Ministry of Defence

Netherlands Defence Doctrine

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Colophon

Design & layout Crossmedia | Defence Media Centre
Historical introductions Dr. A. ten Cate
Working group chairman/secretary, Netherlands Defence Academy Lieutenant Colonel C.J. Sellmeijer

Responsibility
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Reactions to be sent to
Defence Staff
(DS/Directorate of Plans/Knowledge & Innovation)
PO Box 20701
2500 ES The Hague
Netherlands

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Foreword

The Netherlands Defence Doctrine explains the military instrument of power and its use, both in and beyond warfighting. Professions are partly defined by their professional knowledge and the NDD is part of our knowledge domain. Although the NDD is authoritative, professional judgement is required in respect of how it is applied. Doctrine draws upon lessons from history, upon original thinkers and upon experience gained in operations and the preparations for them. It describes the fundamental principles that underlie the use of the military instrument of power.

The revision of the NDD 2013 was prompted by the ratification and implementation of the NATO Allied Joint Doctrine 01. This revised version of the NDD also incorporates the most recent policy documents and the most recent operational experiences, for example in relation to cyber. Lastly, this version has been adapted to the Netherlands government's current views on security policy and the ensuing renewed focus on the first main task of the Netherlands armed forces.

Doctrine is the ideal instrument for promoting internal and external cooperation by reflecting common philosophies and by stimulating the use of specialised terminology. The aim of setting out our thinking is to make the whole larger than the sum of the parts. By providing a conceptual compass and a mental counterweight, the team will be able to cope better with the chaos and confusion of war.

Readers of this doctrine should remember, however, that this can never replace individual initiative. Doctrine is a guide for commanders and subordinates on how to think, not what to think.

CHIEF OF DEFENCE

R. Bauer
Admiral

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"Doctrine is a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books: it will light their way, ease their progress, train their judgement and help them to avoid pitfalls. Doctrine is meant to educate the minds of future commanders, not to accompany them to the battlefields."

Carl von Clausewitz
On War (1835)

Source (*Vom Kriege*):
Doktrine wird dann demjenigen ein Führer, der sich mit dem Kriege aus Büchern vertraut machen will; sie hellt ihm überall den Weg auf, erleichtert seine Schritte, erzieht sein Urteil und bewahrt ihn vor Abwegen. Sie soll den Geist des künftigen Führers im Kriege erziehen oder vielmehr ihn bei seiner Selbsterziehung leiten, nicht aber ihn auf das Schlachtfeld begleiten.

Introduction

Background

The Netherlands Defence Doctrine (NDD) was last published in 2013. That publication was inspired by the increased emphasis on the use of a comprehensive approach as a common denominator for certain operational concepts. Over the subsequent five years, military operations have evolved further. Recent worldwide military deployments and the experience resulting from these have shown that military operations are usually embedded in a multinational, joint and interagency context as part of a strategy where all means of power are employed to contribute to the strategic objective. The new and changing way in which conflicts have been manifesting themselves since 2013 as well as the thinking about the deployment of the military means of power as expressed in, among other things, NATO's highest doctrine publications have led to a revision of the Netherlands Defence Doctrine (NDD).

Doctrine in historisch perspectief

Ever since the Age of Enlightenment, there has been a growing belief in Europe that, as in other fields of science, war and warfighting as objects of research could be understood by study and analysis. The end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th century saw the start of a wave of publications by various (military) authors, such as Clausewitz and Jomini, who took the first steps towards describing patterns in the conduct of military operations.

The professionalization of the military domain and the trend towards mass warfare since the time of the French Revolution meant that armed forces set out their procedures in doctrine. Handbooks defined the functions of the Services, arms and branches in operations and regulated the way in which (large) formations could achieve their objectives. Doctrine created unity of opinion and channelled military thinking at the different levels of operation. Military history was regarded as a primary source for this doctrine writing.

The first doctrines provided guidelines for the planning, execution and completion of military tasks. Mainly, these publications described operations by 'large units' at the strategic level, as well as the tactical actions of arms and branches. Also, there were manuals for operating at the technical level (the modern 'Tactics, Techniques and Procedures'). The correlation between the various publications and the level of detail was still limited.

The Netherlands armed forces issued various doctrine publications too over the course of the 20th century, relating mainly to land and air operations. In 1925, the army's air arm issued the 'Directive for use of Air Power', with the emphasis on operations by the air arm in support of larger units, such as the field army or the division level. In 1926, the army introduced the 'Manual for combat by large units (the Combat manual)', which described operations at division and division group levels in all forms of combat.

The colonial Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL) developed its own doctrine, which focused on counter-guerrilla warfare. The core of the colonial warfighting approach consisted of small groups of indigenous troops who were under the command of a Dutch officer and who, armed with carbines and klewang, sought out and disrupted insurgents in the jungle. The method of using these highly mobile units proved successful and served as a model for operations by all KNIL infantry. The colonial army recorded its procedures in the 'Regulations for the execution of the army's political police task' (VPTL in Dutch). A revised version was published in 1948, specifically intended for the forces fighting in the Dutch East Indies against Indonesian independence. After the end of the war in 1949, this doctrine faded into oblivion.

In the 1950s, the Dutch armed forces were set up to perform a defensive task under NATO. For the army, this primarily meant the co-defence of the IJssel-Rhine line, while the allocated defence sector later shifted eastwards to northern German territory. The navy concentrated on the protection of sea lines of communication in the Atlantic, and the air force focused on ground-based air defence and on achieving air superiority. The air force and navy did not develop doctrine of their own, basing themselves on NATO doctrine instead. The army developed a doctrine publication for land-based operations, Combat Manual VS 2-1386 of 1957.

The 1960s saw the implementation of a number of amendments, partly because of the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons. During this period, NATO doctrine was based on the principle of forward defence, whereby NATO troops would first have to delay and halt the attacker, after which the original situation would be restored by a large-scale counterattack, with or without the support of tactical nuclear weapons. The planning and direction of operations was centralised.

At the end of the 1960s, NATO introduced the flexible response. In theory, this defence concept was to be non-nuclear, focusing on the attrition of the enemy and the execution of a decisive counterattack. A hallmark of the situation at the time was that the individual Services had their own separate task areas, and that the concept of joint operations was still in its infancy.

In the 1980s, the Americans developed the AirLand Battle doctrine, which was partially adopted by NATO in its follow-on forces attack (FOFA) concept. With this, the Alliance was counting on its technological superiority, which would also make it possible to attack the enemy in the depth. Such a method of warfighting required a great deal of planning and coordination between the various command levels and units.

This significant change necessitated a review of the doctrines, with an increased emphasis on detailed joint planning and coordination. In 1989, the armed forces were still adapting when the Cold War suddenly ended. The focus on major combat disappeared and attention turned to other forms of military operation.

In the mid-1990s, the Services produced revised doctrines which were more in keeping with the new situation. In 1996, the air force's Airpower Doctrine and the Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 'Military Doctrine' were issued; both were umbrella documents containing the general principles of, respectively, air and land operations. Because the spectrum of deployment options had increased significantly due to international missions and interventions, the army doctrine was issued in several volumes, dealing with combat operations, peace operations and national operations respectively. The guiding principles of these new doctrine publications were the manoeuvrist approach and mission command.

In 2005, following on from the publication of the first Netherlands Defence Doctrine (NDD), an operational guideline for the maritime component of military operations was issued, namely the Navy Field Manual for Maritime Operations. Since then, the various doctrine publications have been revised and rewritten: in 2014 the Fundamentals of Maritime Operations, the Doctrine Publication on Land Operations and the Netherlands Doctrine for Air & Space Operations (DASO) were developed. The previous year saw the first revision of the NDD. That edition centred on a comprehensive approach to military operations.

Purpose and importance of the Netherlands Defence Doctrine

Unity of opinion. Like other large organisations with a great diversity of work spheres and disciplines, armed forces must have the ability to execute and manage complex activities in order that organisational objectives be realised. Armed forces must also be able to adapt rapidly to changing circumstances and to continue to function effectively in chaotic and life-threatening situations. Military personnel must be able to cope with complex situations and to act responsibly in extreme conditions. They have to be able to operate independently, possibly in isolation from each other and in accordance with the ethical and moral principles to which the Defence organisation adheres, as well as the set operational guidelines. For this, unity of opinion within the organisation is essential.

This unity of opinion is also relevant in situations in which the connection between the Dutch military contribution and the national interest is not self-evident, particularly in operations designed to uphold and promote the international legal order. The professionalism and resolve of individual military personnel and units are supported by placing the Dutch military contribution in the right context.

At the tactical level, this unity of opinion means that actions are performed in the spirit of the military organisation in general and of the individual commanders in particular.

Means of control for the Chief of Defence. Doctrine also paves the way for the planning, preparation and execution of military operations, making those operations more efficient and more effective than they would be without unity of opinion. The Chief of Defence (CHOD) plays a key role in organising and managing the Services (operational commands) and the missions of the Dutch armed forces. Joint doctrine provides the CHOD with a means of control, also for the activities of his own staff directorates. The NDD supports the CHOD in guiding the way in which the armed forces are deployed in the context of Dutch security policy.

National context. The NDD places doctrine in a Dutch context. Although NATO doctrine forms the basis for Dutch thinking with regard to the use of the military instrument, the NDD is intended to highlight specific, national accents. This means that national accents may differ from what is expressed in NATO doctrine. It provides the common framework that enables joint deployment of the Dutch armed forces. The growing interlacing of operations by units from different Services and the collaboration with other departments and (government) organisations mean that unity of opinion regarding the conduct of military operations is essential. The NDD substantiates this and provides guidance for the thinking on the conduct of operations by the armed forces in general and by the individual Services in relation to each other, making collaboration more effective and ensuring better mutual understanding.

Transparency. The NDD also serves as a reference work for other actors who are in any way involved in military missions. To enable collaboration, a clear definition needs to be given of the principles that form the basis for the deployment of the armed forces and of the way in which operations are to be conducted. These actors were also involved wherever possible in the production of this document through an advisory group.
This ensures transparency for other actors, and this transparency will benefit anyone who wishes to familiarise themselves with Dutch military doctrine.

New in this doctrine are the developments in the thinking about the deployment of the armed forces in the information environment and the classification within the framework of the three tasks of the domestic and international role of Defence: remain safe, promote security and communicate securely.[1] Furthermore, today's security context is characterised by a new combination of regular, irregular and hybrid threats.t

Hybrid threats occur where conventional, irregular and asymmetric threats are combined in the same time and space. Conflict could involve a range of transnational, state, group and individual participants operating globally and locally. Some conflict may involve concurrent inter-communal violence, terrorism, cyberspace attacks, insurgency, pervasive criminality and widespread disorder. Adversaries may also choose a long-term strategy to avoid defeat rather than seeking victory, to try to outlast NATO's will and determination. Countering such hybrid threats may require a broader approach, employing integrated capabilities some of which may be unconventional in nature.
(AJP-01, Allied Joint Doctrine, Ed. E v1, Feb 2017, pp. 2-11)

1 Ministry of Defence, Defence White Paper 2018: Investing in our people, capabilities and visibility. 26 March 2018.

The NDD recognises cyberspace as a new military domain, along with the sea, land, air and space domains.[2]

Cyberspace: The global domain consisting of all interconnected communication, information technology and other electronic systems, networks and their data, including those which are separated or independent, which process, store or transmit data.
(AJP-3.20 Final draft, Edition A, Version 1; working definition)

This is the armed forces' response to the increasing integration of communication and information systems, fighting power and military functions, in concert with other military activities. This helps forces to understand and shape the information environment and to influence actors to support friendly operational objectives in the context of strategic communications (StratCom).[3]

This publication also describes the development and deployment of fighting power within the operating environment more explicitly than previous editions. In addition, the revised NDD confirms the focus on maintaining a comprehensive approach in the context of a new

2 Ministry of Defence, Defence Cyber Strategy, 2012.
3 A further explanation of the term StratCom is given in Table 4-2, Operational considerations in military operations in Chapter 4, para 4.5.2.

security environment, including the strategic shift towards a stronger focus on combat operations in large-scale (interstate) conflicts, multidimensional state-building missions and counterterrorism; for military operations take place in a joint, interagency, multinational and public (JIMP) setting (see paragraph 2.4). Lastly, as a result of the increased influence of the information environment on military operations, this NDD introduces the dimension model as a conceptual framework to show - domain-independently - the potential effects and dependencies of military activities within the operating environment, thus ensuring a comprehensive approach in pursuit of objectives.

Target groups

The NDD is primarily intended for commanders and staffs at the military-strategic, operational and higher tactical levels. It also forms a basis for military education, the military training environment and for the further study of doctrine-related subjects. Another target group is thus made up of military students or trainees. The NDD also forms the starting point for the Dutch contribution to allied doctrine development and for the further development of derived doctrine publications. This target group comprises researchers and doctrine developers. Finally, the NDD is also designed for non-military personnel in the Ministry of Defence and for personnel in other ministries and non-military organisations, with a view to promoting mutual awareness.

Definition of military doctrine

NATO defines doctrine as a set of "fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.[4] Doctrine provides guidance for operations. It describes fundamentals, principles and preconditions for military operations at the various levels of warfare. The adage for doctrine development is "NATO unless...". The Netherlands will follow NATO doctrine as closely as possible - unless it negatively affects military effectiveness - and where possible it is adopted and declared applicable as national doctrine. Doctrine must be developed and maintained in a uniform manner within the Netherlands armed forces[5].

4 NATO AAP-47 Allied Joint Doctrine Development, Ed. C V1 (2018), pg. 1.

5 See Instruction CHOD-1400 Doctrine development. This provides a detailed description of the processes enabling doctrine to be developed as efficiently as possible and identifies the tasks and responsibilities of the various actors.

The national doctrine framework provides insight into the structure and cohesion of doctrine publications used within the armed forces, and supports doctrine uniformity and cohesion. The doctrine framework consists of five layers representing the separate land, sea, air, space and cyberspace domains. Within this layer structure, doctrine is specified further according to purpose and application.

The doctrine framework recognises a bimodal subdivision into 'how to think' and 'how to act'. This subdivision then results in three different levels:

- Level 1 contains the NDD as the highest national doctrine publication – the capstone document - and forms the connecting element between the domains;
- Level 2 comprises all Allied Joint Publications (AJPs) and our national (joint or single-Service) doctrine publications, subdivided into domain-specific, functional or thematic doctrine.
- Level 3 is the doctrine that describes our actions ('how to act') per knowledge area (KA). This level comprises all Allied Tactical Publications (ATPs) and national handbooks and manuals, subdivided into knowledge areas per domain layer.



Figure 0-1: Layer structure of the doctrine framework

Structure of the NDD

The chapter structure of the NDD is as follows:

- Chapter 1 describes the context of military activity. The way in which the Netherlands armed forces are deployed cannot be regarded without the context in which that deployment occurs. This chapter discusses the operating environment, national and international actors and factors that may exert influence, the means of power at the state's disposal, the mechanisms that play a role in dealing with opposing interests and the levels of warfare.
- Chapter 2 describes in general terms the political-strategic environment of Dutch security policy in the context of international security policy.
- Chapter 3 deals with the armed forces as a government instrument, the role of the armed forces in government policy and the anchoring in state structures.
- Chapter 4 deals with fighting power, how fighting power is generated and the way the military instrument is used.

Each chapter contains a military historical context. The text also contains boxes in which important principles are highlighted.

1 The context of military activity

1.1 Introduction

The Netherlands does not exist in isolation, but exerts influence on other states, international organisations and various actors. In reverse, these states, organisations and actors also affect the Netherlands, its citizens and its interests. The armed forces play a role in this interaction. To be able to understand military doctrine, it is vital to first describe the context within which the Dutch state and its means of power operate.

The national and international environment in a historical perspective

The period from the 17th century is regarded as the era of the modern, sovereign (nation) state. As far as security was concerned, constantly changing coalitions of states kept each other in a balance of power, while correcting any imbalance by waging war. International relations revolved around diplomacy, mercantilism and the threat of or actual use of force. The first political entity on Dutch territory, the Republic of the Seven United Provinces (Dutch Republic), was a global superpower in the 17th and 18th centuries, small in terms of geography but unsurpassed in terms of naval and economic power. It was constantly engaged in armed competition with major rivals, most importantly Spain, Portugal, France and England, both on the continent of Europe and on the world's oceans. In this fight for power, the Republic, after a 'golden age' of being a world power, gradually diminished.

The state as a ruling entity had grown since the Middle Ages to become the main instrument of war and peace. The authorities promised law and order, and peace and security, in exchange for the monopoly of power, money (taxes) and loyalty (obedience). The latter was 'levied' in the form of conscription since the Napoleonic era, and the state created a bureaucracy for the collection of taxes and the armed mobilisation of its subjects. While states were to their citizens the guarantors of peace and (the legal) order, as well as survival, they were, with their armies (hired or otherwise), the main threat to other states. The state thus created its own *raison d'être*.

The balance of power in the 19th century was known as the Concert of Europe. This was in fact a restoration of the early modern *ancien régime* after the French revolution and Napoleonic rule had thoroughly shaken the old order. For a long time, the Concert, which as a result of European global dominance concerned the entire world order, created a semblance of stability. However, this system came under pressure again in the second half of the century with the emergence of new ambitious states. Moreover, new instabilities were caused by what is a traditional aspect of international relations: the demise of empires.

After the secession of Belgium (1839), the Netherlands – a unified kingdom since 1815 – withdrew into the isolation of armed neutrality. The former superpower plied between the major European powers, most literally between Great Britain and Prussia, later Germany. The latter's vast territorial and economic expansion from the mid-19th century onwards was perceived in the Netherlands as posing the greatest threat to the State of the Netherlands' integrity and its independence. By that time, the Kingdom was a small, rich trading nation, still holding considerable economic sway. The Netherlands exploited profitable colonies in the East Indies and in the Caribbean, and partly because of that wealth, it was one of the countries in Europe to develop, from the mid-19th century, the first contours of a liberal-parliamentary democracy.

After the First World War and the Russian Revolution – in effect the beginning of a period of conflict between major world ideologies - the state gradually began to lose its role of ultimate protector. Threats and security issues were seen less and less as a matter for states alone to deal with. The concept of a universal, supranational law that eroded the sovereignty of individual states was also gaining ground. This led to the formation of a supranational structure, first in the form of the League of Nations, later to become the United Nations, for the peaceful prevention, mitigation and resolution of interstate conflicts.

Furthermore, the industrial revolution and European imperialism had created a global economy that was increasingly transcending national borders to such an extent that important social (financial and economic) processes were slipping out of state control, while at the same time having a growing impact on global security issues and on international stability. This already became evident in the 19th century in the global economic depression that became the catalyst for the revolutions of 1848, and in the 20th century when the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression of the 1930s turned out to be the prelude to the Second World War. Also, technological advances ultimately resulted in the development of weapons of mass destruction, first chemical and biological and then nuclear, the destructive power of the latter being such that states were no longer able to protect their people against them.

At the same time, non-state actors were getting involved in the competition of international relations. Some of these actors placed threats and security issues, such as human rights violations or manmade damage to the environment, on the agenda of what was to become known as the 'international community'. Other actors were a threat in themselves, acting in the name of a particular ideology or a (perceived) injustice, such as terrorist organisations.

In the meantime, however, states continued to be the key players on the world stage and to represent the greatest threat to each other. The Netherlands experienced this from 1940 to 1945, when it was under the occupation of Nazi Germany until it was liberated by a coalition of democratic countries led by the United States and Great Britain. After the Second World War, the threat originated further to the east, from the Soviet Union. The danger posed by this communist dictatorship was deemed so great that the Netherlands gave up its old position of armed neutrality. It joined the Western coalition, which was consolidated in 1949 as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In addition, the Netherlands lost its colonies during the course of these post-war years, as did most other European nations.

After the Second World War, driven by the ideal of eradicating for ever the prospect of disastrous, all-out warfare, the states of Western Europe entered into far-reaching – in some respects even supranational - alliances. This occurred in respect of vital industrial raw materials (the European Coal and Steel Community), nuclear energy (European Atomic Energy Community), trade and agriculture (the European Economic Community), and human rights and the democratic rule of law (the Council of Europe). In respect of defence, they established the Western European Union (WEU), NATO's little brother, as it were. After the end of the Cold War in 1989, these institutions expanded to include many of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and effectively became pan-European organisations under the name of the European Union (EU). Nonetheless, the 2016 referendum in the United Kingdom on the withdrawal from the EU demonstrated that this process was not irreversible and could not yet by any means be taken for granted.

Another sign of the times was the warning in 1972 by a group of scientists (the Club of Rome) of an impending Malthusian catastrophe on a planetary scale caused by population growth, energy and food shortages, environmental pollution, exhaustion of raw materials and famine, impacting living conditions in some parts of the world and causing potentially unstoppable migration flows. Such scenarios, along with human rights and (humanitarian) intervention issues, were becoming part of the security debate. More and more human activities were becoming intertwined on an international scale. This development, referred to as globalisation, was able to take a firm hold because of the emergence of mass media. It was to gain momentum after the end of the Cold War as a result of the ever-increasing pace of technological developments, such as in the case of automation and digitisation, the internet and mobile communication. These developments had far-reaching implications for military operations.

1.2 Actors and factors

The (inter)national context and the operating environment are determined by players (actors) and environmental features (factors).

Actors act consciously and after due consideration, or subconsciously and more impulsively. Examples of actors are states, (international) organisations, interest groups, religious institutions, multinationals, influential individuals (heads of state and government leaders, warlords, leaders of criminal or terrorist organisations, and possibly even local administrators and entrepreneurs). Actors have specific interests and are led in thought and deed by how they think their interests will best be served. Not all actors will explicitly formulate their strategic aims or the way in which their interests are served.

Factors are environmental features that are relevant in the (inter)national context and operating environment. These could be the availability of energy sources and raw materials, (changes in) climate and environment, cultural and historical aspects, religion, ethnicity and politically driven events, demographic developments, the presence of international media and access to the internet, and many other factors.

1.3 Objectives and interests

States have an interest in upholding the principle of sovereignty and improving the well-being of its population. A state may also have higher ideological goals and these will give rise to choices and activities which, also fed by ideological aims, serve the national interest. The promotion of the international legal order and the prevention of human rights violations are examples of such ideological aims. International organisations such as the UN, the EU and NATO support the common interests of member states and promote the international legal order. Membership of these organisations and the provision of an active contribution are thus in the national interest. Ideological and humanitarian organisations, interest groups (mainly non-governmental organisations), private businesses, companies, organisations and individuals with ideological foundations (private volunteer organisations) have their own interests and objectives. They just as readily use means (of power) to exert influence and realise their objectives.

Actors such as states and organisations often express their national and international interests and objectives in a strategic document (e.g., a grand strategy, a white paper). A state's national strategy significantly overlaps its foreign policy, in which political leaders focus on the implications of national security policy, in particular how and by what means and methods the policy will be implemented. The Netherlands does not have a specific grand strategy, but the Constitution contains a number of grand strategic elements. The Constitution contains a number of articles in which national interests are expressed, such as promoting employment (Article 19), the means of subsistence and the distribution of wealth (Article 20) and the health of the population (Article 22). The Constitution also contains a strategic aim, namely to promote the development of the international legal order (Article 90).

1.4 Instruments of power

Actors can use a range of instruments (or instruments of power) to realise their objectives and safeguard their interests. These means of power are designed to influence another party and induce that party to take a course of action that is favoured by the actor. By doing so, the actor (for example, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, or an international organisation such as the UN, NATO or the EU) can put its security policy into practice. By employing political, diplomatic, economic, socio-cultural, humanitarian and military activities, influence will be exerted or power exercised for the purpose of realising these objectives. A state's means of power are also referred to as instruments of national power.
These can be divided into the following categories (DIME):

- the diplomatic instrument,
- information as an instrument,
- the military instrument,
- the economic instrument.

1.4.1 *The diplomatic instrument* is the means used by a state or an international organisation to establish and maintain relations with foreign powers and other actors on the international stage and to protect its interests and realise its objectives. Diplomacy is used to try to influence other actors. Diplomatic pressure can also be applied, with or without the overt threat of the use of other means of power. International fora are an important stage upon which actors use their diplomatic might. A state or international actor wields its diplomatic power through political leaders and ambassadors. Other means of diplomatic power include the use of special envoys, negotiations, participation in or boycott of alliances or coalitions or the signing of treaties.

1.4.2 *Information as an instrument.* Actors may use information as an instrument. For reasons of (national) security and privacy, a state's information needs to be protected, and access to important or secret information must be denied. The controlled and targeted release of correct or incorrect information is an important instrument for influencing public opinion and perceptions held by other actors. Mass media (radio, television and internet) and social media play a major role in this. Apart from the release of information, the information instrument is also designed to influence the availability, reliability and integrity of an opponent's information and to disrupt his information systems, while at the same time protecting the state's own information and information systems. An increasingly important role in this respect is played by cyberattacks and hacks. The information environment[6] is thus becoming an ever more important component of the operating environment, partly because of increased dependency.

1.4.3 *The military instrument* can be used by a government or a coalition of governments as a means to persuade other actors to take a particular course of action or to refrain from one. The use of credible force is key here, the aim being to show all parties that the government or coalition is willing and able to use force to enable it to achieve a desired end state. The military instrument thus distinguishes itself from other instruments: it is the threat or actual use of force. The idea that the use of the military instrument is particularly effective in combination with other instruments is an important principle in a comprehensive approach. Not only because no crisis or conflict can be resolved by military means alone, but also because other instruments are less effective in the resolution of armed conflicts.

The use of the military instrument alone cannot bring about a lasting solution to a conflict. Such a solution always lies in the domain of or in combination with other instruments of power. It is important, therefore, that military planners and commanders consider a security issue in its entirety; the effect of any integrated use of the military instrument can then be estimated. This does not detract from the fact that the threat or use of force can be a deciding factor in the creation of conditions, such as a safe environment, for a lasting solution. By contributing to the successful use of other instruments of power, the military instrument plays a supporting and enabling role.

6 Information Environment (IE): A part of the operating environment, that is comprised of the information itself, the individuals, organizations and systems that receive, process and convey the information, and the cognitive, virtual and physical space in which this occurs. (NATO term)

Viewed from an international perspective, the monopoly of the use of force does not necessarily lie with a military or police force. In a broad sense, the military instrument encompasses all forms of force used by an actor. Terrorist attacks, the use of militias and the poisoning of a specific individual are also examples of the use of the military instrument.

1.4.4 *The economic instrument* provides a range of options to improve a state's well-being and to support or oppose other actors. This instrument of power includes economic aid on the one hand, and measures such as embargoes or boycotts on the other. In a general sense, the economic instrument is used by adopting a particular trade policy and implementing fiscal and monetary policy. Where economic instruments are used against an international actor, the effect will usually only be felt in the long term. It is even the case in practice that the desired effects are not always achieved because the economic instrument is not used consistently, for example in the event of a change of government, or if there are parties who do not consent to the imposed measures. Secondly, governments of Western democracies do not have absolute control over the economic instrument, particularly in respect of multinational corporations, which can easily circumvent local legislation.

1.4.5 *Civil capacities.* Other civil capacities exist alongside the diplomatic and economic instruments, but these are not referred to as instruments of power in this context, as they are unable to make a direct impact outside national territory. A state might use the civil capacities at its disposal to realise its strategic objectives. Civil capacities encompass a wide diversity of means, such as the use of legal powers, police force, administrative bodies, education, health care, media and utility companies.

1.5 Applying instruments of power

As described above, actors apply their instruments of power to safeguard their interests and achieve their strategic objectives. This is best done by using instruments of power in combination. It is not always necessary to deploy all instruments at the same time; depending on the interests to be protected or the objective to be realised, and on the prevailing situation (peace, confrontation or conflict), one instrument will be more suitable than another.

A good understanding of the operating environment[7] is vitally important for the successful deployment of the instruments of power. The commander's operating environment comprises the actors and activities referred to above. The actors have interests that they protect and objectives that they pursue. They have various instruments of power with which to do so. To ensure a better understanding of the operating area to thus be able to deploy fighting power in the right way, commanders and staffs will analyse a number of interrelated (environmental) factors, namely political, economic, social, information and infrastructure, known as the PMESII factors. With a good understanding of these factors, the instruments of power and civil capabilities can be used effectively and effect can be created in pursuit of the desired end state (see Figure below).



Figure 1-1: Relationship between the instruments of power and the factors in an operating environment

7 De *operating environment* is gedefinieerd als '*a composite of conditions, circumstances and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander*'.

Confrontations and conflicts in the international arena are complex. The causes vary widely, but they almost always have economic, ideological and cultural dimensions. Such complex problems require a comprehensive solution and a comprehensive approach. The integrated coordination of all instruments of power at the disposal of one or more international organisations or a coalition of nations is thus the foremost approach for the resolution of confrontations and conflicts.

In a **comprehensive approach**, the instruments of power available to a state are applied in a coordinated and cohesive manner in a coalition with other countries and international and non-governmental organisations. The armed forces must be deployed in such a way as to reinforce the use and efforts of other means and parties and to keep any adverse effects to a minimum.

In a comprehensive approach, those who are directly involved develop, on the basis of a common analysis, a collective strategy in which mutual coordination, tasks, roles and responsibilities are established. A comprehensive approach ensures optimum synchronisation of the various instruments of power with the aim of achieving the best possible enduring solution to a confrontation or conflict.

However, not all actors who are directly involved have the same strategy or the same views in respect of the desired end state. This is the reason for the fact that, although the actors concerned generally acknowledge the sense of a joint approach, a collective strategy and end state do not form part of the concept of the comprehensive approach.

Conflicts of interest, confrontations, crises and conflicts. In the (inter)national arena, all actors always have their own interests and objectives. A conflict of interests arises if a party's interests and objectives are at odds with those of other actors. If that is the case, and actors persist in these differences, the situation becomes one of confrontation. Confrontations can harden and result in a crisis or a conflict. To ensure an accurate definition, these terms are explained below.

In a **conflict of interest** or **confrontation**, there is an escalating difference of opinion about objectives that is so crucial that neither party will concede. The root of the difference of opinion normally lies in conflicting economic or political interests, and it is in that sphere that the solution must initially be sought. Nevertheless, the threat or actual use of fighting power is sometimes made, and this would normally serve to protect, prevent or deter.

- Protection of national interests. This includes, for example, airspace and border security, the military contribution to the coastguard and law enforcement on the high seas, as well as operations to counter smuggling and piracy. The permanent presence of military units at strategically important locations (e.g., the Dutch Caribbean) also falls into this category.

- Prevention of escalation. In this case, military deployment supports the use of other instruments. Examples are military diplomacy, such as showing the flag and military visits, and the provision of military advice, assistance, training to friendly nations and any necessary deterrence.

- Deterrence. Here, military deployment is intended to convince other actors of the willingness to use the military instrument and to apply coercion. Examples are the forward deployment of military capabilities and the execution of joint exercises in or near the area in question.

The emphasis lies on the presence of military power; the actual use of force is not usually relevant here. Confrontations may last a very long time, such as the Cold War, for example. In conflicts of interest and confrontations, it is crucial that the situation does not escalate and develop into a crisis or conflict. This applies particularly in the case of vital interests, where the level of damage caused by an escalation may be disproportionately high or even irreversible. In the case of vital interests, therefore, much emphasis will be placed on prevention and protection. By taking preventive action, in which case the use of force or intervention in an impending conflict is not yet an issue, a state's political leaders preserve the greatest freedom of choice for the application of its instruments of power.

A **crisis** is deemed to have arisen when a state or population group loses control of the situation because of a conflict of interests, a confrontation or an impending or worsening disaster. Crises have no set pattern and each has its own dynamic and characteristics. Generally speaking, a crisis does not arise because of a single specific event, but because of a series of events spread over time. Multiple conflicts of interest are usually to blame for a crisis.

A **disaster** often leads to a crisis and can also be classed under the phenomenon of a crisis, as the characteristics of each bear close resemblance to each other. It involves the severe disruption of public safety, usually caused by a single, brief and catastrophic event at a single location. When a disaster occurs, a great number of people are put in grave danger, and there is extensive material damage or significant damage to the environment, all within a short space of time. Disasters can be caused by human actions (major accidents) or by natural events (earthquakes, hurricanes, flooding, pandemics). The socio-economic consequences of a disaster are often more catastrophic than the physical disaster itself.

In an armed **conflict**, the conflict of interests has escalated to such an extent that parties resort to the use of weapons to secure their interests. A conflict may be small scale and local, but it can also lead to large-scale violence.

1.6 Levels of warfare

There are a number of hierarchical levels of warfare and each of these levels has its own characteristics. This distinction has implications for the thinking behind the application of the military instrument. Particular tasks, authority and responsibilities are assigned to each level and the activities stemming from these tasks are so different that they result in specific theories and in some cases even in specific terminology.

There are three different levels in the planning and execution of military operations:
- the strategic level,
- the operational level,
- the tactical level, which includes the technical level.

Although these levels are used in the military domain, this distinction is not made in respect of the diplomatic and economic instruments. However, more or less similar levels of decision making and planning are used, if only for the allocation of resources and manpower. To ensure a unified, comprehensive approach to crisis management, it is important that the interaction and collaboration between diplomatic, military and economic activities and activities in the information environment take place at all levels.

1.6.1 *The strategic level*

The strategic level is sub-divided into the political-strategic level and the military-strategic level.

The political-strategic level is responsible for the coordinated, systematic development and use of all instruments of power (grand strategy) of a state, alliance or coalition to promote national, allied or coalition interests. The task of formulating the Netherlands' grand strategy is the exclusive responsibility of the government, regardless of whether it is acting alone or in collaboration with other governments in international organisations or in an ad-hoc coalition. The political-strategic level decides which instruments of power are necessary to achieve the objectives. Finally, it will draw up additional guidelines for the use of the instruments of power, such as size, duration and mandate, but without describing the mission in detail. The table below shows examples of actors at the political-strategic level.

The political-strategic level translated according to the Netherlands, NATO and EU actors:		
NLD	**Government**	controlled by parliament
NAVO	**North Atlantic Council**	with ambassadors from Member States
EU	**Political and Security Committee (PSC)**	with ambassadors from Member States

The military-strategic level. Military strategy is the coordinated, systematic development and use of the military instrument of a state, alliance or coalition, integrated with other instruments of power if possible, with a view to achieving the objectives set by the political-strategic level. The military-strategic level is thus closely involved in the deliberations at the political-strategic level. In consultation with relevant actors from other ministries, the military-strategic authority formulates in its strategic guidances or strategic directives a general mission statement on the basis of the military-strategic objectives for the campaign. The aim is to coordinate with representatives of (other) international and non-governmental organisations and departments as early as possible in the preparation phase. This level will then assign objectives and means to the commanders at the operational level and establish any restrictions on their use, without getting involved in the detail of the execution.

The military-strategic level translated according to the Netherlands, NATO and EU actors:		
NLD	**Chief of Defence**	assisted by the Defence Staff, representatives of other ministries and NGOs
NAVO	**Surpreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)**	assisted by Allied Command Operations and other representatives and advisers
EU	**EU Military Staff**	with the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) assisted by the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC)

As will be explained in Chapter 3, the decision to use military force falls under the primacy of politics. The selected military strategy must conform to the political strategy and the frameworks of international law. The aim of this strategy is to advance the realisation of political objectives and it must be synchronised with the employment of other instruments of power at the government's disposal. It is the responsibility of the military-strategic authority and the operational commanders to translate the political objectives and guidelines into achievable military objectives down to the tactical level. The military objectives must be specific, measurable, feasible, realistic and timed. The defining of the political and military strategies and the military objectives can never be the result of a one-way process. There needs to be close collaboration between political and military leaders and with all relevant departments. In reality, there is often hardly any clear dividing line between the political-strategic and the military-strategic levels. There is in effect an overlap, whereby top civil servants and military officials collaborate intensively to develop and prepare decisions to deploy the military instrument of power.

1.6.2 *The operational level*

The operational level is responsible for planning, directing and executing joint and/or multinational operations to achieve the military objectives set by the military-strategic commander in his or her strategic directive. The operational level thus provides the link between the military-strategic objectives and the tactical deployment of units. The commander of the joint, multinational force (Joint (Task) Force Commander) will, as commander at the operational level, design, plan, execute and complete his campaign within the joint operations area (JOA). This not only requires extensive knowledge of the doctrine for the joint force and its structure and cohesion, but also of the political-strategic and military-strategic considerations of all the nations involved in the coalition.

The operations conducted as part of the campaign cover all operational themes (warfighting, security, peace support operations and peacetime military engagement). The table shows examples of actors at the operational level of warfare.

The operational level translated according to the Netherlands, NATO and EU actors:		
NLD	**Contingent commander**	as the most senior Dutch representative in a mission area in expeditionary operations,[8] the NATO joint force commander in Article 5 operations, and the overall commander or operations leader in national operations
NAVO	**Commanders of Joint Forces Commands**	with headquarters in Brunssum and Naples to be split for operations into a forward HQ, e.g., ISAF
EU	**Operational commander**	to be designated per operation (e.g., EUFOR ALTHEA, EU NAVFOR ATALANTA, EUTM Mali)

The commander at the operational level will in principle be located in the mission area and will command his assigned joint multinational force in the execution of his campaign plan. This plan is designed to produce the effects necessary for the realisation of the objectives, thus contributing to the accomplishment of the strategic objectives.

1.6.3 The tactical level

Tactics are the deployment method of and actions by formations and units in order to conduct military activities in a certain cohesion and sequence in order to create (military) effects in support of the objectives of the operational level of warfare. At the tactical level, forces perform actions to complete tactical missions. In contrast to the operational level, the tactical level employs forces directly to conduct military activities, thus contributing to the accomplishment of the campaign's operational objective. There are also examples of cases in which forces operating at the tactical level can make a direct contribution to a military-strategic objective. That applies, for example, to the deployment of special operations forces, the collection of strategic intelligence by submarines or the execution of strategic bombing.

8 The Dutch contingent commander works at the operational level of warfare and fulfils the role of coordinator in the national chain, as opposed to the commander in the functional chain who plays a directing role.

At the technical level, sub-units operate according to an established pattern, the sub-units being individuals and (weapon) systems. At this level, the (tactical) objective is achieved by means of a specific sequence of actions. The technical level deals with performing combat techniques (skills & drills), with one or more specific (weapon) systems. The actual execution of tasks in support of combat actions also occurs at the technical level. Examples of such tasks are repairing materiel, installing and operating radio stations, replenishment at sea and air-to-air refuelling. Typical features at this level are fixed procedures and the absence of an extensive decision-making process.

1.6.4 *Overlap between the levels (strategic compression)*

The need for (near) real-time information about military deployment in mission areas grows as the technical capabilities increase. Nowadays, senior staffs and political leaders can closely monitor the execution of tactical missions. This effect is intensified by the fact that actions by units or individuals at the technical and tactical levels can have far-reaching repercussions at the operational and strategic levels, both in and outside the military domain. In reverse, commanders must take account of the fact that the political-strategic level will, in certain circumstances, wish to exert influence down to the tactical and technical levels. Because of the transparent environment, this political overlapping of military activities, even at low levels, is extensive because of, for example, the use of (information) technology. This could, however, also hamper the decision-making process at the operational and tactical levels of warfare.



Figure 1-2: Increasing overlap between the levels of warfare

This ability of political-military leaders to intervene during the conduct of an operation carries significant risks. As well as having an actual view of the situation, the man on the ground also has other expertise that is necessary to complete the picture of reality. Those carrying out orders at tactical level can also see - sometimes immediately - the direct consequences of their actions on their surroundings and they alone will personally experience the repercussions of the decision that was made. But above all, they are the only ones who are familiar with the physical environment and all the actors at work within it.

Intervention by higher commanders, who have much less insight into this tactical picture, must, therefore, be executed with extreme caution.

1.6.5 *Uniform approach to planning and execution of operations*

All operations conducted by the armed forces are in principle approached in the same way. In the past, a distinction was made between combat, peace support and national operations. Practice has shown that there are no partitions between combat and peace support operations or the force levels that exist within them. All operations are, therefore, fundamentally approached in the same way. In each operation, forces must be able to perform a wide range of military activities simultaneously. These range from offensive and defensive activities to enabling and stabilising activities. The circumstances will dictate the relationship between and the priority of these various activities. A unit could thus have a stabilisation task, while one of its sub-units is engaging the enemy in combat and another sub-unit is performing a humanitarian task. All joint functions must always be taken into consideration in the planning and execution of each operation. A uniform approach to operations is, therefore, essential for unity of opinion, while preconditions such as authority, mandate, legal basis, restrictions and the accents in the commander's analysis, may differ per level of warfare.

2 Dutch security policy

2.1 Introduction

Dutch military doctrine defines military thinking as it is applied in the Netherlands armed forces. Because the use of the military instrument is derived from Dutch security policy, it is first necessary to define that security policy, thus providing an insight into the higher framework in which the armed forces apply their doctrine.

This chapter looks first at security policy, both from an international and Dutch perspective. This will be followed by a description of Dutch interests, and the way in which the Netherlands government serves these interests. Lastly, the chapter will set out what this means for national security organisations and for the armed forces in particular.

Dutch security policy in a historical context

From the time the Kingdom of the Netherlands was established in 1815, the armed forces had two tasks: 1) defending the Kingdom in Europe and 2) upholding law and order in the colonies. The first task was the responsibility of the Royal Netherlands Army and the Royal Netherlands Navy; the second was performed in the Dutch East Indies by the KNIL, the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army and the Colonial Navy (later named East Indies Military Navy). In the Caribbean, the Netherlands Forces in Curaçao and the Netherlands Forces in Surinam were tasked with the defence of the colonies, and a maritime presence was ensured by the Royal Netherlands Navy. The Dutch armies concentrated on territorial defence, on assisting with domestic law enforcement and, in the colonies, on pacification. Expeditionary actions were mainly the responsibility of the navy and the marine corps, who ever since the years of the Dutch war of independence (1568-1648) had been engaged all over the world in the military protection of trade, gunboat diplomacy and showing the flag.

In strategic terms, the Netherlands maintained a policy of armed neutrality until the Second World War and its armed forces in Europe concentrated mainly on the ability to engage in a major conflict in the event of any violation of that neutrality. The assumption was that the potential opponent, the armed forces of another European power, were likely to conduct 'regular' operations. After the conquests of the 19th century, the colonial troops focused mainly on maintaining internal law and order. Activities of the KNIL were focused primarily on conducting offensive operations in rebellious regions, combating indigenous guerrilla fighters and piracy.

In 1913-1914, the very first deployment of Dutch military personnel with a peace-building task took place as part of a multinational operation in Albania. Another mission happened more than twenty years later, in 1935, when marines were deployed in Germany's Saarland in a peace support operation by the League of Nations (the forerunner to the United Nations). Generally speaking though, Dutch defence and security policy, like that of other Western countries, had virtually no ambitions with regard to international crisis management and conflict resolution until long after the Second World War.

After the restoration of Dutch independence in 1945, Dutch defence and security policy focused on territorial defence with its allies against the communist threat from the East. To protect vital interests, the Netherlands opted – initially hesitantly, but gradually with more conviction – for international collaboration and incorporation into multinational (security) structures, such as the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the various European Communities, now the European Union (EU). In so doing, it relinquished part of its sovereignty in decision making on political-strategic and military-strategic affairs.

During the Cold War, the Netherlands' immediate security concern was the territorial defence of Western Europe as part of NATO against a military attack by the Warsaw Pact, led by the Soviet Union. The rebuilt Dutch armed forces consisted of units that were geared towards and equipped for regular combat. The Netherlands also agreed to contribute on a small scale to peace-enforcement and peace support operations by the new UN and to humanitarian aid operations, providing that such a contribution would not interfere too much with the NATO defence task.

The end of the Cold War heralded a new era. The geostrategic upheaval of the period from 1989 to 1991 caused a shift in Dutch security policy. The Netherlands transformed its armed forces into a smaller, more flexible instrument for crisis management and interventions. Deployment under the UN increased. At the same time, NATO changed from a regional defence collective to a globally operating security organisation. Participation in international (UN and NATO) operations, in ad-hoc coalitions or in EU military structures became the norm. After the fall of the 'safe area' of Srebrenica in 1995, the Netherlands became increasingly reluctant to participate in UN operations and developed a preference for NATO and EU missions as well as ad-hoc coalitions.

In terms of security policy, in the early 1990s the Netherlands joined an international trend which was based on the principle that priority should be given to interventions in so-called 'collapsed' or 'failed' states. In keeping with the spirit of the times, ambitious, multidimensional peacekeeping missions were set up, mainly under the UN flag, but, due to failures, also in other alliances. In the report "An Agenda for Peace", this new

generation of crisis management operations was categorised as “post-conflict peace-building”. This UN document effectively laid the intellectual foundation for what would later, in the new century, be called the integrated, 3-D or comprehensive approach in international interventions. Since the 1990s, the Netherlands has applied the principles of this form of modern military deployment consistently in its security policy and doctrines.

NATO remained the Netherlands’ cornerstone in terms of security. After the security situation changed in 1991, the alliance developed a new strategic concept. This provided a wider, flexible, less territory-based security strategy, the essence of which was reduced dependence on nuclear weapons and greater emphasis on the use of multinational formations (combined joint task forces) for a broad set of crisis management and peacekeeping tasks, also outside the treaty area.

NATO also opted to enter into partnerships with non-Member States and to extend the hand of friendship to the old enemies on the other side of the former Iron Curtain. The alliance expanded greatly with the accession of these Central and Eastern European countries and even a number of former constituent republics of what used to be the Soviet Union. In 1999 (the 50th anniversary of the alliance), and again in 2010, NATO revised the Strategic Concept, in which the Member States recognised the increasing complexity of the global ‘security environment’ and the challenges that modern crisis management presented.

In parallel with these adaptations, the Netherlands defence organisation additionally shifted its focus to domains that had been out of sight for a long time. For example, the armed forces were given tasks in overseas counterdrugs and counterpiracy operations. In addition, following 9/11 and various terrorist attacks in European cities, specialised units enhanced their capabilities in the area of counterterrorism, a development that was accelerated after a number of major attacks in France in 2015 and 2016. Furthermore, military personnel began to participate in the control of Europe’s external borders and increasingly provided support in civil disaster relief, both at home and abroad.

The increased assertiveness of state actors such as China and Russia brought about NATO’s strategic shift that was formalised at the Wales Summit in 2014. One consequence of this for the Dutch armed forces is a renewed focus on the first main task, for instance through participation by the Dutch armed forces in an enhanced Forward Presence within NATO territory.

2.2 International embedding

An important principle of Dutch security policy is the obligation of collective defence of NATO territory, laid down in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949. Article 5 obliges each NATO member in the event of an armed attack on a NATO member in Europe or North America to take forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary - including the use of armed force - to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. The 2009 Treaty of Lisbon on the European Union also contains an obligation of mutual assistance between the member states of the EU. It states, for those EU Member States that are also members of NATO, that NATO is the basis for the collective defence of its members and the instrument for conducting this collective defence. The Treaty also states that the European Union has a common security and defence policy (CSDP).

2.3 Dutch security policy

The main objective of Dutch security policy is based on the Constitution and is to ensure the country's independence, integrity, stability and well-being. Dutch security and defence policy is based on a broad security concept and a comprehensive approach. The Integrated International Security Strategy[9] (IISS) and the Defence White Paper[10] were developed in conjunction and partly based on an integrated analysis of external and domestic threats, forming the basis of a comprehensive approach to security. The Dutch National Security Strategy[11] (NSS) covers the domestic part of the security strategy. After all, territorial security may not only be threatened by an internal threat (terrorism, guerrilla, civil war) but also by an international/supranational threat (another state or an international terrorist network). Territorial security is not limited to physical borders; security must also be guaranteed in cyberspace.

2.3.1 Trends

The most important trends which currently determine our international security situation are:

1. **Multi-order world**
   The multi-order world of today manifests itself in different dimensions and impacts national and regional stability in important parts of the world. This puts geopolitical relations under considerable pressure, and altogether causes increasing unpredictability. In geopolitical terms, the international balance of power is shifting towards a more multipolar order. This has implications for the international legal order, democratic principles and the universality of human rights.
   The effect of this multi-order world is that international cooperation is changing substantially. Deteriorating relations could mean that large multilateral alliances become less effective. A mix of state and non-state actors are playing an increasingly important role in this, whether positive or negative. The influence of large multinational companies is clear, as is that of NGOs, influential individual actors and criminal and terrorist organisations.

9 NL Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Working Worldwide for the Security of the Netherlands", An Integrated International Security Strategy 2018-2022, 19 March 2018
10 NL Ministry of Defence, Defence White Paper 2018, 26 March 2018
11 NL Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, National Security Strategy, 8 May 2007

2. **Instability and threats around Europe and the Caribbean**
   Numerous studies point to the increased overlap between external and internal security. This overlap is expected to grow further in the coming years. As the instability in countries and regions on the edges of and around Europe and the Caribbean territories of the Kingdom increases, this poses major risks, both to the sustainable development of those regions and to security in the Kingdom. There is a risk that the surrounding countries will be dragged into a downward spiral of violence and failing governance. The Kingdom has an interest in stability in the regions. Although in some cases symptom control is necessary in the shorter term, preventive measures can mitigate the security risks for the Netherlands, Europe and the Kingdom in the long term.

3. **Accelerated technological developments and hybrid conflict resolution**
   Technological and digital developments are causing rapid changes in relation to security. This presents opportunities for the prosperity and security of the Netherlands. At the same time, sophisticated technology is becoming more advanced, cheaper and available to more and more actors. In the hands of the wrong actors, such technology can easily pose a security risk and enhance the possibilities for states to conduct hybrid conflicts. The same applies to threats and activities that remain below the threshold of overt force. Technology becomes more accessible, costs decrease and it becomes easier to use different instruments simultaneously and in combination.

4. **Tensions in the Netherlands and Europe**
   Alongside these trends, which result in external security risks, there is a potentially growing security problem in the Netherlands and Europe. Certain developments could have a direct impact on the vulnerability and resilience of the Netherlands in a European context. This is therefore relevant to Dutch and European strategic thinking on security.

2.3.2 *Integrated International Security Strategy*

In view of the growing importance of other countries for national security, the government has produced the IISS (2018). The IISS provides the strategic frameworks for worldwide deployment for the security of the Netherlands. The security approach in the IISS is based on three pillars (Prevent, Defend and Strengthen)[12] within which the following specific (political) strategic objectives have been formulated:

- Prevent (insecurity where possible)
  1. Conflict prevention around Europe and the Kingdom
  2. Elimination of the root causes of terrorism
  3. Disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation
  4. Clear international norms for cyber activities
- Defend (the Netherlands using an effective and modern approach)
  5. Modern defence and protection of territory
  6. Forceful cyber deterrence
  7. Counterterrorism
  8. Societal resilience to foreign interference
  9. Safeguarding economic security
  10. Tackling cross-border crime
- Strengthen (the foundations of Dutch security)
  11. Promotion of the international legal order and lasting peace
  12. Strengthening of international security cooperation
  13. Robust border management and control

12 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Working Worldwide for the Security of the Netherlands", pp. 22-41; see Section 2.3.2.

2.3.3 Defence White Paper

The Defence White Paper (2018) highlights the role of the Defence organisation at home and abroad. There are three distinct missions:

- Remain safe: in the Netherlands, the Kingdom, the EU and on NATO territory;
- Promote security: Around Europe (the Middle East, North Africa and parts of sub-Saharan Africa and West Africa)
- Communicate securely: from the Netherlands as a hub and its lines of communication.

The Defence White Paper stated explicitly that there is an increased chance that the armed forces will be required to act simultaneously at home and abroad.

2.3.4 National Security Strategy

At the core of the National Security Strategy is an integral view as to where threats to national security occur. The strategy focuses on the protection of society and the population in the state's own territory against internal and external threats. Our national security cannot be seen in isolation from the security of other countries, in particular our European partners and NATO allies. Partly for this reason, the domestic security policy to which this strategy mainly relates and Dutch international security policy are closely linked.

National security is at stake if the vital interests of the State of the Netherlands and/or society are threatened in such a way that it could lead to social disruption.
Vital interests are defined as follows:

- territorial security (at risk if our territory is affected);
- economic security (undisturbed trade);
- ecological security (living environment);
- physical security (public health);
- social and political stability (for example, respect for core values such as freedom of expression);
- a properly functioning international legal order.

The method described in the strategy enables the government to determine which threats may jeopardise national security and how to anticipate those threats, regardless of their origin and nature. In addition, it enables the government to make well-founded choices about its priorities and how these should be put in practice, and to view these choices in relation to each other.

2.4 Consequences of security policy for the armed forces

In today's security environment, the use of the military instrument alone will not fully achieve the national objectives. In a world where conflicts continue to be driven by ethnic, religious, ideological and material motives, the ability to put into effect all instruments of power (both national and coalition) and apply them in a coordinated, collaborative manner will be essential for achieving effective results. This also applies to the ability to take on board and, where possible, put to good use the opinions and responses of the public - both national and international - as well as those of the media as operations develop further.

The Netherlands government recognises the need for such a comprehensive approach to operations.[13] This requires greater ability on the part of the Dutch armed forces to cooperate with joint, interagency and multinational partners. It also requires the armed forces to adopt a coordinated approach to operations that is recognised by the public and the media as crucial to the success of operations. Outward-looking, integrated and multidisciplinary approaches should be the norm for addressing the complex problems and challenges posed by a multidimensional security environment.



Figure 2-2: Joint Interagency Multinational and Public (JIMP)[14]

13 NL Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Leidraad Geïntegreerde Benadering, 11 July 2014.
14 Canadian Defence Publication, *Land Operations 2021: The Force Employment Concept for Canada's Army of Tomorrow*, p. 25.

Public trust in and support for legitimacy based on consensus
Military operations should be viewed in a JIMP context, in which the Netherlands armed forces collaborate with multinational and interagency partners in order to create the desired effects through unity of purpose and effort. At the same time, account should be taken of the requirements of public trust and public support, both at home and abroad, as public consent lends legitimacy to a military operation.

Security policy – national, international and foreign policy – results in the adoption of a number of principles for the operations of the Netherlands armed forces: joint, multinational, interagency and public. Such a comprehensive approach can be achieved by applying a framework in which effective collaboration and joint efforts of key officials in the following four areas are the norm:

- **Joint operations**, defined as operations involving at least two Services[15] because each Service has capacities that complement the others. Integrated deployment of these complementary capacities of multiple Services will ensure optimum effectiveness for achieving the operational objectives.

- **Multinational** (combined) operations, because the country has opted for NATO membership, to operate as part of the EU or as part of another multinational security organisation or coalition. The Netherlands armed forces will, therefore, almost always be deployed under a grand strategy that is formulated by an alliance or coalition. This does not preclude the exclusive deployment of Dutch forces for small-scale operations, a situation which generally arises in national operations.

15 Joint: "Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organizations in which elements of at least two services participate"(NATO-agreed).

- **Interagency** operations, because, under the comprehensive approach, military power is always deployed in conjunction with other instruments of power. This is based on the accepted fact that military power alone cannot resolve a conflict of interests, confrontation, crisis or conflict.

- **Public** operations, consisting of various elements, including the national and international public, NGOs, volunteer organisations and media and commercial organisations (both domestic and foreign), because these provide trust, support and legitimacy to the armed forces.

3 The armed forces as an instrument of national power

3.1 Introduction

One of the principles on which the Dutch state system is based is that the armed forces are an instrument of national power applied by the government. To understand the thinking behind the operational deployment of the armed forces, a thorough understanding of the context of that deployment is required. This context is made up of the legal framework, the assigned main tasks, the strategic objectives, the decision-making process for deployment within and outside national borders, and the direction of forces on deployment. This context affects the deployment of parts of the armed forces and thus military doctrine itself, and will be discussed in this chapter.

The armed forces as an instrument of national power in a historical perspective

Decisions in the Netherlands about war and peace and about the deployment and tasks of the armed forces were traditionally made by a small ruling elite. When the Kingdom was established in 1815, these powers were constitutionally invested in the government (head of state and cabinet). Initially, the king alone bore the political and military leadership. He had "supreme command over the fleets and armies". After the state reforms of 1848 and the introduction of ministerial responsibility, the cabinet – specifically the Ministers of War, the Navy and the Colonies – was put in charge of directing the armies and the navy and the task of developing military strategy and policy.

For a long time, the tradition remained that the supreme command in wartime lay with the monarch and his family. Since the time of the Dutch Republic, members of the House of Orange had held that office of highest military commander and did so again during the Belgian Revolt of 1830 and 1831 and in the mobilisation for the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. Because of the lack of male heirs to the House of Orange at the end of the 19th century, this situation was not to last. In the mobilisation of 1914, the armed forces were for the first time given a commander-in-chief from the professional military ranks. This happened again in 1939, on the eve of the Second World War. In the Dutch East Indies, the governor-general was both the civil-administrative representative of the Dutch Crown and the commander-in-chief of the land and naval forces operating there.

Until 1940, actual deployment of the armed forces was confined mainly to the colonies. In the 19th century in particular, the Royal Netherlands Navy and the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army undertook many expeditions to 'pacify' the East Indies. The government did not request official permission from parliament for this kind of operation, nor was there any official accountability procedure. On the subject of the authority to declare war, the Constitution originally stated (in the 1815, 1848 and 1887 versions): "war is declared by the King, who will immediately notify both chambers of the States General accordingly". When the Constitution was revised in 1922, this clause was amended, and the law now stipulated that the King could not declare war "without prior approval of the States General".

The revision of the Constitution in 1983 meant that it was no longer the head of state who could make a declaration of war, but the government, and thus the cabinet. By this time, however, such a declaration was no longer the norm internationally. Because of the nature of the international system as laid down in the Charter of the United Nations, and because of the Dutch armed forces' embedding in NATO since 1949, formal declarations of war had become a practice from the past.

The Ministries of War and the Navy were merged in 1959 to form the Ministry of Defence. The Dutch armed forces since the Second World War were, like their predecessors, an organisation that was segregated according to Service and specialisation. From 1948, the overarching part of the organisation was the United Chiefs of Staff Committee (CVCS in Dutch), a consultative committee of the commanders-in-chief of the Services, headed by a chairman. In the 1960s, because of the need for better coordination of the increasingly allied and international cooperation, the chairmanship of the CVCS developed into a permanent function. The full-time chairman of the CVCS was given his own joint staff. This staff grew in the 1970s to form a policy and planning directorate for operations, which in 1976 became the Defence Staff. From then on, it was headed by the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS).

The end of the Cold War brought with it a need for additional changes. Deployment for international crisis response operations became a main task alongside the general defence task. The ongoing 'internationalisation' of the deployment of the Dutch armed forces led to an expansion in the tasks of the CDS and the Defence Staff. The catalyst was the crisis in Srebrenica (1995). After that, the Defence Staff became fully responsible for the planning, preparation, execution and evaluation of international operations. Over the years, this responsibility grew to become a fully-fledged overall command and in 2005, the armed forces were definitively placed under the single command of the CDS, who is now known as the Chief of Defence (CHOD). The CHOD thus became the national military-strategic authority.

The new, expeditionary era was also characterised by a greater political focus on military operations. On deployment, the armed forces were frequently under scrutiny and politicians were keen to increase their control. In 1993, the cabinet drew up a list of evaluation criteria, which was formalised in 1995 in what became known as the *Toetsingskader*, a frame of reference for participation in military operations. This contained 14 points for determining the political desirability and practical feasibility of Dutch participation in a crisis management operation. The *Toetsingskader* underwent some changes in 2001 and 2009. Since then, the 2009 *Toetsingskader* has served as the starting point for decision making and supplying information to parliament.

In 2000, an active duty of information for the government on the deployment of military personnel in peace operations was laid down in Article 100 of the Constitution. Although parliament does not formally have a right of consent, an operation without the support of a majority in parliament became inconceivable. However, the tradition that a large majority of parliament should support a deployment has proven to be subject to erosion. Recent decision making has shown that an ordinary majority in parliament now suffices.

Public opinion, which for a long time appeared to be developing into an important element of the decision-making process, acquired only limited influence over the years. The *Toetsingskader* originally contained the criterion of "public support", but it was deleted in 2001. However, the Netherlands always showed a great deal of support for international peacekeeping and peace-support operations, and this level remained constant for a long time, both during and after the Cold War. Opinion polls have shown, however, that the Dutch population has taken a more critical stance on participation in stabilisation and combat operations by ad-hoc coalitions since 9/11.

3.2 The international legal framework

International law consists of written and unwritten rules that govern relations between states and international organisations. The deployment of the military instrument outside national borders must have a legal basis in international law. The rule of thumb is that the Netherlands may not operate in another country without that country's consent. There are essentially two universal rules for this: the principle of sovereignty and the prohibition of force, as expressed in the UN Charter. After looking at these two rules, this chapter will discuss several other legal principles as well as the laws and jurisdiction that apply during military operations.

3.2.1 The sovereignty principle

According to this principle, the authority of a state does not depend on another, higher authority for actions within its own country. Under the non-intervention principle, as an extension of the sovereignty principle, no state may intervene in the internal or external affairs of another.

3.2.2 Prohibition of the use of force

Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter prohibits the use or the threat of military force in international relations. This stipulation is intended to prevent states from taking military action in the territory of or against another state, either on their own initiative or on the basis of national legislation.

3.2.3 The use of force and the right to self-defence

There are three generally accepted exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force. The first legal basis is the right of individual or collective self-defence, recognised in Article 51 of the UN Charter. The right to self-defence applies in the event of an (imminent) armed attack on a country by another state or by an organised armed group. Leading on from that, it is also the case that states may, under strict conditions, protect their citizens and, if necessary, evacuate them from another country with the help of military forces. One of the conditions that apply here is that the host nation is no longer willing or able to offer those citizens the necessary protection. The second legal basis is authorisation of the use of force by the UN Security Council on the basis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The third legal basis is an invitation from the host nation. This third legal basis focuses primarily – but not exclusively – on the stationing of troops and training, or preparing for operations as part of the collective self-defence of the country in question (for example, the enhanced Forward Presence in Lithuania).

There is also discussion about other exceptions to the prohibition of force, in particular about allowing humanitarian intervention. The Netherlands' position is that military intervention in a humanitarian emergency can be justified on moral and political grounds. This means that humanitarian intervention is permissible as a last resort in exceptional cases and under strict conditions. However, this is not to say that humanitarian intervention constitutes a legal basis. The consequence of the different legal bases is that the responsibilities and powers of military personnel can differ widely in each operation.

3.2.4 *Laws and jurisdiction*

The international law that governs whether a state may use force should be seen separately from the laws and jurisdiction that govern the actual use of force. The legal framework that applies in the case of deployment outside the Netherlands is different for each operation, and in some cases even for different areas or phases of the same operation. For example, counterdrug and counterpiracy operations (law enforcement) could thus also be subject to the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure. In all cases, the way in which the assigned tasks are performed and the authority exercised must be in accordance with the protective provisions of international humanitarian law.

3.2.5 *International humanitarian law*

International humanitarian law (IHL), *jus in bello*, as defined in the Geneva Conventions with the associated supplementary protocols, provides the framework in military operations. The purpose of IHL is to find a balance between military necessity (the reality of the use of force) and humanity (the prevention of unnecessary suffering). IHL grants powers and imposes restrictions to this effect. The powers consist mainly of the right of combatants to take part in hostilities, while the restrictions mainly encompass rules for the methods and means of warfare and rules which govern the protection of people and goods.

IHL only applies officially if there is a situation of 'armed conflict'.[16] Whether the situation is indeed one of armed conflict depends on actual events and not on declarations or political views of warring parties. Even if IHL does not apply formally, Dutch and NATO policy is to use IHL protective provisions as a safety margin for operations by the Dutch armed forces. This prevents any confusion that might arise in respect of the powers of an intervention force as a result of its changing status in a conflict area. This status can after all range from armed enforcement of peace or enforcement of the rule of law and stability to assistance in rebuilding and alleviation of human suffering.

16 There are two types of armed conflict, namely that between two or more states (international armed conflict), and that between one or more states and one or more organised armed groups, or between these groups themselves (non-international armed conflict).

3.2.6 *Human rights*

In principle, the provisions of human rights treaties apply during military operations. The most important human rights treaties are the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). These treaties have an extraterritorial effect. This means that they apply to military operations abroad insofar as jurisdiction is exercised within the scope of these treaties. Given the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, this will apply in most cases.

Human rights also apply in armed conflicts, subject to exceptions recognised under international law. The decision to derogate from human rights obligations can only be taken by the government. If in an armed conflict there are conflicting provisions between applicable rules from human rights treaties and IHL, the latter shall in principle prevail. This means that where IHL does not provide specific rules or such rules are not sufficiently clear, human rights will be leading.

3.3 The national legal framework

As well as being subject to international law, military deployment is also subject to national legislation. This legislation includes, for example, stipulations regarding the existence of the armed forces, defines the circumstances in which the armed forces can be deployed and sets rules for their deployment and actions.

3.3.1 *The Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands*

The Charter deals with the legal order in the Kingdom and distinguishes between the affairs of the Kingdom and those of its constituent countries: the Netherlands, Aruba, Curaçao and St. Maarten. With regard to the armed forces, the Charter stipulates that preservation of the independence and the defence of the Kingdom is a Kingdom responsibility (Article 3, paragraph 1.a). The Dutch armed forces perform this task for all countries of the Kingdom.

3.3.2 *The Constitution*

The existence, management and deployment of the armed forces are embedded in the Dutch Constitution, mainly in Articles 97 and 100.

Article 97

1. There shall be armed forces for the defence and protection of the interests of the Kingdom, and in order to maintain and promote the international legal order.
2. The Government shall have supreme authority over the armed forces.

Article 100

1. The government shall inform the States General in advance if the armed forces are to be deployed or made available to maintain or promote the international legal order. This shall include the provision of humanitarian aid in the event of armed conflict.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply if compelling reasons exist to prevent the provision of information in advance. In this event, information shall be supplied as soon as possible.

Paragraph 2 of Article 97 stipulates that supreme authority over the armed forces rests with the government: the primacy of politics. That also means that the government bears political responsibility in respect of parliament, and ultimately that the government does not relinquish that supreme authority, even when it makes troops available to international organisations.

Article 100 states that the government must inform parliament in advance of deployment or provision of military forces to maintain or promote the international legal order, unless the exception in paragraph 2 of the Article applies. In this event, paragraph 2 stipulates that parliament must be informed as quickly as possible after the start of deployment or the supply of troops. This duty of information does not apply to the defence task, which involves individual or collective self-defence as defined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Deployment for collective self-defence may occur on the basis of the international obligation to assist in Article 5 of the NATO treaty and Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union.

3.4 Main tasks

The main tasks of the armed forces were formulated in 1999. These main tasks are an elaboration of Article 97 of the Constitution, and three main tasks can be identified:

1. protection of national and allied territory, including the Caribbean parts of the Kingdom;
2. maintenance and promotion of the international legal order and stability;
3. support for civil authorities in national law enforcement, disaster relief and humanitarian aid, both nationally and internationally.

This list is not hierarchical: the tasks are equal and must be executable at all times. The likelihood that a certain task will need to be executed may vary considerably over time.

3.4.1 First main task

The general defence task manifests itself in various forms, such as the intensification of NATO deployment. Because it explicitly benefits the security of the population in NATO Member States, NATO forces are now deployed outside the treaty area as well. Allied military capabilities still, however, guarantee the territorial integrity of the Member States. The Defence organisation also remains responsible for the territorial integrity of the Kingdom's Caribbean countries (Aruba, Curaçao and St. Maarten) and the Dutch Caribbean (Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba).

3.4.2 Second main task

Maintenance and promotion of the international legal order and stability requires the execution of expeditionary, usually multinational, operations. Over the years, the accent of the missions has shifted from deployment under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, in which peacekeeping efforts are performed with the consent of the warring parties, to missions based on Chapter VII, in which force may be used if necessary for peace-enforcement. Those operations which aim to prevent or resolve intrastate conflicts also require robust action. These operations are characterised by an intense but relatively short intervention phase at the high end of the force spectrum, followed by a lengthy stabilisation phase. Long-term stabilisation operations are costly and carry high risks. It is for this reason, and because prevention is better than cure, that there is a growing preference for participation in preventive operations. A military presence, the support of diplomatic missions and the education and training of - and exercising with - other armed forces can also have a preventive effect. This second main task also includes deployment for international law enforcement, such as the protection of merchant shipping against piracy and the prevention of arms and drugs smuggling by sea. The deployment of the Dutch armed forces for the second main task occurs wherever possible in an allied or coalition context, ideally with countries which are members of the same security organisations as the Netherlands.

3.4.3 Third main task

The Netherlands armed forces have developed into a structural security partner within the Kingdom. With their highly specific and unique capacities, today's armed forces have a broader range of support capabilities. They serve on a regular basis as a partner in activities such as emergency response, search and rescue ?investigations, intelligence, security and enforcement of public order and the rule of law.

In principle, the whole of the armed forces is available for this third main task. However, this task includes a number of structural activities, such as explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), airspace control and deployment in the context of coastguard operations in the North Sea and the Caribbean. As part of civil-military cooperation, the availability of certain specialist capabilities (such as EOD and CBRN defence[17]) is guaranteed by the military. This availability is linked to response times. Military capabilities are deployed under the responsibility of the civil authorities.

The third main task also has an international component. The armed forces may also operate internationally as a security partner in the event of deployment for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Examples of such cases are the deployment of engineer auxiliary battalions in Iraq (1991) and Kosovo (1999), the humanitarian assistance operation in Albania (1999), the supply of transport equipment and military personnel after the severe earthquake in Haiti in 2010 and disaster relief after various hurricanes in the Caribbean, such as Irma (2017), which struck several islands including St. Maarten.

17 EOD capability: explosive ordnance disposal; CBRN capability: protection against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear effects.

3.5 Decision making for deployment

Article 97 of the Constitution stipulates that the government has supreme authority over the armed forces. Any decision to deploy the armed forces will, therefore, always be made by the government. The form of the decision to deploy and the way in which it is made depends on the reason for deployment. There is a distinction between decision making in respect of the armed forces' permanent tasks and decision making for incidental deployment. In the case of the latter, decision making for deployment within the Kingdom also differs from that outside it.

3.5.1 Decision making for structural deployment of the armed forces within the Kingdom

Deployment of the armed forces is regarded as permanent if military personnel are tasked with a recurring task without a specific end state. Such tasks are normally national and are performed in the Netherlands and in the Dutch Caribbean. Examples of this permanent deployment are territorial defence and the military presence in the Dutch Caribbean.

Decisions about this permanent military deployment are made at ministerial level and are set out in structural agreements between the Ministry of Defence and the other ministries or government departments involved. These arrangements are usually in the form of an order, a covenant or a user agreement, such as the Intensification of Civil-Military Cooperation covenant of 2006.

3.5.2 Decision making for incidental deployment of the armed forces within the Kingdom

Incidental deployment of the armed forces within the Kingdom is said to be the case when public institutions are assisted or supported by military forces. The method of decision making for this type of military deployment depends on the sort of assistance or support and the place where it is needed.

The following forms of military assistance or support exist within the Netherlands.

- **Military assistance under the Police Act**. Under this act, the armed forces may be asked to assist the police in the enforcement of public order and of criminal law. Deployment of special forces occurs after a consultative process agreed between the departments concerned.

- **Military assistance under the Security Regions Act**. In the event or serious threat of a disaster or a crisis, military assistance can be requested by the chairman of the Security Region.

- **Military support in the public interest**. If there is an urgent need for goods or services that could be provided by the defence organisation, a request may be submitted by an administrative body.

In the case of military assistance in the Caribbean region of the Kingdom, a distinction should be made between the Kingdom's Caribbean countries (Aruba, Curaçao and St. Maarten) and the Caribbean Netherlands (Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba – the BES islands).

- For Aruba, Curaçao and St. Maarten, the legal basis for the provision of military assistance is the Royal Decree on instructions pertaining to the deployment of the armed forces (1987). This decree enables the Governor of these countries to make sections of the armed forces available to the governments of Aruba, Curaçao or St. Maarten for the purpose of providing military assistance to maintain internal security and public order (also referred to as "hard assistance"), or in disasters, accidents and disruptions to traffic or communications (known as "soft assistance").

- As public bodies within the Netherlands, the BES islands fall under the Netherlands. Under the BES Security Act (2010), the Kingdom Representative, is authorised to request – at the behest of the public prosecutor – military assistance for criminal law enforcement or for the performance of tasks in the service of the Ministry of Justice. The Kingdom Representative is also authorised to request military assistance in the event or serious threat of a disaster or crisis. The Island Governor is authorised to submit a request for military assistance to uphold public order.

3.5.3 *Operating in exceptional circumstances in the Netherlands*

A situation could arise in the Netherlands in which the usual powers of the government are no longer sufficient to allow an appropriate response or action. If there is also a vital national interest at stake, the situation could be regarded as exceptional. In such a situation, the government may be able to use what are described as special powers, which are also created in a way that deviates from the usual legislation[18]. These powers are extremely far-reaching, and are covered by emergency powers legislation. Examples of these special powers are area clearance/evacuation and the requisition of goods and services from civilians and other government authorities.

3.5.4 *Decision making for deployment of intelligence and security services*

The activities of the two intelligence and security services (the General Intelligence and Security Service and the Defence Intelligence and Security Service) are governed by the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2017 (Wiv 2017). The Wiv 2017 provides an exhaustive set of regulations for the collection and processing of information by both services, with regard to both personal and other data.

18 See the Military Authorities Designation Regulations (*Regeling Aanwijzing Militaire Gezagsdragers (RAMG)*) and the provisions from the Emergency Legislation.

3.5.5 *Decision making for deployment of the armed forces outside the Kingdom*

The decision to deploy the armed forces and to use military force if necessary falls under the primacy of the political leadership. Decision making on how and for what purpose the armed forces are deployed is linked to the political goal and national and international law. As part of the comprehensive approach, military deployment must be coordinated with the other instruments used by the government. The strategic objectives of a military operation are established at ministerial level and in close cooperation with the military leadership. Although a number of ministries could be involved in the decision making under the comprehensive approach, it is mainly the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Development Cooperation and Defence who play key roles in the decision making in respect of military deployment outside the Kingdom. In NATO operations, the North Atlantic Council will decide on the deployment of NATO forces, while the Netherlands government will make the decision on the possible military contribution from the Dutch side. The Netherlands government will also make a similar decision in respect of requests for participation in a military operation that come from authorities within the EU (Political and Security Committee), the OSCE or the UN. There are situations in which (sub-)operations are then executed under national command, such as special operations and elements of counterpiracy operations.

Under Article 100 of the Constitution, the government will inform parliament in writing in advance of any decision to participate in an international operation as part of the second main task and the conditions associated with that participation. The same applies to operations in which there are overlapping objectives from the first and second main tasks. Operations that are exclusively concerned with the defence task do not fall under Article 100 of the Constitution. Three instruments are particularly important in the decision making:

- the threat analysis by the Defence Intelligence and Security Service;
- for operations falling under Article 100 of the Constitution: the *Toetsingskader*, with points that need particular attention to ensure a well-considered decision to deploy. This includes such matters as political aspects, the mandate, other participating nations, feasibility and security risks;
- the CHOD's operational planning process.

Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 100 of the Constitution, the government may decide to inform parliament in camera, or not in advance but soon as possible after deployment. This applies, for instance, in the case of special operations, which are distinguished by a high level of political or military risk, unconventional operational and tactical techniques, special circumstances and methods of deployment, and they contribute to objectives or effects at operational or strategic level. Special operations are usually conducted by

personnel specially selected and trained for that purpose and are characterised by a high degree of complexity and secrecy. These special operations are subject to the same instruments for decision making used for other international operations, the difference being that they are discussed in a separate consultative forum.

Units of the armed forces may also find themselves outside Dutch territory but not involved in an official deployment as defined above. This could happen, for example, in situations where military forces are training and thus contributing to a country's security sector development. In many cases, the interests are more of an economic or diplomatic nature, for example a military presence in support of a trade mission or to support diplomatic negotiations. Decisions about this type of military contribution outside the Kingdom are made by the CHOD in close consultation with the other ministries and Services involved.

At an early stage of the preparatory process for military deployment outside the Kingdom, a decision needs to be made as to whether a civil assessment is necessary. This is an assessment of the situation in a conflict area, in which an analysis is made of such aspects as the causes of the conflict, the civil institutions, infrastructure, activities and attitudes of civil authorities and other leaders, the local population, etc. This analysis leads to conclusions about the need for the use of non-military instruments of power and civil capacities. Ideally, this assessment will be performed multinationally. If a civil assessment is required, it is important for effective military deployment that the results are available early in the process and, for the benefit of a comprehensive approach, before the decision making starts.

3.6 Rules of Engagement

Once there is a legal basis for an international military action, a clear mission, an intent and the rules of engagement (ROE) will need to be drawn up for the military units about to be deployed. ROE are rules for the commanders of a military operation that contain the official parameters in respect of the nature of and methods for the use of force.

ROE for Dutch forces, including any caveats to international agreements, are set by the CHOD. ROE are not a means of assigning specific tasks. Commanders may curtail the relevant ROE for subordinate commanders at any time, but they cannot take it upon themselves to expand them. ROE must at all times remain within the parameters of the applicable legislation, including IHL.

Because the state has the monopoly of the use of force, the legitimacy of the use of force must be evaluable; the ROE are instrumental here. ROE never restrict the right to (collective) self-defence. In a multinational deployment, ROE are established within the relevant alliance or union, or - in the case of an operation by a coalition of states - in consultation with the states participating in the coalition. On the basis of national policy or national law, a country may deviate from the agreed ROE and issue these deviations to the deployed forces as supplementary instructions. Such deviations may never result in broader powers than those contained in the ROE. In practice, the restrictions to the ROE are designated as caveats and must be communicated to the force commander. When planning the missions for his forces, the force commander must ensure that no missions are assigned that fall outside the ROE or outside the caveats that apply to those units. The Dutch senior national representative acts on behalf of the CHOD in monitoring the mandate, the application of the ROE and the observance of caveats in deployment of Dutch forces. As the red card holder, he can intervene if necessary. The most relevant ROE are summarised for individual service personnel in an 'instruction card for the use of force' and in some cases for officers and NCOs in an aide-mémoire.

3.7 Direction during deployment

With the exception of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee in the execution of its (police) tasks under the Police Act, deployed military units are always under the command authority of the CHOD (full command)[19], regardless of whether these units are deployed within or outside the Kingdom's borders. There is, however, a difference in direction of forces between deployment within the Kingdom (under the third main task) on the one hand, and, on the other, deployment outside the Kingdom (regardless of the main task). Both situations are explained here.

19 *Full command: the military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national Services. The term 'command', as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. No NATO or coalition commander has full command over the forces assigned to him. (AJP-3(C) V1 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations, Feb 2019).*

3.7.1 *Direction of forces in the event of military assistance and support within the Kingdom*

Once a decision has been taken to deploy the armed forces under the third main task, units are placed under civil command authority.[20] The decision to deploy may be accompanied by conditions, restrictions and instructions for the deployment of the units or specific (weapon) systems or the interpretation of rules. These units remain under the command of the CHOD. The CHOD will provide a military advisor to support the civil authorities in the planning and execution.

All military operations are in principle directed by the CHOD, with the exception of (police tasks) assigned to the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee under the Police Act; these are conducted under the responsibility of the competent authority, as set out in the Police Act.

3.7.2 *Direction of forces in the event of deployment of the armed forces outside the Kingdom*

Once the government has made the decision to participate in a mission, the CHOD will set out in an 'operations directive' the national guidelines, missions, tasks and responsibilities, as well as the arrangements that have been made for the transfer of authority (TOA)[21] to the multinational force commander.

The TOA is confined to the operational part of the mission. The Dutch government retains ultimate control (the supreme command referred to in the Constitution) and the CHOD has full command. The decision for Dutch troops to participate in an operation may be accompanied by national caveats for the deployment of Dutch units or specific (weapon) systems, or for the interpretation of the rules. One should be aware, however, that national caveats do restrict the multinational force commander's freedom of action. The CHOD will ensure that this commander is mindful of the stated caveats. Even after the TOA, he will retain full responsibility for the deployed units of the Services and is responsible for directing them. The CHOD will also direct the units of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee in missions abroad for non-police tasks.

20 Authority over deployment of the armed forces, or units thereof, as part of the third main task means the administrative power to instruct their deployment for the purpose of conducting whatever mission the administrator deems desirable or necessary. This authority is accompanied by the administrative responsibility and thus also carries the duty of accountability for the decisions taken and the instructed deployment of military units and equipment. Command relationships determine the powers that commanders have to issue missions or orders to their subordinate commanders or units to execute the mission assigned by the competent authority.

21 The transfer of authority (TOA) is the handover or return of operational authority from one commander to another. It may be a phased process. TOA takes place, for example, when a national contingent is placed under the commander of a multinational force commander and again when that attachment ends.

4 Fighting power

4.1 Introduction

The overall capability supplied by the armed forces to perform the main tasks assigned to them is known as fighting power. This fighting power comprises not only personnel and equipment, but also less visible factors such as willingness, cohesion, leadership, doctrine, power of renewal, and so on. Being able to apply doctrine requires insight into all of these factors.

Fighting power is expressed in a model (see Figure 4.1) which consists of a mental, physical and conceptual component. This chapter describes the model, discussing it in relation to the operating environment, as well as the development and application of fighting power. Both the environment and the application of fighting power make demands on the effectiveness and efficiency of the fighting power developed. This means that the fighting power must be brought up to a certain level before it can be applied.

Fighting power in a historical context

The term 'fighting power', consisting of a conceptual, a physical and a mental component, was developed as a concept in doctrine in the 1990s. These three aspects were in themselves not new to the exercise of military power, but their manifestations and correlations did change in the course of time.

From the middle of the 19th century, the development of weapons technology was constant. With the advent of automatic weapons, rapid-fire artillery, smokeless ammunition, armoured (steam)ships, railways, aircraft and tanks or 'battle wagons', the effectiveness, mobility and striking power of the armed forces grew. The growing control that governments had on society also meant that more and more people and equipment could be mobilised. Roughly there were three phases: 1) increased firepower (19th century), 2) increased mobility (first half of the 20th century) and 3) increased command and control capabilities and computerisation (late 20th century).

The introduction of conscript armies brought with it a need to develop a centrally formulated operating method. In the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, countries developed their own doctrine, based on their own wartime experience and also particularly on the opinions of society. The philosophies of traditional military thinkers such as Jomini and Von Clausewitz (land operations), Mahan and Corbett (maritime operations) and Douhet and Mitchell (air operations) still influence the conceptual thinking of today's armed forces.

The mental component traditionally plays an important role in determining fighting power. In the 19th century, the main emphasis was on physical and mental capabilities, on self-sacrifice and on the ability to withstand heavy losses without losing the will to fight (and to win). Over the course of the 20th century, the emphasis shifted away from physical sacrifice and more attention was focused on matters such as motivation, team spirit, training, justification and social acceptance and support.

Until after the First World War, military theorists regarded the mental component as the deciding factor. The country with the greatest resilience would ultimately win the war. Based on experiences from 1914-1918, the emphasis shifted to the conceptual and the physical element. The Second World War showed that it was indeed the physical component that ultimately decided the outcome. After the Cold War, emphasis once again shifted more towards the conceptual component. In the "new world order" armed forces had to cope with a variety of threats and challenges, and had to perform a wide diversity of tasks, such as pacification and stabilisation, military rule, peacekeeping and counterinsurgency. Doctrines and lessons learned that were once formulated for that purpose were once again being studied and practised.

Military operations traditionally distinguished between tactics and strategy. Tactics encompassed the activities on the battlefield; strategy included all other matters, such as the way in which battles had to be prepared and set up (the campaign). In the 19th century, modern warfare increased in scale and complexity as a result of technological developments and improved national organisation. The strategic level was increasingly the point at which the measures and objectives in preparation for war took shape. In this way, room was created for an "operational level" in military deployment. After the First World War, the Russian and German armed forces were the first to give this level a place in their military activities and doctrine.

After the Second World War, the following five levels of warfare were eventually identified, defined and institutionalised: the political-strategic, the military-strategic, the operational, the tactical and the technical level. Until the end of the Cold War, the overlap between the levels was limited, although there were differences per Service. In the context of the NATO defence task, the levels within the land forces were largely linked to the size of units. The military-strategic level was the domain of the theatre commander, known in today's terminology as the commander of the combined joint task force. Army groups and armies were active at operational level and army corps (including the Dutch) at tactical level.

For the naval and air forces, it was the tasking that determined the level of operating rather than the size of the units. The Royal Netherlands Navy, for example, focused on anti-submarine warfare in the North Atlantic Ocean. The purpose of this task was to protect the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that were crucial to NATO in military-strategic terms. Because of the advance technological level of their anti-submarine warfare capabilities, certain navy units were assigned the strategic task of tracking Soviet SSBNs (nuclear-powered submarines equipped with ballistic missiles) and destroying them in the event of war.

The Royal Netherlands Air Force, on the other hand, was mainly a tactical air force. Its squadrons of air defence fighters aimed to achieve (local) air superiority by intercepting enemy aircraft. Its squadrons of fighter-bombers were designed for (offensive) tasks such as the elimination of enemy airfields and radar stations, interdiction behind the front line, air support to land forces and tactical (photo) reconnaissance. Both clusters operated with other NATO air forces in an integrated (combined) chain of command.

After the Cold War, with the modular participation in peace missions and international interventions, the ever-decreasing size of deployed units and the increased possibilities for command and control (a result of the increasing quality of sensors and faster communication as a result of digitisation) caused the real-time interaction and overlap between the levels of warfare to increase. As a result, the traditional demarcation between the levels became less clear-cut, and 'networked' operating methods developed. At the same time, the digitisation of society and the armed forces brought about a new operating domain: cyberspace. This domain also featured task-specific levels of warfare, from tactical to strategic, and a high degree of overlapping.

The forms of "unlimited", "whole of society" or "hybrid" warfare (mixtures of regular and irregular operations, both open and covert, also in the cyberspace domain, targeting all segments of an enemy society) that were developed by China and Russia in particular after the end of the Cold War were also characterised by a high degree of mixing between the operating levels. With limited means, small numbers of personnel and at long range, this method of postmodern, multi-domain warfare made it possible to achieve major effects, without necessarily using kinetic weapon systems. The overlapping of the levels of warfare thus increased even further.

4.2 The components of fighting power

Fighting power is the ability to conduct military operations in an optimum cohesive totality of functionalities and components. It is more than just the availability of means (capacities); there must also be the willingness and ability to deploy these means (capability). If this is properly developed, it then becomes fighting power, and capacities are elevated to capabilities. The components cannot be seen in isolation; they all affect one another. Sophisticated equipment is thus useless without highly motivated and well-trained personnel and without a well-considered, doctrine-based deployment method.



Figure 4-1: The components of fighting power

4.2.1 The mental component

Warfare is an activity conducted by people. The willingness to engage in combat when necessary plays a key role in that activity. The mental component of military operations is thus a combination of four interrelated factors: motivation, leadership, responsible organisation of the deployment of available personnel and materiel, and perception. The mental component is extremely important, for the very reason that military personnel usually operate in conditions that not only call for great mental resilience, but which are also highly demanding in terms of conduct and attitude in a mission area. Such requirements could include cultural awareness, empathy and an open attitude, as well as the need

to demonstrate appropriate initiative, creativity, and the mental attitude to exercise restraint in the use of force.

4.2.1.1 Motivation

Motivation is the result of training, confidence in the equipment, effective leadership and management, strong discipline, self-respect, mutual respect and a good understanding of what is going on. In practice, motivation is closely linked to high morale. Motivation can be influenced by external factors, such as public opinion. An individual's belief that there is public support for deployment in a conflict, the objective and execution of the mission are seen as legitimate and the necessary materiel is seen to be available to support the military activities will contribute substantially to his or her willingness to fight. The media play a key role in this respect.

4.2.1.2 Leadership

The commander is the embodiment of – effective – leadership. That gives commanders at all levels an important role in the mental component. He is also responsible for the training prior to the mission. During the mission, it is the commander who, as leader, ensures the execution of tasks through action, motivation, inspiration and the power to instil in his personnel the will to "go for it". On deployment, the commander is the face of the unit. His actions will shape the image held by all the other members of the unit. He is responsible for the actions of all individual military personnel under his command.

4.2.1.3 Organising the deployment responsibly

The way in which a commander organises the deployment of his assets will influence the mental component. By doing this responsibly, he will ensure that his personnel trust in their own abilities and in the organisation, and he will create a support base for the operation. Responsible organisation of deployment means, amongst other things, that sufficient assets (personnel, materiel and funds) are available for the successful execution of an operation. A support base is also necessary, among military personnel as well as the general population. Thorough preparation, also in education and training, and good planning are organisational preconditions for success. One important means of responsible organisation is the use of risk management. Commanders should ensure a sound balance between set objectives and the risks involved in activities necessary to achieve those objectives. That means that risks need to be identified, assessed and dealt with. This helps to ensure a safe working environment for man and machine and the responsible pursuit of the set objectives. Account should also be taken of the effect that deployment in a mission area, constant exposure to danger, often in difficult conditions and far from home, will have on individual military personnel.

4.2.1.4 Perception

Perception is the subjective observation of an objective reality. Perception is shaped by the view of the world and mindset that determine the specific way an actor observes, interprets and anticipates reality. Perception, as a core element of the cognitive dimension, is therefore a filter through which an actor sees the world. This filter is based on cultural, societal and religious aspects.

Influencing an actor's view of the world will change his perception so that he will interpret a threat, challenge, or even his own weakness, in a different way and will also prepare for it differently. How an actor should be influenced depends on the goal to be achieved and on the actor, who could be a friend, an enemy or a neutral party. An actor's world view can be influenced indirectly using physical means, but also directly in the information environment, for example through misleading reports or fake news, possibly as part of a strategic communication campaign.

The objective of influencing the cognitive dimension is to bring about a change in an actor's will and behaviour.

4.2.1.5 Military work is done by people

Military deployment can only be effective if personnel are sufficiently motivated, trained and educated. Despite advances in unmanned technology and developments in robotics, the human factor remains key. The physical presence of military personnel is still necessary, as this is the only way to establish contact with the local population. That personal contact is essential in gaining a good understanding of needs, expectations, intentions and local conditions. Support among the local population can only be established through a physical presence: military personnel are thus relevant for more than just fighting. Furthermore, it is only people who can respond quickly to changing circumstances, read emotions and act in the spirit of the commander.

4.2.2 The physical component

The people and means of an armed force form the physical component of fighting power; these are the personnel and materiel that are organised for deployment in an operation. The terms 'combat readiness' and 'mission readiness' are used for the planning, preparation and deployment. The way in which the armed forces are deployed determines the right composition, size and quality of the physical component. Deployment options form the basis for requirements and instruction and training programmes.

4.2.2.1 People

With the materiel supplied, deployed personnel must be able to conduct all military activities they have been ordered to conduct, in any conditions. Recruitment and selection is designed to appoint personnel in the right numbers and of the right quality to meet this requirement. Personnel undergo special instruction and training which focus on specific elements derived from the deployment choices. This means that in each phase of instruction and training, there must be attention for motivation, physical fitness and mental toughness (see the mental component), for knowledge of possible deployment choices, for knowledge of tactics and techniques (skills & drills), for basic skills (including physical training, physical toughness) and for specialist, function-specific skills. When units or individuals are assigned to a specific mission, they might need supplementary training specifically tailored to the requirements of that mission.

To ensure that personnel remain available and deployable, consideration needs to be given to sustainability, motivation and mental health. More and more attention is, for example, being focused on possibilities for computerised and unmanned systems to take over tasks currently performed by people.

4.2.2.2 Materiel

The armed forces have a wide range of materiel at their disposal: weapon systems, vehicles, aircraft and ships, as well as associated systems such as communications equipment, optronics, fuels, ammunition, food and personal equipment. These assets must be purchased, deployed, maintained, and eventually divested. Much of this materiel has a specifically military character and is therefore often unique; for that reason, the armed forces have their own organisational elements responsible for these tasks. Materiel under maintenance is not available for preparation or deployment. The armed forces therefore normally possess several units of a particular materiel capacity. This materiel can be used alternately in an ongoing cycle of readiness, deployment and maintenance, thus creating sustainability. To prevent loss of capability during deployment, redundancy is often built in: anticipation of losses in numbers, extra protection of critical assets and/or duplication of critical systems such as propulsion, energy supply, computers and defence equipment. In addition, logistic support is essential in realising and sustaining the operational use of materiel: the assured supply of, for example, fuel, spare parts, ammunition, food and medical supplies to the training or deployment area is often critical to the success of a military operation.

4.2.2.3 Standardisation/interoperability

Standardisation is crucial for multinational forces to be able to operate efficiently and effectively. Standardisation of assets results in particular in improved efficiency, whereas interoperability and uniformity of procedures and tactics mainly benefit effectiveness.

Standardisation can be achieved at three levels: compatibility, interchangeability and interoperability. Compatibility is the suitability of devices, systems, processes or services for use together under specific conditions without causing unacceptable interactions or side-effects. Interchangeability is the ability of one device, system, process or service to be used in place of another to achieve the same goal. Interoperability is the ability to operate with other units or organisations coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve one's own or shared tactical, operational and/or strategic objectives.

Standardisation is the imposition of a particular norm or standard on the design, construction, testing and/or use of a product or on the application of a process. In striving for a certain level of standardisation in the military organisation, the aim is to achieve uniformity in operational procedures and means.

After it had been set up, NATO recognised the importance of interoperability and the standardisation required to achieve it. In NATO, standardisation is defined as "the development and implementation of concepts, doctrines, procedures and designs in order to achieve and maintain the compatibility, interchangeability or commonality which are necessary to attain the required level of interoperability".

For that reason, in 1951 the Military Agency for Standardization was established, the aim of which was to supervise the standardisation of war materiel and operational and administrative procedures. In the decades that followed, NATO member states agreed on a great number of standardization agreements (STANAGs) covering a multitude of subjects, such as operational and tactical doctrine and procedures, technical specifications and training requirements. In 2001, the Military Agency for Standardization was merged into a new organisation called NATO Standardization Office (NSO).

The Netherlands supports this standardisation and is adapting its own standards (work methods and procedures, tactical and technical standards and coding) to bring them as far as possible into line with those of NATO. This is helping to achieve the greatest possible interoperability with allies. A simple example is the use of the English language as standard. This means that concepts, doctrines and procedures are no longer translated into Dutch for use in a Dutch environment.

4.2.3 The conceptual component

The conceptual component provides the coherent, intellectual basis and theoretical foundation for the deployment of military forces. It is relevant for all levels of warfare; at the strategic level, it provides the intellectual background for effective decision making on the political-military dividing line. The conceptual component also plays a significant role in the preservation and development of the institutional memory and experience. To do so, it brings together historical experiences, developments in operational practice (through lessons learned, analyses and experiments) and an ongoing study of the strategic environment.

The main function of the conceptual component is to provide a conceptual framework with which military leaders can acquire an understanding of their profession and of the activities they are expected to deploy, both now and in the future. The conceptual component supplies the commander with the necessary understanding of the context in which he is operating, and is the basis for creativity, ingenuity and initiative in complex situations. The successful execution of military operations requires intellectually precise and clearly formulated opinions that are based on experience. The intellectual activity needed to arrive at clear views is known as military thinking, and it is this intellectual process that leads to concepts for strategic, operational and tactical practice. This scientific process is fed by military history, by recent experiences in conflicts and exercises, and by innovative ideas. The concepts generated by this process are a response to challenges in military operations. These operational concepts can form the basis of doctrine. Skill in applying doctrine can only be acquired by studying and getting to grips with the conceptual component in its broadest sense.

4.2.3.1 Innovation

The conceptual component is constantly being developed through conceptual innovation, whereby consideration is given to what changes could occur because of a changing environment, new technologies and challenges, because of a new environment or activities, methods and processes, or because existing solutions no longer work. Conceptual innovation must, along with new capabilities and new methods of operation, result in the continued effectiveness and thus continued relevance of fighting power. This innovation is brought about through scientific debate about military operations, by research and development and by an institutionalised process in which lessons learned are interpreted, evaluated and implemented.

Innovation can take place within organisations and also in a broader context. The process of innovation comprises the whole of human activity aimed at renewal. Innovation is more than just a technical upgrade or modernisation. Innovation can also occur in, for example, command and control, management or policy. The impact of a new way of using an existing work method or procedure for the introduction of a new weapons system, for example, could be as great as that of the new system itself with its much-enhanced effectiveness.

Innovation is wider in scope than just the conceptual component of fighting power and it also affects the physical component in particular. In the ever-ongoing arms race, innovation is crucial to the armed forces. In the past, many inventions originated in the military sphere (telegraph, radar, internet, etc.) but nowadays the military mainly follows innovations in the civil sector. Innovation in the management of the armed forces is also based on knowledge from the civil sector and is financially driven. As a result, its impact on the military organisation is ever more explicitly felt.

4.3 Fighting power in the operating environment

Fighting power must be adapted to the operating environment in order to be effective. Historically, this adaptation could be seen in the development of specialised Services: naval, land and air forces. Besides these specialised Services, today's complexity of this environment requires a more holistic approach to achieve the necessary adaptation.

The operating environment influences the deployment of fighting power and the decision making of a commander. A good understanding of this environment is essential for fighting power to be applied in the most efficient and effective manner. Models are used to gain an understanding of the complex operating environment. Models provide conceptual support but only give a simplified picture of reality. For the modelling of the military operating environment, domains and dimensions are used. The models serve as potential conceptual frameworks in the planning of military operations.



Figure 4-2: Domains in the operating environment

4.3.1 The domain model

Domain-based thinking is used to organise fighting power for activities in recognised domains. The various domains each have their own characteristics that determine how armed forces are organised and put to use.

Domain-based thinking is instrumental in organising fighting power for a specific domain but can lead to a 'single-domain' approach; in other words, an excessive focus on individual domains. The domains should be viewed as an interconnected whole: all domains are dependent on one another. Eliminating or damaging a transmitter mast in the land domain may, for example, lead to communication problems in the air, at sea or in space, or may restrict access to cyberspace. Besides this interdependence, synchronised military activities in different domains may enhance each other. For example, a target may be identified by special operations forces on land, and the relevant information transmitted via satellite. That target may be eliminated by warplanes, supported by radar images from a frigate, while the enemy air defence is neutralised by a military cyberspace operation. By acting in several domains, goals can be achieved in a more effective or efficient way than through a single domain. This supports the case for a multi-domain approach to military operations.

Although the electromagnetic and acoustic spectrums make up an environment formed by physical laws, they do not actually constitute a domain. Both spectrums are strongly interconnected with the five recognised domains. The ability to use these spectrums – within the laws of physics – is crucial to the ability to conduct activities effectively in those domains.

Most militaries are divided into three Services, designed for the maritime, land and air domains. Although this structure is a historical one, even today each domain has its own characteristic qualities that translate into differences in culture and types of personnel, materiel, tactics and techniques. The Dutch armed forces are also set up for the three domains: sea, land and air. Naval, land and air forces all have their specific capabilities and their own input in operations. In addition, all the Services have an input in the cyberspace domain, the electromagnetic spectrum and the acoustic spectrum and they make use of the space domain. When bringing these capabilities to bear, the effects of the Services are not limited to their own natural environment (land, sea, air, space), as many effects transcend the domain to a greater or lesser extent. The underlying philosophy is that the Services support and complement each other, thereby achieving a synergetic effect, in what are better known as joint operations.

4.3.1.1 Characteristics of the maritime domain

The world's oceans and seas connect countries through an interdependent network of economic, financial, social and political relationships. It is a fact that most of the earth is covered with water, most of the world's population live close to the coast, and most of international trade is carried by sea, through a few vulnerable canals and international straits. The maritime environment includes trade routes, chokepoints, ports, and other infrastructure important to people, such as pipelines, wind farms, platforms for the production of oil and natural gas, and overseas telecommunication cables. Moreover, the sea is exploited for its economic resources, whether on the high seas, in exclusive economic zones (EEZs) or in territorial waters. In short, the sea provides strategic access.

The maritime domain varies from the high seas to the more confined and often shallower waters of littoral regions, estuaries and the air and water columns above and below them. Most human maritime activities – shipping, fishing, oil exploitation, and so on – are currently carried out in EEZs where warships and submarines have free access to conduct exercises and routine operations. This means that a significant part of the world's economic and political activities are carried out in a narrow strip of land and sea. The more confined the maritime environment becomes, the greater the chance that it will be a disputed, congested, confused and restricted space.

Over the course of history, various agreements have been made to regulate the use of the sea and to resolve claims of countries and users. Many of these agreements affect maritime operations. The most important international rules are laid down in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and supplemented, where appropriate, by national legislation.

Naval forces, consisting of task forces, amphibious manoeuvre units and maritime special operations forces, are mobile and deployable worldwide, under widely varying climatic and geographical conditions, across the entire spectrum of conflict. They are characterised by access, mobility, lift capacity, posture, sustained reach, resilience, leverage, versatility and availability.

4.3.1.2 Characteristics of the land domain

The source of human existence lies in the land domain. Conflicts are ultimately decided on land because that is where the continued existence and well-being of a nation, a population, a group, an ideology, etc, can be ensured. There is by definition, therefore, always a land dimension inherent in a conflict. Hostile land forces, both regular and irregular, operate in this domain.

The land domain is characterised as the 'home base' of the actors in the international arena. It is in this domain that direct interaction occurs with the actors in a conflict. It is divided into territories, separated by national borders. Natural features such as mountain ranges and rivers often form natural boundaries between territories and population groups. On the other hand, borders are sometimes established without taking any account of population groups, which can be a cause of conflict. The land domain contains many different kinds of terrain (mountains, deserts, jungle, cities, polders, open plains), each of which affect capabilities of certain types of military operation. As well as being subject to international law, as is the case in the other domains, the conduct of activities in the land domain is largely regulated by national legislation.

Land forces are set up to conduct operations in the land domain, adapted to geographical and climatic conditions where necessary. Land forces are characterised by a multitude of small weapon systems, from the individual serviceman to advanced combat vehicles, equipped with their own sensors and communication capabilities and usually operating in larger units (battalions/brigades/divisions). Provided they are supported by good logistics, land forces are able to operate in the area of operations non-stop and for prolonged periods. Large-scale movements and deployment of a multitude of weapons systems and the associated logistics require coordination and preparation time.

4.3.1.3 Characteristics of the air domain

The air domain spans the entire globe and provides access to any point on earth, with little or no hindrance from geographical restrictions. It thus makes it possible to rapidly observe and influence events in other domains anywhere in the world.
It has characteristics similar to the other two domains: above land, the airspace is divided into 'territories' (national airspace). Above the open sea, the airspace is also a public domain in which freedom of navigation applies. International rules of use are laid down in the Convention on International Civil Aviation, also known as the Chicago Convention. These international rules are supplemented by national legislation for national airspaces.

Operations in the air domain – also referred to as airpower – have a considerable impact on the 'underlying' domains (maritime and land). The characteristics of airpower (altitude, speed and range) enable optimal use to be made of time and space factors and allow the rapid concentration of means. The main constraints of airpower are scarcity because of limited assets, reliance on infrastructure and transience because of limited flight duration.

Air forces are set up to conduct activities in, through and from the air domain. They are fast, flexible and deployable worldwide, across the entire spectrum of conflict and under widely varying conditions. In addition, air forces have a strong focus on technology and require a highly specialised organisation with specialist personnel and high-quality materiel.

4.3.1.4 Characteristics of the space domain

The space domain is physically located above the air domain (above the Kármán line, 100km above sea level, the internationally recognised boundary between the earth's atmosphere and outer space). Because it is even further above the earth's obstacles than the air domain, the space domain in a sense has the same characteristics as airpower. Airpower and space power are therefore closely related.

However, there are also differences. Because of the very different physical environments, such as vacuum versus atmosphere, the characteristics of altitude, speed and range are of a different order of magnitude. Account also needs to be taken of the natural threat of rogue asteroids and the effects of space weather, such as electromagnetic radiation as a result of solar activities, which can adversely affect communication and navigation equipment. Unlike the air domain, the whole of the space domain is 'public domain' which can be freely used by anyone. Because of that, it is, for example, possible to gather information without violating a state's sovereignty in the process. However, its use is subject to international legislation, the most important of which is the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies ("the Outer Space Treaty").

As described in Chapter 2 under 'Trends', the use of space-based objects has become a staple of today's society. These means are used for such purposes as satellite communications for fast, broadband communication applications, for precision navigation that regulates traffic flows efficiently and accurately, for accurate timing that facilitates global financial transactions and for remote sensing, with which all sorts of geospatial information can be collected, analysed and distributed for both military and civil purposes.

The protection of the freedom to use outer space is, therefore, strategically important. Free access to space-based means is also equally important for military operations. These assets have become an integral part of both the planning and the execution of military operations. An inability to use space-based assets will impact on the effectiveness of many military systems, such as precision weapons, unmanned aerial vehicles, Blue Force Tracking,[22] early warning of incoming ballistic missiles, and on the ability to share collected information and intelligence. The modern military mission will thus become virtually impossible. For the Defence organisation, therefore, it is of the utmost importance to remain abreast of what is happening in space. This is an element of space situational awareness.

4.3.1.5 Characteristics of the cyberspace domain

The cyberspace domain is different from the others in that it is entirely man-made. Cyberspace consists of physical and non-physical elements. Cyberspace is dependent on the physical network infrastructure on land (e.g., transmitter masts, routers, data centres), at sea (e.g., subsea communication cables), in the air or in space (e.g., communication satellites). Communication via the physical network infrastructure is enabled by software (such as applications, operating systems, mobile apps, social media platforms, protocols, etc.). Via the hardware, which is situated in a physical location, and the software, systems and users create data, networks and virtual identities (social media profiles, telephone numbers, email addresses).

The cyberspace domain has no defined geographical boundaries and it extends in virtual terms beyond the physical boundaries of the other domains. However, geographical boundaries are important in a legal sense and where national responsibilities are concerned. Cyberspace can be accessed from all the other domains, and all these can themselves be accessed from cyberspace. In terms of sovereignty, however, there are geographical boundaries with associated national responsibilities. Relevant legislation is continuously being developed in order to regulate activities within cyberspace.

22 Blue Force Tracking is a digital system that shows the locations of all friendly troops, for the prevention of, for example, blue-on-blue incidents (fratricide, friendly fire)

The cyberspace domain is constantly evolving and can be used by almost any individual for practically any purpose. Cyberspace is different from the other domains in that it is preserved by physical, artificial components. This makes it possible, in contrast to the other domains, to manage risks and vulnerabilities by manipulating the domain.

4.3.1.6 Characteristics of the electromagnetic spectrum

The electromagnetic spectrum concerns the use of electromagnetic signals including light. Electromagnetic signals are especially useful in air and in space: their range under ground, in buildings or under water is usually very limited. Electromagnetic signals are used to obtain and distribute information (radio, radar, listening devices). Similarly, the electromagnetic spectrum can also be used to deny information or for deception, for example by jamming links and sensors, by generating false radar echoes, or by sending falsified data through links (spoofing). The electromagnetic spectrum can also be used to create physical effects, for example with a directed energy weapon such as high-energy laser.

4.3.1.7 Characteristics of the acoustic spectrum

The acoustic spectrum concerns the use of sound. Sound can be used in air, but its main military application is under water. Acoustic sensors (sonar) are the most important source for collecting information on underwater objects such as submarines and sea mines. Acoustic sensors in the air (microphones) are used for determining the position of enemy artillery.

Sound can be used to create both physical and cognitive effects. The physical effect of sound involves overloading or damaging the human ear, both in the air and under water (for example, anti-sabotage charges against divers). The cognitive effect of sound under water involves the jamming or deception of sonar equipment, for example with the use of air bubbles. The cognitive effect of using sound in the air mainly involves creating fear and confusion, for example by flying a warplane over an object at low altitude and high speed and with a great deal of noise (show of force).

4.3.2 The dimension model

The dimension model is an approach used to identify non-domain-related potential effects and dependencies of military activities in the operating environment. In that respect, it offers a comprehensive approach to achieving objectives while avoiding the trap of a single-domain approach.

This dimension model constitutes a framework that provides an understanding of the aim and consequences of military activities and it is therefore a determining factor in the development of effective fighting power. The framework is formed by three dimensions: physical, virtual and cognitive. In the physical dimension, physical effects are achieved, while in the virtual dimension, intangible effects are achieved. The effects achieved in these two dimensions primarily target behaviour and the alteration thereof. In the cognitive dimension, perceptions are shaped and decisions are taken, and this dimension is therefore focused on the decision making and the influencing thereof. All dimensions are correlated and influence each other.



Figure 4-3: The dimension model

The dimension model can be expanded by adding layers (environments) and entities. These layers form the context of military activities, and it is the entities within these layers that can be engaged by means of activities and/or operations. The physical dimension encompasses the geographical and physical layers and the entities constituted by geographical locations, physical objects and physical persons. The virtual dimension encompasses the layers and entities constituted by virtual objects and persons. The cognitive dimension encompasses the social and cognitive layers containing the entities constituted by psyche (will, perception, behaviour) and target groups.

4.3.2.1 Characteristics of the cognitive dimension

The cognitive dimension constitutes the environment within which social and psychological effects can be achieved. These effects influence the individual's behaviour and are often decisive for achieving the desired end state. Indirect effects in this dimension are often achieved as a result of effects achieved in the physical or virtual dimension.

4.3.2.2 Characteristics of the virtual dimension

The virtual dimension constitutes the environment that contains non-tangible entities. These may be virtual personae as found on social media, or they could be written and unwritten codes of conduct such as software. This dimension can be divided into a virtual personae and a virtual objects layer. It was artificially created by man, which means that it can also be manipulated by man.

4.3.2.3 Characteristics of the physical dimension

The physical dimension constitutes the environment in which interaction takes place between geography, infrastructure, flora and fauna, individuals, states, cultures and societies, and where physical effects are realised. This dimension can be divided into a geographical and a physical layer, within which there are entities that can be engaged. This dimension was partly shaped by man. This dimension can only be manipulated with considerable effort if at all.

4.4 Readiness as the basis of fighting power

The Defence organisation is an operational and executive organisation, the main objective of which is the capability to apply fighting power. Fighting power is created by forging together the physical component (the people and the means), the conceptual component and the mental component. We develop fighting power by means of the readiness process. Readiness and deployment are the important processes within the Defence organisation.

Readiness is made up of three elements:

- Personnel readiness: the extent to which a unit's personnel are available for and fit to carry out the unit's organic task.
- Materiel readiness: the extent to which a unit's materiel is available and fit for the unit's organic task.
- Proficiency: the extent to which a unit has trained the necessary skills and demonstrated a sufficient level of ability to carry out its tasks.

The level of readiness is expressed in terms of:

- Combat readiness: the unit satisfies the standards for personnel readiness, materiel readiness and proficiency required to be able to carry out its organic tasks. These tasks are based on an analysis of the most likely deployment options for such a unit.
- Mission readiness: the unit is mission ready if it is able to carry out an order for a specific deployment within the set notice-to-move (NTM). This order will be specified by the CHOD in a mission-essential task list (METL) in the (provisional) formation and readiness order and/or operation instruction or operation order.

The physical and mental components are brought up to the desired level through activities in relation to personnel readiness, materiel readiness, proficiency and mission-specific preparation, with the conceptual component providing the framework. The conceptual component also provides the integrating framework for all activities relating to combat readiness and mission readiness. Observations leading to lessons learned with regard to education, training, exercise and deployment form the basis for innovation of the physical, mental and conceptual components. Readiness and fighting power are thus closely linked and influence each other constantly.

After a unit has reached combat readiness, there are a number of options:

- The unit is designated for deployment and starts its mission-specific preparations in order to become ready for actual deployment.
- The unit is designated to be on standby for a specific deployment or goal (for example, as a rapidly deployable capability). In that event, mission-specific preparation may also be started in order to be mission ready in the event of actual deployment. Units with this status carry on training in order to maintain the required level.
- The unit maintains combat readiness and is on standby for possible deployment. Units with this status carry on training in order to maintain the required level.

Units cannot keep up a high level of readiness indefinitely, because equipment requires service and maintenance and personnel need time for recuperation and leave. The unit then falls back from mission readiness to combat readiness, or from combat readiness to non-ready status. In that case, the unit must work up again to obtain combat or mission readiness status. This creates an ongoing cycle of maintenance/recuperation, work-up and deployment. By having several identical units relieve one another in consecutive cycles, sustainability is created. This is why the Defence organisation often possesses several units of the same type, but that only part is actually directly deployable.

4.5 Application of fighting power

4.5 Application of fighting power
When applying fighting power, account must be taken of a number of principles, military operational considerations, joint functions and doctrine accents. These will be discussed in the following subsections.

4.5.1 Principles of military operations

The principles of military operations form an important part of the conceptual component. These are rules of a fundamental nature for the use of military means. They have been formed by years of military experience and are thus an excellent guide for military operations. In many cases, they can serve as evaluation criteria for the completeness and feasibility of an operational concept. The correct application of these principles requires common sense and professional judgement, and thus contributes to the success of a military operation.

The principles of military operations must always be considered in relation to each other. On the basis of the situation, the commander will determine which principles are the deciding factors at any given time. Full adherence to one principle may make it difficult or even impossible to apply another. In this evaluation, the commander takes into account the higher commander's intent, his own mission and objective, the actions of other parties involved in the conflict and the factors of time and space. One exception here is the principle of legitimacy, which must be applied at all times. Besides, not all countries and alliances have the same principles. They make a choice in this respect.

Principles[23]	Brief explanation
Unity of effort	Unity of effort emphasizes the requirement to ensure all means are directed to a common goal. Military forces achieve this principally through command and control.
Concentration of force	Concentration of force means that deployment of combat power (physical, intellectual and moral) should be synchronised at a pre-selected time and place designed to achieve the intended decisive results.
Economy of effort	Economy of effort recognizes that if concentrated strength is to be applied decisively (main effort), compromise may be necessary in areas of lower priority.
Freedom of action	Freedom of action empowers commanders to pursue their designated missions and should minimize the restrictions placed upon them.
Definition of objectives	Military operations must be focused towards clearly defined and commonly understood objectives that contribute to attaining the end state.
Flexibility	Plans and procedures should be sufficiently flexible to respond to the unexpected and to empower commanders with maximum freedom of action.
Initiative	Initiative is about recognizing and seizing opportunities and about solving problems in an original way. A commander should be given the freedom to use initiative and should, in turn, encourage subordinates to do likewise. Initiative can be promoted by trust and mutual understanding and developed by training.
Offensive spirit	At the core of offensive spirit is the notion of a proactive mindset. This fosters confidence, encourages enterprise and a determination not to cede the initiative.
Surprise	Surprise is to strike the adversary at a time or place or in a manner for which they are unprepared. A surprise action may achieve results disproportionate to the effort expended.
Security	Security enhances freedom of action by limiting vulnerability to hostile activities and threats through active and passive security measures.
Simplicity	Simplicity requires simple plans and clear, concise orders to minimize misunderstanding and confusion.
Maintenance of morale	Maintenance of morale is essential for operational success. High morale depends on good leadership, which instils courage, energy, determination, respect and care both for, and among, the personnel under command.

23 Details relating to the principles of military operations can be found in AJP-3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the conduct of operations

Legitimacy	Legitimacy has a legal and an ethical side. Legal legitimacy demands in the first place that there is a legal basis for deployment (legal foundation). Secondly, legitimacy is based on compliance with the rules in effect during deployment (laws and jurisdiction), for example international humanitarian law, the status of forces agreements and the rules of engagement. Legal legitimacy is an absolute principle and cannot be set aside in favour of other principles. Legal legitimacy contributes to ethical legitimacy. Ethical legitimacy concerns the preservation of acceptance and support among the local population, the population at home and public opinion; it is an important precondition for successful sustainment and completion of military operations. Lastly, a commander has accountability in relation to the matter of legitimacy.
Selection and maintenance of the aim	Selection and maintenance of the aim is considered the main principle of war. An unequivocal objective is the key to successful military operations.

Table 4-1: Principles of military operations

4.5.2 *Operational considerations in military operations*

The above principles are supported by operational considerations which, along with political and legal considerations, are fundamentally important to military operations. Before a commander reaches his decision, he will have to consider the contributions of his sub-commanders and the results and recommendations from his staff, while also taking into account the results of consultations with the higher level, insofar as these have been possible. His own knowledge, experience and intuition play an important role in his considerations. The following operational considerations are always relevant, but their relative importance depends on the operational theme.

Operational considerations[24]	Brief explanation
Credibility	A military force deployed by the Netherlands must be credible. A key factor in establishing credibility is to ensure that at all levels words match deeds and that every deployed Dutch force is perceived as professional and capable of fulfilling its mission.
Consent	Promoting consent, and cooperation, from the host nation is a prerequisite for executing operations. Before execution, any military force activity that may result in a loss of consent should be carefully balanced and assessed against the long-term objectives of the military operation.
Mutual respect and understanding	The respect in which a Dutch military force is held will be a direct consequence of its professional conduct. How the Dutch force treats the local actors and authorities, although it may enjoy certain immunities related to its duties, will be important for the completion of the mission.
Transparency	The mission and concept of operations, as well as the end state, must be readily understood and obvious to all actors involved. Achieving a common understanding will remove suspicion and generate trust.
Freedom of movement	Freedom of movement is essential for every operation. The mandate, SOFA and rules of engagement (ROE) must allow forces to remain free at all times to perform their duties throughout the area of operations without interference from any of the local groups and organizations.
Strategic communications	Strategic communications (StratCom) integrates communications capabilities and functions, in concert with other military activities, to understand and shape the information environment and to inform, persuade or influence audiences to support the military objectives.

24 Further details with regard to the considerations in military operations are contained in AJP-03, Allied Joint Doctrine for the conduct of operations

Cyberspace Operations	Many aspects of military operations depend on cyberspace which extends beyond geographical and geopolitical borders, and a large part of which may be beyond the range of the territory of the Netherlands and that of the Alliance. Cyberspace is also incorporated into the operation of critical infrastructures, as well as economic activity, administration and national security. When planning and preparing for operations, commanders should therefore take into account their critical dependency on information and cyberspace, as well as factors such as degradations to confidentiality and availability and integrity of information and information systems.
Environmental protection	The prevention or mitigation of adverse environmental impacts. It is about the application and integration of all aspects of environmental considerations to/in military operations.
Gender perspective	Experience in mission areas has shown that applying a gender perspective in the preparation and execution of each operation will have a positive effect on the outcome of the mission. By integrating a gender perspective into operations, all military personnel are made aware of the local gender-related circumstances that will or may affect the execution of the operation and its operational success. The gender perspective will thus help personnel to gain a good understanding of the different intentions, be they positive or negative, and of the expectations and needs and the differences between them for men, women and children.
Protection of Civilians	The protection of civilians is relevant to all tasks of the military. All operations, missions and other mandated activities are conducted in accordance with international legislation and international human rights. The protection of civilians in operations, based on legal, moral and political rules, is important for the credibility and legitimacy of the military.
Risk management	Commanders at all levels weigh up operational risks against safety in the formulation of plans and in the actual deployment of fighting power.

Table 4-2: Operational considerations

4.5.3 *Joint functions*

The joint functions in military operations are a conceptual aid for the commander and his staff in the integration, synchronisation and direction of capabilities and activities in operations. An analysis of the role and form of the joint functions ensures that commanders and staffs consider all aspects of an operation. The results of the analysis will appear in an operation concept and a plan for the deployment of forces. The strength of the functions lies in their integration; together they deliver a unit's fighting power. The functions must, therefore, always be considered in relation to each other. Only a mission in which the functions are synchronised with each other will have any chance of success. The relative importance of a function also varies in accordance with the operational objective. Furthermore, it is not the case that a particular operational function can be traced back to a particular functionality or Service. More than one functionality and Service are usually involved in performing a function. On the other hand, one functionality or unit can contribute to more than one function.
The joint functions apply to all levels of warfare. In the case of joint operations, the following joint functions apply:

Joint functions in military operations[25]	Brief explanation
Manoeuvre	The primary purpose of manoeuvre is to gain the best possible positional advantage in respect of the enemy or other actor. His strongest points will be avoided and his weak points exploited. Manoeuvre entails directing fighting power wherever it will have the greatest effect. It is not exclusively concerned with the enemy's physical component in a positional or geographic sense, but in a broad sense also influences 'the enemy's will' or 'the actor's understanding'.
Fires	Fires create effects on actors. Fires can be applied directly and indirectly to create a broad range of physical and psychological effects. Fires allow the commander to attack the physical component of the enemy and to compromise his judgment and his moral component, consequently influencing his will. Fires are ideally integrated with manoeuvre.
Command and Control	The C2 function is about leading and managing a military organisation to achieve its objectives. Command and control is made up of the elements of leadership, decision making and control, and integrates the other joint functions to form a single concept. Planning, direction, coordination and control guarantee the vertical and horizontal integration of (military) units and assigned assets. As soon as this integration produces greater synergy in the operation, command and control will form a force multiplier for fighting power.[26]

25 Allied Joint Doctrine (AJP-01(E)).
26 A detailed description of command and control can be found in the Netherlands doctrine publication JDP-5, Command and control.

Intelligence	Intelligence is the result of a knowledge and understanding of the activities, capabilities and intentions of all relevant actors and factors. Intelligence provides as complete a picture of the situation as possible (situational awareness) and is an essential condition for success in any operation.
Information	The information function concerns, on the one hand, the use of information as an instrument to change actors' opinions, views and perception and, by doing so, change their behaviour. This involves strategic communication, decision making, information operations, psychological operations and media information. On the other hand, information is vitally important in our own decision-making processes. Information-driven operations enable us collect, process and disseminate all relevant information at any given moment to ensure that we can optimise our ability to be in the right place at the right time with the right assets.
Sustainment	Sustainment entails support with the materiel, medical, personnel and financial means required to build up and maintain fighting power. Once built up, the sustainment of fighting power is vital for maintaining and continuing operations until the mission is completed. An increasingly important role in the context of sustainment is played by energy efficiency in military operations. Optimum energy consumption and production to reduce the logistic footprint of own forces will increase their autonomy, resilience and the availability of means.
Force Protection	For a commander, it is of the utmost importance that his fighting power be protected in all stages of an operation. The primary purpose of force protection is to maintain freedom of action so that it remains possible to conduct the mission successfully. The protection function comprises all activities (defence, security and safety) designed to prevent undesired effects on friendly forces, and minimising or, if possible, eliminating risk. This means that protection needs to be considered at all times and at all levels in the planning and execution of operations. There are several different aspects to force protection: active and passive, physical and mental.
Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)	Support of a military mission through coordination and cooperation between the military commander and civil actors, including the national civilian population and local authorities as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and institutions.[27]

Table 4-3: Joint functions in military operations

27 *Handboek CIMIC* 1st edition, 2 April 2002, p. 1-4.

4.5.4 Accents

As described earlier, the Netherlands armed forces observe and implement doctrine that has been developed and ratified in an allied context. They will normally have been involved in the development and approval of the doctrine. This capstone Netherlands Defence Doctrine is therefore in line with doctrine developed in a NATO context. Like NATO, the Netherlands armed forces emphasise the aspects of the manoeuvrist approach, mission command and network-based operations. These aspects will be elaborated upon in the following subsections.

4.5.4.1 Manoeuvrist approach

The ability to generate sufficient fighting power is no guarantee of success. An approach in which power is mainly deployed against identified weaknesses of other actors and in which it targets the mental component is known as the manoeuvrist approach. The aim of this approach is to influence other actors' perception of reality, their behaviour and their actions. Important aspects here are momentum, tempo and mental agility, which in combination produce a shock effect and the element of surprise on other actors. The manoeuvrist approach requires a mental attitude that centres on creativity, the willingness to take risks, and perseverance.

The traditional manoeuvrist approach is designed to break the will of the enemy and his willingness to carry on fighting. The emphasis is thus on his mental component and not on the destruction of his physical component; direct confrontation is avoided wherever possible.

The purpose of the manoeuvrist approach is to:

- gain and retain the initiative and exert constant pressure at times and places that the enemy least expects it, thus undermining his will and his willingness to continue fighting;

- direct the effects of precision weapons against identified enemy weaknesses, thus breaking his cohesion;

- restricting the enemy's ability to obtain situational awareness, thus adversely affecting his understanding.

A selective and physical elimination of capacities (people and means) is in keeping with the manoeuvrist approach. The manoeuvrist approach can be characterised by preventive action, by outmanoeuvring and by disrupting the enemy. The ability to identify and exploit weaknesses not only requires good intelligence, but also a high operational tempo and multiple simultaneous activities.

A high operational tempo can be reached by rapid decision making, speed of execution and a fast-paced change of activities. This high tempo will allow disruption of the enemy's decision-making cycle which will hinder his response; his will, cohesion and perception will thus be affected.

Despite the emphasis on the mental component, the manoeuvrist approach in combat always involves elements of physical mobility, firepower and control of maritime areas, ground or airspace. This approach also involves the need to bind the enemy, to deny routes, spaces and areas and to preserve our own vital areas and key points. Defensive measures like these are, however, always a means to a higher end, namely the defeat of the enemy.

It is not always possible to break an enemy's will to fight. In the case of ideologically driven groups, other instruments will have to be sought to create the desired effect. This can be achieved within the philosophy of the manoeuvrist approach, by seeking the support of all actors for the operation, and also by denying external support to the enemy, as his sustainability could be partly dependent on this form of support. In this way, the enemy can be deprived of the initiative.

Effective operations are determined by the approach towards all actors, not only by the way in which the enemy is approached. By extension, the 'will of the enemy' in the traditional manoeuvrist approach can therefore be regarded as the 'actor's opinion'. The opinion translates into support and thus into cohesion. Support for the friendly operation must be maintained and increased. Support for the enemy should be reduced, so that he eventually gives up. By tailoring friendly activities carefully to the will, cohesion and understanding of all actors, the effects-based thinking and the manoeuvrist approach are put into practice in a broader sense.

4.5.4.2 Mission command[28]

In the Netherlands armed forces, mission command is the leading style of command. Central to mission command is the establishment and communication of the commander's intent, as full freedom of action is delegated to the lower executing levels. The intent focuses on the context in which the task has to be performed and on the desired results and effects, and not on the way in which they are achieved. Authority for the execution is thus decentralised. In other words, authority is delegated to the lowest appropriate level for the most effective and efficient deployment of equipment and capabilities. The Dutch doctrine publication entitled 'Command and control' (JDP-5) discusses mission command in more detail, along with the conditions needed to apply it successfully.

4.5.4.3 Information-driven operations[29]

A condition for the effective, efficient and integrated deployment of fighting power is the linking of effectors, sensors, C2 elements and communications and information systems in a single network. Along with the interoperability of these means, this method of operating allows our own decision-making cycle to be accelerated and enhanced in terms of quality. This does, however, impose demands on the quality and capability of the materiel with which we work and on our work methods. The increased technological capabilities of communications and information systems contribute to the reinforcing effect of networks on fighting power. As well as the use of technology, network enhancement also involves aspects concerning process, personnel, culture and organisation. All this enables fast and targeted information flows in order to gain greater speed of action and decision making than the enemy. The reinforcement of fighting power through faster and better processing and dissemination of information is referred to within NATO as network-enabled capabilities.

Just as relevant as technical networks are social networks. Social networks serve to build trust between their members. Familiarity with and trust in people are thus the basis for information-driven operations. Despite all the modern technology, the deployment of liaison officers and personnel at multinational headquarters is a vital addition to technical networks. Direct personal contact will never be replaced entirely by the exchange of digital images, sound and text.

28 Mission command is synonymous with the Dutch term *opdrachtgerichte commandovoering* and the German term *Auftragtaktik*.

29 Whereas previous doctrine talked about network-enabled capabilities (NEC) and network-enabled operations, these are now often referred to as information-driven operations.

As part of an integrated approach, information-driven operations are not confined purely to military deployment. To bring about the effective and efficient deployment of all assets in this broad context too, it is vital that, apart from the social networks referred to above, non-military actors also form part of the information exchange, as in a JIMP context. The structures and procedures therefore need to be set up in such a way as to make this possible. This means that particular consideration is needed when deciding what information should be available to whom. From the point of view of operational security or the national interest, it may be necessary to shield part of the information.

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