2.68*	-1.645	2.68*
	(1.403)	(1.532)	(2.065)	(1.532)
Political Terror Scale Average	0.0428	0.147	0.454	0.147
	(0.274)	(0.219)	(0.414)	(0.219)
# Mediation Attempts	0.888	0.165*	0.183	0.165*
	(0.574)	(0.092)	(0.117)	(0.092)
Government Battle Deaths	0.144	-0.061	0.0460	-0.061
	(0.107)	(0.070)	(0.118)	(0.070)
Rebel Battle Deaths	0.000592	.3148035***	0.204*	.3148035***
	(0.100)	(0.088)	(0.118)	(0.088)
Relative Rebel Strength	0.678**	0.252	0.131	0.252
	(0.311)	(0.242)	(0.350)	(0.242)
Rebel Leadership Change	-0.382	0.234*	1.344**	0.234*
	(0.562)	(0.625)	(0.601)	(0.625)

Government Leadership Change	0.477	0.797	1.168***	0.797
	(0.396)	(0.485)	(0.427)	(0.485)
Leftist Rebel Ideology	0.656	-0.799	-0.320	-0.799
	(0.742)	(0.672)	(0.747)	(0.672)
Religious Rebel Ideology	-0.850*	0.025	-0.0293	0.025
	(0.448)	(.684)	(0.610)	(.684)
Ethnic Conflict	-0.254	-0.204	0.617	-0.204
	(0.354)	(0.553)	(0.438)	(0.553)
Number of Rebel Groups	0.0764	-0.248	-0.301	-0.248
	(0.181)	(0.154)	(0.189)	(0.154)
Territorial Control	-0.0175***	-0.012*	-0.00741	-0.012*
	(0.00667)	(0.005)	(0.0149)	(0.005)
Rebel External Support	-0.112	0.390	-0.176	0.390
	(0.317)	(0.480)	(0.533)	(0.480)
Number of Rebel Terror Attacks	-0.00405	0.007	0.00301	0.007
	(0.00859)	(0.006)	(0.00601)	(0.006)
Constant	-3.160**	-1.110	-4.894**	-1.110
	(1.380)	(1.068)	(2.094)	(1.068)
Observations	293	293	293	293

Figure 8: Causal Mediation Models Examining the Effect of Rebel Women Members, as Mediated by *Rebel One-Sided Violence*, on the Probability of Negotiation Incidence and Negotiation Demands



Table 6: Causal Mediation Analyses Examining the Effect of Female Rebels on Negotiation Incidence and Demand as Mediated Through Rebel Strength (Cunningham et al. 2013)				
	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS
	Negotiation Incidence	Rebel Strength	Negotiation Demand	Rebel Strength
Female Members	1.100***	0.463***	0.863**	.463***
	(0.365)	(0.116)	(0.425)	(0.116)
Relative Rebel Strength	0.678**		0.131	
	(0.311)		(0.350)	
Democracy	3.655***	-0.124	-1.645	-0.124
	(1.403)	(0.503)	(2.065)	(0.503)
Political Terror Scale Average	0.0428	0.119	0.454	0.119
	(0.274)	(0.075)	(0.414)	(0.075)
# Mediation Attempts	0.888	0.076**	0.183	0.076**
	(0.574)	(0.033)	(0.117)	(0.033)
Government Battle Deaths	0.144	0.040*	0.0460	0.040*
	(0.107)	(0.024)	(0.118)	(0.024)
Rebel Battle Deaths	0.000592	-0.049**	0.204*	-0.049**
	(0.100)	(0.022)	(0.118)	(0.022)
Rebel Leadership Change	-0.382	-0.114	1.344**	-0.114
	(0.562)	(0.174)	(0.601)	(0.174)
Government Leadership Change	0.477	0.053	1.168***	0.053
	(0.396)	(0.113)	(0.427)	(0.113)

Leftist Rebel Ideology	0.656	-0.407*	-0.320	-0.407*
	(0.742)	(0.240)	(0.747)	(0.240)
Religious Rebel Ideology	-0.850*	-0.258*	-0.0293	-0.258*
	(0.448)	(0.133)	(0.610)	(0.133)
Ethnic Conflict	-0.254	0.168	0.617	0.168
	(0.354)	(0.140)	(0.438)	(0.140)
Number of Rebel Groups	0.0764	-0.153***	-0.301	-0.153***
	(0.181)	(0.053)	(0.189)	(0.053)
Territorial Control	-0.0175***	-0.004**	-0.00741	-0.004**
	(0.00667)	(0.002)	(0.0149)	(0.002)
Rebel External Support	-0.112	-0.026	-0.176	-0.026
	(0.317)	(0.135)	(0.533)	(0.135)
Number of Rebel Terror Attacks	-0.00405	-0.003*	0.00301	-0.003*
	(0.00859)	(0.002)	(0.00601)	(0.002)
Rebel One-Sided Violence	-0.108	0.017	-0.00825	0.017
	(0.0780)	(0.017)	(0.0651)	(0.017)
Constant	-3.160**	1.559	-4.894**	1.559
	(1.380)	(0.418)	(2.094)	(0.418)
Observations	293	293	293	293
Standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses; $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$				

Figure 9: Causal Mediation Models Examining the Effect of Rebel Women Members, as Mediated by *Rebel Strength*, on the Probability of Negotiation Incidence and Negotiation Demands



Table 7: Causal Mediation Analyses Examining the Effect of Female Rebels on Negotiation Incidence and Demand as Mediated Through Rebels' Inclusive Governance Institutions (Breslawski 2021)				
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
	Negotiation Incidence	Inclusive Governance	Negotiation Demand	Inclusive Governance
Female Members	0.747**	0.556	0.819**	0.556
	(0.372)	(0.826)	(0.409)	(0.826)
Inclusive Governance	-0.233		-0.491	
	(0.477)		(0.627)	
Democracy	3.247**	2.769	-1.709	2.769
	(1.531)	(3.156)	(2.022)	(3.156)
Political Terror Scale Average	0.158	-0.332	0.487	-0.332
	(0.256)	(0.486)	(0.393)	(0.486)
# Mediation Attempts	0.971	0.064	0.195	0.064
	(0.624)	(0.164)	(0.123)	(0.164)
Government Battle Deaths	0.174	0.167	0.0628	0.167
	(0.114)	(0.159)	(0.124)	(0.159)
Rebel Battle Deaths	-0.00166	-0.254**	0.202*	-0.254***
	(0.0968)	(0.128)	(0.113)	(0.128)
Relative Rebel Strength	0.871***	-0.270	0.154	-0.270
	(0.297)	(0.620)	(0.345)	(0.620)
Rebel Leadership Change	-0.208	1.403*	1.442**	1.403*
	(0.588)	(0.765)	(0.610)	(0.765)
Government Leadership Change	0.512	-0.033	1.194***	-0.033
	(0.372)	(0.567)	(0.411)	(0.567)

Leftist Rebel Ideology	0.799	2.337	-0.399	2.337
	(0.495)	(2.178)	(0.656)	(2.178)
Ethnic Conflict	-0.148	4.338***	0.700	4.338***
	(0.414)	(1.068)	(0.465)	(1.068)
Number of Rebel Groups	0.0360	-0.011	-0.324	-0.011
	(0.190)	(0.196)	(0.204)	(0.196)
Rebel External Support	-0.0169	-0.601	-0.128	-0.601
	(0.336)	(0.718)	(0.534)	(0.718)
Number of Rebel Terror Attacks	-0.00785	0.086	0.00229	0.086
	(0.0122)	(0.073)	(0.00564)	(0.073)
Rebel One-Sided Violence	-0.0835	-0.127	-0.00921	-0.127
	(0.0773)	(0.147)	(0.0680)	(0.147)
Constant	-4.289***	-3.122	-5.120***	-3.122
	(1.270)	(2.562)	(1.877)	(2.562)
Observations	293	293	293	293
Standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses; $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$				

Figure 10: Causal Mediation Models Examining the Effect of Rebel Women Members, as Mediated by *Rebel Inclusive Governance*, on the Probability of Negotiation Incidence and Demands



Table 8: Causal Mediation Analyses Examining the Effect of Female Rebels on Negotiation Incidence and Demand as Mediated Through Rebels' Domestic Ethnic Support (Wucherpfennig et al. 2012)				
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
	Negotiation Incidence	EPR	Negotiation Demand	EPR
Female Members	1.049***	0.055	0.919**	0.055
	(0.365)	(0.112)	(0.432)	(0.112)
Ethnic Support	0.0969		0.691	
	(0.331)		(0.503)	
Democracy	3.495**	0.246	-1.953	0.246
	(1.401)	(0.347)	(2.129)	(0.347)
Political Terror Scale Average	0.0463	-0.133**	0.547	-0.133**
	(0.269)	(0.056)	(0.412)	(0.056)
# Mediation Attempts	0.886	0.005	0.202*	0.005
	(0.585)	(0.017)	(0.116)	(0.017)
Government Battle Deaths	0.145	0.012	0.0328	0.012
	(0.105)	(0.017)	(0.110)	(0.017)
Rebel Battle Deaths	-0.00382	0.005	0.213*	0.005
	(0.0980)	(0.013)	(0.118)	(0.013) .
Relative Rebel Strength	0.632**	0.049	0.114	0.049
	(0.294)	(0.070)	(0.345)	(0.070)
Rebel Leadership Change	-0.366	-0.046	1.327**	-0.046
	(0.564)	(0.087)	(0.549)	(0.087)

Government Leadership Change	0.540	-0.220**	1.244***	-0.220**
	(0.384)	(0.102)	(0.444)	(0.102)
Leftist Rebel Ideology	0.820	0.088	-0.943	0.088
	(0.688)	(0.122)	(0.733)	(0.122)
Religious Rebel Ideology	-0.734	-0.399**	0.0495	-0.399**
	(0.451)	(0.176)	(0.635)	(0.176)
Number of Rebel Groups	0.0836	0.029	-0.351*	0.029
	(0.184)	(0.028)	(0.199)	(0.028)
Territorial Control	-0.0186***	0.003**	-0.00746	0.003**
	(0.00669)	(0.001)	(0.0159)	(0.001)
Rebel External Support	-0.114	0.219*	-0.319	0.219*
	(0.315)	(0.119)	(0.540)	(0.119)
Number of Rebel Terror Attacks	-0.00370	-0.002	0.00301	-0.002
	(0.00805)	(0.002)	(0.00588)	(0.002)
Rebel One-Sided Violence	-0.107	0.006	-0.0149	0.006
	(0.0767)	(0.024)	(0.0676)	(0.024)
Constant	-3.291**	0.986	-5.173**	0.986
	(1.376)	(0.284)	(2.041)	(0.284)
Observations	293	293	293	293
Standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses; $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$				

Figure 11: Causal Mediation Models Examining the Effect of Rebel Women Members, as Mediated by *Rebel Ethnic Support*, on the Probability of Negotiation Incidence and Negotiation Demands



III. Alternative measurements for negotiation incidence

1. Models using alternate measurements of negotiation incidence

Table 9: Logistic Regression Examining the Effect of Female Membership on the Probability of Negotiation Incidence
Using Alternate Sources for Negotiation Incidence Data

	Thomas (2014)	Thomas (2014)	Cunningham and Sawyer (2020)	Cunningham and Sawyer (2020)	Aris (2022)	Aris (2022)	Combined Negotiations w/Aris (2022)
Female Members	0.843**	1.185***	0.446	0.463	0.394	0.706**	0.980***
	(0.370)	(0.374)	(0.358)	(0.352)	(0.331)	(0.342)	(0.381)
Democracy		2.438*		2.175		3.346**	4.260***
		(1.259)		(1.509)		(1.539)	(1.629)
Political Terror Scale Average		0.0690		0.00704		-0.267	-0.070
		(0.289)		(0.305)		(0.271)	(0.291)
# Mediation Attempts		0.548**		0.704**		1.012**	1.066
		(0.241)		(0.290)		(0.494)	(0.660)
Government Battle Deaths		0.146		0.0785		0.101	0.184*
		(0.107)		(0.102)		(0.102)	(0.105)
Rebel Battle Deaths		0.021		0.075		0.059	-0.014
		(0.104)		(0.100)		(0.101)	(0.099)
Relative Rebel Strength		0.529**		0.409		0.227	0.509
		(0.268)		(0.260)		(0.270)	(0.341)

Rebel Leadership Change		-0.498		-0.100		0.219	-0.263
		(0.510)		(0.558)		(0.566)	(0.579)
Government Leadership Change		0.586		0.483		0.736*	0.172
		(0.479)		(0.382)		(0.416)	(0.419)
Leftist Rebel Ideology		0.441		0.625		0.291	0.336
		(0.633)		(0.684)		(0.710)	(0.705)
Religious Rebel Ideology		-0.950*		-0.761		-1.409**	-0.913*
		(0.486)		(0.548)		(0.407)	(0.472)
Ethnic Conflict		-0.314		-0.020		0.182	-0.227
		(0.357)		(0.338)		(0.309)	(0.363)
Number of Rebel Groups		0.0278		-0.088		0.066	0.009
		(0.165)		(0.178)		(0.185)	(0.190)
Territorial Control		-0.017**		-0.010*		-0.013**	-0.014**
		(0.007)		(0.006)		(0.006)	(0.006)
Rebel External Support		-0.262		0.104		0.247	-0.102
		(0.315)		(0.305)		(0.356)	(0.355)

Number of Rebel Terror Attacks		-0.002		-0.007		-0.003	-0.006
		(0.008)		(0.010)		(0.0055)	(0.008)
Rebel One-Sided Violence		-0.154**		-0.0003		-0.008	-0.063
		(0.073)		(0.078)		(0.077)	(0.075)
Constant	-0.831***	-2.700*	-0.877***	-2.579*	-0.719***	-1.649	-2.220
	(0.230)	(1.389)	(0.236)	(1.424)	(0.227)	(1.410)	(1.467)
Observations	316	288	353	314	391	314	293
Standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses; $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$							

Figure 13: Expected Change in Probability of Negotiation Incidence by Female Members, 95% confidence interval bands shown (Thomas negotiations data)



Figure 14: Expected Change in Probability of Negotiation Incidence by Female Members, 95% confidence interval bands shown (Cunningham and Sawyer 2019 negotiations data)



Figure 15: Expected Change in Probability of Negotiation Incidence by Female Members, 95% confidence interval bands shown (Aris negotiations data)



IV. Forced Recruitment

These results examine how forced recruitment influences the relationship between female members and negotiations, as women's forced recruitment may impact the group's bargaining strategy. In these models, we add an interaction between forced recruitment and our main variable, *Female Members*. We use replication data from WARD (Wood and Thomas 2018), which expands Cohen's (2013) binary coding of whether rebel groups have ever forcefully recruited any of its members. These results appear in Table 10. Overall, the results do not suggest that forced recruitment depresses the impact of female combatants. On the contrary, these models generally show that the relationship between female members and negotiation incidence is stronger when rebel groups recruit forcefully. This is counterintuitive.

Figure 16 plots the first difference in the probability of negotiations for female membership by forced recruitment. This figure shows the expected change in probability between groups with women and those without women for groups that recruit forcefully and those that do not. There is a weak interactive relationship (at the .10 significance level), but the results are unexpected. *Forced recruitment* actually *increases* the probability of negotiations in groups with female members. However, there is no statistically significant effect of female members on negotiation incidence for groups that do not forcefully recruit any of its members. Figure 17 displays the first difference in probability of a negotiation demand for female membership by forced recruitment using the analysis in Table 10, Model 2. With respect to negotiation demands, there is no statistically significant relationship between forced recruitment and female members on rebel demands for negotiation.

In Table 11, we reanalyze these results using a split sample. In Models 1 and 2, Female membership increases the probability of *Negotiation Incidence* for groups that forcefully recruit and those that do not, but these results are only significant at the .10 level. With respect to *Negotiation Demands* (Models 3 and 4), when the sample is split, female members increase the probability of negotiation demands in the subset of observations where rebels recruit forcefully. In the sample of rebel groups that do not forcefully recruit its members, there is a negative relationship between female members and negotiation demands. These results, again are counterintuitive, but are likely due to the fact that there are too few observations in this latter analysis to garner reliable results. Overall, the results do not suggest voluntary recruitment increases women's influence on negotiations and demands for talks.

Existing data on forced recruitment are also likely insufficient to test this relationship accurately since these data reflect whether groups ever forcefully recruited any members; they do not capture whether women are among those forcefully recruited or what proportion of female members are recruited involuntarily. Moreover, existing research suggests that even women who are forcefully recruited can go on to organize collectively and influence the group's practices (Goswami 2015, Alison 2003).

Table 10 : Logistic Regression Examining the Effect of Female Membership on Negotiation Incidence Interacting Forced Recruitment and Female Members		
	Model 1	Model 2
	Negotiation Incidence	Negotiation Demand
Female Members	0.262	-0.857
	(0.775)	(1.121)
Forced Recruitment	0.420	0.444
	(0.496)	(0.673)
Female Members x Forced Recruitment	0.633	1.605
	(0.866)	(1.311)
Democracy	3.933***	-2.302
	(1.501)	(2.116)
Political Terror Scale Average	-0.0297	0.326
	(0.262)	(0.416)
# Mediation Attempts	1.018	0.192
	(0.716)	(0.118)
Government Battle Deaths	0.192*	0.0923
	(0.114)	(0.113)
Rebel Battle Deaths	-0.0181	0.186
	(0.109)	(0.114)
Relative Rebel Strength	0.756**	0.213
	(0.330)	(0.301)
Rebel Leadership Change	-0.170	1.907***
	(0.554)	(0.672)
Government Leadership Change	0.618	1.179***
	(0.410)	(0.440)
Leftist Rebel Ideology	0.739	-0.520
	(0.831)	(0.613)
Religious Rebel Ideology	-0.939**	-0.0473

	(0.435)	(0.575)
Ethnic Conflict	-0.331	0.799*
	(0.389)	(0.461)
Number of Rebel Groups	0.0222	-0.405*
	(0.218)	(0.211)
Territorial Control	-0.0101	0.00535
	(0.00755)	(0.0139)
Rebel External Support	-0.296	-0.182
	(0.335)	(0.572)
Number of Rebel Terror Attacks	-0.00667	0.00140
	(0.0101)	(0.00615)
Rebel One-Sided Violence	-0.106	-0.0290
	(0.0845)	(0.0721)
Constant	-3.046**	-4.612**
	(1.437)	(2.188)
Observations	276	276
Standard Errors Clustered on Dyad in Parentheses * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$		

Figure 16: Expected Change in Probability of Negotiation Incidence by Female Members and Rebel Forced Recruitment

Figure 17: Expected Change in Probability of Negotiation Demands by Female Members and Rebel Forced Recruitment

The following analyses examine how forced recruitment influences negotiations and negotiation demands. Given the small number of observations in each cell, the models suffer from separation problems in the data, which leads some of the control variables to be omitted. Using penalized maximum likelihood models, which can address issues related to separation, show consistent results.

Table 11 : Logistic Regression Examining the Effect of Female Membership on Negotiation Incidence & Negotiation Demands Forced Recruitment Split Samples				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Negotiation Incidence	Negotiation Incidence	Negotiation Demand	Negotiation Demand
	Forced Recruitment	No Forced Recruitment	Forced Recruitment	No Forced Recruitment
Female Members	0.920**	2.951**	0.988*	-6.287***
	(0.451)	(1.298)	(0.528)	(1.722)
Democracy	2.489	12.34***	-0.422	-2.653
	(2.669)	(3.422)	(3.032)	(5.867)
Political Terror Scale Average	0.389	-0.0898	0.638	4.221*
	(0.389)	(0.541)	(0.597)	(2.349)
# Mediation Attempts	0.697	2.783***	0.276**	0.635
	(0.669)	(0.887)	(0.137)	(0.779)
Government Battle Deaths	0.0309	0.862***	0.0484	0.809**
	(0.136)	(0.284)	(0.133)	(0.377)
Rebel Battle Deaths	0.0896	-0.433**	0.262**	-1.319**
	(0.135)	(0.182)	(0.127)	(0.641)
Relative Rebel Strength	1.017**	0.945*	-0.0129	2.198**
	(0.474)	(0.505)	(0.370)	(1.033)
Rebel Leadership Change	0.358	-2.028**	0.770	9.779***
	(0.805)	(0.958)	(0.825)	(3.227)
Government Leadership Change	0.681	-1.137	1.322**	
	(0.444)	(1.374)	(0.529)	
Leftist Rebel Ideology	0.963		-0.678	

	(0.743)		(0.530)	
Religious Rebel Ideology	-0.675	-1.934	0.0357	
	(0.459)	(1.455)	(0.711)	
Ethnic Conflict	-0.159	-3.197***	0.773	-0.564
	(0.433)	(1.062)	(0.500)	(2.065)
Number of Rebel Groups	0.0183	0.113	-0.310	-3.842
	(0.316)	(0.370)	(0.244)	(2.550)
Territorial Control		-0.0372***	0.0281**	0.0443**
		(0.0124)	(0.0131)	(0.0212)
Rebel External Support	-0.569	-0.685	-0.175	-4.469
	(0.442)	(0.836)	(0.645)	(2.877)
Number of Rebel Terror Attacks	-0.00366	-0.104**	0.00427	-2.616*
	(0.00928)	(0.0424)	(0.00532)	(1.430)
Rebel One-Sided Violence	-0.0832	0.0682	0.00657	-0.416
	(0.0947)	(0.205)	(0.0891)	(0.292)
Constant	-4.753**	-3.984*	-6.155**	-14.94***
	(2.199)	(2.221)	(3.013)	(4.453)
Observations	167	105	171	90
Standard Errors clustered on dyad in parentheses * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$				

V. Women's Roles in Rebellion

We use brand new data from WAAR (Loken and Matfess Forthcoming) to better understand how women's roles in rebel organizations influence the main relationship in the manuscript. In contrast to the WARD dataset (Wood and Thomas 2018), which only captures women's participation in combat, WAAR captures the various ways that women participate in rebel groups, including in non-combat roles. Unlike our female membership measure, which also includes women in non-combat roles, these data are *time invariant*, so are not a viable substitute in our main analysis.

1. Women's Combat Roles

First, we examine data on the prevalence of female frontline combatants, as some existing research argues participation in combat roles can be viewed as more prestigious and important in rebel groups (Kampwirth 2002, Viterna 2013, Thomas and Wood 2018). This measure ranges from 0-4, where "0" corresponds to no participation in this role and "4" corresponds to high prevalence.

The results in Table 12 (Model 1 & Model 3) show that including a control for whether female rebels serve in frontline combat does not change the main relationships we posit. However, when we interact our female membership variable with a measure of female frontline combatant prevalence, the prevalence of women in frontline combat roles slightly *decreases* the effect of female members on negotiation incidence. In Figure 18, which plots the first difference from these interactions, we observe that frontline combat prevalence attenuates the effect of female members for a subset of values (0-3; low to moderate). There is no relationship between female members and negotiation incidence in cases where there is a "high" prevalence of female combatants.

The relationship is similar for negotiation demands. Figure 19 shows frontline combat roles depress the effect of female members on rebel negotiation demands. [2] These findings may be explained by the ability of rebel groups with female combatants to deprive their government opponents of victory (e.g., Braithwaite and Ruiz 2019). Given rebels' increased ability to hurt states on the battlefield, rebel groups with more female combatants may be reluctant to demand talks, prioritizing progress on the battlefield instead. Wood and Allemang (2022) argue recruiting female combatants increases rebels' beliefs about their own viability and their prospects for victory. This can raise a group's commitment and resolve to achieve its war aims. According to this logic, rebel groups with gender diverse fighting forces will fight longer to achieve their aims through victory and may be less inclined to propose or accept a compromise deal.

[2] Due to separation issues, this model employs penalized maximum likelihood rather than a standard logistic regression model. This model specification also prevents the addition of clustered standard errors.

Table 12 : Logistic Regression Examining the Effect of Female Membership on Negotiation Incidence & Negotiation Demands Interactions with WAAR female combatant data				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Negotiation Incidence	Negotiation Incidence	Negotiation Demand	Negotiation Demand
	WAAR	WAAR	WAAR	WAAR
	logit	logit	logit	PML
	Negotiation Incidence	Negotiation Incidence	Negotiation Demand	Negotiation Demand
Female Members	1.659***	1.692**	1.652**	0.771
	(0.545)	(0.789)	(0.689)	(0.727)
Female Members x Female Combatant Prevalence WAAR		-0.0371		1.403
		(0.399)		(1.167)
Female Combatant Prevalence WAAR	-0.265	-0.241	-0.0680	-1.231
	(0.265)	(0.319)	(0.272)	(1.129)
Democracy	3.611**	3.585**	-0.614	-0.489
	(1.639)	(1.705)	(2.156)	(2.277)
Political Terror Scale Average	-0.100	-0.101	0.793*	0.697**
	(0.308)	(0.313)	(0.462)	(0.329)
# Mediation Attempts	0.729	0.730	0.112	0.104
	(0.480)	(0.479)	(0.114)	(0.131)
Government Battle Deaths	0.100	0.100	-0.0560	-0.0161
	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.131)	(0.114)

Rebel Battle Deaths	-0.0284	-0.0283	0.185	0.153
	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.127)	(0.113)
Relative Rebel Strength	0.743**	0.740**	-0.197	-0.172
	(0.332)	(0.335)	(0.343)	(0.334)
Rebel Leadership Change	-0.863	-0.868	1.128	1.192*
	(0.737)	(0.748)	(0.846)	(0.707)
Government Leadership Change	0.493	0.498	0.795*	0.675
	(0.394)	(0.401)	(0.448)	(0.547)
Leftist Rebel Ideology	0.518	0.516	-0.447	-0.342
	(0.593)	(0.596)	(0.638)	(0.806)
Religious Rebel Ideology	-0.951**	-0.957**	-0.125	0.00691
	(0.462)	(0.480)	(0.762)	(0.484)
Ethnic Conflict	-0.397	-0.404	0.440	0.483
	(0.368)	(0.371)	(0.457)	(0.423)
Number of Rebel Groups	0.00983	0.0121	-0.176	-0.210
	(0.183)	(0.185)	(0.203)	(0.226)
Territorial Control	-0.00559	-0.00563	0.0188**	0.0167*
	(0.00915)	(0.00916)	(0.00818)	(0.00989)
Rebel External Support	-0.113	-0.113	-0.168	-0.184
	(0.333)	(0.333)	(0.582)	(0.391)
Number of Rebel Terror Attacks	-0.00184	-0.00187	0.00709	0.00534

	(0.00818)	(0.00811)	(0.00517)	(0.00809)
Rebel One-Sided Violence	-0.0968	-0.0957	0.0325	0.0159
	(0.0922)	(0.0936)	(0.0857)	(0.0823)
Constant	-2.210	-2.203	-6.090***	-5.180***
	(1.527)	(1.559)	(2.352)	(1.730)
Observations	244	244	244	244
Standard Errors in parentheses . Models 1, 2, 3 errors clustered on dyad. Model 4 includes no clustered errors * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$				

Figure 18: Expected Change in Probability of Negotiation Incidence by Female Members Across Female Combatant Prevalence (WAAR data)



Figure 19: Expected Change in Probability of Negotiation Demands by Female Members Across Female Combatant Prevalence (WAAR data)



We also replicate these analyses with the WARD data in Table 13. In Figure 20, interaction terms between WARD's female combatant prevalence and our measure suggest female members increase the probability of negotiations in rebel groups that have no female combatants. However, at "low", "moderate" and "high" levels of female combatants, female membership has no significant effect on negotiation incidence.

On the other hand, the effect of female members on negotiation demands increases with female combatant prevalence, as can be seen in Figure 21.[3] However, this prediction is only significant for observations where there are no female combatants, suggesting again that rebel groups that have female members but do not use them in combat are more likely to request talks with the state than those with female combatants.[4]

[3] [3]Due to separation issues, this model employs penalized maximum likelihood rather than a standard logistic regression model. This model specification also prevents the addition of clustered standard errors.

[4] The effect of female members on negotiation demands is positive but becomes attenuated as female combatants become more prevalent though for "low", "moderate" and "high" prevalence, these predictions are insignificant.

Table 13 : Logistic Regression Examining the Effect of Female Membership on Negotiation Incidence & Negotiation Demands Interactions with WARD female combatant data				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Negotiation Incidence	Negotiation Incidence	Negotiation Demand	Negotiation Demand
	WARD	WARD	WARD	WARD
	logit	logit	PML	logit
Female Members	1.529***	1.370**	1.157**	1.329**
	(0.564)	(0.536)	(0.528)	(0.565)
Female Combatant Prevalence WARD	0.674	-0.252	-0.157	-0.432
	(1.141)	(0.292)	(1.371)	(0.324)
Female Members x Female Combatant Prevalence WARD	-1.036		-0.197	
	(1.160)		(1.408)	
Democracy	3.967***	3.954***	-0.812	-0.888
	(1.419)	(1.394)	(1.864)	(2.053)
Political Terror Scale Average	0.00399	0.0345	0.371	0.418
	(0.276)	(0.277)	(0.295)	(0.428)
# Mediation Attempts	0.912	0.897	0.168	0.183
	(0.588)	(0.583)	(0.106)	(0.117)
Government Battle Deaths	0.162	0.164	0.0609	0.0547
	(0.113)	(0.112)	(0.103)	(0.121)
Rebel Battle Deaths	0.000128	-0.00797	0.177*	0.206*
	(0.104)	(0.100)	(0.103)	(0.121)
Relative Rebel Strength	0.672**	0.661**	0.111	0.111
	(0.316)	(0.314)	(0.296)	(0.362)
Rebel Leadership Change	-0.473	-0.454	1.147**	1.242**
	(0.569)	(0.564)	(0.577)	(0.600)

Government Leadership Change	0.532	0.494	1.128**	1.217***
	(0.388)	(0.392)	(0.502)	(0.444)
Leftist Rebel Ideology	0.800	0.743	0.00251	0.00294
	(0.678)	(0.713)	(0.800)	(0.827)
Religious Rebel Ideology	-0.913*	-0.908**	-0.109	-0.143
	(0.475)	(0.459)	(0.431)	(0.593)
Ethnic Conflict	-0.276	-0.252	0.545	0.615
	(0.358)	(0.353)	(0.399)	(0.433)
Number of Rebel Groups	0.122	0.0941	-0.231	-0.253
	(0.181)	(0.180)	(0.207)	(0.172)
Territorial Control	-0.0177***	-0.0179***	-0.00607	-0.00823
	(0.00629)	(0.00638)	(0.00838)	(0.0137)
Rebel External Support	-0.0102	-0.0394	-0.0616	-0.0621
	(0.350)	(0.348)	(0.367)	(0.546)
Number of Rebel Terror Attacks	-0.00427	-0.00437	0.00223	0.00305
	(0.00835)	(0.00847)	(0.00753)	(0.00586)
Rebel One-Sided Violence	-0.0843	-0.0913	0.0105	0.0152
	(0.0757)	(0.0771)	(0.0721)	(0.0738)
Constant	-3.265**	-3.236**	-4.503***	-4.996**
	(1.392)	(1.369)	(1.557)	(2.103)
Observations	293	293	293	293
Standard Errors in parentheses . Models 1, 2, 3 errors clustered on dyad. Model 4, which employs a PML model, includes no clustered errors * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$				

Figure 20: Expected Change in Probability of Negotiation Demands by Female Members Across Female Combatant Prevalence (WARD data)



Figure 21: Expected Change in Probability of Negotiation Demands by Female Members Across Female Combatant Prevalence (WARD data)



2. Women's Leadership Roles

We also examine the effect of women's leadership roles on negotiation outcomes using data from both WAAR and Henshaw et al. (2019). The WAAR dataset disaggregates leadership roles into military and non-military leadership. In Table 14, we see that adding binary control variables for either type of leadership into the main models does not change the substance of our main results; female membership continues to yield a positive and statistically significant effect on negotiation outcomes and negotiation demands. The substantive results are similarly unchanged when women's leadership is measured using Henshaw et al. 2019 in Table 16.

When we interact WAARs female military leadership variables with our female membership measure, both women's military (Figure 22) and non-military (Figures 24) leadership increases the effect of female members on negotiation incidence; overall, rebel groups are more likely to participate in negotiations when their female members are among a group's leadership.

In Figures 23 and 25, we observe the converse with rebel demands for negotiations. Rebel groups are more likely to demand negotiations when they have female members, but women do not serve in military leadership roles (Figure 23). There is no significant effect of female members on rebels' negotiation demands when women hold military leadership positions. Figure 25 shows there is no significant interaction between female members and female non-military leadership roles.

Finally, we utilize leadership data from Henshaw et al, which aggregates all types of leadership roles. The results in Table 16 and Figure 26 suggest female leadership increases the effect of female members on negotiation incidence, while female membership only has a positive or significant effect on negotiation demands when women are not among a group's leadership. In Figure 27, there is no significant effect of female membership on demands for talks when women are among the leadership. These two data sources on leadership provide consistent results.

Overall, these results suggest a complicated relationship between women's roles in rebel groups and negotiation dynamics. Voluntary recruitment and participation in combat or leadership roles, do not necessarily imply women have a greater impact on the group's negotiation behavior. Additionally, the findings, especially those on combat and leadership suggest that when women take on traditionally masculine roles within rebel groups, women in those roles may not have as much of a feminizing effect on rebels' bargaining behavior as we hypothesize. This relationship is likely complicated by the separate effect that female combatants have on a group's perceived bargaining leverage.

A. Women's Military Leadership (WAAR data)

Table 14 : Logistic Regression Examining the Effect of Female Membership on Negotiation Incidence & Negotiation Demands WAAR Military Leader				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Negotiation Incidence	Negotiation Incidence	Negotiation Demand	Negotiation Demand
Female Members	1.471***	1.643***	1.374**	1.286**
	(0.482)	(0.427)	(0.614)	(0.569)
Female Military Leaders	-2.883*	-1.112**	0.146	-0.223
	(1.669)	(0.481)	(1.163)	(0.555)
Female Members x Female Military Leaders	1.953		-0.437	
	(1.746)		(1.290)	
Democracy	3.084**	3.182**	-1.315	-1.434
	(1.449)	(1.470)	(2.114)	(2.095)
Political Terror Scale Average	-0.0586	-0.0723	0.671	0.676
	(0.286)	(0.291)	(0.444)	(0.438)
# Mediation Attempts	0.802*	0.768	0.245**	0.253**
	(0.470)	(0.488)	(0.111)	(0.123)
Government Battle Deaths	0.0805	0.0733	-0.0355	-0.0328
	(0.0932)	(0.0945)	(0.115)	(0.116)
Rebel Battle Deaths	0.00860	0.00506	0.292**	0.297**
	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.118)	(0.119)
Relative Rebel Strength	0.826**	0.843**	-0.0682	-0.0793
	(0.329)	(0.329)	(0.331)	(0.334)
Rebel Leadership Change	-0.737	-0.763	1.166	1.167

	(0.644)	(0.654)	(0.756)	(0.755)
Government Leadership Change	0.314	0.311	1.003**	1.009**
	(0.361)	(0.364)	(0.396)	(0.400)
Leftist Rebel Ideology	0.0853	0.00114	-0.910	-0.900
	(0.563)	(0.545)	(0.797)	(0.798)
Religious Rebel Ideology	-0.829**	-0.837**	-0.0668	-0.0845
	(0.407)	(0.404)	(0.583)	(0.579)
Ethnic Conflict	-0.282	-0.309	0.455	0.472
	(0.334)	(0.332)	(0.405)	(0.398)
Number of Rebel Groups	0.0448	0.0509	-0.190	-0.191
	(0.173)	(0.172)	(0.193)	(0.194)
Territorial Control	-0.00850	-0.00823	0.0197**	0.0195**
	(0.00954)	(0.00932)	(0.00808)	(0.00809)
Rebel External Support	0.0349	0.0353	-0.0280	-0.0242
	(0.321)	(0.321)	(0.551)	(0.552)
Number of Rebel Terror Attacks	-0.00281	-0.00191	0.00519	0.00467
	(0.00821)	(0.00811)	(0.00551)	(0.00566)
Rebel One-Sided Violence	-0.0442	-0.0407	0.0116	0.0118
	(0.0842)	(0.0839)	(0.0744)	(0.0739)
Constant	-2.626*	-2.617*	-6.149***	-6.128***
	(1.508)	(1.534)	(2.330)	(2.307)
Observations	264	264	264	264
Standard Errors clustered on dyad in parentheses * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$				

Figure 22: Expected Change in Probability of Negotiation Incidence by Female Members Across and Female Military Leadership (WAAR data)



Figure 23: Expected Change in Probability of Negotiation Demands by Female Members Across and Female Military Leadership (WAAR data)



B. Women's Non-Military Leadership (WAAR data)

Table 15 : Logistic Regression Examining the Effect of Female Membership on Negotiation Incidence & Demands WAAR Nonmilitary Leaders				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Negotiation Incidence	Negotiation Incidence	Negotiation Demand	Negotiation Demand
Female Members	0.975*	1.250***	1.225*	0.922
	(0.524)	(0.428)	(0.680)	(0.565)
Female Nonmilitary Leaders	-1.748	-0.292	1.668*	0.762
	(1.216)	(0.461)	(0.990)	(0.517)
Female Members x Female Noncombat Leaders	1.770		-1.139	
	(1.259)		(1.076)	
Democracy	2.798*	2.867*	-0.101	-0.292
	(1.476)	(1.518)	(2.039)	(2.026)
Political Terror Scale Average	0.0799	0.0521	0.747*	0.761*
	(0.280)	(0.286)	(0.425)	(0.414)
# Mediation Attempts	0.932	0.817	0.145	0.199*
	(0.615)	(0.539)	(0.108)	(0.120)
Government Battle Deaths	0.0882	0.0849	-0.0173	0.00249
	(0.0886)	(0.0891)	(0.115)	(0.117)
Rebel Battle Deaths	-0.0267	-0.00518	0.294**	0.271**
	(0.102)	(0.105)	(0.124)	(0.121)
Relative Rebel Strength	0.820**	0.770**	-0.0384	-0.0275
	(0.330)	(0.336)	(0.352)	(0.359)

Rebel Leadership Change	-0.577	-0.549	1.413**	1.364*
	(0.642)	(0.655)	(0.714)	(0.726)
Government Leadership Change	0.448	0.471	1.015**	1.037**
	(0.382)	(0.393)	(0.425)	(0.420)
Leftist Rebel Ideology	0.574	0.612	-0.599	-0.722
	(0.534)	(0.535)	(0.489)	(0.525)
Religious Rebel Ideology	-0.736	-0.905**	-0.0612	0.0739
	(0.471)	(0.450)	(0.591)	(0.572)
Ethnic Conflict	-0.193	-0.305	0.431	0.550
	(0.348)	(0.363)	(0.372)	(0.409)
Number of Rebel Groups	0.00766	0.00337	-0.220	-0.226
	(0.182)	(0.178)	(0.212)	(0.217)
Territorial Control	-0.00772	-0.00632	0.0197**	0.0185**
	(0.0104)	(0.00976)	(0.00811)	(0.00817)
Rebel External Support	-0.219	-0.157	-0.142	-0.214
	(0.321)	(0.315)	(0.551)	(0.570)
Number of Rebel Terror Attacks	-0.00412	-0.00337	0.00491	0.00377
	(0.00850)	(0.00847)	(0.00549)	(0.00548)
Rebel One-Sided Violence	-0.0995	-0.0947	-0.00946	-0.0123
	(0.0777)	(0.0792)	(0.0734)	(0.0726)
Constant	-2.934*	-2.798*	-6.923***	-6.859***
	(1.497)	(1.507)	(2.412)	(2.366)
Observations	264	264	264	264
Standard Errors clustered on dyad in parentheses * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$				

Figure 24: Expected Change in Probability of Negotiation Incidence by Female Members Across and Female Non-Military Leadership (WAAR data)



Figure 25: Expected Change in Probability of Negotiation Demand by Female Members Across and Female Non-Military Leadership (WAAR data)



C. Women's Leadership (Henshaw et al data)

Table 16 : Logistic Regression Examining the Effect of Female Membership on Negotiation Incidence & Demands Henshaw et al 2019 Leadership data				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Negotiation Incidence	Negotiation Incidence	Negotiation Demand	Negotiation Demand
Female Members	1.569***	1.513***	0.936*	1.135**
	(0.416)	(0.437)	(0.547)	(0.538)
Female Leadership	-1.042**	-2.788	-0.370	1.877**
	(0.470)	(1.945)	(0.530)	(0.891)
Female Members x Female Leadership		1.827		-2.530**
		(1.958)		(1.201)
Democracy	3.331**	3.378**	-2.475	-2.631
	(1.504)	(1.495)	(2.170)	(2.240)
Political Terror Scale Average	-0.00634	-0.00565	0.389	0.407
	(0.290)	(0.287)	(0.424)	(0.443)
# Mediation Attempts	0.887	0.904*	0.211*	0.149
	(0.552)	(0.537)	(0.127)	(0.104)
Government Battle Deaths	0.153	0.158	0.0413	0.0103
	(0.112)	(0.111)	(0.124)	(0.124)
Rebel Battle Deaths	0.0258	0.0236	0.247**	0.243**
	(0.105)	(0.104)	(0.120)	(0.119)
Relative Rebel Strength	0.807***	0.806***	0.0907	0.148
	(0.303)	(0.305)	(0.341)	(0.333)
Rebel Leadership Change	-0.567	-0.557	1.328**	1.313**
	(0.566)	(0.566)	(0.635)	(0.634)

Government Leadership Change	0.687*	0.677*	1.163**	1.172**
	(0.391)	(0.387)	(0.457)	(0.469)
Leftist Rebel Ideology	0.0105	0.0454	-0.621	-0.653
	(0.865)	(0.866)	(1.085)	(1.037)
Religious Rebel Ideology	-1.139**	-1.102**	-0.0922	-0.135
	(0.453)	(0.459)	(0.713)	(0.753)
Ethnic Conflict	-0.641	-0.613	0.615	0.496
	(0.413)	(0.414)	(0.519)	(0.557)
Number of Rebel Groups	0.0729	0.0733	-0.331	-0.341
	(0.189)	(0.190)	(0.209)	(0.208)
Territorial Control	-0.0109	-0.0115	-0.00379	-0.00168
	(0.00734)	(0.00731)	(0.0142)	(0.0144)
Rebel External Support	-0.179	-0.173	-0.0729	-0.0828
	(0.299)	(0.299)	(0.560)	(0.543)
Number of Rebel Terror Attacks	-0.00239	-0.00281	0.00345	0.00514
	(0.00886)	(0.00897)	(0.00597)	(0.00568)
Rebel One-Sided Violence	-0.0821	-0.0849	-0.000169	0.0186
	(0.0819)	(0.0813)	(0.0689)	(0.0701)
Constant	-2.983**	-3.010**	-4.545**	-4.583**
	(1.475)	(1.466)	(2.144)	(2.210)
Observations	288	288	288	288
Standard Errors clustered on dyad in parentheses * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$				

Figure 26: Expected Change in Probability of Negotiation Demands by Female Members Across and Female Leadership (Henshaw et al data)



Figure 27: Expected Change in Probability of Negotiation Demands by Female Members and Female Leadership (Henshaw et al 2019 data)



VI. Women in Traditional Political Institutions

1. Women in State Legislature

It is possible that rebel women's preferences for negotiations may differ based on the number of women on the government side. Particularly, rebel women may prefer to negotiate with states that have more women in political office. To probe this dynamic, we interact our measure, *Female Membership*, with the proportion of female members in the lower chamber of the legislature from V-Dem (*v2lgfemleg*) in Table 17. The results suggest female participation in the legislature actually decreases the effect of female rebels on the odds of negotiations, but only at very low levels of women's participation in the legislature; Figure 28 shows in cases where women make up greater than 15% of the lower chamber of the legislature, there is no significant effect of women's membership on negotiations. Similarly, Figure 29 shows there is no interactive relationship between women in the legislature and women rebels on negotiation demands.

Table 17 : Logistic Regression Examining the Effect of Female Membership on Negotiation Incidence & Demands - Across Female Legislative Participation (V-dem v2lgfemleg)

	Model 1	Model 2
	Negotiation Incidence	Negotiation Demand
Female Members	2.121***	0.0182
	(0.804)	(0.865)
Percentage lower chamber female legislators	0.0557	0.0350
	(0.0481)	(0.0665)
Female Members x Lower chamber female legislators	-0.0688	0.0181
	(0.0559)	(0.0713)
Democracy	3.696**	-4.220
	(1.653)	(2.588)
Political Terror Scale Average	0.0178	0.403
	(0.307)	(0.474)
# Mediation Attempts	0.639	0.183
	(0.399)	(0.112)
Government Battle Deaths	0.173	0.0793
	(0.132)	(0.151)
Rebel Battle Deaths	-0.0852	0.129
	(0.112)	(0.134)

Relative Rebel Strength	0.602*	0.251
	(0.364)	(0.457)
Rebel Leadership Change	-0.557	1.702**
	(0.699)	(0.726)
Government Leadership Change	1.589***	1.485*
	(0.571)	(0.800)
Leftist Rebel Ideology	1.113	0.501
	(1.091)	(1.066)
Religious Rebel Ideology	-0.750	0.365
	(0.497)	(0.764)
Ethnic Conflict	-0.0726	1.143*
	(0.421)	(0.679)
Number of Rebel Groups	-0.0323	-0.480**
	(0.207)	(0.207)
Territorial Control	-0.0216***	-0.00612
	(0.00734)	(0.0140)
Rebel External Support	-0.312	-0.319
	(0.359)	(0.638)
Number of Rebel Terror Attacks	0.000166	0.00704
	(0.00764)	(0.00586)
Rebel One-Sided Violence	-0.115	-0.0937
	(0.0923)	(0.0885)
Constant	-3.216**	-4.381*
	(1.619)	(2.337)
Observations	244	244
Standard Errors clustered on dyad in parentheses * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$		

Figure 28: Expected Change in Probability of Negotiation Incidence by Female Members Across and Female Participation in Legislature (v-dem: v2lgfemleg**)**



Figure 29: Expected Change in Probability of Negotiation Demands by Female Members Across and Female Participation in Legislature (v-dem: v2lgfemleg**)**



2. Gender Equality

We consider the role of societal gender equality in the relationship between rebel women and negotiations. Table 18 examines interactions between various measures of gender equity and empowerment and female rebel membership on negotiation incidence and negotiation demands. We use data on women's civil liberties (Models 1 and 2) and women's civil society participation (Models 3 and 4)from V-Dem.

Female rebel members have a positive effect on negotiation incidence at different ranges of each of these indices, as shown in Figures 30 and 32. While civil liberties, generally has an insignificant effect on the relationship between female members and negotiations. A positive effect of female members is observed at mid-ranges of the civil liberties index. However, the different values of this index do not seem to alter the relationship substantially. By contrast, Figure 32 shows that civil society participation has a significant effect only at higher ranges of the index; the average effect of female members increases with civil society participation starting at an index value of about 0.568.

Figures 31 and 33 show similar results with respect to negotiation demands. Women's civil liberties is significant at only the middle range of the index (Figure 31). At the mid-range of civil liberties, there is a positive effect of female membership on negotiation demands, though the effect of female members is decreasing slightly with increases in civil liberties. In Figure 33, improvements in women's civil society participation increase the expected probability of rebel demands for negotiations when a group has women among its membership.

Generally, it appears women's latent participation in civic groups has the largest effect on female rebel members' ability to influence their group's conciliation efforts. This is consistent with research suggesting female rebels work with civil society actors during peace processes (Mendez 2005; Krause et al. 2018; Paffenholz et al. 2016). These results offer some support for the intuition that when women participate freely in civic and community life, female rebels have a larger effect on negotiation dynamics in rebel organizations. Society may be more primed to value the judgments and preferences of women when they have the autonomy to engage in civic life and autonomy over their own domestic lives. Thomas and Wood's (2018) provide a basis for this idea. They argue societal gender equality increases the likelihood that rebel groups will recruit female combatants because a rebel group's male leadership will find more value in female recruits when women regularly contribute positively to society.

We also examine the potential impact of women's participation in politics using V-Dem's *Women's Political Participation* index. In Table 18, Model 5 there is a negative effect of women's political participation on the relationship between female rebel membership and negotiations, but these predictions are only significant at the middle ranges of the index. In Table 18 Model 16, There is no joint effect of women in the legislature and women rebels on negotiation demands. The substantive effects of these models are shown in Figures 34 and 35.

Both *Women's Political Participation* and the *Percentage lower chamber female legislators* suggest women's active participation in political institutions, has a largely insignificant— and at times negative— effect on the relationship between women rebels and negotiations/negotiation demands. This may imply that when women are on the other side of the negotiating table, rebel women's activism is less necessary.

Table 18 : Logistic Regression Examining the Effect of Female Membership on Negotiation Incidence & Demands - Across VDEM gender equality measures

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	Negotiation Incidence	Negotiation Demand	Negotiation Incidence	Negotiation Demand	Negotiation Incidence	Negotiation Demand
	Women's Civil Liberties	Women's Civil Liberties	Women's Civil Society Participation	Women's Civil Society Participation	Women's Political Participation	Women's Political Participation
Female Members	0.936	-0.687	0.601	-3.162**	2.595*	0.157
	(0.766)	(0.758)	(1.079)	(1.459)	(1.404)	(1.363)
Women civil liberties index	-1.599	-6.698***				
	(1.391)	(2.432)				
Female Members x Women civil liberties	0.266	4.505**				
	(1.707)	(2.229)				
Women civil society participation			-0.144	-0.718		
			(1.705)	(1.778)		
Female Members x Women's civil society participation			0.950	7.634***		
			(1.896)	(2.728)		
Women political participation					0.869	-1.333
					(1.668)	(1.937)
Female Members x Women's political participation index					-2.065	1.290
					(2.355)	(2.559)
Democracy	4.820***	2.234	3.521**	-4.441**	4.466***	-3.280
	(1.644)	(2.524)	(1.732)	(2.256)	(1.724)	(2.163)

Political Terror Scale Average	-0.146	0.0395	0.0655	0.828*	0.104	0.365
	(0.279)	(0.418)	(0.248)	(0.427)	(0.323)	(0.385)
# Mediation Attempts	0.861	0.105	0.889	0.170	0.623	0.205*
	(0.579)	(0.107)	(0.576)	(0.108)	(0.424)	(0.112)
Government Battle Deaths	0.127	0.00979	0.163	0.178	0.165	-0.00780
	(0.113)	(0.126)	(0.111)	(0.126)	(0.138)	(0.133)
Rebel Battle Deaths	0.0126	0.234*	-0.0113	0.0948	-0.0790	0.223*
	(0.101)	(0.124)	(0.102)	(0.115)	(0.111)	(0.130)
Relative Rebel Strength	0.704**	0.236	0.697**	0.396	0.654**	0.140
	(0.321)	(0.336)	(0.299)	(0.311)	(0.332)	(0.392)
Rebel Leadership Change	-0.310	1.634***	-0.336	1.954***	-0.594	1.291*
	(0.537)	(0.608)	(0.545)	(0.625)	(0.730)	(0.726)
Government Leadership Change	0.380	0.990**	0.477	1.457***	0.843**	1.244**
	(0.408)	(0.452)	(0.400)	(0.417)	(0.404)	(0.582)
Leftist Rebel Ideology	0.722	0.108	0.730	0.595	1.050	0.0830
	(0.792)	(0.755)	(0.749)	(0.669)	(1.029)	(0.768)
Religious Rebel Ideology	-0.702	0.111	-0.909*	-0.316	-0.701	0.192
	(0.579)	(0.740)	(0.491)	(0.883)	(0.588)	(0.789)
Ethnic Conflict	-0.188	0.741	-0.306	0.170	-0.00931	0.945
	(0.345)	(0.481)	(0.363)	(0.471)	(0.398)	(0.606)
Number of Rebel Groups	0.119	-0.250	0.0709	-0.424**	0.0494	-0.426**
	(0.184)	(0.192)	(0.181)	(0.184)	(0.207)	(0.210)
Territorial Control	-0.0179**	-0.00799	-0.0155**	0.00933	-0.0211***	-0.0105
	(0.00694)	(0.0145)	(0.00705)	(0.0120)	(0.00622)	(0.0139)

Rebel External Support	-0.167	-0.228	-0.0845	0.135	-0.220	-0.391
	(0.332)	(0.520)	(0.311)	(0.484)	(0.372)	(0.611)
Number of Rebel Terror Attacks	-0.00436	0.00602	-0.00392	0.00283	-0.00241	0.00129
	(0.00894)	(0.00649)	(0.00818)	(0.00576)	(0.00851)	(0.00669)
Rebel One-Sided Violence	-0.0926	0.00989	-0.119	-0.0775	-0.0819	-0.0814
	(0.0794)	(0.0625)	(0.0809)	(0.0755)	(0.0916)	(0.0741)
Constant	-2.098	-1.836	-3.166**	-5.981***	-4.026*	-3.207
	(1.544)	(2.253)	(1.352)	(2.202)	(2.078)	(2.201)
Observations	293	293	293	293	258	258
Standard Errors clustered on dyad in parentheses * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$						

Figure 30: Expected Change in Probability of Negotiation Incidence by Female Members Across different values of women's VDEM civil liberties index



Figure 31: Expected Change in Probability of Negotiation Demands by Female Members Across different values of women's VDEM civil liberties index



Figure 32: Expected Change in Probability of Negotiation Incidence by Female Members Across different values of VDEM women's civil society participation index



Figure 33: Expected Change in Probability of Negotiation Demands by Female Members Across different values of VDEM women's civil society participation index



Figure 34: Expected Change in Probability of Negotiation Incidence by Female Members Across different values of VDEM women's political participation index



Figure 35: Expected Change in Probability of Negotiation Incidence and Demands by Female Members Across different values of VDEM women's political participation index



VII. Duration Analysis

In Table 19, we conduct a duration analysis examining the effect of female members on the time until negotiations. Figure 36 displays the hazard curves derived from Cox Proportional Hazards model. These results show that groups with women are likelier to negotiate with the state sooner than groups without women. When the dependent variable is conceptualized as negotiation onset, which measures just the first instance where a dyad began negotiations, there is no significant relationship (Model 2). Figure 37, however, shows a similar trend to that depicted in Figure 36; groups with women appear to experience negotiation onset more quickly than groups without women.

Table 19: Cox Proportional Hazards Models Examining Time Until Negotiation Incidence and Onset

	Model 1	Model 2
	Negotiation Incidence	Negotiation Onset
Female Members	0.399*	0.188
	(0.226)	(0.267)
Democracy	1.571	1.412
	(1.209)	(1.227)
Political Terror Scale Average	-0.174	-0.187
	(0.196)	(0.196)
# Mediation Attempts	0.230***	0.201***
	(0.0600)	(0.0654)

Government Battle Deaths	0.101*	0.131**
	(0.0579)	(0.0658)
Rebel Battle Deaths	0.0914	0.0620
	(0.0628)	(0.0650)
Relative Rebel Strength	0.407***	0.463***
	(0.151)	(0.155)
Rebel Leadership Change	-1.044	-0.934
	(0.883)	(0.926)
Government Leadership Change	-0.113	-0.317
	(0.316)	(0.334)
Leftist Rebel Ideology	0.528	0.505
	(0.552)	(0.585)
Religious Rebel Ideology	-0.983***	-0.914**
	(0.368)	(0.376)
Ethnic Conflict	-0.454	-0.471
	(0.300)	(0.307)
Number of Rebel Groups	0.206**	0.186
	(0.103)	(0.114)
Territory	-0.00368	-0.00197
	(0.00532)	(0.00529)
Rebel External Support	-0.283	-0.357
	(0.235)	(0.230)
Number of Rebel Terror Attacks	-0.0280*	-0.0274*
	(0.0155)	(0.0151)
Rebel One-Sided Violence	-0.0789	-0.0550
	(0.0618)	(0.0618)
Observations	170	170
Coefficients shown. Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$		

Figure 36: Cox Proportional Hazard Models Examining the Time Until *Negotiation Incidence* by Female Membership



Figure 37: Cox Proportional Hazard Models Examining the Time Until *Negotiation Incidence* by Female Membership



VIII. Examining Previous Negotiation Attempts

Table 20 Model 1 examines the number of negotiation attempts in a given year. Female members increase the expected number of negotiation-months in a given year. These results suggest that groups with women will either engage in negotiation rounds for longer or take part in a greater number of negotiation rounds in a year. The first difference from this model can be found in Figure 38. Model 2 in Table 20, adds a control variable for whether the dyad ever negotiated before (Ryckman and Braithwaite 2020) to the main models.

Table 20 : Regressions Examining the Effect of Female Membership on Number of Negotiations and Negotiation Incidence– Accounting for Previous Negotiation Attempts

	Model 1	Model 2
	Number of Negotiations in Year	Negotiation Incidence (binary)
	Poisson	Logit
Female Members	0.658***	0.857**
	(0.238)	(0.380)
Negotiations Ever		0.913***
		(0.337)
Democracy	0.644	2.155*
	(1.074)	(1.156)
Political Terror Scale Average	0.101	0.0251
	(0.259)	(0.261)
# Mediation Attempts	0.277***	0.550**
	(0.0297)	(0.223)
Government Battle Deaths	0.0348	0.165
	(0.0673)	(0.106)
Rebel Battle Deaths	0.0551	0.0257
	(0.0679)	(0.106)
Relative Rebel Strength	0.135	0.555**
	(0.165)	(0.253)
Rebel Leadership Change	-0.622*	-0.504
	(0.332)	(0.453)
Government Leadership Change	0.483**	0.594
	(0.214)	(0.525)

Leftist Rebel Ideology	0.228	0.158
	(0.269)	(0.752)
Religious Rebel Ideology	-0.380	-1.032**
	(0.387)	(0.434)
Ethnic Conflict	0.172	-0.366
	(0.236)	(0.347)
Number of Rebel Groups	-0.0109	0.0494
	(0.122)	(0.156)
Terr	-0.0112**	-0.0197**
	(0.00526)	(0.00773)
Rebel External Support	0.0920	-0.136
	(0.190)	(0.292)
Number of Rebel Terror Attacks	0.00654***	-0.00497
	(0.00137)	(0.00850)
Rebel One-Sided Violence	-0.0464	-0.172**
	(0.0421)	(0.0790)
Constant	-1.645	-2.805**
	(1.164)	(1.226)
Observations	288	290
Standard Errors clustered on dyad in parentheses * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$		

Figure 38: Effect of Female Members on Expected Change in Number of Negotiations in Year.



Figure 39: Effect of Female Members on Expected Change in Probability of Negotiations, controlling for previous negotiations in dyad



IX. Replications using group-level data and coding only first mentions

1. Group-level data

Our main dataset uses time variant data on women's participation in rebel movements. While we are confident in our coding, we also recognize that some observations will be coded in accurately. To ensure that the yearly coding of our data do not bias our results, We re-analyze the main relationship using group-level, time invariant data in Table 21. Given the small-N and degrees of freedom constraints, we include bivariate regressions (Models 1 & 2) as well as models with all significant variables in the main analyses (Models 3 & 4). The results generally show a positive and statistically significant effect of female members on negotiation incidence (Figure 40) and demands (Figure 41), even on static, group-level data.

Table 21 : Logistic Regression Examining the Effect of Female Membership on Negotiation Incidence & Demands - Group-Level data

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Negotiation Incidence	Negotiation Demands	Negotiation Incidence	Negotiation Demands
Female Members	2.076***	1.843***	2.810***	1.311**
	(0.544)	(0.484)	(0.784)	(0.548)
Democracy			4.431**	
			(2.204)	
Relative Rebel Strength			0.493	
			(0.510)	
Religious Rebel Ideology			-1.588**	
			(0.770)	
Rebel Battle Deaths				0.0474**
				(0.0229)
Rebel Leadership Change				0.197
				(0.680)
Government Leadership Change				-0.271
				(0.572)
Constant	-0.159	-1.792***	-1.689	-2.149***
	(0.254)	(0.362)	(1.176)	(0.422)
Observations	102	102	87	101

Coefficients shown. Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Figure 40. Effect of Female Members on Expected Change in Probability of Negotiation Incidence (Group Level Data).



Figure 41. Effect of Female Members on Expected Change in Probability of Negotiation Demand (Group Level Data).



2. First-Mentions

In Table 22, we reconceptualize our explanatory variable, coding instead *Female Member Onset*. *Female Member Onset* is coded "1" only in the first year women were recorded as members in each rebel group. Here we adopt a stricter coding rule for female members. In particular, we code only cases where women joined a rebel group that did not already have women members at the start of the war. If women were already members in the first year of the conflict, the observation is coded "0". In Table 23, we consider as onset all instances where women's memberships in rebel groups is recorded for the first time (first mentions). This captures the actual first year of women's membership as well as cases where female members are present the first year of the conflict.

Neither of these alternate coding yields significant results. There appears to be no relationship between female membership onset and negotiation incidence/demands. As such, we can conclude that our data do not reflect women's initial recruitment, but instead, capture women's membership in rebel groups.

Table 22 : Logistic Regression Examining the Effect of Female Membership on Negotiation Incidence & Demands
Coding only first year of female members

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Negotiation Incidence	Negotiation Incidence	Negotiation Demand	Negotiation Demand
Female Member First Year (strict)	-0.0320	-0.199	0.602	0.520
	(0.787)	(0.714)	(0.824)	(0.733)
Democracy		2.580*		-2.015
		(1.360)		(2.084)
Political Terror Scale Average		0.00280		0.381
		(0.264)		(0.409)
# Mediation Attempts		0.859		0.139
		(0.595)		(0.106)
Government Battle Deaths		0.177*		0.0588
		(0.103)		(0.119)
Rebel Battle Deaths		0.0257		0.221**
		(0.0923)		(0.109)

Relative Rebel Strength		0.922***		0.342
		(0.310)		(0.319)
Rebel Leadership Change		-0.256		1.387**
		(0.587)		(0.613)
Government Leadership Change		0.529		1.185***
		(0.367)		(0.420)
Leftist Rebel Ideology		1.057		0.160
		(0.664)		(0.667)
Religious Rebel Ideology		-0.630		-0.000791
		(0.428)		(0.601)
Ethnic Conflict		-0.0736		0.728
		(0.327)		(0.466)
Number of Rebel Groups		0.131		-0.227
		(0.180)		(0.177)
Terr		-0.0127**		-0.00487
		(0.00538)		(0.0137)
Rebel External Support		-0.0601		-0.140
		(0.325)		(0.555)
Number of Rebel Terror Attacks		-0.00507		0.00339
		(0.00971)		(0.00647)
Rebel One-Sided Violence		-0.0397		0.0351
		(0.0600)		(0.0665)
Constant	-0.256	-3.361***	-1.518***	-4.897**
	(0.194)	(1.301)	(0.218)	(2.018)
Observations	353	293	352	293
Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$				

Figure 42. Effect of Female Members on Expected Change in Probability of Negotiation Incidence in Year (Female Membership Onset- strict).



Figure 43. Effect of Female Members on Expected Change in Probability of Negotiation Demand in Year (Female Membership Onset-strict).



Table 23 : Logistic Regression Examining the Effect of Female Membership on Negotiation Incidence & Demands Coding only first mentions of female members (including groups that started with women)				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Negotiation Incidence	Negotiation Incidence	Negotiation Demand	Negotiation Demand
Female Member First Year (All)	0.286	-0.225	0.459	0.131
	(0.357)	(0.424)	(0.408)	(0.473)
Democracy		2.553*		-1.979
		(1.361)		(2.036)
Political Terror Scale Average		-0.00386		0.401
		(0.263)		(0.398)
# Mediation Attempts		0.860		0.137
		(0.598)		(0.108)
Government Battle Deaths		0.180*		0.0606
		(0.103)		(0.121)
Rebel Battle Deaths		0.0272		0.213*
		(0.0917)		(0.111)
Relative Rebel Strength		0.948***		0.331
		(0.307)		(0.316)
Rebel Leadership Change		-0.264		1.380**
		(0.582)		(0.616)
Government Leadership Change		0.527		1.164***
		(0.364)		(0.419)
Leftist Rebel Ideology		1.050		0.160

		(0.690)		(0.671)
Religious Rebel Ideology		-0.632		0.00898
		(0.426)		(0.610)
Ethnic Conflict		-0.0829		0.749
		(0.326)		(0.475)
Number of Rebel Groups		0.137		-0.233
		(0.180)		(0.180)
Terr		-0.0126**		-0.00511
		(0.00554)		(0.0135)
Rebel External Support		-0.0455		-0.149
		(0.318)		(0.554)
Number of Rebel Terror Attacks		-0.00526		0.00346
		(0.00978)		(0.00662)
Rebel One-Sided Violence		-0.0410		0.0363
		(0.0603)		(0.0660)
Constant	-0.286	-3.383***	-1.557***	-4.941**
	(0.201)	(1.300)	(0.231)	(2.001)
Observations	353	293	352	293
Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$				

Figure 44. Effect of Female Members on Expected Change in Probability of Negotiation Incidence in Year (Female Membership Onset & First Year of Conflict).



Figure 45. Effect of Female Members on Expected Change in Probability of Negotiation Demand in Year (Female Membership Onset & First Year of Conflict).