Security through Cooperation

An information brochure on the Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly on the security policy of Switzerland (Report 2000 on Security Policy)







2ND EDITION

This brochure summarizes the core state–ments of the report on Swiss security policy and is intended to facilitate the discussion on security policy. However, it is no substitute for the more detailed and comprehensive full report.

Only the text adopted by the Federal Council is authoritative!

Impressum

Concept, Realization:
Rudolf Pl ss,
Thomas Suremann

Text:
Rudolf Pl ss, Christian Catrina,
Thomas Suremann

Publisher:
Office for Information Concepts, General Secretariat, DDPS

Layout/Print:
Staubli Media, Bern [www.stm.ch]
Druckerei Bloch AG, Arlesheim

Photos:
Keystone-Press, Army Film Service

To be ordered from:
see page 32

Contact address:
Information Service DDPS,
Parliament Building, East Wing,
3003 Bern
Tel ++41 31 324 50 58
www.vbs.admin.ch

Contents

Summary

Our new security policy and its consequences 4–5

Fundamentals

New world – new dangers 6–7
Armed conflicts and their management 8–9*
Our armed forces in comparison with others 10–11*
Our response: security trough cooperation 12–13

Our security policy instruments

The armed forces 14–15
Armed forces: preconditions for mission accomplishment 16–17
Civil protection 18–19
Foreign policy and economic policy 20–21
Police and protection of the constitutional order 22
Information and communication 23

The framework of our security policy

Resources: militia and compulsory service 24–25*
Resources: modification of compulsory service 26–27
Our neutrality adapted to the situation 28–29
Strategic leadership 30

The way ahead: milestones of our security policy 31

** On these pages, this summary contains some additional information and remarks, compared with the full report.*

Summary

Our new security policy ...

The Report 2000 on Security Policy analyses the changed situation, describes the objectives of Swiss security policy and derives from them our strategy: security through cooperation. This strategy determines, in turn, the missions of our security policy instruments.

The new situation

The international situation has changed fundamentally over the last decade. The conventional military threat to Switzerland has decreased. At the same time, the range of other dangers and risks has expanded considerably. Today's security problems cut across borders. The current crises and conflicts in Europe confront many countries with the same challenges and they have a direct impact on Switzerland as well. The crises cannot be solved but by a joint effort. For this reason, greater security cooperation is imperative.



Our previous strategy

The previous Swiss strategy of security policy aimed at security through autonomy. To a large extent it was based on worst-case assumptions (nuclear war) as criteria for the allocation of resources, and it was accepted that a heavy time burden was placed on the militia. This orientation was appropriate to the circumstances of the Cold War but the changed situation calls for a new strategy.

The new strategy: security through cooperation

The new strategy of Swiss security policy is geared to cooperation.
Within *Switzerland*, emphasis is put on the best possible coordination of our own civilian and military instruments through comprehensive and flexible security cooperation. *Internationally*, cooperation with friendly states and international security organizations will be expanded, as well as Switzerland's commitment to enhancing peace. Such a commitment reflects our own interests; it reduces the risk that Switzerland itself is affected by the consequences of instability and war. The strategy of cooperation runs like a thread through all areas relating to security policy. The path to greater security involves more cooperation.

Part of the framework: neutrality

The law of neutrality leaves considerable freedom for manoeuvre to the neutral state. In the current political-military environment neutrality must be interpreted in an active way which expresses a spirit of solidarity. Neutrality does not prevent Switzerland from an active commitment to peace support or from cooperation in military training. However, the law of neutrality does prohibit giving military support to any warring party. For this reason, even in peacetime a neutral state cannot make any commitment to give military assistance in a war. Therefore, membership in NATO is not compatible with neutrality.



... and its consequences

The new strategy will have an effect on our security policy instruments, in particular on the armed forces and civil protection. The strategy calls for a reassessment of the relative importance of the missions of our armed forces. It also calls for a partial review of our compulsory service and will have an impact on our strategic leadership.

Reassessment of the missions of our armed forces

The new strategy demands that the previous three missions of the armed forces are evaluated anew.

Peace support and crisis management:
Compared to the former 'peace promotion' mission, the armed forces must expand their engagement in the trouble area itself. If necessary, it will also be possible to arm voluntary units for their protection and the success of their mission.

Area protection and defence:
Compared to the former defence mission, cooperation with other armed forces will be increased, particularly in training.

Prevention and management of existential dangers:
Compared to its previous civil affairs support mission, the armed forces must be able to conduct several such operations simultaneously after a short period of preparation.

Preconditions for accomplishing armed forces missions:
Altogether the armed forces must be able to fulfil all three missions. Therefore, they must be multi-functional. The armed forces need graduated degrees of readiness. High readiness is necessary for some missions, but not for all. In view of a potential threat increase, the armed forces must also be able to increase their assets accordingly. In order to cooperate better with other armed forces (e.g. in peace support operations), it will also be necessary to improve interoperability.

Compulsory service

The militia system and compulsory service for both armed forces and civil protection will be maintained. However, flexibility must be increased. Thus, the possibility of doing this service within a single period will be introduced for certain functions. Another objective is earlier discharge from compulsory service. Moreover, citizens having fulfilled their military duty will no longer be obliged to serve in civil protection. Finally, three variants for the future assignment of personnel to the armed forces and to civil protection have been submitted for discussion.

Civil protection

Civil protection includes various civilian means (e.g. fire brigades, civil defence, rescue services) to protect the population in the event of catastrophes, military threats or other emergencies. The responsibility lies with the cantons and municipalities. The federal authorities assist in emergencies of national magnitude. Civil protection is primarily geared to coping with disasters. Preparations for unlikely events (e.g. nuclear war) have become less important.

Strategic leadership

The strategic leadership of the Federal Council will be strengthened. A newly created Security Steering Group will permanently assess the situation, identify risks and opportunities as early as possible and propose measures to the Federal Council. The Security Steering Group will also be charged with the efficient coordination of our security policy instruments with a view to comprehensive and flexible security cooperation. At the same time, coordination of the intelligence services will be improved.

Fundamentals

New world ...

In the contemporary world, borders and geographic distances are declining in importance. More and more problems are becoming common problems – and successful solutions are also increasingly common solutions.

The end of this century is, however, characterized not only by greater unity, but also by disintegration and fragmentation. This is obvious from the map of Europe and the crises and conflicts in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. This has far-reaching consequences for Switzerland, most obviously in terms of refugees seeking asylum in our country, but also in terms of a greater humanitarian responsibility.

The Kosovo war: Switzerland has assumed responsibility. Its armed forces contribute to humanitarian assistance (airlift with Super Puma helicopters).

Decreasing military threat

The end of the Cold War has led to a sustained reduction of the stockpiles of nuclear and conventional weapons. The warning time for large-scale operations with conventional means has increased to years.

This gain in security will be lasting,

- *if weapons of mass destruction remain under control*
- *if armed conflicts can be contained by political and military means*
- *if setbacks can be overcome*

More internal conflicts

Today most armed conflicts do not take place between states or groups of states. More often they pit state authorities against groups within the same state.

Among the most important causes and motives of such conflicts are:

- *ethnic tensions*
- *efforts to gain independence*
- *economic disparities*
- *ideological and religious disagreements*
- *individual groups striving for power*

If crisis management is not sufficient, local disputes may escalate to extensive armed conflicts. Such conflicts can also affect distant states, including Switzerland. This is most obvious with regard to refugees. Some of the refugees continue in Switzerland to take part in the conflict of their country of origin in various ways. This can cause problems for the internal security of our country and its foreign relations.

... new dangers

There is a broad spectrum of dangers and risks. The intensity and integration of non-military dangers has increased.

The most important dangers and risks include:

- uncontrolled proliferation of means of mass destruction
- exertion of economic pressure
- vulnerability of modern information and communications systems (cf. box)
- terrorism, violence-prone extremism and organized crime
- the great disparity of prosperity, the scarcity of natural resources and uncontrolled migration
- natural and technological disasters

These dangers and risks increasingly threaten the structures of modern and open societies.

TERRORISM: A bomb attack on the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi caused the death of 240.

ORGANIZED CRIME: Security forces at the German-Polish border fighting against organized crime from Eastern Europe.

PROLIFERATION: An Iraqi Scud missile is destroyed under UN direction. One of the greatest dangers lies in the proliferation of long-range weapon systems and of means of mass destruction.

The threat to the information infrastructure

Modern societies depend heavily on the undisturbed functioning of information systems. These are vulnerable. Attacks on these systems and networks can be waged by state and non-state actors, with limited means and regardless of distance. The risk of detection is small. The range of possible attacks includes manipulating data, introducing malfunctions, destroying data, software, hardware and infrastructure. Motives for such attacks include (economic) espionage, blackmail and influencing certain decisions in economy and administration.

Fundamentals

Armed conflicts ...

Non-military threats, and violence below the threshold of war, have greatly increased, but they have not replaced war. Today war has two faces: It is either being conducted with the most modern means from the air or with conventional arms at close quarters on the ground. These two faces were evident in the Persian Gulf and on the Balkans.

The modern air war

Characteristics

The operation against Iraq 1990/91 was characterized by:

- the high technological level
- the importance of air war
- the use of long-range weapons
- the effort to minimize own casualties

The NATO operation against Yugoslavia in 1999 followed a similar pattern.

Objectives

In the Gulf war:
liberation of occupied territory and enforcement of UN resolutions.
In the war against Yugoslavia:
exertion of military pressure to achieve a political solution of the Kosovo conflict.

Conclusion for security policy

The high technological level and the emphasis laid on air war make it possible to minimize own casualties, but the decision must still be fought out on the ground and requires a great effort.

Effects on Switzerland

Switzerland took part in the economic sanctions against Iraq. At the request of the allies, Switzerland granted over-flight rights for humanitarian purposes, but not for combat purposes. Since 1995 the Federal Council granted transit rights, both in the air and on the ground, through Switzerland for the international peace force (IFOR/SFOR) to Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1999 Switzerland was not in a position to grant over-flight rights for the NATO operation against Yugoslavia because it was not based on a UN Security Council mandate.

Fighting at close quarters

Characteristics

The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995) was waged at short distances. Besides regular armed forces, groups with various degrees of organization and with different objectives took part. The weapons dated from various generations. Most of the fighting took place on the ground, often in the form of hate-inspired close combat which violated the rules of humanitarian international law. The expulsion of the Kosovars followed the same pattern. At the same time, NATO was waging a modern air war against Yugoslavia. The two forms of war combined and overlapped.

Objectives

The goals of both wars were self-determination, power, expulsion and territorial gains.

Conclusion for security policy

Wars such as those on the Balkans are seen by the participants as feasible and promising. This makes their recurrence more probable.

Effects on Switzerland

Both conflicts had an impact on Switzerland through a marked increase of requests for asylum. Within the framework of the OSCE, Switzerland is contributing to the stabilization of Bosnia and Herzegovina (yellow berets, military observers, election observers, humanitarian aid). Switzerland is also helping the Kosovo refugees within the area of tension with civilian and military means.

… and their management

International security structures have been designed for peace support, crisis prevention and conflict resolution. These tasks must increasingly be assumed jointly by the international community.

Conflicts should be resolved as peacefully as possible, preferably by negotiation. Pressure can be exerted with sanctions. As extreme options, the international community can threaten and apply force. Whether political efforts to resolve the problem succeed depends heavily on the credibility of such threats. The decisive prerequisite for resolving a conflict is the political will to act. This will must always be negotiated anew in the various international organizations. In principle, the use of force without a mandate of the UN Security Council is against international law.

Conflict resolution: meeting of the UN Security Council.

Important organizations and agreements

UN
The UN is the universal governmental organization for safeguarding world peace. The UN Security Council bears the main responsibility for maintaining peace and security. Based on the UN Charter, the Security Council decides on conflict management measures which include those taken with the consent of the conflicting parties, but also economic sanctions and military coercion.

NATO
19 European and North American states are members of this defence alliance. NATO has retained its original core function of defending its member states against military attack. For several years it has also assumed the task of maintaining or enforcing peace through military means in areas outside the alliance.

OSCE
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe promotes security, peace, human rights and democracy primarily through preventive diplomacy. Switzerland is a member of the OSCE.

Partnership for Peace, EAPC
In 1994 NATO launched the Partnership for Peace programme to promote cooperation for peace in Europe, in which Switzerland is a participating as well. All states taking part in the partnership are also members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, which serves as a forum for security policy.

EU/WEU
The European Union pursues a common foreign and security policy. The Western European Union (WEU), a military alliance of ten European states, is both the European pillar of NATO and the military instrument of the EU.

Council of Europe
The Council of Europe is an organization of 41 European states, including Switzerland. The Council's main purposes are the protection and promotion of human rights, of the rule of law and of democracy.

Arms control and disarmament agreements are important elements for enhancing international peace. They include, in particular, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (1968) and the conventions on biological and chemical weapons (1972 and 1993), but also the agreements between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on strategic nuclear arms and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

Our armed forces in comparison ...

The armed forces in Europe are being restructured. They are adapting to the changed threat situation.

For most of the European armed forces, restructuring aims at increasing the capabilities for crisis management. Traditional defence components are being reduced in favour of rapidly available crisis reaction forces. These are intended for peace support operations in crisis areas. Our four neighbours France, Germany, Italy, and Austria are also establishing such forces.

For most armed forces, the financial situation has also changed over the past years. Both defence budgets and manpower are being reduced. However, it is conspicuous that the United Kingdom and France, for example, continue to invest heavily in defence (defence expenditure in relation to gross national product). The relatively low personnel expenses of the Swiss Armed Forces are remarkable (a consequence of the militia system), as well as the balanced proportion between outlays for operations and for procurement.



France 1

Population:	58 million
Area:	544 000 km²
Armed forces strength 1990:	460 000
Armed forces strength 1998:	359 000
of which crisis reaction forces*:	41 500
Defence expenditures 1990*:	3.5 %
Defence expenditures 1997:	2.9 %
Personnel expenditures:	20.1 billion SFR
Ratio of expenditures for operations/for procurement:	3:1
Alliance membership:	NATO / WEU
Conscription system 1990:	universal conscription
Conscription system 2000:	professional armed forces being established

Germany 2

Population:	81.5 million
Area:	357 000 km²
Armed forces strength 1990:	469 000
Armed forces strength 1998:	333 500
of which crisis reaction forces*:	52 000
Defence expenditures 1990*:	2.8 %
Defence expenditures 1997:	1.6 %
Personnel expenditures:	20.3 billion SFR
Ratio of expenditures for operations/for procurement:	6:1
Alliance membership:	NATO / WEU
Conscription system 1990:	universal conscription
Conscription system 2000:	universal conscription

... with others



United Kingdom 6

Population:	58 million
Area:	241 000 km²
Armed forces strength 1990:	306 000
Armed forces strength 1998:	210 000
of which crisis reaction forces*:	15 000 (as of 2001)
Defence expenditures 1990*:	4 %
Defence expenditures 1997:	2.7 %
Personnel expenditures:	19.1 billion SFR
Ratio of expenditures for operations/for procurement:	3:1
Alliance membership:	NATO / WEU
Conscription system 1990:	professional armed forces
Conscription system 2000:	professional armed forces

Austria 5

Population:	8 million
Area:	84 000 km²
Armed forces strength 1990:	42 000
Armed forces strength 1998:	45 500
of which crisis reaction forces*:	(being established)
Defence expenditures 1990*:	1.1 %
Defence expenditures 1997:	0.8 %
Personnel expenditures:	1.4 billion SFR
Ratio of expenditures for operations/for procurement:	4:1
Alliance membership:	neutral
Conscription system 1990:	universal conscription
Conscription system 2000:	universal conscription

Italy 3

Population:	57 million
Area:	301 000 km²
Armed forces strength 1990:	389 000
Armed forces strength 1998:	298 000
of which crisis reaction forces*:	23 000
Defence expenditures 1990*:	2.1 %
Defence expenditures 1997:	1.9 %
Personnel expenditures:	13.2 billion SFR
Ratio of expenditures for operations/for procurement:	6:1
Alliance membership:	NATO / WEU
Conscription system 1990:	universal conscription
Conscription system 2000:	partial professional armed forces being established

Switzerland 4

Population:	7 million
Area:	41 000 km²
Armed forces strength 1990:	650 000
Armed forces strength 1998:	380 000
of which crisis reaction forces*:	-
Defence expenditures 1990*:	1.8 %
Defence expenditures 1997:	1.5 %
Personnel expenditures:	1.1 billion SFR
Ratio of expenditures for operations/for procurement:	1:1
Alliance membership:	neutral
Conscription system 1990:	universal conscription
Conscription system 2000:	universal conscription

Remarks

Crisis reaction forces*
are elements of the armed forces with a high level of readiness and suitable for deployment abroad.

Defence expenditures 1990*:
The figures indicate the percentage of defence expenditures in relation to the gross national product.

Armed forces strength:
The figures designate active strength without reserves. In the case of Switzerland they refer to total strength after general mobilization.

Fundamentals

Our response: security ...

The security policy of Switzerland

Our security policy serves to protect our country, population and interests against strategic dangers, i.e. the threat or use of direct or indirect force affecting considerable parts of country and population.

1. Objectives

Our security policy objectives derive from the Federal Constitution (Article 2) and our interests:

- we wish to make our own decisions, both domestically and in our foreign relations, without being affected by the threat or use of direct or indirect force
- we wish to protect our population and its infrastructure against existential dangers
- we wish to contribute to stability and peace beyond our borders and to building an international community of common values. Thereby we reduce the risk that Switzerland and its population will be affected by instability and war abroad. This is also an expression of our international solidarity

2. Strategy

In a world of common values, problems and the necessity for joint solutions, a strategy of cooperation is required. Our strategy of security through cooperation relates to two levels:

- cooperation between our own security policy instruments, especially for missions within Switzerland ('comprehensive and flexible security cooperation') and
- international cooperation in security policy

Characteristics of the new strategy:

- orientation according to the current and most probable dangers
- flexible and modular use of our security policy instruments within Switzerland
- intensification of international cooperation in peace support, crisis management and training

Our own security policy instruments must be kept up to date.

Characteristics of the strategy to date:

- security through as much autonomy as possible
- allocation of resources according to 'worst case scenarios'
- heavy time burden on the militia

... through cooperation

Such force may be of politico-military origin, but may also result from disasters, terrorism or organized crime. Our security policy comprises objectives, strategy, missions and instruments.

3. Missions

Our objectives and strategy result in three tasks.

Peace support and crisis management

Switzerland benefits directly from a stable environment. It is therefore fully in our interest to contribute to peace support and crisis management. Criteria for our commitment are national interests, the firm grounding in international law and the democratic and humanitarian orientation of such operations.

Concrete activities:

- membership and participation in international organizations (e.g. OSCE)
- deployment of civilian and military personnel (e.g. election observers, yellow berets, aid in the Kosovo conflict)
- humanitarian activities (e.g. Swiss Disaster Relief Corps)
- initiatives and services relevant to security policy (e.g. the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining)
- assistance in reconstruction (e.g. in Eastern Europe)
- development cooperation

Prevention and management of existential dangers comprise:

- assistance in the event of natural or technological disasters at home and abroad
- protection of persons and important facilities (e.g. power and communications installations)
- fighting organized crime and terrorism

Defence:

Switzerland must always be able to defend its population, territory and airspace against strategic threats.

This requires:

- maintaining a credible military defence capability
- an efficient and flexibly deployable civil protection
- a high level of equipment and training
- a readiness which can be adapted as the situation develops
- armed forces that can cooperate with foreign armed forces for defence if necessary

4. Instruments

For its security policy missions Switzerland has the following instruments:

- FOREIGN POLICY
- ARMED FORCES
- CIVIL PROTECTION
- ECONOMIC POLICY
- NATIONAL ECONOMIC SUPPLY
- POLICE AND PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
- INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION

The security policy instruments must be conceived in such a way that Switzerland can react to future developments timely, adequately, flexibly and in a coordinated manner.

Our security policy instruments

The armed forces

The mission of the armed forces in security policy

The mission of the armed forces comprises:

- peace support and crisis management
- area protection and defence
- contributing to the prevention and management of existential dangers

Multi-functionality, readiness, force generation capability and interoperability are necessary for the armed forces to fulfil these missions. The missions of peace support and crisis management, as well as the prevention and management of existential dangers will play a more important role than in the past.

Peace support and crisis prevention

The armed forces

- *will contribute within the framework of international security cooperation to peace support and crisis prevention*
- *can, after a short period of preparation, deploy modular units as the situation requires to a crisis area for extended periods*
- *will train, equip and adequately arm units for each operation*

Participation in operations abroad will continue to be voluntary.

This is new

Compared to the previous mission of 'peace promotion', the armed forces will have a stronger presence on the spot and intensify relevant training. Deployed units are to be armed if this is necessary for their security and for the completion of their mission. The Federal Council will decide whether the Swiss Armed Forces take part in operations, with what kind of units, for how long and under which rules of engagement. Such decisions will require subsequent approval by Parliament.

Area protection and defence

The armed forces

- *will defend population, territory and airspace*
- *can, after a short period of preparation, conduct several area protection operations simultaneously*
- *will assure the necessary readiness and force generation capability*
- *will cooperate already in peacetime with friendly states where such coooperation is appropriate and compatible with the law of neutrality (e.g. in training)*
- *will be able to conduct defence together with other armed forces if a military attack against Switzerland renders its neutrality invalid*

This is new

Compared to the previous defence mission, cooperation with other armed forces will be expanded, especially in training.
Differentiated degrees of readiness and a force generation capability will enhance the armed forces' flexibility and efficiency.

Area protection: centrally-led operations other than war of the armed forces to protect important areas or zones (e.g. airspace, main transit routes, border segments).

Prevention and management of existential dangers

The armed forces

- *will assume guard duties*
- *will protect the population against the massive use of force*
- *will give assistance in the event of disasters and other emergencies*
- *will undertake these operations at the request of civil authorities, under their operational direction and when their own means are exhausted*
- *can, after a short period of preparation, carry out several operations simultaneously and for an extended period*
- *will provide disaster relief abroad as well*
- *will protect Swiss facilities abroad*

This is new

Compared to the past, the armed forces must be capable of conducting several such operations simultaneously after a short period of preparation.

Our security policy instruments

Armed forces: preconditions ...

Multi-functionality

Multi-functionality means that the armed forces are geared to mastering several and different missions. The armed forces will be multi-functional as a whole. However, the individual soldier will not have to be able to do all the different tasks at the same time.

Theory and practice correspond with each other

The importance of multi-functionality is becoming increasingly evident in practice. For example, the armed forces simultaneously fulfilled various missions in different places in 1999: caring for people seeking asylum, rescue, assistance and supply missions for people affected by avalanches, fighting floods, protecting foreign missions and international organizations in Bern, Geneva and Zurich, giving support to the border guard corps, protecting Swiss diplomatic missions abroad, and providing disaster relief to our neighbouring countries. Armed forces have been deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as to Albania for peace support operations. Planning and conducting these missions is particularly demanding in the case of a militia system (availability of forces, predetermined duty periods, reserves). Here too, the importance of cooperation is evident: Armed forces perform together with civilian executive staffs, civil defence, police, fire brigades and other organizations. Their success depends on cooperation.

Deployment at the border

Guard duty

Peace support

Care of refugees

Rescue and aid (avalanche winter of 1999)

… for mission accomplishment

Readiness and force generation capability

The current security-policy situation calls for the armed forces to have graduated degrees of readiness.

Warning times for the defence mission are long today. However, for peace support and coping with existential dangers, greater readiness is necessary than in the past. Parts of the armed forces must be rapidly available, after a short period of preparation. Due to their force generation capability, the armed forces continue to be prepared for a relapse into politico-military conflicts. This implies that personnel size, length of service, equipment and training can be increased adequately and in time to cope with a given situation. A timely political decision is necessary to make use of this growth potential.

Leopard II battle tank

Equipment and training

The armed forces' equipment and training are continuously being modernized.

At least for parts of the armed forces, it is necessary to procure weapon systems and other equipment which meet highest European standards. The necessary industrial expertise for maintenance, upgrading and partially also for production must be maintained.

Interoperability

Interoperability includes all capabilities necessary for cooperating with foreign armed forces.

This includes language, staff procedures, equipment and training. Interoperability facilitates cooperation in peace support, crisis management and in preventing and mastering existential dangers. This in itself does not entail joining a military alliance. The Swiss Armed Forces enhance their interoperability through joint exercises in the Partnership for Peace programme and through experiences made in genuine engagements.

Our security policy instruments

Civil protection

Civil protection is a civilian instrument for management, protection and assistance during disasters, politico-military threats and other emergencies.

All civilian resources for coping with disasters, armed conflicts and other emergencies are being coordinated within the framework of civil protection. In principle, the cantons are responsible for civil protection. The federal authorities provide the legal basis and support the cantons, e.g. in training. For events of national magnitude, the federal authorities assume leadership and coordinate.



Civil protection: coordinated cooperation of all partners for dealing with disasters.

Reorientation and adaptation of readiness

The security policy situation calls for a reorientation of civil protection and enables it to adapt its readiness.

'Worst case scenarios' (e.g. nuclear war) have become rather improbable today. Natural and technological disasters and other emergencies have become much more likely. This has consequences for the readiness of civil protection: The main emphasis for mission planning and training will be on coping with disasters. Civil protection will rely mainly on the partly professional assets designed for every-day activities. They will include, e.g. fire brigades, medical rescue services and technical facilities. The assets of civil defence will be integrated into civil protection. The civil protection assets will be designed in a modular fashion, so that modules can be employed selectively as needed. Civil authorities will assume leadership and coordinate.

The responsibility for civil protection will lie primarily with the municipalities, regions and cantons. It is also they who are usually confronted with the task of coping with disasters.

The federal authorities will assist the cantons if the size of the emergency calls for management and coordination at national level. The armed forces will be engaged when the civilian resources are exhausted.

The mission of civil protection in security policy

Civil protection will serve to alert the population and protect them against disasters and politico-military threats. It will provide for the protection of vital facilities and cultural assets. Incidents will be mastered by employing the modular means of cantons, municipalities and private organizations.

Our security policy instruments

Foreign policy and ...

Foreign policy is an important pillar of our security policy. It is a primary instrument for protecting our interests and expressing our solidarity with the international community.

Development cooperation

The security policy mission of foreign policy

Foreign policy increases Swiss security by

- contributing to strengthening and lastingly safeguarding peace, to conflict prevention and crisis management
- enhancing respect for human rights and basic liberties
- safeguarding Swiss interests in arms control and disarmament negotiations
- promoting compliance with humanitarian international law
- assisting less developed countries and Eastern European states by raising their living standards
- providing humanitarian assistance in the event of disasters or armed conflicts
- pursuing a policy of neutrality which allows Switzerland to participate actively in the establishment of effective security structures

Support for the OSCE and the UN

Peace support in concrete terms

Through concrete contributions Switzerland supports efforts of the UN and the OSCE in peace support, preventive diplomacy and crisis management. Switzerland provides election observers and experts, contributes to the build-up of democratic structures and provides material and logistic assistance.
Switzerland also supports the protection of minorities, the freedom of the press, the strengthening of local administration and an efficient justice and police who respect the rule of law.



HUMAN RIGHTS: The indiscriminate effects of anti-personnel mines form one of the cruellest violations of human rights.

Human rights policy

Observance of human rights is an essential concern of Swiss foreign policy. Compliance with the provisions of human rights is in our own security interest. In the long term, peace and security can only be guaranteed if the community of states respect human rights and basic liberties, and political power is under democratic control.

DISASTER RELIEF: The Swiss Disaster Relief Corps conducts operations all over the world.

... economic policy

Switzerland has a long-standing vital interest in an open and liberal global economic trade system. Swiss economic policy relies heavily on cooperation for realizing our national interests.

The security policy mission of economic policy

Swiss economic policy promotes the Swiss economy and ensures its competitiveness. It contributes thereby to prosperity and stability in Switzerland. Swiss economic policy supports an open global trade beneficial to all partners – and hence is also conducive to reducing economic disparities which are in themselves an important source of security problems. Swiss economic policy must also be able to cope with efforts to exert economic pressure on Switzerland. This is facilitated by our presence and ability to safeguard our interests in international organizations (e.g. the World Trade Organization). Swiss economic policy also seeks to maintain the ecological balance.

National economic supply

The organization for the national economic supply of Switzerland ensures the supply of vital commodities and services if the private economy is no longer able to do this due to events abroad.

Switzerland relies on foreign sources for the supply of raw materials and energy. This reliance on others is compounded by the fact that Switzerland has no direct access to the sea. In the era of globalization tougher competition forces the economy to rationalize wherever possible. As a consequence, stocks are being reduced, increasing our vulnerability to supply crises.
This fact is taken into account by the national economic supply.
It is focused primarily on disruptions of supply due to economic, political and other events (e.g. sabotage, disasters).

The objective of ensuring economic supply in wartime has become less important – reflecting the international security situation.

Means and measures

Preventive measures:

- analysis of the situation and its likely development
- appropriate mandatory stockpiles
- ensuring the availability of important means of transport
- preparation of rationing measures

If supply is disrupted, the following measures are considered first:

- use of the mandatory stockpiles
- maximization of importation
- wherever possible, increase of domestic production
- as last resort, restriction of consumption (rationing)

Our security policy instruments

Police and protection of the constitutional order

Internal security has become more important to the citizens than external security. However, the distinction between internal and external security is increasingly an artificial one: Dangers to internal security are becoming more and more related to events abroad. Therefore, international security cooperation is necessary for internal security too.
Internal security is a security policy issue insofar as it involves the fight against grave strategic dangers. Such is the case if the security of considerable parts of country and population is threatened.

The security policy mission of police and protection of the constitutional order

The majority of the *police* are subject to the cantons. The police fight against crime and ensure public security, law and order. Operations are led by federal authorities if the cantons lack sufficient resources to cope with the events. The *protection of the constitutional order* helps to safeguard the democratic infrastructure, the rule of law and the rights and liberties of the population. It serves to identify dangers linked to violence at an early stage and prevent terrorism, extremism, espionage, weapons proliferation and organized crime. At the federal level, protection of the constitutional order supports the police and cantonal judicial authorities.

International cooperation

Dangers and risks are becoming increasingly international. This is also true for internal security. Therefore, the fight against violence, terrorism and organized crime must also be internationalized and coordinated. Security through cooperation applies here too.
With the agreements of Schengen and Dublin, the EU has developed two effective instruments. They define controls at the external borders of the Union and a uniform procedure for granting asylum. These agreements help establish a European area of security. As non-member of the EU and the European Economic Area, Switzerland cannot join these agreements. As far as possible, Switzerland strives to compensate for this disadvantage by concluding bilateral agreements, in particular with its neighbours.

Organized crime such as international drug trafficking can only be fought through international cooperation.

Assistance by the armed forces

If the resources of the civil authorities are no longer capable of maintaining security and public order, they can request assistance by the armed forces. Such armed forces engagements are always subsidiary: The responsibility for the operations rests with the civil authorities. Assistance by the armed forces consists mainly in protection, logistics, and transport. Forces employed in such operations must be adequately equipped and trained.

Information and communications



Direct communication by the responsible authorities has political significance.

As a consequence of the information revolution, the influence state authorities have on information is diminishing. This has the advantage that undemocratic governments find it increasingly difficult to deny their population access to correct information. Conversely it has also become easier to disseminate false and misleading information.

Information and communications infrastructure

The information and communications infrastructure of Switzerland is exposed to many risks, not only in crisis situations but permanently. In principle, each member of the information society is responsible for the security of his or her means of information and communications. But because of the very high level of networking, coordinated efforts are necessary to ensure security. The necessary structures have yet to be established – jointly by government, the economy and science.

The Federal Council seeks to coordinate efforts in the following areas:

- identification of vitally important facilities
- permanent assessment and early recognition of risks
- alerting
- increasing risk awareness of users
- expert training and
- establishing joint security measures

Complete protection is not possible today. We must seek to obtain maximum security at a reasonable cost.

The security policy mission of information

The governmental information agencies

- will satisfy the population's need for information
- will communicate, within Switzerland and beyond its borders, decisions and measures concerning security policy
- will substitute false and misleading information with factual information

In normal situations, information on security policy is disseminated through civilian media.
In special and extraordinary situations, the governmental information agencies (Federal Chancellery, Division for Press, Radio and TV in the Federal Council's staff, Information Regiment 1) will ensure that the population is continually informed openly and comprehensively on important issues even when the civilian media can no longer fulfil their role. Timely and relevant information can decisively contribute to mastering crises and disasters.

Resources: militia ...

The citizens of Switzerland pay the price for security in the form of money (taxes) and time (compulsory service).

Security policy must ensure a reasonable relation between expenditure and results. Financial resources must be allotted in such a way that our security policy satisfies the requirements and is as efficient as possible.

The militia armed forces



Several European states have recently abolished compulsory military service for professional armed forces. However, in Switzerland national circumstances and requirements continue to favour the militia system. It is firmly anchored in the citizens' minds. Switzerland will therefore maintain its militia armed forces. The militia system also has cost advantages, in comparison with professional armed forces. Moreover, it strengthens the link between armed forces and the population, and is an expression of the citizens' direct responsibility for the state.

At the same time an increasing number of service personnel experience the limits of the militia system when they have to reconcile the demands of profession, family and compulsory service. The armed forces themselves also realize that the militia system gives rise to problems in certain areas. These relate primarily to the need for a high degree of operational readiness. If the armed forces have to conduct several missions simultaneously, the availability of manpower quickly reaches its limits with the present militia system. It must therefore be optimized. As far as absolutely necessary the professional component will be increased, especially for the areas of peace support, advanced technology and training.



Finances

Security policy and its instruments must be given sufficient resources. Although the availability of financial resources does have an influence on security policy, this must not be allowed to become the determining factor. Security policy requirements must be defined on the basis of the security policy situation. If the personnel strength of the armed forces and of the civil protection should decrease in the future, financial requirements cannot be expected to drop to the same extent.

Federal defence expenditures

Expenditure in percent of total federal expenditures



International comparison of defence expenditures

Share of defence expenditures in percentage of gross national product (1997)



… and compulsory service

The current organization of the compulsory service place a heavy burden on the militia. Despite this, the availability of the armed forces is very limited in peacetime. Improvements are necessary.

The militia system, universal conscription and compulsory civil protection service will be maintained, but their organization and duration will be adapted to the security-policy situation. Optimization measures will be taken in the context of the reform options presented below. These adaptations do not require a constitutional amendment. However, if compulsory duties were to be modified fundamentally, the Federal Constitution would require amendment. Three models (pp 26-27) indicate possible reforms in compulsory service.

Elements for a reform of compulsory military service

The elements of reform aim at reducing the length of time during which a citizen is liable to serve in the armed forces. This would match the requirements of society and the economy better than the present system does.
These elements would also result in a greater readiness for some parts of the armed forces. This is necessary for both domestic operations (area protection, prevention and management of existential dangers) and for voluntary operations abroad (humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peace support). These adaptations could be realized without a constitutional amendment.

FOR CERTAIN FUNCTIONS THE OPTION OF DOING MILITARY SERVICE WITHIN A SINGLE PERIOD

EARLIER DISCHARGE FROM COMPULSORY SERVICE

CONTRACTUAL SERVICE AFTER COMPLETION OF COMPULSORY SERVICE ('TEMPORAL VOLUNTEERS')

INCREASE THE PROPORTION OF PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS, NCO'S AND OFFICERS, AS FAR AS THIS IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY

Resources: modification ...

The threat situation permits a reduction in personnel strength of the armed forces and of civil protection. This reduction can be realized by lowering the age of discharge from compulsory service.

However, concrete numbers for personnel strength can only be identified on the basis of the forthcoming guidelines for the armed forces and civil protection. Three variants for the future assignment of persons liable to serve to the armed forces and civil protection will be examined.

They have four things in common:

- contrary to the present situation, persons having completed their com pulsory service would no longer be liable to civil protection service
- all male citizens would remain liable to serve
- women could assume service duties on a voluntary basis
- each of the variants would require an amendment of the Federal Constitution

Model A

At conscription, citizens unfit for military service for health reasons would, as in the past, be assigned to civil protection (if not altogether dispensed from compulsory service). All citizens fit for military service would have to do basic military training (recruit school). Subsequently some of them would, however, be assigned to civil protection service. If necessary, transfer from the armed forces to civil protection would also be possible at a later stage, as long as not all the compulsory service days have been fulfilled.



… of compulsory service

Model B

At conscription, citizens fit for service would be directly assigned either to the armed forces or to civil protection, with the armed forces' requirements having priority. There would be no freedom of choice for being assigned to the armed forces or civil protection. However, the citizen's preferences and aptitudes would be taken into account. Training for the armed forces and for civil protection respectively would take place separately. The main responsibility for civil protection training would lie with the cantons and municipalities.



Model C

At conscription, citizens could choose between service in the armed forces and in civil protection, provided that the personnel needs of both are met. Training for the armed forces and for civil protection respectively would take place separately. The main responsibility for civil protection training would lie with the cantons and municipalities.



The framework of our security policy

Our neutrality ...



What kind of security policy commitment is compatible with the law of neutrality?

A neutral state may neither participate in an armed inter-state conflict nor give military support to any party. In peacetime a neutral state may not allow any foreign military bases on its territory and must abstain from entering any obligation for military support in a war.

The following is compatible with the law of neutrality:

- participating in economic sanctions
- participating in peace support operations under a mandate of the UN Security Council or the OSCE, or with the consent of the conflicting parties
- granting transit rights for peace support operations under a mandate of the UN Security Council or the OSCE, or with the consent of the conflicting parties
- membership in international organizations (e.g. OSCE, Council of Europe, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council)
- participating in the 'Partnership for Peace' programme
- membership in the United Nations and the European Union
- cooperating in military training and procurement

Incompatible with neutrality are commitments containing an obligation for support in a war. In concrete terms, the following is ruled out:

- full membership in the Western European Union
- membership in NATO and
- stationing of foreign military bases in Switzerland

… adapted to the situation

Neutrality policy in the 20th century

The scope varies



New situation, new responses: The room for manoeuvre of neutrality policy has changed repeatedly during the 20th century. International changes called for new responses.

The neutrality policy of Switzerland was never something immutable. The policy Switzerland practised was always in keeping with the international situation. Obviously, the scope of our neutrality policy was very limited during World War II. Surrounded by the Third Reich, Switzerland mainly emphasized its independence. The situation after World War II allowed for a more active engagement in the spirit of solidarity. Switzerland made use of these opportunities, for example by taking part in peace-keeping operations or in the Partnership for Peace programme.

That Switzerland sovereignly used its security policy scope, was evident already in 1919. At that time the Swiss Government – with the consent of all governments concerned – sent armed military escorts to Eastern Europe. These escorts were assigned to protect the transport of goods from the Swiss textile industry.

Documentary rarity: photograph of a Swiss military escort in August 1919 in front of the Russian Church in Warsaw.

The framework of our security policy

Strategic leadership

The activities of numerous instruments – situated in various federal departments and at different levels – must be coordinated to ensure our security: Strategic leadership is necessary. The newly created Security Steering Group assists the Federal Council in this task.

The Security Steering Group is a staff of the Federal Council. It includes as permanent members the top officials of the federal departments responsible for security affairs. If necessary, non-permanent members from cantons and scientific experts will be integrated. The Steering Group will contribute to an early identification and improved management of major security problems. It will monitor the situation and its possible evolution. It will identify dangers and risks, but also opportunities to counter them as early as possible, and work out what the options are and what measures should be taken. Another important task of the Steering Group will be applying comprehensive and flexible security cooperation to our own security policy instruments.

Refugee drama in Kosovo.

Assess the situation ...

Terrorist attack of 1997 in Luxor.

... identify possible threats ...

Coordination of the intelligence services

The post of a coordinator for intelligence cooperation will be created within the federal administration. This coordinator will belong to the Security Steering Group and have the support of a small office for early situation assessment. The coordinator will ensure that the Security Steering Group – and thereby also the Federal Council – receives the relevant information in time, so that it can effectively assume strategic leadership.

Security risk of PKK protests.

... work out our options.

The way ahead: milestones of our new security policy

Security policy is not just a matter for the armed forces and civil protection. Our security policy instruments include foreign policy, economic policy, national economic supply, police, protection of the constitutional order and information. However, armed forces and civil protection are the instruments with the greatest need for reform. The Report 2000 on Security Policy provides the basis for these reforms.

The projects for reforming the armed forces and civil protection are currently in the planning stage. Respective guidelines will be presented in the year 2000. Implementation of reforms is planned for 2003.



Types of puplication

The Report 2000 on Security Policy can be obtained in 3 different versions in various languages:

Complete

	reference number
German	97.667 d
French	97.667 f
Italian	97.667 i
English	97.667 e

Summary (brochure)

this edition	reference number
German	97.668 d
French	97.668 f
Italian	97.668 i
English	97.668 e

Flyer (prospectus)

	reference number
German	97.673 d
French	97.673 f
Italian	97.673 i
English	97.673 e

They can be obtained free of charge from

SFOBL/EDMZ
3003 Bern

Only written orders will be accepted.

©1999/2nd edition
General Secretariat DDPS

Report and brochure have also been published on the internet under www.vbs.admin.ch



Form 97.668 e 10.99 10 000 VBS 99697