DEFENDING THE NATION'S SOVEREIGNTY

A SECURE AND RESILIENT FUTURE

DEFENCE WHITE PAPER 2021

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF BRUNEI DARUSSALAM

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HIS MAJESTY SULTAN HAJI HASSANAL BOLKIAH MU'IZZADDIN WADDAULAH IBNI AL-MARHUM SULTAN HAJI OMAR 'ALI SAIFUDDIEN SA'ADUL KHAIRI WADDIEN, SULTAN AND YANG DI-PERTUAN OF NEGARA BRUNEI DARUSSALAM

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS PRINCE HAJI AL-MUHTADEE BILLAH
IBNI HIS MAJESTY SULTAN HAJI HASSANAL BOLKIAH MU'IZZADDIN WADDAULAH
D.K.M.B., D.P.K.T., King Abdul Aziz Ribbon, First Class (Saudi Arabia),
The Order of the Renaissance (First Degree) (Jordan), Grand Cross of Crown Order - G.K.K.(Netherlands),
Medal of Honour (Lao), DSO (Singapore), Order of Lakandula with the Rank of Grand Cross (Philippines),
The Order of Prince Yaroslav the Wise, Second Class (Ukraine), DSO (Military) (Singapore), P.H.B.S.

The Crown Prince and
Senior Minister at the Prime Minister's Office

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Foreword by the Minister of Defence II

Having had the privilege of supporting and formulating the development of Brunei Darussalam's first Defence White Paper in 2004 and its update, Defence White Paper 2007 as Commander of the Royal Brunei Armed Forces then, this 2021 edition builds on the strengths of that initial Paper and that of the subsequent Papers published in 2007 and 2011.

This 2021 Defence White Paper represents a comprehensive examination of how the Ministry of Defence of Brunei Darussalam (MINDEF) and the Royal Brunei Armed Forces (RBAF) must adapt to continue to defend our nation, its sovereignty and territorial integrity into the future.

The 2021 Defence White Paper acknowledges that the world has seen constant and dramatic shifts in the geostrategic environment over the past ten years. It also predicts that the trends explored in the paper are likely to continue, creating a security environment that is evolving, delicate, uncertain and, at times, tense. The unprecedented outbreak of the global COVID-19 pandemic is testament to this analysis, having tested security mechanisms and structures nationally, regionally, and globally.

Supporting the successful realisation of Brunei Darussalam's national vision (Wawasan 2035), MINDEF and RBAF will remain a fundamental aspect of our ability to protect and secure Brunei Darussalam and its people. Our approach must remain tightly integrated and coordinated with our broader national security approach in achieving sustainable peace

and stability. We must continue to work closely with our security agencies in enhancing multi-agency collaboration to ensure that we continue to build on the stability and resilience that we enjoy as a peaceful nation.

Working to protect our national security interests as part of a wider national security effort, integrated fully within a whole of government approach, we must now reinforce our efforts to understand the changes and respond to threats using various means effectively, whether traditional or non-traditional in nature. We must also increasingly work with our international partners and foster multilateralism to ensure that we are well informed, ready and supported to counter the challenges we will face. Overall, Defence's efforts are reflected in the seven result areas of IKWONDAMAI, which in its entirety reinforces further Brunei Darussalam's identity of a peaceful and peace-loving nation, being that "damai" is the Malay translation for "peace".

In building partnerships, MINDEF and RBAF must retain our unique and hard-fought identity. We must never forget the beliefs, values, principles, and standards that provide us with our strength, and we must prepare to defend these in the face of adversity. The challenges ahead of us will remain uncertain and complex. Therefore, the 2021 Defence White Paper sets out the path by which MINDEF and RBAF will need to adapt to, and constantly review and develop, as we progress to achieve sustainable national security.

YANG BERHORMAT PEHIN DATU LAILARAJA MAJOR GENERAL (RETIRED)
DATO PADUKA SERI HAJI AWANG HALBI BIN HAJI MOHD YUSSOF
MINISTER OF DEFENCE II

Foreword by the Commander of the Royal Brunei Armed Forces

In our sixtieth year since formation, this 2021 Defence White Paper provides a timely reflection of the journey that the Royal Brunei Armed Forces has taken and marks the success the RBAF has achieved in contributing to the continued peace, security and stability of our nation and its sovereignty.

Looking forward, it is necessary for our Armed Forces to adapt in a controlled, planned, and balanced manner to ensure that we can meet the future challenges and threats that we may face. In all that we do, our Armed Forces must be prepared and operationally ready to the highest of levels at the right time. We have, to date, taken great strides in developing our ability to deliver the necessary operational output, but this 2021 Defence White Paper, marks a point in our history where we must now review in detail and realistically refine our capabilities to ensure that all we deliver is Joint in nature and set in the context of a wider national security approach.

In helping the Armed Forces to be able to deliver the required effect, this 2021 Defence White Paper clearly directs, defines and prioritises the tasks which are required of us. This approach, which recognises that we cannot do everything all the time, is now essential to ensure that our Armed Forces are designed and readied to deliver when required, and in

the right manner. In developing our future capability, the directed prioritisation of tasks must be adhered to, as this will ensure that we are shaped correctly and resourced properly for the full life of each respective capability.

Our Armed Forces must be forward-looking and must naturally be moulded on systems and structures that are resilient in the future; the Armed Forces of the future must adapt and evolve from that of the past. In developing future capability, thereby enhancing our operational output, our Armed Forces must seek to utilise innovation and technology; we must be novel and imaginative in our approaches to ensure that our capability solutions are maximised for effect, but are also sustainable and affordable.

With options for change on the horizon, while the Armed Forces of the future may look very different to that of today, our people will remain key to all that we do – we must continue to invest in this most important of resource, so that we will continue to be humbled by all that they do and the service that they provide.

MAJOR GENERAL (U)
DATO SERI PAHLAWAN HAJI HAMZAH BIN HAJI SAHAT
COMMANDER OF ROYAL BRUNEI ARMED FORCES

Foreword by the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence

This 2021 Defence White Paper recognises that as the strategic environment changes, so too must the military means by which to tackle the challenges we are confronted with. As Defence and the Armed Forces, we therefore must ensure that our military capability is forward-looking, designed specifically to face the threats, shaped to provide Joint operational output, and sustainable and efficient in its use.

Having set the context of the strategic environment (Part One) and defined how the Defence and the Armed Forces will operate (Part Two), Part Three of the 2021 Defence White Paper focuses on the development of our capability. Acknowledging that the challenges and threats we will face in the future will become increasingly diverse, interconnected, and complex, it is essential that our future capabilities are designed for the future and therefore not necessarily shaped by our past endeavours.

In the future, we must focus on all operating domains, which now increasingly are dominated by cyber and space technologies – while conventional operations remain a possibility, recent history has demonstrated that exploitation across multi-domain environments represents the nature of non-traditional threats. Based on these facts, our capabilities, which are likely to look different from those of the past, must be resilient and multi-role by design.

Following on from the publication of this Defence White Paper, it will be necessary to conduct deep and searching reviews of our capability requirements that is underpinned by key enablers that broadly ranges from our people to our infrastructure. Within this vein, this review must be holistic by considering all aspects of capability across all Lines of Development and must lead to the production of a consolidated and coherent strategic capability plan that is ultimately affordable, deliverable and able to meet the demands placed on it by the environment and the directed tasks, in support of our national security objectives. This will involve many layers of cross-cutting activities with both our internal and external partners and as such, coherence will remain imperative and must be undertaken in a consistent manner.

In our sixtieth year, Defence and our Armed Forces must move forward, proud of our past, but ready to adapt to the challenges the future will present.

BRIGADIER GENERAL (RETIRED)
DATO SERI PAHLAWAN SHAHRIL ANWAR BIN HAJI MA'AWIAH
PERMANENT SECRETARY

Introduction

1. Wawasan 2035 continues to define Brunei Darussalam's forward-looking nation-building vision. This vision, which depicts a nation with stability at its core, is reliant upon the development of economic and social factors all of which continue to be underpinned by the maintenance of peace and security. Central to this provision, and working alongside other national security agencies, sits the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) and the Royal Brunei Armed Forces (RBAF) who will continue to provide the defence of the nation and support the security assurance to the people living within Brunei Darussalam. 2021 marks the 60th anniversary of the RBAF's formation. The publication of this Defence White Paper (DWP) acts as a timely reminder of both the sacrifice and service the RBAF has played in the past six decades, while at the same time also indicating how it will continue to do so in a dynamic and ever-changing security environment.

2. Since the DWP 2011, the geostrategic context on which the analysis and deductions were set has shifted significantly. In order for Brunei Darussalam to navigate an increasingly complex security environment, it is necessary for DWP 2021 to set out how MINDEF and the RBAF will be required to review, reconfigure, and redefine the national defence posture and defence priorities for the future. DWP 2021 will align MINDEF's and the RBAF's strategies, capability development, and resources to improve their overall ability to address and respond to the challenges.

3. DWP 2021 has been developed in conjunction with a comprehensive consultative process with other Government agencies. Their inputs are appreciated and deeply valued.

Looking Back Before Looking Forward: Review of Previous White Papers

4. Released in 2004, Brunei Darussalam's first Defence White Paper "*Defending the Nation's Sovereignty*" identified the essential roles and tasks that the RBAF would need to undertake, in accordance with the essential features of Brunei Darussalam's strategic environment. In broad terms, the defence roles outlined were to: **enhance defence diplomacy, to provide an efficient and effective defence capability, and to contribute to nation building.** While these roles have evolved over time, their fundamental premise remains firm today.

5. The DWP 2004 highlighted the importance of greater transparency in both operational environment and command and control to maximise the effectiveness of a small force. DWP 2004 also introduced the development of a more holistic approach in the conduct of military operations, by establishing the RBAF as an operational joint armed force. The White Paper also established the foundation for MINDEF and the RBAF to conduct effective defence diplomacy, setting the tone for a range of warm and favourable international defence relationships that Brunei Darussalam continues to enjoy today and will be required to maintain in the future.



The Ministry of Defence and the Royal Brunei Armed Forces continue to provide the defence of the nation and support the security assurance to the people living within Brunei Darussalam.

6. The 2007 Defence White Paper "*Shaping the Force Today*" provided a focus for MINDEF and the RBAF to promote a robust regional security dialogue and to develop cooperative policies in response to shared strategic challenges. This development paved the way to allow the RBAF's participation in a number of international missions which have included the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) since 2008 and the Combined Task Force 151 in the Gulf of Aden in 2010. The broad defence roles stipulated in 2004 remained broadly extant, with an addition **"to implement defence policy"** now being included.

7. DWP 2007 also directed MINDEF and RBAF to conduct several structural changes to allow for its ability to improve the nation's management of Defence. Developments were made in the areas of human resource development, performance monitoring, safety and compliance, capability planning and acquisition management.

8. In Brunei Darussalam's third DWP, "*Defending the Nation's Sovereignty: Expanding Roles in Wider Horizons*", published in 2011, the theme of developing and maintaining an integrated approach to national security was further reinforced. Mechanisms to strengthen the joint planning process and capability development through the formation of the Defence Capability Committee were also introduced.

9. In preparation for Brunei Darussalam's chairmanship of ASEAN in 2013, DWP 2011 also directed MINDEF and the RBAF to heighten and maintain their involvement in regional security efforts and practical cooperation through the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM-Plus activities. This direction marked a milestone in the way in which Defence was to conduct itself and has provided an essential and significant focus of effort since.

10. Since DWP 2011 was published, MINDEF and RBAF have also firmly established a functioning Joint Force Headquarters and developed new approaches to the conduct of joint operations to allow it to better integrate across government, with other security agencies and other nations to provide increasingly enhanced operational output.

Adapting to the Future with the Defence White Paper 2021

11. Since 2011, there has been continued, and in many respects, dramatic shifts in the geostrategic political, economic and military environments. Ever more so, activities that closely lie below the threshold of conventional threats (hybrid threats or grey zone threats) will now dominate Defence's future approach and delivery.

12. While the past three Defence White Papers have directed and enabled delivery of many significant transformative approaches, mechanisms and capabilities, it will be necessary for MINDEF and the RBAF to enhance their efforts to be ready to respond to the current and future threats in an ever-changing strategic environment.

13. Having assessed Brunei Darussalam's existing Defence capabilities and outputs, DWP 2021 sets out new strategic direction, in the context of Brunei Darussalam's Defence external and internal environments, which will ensure the future development of MINDEF and the RBAF can deliver an output that provides an increasingly enhanced operational effect and is conducive with operations under a whole of government approach.

14. Initially summarising the evolving context of the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE), DWP 2021 aims to assess the key security drivers based on indicative potential future threats and challenges facing the sovereign state of Brunei Darussalam. Identifying likely threats and challenges provides the context from which Defence, and this Defence White Paper, will define its Defence Task priorities out to a range of 2035. In many cases, the baseline of threats and challenges identified in the 2004, 2007 and 2011 DWPs remain extant; however, the manner in which they now manifest themselves demands Defence to continuously evolve its approach and capabilities as a counter and to ensure relevancy.

15. Assuring the requirement to generate an integrated approach to national security, DWP 2021 focuses on facilitating the design and delivery of military capabilities across all operating domains (Land, Maritime, Air, Space and Cyber) with a focus on the delivery of joint operations having primacy.

16. Future capability design and development must be focused and balanced across all Defence Lines of Development (DLoDs). Military equipment must be complemented by the other DLoDs to be useful capability. Development should be in the context of examining how the RBAF can utilise modern technologies and innovation to build regional relevancy for the future. This facilitation will come from a series of Defence Tasks.

17. While DWP 2011 identified the utility of defence engagement and facilitated the building of its defence network that was reinforced during its ASEAN Chairmanship in 2013, the RBAF has been able to maintain its ability to engage through various bilateral and multilateral means which have included support to overseas operations, as well as its participation and contributions to ADMM and ADMM-Plus cooperative mechanisms and initiatives. Defence engagement remains fundamental to the provision of Defence and Security for Brunei Darussalam. Therefore, efforts to enhance support activities and operations which seek to deter and counter the proliferation of non-traditional security threats must be improved. This will specifically relate to the areas of peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) where Bruneian Defence Capabilities have the potential to offer significant niche effects.

18. In this manner, the RBAF will present itself as a contributing nation to regional and international peace and stability. This positioning of Brunei Darussalam as a nation able to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity, while contributing to the region's security and stability, is a form of defence in its own right.

19. Given the future contextual outlook and the opportunities that present themselves to allow Brunei Darussalam to continue to enjoy equal regional status within South East Asia, it will be necessary for MINDEF and the RBAF to conduct a period of long developmental and adaptive change by identifying and implementing innovative solutions. Defence must move itself away from traditional or conventional approaches and better position itself to tackle contemporary and emerging challenges. The RBAF will need to retain flexibility and adaptability to ensure that it is ready to counter a multitude of tasks, even when these are not resourced directly. Flexibility and the ability to multi-role remain imperative in capability development for the future.

20. As Brunei Darussalam continues to adapt for the future, there is now more of an inherent need to introduce the concept of self-reliance in the Defence's approach to defending and protecting the nation. The term self-reliance, which assures resilience, requires MINDEF and the RBAF to maintain force elements at readiness to deliver and sustain current and future operational requirements; at the same time, self-reliance also provides further opportunities to engage, cooperate and collaborate together with current and new partners and friends in the future. Out to 2035, Brunei Darussalam must be seen as a reliable regional partner that other countries can depend on within the remit of its Defence Tasks.

This positioning of Brunei Darussalam as a nation able to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity, while contributing to the region's security and stability, is a form of defence in its own right.

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PART ONE

Defining the Strategic Context

The Changing Security Environment

1. In the last decade, since the publication of Brunei Darussalam's 2011 DWP, the global security environment has continued to shift dramatically and, at times, very rapidly and unpredictably. Since 2011, the world has faced continuous and intense pressures exerted from multiple and concurrent threats. These pressures have significantly impacted the established order on a national, regional, and global scale, and across all contemporary levers of power.

2. As this DWP looks ahead to 2035 as its aiming mark, it is unlikely that the spread, scale or intensity of threats will subside. Thus, there is a need for national security agencies to become more agile, prepared, and capable as a counter.

3. While the scale and intensity of threats may increase rapidly and unexpectedly, there is some consistency in the nature of threats faced today compared to those identified back in 2004 (the year of Brunei Darussalam's first DWP) – it is therefore key to understand the dynamics of the past, in order that the nation can plan to secure for the future.

4. Global challenges in the form of political instability, economic fragility, resource over-demand, natural and man-made disasters, climate change, terrorism, and violent extremism are all likely to be as significant in the next 15 years as they have been in the previous 15 years. But there will also be variations, likely to be shaped by drivers such as globalisation, digitalisation, automation, and migration; all of which will create not only the capacity for significant development, but also potential shocks in the future.

5. Like all nations, Brunei Darussalam has felt the impact of wider regional and global events. Fluctuations in the global economy and resource demand have impacted national economic growth, and more recently, the continuing effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have placed pressures on national security structures not seen at such a scale for many decades. The events described above provide very real examples of Brunei Darussalam's dependency on the wider region and the world; this dependency is likely to increase rather than diminish in the future.

6. Beyond the impact of wider global shocks, Brunei Darussalam, like all other regional nations, has faced challenges that it has been required to protect itself from, both as an individual nation state, but also as part of a regional collective – ASEAN.

7. Threats in the last decade have highlighted a spread in transnational crimes, terrorism and violent extremism. While the world has focused on the continued instability in the Middle East, the 2017 attacks in Marawi, Philippines has provided a similarly clear example of South East Asia also being engaged in the intense and prolonged fight against the spread of terrorism and extremism.

The global security environment has continued to shift dramatically and, at times, very rapidly and unpredictably. Thus, there is a need for national security agencies to become more agile, prepared, and capable as a counter.

Faced with complex and evolving threats in five operating domains, MINDEF and the RBAF will need to continuously monitor the strategic environment to identify and assess any threats that may affect Brunei Darussalam's national interests.

8. In the last decade, there also have been continued pressures placed on security in the maritime domain in the South East Asia region. Tensions over overlapping claims, over- and illegal fishing, and the security of sea lines of communication (SLOC) from those who seek to exploit internationally recognised laws, all have placed continued and growing demands on Brunei Darussalam's security forces to secure and police its sovereign maritime borders and territory.

9. Similar incursions and exploitation in the land domain have also increased by those who seek to gain from various activities, financially or otherwise. As Brunei Darussalam strives to preserve its natural habitat in a world that is experiencing climate change and the threats posed by those who seek to exploit the unlawful extraction of resources have placed increasing pressure on Brunei Darussalam's security agencies, often in the most remote areas of the nation.

10. In the next 15 years, the South East Asia region is likely to face five specific challenges which will, in turn, drive and shape the nature of the strategic security and defence environment for Brunei Darussalam:

    10.1. The influence of major power dynamics in the region.

    10.2. The impact of regional and global instability and the requirement for Brunei Darussalam to maintain its international obligations.

    10.3. The continuous and increasing threats of terrorism, violent extremism, and transnational crimes in Brunei Darussalam or at its near borders.

    10.4. The impact of technological development, especially in the cyber domain, and how these may be exploited by others for gain.

    10.5. The impact from the increasing frequency and intensity of natural disasters and the way in which Brunei Darussalam can shape its ability to respond both at home and overseas.

11. Part One of DWP 2021 seeks to summarise the potential threats facing Brunei Darussalam, directly or indirectly, to set the context for defining the future scope and approach of Defence to meet these challenges in support of a wider national security effort.

12. **Strategic foresight**. Faced with complex and evolving threats in five operating domains, MINDEF and the RBAF will need to continuously monitor the strategic environment to identify and assess any threats that may affect Brunei Darussalam's national interests. It will be increasingly more important for Brunei Darussalam to maintain situational awareness across all domains of operations, and promote an environment of collective analysis and assessment that will inform future policymaking. Cooperative defence measures with neighbouring nations and other regional ties remain crucial, to provide a comprehensive understanding of the event of concern.



A. MAJOR POWER DYNAMICS IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD

Multipolarity

13. Since the end of World War II, the world has witnessed periodic shifts in strategic polarity. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 20th Century, the US has dominated as the world's economic, political and military power – thus seeing a shift from bipolarity to unipolarity. China's sustained rise on the global stage has inevitably and unavoidably led to a strategic competition between both the US and China. More recently, this relationship of competition and cooperation has become increasingly tense. Frictions over trade are matched by equal posturing in the political and military domains. Brunei Darussalam will need to work ever closer with both the US and China to realise its own national development. Navigating a path will be complex, and at times, tense. From a Defence and Security perspective, this adds further complexity as it will be necessary to continue to enhance bilateral relations towards each nation. Carefully considered controls and forward planning will be essential to ensure that neither is perceived to be favoured above the other.

14. This major power dynamic has yet to guide the world back into full bipolarity. While the US, and increasingly China, have continued to influence and dominate global matters in these early stages of the 21st Century, globalisation has also supported the rise or resurgence of other nations which now compete significantly. Just like the US and China, these other rising nations seek to build regional and global influence to assure their own development. In doing so, the global dynamic increasingly shifts to that of multipolarity, where other nations seek to be considered as Major or Middle Powers.

ASEAN sits at the heart of Brunei Darussalam's multilateral engagements in the Defence and Security domain, and specifically from a Defence perspective, its engagement in the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) agenda.

15. This shift presents both opportunities and challenges. In the future, it is likely that competition between Major and Middle Power nations will increase as they seek to gain a necessary share of market access and political influence to assure their own status. This competition is also set in the context of finite resource availability, which will only exacerbate potential tensions. Given recent trends, it is likely that Major and Middle Powers in a multipolar world will be required to maintain interactions with one another, albeit these may be tense, where they are forced to find common ground to facilitate trade to garner their own development. In the next 15 years, these nations will continue to form alliances with each other in certain areas, but similarly may find themselves opposed in others.

16. This shift to multipolarity has also permitted smaller nations to hold positions of relative influence, as Major or Middle Powers seek to engage with these nations. As the Major and Middle Powers further compete in the future, smaller nations will find it increasingly difficult to adopt a friends-to-all approach, where they will need to choose, and often in a binary manner in relation to their partnerships with Major or Middle Powers.

17. From a Defence and Security perspective, an approach where a small nation is able to offer utility in supporting wider regional and global stability is likely to mitigate the natural pressure faced from respective Major and Middle Powers as they seek to exert influence in the political and economic spheres. For small nations, this is likely to be a challenging balancing act and will require carefully considered and enduring defence diplomacy plans that are integrated with wider national security strategies.

Multilateral Partnerships and Forums

18. As a necessary balance for the careful and considered development of bilateral relations with Major and Middle Power nations, the prospect of continued development to further unite like-minded nations in the political, economic and security domains will remain key. As bedrock for the provision of enduring 20th Century peace and security, multilateral partnerships and forums will remain fundamental in preserving the international rules-based order.

19. ASEAN sits at the heart of Brunei Darussalam's multilateral engagements in the Defence and Security domain, and specifically from a Defence perspective, its engagement in the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) agenda. Beyond the publication of this 4th DWP, 2021 also marks Brunei Darussalam's Chairmanship year of ASEAN and the ADMM, and as such provides an opportunity to drive forward the cooperative momentum in defence and security through the ADMM and ADMM-Plus mechanisms. With ASEAN centrality at its core, Brunei Darussalam will continue to view these ADMM and ADMM-Plus forums and mechanisms as serving a pivotal role in fostering stability, instilling regional norms and international law, facilitating dialogue and promoting practical cooperation in order to address and counter shared security challenges and threats.

20. There also has been a steady shift where individual nations are expanding memberships to many multilateral partnerships and forums across a spectrum of their national interests. Unlike structures of the 20th Century which steadily evolved over time, the 21st Century-established multilateral partnerships have been impacted quickly and significantly by shocks, creating tensions between member states. As a result, relationships will see rapid changes in their dynamics rather than a steady evolution over time.

With ASEAN centrality at its core, Brunei Darussalam will continue to view these ADMM and ADMM-Plus forums and mechanisms as serving a pivotal role in fostering stability, instilling regional norms and international law, facilitating dialogue and promoting practical cooperation in order to address and counter shared security challenges and threats.

Brunei Darussalam, as a responsible member of the international community, will continue to exercise principled positions in upholding international laws, rules-based global order, codes of conduct, and norms, and to also work continuously to strengthen multilateral structures within its resources.

The International Order

21. The existing rules-based international order, utilising the mechanisms of international structures and institutions, continues to be based on a need for relationships to be formed between states, to collectively reinforce agreed rules and behaviours. However, as the global order shifts, it is likely that the current international order will need to evolve to support the changing dynamics in global power status. Undoubtedly, this evolution will present challenges as it is likely that some nation states, and non-state actors, will seek to exert influence on future mechanisms to ensure that any new order is designed with benefit to their own nation state's or grouping's interests.

22. Acknowledging that the rules-based international order requires active participation from nation states to deliver credible effect, Brunei Darussalam, as a responsible member of the international community, will continue to exercise principled positions in upholding international laws, rules-based global order, codes of conduct, and norms, and to also work continuously to strengthen multilateral structures within its resources. To Brunei Darussalam, a stable security environment is of utmost importance for countries to thrive and prosper.

B. CHALLENGES TO SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAINTENANCE OF STABILITY

23. Globally, challenges to sovereignty and national territorial integrity remain major causes of instability. Whether disputes are ideological, geographic, or economic based, their effects spread far and impact across all contemporary security dimensions which now firmly include the consideration of health, resource (including food and water), people and climate as examples.

State on State Conflict

24. In an increasingly interconnected and interdependent world, the prospect of state-on-state conflict may have diminished but is certainly not wholly removed. With nations now increasingly needing the support of many other nations to assure their own development, it is assessed the likelihood of wide-scale high-intensity conflict will remain low for at least the next 15 years. However, miscalculation and misinterpretation continue to risk drawing nations into conflict in a manner that would likely be unpredictable and intense, whether this be in limited duration or domains, or both. In the past decade, there continues to have been several significant indicators and warnings that these challenges to sovereignty by state or non-state actors can quickly escalate to limited conflict and potentially risk instability on at least a regional scale. With effective measures applied, conflict can be de-escalated quickly and effectively, however it is likely that tension will continue to smoulder, ready to flare up.



A nation's ability to provide complementary support to wider diplomatic efforts to maintain peace and, if necessary, through defence and security stabilisation operations where military influence is required, will further ensure stability is maintained.

25. While respecting the rights of nations, it is also essential for all nations to maintain their duties to be able to respond to the threat of conflict. Beyond preparations to defend a nation's own sovereignty and territorial integrity, prevention is usually far more effective, and far less damaging. The ability to promote, and if necessary, help return to stability amongst nations and regions is critical. A nation's ability to provide complementary support to wider diplomatic efforts to maintain peace and, if necessary, through defence and security stabilisation operations where military influence is required, will further ensure stability is maintained. Contributions to wider UN and regional peace support operations are likely to be an increasing necessity where timely, swift, well-resourced, and effective support will likely reduce tension and restore stability before the point at which a situation can deteriorate.

Regional Tensions

26. **Maritime**. Despite efforts to maintain stability through collective measures and activity, security in the maritime domain continues to be placed at increasing risk. Tensions arise from a combination of threats which include but are not limited to: maritime terrorism, piracy, unlawful intrusions into territorial waters, illegal fishing, and the trafficking of drugs, weapons and humans. Illegal, unreported, unregulated (IUU) fishing activities threaten as a worrying catalyst for maritime conflict in the region. Not only do these activities impose significant economic costs on countries that face exploitation, but they also have the ability to heighten tensions between states, becoming politicised, fractious and unpredictable. Port infrastructure and commercial shipping are also increasingly vulnerable to regional piracy and maritime terrorism. The maintenance of essential SLOC for all nations in the South East Asia region is fundamental to the security and prosperity of each state. Threats posed to lines of communication and infrastructure, present significant economic disruption to all nations. Tensions related to overlapping maritime claims in the South China Sea have increased, as nations seek to dominate and influence in the region. Militarisation of maritime features will continue to be of grave concern as the reach of nations expand well beyond their own mainland shorelines and recognised Economic Exclusive Zones (EEZs). This risk of miscalculation and the ensuing spiralling of regional instability is potentially the most significant threat in the maritime domain. Left unchecked, the situation will only worsen. A sophisticated combination of collective and individual actions from nations will be required to maintain stability in the maritime domain. In the first instance, efforts must be made to define accepted norms and behaviours in accordance with international law (namely UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS). Beyond this, it will be necessary for nations to build more effective and integrated maritime security capabilities, blended with those of all other operating domains, to ensure the integrity of the oceans and seas. Additionally, efforts should be enhanced to ensure full and effective implementation of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in its entirety, as well as, ensuring substantive progress is made in the negotiations towards an early conclusion of an effective and substantive Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) consistent with international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS.

27. **Land**. Land borders disputes also generate significant tensions across the region. Recent examples have demonstrated how military forces can resort to deadly force in the protection of national territory, particularly in areas where boundaries are disputed. In most cases, territorial disputes continue to be managed through dialogue and steady progression, but these recent fatal examples demonstrate how rapidly tensions can escalate, particularly at the tactical level. Where land is disputed, tension or the threat of tension is unlikely to subside in the foreseeable future. For Brunei Darussalam, land survey and demarcation are currently ongoing. While several areas still remain undefined, these are unlikely to result in miscalculation and escalation to military force. However, it remains necessary for Brunei Darussalam's security forces to be ready to respond to incursion. It remains essential to maintain command and control systems that can provide the necessary direction to deployed forces when needed and over extended ranges into remote areas over all terrains.

C. THE GROWTH OF TERRORISM, VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMES

Terrorism and Violent Extremism

28. Contemporary acts of terrorism are usually globally interconnected, both in terms of those that perpetrate the acts, and those that face the effects. These attacks, while often targeting a single nation, or a specific aspect of the nation, are commonly more than capable of providing influence on a global scale; these sorts of events have therefore defined a new age and approach for terrorism.

29. Global terrorism has sought to capitalise on the impacts of globalisation and has increasingly become a beneficiary, utilising aspects of the globalised network to promote support, funds and conduct activity. Interlinked with the globalisation of the terrorist cause, some contemporary groups have pioneered a more decentralised and diffused model of operation, particularly in comparison to the approaches of their predecessors. This has transformed traditional chains of command and therefore, challenged traditional methods of targeting key leadership. Loss of central leadership does not necessitate a loss in the momentum of respective terrorist groups who now focus on the building of dispersed affiliations.

30. The act of terrorism, particularly in the modern era, has continuously responded to the dynamics of increasing globalisation and as such, evolved in its form, key messages, motive, targets and methods of attacks. In this respect, the nature of terrorism has shifted from the targeting of objectives, which offer localised effect and impact, to those which transcend borders and boundaries, and are able to generate significantly greater influence towards both opponents and sympathisers. Consequently, terrorism is often described as asymmetric warfare that dilutes the traditional nature of warfare across all contemporary domains, making its attacks less predictable.

31. South East Asia specifically has experienced a significant increase in terror related activities during the last decade. Within a South East Asian context, in the aftermath of the events in Marawi, terrorism has demonstrated that it does not respect traditional sovereign borders. The fight to liberate Marawi City sieged by large scale organised terrorism in the last quarter of 2017 serves as a reminder of the region's vulnerability posed by similar threats and has raised concerns terrorist proliferation, radicalisation, and the possible expansion of terrorism specifically within South East Asia.

32. However, while the terror-related situation in the Philippines continues to pose significant challenges, acts of terrorism are not occurring in isolation, with most other South East Asian nations also facing considerable and continuing threats. Activities are increasingly becoming more diverse and more connected, particularly with the return of South East Asian foreign terrorist fighters who have fled the Middle East to the region in order to create and strengthen terrorist networks in South East Asia. Based on recent events, it remains concerning that these returning foreign terrorist fighters continue to bring with them a radicalised narrative, the means to indoctrinate others, and the skills to harm the public and foster crisis. The potential emergence of new terrorist groups will continue to pose enormous challenges to the region in the future. In this past decade, the region has experienced multiple terrorist threats, manifested in many different forms both traditional and novel, but all invoking fear.

33. An indirect consequence of this decentralised structure backed by a diffused virtual propaganda and recruitment machine via the internet, is the increased rate of lone-wolf attacks, particularly at soft targets i.e., areas or people with little to no military protection and security, and hence typically easier targets. These attacks have also been galvanised and capitalised by local extremist groups although not necessarily directly affiliated to central extremist organisations, in local contests of power.

34. At the same time, ideological extremism also poses enormous challenges to a country which may polarise groups in society into hostile and opposing camps. The combination of ideological extremism and its spreading through the expansive network of media, especially social media, and the internet will continue to increase the influential reach of terrorist groups.

35. Acting as a co-signature of the 2007 ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism (ACCT), which demonstrated ASEAN's regional commitment to combatting the growth and spread of terrorism by articulating its collective position, Brunei Darussalam will continue to stand by its South East Asian partners as well as through the UN in support of countering terrorism and terrorist activities in the region and beyond.

Transnational Crimes

36. In relation to the illegal and unlawful threats posed by transnational crimes in the South East Asia region, the following areas have been, and are likely to continue to be, areas of potential significant threat: piracy; human trafficking; drug smuggling; IUU fishing; illegal logging; and, smuggling of contrabands which include wildlife and natural resources.

37. Illegal/criminal activities can be either localised (contained within a single nation's borders) or increasingly transnational in nature. Similarly, activities are equally conducted across all contemporary domains, or as a combination of more than one domain. The conduct of illegal/criminal activities generally differs from the conduct of terrorist activities as methods are generally not represented by self-styled military behaviour. However, at the local level, illegal activity may still pose a significantly violent threat and has required military or paramilitary responses to provide resolution. Increasingly so, perpetrators of illegal/criminal activity continue to exploit gaps or differences in the legal terrain which are used for both benefit and evasion from prosecution. While globalisation has provided the establishment and enhancement of integrated policing and legal frameworks, it has also provided greater scope for criminal networks to develop across both physical and virtual national and international borders.

38. While a significant proportion of illegal activity is often driven by opportunistic gain or a basic need for survival, the relationship between illegal activity and terrorism continues to develop as non-state actors are increasingly required to find methods to resource activities. Therefore, in future, where there is irregular armed struggle, there is also likely to be a network of criminal activity either benefiting directly from the situation or resourcing further terror activity. As a counter, it will be necessary to develop further national legal systems and interagency and interstate cooperation and coordination to address existing loopholes exploited by criminal groups.



Brunei Darussalam will continue to stand by its South East Asian partners as well as through the UN in support of countering terrorism and terrorist activities in the region and beyond.

D. FUTURE TECHNOLOGY AND THE CYBER AND SPACE DOMAINS

39. Technology change and development has had a profound impact on the world in the past few centuries. Humans' desire to learn, understand and create have shaped the course of history and brought many innovations in technology in this modern world. These technological innovations have changed the way humans live and interact. Modern and emerging technological change is characterised by development of information technology, artificial intelligence, virtual reality (VR), augmented reality (AR), blockchain, cloud computing, Internet of Things (IoT), robotics, and nanotechnology are some examples. The pace of change created by this technological revolution is exponential and the rate of development will continue for the foreseeable future which will therefore, have a far-reaching impact on the economics, politics, environment, security, and social aspect of Bruneians' daily lives.

40. Within MINDEF and the RBAF, the emerging Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) technology presents a multitude of opportunities to help address defence needs and requirements. While so, the exponential speed at which 4IR technologies are evolving presents challenges in terms of disruptions in industries, increased vulnerabilities to defence security threats by those that utilise the technologies with ill intent, as well as, the inability to cope with transformation of entire systems of capabilities.

41. This rapid pace of change in scientific research, innovation, and emerging technologies, is also shaping the activities of the military across all contemporary domains with cyber space, and outer space also becoming increasingly contested. MINDEF and the RBAF will need to keep pace in monitoring the development of such technological changes to maintain agility in its response.

Information and Disinformation

42. Diverse actors, whether groups or individuals, are now more than ever capable of shaping the geopolitics of a country. Social media, the news, and many other channels and platforms are now utilised to sway cognitive biases and distort public discourse on real issues, which can in turn influence decisions and policies of a country. Disinformation challenges Defence's capacities to recognise, differentiate, monitor, and respond effectively.

43. To ensure that Defence can guard against disinformation, proper verification measures that check reports or news against credible sources of information must be in place. This remains pertinent in this digital era where disinformation can spread rapidly and uncontrollably. Defence must therefore strengthen its conduct of audits, inspections, investigations, and its governance policies to be sufficiently robust in the future.

The Cyber Domain

44. Opportunities exist within the cyber domain to expand communications and domain awareness. While these are opportunities to be leveraged by the military, military forces must protect the integrity of Brunei Darussalam's national cyber space usage. The cyber threat is increasingly asymmetric and global in nature.

This rapid pace of change in scientific research, innovation, and emerging technologies, is also shaping the activities of the military across all contemporary domains with cyber space, and outer space also becoming increasingly contested.

45. As information demands and the requirements for ever more capable communications systems increase in the future, there will continue to be a corresponding increase in security challenges. These challenges will specifically and progressively see more attempts of unauthorised access or hacking of communication networks by individuals and/or organisations with the intent of spying and unlawful purposes (financial and intellectual property) in the personal, private, and public sectors. Military networks are also at risk from cyber-attacks from individuals, groups, or nation state sponsored hackers. As governments and militaries around the world move towards the digital usage, there is likely to be ever more reports of government network espionage activities as hackers try to steal state-sensitive information. As information technology demands and cyber risks increase, communication security's importance will increase as a core security theme for the future. The sometimes-contradictory relationship between individual privacy and national security will also become increasingly challenging, but important to balance correctly.

46. Defence must be prepared to respond to hostile cyber activities. Working in partnership with civilian agencies to develop cyber interoperability will help to identify, monitor, warn, and deter such activities. MINDEF and the RBAF will also need to enhance existing, and develop new, collaborative relationships with partner nations and international security organisations to support identification of threats and help to support a unified response. The protection of critical national infrastructure (for example power supplies, national broadcasters, port facilities and airports) will continue to be essential from an all domain perspective.

The Space Domain

47. As Brunei Darussalam's national, regional and global technological demands increase, its reliance on the satellite infrastructure will continue to grow, resulting in space becoming more crowded. This will undoubtedly present security challenges. In conflict, a nation may attempt to disrupt the satellite communication infrastructure of others by means of interference or destruction. Anti-satellite weaponry such as jamming, laser, ballistic missiles and counter-measures technologies are already being and will continue to be developed if these threats remain. In the military context, Brunei Darussalam will continue to have a reliance on space to provide communication and navigational connectivity. Being reliant on the systems of other nations for the foreseeable future, therefore, presents risks that must be mitigated to assure a continuous and undisrupted ability to conduct directed military operations.

Working in partnership with civilian agencies to develop cyber interoperability will help to identify, monitor, warn and deter such activities.

Key Defence and Security Implications

48. Focused on the provision of Defence and Security, the key implications relating to current and future trends in technology, information, cyber and space are:

48.1. Quantum computing could render today's encryption standards ineffective. This means institutions like financial centres, banks and military networks who rely on encryption to keep their information secure, could be exposed to more cyber threats. New encryption methods and means to secure information may need to be developed.

48.2. Space could become increasingly crowded as nations' reliance on space technologies such as satellites continue to grow. Global powers rely on satellite technologies to enhance their communication network and maintain a competitive edge over their adversaries. Conflicts in this domain could be a possibility.

48.3. Information demands and communications are expected to increase as people move towards digitalisation. Cyber-attacks and network espionage activities have already become a common occurrence, and this trend will grow. Information and communication security is a theme that must take centre stage.

48.4. Social media has offered speed, accessibility and convenience to users who wish to share information, whether it is for benign or illegal purposes. Security agencies will have to react faster as information travels more rapidly.

48.5. As internet usage increases over the coming years, there will also be an increase in the frequency of illegal activities in the online domain. Authorities will need to introduce measures to monitor and police these illegal activities.

48.6. Engaging in defence Research & Development (R&D) in materials and its subsequent applied technologies will aid efforts for military modernisation, as well as countering commercial and operational threats.

48.7. Utilising simulation and modelling technologies in various aspects of operational planning and training can be a more efficient and cost-effective way to improve operational readiness, while enhancing logistics and sustainability.

48.8. The rise of human augmentation technologies, such as AI, will improve situational awareness and capabilities.

48.9. Ongoing and future planned R&D efforts in areas including Tropical Environment, Human Performance, Sensors & Mechatronics, Modelling & Simulation, provide a crucial departure point to address some of these needs.



Defence will be required to continue to play its part in monitoring its own environmental behaviour and consciously make reductions to its overall carbon footprint.

E. CLIMATE CHANGE, THE IMPACT OF HUMANS AND NATURAL DISASTERS

49. The security risks posed by climate change are significant and can no longer be ignored. The impact of continued global temperature rise will directly impact further sea level rise, increased frequency of extreme weather events, and desertification. In turn, this will pose a threat to humans as there will be commensurate impacts on food and water supply, biodiversity, and habitation areas.

50. It is highly probable that actions carried out by humans will continue to have a significant effect on the environment. The results of urbanisation, industrialisation, deforestation, fishing, and agriculture all have had a negative impact on the wellbeing of the environment. Balancing conservation and sustainable management of Brunei Darussalam's diverse forest ecosystem, while continuing its urbanisation efforts, and pursuit of prosperity, will remain key challenges for the nation.

51. Rising global average temperature is associated with widespread changes in weather patterns. Extreme weather events, such as heat waves and large storms, are likely to be more frequent or more intense with the human-induced element of climate change. These frequent and intense heat events can increase the number of people suffering from the spread of vector borne diseases and death, especially among vulnerable populations, as well as crop damage. It is also probable that instances of intense rainfall will increase and that extratropical storms will move pole-wards. Brunei Darussalam will undoubtedly continue to be vulnerable to the consequences of severe weather events, which include flooding, landslides, and storm damage. While increased precipitation can replenish water supplies and support agriculture, intense storms can damage property, cause loss of life and population displacement, coastal erosion, and temporarily disrupt essential services such as transportation, telecommunications, energy, and water supplies.

52. Sea level is expected to rise significantly by the middle of the century. Estimates suggest this could be in the tens of centimetres. As a result, Brunei Darussalam's land masses will be affected, particularly in coastal or low-lying riverine areas where the frequency of flooding events is likely to increase. Rising sea levels will also result in raising water table levels, increasing the risk of pollution and disease in Brunei Darussalam's water systems. When rising sea levels are coupled with inadequate drainage, the effect of the water table rising to the upper soil levels will lead to impaired crop growth. Such land is labelled as 'wet desert', due to the progressively unproductive nature of the soil.

53. With biodiversity loss increasing rapidly in the previous five decades, wildlife will almost certainly be affected by pollution, destruction of habitat and climate change, especially species that are poor at adapting. Potentially, without changing habits, plant and animal species could be at risk of extinction due to climate and human activity. In turn, reductions in biodiversity will also risk a considerable effect to food supply. Brunei Darussalam is rich in biodiversity and particularly famous for its flora and fauna. However, like other nations, that biodiversity is under threat from human activity and climate change. Human activity such as urbanisation, unsustainable levels of harvesting certain plant/animal species and, to a certain degree poaching, provide the main causes of biodiversity loss in Brunei Darussalam.

54. Deforestation and other climatic factors promote desertification under certain conditions. While desertification may not directly affect populations living in urban areas, those in rural environments will continue to face the direct threat of loss of livelihood. Indirectly, urban populations may become affected through food shortages, both in quantity and variety.

55. With many infectious diseases in developing nations being water borne, water pollution will continue to be of major concern particularly when linked to an increasing global population who do not have adequate access to clean drinking water. Moreover, greater food demand and freshwater shortages will lead to reductions in crop and livestock production, thus worsening food security risks.

56. While Defence, like all other areas of the national security architecture, will be required to continue to play its part in monitoring its own environmental behaviour and consciously make reductions to its overall carbon footprint, it will also be required to be increasingly prepared to react to instability caused and crises arising from climate change. It is likely that this will increasingly provide a drain on resources, with military forces required to offer security solutions to populations as their habitats become progressively impacted. Moreover, climate change developments such as increasing salinity of the seas, areas prone to flooding and landslides, and increasing rate of environmental deterioration, will have detrimental impacts to force structure planning and resource allocation. To address potential security challenges or national crisis that are beyond the capacity of civil agencies, Defence must ensure sufficient and scalable forces to respond rapidly to threats and be prepared to secure the population.

HARDI

PART TWO

Defining the Defence Solution

1. DWP 2021 focuses on Brunei Darussalam's Defence and Security approach both domestically and internationally. In doing so, DWP 2021 will direct the Defence Ends, Ways and Means to ensure that subsequent Defence development and output can deliver increasingly better effect regionally and is conducive with operations under a whole of government fused approach.

2. DWP 2021 has a focal point of 2035, however, it is necessary to conduct continuous review and be able to horizon scan out to a rolling point in time. Future DWP reviews will therefore be conducted with a five-year frequency, with a continuous aiming point of fifteen years ahead. This approach will allow for more effective and efficient development of military capabilities, and in turn, operational output in the future.

3. Fundamentally, DWP 2021 is concerned with enhancing the delivery of operational output to meet effectively and efficiently the requirements of all the directed Defence Tasks. Failure to focus on joint operational delivery, with a whole of government approach, will result in an unacceptable lack of coherency and will place the security of the nation at risk.

4. The strategic guidance defined within the DWP 2021 is structured in the form of its strategic **Defence Ends**, **Ways**, **and Means**. This approach ensures strategy coherence and an integrated approach to national security.

Principles Guiding Brunei Darussalam's Defence

Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB) and Syariah

5. Underpinning what Defence must be, and the expectations placed on it, exists the national principles that guide the way of life in Brunei Darussalam. The philosophy of Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB) acts at the core of these principles, supported by Syariah, which is the understanding and guidance of the Islamic way of life concerning an individual's value system, beliefs, morals, and behaviours for the preservation of goodness and wellbeing, and subsequently, to attain success in this life and the hereafter.

6. Through the lens of nurturing core values of MINDEF and the RBAF which are based on the values of MIB, that are: professionalism, takwa (piety), loyalty and courage, MINDEF and the RBAF will continue to be committed in upholding and preserving the framework of Maqasid Syariah (the objectives of Syariah) in the organisation.



The strategic guidance defined within the DWP 2021 is structured in the form of its strategic Defence Ends, Ways, and Means.

MINDEF and the RBAF will continue to be committed in upholding and preserving the framework of Maqasid Syariah (the objectives of Syariah) in the organisation.

“As a progressive Islamic nation, strengthening ‘Maqasid Syariah’ (objective of Islamic law) is the pre-requisite to achieve success for the nation. Empowering it is important - as a catalyst towards ensuring that the nation continues to attain prosperity and remain in harmony.”

TITAH OF HIS MAJESTY SULTAN HAJI HASSANAL BOLKIAH MU’IZZADDIN WADDAULAH IBNI AL-MARHUM SULTAN HAJI OMAR ‘ALI SAIFUDDIEN SA’ADUL KHAIRI WADDIEN, SULTAN AND YANG DI-PERTUAN OF BRUNEI DARUSSALAM DURING THE 34TH NATIONAL DAY CELEBRATION IN 2018.

7. This commitment by MINDEF and the RBAF remain in line with national efforts to create a progressive Islamic nation as proclaimed by the titah of His Majesty Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Mu'izzaddin Waddaulah ibni Al-Marhum Sultan Haji Omar 'Ali Saifuddien Sa'adul Khairi Waddien, Sultan and Yang Di-Pertuan of Brunei Darussalam during the 34th National Day Celebration in 2018.

8. Maqasid Syariah provides the purpose, objective and intent behind the Syariah guidance and creates the necessary and conducive environment for a nation to be known as a true Islamic country. The continued integration of the five essential principles of Maqasid Syariah to guide Defence principles and nurture appropriate values within MINDEF and the RBAF, will bolster spiritual combat and the resilience against negative and damaging influences.

The Relevance of Maqasid Syariah Principles in Defence

9. The five principles of Maqasid Syariah that nurture an environment that is conducive for the nation to grow and prosper are as follows:

    9.1. Preservation and Promotion of Faith.

    9.2. Preservation and Promotion of Life.

    9.3. Preservation and Promotion of Mind.

    9.4. Preservation and Promotion of Wealth.

    9.5. Preservation and Promotion of Progeny.

10. These principles shape and influence defining Defence in Brunei Darussalam:

    10.1. **Flexible and responsive**. Defence must be adaptable, innovative, and resilient. In view of the unique characteristic and positioning of Brunei Darussalam, MINDEF and the RBAF must approach Defence in an innovative manner to be equipped to address and respond to complex and wide-ranging sets of potential contingencies. The RBAF must be able to defend the country in order to preserve the nation's values, its future, and its way of life.

    10.2. **Secure**. Defence is responsible and reliable in preserving the nation's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The RBAF must instil a level of public confidence when the country is faced with threats or in crisis. It is the duty of Defence to remain strong and dependable in order to ensure the security and preservation of future generations.

    10.3. **Disciplined**. Defence must be disciplined and uphold the values of professionalism. Military personnel must be professionally trained and demonstrate competence and skills in their work. Commitment to improvement and excellence in the organisation is an essential element, in developing its people to achieve their full potential. The RBAF must be exemplary in their conduct and devoted to duty. They must maintain professional decorum, as well as respect for one another across the organisation.

10.4. **Supportive and Stabilising**. Defence must create and maintain an environment which enables the nation's prosperity to be sustained and developed. Defence must secure Brunei Darussalam's land territory, maritime and air spaces to prevent any destabilisation which would threaten the nation's sea, air and land lines of communications. This also includes protecting Brunei Darussalam's critical national infrastructure, as well as its cyber and space environments, so that the nation can continue to engage globally.

10.5. **Trusted**. Defence must continue to develop itself to be a credible and trusted agency to its regional and international partners. The RBAF must operate in accordance with domestic laws and be committed to supporting the rules-based global order. Defence's contributions must add value in promoting regional and international stability.

Adherence to International Norms, Standards and Values

11. Brunei Darussalam strives to preserve its rich heritage of tradition, culture and religious values that form the foundation of a unique Bruneian identity, which is one that exudes peace, respect and understanding – hence earning the name, "the Abode of Peace". At the same time, Brunei Darussalam is also mindful of the realisation of its international commitments and continues to adhere to those international obligations, norms and standards that it has previously acceded to.

12. Brunei Darussalam's continued adherence to these international commitments, which encompass the notions of legality and morality, will continue to ensure that the decisions and actions of MINDEF and RBAF remain justifiable and appropriate, whether this be through operations within national sovereign borders, or beyond in support of regional or global stabilisation or peace support operations.

Brunei Darussalam's continued adherence to these international commitments, which encompass the notions of legality and morality, will continue to ensure that the decisions and actions of MINDEF and RBAF remain justifiable and appropriate



Strategic Defence Ends

13. Strategic Defence Ends provide the objectives for Defence. They are defined by the **Defence Vision** and **Mission** and integrated with a refined set of **Defence Roles** and enduring sets of **Defence Deliverables** and **Defence Pillars**. Collectively, these strategic Defence Ends provide the approach to be undertaken by MINDEF and the RBAF, now and in the future.

DEFENCE VISION
A Formidable Armed Forces and a Reliable Partner

14. The Defence Vision is **A Formidable Armed Forces and a Reliable Partner**. The RBAF will display formidable strength in its courage and resilience to protect the nation and a strong sense of preparedness and readiness in addressing contemporary and emerging threats. The strength articulated in this manner, not only indicates the prowess that has been honed and sharpened, but also drawing from spiritual strength and faith to persevere onwards in the face of adversity. These qualities serve to uphold the credibility and respectable reputation of the RBAF.

15. The Vision also reflects the requirement for Defence to be fully prepared to engage across the range of defence and security activities it is directed to support as a reliable partner to national security agencies, as well as international defence relationships. It also recognises the significant responsibilities and roles that the RBAF has to undertake in ensuring nationwide security and stability.

DEFENCE MISSION

To Defend our Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity; Uphold the Constitution and the Malay Islamic Monarchy Philosophy

16. The DWP 2021 Defence Mission remains consistent with all previous Defence White Papers. Defence's mission continues to be **Defend our Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity; Uphold the Constitution and the Malay Islamic Monarchy Philosophy**. The mission remains coherent with the National Strategic requirements for Defence.

DEFENCE PILLARS

- Deterrence and Response
- Defence Diplomacy
- Holistic Defence

17. Underpinning the Defence Vision of a Formidable Armed Forces and a Reliable Partner and its Mission, sits a three-pillar strategy which continues to be employed by MINDEF and the RBAF. These pillars highlight the fundamental and enduring approach to be undertaken by Brunei Darussalam in determining what defines Defence in the national context. The three pillars are **Deterrence and Response**, **Defence Diplomacy** and **Holistic Defence**.

18. **Deterrence and Response**. Defence must be positioned appropriately to deter and counter security threats, as well as, be prepared to defend the nation against threats where the nation's sovereignty and territorial integrity is at risk. In order to do so, Defence must be able to monitor the strategic environment to detect threats that affect the nation's security.

19. **Defence Diplomacy**. Enhancing Defence Diplomacy must build on stable and strong working relationships with its regional and international partners. Defence diplomacy continues to significantly help maintain a peaceful and stable security environment. Defence diplomacy is multi-faceted and extends beyond the network of Defence Attachés and Advisors. Defence diplomacy must incorporate all activities conducted with international partners in a joint and coherent manner to ensure the impact of all that Defence does has a multiplying effect on delivery of wider national security. In

the broadest sense, activities conducted within the auspices of defence diplomacy must continue to promote an international rules-based order which supports Brunei Darussalam's interests and encourages dialogue and constructive approaches in addressing challenges and threats.

20. **Holistic Defence**. Holistic Defence captures the concept of a Whole-of-Nation approach and therefore Defence's contribution within it. This includes the support and contribution that Defence provides to other national security agencies in facilitating their activities and ensuring the security and resilience of the nation against threats and crisis is maintained. Holistic Defence involves coordination and collaboration with all other national civilian agencies and the provision of support for each other's activity, thereby contributing towards a conducive environment for the nation's political economic progression and development.

Defence Roles



21. Adapting a forward-looking approach, MINDEF and the RBAF will now embrace the following Defence roles in the delivery of its activity:

21.1. **To develop and implement defence strategic guidance and policy**. Current and future defence strategic guidance and policy must be better cohered to ensure that operational delivery is maximised. Similarly, defence policy must also be coherent with wider national security guidance and objectives.

21.2. **To advance defence relations.** In both a bilateral and multilateral context, Defence must not only maintain, but build, deeper and more resilient relationships with partners on a regional and wider scale. Stronger relationships will, in the future, become increasingly important in assuring the security of Brunei Darussalam as a Sovereign State.

21.3. **To enhance military operational output through coherent Force Capability Development.** With operational output being at the core of Defence's ability to provide security, it is essential that MINDEF and the RBAF are provided with appropriate capabilities that are designed coherently across all Defence Lines of Development and through life.

21.4. **To contribute to integrated national security.** Defence activity must be carefully woven into the fabric of national security provision. Operating within a directed set of Defence Tasks, defence output must always support and reinforce wider national security guidance.

I	**Protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity** (Integriti Wilayah Yang Kukuh)
K	**High level of preparedness and readiness** (Tahap Keupayaan Tempur dan Kesiagaan yang Tinggi)
WON	**Support towards "whole-of-nation" approach** (Mendokong Pendekatan "Whole of Nation")
D	**Effective defence diplomacy** (Diplomasi Pertahanan yang efektif)
A	**Military participation in international missions** (Penglibatan Ketenteraan dalam Misi-Misi Antarabangsa)
MA	**High and professional standards of human resource capability** (Sumber Tenaga Manusia yang berkualiti tinggi)
I	**Respected and credible image for Defence** (Imej Pertahanan yang berwibawa dan kredibel)

Defence Deliverables

22. Defined by the 'seven key result areas' directed within the IKWONDAMAI approach; Defence is provided with a framework within which it is required to deliver its Directed Tasks. The key result areas are defined as follows:

22.1. **I – Protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity (*Integriti Wilayah Yang Kukuh*)**. Covering all domains (land, maritime, air, space and cyber), MINDEF and the RBAF form a significant component of Brunei Darussalam's national security. Operating together and in coordination with other security agencies, Defence is able to deliver a broad range of activities to protect and defend Brunei Darussalam's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

22.2. **K – High level of preparedness and readiness (*Tahap Keupayaan Tempur dan Kesiagaan yang Tinggi*)**. Sufficiently equipped with the right resources, MINDEF and the RBAF must maintain a high state of preparedness and readiness, to respond effectively, in crisis. It is therefore essential to ensure the RBAF is well-equipped to address the uncertainty and complexity of the contemporary security environment.

22.3. **WON – Support towards "whole-of-nation" approach (*Mendokong Pendekatan* "Whole of Nation")**. The RBAF plays a key role in supporting and coordinating with other Government agencies, in managing crisis and providing national resilience. Activities including border security and other domestic security operations, involving but not limited to, counter-terrorism activities, search and rescue missions, natural disaster management operations, and explosive ordnance disposal, all support meeting the challenges that Brunei Darussalam currently does, and will, face.

22.4. **D – Effective defence diplomacy (*Diplomasi Pertahanan yang efektif*)**. MINDEF and the RBAF must continue to engage effectively with countries by developing strong networks of defence relationships, bilaterally and multilaterally. Building trust and confidence with other countries and adhering to an international rules-based system that upholds global norms also contribute to Brunei Darussalam's broader security in the regional and global stage. Support to ASEAN, and its stability, continues to be central to Brunei Darussalam's interests.

22.5. **A – Military participation in international missions (*Penglibatan Ketenteraan dalam Misi-Misi Antarabangsa*)**. The RBAF is to remain committed in achieving a credible and professional reputation by engaging with international partners. Development engagement and activities with, and support to international missions also provides opportunities for the RBAF to enhance Brunei Darussalam's own security as a result, as Defence's work to address common security threats that are transnational in nature. This has included the RBAF's participation in areas of peacekeeping through the experiences of United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, International Monitoring Team and UNIFIL, maritime security, and various HADR operations.

22.6. **MA – High and professional standards of human resource capability (*Sumber Tenaga Manusia yang berkualiti tinggi*)**. The adoption of MINDEF and the RBAF's core values which are, professionalism, takwa (piety), loyalty and courage, all form the foundations of the people within Defence. From the point of recruitment until the end of an individual's service, Defence personnel must continue to be exemplary and professional in their conduct. They must also be competent, reliable, and aspire to improve themselves continuously and actively. In future, manpower optimisation must be further enhanced with increases in efficiency and productivity through the leveraging of Science and Technology. Spiritual and welfare aspects of Defence's workforce will continue to be given strong focus, through the implementation of morale and ethics, and the highest standard of integrity.

22.7. **I – Respected and credible image for Defence (*Imej Pertahanan yang berwibawa dan kredibel*)**. By upholding the highest levels of integrity, professionalism, competency and reliability, an environment of respect and credibility will be created, maintained, and developed. The defence of the nation relies on strong and capable leadership, and a workforce with both civilians and military, who excel in what they do.

Strategic Defence Ways and Means - Defence Directed Tasks

23. **The Strategic Defence Ways** are defined by a set of Defence Tasks. These Defence Tasks are directed and therefore, non-discretionary. DWP 2021 Defence Tasks are broadly similar in content to those articulated in previous DWPs, although refinement has been necessary to accurately represent the current and future strategic environments. The Defence Tasks have been separated thematically to better indicate their respective area of strategic importance. In total, there are eleven directed Defence Tasks sitting within five themed areas; however, while the Defence Tasks sit within specific themes, there continues to be cross-over across all areas.

24. **The Strategic Defence Means** represent the methods in which the Ways are to be delivered. The methods are indicative, not exhaustive, and will require continued adaption through time to ensure relevance in step with the current operating environment.



Defence Ways – the Themes

25. The themes which bring coherency to DWP 2021 Strategic Defence Ways are:

25.1. **Strategic Insight**. Strategic Insight relates to the way in which Defence understands the strategic environment. Understanding must be comprehensive and of sufficient depth to inform strategic decision making. Strategic Insight must also cover the expanse of all operating domains. Defence's contribution to the provision of Strategic Insight is dependent on coherent integration with other national security and intelligence agencies and through bilateral and multilateral partnerships.

25.2. **Defending the Nation**. Defending the Nation is defined by Defence's ability to assure security of Brunei Darussalam's Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity across the full spectrum of conflict. The defence of the nation must continually remain cognisant of the threats and the risk posed by those threats. Acknowledging that risk represents the cumulative effect of impact and likelihood, it is logical to be ready to counter those threats that pose a more imminent and immediate risk to national security, while remaining prepared to counter others. While Defence must remain prepared to fight at a high intensity scale, it is much more likely that the RBAF will be required to counter other threats. Defence will therefore be required to adopt an innovative approach where capabilities designed to counter threats at the lower end of the conflict spectrum are also multi-functioning and can be up-scaled rapidly to support higher intensity conflict if necessary.

25.3. **National Cooperation**. National Cooperation relies upon the support of all Ministries, Departments and Agencies to collectively deliver National Security objectives in times of peace and crisis. National-level security coordination will force-multiply the sum of the individual parts. Defence has a clear part to play at the national level in supporting command, control, and delivery in crisis.

25.4. **International Cooperation and Engagement**. The maintenance of current international defence relationships and the building of new relationships are fundamental to assuring Brunei Darussalam's national security. Defence's ability to engage must become more diverse and able to be supported by both general and niche military capabilities. While the RBAF must be able to enter into dialogue, it must also increasingly be able to deliver military effect through the conduct of international activity.

25.5. **Contributions to Promote International Stability**. Maintaining its position on upholding the international rules-based system, Defence must be prepared to enhance its support to international peace support operations and in response to natural or man-made disasters.

Defence Ways – Defence Directed Tasks

26. To deliver the Tasks effectively, Defence must have the capability, sufficient resources, and a high level of preparedness and readiness in order to mobilise the Armed Forces effectively. Resources will include manning, infrastructure, critical support capabilities such as technological research and development, logistics, academia, and welfare – these will be covered in more detail in Part Three of DWP 2021.

27. Defence must also work with other national agencies in Brunei Darussalam to protect the security of the nation and its citizens. MINDEF and the RBAF will be expected to take leading roles in some aspects (Supported), and play assisting roles in others (Supporting).

28. Defence's Directed Tasks (by theme) are:

28.1. **Strategic Insight**.

- Monitor the strategic environment to ensure the early identification of both specific events and longer-term trends that may impact upon the nation's security.

28.2. **Defending the Nation**.

- Be prepared to deter and, if necessary, defend the nation against any prospect of direct military coercion.

In coordination with civilian agencies:

- protect national interests in adjacent maritime areas.
- protect the integrity of the nation's land borders, particularly in the more remote inland areas.
- enhance the national capacity to counter terrorism.
- develop enhanced preparedness to counter hostile cyber activity.

28.3. **National Cooperation**.

- Within resources, be prepared to assist civilian agencies during periods of national crisis (particularly where the scale, nature and/or immediacy of the challenge is beyond the capacity of civil agencies).

28.4. **International Cooperation and Engagement**.

- Cooperate closely with ASEAN nations to promote shared security understanding, transparency in the security environment, and initiatives to enhance stability in the wider regional context.

- Foster security relationships with regionally focused nations and multilateral structures to counter shared challenges and threats.

28.5. **Contributions to Promote International Stability**.

- Support regional and wider international efforts which promote stability and a rules-based global order, through tailored and/or niche contributions to peace support operations.

- Be prepared to support national contributions to regional and wider international humanitarian relief operations through tailored and/or niche capability provision.

PART THREE

Defining the Strategic Defence Capability Requirements

Introduction

1. Set against the backdrop of an increasingly challenging strategic environment and the requirement for Brunei Darussalam's National Security architecture to be ready to confront a wide range of current and future security threats, Defence must be equally and appropriately shaped, developed and prepared to meet these challenges in line with the directed Defence Ways and Means detailed in Part Two of DWP 2021.

2. The term Strategic Defence Capability used in Part Three of DWP 2021 encompasses not only military capability, but also the ability to deliver and execute defence roles, and to employ the force structure as a whole. Strategic Capability, and the development thereof, will be referred to using the recognised Defence Lines of Development (DLoDs). These Lines of Development act as the core thematic work strands on which all current and future capabilities must be designed. The Defence Lines of Development are: Training (and Education); Equipment; Personnel; Intelligence and Information; Policy, Doctrine and Concepts; Organisation; Infrastructure; and Logistics. Effective military capability demands to coherent delivery across all DLoDs. Specifically concentrating merely on equipment, and neglecting the other DLoDs, will not deliver an effective and sustainable military capability.

3. Part Three provides direction on the future shape of Defence Capability, with a Section dedicated to each DLoD. Within each Section, this Paper provides the necessary direction to MINDEF and the RBAF, to reinforce, amend, and build capability to meet the threats out to 2035 and beyond.

4. General guiding principles which support DWP 2021 Part Three, and the development of Defence Capability are:

    4.1. Capability design is based on the requirement to meet directed Tasks set against the context of threat, and environment. Defence Capability must be designed to support Brunei Darussalam's wider National Security Strategy, and to enhance operational output and the delivery of operations.



Capability design is based on the requirement to meet directed Tasks set against the context of threat, and environment.

Future capability development must be affordable and not simply aspirational.

A through-life capability development approach in all programmes must be adopted, irrespective of life span.

4.2. To build effective and sustainable Defence Capabilities, it is necessary to plan for the long-term and to employ systems thinking. All capability development is represented by significant multi-year investment. It is therefore essential that capability be developed responsibly from the point of initial concept to ensure the return on the investment is maximised. Capability Development is to be fully accountable and transparent in the context of its support to Brunei Darussalam's wider national security objectives.

4.3. Prudent and optimised use of the Defence budget is essential to provide cost-effective solutions which do not compromise on operational effectiveness or incur waste, either monetarily or materially. Future capability development must be affordable and not simply aspirational.

4.4. The development of Capability must be delivered through cross DLoD coherency. History clearly demonstrates that where capabilities are generated in isolation, without the inclusion of all DLoD stakeholders, these capabilities always fall short of the stated requirement. Defence Capability Development must be a fully integrated process.

4.5. A through-life capability development approach in all programmes must be adopted, irrespective of life span. This through-life approach commences at concept creation and requirement setting and is complete only once capabilities have been appropriately disposed of. In the life of a capability, it is also necessary to apply rigorous checks and audits to ensure stringent adherence to standards. Through-life milestones for each capability must be planned for in the early stages of development to ensure the continued relevance of respective capabilities. It is essential to recognise that whole life costs far exceed just the procurement of the hardware.

4.6. Capability Development in the future must be innovative and novel. The process must seek alternative solutions and not be bound by historic convention. In the same way that the threats and operating environment have changed, and will continue to do so, so must the future development of defence capabilities.

4.7. **Adapting for the Future**. In preparing for the challenges Defence may face in the next 15 years, as detailed in Part One, and therefore Defence's ability to meet the full requirements of the directed Defence Ends, Ways and Means (Part Two), Part Three of DWP 2021 focuses on the requirement to conduct Defence-wide Capability Development innovatively. While the defence of the nation's sovereignty will continue to be at the centre of every defence and security decision, the RBAF must seek equally new, novel and smart ways to approach the challenges it faces. It must aim to draw on areas of best practice and adapt across the RBAF. Similarly, development must occur in a steady and controlled manner with the objective of meeting requirements fully by 2035. In the first instance, innovative change must commence with a period of deep and collaborative review to establish the parameters and requirements for reform. Concurrently, it will also be necessary to review the way in which operations are currently conducted to identify more effective and efficient approaches to be developed to deliver enhanced operational effect at the appropriate scale of effort and readiness.



The military must develop and train both their physical ability and mind in tandem in order to bring both aspects to operate as one to achieve maximum effect.

Training (and Education)

The Importance of Training (and Education) in Capability Development

5. Training (and Education) are fundamental facets of delivering operationally capable, prepared and ready forces. Like all other Defence Lines of Development, the Training (and Education) Line ensures that the core competencies of the fighting force, both individual and collective, are met and maintained.

6. Both Training and Education support the development and maintenance of Fighting Power – the essential life force behind military effectiveness. The military must develop and train both their physical ability and mind in tandem in order to bring both aspects to operate as one to achieve maximum effect. As the operating environment becomes increasingly more complex over the next 15 years and beyond, it is necessary for Defence training to adapt accordingly to ensure that both MINDEF and the RBAF are able to meet the full range of the directed Defence Tasks at the appropriate scale of effort.

7. Like all other DLoDs, the Training (and Education) Line of Development must link coherently with all others, and is required to integrate with all the stakeholders to provide integrated and interoperable training. Training (and Education) brings together the People and Equipment DLoDs to generate readiness. Training (and Education) must be governed by centralised policy, supported by appropriate training estates and infrastructure, and sustained and resourced through the Logistics DLoD.

Training and Education Development Guidelines

8. In developing future training and education mechanisms, the following must be considered:

8.1. **Training and education must be progressive**. Competency requirements are necessary to ensure that individuals and collective elements confront increasingly more complex and challenging demands as they progress through accumulative training or educational stages. Each level must be seen as the enabler to move to the next level. Without successful completion of any level, shortcomings will be compounded further and lead to downstream complications in the training and education pipelines.

8.2. **Educational skill and training competency must be made demanding but realistic**. It is essential to balance training and education with the realistic requirements necessary to successfully meet the range of directed Defence Tasks. In facilitating this, it must be understood that not all levels of skill and competency will be needed to be met by all. Training and Education must therefore be provided for the right people at the right time in the right amounts. Innovative approaches to training and education (for example the use of technology and simulation) should improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the delivery of training and education.

8.3. **Specialist training and education must be focused but integrated at the appropriate level**. Specialist Force Elements must be considered for training and educational audiences, in the same way as more generalist forces. Specialist competencies will need specific training and educational resources and cycles to be allocated to ensure that Specialist Force Elements are able to also train effectively to meet the requirements across the range of directed operational conduct. At the appropriate time and level, aspects of Specialist Force Elements must be integrated with the broader training and educational models, both at Single Service and joint levels.

8.4. **Training and Education must be sufficiently resourced to enable competency to be met**. Training and Education for all elements of MINDEF and the RBAF will vary depending on the requirement and outcome necessary. However, training and educational development must be integrated to ensure that time is not wasted with inactivity resulting in skill fade thus generating a requirement for retraining. Dedicated periods for training and education must match requirements to deliver assigned operationally ready Armed Forces at the right time to the Joint Force Commander.

8.5. **Apply the right quantity of personnel to training at the right time**. Personnel being trained or educated must always be allowed to focus solely on these activities. The impact of disrupting training and education and the reduction of effectiveness of that training, which in short order degrades Defence's ability to deliver the appropriate operational output.

8.6. **Training and education delivery must be Command-led**. Any transformation of existing training and educational models must continue to allow the Chain of Command at all levels to be provided with the appropriate freedoms and resources to meet training requirements. Applying a mantra of sufficiency and timeliness will ensure that Commanders are able to deliver training to meet operational needs without wastage.

8.7. **A culture of self-learning**. Whether in Training or Education, Defence must engender a culture of personal responsibility to learn and develop. With increasingly limited resources, it will no longer be possible to provide individuals with a training and education environment that teaches everything that is needed to know. Individuals must be provided with necessary resources, material and an environment that is conducive to self-learn; with centralised training and education activities capitalising on the self-learning experience. Accreditation with civilian qualifications should also be maximised as an incentive to engender this cultural change.

8.8. **The Training Audience**. To ensure maximum strategic support to wider national security and delivery of operational output, training and education must be provided to both military and civilian staff in a balanced and integrated manner.

Previous Training and Education Developments

9. Since DWP 2011, Training and Education has evolved to meet increasing demands on military forces. An appropriate level of coherency of training must be ensured in order to positively impact operational output.

10. Collective Training Policy and delivery has increasingly become the domain of the Single Services, which while providing a suitable standard of competency at the component level, should continue to be developed further in order to have in place a fully integrated assigned Joint Force to conduct directed operations.

11. Similarly, individual training has seen developments at both the Single Service level and within wider Defence. The constant evolution of the Training Institute RBAF, the creation of Single Service Warfare Centres, the establishment of the Defence Academy and crucial policy developments (including areas such as the Defence-wide Systems Approach to Training, DSAT) have all delivered significant enhancements to both training and education at the officer and other ranks levels. Like collective training, Defence must ensure that individual training and education should evolve evenly across the RBAF, resulting in a coherent balance across the Services.

Training and Education Reforms

12. Based on the requirement to fully meet the broad range of directed Defence Tasks, reforming the training and education environment is now essential to ensure suitable preparedness across all directed Defence Tasks. A thorough review of Defence Training and Education is necessary and must be initiated immediately following the publication of this DWP 2021.

13. Within the civilian context, a thorough examination of training and education and a comprehensive identification of training requirements and competencies must also be conducted to ensure that MINDEF possesses personnel who are able to support the military in delivering effectively on the directed Defence Ends, Ways and Means. This may include the consideration of civilians undergoing integrated training and education similar to the military, particularly for those who share similar scope of core duties as the military.

Equipment

14. In supporting Defence people's ability, determination, and courage to serve in challenging situations and crisis across a wide range of operational missions and tasks, it is necessary to provide them with the essential equipment and tools to perform their duties.

15. It is now necessary to shift from the design of previous equipment structures to those which will provide operational capability resilience, deterrence, and defence in the face of future threats and challenges.

Equipment Development

16. For the future over the next 15 years and beyond, Defence equipment development must be designed to directly support the prioritisations of the directed Strategic Defence Ends, Ways and Means.

17. It is necessary for Defence, in the immediate term, under the direction of the Defence Capability Committee and the Directorate of Force Capability Development (DFCD), to conduct a comprehensive integrated review of the equipment requirements out to 2035. It is also important that DFCD should be empowered by the Defence Capability Committee as the central hub for all Defence Capability Development programming.

18. Acknowledging the recent development of a Defence Capability Management Framework, this approach to Capability Development must now be fully implemented. This implementation must be recognised and adopted by all DLoD stakeholders and must also ensure the appropriate resourcing of DFCD to manage the future complexities of Capability Development.

19. The review will be required to design an affordable model which phases out legacy capabilities, and replaces them with capable types that can competently meet the security challenges described in Part One and the prioritised directed Defence Tasks in Part Two of DWP 2021.

20. In developing a wider defence capability review, from an equipment perspective, the following guidelines are to be applied:

    20.1. **Convention**. The ability to conduct operations in the future, must not be constrained by the manner in which they have been done in the past. Where equipment has traditionally been designed to defend in a conventional setting in future the RBAF must develop a suite of equipment that are made to specifically confront the contemporary and future challenges. The size, structure and nature of the RBAF is not an end state in its own right; rather, it provides the Means to meet the operational Ends and will only be assessed in terms of the equipment's ability to support successful operational output.

It is now necessary to shift from the design of previous equipment structures to those which will provide operational capability resilience, deterrence, and defence in the face of future threats and challenges.



The size, structure and nature of the RBAF is not an end state in its own right; rather, it provides the Means to meet the operational Ends and will only be assessed in terms of the equipment's ability to support successful operational output.

20.2. **The need to apply Innovation and New Technology**.

20.2.1. **Innovation** is used here as a conceptual term and is therefore not limited to technological innovation. In view of the unique characteristic and positioning of Brunei Darussalam, its concept of Defence must be approached in an innovative manner. Faced with finite resources and the current security environment, the RBAF is fortunate to be able to determine and shape their Defence posture in a path unique to the Bruneian context.

20.2.2. **Defence's approach to smart technology**. Defence must be able to protect itself from security threats by leveraging and enhancing smart thinking and approaches – the least likely option, may be the most plausible. Smart approaches and technological solutions to match output and deliver a desired effect will be a growth area in Defence and one in which Brunei Darussalam has an opportunity to capitalise upon now.

20.2.3. **Science, technology and the research environment**. With the introduction of the Defence Science & Technology Group (DSTG) reflected in the Defence Science and Technology Policy Framework, the grouping is tasked to support Defence in providing Science and Technology (S&T) knowledge and expertise where necessary, be it regarding defence research or on the expansion of MINDEF's complex systems. Continued opportunities exist to also reduce military carbon footprints through proper investment and research. The foundation to instil a culture of science, technology, research and development into Defence organisations is published in the Defence Science and Technology Policy Framework which should act as a guide for future approaches.

20.3. **Thematic equipment development across a Joint environment**. Equipment acquisition must perform a balancing act across a range of requirements, or thematic requirement areas. The priority for each theme will be determined by the overall requirement of the equipment capability. Themes are not Single Service specific; rather they are Joint in nature to ensure maximised integration across the Force. Themes by which to develop equipment capabilities are:

20.3.1. Information Advantage (including ISR, Cyber and Networked Command Communications)

20.3.2. Influence

20.3.3. Reach

20.3.4. Mobility

20.3.5. Strike

20.3.6. Protection

20.3.7. Sustainment

20.4. **Multi-role utility and Adaptable Forces**. Due to the range of directed Defence Tasks and the limit of available resources, the design of defence capabilities, and therefore military equipment, must aim to perform a multi-role function wherever possible across two or more directed Tasks in accordance with the stated delivery priorities of each Task. Equipment design should therefore balance multi-role against primary utility, with multi-role having primacy.

20.5. **Multi-domain Development**. Since DWP 2011, developed capabilities have allowed the RBAF to operate in all contemporary domains (Maritime, Land, Air, Cyber and Space). In future, a balanced weighting must be placed on all operating domains to allow Defence to operate and defend itself from current and future threats.

20.6. **Integrated and Interoperable**. To develop increasingly enhanced joint operational output, the RBAF must also become more integrated across all domains and all operational Component areas. Where possible, equipment compatibility must be commonplace. Similarly, systems must be able to communicate with one another to enhance the speed at which Command and Control and effect can be delivered.

Personnel

21. One of the instrumental elements that contributes to organisational success is the human aspect of the organisation. The Personnel, their approach, behaviour, and standards, provide the bedrock of the RBAF's ability to deliver capability and maintain reputation.

22. Defence personnel are formed from a mix of both military and civilian staff. To carry out the diverse range of Defence functions the organisation is tasked with, it is essential that all personnel must integrate fully in their work. To do this, all personnel, irrespective of whether they are military or civilian, must develop an understanding of their own professional areas, while, at the same time, having a broader understanding of wider Defence matters. This is especially important as there is an expectation for future and existing working environments to be inclusively civilian and military. Areas where military personnel are unable to achieve further operational efficiencies, civilian personnel may be utilised further in support positions, and vice versa.

23. Faced with an increasingly challenging security environment and the rapid and dynamic nature of the threats, the imperative for a professional and high-skilled workforce with significant technical expertise becomes ever more important. Defence must continually improve and modernise its human resource capability to maintain and build an agile and productive workforce.

24. This will include preparing and training for areas such as: strategic foresight, science and technological systems, procurement and acquisition management, cyber security operations, response to natural disasters, constabulary operations, deployment operations in peacekeeping missions, logistics, engineering, legal and international frameworks, scientific research, spoken languages and programming. Noting that this list is far from exhaustive, the challenges of recruiting the right people and then managing and maintaining their skill sets appropriately is likely to become more and more difficult as the operating environment becomes more complex. For the future, it will be essential to align human resource management with Defence's policy objectives, so that MINDEF and the RBAF will be able to provide the necessary high levels of readiness and preparedness at all times.



Defence must continually improve and modernise its human resource capability to maintain and build an agile and productive workforce.

25. Defence must be considered as a specialised field of work, as such it is important to recruit people with appropriate and relevant skill sets from the outset. Moreover, Defence must continue to demand the highest calibre individuals who are professional, reliable, and increasingly more adept at dealing with complexity. To meet the demands of the future, Defence must continue to enhance its ability to provide a sustainable cycle of human resource management from recruitment until retirement, for both civilian and military personnel, including developing of its personnel with relevant skill profiles that will allow them to deliver and execute their roles in defence and future succession planning.

Recruitment, Training and Retention – A Career Lifecycle

26. Recruitment, training and career development, and retention are all important factors in developing Defence personnel capabilities as these ensure through-life maintenance of Defence's ability to provide increasingly capable operational output. Careful management of Defence personnel is essential to the delivery of Defence outputs. To keep an equal pace with the dynamics of the operating environment, there is an immediate requirement to review current Human Resource (HR) policies with a view towards modernisation in relation to recruitment and selection, training and development, career management strategies, performance appraisal, welfare and incentives, retention, and retirement. Such modernisation efforts on HR policies should also include streamlining efforts and initiatives as there is an increasing undertaking to outsource defence support activities and functions. Defence must continually be mindful of ensuring an optimal workforce composition, comprising of both civilian and military, to ensure sustainable success in productivity and effectiveness.

27. Recruitment and selection

27.1. Future-proofed recruitment strategies are essential to maintain the provision of young and motivated personnel which will ensure the successful continuation of Defence. These strategies will prevent skills-based shortages which result from the equally continuous reality of outflow of personnel who leave Defence or the Armed Forces on retirement or for other reasons. It is also essential to maintain the introduction of motivated young personnel with new and modern skill sets to meet future demands necessary to operate in the security environment. The opening of the new RBAF Recruitment Office building in 2019 exemplifies the importance that the organisation has accorded to ensure the maintenance of suitable applicants to the Armed Forces.

27.2. As the RBAF changes shape to meet the challenges Brunei Darussalam will face out to 2035, it will be necessary to maintain the required quantity of personnel, with the right skill sets. This will be challenging and implies an element of re-training and re-skilling in role as other areas of Defence capabilities change. It will also be likely in the future that Defence will be asking its personnel to do more as other areas of our capabilities are streamlined for the future as new work demands arise. To support the necessary requirements of and demands placed against the personnel, Defence must develop suitable, future-focused planning and human resource auditing requirements which consider age profiles, competencies, and experiences to deliver an efficient and effective workforce composition.

Defence must continue to demand the highest calibre individuals who are professional, reliable, and increasingly more adept at dealing with complexity. To meet the demands of the future, Defence must continue to enhance its ability to provide a sustainable cycle of human resource management from recruitment until retirement, for both civilian and military personnel, including developing of its personnel with relevant skill profiles that will allow them to deliver and execute their roles in defence and future succession planning.

27.3. Defence must also seek to enhance its selection processes by expanding its programmes to recruit people within both the civilian and military areas who provide specific skills in growing areas of importance. Areas such as Science and Technology, Cyber, Communications and Engineering potentially present options for future targeted recruiting efforts.

27.4. The technological demands of a modern fighting force will require additional skillsets. Within a competitive labour market, Defence must secure its share of talent and offer opportunities which encourage diverse participation, requiring it to offer attractive employment opportunities and fulfilling careers. Defence should work with the education sector to build the capacity of qualified people. Efforts in encouraging female applicants to be enlisted into the RBAF at both the Officer and Other Ranks levels should be maintained. As the numbers of female applicants increase, a thorough review of redefining their roles in the military is necessary.

27.5. For the civilian workforce, while most of the recruitment of civilian officers is held centralised by the Public Service Commission, the organisation will continue to optimise and update its Technical Equipment Maintenance Division (TEMD) to provide flexibility in meeting its growing manpower demands in the workforce. In recent years, the TEMD scheme has grown to include other vocations, which include project management, information technology, research, and sport sciences. MINDEF will continually update its TEMD scheme to accommodate more disciplines and fields of work to provide necessary and relevant support to the armed forces, and to subsequently enhance the scheme to include full-fledged career paths.

28. **Training and Life-long Learning**. As already articulated in the DLoD section 'Training (and Education)', Defence must continuously update skills and improve professional capabilities to maintain balance with future trends. It will continue to be essential for all Defence personnel to continuously and progressively upgrade knowledge expertise to tackle the ever-changing security challenges. The organisation will need to identify the optimal level of a balanced and specialised MINDEF and the RBAF.

29. **Retention and Retirement**. While recruitment is important to ensure a continuous flow of talent and expertise entering the organisation, retention is equally essential to maintain the necessary skill sets that are required. As the organisation seeks to achieve balance between retention and retirement of the personnel, the RBAF must seek to implement more comprehensive systems and processes which ensure military personnel are able to transition to a civilian life once their service has concluded. This will also include providing military personnel with internationally recognised qualifications which are able to reinforce professional expertise while in service, and also foundation requirements to settle into subsequent careers.

Better Utilisation of Reserve Forces

30. Recent training experiences have indicated a requirement for reservists to undertake roles of regular forces in protracted and sustained crisis situations to maintain operational tempo. The current roles of reserves are limited and are based on provision of support to the RBAF in the context of previous operational environments. To meet the future demands posed by complex, highly sophisticated and technical challenges, the reserves as a capability must be reviewed. A review of reserves must be conducted in conjunction with other capability reviews and across all DLoDs to ensure that duplication is provided only where necessary, gaps are filled, and niche areas best provided by the civilian community are considered for utilisation.

Looking After the Welfare, Health and Safety of Defence's People

31. In addition to the provision of training opportunities for its people, Defence must also do its part in maintaining a conducive and safe working environment. Not only does this environment relate to the equipment and its function, but it is also a direct result of leadership which is dedicated to gaining the best from its staff, effective human resource management and engagement, and appropriately robust working practice policies. A working environment free from negative and damaging influences and behaviours will create the conditions for capabilities to thrive by encouraging its people to perform at their optimum levels.

32. Principles surrounding the practice of fairness, openness, respect, firm but fair discipline, and protecting the dignity of all Defence personnel: women and men alike, will continue to guide the policies of human resource management in Defence. This commitment will continue with the ongoing implementation of existing policies and initiatives, including the recent establishment of the Prihatin Centre in 2020, including the RBAF Welfare Strategy and RBAF Well-Being Guidebook. As an Islamic nation, the RBAF Religious Department (JAMAAT) remains a core component of the spiritual welfare structure for MINDEF and the RBAF. The provision of vital support system services, including those of Islamic spiritual and religious care, will be monitored, and where required, be developed and strengthened further for the benefit of the workforce.

33. The prosecution of Defence objectives carries with it an inherent risk, irrespective of whether individuals are deployed operationally, during training or in the workplace. Defence must, as a priority, continue to maintain a secure working environment to protect its people, capabilities, infrastructure, as well as sensitive data and information. In the future, threats posed by climate change may also require a Defence response to better protect its People – this may be in the form of better health, both physical and mental, who are required to deal with the impacts of operations, crisis and disaster.

34. Since 2005, Defence, with the establishment of the RBAF Inspectorate Unit, has taken several measures to enhance safety standards. In future, the effort must continue and be enhanced – particularly in the areas of operational and training safety where a comprehensive lesson learned process must be developed to ensure Defence's capability is maximised in the future.

Intelligence and Information

35. Having identified "Monitor the Strategic Environment" as a core directed Defence Task for Defence to undertake, the development of the Intelligence and Information DLoD is essential to shape the future conduct of the RBAF. Without well-developed Intelligence capabilities that can collect information, Defence's ability to process, disseminate and provide direction through Command and Communication mechanisms will be rendered ineffective. Understanding is a necessity, and a prerequisite to allow Defence to act as a cohesive force and in a wider National Security context.

36. The development of the Intelligence and Information DLoD will ensure that future assessments of those changes affecting the national, regional, and global security environment become increasingly timely, comprehensive, and integrated with both the wider internal and external intelligence communities. Intelligence and information are key to ensuring that Brunei Darussalam maintains situational awareness across all its operating domains and as a result, be able to best determine the most appropriate course of action in response. Intelligence must continue to be the initial driver in the development and conduct of all Defence's operations, whether these be within the territorial borders or deployed overseas in support of wider peace support or humanitarian support operations.

37. The value of Intelligence to Defence is dependent on the quality of information obtained and the effectiveness of its subsequent assessments. Intelligence and information must continue to be at the heart of the development of effective defence policy; hence it is important that the structures responsible for delivering and governing intelligence and information collection, analysis and utilisation must be continuously strengthened. In the same way, the processes that drive the intelligence cycle must also undergo continuous and rigorous review to identify gaps where information is not effectively utilised.

Developing Intelligence for the Future

38. As part of wider adaptive changes that Defence must undertake in the next 15 years, the development of its ability to gather information and understand what this information means will be equally necessary. In undertaking a review of how the Intelligence and Information DLoD must be progressed, the following acts as broad guidelines for future development:

    38.1. **Defence Intelligence and the wider network**. Defence must provide an increasingly integrated and wider holistic approach to acquiring intelligence across all operating domains. Defence Intelligence must strengthen links with Brunei Darussalam's wider agencies to ensure information is fused more effectively to develop a more comprehensive intelligence picture. Similarly, Defence Intelligence must enhance methods to fuse information between the Tactical, Operational and Strategic levels to develop contextual understanding of the strategic security environment.

    38.2. **Intelligence Collection**. The collection of information will be required to become more timely, relevant and of an appropriate quality. Enhanced joint intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, modern and updated cyber networks, information operations, and increased satellite systems are likely to all become essential facets of the network.

Defence must provide an increasingly integrated and wider holistic approach to acquiring intelligence across all operating domains.

38.3. **Intelligence Dissemination**. Concurrently, it will also be necessary to review the way in which Information and Intelligence is processed and disseminated. The threat of disinformation remains pertinent in this information age, and Defence must therefore guard against disinformation in the form of fake intelligence.

38.4. **Training and education**. Training facilities and intelligence curriculum must keep pace with the development in intelligence capabilities and systems. Training and education must also meet the growing requirements of an increasingly complex security environment. While Defence must develop a core of intelligence specialists, at all levels of operation, who must be developed appropriately and recognised as such, it will also be essential to ensure that the wider population of Defence personnel are provided the necessary education, at the right time, to understand how their specific roles must increasingly interact with the Intelligence cycle.

38.5. **Intelligence People**. As the operating environment becomes ever more challenging and dynamic across all operating domains, the task of gathering information and processing this as intelligence will become equally challenging. In the future, the skills sets required by Intelligence Staff, at all levels, to allow them to operate, will become increasingly niche and important. The initial selection of the right people and the provision of coherent, through life career structures will be fundamental in allowing Defence to fulfil its Intelligence roles and functions.

38.6. **Manned vs Unmanned**. Innovative solutions, specifically, the integration of unmanned technologies into intelligence systems, are now increasingly utilised to overcome human limitations in intelligence gathering and reconnaissance. Not only do these systems increase the capacity to which Defence is able to collect intelligence, but also, they reduce the risks posed to personnel in the conduct of operations. While technology is likely to provide significant capability enhancements in the future, it is also likely that the people in the system will continue to be equally key. New or enhanced Intelligence capabilities must seek to perfectly fuse the interaction between manned and unmanned systems.

38.7. **Wider networks**. Defence will also be required to leverage and enhance links and networks with its partners, domestic and international, to provide more sustainable means of information collection and intelligence assessment. Liaison, coordination, collection and joint information sharing, across all domains, will need to be progressively enhanced to maximise Brunei Darussalam's situational awareness.

Enhanced joint intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, modern and updated cyber networks, information operations, and increased satellite systems are likely to all become essential facets of the network.

Defence will also be required to leverage and enhance links and networks with its partners, domestic and international, to provide more sustainable means of information collection and intelligence assessment.

Policy, Doctrine and Concepts

Policy Development

39. DWP 2011 highlighted a range of measures aimed to enhance and strengthen the depth of policy expertise within Defence. These measures included structural changes within the Directorate of Defence Policy and within the Ministry's leadership to ensure that roles, remits and responsibilities became more clearly defined. The measures also directed that integration between the Policy and Intelligence Directorates be enhanced to provide better strategic understanding on which to base the generation of meaningful Defence Policy. With these measures now firmly implemented, further opportunities are now presented to assure the enhanced development of future Defence Policy.

40. Beyond the limits of National Defence, policy development must continue to strive to better interact with national security objectives and help shape and develop these wider objectives to support the provision of increasingly greater capacity for integrated national security provision across all agencies. Beyond Brunei Darussalam's borders, Defence Policy must also seek to generate more coherent and innovative ways in which it will interact with regional and wider partnerships to deter and protect itself from the complex range of future security threats.

Doctrine and Concept Development

41. DWP 2011 also directed that Defence must invest in the development and understanding of Joint Operational Doctrine to enhance operational output across the Armed Forces. In 2013, the Joint Doctrine and Warfare Centre (JDWC) was established. Since establishment, JDWC has embarked on an ambitious plan to develop and deliver a full suite of Doctrine to the RBAF. Commencing with the publication of Brunei Military Doctrine in 2013 which captures the core approach of Bruneian Defence, JDWC continues to provide Doctrine and Concepts to the Armed Forces across thematic, environmental, and functional Joint Operational areas.

42. While it is anticipated that the full suite of operational doctrine and concepts will be completed and published by 2022, the development of doctrine is a continuous process and will require testing, evaluation, and revision to ensure joint operational approaches remain current in the context of the operating environment and the capabilities that Defence will continue to evolve.

43. While JDWC will continue the work to maintain and develop its Doctrinal approach, it is inherent on all personnel to share a common understanding of these doctrinal approaches. A combination of self-learning, programmed education, and collective training must all be used, by the appropriate personnel, to develop a broader and deeper understanding of how Defence must deliver operations. Further effort is to be placed on promoting access and availability of its Doctrine to ensure that collective understanding is enhanced in the future.

44. To ensure greater cohesion in the RBAF's ability to deliver military operations, it is now also essential to provide greater coherency to the RBAF's tactical doctrine. Specifically, in the immediate term, it will be essential to develop methodology to integrate tactical and operational planning using coherent and complementary processes. It is essential to identify doctrinal best practice at the tactical level to ensure that this is implemented across the wider organisation.

Defence Policy must also seek to generate more coherent and innovative ways in which it will interact with regional and wider partnerships to deter and protect itself from the complex range of future security threats.

Policy development must continue to strive to better interact with national security objectives and help shape and develop these wider objectives to support the provision of increasingly greater capacity for integrated national security provision across all agencies.

45. To promote greater understanding of the wider conduct of military operations and to be able to develop its own doctrine further, Defence must also become increasingly prepared to share its doctrinal approaches with partners. In return, Defence will seek to better understand its partners' doctrine to gain best practice and acknowledge their lessons learned. This will assist in the development of Defence's own future doctrine, while maintaining the fundamental principle that Bruneian Doctrine must be wholly Bruneian in nature.

Organisation

46. Existing Defence structures have evolved over time. They have been iterative in design and represent the steady progression of development directed in previous Defence White Papers. While this approach has identified and developed new structures, existing structures have generally remained static.

47. MINDEF's and the RBAF's structures continually face increased pressures due to resource constraints, despite the desire to grow. If not managed or administered well, there is a high risk of creating hollow structures, where the hollowing will significantly increase the tempo and frequency of operational conduct on individuals and as a collective.

Structural Reformation

48. In creating necessary adaptive change in Defence's approach to capability development, it is now equally important to conduct a full review of its Force structures so that these may be re-shaped and re-defined to enhance future operational output. This review must be conducted immediately, be all inclusive and integrated fully into the wider findings as part of the Defence Strategic Capability Plan directed at the start of Part Three of this DWP. A comprehensive Force Structure Review will provide a platform for considerations raised on decision-making and budgetary management, transparency, alignment of strategies and policies, as well as, the effectiveness of structures in delivering Defence objectives.

49. In review, the following guidelines must be adhered to:

    49.1. Structures must be designed to deliver directly to the provision of operational output in accordance with the directed Defence Tasks articulated in Part Two of this DWP.

    49.2. Structural change must be driven from the top down which provides balance and coherence in Defence's ability to deliver effective command and control and is a necessity in maintaining operational momentum.

    49.3. Structures must be cost-effective and able to be resourced with sufficient personnel, equipment, and logistics.

    49.4. Structural change must be viewed in the context of all DLoDs.

    49.5. The existence of structures must be considered based on a structure's ability to deliver coherent operational output now, and importantly in the future.



Structural change must be driven from the top down which provides balance and coherence in Defence's ability to deliver effective command and control and is a necessity in maintaining operational momentum.

Infrastructure

50. Infrastructure is vital for the conduct and sustainment of the Defence activities and operations. Infrastructure in this context is defined as buildings, estates (including Training) and installations and includes, but is not limited to, camp barracks, naval bases, airfields, training areas and ranges, educational establishments, communications networks, logistic depots and stores, medical facilities, and maintenance workshops.

Continuous Development

51. Aside from its purpose of housing personnel, assets and capabilities, it is essential that the functionality of infrastructure must be fit for purpose and safe to operate in. Noting that people continue to be Defence's greatest asset, it is necessary to provide appropriate levels of infrastructure for the personnel to live and work, to maximise all aspects of Defence's capabilities and in turn enhance operational output. Therefore, Defence must continue to undertake a full and comprehensive review of its infrastructure to mitigate risk associated with current holdings and identify requirements, in conjunction with other DLoD stakeholders, for future infrastructure design. Identification of risks and subsequent prioritisation of these risks will promote the necessary modernisation of the estates in the near term.

52. Since the publication of DWP 2011, Defence has also introduced Facilities Management processes, to all camps and base locations, through the provision of integrated term contracts which aim to optimise the routine functionality of its infrastructure. Continued outsourcing of Facilities Management will improve cost control and ease administrative burden, allowing Defence to re-invest its people to areas of operational concern. In the near term, Defence must, with service providers, work towards the provision of an automated Facilities Management system which will reduce manual processes to a minimum and enhance efficiency of processes.

53. Working with other Departments and Agencies, the continuous development of defence estates must also aim to promote enhanced national economic resilience, by utilising national and local industries to fulfil the work requirements.

Future Development

54. As Defence adapts to meet future challenges with re-shaped or new capabilities, it will be necessary for Defence's Infrastructure to adapt accordingly. It is likely that as further capability review is conducted in the immediate future, revision and addition to existing plans will be a necessity. It is essential that Defence identifies these changes to current and new requirements at the earliest opportunity to ensure that the necessary financial investment is factored for within future national development plans.

Sustainability of Infrastructure and the development of Green Initiatives

55. Climate change will impact the way in which infrastructure is designed in and for the future. Changes in the climate will necessitate design changes in infrastructure to ensure that the working environments continue to be workable. Similarly, Defence will need to consider how it protects its infrastructure to ensure it continues to be resilient, sustainable, and to safeguard planned through life costs.

56. Defence should also be an increasingly responsible supporter of green initiatives. Initiated in 2010 with the Bolkiah Garrison Energy Management Project, Defence has maintained its focus on its infrastructure energy management and efficiency initiatives. The Defence Energy Efficiency Policy and Guideline, also introduced in the same year, continues to provide focus on minimising carbon emissions through energy saving practices. The initiatives have provided a useful start point for Defence. Future initiatives must be developed and matured with environmentally green considerations being at the heart of infrastructure decisions and working practices to ensure that Defence consciously and responsibly take efforts to reduce its carbon footprint.

57. To enhance Defence's efforts to reduce carbon emission, Defence must:

    57.1. Incorporate the use of energy-efficient systems into Defence Infrastructure Guidelines. This must include the use of energy-efficient materials, equipment, and fittings, where appropriate, into future construction projects.

    57.2. Resolve maintenance issues with energy efficiency procedures; produce energy reports that will detail energy consumption differences between originally installed systems and newly introduced/repaired systems.

    57.3. Review, improve and expand energy management practices and ensure that these are implemented into all existing and future buildings and infrastructure as well as maintenance systems.

Logistics

58. Logistics and the provision of logistic support (defined as logistics, medical and equipment support) delivers an essential enabling element for Defence to sustain operational output and provide support to wider national security efforts. Sustainability considerations must be an essential component of all current and future development of capability to ensure that both through life costs are correctly captured and the delivery of operational output is maintained at the appropriate tempo.

Supply and Support Transformation

59. In line with wider future Defence adaptation to future challenges, consideration of the Logistics Line of Development must include:

59.1. **Defence's ability to sustain existing capabilities**. Defence must strike a balance between the affordability of retaining current capabilities and the need to generate credible investment in new capabilities.

59.2. **Delivery of Logistic Support at all Levels of Operation**. Since DWP 2011, significant effort has been placed on developing Joint Operational capability. Primarily focusing on the function of the Joint Force Headquarters and the interaction between the Commands of the Land, Maritime and Air component areas, it is now essential to develop equal utility in the Logistic component area. In developing this capability, it will be necessary to ensure a coherent approach is developed from the Strategic level down to deployed tactical units and Combat Service Support headquarters.

59.3. **Logistic Reach**. As the complexity of the operating environment increases, requiring the scales at which distance, demand and duration need to be applied to be constantly challenged, it will be necessary for Defence to develop capabilities that provide our operational Forces with sustainable reach. This reach applies equally in all operating domains, but predominately (in the near term) in the Land, Maritime and Air domains. Defence must be capable of providing sustainable strategic reach for its forces, whether this means operating in the depths of Brunei Darussalam's jungle, conducting naval activities and exercises at the full extent of its EEZ and beyond, or providing support and supply to the RBAF deployed overseas on Peace Support or HADR operations.

59.4. **Supply Chain development**. Designing and developing a robust and resilient supply chain is crucial in meeting Defence needs and requirements. A dockyard maintenance agreement that was signed in 2019 to ensure the long-term sustainment of a ready and available RBN fleet represents an effort from Defence to bolster its supply chain. Furthermore, the COVID pandemic has highlighted the fragility of global supply chains. Like all other areas, Defence has faced similar challenges. In future, Defence must ensure that appropriate resilience and self-reliance is incorporated within its sustainment approaches and plans. Efforts to explore the development of a domestic defence support industry will contribute to this. The increased use of technology and Information Systems is likely to help improve management processes, contractual arrangements, and inventory tracking and should be considered as part of all future capability development.



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
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Conclusion

1. In outlining the detailed work and requirements of each Defence Lines of Development in order to deliver on Defence Ends, Ways and Means, a comprehensive and all-encompassing Force Capability Review is necessary to be undertaken.

2. Defence will deliver on its directed Defence Tasks in support of nationwide security and resilience. In order to ensure its relevance and effectiveness, Defence will need a shift in its perspective towards Defence Capability Development in order to match against the ever-dynamic security environment and threats that the nation faces.