THE WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC



2013

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The White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic was approved by the Government of the Slovak Republic by resolution No. 326/2013 on 26 June 2013.

MODERN DEFENCE
MODERN **ARMED FORCES**

Mobile
Operationally Ready
Defensively Minded
Effective and Economically Sustainable
Relevant
NATO-Interoperable

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Foreword by the Minister of Defence of the Slovak Republic

The Slovak Republic has, as a sovereign, democratic and law abiding state, a commitment towards its citizens to safeguard their security and to provide for national defence. Additionally, in accordance with its international treaty obligations, it shares the responsibility for security and defence of the broader community of democratic nations - its Allies and partners associated in the Euro-Atlantic structures. The internal and external credibility of the Slovak Republic as a state is dependent on the ability to fulfil this commitment and its shared responsibilities.

In 2013, we celebrate the 20th anniversary of the Slovak Republic. In addition, twenty years passed since the establishment of its Armed Forces. That is why the beginning of this document includes a section linked to our national and military traditions that we proudly profess. This anniversary is a good opportunity not only to summarize the achievements, but also to set goals and strategy for the future. This is what we have aimed for when working on *The White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic* that you have just opened.

The first chapter of this politico-strategic document provides a realistic view of the condition in which we find ourselves. Not only does it define a stalemate in the transformation of the Armed Forces, including the naming of causes and consequences of this state, it also highlights the real risks of further deterioration of the already critical situation in the entire area of ensuring national defence.

When designing a solution to this situation, we have to respect the reality we live in, as well as the complexity and uncertainty of the current and future security environment. We point to these aspects in the next chapter knowing that even though we live relatively peaceful and safe lives now, the security threats to the Slovak Republic in fact do exist. Neither does the fact that Slovakia is a small country developing good relations with all its neighbours provide us with the immunity against a broad spectrum of threats and challenges, which ultimately can in various forms directly affect our security, as it was for example in the case of the gas crisis or massive floods. At the same time, our values and interests, the location of Slovakia and, ultimately, the very membership in NATO and the EU, make us inevitably and strongly bound to the security of a wider Euro-Atlantic area.

The fact that our security is enhanced by collective defence capabilities of NATO does not relieve us of the responsibility to guarantee at all times and primarily by ourselves the security of our citizens and the national defence in any danger. Responsible policy must not disregard the fact that history is full of events that at the time seemed unlikely but their consequences proved dire.

Such an environment requires constant readiness not only of the Armed Forces but the entire national defence system based on continuous maintenance and development of defence capabilities. Here, I want to emphasize that this is a comprehensive long-term effort, including a continuous adaptation to evolving conditions and needs. And the preparation, more specifically the readiness of national defence for the uncertain and turbulent future, is exactly what other chapters deal with.

In this context, we present a modern, realistic, conceptual development framework for the national defence capacity with emphasis on the Armed Forces and a clearly defined target state and the prerequisites for its achievement. This will be further elaborated in the conceptual and other documents, including the *Defence Department Development Plan with a View to 2024*.

We fully realize that our ability to defend ourselves is closely linked to the economic security of the state. We therefore proposed, while taking the need for rigorous fiscal consolidation into account, to implement the development strategy in two stages, each with measurable goals. In the first stage, already in this election term, we expect the equipping of one battalion of the Land Forces, which will have been the largest contribution to the development of the Armed Forces since their inception. In the second stage, in the period of 2016-2024, the main output will be the rearmament of a mechanized brigade. The result will be substantially modernized Armed Forces which, by internal transformation of units and optimisation of the command and control structures, will greatly enhance their combat readiness and usability.

But all this is not just about military hardware. Even the most sophisticated weapons would be just worthless pieces of material without soldiers. It is our duty to provide them with full support, including an up-to-date legislative treatment of military service and a stabilization of their welfare system.

With respect to the foregoing, it is obvious that our strategy is based on applying a modern approach to defence, which basically relies on a modern approach to solving the issue of personnel in line with the up-to-date requirements, on the armament of the Armed Forces with state-of-the-art equipment and latest technologies, and the application of modern methodology as provided by the Strategic Defence Review. The main output of this modern approach to defence will be **MODERN Armed Forces - M**obile, **O**perationally Ready, **D**efensively Minded, **E**ffective and Economically Sustainable, **R**elevant and **N**ATO-Interoperable. These basic attributes allow our Armed Forces to be able to perform well the established roles in protecting citizens and in the defence of the state and Allies.

I believe that the defined objectives and the course of action to be taken in terms of their implementation are realistic and affordable.

Let me express the hope that *The White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic* will be perceived by the public and politicians in the spirit of understanding that the security and defence of the state is a common concern and responsibility of all of us, regardless of political persuasion.

Finally, I want to thank all those who have participated in the preparation of this document, including professionals from key departments and experts of the Slovak security community working outside the public administration. In addition, I would like to invite the personnel of the Ministry of Defence and other elements of the national defence system to a consistent implementation of the proposed solutions.

Martin GLVÁČ
Minister of Defence of the Slovak Republic

Foreword by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic

From the early days of independence, our Armed Forces have been perceived as a guarantor of peace and security of the Slovak Republic. Every Slovak soldier swears to be loyal to the Slovak Republic and to defend its freedom, independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of its borders. It is a very strong commitment of lifelong fidelity to his/her homeland, even after discharge.

I'm very proud of our soldiers who in twenty years of the existence of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic managed to meet with honour all the demanding operational tasks at home and abroad. They deserve our respect and recognition. Unfortunately, the active participation of Slovakia in resolving crises in the world also resulted in victims in our ranks. The ultimate sacrifice of those who lost their lives in the line of duty will not be forgotten. Let us try to honourably cultivate their legacy through our work.

The past twenty years has been a period of changing our Armed Forces on the go and almost from the ground up. We had gradually rebuilt the army, which was based on the split Czech-Slovak Army, especially with regard to how Slovakia's position had evolved in the international community. Admission of Slovakia into

NATO, subsequently the EU and the long-term presence of Slovak troops in crisis areas around the world significantly determined the transformation efforts of the Armed Forces. I am proud that we were able to successfully manage both the dramatic downsizing of personnel and sharp cuts in the rank structure that occurred after 1993. Today's fully professional military personnel are ready to perform their tasks in demanding conditions of current operations. The positive feedback we receive from our allies in operations stands as a testament to this fact.

We did not manage to meet all long-term transformational goals. Perhaps the most pressing problems are associated with the slow modernization of armament. Let me emphasize that a decisive criterion of success in meeting our development goals will be in implementing the necessary replacement of obsolete equipment and material of tactical units. In the Strategic Defence Review, we have sought solutions as to how to ensure the implementation of all tasks, in view of the financial resources available, to stimulate further development and to modernize several key capabilities. I am fully aware that in the upcoming three to five years the Slovak economy will probably allow us only a limited capability development of the Armed Forces. In this situation we faced the question of whether to go again the way of a popular but not always effective economizing through a drastic reduction of troops, which in the past has also caused the loss of skilled and experienced military professionals. We will economize, but not at the expense of a possible loss of qualified personnel or a decrease in combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

Chapter 5 identifies long-term projections of the development of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic. These projections present the desired end-state of the Armed Forces development by the end of 2024, while being also the outline of the way how to achieve it. The strategy of development of the Armed Forces capabilities is the result of a combination of reasonable military requirements to ensure the fulfilment of the entire spectrum of tasks of the Armed Forces and a realistic view of the possibilities of this state within the upcoming ten to twelve years.

I think it is crucial that the leadership of the Ministry of Defence has concurred with the Command of the Armed Forces that in this situation we cannot afford to make costly changes that we have no money for, which could ultimately mean further increase in personnel instability and weakening of the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. I consider a highly qualified and expertly knowledgeable professional soldier the most valuable asset of the Armed Forces. We will therefore make changes in order to maintain highly qualified military personnel and globally stabilize the personnel environment. We will refine alternative forms of augmenting the ranks of the Armed Forces, especially with the aim of assisting our citizenry during natural disasters. We will simplify the internal structures of staffs and staff processes. We will improve logistics processes to have the day-to-day operation of the Armed Forces cheaper. This will all be linked, of course, to certain organisational changes. Nevertheless, we will implement only inevitable

organisational changes, which will not carry excessive financial costs. To increase the efficiency of capabilities development of the Armed Forces, including addressing critical shortfalls, we will actively use multinational and bilateral military co-operation, the possibilities offered by NATO and the EU in particular, but also the Visegrad Group.

I am glad that the leadership of the Ministry of Defence, even with the knowledge of unforeseeable developments of the economic crisis, plans in the next few years to start modernizing the equipment of some tactical units. The intention by the end of 2015 to equip one battalion of the Land Forces with a new type of multipurpose tactical vehicle and to make a decision on the replacement of other main weapon systems is for me a clear signal of a commitment of the leadership of the Ministry of Defence to reverse the unfavourable condition of the armament of the Armed Forces and to prepare the ground for a gradual and targeted modernization of the entire Armed Forces over the next ten years.

Let me finally express my sincere gratitude to all the soldiers and civilian employees of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic for the efforts made so far in meeting the challenges of the Armed Forces. At the same time, allow me to express my belief that the implementation of the measures we have outlined in *The White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic* will increase the operational readiness and combat potential of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic.

Lieutenant General Peter VOJTEK
Chief of the General Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic

Summary

Since 1993, the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic (hereinafter referred to as the „AF SR“) **have guaranteed national defence and security of the citizens** and in parallel performed tasks arising from international treaties.

To achieve the ability to perform these tasks, they had been transformed from a large offensive army to the defensively minded armed forces of a democratic state. **The goal of their transformation** was to develop relatively small, well equipped and trained Armed Forces capable of performing their tasks at present and in the future.

The White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic (hereinafter referred to as the „White Paper“), as the product of the Strategic Defence Review, assesses primarily how and under what conditions the transformation of the AF SR has taken place and how it was reflected in their ability to fulfil tasks. It also defines what tasks they will perform in the next decade and what they will need to fulfil them. This assessment also includes other agencies of the defence department and the state involved in the preparation for national defence.

I. Basic findings:

1) The qualitative parameters of the Armed Forces transformation have not been met in the following key areas:

- ***military personnel*** - despite a substantial reduction in numbers of the Armed Forces to one-third and the introduction of professional military service, military career growth has stalled, the aging of military personnel is progressing, units are undermanned, all of this with an impact on the level of training, expertise, scope and quality of the tasks being fulfilled;
- ***equipment*** - no armaments project concerning major military equipment was implemented, resulting in more than 70% of ground equipment being past its life cycle; in recent years modernization has basically stopped;
- ***military capabilities*** - the loss of capabilities occurred gradually, even irreversible in some cases; the goals of their development have not been met; thus, the Armed Forces have only a limited range of capabilities of limited quality; the level of their interoperability according to NATO standards reaches 54% on average, which substantially limits their ability to contribute to joint operations.

This puts in question the ability of the Slovak Republic to defend itself as well as the quality of fulfilment of international commitments, especially in terms of preparation for future conflicts.

2) Fulfilment of transformation plans is lagging behind in other elements of the Ministry of Defence in relation to the objective needs of national defence and the Armed Forces, particularly in terms of:

- a failure to complete the rationalization and streamlining of managerial and support elements;

- the existence of a large-scale infrastructure managed by the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic (hereinafter referred to as the „MoD SR"), which exceeds the needs of national defence;
- a failure to complete the restructuring of the joint stock companies administered by the MoD SR.

3) Quality and efficiency of the national defence system is limited by the:

- underdeveloped management of national defence;
- its insufficient functional interconnectedness with the national security system;
- its insufficient ability to co-operate with crisis systems of NATO, the EU and neighbours.

Underlying causes:

- a long-term imbalance and a growing gap between the tasks of national defence and resources devoted to it;
- inefficiency in the use of available resources, often influenced by the unrealistic requirements placed on the development of the Armed Forces;
- ineffective defence planning in view of the absence of a long-term development framework.

II. Basic recommendations:

Recommendations are based on the understanding that economic and social stability, along with national defence, are a significant part of overall security. They take into account the urgent need to consolidate public finances as a key prerequisite of a positive future development of Slovakia.

- ***transformation of the Armed Forces***

- stay flat reductions in the number of professional soldiers;
- stabilize the qualified and prospective military personnel;
- ensure long-term sustainability of the comprehensive welfare system of soldiers;
- optimize the command and control system of the AF SR and streamline support elements;
- transform tactical units in parallel with modernization/replacement of equipment;
- develop international co-operation in pooling and sharing capabilities;
- in further transformation proceed in two stages:

  in Stage 1 between the years 2013 and 2015 the priority lies in:
  - stabilization of current situation, retention of current standards of military personnel and range of capabilities;
  - armament of one battalion of the Land Forces with multipurpose tactical vehicles;

  in Stage 2 between the years 2016 and 2024 the priority lies in:
  - comprehensive rearmament of a mechanized brigade and other elements of the Armed Forces, thereby completing the transforma-

tion of tactical units. This will improve the combat potential and interoperability of the AF SR;

- ***defence spending*** [1]

- gradually reduce tensions between tasks and resources:
  - by the end of 2015, stabilize the resource framework so that it does not fall below 1% of GDP;
  - 2016 and after, depending on the state of public finances, gradually increase defence spending in order to decrease the imbalance between tasks and resources;

- ***utilization of available resources***

- apply a wide range of economic efficiency measures in the defence department;
- rationalize and streamline all managerial and support structures;
- contribute to higher efficiency of joint stock companies and the state-owned company administered by the defence department;
- revitalize the defence planning system – interconnect goals, tasks and resources;
- set up more effective monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for the timely correction of deficiencies;
- adjust the scope of the state property administered by the MoD SR and other defence infrastructure to the objective needs of national defence; release redundant assets;
- intensify international co-operation in capability development;

- ***defence management of the Slovak Republic***

- strengthen strategic and control role of the MoD SR;
- promote a comprehensive approach to defence and security;
- prepare a new set of conceptual documents and directives;
- ensure operational readiness of the territory and the necessary capacities of the national defence system elements to provide services and activities in support of the Armed Forces;
- foster public communication and relations in the field of national defence.

The solutions presented in this paper are not perfect, but realistic; they stay negative trends and create conditions for sustainable development of the Armed Forces in the future. These will allow us to retain the Politico-Military Ambition of the Slovak Republic at its current level, keep up the current degree of fulfilment of its international obligations, but in particular, they will allow us, in the context of rearmament of the Armed Forces, to maintain and gradually increase their combat readiness and the ability to defend the Slovak Republic.

[1] *At the time of preparation hereof, the "defence spending" means, in addition to the MoD SR budget, also expenditure in the framework of interdepartmental programs for Defence Support, Economic Mobilization and Deployment of Civilian Experts in Crisis Management Activities abroad.*

Cpt. Ján Francisci, one of the leaders of the Slovak armed struggle for national self-determination in the years 1848-1849

M. R. Štefánik - astronomer, politician, French army general and co-founder of the Czechoslovak Republic

Slovak National Uprising, the most significant anti-fascist uprising in Central Europe, in which the Army fought side by side with partisan groups

The beginning of the liberation of Czechoslovakia by members of the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps (October 1944)



NÁRODNEJ RADY

zo 16. decembra 1992

o zriadení Armády Slovenskej republik

rodná rada Slovenskej republiky sa uzniesla na
o zákone:

ne ministerstvo
rozumie sa tým
obrany Slover
republiky".

§ 1

(1) Zriaďuje sa Armáda Slovenskej republiky (ďalej
len „armáda").

(2) Na označenie armády sa používa skratka „Ar-
máda SR".

(3) Armádu tvoria vojenské útvary a zariadenia
umiestnené na území Slovenskej republiky.

§ 2

Úlohou armády je brániť slobodu, nezávislosť, su-
verenitu, územnú celistvosť Slovenskej republiky a
pomáhať pri odstraňovaní následkov živelných po-
hrôm a katastrof ohrozujúcich ľudské životy alebo
majetok vo veľkom rozsahu.

§ 3

The Act No. 3/1993 adopted by The National Council of the Slovak Republic on 16 December 1992 which established the Army of the Slovak Republic became valid on 1 January 1993

AF SR have participated in more than 30 operations and missions. Currently they are involved in six operations and missions abroad

The Slovak Republic became a NATO member on 29 March 2004. The admission ceremony of the Slovak Republic and the other six new members took place in front of NATO Headquarters on 2 April 2004

Slovak National and Military Traditions

The Slovak Republic in the context of European history has been in existence as an independent, sovereign state only briefly. The history of the Slovak nation, however, goes back deeper than that, all the way to the early Middle Ages. The population of the territory of what is today Slovakia has since then repeatedly struggled, often in arms, for their survival, freedom and statehood.

1) Historical Roots of Military Arts in Slovakia

For centuries, Slovakia was part of multinational state formations and Slovak soldiers had served and fought in their armies, many of them gaining widespread recognition either as commanders or ordinary soldiers and leaving a permanent imprint on European military history.[2]

The first truly Slovak national military units were formed during the revolutionary years of 1848 - 1849. The Slovak volunteer corps organized by the Slovak National Council as the national revolutionary authority fought until the end of the revolution in the autumn of 1849, when they were dissolved. Their military traditions remain permanently in the minds of the Slovak population and Slovak soldiers proudly harked back to them in all other struggles for national freedom and equality.

The idea of restoring a Slovak volunteer army, which would be involved in the struggle for national liberation, independence and equality, was raised for the second time during World War I by Milan Rastislav Štefánik. Later, a combined force was organized upon the emergence of a joint Czecho-Slovak resistance movement in order to jointly gain national freedom for Slovaks and Czechs.

Czecho-Slovak troops abroad (later called the Czechoslovak Legions) began to be organized in the years 1914 - 1915 on the territory of Russia and France. The most numerous were the legions in Italy; they were formed just before the end of the war and played a role especially in October - November of 1918 These Legions contributed to the victory of the Entente, but mainly helped the domestic and foreign resistance movement of Slovaks and Czechs in creating and gaining international recognition of the Czecho-Slovak state.

The Czecho-Slovak state (the Czechoslovak Republic), which was established on the 28 October 1918, built its Army mainly from members of the Czechoslovak Legions. The Army was prepared for territorial defence and by European standards was very well equipped and trained.

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[2] *E.g. Field Marshal Andrej Hadik, a descendant of a small Slovak noble family, as commander of a Habsburg hussar regiment took Berlin during the Seven Years' War in 1757 and permanently left an imprint on military history by this "escapade". Later on, he held the office of the President of the Court War Council in the Habsburg Monarchy, which can be compared to the current Minister of Defence (War). Similarly, Ladislav Gábriš - Škultéty, the Habsburg soldier of the 18th and 19th century, is considered the longest-serving soldier of all time, as he served 81 years in the army.*

On Hitler's insistence the Slovak state was established on the 14 March 1939 (named the Slovak Republic since July of 1939); its Army organization was subsequently formed on the basis of the Czechoslovak Army located in Slovakia. The Officer Corps was formed mainly from drafted reserve officers, especially teachers, which contributed to the fact that the Armed Forces had not become the backbone of the regime. During their deployment on the Eastern Front in the years 1941 - 1943, Slovak soldiers first individually, and then in whole groups defected to the allied side of the front where they primarily joined up with the Czecho-Slovak foreign army fighting on the side of the allies.

The gradually growing anti-Hitler mood among the officers led to the preparation of the armed anti-fascist rising of the Slovak Army in the Slovak National Uprising. The armed resistance began on 29 August 1944, when German troops tried to seize control of the territory of the Slovak Republic. The Slovak rebel army managed to fight for two months in the open, yet it did not surrender even after that time. Some units endured in guerrilla fighting until the arrival of the front at the turn of 1944 - 1945, some until liberation in April - May of 1945. The armed uprising of the Slovak soldiers and partisans of 29 August 1944 was one of the largest and longest analogous military risings against Nazi Germany in Europe.

Many anti-fascist-minded Slovaks in World War II also took part in the allied struggle to defeat Nazi Germany as part of the foreign Czecho-Slovak resistance. Thousands of Slovaks fought together with Czechs in battles of the Western Front: in the Battle of Britain, Northern Africa, especially at Tobruk, as well as in the fighting on the Eastern Front in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Czechoslovak Republic was restored at the end of the war as a result of their struggle.

The new Armed Forces were built primarily on the basis of foreign troops, particularly the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. After the communist coup in 1948, the Armed Forces became an instrument of power of the communist regime and, since 1955, a part of the combined forces of the Warsaw Pact. Build-up of the Army, education and training of its members, including the officers in command, met the principles and requirements of Soviet political and military doctrine.

The end of the Cold War at the turn of 1989 - 1990 also meant a call for the transformation of the Armed Forces to the conditions of the democratic polity in the new security environment. This was reflected not only in the creation of new military-strategic principles of development and employment of the Armed Forces, but also in promoting the gradual democratization changes in the management of the army and humanization of the military service.

These important historical events and milestones, especially those related to the fight of Slovaks for national freedom, against national oppression, for the European ideals of humanism, egalitarianism and equality, against fascism and war, and also the fight for peace and democracy form the basis of the military and martial traditions of Slovakia.

2) Building-up the Army of the Independent Slovak Republic

On 1 January 1993, a peaceful split of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic into two independent states took place in parallel with a division of the federal army and a formation of the Army of the Slovak Republic, from which the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic were created by the gradual transformation as of 1 July 2002. [3]

The build-up of new fully-fledged Armed Forces of a sovereign state required a transformation of the offensively-minded mass army with a predominance of heavy military equipment into Armed Forces that are smaller, modern, well-trained and which, in addition to national defence, would also fulfil international commitments, including participation in international operations and missions.

The security and defence policy of the Slovak Republic has evolved as an integral part of the overall policy of a sovereign state. An essential factor of its development was the interest of decisive political actors in the Euro-Atlantic orientation of the Slovak Republic.

In the period 1993 - 1997, the security and defence policy of the Slovak Republic was able to define adequately for that point in time the political and strategic framework for the development of defence capabilities of the Slovak Republic, including the Armed Forces. The first politico-strategic documents of the Slovak Republic *(The Defence Doctrine of the Slovak Republic, 1994, The Fundamental Objectives and Principles of the National Security of the Slovak Republic, 1996)* were timely.

The fact that the Slovak Republic was not invited to NATO in the first round of enlargement had a significantly negative impact on the overall reform efforts, which at the end of the 90s resulted in a lower level of readiness of the Army of the Slovak Republic.

The period from 1998 to 2003 saw qualitative changes in the security and defence policy of the Slovak Republic that were associated with the intensification of integration efforts and the subsequent invitation of the Slovak Republic to negotiations on accession to NATO. For the first time in the history of the Slovak Republic, standard strategic documents were approved in 2001 *(The Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic, The Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic,* and *The Military Strategy of the Slovak Republic)* which defined the objectives and tasks of the security and defence policy of a democratic state aspiring to join NATO and the EU.

Subsequently in 2002, *The Long-Term Plan of the Structure and Development of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic - the Development Plan and Programs, Including Their Financial Performance (Model 2010)* was adopted. Although, it still focused on the individual and territorial defence of the Slovak Republic, it created

[3] *By 30 June 2002, the Armed Forces consisted of three separate elements - the Army of the Slovak Republic, the Troops of the Ministry of Interior and the Railway Troops. From 1 July 2002, the Army of the Slovak Republic was officially renamed the AF SR (consisted of the Land Forces of the AF SR, the Air Force of the AF SR and the Training and Support Forces of the AF SR) with the Railway Troops and the Troops of the Ministry of Interior dissolved as of 31 December 2002.*

space for integration with NATO. For the first time, the necessary resource framework for the development of the defence department was defined and guaranteed by resolutions of the Government of the Slovak Republic and the National Council of the Slovak Republic.

During this period, related legal norms that formed the basis for change in the approach to defence capabilities development planning, including the Armed Forces in the context of the Euro-Atlantic integration, were also adopted. In March 2003, as a pre-condition for joining NATO, the Slovak Government approved the *Implementation Timetable of Reforms* which defined individual reform steps and guaranteed the commitment of the Government of the Slovak Republic to allocate the necessary resources for defence.

In the period 2004 - 2008, the security and defence policy of the Slovak Republic focused on the issues related to its functioning in the EU and NATO and other commitments of the Slovak Republic. In 2005, the National Council of the Slovak Republic approved new politico-strategic documents *(The Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic* and *The Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic)* which were fully compatible with the strategic documents of the EU and NATO and clearly defined the new nature of the defence of the Slovak Republic in the framework of collective defence, formulating requirements arising from the transition from territorial defence to defending interests. These documents together with the adoption and amendments to relevant acts created a corresponding strategic and legal framework for national defence as part of collective defence, and the fulfilment of NATO and EU commitments.

In 2005, a new conceptual document, *The Long-Term Development Plan of the Ministry of Defence with a View to 2015 (Model 2015)*, which laid emphasis on building expeditionary forces while at the same time, in contrast with *Model 2010*, predicting a lower level of defence spending, was approved. Its implementation was lagging behind as well, which was negatively reflected particularly in the process of modernizing and development of the Armed Forces capabilities. On 1 January 2006, the AF SR became fully professional with conscription legally retained.

Since 2009, the unfavourable situation in the Armed Forces has been worsened by the effects of the economic crisis on defence spending, the level of which showed a significant downward trend. At the same time, the growing demand for capabilities development and gradual shift in the Slovak Republic‘s participation in international crisis response operations in favour of higher intensity operations under NATO command brought with it increased demands on human, material, but in particular, financial resources.

The slowdown in the transformation of the Armed Forces began to gradually limit the fulfilment of their basic tasks. The urgent need to define new parameters for the long-term development of the defence capacity of the Slovak Republic with an emphasis on the projection of the future development of the Armed Forces, while responding primarily to the reduced levels of defence spending, resulted in the initiation of the Strategic Defence Review process in the second half of 2010.

Training of mechanized units on BMP-2

Sniper during training

The cockpit of a modernized
Slovak Air Force helicopter Mi-17

A MiG-29 fighter jet during take off fulfilling tasks of protecting Slovak air space

A Mi-17 helicopter customized for air search and rescue operations

Joint military training of Land Forces and Air Force

Current State of Slovak Defence

1) Despite the fact that the Government and other relevant institutions of the Slovak Republic have continually dealt with issues of ensuring national defence since its very inception, they failed to achieve the necessary continuity in the long-term development of its defence capabilities.

2) The results achieved were determined by political priorities in relation to the ambitions of the Slovak Republic to integrate with Euro-Atlantic organizations, as well as by the level of the resources allocated to national defence.

3) Ultimately, the results were also affected by inadequate strategic management of national defence, the level of effectiveness of decision-making processes in managing allocated resources and often by unrealistic (inefficient) requirements placed on development of the Armed Forces.

1) Implementation of the Basic Objective of the Defence Policy of the Slovak Republic

4) The basic objective of the defence policy of the Slovak Republic to ensure the security of its citizens and national defence had been implemented by 2004 with limited defence capacity of the Slovak Republic; after joining NATO, this was augmented by the defence potential of Allies within the framework of collective defence.

5) The ability of the Alliance to guarantee the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area, and to contribute to the strengthening of global security and stability, has become essential to the security of the Slovak Republic. That is also why the Slovak Republic has not been exposed to any direct military threat, which would have an immediate impact on its security, independence and democratic constitution. The sense of security associated with membership in NATO and the EU caused that ensuring defence has gradually ended up on the periphery of public and political concern. This happened despite the fact that the security environment had contained real threats and challenges to the security of the Slovak Republic and its citizens.

2) Security Environment

6) The Security Environment of the Slovak Republic has been affected since 1993 by highly dynamic changes, complexity, interdependence of actors and processes, and instability in the global security environment. This was marked by an increase in the number of intrastate conflicts and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the threat of mass migration and other asymmetric threats, including threats to energy security and cyberspace. This development has adversely affected the realization of the security interests of the Slovak Republic.

7) The Euro-Atlantic security environment was determinedly influenced by the reaction of the international community to the activities of militant extremist groups using terrorist methods on an international scale. The nature of combat engagement in international crisis response operations has increased the pressure to develop new capabilities of armed forces, with emphasis on their deployability and sustainability far from home. NATO and the EU, in response to this development, apply a comprehensive approach utilizing a wide range of tools and mechanisms including the development of new, highly sophisticated and very expensive defence capabilities.

3) National Defence System

8) Since the foundation of the Slovak Republic, the political leaders, the leadership of the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces have not been able to maintain a frank and on-going dialogue about a strategic direction, key issues of national defence, nor the development of the Armed Forces and their funding.

... current conceptual framework of the national defence system fails to fully meet the requirements...

9) The current conceptual framework of the national defence system, which dates back to 2002, fails to fully meet the requirements whether in the context of NATO and EU membership, or arising from the nature of the security environment. This is especially true for the effectiveness of its management. Its closer links with the national security system in dealing with crises as well as the vital links with corresponding systems of NATO, the EU and neighbouring countries are lacking.

10) Within the MoD SR, as a governmental department responsible for performing essential tasks of national defence, there is no clearly defined responsibility of its organizational branches for strategic planning, defence management and development of the Armed Forces. A functional link between the goals and tasks on the one hand and resources on the other is missing.

11) The MoD SR, including its directly subordinate structures, has not reached the requisite level in the rationalization of its structures and efficiency in their operation despite almost annual organizational changes and layoffs.

Chart No. 1
*Peacetime establishment numbers of the MoD SR + DSOF**



*DSOF = Directly Subordinate Offices and Facilities of the MoD SR including Military Police
- Data of 2013 reflect the condition as of 1 March 2013

12) Implementation of the tasks of preparing for defence support, involving other ministries and central institutions of state administration, was influenced by a complex process of public procurement of goods and services, lengthy legal property settlements in the facilities of interest, but also reduced spending in budgets of directly involved ministries and other central institutions of state administration. As a result, time lags occurred in the implementation of some activities, which did not, however, fundamentally jeopardize the system of national defence support.

Chart No. 2
Total expenditure of interdepartmental Programme for Defence Support in the years 2007 - 2012



4) Employment of the Armed Forces

13) The AF SR have been established as an organic part of the democratic state and a power tool of protection and defence of the Slovak Republic, including its airspace. So far, they have been used neither independently nor collectively to defend either the territory of the Slovak Republic or the Allies against military attack. They have been deployed most commonly in international crisis response operations and for the protection of citizens as part of the crisis management in the Slovak Republic. At the same time, they have contributed to the rotations of the NATO and EU rapid reaction forces.

... participation of the AF SR in operations is of crucial importance not only for the international credibility of the Slovak Republic...

14) Since the establishment of the independent Slovak Republic in 1993, its armed forces participated in more than thirty operations and missions abroad led by NATO, the EU, the UN or within the framework of international coalitions in different countries on three continents. Participation of the AF SR in operations with around 590 soldiers sustained in recent years is of crucial importance for the international credibility of the Slovak Republic in terms of the fulfilment of its obligations in maintaining peace and stability in the world, and has also enhanced its weight in promoting its own foreign policy objectives.

Chart No. 3
Number of troops in international crisis response operations



15) Given the absence of the required quality and range of capabilities of the AF SR, contingents based on compact organic units were as a rule not deployed to operations. This resulted in the fact that the overall benefit derived from the participation of the AF SR in operations for the development of their combat capabilities has been so far severely limited.

16) Increase of operational tempo in international crisis management is associated not only with the increase of demands on the quality and range of operational capabilities, but also with the increase of their cost. As this increase is being fully covered by the MoD SR budget, it narrows its development opportunities and the development of the Armed Forces in particular.

Chart No. 4
*International crisis response operations expenditure**



* Includes only expenses for deploying and sustaining AF SR contributions to operations

17) Since the accession to NATO and the EU, the tasks of the AF SR have also included participating in NATO Response Force (hereinafter referred to as „NRF“) and EU Battle Group (hereinafter referred to as „EU BG“) rotations, which brought additional demands on resources to ensure their preparation and maintenance in standby mode as well as their possible deployment.

Table No. 1
Development of the participation of the AF SR in the NATO/EU rapid reaction forces

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Number of persons	NRF 4 persons	NRF 23 persons	NRF 789 persons	NRF 24 persons		NRF 6 persons	NRF 153 persons
				EU BG 442 persons	EU BG 346 persons		

18) Funding of an unscheduled deployment and sustainment of forces in international crisis response operations and in the framework of the NRF and the EU BG is not systematically resolved. Any funding of an unscheduled deployment and sustainment of units in rapid reaction forces at a company level by the MoD SR would mean, given the present participation in international crisis response operations, a collapse of the MoD SR budget.

19) The AF SR has been more frequently and to a greater extent deployed to protect lives, health and property of citizens and the state property within the crisis management in the Slovak Republic. They have supported civil authorities to prevent and deal with the consequences of natural disasters (floods, forest fires, snow calamity), with violations of public order on a large scale (looting of shops and warehouses), as well as by their engagement in a variety of security activities under the responsibility of the Police Corps (e.g. assistance in transporting euro currency, air search and rescue service, tracking down missing persons, securing high-profile events), and/or by emergency deployment of military medics in order to assist in ensuring delivery of health care to citizens.

5) Defence Spending

… the fundamental problem is in a continuous imbalance between tasks and resources…

20) A fundamental and long-standing problem in ensuring the defence of the Slovak Republic and the transformation of the AF SR is in a continuous imbalance between tasks and resources actually allocated for their implementation. The intention of the Government of the Slovak Republic [4] or the National Council of the Slovak Republic [5], approved by several governmental and parliamentary decisions to allocate a minimum of 2% of GDP to national defence or to the MoD SR budget has not been fulfilled, while the tasks of the Armed Forces have steadily increased in many areas. This has resulted in a critical situation in the most important areas of the operation of the defence department, including the development of the Armed Forces.

[4] *The Resolution of the Government of the Slovak Republic No. 1004/2001; The Resolution of the Government of the Slovak Republic No. 133/2003; The Resolution of the Government of the Slovak Republic No. 607/2004.*
[5] *The Resolution of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 2403/2002; The Resolution of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 2404/2002.*

21) Since 2009, the defence spending of the Slovak Republic, due to the economic crisis, has been gradually reduced to around 1.1% of GDP in 2012 in the approved budget. In addition, the instability and unpredictability in the medium-term resource allocation to defence and the freezing of the allocated defence funds by the Government of the Slovak Republic have almost yearly further limited the possibility of implementing key reform projects. These restrictions disrupted the expenditure plans and defence planning processes themselves for the years ahead and caused improvisation accompanied by low efficiency in utilizing available resources.

Chart No. 5
Actual MoD SR expenditure compared with 2% of GDP



6) Efficiency of Utilizing Available Resources

…a lower level of efficiency in utilizing available resources…

22) A long-term imbalance between tasks and resources was increased by a lower level of efficiency in utilizing available resources in the defence planning process, including low functionality, efficiency and transparency of procurement processes which increased the resource deficit in the defence department. These factors, along with often disproportionate requirements for the development of the Armed Forces, resulted in the fact that even resources actually allocated to the defence department were not always used for the planned development priorities of the required capabilities of the Armed Forces.

23) Strategic, long-term objectives of the defence policy have not been sufficiently reflected in program plans and draft budgets. Furthermore, the allocated budget was revised during the fiscal year or priorities were changed. This in turn caused changes in the annual procurement plan. Although the revised plan was mostly implemented, the negative consequences of the deviation from the original plans were not evaluated realistically. This system of managing resources proved to be insufficiently effective and non-transparent.

7) Armed Forces Transformation

24) Comprehensive transformation goals of the AF SR were defined for the first time in the long-term plan – *Model 2010*. The National Council of the Slovak Republic agreed to allocate for its implementation at least 2% of GDP [6] within the MoD SR budget. NATO in its defence planning process transferred most of the goals of our transformation plan into the Force Goals 2004 for the Slovak Republic upon its admission to NATO in 2004. The size of this commitment accounted for fair burden sharing of the overall Allied efforts, the economic potential, as well as the declared commitment of the constitutional authorities of the Slovak Republic in terms of resource allocation.

25) Achieving NATO ambitions in a changing security environment, in particular the nature, condition and operational tempo in Afghanistan, made it necessary to develop new capabilities of armed forces to increase their deployability and sustainability in operations abroad for extended periods. Development of new capabilities significantly increased the strain on resources. In 2006, these requirements were reflected in the Force Goals 2006 for the Slovak Republic. Based on these requirements the current conceptual framework of the Armed Forces transformation (*Model 2015*) was approved; this long-term plan assumed an MoD SR budget of around 1.85% or 1.86% of GDP. However, similarly as with *Model 2010*, these fiscal provisions were not met. Resource insufficiencies limited the potential of long-term continuity in implementing development plans of the defence department and the transformation of the Armed Forces.

[6] *The Resolution of the Government of the Slovak Republic No. 1004/2001 – at least 1.89% of GDP in the years 2002 - 2005; 2% of GDP since 2006;*
The Resolution of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 2403/2002 – since 2003, at least 2% of GDP;
The Resolution of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 2404/2002 - 1.89% of GDP in 2002; 2% of GDP in 2003 and +0.1% of GDP annually by 2006.

26) Work on a new long-term plan *(Model 2020)*, in response to the commitments made in the framework of NATO (Force Goals 2008) and to the lagging of the transformation of the Armed Forces, in contrast with the projected progress defined in *Model 2015*, was stopped in October of 2009. Thus, the absence of an up-to-date conceptual framework for a long-term development of the defence department, including the Armed Forces, has lasted until now.

Chart No. 6

MoD SR budget as a percentage of GDP – reality vs. plans



Model 2010 – The Resolution of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 2404/2002;
Model 2015 – The Resolution of the Government of the Slovak Republic No. 1016/2005.

27) Failure to provide declared resources, as postulated in approved long-term development plans of the defence department and inefficiency in the use of available resources, including unreasonable demands by the Armed Forces, along with increasing tasks, has gradually led to the slowdown of the AF SR transformation. In recent years, it has even led to its complete suspension in some areas.

28) Fundamental problems remain in the replacement and modernization of major equipment and material, and the stability and readiness of military personnel. Due to the financial constrains, there has been a decrease of quantity and quality of military training. All this factors have a negative impact on the development of key capabilities. Development of the Armed Forces capabilities is increasingly lagging behind in achieving qualitative and quantitative parameters according to NATO capability statements (Force Goals) within agreed deadlines. International co-operation (e.g. pooling and sharing) that might streamline capabilities development is taken advantage of by the Slovak Republic only to a limited extent.

... the AF SR have only a limited range of capabilities...

29) The AF SR have only a limited range of capabilities and those are of only a limited quality. The level of their interoperability according to NATO standards is very low, which greatly limits their potential for joint deployment to operations with Allied forces, particularly high intensity operations. In addition, the declared units that have already been certified have met capability requirements only at minimal levels; some of them have lost the achieved level of capability after the stand-by period was terminated.

30) It will not be possible to retain and develop capabilities of the AF SR in the full range of commitments in line with NATO Force Goals (in the next planning cycle called „*Capability Targets*“) without a positive development of the resource framework, its more effective use in accordance with the strategic goals and greater involvement in international cooperation.

31) The objectives in the area of operational readiness of the Armed Forces were also not met; except for units declared to the NRF and the EU BG and some of the declared units being prepared to meet capability statements under Forces Goals commitments, units have not increased their level of operational readiness in recent years; in several of them the level of operational readiness has even decreased.

32) Despite the gradually performed reduction in the command and control structures of the Armed Forces, the process of their rationalization and optimization is not completed.

8) Professionalization of Military Personnel

33) The decision to professionalize the Armed Forces since 2006 has brought desirable changes in the composition of military personnel, including changes in the rank structure in favour of the rank and file as well as the warrant officer and NCO corps. However, in the following period some non-systemic amendments to the *Act on the State Service of Professional Soldiers* were made, which destabilized personnel policy.

… the aging of military personnel continues…

34) Due to the insufficient rotation of the rank and file and NCOs, career development has almost halted completely and the aging of military personnel continues. In recent years, recruitment to the AF SR was limited mainly because of lacking resources, while the retirement rate of professional soldiers is higher than of those recruited. The number of professional soldiers in units is on average about 85% of full strength (2012). The long-term challenges are an insufficient level of foreign language proficiency as a prerequisite of successful operations in multinational formations and the recruitment of highly qualified specialists, particularly with medical and other specific skills. Shortfalls exist in the level of professional training as well.

35) Professionalization has also brought greater demands on funding of military personnel which along with the shrinking MoD SR budget increased the portion of the overall defence department expenditure on military personnel. This untenable situation puts pressure on reducing the peacetime strength of units which ultimately leads to decline in their level of preparedness for implementation of tasks. Since compulsory military service was abolished by professionalizing the Armed Forces, the size of reserves of at least a basic military skill level is gradually shrinking. There are no active reserves created and thus, no preparation of reserves takes place; the existing legal framework does not allow their use in fulfilling tasks of the Armed Forces in the state of security.

9) Armaments

36) Frequent changes of conceptual plans for the development of the Armed Forces and the resulting changes in their development priorities and the long-term insufficient funding of development plans implementation have not even allowed for a basic systemic replacement and modernization of equipment and material of the Armed Forces. In the period since 1993, not a single major project aimed at the systemic replacement of either major military equipment and material, or communication and information systems has been completed.

37) Projects demanding major investments had been regularly postponed. Modernization was focused on acute needs associated with the implementation of selected international commitments, ultimately making it fragmented. The effect of such a modernization of the Armed Forces` capabilities was therefore limited. The procurement of vehicles, specific variants of containers, special engineer equipment, personal equipment and accoutrements was limited. Air Force equipment, air defence ground equipment and artillery equipment have partially been upgraded (modernized); a shift occurred in the development of the communication and information systems with emphasis on systems of command, control and information transfer.

38) The pace of modernization has been gradually slowing down and in recent years it has stopped in many areas. This accumulates the need for major investments in a relatively short period after 2015.

... the life cycle of 70% of the ground equipment has expired...

39) The most sensitive is the absence of replacement and modernization of transport and specialized vehicles, armoured fighting vehicles, systems of aerial reconnaissance and air defence, combat and transport aircraft (helicopters, airlifters), as well as mobile communication and information systems which are crucial for the interoperability of the AF SR. The life cycle of approximately 70% of the ground equipment has expired. The battle systems and equipment of the Air Force including radars and certain types of aircraft are approaching the end of their life cycle.

40) The share of defence spending earmarked for modernization of equipment well below the NATO recommended level of 20% of the overall defence expenditures and the lack of a systemic approach to life cycle management of equipment and material, did not create preconditions for rearmament of the AF SR. Without a comprehensive solution, the AF SR are condemned to being in a „critical state“ and to a gradual loss of core capabilities necesary to ensure the security of citizens and national defence.

10) Infrastructure and State Property Administration in the Defence Department

41) In the past, the existence and maintenance of excessive movable and immovable state property administered by the MoD SR and a large number of buildings under construction have significantly drained resources needed for the development of the Armed Forces. The range of assets has gradually declined in the context of changes in the organizational structures and dislocations.

42) In recent years, the process of dealing with redundant state assets of the MoD SR has been considerably accelerated allowing for a dynamic reduction of operation costs including the costs of property protection and property taxes, as well as of renovation.

43) Ownership transfer of redundant assets by way of sale, which has also increased since 2009 due to changes in legislation, has resulted in increased budget revenues. The unusable movable property of the MoD SR has been also continuously disposed of.

... the majority of infrastructure is in poor condition and outdated...

44) Infrastructure development, which has been continuously underfunded along with the significant limitation of investment in its modernization and maintenance, have resulted in that nowadays the majority of infrastructure administered by the MoD SR is in poor condition, outdated and costly to operate.

45) The process of optimizing the quantity of assets and places of dislocation is not complete. The number of facilities and the extent of real estate including garrison firing ranges and training grounds must be defined once again in relation to the needs of national defence and the AF SR.

Conclusion

The basic objective of defence policy – the security of citizens and national defence – **had been provided for** independently and also, after NATO admission, by utilizing the potential of collective defence.

… do not change the basic goal of transformation, but change the ways of its achievement…

The basic goal of the transformation of the Armed Forces – to develop relatively small, well equipped and trained armed forces – included in all long-term documents **has not been met in qualitative parameters in particular**. Despite the massive reduction in numbers of personnel, equipment and infrastructure, resources necessary to modernize the Armed Forces were not generated. The current numbers of soldiers are no longer sufficient for a full-fledged fulfilment of tasks; any further reductions would lead to irreversible loss of certain capabilities.

The level of implementation of tasks in the field of national defence was limited by prolonged insufficient defence spending, its instability and by inefficiency of management processes in achieving desired results with available resources. Funding for transformation was also drained by growing demands of the ongoing international crisis response operations requiring new and costly capabilities. These factors led to a **critical state of the Armed Forces, an actual halting of their transformation and other deteriorating trends**. Consequently, the Slovak Republic is lagging behind in implementing its own plans as well as commitments within the framework of collective defence.

In order to avoid a progressive and uncontrolled loss of several capabilities of the AF SR, **a systemic solution should be adopted** that would be sustainable in the long-term, steadily funded and consistently implemented. The basic premise for such a solution is to define a new framework of long-term development.

The result of the transformation process to date offers the following lesson: **“do not change the basic goal of transformation, but change fundamentally the practices, methods and conditions of its achievement”.**

Transportation of Slovak troops and materiel for operation ISAF in Afghanistan

Utilization of communication and information technologies when training the AF SR

Leader preparation also takes place on the ground in several training facilities

An EOD specialist with a robot for reconnaissance and disposal of improvised explosive devices

Hands-on landmine clearing under difficult conditions of ISAF

Slovak-produced armoured vehicle TATRAPAN is usable also in operations and missions abroad
Photo – during deployment in Afghanistan

Future Security Environment and Challenges

1) Global Security Environment

… complexity, instability and uncertainty of the security environment development…

46) The global security environment will likely continue to be characterized by a dynamic development including its complexity, instability and uncertainty. Globalization as a major factor in the evolution of the security environment increases the interconnectedness and interdependence between states and hence their vulnerability. Its character and form may be significantly affected by the values and interests of new power centres. The interdependence between the internal and external security dimensions will likely be deepened, while tensions, crises and conflicts within the individual states could in greater extent affect their external security environment.

47) Global market relations can also deepen economic differences between countries and polarize the situation inside countries, possibly resulting in tensions, crises and conflicts, which may take on an international character. It is likely that the depletion of non-renewable and scarce raw materials and energy resources, and the effort to access them, will become increasingly a source of global power rivalry.

48) Economic factors, together with the increase in the world population and urbanization rate, may increase extremely demands on the ability of states to regulate and meet the growing needs of their populations, even in terms of basic foodstuffs and fresh water. This can be a source of tensions and crises that might erupt into armed conflicts between states and within states, or even lead to failures of states. It is likely that the number of failing states will increase. This may result in an uncontrolled migration to other states, an increse of intolerance and xenophobia towards immigrants, and manifestations of political extremism and conflicts based on cultural, religious, ethnic and lifestyle differences.

49) The increased mobility of individuals in connection with the global transport infrastructure can lead to a rapid, difficult-to-control spread of epidemics. Climate change, environmental degradation and natural disasters have also their significant destabilizing potential in relation to the global security environment.

50) Various manifestations of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery and their components, as well as dual-use materials pose a serious security threat that may grow. An uncontrolled spread of weapons of mass destruction together with their acquisition by terrorist groups should be considered as the most serious security threat.

51) The expansion of information and communication technologies creates preconditions for sharing common values, interests and self-identification among individuals and groups, but at the same time, can strengthen the awareness of differences, including different values and interests which could generate frustration, as well as radicalism in their protection or enforcement. The mass-media and a personalized information flow will most likely influence political decisions and public opinion in real time which can be misused in information wars.

52) A higher rate of the utilization of advanced communications and information technology will probably increase the dependence of public and private institutions and individuals on the stability of the cyberspace infrastructure and free access to it. Cyberspace can be misused by state and non-state actors for attacks against public and private critical infrastructure. The misuse of cyberspace can become one of the ways of waging war.

53) Space and its use by sophisticated but violable infrastructure represents an area of international co-operation, but also rivalry. In case of an increase in the number of actors with the ability to reach Earth's orbit, higher utilization of space for military purposes is likely.

2) The Security Environment of the Slovak Republic

54) The Slovak Republic is by its geographic location and historical, cultural, political and economic ties part of the Euro-Atlantic area. Based on the principle of indivisibility of security, the threats to the Euro-Atlantic area are considered to be the threats to the Slovak Republic. Taking into account national circumstances, the Slovak Republic perceives future security threats as follows:

55) The likelihood of an extensive conventional armed conflict in the Euro-Atlantic area in the foreseeable future is low, but it cannot be completely excluded. The strengthening of military capabilities in many countries outside the Euro-Atlantic area, while defence spending of NATO and EU Member States is declining, represents a serious security risk.

56) A greater threat to the security of the Slovak Republic in the future could be posed by states not respecting norms of international law and carrying out an aggressive foreign policy and, at the same time, developing weapons of mass destruction and missile technology capable of reaching the territory of the Slovak Republic and its Allies.

57) Persistence and emergence of new local military and non-military conflicts outside the Euro-Atlantic area is likely while their escalation to a regional scale cannot be excluded. In this context, the security of the Slovak Republic will be particularly influenced apart from developments in the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe, by developments in North Africa, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia with possible negative consequences such as destabilization of regions, humanitarian crises, mass illegal migration and threats to the flow of strategic raw materials.

58) The deployment of missile systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons in the immediate neighbourhood of NATO countries constitutes an increased security risk to the Euro-Atlantic area, including the Slovak Republic.

59) The territory of the Slovak Republic could be used by terrorist groups as a transit and logistic base to support terrorist attacks elsewhere in Europe, while a terrorist act on our territory cannot be excluded. The probability of lone wolf terrorism on our soil is expected to increase.

60) Disruption of transport corridors, the energy raw materials grid or interruption of supply poses a threat with potentially serious consequences not only to the economy but also to the ability of the Slovak Republic to defend itself and to its general population.

61) The overall security of the Slovak Republic could be negatively affected by a potential deepening of problems of the European economic and monetary union. These can trigger protectionism, nationalist tendencies, as well as social tensions including mass unrest that may also occur in the Slovak Republic.

62) Other (uncoordinated) cuts in defence spending of Allies can undermine mutual solidarity, collective defence efforts and credibility of the Alliance. Under such conditions one cannot exclude the emergence of tensions in relations between the Slovak Republic and those countries which it currently shares common values with, as well as membership in international political, economic and security organizations. This would result in a significant threat to international guarantees of defence of the Slovak Republic and the security of its citizens.

63) A deepening inequality in distribution of incomes, wealth and living standards among citizens and regions within the state, the lack of public resources to mitigate such differences, the weakening of intergenerational solidarity, as well as an uneven population growth of various ethnic groups in the Slovak Republic can lead to social tensions and mass discontent of citizens in these regions.

64) Various populist or extremist groups with the agenda of weakening or destroying the constitutional system of the Slovak Republic or its sovereignty and territorial integrity may take advantage of such a situation in order to provoke large-scale riots and expressions of civil disobedience. This can lead to a decrease or loss of confidence in the ability of the institutions of representative democracy to solve problems in the society.

65) In connection with the increased use of information technologies in the public and private sectors, the threat of disruption of cyberspace and information systems of the political, financial, commercial and economic institutions in the country will most likely grow as well having an impact on the security interests of the Slovak Republic.

66) Activities of foreign intelligence services directed against the security interests of the Slovak Republic, in particular the pursuit of infiltration into the central institutions of state administration and the security forces, pose a constant security threat.

67) Organized crime, particularly in relation to the illegal trade in arms and explosives, including smuggling of materials of dual-use, but also people smuggling, corruption and money laundering will remain a serious threat to the security of the Slovak Republic.

68) Large scale natural disasters and man-made disasters in the Slovak Republic or in its neighbourhood that are difficult to predict, particularly massive floods, forest fires and industrial accidents, could seriously challenge the security of the Slovak Republic. The frequency and magnitude of natural disasters may increase regionally as a result of global climate change.

3) Anticipated Theatre of Operations of the Armed Forces

69) The future theatre of operations of the Armed Forces **outside the territory of the Slovak Republic** in areas more or less distant from the Euro-Atlantic region will be most likely characterized as complex and multi-dimensional in terms of different geographical, climatic, political, economic, cultural and religious conditions. It can be assumed that there will be most likely a lack of support of the local population, a number of mutually overlapping lines of conflict, none or limited Host Nation Support and insufficiently developed or functioning legitimate state authorities or institutions.

70) Within the area of operations there will likely be neither a clear distinction between battle zones and rear areas, nor a clear distinction between opposing armed forces and the civilian population. Operations of the Armed Forces will be conducted mainly against opponents conducting irregular, asymmetric warfare. Hybrid conflicts characterized by a combination of conventional and unconventional ways of fighting in different stages of the conflict or simultaneously, continue to be likely. The area will also most likely be characterized by the simultaneous presence of various international, governmental and non-governmental organizations.

71) The theatre of operations of the Armed Forces **in national crisis management** will be determined by the place, type and extent of the crisis. The frequency of their deployment and their contribution to national crisis management will likely increase in the context of multiplying natural disasters and their increasing consequences.

72) In order to create the grounds for a strategic, operational and tactical advantage in case of defending against military threats, especially to ensure fast deployment and efficient operation of the Armed Forces, as well as Allied armed forces, **defending the Slovak Republic** against an aggressor, operational preparation of the territory including Host Nation Support will be enhanced beforehand. During the execution of defence operations in Slovakia, all-round assistance and support will be provided by all elements across the security system, by private businesses and individuals including the mobilization of human and material capacities of the state.

4) Requirements for National Defence

73) The Slovak Republic, in view of its limited defence capabilities, is able to respond effectively to a significant part of the above mentioned security threats and challenges only **through playing an active role within international organizations.**

74) It also follows from the fact that individual states are usually not able due to the complexity of current security threats and challenges to deal with them effectively on its own, especially with threats such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missile attacks against population centres, armed forces or critical infrastructure, regional conflicts, failing states, activities of internationally active terrorist groups, coordinated cyber-attacks, disruptions in the supplies of strategic raw materials, effects of the global economic crisis, climate change and large-scale natural disasters, global poverty problems, migration and epidemics.

75) Treaty guarantees of collective defence and membership in international organizations have not, however, relieved the Slovak Republic of its **primary obligation to guarantee its security and defence by means of its own capacities** in line with the UN Charter. The Slovak Republic must be able to act **independently and directly by employing** its full defence capacity to all challenges and threats to the state coming from external or internal environments. **This requires the state not only to continuously maintain adequate military capabilities to address the most probable threat scenarios to the Slovak Republic, but also to have the ability to gradually generate military capabilities in time to be able to meet the worst-case threat scenario**. This approach is fully consistent with a holistic perception of the North Atlantic Treaty including Article 3 which

requires the Parties, **separately and jointly**, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, **maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack**.

76) Traditional and new threats are becoming more complex and their effective handling requires a **comprehensive approach** integrating the use of military and non-military instruments. This increases requirements on the level of readiness of the national defence system with emphasis on the development of sophisticated and often costly capabilities, the quality of its management and efficient use of the national defence capacity. It also increases the need to improve the tools and mechanisms of the **early warning system** to identify emerging threats in order to adopt effective countermeasures in time.

77) The key requirement for a coordinated and effective action by the public authorities in the management of the state in all crises situations is the **interconnectedness of the national defence system with the security system of the Slovak Republic**. Equally important will be its active **involvement in the crisis management system of international organizations and a functional co-operation with the crisis management systems of neighbouring countries**.

78) The Slovak Republic, in response to the evolution of the security environment, must ensure the development of a **single set of capabilities** of the AF SR to be capable of a flexible response to any particular crisis situation at home as well as abroad.

79) **In addition to their primary role, the AF SR** must also be prepared to **respond effectively to non-military threats** on Slovak soil. The most likely form of employment of the Armed Forces in national crisis management will be in a decentralized support of the local state administration and self-government authorities in the prevention, elimination or mitigation of the consequences caused by natural disasters and industrial accidents. The Armed Forces could assist e.g. in the evacuation of people from vulnerable areas, making roads passable and by other means within their capacities if the solution of the situation exceeds the means and capabilities of other elements of the security system of the Slovak Republic. This may particularly include a provision of transport capacities, engineer capabilities, special firefighting capabilities, medical capabilities, air search and rescue service and the capabilities of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) protection for air quality control and decontamination. AF SR must also be prepared to provide assistance in maintaining public order if threatened by the activities of various extremist and pressure groups. In case the nature and consequences of an extraordinary

incident as well as the urgency of the solution make it necessary, the AF SR must be prepared to provide all available capabilities.

80) To address the threats and security challenges **within international efforts**, the AF SR must develop capabilities for **an efficient discharge of their tasks within the framework of collective defence and/or in international crisis response operations**. The international crisis response operations, as the most probable future form of deployment of the AF SR, will be mainly carrying out the following tasks of: peace enforcement, peacekeeping, post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, providing of humanitarian aid, support for the security and defence sector reforms and development of local security forces. Development of scarce and costly capabilities, particularly the development of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, strategic transport and missile defence etc., requires greater multinational co-operation within NATO and the EU which also offers the opportunity to spend resources more effectively.

81) In accordance with the principle of civilian control and democratic oversight of the Armed Forces, tasks of national defence, resources allocated to it and the level of defence capabilities are determined by democratically elected constitutional authorities of the state. Should the Slovak Republic, including its Armed Forces, be incapable of covering all possible threats, a risk to the security of citizens and national defence would inevitably arise. It will be up to the political leadership of the state to determine the level of **acceptable risk** taking into account the expected development of the security environment and the economic potential of the state.

Members of the AF SR
assisting citizens during floods
in Devín (2013)

Live firing of
anti-aircraft missile system
2K12 KUB (SA-6) in Poland

Engineer Company servicemen
building a pontoon bridge
in Breznica

A Slovak Guard Unit of ISAF while performing checks of locally contracted transport operators entering Kandahar Air Base

Professional soldiers training in conditions similar to a real combat situation

A Slovak-produced demining machine Božena fulfilling tasks in Afghanistan

Slovak military policemen taking part in NATO Multinational Military Police Battalion training in Poland

Hands-on demining training

Future Defence Efforts of the Slovak Republic

Defence efforts of the Slovak Republic express the will and clear determination of the Government to continuously guarantee defence of the Slovak Republic and security of citizens in the current and future security environments, and to maintain and develop the necessary defence capabilities. The extent and pattern of the defence efforts is based on the political decisions of the state leadership determining the appropriate level of resources of the state and the way they are to be used for defence in response to threats to the Slovak Republic.

Defence efforts of the Slovak Republic confirm the security assurances towards its citizens and guarantees for its Allies; it is also a clear message to potential adversaries about the credibility of the efforts of the Slovak Republic in national defence.

Basic parameters of the defence efforts of the Slovak Republic are expressed by its Politico-Military Ambition.

1) Basis of Defence Efforts

82) Defence efforts of the Slovak Republic **are based on the continuity of security interests, basic objectives, principles and tasks of the security and defence policy** of the Slovak Republic as defined in the *Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic* (2005), the *Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic* (2005) and the generally binding legal regulations of the Slovak Republic. It also stems **from Allied and other international agreements and treaties** binding for the Slovak Republic, the fundamental treaties and strategic documents of NATO and the EU in particular.

83) **The ability to defend the Slovak Republic** is one of the preconditions of its existence, sovereignty, elementary security, national survival, democratic evolution and stable social and economic development. The objectives and tasks for ensuring national defence including the development of its national defence capacity are **therefore among the key priorities of the state policy**.

... the objective of the defence policy is to ensure the security of the citizens and national defence...

84) The basic and long-term **objective of the defence policy of the Slovak Republic** is to ensure **the security of its citizens and national defence based on the capacities of the state,** the means of collective defence within NATO and utilizing instruments of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU. The Slovak Republic perceives NATO as the main guarantee of ensuring its defence and the security of its citizens.

85) Requirements for defence are of a **long-term nature** exceeding the term of each government. Therefore, a broad political consensus of relevant political bodies about key issues of defence policy including guarantees for the stability of defence spending is the basis of long term continuity.

86) **The level and stability of defence spending** of the Slovak Republic dedicated to maintaining and developing its defence capacity could be influenced but not significantly determined by external factors such as the economic crisis and its impacts on public finances. The current economic turmoil in Europe, taking also into account the history-proven increase in security threats during economic crises, creates a great demand for **maintaining the basic functions of the state, including defence**, for the future as well.

87) **Stabilization of defence spending** with its effective utilization will enable a systematic development of national defence capacity, as well as effective participation in long-term bilateral and multinational defence capabilities development projects.

88) **The basic instrument of the defence efforts of the Slovak Republic is the national defence system** as an integral part of its security system. The **AF SR are the main executive instrument** of the national defence system. Operational armed forces are seen as an attribute of statehood, sovereignty and independence of the Slovak Republic.

89) The AF SR also represent **an important foreign policy tool** of the Slovak Republic, through which the weight of its foreign policy decisions is amplified, implementation of its Allied and other international commitments is materialized and its international credibility as a reliable ally and partner is confirmed.

90) The AF SR also play **an important supporting role when dealing with non-military threats on the territory of the Slovak Republic** by providing assistance to the civil authorities in protecting lives, health and property of the citizens and the state.

91) In accordance with the principles of international law and its Allied and other international commitments, the Slovak Republic **is determined to use its Armed Forces** for the protection, support and defence of its security interests based on the natural right of individual or collective self-defence as stipulated by the UN Charter.

2) Politico-Military Ambition

92) The Politico-Military Ambition of the Slovak Republic **articulates the target level of the ability and preparedness** of the Slovak Republic to defend itself, to meet Allied and other international commitments, and to implement tasks of national crisis management.

93) The current Politico-Military Ambition towards the end of 2010 defined in the current *Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic* (2005) contains only the parameters of readiness of the Armed Forces for participation in operations, while participation in NATO-led operation is the priority; the second priority, as a rule, is the participation in a peace support operation led by any international organization. This narrow definition of the Politico-Military Ambition no longer meets current requirements.

94) In defining its Politico-Military Ambition for the period before the end of 2024, the Slovak Republic ensures its **comprehensive character** indicating the extent and manner of use of the defence capacity of the Slovak Republic in the implementation of the following tasks:

I. Collective defence in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty:
- *for defence of the Slovak Republic in case of an armed attack*
- *for collective defence of Allies*

II. Military crisis response operations of international organizations
(except for collective defence operations)
III. The support of civil authorities within national crisis management

95) Conceived in such a comprehensive way, the Politico-Military Ambition shall express more clearly the defence of the Slovak Republic as a fundamental priority of its defence policy. Also, the Slovak Republic will maintain its contribution to meeting NATO's level of ambition and the development of defence capabilities in the EU, as well as enhance the share of its national defence capacity in preventing and addressing potential non-military crisis situations in the Slovak Republic.

96) **In formulating its Politico-Military Ambition** the Slovak Republic **takes into account:**

- the expected development of the security environment and the threats and challenges with an emphasis on new, more sophisticated threats;

- a comprehensive approach to ensuring the security of citizens and national defence using the entire national defence capacity;

- the increasing quality requirements on the national defence system in providing defence of the Slovak Republic as part of collective defence;

- tasks stipulated in NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept;

- Allied commitments in the field of defence capabilities development resulting from defence planning to meet NATO´s Level of Ambition;

- tasks resulting from the Lisbon Treaty in the field of defence and defence capabilities development;

- other international commitments of the Slovak Republic in relation to international crisis response operations;

- the enhancement of the role of the AF SR in national crisis management in preventing and addressing non-military crisis situations and mitigating their consequences including fulfilling of the tasks of maintaining public order and national security.

97) The Politico-Military Ambition of the Slovak Republic will be newly defined in the next *Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic* which will be presented to the National Council of the Slovak Republic for approval.

98) **The Politico-Military Ambition of the Slovak Republic should be met by the end of 2024 at the latest, provided that the planning assumptions including the stability of defence spending will be fulfilled.**

99) Tasks guaranteeing the implementation of the Politico-Military Ambition will be pursued as key and fixed priorities. Their implementation will be stratified according to their hierarchy of importance and urgency based on the parameters of the resource framework, its predictability and stability.

100) **The highest priority is given to tasks** guaranteeing the security of the citizens and defence of the Slovak Republic, and the implementation of international commitments of the Slovak Republic within the system of collective defence. In terms of the importance and urgency of these tasks, these will be divided into:

- **tasks continuously requiring high readiness** of capabilities of the Armed Forces; a shortage of and the inability to provide these capabilities **can give rise to an immediate high risk** to the defence of the Slovak Republic and the security of its citizens. These are:
    - continuous protection and defence of Slovak airspace within the NATO Integrated Air Defence System;
    - sustaining a mechanized battalion task group in high readiness;
    - participation of the AF SR in the international crisis response operations including the ability to contribute to NRF and EU BG rotations;
    - support of civil authorities in the framework of national crisis management.
- **tasks** allowing for more time for generating **defence capabilities**; shortage of and inability to provide these capabilities **do not give rise to an immediate high risk** to the defence of the Slovak Republic and the security of its citizens; **a degree of this risk would increase over time** if failing to adhere to the planned development of appropriate defence capabilities. These are:
    - sustainment of critical capabilities needed for national defence and their planned expansion depending on the extent and intensity of the threat to the Slovak Republic;
    - implementation of the capability development commitments within NATO (Capability Targets) and the EU, especially of a mechanized brigade dedicated to collective defence;
    - Host Nation Support for Allied forces in case of a collective defence operation.

3) Planning Assumptions for Ensuring National Defence

101) In NATO, the efforts to ensure fair burden sharing of collective defence and fulfilment of other tasks related to threat prevention and guaranteeing wider security have been doubled. Therefore, one of the main indicators of the defence efforts of Allies includes the level and stability of defence spending.

102) In the long-term perspective, the Slovak Republic does not give up its ambition to move towards 2% of GDP for defence spending and also towards a 20% share of total defence spending on modernization of equipment and material.

103) The Slovak Republic will strive in line with the *NATO Political Guidance* of 2011 to halt the decline in defence spending and will seek its gradual growth in real terms. The evolution of defence spending of the Slovak Republic in the upcoming years will be determined by a rigorous **consolidation of public finances**. However, defence expenditure will not be allowed to drop below 1% of GDP by the end of 2015. In 2016 and beyond, defence spending in terms of its share in GDP and in real terms will gradually increase depending on the state of public finances.

104) However, such a level of defence spending is insufficient to meet the Politico-Military Ambition of the Slovak Republic and does not allow for an adequate level of investment to ensure the necessary replacement and modernization of equipment and material as a precondition to enhance the usability and interoperability of the Armed Forces.

105) Therefore, to support the implementation of the Politico-Military Ambition with emphasis on gradually overcoming long-term shortfalls in the modernization of the Armed Forces, **additional funds for the implementation of the Government's projects of replacing major military equipment and material will be earmarked in the budgetary process based on the state of public finances** over and above the limits of the MoD SR budget, as approved in the budgetary baselines of the public administration for the years in question (hereinafter referred to as „limits").

106) The government will seek possibilities to fund outside the MoD SR budget the deployment of the Armed Forces declared for the NRF and EU BG or their deployment in new international crisis response operation,

which were not previously included in the binding limits of the MoD SR budget for the year.

107) The MoD SR will **also implement measures to eliminate internal redundancies in order to enhance the effectiveness and generate savings**, namely by:

- improving activities of the MoD SR in the area of national defence management and control, development and oversight of the AF SR (strengthening of the strategic nature of the MoD SR activities);
- rationalizing structures and optimizing internal processes of the MoD SR and the AF SR;
- rationalizing and streamlining the activities of subordinate elements of the MoD SR, including state budgetary organizations and semi-budgetary organizations, joint stock companies and the state-owned company supporting the defence department, even by applying measures of the ESO governmental program (Effective, Solid and Open state administration);
- adjusting the range of movable and immovable property administered by the MoD SR and other defence infrastructure to the needs of national defence and the AF SR;
- applying measures to make facilities energy efficient;
- optimizing inventory of all kinds and its management;
- optimizing defence planning system of the Slovak Republic including clarification of purviews and responsibilities, planning and monitoring of consumption throughout the life cycle of systems, a wider use of management accounting (controlling) and a systemic linking of the program planning processes with the budgeting processes in the MoD SR integrated information system;
- a continuous and dynamic supervision of requirements for public procurement through streamlining the ambiguous procurement plan and by addressing and tracking the progress of the fulfilment of a request in line with priorities on the basis of periodic evaluation and assignment of tasks;
- joint armament projects on interdepartmental and international levels;
- a system of efficient, effective and transparent processes of management of state property and public procurement including the use of electronic auctions;
- strengthening inspection mechanisms with emphasis on disposing of resources, including the risk management system and a continuous assessment of the effectiveness of internal processes;
- a continuous analysis of capabilities of the defence department with emphasis on the areas of training, education and healthcare followed by the offer of current vacancies or demand for lacking capacities at the national and international levels based on the

principle of mutual benefit;
- a wider use of EU funds within the defence department.

The acquired resources will be used primarily for the development priorities of the AF SR.

4) Defence Planning

108) Defence planning will be **a decisive tool** of the Government for the development and maintenance of defence capabilities including a balanced and efficient distribution of resources to capabilities development and other defence task implementation in accordance with the requirements of national defence and international commitments. **The MoD SR will strengthen its ability and effectiveness in achieving its coordinating role** in the defence planning process at the national level.

… establish a close link between strategic objectives, priorities, tasks and funding…

109) The purposefulness and functionality of defence planning **will be enhanced by the stability of financial resources** in the years ahead. To increase the level of effectiveness, a **close link between strategic objectives, priorities, tasks and funding** shall be enforced in the system of defence planning. Given that the operationally ready AF SR are the main product of defence planning at the MoD SR level, the internal allocation of available resources will be subordinated to it.

110) The programme planning processes **ensure a targeted and transparent allocation of resources** to maintain and develop specific capabilities, taking into account their life cycle and **allowing retrospective monitoring of the effectiveness of their use** in accordance with already approved plans with an emphasis on the planned development priorities.

The President of the Slovak Republic – the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces Ivan Gašparovič together with the Minister of Defence Martin Glváč visiting the largest NATO military exercise on Slovak soil (2013)

The National Council of the Slovak Republic takes decisions on fundamental issues of national security and defence

The AF SR Honour Guard provides military tribute for state-protocol events with the highest representatives

Military medical personnel working within the framework of expert internships, not excluding civilian facilities in Slovakia

Military police exercise

Activities in a field Headquarters

Slovak troops fulfilling tasks in operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Chapter 4)

Defence Management

The aim is the ability of the state authorities to effectively manage national defence along with the effective utilization of its defence capacity on the principle of a comprehensive approach to addressing security threats and challenges. This requires strengthening the ability of the Ministry of Defence to effectively and efficiently fulfil its tasks with an emphasis on defence management, control and development of the Armed Forces, coordination of defence planning and coordination of activities of other parts of the national defence system in preparation for the defence of the Slovak Republic.

1) Constitutional and Legal Definition of National Defence Tasks

111) In accordance with legislation, the National Council of the Slovak Republic and the President of the Slovak Republic are responsible for national defence within their constitutional powers. The primary responsibility for the security and defence of the state is delegated to the Government of the Slovak Republic. Ministries, other central institutions of state administration and other state institutions, municipalities, self-governing regions, legal and other entities are responsible for tasks related to national defence at the extent defined by the law.

112) The MoD SR, as a central institution of state administration in terms of national defence, performs tasks under the relevant legislation [7].

[7] *In particular The Act No. 319/2002 on the Defence of the Slovak Republic; The Act No. 321/2002 on the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic; The Act No. 570/2005 on Conscription, amending and supplementing certain laws; The Act No. 569/2005 on Alternative Service in Wartime and State of War.*

In accordance with the *Act No. 575/2001 on Organization of Government Activities and Organization of the Central Institutions of State Administration, as amended*, it is responsible for the management and supervision of the defence of the Slovak Republic; control, development and oversight of the AF SR; coordination of activities of the state administration bodies, local government bodies and other legal entities in the preparation for the defence of the Slovak Republic and their inspection; coordination of defence planning; ensuring the inviolability of Slovak airspace; coordination of military and civil air traffic; alternative service in wartime and the state of war; and finally, military intelligence. It also administers military districts and military forests.

2) Requirements for the Improvement of the National Defence System

... the basic tool of the state in its defence efforts is the national defence system...

113) Guaranteeing national defence in the dynamically changing security environment **increases demands on the level and effectiveness of the analytical, managerial, coordination and support activities of all entities responsible for the execution of defence tasks**. The basic tool of the state in its defence efforts is the national defence system.

114) **The national defence system** consists of the sum of the elements and measures of the state through which the ministries, other central institutions of state administration, courts, the office of public prosecution, local institutions of state administration, municipalities, self-governing regions, other legal entities, individuals authorized to conduct business and individuals create the conditions for ensuring national defence, protecting the lives and property of citizens, and fulfilling the commitments arising from the international treaties on collective defence against aggression and other international treaties which the Slovak Republic is party to.

115) To carry out these tasks effectively, the national defence system will be developed **as an integral part of the security system** of the Slovak Republic, while being **harmonized with the** crisis management systems of **NATO, the EU** and other international organizations, and will be capable of a **functional interaction** with the crisis management systems of the **neighbouring** states.

116) The national defence system will enable **the timely implementation of adequate decisions of constitutional authorities on the use of national defence capabilities** including military force. This will be based on the specific roles and status of its managerial elements (public officials, ministries and other central institutions of state administration, other state administration institutions and municipalities), executive elements (AF SR) and support elements (security and armed security forces, state administration, self-governing authorities, legal entities and individuals).

117) **In the state of security**, the national defence system will ensure a timely, effective and coordinated implementation of defence tasks, in particular:

- developing and maintaining critical capabilities needed for national defence;
- developing and maintaining capabilities for collective defence;
- the preparation of the territory for defence, including Host Nation Support;
- the participation of the AF SR in international crisis response operations;
- the support of the AF SR provided to national crisis management.

118) **In crisis situations, when the state of emergency or the state of extreme emergency is declared**, the national defence system will provide manpower and resources without delay, including employment of the Armed Forces in support of the civil authorities within national crisis management, e.g. in case of a terrorist attack, large-scale natural disasters and industrial accidents etc., when the lives and property of citizens, and state property are extensively threatened, and also for the protection of the constitutional system and the maintaining of public order and national security.

119) **In crisis situations, when the state of war or war is declared**, the national defence system will ensure effective command and control of national defence on the basis of relevant executive documents using its capacities and creating conditions for rapid deployment and effective operation of the Allied forces on the territory of the Slovak Republic.

120) The national defence system will also provide forces and equipment to **support Allies** in accordance with commitments under the international treaty on collective defence against armed attack and in accordance with other international treaties which the Slovak Republic is party to.

121) The basic requirement for improving the functionality of the national defence system at the national and international levels is the **application**

of a comprehensive approach in its development and operation. This allows, in response to military and non-military threats, a coordinated, synergistic and effective use of all available military and civilian capabilities of the national defence system elements, especially the AF SR, the elements of the integrated rescue system and supporting elements.

122) Enhancement of the functionality of the national defence system requires improvement of the defence management processes guaranteeing **a unified state governance system in all crisis situations** including national defence. This will include a clear **definition of competences, hierarchy, relations** between individual elements of the state governance system and also a **more detailed specification of the decision-making mechanisms at all stages of crisis management and at all levels** including the timely establishment and effective functioning of the National High Command Headquarters and the Military High Command Headquarters in the state of war and wartime. The crisis management exercises will be executed continuously in order to improve processes of national defence management.

123) To promote the decision-making processes of the relevant state bodies during crisis situations, **institutional, organizational and personnel preconditions** will be **created to provide timely, competent and credible information** on the development of potential threats, their nature and potential consequences, together with recommendations to prevent their occurrence, solutions and mitigation of their consequences.

124) To achieve the necessary synergy of activities and measures of the national defence system elements, the effective **mechanisms for joint preparation** of the crisis command and control elements of the Armed Forces with the crisis staffs and emergency and rescue services will be established including the use of NATO and EU crisis management exercises.

125) A new ***Concept of the National Defence System Development*** will be prepared following the new *Concept of the Security System of the Slovak Republic*. This concept will define the mission, tasks, and the qualitative and quantitative parameters of the national defence system. Defined requirements will be then included in the necessary amendments to legislation.

3) Requirements for the Functional Improvement and Optimization of the MoD SR

126) A fundamental requirement for the functional improvement and optimization of the MoD SR is to ensure its ability to **fulfil the role of the central body for national defence** with a more efficient use of strategic managerial methods for achieving the objectives set. Therefore, **its strategic, conceptual, planning, norm-setting, decision-making, assessment and inspection activities** will be **reinforced** to provide for defence. Support and servicing activities will be detached outside the MoD SR structures.

127) The focus on the functional improvement and optimization of the MoD SR will be in strengthening its **ability to meet the tasks** defined by law with emphasis on the **preparation for national defence, national defence management, as well as the control, development and oversight of the AF SR.**

128) The scope of the purview and structure of the MoD SR will be built on the principle of **mutual interconnectedness of functional areas,** a clear definition of responsibilities and purviews which will distinguish between the responsibilities of the Ministry of Defence as one of the central institutions of state administration and the strategic and operational responsibilities of the General Staff of the AF SR.

129) The Ministry of Defence will formulate policies, strategies and concepts, create a legal framework and manage the use of available resources to fulfil national defence tasks including the implementation of international commitments. The General Staff will be responsible for their implementation in relation to the Armed Forces as well as providing expert, organizational and technical support to the command of the Armed Forces. **A functional link between the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff**, the level of mutual communication and synergy of efforts of civilian and military components in achieving common goals will become the key factors for the effectiveness of command and control of the Armed Forces.

130) **Clear and direct delegating of competences and particular responsibilities of the individual branches of the MoD SR will lead to a rationalization and higher levels of efficiency in their operations**

along with reductions in the overall number of personnel. To do this, appropriate procedural and structural changes will be carried out to flexibly adapt to given circumstances.

131) These changes will be based on the **arrangement of the organizational structures of the MoD SR and their competences according to established processes** for all functions and key tasks of the MoD SR. Procedures of each function and task of the MoD SR will be charted in terms of its content, methodology and sequence of each individual step.

132) This process will **trim down the current organizational structure, remove persisting duplication** in the activities of individual elements, unnecessary intermediate stages, and thus excessive bureaucracy slowing down the decision-making processes of the MoD SR. This will result in the creation of a transparent decision-making cycle and specific responsibilities for the fulfilment of tasks. The criteria of effectiveness and the quality of services provided by the MoD SR will be the level of the ability to defend the state and combat readiness of the AF SR.

133) Inspection and assessment will become an integral **part of improving national defence management processes** at all levels. The implementation of long-term objectives and plans will be assessed through the Strategic Defence Review which is generally conducted every four years or in case of significant changes in the political, security or resource conditions. The periodical assessment of the level of fulfilment of objectives and tasks will be carried out annually as part of a comprehensive assessment of the defence of the Slovak Republic in the form of a public document that will serve as a tool for a tasks completion assessment with regard to actual resources allocated to the defence of the Slovak Republic.

4) Subordinate Elements of the MoD SR

134) *Military Police* fulfilling specific tasks of police protection within the defence department will be primarily a support element in relation to AF SR activities. Its position, range of tasks and staffing will be reviewed in conjunction with its subordination to the Chief of General Staff.

135) *Military Intelligence*, with a structure and tasks complying with the legal framework, will be a special service to support the defence management processes, including the tasks of an early warning system. Optimizing

its democratic oversight as well as its activities will be addressed in the context of the overall changes in the functioning and organization of the national intelligence bodies.

136) The defence department will also include elements that provide support and service activities to the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces. This includes the offices and facilities under the administration of the MoD SR, state budgetary organizations [8], semi-budgetary organizations [9] and joint stock companies with state shares within the MoD SR and a state-owned company of the MoD SR. Offices and facilities under the MoD SR and the state budgetary and semi-budgetary organizations will **undergo a re-evaluation process in order to rationalize and optimize their structures** along with an overall reduction of personnel in response to the identified needs of the AF SR and the MoD SR.

137) Eight state budgetary organizations - *Regional Military Administrations* – were dissolved effective as of 1 January 2013. Their responsibilities have been transferred to the local state administration in each capital of all eight administrative regions by establishing defence offices to be guided by the Ministry of Defence.

138) *The Military Sports Centre Dukla in Banská Bystrica* (Vojenské športové centrum Dukla Banská Bystrica), a state budgetary organization ensuring the preparation of athletes in individual sports for the sport representation of the AF SR and the Slovak Republic, shall have performance criteria established to help assess its effectiveness or decide on its future within the defence department. Support for specific sports sections by the MoD SR will be differentiated according to the objectives set, while those not achieving the desired results will be dissolved. It will co-operate closely with the Armed Forces in order for national defence to make effective use of its specific know-how and experience in the sports of martial or military nature (martial arts, shooting competitions) as well as to increase overall physical fitness of soldiers. It will deepen co-operation with the Police Sports Club in order to more effectively use funds and specific prerequisites of both organizations. In addition, it will also actively co-operate with civil society organizations to enhance the physical fitness of the population with an emphasis on meeting recruitment objectives (numbers and qualitative criteria) of the AF SR.

[8] *The Defence Standardization, Codification and Quality Assurance Bureau; The Military Technical Testing Institute; The Institute of Military History; The Ordinariate of the Armed Forces and the Armed Corps of the Slovak Republic; The Centre of Ecumenical Pastoral Service of the Armed Forces and the Armed Corps of the Slovak Republic; The Military Welfare System Office; The Armed Forces Academy of General Milan Rastislav Štefánik; The Institute of Special Health Care and Training of the MoD SR in Lešť; The Military Sports Centre Dukla in Banská Bystrica.*

[9] *The Central Military Hospital of SNP in Ružomberok - Faculty Hospital, The Housing Agency of the Ministry of Defence (BARMO).*

139) *The Institute of Special Health Care and Training of the MoD SR in Lešť* (Ústav špeciálneho zdravotníctva a výcviku MO SR, Lešť), the state budgetary organization (hereinafter referred to as „ISHCT"), possesses advanced training facilities including unique simulation technology and know-how. The interest in its use has been constantly growing. With regard to its potential and the resources already invested, the utilization of its capacities will be expanded within the available financial resources. Specific intentions will be defined in the ISHCT Development Plan. The MoD SR will initiate a re-evaluation of its funding to-date exclusively from the MoD SR budget while also seeking opportunities for obtaining financial resources in an international environment.

140) *The Housing Agency of the Ministry of Defence – BARMO in Trenčín* (Bytová agentúra rezortu ministerstva obrany, Trenčín), a semi-budgetary organization, will be dissolved once all apartments and lodging houses in its administration have been sold. *The Central Military Hospital of SNP in Ružomberok – the Faculty Hospital* (Ústredná vojenská nemocnica SNP, Ružomberok – fakultná nemocnica), also a semi-budgetary organization, will continue to primarily perform tasks related to national defence rationalization measures will be taken to achieve a condition in which expenses will be fully covered by revenues from health insurance companies.

141) Joint stock companies administered by the MoD SR have a specific legal status. A decision will be taken about the further existence of the *Aircraft Repair Plant in Trenčín, Inc.* (Letecké opravovne, Trenčín, a.s.) and the *Military Repair Plant in Trenčín, Inc.* (Vojenský opravárenský podnik, Trenčín, a.s.) based on the assessment of their manufacturing and modernization capacities in relation to boosting performance of the AF SR. The long-term development of the defence department does not take into account the *Military Repair Plant in Nováky, Inc.* (Vojenský opravárenský podnik, Nováky, a.s.), since it was leased to a strategic partner as of 1 January 2013, renting a substantial part of the movable and immovable assets of this company, selling its inventory and other assets together with the transfer of rights and obligations arising from the legal and employment relations.

142) *The Military Medical Facilities, Inc.* (Vojenské zdravotnícke zariadenia, a.s.), *The Military Sanatorium and Hotel in Zemplínska Šírava, Inc.* (Vojenská zotavovňa a hotel Zemplínska Šírava, a.s.) and *The Military Sanatorium and Hotel in Smrekovica, Inc.* (Vojenská zotavovňa a hotel Smrekovica, a.s.) will undergo the process of rationalization and optimization based on the analysis conducted according to the needs of national defence,

including a reduction in their numbers with the aim to create a single departmental organization.

143) *The Military Forests and Estates of the Slovak Republic, the State-owned Company* (Vojenské lesy a majetky Slovenskej republiky, štátny podnik) shall be maintained for the purposes of effective management and ecological cultivation of forests and farmlands in military districts, military forests and areas that are necessary to ensure national defence tasks. Measures will be taken to streamline its activities to ensure that it fulfils delegated tasks effectively without additional financial support from the MoD SR.

144) It follows from the above mentioned that **in terms of the number of entities** in the founding and establishing authority of the MoD SR (state budgetary organizations, semi-budgetary organizations, joint stock companies and the state-owned company) **there will be a reduction** from 26 elements [10] at the end of 2012 to 15 (or less) elements in total.

[10] *The MoD SR also owns a 50% stake in the share of the Hospital of St. Michael, Inc. (Nemocnica sv. Michala a.s.).*

Utilization of the MILES 2000 Simulation System significantly enhances the quality and realness of training

Training before deployment to ISAF in Afghanistan is aimed also at defending our own positions and helping wounded comrades

Troops training in crossing through a contaminated area

Training in an urban area

Members of the 5th Regiment of Special Assignment during an international anti-terrorism exercise in Kolárovo

The RM 70/85 MODULAR Rocket System firing live ammunition

Live firing of the IGLA (SA-18) anti-aircraft missile system

Long-Term Projections of the Development of the AF SR

The AF SR are a cornerstone of statehood and represent a key instrument of the national defence system; therefore, their maintenance and development must be a constant priority of the state.

The aim is to have modern, credible and operationally ready AF SR having a higher combat potential, able to guarantee national defence as part of the collective defence of Allies and actively contributing to conflict resolution in international crisis management. The AF SR will be able to resolutely, efficiently and effectively fulfil their intended mission of protection, support, defence and enforcement of the security interests of the Slovak Republic.

MODERN Armed Forces will possess the following attributes:

Mobile = *having high-quality and reliable equipment at their disposal allowing for rapid movement into and high manoeuvrability within the area of operation;*

Operationally Ready = *structured, prepared and maintained to perform tasks in line with their predetermined operational role of ensuring national defence and security of citizens as well as tasks connected with collective defence within a determined time and space;*

Defensively Minded = *based on the defensive nature of the Armed Forces, focused on guaranteeing the security of the citizens of the Slovak Republic, national defence and defence of Allies within collective defence;*

Effective = *effective in training, service and task fulfilment by maximizing results utilizing available resources; and Econo-*

mically Sustainable = enabling a long-term continuity of achieving basic goals within the economic potential of the state;

Relevant = *adequate in size, composition and capabilities to national defence needs, fulfilment of Allied and other international commitments;*

NATO-Interoperable = *able to work with Allies as part of collective defence, as well as in international crisis response operations led by NATO.*

Upon achievement of these attributes the Armed Forces will be respected at home and abroad.

145) To meet this goal, the AF SR will have to develop a balanced range of achievable, flexible and affordable military capabilities and a command and control system with a high degree of affiliation with NATO Force Structures.

146) The transformation of the Armed Forces, as a long-term process of developing their capabilities, will be mainly focused on improving the quality of capabilities, in particular by launching a targeted rearmament and the associated gradual restructuring of tactical units, reaching battalion level. **Progress in the field of armaments will be the main criterion for the success of the transformation** of tactical units and hence the overall success of the capabilities development of the future AF SR. **The internal structure of tactical units will be adapted to the new NATO requirements** (Capability Targets 2013) which reflect the developments in the security environment and recent experiences from international crisis response operations.

147) The transformation of the Armed Forces will also:

- stabilize personnel environment of the Armed Forces to motivate qualified key personnel to remain in service as long as possible;
- optimize the peacetime command and control system of the Armed Forces in order to consolidate its ability to flexibly switch to the state of war (and wartime) command and control system;
- re-evaluate peacetime service support of the Armed Forces units in order to achieve better efficiency and performance of logistical capabilities in particular;
- optimize internal processes aiming at eliminating economically inefficient processes and processes without value added;

- optimize the utilization of financial resources with an emphasis on eliminating ineffective spending;

- reinforce military culture and international military co-operation.

148) All tactical units will be reorganized according to NATO standards, thereby increasing the proportion of soldiers in combat units to non-deployable logistics. Creating a new motorized battalion and the reorganization of the existing mechanized battalions will increase the strength of combat units by about 20%. Units of CBRN protection will be strengthened by about 15%. Reorganization of reconnaissance companies under a reconnaissance and intelligence battalion will increase capacities of tactical intelligence and reconnaissance by about 70%.

149) The operational readiness of the AF SR will be enhanced in dealing with consequences of natural disasters and industrial accidents within the borders of the Slovak Republic, especially by an increased intensity of joint preparation of the AF SR with the other elements of the Integrated Rescue System of the Slovak Republic.

1) The Required Composition of Forces and Capabilities of the Future AF SR

150) The achievement of the basic goal of transformation of the AF SR - developing relatively small, well equipped and trained armed forces possessing necessary military capabilities compatible with those of Allies - was part of the manifesto of each government of the Slovak Republic. Yet, **planned targets have not been met under any government**. Experience from the implementation of *Model 2010, Model 2015* and the *Internal Organizational Structuring of Large Units, Formations, Regular Units, Offices and Facilities of the AF SR and their Logistic Support as of 31 December 2009* has shown that only repeated reductions in the structures of the AF SR, abolishing of units and reductions in the number of personnel took place, but that the modernization of equipment has actually stagnated. This resulted in a situation where the current level of interoperability of the AF SR with Allied forces reaches only 54% of NATO standards and most of the equipment, especially of the Land Forces, is already past its life cycle.

151) In the analytical phase of the Strategic Defence Review process, three strategic options were defined that the state leadership faces regardless of its political orientation. Simply put, either the replacement of major military equipment and material will be launched and sufficient resources devoted to training and operation of the Armed Forces, or it will be necessary to substantially reduce the tasks of the Armed Forces arising from generally binding legal regulations, to reduce international commitments and globally change the philosophy of national defence and the development of the Armed Forces. The third non-option was a description of the state that would come about if none of the two previous choices were implemented; it revealed that the shortfalls of the Armed Forces would continue to the point where serious measures would have to be adopted, but at a much higher price.

152) Taking into consideration these three strategic options and the condition of public finances of the Slovak Republic, a development strategy of the capabilities of the future AF SR was outlined in order to not repeat the negative outcomes of past reforms and organizational changes. Indeed, experience has shown that the transformation of the Armed Forces by way of permanent organizational changes aimed to reduce the number of personnel has never in the history of the AF SR transformation produced desired effects, i.e. saving resources and investing these in the development of military equipment. Instead, losses of highly qualified personnel took place due to the destabilization of the personnel environment, and ultimately, a negative change in the ratio of expenditure on personnel, training and development. Moreover, the increased subsidizing of the resource deficient Separate Account which funds the military welfare system also reduced the resources available for training.

153) The answer to the question "How large should ‚the relatively small' Armed Forces be?" (*Model 2010*) was arrived at by analysing tasks and international commitments. Even „relatively small" Armed Forces must be ready and able to respond directly, independently and flexibly to security crisis on the territory of the Slovak Republic and abroad. They must be able to cover by their own capacities the preparation, development, deployment, sustainment and recovery of capabilities to ensure:

- defence of the Slovak Republic until the arrival of Allies by employing all available capabilities, including those generated by mobilization;
- continuous protection and defence of Slovak airspace within the NATO Integrated Air Defence System;
- deployment of one mechanized brigade for a collective defence operation of Allies outside the Slovak Republic;
- participation of the Slovak Republic in international crisis response

operations in accordance with the Politico-Military Ambition of the Slovak Republic;
- providing specific and unique military capabilities to support civil authorities in the implementation of assisting tasks in non-military crisis situations and in resolving extraordinary incidents on the territory of the Slovak Republic;
- protection of the information systems of the defence department against cyber-attacks [11];
- receiving Allied forces in our country within a collective defence operation.

154) **The analysis of the entire spectrum of tasks of the Armed Forces in line with the current legislation of the Slovak Republic and its international commitments resulted in defining of all capabilities necessary for their full implementation. A set of such necessary capabilities forms the Basic Model of the AF SR** (hereinafter referred to as "Basic Model").

155) The Basic Model reflects the mission of the AF SR as stipulated by *Act No. 321/2002 on the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic, as amended*, which is to participate in the fulfilment of tasks **during the state of extreme emergency** or **the state of emergency**, when threats to the lives and health of individuals or property occur and when the elimination of their consequences is necessary. To fulfil a total of 252 tasks of the Armed Forces as dictated by the generally binding legal regulations of the Slovak Republic, relevant resolutions of the Government of the Slovak Republic and international agreements, the Slovak Republic must maintain and develop a package of capabilities of the AF SR applicable to the whole spectrum of crisis situations.

156) The Basic Model is **a military requirement for forces and capabilities** that includes six brigade equivalents (32,000 strong) for a wide range of tasks of the AF SR in the state of war, including the command and control system. A comparison of the required size of forces made in strategic analyses in 2001 revealed that guaranteeing national defence within collective defence represents a smaller resource burden than in the case of individual defence, where an objective need for a 62,000 strong army was identified.

[11] *In connection with the protection of the information systems of state institutions (including the Ministry of Defence) against cyber-attacks, a national authority may need to perform adequate conceptual and possibly legislative solutions in this area at the national level also in relation to the international commitments of the Slovak Republic.*

157) **Given that, according to current forecasts of the security environment development, the maintenance of the Armed Forces at the level of the Basic Model is not necessary nor economically sustainable in the long term, in the state of security the AF SR will be internally structured according to the urgency of task fulfilment into:**

- forces for immediate combat deployment - fully professional forces of the highest readiness or forces fulfilling operational tasks, i.e. forces included in the NATO Integrated Air Defence System, the Air Search and Rescue Service, contingents in international crisis response operations and units in the NRF standby mode, units in the EU BG standby mode, NATO High Readiness Forces and forces to fulfil special tasks, including their supporting elements;

- forces ensuring the ability to rapidly increase combat potential - fully professional forces of lower readiness designed for the formation of a mechanized brigade and its deployment for a limited period, the command and support structures required for fulfilling the tasks of the Armed Forces (including specific and unique military capabilities to support civil authorities as part of the fulfilment of assistance tasks in non-military crisis situations and in resolving extraordinary incidents in the Slovak Republic);

- forces supplemented by active reserves/soldiers on short-term contract - professional forces with selected posts to be filled by reservists (for example military specialists) to carry out some tasks in support of civil authorities in non-military crisis situations and extraordinary incidents on Slovak soil and in international crisis management;

- mobilized forces - forces formed by mobilization, necessary for national defence, to ensure the protection and defence of the Facilities of Special Importance and Other Important Facilities on the territory of the Slovak Republic and to support the receiving process of Allied forces as part of any collective defence operation on the territory of the Slovak Republic.

158) In order to retain units in the above mentioned categories (except for mobilized forces) **the system of multi-annual cyclic tasking of units** (the lifecycle of units) will be applied. Units will pass in regular cycles the stages of preparation, high readiness, operational deployment and regeneration allowing for a targeted allocation of human, financial and material resources which will be the main tool for ensuring a long-term sustainability of task fulfilment in the AF SR.

159) **The Basic Model together with the planning assumptions of ensuring national defence sets the framework for an affordable model of the Armed Forces - Peacetime Organizational Structure of the AF SR.**

160) **The future Peacetime Organizational Structure of the Armed Forces – Model 2024** (about 20,400 strong, including civilian employees of the AF SR) quantifies a demand for capabilities retained in peacetime and the peacetime command and control structure. It allows for an effective organization of training of the Armed Forces and ensures their peacetime operation (e.g. by centralization of capabilities) while ensuring the availability of capacities needed for the transition of the AF SR to the fulfilment of tasks in the state of war and in wartime. The difference between the Basic Model and the Peacetime Organizational Structure of the Armed Forces (*Model 2024*) is in the mobilized forces. If the planning assumptions of ensuring national defence will not be satisfied, the proposed Peacetime Organizational Structure of the Armed Forces will have to be reviewed; they will either be supplemented by active reservists on a larger scale or other units will be transferred to the category of forces formed by mobilization with a parallel increase in the risk that tasks will not be fulfilled.

161) The AF SR will consist of the following major branches: the Land Forces, the Air Force and the Training and Support Forces.

- The main mission of the **Land Forces**, which are the main factor determining the size and performance of the future AF SR, is to ensure the security of citizens and the defence of the territory of the Slovak Republic against military and non-military threats. To fulfil this mission, the Land Forces will maintain units at a high degree of combat readiness; they will have at their disposal capabilities in compliance with NATO standards and will be able to operate in a wide range of conflicts that could arise in the coming decades. They will include reconnaissance forces, infantry mounted on multipurpose tactical vehicles and highly mobile armoured fighting vehicles, combat support and combat service support (artillery, engineer support, CBRN protection, communication and information systems, intelligence and electronic warfare equipment, logistics, medical support, civil-military co-operation and psychological operations).

- The main mission of the **Air Force** will include the continuous protection and defence of Slovak airspace within the NATO Integrated Air Defence System by multipurpose tactical aircraft, tactical air support for operations of the Land Forces with combat and multipurpose helicopters and a tactical airlift capable of performing

tasks in support of forces deployed in international crisis response operations by small and medium-sized transport aircraft. The Air Force will have capabilities to plan and manage air operations and conduct training of aviation personnel. The Air Force will also include air defence units and radar and radio-electronic reconnaissance units.

- The main mission of the **Training and Support Forces** will be a comprehensive replenishment and mobilization employment of forces for the tasks following the declaration of the state of war and in wartime, arranging for the entrance and expert training of soldiers and NCOs of the AF SR, including training of soldiers in active reserves, promotion of specialized training before being put into operation, combat service support of the AFSR, transport, preparation and provision of the logistic support elements for the operations of the Land Forces, provision of comprehensive protection and defence of the Facilities of Special Importance and Other Important Facilities on the territory of the Slovak Republic, ensuring a comprehensive reception of Allied forces as part of collective defence operations on the soil of the Slovak Republic, and preparation and provision of support elements of mobile communication and information systems for the operations.

162) To ensure a comprehensive support for the implementation of their basic mission the AF SR will also include the following elements:

- **Specialized Forces**, the primary mission of which will include the exe cution of tasks of special reconnaissance and direct action, Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), military assistance, tasks of early warning in order to prevent crises threatening the security interests of the Slovak Republic and its Allies, and intelligence support of the AF SR as a whole and contingents in operations;

- **Stationary facilities of communication and information systems**, the primary mission of which is to ensure the operation and development of stationary communication and information system networks of the defence department in the Slovak Republic and the protection of the information systems of the department against cyber-attacks;

- **Supporting bureaus and facilities of the AF SR**, the primary mission of which will include the centralized personnel management of the AF SR, military chaplain service, topography service, language

training of the AF SR personnel, providing personnel for the representation of the AF SR in the military structures of NATO and the EU, medical support personnel of the AF SR and the joint materiel management.

163) As part of the preparation for national defence against military and nonmilitary threats, all elements of the AF SR will be able to take on mobilized reserves to the extent necessary to meet national defence tasks within collective defence, ensure the protection and defence of Facilities of Special Importance and Other Iportant Facilities and support the reception of Allied forces in case of collective defence operations on the soil of the Slovak Republic.

2) The Capabilities Development Strategy of the Future AF SR

… capabilities development is based on a comprehensive internal transformation of tactical units…

164) The strategy of capabilities development of the AF SR is based on a thorough and **comprehensive internal transformation of tactical units** in line with NATO standards, which will be undertaken in parallel with the targeted and gradual replacement and modernization of equipment and material.

165) **The end-state** of capabilities development will be relatively small, well-equipped and well-trained AF SR having four brigade equivalents at their disposal with an optimized peacetime system of command and control and an enhanced level of capabilities and interoperability of tactical units able to fully participate in a NATO joint task force.

166) Implementation of the capabilities development strategy will be executed in a way so as to avoid any distortions to operational tasks being fulfilled in real time (protection and defence of airspace, participation in international crisis response operations, intelligence) and tasks with short response times (NRF, EU BG, support of the Integrated Rescue

System of the Slovak Republic and civil authorities by fulfilling assisting tasks). **In view of the above mentioned and depending on the available resources, the transformation of the formations and units of the Armed Forces will be conducted in two stages as follows**:

a) **In Stage 1 (2013 - 2015),** key personnel will be retained, the full spectrum of current capabilities preserved, the level of fulfilment of international commitments increased (mechanized battalion group), the link between peacetime and wartime command and control systems strengthened, the qualitative and quantitative level of support in national crisis management increased and the logistics of the AF SR optimized.

The following will be ensured by the end of 2013:

- internally optimized peacetime and wartime command and control systems;
- a departmental office for the centralized command and control of forces created for addressing crisis situations of a non-military nature and for extraordinary incidents;
- an enhanced performance of the logistics units of the AF SR and the elimination of inefficient transport operations of the AF SR;
- a review and a reduction of the support and service support offices and facilities of the General Staff of the AF SR with their careful adaptation to the needs of the AF SR.

The following will be ensured by the end of 2014:

- a continuation of the process of optimizing logistics by removing duplicities of either existing logistical capacities or services contracted to the private sector;
- an implementation of low-cost organizational changes which include the unification of command structures at the battalion level and lower, while increasing the ratio in favour of operational in contrast to command elements;
- a revision of the system of doctrines, military regulations and training practices which will be followed by a specialization of training based on unit tasks within its life cycle and its preparation for specific use;

- personnel will be stabilized at current numbers, with „unit strength management“ being the main instrument of maintaining a financially affordable number of personnel based on the life cycle needs of the Land Forces units of the AF SR.

The following will be ensured by the end of 2015:

- in the area of armaments, the highest priority:

- in the Land Forces: one battalion will be equipped with multipurpose tactical vehicles and additional equipment and material as required by the AF SR in order to create the conditions to meet all certification criteria by one mechanized battalion group under NATO standards in 2016; the enhancement of the combat potential of existing armoured fighting vehicles will be started; the Mobile Communication System (MOKYS) and the Combat Radio Communication System will be made fully functional within the system of Command, Control, Communications, Computers & Intelligence (C4I) including the appropriate security certification for one mechanized battalion group;

- in the Air Force: replacement of the medium-sized transport aircraft in order to eliminate the lack of critical tactical air transport capability of the Armed Forces in national and inter national crisis management will be initiated; replacement of radars with new types of 3D radars will be launched in order to maintain the ability to ensure the protection and defence of Slovak airspace independently;

- in the Training and Support Forces: replacement of obsolete vehicles and acquisition of container carriers will be continued to increase deployability and reduce running costs of logistics units.

- **decisions will be taken**, on the basis of military and technical expertise, on the following armament projects of major equipment:
    I. **training aircraft;**
    II. **armoured fighting vehicles;**
    III. **combat and multipurpose helicopters;**
    IV. **multipurpose tactical aircraft;**
    V. **air defence systems.**

- concerning infrastructure, cost effective dislocation changes will be made which will bring cost reduction to peacetime infrastructure and cause no additional costs;

- generally, the current levels of capabilities and interoperability of tactical units will be retained and logistics functionality optimized.

- At the end of Stage 1, assumptions and preconditions of the *White Paper* and the *Defence Department Development Plan with a View to 2024* will be verified. Depending on results, the state of armaments projects and financial possibilities, a decision will be made either to take further steps or launch Stage 2 of capabilities development of the AF SR.

b) **In Stage 2 (2016 - 2024)**, the combat potential of the AF SR will be increased, the full operational capability of a mechanized brigade achieved, the capacities of ground intelligence and reconnaissance at the tactical level strengthened, the capacities of combat support and combat service support provided concurrently for one mechanized brigade and one mechanized battalion group, NATO Capability Targets met and capacities for fulfilment of ambitions in the area of international crisis management enhanced.

In the second stage, the highest priority regarding armaments will be:

- in the Land Forces: rearmament of two mechanized battalions to the platform of a multipurpose tactical vehicle; replacement and modernization of major military equipment, material and communication and information systems; procurement of equipment and material in units of ground reconnaissance and intelligence and in units of Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) in order to meet certification criteria by one mechanized brigade in accordance with the adopted international commitments of the Slovak Republic;

- in the Air Force: conclusion of radar replacement with new types of 3D radars and replacement of air defence systems; conclusion of medium-sized transport aircraft replacement, replacement of training aircraft, combat helicopters and multi-purpose helicopters, and multipurpose tactical aircraft in order to complete a comprehensive rearmament of the Air Force including the Air Defence Systems;

- in the Training and Support Forces: conclusion of vehicle replacement, acquisition and replacement of container and handling equipment, spare parts, repair and field logistic capacities and field medical capacities in order to complete a comprehensive rearmament of combat service support units.

3) Key Areas of Capabilities Development of the Future AF SR

167) **The internal transformation of tactical units** will be based on a comprehensive approach to the development of military capabilities, interdependence and interconnectedness of each area – equipment and material; doctrines; organizational structure; training; leadership and human resources development; infrastructure and interoperability – in order to achieve their greater efficiency and deployability.

... the basic precondition is the execution of the replacement of major military equipment and material...

168) **Equipment and material**. Progress in this area will be the main criterion for the transformation of tactical units and hence for the overall success of the capabilities development of the future AF SR. **The basic precondition for** achieving the desired capabilities within the horizon of 2024 **is the execution of the replacement of major military equipment and material** by targeted rearmament of tactical units and a modernization of that major military equipment and material, where militarily justified and economically efficient.

169) **Doctrines.** The system of military doctrines will be revised and supplemented. By the end of 2013, the *Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic (C)* will be revised to implement the conclusions of the *White Paper* and the knowledge and experience from operations led by NATO and the EU into the doctrinal system of the AF SR. A revision of the entire system of military doctrines of the AF SR will be completed by the end of 2014.

170) **Organizational structures.** Changes in the organizational structures of the Armed Forces will be implemented gradually, depending on the progress of replacement of major military equipment and material, and the availability of financial resources. By the end of 2014, gradual adjustments will be made to the peacetime command and control system of the AF SR without jeopardizing its ability to act in order to increase its efficiency in managing training and fulfilling the tasks of the AF SR in the state of security, while strengthening its link to the chain of command in the state of war and in wartime.

171) **Training**. Changes in the training of units will focus primarily on the implementation of the revised military doctrines and the implementation of new operational procedures in conjunction with the introduction of new types of weapon systems to units. The efficiency and effectiveness of training will be increased through a stricter implementation of the life cycles of AF SR units. Joint trainings of the AF SR with crisis staffs and rescue forces will be intensified to increase the operational readiness of the AF SR in the aftermath of natural disasters, industrial accidents or other non-military threats to the Slovak Republic. Some initiatives will take place to enhance and streamline the processes of collecting, sorting, analysing and implementing knowledge and experience *(lessons learned)* from ongoing operations and missions.

172) **Leadership**. Changes in training of leaders will focus on strengthening their professionalism and on orientating their academic and lifelong military education to meet the requirements of accessibility and flexibility of capabilities of the AF SR. The development of their skills will be encouraged through the performance of operational tasks (also in everyday practice) in order to lead subordinates effectively and efficiently by a combination of personal example, motivation and enforcement of duties.

173) **Human resources development.** Changes in human resources development will focus on stabilizing the personnel environment by creating conditions favourable for a lifetime career in the military of qualified and key personnel with the simultaneous stabilization of the military welfare system. Alternative forms of augmenting personnel will be considered with the aim to exploit the potential of former professional soldiers and the defence department civilian employees to perform tasks of the AF SR in the state of security (e.g. active reserves, short-term contracts or voluntary military service). Where militarily acceptable and economically beneficial, military positions will continue to be made civilian in order to achieve a reduction in personnel costs and promote long-term continuity in expertise at selected positions. Creativity of soldiers and civilian employees of the AF SR will be exacted and stimulated. Negative phenomena associated with frequent alternation of military personnel will be eliminated by the centralized collection, sorting and storage of all products of intellectual activity in a form of information databases.

174) **Infrastructure**. Changes in the peacetime infrastructure of the AF SR including dislocation of headquarters and units will be carried out mainly in connection with organizational changes with a concurrent emphasis on reducing total operation costs of the peacetime infrastructure of the AF SR, but not reducing the number of garrisons. Possibilities of the

centralization of field training will be evaluated to finally settle ownership rights to property in use by the defence department. Projects in the field of development of peacetime infrastructure will be focused on further improvements of living and working conditions of soldiers in the workplace in continuous combat readiness and improvements of the quality and effectiveness of unit training in the place of permanent dislocation and in military training areas.

175) **Inventory.** The system of formation and maintenance of stocked supplies of ammunition and other materiel for combat use by the AF SR will be reviewed and optimized and the process of reducing surplus materiel will continue in order to eliminate storage costs. A review and optimization of the materiel supply system in the AF SR will be conducted.

176) **Military health service**. Changes in this area will be carried out systematically by developing a conceptual document on the military health service and its future development with relevant legislation to follow. The priority is to stabilize the system of health service in the defence department and to define its individual elements, their roles in providing healthcare in the Slovak Republic. This includes national crisis management, protection and promotion of the health of the public and performing medical assessment of soldiers. The primary objective of the above mentioned will be for the defence department to obtain the necessary oversight of the health of professional soldiers and a possibility of adopting the latest measures in the area of prevention, medical treatment, medical training and medical supplies. Field medical capacities and other special capabilities will be developed in accordance with NATO requirements and the demands of national crisis management. Medical treatment of soldiers will be redefined including modifications of relevant legislation, especially in terms of the periodicity of preventive medical check-ups, work-related examinations, preventive rehabilitations etc.

177) **The mobilization system of the AF SR**. Changes in this field will reflect the pace of transformational changes. A requirement for reserves and a demand for real property and material resources of the civilian sector in the discharge of national defence tasks in accordance with legislation will be clarified.

178) **Internal processes in the AF SR**. Advanced tools for simplifying and improving the efficiency of processes (e.g. Lean Six Sigma) will be implemented. The development of the system of planning and development of the force structures and capabilities in the defence planning of the Slovak Republic will continue. The Procurement processes and strategic planning of deployment of the AF SR (planning of operations) within

collective defence, in national and international crisis management will be optimized and internally harmonized to be able to react flexibly to urgent operational requirements and external influences. Initiatives will be implemented in the AF SR to improve the quality and effectiveness of staff work so that internal processes and the staff work system do not generate excessive demands on resources.

179) The overall progress in capabilities development of the AF SR will be measured by two main indicators. **Achievement of the Initial Operational Capability** will mean that the headquarters or unit has reached the initial measurable indicators for personnel, equipment, organizational structure and infrastructure, and is ready to start training. **Achievement of Full Operational Capability** will mean the fulfilment of certification criteria for the most demanding operational task of the headquarters or unit. Transformation of the headquarters or unit will be completed by issuing of a certificate of achieved combat readiness in accordance with NATO certification standards.

4) The Command and Control System of the Future AF SR

180) The essential features of the current peacetime command and control structure of the AF SR remain preserved; its internal optimization will be executed with a possibility of its streamlining to match the number and size of its elements to the objective needs of the Armed Forces. This will enhance its **functionality** to perform tasks in the state of emergency and the state of extreme emergency and increase **its flexibility** in relation to its ability to provide and maintain the required number of qualified staff personnel in the command structures of NATO and the EU, in the operational headquarters and staffs of collective defence operations and for the needs of international crisis management (including observer missions). Procedural and structural changes will be made to strengthen the unity of command and control of the forces of the defence department deployed in the performance of tasks within and without the borders of the Slovak Republic. The doctrinal and organizational support for a smooth transition from the peacetime command and control system of the Armed Forces to the command and control system in the state of war and in wartime will be emphasized.

181) An internal optimization of the General Staff will be conducted aiming to improve the efficiency of the General Staff in managing of training and employment of the Armed Forces in addressing non-military crises and also to strengthen its ability to flexibly switch to the command in defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Slovak Republic at the state of war (and in wartime).

182) The responsibility of the General Staff of the AF SR will include long-term and medium-term planning, management of training and deployment of units, emergency planning, managing the use of Armed Forces capabilities in dealing with non-military crisis situations, evaluation of operational readiness of the Armed Forces, national evaluation of combat readiness of units before being deployed to operations, combat and mobilization readiness of the Armed Forces, the implementation of capabilities development plans of the AF SR and the internal inspection process in the Armed Forces.

5) Multinational and Bilateral Military Co-operation

183) To increase the effectiveness of capabilities development of the AF SR including addressing critical shortfalls in capabilities, initiatives and projects of the **multinational military co-operation** (NATO, EU, and the Visegrad Group) and **bilateral military co-operation** will be applied in addition to national initiatives. The concept of bilateral co-operation will be based on a pragmatic approach to relations with regions or states which are from a long-term perspective militarily and economically feasible.

... effective use of the multinational and bilateral military co-operation...

184) To address critical shortfalls in capabilities, participation is expected in NATO and EU programmes and initiatives, in particular focusing on:

- airspace protection through international co-operation under the NATO Integrated Air Defence System;
- Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) and its expansion with the ballistic missile defence of the territory;

- strengthening of the protection against attacks by Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED);
- strategic and tactical airlift and strategic maritime transport;
- joint multinational logistics and medical support;
- defence against cyber-attacks;
- Air Command and Control System (ACCS);
- Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS);
- Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR);
- joint military training and exercises with other countries;
- implementation of Network Enabled Capability (NEC).

185) To deepen co-operation in the field of training and education, the Slovak Republic will provide its specialized facilities to Allies and partners (The ISHCT, The CBRN Training and Testing Centre in Zemianské Kostoľany, The Armed Forces Academy of General M. R. Štefánik in Liptovský Mikuláš).

6) Factors Affecting the Implementation of the AF SR Target Model 2024

186) The AF SR target *Model 2024* is based on the premise of not increasing the range of tasks and not reducing the amount of planned resources for the operation and development of the AF SR.

187) In case of non-fulfilment of this assumption, several risks may occur:
- resources will be sufficient only to keep up the current (in many indicators a deficient) pace and quality of implementation of international commitments and tasks of the AF SR;
- further decline in resources for the AF SR will force the AF SR to gradually shift in the medium-term an increasing share of capabilities to the category of forces formed by mobilization leading to a gradual loss of capabilities;
- stagnation in the transformation of the AF SR and in achievement of NATO interoperability standards will continue;
- the technological level of major military equipment and material of the AF SR will continue to lag behind NATO standards;
- deterioration of the technical state of already outdated military equipment will continue;
- decrease in the intensity and quality of preparation and training of AF SR units will continue with the proportional increase in the number

of cases of failure to meet minimum NATO certification requirements;
- consumption of central stocks of ammunition, fuel and other materiel intended for crisis situations as a substitute for unavailable materiel to ensure necessary training of units prior to their deployment in international crisis response operations will continue;
- putting off projects of replacement and modernization of equipment and material as well as infrastructure upgrades will continue while the total cost of its implementation will increase with each year of delay;
- efficiency of investment in training and education of professional soldiers will decline.

Conclusion

Capabilities development of the AF SR assumes, in addition to the replacement and modernization of equipment and material, also qualitative changes in existing structures based on internal transformation of tactical units under the new NATO requirements. Units will become fully interoperable and more effective in defending the Slovak Republic, providing support during natural disasters and industrial accidents, as well as in the international crisis response operations. Some units of the current structure of the AF SR will be internally transformed and some will be reduced. The target structure will include newly created units or units with improved capabilities responding to new security challenges.

Risks arising primarily from a possible instability of available financial resources with small-scale fluctuations will be eliminated by unit strength management through implementation of the lifecycles of units. Fluctuations of financial resources to a greater extent will be eliminated by supplementation by active reserves or by mobilization which will, however, impact on the qualitative and temporal availability of capabilities.

Combat ready units, ready to fulfil predetermined tasks without any military-technical constraints will be considered the principal output of the transformation of the Armed Forces.

Training effectiveness is also enhanced by two simulation centres located in the Armed Forces Academy in Liptovský Mikuláš and in the ISHCT in Lešť

The role of women in the Armed Forces is expanding

The theoretical preparation of Slovak soldiers before deployment in operations was provided by the Armed Forces Academy in Liptovský Mikuláš in co-operation with NATO instructors

Graduation of the Armed Forces Academy students

A Slovak soldier training with radar equipment

The AF SR were successfully represented by athletes Jozef Gönci, Michal Martikán and Anastasia Kuzminová from the Military Sports Centre Dukla in Banská Bystrica

Chapter 6)

Human Resources Development in the Defence Department

The aim of human resources development in the defence department is to stabilize top-quality, skilled professional soldiers, maintain adequate welfare conditions, improve the system of academic and career education and enhance the effectiveness of the recruitment system of the Armed Forces, as well as enhance the professional erudition of civilian employees in the areas of security, defence and military affairs.

1) Requirements for Human Resources Development

188) Personnel management of the defence department will be **developed comprehensively** in all its key aspects in order to be able to continuously provide the required number, quality, professional and qualification composition of military and civilian personnel.

189) Effective development of human resources requires creating the organizational and personnel prerequisites for a **centralized management** of their development in the defence department allowing their faster and easier optimization in any area.

190) Growing demands on quality of personnel and increasing competition in the labour market call for **changes in conceptual framework** for the improvement, retention and replenishment of military and civilian personnel.

2) Improving, Retaining and Replenishing Military Personnel

Stabilization of Military Personnel

191) Following the amendment to the *Act on the Welfare System for Policemen and Soldiers* **a new *Act on the State Service of Professional Soldiers*** shall be adopted to stabilize qualified and experienced professional soldiers in the service with emphasis on command staff while saving financial resources.

192) The new *Act on the State Service of Professional Soldiers* will redefine **the temporary State Service** which will guarantee regular alternation of the rank and file and lower officers in tactical units. Introduction of **the permanent State Service** of professional soldiers will create preconditions for a long-term stabilization of top-quality military professionals of the command corps at the operational and strategic levels and high-level experts with specific military expertise.

193) The management of professional soldiers will be improved by an **enhanced personnel competence of the Chief of General Staff of the AF SR** in relation to the professional soldiers temporarily placed outside the structure of the Armed Forces.

194) An important element forming and regulating the career of a professional soldier will be in his/her participation in multinational operations and the exercise of command and staff duties in the structures of NATO and the EU. Attending courses abroad, active experience from international crisis response operations and command structures of NATO and the EU will form an important part of the expertise of the professional soldier.

195) The condition of the success of upcoming changes will be the **adjustment of the reward system** by strengthening the motivational factors for increasing the attractiveness of short-term contracts and for retaining a select group of military experts in active service throughout the duration of their career. The reward system will stimulate career growth including adequate mobility of personnel.

The Military Welfare System

196) The separate welfare system will play an important role in attracting and retaining quality personnel in the AF SR and in other state security forces in the future. The amendment to the *Act on the Welfare System for Policemen and Soldiers* along with a new *Act on the State Service of Professional Soldiers* will provide a **connection between the military service system and the military welfare system** creating conditions for the effective use of military personnel, and also for the positive developments in financing the so called Separate Account, ultimately enhancing the **long-term sustainability** of the military welfare system.

197) A part of the development of the overall care for a soldier will be the **conceptual elaboration of the care for his/her family and the care for war veterans**. Therefore, methods of social work will be developed in these areas, including innovative solutions based on the experience of Allies with a long tradition of social work with these social groups.

198) In the framework of the comprehensive care for professional soldiers, conditions will be created for their successful **integration into the civilian environment** and the labour market after discharge.

Education

199) The Armed Forces Academy of General Milan Rastislav Štefánik will be developed as an educational institution that will guarantee the quality of entry military education and military training of future military professionals and then ensure their systemic and systematic education during their military career. Analysis will be made of the functionality and economic viability of locating all educational facilities of the defence department in the Armed Forces Academy of General Milan Rastislav Štefánik.

200) To improve the quality of military education:

- **the profile of graduates** of the Armed Forces Academy will be flexibly **updated** to match the latest requirements of the Armed Forces and military science.

- **the proportion of theoretical and practical professional military education** will be **increased** in the curricula of various departments of the Armed Forces Academy; practical military training will be implemented in a form **of internships** in the units and facilities of the AF SR and practical training in the AF SR training facilities.

- the educational and training system of professional soldiers will also include the **education and training at foreign educational institutions** for selected military expertise and functions.

- **in the field of career education,** systemic measures will be adopted to reduce **its temporal requirements** including the use of innovative methods of teaching.

201) One of the basic conditions for the appointment of a professional soldier to the first general rank will be passing the highest level of the command-staff course (War College) abroad with a focus on national security and defence as well as military strategy primarily in English-speaking countries.

202) **Furthering language skills** of professional soldiers **will be a priority** for their further training according to their role and career development. The required level of language proficiency will be set for each military rank. This will ensure that increasing and maintaining the level of language ability is in the interest of each professional soldier.

Replenishment of Military Personnel

203) Alternative solutions for replenishing personnel and new recruitment methods targeted at specific social groups and professional expertise will be developed. Increased efficiency of the recruitment system will be achieved by centralizing all activities related to acquiring professional soldiers.

204) To achieve and ensure a high quality process of recruitment, the admission requirements for applicants for military service and quality output parameters that the successful candidates must reach at the end of the process of preparation for professional service and in each of the following stages of preparation for his/her appointment, will be continuously evaluated.

3) Alternative Forms of Augmentation of the Armed Forces

205) During crisis situations (state of emergency, state of extreme emergency, state of war and wartime), the Armed Forces can be augmented with citizens called-up for extraordinary military service. In the state of war and in wartime, a partial or general mobilization can be declared. To enhance the quality of augmented personnel during crisis situations, a **system of active reserves will be further developed** and their training for extraordinary military service in the AF SR will be carried out in the state of security.

... seeking alternative forms of augmentation...

206) In the context of the needs of the AF SR, some **alternative forms of augmentation** will be sought while utilizing active reserves, short-term contracts and voluntary military service **to perform tasks in the state of security**.

207) To augment the critical shortage capabilities of the Armed Forces to carry out tasks in the state of security, a possibility of applying **short-term military service contracts** to active reservists and also to civilian experts in selected fields (after fulfilling the set criteria), will be evaluated.

208) The possibility of introducing **voluntary military service**, which would allow citizens to undergo basic military training, will be examined. Based on the needs of the AF SR, while meeting the set criteria, selected voluntary military service members will be allowed to join the active reserves or enter the professional military service. This restores the process of generating new reservists ready with basic military skills to fulfil their duty to defend the homeland, if necessary.

209) The character and terms of possible forms of alternative augmentation of the Armed Forces for carrying out the tasks of the AF SR in the state of security will be developed in conceptual documents and subsequently reflected in the drafts of legislative changes. What is common for all alternative forms of augmentation of the Armed Forces is voluntary enrolment and obligatory fulfilment of tasks.

4) Improving, Retaining and Replenishing Civilian Personnel

210) The MoD SR will develop, in the context of state policy in the fields of education, employment and social issues, **a conceptual document concerning personnel management of the defence department civilian employees**. It will define in particular the objectives of personnel management, elaborate the processes associated with improvement, retention and replenishment of personnel in the defence department, identify the tools and ways of achieving them including their funding and contribute to a comprehensive solution of improvement, retention and replenishment of civilian personnel at the defence department including the Armed Forces. In implementing personnel policies in relation to civilian employees, applicable advanced experience and knowledge in the field of personnel management of foreign armed forces and human resources management in the civilian sector will be applied.

211) In the area of quality improvement and retention of personnel, **qualification requirements will be defined for each position** at the defence department (standardization of functions) on which the system of continuous/further education and training of civilian employees will be based. Expert readiness of the defence department civilian employees will be increased by their **systematic training in the relevant expert areas including specific issues associated with security, defence and military affairs** in departmental, national and international educational institutions. Professional advancement of civilian employees will also include, with regard to their expertise, their deployment to operations and missions of international crisis management as civilian experts, as well as the representation of the Slovak Republic in international organizations with a transparent selection for a particular position. The successful completion of a prescribed form and level of education and the assessment of the ability to apply the knowledge acquired in the performance of a particular function will be essential for further career growth of the civilian employee. The social and family policy in relation to civilian employees and their families will become an integral part of the acquisition, retention and motivation of civilian employees.

212) In order to fill particular posts with the civilian employees of the highest quality not only in terms of the required level of education, but also in terms of their prospective career, the **entry qualification requirements** necessary to perform a function depending on the focus and complexity of the specific posts will be **diversified**.

213) Experience as well as proven forms and methods of work in improving human resources management successfully used in practice by the defence department, can then be simplified and applied to improve work in this area also by other state administration and local self-government bodies. In this regard, the defence department has an ambition to co-operate with other central institutions of state administration and non-governmental organizations. Should the existing legal framework be an obstacle to the higher efficiency in the application of these experiences, the department in charge of this area at the national level will obtain the initiatives to be used in case of any amendments to relevant legislation.

Technological demonstrator of the modernized infantry fighting vehicle BMP-M2 SKCZ at International Exhibition of Defence and Security Technologies in Brno (2013)

A new modification of the L-410 Turbolet light transport aircraft

The light armoured vehicle ALIGATOR has been integrated into the AF SR in different variants for more than a decade

The self-propelled Božena demining system developed in Krupina is used in more than a dozen armies around the world

Representatives of military units receiving new Land Rover Defender 110 off-road vehicles in Nemšová

The MAN HX 8x8 truck in a special carrier variant has been in use in the Armed Forces since 2012

The latest version of the self-propelled howitzer Zuzana has successfully passed challenging testing

Armaments

The aim of the arming process is to guarantee by way of armament projects the qualitative and quantitative availability of military equipment and material and communication and information systems and their unification to ensure implementation of Armed Forces tasks.

1) General Requirements

214) The tasks of national defence and international commitments of the Slovak Republic will be decisive for the AF SR armament projects to turn to international co-operation in long-term projects.

215) Long-term shortfalls in financing modernization along with planning assumptions of ensuring national defence in the future also require seeking alternative solutions for the procurement, modernization and maintenance of military equipment and material, communication and information systems including joint procurement, pooling or sharing and the utilization of off-the-shelf technologies and dual-use technologies.

216) The MoD SR will promote a gradual unification of military equipment and material and communication and information systems.

217) In the arming process, the MoD SR will use the services of NATO agencies and the European Defence Agency with an emphasis on the standardization documents of NATO and the EU.

218) In international co-operation, the armaments will focus on finding common solutions particularly in the areas of equipment and accoutrements of the individual soldier, CBRN protection, the means of air defence, strategic logistics, system lifecycle management, and defence standardization, codification and state verification of quality.

219) To ensure objective assessment of the procured military equipment and material and the communication and information systems, the MoD SR will support the development, accreditation and certification of the technical and testing base of the defence department. The MoD SR will establish a system of state supervision of explosives, ammunition and hazardous substances.

2) Main Priorities

220) Armaments will ensure the implementation of the priority requirements of the AF SR in the field of military equipment and material aimed at capabilities development in accordance with long-term projections of the development of the Armed Forces and the needs of the defence department formulated into the planning documents within the extent of the available resources. Primarily, the focus will be on the rearmament of organic units.

221) In the preparation of armament projects, possibilities of modernization of the existing military equipment and material as well as communication and information systems will be thoroughly evaluated in terms of military justification, economic efficiency and their further use potential.

…replacement of obsolete major military equipment financed from purpose-bound additional resources beyond the limits of the MoD SR budget…

222) Replacement, particularly of obsolete major military equipment and material, will be implemented through armament projects pursued by the Slovak Government which will be financed according to its individual decisions within the limits of the MoD SR budget, as well as from purpose-bound additional resources beyond the limits of the MoD SR budget.

Replacement and modernization of military equipment and material will be in line with the capabilities development strategy of the AF SR as described in Chapter 5 and implemented as follows:

Stage 1 - from 2013 till the end of 2015

223) The aim within the limits of the MoD SR budget will be primarily to ensure:

Land Forces:

- the equipping of one battalion with multipurpose tactical vehicles and its outfitting with other necessary equipment and material including communication and information systems;

- the conclusion of the modernization and integration of the means of artillery support (DELOSYS);

Air Force:

- the conclusion of the Mi-17 helicopter modernization and finalization of the L-410 light transport aircraft purchase;

- the commencement of upgrading or replacing radar technology;

- the completion of the mobile Control and Reporting Centre (CRC);

- the procurement of one medium-sized transport aircraft;

Training and Support Forces:

- the platforms of the Mobile Communication System (MOKYS) and the Combat Radio Communication System within the system of Command, Control, Communications, Computers & Intelligence (C4I) including the appropriate security certificate for one mechanized battalion group will be made fully functional;

- the completion of the integrated information system with emphasis on logistics, administration of state property and the economy;

Land Forces, Air Force and Training and Support Forces jointly:

- a continued replacement of vehicles;
- the completion of the mobile network communication and information infrastructure of command and control with the implementation of communication and information security measures;
- the completion of a unified stationary communications environment at the strategic level of command and control with the implementation of communication security measures;
- the completion of the Central Location - the main data centre, a backup for the main data centre and regional data centres.

224) To overcome long-term deficits in terms of replacement of **major military equipment and material** or their modernization, decisions will be adopted as part of the budgetary process on financing selected projects by applying purpose-bound additional resources **beyond the limits of the MoD SR budget**. In this context, the MoD SR:

- based on military and technical expertise will **draw up projects to be pursued by the Slovak Government:**
  - rearmament of mechanized battalions with a **new type** of **armoured fighting vehicle or** an increase of their current combat potential via a militarily justified and cost-effective **modernization of the existing BMP-2** together with a proposed mode of financing;
  - replacement of the following equipment together with a proposed funding scheme:
    - **training aircraft;**
    - **combat and multipurpose helicopters;**
    - fighters by **multipurpose tactical aircraft;**
    - **air defence systems.**

Armament projects implemented in this way and pursued by the Government of the Slovak Republic also represent the strongest guarantee for the transparency and efficiency of the use of allocated funds in accordance with their intended purpose.

Stage 2 - from 2016 till the end of 2024

225) The key priority in armaments will be the rearmament of a mechanized brigade of the Land Forces of the AF SR in accordance with the commitments adopted by the Slovak Republic. At the same time, replacement of other major military equipment and material will be gradually implemented according to decisions taken by the Government.

226) The aim within the limits of the MoD SR budget will be primarily to ensure:

Land Forces:

- the rearmament of the remaining two mechanized battalions with a combination of different variants of the multipurpose tactical vehicle;

Air Force:

- the modernization or replacement of radars necessary for the standby system of air protection and defence within the NATO Integrated Air Defence System;
- the replacement of surveillance radars for air traffic control;
- the acquisition of 3D radars for anti-aircraft launchers of ground based air defence;
- the replenishment of units with a new type of multipurpose helicopter;
- the conclusion of the replacement of medium-sized transport aircraft;

Training and Support Forces:

- the replacement and modernization of logistics units equipment;
- the building of the Network Communication and Information Infrastructure based on the Network-Enabled Capabilities (NEC) of the AF SR, including links with NATO and EU Member States;
- the building of the Information Assurance Framework (IAF) in the network-enabled environment (the NEC platform).

227) After verifying that the Mobile Communication System (MOKYS) is fully functional within a mechanized battalion group, it will be extended to one mechanized brigade.

228) **Within the limits of the MoD SR budget,** in addition to the above mentioned main armament projects, the following will also be implemented:

- replacement and procurement of up-to-date container handling and transport means;
- modernization and replacement of spare parts, repair and field logistics means;
- replenishment and making field medical facilities fully functional;
- replenishment and replacement of small weapons;
- replenishment of equipment and material for engineering units and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units;
- introduction of the Mode 5 Identification Friend or Foe (IFF M5);
- outfitting the Preventive Medical Team;
- outfitting of units to perform the tasks of intelligence gathering and reconnaissance and of civil-military co-operation.

229) Co-operation with partners will continue in technical and technological projects to develop national capabilities in the field of EOD and to promote the international EOD Centre of Excellence which is situated in the Slovak Republic.

Members of the Rožňava CBRN Battalion while training with real chemical precursors in the CBRN Training and Testing Centre in Zemianske Kostoľany

A multipurpose surgical pavilion of the Central Military Hospital of SNP in Ružomberok in operation since 2010

The ISHCT also offers training under real conditions to the firefighters and rescue corps

Specialized training facilities of the ISHCT like the "Jakub Koloseum" simulator contribute greatly to the quality of training

Generally, the capstone of training of units is their demonstration in a training area

Intensified preparation of selected units for NRF rotation is taking place periodically

Chapter 8)

Infrastructure Development and State Property Administration in the Defence Department

The aim of infrastructure development and state property administration is to adapt these to the objective needs of national defence and the Armed Forces while applying the most efficient management of allocated funds and entrusted property.

To meet this objective:

- *in the field of infrastructure development and immovable property management a functional up-to-date infrastructure will be preferably formed for dislocation and training of the AF SR. In addition, unnecessary facilities and areas will be released and transferred out of the defence department. Measures will be taken to optimize the utilization of lodging houses, firing ranges and training areas.*

- *in the field of movable property management, the volume of inventory and other movable state property shall be reviewed and the process of disposal of excess assets and their further handling shall be accelerated as much as possible.*

1) Dislocation of Units and Facilities of the MoD SR and the AF SR

230) **Centralization of the location** of the elements of the MoD SR and the AF SR will continue, **thereby achieving a reduction in the overall number of military facilities used** in places of dislocation. Local bodies of the MoD SR for property management which are responsible for the operation and maintenance of facilities will be located closer to the selected main places of dislocation. This will ensure closer contact between the operator and the user of a particular facility with a closer relationship and more effective approach of the operator to the facilities.

231) **More than 180** out of more than 400 military facilities including shelters, fords, firing ranges and ammunition dumps, **will be abandoned** by the defence department; **almost 40 others will be re-evaluated** in terms of optimization of use by the housed departmental elements, a possibility of a partial vacation of the facility and its subsequent detachment or a gradual vacation of the facility and its subsequent abandonment.

232) In the area of property and infrastructure management, the optimization of structures and activities will continue in order to integrate functionally and organizationally the three separate immovable property and construction administrations into a single element – the Property Management Agency; this structure will also include facility maintenance centres. Immovable property management will be carried out in combination of core civilian employees with external contractors, with effectiveness and economic efficiency being the main criteria.

2) Basic Directions in Infrastructure Development

... development of infrastructure at places of confirmed future dislocation of units and facilities...

233) **Development of immovable property** in the defence department **will be implemented** focusing on building a functional and modernized infrastructure **at places of confirmed future dislocation of units and facilities**

of the Armed Forces and other organizational units of the defence department which will create conditions for obtaining, maintaining and improving the capabilities of the Armed Forces. Regarding infrastructure development, available funds will be primarily focused on reconstruction and modernization of the existing facilities in six major areas. Priorities are specified in the *Defence Department Development Plan with a View to 2024*.

234) Infrastructure development will be focused on the following areas:

- completion of the basic *infrastructure of airports* in line with NATO standards;

- ensuring technical conditions for handling classified information in selected facilities (*comprehensive facility security*);

- building a high quality *educational and training base* with a focus on new methods of goal-directed training and networking of simulation technology centres with an emphasis on training of units in the most realistic conditions of the modern battlefield. The basic infrastructure will be built in the common and garrison training facilities, in military training areas and other facilities used for training. The ISHCT will be further expanded while fulfilling the function of an interdepartmental training centre for both domestic and foreign security forces and rescue teams;

- bettering of the *natural environment* through refurbishment of buildings and modernization of technological facilities designed in particular for storage and handling of fuel, vehicle repair workshops, vehicle washrooms as well as the necessary reconstruction of water management facilities;

- improvement of *energy efficiency*, in particular through renovation of boiler rooms, gasification of selected sites and building insulation;

- *improvement of the quality of life* through modernization and renovation of training areas, administrative offices and warehouses to improve the living and working conditions of professional soldiers and departmental civilian employees;

- augmentation of existing infrastructure through construction of new facilities where corresponding assets, refurbishment or modernization of which could address the emerging needs of departmental users, are not available;

- settling real estate legal issues;

- creating conditions for flatlet type accommodation for professional soldiers in barracks (in lodging houses, where technically possible), in places of confirmed future dislocation of selected garrisons.

235) Infrastructure development will further remain limited by available resources which will affect the material and temporal fulfilment of the requirements of the AF SR in this area with the assumption that the target state could be achieved after 2024. To achieve the target state, funds saved by release of surplus facilities and by implementation of energy efficiency measures will be used.

236) Due to the limited resource framework, **the development of infrastructure by the end of 2015 will be primarily ensured in the following priority areas:**

- *energy efficiency* - renovation of facilities with the least efficient or ecologically inadequate heating will be addressed;
- *airbases* - investments will be focused on the Sliač Air Base;
- *improvement of the quality of life* - in addition to improvement of the conditions of operation, storage and training facilities in places of permanent dislocation of troops, the necessary renovation of utility lines will be provided;
- *comprehensive facility security* - tasks of comprehensively ensuring protection of selected facilities (for handling classified information) will be addressed.

237) **After 2016**, the infrastructure development will continue in the above mentioned priority areas and in line with the needs of the AF SR target *Model 2024* and will also be addressed in the field of *training facilities* and *natural environment* as well as by the construction of new facilities.

The Aircraft Repair Plant in Trenčín intends to satisfy not only domestic but also foreign customers

Military repair plants service most of the equipment in the AF SR arsenal

Our largest and best-equipped military training area Lešť is mainly used for field training of units

Guaranteeing accessibility of manufacture and repair capacities is an important prerequisite of AF SR task fulfilment

Part of the universal provision for soldiers are also new accoutrements

Joint training of military firefighters and servicemen of the Air Search and Rescue Service Unit

National Defence Support System

The aim of the national defence support system is to provide operational preparation of the territory and the ability of the elements of the national defence system to provide services and activities on the territory of the Slovak Republic for the support of the Armed Forces in performance of defence duties, and as part of Host Nation Support in case of a collective defence operation.

1) Basis for Effective National Defence Support

238) **The national defence support system will be developed as an organic part of the national defence system through defence planning. Coordinated approach to the fulfilment of tasks** by relevant ministries and other central institutions of state administration in establishing and maintaining the necessary infrastructure and required inventory, activities and services to ensure national defence, including support of the Armed Forces, will be essential for the effective support of national defence.

... deepening of coordination of national defence support activities...

239) **The MoD SR**, as a body responsible for the management of national defence, **will actively coordinate national defence support activities** and will reinforce the importance of the long-term planning of preparation, development and support of national defence to allow for a **synergy of activities** in preparing the state for defence within the actual resource framework.

240) Measures of economic mobilization to assure the readiness of the state for defence and crisis management with emphasis on supporting the activities of the Armed Forces in performance of defence duties will remain a peculiar area addressed by the national defence support system.

241) **In the area of the national defence support, the efforts will focus on:**

- the re-evaluation of the real needs for maintaining and developing services and activities to ensure support for national defence;
- an evaluation of the extent of maintaining production capacities, mobilization reserves, stocked supplies of all kinds including planned deliveries to compensate for losses and consumption of the Armed Forces;
- a continuous improvement and maintenance of the technological level of the communication and information systems and their security with an emphasis on the review of the use of stationary points of command and control (headquarters);
- the compliance with the principles of efficiency in the processes of planning and utilizing available defence resources;
- providing for the mobilization needs of the Armed Forces.

242) **In the area of national defence support, the individual institutions of state administration will aim at the following:**

The Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic – gradual modernization of the National High Command Headquarters with an emphasis on achieving its interoperability with NATO and the EU;

The Ministry of Transport, Construction and Regional Development of the Slovak Republic – arrangement of the transport networks for the operational deployment of the Armed Forces and Allies on the territory of the state as part of Host Nation Support, building and maintaining support facilities and maintaining the necessary capacities of railway carriages and engines, electronic communications support, rental of telecommunications lines and providing for a preferential treatment, building the system of emergency communications, fulfilling the tasks of frequency management and creating conditions for the shipping of military mail;

The Ministry of Health of the Slovak Republic – providing inpatient bed capacity for the Armed Forces and ensuring all necessary medical services;

The Ministry of the Environment of the Slovak Republic – maintenance and operation of water access points, predetermined water sources and water facilities in order to meet the needs of the Armed Forces;

The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of the Slovak Republic – ensuring food commodities required in order to meet the needs of the Armed Forces;

The Ministry of the Economy of the Slovak Republic – supply, replenishment of losses and consumption of the Armed Forces by ensuring the production and supply of material and equipment, and retaining production capacities within the logistic support system of the Armed Forces;

The Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family of the Slovak Republic – adoption of measures focused on creating conditions for a stable social environment and organizing social security services in crisis situations;

The Administration of State Material Reserves of the Slovak Republic – provision for inventories of POL (petrol, oil, lubricants) and mobilization reserves, including their regular maintenance and replenishment.

243) While applying the principle of efficiency in the area of supporting national defence, solutions for providing necessary capabilities within international co-operation will also be considered.

2) Defence Infrastructure

244) In terms of the needs of a comprehensive preparation for national defence, emphasis will be laid on building, maintaining, protecting and defending defence infrastructure facilities, especially in the area of:

- transport (maintenance of required parameters of the selected transport networks);
- communication and information systems including their protection (cyber defence);
- energy (for storage and transport of oil and gas, generation and distribution of electricity and petroleum products);
- crisis management (offices of crisis management bodies).

245) In the preparation for national defence, the selection and inclusion of specific defence infrastructure elements into the category of Facilities of Special Importance and the category of Other Important Facilities will be re-evaluated. The method of their protection and defence will be made more precise.

246) A specific role of the MoD SR regarding defence infrastructure will be in:

- re-evaluating the actual need for the range and level of maintenance of the defence infrastructure facilities;
- examining the possibility of building, maintaining and exploiting defence infrastructure facilities on both bilateral and multinational basis within NATO and the EU;
- guiding responsible entities to achieve the required degree of readiness of facilities and areas to receive and support NATO/EU forces as part of Host Nation Support.

Diplom
SLOVAKIA

Children's days with the Armed Forces are a tradition
(1 June 2013 in Giraltovce)

Co-operation with schools and children in summer camps is part of AF SR life

Pupils of the Children's University also visited the Military Museum in Piešťany and the troops in Hlohovec in summer 2013

Slovak troops in operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina also take part in educational programmes for children

Events where the public directly meets with AF SR personnel are attractive mainly for children

National Defence – A Public Concern

The aim in the field of communication and public relations is to achieve a positive change in the attitudes of the public towards the status and legitimacy of national defence and the Armed Forces, and to the mobilization of resources needed to fulfil the tasks set.

1) Public Communication Focus

247) One of the key assumptions of quality fulfilment of tasks related to national defence is a **perception of national defence by citizens as a public issue** which has a direct impact on the level of their security, protection of lives and property, as well as the exercise of their other human rights and civil liberties. At the same time, every citizen in a democratic society has the **right to be properly informed** about matters of public interest including the ways its security and national defence are ensured.

... fostering shared responsibility of citizens for national defence...

248) On this basis, **awareness of solidarity, common interest and responsibility of all citizens for national defence will be fostered and an achievement of a society-wide consensus** on fundamental issues of national security and defence supported with an emphasis on the development of the Armed Forces.

249) The MoD SR will **apply the principles of strategic communication**, the purpose of which is to influence patterns of behaviour and attitudes of key individuals and the public to ensure their interests are as far as possible compatible with the needs of national security and defence and that they are less prone to be affected by dangerous individuals, groups or states and simplistic radical solutions.

250) **The quality of information and efforts to raise public understanding and support for implementation of national defence tasks will be enhanced.** This will require an opening-up of the defence department through an active, professional and unbiased communication and comprehensive development of relations with the public, thus helping to maintain a high level of confidence in the Armed Forces, deepen interest in participating in their activities and increase their prestige and support at home and abroad.

251) **Communication with the public will be** primarily **focused** on informing about and clarifying the following crucial aspects of the defence policy of the Slovak Republic:

- guaranteeing the security of citizens and national defence, sovereignty, territorial integrity of the Slovak Republic and inviolability of its borders;
- fulfilment of international obligations of the Slovak Republic in the field of security and defence of Allies and partners in the Euro-Atlantic structures, including its contribution to international crisis management;
- implementation of assistance tasks of the AF SR as part of the national crisis management.

252) It will be explained to the public that we do not live in an isolated world and the peaceful conditions of our lives do not mean that we are not affected by security threats and risks. **Plans and measures** taken to prevent, reduce or eliminate the consequences of threats to the state and citizens will be actively **presented**. The comprehensive communication issue of national defence will also include the costs issue in the context of the fact that national defence policy measures, including the implementation of international commitments, which also comprise a development of sophisticated capabilities, require adequate funding.

... openness and transparency towards the public...

253) As part of the transparent presentation of achieved results, the MoD SR will **inform the public openly and objectively about the problems it faces,** and will explain their impacts on the extent and quality of national defence tasks implementation. It will also inform the public **about the proposals to address them** including the coverage of resource requirements.

254) A conceptual framework of the communication strategy of the defence department shall be established; the performance of its key tasks will be supported by the development of specific communication strategies.

2) Public Relations Development

255) In order to ensure direct communication of its messages, the MoD SR will be able to communicate with key departmental and non-departmental domestic and foreign counterparts quickly, reliably, efficiently and continuously.

256) In relation to **internal (departmental) communication counterparts,** the MoD SR will strive to strengthen solidarity and common interest of the defence department civilian employees, military personnel, retirees, war veterans and their families. To this end, it will use such instruments as will ensure relevant and timely information for all affected groups and generate conditions for their feedback.

257) In relation to **non-departmental domestic counterparts**, such as:

- the general public – priorities will include building a high confidence in and support for the activities of the MoD SR and the AF SR including a perception of the AF SR as a necessary part of the democratic state, while also deepening the democratic oversight of the Armed Forces.

- the intermediaries of information – priorities will include factual, balanced and professional communication, reinforcement of existing positive attitudes and a change of existing indecisive or negative attitudes while maintaining the basic attributes of effective communication of the MoD SR which are transparency, openness and an apolitical stance.

- political leaders, state administration and self-government authorities – the priority will be to obtain their support for defence policy objectives and the needs of the Armed Forces. In co-operation with other ministries and other elements of the security system, the MoD SR will also generate activities to increase civil preparedness for security threats and crises.

- the third sector, non-profit and non-governmental organizations and interest groups – the priorities will be: co-operation in fostering of the awareness of duties of citizens regarding defence, their readiness to defend the state and understanding of defence issues, fostering patriotism and pride in the Armed Forces and developing traditions, and a historical legacy of fighting for freedom and democracy. There will be an intensified communication with the domestic security community including the civil society organizations already co-operating or having interest in such co-operation with the defence department.

258) In relation to **foreign counterparts** especially foreign media, headquarters of international organizations, diplomats and military and air attachés, commanders of international contingents and the local population in the area of deployment of the AF SR, the MoD SR will present the Slovak Republic as a democratic state contributing to international peace, security and the protection of human rights, a reliable ally and a trusted partner who is ready to contribute to the success of military operations and come up with solutions that contribute to securityandstability in crisis regions, and to adequately participate in the development of defence capabilities in the framework of bilateral and regional co-operation projects and projects of NATO and the EU.

Implementation Timetable of the Basic Measures of the White Paper

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Defence Efforts of the Slovak Republic												
- re-evaluate and update the *Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic*	■	■										
- draw up proposals for optimization of the defence planning system	■											
- implement a new defence planning system	■	■	■									
Defence Management												
- develop the *Concept of the National Defence System Development (Concept of Security System of the Slovak Republic)*	■	■										
- prepare a draft amendment to the *Act on Defence of the Slovak Republic* and the *Act on the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic*	■											
- carry out organizational changes at the MoD SR with a focus on strengthening its strategic and managerial dimensions	■											
- establish an analytical centre of the MoD SR to produce visions and studies in the field of national defence	■											
- rationalize and streamline the activities of joint stock companies administered by the MoD SR	■											
- continuously audit process management of the MoD SR	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
- continuously carry out crisis management exercises for the purpose of improving the national defence management processes	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
- establish a joint preparation of the elements of the crisis command and control of the Armed Forces along with crisis management staffs and rescue services	■											
Long-Term Projections of Development of the AF SR												
Stage 1 (maintain the current range of capabilities)	■	■	■									
- internally optimize the peacetime and wartime command and control systems of the AF SR	■											
- reduce offices and facilities of support and service support for the General Staff of the AF SR	■											
- increase the efficiency of logistics units of the AF SR and eliminate unnecessary transport operations	■											
- create a departmental element for centralized command and control of forces in addressing non-military crisis situations	■											
- carry out cost-effective organizational changes (battalion and lower) while increasing the ratio in favour of operational in contrast to command elements	■	■										
- establish the lifecycle system of units and their preparation for specific use	■	■										
- remove duplicities of either existing logistical capacities or services contracted to the private sector	■	■										
- perform cost-effective dislocation changes which will bring cost reduction of peacetime infrastructure	■	■	■									
- maintain the level of capabilities and interoperability of tactical units	■	■	■									
- achieve optimized functionality of logistical capacity of the AF SR	■	■	■									

Stage 2 (gradual increase of the combat potential of the AF SR)													
- implement organizational changes - tactical units (depending on the replacement of major military equipment and material)													
- achieve full operational capability of the mechanized brigade (by 2018)													
Human Resources Development in the Defence Department													
- prepare a draft of a new *Act on State Service of Professional Soldiers*													
- flexibly update the profile of the Armed Forces Academy graduates													
- establish a comprehensive system of internships for the Armed Forces Academy students in facilities of the AF SR													
- conceptually elaborate alternative augmentation of the Armed Forces													
- conceptually elaborate the care for families of professional soldiers deployed in operations abroad													
- conceptually elaborate the care for war veterans													
Armaments													
Stage 1													
- equip one battalion of the Land Forces (*multipurpose tactical vehicles*); ensure *MOKYS* and *Combat Radio Communication System* platforms of one mechanized battalion group are fully functional; and implement other projects													
- present to the Government proposals for replacing major military equipment (*armoured fighting vehicles/modernization of BMP-2, training aircraft, combat* and *multipurpose helicopters, multipurpose tactical aircraft*, and *air defence systems*)													
- implement continuous (small) modernization/replacement of equipment and material													
Stage 2													
- rearm one mechanized brigade													
- rearm two mechanized battalions (*multipurpose tactical vehicles*)													
- implement a comprehensive rearmament of the transport and helicopter aviation and other projects of replacement of major military equipment and material upon decisions taken by the Government													
- implement the continuous (small) modernization/replacement of equipment and material													
Infrastructure Development and State Property Administration in the Defence Department													
Stage 1 – as part of the development of the functional up-to-date infrastructure for dislocation and training of the AF SR: - as a priority, implement energy efficiency projects, projects of airport infrastructure (using the *NATO Security Investment Programme*), projects for improving the quality of life and projects in the comprehensive facility security													
Stage 2 - in addition to the continuing construction of the functional up-to-date infrastructure for dislocation and training of the AF SR of the Stage 1: - as a priority, implement projects in the field of quality of training and natural environment and projects of construction of new facilities, taking into account the needs of a mechanized brigade													
National Defence Support System													
- analyse the need to maintain defence infrastructure													
- analyse the requirements of the Armed Forces for retaining production capacities													

- develop the *Defence Support Development Plan with a View to 2024*	
- develop conceptual and executive documents on ensuring preparation of the state's territory for defence and mobilization	
- regularly review the selection and inclusion of the defence infrastructure elements into category of Facilities of Special Importance and the category of Other Important Facilities and clarify the way of their protection and defence	
National Defence – A Public Concern	
- conceptually elaborate a communication strategy of the defence department	
- continuously elaborate specific communication strategies of the defence department to support the fulfilment of key tasks	
- update the policy of co-operation and development of relations between the defence department and the public	
- implement and carry out corrections to the communication strategies and the policy of public relations development	
Assessment of the Implementation of the White Paper	
- continuously - every year – as part of a comprehensive assessment of defence of the Slovak Republic	
- as part of the NATO defence planning cycles	
- at the end of Stage 1, assess the results and verify the validity of assumptions of the *White Paper*	

Yearly

In the period

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACCS	Air Command and Control System
AF SR	Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic
AGS	Alliance Ground Surveillance
ALTBMD	Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence
BARMO	Housing Agency of the Ministry of Defence
BMP-2	infantry fighting vehicle
C-IED	Counter Improvised Explosive Devices
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CIMIC	Civil-Military Co-operation
CRC	Control and Reporting Centre
C4I	Command, Control, Communications, Computers & Intelligence
DELOSYS	system of command and support of the artillery
DSOF	Directly Subordinate Offices and Facilities
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ESO	Effective, Solid and Open state administration
EU	European Union
EU BG	European Union Battle Group
GEOINT	Geospatial Intelligence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IAF	Information Assurance Framework
IFF M5	Mode 5 Identification Friend or Foe
Inc.	Incorporated
ISHCT	Institute of Special Health Care and Training
JISR	Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
MOKYS	Mobile Communication System
MoD SR	Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NEC	Network Enabled Capability
NRF	NATO Response Force
POL	Petrol, Oil, Lubricants
SNP	Slovak National Uprising
UN	United Nations

THE WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC 2013

Published by the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic in 2013
Photography: Military Historical Institute – Military Historical Archive,
Archive of the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic

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ISBN 978-80-89261-48-2

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