“The White Paper” of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine

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THE WHITE PAPER

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Opening statement by the President of Ukraine

The year 2020 was important for the development of the national intelligence agencies – the law "On Intelligence" was passed and a new draft of the law "On Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine" was approved.

This legislation took into account the experience of leading western states and relied on the assistance of the EU and NATO. It is an important step on the path to creating a new national security architecture, with the reformed Foreign Intelligence Service at its heart.

The government views the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine as a contemporary, dynamic, and offensive intelligence agency that can quickly adapt itself depending on the security threats confronting Ukraine.

As the principal intelligence consumer, I support the Intelligence Service's active adoption of new and advanced approaches as well as the integration of the practices of leading global intelligence services in its work.

The intelligence service is one of the few organizations that cannot openly talk about its accomplishments and successes. An intelligence officer's work is obscure and hidden from the public eye, thus it is misunderstood and underestimated by society.

I heartily welcome the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine's initiative to issue a professional information bulletin. The White Paper is intended to convey an assessment of the main national, regional, and international security threats as well as to acquaint Ukrainians with the work of the Foreign Intelligence Service in today's conditions.

With the approach of the 30th anniversary of Ukraine's independence, our national intelligence has accumulated considerable practical expertise in detecting external threats and neutralizing them. It has

always demonstrated its ability to act, its efficiency, and its huge potential relying on true patriots who are ready to sacrifice themselves for the sake of a more prosperous future of a free, independent, and sovereign Ukraine.

I am sure that the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine will continue to boost its capabilities and effectively protect our state borders from hostile encroachments.

Glory to Ukraine!

President of Ukraine

Volodymyr ZELENSKYY

The geopolitical situation and its impact on Ukraine 1

The current global crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic has revealed deep contradictions and it has taken present-day global threats to a new level, forcing the majority of states to review their national and international priorities.

The main components of this new reality are: the limited effectiveness of established collective security systems amid individual nation states threatening or using force and ignoring the norms of the international law; attempts to re-write free trade principles; threats to traditional financial systems by block-chain technologies, as well as the determination of regional players (Russia in particular) to play on the contradictions existing between leading nations of the world without refusing to exploit raw natural resources as a geopolitical weapon.

A number of global and regional players are trying to use this to aggressively promote their interests. In doing so, they use every lever at their disposal to artificially exacerbate crises and tensions in order to pull states deeper into the orbit of their own influence. In the process, they create pre-conditions for provoking further local and / or regional conflict.

Russia is using the Coronavirus pandemic to strengthen its influence by manipulating vaccination issues

In upcoming years, the development of the global situation will be determined by the establishment of a new global order. The economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic will set the foundation for conflict escalation between the USA and China, will catalyse the struggle for geopolitical leadership, access to natural resources (sources of energy, drinking water reserves, agricultural lands, etc.), control of the main transportation routes and communication channels.

In recent year, China (as a leading global exporter and prospective first global economy) has been the main ‘generator’ of changes in the configuration of trade routes. Russia has been making similar efforts, but

with no success due to its poor economic performance and lack of economic clout.

Changes in the geography of transit routes will sharpen competition and potential conflict between global power centres, and this will stipulate principal shifts in security systems and military-political alliances emphasizing the role of naval forces. It is likely that relations between Russia, western countries, and China will grow increasingly tense due to the fact that global warming is making navigation along the Northern Sea Route more and more accessible.

Centres of instability in Europe will be used by Russia to provoke crises

The ongoing trends - of deepening economic disparity, rising competition for labour and raw materials resources, limited access to cutting-edge industrial and information technologies, modern infrastructure and logistic systems, scientific discoveries - will negatively affect global stability. In general, the deepening of economic problems will stagnate the development of most countries.

The centres of European security instability as well as open and frozen conflicts will be used by Russia to provoke crises. The fragmentation of the security space with established buffer zones will prevail, as there is no effective system of pan-European security.

Amid these developments, EU policy will gravitate towards ‘strategic autonomy’ implying minimal dependence of the EU on other global and regional players. Ukraine’s key European allies and principal partners will be forced to focus on solving their internal problems. Eventually, European countries may pay less attention to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and some will seek to liberalize relations with the Russian Federation.

Contiguous European states will adhere to a relatively friendly policy towards Ukraine and support its Euro-Atlantic ambitions. Despite the negative impact of COVID-19 on their economies, European states will

continue to strengthen their military capabilities. This will allow some of them to pursue a more ambitious regional policy, including attempts 'to dictate their rules to Ukraine'. Concurrently, the issue of protecting the interests of their national minorities living on the territory of Ukraine will always remain relevant..

The issue of protecting the interests of national minorities that live on the territory of Ukraine will remain relevant for contiguous European states

The present-day architecture of international security agreements remains inflexible and incapable of fully guaranteeing the security of non-member countries such as Ukraine. This can partly be explained by UN inefficiency (for example the UN Security Council permanent members` veto right), the OSCE formalized activity (its key initiatives are hindered by Russia, a country that has consistently violated the Helsinki Final Act fundamental principles), NATO being in the process of a lengthy transformation, as well as the lack of agreement over EU security policies and structures. Taking into consideration the active development of military technologies, traditional deterrence systems are no longer viewed as efficient as they were in the past decade.

The course chosen by the Russian government towards attaining the status of a global player and recognition of its 'so-called' interests is the main source of threats to European security and to the national security of Ukraine that will endure into the medium term.

It is highly likely that the Kremlin will maintain its tactics of 'raising the stakes' in military and political confrontations, manipulate the many problems facing European security (by hyperbolizing the Russian Federation's role in countering uncontrolled migration, terrorist and cyber attacks), and fuel the EU disintegration processes (by financing populists and radicals, and provoking economic separatism of some EU states).

Moscow will seek to torpedo European efforts to construct their own security architecture, by urging EU countries to join an elaboration of

de-facto power balance variants. In order to ensure they continue to undermine European consensus, the Russian Federation will continue to thrust phobias on European countries related to the deployment of advanced offensive capabilities on or near EU borders.

Serious military demarches against new NATO member-countries are not expected from the Russian Federation, but incidents in the air, sea, and cyber space will continue to occur, therefore being the threat of conflict escalation between the Russian Federation and NATO through unintentional collisions and misunderstanding of intent.

NATO will remain the leading defence organization in Europe. The North Atlantic Alliance will pursue an open-door policy towards Ukraine and increase cooperation with our state. The Alliance will continue to strengthen Ukraine's security and defence sectors. However, Russia will try to block this cooperation by provoking division in Ukrainian society regarding membership of NATO as well as by weakening the alliance's unity towards Ukraine's accession to the organization.

Climate change threats and the unbalancing of ecosystems will increase. This will cause migration to rise globally, with the ability of countries to access clean water and safe food becoming acute as their populations continue to grow.

Information influence will become more significant aided by information technologies from aggressors – principally Russia. Moscow will expand on the practice of creating temporary fake platforms created by their secret services, in Europe particularly, in order to disseminate false and biased information.

Intensification of information propaganda campaigns

Cyberterrorism will pose an undeniable threat to international security. State institutions, objects of critical infrastructure, industrial corporations, medicine, and the financial sector will be the main targets of attackIn general, the global situation is characterised by a high level of

uncertainty. More and more challenges for Transatlantic and European unity are appearing. In addition, risks of using military and internal social conflicts as a tool to achieve goals by certain players are growing.

Economic instability will stimulate the national egoism growth and populist sentiments, striving for self-isolation and seeking for possibilities to solve personal problems at the expense of others. In conjunction with the militarization trend, this can cause the escalation of existing conflicts and the emergence of new ones. The Russian Federation will try to take advantage of this situation which, in general, will increase the threats to Ukraine from the aggressor-state.

2 Assessment of external threats to the national security of Ukraine



2.1 Threats connected with the Russian Federation

The Russian Federation will remain the main source of threats to the security of Ukraine and its surrounds in the foreseeable future.

At the strategic level, the objectives of the Russian Federation in regards to Ukraine will remain unchanged - keeping the country solely under Russian influence and preventing it from moving in the Euro-Atlantic direction.

This policy is unlikely to change despite an unfavourable international background for Russia and the emergence of new factors, specifically Joe Biden's presidential election victory, turbulence in the oil and gas markets, a poor-performing national economy, as well as a possible change in leadership (transfer of power) in Russia.

Russia is changing its tactics towards Ukraine, however its strategic goal remains the same: to impede the successful Western orientation of Ukraine

Thus, amid V. Putin's obvious health problems and visible complications for him in fulfilling his public function as head of state, the de facto transfer of power in Russia has started. Irrespectively of the chosen variant ('Putin as the eternal president', 'Putin as the leader of the nation', 'Putin in a tandem', 'Putin's successor'), the reality in the medium term is that 'Putinism' will continue to be the way in which Russia is governed regardless of whether Putin himself occupies the Presidency or not.

Under such circumstances, a rapid change in the Kremlin's foreign policy goals is not expected. Moscow's gradual deviation from its current

RUSSIAN OBJECTIVES AND APPROACHES TOWARDS UKRAINE

Strategic Goals	Tactical Goals	Dominants in the Kremlin's Approaches
keeping Ukraine purely under the geopolitical influence of the RF (preferably by integrating Ukraine or part of it into a certain superpower project under the auspices of Moscow, de facto 'USSR 2.0');	institutional weakness of Ukraine and disruption of its statehood;	the existence of an independent, unitary, West-oriented Ukraine poses a threat to Putin's regime;
preventing Ukraine's strategic convergence with the West via Euro-Atlantic integration;	federalization of Ukraine (preferably, the creation of a confederation), where a member of the federation - practically controlled by Moscow – will act as an 'anchor' in the civilized movement of Ukraine towards the West (namely, by blocking important decisions on policy and security issues);	currently, Russia doesn't have enough power to "resolve the Ukrainian issue once and for all" by the use of military force;
preventing a reality in which the pace of economic development and quality/standards of life in Ukraine would surpass those in Russia;	gaining control over the legislative and executive branches of power in Ukraine by pro-Russian forces;	achieving a comprehensive compromise with Ukraine is impossible, primarily because of Crimea;
gaining free access to Ukraine's market and resources ensuring unilateral benefits;	weakening the international support given to Ukraine;	Russia's policy towards Ukraine pursues the systematic implementation of a long-term strategy aimed at disrupting the 'Ukrainian statehood project';
solving Russia's systematic demographic problems at the expense of Ukraine's human resources.	preventing the USA from directly participating in solving the situation in/around Ukraine;	use of a wide range of already tested tools of hybrid influence on Ukraine – simultaneous application of internal and external measures of military, political, financial-and-economic, security, trade, energy and information pressure / impact;
	transferring the burden - of providing for / maintaining the temporarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk regions - onto Ukraine with Russia continuing to exercise control over these territories;	use of '5th column' and the Ukrainian media space.
	hindering the reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories as planned by Ukraine;	
	Ukraine's unilateral lifting of economic blockade against temporarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and especially against temporarily occupied territories in Crimea;	
	lifting / maximum easing of the 'Ukrainian set' of western sanctions (as well as personal restrictions) against the RF in the sphere of trade, finance, and technology.	

course is possible in the sphere of global security, acceptance of its status as a regional (not global) state, cancellation of its active presence far abroad (e.g. Syria, Libya, Venezuela, the Central African Republic), which entails a too heavy cost for taxpayers to bear. At the same time, Russia will not abandon attempts to control its so-called 'strategic interest zone' including the former USSR member-states.

Here we see the key threat from Russia that lies in the systemic destabilization of the internal situation in Ukraine. Moscow plans to lay the ground for revenge of pro-Russian forces by means of creating a political structure for a covert takeover of the legislative and executive branches of the Ukrainian government.

Thus the autumn 2020 local elections were just a preparatory stage. Moscow is now seeking to create the necessary preconditions for snap parliamentary elections.

Moscow is bidding on 'the guided chaos approach', which paves the way for revenge. The key preconditions are: internal discord, weakness of state institutions, and loss of support from the West

Within the framework of this scenario, Russia is actively pursuing several directions:

1. Degrade Ukraine's state institutions

The RF and its special services' multiple attempts to discredit Ukraine's state institutions are regularly recorded. These attempts aim to portray the transformation of Ukraine into a 'failed state' to both domestic and foreign audiences, proving that Ukraine is not able to successfully function as a state.

The people of Ukraine and the 'Kyiv authorities' are portrayed as opposing parties. The Russian government continues to push the idea that somehow the Russian and Ukrainian people are 'the same, with one shared history and a common culture' and that Ukraine will only thrive when it is also under the rule of Putin. A number of Ukrainian channels are being actively used to push these narratives.

A special focus is being made on deepening tensions between the 'centre' and the regions. With this aim, Russia continues to stir up demands for ethnic autonomies and regional separatism in different regions of Ukraine, namely Transcarpathia, Halychyna, Bessarabia and this is accompanied by inciting interethnic and inter-confessional animosity.

To provoke enmity in the Ukrainian society and to undermine our statehood, the Kremlin has been systematically discrediting the Ukrainian national identity and our choice to be part of Western civilization. It has also systematically attempted to demonstrate the 'artificial nature' of the Ukrainian identity and state altogether.

Russia's political objective is to destabilize the social and political life to the point when 'the Kremlin's support' is the only solution for Ukraine's 'survival'. In achieving these goals, Russia is prepared to provoke a 'war of all against all' in Ukraine and to use military and political capabilities to force a change in government.

2. Weakening of international support

Within this framework, the Kremlin keeps trying to produce the effect of 'fatigue of Ukraine' in the West. At the same time, corresponding lobbying and subversive anti-Ukrainian activities of pro-Russian forces in Western countries are skilfully emphasising and reinforcing other sources of friction, such as difficulties in the European integration reforms in our country and a deepening crisis within the EU, distracting Brussels from Eastern European issues.

Conflicts in relations between Kyiv and contiguous EU member states are also constantly provoked.

Separating the issue of 'the occupation of Crimea' from the rest of the 'Ukraine issue' is of particular importance to Moscow. Among other things, attempts to discredit the Ukrainian international platform 'Crimea is Ukraine' are expected to continue via pro-Russian lobbying efforts abroad alongside the simultaneous promotion of counter-initiatives by the Russian Federation (such as the 'Friends of Crimea' platform).

In addition, in the economic dimension, Ukraine's cooperation with international financial institutions is being torpedoed while direct foreign investments into our country are being obstructed. During official contacts of top Russian leadership with Western leaders, misinformation about the 'economic decline of our state due to corruption' is actively spread. Through its diplomatic and other channels, Russia conveys to high-ranking representatives of foreign banking and business circles information on the alleged misuse by Ukraine of credit funds, as well as technical and humanitarian aid.

3. Manipulation of the temporarily occupied territories factor

Moscow is actively manipulating the temporarily occupied territories factor.

The Kremlin's approaches to the temporarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk regions envisage the following:

rapid integration of the temporarily occupied territories (TOT) of Donetsk and Luhansk regions into the political and legal structures of Ukraine via a so-called 'Special status' of these territories. In essence, this means granting sovereignty, which provides for a full amnesty for officials and militants of the 'DPR / LPR', holding elections on the terms set out and with the participation of representatives of the self-proclaimed 'republics', etc.;

transfer to Ukraine: a) of a major part or the whole burden of maintaining and restoring TOT in Donetsk and Luhansk regions (DLO); b) solving the environmental problems, which have become catastrophic over the over 5 years of hostilities and occupation; c) responsibility for socio-demographic problems caused by the Russian aggression;

forcing these measures through and then using them as an argument to lift Western sanctions that limit the RF in the areas of trade, finance and technology, as well as achieving the abolition of personal sanctions against Russia's top officials.

At the same time, the tactical intentions of the Russian Federation regarding the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the period before their full reintegration into Ukraine provide for the recognition (formal or informal) by Ukraine of the so-called 'DPR / LPR' as full-fledged subjects of the negotiation process for a peaceful settlement, as well as maintaining the total dependence of the DPR / LPR leadership on Russian leadership and power groups in Moscow. The dependence mentioned will be manifested both in appointments to management positions, decision making and control of 'vital functions' in the quasi-entities.

In so doing, Russia will use the following levers of influence on the situation in the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions:

coercive: the presence on the TOT in the DLO (on the basis of rotation) of the so-called advisers and a limited contingent of servicemen of almost all law enforcement / special structures of the Russian Federation, 2 or 3 thousand strong. At the same time, the Russian side is capable of significantly increasing this presence at short notice across the uncontrolled section of the state border with Russia;

financial: filling most of the budget of the DPR / LPR with the federal budget funds of the Russian Federation -- both directly and through intermediary structures (CJSC Vneshtorgservice, mechanisms of humanitarian aid, etc.);

institutional: ensuring the functioning of such a model of power in the occupied territories, which is a modified copy of the current power in Russia, based on totally corrupt political and social relations (numerous grey schemes allow for the enrichment of power groups in Moscow and in the 'republics').

The occupied territories of Donbas are important for the Russian Federation principally as a tool for destabilising Ukraine

At the same time, the 'republics' will almost certainly continue to marginalise and this will be manifested by the following factors:

the final transformation of the self-proclaimed 'republics' into a 'grey zone' in the broadest sense (money laundering by part of the Russian elite, including the leadership of the power bloc, sales of low-quality products of Russian manufacturers, testing of political technologies that control the population);

further criminalization of political and economic networks within the 'DPR and LPR leadership';

development of the local economy in conditions of complete shortage of resources and a skilled work force, as well as problems with obtaining raw materials and diversification of markets for manufactured products;

depreciation of some key infrastructural assets to almost 100%;

lumpenisation of the population, in particular its return to primitive forms of economic relations;

testing in the temporarily occupied territories of new military equipment, which has not yet passed all stages of testing for the Russian army and may be imperfect, and therefore additionally dangerous;

covert testing on the population of the 'republics' of new drugs and vaccines that have not passed all the necessary stages of testing.

In addition to that, the high level of Ukraine-phobia (Ukrainophobia) will be fuelled among the residents of the temporarily occupied territories due to the overwhelming nature of Russian propaganda in mass media.

In particular, the following narratives - which are designed not only for TOT residents, but also for the entire population of Ukraine - will be actively promoted:

- allegedly, 'the Kyiv authorities are deliberately sabotaging the implementation of the Minsk agreements, as they do not want to end the war, which allows them to shift responsibility for the deterioration of the socio-economic situation in Ukraine';
- allegedly, the President and the ruling party did not live up to the expectations of the people of Ukraine as far as the cessation of 'the civil war' in eastern Ukraine is concerned;
- allegedly, the policy of the incumbent Ukrainian government cut off all ways for the political return of Donbas;
- allegedly, the main beneficiary of the civil war in Donbas is the United States, which is interested in weakening the Russian Federation through the creation of an Arc of instability near its borders

Particular attention is devoted to the widespread Soviet-style standards of voluntary-compulsory Russian citizenship passports issuance to the residents of the temporarily occupied territories. In the future, Russia will manipulate the factor of 'protecting its citizens' for open / undisguised interference in the internal affairs of Ukraine, including threatening force scenarios.

A separate issue is Russia's manipulation of the peace and negotiation processes in eastern Ukraine.

Against the background of Ukraine's principled position, the Kremlin is currently not interested in the intensification and effectiveness of negotiations in the Normandy and Minsk formats. In this regard, Moscow is resorting both to technical delay of all elements of its participation in the negotiation process, and to the direct rejection of meetings in all formats.

At the same time, the Russian Federation is trying to shift responsibility for disrupting the regular talks to Ukraine, accusing Kyiv of bargaining failure. Russia's manipulation of the risk of walking out of the negotiation process is not ruled out.

Russia does have and strongly defends its own vision of peace establishment in eastern Ukraine, which is based on the corresponding Minsk agreements, supplemented by the so-called 'Steinmeier's formula'.

This means that Kyiv must first grant the TOT a special status, make appropriate amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine, provide for local elections in uncontrolled territories, unconditionally pardon members of criminal armed groups, and ensure procedural cleansing of individuals kept in custody, including ex post facto, i.e. after exchange. Only then will the Russian side and the DNR / LNR begin to meet their commitments, the most important of which is the transfer to the Ukrainian side of control over the entire border of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions with the Russian Federation. Simultaneously, under the existing conditions, such a transfer of border control is a 'red line' for Russia, and it is almost certain that in the mid-term future, the Russian side will not give up this control, putting forward additional conditions.

Concurrently, during the negotiation process, the Russian Federation is trying to implement a number of tactical tasks, including:

- striving to radically change the status of Russia – from the party of conflict to the role of a mediator. Moscow hopes that this will pave the way for lifting of sanctions and a return to a ***business as usual*** situation in relations with Europe;
- acquisition of a legal personality by representatives of the Russian occupation administrations in the negotiation process, as well as their inclusion as fully-fledged parties not only in the negotiations in the Tripartite Contact Group, but also in the meetings within the framework of the Normandy Quartet. Russia is also striving to legitimize the so-called DPR / LPR through the mechanism of optimization / innovation of the ceasefire controls.

For instance, one of the elements of the campaign to legitimize the occupation administrations and position them as parties to the conflict

was an informal UN 'Arria formula' meeting organized by Russia on December 2, 2020, which was attended by some TOT officials in DLO. Such attempts will only become more frequent, and high-ranking officials of pan-European organizations will become the object of special interest from both Russian diplomats and representatives of the Russian secret services.

4. Creating a threatening military background

Russia's war-making capabilities, concentrated along its borders with Ukraine, enable it to conduct any form of military operation against Ukraine by deploying three combined forces groups without additional mobilization and with minimal preparatory measures.

At the same time, Russia continues to threaten military invasion by conducting numerous military exercises along or near Ukraine's borders, including 'West 2021' strategic command and staff exercise which is planned for 2021.

An example of intrusion threat manipulation is the targeted information campaign about the use of 'Caucasus 2020' Strategic command-and-staff exercise for the purpose of delivering a final solution to the issue of water supply to Crimea.

5. Economic and energy-supply pressure

This direction provides for a large-scale trade and economic war against Ukraine, designed to obtain political dividends.

Russia will expand sanctions against Ukraine, intensify financial pressure, energy blackmail, transit and transport blockade, will supplant Ukrainian producers on traditional markets, discredit Ukrainian enterprises on the international markets, and penetrate the Ukrainian markets by investing in sham structures. There is a blockade of Ukrainian ports in the Sea of Azov and a willingness to transfer this practice to the Black Sea ports to undermine our economic potential.

The targets for attacks will remain to be key leaders of domestic industries, Ukrainian ports and transport infrastructure, enterprises of fuel, energy, and defence-industrial complexes.

The scheme of Ukraine's energy embargo will be pushed forward for many years to come through bypassing gas-supply routes, the final stage of which will be the completion of Nord Stream-2 and the closure of natural gas-supply routes from Russia through Ukraine. The Kremlin is doing its utmost to complete the Nord Stream-2 project as soon as possible. Russian diplomacy and special services are actively lobbying international politicians. Russia is looking for ways to circumvent

sanctions and protect construction partners from sanctions and economic attack.

Russia will keep trying to persuade its satellites in the Eurasian Economic Union to discriminate against Ukrainian companies in the EEU markets. In particular, new trade restrictive measures on Ukrainian goods in the form of anti-dumping, blocking, risk profiles, new technical regulations, allegations of inadequate quality control, etc. are already in progress.

Moscow considers economic pressure to be an important tool for persuading Kyiv to make concessions, creating preconditions for lowering government ratings, and ousting Ukrainian producers from certain sectors of the Russian market, including in the context of Russia's import substitution program.

2.2 Regional assessment of threats to national security

The main factors influencing the situation in the regional security sphere in the context of Ukraine's interests are:

- confirmed ineffectiveness of main security institutions (UN, OSCE) in resolving regional conflicts. A trend has emerged towards militarization of the territories and waters adjacent to the Ukrainian border, while the current system of international agreements in the sphere of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, sensitive technologies, and knowledge are being destroyed;
- the regional security environment experiences greater influence from the Russian Federation and other countries seeking to realise their ambitions, including using of Ukraine's resources (territory, scientific and technological potential, agriculture, water, human and other resources).

The Kremlin's strategic course involves provoking crises further away from its borders, closer to the territory of its main adversaries (ideally on their territory) or in the area of their special interests. This causes Russia to provoke in a hybrid way the emergence of new grey areas of global and regional instability (Moldova, Belarus, the Baltic States, Central Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa).

In this regard, Russia's permanent attempts to form institutional levers of influence on the format of regional security should be considered, in particular by means of potentially involving member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in its military adventures (Syria, Donbas) and joint interaction formats (unification of national air defence systems, joint exercises, etc.).

In general, the imposition to partners of 'friend or foe relations' and stereotypes of 'bloc thinking' provokes an antagonistic confrontation between different systems of collective security.

In addition, NATO'S limited willingness to demonstrate strong support for the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova provides room for manipulation and military provocation by Russia.

Europe's eastern and southern neighbouring countries as objects for Russia's strength projection	
Russia's strategic interests and objectives	blocking NATO expansion;
	neutralization of Western influence;
	involvement of flank states into Russian integration projects (such as the Eurasian Economic Union, the CSTO, etc.)
The Kremlin's main tools	exploiting the cultural heritage of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union to 'clear' the image of the Russian Federation, as well as uniting supporters of anti-Western values into a single network / front;
	exploiting the weaknesses of European states in order to completely eliminate Europe's ability to act collectively;
	diplomatic, political, and economic intimidation;
	information and propaganda manipulation;
	constant threat of resorting to military force.

The Azov-Black Sea region is viewed by Moscow as an important springboard for expansion in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the African continent. The militarization of annexed Crimea plays a key role in changing the military-political balance of power in the Black Sea region, particularly by creating a system to restrict NATO's freedom of action in the region.

Moscow views the Azov-Black Sea region as a springboard for expansion in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the African continent

Years of occupation have provided a substantial amount of overt and covert intelligence to confirm the fact that Moscow, despite its statements, has never considered the Crimea in terms of developing its economic (industrial, agricultural, tourist or humanitarian) potential.

Since the occupation of the Crimean peninsula, Russia has been actively enhancing the offensive capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces based on this territory, increasing the number of troops and equipping them with new models of weapons and military equipment, while creating conditions for strengthening their nuclear capabilities. The main goal is to make the Russian Federation a dominant state in the Black Sea region.

In Crimea, Russia has created a powerful joint force grouping, which includes land, air, and maritime components manned by about 32,500 military men. The Russian Federation is creating conditions for the deployment of nuclear weapons, its components, and carriers on the temporarily occupied territory (TOT) of Crimea, and it is carrying out work to restore nuclear facilities infrastructure threatening Ukraine's national security.



Militarization of the Crimean Peninsula (2013-2020)

Almost all Soviet anti-aircraft missile systems capable of firing missiles with a nuclear warhead have been activated.

Upgrading anti-aircraft missile systems with modern missiles is underway. New missile systems have been put on combat duty. At the present moment, Russian anti-aircraft systems have control over most of the Black Sea, with surface-to-surface missiles covering it entirely.

Military aircraft and ballistic missile launching ships have been stationed in the TOT of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol.

The rhetoric of Russian officials is dominated by the thesis of 'Russia's right to deploy nuclear weapons on its own territory and the possibility of such deployment in Crimea'.

Russia's activity to deploy air defence systems in the annexed Crimea, modernizing the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and its mass equipping with naval-based cruise missiles (Kalibr-NK and Kalibr-PL) indicate that Moscow is planning to ensure its ability to ban / restrict zonal access not only in the Black Sea region, but also in the Mediterranean.

Moreover, Russia's plans to develop and use tactical nuclear weapons (namely from the TOT of Crimea) will allow the Kremlin to increase pressure on the international community, as well as aggressively dominate the Black Sea, Mediterranean, and European theatre of military operations. This threatens the security and national interests of Ukraine and its strategic partners.

Notably, Russia is comprehensively arranging the process of transforming Crimea into one large military base with all factors assumed, including the social dimension. The population structure of the peninsula is changing. Crimean Tatars, as a 'disloyal' component of the population, are being purposefully pushed out to mainland Ukraine or Turkey. The military and their families are being turned into a social support of the occupying power by means of the subsidy policy manipulation.

The Kremlin regards Crimea primarily in military terms (the concept of an 'unsinkable aircraft carrier'), ignoring economic, humanitarian, and environmental factors

In addition, the active militarization of education through compulsory introduction of patriotic education of children is underway in Crimea. Thus, in every city / district the occupying administrations have developed and approved specific programs of military and patriotic education, and military-applied and military-technical sports. The so-called 'Yunarmiya' (Youth-army) teams and other militaristic children's and youth organizations have been established.

Russia's efforts to ensure military and political domination in the Black and Azov Seas also provide for the possibility to block / thwart the implementation of non-Russian energy, transport, logistics, and security projects in the region, having a significant negative impact on Ukraine and the states in the region, torpedoing their European integration courses.

The Russian Federation is also trying to take advantage of historical conflicts between Ukraine and its neighbours in order to incite enmity between the nations and use the consequences to its favour.

A typical example is the historical heritage of our relations with Hungary and Poland. The states have managed to reach understanding on this issue, but even here it was not without Russia seeking to fuel chauvinism against Ukraine. At present, Russia is acting not only covertly, but also brazenly and out in the open.

For example, the Vovan and Lexus pranksters' attempt to trick the President of Poland A. Duda and to provoke him to speak on sensitive issues of Ukrainian-Polish relations (they offered to 'return the Ukrainian territories ... Lviv and many others'). A few more examples: in 2016, the Polish Internal Security Agency detained the leader of the pro-Russian *Zmina* party, Mateusz Piskorski, for cooperating with the Russian secret services; in 2018, Polish law enforcement officers detained their own citizens, members of the radical pro-Russian organization *Phalanga,* on suspicion of setting fire to the Hungarian Culture Society office in Uzhhorod.

The situation with Belarus is a bit different: the Kremlin has never stopped absorbing Belarus under the guise of 'unification'. This poses a danger of Belarus turning into a springboard for the implementation of a more aggressive policy towards Ukraine. Using all levers, Moscow is trying to weaken Belarus as much as possible and ensure that Russia is its only viable partner.

Russia has moved to the decisive stage of achieving its goals in Belarus through the so-called 'strategy of coercion to integration'. It envisages both a solution to the 'problem of toxic O. Lukashenko' and the long-term keeping of the country under Russian influence using a group of several pro-Russian political forces (parties) in the Belarus parliament.

Developments according to this scenario include a number of threats to the national interests of Ukraine, in particular:

- shift in the Belarusian leadership's position on the 'Ukrainian issue', full solidarity of the Belarusian leadership with the Russian policy on Ukraine, including recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea by Minsk;
- transformation of Belarus into a springboard for Russia to destabilize Ukraine or to conduct military operations against our state;
- enhancing the interaction between the special services of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus against Ukraine, including conducting intelligence and subversive activities.

Moscow remains a key player in Moldova. At this stage a controlled opposition between the president and the parliament as well as prevention of a pro-European governing coalition is an acceptable option for the Russian Federation. In the meantime Moscow still possesses sufficient tools and resources to destabilise the situation in the region even if the pro-Kremlin forces defeat the upcoming pre-term parliamentary elections in the Republic of Moldova. In that regard the Kremlin considers the Transnistrian issue as a way of the most effective manipulation to block the negotiating process in the '5+2' format, to intensify military drills of the OGRF and the Transnistrian law enforcement agencies, to conduct provocations on the administrative border between Moldova and Transnistria, and to enhance Russian troops in the Transnistrian region, etc.

On the whole, the analysis of the processes taking place in Moldova (Transnistria), Georgia (Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region), as well as in Azerbaijan and Armenia (Nagorno-Karabakh) demonstrates that Russia continues manipulating regional (both open and frozen) conflicts. The Kremlin exploits them as a tool to bring pro-Russian forces to power and force these countries back into the orbit of its influence while hypocritically offering its services as a peacemaker.

On the other hand, the turbulence on Russia's borders raises internal challenges for the Putin regime as well. It particularly includes the excessive burden on the Russian economy caused by its foreign policy and military adventures, enhancement of covert opposition within the Russian elite groups (including the competition for 'curatorship' (mentorship) in the post-Soviet area), growing of protest activity among the Russian population as well as the deepening of contradictions between the central and regional elites.

The turbulence in the post-Soviet space has already become a catalyst for the deep institutional 'Eurasian' integration crisis under the auspices of the Russian Federation (CSTO, EAEU, CIS, etc.). In practice, this makes it impossible for the Kremlin to implement its ambitious geopolitical projects to restore the "USSR 2.0" in one form or anotheri.

2.3 Threats to national security in the economic sphere

Globally, the world economic recovery pace remains uncertain amid the crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, despite some positive expectations for the period of 2021-2025.

Under such terms, significant dependence of the domestic economy on exports as well as foreign export-import markets and capital markets trends causes increased sensitivity of our country to external influences.

World trade to be de-globalized and segmented

The recent years` dominance of 'national selfishness' in economic relations as well as preference for development of bilateral relations while neglecting the interests of other states, including within existing multilateral systems, in particular the WTO, has led to a gradual weakening of the ability to shape a consolidated response to the current threats.

World GDP growth rates in 1981-2020 and the forecast for 2021-2025, %



Datasource: The Economist Intelligence Unit (2020).

The World Trade Organization's inability to resolve interstate trade disputes has lead to increased protectionism as well as the imposition by economically developed states of their approaches to weaker trading partners. These processes lead to the regionalization of the world trade structure that will largely correlate with the regional architecture of political alliances and partnerships.

The reduction of opportunities for a symmetrical response to unilateral trade restrictions poses a threat to Ukraine in the trade and economic sphere amid WTO's significantly limited role as an objective institution to resolve disputes. The intensification of the global trade confrontation between the leading centres (USA, PRC, EU) actually leads to ignoring the interests of the economies moving in their direction. This situation, for example, enabled the Russian Federation to freely block the Ukrainian products transit through Russian territory to Central Asian countries.

Ukraine is in a critical zone of both economic and security threats

Regional economic disparities provoke security threats

Ukraine is in a critical zone where economic and security threats intersect. Along with growing domestic political pressures, it creates a high potential for a state systemic crisis. So far, the Western comprehensive support of our state has been a determining external factor that hinders the implementation of such a scenario.

On balance, Ukraine should expect:

- growth of external and domestic debt amid stagnation of the economic growth rate;
- difficult access to external financial sources / international capital markets, due to increased competition for the resources needed to restore other state economies as well;

export markets narrowing. The interest of most countries to exercise foreign trade restrictive / protectionist measures to support domestic producers (amid low efficiency of international regulators / WTO / and the need to recover national economies) may lead to Ukraine being pushed out from traditional export markets (grain, metallurgy, etc.);

increase of potential strategic investors' requirements for project implementation in Ukraine;

further preservation of Russian restrictions on Ukrainian export goods given the negative price environment, leading to a reduction in foreign currency revenues;

blocking of Ukrainian goods' transit by the Russian Federation and involving other EAEU participants in this process;

maintaining a low level of Ukraine's involvement in transcontinental transport routes.

Uncontrolled migration might be a destabilizing factor for the economies of the recipient countries

New zones of military and political instability as well as the 'hot zones' stimulate the migratory flows to economically resilient countries. Such migration is accompanied by an increase in the socio-economic burden on the receiving countries, exacerbation of cultural and social contradictions and, ultimately, that creates additional challenges for such countries.

Hence, it is crucial that developed countries prevent economic and security crises in the geopolitical periphery as well as create conditions for controlled migration of labour while blocking the settling of marginalized people.

Migratory threats for our country are low at present, as the main refugee flows (from Asia and Africa to Europe) head for the Mediterranean routes.

In turn, the outflow of the Ukrainian citizens may lead to deepening of the Ukrainian demographic crisis in the long run.

2.4 Threats to national security in the energy sphere

The transition from hydrocarbon to renewable energy is the main medium-term trend of the global energy market. Thus, the following is observed:

increased price volatility in the world oil market fuelled by the economic recession and differences among the OPEC + member countries;

heightened investment risks in the development of new hydrocarbon production projects;

increased consumption of gas as a more environmentally friendly fuel for the transition period, especially in the energy and transport sectors;

encouraging development of hydrogen technologies as production costs are rapidly declining.

Average annual prices for Brent oil in 1990-2020 and the forecast for 2021, USD per barrel



The national energy transformation most adversely affects the coal industry, which leads to increased socio-economic tensions in the regions of traditional coal mining.

Hydrocarbon price volatility puts long-term investments in the underground gas and oil deposits development projects at risk. It further complicates the increase in domestic hydrocarbon production (for the purpose of balancing import dependence) in our country.

Affordability, environmental acceptability, reliability of sufficient supply to meet demand and diversification needs are the priorities of ensuring Ukraine's energy security. In this respect, an important task is improving the efficiency of internal energy potential, including by increasing energy efficiency.

An important element of guaranteeing energy security is the integration of energy markets. In this regard, a positive aspect is the accession of our country to the European Union of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO-E) and the European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO-G).

Despite the diversification measures already taken by Ukraine, Russian energy resources retain an important role in the energy supply of our country

Accession of our state to these instruments and joining the Energy Community increases the effectiveness of steps taken to preserve the transit potential of Ukraine and counter the implementation of Russian plans that negatively affect the energy security of the state.

Despite the relative success of measures to diversify sources of supply, primarily natural gas, Russian energy resources retain an important role in Ukraine's energy supply. At the same time, Russia continues to use energy as a tool to achieve its geopolitical goals.

On the whole, the current threats in the energy sector for Ukraine are:

promotion by Russia of politically motivated gas transportation projects ('Nord Stream-2' and 'Turkish Stream'), which form a disproportion in the regional gas infrastructure;

a significant level of dependence on Russia in nuclear energy, Russia's opposition to the development of the nuclear power fuel supply diversification project by the US company Westinghouse;

high level of dependence on energy imports under conditions of low energy efficiency of the economy;

reduction of transit potential of domestic gas transportation system;

dependence of the oil and oil products' domestic market on the stability of imports.

2.5 Threats to national security in the information and cyber spheres

Rising levels of information threat is a global trend. Given the fast-paced development of information and telecommunication systems as well as the transnational nature of social communication, it is cyberspace that becomes the major sphere of conflict. It typifies the 'no rules battlefield', where almost all Helsinki principles, human rights, and generally accepted moral norms are intentionally ignored. Ukraine is no exception and increasingly becomes the target of information wars and cyber-attacks.

The major source of the threat to the national security of Ukraine traditionally remains Russia, which pursues several directions in the so-called 'Ukrainian case':

Russia strives to dominate the Ukrainian information space. This is one of the prerequisites of the preparation for aggression against Ukraine

1. Internal Ukrainian. It includes the following:

promotion of the ideas of seemingly 'anti-popular actions of the incumbent Ukrainian authorities' and 'suppression of the Ukrainian people'. Topics of rising communal services tariffs, worsening of the political-economic crisis, low rates of the social-economic development of the country, corruption, negative results of reforms, priority of the business interests of the government over the people's interests, etc. are articulated;

imposing on the Ukrainian population the idea of the alleged necessity and/or inevitability of the resumption of ties with the Russian Federation. Theses of the 'Russian world' with an emphasis on the common historical past and political and economic ties between Ukraine and Russia are being actively promoted.

This track involves the use of theses on 'Slavic unity', the 'Russian-nature of Ukrainians and Belarusians', the spread of the Russian vision of history, etc., as well as the implementation, especially in the south-eastern regions of Ukraine of media projects to cover and promote the economic growth of Ukraine and Russia during the common Soviet past;

discrediting the reputation and personal image of the Ukrainian political, military, and business elites;

demonization of the EU, NATO, and the United States.

The main task of the Russian Federation in the Ukrainian information space is to oppose the Ukrainian authorities and the people, at the same time interpreting the idea of non-alternative development of cooperation with Russia for Ukraine

2. International. It includes two sub-directions:

2.1 Discrediting Ukraine:

imposing the image of Ukraine as a seemingly 'potentially militarist, fascist country posing a threat to its neighbours', shaping the perception of Ukraine as a 'source of security threats' to Europe. To transmit this message, the Russian side is actively trying to involve Belarus;

accusing Ukrainian leadership of alleged corruption and a lack of real intention / inability to carry out reforms;

Russia's objectives in the international dimension:

to give the 'Ukrainian question' less prominence;

to shift focus from the topic of Russian aggression to the prospects of cooperation on other global issues.

discrediting Ukraine as an allegedly unreliable partner that does not comply with international norms and its own obligations;

provoking tensions in Ukraine's bilateral relations with neighbouring countries, primarily Poland and Hungary;

disseminating theses on alleged human rights abuses in our country (persecution of journalists, violation of the rights of Russian-speaking citizens in Ukraine, violation of freedom of speech, and restriction of unimpeded access to and exchange of information);

interpreting the conflict in the east of our state as a 'civil war'. To realize this, the Russian Federation is also trying to involve as much as possible the occupational administrations of the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, whose task is to spread the Russian interpretation of the situation in the eastern Ukraine and impose a Russian vision of the conflict resolution;

accusing the Ukrainian side of allegedly ignoring the Minsk agreements, deliberately aggravating the situation in Donbas in order to keep Western sanctions against Russia.

2.2. Shift the focus from Russian aggression against Ukraine and the Kremlin's crimes at the international arena.

efforts include Moscow's attempts to legitimize the occupation of Crimea, quasi-republics in Donbas, breakthrough of international isolation, and the bypassing of international sanctions. As a rule, these narratives are camouflaged by messages about the need to jointly counter new challenges and threats to international / regional security, which is impossible without a return to ***business as usual*** in the interaction between the West and Russia.

The mechanism of Russian information influence

The Russian Federation destructive information influences paradoxically combine, on the one hand, high technologies, and, on the other - archaic ideological approaches based on the proven experience of 'active measures' of the Service 'A' of the USSR KGB PSU. Such combination of high-tech and archaic is generally characteristic of Putin's neo-totalitarian state model.

The peculiarity of the destructive activity of the Russian Federation in the information sphere (in its various manifestations) is that the whole world, and not only Ukraine, faces its destructive consequences. Thus, the Kremlin flexibly varies the ideological content of foreign propaganda depending on the target of influence: the humanitarian expansion of the 'Russian world' – for the post-Soviet territory; naphthalene ideas of Panslavism and Orthodox messianism – for the Balkans; promotion of anti-Americanism – for developing countries; the spread of Eurosceptic ideas and anti-liberal discourse – for the EU, etc.

The information component of the Kremlin's hybrid activity is based on the established system of disinformation and external propaganda. Such a system is based on several interrelated areas of application of a wide range of tools to promote Russia's necessary narratives abroad among various social groups - political and business circles, experts, civil society representatives, and the general public.

These tools are the following:

official communications channels – the declared statements of Russian governmental officials and official messages of governmental agencies posted in social networks, etc.

However, this format is increasingly floundering. Even the traditional annual big press conference of Vladimir Putin on December 17, 2020 was marked by a certain 'fatigue' of the audience, especially the international one, because of the relatively traditional messages of the President of the Russian Federation. There were no elements of novelty, constructiveness or significant information on topical international issues on the agenda. The main signals were given in the paradigm of a 'new Cold War', containing traditional accusations of the West, combined with messages of their willingness to cooperate, calls to strengthen Russia's defence capabilities, dreams of a strategic partnership with China, and a desire to return to the G7;

activity of Russian special (financed from the Russian Federation budget) external disinformation and propaganda structures. ЙThese are primarily activities of the Russian international propaganda media, such as foreign units of Sputnik or Russia Today – well-known 'fake factories' – as well as special institutions promoting Russian 'soft power' such as 'Rossotrudnichestvo'.

The fact that Yevgeny Primakov (a grandson of the former Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Foreign Intelligence Service Director), who is close to the Chairman of the State Duma V. Volodin, heads 'Rossotrudnichestvo' has testified that the Kremlin withdrew plans to radically reform it.

Thus, being a federal agency, 'Rossotrudnichestvo' remains a separate hybrid instrument of the Russian Federation, primarily in the context of applying "soft power" in post-Soviet countries and Eastern Europe.

After a certain audit of the agency, the activities of which have always been associated with corruption (including on the 'Ukrainian issue'), 'Rossotrudnichestvo' made attempts to act offensively;

- activities of Russian foreign disinformation and propaganda structures indirectly / covertly funded by the Russian Federation.

It is noteworthy that, in addition to media institutions, which are covertly funded by the Russian Federation (there is no need to look hard for examples in Ukraine, one may just turn on the TV), the same segment includes entities (media, experts) that are used without knowing it;

- work in social networks, which seem to be attractive for destructive influence due to their accessibility and scope amid virtual lack of control.

A peculiar feature of work in social media is the infiltration of bots into local chats / comments under articles, etc., aimed at sowing discord and undermining trust in institutions.

A real breakthrough for Russia has become the 'anonymous' Telegram channels. The work of such channels has been recorded in Ukraine and other countries. These channels allegedly work against all - they ruthlessly criticize the government and the opposition, pro-European and even pro-Russian segments of the politics. The real goal of such channels is to undermine trust in state institutions and democratic procedures, as well as to shape a dominant stereotype in the population of 'total disillusion in the ability of the Ukrainian people to statehood'.

Moscow will continue to use traditional media resources along with diplomacy and special services activity, and will expand its disinformation activity through a variety of online publications. Methods of 'concept substitution', fake news formation, based on partially true information, references to a dubious / fictional source of information with its subsequent distortion in the favourable perspective and replication, etc. will be used.

There is a noticeable shift of emphasis from the traditional means of the Russian Federation influence, such as television, distribution of printed products, expert interaction, and so on. Misinformation, manipulation, propaganda, fake news shifted from the physical realm to digital.

Thus, one of the key factors of Russia's information influence transformation is a clear trend towards its 'digitalisation', that is the maximum use of new information technologies, especially in cyberspace.

Russia seeks to dominate the Ukrainian information space. This is one of the preconditions for preparing aggression against Ukraine

The main factors of Russia's growing interest in cyberspace for conducting operations of influence are:

- higher efficiency of Internet technologies due to lower costs and coverage of a wider foreign audience;
- a wider range of application, which allows to influence the selected target audiences more purposefully and a quick change of the work tactics depending on the situation;
- ensuring (if necessary) the anonymity of the content authorship, which provides an opportunity to exert influence through third parties (allegedly not Russian experts, media people, etc.).

Cyber-impact operations envisage the use of all available 'devices', e-mail services, and commercial software (including for tracking 'victims' and psychological influence), as well as the use of the above mentioned as espionage tools or for technical intrusion into critical infrastructure.

The Kremlin aims to prioritize the use of Internet technologies, in particular to create new platforms for cyber attacks on key elements of 'target countries' infrastructure. The latest striking example of Russia's destructive policy in cyberspace was a series of hacking attacks on US government agencies in December 2020, which disrupted the US Treasury Department and some other strategic government agencies. Hacker groups (such as ART29 or CozyBear) linked to Russian intelligence are almost certainly behind this.

Russia's actions are becoming more and more daring, and the lack of political consequences for such activities only encourages Russia to continue doing it. De facto Russia is becoming a cyber terrorism sponsor.

2.6

Threats to national security in the environmental sphere

The long-term challenges of anthropogenic pressure on the ecological system are intensifying, and the global warming threat remains. The combination of these phenomena poses a threat to life quality and life expectancy, as well as food and drinking water shortages in the world's poorest regions.

As for Ukraine, the external environmental threats are as follows:

- climate change due to global warming;
- external / cross-border outbreaks of epidemics and epizootics ***(outbreaks of disease effecting animals);***
- economic activity of the Russian Federation on the temporarily occupied territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and the city of Sevastopol, which breaks the ecological balance in the Black and Azov Seas.

2.7 Terrorist threats

The highest terrorist threat to Ukraine and its citizens is posed not so much by international criminal groups and various religious extremist organizations, as by the aggressor state of Russia, the activities of which have the characteristics to be qualified as sponsorship of terrorism.

The consequence of these activities were tens of thousands of Ukrainian citizens killed and injured in the Donbas, and millions of temporarily displaced persons. Russia provides comprehensive support to its armed forces proxies on the territory of Ukraine, allocating both finance and weapon, providing military equipment and instructors. Despite the fact that no active hostilities took place in eastern Ukraine during 2020, Russia continues to provide considerable support.

Citizens of foreign countries also suffered from terrorist acts by the Russian Federation. This refers to the downing of Malaysian flight MH-17 as well as the poisoning of members of the Skripal family and Navalny.

The level of terrorist threat to domestic institutions and citizens remains high on the territory of some 'crisis' countries in the Middle East

(Iraq, Syria, Yemen), Central and South Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan), North Africa and the Sahel region (Egypt, Libya, Mali, Niger), Western (Nigeria), Central (Democratic Republic of the Congo, partly Cameroon), Eastern (Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea) and Southern (northern regions of Mozambique) Africa.

In other regions, they will remain moderate, while terrorist activities will aim to strengthen and create new positions and influence both in Islamic countries and in countries with a significant Muslim population.

There still remains a threat of foreign citizens being taken hostage (abduction) by members of terrorist and criminal groups on the territory of Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt (Sinai Peninsula), Yemen, India, Iraq, Cameroon, Kenya, Colombia, Libya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Senegal, Somalia, the Philippines, Sudan and Tunisia.

Maritime banditry and piracy keep posing a threat to the lives and health of Ukrainian citizens – the crews of civilian ships (both Ukrainian and under the flags of other countries). Regions like the Horn of Africa (Somalia coast, the Gulf of Aden, the western Indian Ocean) and the Gulf of Guinea in the Atlantic Ocean (coast of Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Cote d'Ivoire) remain the most dangerous for shipping due to the activity of pirate groups.

General information about the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine

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

The Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine is a state body that carries out intelligence activities in foreign policy, economic, military-technical, scientific-technical, information, environmental spheres, and cybersecurity.

In its activities, the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine is guided by the Constitution of Ukraine, the Law of Ukraine "On Intelligence", the Law of Ukraine "On Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine", and other laws and regulations.

The following key tasks are assigned to the FISU:

- collecting, analytical processing, and dissemination of intelligence (in the manner prescribed by the legislation of Ukraine) to heads of the highest decision-making bodies of state power;
- implementing special measures to further Ukraine's national interests in the political, economic, military-technical, scientific, information, environmental and cyber security spheres, as well as strengthening defence capabilities, economic, and scientific-technical development of the country;
- identification and evaluation of external threats that can affect: the national security of Ukraine, including in the field of cyber security, the lives and health of its citizens, and state establishments abroad, as well as planning and execution of special (active) measures to counter such threats;
- participation in ensuring the secure functioning of Ukrainian institutions abroad, facilitation of counterintelligence support of the said institutions, their employees and their family members in a host country, as well as Ukrainian citizens sent abroad with clearance to state secrets;
- participating in the fight against terrorism, counteracting to subversive activity against Ukraine, international organized crime and other illicit activities, that pose external threat to the national security of Ukraine.

The FISU comprises human intelligence units, signals intelligence and cybersecurity units, operational-and-technical units, informa-

tion-and-analytical units, internal security units, as well as other units in accordance with the orders of the President of Ukraine.

According to established global practices, the functional structure of intelligence covers the processes of obtaining relevant information by human and technical intelligence, its analysis and producing of analytical materials, forecasts and scenarios of the situation development in the field of national and international security.

As in the vast majority of countries around the world, human intelligence is a priority in the Service. Its irreplaceability was confirmed globally during the terrorist attacks in the United States of America on September 11, 2001, and in the case of Ukraine – during the events of 2014.

The main efforts of human intelligence officers are aimed at providing state leadership with up-to-date intelligence and to conduct special measures in order to ensure favourable decisions for Ukraine and maintain its positive image at the international level.



Currently, intelligence promotes state foreign policy and economic programs implementation, including those of anti-crisis nature, attracting foreign investment, concluding contracts, which allows expanding the country's export potential, loading the capacity of domestic enterprises and creating new workplaces.

An important system-forming component of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine is technical intelligence that provides specific methods of obtaining reliable documentary information via the channels of international telecommunication networks. Ukraine is one of the countries with the potential to carry out a full cycle of signals intelligence.

The department of technical intelligence and its units (stationed throughout the country) have unique equipment at their disposal; experienced radio interception and cryptography specialists as well as system programmers and analysts work here. This makes it possible to: regularly obtain highly valuable confidential information of political, economic, scientific, technical, and military-strategic nature, as well as ensure the active participation of the Ukrainian intelligence community in the fight against international terrorism and transnational organized crime.

Following global development trends in information and telecommunications system, FISU technical intelligence units are able to make timely and accurate predictions, as well as develop and implement advanced technologies for obtaining intelligence information. The high level of its own technical developments is at the core of its scientific research achievements. Today, technical intelligence units are equipped with hardware and software systems developed by Ukrainian manufactures.

The State Prize of Ukraine in the field of science and technology – which was granted to a team of FISU employees - became an honourable sign of recognition of the Service's scientific achievements in technical intelligence.

The information-and-analytical support system of disseminating intelligence products among the highest bodies of state power in Ukraine operates on a conceptually new basis. Modern approaches to the organization of this activity - with the use of forecasting and situation modelling methods, providing state leadership with valid recommendations for the development of adequate measures to counteract national secu-

rity external threats - are used. Intelligence consumers are provided with timely and predictive data on priority issues which is used for decision making and negotiations with foreign partners.

The Service's leadership pays special attention to the work of the Department countering external threats to the national security. It operates in accordance with the legally imposed tasks of combatting terrorism, transnational organised crime, drug and weapon trafficking, weapon production technology, and illegal migration.

As a result of the Department's complex efforts, a number of real terrorist attempts against Ukrainian diplomatic missions abroad were prevented and thousands of Ukrainian citizens were evacuated from high-terrorist risk conflict zones, particularly from Palestine, Israel, South Ossetia, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya and others. Cooperating with Ukrainian state authorities and foreign partners, the Department provided support for ship owners in releasing merchant ships and crews with Ukrainian sailors on boards captured by pirates.

To successfully fulfil the above-mentioned mission, FISU concentrates its efforts on priority issues, and tries to ensure adequate measures to counter existing or potential risks and threats to the national security of Ukraine, aiming at the end-result.

FISU provides its officers with unceasing professional education. The main specializations in the Academy of Foreign Intelligence of Ukraine, established in 2020, are:

- master and PhD training in the specialization 256 National security (in particular spheres and activities);
- qualification retraining and skills development courses for FISU employees and officers of other intelligence agencies in HUMINT and SIGINT activities.

Qualification retraining and advanced training for FISU officers and officers of other intelligence agencies are held at the Academy, lasting from 1 day up to a 6 months period.

The Academy's leadership, together with the research and educational personnel, constantly: conform the instructional content to the actual needs of intelligence, implement new teaching methods, and engage different types of specialists and professionals for intelligence officers` training.

Moreover, FISU officers have an opportunity to receive advanced professional training at the best Ukrainian universities as well as go through special training abroad.

As with any body of the Ukrainian security and defence sector, FISU requires resources (financial, technical and material, logistical support), which would suffice for its appropriate functioning.

The 2021 State budget reserved 3.99 bln UAH for FISU functioning, which considerably exceeds previous (underfunded) FISU budgets.

Considering objective state possibilities, FISU was underfunded by 6.8 bln UAH during the last 5 years that prevented the enhancing of its



intelligence capacities. The 2021 FISU budget is expected to change this unfavourable trend and become a real development budget.

In 2021, the taxpayers' money will be streamed in two main directions.

The first direction – reinforcement of FISU intelligence capacity. In this context, the realization of the 2021-2025 National intelligence program is of utmost importance. Cutting-edge intelligence requires a developed intelligence infrastructure, modern spy technologies, AI data-centres and analytical systems, as well as special communication networks. In particular, funds will be oriented at substantially reinforcing the Service's HUMINT abroad as well as at the modernization of SIGINT, GEOINT, cyber intelligence, and decryption systems.

The second direction - ensuring state social commitments to FISU officers.

FISU officers meet the high professional demands. They are expected to be fluent in several foreign languages, well educated, and able to perform missions abroad under extreme psychological and physical strains.

The state cannot afford to lose qualified officers whose professional training was costly. For this purpose, the Law of Ukraine "On Intelligence" fixes significantly higher salaries for qualified staff.

In addition, the law provides new, progressive social security standards: living quarters, social guarantees, medical insurance. Thus, the 2021 Budget pays great attention to the retention of FISU staff.

In general, 2021 is expected to become the turning point in building new intelligence capacities of the intelligence community in Ukraine.

FISU is oriented at transforming into a highly effective, flexible intelligence agency, which acts asymmetrically and achieves considerable results at low expense.

Democratic civil control

FISU civil control measures are constantly developing and improving.

The Law of Ukraine "On Intelligence", adopted on the 17 of September 2020 by the Verhovna Rada of Ukraine, stepped up democratic civil control (foremost parliamentary and public) over the intelligence sector of national security and defence. This will contribute to the better understanding of the tasks, methods, and techniques of the intelligence community and the appropriate assessment of their results.

Presidential control over FISU is carried out by direction from the Head of the State, nomination of the leadership, tasking, and the (subsequent) accountability of FISU. The Service is accountable to the President in accordance with the established order and reports on relevant issues to the President. The President also controls FISU through the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine. Concurrently, the Chairman of FISU is a member of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, which ensures that FISU is constantly involved in the modelling of the state policy.

Parliamentary control is carried out by the Verhovna Rada of Ukraine via its National Security, Defence, and Intelligence Committee. Issue discussion and hearings are practiced frequently during the Committee sessions or field sessions at FISU.

Control over expenditure on FISU (from the State Budget of Ukraine) is carried out by the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine via a special group consisting of its members. The Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine is monitored by the Prosecutor General of Ukraine as well as the prosecutors authorized by him under the Constitution and Laws of Ukraine.

The Law of Ukraine "On National Security of Ukraine", adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, defines the legal principles that ensure the maximum possible transparency in state activities on national security and defence issues. The law provides civil control over the activities of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine, which is carried out by the citizens of Ukraine through public organizations they are members of, deputies of representative bodies, and via in-person appeals to the Verkhovna Rada Commissioner for Human Rights and his / her representative for the protection of military personnel rights or to another state body according to the manner prescribed by the Constitution of Ukraine and the Law of Ukraine "On Citizens' Appeals".

This distribution of control complies with democratic practices and closely resembles the fundamental principles of European norms as to the control and oversight of intelligence activities.

International cooperation 4

By its nature, intelligence is one of the most secretive tools of any state. Methods, forces, means, and results of its activities are the subject of special protection in each country.

However, a modern full-fledged intelligence model cannot be imagined without active international cooperation with partner intelligence agencies. After all, the specifics of threats to international and regional security require an increasingly close interaction of intelligence and special services, including extremely sensitive issues for intelligence.

On the one hand, such interaction implies the most weighted approach, and on the other, an unprecedented level of mutual trust. And this is not only the exchange of information and assessments – but also the execution of joint intelligence operations.

FISU gives prominence to international cooperation with competent authorities of foreign states and international organizations. The Service has officially established and maintains contacts with 174 intelligence, special and law enforcement agencies of 84 countries. This wide range of connections allows us to react quickly to any threats that are important for Ukraine, in any region of the world.

Ukraine has taken a strategic course to join the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a full-fledged member. Thus, FISU cooperation with intelligence agencies and special services of NATO and EU member states is the most active and productive one.

A pivot point was clearly defined with the beginning of Russia's open aggression against Ukraine in 2014. Most of the world's intelligence services are fully aware that Russia's attack on our state as well as the current Russian foreign policy are undermining the fundamental principles of global international security. It was during this period that FISU radically shifted both its geography as well as its approaches to cooperation with foreign partners. The priority of the Service's international activity became the need to consolidate the efforts of Ukraine's allies in protecting its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence.

Since then, FISU has begun to actively adopt the experience of developed Western countries in the organization of intelligence activities.

In their turn, foreign partners have expressed great interest in the capabilities of Ukrainian strategic intelligence. After all, FISU was able to fill the gaps in their understanding of the tools and logic of Russia's hybrid actions in the international arena. This need, admitted by the partners themselves, was shaped as a result of the intelligence monitoring reduction of Russian issues in the previous periods.

New interaction forms with Western partners made it possible for Ukraine to acquire expanded partnership status as part of NATO's Partnership Interoperability Initiative. Today, FISU is a participant of all the co-operation formats the Alliance offers for partner intelligence services. And since 2018, the FISU has been participating as an observer in forums under the auspices of the North Atlantic Alliance, which have so far been held exclusively by NATO members.

FISU is actively working to become a legitimate participant in the North Atlantic Alliance communication system of intelligence and special services in the nearest future. We also plan to reinforce and extend the presence of Ukrainian intelligence in the relevant collegial structures of NATO and the EU.

Another important cluster for the Service - is the accomplishment of the tasks and activities of the Ukraine-NATO Annual National Programs, aimed at enhancing the intelligence capabilities of the Ukrainian state through cooperation with foreign partners.

Along with the western direction, FISU maintains intensive contacts with the secret services of some countries in the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific region. The shared vision of the transnational challenges and threats specific to these regions, as well as the high mutual interest in the carrying out of intelligence activities experience exchange - provide a solid basis for such cooperation both currently and in the future.

The Service is an active participant in non-public international forums, conferences and closed special services and the diplomatic corps representatives meetings. FISU is traditionally represented at a high level in such events as the annual Munich Security Conference, the Meeting of Heads of Special Services of the Black Sea-Caspian Dialogue, the Conference of Intelligence Services of Turkic-speaking countries, etc.

Currently, cooperation with relevant partner intelligence services is becoming more intensive and diverse in its directions and forms. FISU has established a regular information exchange with foreign partners and expert meetings are held on a regular basis. During these meetings, opinions on relevant issues of the international agenda are exchanged. Special attention is paid to cooperation development between operational units with an emphasis on the joint execution of practical measures and operations in the stakeholders' interests.

Certainly, the main focus of cooperation is on joint counteractions to the hybrid aggression of Russia against Ukraine and the destructive policies of the Kremlin in other states and regions.

In addition to the Russian issue, the cooperation range includes detection and counteraction to cross-border terrorist threats, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the participation in the fight against organized crime, energy security, the protection of Ukrainian citizens abroad, and respectively of foreign citizens in Ukraine.

The comprehensive international cooperation of FISU with foreign intelligence services lies in the professional training of personnel. The regular trainings and specialized courses in foreign training centres have become an integral part of the Service officers' professional development.

It is hard to overrate such an integral part of the international cooperation as the foreign partners' advisory assistance in the institutional development of the intelligence community of Ukraine. The support on drafting the Law of Ukraine "On Intelligence" serves as a good example and demonstrates the practical result of such interaction.

By showing confidence in FISU, the leading intelligence services of other countries share their own models of organizing intelligence activities, best practices, and modern developments of the most effective forms and methods of their work. For the Service, which is currently undergoing reform, it is particularly relevant to gain proper knowledge and to take into account advanced foreign practices.

The COVID-19 pandemic became a key challenge to the international community. The Ukrainian intelligence service have quickly adapted to the new reality and continue full-fledged cooperation with our partners. In these difficult times, we felt the support of our friends who, despite acute shortages, helped FISU with anti-coronavirus means.

The new reality, like the COVID-19 pandemic, prompted FISU to initiate the reorganization of the centre for international relations, which aims to provide proper conditions for the interaction with our partners.

The Ukrainian intelligence service considers international cooperation as an effective and essential tool not only for the execution of assigned tasks, but also for strengthening the security of our allied states.

The Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine has ambitious plans to boost international interaction, primarily via making it as ‘hands-on’ as possible. FISU is open to the implementation of bold joint projects in various types of intelligence activities and has expertise to offer to our partners.

Viribus unitis!

It is time to move forward

Dear friends,

We live in a globalised community which is slowly forgetting the horrors of the wars of the XX century. Unfortunately for Ukraine, this does not mean that the tragedies which took the lives of millions of our compatriots – Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars, Poles, Russians – will not be repeated.

As we did a hundred years ago, our country is resisting the attempts of the 'neighbouring' imperial regime which considers Ukraine only as its vassal territory. By the means of political, economic, corrupt, informational, historical, cultural and religious ties, the Kremlin keeps trying to chain the freedom-loving Ukrainian people to its galley, doing its best to stop our Euro-Atlantic progress.

Our struggle against this Neanderthal worldview, imposed by the Kremlin on humankind through hybrid means, will result in civilizational consequences. Victory over Putinism will, first and foremost, be a victory of the truth as it will stop the complete lies which the Russian regime contaminate the information space with through the use of their puppets in the media. Truth is the strongest weapon that the Kremlin fears.

Today we are sharing some of our weapons with you.

The Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine, together with its law enforcement and special agency blood-brothers have learned well the Moscow tools and are able to counteract them. The other challenges that Ukraine and mankind are facing are not left behind our concerted attention.

We are strong when we act together.

Having received a powerful impetus for development in 2020, the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine will continue to strengthen itself. We will make priority efforts to improve our intelligence officers' professional skills and to implement advanced technical and technological solutions.

Synonyms to the word 'the Ukrainian intelligence' are - efficiency, mobility, proactivity. We do not merely obtain and analyze information. We implement complex activities and conduct operations, take a proactive role, protect the interests of Ukraine and civilized societies.

We are on the right path because we are united in our desire not only to protect the national interests of the state, but also to change ourselves and the world for the better.

Glory to Ukraine!

Head of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine
Lieutenant-General
Valerii KONDRATIUK

The White Paper 2021

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF UKRAINE

UNVEILED HISTORY

Yakiv Makohin. Founder of the “Ukrainian Press Bureau in London”

Galician Yakiv Makohin, who came to Europe from the United States in the early 1930s, immediately became the object of interest of influential figures of Ukrainian emigration and Soviet intelligence. He pretended to be a retired Colonel of the US Marine Corps and a descendant of Ukrainian Hetman Kyrylo Rozumovskyi, bought villas and apartments in Italy and Switzerland, in his car with his beautiful and wealthy American wife he had traveled half of Europe, and contributed a lot to support the Ukrainian national liberation movement and to draw the world’s attention to the Ukrainian question. At this, he cultivated a halo of mystery and secrecy around his persona, which is why he was often thought to be an American, or an English, or some other spy.

All stories

Повідом про корупцію

СЛУЖБА ЗОВНІШНЬОЇ РОЗВІДКИ УКРАЇНИ

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