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NATIONAL DEFENSE CONCEPT

Riga 2020

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INTRODUCTION

The concept of national defense is a policy planning document that defines the strategic goals and basic principles of national defense.

State protection applies to every citizen of Latvia. Therefore, guaranteeing national defense is not only the responsibility of the state power and administrative institutions, but also the responsibility of each individual. If everyone treats and acts responsibly towards their own security and that of the country, the goal of national defense will be achieved and society will be prepared to overcome crises and other upheavals.

The national defense concept is developed taking into account the analysis of military threats and the geopolitical and internal political situation of Latvia. In accordance with the National Security Law, based on the goals and principles defined in the National Defense Concept, a National Defense Plan is developed, which includes specific measures for the implementation of the goals. Information on the content of the National Defense Plan is not publicly available to the public for security reasons.

The concept of national defense was written at a time when society is suffering from various types of non-military threats. Pandemics, economic crises, natural disasters and other shocks significantly affect not only public safety, health and well-being, but also the stability of the country as a whole. It is important for the country to maintain military vigilance and combat readiness of the armed forces while dealing with the consequences of these challenges. During the previous crisis, when defense issues were neglected, the development of the capabilities of the armed forces was halted. Therefore, being aware of the regional security situation, only by consistently and pragmatically strengthening the national defense, we will be able to resist external influences and recover quickly after crises.

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1. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

1.1. Global trends

The multilateral international world order, which was formed and institutionally strengthened after the end of the Cold War, in order to create mutually binding rules with the help of international organizations and regimes and reduce the possibility of interstate conflicts, is undergoing significant changes. Despite existing and legally binding conventions, political agreements, functioning security institutions and instruments, some countries blatantly ignore international norms and national sovereignty. Such a trend shows the lack of effectiveness of international organizations in guaranteeing security and the weakening of the multilateral approach in security management.

Current trends in the international order are characterized by power politics, and changes in the international security environment are still difficult to predict. A variety of security challenges, incl. the development of new technologies, terrorism, private military and security companies, climate change, pandemics pose serious threats to the multilateral world development model.

Under the impact of the fragmentation of the global system, the multilateral approach is gradually being replaced by unilateralism, in which disagreements are resolved from positions of strength. As this process continues, the risk of confrontations and conflicts will increase, so the armed forces of countries will play an increasing role in international relations. Power politics becomes potentially dangerous for countries that are geographically close to ambitious regional powers, including Latvia, creating the need to further strengthen the unity and military capabilities of NATO countries.

The insufficient military spending of European countries continues to affect the ability to respond adequately both to the military threats of European countries and to crises outside their territories. Although the US political will to maintain world order is waning, the military dependence of European countries on the US remains both in the field of collective defense and international operations.

Under the influence of the fourth industrial revolution, new technologies are emerging, which play an important role not only in the defense of the country, but in the life of the entire society. New technologies, the development of social networks and the increasing technological dependence of the society are already changing the habits of using the informational space of the society and revealing more and more vulnerabilities, opening wide possibilities of manipulation. In the future, this will threaten democratic countries more than authoritarian regimes, which not only monitor social networks and the Internet, but also use new technologies to control and influence their citizens.

Terrorist groups and organizations continue to influence the domestic political developments and international relations of countries. In Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, the number of terrorist attacks has increased significantly. There is a growing risk that terrorist organizations will fill the power vacuum created by economically and politically underdeveloped countries, offering an alternative to the traditional state governance structure.

Private military and security companies have become part of today's armed conflicts. Individual countries *de facto* use private military and security companies to achieve national ambitions while denying direct ties to

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mercenaries. These companies are instrumental in providing services such as logistics and intelligence, force protection and training that are traditionally provided by the state. In the future, the role of private military and security companies in international interventions may increase and create security risks by interfering in the affairs of sovereign states.

Global climate change is making many regions of the world uninhabitable, fueling new conflicts and human migration, which directly or indirectly also affects European security. Pandemics, man-made crises and natural disasters can particularly severely affect not only Latvia, but also other technologically and socially highly developed countries.

The "COVID19" pandemic proves not only the vulnerability of the globalized world, but also reveals serious risks in the global economy. The concentration of production of vital goods in crisis situations creates serious supply security problems and reduces the availability of vital goods on the market. At the same time, it is clear that nowadays even the pandemic is being used to implement the geopolitical ambitions of countries through both conventional and asymmetric means.

Global trends show that the current balance of power has changed and that maintaining peace and stability through diplomatic and economic means alone is becoming more and more difficult. As the military and technological advantages of Europe and North America gradually decrease, regional power centers will play a greater role, competing for dominance in international relations. The challenges caused by the changes in the international order require not only to continue to maintain the unity of the allied countries, but also to strengthen the national defense capabilities by demonstrating solidarity and a credible deterrence and defense policy.

1.2. Regional trends

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the security situation in the Baltic Sea region has been largely influenced by Russia's challenging and aggressive military and hybrid activities. Russia has widely influenced elections, public opinion and politicians through information warfare and cyber attack techniques. Persecution of dissidents is increasing, there are covert and open demonstrations of military force, which until recently were perceived as a relic of the Cold War. Russia has a clearly visible model of future international relations - everything that cannot be punished or retaliated against is allowed.

Russia continues to develop as an authoritarian state whose main strength is its military capabilities. The recently proposed changes to the Russian constitution only strengthen the existing processes: economic stagnation, the country's dependence on the prices of natural resources, and a decrease in the standard of living of society. Economic backwardness is compensated by strengthening the cult of World War 2 and May 9, demonstrating military prowess, as well as secretly influencing the internal political processes of democratic countries.

The widespread narrative among the Russian population that Russia is a “fortress besieged” by enemies will continue to be an important argument to justify the socio-economic problems of the population. The war in Ukraine, as well as attempts to undermine the independence of Belarus, indicate Russia's growing ambitions. In the future, more and more serious attempts will be made to change the geopolitical situation in Europe, without excluding the possibility of using military force.

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The Russian state-controlled media deliberately cultivates a negative image of Latvia, where Latvians and the Latvian state administration are portrayed as Russophobic and Nazi. As a result, as public opinion polls show, Latvia has been perceived as one of Russia's main enemies for a long time in Russian society. In the Russian Federation, a suitable soil is deliberately maintained, which justifies aggression against Latvia.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Latvia, which has neither rich oil nor natural gas resources, as a democratic country has achieved a higher standard of living than Russia with its abundance of natural resources. Therefore, it is expected that Russia will continue to try to portray Latvia as a failed country in order to mask both the historical socio-economic damage caused by the Soviet Union to the occupied countries, as well as the inability to provide a high standard of living to society today.

In recent years, Russia has invested huge funds and developed military capabilities in the western strategic direction, creating new units, introducing modern weaponry, as well as strengthening the military units stationed in the Kaliningrad region. In military exercises and capability development, great emphasis is placed on force mobility, high readiness units, and blockade of the Baltic sea and air routes. At the same time, Russia cannot afford a full-scale global conventional war with NATO. Therefore, its most realistic option is a hybrid war and a surprise attack to seize some territory, as it has already been done in Georgia and Ukraine. Threats to use tactical nuclear weapons could follow if necessary.

Although the war in eastern Ukraine is not over, a "fatigue" is gradually emerging due to the unresolved problems that the war has created. In this regard, some European countries are increasingly showing a desire to prioritize economic benefits over democratic principles, thus demonstrating a desire to restore relations with Russia as they were before 2014. This is also evidenced by the trends in international cooperation caused by the "COVID 19" crisis, which is why Russia's activities could increase in order to promote the initiative of Western countries to restore cooperation faster.

Since 2014, deterrence measures in the Baltic region, both by developing national capabilities and deploying NATO forces, have reduced the threat. The security and defense of the Baltic States will largely depend on the ability to continue to improve the National Armed Forces and NATO's collective defense, as Russia's internal political instability and foreign policy ambitions will continue to make it look for weak targets against which to direct aggression, thereby diverting attention from internal problems and proving to the world that Russia military potential.

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2. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

2.1. The purpose of national defense

The people of Latvia and the country of Latvia have been continuously affected by European geopolitical events. In the course of its history, the Latvian nation has experienced existential threats more than once, so national defense is the cornerstone of the existence of the Latvian state and nation.

The purpose of national defense is to prevent and overcome possible threats to the state, to guarantee statehood, the operational capacity and continuity of state power and apparatus, as well as to promote a responsible attitude of all Latvian citizens towards the state and its security.

2.2. National defense strategy

The goal of the national defense strategy is to make Latvia's defense strong enough so that any attack would cause significantly greater losses to the aggressor compared to the potential gains, thus deterring it from carrying out an attack.

Regardless of the balance of forces, the National Armed Forces are ready to protect Latvia in the event of a military attack, and no potential aggressor should live under the illusion that Latvian territory can be taken without resistance or significant losses. Along with guarantees of collective protection, Latvian society must have a clear understanding that no one else will protect Latvia if Latvian society is not ready to do so.

Taking into account the development of modern technologies and the methods of influencing society using the Internet and big data, deterrence can no longer be ensured by military means alone. It is also formed by society's will to protect the country and timely preparation for all kinds of shocks. The psychological resilience of society in peacetime becomes an increasingly important factor in mitigating external influence and ensuring deterrence.

Comprehensive protection is the best tool for building a resilient society. Comprehensive defense will not only increase readiness to overcome the shocks of peacetime and wartime, but also reduce the gap of mistrust between citizens and the state administration, as well as unite society as a whole.

National defense is based on four main directions of activity:

- **NATIONAL ARMED FORCES.** The purpose of the national armed forces is to ensure the continuity of state power, the ability to make decisions and quickly respond to an unexpected attack, quickly localize hidden aggression, identify the threat, evaluate and eliminate it. In the event of a massive military aggression, the National Armed Forces must weaken and delay the adversary and inflict maximum losses on it. In case of occupation of the country's territory, the National Armed Forces organize the public resistance movement.

- **COMPREHENSIVE PROTECTION.** The purpose of comprehensive national defense is to ensure that state institutions, public organizations and citizens are ready to provide support to the National Armed Forces and perform vital functions for the existence of society and the national economy, as well as civil defense activities during wartime. Community resilience is based on the psychological

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resilience against external influences and timely preparation, so that in times of crisis and war, all members of society are informed, know their responsibilities and desired actions.

- **NATO COLLECTIVE DEFENSE.** The unity of NATO, the presence of allied forces in Latvia and the credibility of the guarantees of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty are the main elements of NATO's collective defense, which ensure the deterrence of aggression against Latvia.
- **INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION.** In order to ensure full-fledged deterrence and the country's readiness for external aggression, it is also essential to strengthen bilateral military cooperation, primarily with the USA and the countries of the Baltic Sea region. The role of the European Union in security policy and its cooperation with NATO must be promoted. The purpose of this cooperation is to promote information exchange, defense partnership between the countries of the region, joint participation in international operations, as well as support to partner countries that have already suffered from an external attack, such as Georgia and Ukraine.

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3. BASIC STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

3.1. National armed forces

The National Armed Forces (hereinafter - NBS) is the cornerstone of national defense. The development of NBS should be designed in such a way that it provides the most effective protection against potential attack scenarios. The protection system must be able to detect signs of danger in time.

In order to successfully implement national defense tasks, it is necessary to use the advantages of Latvia's territory, hindering the enemy and inflicting maximum personnel losses on him, disrupting and destroying the enemy's command and supply system, as well as ensuring the reception of allied reinforcements.

The operational core of the national armed forces consists of the Ground Forces, including the National Guard and the Special Task Force. The development of NBS is focused on ensuring that the units are:

- mobile;
- with high decentralization of command and supply;
- with high survivability;
- mutually integrated;
- with high fire power;
- resistant to electronic warfare attacks;
- able to maintain the equipment at their disposal;
- technologically advanced.

Only the most necessary capabilities can be developed within the existing defense funding. Therefore, it will be possible to start the development of such capabilities as medium-range anti-aircraft defense, active protection of sea waters and long-range indirect fire support only in the long term. Therefore, the support of our allied countries is essential in mitigating these deficiencies, including financial support for capacity development.

3.1.1. Conventional protection

3.1.1.1. Early warning

Taking into account the military development of Russia, where emphasis is placed on maintaining high readiness and mobility units, it is necessary to improve Latvia's defense early warning systems in order to minimize the element of suddenness as much as possible and provide decision makers with timely information.

The State Security Services and the NBS are primarily responsible for the timely acquisition, analysis and transfer of information to decision-makers. It is essential that the State Border Guard systems and the modernized eastern border surveillance system are integrated into the unified early warning system. The effectiveness of early warning consists of:

- the ability to detect changes in the situation;
- ability to quickly transfer information to decision makers;
- pre-prepared response plans for potential scenarios.

3.1.1.2. Command and control systems

Understanding the battlefield situation, fast, effective exchange of information between the strategic, operational and tactical levels is an essential prerequisite for successful

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ensure defensive operations. Command and communication systems must be designed to be able to operate in a variety of environments, including situations where the systems are subject to various types of communications jamming, loss of GPS signals, and other forms of electronic warfare attack. At the same time, the command and control system must ensure information security against interception and other types of manipulation.

3.1.1.3. Rapid response The

rapid response capability of the units of the national armed forces, including the National Guard, is particularly important. National defense needs to maintain a certain number of units that are able to react immediately, and also units that are at a very high level of readiness.

Such a response core primarily consists of the Mechanized Infantry Brigade of the Ground Forces and the National Guard Brigades. National Guard battalions must complete company-sized high readiness units with combat support elements (indirect fire support, anti-tank capability, anti-aircraft capability, etc.). National armed forces must be able to respond immediately to a threat and also be prepared to respond to a surprise attack. In order to further improve the response capabilities, it is important to improve and strengthen the territorial units by integrating professional service subunits into the Vidzeme and Latgale National Guard brigades.

3.1.1.4. The Border Guard and the Security Administration of the Bank of Latvia integration

In the event of a military attack, the State Border Guard and the Defense Department of the Bank of Latvia are included in the NBS, thereby strengthening the state's defense capabilities. In order to successfully fulfill protection tasks, it is essential to promote closer integration and mutual compatibility of the State Border Guard and the Security Administration of the Bank of Latvia with the NBS. This can be achieved by ensuring the compliance of these institutions with common NATO standards and conducting basic military training of personnel.

3.1.1.5. Maintaining combat readiness

In order to maintain high combat readiness capabilities of the NBS, it is necessary to constantly organize military exercises of various levels. At least once every four years, the "NAMEJS" exercises of the National Armed Forces must be organized, in which all NBS personnel are involved. The training should use a real environment of potential warfare, therefore the training should be organized more often outside the military training grounds, especially in the regions of responsibility of each unit.

It is necessary to activate the wartime structural units of the NBS, implementing the full mobilization of personnel and material and technical resources, including involving the private sector and the civil defense system. At the same time, joint exercises of all three Baltic states should be organized, coordinating them with NATO military structures and promoting the coordination of forces and the ability to perform tasks in a unified operational environment.

In order to check the training, readiness and combat capabilities of the units, sudden combat readiness tests should be organized regularly. The purpose of these tests is to evaluate both the response plans of the units and the ability of the personnel to react in a situation of national threat, as well as the readiness of the units to deploy and start performing military tasks at a certain time.

Likewise, strategic-level exercises "KRISTAPS" should be organized regularly, but not less than once a year, checking the crisis plans of the Cabinet of Ministers, ministries and other state administration institutions and their ability to operate in crisis and wartime conditions.

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3.1.1.6. Decentralized protection

Latvia has a large territory, therefore, in order for the NBS to be able to effectively counter the aggressor in the entire territory of the country, the NBS units must be able to perform operational tasks in a decentralized and coordinated manner.

To implement this, it is important to develop small unit tactics. Unit commanders, from the highest to the division level, must be able to take the initiative and fulfill unified strategic, operational and tactical tasks. In order to perform these tasks, it is of great importance to obtain full information about the enemy's units and ensure the communication possibilities between the units.

Unit commanders must be trained and ready to carry out national defense tasks without the orders of higher commanders, in accordance with the developed operational plans, as determined by the National Security Law.

3.1.1.7. Infrastructure

In order to provide support to the national armed forces and the host country, regional training infrastructure, training ranges and shooting ranges must be developed, as well as the construction of all types of warehouse infrastructure must be prioritized.

The infrastructure of the National Guard battalions should be gradually improved, which facilitates the execution and supply of decentralized tasks. In order to make construction more efficient and facilitate the maintenance of infrastructure, it is necessary to continue to standardize the infrastructure necessary for military needs, while at the same time promoting the wider use of environmentally friendly wooden structures suitable for Latvian conditions.

3.1.1.8. Anti-mobility

The anti-mobility system must be developed during peacetime by identifying cooperation partners, adapting infrastructure in time, planning and training personnel, and organizing exercises. NBS will continue to develop cooperation with the private sector in the field of counter-mobility, regularly testing delay operations during military exercises, including mobilizing the necessary resources.

The creation of such a system should be promoted so that the NBS can deploy obstacles and defensive positions already at the initial stage of a crisis or even during peacetime. In wartime, the Minister of Defense may decide to destroy civilian infrastructure facilities to ensure the necessary operational counter-mobility measures.

3.1.1.9. Basic principles of peacetime and wartime security

The national armed forces, the National Guard and the National Guard are centrally provided on a daily basis in peacetime by a professional competence center which, on the basis of a civilian institution, gradually consolidates the procurement of the defense sector, ensures uniform storage, distribution, quality control of material and technical means, promotes standardization and develops technical and supply management competence.

In the field of security, the primary task of the National Armed Forces is to develop combat support, supply and maintenance units.

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3.1.1.10. Support of the host country Latvia

is responsible for the support of the host country to the allied forces in peacetime and at the beginning of a crisis, providing them with the necessary resources, infrastructure, territories, as well as organizing their movement and access to the country's airports, ports and roads as a priority. In order to ensure the rapid movement of allied forces within NATO and the EU already in peacetime, bureaucratic obstacles must be reduced to a minimum, including at the EU level. Also, the infrastructure needs to be adapted to military requirements.

For the support needs of the host country, it is especially important to continue developing Liepÿja port and Lielvÿrde airport. Such new infrastructure projects as, for example, "Rail Baltic" need to be adapted to military needs as well, including by building a railway branch to the ÿdaži military base. When developing or repairing roads and bridges, the military mobility parameters agreed upon by NATO and EU members should be taken into account.

3.1.1.11. Cooperation with civil structures

In order to ensure the functions of the NBS and the basic needs of society during the war, closer permanent cooperation with civil institutions should be established.

The ability of military medicine in the NBS, cooperation with Latvian universities to integrate military medicine into curricula must be strengthened, as well as cooperation with the health sector in the development of crisis training and response plans in accordance with potential aggression scenarios.

The integration of the State Border Guard, the Security Administration of the Bank of Latvia, the Information Technology Security Incident Prevention Institution, the Latvian Center for Environment, Geology and Meteorology, A/S "Latvijas Gaisa satiksme" and the Civil Aviation Agency into the NBS should be regularly tested, involving the aforementioned institutions in planning activities and exercises.

During the war, civil defense measures are organized by the Civil Defense Operational Command Center, whose operation must be regularly tested in crisis management exercises.
The center must cooperate with the NBS, involving also the municipal civil defense commissions.

3.1.2. Protection against hybrid threats

The level of hybrid threat in Latvia has been constantly increased, which is why it is important to strengthen society's resilience and response capabilities both in everyday life and in the event of aggression.

Given the unlimited possibilities for influence operations and social engineering with the help of widely available technologies, society must be prepared for new types of threats. In this context, the National Armed Forces, state security institutions and other responsible institutions must develop the capacity to identify, document and prove hybrid warfare activities against the state.

In the event of a hybrid threat, the effectiveness of decision-making and the speed of reaction of the country's highest officials are decisive for the preservation of Latvia's statehood.
Therefore, crisis management procedures and the knowledge of officials should be regularly improved so that the country's top officials are able to make quick and balanced decisions to limit the threat or completely prevent it.

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3.1.3. Resistance movement

It is the co-responsibility of every citizen to defend the country and actively or passively resist the aggressor. In the event of a sudden military invasion, each NBS unit and civil institution acts in accordance with the National Defense Plan, without waiting for a separate decision on the initiation of defense.

Even in a situation where, as a result of hostilities, control over a part of the country's territory would be temporarily lost, the NBS and the responsible services will continue to protect the country, showing resistance as long as Latvia's territorial sovereignty is fully restored. Normative acts and defense planning documents clearly define the tasks of the NBS and the services, while also determining the citizens' responsibilities in the event of a military threat.

In this context, the National Armed Forces are obliged to plan and prepare resistance measures in a timely manner, in which civilians are involved voluntarily and on the basis of mutual trust in the preparation of countermobility and resistance. In order to implement it, training of the population must be provided during peacetime, an organizational structure and the necessary support infrastructure must be created.

3.2. Comprehensive national protection

If the society is not ready to stand up for itself, the country can be lost even without a battle. Public education, resistance to manipulation, practical readiness to overcome crises and civic participation are the basis for the stability and security of society. Sustainable development of Latvia is not possible without national defense and community resilience.

In order to be able to prepare, overcome and recover, knowledge and active individual action are required. Comprehensive national defense must promote a culture of preparedness, so that citizens are purposefully prepared for even the worst possible scenarios, as well as ready to support each other in their personal and public life, thus providing a greater sense of security and the resulting psychological resilience. In this context, the National Guard and Young Guard should be further strengthened, as these structures offer every citizen the opportunity to prepare for a potential threat, while not renouncing civilian life.

Comprehensive defense has two main goals - the resilience of society in peacetime and the defense of the country in wartime. In times of crisis and war, comprehensive defense has the following main tasks:

1) public support for the National Armed Forces in providing national defense:

- involvement in the National Armed Forces and armed resistance organizing;
- support of the host country to the allied forces;
- implementation of anti-mobility measures;
- any kind of support to NBS, allies (for example, exchange of information, supply and other activities and measures);
- resistance movement and network of supporters, as well as passive resistance (eg non-cooperation with the aggressor's armed forces, civil disobedience);

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2) the ability of society and economy to provide vital functions and overcome any shocks, including military conflict:

• the capacity of the state authority to act, its effective functioning and continuity; • clear tasks and role of each institution and municipality during the war, defining critical personnel and functions; • provision of vital functions (eg electricity, communications, financial services, food, critical infrastructure and personnel safety) in all conditions;

• timely formation and storage of reserves of vital resources and raw materials; • timely readiness to act in crisis and war situations at different levels of society, including individual civil readiness.

3.2.1. Continuity of state power

In order to ensure the continuous operation of the basic functions of the state during possible crises and war, it is necessary to implement previously prepared mechanisms at all institutional levels. This includes the continuity of the Cabinet of Ministers' activities, as well as the ability of ministries, responsible services and municipalities to implement tasks essential to the functioning of society.

Taking into account the general dependence of public administration institutions and society on the availability of technology and data, a crucial factor for the state's ability to continue its work during a crisis and war is the creation of backup copies of database systems in foreign countries in order to be able to restore the most important state data.

Finally, each state institution must determine specific tasks and role in the defense of the state, defining the most essential functions and the necessary personnel of the institution in order to be able to ensure its operation in any conditions.

3.2.2. Resilience of society

Comprehensive national defense is possible only with the involvement of the entire society, therefore, the civic activity of the Latvian population is particularly important, as well as citizens taking greater responsibility for the processes taking place in the country, including national defense.

A culture of preparedness must be created, where every private and public organization in Latvia accepts preparedness for potential crisis scenarios as mandatory. Therefore, it is necessary to promote the resilience of the society, which is based on timely education and preparation for action during war, including the ability of the population to survive and hold on by their own forces for as long as possible, but at least 72 hours. More active dissemination of information and training on recommended actions in the event of a threat should be ensured by providing regular seminars, trainings and lectures for various groups of society. Efforts should also be made to provide practical training for different population groups and communities.

Everyone can provide support for national defense with their knowledge and skills, material and technical means and resources, or provide psychological support to victims by supporting families whose members are involved in overcoming crises or eliminating their consequences.

3.2.3. Information space protection

The state must more actively ensure the protection of the information space with various means at its disposal. Every resident of Latvia must be aware that his and

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protecting the rest of society against influence operations and attacks in the information space is an ongoing process.

Therefore, it is necessary to continue educating the public in the field of media literacy, both in school subject programs and in the education of various groups of society. Also, active communication with various groups of society should be continued, explaining the current challenges and threats of the information space, thus promoting critical thinking and psychological resilience against influence operations.

In addition to that, strategic communication should be developed in the defense sector as a set of different communication disciplines, so that in the event of a country's military threat, strategic communication and activities in the information space promote the state's ability to counter information and psychological operations, which are an integral part of military conflicts.

In Latvia, a clear understanding must be strengthened at all levels of the state that foreign influence operations are not permissible. Latvia has to prepare tools with which to counter anyone who carries out influence operations against Latvia. Such a position in itself forms a strategic message to the potential aggressor that tolerance is not expected in terms of influence operations, both in peacetime and in the event of a military threat.

3.2.4. Resilience of the national economy

Every businessman plays an important role in the defense of the country. However, the most important are businessmen, whose business in a crisis situation becomes an integral part of the national defense system, as they provide vital services. Providers of these services and large companies employing more than 250 people must ensure the basic functions of the company in the event of crisis and war, continuing to ensure the functioning of the national economy, the production of necessary goods and the provision of services. In this context, when planning a business, one should also take into account issues of security of supplies, as well as economic and technological dependence on countries that are not members of NATO or the EU.

In order to ensure the above, the country must create a reserve system, which provides that, in response to the first signs of danger, contracts for deferred supplies are concluded, as well as limited exports of food, medicine and the most important raw materials. Assigning mobilization tasks to reliable businessmen already in peacetime is an effective mechanism for structuring the involvement of the private sector in national defense.

On the other hand, in times of peace, businessmen can strengthen national defense by promoting the participation of employees in the National Guard and the National Armed Forces Reserve, forming National Guard sub-units in their companies, and thus facilitating the provision of physical security of possible objects in the event of a crisis.

3.2.5. Non-governmental organizations

State policy is made by every citizen of Latvia. Elections are not the only time when citizens can get involved in shaping public policy. In a democratic state system, citizens must be able to organize themselves to represent their interests in order to help improve daily life and the efficiency of state institutions. Independent organization is especially important in today's complex conditions of communication and manipulation. Only mutually

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by working together, people can better understand what is happening outside of their social environment and distinguish between the important and the trivial in a crisis situation.

Citizens' mutual trust and confidence in the state administration is extremely important for the security and development of the state. In the event of a crisis, trust between the public and the state administration is especially necessary to be able to overcome the threat together.

In this regard, non-governmental organizations have an essential role, which must be involved in the defense planning process by organizing training and practical exercises.
On the other hand, from the point of view of national interests, it is important to clearly define the role and responsibility of non-governmental organizations for the functions and tasks assigned to them.

Finally, the role of non-governmental organizations in peacetime is to educate the population and acquire practical skills, as well as to inform the public about actions in crisis situations. On the other hand, in a crisis situation, the role of these organizations is to provide support to the population and ensure the transmission of reliable information, including making maximum use of compatriot diaspora organizations abroad.

3.2.6. Church

In times of crisis and war, the role of the church in strengthening the psychological resilience of believers becomes important, in order to help believers overcome difficulties and motivate them to support society.
Likewise, the role of religious organizations is important in times of crisis and war, supporting the state in the transmission of reliable information, helping the victims and strengthening those individuals who have faced or experienced crises, especially tragedies caused by war.

3.2.7. Civil resistance

In hypothetical national threat situations where control over a portion of the territory is temporarily lost, civilians should evacuate to the extent possible to the part of the country still under the control of the National Armed Forces and allied forces.

At the same time, citizens are obliged not to cooperate with illegally established administrative institutions, the occupying power and the armed units of the aggressor, in implementing passive resistance. This is possible by distancing yourself from the decisions and actions of the occupying power, by not participating in public events organized by the occupiers, by not providing information, as well as by not participating in illegal elections, referendums or popular votes organized by the occupiers.

The success of a resistance movement depends on the population's covert support (eg provision, medical care, information, finance, communications, training, recruitment, intelligence) to civil disobedience, armed resistance, NBS and allied forces. Every citizen of Latvia can participate in the resistance campaign in various ways, while being aware of and taking into account the security risks.

3.2.8. Cyber security

Cyber security and the resilience of information technology systems are an integral part of comprehensive national defense. In order to reduce the risks (vulnerability) of state institutions, society and merchants and ensure the continuity of their operations, it is necessary to focus on cyber security training (cyber hygiene) and the minimum

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implementation of safety standards. At the same time, it is necessary to reduce technological dependence on countries that are not NATO or EU members or their official partners.

With the start of the creation of the fifth generation mobile data transmission networks, guaranteeing the security of 5G networks has become a strategic security issue on the agenda of every country, where both technical, technological and political factors must be taken into account.

It is also necessary to change the habits of society and each individual, reducing such digital vulnerabilities as storing personal data on insecure servers, using unverified apps on personal devices, as well as developing a critical attitude towards which personal data should be published on publicly accessible websites.

Cyber security issues must be included in the programs of educational institutions, in the subject of national defense training, as well as in the annual training of state and local government institutions. In addition, it is necessary to promote the creation of regional subunits of the Cyber Youth Guard and the Cyber Defense Unit of the National Guard.

The protection of information and cyberspace in times of crisis and war must be ensured by using active and passive protection measures in order to prevent external influence on the population and paralyzing the ability to act.

It is very important to ensure the storage of important data in Latvia in order to ensure the exchange of data and the continuity of critical services in the event of a national threat.

3.2.9. Education of young people

The education and upbringing of young people is of great importance in creating the society of the future in Latvia. The quality of education will determine how resilient the Latvian society will be against the effects of external conditions, the ever-increasing technological challenges and the vulnerability that technology can inflict on it.

Therefore, the Young Guard movement and the introduction of national defense education in schools play a vital role in achieving these goals and fully implementing a comprehensive national defense system. Thoughtful education of youth in the field of national defense, development of youth patriotism, civic consciousness, cohesion, leadership and physical abilities will also contribute to higher international competitiveness of Latvia in the future.

Taking into account that competence-based learning content is introduced in Latvian schools, in the context of the development of the comprehensive national defense system and the Young Guard movement, it is necessary to focus more on cultivating leadership qualities in young people. Until the time when national defense training will be introduced in all educational institutions of Latvia, Jaunsardze will continue to operate as a voluntary youth movement of Latvian schools, which provides education of interest to students from the 5th to the 9th grade, uniting 8,000 students throughout Latvia.

Currently, the teaching of national defense is introduced in secondary schools (10th and 11th grade), where young people learn the skills necessary for national defense, action in crisis situations, critical thinking and civic patriotism. In addition, these young people can participate in voluntary national defense summer camps, where the knowledge acquired during the school year is strengthened in practice and the physical health of young people is improved. 2024/2025 in the school year, national defense training will be a compulsory subject

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in all Latvian secondary schools. This means that around 30,000 students (average age of 15 to 17) will learn it every year.

On the other hand, it is important to involve no less than 2,000 young people every year in voluntary summer camps, increasing the number of militarily trained citizens in the country. This will allow to replenish not only the ranks of professional military servicemen, but will also encourage young people's interest in serving in the National Guard, reserve or any other state service. Even if the young people who visited the camp will not be involved in active service, the military camps will train reservists who are resistant to threats and capable of mobilizing in a critical situation. In the event of a crisis, this will be the most active, mobile, actionable part of society, which will be able to defend itself and fellow human beings.

National defense training is a modern approach to the new challenges of the security environment, as it covers a much wider target audience than the mandatory military service, which involves only a part of society, and traditionally only men. With the introduction of national defense training, the number of citizens who are educated about national defense issues will increase rapidly, reaching almost a third of all Latvian residents within ten years.

In order to purposefully prepare future military commanders and strengthen the leadership of Latvian officers, the Ministry of Defense will establish a professional secondary education institution under its authority, where the teaching of general education subjects will be combined with the acquisition of such skills and values, which will develop students as intellectual personalities with strong leadership skills, a high sense of responsibility, improving the necessary abilities to withstand increased physical and psychological stress. The general educational curriculum of the vocational secondary school will be oriented towards the exact subjects – mathematics, physics, chemistry and technology, in order to be able to learn and use modern combat equipment.

3.3. NATO collective defense

Although Latvia faces military superiority regionally, within NATO Latvia is part of the most militarily powerful alliance in world history, which strengthens deterrence and defense policy. Therefore, NATO, as a collective defense organization, plays a major role in ensuring Latvia's security and peace in Europe.

3.3.1. Regional presence

The presence of the allied forces in Latvia is the most direct proof of the readiness of the allied countries to support Latvia. This is a clear deterrent signal to a potential aggressor. The presence of the Allies is of strategic importance, and in the future everything possible should be done so that the units of the armed forces of the NATO countries remain permanently in Latvia. Allied units must support the NBS in defense operations, so they are integrated into a single NBS command and provided with capabilities appropriate to the task.
The presence of the allies can also be implemented outside the NATO defense mechanisms, based on a bilateral or multilateral agreement with Latvia.

It is necessary to strengthen the extended battle group of the allied forces stationed in Latvia in order to improve the ability of this unit to support the defense of Latvia and increase its deterrent effect. Reinforcing the presence of allies with ranged abilities like fire is especially important

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support, anti-aircraft defense and coastal and harbor defence. The allied units in Latvia are the most important element of the presence. On the other hand, the following are also important for deterrence:

- regular international military exercises in Latvia;
- Elements of the NATO command in Latvia, especially the Multinational headquarters of the division "North";
- placement of armored vehicles and military materiel stocks in Latvia.

3.3.2. NATO's credibility

NATO deterrence is based on the principle that an attack on one NATO country will be answered as an attack on all NATO countries. The most important elements of NATO's credibility are:

- readiness to provide political and military support against an attack;
- the presence of military forces in the most threatened member states;
- the ability to ensure the dispatch of additional forces;
- development of member states' capabilities by investing at least 2% of GDP in defense.

Latvia must constantly improve these elements, so that NATO's military superiority also would ensure peace and stability for Latvia and our allied countries in the future.

3.3.3. Willingness to react

The presence of forces does not automatically mean that those forces are ready to respond. NATO must be able to respond militarily so quickly that an aggressor cannot achieve *a fait accompli ,* or irrecoverable gains. In the event of military tension, NATO must be able to preemptively strengthen the defense of its member states in order to de-escalate the situation. The pace of modern warfare has increased significantly, making early warning difficult, so NATO must be able to respond in short-warning or no-warning scenarios. The basic elements of being ready to react quickly enough are:

- preventive presence of allied forces in threatened member states;
- available, sufficiently powerful, secured and rapidly deployable units;
- prepared operational defense plans for sending additional forces;
- effective political and military leadership;
- rapid military mobility.

Latvia must strengthen all these elements. The multinational headquarters of the division "North" created in Latvia should be used to improve the ability of NATO forces to respond quickly and in a coordinated manner to crisis scenarios.

3.4. International cooperation

3.4.1. USA as a strategic partner

Latvia's main strategic ally is the United States of America (hereinafter - USA), with whose long-term support since the restoration of independence, Latvia's defense has been significantly strengthened. Latvia highly appreciates the support provided by the United States, especially highlighting the presence of US soldiers in Latvia, support in the development of NBS capabilities and organization of joint exercises.

Latvia must continue in-depth cooperation with the USA, working on regional defense plans, strengthening military capabilities, as well as constantly exchanging

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information about the security situation in the region. An important part of the deterrence capability is the US military presence in Latvia, therefore it is necessary to work to strengthen this presence and ensure the deployment of US armored equipment and military materiel stocks in Latvia and the Baltic region.

Latvia must continue to cooperate with the USA in international operations. NBS should continue cooperation with the US Michigan National Guard, which has already supported the development of NBS for 30 years.

3.4.2. Cooperation of the Baltic States

Latvia's historically, politically and geographically closest allies are Estonia and Lithuania. Targeted cooperation between the Baltic states in the field of defense is an important factor for the region's security, stability and threat mitigation. It is in the interests of Latvia to promote the unity of the Baltic States both in the existing military cooperation formats and to represent the unity of the Baltic States in matters of security and defense policy in various international formats and forums. Cooperation should be based on mutual trust, coordinated development of military capabilities, raising the interoperability of the armed forces and developing coordinated command and control.

3.4.3. Canada

Canada is the embodiment of NATO's extended presence battle group and an excellent ally of Latvia, providing command of the battle group. Latvia should continue to strengthen bilateral relations with Canada. The development of the battle group must be continued together, including - looking for solutions in providing combat support capabilities. In order to promote deeper cooperation with Canada, it is important to evaluate the participation of the NBS together with Canada in international operations, as well as the creation of cooperation in various areas of civilian life.

3.4.4 United Kingdom

The United Kingdom is one of Latvia's most important allies in Europe, which has consistently advocated strengthening NATO's collective defense and whose understanding of security challenges in the region matches Latvia's vision. Latvia should continue cooperation with the United Kingdom in the field of defense, regardless of how the United Kingdom's relations with the European Union will change. Latvia should continue to participate in various formats of military cooperation maintained by the United Kingdom, especially in the framework of the Joint Response Force.

3.4.5. Poland

Poland is one of the militarily strongest NATO countries in the Baltic region and Europe. Poland's understanding of the geopolitical situation in Europe, as well as its geographical proximity, allows Poland to be ranked among the countries of the Baltic Sea region and to be chosen as Latvia's strategic partner in the field of defense policy. Thus, it is necessary to continue closer bilateral cooperation with Poland, while strengthening cooperation in the cooperation formats of the Baltic Sea countries.

3.4.6. Members of the NATO extended presence battle group

All the members of the NATO extended presence battle group stationed in Latvia - Canada, Albania, Czech Republic, Iceland, Italy, Montenegro, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain - contribute significantly to deterrence and protection of Latvia. Latvia is

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grateful for the contribution of the countries, therefore it is essential to further strengthen bilateral relations with them. Latvia will continue to support the prevention of threats from these countries - both on the southern flank, in the Arctic and in Central Europe.

3.4.7. Germany

Following the United Kingdom's exit from the EU, Germany's role in defense and foreign policy matters has significantly increased. Latvia must promote cooperation with Germany in order to create a common understanding and solutions for Europe's strategic and military threats. Germany plays an essential role in strengthening the defense and security of the Baltic Sea region. A politically and militarily strong Germany is in Latvia's interests to ensure peace and stability on the European continent. Therefore, bilateral cooperation should be strengthened, especially in the field of military industry and the organization of military training. Strengthening of cooperation also in multilateral formats of the region should be continued.

3.4.8. France

Taking into account the importance of France in the formation of European security and defense policy, it is necessary to continue the political-military dialogue and cooperation with France in the field of defense. We must continue to look for common denominators for the defense of the Baltic region and the implementation of a successful NATO deterrence policy.

3.4.9. Northern countries

Cooperation between the Baltic and other Nordic countries should be deepened, taking into account our geographical proximity, common threat awareness and cultural-historical similarities.

Latvia must use the cooperation frameworks of the Nordic Group, the Nordic-Baltic countries and other cooperation frameworks of the Baltic Sea region to promote political and military cooperation, as well as solidarity among the countries of the region.

3.4.10. Ukraine and Georgia

Demonstrating solidarity with Georgia and Ukraine, not recognizing the violent occupation of their territories, Latvia will continue to support the efforts of these countries to peacefully return the occupied territories to the hands of the legitimate authorities. Latvia will continue to strengthen bilateral cooperation in the field of defense, as well as support the membership of Ukraine and Georgia in NATO and the European Union.

3.4.11. Arms control

It is in Latvia's interest to support the peaceful settlement of international disputes based on international agreements and mechanisms of mutual trust.
Arms control is an essential tool that can ensure transparency of military capabilities and promote stability in international relations.

During the last decade, arms control mechanisms are less and less able to ensure the balance and transparency of military forces, as previous agreements are not fully respected. Latvia should promote the understanding of allied countries that arms control can only function if both sides comply with their obligations.

Latvia, together with its allies, must be ready to guarantee its sovereignty with military means, in case the arms control cooperation partners decide to violate the previous agreements.

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3.4.12. NBS participation in peacekeeping operations

Latvia will continue to contribute to international operations and force structures, thereby strengthening overall security and organizational capacity, as well as maintaining and increasing the combat readiness of NBS units.

The scope of participation in operations will, as always, be evaluated according to the operational needs of Latvian defense. The NBS should develop the ability to send one battalion-sized unit to one of the peacekeeping operations, for a period of not less than two rotations.

3.5. The European Union

Latvia has been actively participating in the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy since 2004. Our soldiers continue to contribute to the implementation of security reforms and peacekeeping in the EU's neighboring regions, demonstrating solidarity with EU member states.

Also, the resilience of our neighboring regions against various types of security threats is promoted. Historically, the EU's strength has been a collection of non-military instruments to combat elements of asymmetric warfare. However, since 2017, EU member states have strengthened their defense cooperation by launching several initiatives (Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), European Defense Fund (EDF)) to promote EU-level military capabilities, harmonize defense planning processes, develop defense technologies and support European companies.

Military cooperation within the EU can strengthen countries' readiness to resist and deter external aggression. However, this requires adequate funding of the EU member states' defense sector, the lack of which continues to have a negative impact on the development of the EU member states' military capabilities.

It is in Latvia's interest to continue to be pragmatically involved in EU defense initiatives. This will enable the strengthening of existing and the search for new opportunities for the development of national capabilities, research and technology and local enterprises. At the same time, we cannot afford for EU initiatives to overlap with NATO, and we will continue to emphasize cooperation between the two organizations in areas such as military mobility, crisis management and military exercises, protection against non-military threats, prevention of disinformation and strategic communication, clearly stating that the provider of collective defense for Latvia is only NATO.

3.6. National defense resources

3.6.1. Budget

The prerequisite for the development of national defense capabilities is the provision of an adequate defense budget. The ability to invest in defense shows not only the fulfillment of international obligations, but primarily demonstrates the country's will to take responsibility for the defense of its country.

In accordance with the agreement reached at the NATO Wales Summit in September 2014 to reach a defense expenditure level of no less than 2% of the gross domestic product, and to prevent a decline in defense expenditure in the future, Latvia has approved the amount of defense expenditure - no less than 2% with the National Defense Financing Law of gross domestic product.

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According to the NATO definition, these resources can only be used for defense purposes. Funding that goes to projects not related to national defense is not considered defense funding.

During the operation of the concept, Latvia must adhere to a balanced defense expenditure structure, respectively allocating less than 50% to personnel and administrative expenses, 30% to maintenance expenses and at least 20% to investments.

3.6.2. Personnel

It is necessary to continue to increase the numerical composition of the NBS, at the same time being realistically aware of Latvia's limited labor market. By increasing the number of soldiers available for defense, Latvia significantly increases the costs of an attack for a potential aggressor.

In order to complete the composition of the soldiers of the NBS units and provide the personnel necessary for the development of capabilities, a large number of professional servicemen must reach 8,000 during the operation of this concept. In the coming years, the acquisition of new capabilities and equipment will continue in the armed forces, therefore professional servicemen who are educated, trained, highly motivated and experts in their field will form the core of the NBS.

The National Guard plays a decisive role in the territorial defense of the Latvian state. By 2024, the number of National Guard should reach 10,000, and by 2027 - 12,000.

It is necessary to continue attracting new national guardsmen in order to include a new generation in the defense of the country, which is determined to learn basic military training and build a national guard military career, combining it with civilian life. Active cooperation with employers should be continued so that they support the wishes of national guardsmen to participate in military training, perform service tasks and learn the necessary specialties.

In order to ensure the attraction of national guardsmen of various professions, including support specialists, the National Guard must work on modular training and distance learning, creating opportunities for national guardsmen to gradually and constantly supplement their knowledge and raise their qualifications, flexibly applying the training schedule to each person's capabilities and free time.

Voluntary involvement in the defense of one's country should be popularized in society, so that such civic behavior is widespread and respectable. An essential prerequisite is to break the passive attitude of society towards the National Guard. Therefore, politicians and society leaders, by personal example, should be more actively involved in the National Guard, as well as in public campaigns, emphasizing that service in the National Guard is a matter of honor, which should become a self-evident part of society's everyday life.

Also, the number of trained reserve soldiers should be continued to increase, consisting of retired soldiers from professional service, inactive National Guardsmen and those who have completed the 4th level training program of the Young Guard and the training of the national defense training camp and have taken the oath of a reserve soldier, as well as completed the military training of volunteer reserve soldiers. Based on these possibilities, the number of trained and conscripted reserve soldiers should reach 6,000 during the operational period of the national defense concept.

At the same time, it is essential to introduce a full-fledged training system for reserve soldiers, where the units are primarily responsible for the effective involvement and operational readiness of reserve soldiers.

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thus creating a two-tier division of personnel reserves: active reserve (responsibility of units) and permanent reserve (centralized management and supervision). In case of full mobilization, the Young Guard Center has the task of training reservists.

Civilian employees working in the defense sector play an essential role in maintaining the sustainability and efficiency of the common system. Although there is a systematic separation of military from civilian functions, civilian employees of the defense sector who perform functions important to the sector must have at least minimal military knowledge.

In order for the state and society to function even in the event of a threat and attack, it is necessary to define the most important specialties also outside the defense department. These specialists must continue their work even in times of crisis and war.

3.6.3. Security of delivery

Work on strengthening the security of the supply of material and technical means necessary for the combat capabilities of the NBS should continue, which is of crucial importance in times of crisis, when continuous, reliable, safe and timely supply of goods and services is vital for national defense.

3.6.4. Reserves of the material and technical resources

of the sectors In the framework of a comprehensive national defense system, the resilience and continuity of functioning of each department can be viewed through the prism of national defense. In crisis situations, the availability of critical material and technical means at the initial stage of the crisis is of crucial importance in order to ensure the vital functions of society and the ability to overcome the national threat. Each ministry must define the goods and services necessary for the implementation of the threat management plan for their sectors, creating material reserves or ensuring their supply security by developing appropriate industrial capacity in Latvia .

3.6.5. Industry

The implementation of the national defense and security industry development support policy should be continued. Its primary goals are to promote the security of supplies of material and technical means intended for the fulfillment of NBS tasks, to support the acquisition of knowledge necessary for the maintenance of material and technical means, as well as to expand the base of mobilization resources that meet the needs of the NBS within the national economy.

Targeted and effective industry development support is provided by the determination of national support priorities. It is carried out on the basis of a constant analysis of the potential of the national economy and the development priorities of NBS capabilities.

The national priority at the moment is the development of unmanned systems, armament, maintenance of NBS support and combat equipment, individual equipment systems of soldiers and their components, cyber security, as well as information and communication technologies.

3.6.6. Strategic partnership

In accordance with national priorities, in order to promote targeted and coordinated expansion of the base of mobilization resources, as well as the security of supplies of material and technical means and services necessary for the fulfillment of the tasks of the National Armed Forces, cooperation between the defense sector and industry is organized based on the concept of strategic partnership.

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The priority areas for the establishment of a strategic partnership are the maintenance of NBS combat equipment and the production of ammunition in Latvia in order to ensure the security of supplies in crisis and war conditions.

The prerequisites for the implementation of this concept are based on the performance indicators of the industry in cooperation with the defense industry, the necessary knowledge, technical capabilities and availability of investments, as well as complying with the legal requirements for commercial activities with goods of strategic importance.

When developing the concept of strategic partnership, principles such as the gradation of cooperation projects, involvement in the NBS reserve, mobilization and comprehensive national defense system, involvement in the National Guard, profit share restrictions, unlimited audit opportunities, as well as the commitment to invest in future development are simultaneously taken into account.

3.6.7. Innovations

Innovations are an essential part of the development and competitiveness of the national industry. By effectively adopting and implementing innovative technologies, it is possible to significantly increase the performance of the NBS within the framework of the limited resource base available for national defense.

Latvia must strengthen the innovation environment of the defense industry by introducing and implementing appropriate national-level innovation support mechanisms, promoting the cross-border integration of national scientific research capital in EU and NATO research structures and at the same time assuming possible financial risks that may arise in the research process and the implementation of developed technologies.

The support measures based on the innovation environment are implemented both in the areas of national priorities and in the areas of new, revolutionary technologies, where the accumulation of knowledge of the national scientific and research capital can be observed.

3.6.8. Mobilization resources

Every year, the NBS must update the Mobilization Plan, identifying the missing capacity needs and resources that, in case of mobilization, must be taken over from the civil sector in order to fulfill the tasks of the NBS. Also, for the needs of the NBS and allies during the war, it is necessary to take over territories and assets to ensure unit training, force integration, maintenance and maneuvering. It is essential to identify missing resources and issue mobilization requests in a timely manner.

In order to determine the readiness of the National Armed Forces for mobilization, it is necessary to organize mobilization readiness tests without announcing mobilization, while in order to prepare for mobilization and train the personnel involved in the implementation of mobilization, plan and organize mobilization exercises involving businessmen who have been issued mobilization requests.

During the crisis, the national economy provides support to the NBS and allied forces - supply of energy resources, medical services, civil communications, catering and other services necessary for the implementation of national defense.
It is necessary to regularly practice and test the readiness for the mobilization of the national economy, ensuring the training and preparation of merchants for the performance of the specified tasks, as well as planning the delayed deliveries.

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4. FINAL TASKS

The Ministry of Defense will implement the National Defense Concept within the framework of the state budget funds allocated to it.

The concept of national defense and the NBS development plan are the basis for the development of medium-term planning documents, including the guidelines issued by the Minister of Defense for the development of the national defense system and budget planning for the next year.

The planning process of the development of the national armed forces must ensure the continuity of the implementation of the concept. Within the framework of this process, it is essential to identify the particularly important capabilities of the NBS necessary for the performance of the basic tasks of national defense.

The implementation of the national defense concept is ensured by state institutions accordingly for their competence and the tasks defined in the regulatory acts.

The Minister of Defense, based on the concept, issues guidelines to the NBS commander on the main planning principles of the operational work of national defense.

According to the National Security Law, the Saeima approves the National Defense concept at least once in each convocation until October 1 of the second year of its activity.

Member of the Prime Minister,

Minister of defence dr. A. Pabriks