National Risk Assessment 6

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The Network of Analysts for National Security

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1 Introduction

In support of the inter-departmental National Safety and Security Strategy of the Netherlands, a National Risk Assessment (known by the initials NRA) is carried out once a year. The exercise involves exploring a number of safety and security themes by analysing various scenarios in the context of a standard reference framework. The approach is referred to as the NRA methodology[1]. The findings are intended to provide policy makers with insight into the relative likelihood and impact of the various scenarios. Such insight is important for specifying capability implications, formulating policy, and defining priorities, with the aim of preparing the Netherlands as well as possible for various types of disaster and threat.

This report summarises the NRA 6. This NRA and the constituent scenarios have been independently produced by the Network of Analysts for National Security (known by the Dutch initials ANV). The ANV is an authoritative knowledge network, which since 2011 has been tasked by the Ministry of Security and Justice with performing the annual NRA on behalf of the National Steering Committee for National Safety and Security (known by the Dutch initials SNV).
The NRA 6 examined three scenarios: Far-right extremism, Lek Dike breach/Flooding of Lopiker- and Krimpenerwaard and Foreign enterprise unmasked as a criminal Trojan horse. For each of the scenarios addressed in the NRA 6, the impact and likelihood assessments have been used as the basis for a capability analysis.

In this report a summary of each scenario is given, preceded by an explanation on its aim and rationale for inclusion. Subsequently the NRA risk diagram and the main conclusions of the analysis of each scenario's likelihood and impact are provided. Consideration is also given to the impact scores: which criteria often yield high scores, and what can be concluded from such patterns.

[1] The NRA methodology is described in a manual entitled Working with Scenarios, Risk Analysis, and Capabilities in the National Safety and Security Strategy (2014), published by the Ministry of Security and Justice.

2 Scenarios for the NRA 6

2.1 Far-right extremism scenario

Aim and rationale for inclusion

On the advice of the Network of Analysts for National Security (ANV), the National Steering Committee for National Safety and Security (SNV) has selected the theme of Extremism for the NRA 6. The main reason for this is that the extremism-related scenarios produced for previous NRAs are now several years old and developments regarding the issue of radicalisation have increased the urgency of fresh analysis. In order to define the theme of Extremism, a brainstorming session was organised with experts from the ANV and a number of policy advisors from the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Ministry of Security and Justice. The experts and advisors indicated that updating the scenario for the issue of right-wing extremism (referred to here as far-right extremism) would be the most desirable option for the National Risk Assessment. Other subjects relating to polarisation and radicalisation – such as left-wing extremism, Muslim extremism and animal-rights extremism – were also considered important, albeit less urgent. It was therefore advised that these issues are addressed during the next National Risk Assessment.

Scenario description

At the beginning of 2015, there is a major economic crisis and mass unemployment. As a result, anti-government, anti-Europe and anti-immigration sentiments are successfully exploited by 'populist' movements within the Netherlands. By this point, the traditional far-right groups in the Netherlands (neo-Nazis and ultranationalists) haven't yet figured out how to capitalise on these opportunities.

In 2016, this situation begins to change following a split in the 'right-wing populist' party set up several years before. The parliamentary group in the Dutch Lower House is divided regarding whether or not to co-operate with groups in other European countries that hold either private or open anti-Jewish and anti-Semitic viewpoints. The split in 2016 results in two 'right-wing populist' parties, both with strongly anti-Islamic and Eurosceptic viewpoints, with one of these parties also embracing a northern European identity and occupying an anti-Zionistic position.

In mid-2016, a number of medium-sized southern European banks go bust despite years of financial support

from the EU emergency fund. On the internet and on social media, unconfirmed reports regularly appear of large-scale mismanagement and corruption by an alleged network of southern European bank directors of Jewish descent. The web forum of the Schwarzwald Council – a think-tank that focuses on opinion forming about the 'Northern European identity' – regularly displays messages making such insinuations. Despite the think-tank's claims that they have no connections to far-right extremist groups, the forum also regularly features other racist, anti-Semitic and anti-Islamic posts. A fire at a mosque in Munich in May 2017, which kills 12 people, is applauded by a number of forum contributors. In the Dutch think-tank, like those in many other Western European countries, participants have been involved in threats against prominent figures in the Islamic and Jewish communities.

In the meantime, the old anti-capitalist attitude of the traditional right-wing extremists is gaining new momentum. This movement, which a few years earlier distanced itself from the classic Nazi ideology of Adolf Hitler, subscribes predominantly to the early, more anti-capitalist ideology of the 1920s Nazi party. The movement conducts active online propaganda that preaches the maintenance of social achievements for natives at the expense of non-natives, hatred of what it sees as the neoliberal European Union, the supposed threat of 'capitalist' Zionism and Judaism around the world (as 'they' purportedly seek to control the Dutch government and the financial world) and anti-capitalist 'solutions' to the global financial crisis. Their opinions regularly coincide with those held in anarchist circles. Due to the weakness and limited influence of far-left extremist groups in the Netherlands, there is growing willingness amongst these groups to join forces with the far-right extremists. This development is also evident in other European countries.

Collaborations are set up between far-left and far-right extremists, serving as a hotbed for further radicalisation. In 2016, a previously unknown group known as the Anti-Capitalist Alliance (ACA) carries out an arson attack on the Ministry of Finance in The Hague and threatens the CEO of the Bank of the Netherlands. Cyber attacks made possible by collaborations between far-left hacktivists and far-right extremists bring down government and bank websites. The police and the General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (AIVD) work together with their German counterparts following clues about possible links between the ACA and the New Red Army Faction in Germany.

Another development is the rise of the far-right 'Neighbourly Assistance' movement. Originating in Sweden, the group is soon replicated in other European countries. The movement focuses on providing aid to senior citizens and other vulnerable people in deprived areas, providing them with food and care. However, they expressly exclude Jews and Muslims from the scope of their activities. Eventually, a European collaboration is created under the name European League for Neighbourly Assistance (ELNA). From 2017, regular attacks against banks, Muslims and Jews are carried out in the Netherlands, in which individual members of the movement are involved. The movement calls upon its members to boycott democratic procedures and reject all contact with the authorities.

In mid-2017, a number of young members of the ACA and the ELNA comes together and forms what they refer to as the Public Defence League (PDL). In collaboration with Dutch-based members of the German New National Socialist Underground (NNSU), they decide to carry out a series of murders targeting entrepreneurs of Jewish and Muslim descent. This results in major unrest amongst Jewish and Muslim entrepreneurs, many of which decide to hire personal security. Many radical websites call for Muslims to set up armed protection groups.

By the end of 2017, the Netherlands appears to be in the clutches of an escalating spiral of violence. Violent confrontations between far-right extremists and radical Muslims supported by anti-fascist groups become a regular occurrence. They often result in fatal shootings, many times with innocent bystanders as victims. The PDL continues to carry out attacks, with targets now including politicians of Jewish or Muslim descent. Furthermore, arson attacks are frequently carried out on synagogues and mosques.

In response to the escalating violence, a widespread public protest movement develops. Demonstrations are conducted in the major cities, organised by a national alliance of Jewish, Christian, Islamic and Humanist groups in addition to other social organisations. At the end of a huge demonstration in a major city, in which MPs, cabinet members and prominent figures from the business community, trade unions and churches also participate, anti-fascists and ELNA members come to blows. The tussles between the two groups continue all night, resulting in some serious injuries and substantial material damage in the inner city.

The 'populist right-wing' parties strongly distance themselves from the increasing violence. Prominent members of the Schwarzwald Council publicly state that terrorism achieves nothing. The government covertly attempts to seek contact with members of the Schwarzwald Council to ask them to establish contacts with prominent figures amongst the young membership of the ELNA. In the foreign press, the Netherlands is

increasingly described as an unstable country. Tourism falls and investors from Muslim countries and even the United States begin to question the wisdom of involvement in the Netherlands. Public opinion in these countries paints the picture that many Dutch people sympathise with the far-right extremists and calls are made to boycott Dutch products.

2.2 Lek Dike breach/Flooding of Lopiker- and Krimpenerwaard scenario

Aim and rationale for inclusion

The results of the long-term study 'Veiligheid Nederland in Kaart' (National Safety Analysis for the Netherlands) conducted by the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment into the likelihood of flooding in Dutch dike-ring areas, warrant the creation of a new scenario concerning flooding in the river district. In contrast to flood scenarios from previous NRAs, this is not a worst-credible flood, but a flood that has a higher risk of occurrence than the current norms, according to the recent insights into dike strength in the Netherlands. The increased risk of flooding is a consequence of the dike-failure mechanisms of microstability and piping, and the unpredictability and unmanageability of these mechanisms.

In consultation with the organisations concerned, a scenario was chosen that involves the flooding of Lopiker- and Krimpenerwaard originating from the River Lek, followed by a cascade effect in the Central Holland dike ring. Furthermore, it was decided to include a cross-border flooding threat from Germany. In the scenario, this eventuality will not manifest itself: it will remain 'just' a threat. The added value this provides is that governments and organisations will be forced to extend the focus of their capabilities to include greater areas of the river district. This is particularly relevant with regard to co-ordination between various safety regions and evacuation opportunities.

In this scenario, the predictability (particularly with regard to timescale) and ability to evacuate the affected area will play a major role. The selected scenario involves both an area that floods relatively quickly and an area that takes several days to flood. The scenario also involves a significant element of surprise: the flood proves unpredictable because the dike appears to be weak even at low water levels. This makes horizontal evacuation almost or entirely impossible. As a result, the various government bodies must select alternative options, such as vertical evacuation.

Scenario description

This scenario involves the same type of weather that caused the 1995 flood threats. In the first weeks of January of that year, a large volume of snow fell in the Rhine river basin. Once the weather changed, the soil became saturated due to the melting surface snow and the still-frozen subsoil. Days of persistent rain in the Rhine river basin resulted in the rainwater being quickly drained from the river, causing high discharge-water levels.

The scenario plays out in the dike-ring region of Lopiker- and Krimpenerwaard (dike ring 15). The southern boundary of this dike-ring area is the relatively weak Lek Dike. This area borders the northern part of the Hollandse IJssel River. The northern watercourse along the canalised Hollandse IJssel separates dike ring 15 from the western Central Holland dike ring (dike ring 14). This watercourse is too low to hold back the floodwater, which will result in the flooding of part of dike ring area 14 (cascade effect).

Elsewhere along the Rhine branches and in the lower river district there are sections of the dike with comparable chances of failure. The threat caused by the high discharge-water levels will ensure that the attention of the water boards and the preparation conducted by safety regions, local authorities and emergency services has to be focused on practically all of the dike rings along the Rhine branches, the Meuse and the lower river district. In all regions, permanent dike monitoring and scaled-up crisis management will be engaged and measures will be taken (sandbags, dike heightening) to reinforce relative weak spots in the dike.

One day before the dike breach, water bailiffs in the region report that according to the experts, the dikes are weakening so quickly that there is a 'real' risk of a breach in the next few days. Experts from the safety regions estimate that if this happens and the residents are unable to get out of the area, that hundreds of thousands of people could end up trapped without food, drinking water, electricity or heating, and without assistance. The authorities within the safety regions in dike rings 15 and 44 decide to jointly evacuate their residents. However, there is too little capacity and too little time to engage people from other regions or even to evacuate the eastern region of dike ring 14, partly because of the critical situation along other sections of the river. Furthermore, there is a threat of flooding from the Lower Rhine region in Germany, which will – should it occur – result in huge volumes of river water pouring into the Netherlands.

The decision to evacuate is taken in the morning to enable the residents to pack their things and leave by daylight. Via the media, residents are informed of the areas to be

evacuated and the routes that must be taken to do so. They are also asked to help to evacuate residents requiring care or assistance. All municipalities in the evacuation area set up hotlines for people who are unable to evacuate either on their own or with the assistance of others. The residents of the evacuation area react calmly; no panic ensues. The evacuation slowly swings into action.

That same evening, there is a breach in the Lek Dike west of Nieuwegein. Only a small proportion of the residents of dike rings 15 and 44 have left the area, a proportion were about to leave and others had packed their things and were ready to go the following morning. Panic breaks out in Nieuwegein and IJsselstein. There is also growing unrest elsewhere in the region. There is a sudden surge of people rushing to leave by car or public transport.

In the first few hours after the breach, the water level rises rapidly. Major problems begin to occur as people are no longer able to escape the region. Most of the residents seek refuge in buildings or look for higher ground. For some, it is already too late. Many drown, some in their cars, others (particularly the elderly) at home or in the street, unable to outrun the rapidly encroaching waters. The water penetrates both dike ring 14 and dike ring 15. In just a few hours the water flows through viaducts under the A2 motorway. IJsselstein is immersed. The Lopik transmitter mast is surrounded by water, but it remains in operation. It is clearly evident that large regions of dike rings 14 and 15 are going to flood. The images of people drowning as they flee the floodwaters send shockwaves through the nation. In dike ring 15, the eastern region of dike ring 14, the city of Utrecht and the surrounding area, the chaos is complete. There is little the police can do, and the traffic grinds to a halt.

The authorities in the affected safety regions decide to halt horizontal evacuation and initiate vertical evacuation. People in the areas under threat are urgently advised to seek a safe, high place and stay there. Evacuation by car is strongly discouraged. Repeated warnings emphasise that the threat applies to the entirety of the river district. However, this warning is largely ineffective. In Utrecht, Nieuwegein and IJsselstein, most of the citizens have sought refuge in a high place, but in other areas, many residents have nevertheless decided to evacuate by car: most of them are already en route. In the flooded areas, both mobile phone networks and land lines are inoperative. In the hours and days that follow, other vital facilities also fail.

Approximately a week after the breach, the flooding reaches its peak. By this time, the area is practically inaccessible. Major food shortages affect the disaster area and attempts at food distribution are chaotic. In the western region of dike ring 15, the army has succeeded in erecting an emergency dike around the high-voltage substation. The dike is expected to be tall and strong enough to repel the waters and ensure the operation of the substation. The emergency power generators are divided between hospitals, care homes and water boards insofar as they are needed. However, the supply of diesel for the generators is a major problem. In the disaster area, looting of shops and houses is reported. People who have left their houses call on the police to guard their property. However, the police simply don't have the capacity to do so and continue to focus their efforts on rescuing people.

The providers of vital products and services such as electricity, gas, sanitation, drinking water and telecommunication were able to disconnect the facilities in the majority of the disaster area soon enough to prevent as much damage (to areas outside the disaster area) as possible.

It takes well over a week to get all of the people in the flooded area to safety. Homes, office blocks and other buildings are checked for any remaining survivors. Bodies of the victims continually materialise. Soldiers and emergency workers in the safety regions begin to clear up the cadavers of drowned cattle. This involves a great deal of urgency in order to prevent disease.

The hole in the dike in Lopik has now expanded to 100 metres wide and 15 metres deep. It cannot be sealed immediately as the current is too strong for light materials to plug the gap, and the dike is too weak to enable supply of coarser materials. It takes two weeks following the breach to stabilise the situation and for the Lek's water levels to recede enough to enable repair. The threat of a dike breach elsewhere on the major rivers dissipates.

The flooded area is too low-lying to drain naturally, so all of the water has to be pumped away. Using all of the pumps that the Netherlands possesses and is able to buy/borrow from abroad, it takes 10 months to pump all of the water out of the area. Throughout this period, vital facilities and infrastructure such as roads, electricity, sanitation, drinking water and telecommunications are unavailable in the disaster area. The area remains deserted for a long time. Saturation of the subsoil caused by the flooding results in a great deal of water damage and cable breaks, which take months to put right.

Two years after the breach, the area has been cleaned up, the buildings repaired and the vital infrastructure restored. The residents have returned and life begins to get back to normal. An upgraded distribution network for both electricity and gas is also in place following a project that ran for over a year.

2.3 Foreign enterprise unmasked as a criminal Trojan horse scenario

Aim and rationale for inclusion

Large-scale fraud and crime can potentially pose a threat to national security. Furthermore, global criminal subversion of mainstream activities has been shown to be on the rise. In a 2013 report by the Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV), it was advised that more attention be focused on the topic of cross-border criminal activity. International organised crime has therefore been selected as an issue for a scenario in the NRA 6.

In order to determine a specific scenario within this broad issue, consultations and brainstorming sessions were held with experts and representatives from relevant government bodies. Based on the information gathered, four scenarios were proposed. These proposals were then discussed and a single proposal was selected for further elaboration into a comprehensive scenario.

The following considerations played a major part in the selection of this particular scenario:

1. The scenario is inspired by recent political revolutions and conflicts in the Middle East, and in particular the resulting large volumes of flight capital that are too substantial to be processed using traditional money-laundering channels.
2. As a result, there is increasing subversion of mainstream commercial activities by cross-border criminal organisations.
3. The Netherlands is an attractive location for non-European organisations, particularly due to the country's key position in Western European logistical networks.
4. The Trojan horse aspect is central to the scenario, i.e. the fact that it is only discovered at a late stage that a foreign enterprise established in the Netherlands is partially a front for illegal activity. Furthermore, it is found that the enterprise in question is not only involved in money-laundering practices within the Netherlands, but also seeks to profit from other criminal activities.
5. The potential damage goes further than just economic damage. Due to the close ties that the criminal enterprise has with politicians and authorities, in addition to the services it provides to wider society, the unmasking and collapse of the organisation results in political instability and social unrest.

In order to produce a complete scenario encompassing the potential effects on national security, an indicative scoring system was established with the aim of compiling data and aspects based on the selected issue and the impact criteria designated as relevant. This ensured a comprehensive scenario involving a meaningful and appropriate capability analysis.

Scenario description

Coralart, a recently established enterprise from one of the Gulf states, is making major investments in the Netherlands with the aim of creating a base for strategic expansion in Europe. The planned investments for the first ten years amount to twelve billion euros and include activities such as prestigious construction projects, joint ventures in the transport sector and logistics, and an aggressive expansion of various financial services. At first glance, Coralart seems to be an ultramodern investment and holding company. However, in reality, it is simply a vehicle for processing the stolen riches of fallen Arab regimes. The formal management structure has been infiltrated by criminal elements, creating a parallel criminal circuit of money-laundering processes, profit pursuit and decision making. The CEO's special legal advisor and the management of the HR and financial departments are strategic posts that are covertly under orders from a second (criminal) management level and largely operate as a clan. This alternative management system within the organisation works behind the scenes and most employees have no idea it exists.

Initially, the business is a great success. By conducting intensive lobbying and media activities, making substantial injections into the Dutch economy (particularly several crisis-hit sectors), directly and indirectly creating 20,000 jobs and carrying out a series of social projects in deprived areas, the business is able to establish an excellent reputation with the general public and gain access to the upper echelons of Dutch politics. The prospect of further investment in the Dutch economy ensures broad public and political support.

However, within three years, this excellent reputation is tainted by judicial inquiries into a number of the conglomerate's business units. Despite the slow progress and limited co-ordination of the inquiries in addition to strong political resistance, it eventually becomes clear that the illegal activities in question are not one-off incidents but part of a systematic operation to launder money and reinvest the proceeds of criminal activity.

The spectacular demise of the organisation following this discovery eventually results in the loss of 20,000 jobs (although some of these are saved by selling affected firms to new owners) and the cessation of the enterprise's

activities in the Netherlands, which achieved total annual turnover of five billion euros per year. The same applies to the annual flow of thirty billion euros via the currency, credit and transfer services conducted by the enterprise's financial division. Countless charitable activities are cancelled and major construction projects are halted.

The collapse of the enterprise also results in a legitimacy crisis at various political and administrative levels and the resignation of a number of ministers and political leaders. Furthermore, the continued popularity of the company in certain underprivileged areas/communities and in its home base of Rotterdam results in social unrest and protests in the streets. A great deal of friction is created between the established liberal media and local communities. Populist politicians who run campaigns promising to clean up the government and defend the rights of ordinary working people rapidly gain support. Their words are given even more weight when criminal vendettas relating the termination of Coralart's illegal activities claim the lives of nine people, mostly foreigners. New laws and control measures for foreign investment, established with the intention of restoring international trust in Dutch ports and trade facilities, initially result in a decline in foreign investment.

3 Comparative analysis of the scenarios

The risk diagram

The findings of the likelihood and impact analysis of each scenario according to the NRA methodology are depicted in the risk diagram (Fig. 1). The scenarios developed for the NRA 6 are in green and underlined for ease of recognition.

Figure 1 Position of each scenario in the risk diagram



The risk diagram's vertical axis represents the impact score. The vertical axis is graduated logarithmically, so that each category of impact is three times as high as the preceding category. The diagram's horizontal axis represents the likelihood. The graduation of this axis is such that each successive category represents a likelihood ten times greater than the preceding category.

Table 1 shows the scores (expected values, upper and lower limits) of each scenario for likelihood and impact criteria.

Positions of the new scenarios in the risk diagram

The overall impact of the *Far-right extremism* and *Lek Dike breach/flooding of Lopiker- and Krimpenerwaard* scenarios are assessed as serious to very serious, with a lesser impact of substantial to serious for the *Foreign enterprise unmasked as a criminal Trojan horse* scenario.

The *Far-right extremism* scenario is classified as unlikely (albeit in the upper range of this particular category) and the other two scenarios are classified as somewhat likely.

In the *Far-right extremism* scenario, various developments result in an upswing in extremist activity against Muslim and Jewish communities. Far-left and far right extremist groups unite in their campaign against capitalist excess and a European 'Neighbourly Assistance' movement with far-right tendencies gains growing support in many countries, including the Netherlands. There is an increasing number of violent incidents carried out against Muslims and Jews. The violence escalates when a number of young members of various movements set up a new group willing to collaborate with a German neo-Nazi group. They assassinate entrepreneurs of Muslim and Jewish descent, resulting in protest demonstrations that escalate into serious riots. Extremely violent confrontations between far-right extremists, radical Muslims and other groups also become a regular occurrence, resulting in a number of fatalities.

Consequently, feelings of insecurity grow within many sections of society, particularly the Muslim and Jewish communities. In some areas, many people are afraid to walk the streets due to the violence and intimidation perpetrated by certain groups. Respect for and tolerance of minority groups disintegrate. The government has insufficient control over the situation and public confidence in the government gradually declines. The extreme violence also places a heavy strain on the emergency services.

These effects are manifest in high scores for the criteria of violation of the democratic system and the socio-psychological impact. The events in this scenario result in the Netherlands gaining an international reputation as an unstable country. Tourism declines and some investors withdraw from the country. In many nations, there are calls to boycott Dutch products. Fatalities occur and a number of people suffer psychological damage. The material and economic damage caused is considerable. Taking all of this into consideration, the impact rating has been determined as serious to very serious.

The likelihood of this scenario occurring is estimated as unlikely to somewhat likely. There is hard evidence that certain developments described in the scenario could occur in real life. However, most experts consider it unlikely or highly unlikely that such a substantial spiral of violence would occur. After all, our society is characterised by a certain degree of resilience, making people less amenable to activities that violate the democratic system and unlikely to tolerate extreme violence. However, experts do warn against further decline of social antennae and advocate that curbing anti-democratic movements in society should remain a focal point.

Rather unexpected flooding of the river district can result in significant problems, such as evacuating the population and keeping vital services running. This is shown from the *Lek Dike breach/flooding of Lopiker- and Krimpenerwaard scenario*. In this scenario, following a long period of rain and snowfall in the Rhine river basin and high discharge-water levels in the rivers, a relatively weak section of the dike on the River Lek is breached, resulting in the flooding of dike ring 14.

Table 1 Likelihood and impact criterion scores

		Far-right extremism	Lek Dike breach	Foreign enterprise criminal TH
Likelihood	EV LL UL	B_{high} B C	C C C_{high}	C_{high} B D_{high}
Impact criteria				
1.1 Encroachment on the territory of the Netherlands	EV LL UL	D X D	D D D	X X X
1.2 Infringement of the international position of the Netherlands	EV LL UL	D B E	A X B	A X D
2.1 Fatalities	EV LL UL	B B C	C C C	A A A
2.2. Seriously injured and chronically ill	EV LL UL	C B D	C B E	B A C
2.3 Physical suffering (lack of basic necessities of life)	EV LL UL	X X X	B A D	X X X
3.1 Economic security	EV LL UL	B A C	D D D	D C D
4.1 Long-term impact on the environment and on nature	EV LL UL	X X X	A A B	X X X
5.1 Disruption of everyday life	EV LL UL	A A B	D C E	B A B
5.2 Violation of the democratic system	EV LL UL	E E E	A X D	C B D
5.3 Socio-psychological impact	EV LL UL	D D E	D B E	C A E

EV = Expected Value, LL = Lower Limit, UL = Upper Limit, X = Not applicable
Likelihood: A = highly unlikely, B = unlikely, C = moderately likely, D = likely, E = very likely
Impact: A = limited, B = substantial, C = serious, D = very serious, E = catastrophic

Although the authorities begin to evacuate beforehand, the breach is still fairly unexpected, resulting in the drowning of several hundred people and the cattle in the adjacent polder. The emergency services are sluggish and chaotic, due in part to the need to reserve capacity for possible breaches elsewhere. This is because at the same time, a flood threat also exists in the Lower Rhine region in Germany, which would result in excess river water flowing into the Netherlands (although this situation does not materialise). Several days after the breach, a large area has been flooded and the vital infrastructure in this area is out of action or has been cut off as a precautionary measure. It takes ten months to pump the floodwaters away and the entire recovery takes approximately two years.

The impact with regard to encroachment on the territory of the Netherlands is therefore high, as is also the case for the disruption of everyday life. The total cost of the damage is estimated at 13 billion euros (high impact). The temporary/permanent failure of vital infrastructure in the area (in the rest of the country it remains largely unaffected) results in a considerable lack of basic necessities of life for the flood victims. The socio-psychological impact is also substantial. The impact on the environment and on nature remains limited as the area does not contain any heavy industry or major storage sites of harmful agents or other hazardous substances. The total impact score is serious to very serious.

The total scenario is considered somewhat likely. This score is a direct reflection of the failure calculations conducted within the scope of the study 'Veiligheid Nederland in Kaart' (National Safety Analysis for the Netherlands), which also took into account existing policy/measures and the consequences described in the scenario. It is noted that although the scenario is representative of the situation in the river district as a whole, certain dike rings have a lower or higher likelihood of failure. For this reason, the likelihood is classified within a range (albeit a rather narrow one) of somewhat likely to likely.

In the scenario *Foreign enterprise unmasked as a criminal Trojan horse*, a recently set-up enterprise from Dubai named Coralart decides to establish itself in the Netherlands. The enterprise presents itself as an advanced investment vehicle for the Middle East's up-and-coming billionaire class. It invests heavily in the construction sector, the logistics sector and the financial-services sector. With bold projects and major investments, the enterprise makes a considerable contribution to the Dutch economy (which is in need of such a boost) resulting in a warm reception for the organisation amongst politicians and authorities.

However, within a few years, it gradually becomes evident that the enterprise is also involved in large-scale criminal activities such as money laundering, fraud, drugs traffic, extortion and bribery. With scandal piling on top of scandal, the Coralart empire comes crashing down and the directors of the Dutch subsidiary are arrested.

Consequently, more than 20,000 jobs are lost, a large number of businesses go bust (with a total annual turnover of 5 billion euros), social organisations lose a great deal of funding and all kinds of construction projects and charitable activities are halted. The economic impact is therefore very serious. The demise of the enterprise also relates in tension within Dutch society, politics and government. Research shows that a number of politicians and administrators had close ties with the enterprise and turned a blind eye to numerous issues. Pressure from the media and wider society results in the resignation of three ministers and the instigation of a parliamentary inquiry. There is also a great deal of disquiet amongst local communities affected by the national judicial establishment's cancellation of projects and activities. Public governance and the political system are considerably affected, core social values come under pressure, a proportion of the population is angry or insecure and trust in government bodies, institutions and businesses is severely damaged.

These effects are reflected in considerably high scores for the criteria of violation of the democratic system and socio-psychological impact. A number of direct victims (job losses, extortion or intimidation) can become chronically ill from the stress. Our country's image also takes a blow, especially in the eyes of other Western countries. Taking all of this into consideration, the impact rating has been determined as substantial to serious. It is noted that the uncertainty level regarding a number of impact scores – and therefore of the total impact – is high.

The likelihood of the scenario is also subject to a high degree of uncertainty. On the one hand, it was stated that although some of the events could occur independently of each other, the scenario as a whole is considered unlikely. On the other hand, arguments exist to justify a high likelihood, for example, the fact that many of the elements of the scenario have already become reality. Based on the average value, the score has been set at somewhat likely to likely, with an error margin ranging from unlikely to highly likely.

What are the main effects of the new scenarios?

The three scenarios in this NRA differ greatly with regard to cause, triggers, duration and consequences. These differences are reflected by the different impact scores.

The natural disaster in the *Lek Dike breach/flooding of Lopiker- and Krimpenerwaard* scenario predominantly causes physical damage and the failure of a large proportion of the vital infrastructure in the region. This is shown by the high score for the corresponding criteria, such as the encroachment of the territory of the Netherlands, disruption of everyday life, lack of basic necessities of life and economic damage. The flooding also results in many fatalities, serious injuries and chronic illnesses, and the socio-psychological impact is severe. There is also some damage to the environment, albeit limited.

The scores for the social scenario of *Far-right extremism* paint an entirely different picture. In this scenario, the impact on the international position of the Netherlands and the violation of the democratic system are the dominant criteria in addition to the socio-psychological impact. The latter criterion has a clearly different cause compared to the flooding scenario, as it is caused by unrest, fear and anger stemming from social tension and extreme violence, not a natural disaster. There are deaths and injuries, and the economic damage is considerable. As a number of neighbourhoods and regions (of limited size but with high population density) are controlled for several months by violent and intimidating groups, a number of experts interpret this as a substantial encroachment on the territory of the Netherlands. However, others

Figure 2 Frequencies with which impact criteria are scored 'not relevant' or 'limited' (0 or A), 'substantial' or 'serious' (B or C) or 'very serious' or 'catastrophic' (D or E)



shared the opinion that despite the threatening atmosphere, these regions could not be considered unusable. These different interpretations resulted in a high degree of uncertainty for the impact score.

In the scenario *Foreign enterprise unmasked as a criminal Trojan horse*, the economic impact is the dominant aspect. After all, this scenario relates to criminal activities involving large sums of money, such as fraud and money laundering. As it becomes gradually clear in this scenario that there is a certain degree of conflict of interest between politicians, authorities and the enterprise, that monitoring failed and that society's trust in the government and businesses is seriously damaged, the socio-psychological impact and the violation of the democratic system are also rated as serious. In addition to the fatalities, there are also other direct victims (due to job losses, extortion or intimidation by the criminal elements within the enterprise) who suffer extreme stress, which can result in chronic illness (substantial impact). Other criteria are rated as limited or not applicable.

Which are the most relevant impact criteria in view of all the scenarios?

The goal of the NRA is to analyse which capabilities need to be developed or reinforced in order to properly prepare our country for disasters, crises and threats. Furthermore, it is important to ensure that these capabilities are deployed in a way that reduces the impact of the criteria deemed most relevant by the scenario evaluation. In this way, the total impact of multiple threats can be limited.

Figure 2 gives an overview of the scores for the ten impact criteria in all 48 scenarios that have been developed until 2013.

Disruption of everyday life and socio-psychological impact are the most frequent high scorers, followed by the criteria of costs and violation of the democratic system. Of the latter two criteria, costs is most frequently awarded a B or a C.

The lack of basic necessities of life (physical suffering) and infringement of the international position of the Netherlands are the next-highest scoring criteria on the list (both have a roughly equal frequency of D-E or B-C scores).

For the other four criteria, a high score (D or E) is not often awarded, although the number of B or C scores for the criteria of fatalities and seriously injured/chronically ill is relatively high. Based on the similarity in the patterns, these two criteria would seem to be related. The scores for the criteria of encroachment on the territory of the Netherlands and long-term impact on the environment and on nature are mostly low (over 80% of the time), with the former criterion scoring a D or an E slightly more often. These criteria correspond to just a small set of a specific category of emergencies, such as floods or major nuclear disasters.

It was noted that for other criteria also, the frequency of high scores mildly correlates to particular types of disasters and threats. For example, violation of the democratic system mainly occurs during scenarios relating to *Polarisation and Radicalisation, Criminal Subversion of Mainstream Activities, Energy Supply Security* and *Cyber Threats*, as these themes generally involve deliberate acts.

Appendix 1

The National Network of Safety and Security Analysts

The National Network of Safety and Security Analysts (ANV) is an authoritative knowledge network, which is tasked by the Ministry of Security and Justice with performing the annual National Risk Assessment (NRA) on behalf of the National Steering Committee for National Safety and Security (SNV).

The ANV has a permanent core of six organisations (the NRA Task Group), plus an extended network (the 'ring'), made up of knowledge institutions, civil services, private companies, research agencies and consultancy firms, whose input is utilised for the NRA whenever a relevant topic arises. The permanent core consists of the following six organisations:

- The National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM)
- The Research and Documentation Centre (WODC), Ministry of Security and Justice
- General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (AIVD)
- The Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research (TNO)
- The Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'
- The International Institute of Social Studies (ISS) of the Erasmus University Rotterdam

The core organisations possess wide-ranging, multidisciplinary expertise and thus collectively span the National Security work field. The structure ensures the NRA's *all-hazard approach*, as well as methodological uniformity and cross-disciplinary analysis.

The six core organisations share responsibility for the material quality of the NRA. Specific, supplementary expertise is provided by the other organisations in the network. The organisations in the core and the ring make experts and analysts available to sit on panels, which are temporarily convened to undertake the various NRA activities. There is also a supporting secretariat (the NRA Secretariat) made up of a general secretary, panel coordinators, and project support personnel, who provide process control, progress monitoring, and support for the NRA. The NRA Secretariat acts as the fixed point of contact for the SNV, the IWNV (Interdepartmental National Security Committee), and the associated departments. The NRA Secretariat also supports the Task Group and the scenario panels in the production of the NRA, and directs and monitors the process. The NRA Secretariat is accommodated within the RIVM.

The Methodology workgroup[2] – made up of experts of a number of knowledge institutes and businesses, including several organisations belonging to the Task Group – is not part of the ANV, but operates under the responsibility of the Ministry of Security and Justice. The Methodology workgroup supports the ANV in the production of the NRA, particularly monitoring of the NRA method, answering methodical questions, and preparing refinements and changes to the method.
The ANV's main tasks are:

1. To produce the annual NRA, on the basis of themes selected by the SNV
2. To advise the SNV about appropriate themes for the (next) NRA, taking account of incident scenarios as well as developments in the (medium to) long term and very gradual processes
3. To produce other scenarios and analyses and organise expert meetings regarding National Safety and Security issues, on request of the Ministry of Security and Justice

The ANV's working methods, organisational structure, tasks and responsibilities as well as the planning cycle, the production process, the arrangements for handling knowledge and confidential information, the communication, the transfer to the panels for capability analysis, and quality and expertise assurance are all set out in a Quality Plan.

[2] This workgroup has developed the NRB methodology and has been active since the National Safety and Security Strategy was introduced in 2007.

Appendix 2

Organisations involved in the NRA

This appendix lists the organisations involved in devising the scenarios for this NRA. The following information is provided regarding each scenario: the organisation that is responsible for the content (the scenario author), the organisations that contributed to the development of the scenario (by providing essential information)[3] , and the organisations that participated in the analysis (scoring) of the scenario.

Each scoring session was attended by a representative of the Methodology Working Group to handle methodological problems and questions and to ensure consistent analysis and scoring.

[3] Note: often, before work starts on the production of scenarios, one or two brainstorming sessions are held, at which a number of experts and organisations exchange and generate ideas and information for use in development of the scenario and agree a storyline (including scope) that will enjoy sufficient support amongst the relevant experts. Only those organisations that have made a material contribution to the scenario by providing essential information or building blocks are listed. It should be noted that a number of the experts who took part in the brainstorming sessions and reviews were also involved in the scoring session.

Far-right extremism

Scenario author	General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (AIVD)
Contributors	University of Amsterdam, Overstag Uitvoering (organization providing support to young people with multiple problems), National Police, Ministry of Security and Justice, Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations
Participants in scoring session	AIVD, University of Amsterdam, Overstag Uitvoering, LindenLink consultancy, Verwey-Jonker Institute, International Institute of Social Studies, Ministry of Security and Justice

Lek Dike breach/Flooding of Lopiker- and Krimpenerwaard

Scenario authors	Blueland Consultancy and TNO, in cooperation with HKV Consultants
Contributors	Deltares, Rijkswaterstaat (Department of Public Works of the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment), Stedin, Foundation Arq/Impact, National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), Regional Medical Assistance Organisation (GHOR), Safety region Utrecht, Safety region Rotterdam-Rijnmond, Safety region Hollands Midden, Schieland en de Krimpenerwaard District Water Board, University of Amsterdam, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Security and Justice
Participants in scoring session	Deltares, Rijkswaterstaat), Stedin, Foundation Arq/Impact, RIVM, TNO, HKV Consultants, International Institute of Social Studies, Naeff Consultancy, Safety region Zuid-Holland Zuid, Safety region Hollands Midden, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Security and Justice, National Operational Coordination Centre (LOCC)

Foreign enterprise unmasked as a criminal Trojan horse

Scenario author	Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations, in cooperation with the Police Academy of the Netherlands
Contributors	International Institute of Social Studies, AIVD, WODC (Research and Documentation Centre), Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, National Police
Participants in scoring session	Clingendael, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, Erasmus University, Foundation Arq/Impact, Arcadis, Public Prosecution Service, Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Security and Justice

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