Summary of the Defence White Paper 2000

Nieuws
Nieuwsberichten
Defensiebladen
Parlement
Toespraken
Evenementenkalender

Kansrijk van werk naar werk
Reorganisatie
Defensie Topsport Selectie
Open Dagen
Vacatures
IGK
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SUMMARY OF THE

DEFENCE WHITE PAPER 2000

Introduction

Further modernisation of the armed forces

The Defence White Paper 2000 takes important steps towards completing the transformation process of the armed forces. Among the tasks of the armed forces, that of conducting peace operations has gained greatly in importance. Over the past ten years, Dutch units have made an active contribution to a large number of peace operations. The Dutch armed forces were transformed into an all-volunteer force, while simultaneously being restructured and downsized. In the course of this process, a number of shortcomings came to light, while new requirements were also formulated, particularly in relation to the operational readiness of the armed forces and personnel policy. The contours of the new defence policy were outlined in the Framework Memorandum of January 1999. These contours have taken a definite form in the Defence White Paper 2000, which charts the course to be taken in the coming decade.

Over the last few years, our armed forces have undergone radical change and modernisation, but new steps are needed. The government is aware of the political and public support for this view, as evidenced in the parliamentary discussion on the Framework Memorandum and during the Strategic Discussion on the Future of Defence. Over the past period, social and political support for Defence has markedly increased. The financial framework outlined in the Government Policy Accord forms the starting point for the plans launched in this Defence White Paper. The additional NLG 50 million for the Defence budget, which was recently allocated, marks a turning point in the political climate after years of structural cut-backs and increases confidence where the available budget for the coming years is concerned. This is all the more important in light of the daunting tasks with which the Defence organisation is faced.

The need for renewal stems not only from international developments and experiences during recent operations, such as those in Kosovo; we must also keep pace with rapid and far-reaching changes within our own national borders. The meagre labour market thus places considerable demands on personnel policy, which occupies an important place in the Defence White Paper. The changing relations between government and society have a direct impact on the way in which the Defence organisation functions, the central theme in the Process of Change in the Defence Organisation.

Difficult choices are involved in the formulation of defence plans. Black and white are

colours that are seldom seen in the complexity of reality. There is no simple formula by which optimal armed forces can be derived from the international situation. The evaluation of security risks and the military threat is paramount. More than ever before, the nature and scope of the defence effort are also determined by the willingness to share responsibility for the international community. Furthermore, desirability does not always mean feasibility.

All things considered, the government is convinced that this White Paper constitutes a foundation rich with possibilities for the development of the Defence organisation over the next ten years. The 2000 Defence White Paper contains important innovations. The cut-backs laid down in the Government Accord require structural measures to be taken. The Defence White Paper 2000, however, does more than implement the intended cut-backs. While reductions will be effected in some areas, efforts will be stepped up in other areas. The coming decade will see financial adjustments being made to the amount of just under NLG 10 billion. The aim is to prepare the armed forces for the challenges of the 21st century.

The Strategic Discussion on the Future of Defence (STD) was characterised by four recurring elements: the increase in the combat-ready strength, the improvement of sustainability, the need for a re-evaluation of the workload of armed forces personnel in the light of the frequency of deployment and making a more efficient use of reserve personnel. The wishes and desires that were formulated in the course of the STD were taken into serious account in preparing the Defence White Paper 2000. The plans specified in this Defence White Paper provide for a further increase in combat-ready strength on top of the increase announced in the Framework Memorandum. The combat-ready personnel of rapidly deployable units will increase by 2,100. Fifty percent of this increase will benefit mechanised infantry units. We consider this increase of 900 military personnel on top of the figure mentioned in the Framework Memorandum to be the maximum achievable for the present moment. The problems identified in relation to the frequency of deployment are not characteristic of the entire spectrum of the armed forces, but mainly concern combat functions, engineers and medical personnel. The increase in the combat-ready strength is mainly targeted to these and other bottlenecks. The Defence White Paper formulates a number of measures aimed at reducing the workload of armed forces personnel as a result of the frequency of deployment. In future, reserve personnel are to be deployed more frequently, also in the context of peace operations.

The armed forces must be capable of carrying out various tasks in various scenarios and operational alliances. Flexibility and multi-functional deployability are key words in this context. Although the structure of the armed forces is determined to an important extent by the more demanding combat tasks, the armed forces, following some adjustments, can also be rendered suitable for carrying out lighter tasks. The Netherlands cannot afford to have highly specialised armed forces. The armed forces need to be deployable across the entire spectrum of tasks: from combat tasks and military assistance to contributing to civil government tasks.

The international environment imposes high demands on the military personnel who often face complex situations, in which both diplomatic and military skills are required. Deployed military personnel may be faced with serious humanitarian emergencies and difficult moral choices. The care for personnel, therefore, is at the very heart of the

Dutch Defence policy. Over the coming ten years NLG 950 million will be allocated to shaping and implementing the new Defence personnel policy.

Armed forces personnel must have the professional knowledge and skills and the flexibility required to be able to carry out all their tasks properly. This will lead to far-reaching changes in the personnel structure in the coming decade, as well as to a considerable reduction in the average age of the personnel complement. This change is not caused by international developments and the change of tasks of the armed forces alone, however. Changes in Dutch society also have an important bearing on the structure and procedures of the armed forces. The Defence organisation welcomes this input by society. Social developments and developments concerning conditions of employment, which apply to employees in the Netherlands as a whole, in principle also apply to military personnel. The Defence organisation must offer its personnel challenging and motivating work and good working conditions. The men and women employed by the armed forces must be offered attractive opportunities for career development, both in the Defence organisation itself and with a view to their return to the civilian labour market. In this context it is likewise of the utmost importance for conditions to be created which enable work and private life to be combined as well as possible. Annually, an additional NLG 150 million will be made available for the purpose of intensifying personnel policy.

As described above, the choice of the appropriate structure and size of the armed forces, which is the central theme of this Defence White Paper, is anything but self-evident. It goes without saying that the international situation and the security risks involved are to be taken into account. International alliances, however, not only enhance our security, they also impose obligations. At some point or other, foreign policy and domestic policy are bound to overlap. It is at that point that we shall have to make our own decisions. This poses the question as to how our society wishes to deal with the opportunities and the risks involved in a world without frontiers. What sacrifices are we willing to make for our norms and values? What is our level of ambition? What financial resources are we willing to dedicate to achieving our ambitions?

The Netherlands is expected to make its contribution to the common effort and not sponge off the efforts of other countries. Peace and stability constitute a common good, to which all should contribute. Our international position and influence are in part determined by our political, economic and not least, military contribution. After all, the political and social support in our own country and the importance attached by our society to national interests and values also play a role here. In short, what is our level of ambition?

Large parts of the world are characterised by instability. Only a relatively limited number of countries are capable of exporting stability. The Netherlands has been making a meaningful contribution in this context. Therefore, Dutch foreign policy may be expected to be both active and committed to and focused on promoting peace and stability throughout Europe and elsewhere in the world. The armed forces constitute an important, if not indispensable, instrument towards achieving this end.

Tasks of the armed forces

The core tasks of the Dutch armed forces are the following:

* protecting the integrity of national and Allied territory, including the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba;

* advancing the international rule of law and stability;

* assisting the civil authorities in the context of law enforcement, disaster relief and humanitarian aid, both nationally and internationally.

The level of ambition for the Dutch armed forces laid down in the Government Policy Accord comprises contributions to NATO in the framework of collective defence and participation in a maximum of four peacekeeping operations simultaneously with battalion-sized units or their equivalent, if necessary for a period of three years. This is in keeping with the ambitions and capabilities of a country such as the Netherlands and expresses our commitment to international involvement. The level of ambition is determined to a great extent by the sum total of military capabilities which our country can make available to international alliances for collective defence and for crisis management, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. The defence plans outlined in this White Paper describe the military capabilities necessary to fulfil the demands laid down in the Government Policy Accord. The large variety of missions requires a large variety of modules. However, theory and practice part company when it comes to the number of deployed units actually required and the actual duration of the deployment. This is illustrated by what has occasionally been a sizeable deployment in Bosnia and Kosovo over the much longer period of three years. The armed forces have a wide range of choices with regard to the assets which may be deployed for peacekeeping operations. A priority in this respect is that the armed forces must be organised and equipped for the general defence tasks. There must be some margin to enable the armed forces to function well and to allow a certain amount of political freedom of choice.

To carry out the tasks defined above, the armed forces must be capable of the following:

* general defence in a NATO context, which may involve mobilisation of reserve units;

* participation for a limited duration in a peace-enforcement operation with a brigade or its equivalent (e.g. a maritime task group, three squadrons of fighter aircraft, or a combination of these units);

* sustained participation in a maximum of four peace operations involving contributions at battalion level or its equivalent (e.g. a squadron of fighter aircraft or two frigates);

* national military tasks, such as the protection of the integrity of national territory, coastal waters and air space;

* civilian government tasks, such as police tasks carried out by the Royal Marechaussee (border control, mobile monitoring of aliens and security on aviation premises) and providing military assistance in helping to carry out civil

government tasks;

* safeguarding the territorial integrity of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba and carrying out civil tasks, such as coastguard duties and the fight against drugs.

Military operations in a changing environment

Dealing with unpredictability is the biggest problem with which planners are faced. Where, when, with whom, under what circumstances and for what task the units of our armed forces are deployed in the future is uncertain. However, significant trends can be identified. Operations are being conducted further from home. Units must be prepared for operations in the entire spectrum of force, partly so that they can achieve escalation dominance. Rapid deployment is vitally important. Operations often last for years and always take place in an international context.

Modern armed forces must be flexible. For this reason, the Dutch armed forces are based on the module concept: the armed forces represent a system of modules which can form part of multinational military alliances. They must be able to operate in groups led by NATO, the UN, the (W)EU or an ad hoc coalition.

The old, fairly marked distinction between operating for collective defence and participating in peace operations no longer exists. The result of all this is that the demands placed on units for the collective defence and for peace tasks are very similar nowadays. All the Netherlands active units must be suitable for both main tasks; flexibility is the key element.

Further improvement of the flexibility, combat-readiness, mobility, combat power, sustainability, security, interoperability and quality was the theme of the Framework Memorandum; the same applies to the Defence White Paper. These general policy objectives also occur in NATOs Defence Capabilities Initiative. The more the European Allies manage to substantiate these objectives, the better the European military contribution to NATO. In this way, the political ambitions in respect of European security and defence policy are also supported by military capabilities. The coming years will see an intensification in European defence cooperation. Opinions on this matter have become more pragmatic, partly because the need to improve Europes defence capacity has become even more apparent in the light of the conflict in Kosovo. The improvement of the Dutch armed forces intended by the Defence White Paper should also be seen against the background of the Netherlands desire to contribute to an improved European military capacity. This will also benefit the vitality and cohesion of NATO, as is also emphasised in the Strategic Concept.

Improved levels of combat-readiness, flexibility and deployability

In particular the combat-readiness and the deployability of Dutch land forces must be further enhanced. This is rightly stressed in the Strategic Discussion on the Future of Defence. It is, of course, limited by the recruitment possibilities on the meagre labour market and by budgetary constraints. The measures in this Paper nonetheless mean that the number of active functions in rapidly deployable units (as mentioned previously) will be increased by 2,100, including one thousand mechanised infantry personnel and three hundred marines.

More specifically, this concerns:

*** the expansion incorporated in the Framework Memorandum by approximately 800 active functions in the Royal Netherlands Army (RNLA): 500 for the mechanised infantry, 200 for the engineers and 100 for civil-military cooperation and logistics;**

*** approximately 700 active functions in the RNLA as a result of new measures in the Defence White Paper. These consist of 500 functions in another three mechanised infantry companies which are to be activated, 150 functions for the enhancement of the operational target acquisition and intelligence collection and 50 functions with logistic units;**

*** 300 extra functions in the Marine Corps, as envisaged in the Framework Memorandum. A third marine battalion will be fully activated;**

*** 300 functions in the logistic ground units of the Tactical Helicopters Group (THG) in order to improve sustainability; this will also increase the level of operational deployability of the Airmobile Brigade.**

As well as all the combat-ready assets of the Royal Netherlands Navy, the Royal Netherlands Air Force and the Royal Marechaussee, the armed forces will have a total of 24 battalions (a battalion is made up of 800 men), from which the following can be selected for deployment:

*** six mechanised battalions, each with two companies of mechanised infantry and a tank squadron (approximately 600 military personnel). Mechanised battalions of this sort are currently serving in NATOs SFOR in Bosnia. The number of active mechanised infantry companies will be doubled;**

*** three infantry battalions from the Airmobile Brigade;**

*** three battalions from the Marine Corps;**

*** nine battalion-sized units for special tasks, such as engineers, (air defence) artillery and communications. Examples are the engineer auxiliary battalion and the *Gele Rijders*battalion (field artillery), which are participating in the NATO peace force in Kosovo;**

*** three battalion-sized units for logistic support, parts of which can generally be assigned to other battalions to provide logistic support.**

With the exception of the marines, all these units are part of the German-Netherlands Army Corps (GNC), which thus contains 21 Dutch units of battalion size that are suitable for collective defence as well as peace operations outside NATO territory. In addition, the corps has three active companies of commandos, which can be deployed for special operations.

If the proposed measures are implemented, the peacetime composition of the Dutch armed forces will, in 2009, consist of more than 76,000 personnel (including civilians): almost 16,600 in the Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN), more than 34,500 in the RNLA, over 12,700 in the (Royal Netherlands Air Force) RNLAF, approximately 5,500 in the Royal Marechaussee and approximately 6,800 in the Defence Interservice Command (DICO) and the core department.

Once the measures have been implemented, it will, in 2009, be possible to increase the strength of the armed forces in the event of a major conflict to approximately 108,000 personnel: 19,500 in the RNLN, 56,700 in the RNLA, 17,200 in the RNLAF, 7,600 in the Royal Marechaussee and approximately 6,800 in the DICO (and the core department).

The intended potential in terms of combat-ready, rapidly deployable land forces represents the maximum that is currently regarded as feasible within the confines of the recruitment possibilities.

Sustainability and cooperation between the Services

The measures intended to increase the level of combat-readiness and deployability will contribute significantly to the level of sustainability. The structure of the armed forces will also be better orientated to the deployment system for peace operations. The basic principle in this respect is that three similar units are available at all times: one unit preparing for deployment, one available for or on deployment and one recuperating. This approach has not only been chosen for the land forces.

The Defence White Paper contains various initiatives which underline the growing importance of cooperation between the Services. This is based on various considerations:

* an alert and flexible defence organisation requires that personnel can see beyond and cross the partitions between the sections of the organisation, since it is, despite all its diversity, a single entity;

*** military personnel from different Services operate together ever more frequently during missions. The concept of joint operations by land, air and naval forces is becoming increasingly important. There are strong military-operational arguments for more cooperation between the Services, of which the modules are also capable of operating jointly: modules such as a mechanised battalion, a Patriot unit, the Amphibious Transport Ship (ATS) and parts of the THG. Countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom are now going to great lengths in response to the need to prepare the armed forces for joint operations. This is a crucial success factor in military operations. The Dutch modules will form part of multinational groups which operate jointly and must be thoroughly prepared in this respect. NATO also endorses this in the context of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF);**

*** cooperation between Services can improve efficiency, for instance in**

combat and logistic support.

Cooperation between the Services is increasingly taking shape. Familiar examples are the cooperation between the RNLAFs THG and the RNLAs Airmobile Brigade, the cooperation between the Commando Corps, the Marine Corps and the Airmobile Brigade as well as the interservice disaster assistance response teams. The DICO is also an illustration of this development.

New steps in interservice cooperation are required. The following initiatives will, therefore, be taken:

·the object air defence of the RNLA and the RNLAF will be merged and stationed at De Peel Air Base. The final stage of the merger is the setting up of a Joint Air Defence Centre, which will also be responsible for the operational planning, teaching and training;

·the training courses for air rescue and firefighting for all Services involved will be given at a new school for the RNLAFs firefighting courses at Woensdrecht Air Base. The aim is to concentrate the general firefighting courses of the RNLN and the RNLA here as well. Highly specialised RNLN firefighting courses will continue to be given on board ships in Den Helder because of the connection with operational management;

·the technical and maintenance training for small arms will be merged, as has already occurred in the case of courses for ammunition awareness and the demining pool;

·for the armed forces as a whole, a new medical concept will be developed which will more accurately reflect the changing circumstances under which operations take place. In respect of the transport capacity for wounded personnel, the accent will shift from ground transport to air transport, both in the area of operations and from the area of operations to the Netherlands. This will serve to increase speed, flexibility and efficiency. Partly in aid of this new medical support concept, the armed forces will have new light helicopters. In peace operations, the Services will be, as they are now, able to call upon each others medical personnel;

·the three training institutes, the Royal Naval College (KIM), the Royal Military Academy (KMA) and the Netherlands Defence College (IDL) will be merged in a single, new administrative form. This will result in much closer cooperation in respect of the officer training within the Defence organisation. The initial training for midshipmen from the RNLN and cadets from the RNLA and RNLAF is geared towards functioning in the respective Services. In the final stage and in the secondary and tertiary training, they will be much more involved in joint activities, as these form an important part of the training. There will be a joint Military Science Faculty, which will include professors and university lecturers from the KIM and the KMA. An advisory council will monitor the academic standards and optimal cooperation between the Services. The capacity of the Netherlands Defence College will be put to better use for the training courses followed by officers

of all Services. A separate training programme will be developed for officers of the Royal Marechaussee, so that their training will be fully tailored to their future activities. Some Royal Marechaussee officers are currently recruited from the other Services.

·there is to be an interservice capacity for civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) for peace operations. At the request of NATO, the Netherlands will probably, together with Germany, set up a core staff for a CIMIC group, which will be expanded on deployment to form an international interservice CIMIC unit. The interservice core staff will be incorporated in the RNLA. It will also be possible to deploy the CIMIC unit for humanitarian relief for the benefit of Development Cooperation;

·training courses in respect of the detection and clearance of mines and explosives are to be merged. In 2002, there will be one EOD school for the whole of the armed forces. This school will be part of the RNLA.

The future of the Dutch armed forces lies in international cooperation. Dutch military units must, therefore, be able to fit easily into multinational alliances. This imposes heavy demands on the teaching and training of personnel and on equipment. The best example of multinational military cooperation is the integrated military structure of NATO. This form of cooperation goes beyond combined operations. NATO also plays a key role in the coordination of standards and procedures of member states. The Netherlands is striving for optimal harmonisation, since compatibility, or interoperability, is vitally important now that personnel operate more than ever before in changing international settings.

The German-Netherlands Corps (GNC) is, in international terms, one of the most highly developed forms of cross-border military cooperation. There are good reasons for proceeding with the efforts made by both countries to fully prepare this unit for future tasks. The German-Netherlands Corps can play a major role in connection with the requirement for rapidly-deployable ground troops for peacekeeping operations. The high degree of integration in this corps is an impetus for further European cooperation.

The reserve complement will be reduced but not abolished. It is still a relatively cost-effective military capacity in the unexpected event that it will have to be called upon in the future. All active armed forces generate a reserve complement in the form of former military personnel. It is inefficient not to make use of this. Reservists can contribute to peace operations to a growing extent. Thanks to these personnel, the armed forces have people with rare expertise and skills which are required temporarily but which cannot be incorporated in the defence organisation because it would be too costly or simply not feasible; one example of such a category is medical personnel.

Creating scope for new policy

To enable the organisation to implement these innovations within the financial constraints, scope will have to be created elsewhere in the Defence budget. This will

result in difficult but unavoidable choices. Measures that are considered advisable to create scope for new policy include the disposal of two Standaard-class frigates, three minehunters, three Orions, 136 Leopard-2 tanks from the reserve complement and eighteen F-16 fighter aircraft. The planning also aims to create scope for the improvement of the armed forces by abandoning replacement investment and investments connected with disposal. The scale of investments in ammunition, air defence and mine systems has also been reduced. These far-reaching measures have been taken in the belief that the inevitable loss of combat power will be partly compensated by the resulting scope for new policy, which will ensure that the armed forces are better prepared for the future.

The Defence White Paper is based on difficult but careful decisions and assessments. It is, however, impossible to predict with any accuracy the developments over the next ten years. During the implementation of the Defence White Paper, therefore, a finger will have to be kept constantly on the pulse. This will apply in particular to the following aspects:

- experiences during peace operations;
- new military doctrine;
- the permanent dialogue between the Defence organisation and society;
- the results of recruitment on the labour market;
- experiences in connection with the new personnel policy;
- experiences in connection with the Process of Change in the Defence Organisation;
- experiences in connection with Defences management concept;
- the financial resources allocated to Defence;
- new opportunities for international cooperation and possible task specialisation;
- the development of our Allies armed forces;
- advances in technology;
- changes in the cost of defence equipment.

A modern defence organisation

A modern defence organisation must be geared towards the future. The Defence White Paper gives a ten-year perspective in the knowledge that a directional outlook is vital for defence policy. This provides a foothold. Defence plans must be explained clearly and in good time in order to encourage broad political and public support.

In order to translate policy objectives into concrete plans and to obtain the required support, the Defence organisation must be efficient, alert and flexible. The way in which the organisation functions is thus the first aspect to be examined. Since last year, a series of measures has been taken in the context of the Process of Change in the Defence Organisation in order to improve the way in which the Defence organisation functions. The organisation must, after all, meet the high standards set by the politicians and society for a contemporary governmental organisation. The characteristics of the Defence organisation underline the fact that it has a wide-ranging task which calls for tailor-made measures. After all, the organisation:

· is substantial (approximately 75,000 people);

· is spread over some 350 locations;

· has a high degree of diversity;

· has in a short time been assigned important new tasks;

· performs its tasks in a peacetime situation in the Netherlands, but must prepare units for operations in wartime conditions;

· operates within and outside our national borders, in the case of the latter in a multinational context;

· conducts activities which are certain to arouse major political and public interest;

· has been undergoing constant, radical change since the beginning of the nineties;

· operates within a strict budgetary framework.

This imposes heavy demands on the administration of the Defence organisation. The need for an alert and flexible response means that responsibilities cannot and must not be too highly centralised. At the same time, the core department must have the information that the political leaders need to steer the organisation in broad terms and to be properly politically accountable. The idea is to unite centralisation and decentralisation.

Defence is a large, multi-faceted government organisation which should be able to respond swiftly to todays challenges. This places heavy demands on personnel and also on the structure and culture of the organisation. During the course of last year, the structure and work methods of Defence were brought into question, mainly as a result of several incidents. This is why a decision was made last autumn to instigate the Process of Change in the Defence Organisation, on which this Paper continues to build.

The measures taken to achieve the objectives of the Process of Change in the Defence Organisation are also designed to ensure that the political leaders are better able to fully live up to their responsibility for the functioning of the organisation. Transparency,

accountability and reliability are the key concepts for a contemporary government organisation. To ensure that these concepts are fully substantiated, heavy demands are placed on the Defence organisations management concept.

The government believes that the management of so complex and dynamic an organisation requires central direction and decentralised execution. Decentralised execution helps to ensure that the organisation can be swift and flexible in its response, clarifies responsibilities and promotes efficiency. Central direction in broad terms is thus preferable to centralisation.

Neither centralisation nor decentralisation is feasible as the only applicable principle. Purely centralised management leads to delays and unwieldiness. Purely decentralised management means that the overview is lost. The management concept of "central direction and decentralised execution" reflects the balance. The decentralised execution organisations provide the information which forms the basis on which the central direction is conducted. The information must meet stringent requirements.

The Defence organisation is directed in broad terms from its core department; in 2001 the number of policy and policy support functions in the core department will be reduced by 25% compared to 1995/1996. The Services and the DICO implement policy. In this respect, the Commanders in Chief and the Commander of the DICO are, within the confines of the policy set out by the political leaders, responsible and thus accountable. This naturally goes hand in hand with clear reporting and monitoring.

The balance between operational and other units will be improved in the following ways:

- ·combat-readiness and deployability will be enhanced, partly by adding 2,100 extra functions to rapidly deployable ground forces;

- ·the number of policy and policy support functions of Defences Central Organisation and the staffs of the Commanders in Chief will be reduced by 25% compared to 1995/1996;

- ·executive tasks will be evaluated against the opportunities for efficiency improvements and out-sourcing (competitive service provision).

An important factor in respect of the operational readiness of the Dutch armed forces is that the deployment system - six months preparation, six months deployment or standby for deployment and six months recuperation - significantly limits the number of immediately deployable military personnel at any given time: we are, after all, talking about one third of the entire complement. In view of the pressure on personnel, it would not be appropriate to tighten this norm. On the contrary: thanks to the armed forces increased levels of combat-readiness and deployability, this norm, which for some units has been a reality for years, will gradually become the maximum.

Competitive service provision will promote more efficient management within the Defence organisation. This will produce substantial savings. The aim is to achieve savings amounting to at least NLG 40 million in 2001 and NLG 65 million the following year. From 2003, the savings should total NLG 100 million a year.

Personnel policy

Reducing the average age of the personnel complement

The quality of the armed forces is increasingly determined by the question of whether sufficient qualified and motivated personnel are available. The armed forces personnel complement must, even though the quality, efforts and motivation of the current individual employees are not being called into question, improve its position in terms of meeting the requirements for a professional, flexible and rapidly deployable force. Against that background, the personnel complement will acquire a broader base of young personnel and a narrower top consisting of older employees. For many, a professional military career will no longer mean a job for life.

The first objective is a shift in the ratio of regular personnel on indefinite contracts to those on fixed-term contracts from 60:40 to 40:60. Once the new personnel policy has been implemented, the difference between the two categories will diminish sharply. As most personnel will leave the Defence organisation after five to seven years, it is vital that measures be taken to increase the chances of former military personnel on the labour market. This shift from job security to work security is also taking place elsewhere in society.

An amount of NLG fifty million has been set aside for personnel policy in 2000; from 2001 this will be one hundred million per year. Despite the tight Defence budget, the choice for this extra investment was made with conviction. The political support for the intensification of personnel policy was endorsed during the Parliamentary Debate on the Speech from the Throne in September this year when, at the time the Dijkstal motion was carried, a decision was made to add a structural amount of NLG fifty million to Defence resources for personnel policy. This amount is in addition to the aforementioned funds already set aside.

The personnel policy serves to guarantee that the organisation has personnel at its immediate disposal who are equal to their task. In this regard, two factors are essentially influential: the developments in society and the special requirements that the tasks of the armed forces impose upon their personnel.

In ten years time, the introduction of a new personnel structure will have resulted in a well-balanced, streamlined personnel structure. Over the next ten years, some 5,200 people are expected to become supernumerary in the Defence organisation. Instruments of the Defence Social Policy Framework will apply to personnel who become supernumerary as a result of this or other measures. The Defence organisation will provide the resources necessary to enable a successful transition to the civil sector. The purpose in this respect is to avoid compulsory redundancies.

The assumption that a career in the Defence organisation is in principle a career for life has been abandoned. Work security is to replace the certainty of a permanent job. Offering work security, both within and outside the organisation, to each employee is a spearhead of the policy intensification. This not only applies to the fixed-term contractor who leaves the organisation, but also, without exception, to personnel who become supernumerary for any reason whatsoever.

The tasks of the armed forces place heavy demands on military personnel in general. The range of tasks has become more extensive and the possibilities and areas of deployment more varied. The work has thus become more challenging and the operations conducted by military personnel - still exclusively regular personnel - are not the same as they were a few years ago. The risk to individuals, however, is greater, as are the effects on the home front. The military employee is faced with tasks of a special nature, especially during the preparation and execution of tasks under operational conditions. The personnel policy takes account of this and helps to ensure that employees can perform their duties precisely under special circumstances. The policy must find a balance between special and more general conditions and must also be in line with norms outside the Defence organisation. This is particularly important in terms of simplifying the transition to the civil sector for those personnel leaving the Defence organisation after a fixed-term appointment.

Dutch society is changing at a fast pace. Of particular importance to the Defence organisation are the demographic developments, especially the ageing population, the increase in the average level of education, the loosening ties of employees to a particular employer together with an increased labour mobility, changing labour relations, the greater availability of women and ethnic minorities on the labour market, the shifting roles of men and women and the deliberate search for a balance between ones work and private life.

Measures are being taken to make Defence a more attractive employer in a competitive position on the labour market. The Defence organisation is therefore not only investing in work security, but also in the improvement of the working environment and working conditions. These must be in balance with what Defence expects from its personnel. General developments which affect all employees in the Netherlands also apply in principle to military personnel, unless this compromises the tasks of the armed forces to an unacceptable extent. A strong competitive position is not only necessary for the purpose of recruiting new personnel, but also to keep existing personnel in the organisation.

Over the next few years, the following principles and policy objectives will guide the development of policy for defence personnel:

- the prospect of good working conditions;
- challenging and inspiring work;
- a personnel structure which is in keeping with modern armed forces;
- holding an advantageous position on the labour market;
- the prospect of work security within and outside the Defence organisation;
- a social policy that takes account of the need to combine work and private life;
- guarantee of effective support for personnel before, during and after deployment.

The structure of Defences personnel complement must meet the requirements set for modern, flexible, rapidly deployable and professional armed forces, thus promoting a satisfactory staffing of the organisation both in terms of quantity and quality and ensuring support for the deployment of the armed forces in peace operations. To meet the standards set by the organisation, the structure of the personnel complement will have to undergo radical changes. On balance, this will mean that the average age is lowered, thus improving the availability and deployability of operational units.

Furthermore, imbalances in the personnel structure of the armed forces, in particular the age structure, can eventually be eliminated. These imbalances, which are partly the result of the combination of lifetime career patterns and initiatives taken in the nineties in respect of the reorganisation and reduction of the armed forces, would otherwise lead irreversibly to the ageing of the Defence organisation in the coming years. With a modified personnel structure and more young people in lower ranks, the distribution of labour over the various function levels in the organisation must be reorganised. An increase in the number of young people, particularly in the lower ranks, together with a variable contract term, must produce the required flexibility in the new personnel structure.

The starting points of the new personnel structure are thus flexibility, professionalism and a reduction in the age of the personnel complement. This requires an increase in the proportion of fixed-term contractors, thus changing the ratio of personnel on indefinite contracts and those on fixed-term contracts. In the envisaged structure, sixty percent of military personnel will ultimately have a fixed-term appointment. As compared to the personnel complement at the beginning of 1999, 10,000 personnel on indefinite contracts must thus be replaced by fixed-term contractors. The end-of-service arrangements for military personnel will also be changed. Features of the new system are the introduction of a capital-funded pension that will take immediate effect from the age of 60, a flexible system of retirement ages between 55 and 60, with an average of 58, and an adjustment of the level of and eligibility for benefit. The revised end-of-service system is to be introduced in 2001.

The guaranteed intake of more than 40,000 conscripts a year has given way to a recruitment drive on the labour market, with a recruitment target of 7,000 fixed-term contractors per year.

From the point of view of recruitment it is undeniably important that potential employees are familiar with the functions available in the armed forces. The image held by young people in respect of (functions in) the Defence organisation is a decisive factor in this respect. A recent study has shown that, within the target group of 18 to 29-year-olds, the possibility of serving in the Defence organisation on a temporary appointment is by no means common knowledge. Only 45 percent of the indigenous target group and 33 percent of the ethnic minorities target group are aware of it. The same study has shown that young people from ethnic minorities are more interested in a job in the armed forces than are indigenous youngsters. Much of the potential in this segment of the labour market is up to now unused.

In view of the importance of image, labour market communication will be improved. Defence will also portray itself more vigorously as an employer (interesting jobs offering variety and challenges in an attractive environment, possibilities for study, attractive and

competitive conditions of employment). The way in which this information is conveyed will be further tailored to the intended target group. To this end, further studies will be conducted to ascertain the profile of the target group from which Defence must draw in the coming years. Defence must get a better idea of what the current generation of 15 - 16-year-olds think about work and training.

Defence must improve the way in which it functions. This will also help to ensure that Defence is regarded as an appealing, professional organisation offering good jobs. The new personnel policy will also improve the quality of the organisation. If Defence has faith in its own organisation it will present itself confidently, which will benefit its allure on the labour market. This is necessary in order to have the right people in the right place for the often difficult tasks facing the armed forces.

Concrete objectives for change

In consultations between the government and parliament, ever more attention is paid to concrete change objectives on the basis of which the cabinet is subsequently better able to fulfil its obligations of accountability with regard to the implemented policy. Against this background, concrete change objectives stemming from the Defence White Paper have been drawn up below.

The main change objectives for the **functioning of the Defence organisation**are:

·The full implementation before 2003 of the measures announced in the context of the Process of Change in the Defence Organisation:

- a strengthened Political Consultative Group and an improved system of reporting on the basis of clearly formulated objectives, with a view to reinforcing central

direction;

- the strengthening of the role of the Inspector-General of the Armed Forces;

- improved external communication;

- coping efficiently with exceptional occurrences;

- central leadership of peace operations and strengthening of the integral planning

by the Chief of the Defence Staff;

- a uniform framework for the completion of peace operations;

- greater mobility of personnel;

- extra attention for the social environment in personnel training;

- improved structure for the internal provision of information;

- accountability by senior officials.

·The completion in 2001 of the 25% reduction of the number of policy and policy support functions in the core department. This reduction is to be implemented from 1998 - 2003 in the Hague headquarters of the Services.

·The strengthening in the near future of the central direction for the realisation of major high-cost equipment projects. The Commanders in Chief are directly accountable in this regard to the political leaders. There will be a direct information line between the project leaders in the Services and the Director-General for Materiel. Against this backdrop, the Defence Materiel Selection Process will be evaluated in 2000.

·A start will soon be made on a competitive service provision programme for Defence Telematics Organisation, the Defence Infrastructure Agency, the Topographic Service of the Netherlands, the Central Mechanical Maintenance and Repair Facility, the Defence Organisation for Recruitment and Selection and the Personnel and Salary Administration. The higher echelon maintenance agencies of the RNLAF and the RNLN, and the occupational health & safety services of the RNLN, RNLA and RNLAF will soon join the programme, as will the remaining support services.

·The operational management policy will be fully implemented, on the assumption that complete support for operational management with integral and standardised information systems will be provided as of 2006.

·The increase in expenditure for Defences environmental policy by an amount rising to NLG 20 million in 2003.

Objectives for change with regard to operational management

Over the course of 2000, all units down to sector level and result-responsible units (abbreviated to RVE in Dutch) will have the authorities and assets in order for those in positions of authority at that level to be able to bear integral responsibility for implementation of their allocated tasks.

The budget for 2001 must include transparent objectives down to RVE level.

As of the budget for 2003, all index figures must be developed for measuring the realisation of the objectives. It must be possible to present these figures in the budget.

In 2001, all RVEs will have their own expenditure budgets and quantity budgets with regard to services (with respect to large support units).

In 2001, organisational elements down to RVE level must have a cost insight that forms an independent factor in considering the deployment of assets in relation to the realisation of products and services.

The creation of an audit function, and its related capacity, is the responsibility of the line management of the policy areas. As of 2001, all organisation units up to RVE level must have an audit plan.

Having established the Defence-wide operating processes, from 2006 onwards there must be an integral and standardised operating process system which is to be introduced in phases, for the time being within the materiel-logistic units.

The major objectives for change for the **Royal Netherlands Navy**(RNLN) are:

· The acquisition of a second Amphibious Transport Ship, if possible with CJTF command facilities, which is to be operational as of 2007.

· Combat-readiness in the period 2001 - 2004 of a third Marine Corps battalion by expanding the Marine Corps by 300 functions. Infrastructural facilities will be provided in Den Helder.

· A reduction in the number of frigates from sixteen to fourteen as of the end of 1999. This reduction is to be achieved by:

- disposing of both Tromp-class guided missile frigates in 1999 and 2003 respectively, as well as the disposal of four Standaard-class frigates in the period 2001 - 2005;

- taking into service in the period 2002 - 2005 four Air Defence and Command frigates (LCF).

· Completion in 2003 of a study into the opportunities to equip LCF frigates with a capacity for defence against ballistic missiles (TMD).

· The disposal of three minehunters in the period 2000 to 2002.

· Completion of the modernisation of twelve minehunters which also possess minesweeping capabilities in 2008.

· In the period 1999 - 2003, the replacement of the two outdated North Sea vessels by two new hydrographic vessels; disposal of HNLMS Tydeman in 2003.

· Disposal of three Orions in the period 2001 - 2006.

· Stationing of a third Orion in the Caribbean as of mid-2000.

· Modernisation of ten Orions in the period 2001 to 2006.

· Replacement of the Lynx helicopters by twenty NH-90 helicopters from 2007

onwards

· Operational introduction of the Netherlands Maritime Headquarters in Den Helder in mid-2001, in which the headquarters of the Commander in Chief of the Fleet and the Coastguard Centre will be combined.

The major objectives for change for the **Royal Netherlands Army**(RNLA) are:

·An increase in the combat-ready capacity of the mechanised infantry units by 1000 functions, by means of expansion by six combat-ready companies in the period 2001 - 2004.

·An increase in the combat-ready capacity of the engineer (and NBC) units by about 200 functions in the period 2000 - 2001.

·An increase in the combat-ready capacity of the intelligence gathering units (Remotely Piloted Vehicles battery, Electronic Warfare company and mortar acquisition battery) by about 150 functions in the period 2001 - 2004.

·An increase, in conjunction with the above, of the logistic capacities and the appointment in the division headquarters of officials for civil-military (CIMIC) cooperation, which will lead to an expansion in the personnel complement of about 150 functions in the period 2001 -2003.

·The addition in 2001 of a combat-ready reconnaissance squadron to all three division brigades; the division reconnaissance squadrons will be given reserve status.

·The creation of an international, interservice CIMIC framework group in the period 2000 - 2001, led by the Netherlands and Germany and with Dutch input comprising about 20 functions in the core staff.

·The disbandment of three reserve tank battalions: 136 Leopard-2 tanks, 125 YPR tracked vehicles and more than 400 wheeled vehicles are to be sold off.

·The reorganisation of the National Command (including the National Reserve), which is to be reduced in size by about 800 functions.

·The concentration of object air defence of both the Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF) and the RNLA into a joint air defence unit within the RNLA, which is to be stationed at De Peel Air Base. A Joint Air Defence Centre is to be set up in 2004.

The major objectives for change for the **Royal Netherlands Air Force**(RNLAF) are:

· The purchase of fourteen, if possible sixteen, light utility helicopters to replace 27 Bölkow and four Alouette helicopters. The new helicopters will be available as of 2003.

· The disbandment of 306 Squadron at the start of 2001. Prior to disbandment, the available air reconnaissance assets from the squadron will be distributed among the three squadrons with high combat-readiness status at Leeuwarden, Twenthe and Volkel Air Bases. Eighteen F-16 fighter aircraft are to be disposed of.

· Reinforcement of the deployability and capacity of the Tactical Helicopter Group (THG) by means of expansion by about 300 functions in the period 2001 - 2003. The THG will be fully deployable as of mid-2003.

· The acquisition as of 2003 of Longbow radar for the Apache combat helicopters

· Fitting of all transport helicopters with self-protection equipment as of 2004 at the latest.

· Disbandment of 336 Squadron in the Netherlands Antilles as of mid-2000 and the sale of two F-27-M aircraft.

· Integration of the training squadron from the Guided Weapons Group into one of the four operational squadrons as of 2001.

· Disbandment of the object air defence squadrons at Leeuwarden and Twenthe Air Bases in conjunction with the concentration of ground-based air defence at De Peel Air Base.

The major objectives for change for the **Royal Marechaussee**are:

·The introduction in 2001 of a new operational management system in the context of the Royal Marechaussee Policy and Operational Management 2000 project.

·Implementation in 2000 of the integral plan of approach for, among other things, the management of the Royal Marechaussee, the reorganisation of the headquarters and the personnel complement; NLG 35 million is needed for this in the next ten years.

·Completion of personnel additions by 400 Royal Marechaussee personnel due to task intensification with regard to the mobile monitoring of aliens, control at the Schengen areas outer borders and for registration centres for asylum seekers. In 2000 and 2001, training for this expansion will be intensified such that three groups of ninety personnel members will be available more quickly.

·Expansion of the training capacity and, consequently, adaptation of the infrastructure of the Royal Marechaussee Training Centre (abbreviated to OCKMar in Dutch) in Apeldoorn in the period 2001 - 2007. The other OCKMar location, the Detmers Barracks, will be disposed of in 2006.

·From 2000 onwards, clearance of the personnel shortages in the military police brigades, border control and mobile monitoring of aliens as a result of setting priorities for the short term for the benefit of the Royal Marechaussee personnel

complement at Schiphol.

·Improvement in the system for sending Royal Marechaussee personnel on missions abroad for the benefit of international operations, as a result of which those involved are appointed and prepared for the mission in good time.

·103 Royal Marechaussee Squadron (combat-ready) and 41 and 102 Royal Marechaussee Squadron (mobilisable), which are currently part of the Royal Netherlands Army are to be assigned to the Royal Marechaussee.

The major objectives for change for **personnel**are:

·The introduction in 2000 of a new management form for the officer training courses at the Royal Naval College (KIM), the Royal Military Academy (KMA) and the Netherlands Defence College (IDL). A joint Faculty of Military Science which will contain lecturers from the Royal Naval College and the Royal Military Academy is to be set up. A separate training programme will be created for Royal Marechaussee officers.

·The introduction of a new personnel system in the period 2000 - 2009, by which fixed-term contractors will make up 60% of the personnel and indefinite contractors 40%; the current ratio is the other way round. This will reduce the age of the personnel complement.

·A reduction in the claim laid on personnel in the framework of international operations. Thanks to the expansion of the rapidly deployable combat-ready units in the armed forces, the norm will become a maximum of a six-month mission abroad in each eighteen-month period.

·An increase in the contribution from reserve personnel to peacekeeping operations. This chiefly involves deployment of medical personnel and personnel for transport tasks, the Naval Control of Shipping Organisation and civil-military cooperation during peacekeeping operations.

·The introduction of a new system for the end-of-service regulations in 2001 and an actual increase in the retirement age for military personnel from 55 to an average of 58 in the period 2003 to 2009.

·The elaboration in 2000 of an external work assurance policy in consultation with the business sector. The organisations for mediation and supervision in the armed forces must be up and running in 2001. Where necessary, investment will be made in training courses in order to enable an oriented transfer to the civilian labour market.

·Completion in 2000 of the study into the opportunities for improving communication with the labour market. The measures for better informing the target group of 18 to 29-year-olds about temporary positions in the Defence

organisation will subsequently be implemented in 2001.

·Evaluation of staffing in 2000. In 2001, a decision needs to be made on how staffing should be organised in Defence and which activities should be contracted out.

·The introduction in 2000 of case management to improve questions about care from (ex) military personnel.

·Development of a new medical support system, about which decisions are to be taken in the first half of 2000.

·Development of a new welfare model in which, among other things, the content of the material welfare package will again be laid down. The alterations will form part of the next labour conditions consultations in the Defence Sector Committee.

·Completion in 2000 of two trial projects for juvenile delinquents. A decision will be subsequently be made as to whether, and if so how, such projects can be continued in a structural manner.

·Implementation in 2000 of a trial company crèche project. Following evaluation, there will be a review of structural provisions in 2001.

The major objectives for change with regard to **equipment**are:

· The accession of the Netherlands in 2000 to the OCCAR equipment agency, with the GTK project as admission ticket.

· The scrapping in the short term of the penalty clause in compensation contracts.

· The introduction of a new operational logistics concept, based more on the civilian model, which is to be elaborated in 2000 and implemented in full in 2006, or as much earlier as possible.

· The drawing up of a basic document on the replacement of F-16 fighter aircraft in February 2000.

· The disposal of surplus Defence materiel with estimated receipts from sales of NLG 640 million over the next ten years.

· A decrease in the budget for scientific research and development by a sum rising to NLG 10 million a year as of 2003.

The Defence White Paper 2000 and the Framework Memorandum: the differences

The major differences between the Framework Memorandum and the Defence White

Paper are:

· An increase in the financial shifts over the coming ten years from NLG 6.5 billion in the Framework Memorandum to almost NLG 10 billion.

· A doubling of the expansion of the RNLAs combat-ready mechanised infantry capacity. Instead of 500, 1000 combat-ready functions will now be created thanks to making six instead of three mechanised infantry companies combat ready.

· An expansion by 500 combat-ready functions instead of 300 for the RNLAs engineer and NBC units and for target acquisition, civil-military cooperation and logistic units

· Expansion of the logistic ground units of the THG by 300 combat-ready functions, resulting in an increase in the sustainability of the THG.

· Disposal of three RNLN minehunters.

· Distribution over the three RNLAF high combat-ready status squadrons of the reconnaissance capacity of 306 Squadron of fighter aircraft, the disbandment of which was announced in the Framework Memorandum.

· The drawing up of a basic document on the replacement of the F-16 fighter aircraft

· The requirement for fourteen, if possible sixteen, new light utility helicopters to replace the Bölkow and Alouette helicopters.

· Implementation of the integral plan of approach for the improvement of management of the Royal Marechaussee and the reorganisation of the staff of this Service. Intensification of the training courses for the benefit of the personnel expansion which has already been started.

· Transfer of what are known as khaki (tasked with the escort of convoys) Marechaussee squadrons from the RNLA to the Royal Marechaussee.

· Implementation of the measures announced in March 1999 in the Process of Change in Defence, including strengthening of the central direction of the management of Defence, an improved structure for internal information provision, the strengthening of the management by the Chief of the Defence Staff of peacekeeping operations and integrated planning, an improvement in external communications and an increase in the mobility of personnel.

· Reinforcement of the central direction of the implementation of major, high-cost equipment projects.

· Far-reaching cooperation between the Royal Military Academy, the Royal Naval College and the Netherlands Defence College and a merger of various other

training courses.

· The introduction of a Competitive Service Provision programme for a large number of executive and support services in Defence.

· As a result of the Dijkstal motion, an increase in funds for the new personnel policy up to NLG 100 million in 2000 and NLG 150 million structurally over the following years.

· A reduction in pressure on personnel as a result of the frequency of missions abroad for peacekeeping operations.

· An increase in the contribution from reserve personnel to peacekeeping operations

· The introduction of a new system for end-of-service regulations up to an average of 58 years.

· The development of a new medical support system for the armed forces.

· The scrapping of the penalty clause in contracts in which industrial compensation for materiel procurement is laid down.