The Security Strategy for the Kingdom of the Netherlands

Foreword

Security is like oxygen or water. It is a basic necessity of life. We cannot live without it and you only really start thinking about it when it becomes a problem. Without security, everything we value today that is important for our future would be threatened and disrupted. Hence, security is an essential precondition for a society in which people can give shape to their lives and their relationships in freedom and certainty.

We are fortunate to live in one of the safest countries in the world. At the same time, we are faced with a growing number of threats that are more complex and interconnected, we cannot afford to be naive about this. We are dealing with a many-faced monster. For example, the geopolitical balance of power is changing rapidly. Instability reigns on Europe's eastern and southern borders, with Russia's invasion of Ukraine as the ultimate game changer. Cyber attacks are proliferating at an alarming pace, and in today's digital world, the reliability of information is increasingly at stake. Cross-border organised crime undermines the stability of societal relations. During the time of the coronavirus, we have seen how a pandemic can lead to great societal unrest. And the effects of climate change also have a significant and growing impact on our way of life. The uncertainty associated with all these developments is a breeding ground for societal distrust and polarisation. This, too, is a security concern.

With this Security Strategy for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the government wants to lay the foundation for a future in which we are resilient and prepared. For the first time, we are doing it together with all the countries in the Kingdom. This cooperation is based on a deep sense of alliance with each other, and also because we are largely facing the same threats. This strategy premiers in linking internal and external security from the policy perspective, to do justice to the existing interconnectedness and to allow for new interrelationships.

Security is a key task of the government and therefore it is logical and justified that people look to the government for strengthening national security. A lot of harm and suffering can be prevented by making a proper assessment of all possible threats and determining a clear strategic course. But what the government cannot offer is a hundred percent guarantee of security. There is no such thing as absolute security. Risks can be managed, but not eliminated. Therefore, this Security Strategy also requires people to be alert and prepared. We can create a safe and resilient society only by acting together.

Mark Rutte
Prime Minister and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom

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Introduction

Determining principles for the strategic course

Our security is of critical importance. After all, without security, there is no liberty.[1] Our security is neither self-evident nor optional. It can be harmed by various threats. The world is changing, the threats are changing, society is changing.Therefore we must also change the way we protect the Kingdom of the Netherlands (hereinafter: the Kingdom). More than ever before, it is important to create a resilient and shockproof Kingdom that is prepared for a multitude of threats.

Below are the basic principles underlying the strategy that have helped determine the course to be taken:

Providing guidance and all-hazards

The Security Strategy for the Kingdom (hereinafter: the Strategy) sets the course for our national security for the next six years (2023-2029).[2] The course to be followed encompasses both intentional (*security*) and unintentional (*safety*) threats, therefore resulting in an *all-hazards* strategy. It gives direction to what we will do in the area of national security, and where we view the threats in conjunction with one another. *How* the course is to be concretely implemented will be outlined via domain-specific strategies, policies, andaction plans as well as national crisis plans. Some of the above has already been done. The strategy forms the overall framework for this. Elaborating this strategy is part of the existing policy responsibility of each ministry, minister and country in the Kingdom. Moreover, this strategy guides the Kingdom's European and international efforts.

Across borders

The protection of the Kingdom extends far beyond our borders. Indeed, threats to our national security do not stop at the borders of our Kingdom. The external (European and international) and internal (national) security dimensions are inseparable from one another. The Kingdom benefits greatly from a stable and secure world and a well-functioning international legal order, which includes the promotion of human rights and an inclusive and effective multilateral system based on rules.[3] This requires us to follow an integrated course with regard to national security that encompasses both internal and external security dimensions.[4]

Kingdom-wide but with separate responsibilities

This strategy sets the course for national security for the entire Kingdom. The course to be followed has been integrated as far as possible for all parts of the Kingdom since the threats facing the Kingdom are all interconnected. At the same time, the threats, level of resilience, and hence the necessary approach, differ within the various parts of our Kingdom. The strategy is mindful of these differences. The Kingdom-wide nature of this strategy does not affect the existing division of responsibilities within the Kingdom. Each country in the Kingdom is, and remains, responsible for its national security unless it concerns the so-called Kingdom matters such as the defence of the Kingdom and its foreign policy.

Risk control, not risk exclusion

Absolute security does not exist; threats cannot be entirely eliminated. However, we are committed to reduce the likelihood of a threat occurring, toreduce the potential *impact* of the threat and to take opportunities to proactively promote our national security interests. Therefore, the focus is on *risk control*, not *risk exclusion*. This requires all of us to be prepared, even if things go wrong unexpectedly.

For all of society

Strengthening national security is primarily the task of the government. Nevertheless,enabling a safe and resilient society requires commitment from all: not only from all branches of government but also citizens, businesses and civil society organisations. Together, we are responsible for protecting our security. Everyone contributes to this. It is, therefore, important that public and private partners, civil society organisations and citizens remain resilient to threats to national security. What also contributes to developing such resilience is proper communication from the government regarding the risks relating to threats, what the government is doing about this and the potential impact it has on our way of life. In addition, targeted advice and a prospect of action offered by the government to, for instance, companies can also help increase our resilience to threats. This is how we counter threats and reduce their impact, and should things still go wrong unexpectedly, this is what will ensure so we are prepared and can show resilience.[5]

Strategic scope

This strategy sets the course for how we will protect the Kingdom from threats that could affect *national security*. But of course, this approach does not exist in isolation. Various socio-economic and demographic factors can affect the extent to which everyone in society is actually capable of resisting threats and displaying resilience. These factors may include poverty-related issues, access to and quality of education and healthcare, socio-economic and job security, shortages of technical and other manpower, discrimination or unequal treatment (including based on gender), pressure on the asylum chain and global population growth. The strategy itself focuses only on the so-called first-order effects that can be directly related to national security at this point in time. However, the above-mentioned social and economic factors, acting as second-order effects, can influence these first-order effects. To protect national security, these factors must and will be taken into account, including in the implementation of this strategy. On the other hand, efforts aimed at dealing with these socio-economic and demographic factors must also take into account our national security and the threats we might face as a society.

The Kingdom of the Netherlands

The Kingdom consists of four countries: Curaçao, Aruba, Sint Maarten (the Caribbean Countries) and the Netherlands. The Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands governs the constitutional relationship between the countries.

The countries are autonomous and responsible for their national security. The exceptions to this are the so-called Kingdom affairs, i.e. preservation of the independence and defence of the Kingdom, Dutch citizenship and foreign policy. The Kingdom as a whole is responsible for this and not the separate countries themselves.

In 2010, the islands of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba (the Caribbean Netherlands) were designated as a public body. As a special municipality, they fall under direct responsibility of the Netherlands, also with regard to the approach to national security.

Terminology

- Kingdom: entire Kingdom of the Netherlands
- The Netherlands: European Netherlands
- The Caribbean Countries: Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten
- The Caribbean Netherlands: Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba
- Caribbean part of the Kingdom: Caribbean Countries and the Caribbean Netherlands

The Kingdom of the Netherlands consists of four countries



And 3 special municipalities

*Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba are special municipalities. They are referred to as the **Caribbean Netherlands**. Together with the countries Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten, they form the **Caribbean part of the Kingdom**.*

Caribbean part of the Kingdom



The security strategy in short

The key objective of the Security Strategy for the Kingdom of the Netherlands is to protect our **national security interests** (Part 1). There are several **threats to national security**. If a threat severely affects one or more security interests, it can cause societal disruption and therefore harm national security.

At the same time, threats are interconnected. One threat influences and, subsequently, possibly reinforces another. The Security Strategy focuses on this interconnectedness and describes the seven **intersecting themes** showing the consistency between threats (Part 1).

This threat landscape translates into an integrated strategic course (Part 2) and integrated control of national security (Part 3). In this way, the Security Strategy lays the foundation for a future in which we are resilient and prepared.

The three main objectives of the strategic course for national security are:

1. A secure Kingdom in a multipolar world
2. A resilient democratic legal order
3. A ready and resilient society

Subsequently, we set out twelve lines of actions for inreasing our resilience against the threats.

1. Invest in international partnerships and strengthen the armed forces
2. Counter hybrid conflict
3. Increase the resilience of the economy and protect science
4. Increase social stability
5. Fight organised subversive crime
6. Counter unwanted foreign interference and espionage
7. Strengthen digital resilience
8. Prevent and counter terrorism and extremism
9. Intensify climate mitigation and adaptation
10. Ensure better protection for critical infrastructure
11. Increase level of pandemic preparedness
12. Strengthen crisis control capabilities and increase preparedness of society

See next page
Figure 1: The security strategy in short

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Figure 1: The security strategy in short

Overview

The strategy consists of three components.

In the first part of the strategy, we describe the national security interests (hereinafter: security interests) that we want to protect from a national security perspective and the main developments in the threats to national security.

The second part of the strategy sets out the strategic course. This is done based on three main objectives and 12 lines of action that will be applicable for the next six years.

Finally, the third part of the strategy describes the integrated control over and division of responsibility for national security within the Kingdom. A whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach is needed. In addition to the government, public and private partners, civil society organisations and citizens play a role in this.

The strategy describes the strategic course to be followed for the entire Kingdom. Wherever the 'we' form has been used, the text refers to the Kingdom. The term 'national security' refers to the national security of all countries within the Kingdom and the security of the Kingdom as a whole. The national security as a concept is further explained in Part 1.

Part 1

Threats to national security

Our security cannot be taken for granted and it is vulnerable to a multitude of threats. Problems can become more urgent when various threats occur simultaneously and reinforce each other. The strategy emphasises the interconnectedness between threats. This integrated approach allows us to determine what we need to do together to protect the Kingdom's national security.

- National Security as a concept
- Development of the threats
- Opportunities for promoting security interests
- Connections and intersecting themes

Part 1

Threats to national security



Our security cannot be taken for granted and it is vulnerable to a multitude of threats. Problems can become more urgent when various threats occur simultaneously and reinforce each other. The strategy emphasises the interconnectedness between threats. This integrated approach allows us to determine what we need to do together to protect the Kingdom's national security.[6]

National Security as a concept

Central to the strategy is the term 'national security'. There is no conclusive or unambiguous definition of national security.[7] In this strategy, we use the following description:

> *With national security is meant the protection of our national security interests against threats that could harm those interests and thereby could cause societal disruption. We ensure this protection by reducing threats and becoming more resilient to them.*

National security is about making autonomous decisions in a free and secure society, independent of unwanted foreign interference by other countries but within internationally agreed frameworks. The protection of national security includes preventing the impairment of the sovereignty of the Kingdom and guaranteeing our democratic processes, the authority of democratic institutions in our rule of law,and the values and norms that bind us. The term 'national security' refers to the national security of all the countries within the Kingdom and the security of the Kingdom as a whole.

In the context of national security, we focus on the security interests we want to proactively protect and promote (*Table 1*). These security interests may be harmed by threats, which can lead to societal disruption. To prevent this from occuring, we are committed to reduce the *likelihood* of a threat occurring, toreduce the potential impact of these threats, and to take opportunities to proactively promote our security interests. Therefore, the focus is on *risk control*, not *risk exclusion*. Security interests, threats, opportunities and resilience form the basis for the strategic course.

Development of the threats

The basis for this strategy is the Nationwide Risk Assessment (*Rijksbrede Risicoanalyse, RbRa*)[8] and a complementary assessment of the impact of the war in Ukraine on the national security of the Netherlands.[9] Both assessments have been prepared by the National Network of Safety and Security Analysts (*Analistennetwerk Nationale Veiligheid, ANV*).[10] These assessments provide an overview of threats to the Kingdom's national security in relation to the six national security interests (*Table 1*).

The ANV has methodically elaborated the security interests via impact criteria thereby clearly showing the extent to which the interests could be harmed. Together with domain-specific analyses,[11] these assessments are important input for the strategy, and therefore help in defining a strategic course for national security that focuses not only on short-term threats but also on actual or possible developments in the threat in the long term.

The assessments show that there is a high level of urgency: the likelihood of events affecting national security occurring

in the coming years is relatively high.[12] Developments such as the war in Ukraine, the COVID-19 pandemic and Hurricane Irma show how threats can become reality and directly or indirectly affect our national security interests. In addition, we are more online than ever before, and as a result, the threats posed by this digital presence are growing as well.[13] This affects our society and influences our daily lives. Moreover, a threat is never an isolated event. The threats that can potentially affect national security are increasingly interconnected, complex, and dynamic in nature, with digitalisation and technological advances being key catalysts in this process. This manifests itself in the dynamics of further escalating geopolitical tensions that include the use of hybrid methods.

The likely impact of some of the threats varies within the Kingdom. One example of this is climate and natural disasters. Hurricanes are a threat to the Caribbean part of the Kingdom (particularly Sint Maarten, Sint Eustatius and Saba), but not to the Netherlands, where instead drought and wildfires (besides the long-known challenges such as floods) are a major risk.[14] There are also differences in geopolitical influences or threats, such as the war in Ukraine and side effects for the Netherlands or migration flows from Venezuela (the Kingdom's largest neighbouring country) toward the Caribbean part of the Kingdom (especially Curaçao and Aruba).[15] The geopolitical interests of major powers such as the US, Russia and China also play a role in this, and this could potentially lead to a geopolitical showdown with an impact on the Caribbean part of the Kingdom and resulting consequences for the Kingdom as a whole.

Opportunities for promoting security interests

It is essential to have a national security policy that is not based solely on threats but also considers the opportunities for actively promoting our security interests. This can be done by identifying strategic opportunities for the use of various policy instruments (including economic, diplomatic and military policy instruments) that benefit our prosperity, well-being and security. For example, this could include improving the investment and establishment climate for companies in specific sectors where we are now dependent on third countries. It is also important to adopt a broad approach based on early warning and early action: identifying and interpreting trends and developments that could potentially lead to conflict and taking action in this regard. Not merely to prevent potential conflict but to actively promote lasting stability.

Table 1: Six national security interests[16]

Security interests	Explanation
Territorial security	The unimpeded functioning of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and its EU and NATO allies as independent states in the widest sense, or their territorial integrity in a narrow sense.
Physical security	The unimpeded functioning of people in the Kingdom of the Netherlands and their surroundings.
Economic security	The unimpeded functioning of the Kingdom of the Netherlands as an effective and efficient economy.
Ecological security	The unimpeded continued existence of the natural living environment in and around the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
Social and political stability	The unimpeded and continued existence of a social climate in which individuals can function without disruption and groups of people enjoy living together within the benefits of the democratic constitutional system of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and values shared therein.
International legal order and stability	The proper functioning of the international system of norms and agreements aimed at promoting international peace and security, including human rights and effective multilateral institutions and regimes, as well as the proper functioning of the states bordering the Kingdom of the Netherlands[17] and in direct vicinity to the European Union.

Connections and intersecting themes

It is important to consider the connections between the assessments of threats and opportunities in relation to our national security so that we can lay out an integrated strategic course. Based on this consideration, we arrive at seven intersecting themes, which are explained below.

1. Geopolitical challenges and military threats

Our foreign policy aims to contribute to the security, prosperity and well-being of the Kingdom and its citizens. To ensure its prosperity and security, the Kingdom relies heavily on a stable and secure world with a functioning international legal order that promotes human rights and an inclusive and effective multilateral system. We cannot rule out the possibility of an attack on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the territory of our allies.[18]

Our foreign policy aims to contribute to the security, prosperity and well-being of the Kingdom and its citizens. To ensure its prosperity and security, the Kingdom relies heavily on a stable and secure world with a functioning international legal order that promotes human rights and an inclusive and effective multilateral system. We cannot rule out the possibility of an attack on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the territory of our allies.[19] The changing balance of power in the world, intensification of strategic competition, the proximity of military conflict, the threat to the territory of our allies and the pressure on democratic societies imply that greater diplomatic, military and development efforts are needed than in the past to safeguard the objectives of our foreign policy. The Kingdom has a strong interest in ensuring a world in which countries cooperate based on clear agreements and where they can hold each other accountable if these agreements are violated.

The world order faces great challenges and is subject to change. The rules-based international order that emerged after World War II was characterised by geopolitical rivalries between the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union. This system came to an end with the implosion of the Soviet Union. The subsequent unipolar system with a key role for the US is being replaced by a multipolar system, in which a multitude of influential countries and regions are betting on fundamental changes in the existing order. Institutions such as the World Trade Organization, the Council of Europe and the United Nations are losing influence, and alternative alliances are emerging. Central to the new geopolitical rivalry is the relationship between the US and China. This rivalry expresses itself primarily in the military and economic field and results in the creation of new high-risk strategic dependencies, for example, in the area of energy, food and raw materials. This is a particularly pressing issue for the Netherlands, which relies on the US and the ground rules of the international legal order and stability for its security and prosperity.

For the first time since 1945, Europe is facing a major interstate conflict. Relations between Russia, the EU and NATO are severely disrupted as a result of this. The future development of the war is difficult to predict. However, there is likely to be a protracted conflict in Europe with characteristics of a hybrid conflict. The longer the current situation drags on, the effects of this war will weigh more heavily and have a more lasting effect on our national security. This applies both in case of an escalation or de-escalation of the war. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has led to a hardening of diplomatic relations, a seriously deteriorated economic situation, new developments in the cyber and espionage domain and a large influx of refugees into Europe. In this way, the developments in the military domain become a catalyst for developments in other domains, such as migration, economic security and societal tensions, where the time factor plays an important role.[20]

In addition, the security interest of the international legal order and stability is also, obviously, greatly affected by the war in Ukraine.[21] Developments since the Russian invasion of Ukraine highlight the larger shifts taking place in the world order. For a long time now, some countries have been questioning the functioning of the international legal order. These countries regard the current international legal order as a Western construct, designed to further Western interests. Russia and China, in particular, are challenging the existing international order. Russia is undermining the international legal order and often seems to act as a disruptor in multilateral contexts. China believes in international

stability and a properly functioning multilateral system but wants to remould the system to align with its vision in the long term. The countries find common ground in their opposition to what they see as a Western-oriented international legal order, their anti-US stance and geo-strategic competition with the West.[22] In Africa, the population is expected to double in the coming decades. Africa is suffering the hardest from the shock effects of the geopolitical and geoeconomic crises plaguing the world.[23] The demographic and economic centre of gravity is shifting eastward, particularly toward China and the broader Indo-Pacific region. These developments will lead to a more multipolar world order.[24] The Kingdom will have to realign itself based on this changing balance of power.

The new power politics are not limited to the traditional security domain. Increasingly, power is being exercised through the use of economic instruments, control over technologies, high-risk strategic dependencies and other hybrid means. Examples of this include the use of migration to exert pressure (instrumentalisation of migration)[25] and the use of online and other means such as disinformation and propaganda to influence public opinion. The NATO alliance is under pressure due to the build-up of Russian military capability, as well as an increase in naval activities in the North Sea aimed at espionage, disruption and sabotage. Several countries are also working on new types of weapons of mass destruction and hypersonic missiles.[26]

These resources can affect various security interests such as territorial security, economic security, physical security, and social and political stability. Increasingly, countries consider themselves less bound by multilateral agreements on arms control and non-proliferation, and the current frameworks are proving inadequate for regulating new developments. To some extent, some players are trying to make themselves more autonomous and less vulnerable to third countries by partially 'decoupling' their economies and developing alternative standards. In recent years, geopolitical considerations have started playing a more prominent role in international standardisation forums. The risk of this is that the new standards that are set may not be incompatible with the norms, values, laws and regulations of the Kingdom, the EU or other like-minded countries, which could eventually harm our security. This also applies to the Caribbean part of the Kingdom where our largest neighbour - Venezuela - happens to be located just a few kilometres away. In Venezuela, the absence of democracy and a functioning state based on the rule of law, combined with geopolitical interference and the ongoing humanitarian crisis, remains an unpredictable factor that could threaten the stability and security of the Kingdom. The geopolitical interests of the US, Russia and China also play a role here. In addition, the interrelationship between organised crime and the Venezuelan armed forces in the area of illegal drug, gold and arms trafficking in Venezuela also has a destabilising effect on the region. It is unlikely that Venezuela will harm the territorial integrity of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. However, there is a chance of an unintentional escalation due to possible misinterpretations and incidents as a result of a decline in the professionalism of the military forces of Venezuela.[27]

Impact of the Ukraine war on the security of the Netherlands [28]

The Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has major and long-lasting consequences not only for Ukraine and its people, but also for the Kingdom and our allies. The war is already affecting various national security interests, including the international legal order, economic security and social and political stability. The longer the war in Ukraine continues, the greater the impact will be.

In this way, the geopolitical consequences of the war are attacking the foundations of the rules-based security policy order that the West thought it had established after the end of the Cold War. Trust in multilateral organisations is under pressure, as are the principles of non-intervention and state sovereignty.

Europe's dependence on Russian energy poses great risks to our economic security. Today, roughly a year into the Russian invasion, virtually no Russian energy is coming to the Netherlands. With the latest sanctions package on Russian oil products, all the possible European energy sanctions are now in effect. As a result, virtually no Russian oil products, crude oil and coal are entering the Netherlands. The only exception to this is liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Russia, which is supplied by ship rather than pipeline. Although the Netherlands has greatly reduced its dependence, other European countries have not yet gone so far. Russia is using this dependency on Russian energy to exert pressure on EU Member States and undermine European cohesion. This has an effect on energy prices and the security of supply, leading to high inflation.

Higher energy prices and rising inflation are placing increasing pressure on Western unity. Russia takes advantage of this by reinforcing the narrative that economic uncertainties in Europe are the result of anti-Russian decisions by Western policy-makers. Via disinformation campaigns, Russia is trying not only to undermine the sense of political unity in the West but also to further polarise public debate and diminish the level of support for sanctions against Russia.

2. Hybrid threats

In the current era of international and geopolitical threats, both state and non-state actors are increasingly using hybrid methods and techniques.[29] Hybrid threats are threats to national security that manifest themselves largely below the level of open armed conflict. In hybrid conflicts, state and/or non-state actors use multiple means aimed at achieving certain strategic objectives. Such means may include the use of military intimidation, espionage and sabotage, cyber attacks, disinformation campaigns, unwanted foreign interference in diaspora communities, knowledge theft or economic instruments. These means may be used in combination with one another or alone.[30] As far as espionage is concerned, the Kingdom is an attractive target because of the specialised knowledge and technology available here, a high density of internet hubs, the fact that the Netherlands acts as a host country for various international organisations (such as the OPCW and the ICC), and the geographic location of the Caribbean part of the Kingdom (proximity to Venezuela and the US).[31]

Hybrid threats do not only arise in direct association with state actors. Criminal groups or even private parties (as so-called *proxies* of state actors) may also pose a hybrid threat.[32] In such cases, they are part of a hybrid campaign launched by a state actor. This combined or hybrid use of means and actors can pose a threat to our national security. It can harm our economic security or affect our social and political stability. Consider, for example, certain forms of state interference, where communities in the Netherlands are targets of various forms of influence by countries of origin through the use of various online and physical tools by different state and non-state actors.[33] This confirms the importance of international cooperation to prevent and combat hybrid threats.

3. Climate change

The potential impact of climate change on our national security is becoming increasingly visible. There are ever-increasing consequences that are becoming more difficult to control. Climate and natural disasters have a broad impact; with the exception of the security interest relating to the international legal order, climate change affects all the other security interests.[34]

For example, climate change is a major catalyst for various threats against national security. Due to climate change, extreme weather is becoming more common, increasing the likelihood of drought, wildfires, floods and more powerful hurricanes. Subsequently, these phenomena can disrupt critical infrastructure such as drinking water, electricity and telecom facilities. Climate and natural disasters may imply the devastation of large areas, which can lead to physical casualties and, in extreme cases, even lead to the collapse of the healthcare system.[35]

Specifically for the Netherlands, the risk of drought, and therefore wildfires, poses a problem (in addition to longer-known challenges such as flooding): it is not a question of *if* but when an uncontrollable wildfire will occur.[36] The consequences of these fires could quickly become very severe in a densely populated country such as the Netherlands.

For the Caribbean part of the Kingdom, hurricanes are the main threat.[37] Moreover, the consequences may be even greater for these already vulnerable islands if critical infrastructure and processes such as telecommunications and electricity, drinking water and gas supplies are affected. In the longer term, a rise in sea levels poses a significant threat: millions of people in cities in and around the Kingdom are increasingly vulnerable to sea level rise. By 2050, two-thirds of the world's population is expected to live in cities, 800 million of them in cities vulnerable to sea level rise.[38] This applies specifically to Bonaire where, due to the effects of climate change, the island will be partially submerged by 2050.[39]

Other threats may also be amplified by climate change. For example, higher temperatures in the Netherlands are expected to create conditions that will allow new kinds of infectious diseases to occur. Infectious diseases can result in an impairment of physical security, such as during the COVID-19 pandemic. Climate change issues also appear susceptible to rapidly polarising views, the emergence of anti-government sentiment regarding measures that are or are not being taken and the uneven impact on vulnerable groups in society. All of this can harm our social and political stability.[40]

Climate change can also create tensions on the geopolitical stage, for example, in international negotiations on consensus and actions to prevent climate change or address the consequences thereof. Furthermore, climate change creates 'new' areas of geopolitical power struggles.[41] Consider the case of melting polar ice where access to and control of new Arctic shipping routes and resources could lead to conflict. Climate change could result in water, energy and food shortages worldwide, potentially causing instability, increased competition among populations and migration. Extreme weather events can also lead to the disruption of international production and commercial chains, and subsequent temporary or permanent shortages and price fluctuations. Sea level rise can make ports inaccessible, thus affecting global trade. This has implications for our national security because it jeopardises the safeguarding of public interests.

An adequate approach to tackling climate change calls for a worldwide transition to renewable and clean energy. At the same time, this transition exposes certain vulnerabilities. For example, the Kingdom is heavily dependent on other countries for our energy supplies: the war in Ukraine shows us that Russia is using the European dependence on Russian oil and gas to put pressure on EU Member States to undermine European cohesion.[42] To achieve the energy transition while reducing dependence on Russian oil and gas, we need a greater supply of critical raw materials than what is currently available for our economy.[43] The energy transition creates a shift in demand from fossil resources, such as coal,

oil and gas, to raw materials such as lithium, nickel and copper. New vulnerabilities may arise in this area because there are hardly any mining or processing activities for these metals and minerals in Europe.[44]

4. Societal tensions, declining trust, disinformation and a radical undercurrent

Societal tensions may arise due to various reasons such as a large influx of refugees, international conflicts and instability impacting diaspora communities, increasing inequality or fundamentally different views on how to address climate change and the energy transition (see also Intersecting Theme 3).[45] In the vast majority of cases, these tensions express themselves in a manner that is appropriate within a free and open society, such as through demonstrations. Debate and protest are part of living together in a democracy. But these tensions may also be expressed through undesirable forms of action that involve exclusion, threats, serious disturbances to public order, and even physical violence in the form of assaults or vandalism.[46] These processes can harm our physical security and social and political stability.

Sufficient legitimacy and support are necessary for the proper functioning of our democratic legal order. Many citizens are critical of politics, for example, because they believe that politicians do not come up with enough solutions to societal problems.[47] Criticism, debate and protest are a part of living together in a democracy. It becomes problematic when people become completely disaffected and start acting accordingly, for example, because they have a systematic distrust of systems or because they no longer believe that politics is capable of solving problems.[48] The manner in which government and other institutions communicate has a direct impact on increasing or eliminating distrust.[49]

In themselves, societal tensions do not necessarily form a threat to national security. However, there is a radical undercurrent within these protests that, under normal circumstances, contribute positively to the democratic legal order. For example, some extremists have turned against the government and other institutions out of a fundamental mistrust, anger and a sense of injustice. The storming of parliaments abroad by people unwilling to accept the outcome of the democratic process shows what this can lead to. They oppose the way politics, the legal system, the media and science are conducted. Some of them embrace conspiracy theories or even share disinformation regularly.[50] The use of social media plays an important role in this. These conspiracy theories impair public confidence in the democratic legal order. Such impairment is not immediately noticeable but manifests itself insidiously. In addition, citizens form opinions and make choices based on the information disseminated within the public discourse. The spread of disinformation, both from home and abroad, can disturb this public discourse and have a disruptive effect on society and the lives of individuals in that society.[51]

Societal discontent and the COVID-19 pandemic[52]

A pandemic can have a major impact on national security. The COVID-19 outbreak illustrates that a pandemic not only affects our physical security, but that it also has a general impact on the social and political stability within the Kingdom.

For example, the COVID-19 pandemic, with its disruption of daily life and subsequent measures, resulted in expressions of societal discontent throughout the Kingdom. The pandemic and the government's policy response to it have succeeded in mobilising people who are, to a greater or lesser extent, distrustful of the government and have made them more ready to take action. Often these manifestations occurred in a peaceful and legitimate manner, but sometimes this societal discontent was expressed in a persistently intimidating manner, both in the digital and physical realms.

In the Netherlands, for example, there were calls for committing arson at a Municipal Health Service (GGD) testing centre and transmission towers were set on fire. Incidents also occurred in which people issued threats against politicians, journalists, scientists, the police and special investigation officers, healthcare workers and public transport staff. Several members of the Outbreak Management Team (OMT) received threats: these were not just limited to threats on social media but also included visits to the homes of several OMT members and leaving letters containing intimidating personal messages. In the long term, this can contribute not only to undermining public confidence in and the legitimacy of government institutions, politicians, journalists or scientists but also to a subversion of the democratic legal order, leading to a situation where these institutions and persons can no longer practise their profession freely.

5. Pressure on the democratic legal order

We see several phenomena that may threaten our democratic legal order and social cohesion. For example, societal tensions, societal polarisation and the spread and normalisation of conspiracy theories may also be accompanied by demonstrations of extremism (see also Intersecting Theme 4) or terrorism. Currently, jihadism is the main source of terrorist threats in the Kingdom.[53] In addition, the threat emanating from right-wing terrorism, especially accelerationism, is significant. Moreover, the entire extremist domain is in flux. The extremist domain is made up of a hodgepodge of radical views ranging from anti-Semitism to anarchism, from racism to a deep-seated aversion to government and other institutions, or a combination of some of these elements. It is diffuse, variable and difficult to predict and is also influenced by other issues such as energy, the climate and asylum. Events and developments outside the Kingdom's borders may also have implications for extremist and terrorist threats in and towards the Kingdom. Calls by terrorist organisations, such as ISIS and Al-Qaida, to carry out attacks in the West are proving successful. Right-wing extremists often find each other online via international groups and draw inspiration from international examples. Digitalisation and the increased use of social media is being exploited for recruitment purposes and for spreading propaganda.[54]

Another phenomenon that can threaten our democratic legal order and social cohesion is organised subversive crime. The open economy, proper financial and other infrastructure and geographical location bring prosperity to our Kingdom, but at the same time, all of this also makes us attractive to organised subversive crime. The above aspects are misused for illegal activities, which adversely affects our democratic legal order and causes a significant social impact. Organised subversive crime is becoming increasingly entrenched and often operates via digital and global networks. On the one hand, international criminal networks operate at home and abroad with Dutch contribution; on the other hand, the Netherlands plays a facilitating role in global, illegal trade. This constitutes a serious threat to our democratic legal order: deaths due to contract killings, intimidation and attempts to infiltrate the public administration, violence towards the media and the emergence of parallel societies outside the sphere of government control. Even young people are drawn into the criminal environment and used for carrying out odd jobs, sometimes at an early age, and in this way, they become entangled in the criminal underworld.[55]

Unwanted foreign interference by state actors also poses a threat to our democratic legal order (see also Intersecting Theme 2). This can lead to societal disruption and affect the political and social stability within the Kingdom.[56] Such interference often involves activities possibly controlled by state actors targeted at diaspora communities living in the Kingdom, with the aim of binding these communities to the national and international political agenda of those countries. Citizens may become victims of social pressure, intimidation or threats and therefore be hindered in the free exercise of their fundamental rights within the Kingdom. They may also feel compelled to declare solidarity with the political agenda of a foreign government machinery or head of state.

People who are responsible for preserving the democratic legal order (such as judges and justices, public prosecutors, lawyers, journalists, politicians and local officials) must be able to do their jobs safely and without fear. Protection of these individuals, as guardians of the rule of law, is therefore a prerequisite for the functioning of the democratic state under the rule of law.

6. Increased high-risk (strategic) dependencies and their consequences for critical infrastructure and economy

Technological developments, digitalisation and globalisation are increasing the level of connectedness and complexity of various systems. As a significant economic player with a large knowledge base, this offers the Kingdom many opportunities. For example, the Netherlands, as the 'gateway to Europe', is an important logistics hub for world trade and a transit country for military personnel and material of the NATO allies.[57] At the same time, this connectedness also implies risks and vulnerabilities, including the creation of high-risk (strategic) dependencies within the critical infrastructure and economy. Increased economic influence is being exerted for geopolitical purposes (see also Intersecting Theme 1).[58] addition, the increased dependence on the North Sea and seabed for critical infrastructure gives opponents more opportunities to disrupt our society in part or whole.

As a result of changing geopolitical dynamics, the Kingdom is increasingly confronted with issues spanning the areas of economics and security. The war in Ukraine illustrates how dependencies in the energy sector or concerning food security directly affect our economy.[59] Increasingly, major state actors are focusing their efforts on creating unilateral high-risk strategic dependencies in the economic and technological spheres. They use these dependencies as a means of exerting pressure to strengthen their geopolitical position. In addition, this dependency increases opportunities for undesirable knowledge transfer, including knowledge theft, in companies as well as within our knowledge and educational institutions. Actors from these countries try to obtain knowledge via control structures (mergers, investments and acquisitions), by winning tenders, via digital attacks or by infiltrating institutions.

High-risk strategic dependencies are also an important issue specifically for the Caribbean part of the Kingdom. If a cyberattack disrupts the supply of goods, food and energy, the consequences will be severe, and there are very limited alternatives to resume the crucial supply of goods and food.

Climate and natural disasters and infrastructure critical to the Caribbean part of the Kingdom [64]

Climate and natural disasters can have a far-reaching impact on our national security. Especially if important processes such as food and energy supplies are harmed or even break down completely. For the Caribbean part of the Kingdom, failures of such crucial processes can be especially significant given its geographic location. The islands rely on maritime and air transport for supplies of food and goods. If ports or airports become inaccessible or unusable, the consequences will be drastic because alternative infrastructures are often lacking. On Saba, for example, there is only one power plant, one port and one service station, and the telecom cables come ashore on one side of the island.

The Kingdom is increasingly vulnerable to climate and natural disasters such as extreme weather conditions such as heat/drought and hurricanes. Hurricane Irma illustrates how a natural disaster can have a major impact on the Caribbean part of the Kingdom, especially if multiple infrastructures are affected simultaneously. Sint Maarten, for example, was hit by this severe hurricane in September 2017, which led to extensive damage to buildings and infrastructure. The destruction of the airport and the maritime port cut off the supply and transport routes for people, food and materials, both in Sint Maarten and the surrounding islands that depend on them, including Saba and St. Eustatius. Due to the difficult supply of relief goods, stocks of water and medicine were largely exhausted after only a week. There was also virtually no communication possible within the region after the hurricane, due to the damage caused to telecom masts and the failure of power plants on Sint Maarten. Walkie-talkies, radios, the internet, mobile phones, landlines and satellite phones were not working or barely working. This made it more difficult to request assistance of the other islands.

The likelihood of a tropical storm or major hurricane such as Hurricane Irma is lower for Bonaire, Aruba and Curaçao. Yet also here, climate change has an impact on national security interests, for example, due to the risk of flooding. The water level is steadily rising in the Caribbean Sea. By 2050, the lower parts of Bonaire are even at risk of permanent flooding due to sea level rise. Moreover, Bonaire's critical infrastructure is also vulnerable because it is located mainly in the south and on the coast.

7. Technological developments and digitalisation of systems

Besides the many benefits it offers our society, technological developments also create new threats and make threats more complex and interconnected. Digitalisation makes systems more interconnected, and as a result, vital and non-vital processes become more susceptible to cyber threats (see also Intersecting Theme 6). Potential adversaries are investing heavily in strengthening their armed forces. The proliferation of high technology and weapons, both conventional and non-conventional, is increasing. This puts pressure on the existing multilateral arms export control and non-proliferation regimes. At the same time, the geopolitical environment makes it difficult to reach new agreements on new technology as part of these instruments for disarmament. In addition, technological developments are increasing the 'proximity' of military and other threats, for example, due to the development of new weapons technologies (hypersonic missiles and autonomous weapons systems).

The digitalisation of society creates many interdependencies that are difficult to identify. With increasingly interrelated digital and physical processes, the consequences of a disruption in the functioning of the internet can potentially lead to societal disruption as well. A disruption affects our security interests such as territorial security. Territorial security concerns not only the integrity of our national territory and that of our allies but also the integrity of the digital domain: the availability, confidentiality and integrity of essential information services and infrastructure and processes that depend on this.[61]

The digital threat is permanent and increasing rather than decreasing, with all the associated consequences. On top of that, the digital space - a complex interplay of interrelated digital processes, operating via networks, ICT systems and operational technology - is constantly changing, which in turn creates new, unexpected dependencies and effects. This is a dynamic that will not diminish.[62] For example, by using

technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing[63] malicious actors can use high-performance computing to launch automated attacks that can crack cryptographic security systems. Technological leadership and dominance in key technologies will determine the geopolitical and military balance of power in the future (see also Intersecting Theme 1).

At the same time, technological developments also offer opportunities for promoting national security. Technologies can help strengthen capabilities to make our society more resilient to threats.[64] And, therefore, also strengthen our resilience to societal disruption. For example, digitalisation, data science and AI allow us to identify threats faster, reduce dependence on human perception, analyse large amounts of data and improve communication between the parties involved. This helps ensure an improved intelligence position, support for decision-making and increased efficiency of operations. Quantum technology makes encryption stronger, making data and communications more secure. New technologies also provide opportunities for the development of systems and capabilities requiring low labour intensity. Robotics, for example, can be used to automate repetitive tasks or in situations where it is dangerous for humans to operate, as in the case of the dismantling of explosives or inspection of buildings after an attack. Low labour-intensive solutions also offer opportunities for addressing increasing labour market shortages.

Cyber threats against the Kingdom[65]

Digital systems are becoming increasingly intertwined in our society, and it is no longer possible to make a clear distinction between the physical or digital domain. Cyber threats can therefore have a variety of consequences on our social and political stability and physical and economic security. For example, physical security may be at stake if a cyber attack on a hospital prevents doctors from providing accurate care to patients. Furthermore, a cyber attack on a bank, for example, could have direct financial consequences; and social and political stability could be at stake if a cyber attack at a power plant leads to prolonged power outages and results in societal unrest.

In June 2017, the world was alarmed by the rapid spread of the malware NotPetya that appeared to hold files hostage. In effect, the files proved impossible to recover, making the malware devastating. The attack targeted users of a software package used in Ukraine, but its effects were felt far beyond Ukraine. In the Netherlands, Maersk's facility at the Port of Rotterdam was affected, resulting in financial losses of 200 to 300 million dollars.

The Netherlands faced a vulnerability in connection with Log4J in December 2021. This is a frequently used software module in ICT systems and is widely in use by large and small organisations at home and abroad. Every system using Log4j appeared to be vulnerable: a malicious actor could execute a random code remotely. As Log4j is used in a large number of systems all over the world, this vulnerability caused a great deal of concern. Ultimately, it was found that both state actors and cyber criminals were exploiting this vulnerability in the Netherlands.

Cyber attack incidents also occur in the Caribbean part of the Kingdom, where the consequences can be socially disruptive. One example of this is the major ransomware attack in 2022 on Sint Maarten's sole water and electricity company. The attack caused the company to lose access to its financial data while no recent backup was available. This posed a threat to the operations and continuity of two vital processes: water and electricity. Another case is the 2019 ransomware attack on a hospital in Aruba. This attack disrupted the hospital's course of operations and activities, impacting both services and patients.

Part 2

Strategic course

The first part of the strategy shows how the impact could potentially be greater because of the interconnectedness and accumulation of threats. Strengthening national security is primarily the task of the government. Nevertheless, the creation of a secure and resilient society requires commitment from all: not only from all branches of government but also citizens, businesses and civil society organisations. This means that all of us have to prepare ourselves for possible societal disruption so that if a crisis does occur, in any form, both the government and citizens can act adequately to mitigate its effects.

The three main objectives of the strategic course for national security are:

1. A secure Kingdom in a multipolar world
2. A resilient democratic legal order
3. A ready and resilient society

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An integrated approach to these threats is more important than ever. Focused on both the short as well as the long term. In this second part, we describe the strategic course for protecting our national security today and in the future, based on the threats outlined in part 1.

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2. A resilient democratic legal order
3. A ready and resilient society

For each of these main objectives, we briefly describe the relationship between the various threats to our national security interests and subsequently outline the lines of action for increasing our resilience to those threats. For each line of action, we formulate priorities for the efforts to be made over the next six years.

1. A secure Kingdom in a multipolar world

A predictable, prosperous and secure international environment is in the interest of the Kingdom. The proper functioning of the international system of rules, standards and agreements aimed at promoting international peace and security is, therefore, of great importance. As is the proper functioning of countries in the immediate vicinity of the Kingdom and the EU. We strive for a world in which countries cooperate on the basis of clear rules and universal human rights and where countries can hold each other accountable if these rules are broken or not followed.

The changing balance of power in the world,the growing pressure on democratic societies and the rule-based multilateral world order imply that we, as the Kingdom, must adopt a strong position. The Kingdom will need to strategically adjust or step up its priorities, policy instruments and partnerships and offer support for the reform plans of multilateral organisations, based on the principles that are important to the Kingdom. At the same time, the Kingdom will also have to make changes, where necessary. Targeted diplomatic, civil[66], military and development efforts are needed to get closer to achieving our foreign- and security-policy objectives. The above policy is also aimed at protecting the interests of the international legal order, promoting a state based on the rule of law and fighting against impunity worldwide.

The Kingdom has a constitutional obligation to promote the development of the international legal order.[67] Therefore, it is important to continue exerting influence on the multilateral system along with like-minded countries.[68] Moreover, to protect our economy and science or combat hybrid threats, existing or new coalitions in the areas of economic security and cybersecurity and technological developments (including standardisation and countering of disinformation) can contribute to joint actions, and therefore enhance resilience. This calls for the following lines of action:

Line of Action 1: Invest in international partnerships and strengthen the armed forces

In a highly polarised world in which major powers vie for power and influence and where direct conflict with Russia has become more conceivable,[69] the Kingdom and EU must be better able to defend their territories as well as defend and strengthen our common security interests.[70] The power of European cooperation lies in jointly tackling and sharing knowledge about major, international challenges. We must grow stronger together to protect our freedom, security and prosperity. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has led Europe to invest further in its security. European countries are systematically increasing their defence budgets and applying existing instruments such as sanctions and the European Peace Facility more effectively.[71] The military capability of both NATO and the EU is being strengthened through investment in necessary military capabilities and intensified (European) defence cooperation. More joint practices will help increase readiness and deployability and contribute to credible deterrence.

The increasing geopolitical competition will require the Kingdom to make sharper trade-offs in its relations with third countries based on strategic interests, including security interests. We want to anticipate future threats to a greater extent and remain committed to making targeted improvements in terms of our combat power, readiness, deployability within and outside our territories and the agility of our armed forces.[72] We are also investing in European self-reliance, military-industrial sustainment and improvement of the position of our defence industry.[73]

This will deter and help prevent armed conflict. But if conflict does break out, we and our allies must be able to engage in combat and sustain this effort, if this is necessary for protecting our common interests.[74] Effective civil-military cooperation is essential in this respect, also for the sake of performing our host nation support task[75], since the Netherlands is an important transit country for military personnel and equipment of NATO allies. This is how we intend to remain a resilient Kingdom, even across borders.

In addition to the necessary reinforcements to defend the Kingdom and the allied territories, the Kingdom itself must remain capable of contributing its fair share to military missions and operations to promote the international rule of law. In this respect, the strategic competition between the superpowers will increasingly be an influencing factor that must be taken into account. In addition, a broader effort is needed, one that extends beyond the shrinking platform of like-minded Western countries. Consequently, we also plan to work more intensively with our less traditional partners. This investment in new partnerships will have to be accompanied by a willingness to make compromises - sometimes uncomfortable ones - so we can work effectively to advance national and collective interests, without compromising on our norms and values.

Priorities for 2023-2029:

A. NATO is the cornerstone of our collective defence. For this reason, the Netherlands invests systematically in the NATO alliance and cooperation with NATO allies.[76] The NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) is the main instrument for identifying the required capabilities and dividing their development and implementation among the allies.
B. Within the EU context, work on strengthening the Common Security and Defence Policy as outlined in the EU Strategic Compass[77], an effort which will also help strengthen the NATO Alliance.
C. Advance the support and cooperation with the

implementing organisations of global multilateral treaties, including independent verification mechanisms, such as the International Atomic and Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).[78]

D. Ensure progress on the control of sensitive technologies in international export control regimes, explore opportunities for the mutual recognition of arms export licences and commit to a further convergence of the arms export policies.
E. Ensure effective military cooperation at the political-strategic, operational and materiel levels, with explicit attention to interoperability, feasibility and affordability, where we take a lead on specific topics such as military mobility[79] and specialisation[80]. We will continue with the integration of the German-Dutch army.
F. Continue to improve the readiness, deployability, agility and combat power of the armed forces[81] by various means, for example, through investments in intelligence capabilities, cyber domain capabilities, special operations forces and integrated air and missile defence systems, including the reinforcement of frigates, submarines, fighter aircraft and ground-based air defence systems.
G. Intensify civil-military cooperation to better face present and future threats by further pooling together mutual knowledge and expertise. This cooperation takes place as part of an integrated approach, with the combined use of all available instruments (including the armed forces, diplomacy and development cooperation.
H. Strengthen cooperation with strategic partners such as the UN, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the African Union (AU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); and enter into new customised (bilateral) partnerships, for example, in Latin America and the Caribbean, such as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Organization of American States (OAS) and Association of Caribbean States (ACS).
I. Continue the additional investments in development cooperation, with a particular focus on the areas in which the Netherlands is strong. Such investments help in addressing the root causes of poverty, terrorism, irregular migration and climate change, and therefore also contribute towards achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).[82] In this respect, special attention is paid to *human security*[83] in general, and the meaningful participation of women and girls in decision-making processes for peace and security in particular.[84]

Line of Action 2: Counter hybrid conflict

The security of the Kingdom is closely intertwined with the international environment. Due to shifting geopolitical power dynamics, increased geopolitical rivalry, and technological developments, our Kingdom and its international partners are increasingly faced with hybrid threats.

Since hybrid threats are often latent in nature andconsist of a mix of different activities or instruments, it is necessary to fight such threats in an integrated manner in multiple fields ranging from the economy and trade to security and education. Effective and comprehensive management of hybrid threats requires cooperation involving the whole of government and whole of society. We cannot do this alone as a Kingdom, but must do it together with international partners, both bilaterally and via alliances.

Priorities for 2023-2029:

A. Strengthen the whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach to hybrid threats, including improved resilience and proportionate response in the international context. The Nationwide Response Framework against Threats from State-Sponsored Actors (Rijksbrede Responskader tegen Statelijke Dreigingen) will be closely aligned with initiatives in the EU and NATO context such as the EU Hybrid Toolbox, the EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox or the toolbox focused on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI).[85] This requires close cooperation between the parties involved, including information sharing, and a strong intelligence position for the Kingdom's intelligence and security services. This is specifically true for the AIVD and MIVD, where the aim

is to leverage the operational strength to assertively identify, investigate and mitigate new and growing digital threats and attacks, particularly by state actors, with safeguards for proper and effective oversight and for digital civil rights.[86]

B. Increase the resilience of the government, public and private partners, civil society organisations and citizens by raising awareness about hybrid threats.[87] In this way, we strengthen information and knowledge sharing between public and private parties in the area of economic security. These parties may include high-tech businesses and knowledge institutions. We will also invest in raising awareness about unwanted foreign interference among various target groups such as communities, policy officers at municipalities, police officers and local politicians.
C. Strengthen our international partnerships and coalitions within which we share information, address hybrid threats and present a joint response, if necessary.
D. Develop new and effective options for a diplomatic response to cyber threats.[88]

Line of Action 3: Increase the resilience of the economy and protect science

Our economy is open where possible and protected where necessary.[89] In recent years, the main focus in the economic domain has been on protecting the Netherlands from existing threats. It is not only important to mitigate the current identified threats but also to focus on increasing our resilience by strengthening various sectors. This also needs to be done in the European context. It is about establishing a balance where threats against national security are reduced to a manageable level while maintaining the openness of our economy as much as possible. We are committed to greater diversification, coherence and integration between economic security measures and to ensuring better control of national and international policy, also for the sake of a stable global economy and a reliable international trade system. An important cornerstone for this is a rules-based international legal order that is appropriate and effective for the Kingdom.

We strive to achieve this same balance with respect to our science. Unprotected science poses direct risks to our security interests and strategic position. At the same time, science as a source of knowledge, innovation and influence is indispensable for seizing opportunities relating to these strategic interests. This will help strengthen the Dutch knowledge economy and other economic sectors and also help solve other complex challenges and lines of action within this strategy.

Priorities for 2023-2029:

A. Invest in further identifying and assessing the risks of strategic dependencies, an overarching picture of critical commodities and technologies, the possible policy instruments and the costs involved. This requires national and international efforts, cooperation and knowledge sharing.[90]
B. Increase awareness among national, local or regional authorities, companies and knowledge institutions regarding the threats posed by state actors to economic and knowledge security.
C. Continue to mitigate economic threats through control structures (mergers, acquisitions and investments, procurement and tendering) and by more broadly opposing undesirable knowledge and technology transfer and espionage.
D. Mitigate the risks of strategic dependencies for the Kingdom. In particular, in the areas of critical raw materials, fossil and other forms of energy, medical products, knowledge, technology and food security. Coordination at the European level is necessary for this.[91]
E. Focus on developing technology leadership in key sectors (including the semiconductor, quantum and space industries).
F. Strengthen the approach to knowledge security at the national level: continue the dialogue for, and self-regulation by, knowledge institutions, continue to develop a national desk and expertise centre for knowledge security and develop a legal assessment framework for screening students and researchers involved in sensitive technologies.
G. Strengthen the approach to knowledge security internationally: strengthen relations with European and other allies and maintain our significant (international) knowledge position under the motto ‘open where possible, protect where necessary’. A leading role for the Netherlands contributes to a level playing field for our knowledge institutions and helps to counter the misuse of knowledge belonging to friendly countries by unfriendly state actors. We can do this by, on the one hand, encouraging (international) scientific cooperation and, on the other hand, countering undesirable knowledge transfer and covert influence. In this way, the Kingdom and the EU can remain at the forefront of high-tech innovative open economies. This will require commitment both within the EU and within bilateral partnerships aimed at reciprocity.
H. Strengthen the substantive contribution that can potentially be made by knowledge institutions and scientists to the necessary technological and social innovations relating to our national security interests, for example, to the lines of action defined within this strategy (Science for Policy).
I. Strengthen the participation of the Kingdom in international and European coalitions, so that international cooperation for high-tech innovation remains possible. For this, the Netherlands will also remain closely aligned with EU initiatives in this area, such as the Important Projects of Common European Interests (IPCEIs).

J. Develop and strengthen the range of instruments (policy and legislation) in the area of economic security for the Caribbean part of the Kingdom. This will lead to increased awareness, a clearer picture of the threat and an increased prospect of action.

2. A resilient democratic legal order

The Kingdom has an open and free democratic society. Social and political stability is an important security interest, which involves a societal climate in which individuals can function undisturbed and groups of people can live in harmony with one another. Our open society is characterised by various freedoms, human rights, a democratic legal order and an international orientation. This is a great asset that we will continue to protect.

However, our democratic legal order is not a given. Our Kingdom is facing major societal challenges. The Kingdom and its democratic legal order can be affected by a broad spectrum of activities from state actors or non-state, criminal actors. Hybrid threats, extremist and terrorist threats, espionage, unwanted foreign interference and organised crime are examples of such activities.[92]

In addition, the resilience of a democratic legal order can be affected by societal tensions and polarisation. Societal tensions and differences in opinion are inherent to the proper functioning of the democratic legal order, but radical undercurrents can potentially have a major effect on the proper functioning of society at large.[93]

It is important to place the focus on the resilience of our democratic legal order and open societyby strengthening democratic institutions, restoring trust between citizens and government, and working towards reducing the likelihood and impact of threats.[94] This is how we can maintain a democratic legal order in which we can live together in freedom and security. This requires commitment from the government and citizens in collaboration with all partners in society, by an approach focused on the lines of action described below:

Line of Action 4: Increase social stability

Societal tensions are part and parcel of a free and open society. However, serious manifestations of tension and polarisation can, in extreme cases, affect social and political stability. These manifestations require a broad and coherent approach on socio-economic aspects,[95] maintaining and restoring trust in the democratic legal order, social stability, and addressing societal tensions and unwanted polarisation. At the same time, a major challenge for the government is to reduce tensions, both where government action itself contributes to these tensions as well as where these tensions arise due to other causes. Restoration of trust between government and citizens requires systematic self-reflection within the government and skills in conflict management. For this, it is essential to improve the quality of policy and legislation as well as the communication by the government, both locally and nationally. A visible and concrete manifestation of the democratic legal order, through open and approachable governance, says more than a thousand policy documents.

Priorities for 2023-2029:

A. Strengthen the whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach to promote social stability, restore trust in government and counter societal discontent and unwanted polarisation. This will be done in cooperation between national, regional and local governments, including tailored (local) advice.
For this, we are committed to creating an open and

approachable government, increasing knowledge about online or offline conspiracy theories and anti-government sentiments, countering discrimination or unequal treatment through broad-based prevention efforts (including through education and in the social domain), creating an open dialogue between government and critical groups, and enhancing the quality of policy and legislation.

B. Focus specifically on protecting the public discourse from disinformation by preserving the pluriform media landscape, strengthening citizens' resilience to disinformation, and reducing the influence of disinformation (regardless of content, the disseminator of the disinformation or the means of dissemination.[96]
C. Offer protection to persons for online and offline participation in the public debate, with specific attention to groups that face high risks in this respect such as journalists. Commit to supporting at-risk groups, develop effective interventions to combat online and offline harassment, contribute to discussions on setting standards for online conduct and raise awareness.
D. Get a better insight into the various dimensions of social stability and how they evolve and relate to each other, by developing insights into society.
E. Get a better idea of the threats against national security by continuing and broadening standard conceptions with information about the resilience of the democratic legal order and analyses of phenomena and developments (within the applicable legal framework). Support local identification of threats and deal with the subversion of the democratic legal order where a breach of the law/national security is not yet at issue (for example, recognising and dealing with anti-democratic conspiracy theories, disinformation, extreme polarisation, etc.).

Line of Action 5: Fight organised subversive crime

The impact of organised subversive crime is a serious threat to our society, especially to the social and political stability of the Kingdom. Criminals misuse vulnerable structures and individuals in society and do not shrink from perpetrating acts of extreme violence. Organised subversive crime is not an isolated phenomenon but is strongly linked to cyber and hybrid threats. Therefore, in the Netherlands, tackling organised subversive crime is one of the major spearheads of government policy. Efforts are also being made to formulate an approach to this with the Caribbean part of the Kingdom, given its location in an important maritime drug corridor towards North America and Europe. This approach focused on the Caribbean part of the Kingdom and Latin America must be continued and developed further. International cooperation and an international commitment are essential to reduce the threat of organised subversive crime in the Kingdom.

The approach to organised subversive crime takes into consideration not only the changes in the modus operandi of criminal groups but also, in a broader sense, the prevalent societal and geopolitical changes. The approach to subversive drug crime is shaped in cooperation with public and private partners through the following tasks: prevention (which includes addressing the recruitment of young people in organised drug crime and other forms of crime), an international offensive, tackling logistical hubs, dealing with criminal financial flows, regional reinforcements and strengthening the surveillance and protection system.[97]

Priorities for 2023-2029:

A. Persist with a broad approach to organised subversive crime that is sufficiently adaptive such that it remains stable even if the environment changes. Such an approach takes into consideration not only the changes in the modus operandi of criminal groups but also, in a more broad sense, the prevalent societal and geopolitical changes. This means that the approach should be 'shockproof' against incidents, whether violent or otherwise: the risk of setbacks is real, so it is essential to maintain trust among politicians and society with the long-term perspective in mind.
B. Intensify national and international cooperation in the common areas at the intersection of the approach to organised subversive crime and the national security approach. This includes increased cooperation to prevent the use of criminal groups by state actors and leveraging the foreign security policy to tackle organised subversive crime internationally.
C. Intensify efforts in the Caribbean part of the Kingdom to expand the approach against organised subversive crime, including the development of legal and other instruments against unwanted investments and the strengthening of local services within the justice system.
D. Improve information exchange within the Kingdom.

Line of Action 6: Counter unwanted foreign interference and espionage

Unwanted foreign interference by state actors poses a serious threat to the Kingdom and its allies, which can lead to the disruption of our society. To effectively deal with unwanted foreign interference, we are committed to strengthening the intelligence and information position of the Kingdom's intelligence and security services, intensifying the exchange of information, opposing espionage and disinformation, strengthening the approach towards increasing the resilience of vulnerable groups, entering into diplomatic dialogue with state actors that are committing unwanted foreign interference, and taking criminal action in the event of criminal offences.

Priorities for 2023-2029:

A. Continue to develop the three-track approach consisting of a resilience track, a diplomatic track and a criminal/administrative track.
B. Gain better insight into and anticipate the threat of unwanted foreign interference.
C. Increase awareness of this threat among target groups and targets, specifically in connection with China, Turkey, Morocco, Iran and Russia.[98]
D. Reduce the influence of disinformation by focusing on developing expertise in communication in case of disinformation relating to crisis communication and national security.
E. International commitment by the Kingdom to internationally shared standards for dealing with disinformation, where online platforms should be regulated such that disinformation campaigns can be countered without unlawfully restricting individual citizens' freedom of expression. Also the European response to disinformation produced or disseminated by foreign or affiliated actors should be made stronger and more effective. In the Netherlands, the latter falls under the scope of the Nationwide Response Framework against State-Sponsored Actors (*Rijksbreed Responskader tegen statelijke dreigingen*).[99]
F. Widen the opportunities to criminalise espionage in order to take action against conduct that may harm national security.[100]

Line of Action 7: Strengthen digital resilience

Digital processes are the nerve centre of society and the economy and require continuous reinforcement for uninterrupted functioning. Despite earlier efforts to improve resilience, there is still an imbalance between, on the one hand, the increasing and rapidly developing threat and, on the other hand, the build-up of resilience.[101] With the Dutch Cybersecurity Strategy (*Nederlandse Cybersecuritystrategie*)[102], the Netherlands is working to ensure that there is as little imbalance as possible between the digital threat and digital resilience today and in future. Specifically for the Caribbean part of the Kingdom, cybersecurity policies are lagging behind and need to be further developed. In this part of the Kingdom, cyber attacks pose a particular threat to critical infrastructure due to the lack of redundancy, with potentially large cascading effects.

Cyber incidents do not stop at country borders. That is why the government is actively utilising the opportunities for cooperation within and outside the EU. As part of the cooperation among EU Member States, cross-border digital threats are addressed and a coordinated response is made to large-scale cyber incidents and crises both within and outside the EU. In addition, the Kingdom engages closely with the EU and third countries in a multilateral context and is committed to protecting cybersecurity agreements, the responsible use of AI with legal safeguards to protect citizens from high-risk applications, and an open, free, secure and interoperable internet based on respect for human rights and democratic values.

Priorities for 2023-2029:[103]

A. Increase the digital resilience and preparedness of government, business and civil society organisations by focusing on deliberate risk control and detection, recovery and response capabilities.
B. Continue commitment within a multilateral context with EU and third countries on protecting agreements on cybersecurity, mitigating the risks of new technology in development and deployment, the responsible use of AI, and an open, free, secure and interoperable internet, based on respect for human rights and democratic values.
C. Reduce high-risk strategic dependencies in the area of digital resilience.
D. Work towards a secure and innovative digital economy with stronger digital open strategic autonomy and secure products and services. This can be done by investing in a strong cybersecurity knowledge and innovation chain.
E. Counter digital threats from states and criminals, including through attribution and response to attacks by states in cooperation with partners, especially within the NATO and EU context, and through more effective cooperation in investigating and prosecuting cyber criminals.

F. Boost the cybersecurity job market and focus on educating and developing the digital resilience of citizens.
G. Limit the Kingdom's attack surface for cyber threats by making conscious choices in digitalising and connecting processes.
H. Develop a cybersecurity policy for the Caribbean part of the Kingdom. Legislation and policy frameworks are needed to promote cybersecurity and counter cyber-crime, which includes enhanced knowledge exchange, cooperation and technical assistance between the Netherlands and the Caribbean part of the Kingdom. In addition, more effort is needed to increase cyber awareness, implement cybersecurity policies and boost technical expertise among citizens, government and companies.

Line of Action 8: Prevent and counter terrorism and extremism

Sustained commitment is needed to prevent and counter terrorism and extremism in the Kingdom and beyond. Jihadist and right-wing terrorist threats remain major concerns. Both these forms of terrorism and extremism are expected to pose threats for us in the coming years. At the same time, the entire extremist domain is in flux. Particularly notable is the rise of extremists who have turned against the government and other institutions out of a fundamental mistrust, anger and sense of injustice. The threat landscape is diffuse and variable. These developments are also influenced by events abroad.[104]

Priorities for 2023-2029:

A. For the Netherlands: to tackle violent extremism and terrorism, the approach towards potentially violent extremist loners, fighting terrorism and violent extremism online, and ensuring a safe reintegration process following detention are important.[105] In this respect, the further development and safeguarding of the information exchange between international partners, healthcare partners and partners in the security domain is essential (within the existing legal frameworks). In this way, signs of radicalisation or threat can be identified and shared timely to allow for early intervention. The exchange of information and best practices among international partners will be continued.
B. Respond to the significant role played by social media and internet forums in the spread of extremist sentiments and ideas online. A challenge for the coming years will be how we deal with the internet, the limits of freedom of expression, and the level of support for enforcement when certain boundaries are crossed. In addition, we will strengthen legal frame-works for information collection and sharing. Additional agreements will also be made about how to ensure that this information reaches the right people so that it can help partners to continuously gain and maintain insight into the nature and extent of the threat.
C. Commit to strengthening society's resilience and power of resistance to reduce the appeal of extremist and terrorist messages.
D. Keep track of the international terrorist threat, which includes maintaining oversight of convicted terrorists following detention, through international cooperation at multilateral and bilateral levels. A terrorist threat elsewhere may also affect the Kingdom. In the coming years, this will also be an area of focus within existing multilateral forums such as the EU, UN, Anti-ISIS Coalition, NATO, the Global Counterterrorism Forum, and the cooperation within the Caribbean region.
E. Invest in bilateral and multilateral cooperation and address the root causes of terrorism to combat terrorism and the threat posed toward the Kingdom and the West.
F. Strengthen local capabilities in regions that are strategic to the Kingdom to prevent and combat terrorism at its source and eliminate root causes. In the coming years, we will do this by continuing to seek cooperation with international partners and local authorities in partner regions and especially in fragile states.
G. For the Netherlands: develop a broad-based strategy with respect to all forms of extremism, both non-violent and violent, with an additional focus on finding out more about the instigators of extremism and how to deal with them.
H. For the Caribbean Countries: start strengthening the approach to terrorism and extremism, by also paying additional attention to the formulation of a strategy and the process of cooperation and coordination required for this among the Caribbean Countries. Efforts are needed to raise awareness about various forms of terrorism and extremism and make soft targets and critical infrastructure more resilient to attacks.

3. A prepared and resilient society

Threats to our national security are unpredictable and can never be completely prevented. This is because absolute security does not exist. What is important is to mitigate the impact of threats as far as possible to prevent crises. Preventive, adaptive and responsive policies - both internationally and nationally - are needed to help society adapt to the threat, even when there are multiple (latent) crises occurring simultaneously that reinforce each other. This inevitably calls for difficult choices and prioritisation of efforts.

All of us together - the government, public and private partners, civil society organisations, and citizens - are responsible for protecting our security. Proper communication about risks contributes to the enhancement of a prepared and resilient society. This starts with being open about the current risks as well as being clear about the possible temporary or lasting impact of short and long-term crises on the way of life we are used to. By communicating, we make clear what the government is doing to prepare for threats and crises ánd how citizens and businesses can prepare themselves. After all, we may need to make changes in our way of life to reduce the likelihood and impact of the threat. The response to climate change and pandemics is an important example of this. By linking the communication to specific circumstances and providing a concrete prospect of action, we can assist organisations and citizens in taking action and increasing their resilience. A reliable government and expert organisations are an important prerequisite for this.

A prepared and resilient society requires not only certain efforts by the government but by all parts of society.[106] For this, we focus on the following lines of action:

Line of Action 9: Intensify climate mitigation and adaptation

The implementation of a national climate policy[107], focused on climate mitigation and adaptation, is currently well underway. This calls for undiminished attention and there is a growing urgency to reduce the threat to national security. The Kingdom's adaptive capacity against climate and natural disasters must be increased, among other things through climate-resilient spatial planning that will take into account extreme weather, flood risks, the spread of infectious diseases and wildfires. Ensuring more redundancy, in case of the failure of critical infrastructure, is also important. This approach requires proper coordination between ministries and intensive cooperation between private and public parties, next to close international and multilateral cooperation.

In addition, preventing climate change is, and will remain, a high priority. This is to be achieved through a secure energy transition to renewable and clean energy, the agricultural transition to reduced emissions, clean transportation (including in the maritime and aviation sectors) and the transition to a circular economy. As part of the EU, the Netherlands is working ambitiously to arrive at international agreements on this matter and is requesting other countries to do the same, because it is important to limit the adaptation task as far as possible. The Caribbean Countries are also implementing international standards and agreements on the climate to the maximum extent possible. Continued attention and increased commitment in this respect is necessary.

Priorities for 2023-2029:

A. Achieve climate mitigation goals and reduce our international footprint.
B. Increase the urgency of the implementation of the existing national and international climate plans and agreements, including strengthened cooperation between public and private sectors.
C. Ensure that the Netherlands is fully circular by 2050.[108] By dealing as efficiently as possible with the available (critical) raw materials, we can increase the security of supply, and at the same time, reduce the negative impact of the extraction and processing of critical raw materials on humans and the environment. We will do this by focusing on four key circular strategies: reduction of raw material use, raw material substitution, product life extension and high-value processing. In the EU context, the Netherlands is pushing for the broad adoption of circular strategies, especially in the context of the Critical Raw Materials Act which is expected to be published in early March.
D. Ensure security of supply for critical materials needed for the energy and digital transitions.[109] by taking actions within and outside the EU.
E. In the area of spatial planning, we explicitly take into account the risks to national security due to climate and natural disasters. This is done especially in cases involving cascading effects on critical infrastructure that must continue functioning even in times of crisis.[110] For the Netherlands, this is incorporated in the National Environmental Strategy (*Nationale Omgevingsvisie, NOVI*), which is to be reviewed.
F. Strengthen the approach to wildfire prevention and suppression for the Netherlands, partly through the administrative agreement on wildfires, sharing best practices, increasing the deployable resources and a national wildfire crisis plan.
G. Define a long-term approach to the effects of climate change for the Caribbean part of the Kingdom. The key

objectives are switching to solar and wind energy, climate-proof spatial planning and increasing redundancy in case of the failure of critical systems.

H. The Kingdom incorporates the impact of climate change and climate transitions in the security policy and takes climate risks and resilience into account in the strategic context analyses, conflict analyses and programmes.[111]

I. In specific sectors such as water, land use and food security, Dutch knowledge regarding climate change assists in the preparation of better climate vulnerability and risk assessments. We strive to convince multilateral and international partners and partner organisations of the importance of following a conflict-sensitive approach in their climate efforts.

J. Contribute to greater water security and water safety in fragile states.[112] This will reduce the impact of threats due to climate change and prevent other threats (such as food shortages, geopolitical tensions, conflict and migration).

Line of Action 10: Ensure better protection for critical infrastructure

The territorial security of the Netherlands and the unimpeded functioning of the economy depend heavily on the integrity of critical infrastructure and the continuity of vital processes.[113] This requires infrastructure that is more resistant to failure, disruption and manipulation, both intended or unintended. High-risk dependencies will also need to be greatly reduced. Critical infrastructure must continue functioning during incidents and crises. That is primarily the responsibility of businesses and organisations, with support from the government. This responsibility is being laid down in legislation for a growing number of sectors. The government actively works towards ensuring the resilience of sectors and services by gaining a better understanding of this aspect and by taking measures - together with critical providers - to increase this resilience when necessary.

To reduce high-risk strategic dependencies, the government is working to strengthen the EU's open strategic autonomy (OSA) policy. More often than before, it will be necessary to consider whether dependence on specific raw materials, suppliers, services or specific countries creates an unacceptable level of risk. In this way, OSA helps reduce the high-risk dependencies with respect to critical providers.

The threat landscape demands robust critical infrastructure. Increasing redundancy and reducing the negative impact of the just-in-time economy is not only a task for the government but also for public and private partners, civil society organisations and citizens. If vital systems fail, you must have backup systems that share as few single points of failure as possible with production systems, such as the same software or hardware. In this way, the Kingdom will be both digitally and physically resilient to threats, and be able to mitigate these threats and recover resiliently from setbacks.

Priorities for 2023-2029:

A. An integrated and more committed approach to protecting the continuity, integrity and confidentiality of critical infrastructure. Strengthening the physical, digital and economic resilience of critical infrastructure requires guidance from the government, a clear division of responsibilities and clear frameworks. To this end, the duty of care of critical providers will be laid down by law. In addition, the policy instruments, support for providers, information exchange and level of supervision will be expanded. As part of this, existing networks and structures will continue to be developed as far as possible, and the support and communication via government offices will be streamlined.

B. Broaden the scope of critical infrastructure, with a focus on the significance of a process or service for the unimpeded functioning of the economy and society, with the aim of protecting our national security.

C. Identify and subsequently reduce high-risk dependencies of critical infrastructure and make sure to include dependencies in production chains, services and sectors as an integral part of risk assessments. The mitigation of such risks is mandatory under certain conditions insofar as these risks could affect the continuity, integrity and confidentiality of a process or service. The government offers intensive and integrated support for critical providers for this, and together with the sector, looks for possible solutions at the European level or otherwise. This requires international commitment.

D. Improve preparedness for widespread and/or prolonged disruption. This is done by expanding emergency and strategic (civilian and military) supplies, preparing and practising crisis plans, and investing in the cooperation and mutual support between the government (including

Defence) and critical providers.

E. For the Caribbean Netherlands: identify the processes on Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba that need to be better protected to prevent societal disruption, taking into account the local context. Subsequently, the appropriate measures to be taken to ensure continuity must be considered in accordance with the comply or explain principle.
F. Strengthen the protection of critical infrastructure against unwanted foreign takeovers, mergers and investments by bringing newly designated critical providers under the scope of the Investments, Mergers and Acquisitions Security Screening Act (*Wet veiligheidstoets investeringen, fusies en overnames*) or other statutory investment review.
G. To properly protect the North Sea infrastructure from state and non-state threats, the relevant ministries work on the strategy implementation approach together with critical partners and under the coordination of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management. This also involves international cooperation with EU Member States and NATO allies.[114]

Line of Action 11: Increase level of pandemic preparedness

The COVID-19 pandemic has taught us that we need to be better prepared for pandemics. Our vulnerabilities in the response to pandemics have been exposed. Such as the set-up of the initial outbreak response, the availability of specialised care (such as ICU care and artificial respiration equipment), the separate nursing care options (quarantine) that might be needed in the event of a new pandemic, as well as the security of supply and availability of personal protective equipment and vaccines.

The COVID-19 pandemic showed that a pandemic can also create tensions within society and that measures or vaccines can have a polarising effect. Foreign actors may instigate or add fuel to such discussions. Moreover, there is a link to hybrid threats, with the spread of disinformation as a possible tool.[115]

Structural preparedness against infectious diseases and continued preventive efforts are important. Not just for another wave of COVID-19 but also, particularly, for another pandemic that may be completely different in nature. For this, cooperation in the international arena is indispensable for a properly integrated approach.

Priorities for 2023-2029:

A. Strengthen pandemic preparedness by working toward reinforced public health and infectious disease control systems, flexible and scalable care and improved security of supply of medical products based on the recently adopted Pandemic Preparedness Policy Agenda and Programme (*Beleidsagenda en -programma Pandemische paraatheid*).[116] This instrument also specifically focuses on the ongoing (staffing) shortages in, and the resilience of, healthcare services during crises. Another key element is the relationship between local and regional implementation and national control, partly because of the separation between the decentralised and the national crisis management structures.
B. Intensify the cooperation between hospitals in the Caribbean part of the Kingdom to better deal with crises and the distribution of patients.[117]
C. Adopt a cross-sectoral approach to spatial planning and quality of life, including climate change and pandemic threats. This not only concerns the division of the living environment in the Kingdom between humans, nature and animals (One Health) but also concerns related aspects such as mobility. Extra attention must be paid to zoonotic risks, a virus that passes from animals to humans. The important thing is that spatial plans must take into consideration infectious disease risks and the One Health approach.
D. Focus on prevention programmes to promote public health that can help in reducing the impact of a pandemic.
E. Commit to providing reliable information and countering disinformation to prevent and discourage societal unrest.

Line of Action 12: Strengthen crisis control capabilities and increase preparedness of society

The Kingdom must be adequately prepared for current and future crises, which may be complex, unpredictable, large-scale and protracted. This calls for the strengthening of crisis control capabilities (in accordance with the outline policy memorandum[118]) in cooperation with all partners and increased preparedness of society. Society should be able to count on an adequate response to a crisis or impending crisis, but the resources and capabilities happen to be finite. Therefore, we increase the level of preparedness of public and private partners, civil society organisations and citizens, including through better risk communication.

Together with local and regional governments and critical and private partners, we are committed to preventing threats and mitigating risks, by preventing future crises at much as possible through robust and crisis-resistant policies and legislation. We also focus on strengthening and making our crisis control future-proof for when crises do occur.

Priorities for 2023-2029:

A. Introduce and lay down by law a structural, national, integrated and cyclical working method for preparing for and the approach (response) to actual and potential crises up to the post-crisis and recovery phase in the Kingdom, both in a generic sense as well as for specific threats and risks.
B. Strengthen the crisis response with regard to threats emerging from the Nationwide Risk Assessment, including climate-related threats, the failure of critical processes, military threats and pandemics. This requires joint national planning with attention to specific issues such as the care, shelter and evacuation of vulnerable groups.
C. Improve the cooperation within the components of the Kingdom. This includes the improvement of information-sharing processes, increasing the visibility of crisis capacity and emergency supplies, making agreements regarding aid and assistance, and organising exercises. For the Caribbean part of the Kingdom, there is an emphatic need - especially in times of crisis - to pay greater attention to the local context and autonomy to promote unity and cooperation.
D. Utilise transnational partnerships in the Benelux, EU, NATO and the Caribbean region[119] in a systematic manner. For example, sharing information and expertise, agreeing on the deployment of firefighting helicopters and carrying out joint exercises.
E. For the Netherlands: establish multi-year ambitions in the form of a shared national agenda, and where necessary, shared national objectives. This is done in close cooperation based on stronger supervisory roles laid down by law for the Minister of Justice and Security (centralised), the line ministers, the boards of the security regions (decentralised) as well as municipalities and public and private partners. In developing these ambitions, there is a focus on civil-military cooperation in the event of military threats and on ongoing developments relating to the modernisation of (national) emergency legislation and crisis legislation. The achievement and implementation of these multi-year ambitions will be supported by a national support capacity to be created for the central government and the security regions.
F. For the Netherlands: create a legal basis for, and establish a single shared nationwide digital information infrastructure available 24/7 for crisis control professionals.
G. For the Caribbean Netherlands: strengthen the crisis control process and fire-fighting services using the outline policy memorandum as a basis and explain any decisions that deviate from this. The recommendations resulting from the review of the Safety (BES Islands) Act (*Veiligheidswet BES*) will also be taken into account.[120]
H. Increase the level of preparedness of society via targeted information campaigns, training for public administrators, company directors and administrators of civil society organisations and (large-scale) exercises.

Part 3

Control over national security

This strategy sets the course for how we intend to protect our national security over the next six years. But we need to do more. We also haveto make sure that we can implement this strategic course. The government cannot do this alone. We need not just an approach involving the entire government but also one that involves all of society so that we can protect our national security effectively.

- A government that exercises integrated control over national security
- An approach involving all of society
- An approach that is evaluated annually and adjusted where necessary

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A government that exercises integrated control over national security

The strategic course for national security can only be achieved through a more integrated control of the implementation process. This is the only way to prevent the strategic course from bein just paper. Integrated control means that we focus not only on the individual lines of action but also on the link between these lines of action and the underlying priorities. Indeed, a decision on a particular policy theme may immediately pose a risk or even provide a solution for another theme. This kind of integrated control is exercised across all levels of government, with cooperation between national, regional and local governments. This also characterizes integrated control.

This does not mean that the overarching strategy replaces the existing control mechanisms in a specific policy domain, but we do ensure consistency between the threats and the approach to these threats. This is done without detracting from the autonomous responsibility, in the area of policy or otherwise, of each country in the Kingdom, each ministry and each minister.

The integrated control over national security is exercised as follows:

The Netherlands (including Caribbean Netherlands):

- The central government monitors the progress of the implementation of the strategy for the European and Caribbean Netherlands, and this matter is discussed every six months with the ministries and ministers concerned within the existing bodies.[122]
- Any dilemmas regarding strategy implementation as well as any changes in the threat that call for changes in the strategic course are discussed by the central government in the National Security Council (*Nationale Veiligheidsraad*).[123]
- The central government (the primarily responsible ministries) translates the strategy into the underlying thematic, policy agendas, action and crisis plans.[124] This is done in cooperation with local and regional governments that play an important role in the implementation. The implementation of the integrated strategic course and any ensuing dilemmas are discussed on an ongoing basis between the national, regional and local governments.

The Caribbean Countries:

- For the Caribbean Countries, the control and further development of the strategy at the national level are carried out within the context of applicable national mechanisms.

Entire Kingdom:

- We also maintain oversight of the strategy implementation at the Kingdom level by discussing progress and any problems in implementation annually.[125] This is also important for maintaining a consistency of approach at the level of the Kingdom. After all, threats do not stop at borders.

An approach involving all of society

National security cannot be achieved without the commitment of all: government, public and private partners, civil society organisations and citizens. Therefore, the integrated approach to national security also implies a whole-of-society approach. The central government provides information on the development of threats and resilience through which it makes it possible for other public authorities, civil society organisations, businesses and citizens to fulfil their responsibilities.

In addition, the network that has emerged during the creation of this strategy will help ensure the follow-up of the strategic course over the next six years. Together with all the parties, we need to consider: what is going well in terms of following this course, what could be improved, does the course need to be adjusted? What concrete tools do parties need to contribute to our national security? For this purpose, a meeting is organised with the network annually. In addition, we are working towards creating a broad knowledge network of professionals from companies, civil society organisations and public authorities in the field of national security who can contribute based on their specific area of expertise and role in society to eliminate the threats to our national security as far as possible.[126] We also engage in dialogue annually with the experts involved in creating the strategy. This is how we make sure we stay on our toes, together. Citizens are kept informed (through better risk communication) regarding the uncertainties posed by the threats and what they can do to prepare themselves.

An approach that is evaluated annually and adjusted where necessary

Controlling the course of the strategy also means making a timely review of whether the course set is still the right one. Knowledge and information are crucial for strategically anticipating future developments and making timely adjustments. The ability to anticipate requires an ongoing analysis of future developments: geopolitical, military-strategic, technological, societal and social. For this, we make increased use of the various research agendas and activities of the relevant ministries, their academies[127] as well as the scientific input of knowledge institutes, universities and think tanks. This is how we strengthen our ability to anticipate changes in the threat. In addition to the evolution of the threats, the developments in how society perceives these threats are also taken into account.[128]

An interim review will be conducted midway through the term of this strategy (2026). The starting point for this review is the update of the underlying Nationwide National Security Risk Assessment (*Rijksbrede Risicoanalyse Nationale Veiligheid*) by the National Network of Safety and Security Analysts. Subsequently, we will examine changes in the level of resilience to the threats emerging from the updated risk assessment. If necessary, the strategy will be adjusted. We will inform the House of Representatives about this as well as about our progress in the first three years. This will be done under the coordination of the Ministry of Justice and Security (NCTV), in cooperation with all the relevant governmental units of the Kingdom. The broader network of public and private partners will also be involved in this review, as well as the experts involved in creating the strategy.

The Caribbean Netherlands: comply or explain

In the Caribbean Netherlands, the comply or explain principle is used as a basis. In addition, further efforts are invested in bringing public bodies to a more equal level with one another.

One of the guiding principles for this is the premise that all European-Dutch policy reinforcements and resulting legislation will apply in the Caribbean Netherlands unless there are reasons to the contrary. These reasons might include arguments such as limited implementation capacity, insularity, the geographic distance between the European Netherlands and the Caribbean Netherlands, smaller scale, climatic conditions, geographical conditions and coping capacity.

The important thing is that, while these factors may be grounds for customisation, they should not detract from the ultimate goal of achieving a more equal level of facilities in the Caribbean Netherlands. Therefore, a certain degree of restraint, and perhaps deferment, is appropriate here, for which it is essential to consult local stakeholders properly and take into account the ‘absorptive capacity’ of the Caribbean Netherlands.

Finally

Appendices

Rationale and formulation of the strategy

Glossary

National security interests and impact criteria

Endnotes

Rationale and formulation of the strategy

This strategy reveals the national security interests that need to be protected, how these interests are currently under threat and how we can deal with these threats. By considering the threats in connection with one another and being mindful of intersecting themes, an integrated strategic course has been determined.

With three main objectives and 12 underlying lines of action, the strategy gives direction to what we intend to do in the area of national security. The threats are seen in correlation with one another so that they can subsequently be controlled in an integrated manner. *How* the strategic course is to be implemented will be elaborated via domain-specific strategies, policies and action plans and national crisis plans for national security, for which this strategy serves as an overall framework. The implementation of the strategic course falls under the existing autonomous responsibility, in the area of policy or otherwise, of each country in the Kingdom, each ministry and each minister.

The formulation of the strategy can be broadly divided into three phases:

1. Threat assessment

This strategy is based on the Nationwide Risk Assessment[129], which contains an overview of the threats to the national security of the Kingdom prepared by the ANV. This assessment considers the threats to national security in relation to the likelihood and impact on the six national security interests of certain specific threat scenarios, with a planning horizon of approximately five years.

The assessment also demonstrates the interconnections between the threat themes. In addition, the assessment makes a qualitative assessment of the latent threats and developments that may be particularly relevant in the longer term (10-20 years) as well as the wild card scenarios lying at the very edge of plausibility.

The ANV has also prepared an additional assessment that specifically addresses the impact of the war in Ukraine on the national security of the Netherlands. This assessment considered three scenarios (continuation of the current situation, escalation and de-escalation).

These assessments prepared by the ANV, together with domain-specific analyses, are important input for the strategy and they help in defining a strategic course for national security that focuses not only on short-term threats but also on actual or possible developments in the threat in the longer term. The objective of this is to prepare the Kingdom as effectively as possible for threats that may affect the Kingdom's national security, both now and in the future.

2. Resilience to the threat

Thereafter, based on the threats to national security emerging from the Nationwide Risk Assessment, the degree of resilience to these threats was considered. Via sessions with relevant policy officers/coordinators, the level of resilience was examined for all threat themes emerging from the risk assessment. These sessions focused on any vulnerabilities in resilience, which are important input for determining the strategic course. The purpose of the sessions was not to reveal a 100% complete picture of the extent of resilience or the gaps therein but to expose the most pressing blank spots in terms of the resilience to threats. These sessions were conducted for the European Netherlands (involvement of the central government and security regions), the Caribbean Netherlands and the Caribbean Countries.

3. Determining the course

Based on the national security interests, the threat assessment (including intersecting themes) and the level of resilience, the required strategic focus and priorities were determined. The strategic focus is partly based on existing policies but also takes a step forward by connecting the threat themes to one another and aligning the focus accordingly. This results in an overarching strategic course, as outlined in the present strategy document.

Parties involved in the formulation of the strategy

An inter-ministerial and nationwide project structure was set up to formulate the strategy. For the Netherlands, all the ministries involved were represented in this structure, as well as representatives from the security regions. The Caribbean Countries and the Caribbean Netherlands were also represented in the project structure. During the course of the project, the process and content were coordinated at the level of the Kingdom (including in the Quadrilateral Judicial Council), in national bodies (sub-councils and ministerial councils) and in consultations with the Dutch security regions (including in the Security Regions Council (*Veiligheidsberaad*)).

In addition, parties throughout the Kingdom outside of government, were consulted during the formulation of the strategy. As part of a focus group, experts (in the area of science, from the private sector and from local or other levels of government) were requested to offer their critical insights regarding the content of the strategy. Stakeholder meetings with private parties, knowledge institutes and civil society organisations were held, both in the Netherlands and in the Caribbean part of the Kingdom, in which the envisioned strategic course was assessed and useful inputs were obtained from the stakeholders. Finally, citizens' reflections on national security were also taken into consideration in the strategy formulation, via focus groups and based on existing measurements such as the Risk and Crisis Barometer commissioned by the NCTV.

Glossary

Accelerationism
: The far-right ideology in which the creation or acceleration of chaos is sought to hasten racial warfare and the replacement of democracy with a white ethnostate.

Crisis management
: Coordination and decision-making of an urgent nature about the entire range of measures, provisions, regulations and prospects of action initiated by the central government in cooperation with relevant public and private partners in situations where national security is or may be at stake or in other situations which have or may have a major impact on society.

Critical infrastructure
: The processes and services that are so essential that failure or disruption would cause serious societal disruption and threaten its national security.

Democracy
: A form of state in which power rests with the people. In a representative democracy, this means that citizens can exercise their power by electing a people's representatives who, in turn, can legitimately make decisions that are binding on all; and that political differences are appropriately channelled and there are procedures laid down for an orderly changeover of power; that political minorities are respected and have, at all times, the opportunity to become the political majority; and that previous decisions can be reviewed, corrected and improved through the appropriate democratic procedures. The latter implies there is a limit on democracy: democracy cannot be used to abolish democracy.

Democratic state under the rule of law
: The characteristics of such a state are the acceptance of fundamental rights (right to equality, freedom and participation), the separation of powers, a government subject to the law and an independent legal system. In a democratic state under the rule of law, citizens enjoy protection of their fundamental and other rights and freedoms with respect to fellow citizens as well as the government. We speak of a democratic state under the rule of law when power lies with the citizens ánd the government is bound by law. In a democratic state under the rule of law, the democratic and rule of law requirements are interrelated and complementary. This is because the law, to which the government is bound and based on which it derives its powers, must be drafted via a democratic process. In turn, the rule of law ensures that a democratically legitimised government respects the rights of minorities and does not degenerate into arbitrariness or abuse of power.

Democratic legal order
: A social order based on law and democracy. The broad approach to the democratic legal order sees this both as:

1. A political system (democratic state under the rule of law) within which the relationship between government and citizens is organised
2. A mode of living together (an open society) in which relationships between citizens are mutually organised (horizontal axis)

This makes the protection of the democratic legal order not only a legal-institutional issue but also a socio-civic issue.

Disinformation
: The deliberate, often covert, dissemination of misleading information with the aim of impairing the public debate, democratic processes, the open knowledge economy or national security. This may affect national security.

Energy transition
: The transition from the use of fossil fuels, such as gas, oil and coal, to sustainable energy from renewable/clean sources.

Organised subversive crime
: When groups primarily focused on illegal gain systematically commit crimes with serious, often subversive, consequences for society and are able to conceal these crimes in a relatively effective manner.

Hybrid conflicts
: Conflict conducted between states, largely below the legal level of an open armed conflict, involving the integrated use of resources and actors, aimed at achieving certain strategic objectives.

International legal order
: System of standards and agreements aimed at promoting international peace and security. This is inextricably linked to the promotion of human rights, a rules-based international financial-economic system and effective multilateral institutions and regimes.

Climate adaptation
: Adapting the spatial environment to ensure that we are prepared for the risks posed by the changing climate.

Climate mitigation
Preventing further climate change by, among other things, reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

Societal unrest
Collective behaviour, visible or otherwise, in situations arising from societal discontent, ranging from peaceful and small-scale demonstrations to radical, punishable and large-scale actions.

Societal discontent
A sense of fear, uncertainty, dissatisfaction or misunderstanding as a result of intangible phenomena such as globalisation, climate change, migration and inequality. Societal discontent stems from a sense of pessimism.

Open strategic autonomy
The ability, as a global player, to safeguard one's public interests based on one's insights and choices and remain resilient in an interconnected world, in cooperation with international partners.

Polarisation
The emphasising of contradictions in society, which results in further alienation between groups and increased tensions.

State based on the rule of law
A state that wants to be based on and bound by law (rule of law).

High-risk strategic dependencies
In a world characterised by increasing complexity and unpredictability, there is a strong and often-increasing level of mutual international dependence. This also affects the Netherlands because of the open nature of our society and economy. This kind of dependence creates risks.

Social cohesion
The involvement of people with one another as part of community organisations and other social connections, and within society as a whole.

Social stability
This means that our society is resistant to conflict from within and without. Social stability is a dynamic phenomenon: it is about organising sustainable resilience in society so that it can withstand various adversities. This social balance requires continuous efforts to maintain networks that involve all of society: citizens, communities, organisations, government and society as a whole.

Resilience
The ability to resist threats by reducing the likelihood of threats occurring, limiting the amount of harm if threats do occur and allowing for adequate recovery. To this end, we take measures in different phases: from proactive action (removing the causes of insecurity) and prevention (preventing or eliminating threats at an early stage) to preparation (preparing for a proper response when threats occur), response (combating the threats that occur) and recovery (returning to the normal or new normal).

Whole of government
Whole-of-government approach.

Whole of society
Cooperation between all actors involved, including civil society organisations, businesses and knowledge institutions.

National security interests and impact criteria

National Security Interests	Impact Criteria
Territorial security	1.1 Violation of the integrity of the territory of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 1.2 Violation of the international position of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 1.3 Violation of digital infrastructure integrity 1.4 Violation of the territorial integrity of allied states
Physical security	2.1 Fatalities 2.2 Seriously injured and chronically ill people 2.3 A lack of basic needs (physical suffering)
Economic security	3.1 Costs 3.2 Violation of the vitality of the economy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
Ecological security	4.1 Long-term violation of the natural environment
Social and political stability	5.1 Disruption of daily life 5.2 Violation of the democratic constitutional system 5.3 Societal impact
International legal order and stability	6.1 Violation of state sovereignty, peaceful coexistence and peaceful conflict resolution (as codified in the UN charter) 6.2 Violation of the functioning and legitimacy of or adherence to international treaties and norms on human rights 6.3 Violation of a rule-based international financial-economic system 6.4 Violation of the effectiveness and legitimacy of multilateral institutions and international regimes 6.5 Instability of states bordering the Kingdom of the Netherlands and in direct vicinity of the European Union

Endnotes

1 Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) lays down the right to liberty and security: *Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person*. This is also stated in Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: Right to liberty and security. *Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person*.

2 The term 'national security' refers to the national security of all the countries within the Kingdom and the security of the Kingdom as a whole.

3 National Network of Safety and Security Analysts, *Internationale Rechtsorde als zesde Nationaal Veiligheidsbelang* [international Legal Order as the sixth National Security Interest], 2019, p. 17. In this respect, it should be noted that certain parts of our national security fall under the framework of international agreements in the context of NATO and the EU.

4 The Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy, *WRR-rapport nr. 98: Veiligheid in een wereld van verbindingen: een strategische visie op het defensie-beleid* [WRR Report No. 98: Security in a connected world: a strategic vision on the defence policy], 2017, pp. 177-178.

5 NCTV, *Nationaal Handboek Crisisbeheersing* [National Handbook on Crisis Control], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 29517, No. 25.

6 How the strategic course is to be implemented will be elaborated via domain-specific strategies, policies and action plans and national crisis plans for national security, for which this strategy serves as an overall framework.

7 National security is a concept that appears in various European and Dutch laws and regulations such as the Dutch Constitution and Article 8(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This concept is used by various bodies and treaties without there being an unambiguous definition of the concept, neither at the European nor national level.

8 National Network of Safety and Security Analysts, *Rijksbrede Risicoanalyse Nationale Veiligheid* [Nationwide National Security Risk Assessment], 2022, p. 16. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 165. See also the appendix 'National security interests and impact criteria'.

9 Appendix, National Network of Safety and Security Analysts, *Verdiepende Analyse: De Gevolgen van de Russische oorlog in Oekraïne voor de Nationale Veiligheid van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden* [In-depth Analysis: The Consequences of the Russian War in Ukraine for the National Security of the Kingdom of the Netherlands], 2023.

10 The ANV is a multidisciplinary network of knowledge institutes (National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD), the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO), Clingendael Institute, SEO Amsterdam Economics, and the Research and Documentation Centre (WODC)). The ANV's objective is to improve the continuity, the safeguarding of knowledge and the multidisciplinary approach to national security assessments.

11 These include the Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands (*Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland*), Threat Assessment State-sponsored Actors (*Dreigingsbeeld Statelijke Actoren*) and the Cyber Security Assessment Netherlands (*Cybersecuritybeeld Nederland*), as well as scientific studies on, for example, the impact of climate change in Bonaire. Where applicable, these assessments have been referred to in the strategy.

12 National Network of Safety and Security Analysts, *Rijksbrede Risicoanalyse Nationale Veiligheid* [Nationwide National Security Risk Assessment], 2022, p. 59. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 165.

13 NCTV, *Nederlandse Cybersecuritystrategie 2022-2028: Ambities en acties voor een digitaal veilige samenleving* [Netherlands Cybersecurity Strategy 2022-2028: Ambitions and actions for a digitally secure society], 2022, p. 3. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 26643, No. 925.

14 National Network of Safety and Security Analysts, *Rijksbrede Risicoanalyse Nationale Veiligheid* [Nationwide National Security Risk Assessment], 2022, pp. 21-23. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 165.

15 According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 7.1 million Venezuelans have by now left the country, 80% of whom live in Latin America, including the Caribbean parts of the Kingdom. These figures are from January 2023.

16 National Network of Safety and Security Analysts, *Rijksbrede Risicoanalyse Nationale Veiligheid* [Nationwide National Security Risk Assessment], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 165.

17 The Caribbean part of the Kingdom, with the exception of Sint Maarten, has no immediately adjacent countries. Based on this context, the definition also refers to nearby states in the region.

18 NAVO, *NATO 2022 Strategic Concept*, 2022, pp.1-2.

19 AIVD and MIVD, *24/2 De Russische aanval op Oekraïne: een keerpunt in de geschiedenis* [24/2 The Russian attack on Ukraine: a turning point in history], 2023, p. 29. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 36045, nr. 153.

20 Appendix, National Network of Safety and Security Analysts, *Verdiepende Analyse: De Gevolgen van de Russische oorlog in Oekraïne voor de Nationale Veiligheid van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden* [In-depth Analysis: The Consequences of the Russian War in Ukraine for the National Security of the Kingdom of the Netherlands], 2023, pp. 76-77, 90-92; AIVD and MIVD, *24/2 De Russische aanval op Oekraïne: een keerpunt in de geschiedenis* [24/2 The Russian attack on Ukraine: a turning point in history], 2023, pp. 25-29. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 36045, nr. 153.

21 Appendix, National Network of Safety and Security Analysts, *Verdiepende Analyse: De Gevolgen van de Russische oorlog in Oekraïne voor de Nationale Veiligheid van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden* [In-depth Analysis: The Consequences of the Russian War in Ukraine for the National Security of the Kingdom of the Netherlands], 2023, pp. 94-96.

22 AIVD, MIVD and NCTV, *Dreigingsbeeld Statelijke Actoren 2* [Threat Assessment State-sponsored Actors 2], 2022, p. 37. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 175.

23 Advisory Council on International Affairs (*Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken, AIV*), *AIV Briefadvies 36: Urgentie van een nieuwe Nederlandse Afrikastrategie* [AIV Letter with Recommendations 36: Urgency of a new Dutch Strategy on Africa], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 21501-02, No. 2537.

24 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Beleidskader Mondiaal Multilateralisme: Positionering van het koninkrijk in een veranderende mutilaterale wereldorde* [Policy Framework for Global Multilateralism: Positioning the Kingdom within a changing multilateral world order], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 36200-V, No. 72.

25 AIVD, MIVD and NCTV, *Dreigingsbeeld Statelijke Actoren 2* [Threat Assessment State-sponsored Actors 2], 2022, p. 19. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 175.

26 AIVD, *Jaarverslag AIVD 2021* [AIVD Annual Report 2021], 2022, pp. 25-26. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30977, No. 162; National Network of Safety and Security Analysts, *Rijksbrede Risicoanalyse Nationale Veiligheid - Themarapportage internationale en militaire dreigingen* [Nationwide National Security Risk Assessment - Themed report on international and military threats], 2022, p. 47. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 165.

27 AIVD, MIVD and NCTV, *Dreigingsbeeld Statelijke Actoren 2* [Threat Assessment State-sponsored Actors 2], 2022, p. 12. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 175.

28 Appendix National Network of Safety and Security Analysts, *Verdiepende Analyse: De Gevolgen van de Russische oorlog in Oekraïne voor de Nationale Veiligheid van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden* [In-depth Analysis: The Consequences of the Russian War in Ukraine for the National Security of the Kingdom of the Netherlands], 2023; AIVD and MIVD, *24/2 De Russische aanval op Oekraïne: een keerpunt in de geschiedenis* [24/2 The Russian attack on Ukraine: a turning point in history], 2023, Parliamentary Papers II, 2022/23, 36045, nr. 153.; AIVD, MIVD and NCTV, *Dreigingsbeeld Statelijke Actoren 2* [Threat Assessment State-sponsored Actors 2], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 175.

29 National Network of Safety and Security Analysts, *Rijksbrede Risicoanalyse Nationale Veiligheid* [Nationwide National Security Risk Assessment], 2022, p. 42. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 165.

30 Ministry of Justice and Security and other ministries, *Aanpak statelijke dreigingen en aanbieding dreigingsbeeld statelijke actoren 2* [Addressing threats from state-sponsored actors and presenting the Threat Assessment State-sponsored Actors 2], 2022, p. 2. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 175.

31 AIVD, MIVD and NCTV, *Dreigingsbeeld Statelijke Actoren 2* [Threat Assessment State-sponsored Actors 2], 2022, pp. 14, 26-27, 30. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 175.

32 AIVD, MIVD and NCTV, *Dreigingsbeeld Statelijke Actoren 2* [Threat Assessment State-sponsored Actors 2], 2022, p. 33. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 175; National Network of Safety and Security Analysts, *Rijksbrede Risicoanalyse Nationale Veiligheid - Themarapportage cyberdreigingen* [Nationwide National Security Risk Assessment - Themed report on cyber threats], 2022, p. 57. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 165; National Network of Safety and Security Analysts, *Rijksbrede Risicoanalyse Nationale Veiligheid - Themarapportage ongewenste inmenging en beïnvloeding* [Nationwide National Security Risk Assessment - Themed report on unwanted interference and influence], 2022, p. 13. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 165.

33 Ministry of Justice and Security and other ministries, *Aanpak statelijke dreigingen en aanbieding dreigingsbeel statelijke actoren 2* [Addressing threats from state-sponsored actors and presenting the Threat Assessment State-sponsored Actors 2], 2022, p. 5. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 175.

34 National Network of Safety and Security Analysts, *Rijksbrede Risicoanalyse Nationale Veiligheid* [Nationwide National Security Risk Assessment], 2022, p. 22. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 165.

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36 National Network of Safety and Security Analysts, *Rijksbrede Risicoanalyse Nationale Veiligheid* [Nationwide National Security Risk Assessment], 2022, p. 22. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 165.

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38 World Economic Forum, *The Global Risks Report 2019 14th edition*, 2019.

39 Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM), *The Impacts of Climate Change on Bonaire*, 2022, p.71.

40 National Network of Safety and Security Analysts, *Rijksbrede Risicoanalyse Nationale Veiligheid* [Nationwide National Security Risk Assessment], 2022, p. 65. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 165.

41 National Network of Safety and Security Analysts, *Rijksbrede Risicoanalyse Nationale Veiligheid - Themarapportage internationale en militaire dreigingen* [Nationwide National Security Risk Assessment - Themed report on international and military threats], 2022, pp. 13 and 47. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 165; Clingendael (Netherlands Institute of International Relations), *Military Capabilities affected by climate change: An analysis of China, Russia and the United States*, 2023; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Nederlandse Polaire Strategie 2021-2025: Beslagen ten ijs* [The Netherlands' Polar Strategy 2021-2025: Prepared for Change], 2021; Ministry of Defence, *Sterker Nederland, Veiliger Europa, Investeren in een Krachtige NAVO en EU: Defensienota 2022* [Stronger Netherlands, Safer Europe, Investing in a Strong NATO and EU: Policy Document on the Armed Forces 2022], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2021-22, 36124, No. 1; United Nations Climate Change Conference (UNFCCC), *Decisions taken at the Sharm El-Sheikh Climate Change Conference*, 2022.

42 AIVD, MIVD and NCTV, *Dreigingsbeeld Statelijke Actoren 2* [Threat Assessment State-sponsored Actors 2], 2022, p. 25. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 175.

43 Critical raw materials are metals and minerals that are critical to our economy and for which there is a supply risk. The rapidly rising demand for critical raw materials is largely due to the energy transition, since these raw materials are essential for renewable technology. See, for example, International Energy Agency (IEA), *The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions*, revised 2022.

44 Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy, *Grondstoffen voor de grote transities* [Raw materials for the great transitions], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 32852, No. 224.

45 See also the report by Voogd, de J. & Cuperus, R. *Atlas van afgehaakt Nederland. Over buitenstaanders en gevestigden* [Atlas of a disaffected Netherlands. About outsiders and insiders.]. Parliamentary Papers II, 2022/23, 36200 VII, No. 17.

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47 About half of the Dutch population is dissatisfied with politics. In contrast, the Dutch continue to be highly satisfied with the democratic functioning of the country. See The Netherlands Institute for Social Research (*Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, SCP*), *Burgerperspectieven Bericht 1 2022* [Citizen Perspectives Report 1 2022] and *Bericht 2 2022* [Citizen Perspectives Report 2 2022].

48 See also the government's response to the report by Voogd, de J. & Cuperus, R. *Atlas van afgehaakt Nederland. Over buitenstaanders en gevestigden [Atlas of a disaffected Netherlands. About outsiders and insiders.]. Parliamentary Papers II, 2022/23, 36200 VII, No. 17.*

49 NCTV, *Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 57* [Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands 57], 2022, p. 43. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 29754, No. 653.

50 NCTV, *Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 57* [Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands 57], 2022, p. 4, 33-37. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 29754, No. 653; AIVD, *Jaarverslag AIVD 2021* [AIVD Annual Report 2021], 2022, p. 8. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30977, No. 162.

51 Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations, *Versterkte Gedragscode tegen Desinformatie* [Stronger Code of Conduct against Disinformation], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 169.

52 NCTV, *Fenomeenanalyse: de verschillende gezichten van de coronaprotesten* [Phenomenon analysis: the different faces of the coronavirus protests], 2021, pp. 8, 11 and 14. Parliamentary Papers II 2020/21, 29754, No. 593; National Network of Safety and Security Analysts, *Rijksbrede Risicoanalyse Nationale Veiligheid* [Nationwide National Security Risk Assessment], 2022, p. 26. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 165.

53 NCTV, *Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 57* [Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands 57], 2022, p. 3. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 29754, No. 653.

54 Ministry of Justice and Security, *Aanbiedingsbrief Nationale Contraterrorisme Strategie 2022-2026* [Letter of Presentation for the National Counterterrorism Strategy 2022-2026], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2021/22, 29754, No. 641; NCTV, *Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 57* [Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands 57], 2022, pp. 3-5, 25-27. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 29754, No. 653.

55 National Network of Safety and Security Analysts, *Rijksbrede Risicoanalyse Nationale Veiligheid - Themarapportage ongewenste inmenging en beïnvloeding* [Nationwide National Security Risk Assessment - Themed report on unwanted interference and influence], 2022, pp. 7-64. Parliamentary Papers II 2022-23, 30821, No. 165; Ministry of Justice and Security, *Najaarsbrief Bestrijding georganiseerde criminaliteit* [Autumn Letter on Fighting organised crime], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 29911, No. 379; National Police, *Veiligheid, Vertrouwen en Verbinding: Strategische agenda politie 2021-2025* [Security, Trust and Connection: Strategic Agenda of the Police 2021-2025], 2021, p. 18.

56 National Network of Safety and Security Analysts, *Rijksbrede Risicoanalyse Nationale Veiligheid - Themarapportage ongewenste inmenging en beïnvloeding democratische rechtsstaat* [Nationwide National Security Risk Assessment - Themed report on unwanted interference and influence], 2022, p. 44. Parliamentary Papers II 2022-23, 30821, No. 165.

57 Host nation support is a task referring to the support and facilitation of movements of military equipment and personnel of NATO allies through the Netherlands. For the purpose of exercises, unit changes or actual operations. As the host country, the Netherlands assists with transportation via ports, road, rail or air.

58 Bijlsma, M, et al. *Geo-economische monitor: Strategische afhankelijkheden, economische beïnvloeding, kennispositie en investeringsstromen* [Geoeconomic monitor: Strategic dependencies, economic influence, knowledge position and investment flows], 2022.

59 Appendix, National Network of Safety and Security Analysts, *Verdiepende Analyse: De Gevolgen van de Russische oorlog in Oekraïne voor de Nationale Veiligheid van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden* [In-depth Analysis: The Consequences of the Russian War in Ukraine for the National Security of the Kingdom of the Netherlands], 2023, pp. 38-42; National Network of Safety and Security Analysts, *Rijksbrede Risicoanalyse Nationale Veiligheid - Themarapportage economische dreigingen* [Nationwide National Security Risk Assessment - Themed report on economic threats], 2022, pp. 31, 57. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 165.

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61 AIVD, MIVD and NCTV, *Dreigingsbeeld Statelijke Actoren 2* [Threat Assessment State-sponsored Actors 2], 2022, p. 10. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 175.

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64 Vliet van, P.j. & Mennen, M.G., *Technologieverkenning Nationale Veiligheid: Een verkenning van kansen en dreigingen van technologische ontwikkelingen voor de nationale veiligheid* [National Security Technology Study: An exploration of the opportunities and threats of technological developments for national security], 2014.

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66 Central government, *Nederlandse bijdrage aan missies en operaties* [Dutch contribution to missions and operations], consulted in January 2023.

67 Article 90 of the Dutch Constitution states that the government will promote the development of the international legal order.

68 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Beleidskader Mondiaal Multilateralisme: Positionering van het koninkrijk in een veranderende multilaterale wereldorde* [Global Multilateralism Policy Framework: Positioning of the Kingdom in a changing multilateral world order], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 36200-V, No. 72.

69 AIVD, MIVD and NCTV, *Dreigingsbeeld Statelijke Actoren 2* [Threat Assessment State-sponsored Actors 2], 2022, p. 10. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 175.

70 The Kingdom's commitment is in line with the EU Strategisch Kompas and the NAVO Strategisch Concept.

71 European Peace Facility (EPF) is an instrument for financing Common Foreign and Security Policy operations that have military or defence implications.

72 Ministry of Defence, *Sterker Nederland, Veiliger Europa, Investeren in een Krachtige NAVO en EU: Defensienota 2022* [Stronger Netherlands, Safer Europe. Investing in a Strong NATO and EU: Policy Document on the Armed Forces 2022], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2021-22, 36124, No. 1.

73 Ministry of Defence, *Defensie Industrie Strategie in een nieuwe geopolitieke context* [Defence Industry Strategy in a new geopolitical context], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 31125, No. 123.

74 The task of the armed forces is not just to deter but also to protect the vital interests of the Kingdom (Article 97 of the Constitution) and to support civilian authorities in maintaining order within the Kingdom, by controlling disasters and managing crisis situations. In the event of extraordinary circumstances and war, the armed forces will need to be able to act as a last line of defence.

75 Movement of military equipment and personnel belonging to NATO allies via the Netherlands for the purpose of exercises, unit changes or actual operations. As the host country, the Netherlands assists with transportation via ports, road, rail or air.

76 NAVO, *NATO 2022 Strategic Concept*, 2022, p.6.

77 Ministry of Defence, *Een strategisch kompas voor veiligheid en defensie: voor een Europese Unie die haar burgers, waarden en belangen beschermt en bijdraagt aan de internationale vrede en veiligheid* [A strategic compass for security and defence: for a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2021/22, 21501-28, No. 240.

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83 Human security is based on the principle that peace, security, human rights and development are linked to one another. See also Dutch Research Council (*Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek*), *Menselijke veiligheid: een oefening in evenwicht* [Human security: a balancing exercise], 2020 and United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, *What is human security?* consulted in February 2023 via https://www.un.org/humansecurity/what-is-human-security.

84 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Women, Peace and Security: Nederlands Nationaal Actieplan* (NAP 1325-IV (2021-2025)), [Women, Peace and Security: Dutch National Action Plan], 2020. Parliamentary Papers II 2020/21, 26150, No. 190.

85 Ministry of Justice and Security and other ministries, *Aanpak statelijke dreigingen en aanbieding dreigingsbeeld statelijke actoren 2* [Addressing threats from state-sponsored actors and presenting the Threat Assessment State-sponsored Actors 2], 2022, p. 8. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 175.

86 Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, *Impact coalitieakkoord en stand van zaken wijziging Wiv 2017* (2e herdruk) [Impact of the coalition agreement and status of the amendment to the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2017 (Wiv), (second reprint)], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2021/22, 34588, No. 91.

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88 NCTV, *Nederlandse Cybersecuritystrategie 2022-2028: Ambities en acties voor een digitaal veilige samenleving* [Dutch Cybersecurity Strategy 2022-2028: Ambitions and actions for a digitally secure society], 2022, p. 40. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 26643, No. 925.

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91 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Kamerbrief Open Strategische Autonomie* [Letter to the House of Representatives on Open Strategic Autonomy], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 35982, No. 9.

92 National Network of Safety and Security Analysts, *Rijksbrede Risicoanalyse Nationale Veiligheid* [Nationwide National Security Risk Assessment], 2022, p. 31-40. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 165.

93 National Network of Safety and Security Analysts, *Rijksbrede Risicoanalyse Nationale Veiligheid* [Nationwide National Security Risk Assessment], 2022, p. 66. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 165; NCTV, *Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 57* [Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands 57], 2022, pp. 33-34. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 29754, No. 653.

94 Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, *Samenstelling en werkzaamheden adviescommissie versterken weerbaarheid democratische rechtsorde* [Composition and activities of the Advisory Committee on strengthening the resilience of the democratic legal order], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 29279, No. 753.

95 A continued commitment to safeguarding socio-economic security is important (see also the Implementation of Plan Approach to Financial Concerns, Poverty and Debts (*Implementatieplan Aanpak Geldzorgen, Armoede en Schulden*)). The absence of such a commitment creates a potential breeding ground for various phenomena, such as societal tensions, polarisation and organised subversive crime, that can threaten social stability.

96 Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, *Versterkte Gedragscode tegen Desinformatie* [Stronger Code of Conduct against Disinformation], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 169.

97 Ministry of Justice and Security, *Bestrijding georganiseerde criminaliteit* [Fighting Organised Crime], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2021/22, 29911, No. 348; National Police, *Veiligheid, Vertrouwen en Verbinding: Strategische agenda politie 2021-2025* [Security, Trust and Connection: Strategic Agenda of the Police 2021-2025], 2021, p. 18.

98 Ministry of Justice and Security and other ministries, *Aanpak statelijke dreigingen en aanbieding dreigingsbeeld statelijke actoren 2* [Addressing threats from state-sponsored actors and presenting the Threat Assessment State-sponsored Actors 2], 2022, pp. 14-16; Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 175; AIVD, MIVD and NCTV, *Dreigingsbeeld Statelijke Actoren 2* [Threat Assessment State-sponsored Actors 2], 2022, p. 20. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 175.

99 The EU refers to this as Foreign Information Manipulation or Interference (FIMI).

100 Ministry of Justice and Security, *Wetsvoorstel Uitbreiding Strafbaarheid Spionageactiviteiten* [Bill to Increase Criminal Liability for Espionage Activities], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 36280, No. 2.

101 NCTV, *Cybersecuritybeeld Nederland 2022* [Cyber Security Assessment Netherlands 2022], 2022, pp. 7-8. Parliamentary Papers II 2021/22, 26643, No. 891.

102 NCTV, *Nederlandse Cybersecuritystrategie 2022-2028: Ambities en acties voor een digitaal veilige samenleving* [Dutch Cybersecurity Strategy 2022-2028: Ambitions and actions for a digitally secure society], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 26643, No. 925.

103 NCTV, *Nederlandse Cybersecuritystrategie 2022-2028: Ambities en acties voor een digitaal veilige samenleving* [Dutch Cybersecurity Strategy 2022-2028: Ambitions and actions for a digitally secure society], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 26643, No. 925; Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, *Werkagenda 'Waardengedreven Digitaliseren'* [Working Agenda for 'Value-Driven Digitalisation'], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 26643, No. 940. The European directives *Network and Information Security 2 Directive* (NIS2) and the *Critical Entities Resilience Directive* (CER) determine the priority focus areas.

104 NCTV, *Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland 57* [Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Netherlands 57], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 29754, No. 653.

105 NCTV, *Nationale Contraterrorisme Strategie 2022-2026* [The National Counter-terrorism Strategy for 2022-2026], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2021/22, 29754, No. 641.

106 NCTV, *Nationaal Handboek Crisisbeheersing* [National Handbook on Crisis Control], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 29517, No. 225.

107 Climate Act (*Klimaatwet*), Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2019, 253; Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy, *Klimaatplan 2021-2030* [Climate Plan 2021-2030], 2019. Parliamentary Papers II 2019/20, 32813, No. 406; Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy, *Ontwerp beleidsprogramma Klimaat* [Draft Climate Policy Programme], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2021/22, 32813, No. 1049; Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management, *Deltaprogramma 2023* [Delta Programme 2023], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 36200-J No. 4; Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, *Aanpassen met ambitie: Nationale klimaatadaptatiestrategie 2016 (NAS)* [Adapting with ambition: National Climate Adaptation Strategy 2016], 2016. Parliamentary Papers II 2016/17, 31793, No. 162; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Internationale Klimaatstrategie: van ambitie naar transitie* [International Climate Strategy: from ambition to transition], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 31793, No. 231; Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management, *Hoogwaterbeschermingsprogramma (HWBP)* [Flood Protection Programme], may be consulted via www.hwbp.nl.

108 Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment and Ministry of Economic Affairs, *Nederland Circulair in 2050* [Circular Netherlands by 2050], 2016. Parliamentary Papers II 2015/16, 32852, No. 33; Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management, *Nationaal Programma Circulaire Economie 2023-2030 (NPCE)* [National Programme for the Circular Economy 2023-2030], 2023. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 32852, No. 225.

109 Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy, *Grondstoffen voor de grote transities* [Raw materials for the great transitions], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 32852, No. 224.

110 Climate resilience of critical infrastructure ensures that this infrastructure is able to continue functioning during crisis situations. This is important for the conduct of NATO military operations and/or for responding to crises.

111 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Internationale Klimaatstrategie: van ambitie naar transitie* [International Climate Strategy: from ambition to transition], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 31793, No. 231.

112 Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management, *Nederlandse Internationale Waterambitie* [Dutch International Water Ambition], 2019. Parliamentary Papers II 2018/19, 32605, No. 217; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Internationale Klimaatstrategie: van ambitie naar transitie* [International Climate Strategy: from ambition to transition], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 31793, No. 231..

113 Certain processes are so essential to Dutch society that failure or disruption will cause serious societal disruption and threaten national security. These processes together constitute the critical infrastructure. Electricity, internet access, drinking water and payment transactions are some examples of these critical processes.

114 Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management, *Kamerbrief Strategie ter bescherming van Noordzee-infrastructuur* [Letter to the House of Representatives on the Strategy to protect North Sea infrastructure], 2023. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 33450, No. 118.

115 National Network of Safety and Security Analysts, *Rijksbrede Risicoanalyse Nationale Veiligheid* [Nationwide National Security Risk Assessment], 2022, p. 26. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 165.

116 Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, *Infectieziektenbestrijding – Beleidsagenda pandemische paraatheid* [Infectious disease control - Pandemic preparedness policy agenda], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2021/22, 25295, No. 1836; Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, *Infectieziektenbestrijding – Beleidsprogramma pandemische paraatheid* [Infectious disease control - Pandemic preparedness policy agenda], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II, 2022/23, 25295, No. 1964.

117 This includes a regional cooperation among health insurers and the establishment of the Dutch Caribbean Hospital Alliance (DCHA).

118 Ministry of Justice and Security, *Contourennota Versterking Crisisbeheersing en Brandweerzorg [Policy Outline Memorandum on Strengthening Crisis Control and Fire Services], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 29517, No. 225.*

119 For example, the Framework Western Hemisphere Allied Cooperation (FWHAC).

120 Ministry of Justice and Security, *Rapportage over de evaluatie van de Veiligheidswet BES* [Review report of the Safety (BES Islands) Act], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2021/22, 29517, No. 221; Ministry of Justice and Security, *Beleidsreactie op de evaluatie van de Veiligheidswet BES* [Policy response to the review of the Safety (BES Islands) Act], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 29517, No. 228.

121 Here, 'government' refers to both the government of the Netherlands and the governments of the autonomous countries within the Kingdom.

122 This takes place via the continued functioning of the National Security Strategy Steering Committee (*Stuurgroep Rijksbrede Veiligheidsstrategie*) in which all the parties involved are represented and through the sub-council structure of the Council for Defence and International, National and Economic Security (*Raad Defensie, Internationale, Nationale en Economische Veiligheid, RDINEV*). The other involved ministries (Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management, Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment and Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality) are also invited to participate in this process. A part of the process is carried out via the Missions and Operations Steering Committee (*Stuurgroep Missies en Operaties, SMO*) and the Security and Intelligence Council (*Raad Veiligheid en Inlichtingen, RVI*).

123 If this leads to a need for making adjustments in the strategic course for the Netherlands, this task is placed on the agenda of the Council for Defence and International, National and Economic Security, and the other involved ministries are also invited to participate in this process.

124 This has already been done in some areas, for example, in the case of the National Counterterrorism Strategy (*Nationale Contraterrorisme Strategie*) and the Dutch Cybersecurity Strategy (*Nederlandse Cybersecuritystrategie*).

125 Existing consultation bodies such as the Quadrilateral Judicial Council (*Justitieel Vierlanden Overleg*) and the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom can be used for this purpose.

126 In this context, efforts are being made by the Dutch Defence Academy (*Nederlandse Defensie Academie*) to set up a Masterclass on National Security (*Masterclass Nationale Veiligheid*) in cooperation with the academies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the NCTV and the National Police.

127 These include the academies of the Ministry of Defence, Foreign Affairs and the NCTV.

128 Examples include Clingendael Institute's annual Foreign Policy Barometer (*Buitenland Barometer*) and the biannual Risk and Crisis Barometer (*Risico- en Crisisbarometer*) commissioned by the NCTV.

129 National Network of Safety and Security Analysts, *Rijksbrede Risicoanalyse Nationale Veiligheid* [Nationwide National Security Risk Assessment], 2022. Parliamentary Papers II 2022/23, 30821, No. 165.

The Security Strategy for the Kingdom of the Netherlands is the outcome of broad participation on the part of public, private and civil society organisations from all parts of the Kingdom, coordinated by the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV).

www.government.nl/securitystrategy