Strategic Defence Review

I. General Overview

II. Basic Criteria

FICHA CATALOGRÁFICA DEL CENTRO DE PUBLICACIONES

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FOREWORD
BY THE
PRESIDENT OF THE GOVERNMENT

It is with great satisfaction that we present before Spanish society this Strategic Defence Review. As I stated in the White Paper 2000, the Review was to be the fruit of a significant collective reflection process designed to provide the Armed Forces with the necessary military capabilities to act in the strategic scenario of this new century.

To this end and through this Review, the Government that I lead seeks to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of the efforts that Spain as a sovereign nation must make over the next 12-15 years in order to meet its own defence needs as well as those of the security framework we share with our partners and allies.

With this in mind, we initiated a process that has led us one step further in the continuous evolution of our Defence. We now present the Strategic Defence Review, which creates new structures and mechanisms for decision-making, modifying old concepts so as to have a modern and capable security and defence system, adjusted to both national possibilities and the strategic international panorama.

This is also another step in the reform of our Services, which should not be limited to the objective of creating a smaller but more efficient Armed Forces. Rather, this reform should ensure the fulfilment of the missions constitutionally entrusted to the Armed Forces, reinforce our commitments with the Atlantic Alliance and better contribute to the European security and defence instruments. In any case, our membership in the main international security and defence organizations is a matter of satisfaction and pride, and strengthens Spain's freedom of action in defending its interests as a sovereign nation.

The peace, liberty, prosperity and stability that Spain now enjoys, the level of political, human, cultural and economic development, the degree of pluralism in our society, the depth of support for modern and advanced democracy, and the constitutional protection afforded for all Spaniards in the exercise of their human rights, are values that have not come about spontaneously. They have been achieved through the efforts of the generations before us, and we have the inescapable obligation to preserve and transmit them to the next generation.

The mission of Defence is to help ensure these values and protect our freely chosen way of life, our rights, our possessions and our interests, wherever they lie. The best guarantee that Spanish Security and Defence policy can offer our society is the firm resolution to have the capability for active participation in maintaining a more stable and secure international order, based on peaceful coexistence, defence of Western democratic values and interests, human rights and international law. All this must be done while still carrying out the basic missions of deterrence, and defence of the national territory.

In an effort to involve the entire society in designing the Armed Forces of the 21st century, the Government made the political

decision to encourage debate on the Strategic Defence Review, both within the Ministry of Defence and externally. For this purpose it was stipulated that the Review be carried out with the greatest possible transparency and consensus, as indicated in Directive 1/2000, which initiated the whole process.

In sum, throughout the entire Strategic Defence Review process it has been clearly demonstrated that Spanish society is fully capable of providing ideas and valid initiatives related to security and defence. For any policy to achieve its desired ends, there must be a strong bond between society as a whole and political power so that society may feel a sense of participation in the making of policies. Such policies have citizen backing, which benefits democracy.

Therefore, this Review will be the future general frame of reference for our Armed Forces regarding its structures and action procedures in a changing strategic scenario, harmonising its actions with the external action of the State, thus achieving our national aspirations and protecting our interests wherever they lie.

I trust that the significant effort involved in our country's first Strategic Defence Review can satisfy the interest that has arisen in the various national and international settings.

Jose Maria Aznar

PREFACE
BY THE
MINISTER OF DEFENCE

As I explained at the beginning of my term as Minister of Defence, during my first parliamentary appearance to outline my programme for the current legislature, I planned to carry out a reform that would encompass a long-term view of our security and the role of the Armed Forces - a vision extending to 2015 or 2020 at least. More specifically, I spoke of this vision in terms of a Strategic Defence Review process, defined by the following elements: facilitation of the joint action of the Services; a fully professionalised Armed Forces with modern equipment and capable of contributing both to European defence and to allied commitments; and a defence culture characteristic of an advanced democratic society that takes ownership of the effort and contribution required for collective defence.

This process began with the impetus of the President. According to Defence Directive 1/2000, signed late that year by President Aznar, the first line of action in our Defence Policy was to begin a Strategic Review. This Review should integrate Defence within the broader framework of shared security with partners and allies and determine the military capabilities needed for fulfilling the

responsibilities derived from this. The priority of the Strategic Defence Review was a fundamental reason for the creation -in January, 2001- of the Secretariat General for Defence Policy; this organ assumed the responsibility for the groundwork and development of the process that has just concluded.

Prior works by other countries were examined in depth, especially those closest to us in the geopolitical and geostrategic environment: the United States, Belgium, Norway, Germany and especially Great Britain. The events of September 11th confirmed the transcendence and urgency of the process that was already underway. A decision was taken to end this process of reflection immediately after the Prague Summit, understanding that key strategic decisions concerning the Alliance would be taken there, which we would subsequently need to incorporate into our Strategic Review.

Given the anomalies that have characterised our history in security and defence matters, as well as the changes taking place in our Armed Forces and in the contemporary strategic panorama, we can currently state with legitimate pride that Spain's situation in the field of security has changed radically. Now fully integrated in the Atlantic Alliance and a prominent member of the European Union, we have opened up our country and our society, projecting our democracy towards Europe and the world. Actively participating in this new reality, our fully professional Armed Forces have a newly established profile resulting from the historic and successful transformation process of the last few years. Breaking with the conscript-based model that formerly composed the Armed Forces, we now have a professional model staffed with 75,000 volunteers that have enabled the deployment of our Armed Forces both in defence of our own national interests and in the framework of shared security and collective defence of Western values.

The new professional Armed Forces in new scenarios and with new missions have made it absolutely indispensable to carry out the Strategic Defence Review. This process was conceived as a critical and open debate on broad security and defence questions. In order to establish the Spanish strategic conception, we analysed its three traditional components: security interests, risks and scenarios and missions of the Armed Forces. Then we began a second phase to determine the capabilities needed for the Armed Forces, regarding both numbers and materiel.

In accord with Directive 1/2000, we sought from the very beginning to achieve the maximum internal political, institutional and social consensus. For this purpose we established contact with other Departments in this Ministry, sought the cooperation of prestigious academic institutions and organised seminars, debates and surveys to encourage civil society's participation in this process.

We are pleased that this Review recently received broad majority support after its presentation to the Parliament. Its conclusions project a vision for the Armed Forces over the next 15 years, providing a stable and permanent frame of reference for Spain's defence and military policies.

The Spanish strategic conception, which includes both external action and defence policy, represents the overall Spanish perception of our role in the world, our positioning in the international arena, and our vocation based on our geography, history, political reality and future projects.

In the current globalised strategic scenario, our geopolitical position indisputably predisposes us toward a global orientation in the perception and subsequent protection of our interests, our presence throughout the world, and our efforts at international cooperation in support of peace and stability.

The main beneficiary of this theoretical and practical reflective process is Spanish society. If we have been able to achieve a notable degree of consensus concerning a strategic document for the next 15 years, it is because Spanish society gives increasing importance to questions related to security and defence. It is evident that our society is beginning to express a desire to strengthen its current level of national defence consciousness, which will determine our future and the preservation of our system of rights and freedoms.

Federico Trillo-Figueroa y Martínez-Conde

STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEW

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INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

This document is the result of the **development process** of the **"STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEW"**, directed by the Secretariat General for Defence Policy. It consists of **one global structure**, composed of **two parts** and several distinct Annexes.

PART ONE, the **"GENERAL OVERVIEW"**, is a synthesis of all the aspects related to the Strategic Review, including classical themes from the strategic planning exercises of surrounding countries, as well as uniquely Spanish issues. These first pages, that develop the essential elements of the Review, have been written in a straightforward manner and without extensive analysis, in order to make them easier to read.

The **index** allows a good understanding of the general content of the Review and of its main subheadings. The first chapter describes **"The Context of the Strategic Review"**, including a specific examination of strategic and military innovations, changes in present-day values, and the new reality of globalisation; all of which affect the evolution of our country in a timeframe that extends through the year 2015.

The second chapter is titled **"National Security Interests"**. It briefly describes each of these interests both within and outside our borders, while also analysing other traditional elements of strategic conception, such as risks and theatres of action.

The third chapter is central to the entire Review, as it examines the **"The Missions of the Armed Forces"**, addressing the many

autonomous perspectives as well as our present reality of allied and collective defence. Along with defensive tasks, the other two general missions of the Armed Forces are also examined. The first is the need to achieve international peace and stability. The second task, though not entirely a military one, is still of equal importance: ensuring the security and welfare of our citizens, in accord with the laws of our constitutional framework.

The fourth chapter, **"The Armed Forces in the 21st Century"**, relates to a series of ideas found in other parts of the Strategic Review concerning the clear need to fully modernise our Services, formally and functionally, structurally and operationally.

The last chapter of Part One, **"Parameters of the Review"**, highlights elements that will be carefully developed throughout the remainder of the Review. Several key aspects are debated: the human factor, material and technological factors, along with other objectives found in the Review; such as achieving greater projection, mobility and interoperability within the context of a necessary rationalisation of the existing Armed Forces structures.

PART TWO might be considered the "core" of the Strategic Review. Presented there are **14 BASIC CRITERIA,** the outcome of a series of decisions and definitions adopted during the Review process, and which may be considered final conclusions of the process.

Beginning with the place of the **Armed Forces** within our constitutional framework, this document goes on to define a series of objectives related to the Defence effort: orientation towards Force, readiness for the most demanding action, and capability to adequately carry out the new missions **(Criteria 1, 2, 3 and 4)**.

Following these are three key Criteria for empowering the tasks of **Chief of the Defence Staff** as Operational Commander of the

Armed Forces, through the creation of an **Operations Command** subordinate to him, as well as a **Joint Rapid Reaction Force** from pooled Forces. As a result the Service Chiefs of Staff will constitute the exclusive **Organic Commands (Criteria 5, 6 and 7)**.

After **Criterion 8** concerning the **functional structure** of the Services, the question of **human resources** is examined in **Criterion 9**, followed by the **logistic integration** of Defence in **Criterion 10**. The **11th Criterion** argues for **maximum interoperability**.

Using basically operational terms, the last three **Criteria (12, 13 and 14)** define the specific characteristics of the three main Forces: the **Land**, **Naval** and **Air Forces**.

Lastly, the **eight ANNEX DOCUMENTS** are in most cases directly linked to elements already mentioned in the first and second parts.

The first three Annex Documents include in an abbreviated fashion the conclusions from the work groups designated to analyse the essential elements of any strategic conception. **ANNEX A** refers to **"national security interests"**; **ANNEX B** refers to **"risks and security and defence scenarios"**; and **ANNEX C** refers to **"the missions and tasks of the Armed Forces"**.

ANNEX D contains a detailed study of the **"Capabilities of the Armed Forces"**. It is the result of a broad work group of military planning experts and describes the efforts required in the fields of joint and Service capabilities, in order to carry out the missions entrusted to the Armed Forces.

These issues are further detailed in **ANNEX F: "Material Resources for Defence"**. This section was written by the Secretariat of State for Defence and is of their direct competence. Special emphasis was given to the first subheading: **"Armament and**

Materiel Policy", which includes concrete statements concerning short, medium and long-range acquisitions policy as well as statements regarding key areas such as logistic integration and financing new arms systems. The other two subheadings of Annex F deal with **"Infrastructures Policy"** and the **"Information Systems and Telecommunications Policy"**, which have been advanced by the Defence Secretariat and are essential in the process of modernising the Armed Forces.

The Under-Secretariat for Defence was responsible for the final draft of **ANNEX E** on **"Human Resources for Defence"**. It describes the Armed Forces model and present situation, analysing the various personnel processes required to develop an efficient policy in this matter.

ANNEX G, **"Normative and Organisational Consequences"**, was drafted - with the appropriate coordination - by the Ministry of Defence's "Study and Monitoring Group". It contains the Criteria that will inspire the **reform of the Organic Law on National Defence and Military Organisation**. It also reviews other goals reached during the Review process due to the approval of several Organisational Decrees regarding the **basic functional structures** of the Services and their **institutional representation**, along with the **peripheral structure** of the Ministry and its **external representation**.

ANNEX H, **"The Process behind the Strategic Defence Review"**, completes the list, dealing exclusively with procedural aspects. Recorded here are the various steps involved in fulfilling the express mandate contained in Defence Directive 1/2000: to "seek the maximum political, institutional and social consensus" on the Strategic Review, which has required adherence to high standards of transparency.

PART ONE

GENERAL OVERVIEW

GENERAL OVERVIEW

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I

THE CONTEXT OF THE STRATEGIC REVIEW

1.- Changes in the Strategic Scenario

Over the last decade few things have changed as much as the environment and the conditions for security and defence. The Defence White Paper 2000 clearly reflected that **the changes in the strategic scenario during the nineties have been spectacular**. The disappearance of the traditional enemy was a great relief in terms of military availability in the last decade, but it has not created a new order free from risks and threats to international stability and peace. In the nineties numerous conflicts erupted, some new in nature, which have torn entire nations apart through civil, religious and ethnic conflicts.

The persistence and virulence of these conflicts, especially those closest to Western Europe like the one in ex-Yugoslavia, strengthened a **new collective conscience favouring intervention by the International Community** under the auspices of the UN, or through regional organisations such as NATO or coalitions formed by some of its members. In the nineties defence went from being an instrument dedicated to the national interest, to also becoming an instrument of international peace.

NATO's New Strategic Concept, approved in April of 1999, explained the essence of the changes that have led our troops to be present in different parts of the world, from the Balkans to Afghanistan. After half a decade of Balkan interventions, it was recognised that **peace support missions** were becoming one of the basic tasks of Western armies, in contrast with the traditional

collective defence mission for which NATO had been created fifty years ago.

In addition, the last three years have demonstrated a new European interest in playing a more relevant role in the international context, reaching beyond the diplomatic dimension to include the indispensable **military capability for action**. For this purpose the European Union (EU) has set the **"Headline Goal"** of having in 2003 a Rapid Reaction Force capable of fulfilling the Petersberg missions, which according to the EU Treaty include **humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management**, including **peacemaking**.

With this institutional capability for decision-making and action, the EU becomes a true strategic actor, altering the security panorama to some extent. The Atlantic dimension represented by NATO is no longer the only one; now, if necessary, Europeans may develop their own missions autonomously, taking on a new responsibility. For this purpose the **concept of "Petersberg Plus" missions** are now being considered as a means of incorporating the fight against terrorism and other tasks. This is presently being debated in the "European Convention".

2.- A New Sense of Vulnerability

In the last few years history, instead of slowing down, has increased its momentum. The dramatic September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. transformed the strategic scenario. **We have moved** from a recent horizon free from obvious threats **into a new sense of vulnerability**, where peace missions are no longer sufficient and **military action once again takes on an increasingly important role**.

The **terrorist threat** is now at the forefront and the fight against it has become a **key element in defence and security organisation strategies**. Though NATO had just completed a profound transformation towards the end of the nineties, it began once more a period of adaptation to the new circumstances due to the commitments to collective defence established by its Article 5. Once again NATO members took part in a **general reflection** process concerning the future implications for the Armed Forces of the fight against external terrorism.

The **European Union** has also begun to adjust its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in order to adequately meet this new threat, although it still has a long road to travel.

3.- A Revolution in Military Affairs

It is evident that the changes taking place in society in general and specifically in certain technologies related to information have repercussions in the area of defence, as manifest in the 1991 Gulf War and again in the Afghanistan operations. This undeniable **"Revolution in Military Affairs"** includes, among other aspects, the use of new technology for command and control, precision weapons, and delivery systems outside the reach of enemy weapons. There may be some debate concerning the speed of development and assimilation, and the final impact on the ways and means of conducting operations, or on the operations themselves, but **no country can escape the need to innovate if it plans to continue playing a part on the international scene**.

Even though the future may see rapid qualitative progress in domains such as data treatment, sensors and biotechnology applications, military systems still tend to be very slow, extending the design, production and implementation processes for the principal systems and platforms over a period of decades, especially in times of

financial constraints. Therefore, as stated in this Strategic Review, it will be important to **carefully evaluate what Armed Forces we need and want to have by 2015** in order to begin a gradual process of transformation in that direction.

4.- A Change in Social Values

Alongside the technological revolution there have also been **substantial changes in social values**.

The new information-centred technological revolution of the last quarter of a century has transformed the way societies relate to each other in a globalised world.

Our societies are increasingly influenced by a materialist perspective emphasising the pursuit of individual well-being and personal success with the minimum effort required. The result is a decreasing acceptance of personal sacrifice, although there are still many daily examples of solidarity.

Related to this change in social values are **new demands for military action**, imposing a new logic of action seen most clearly in the increasing rejection of collateral damage and casualties among our own forces. One of its outcomes has been an increased use of **intelligent weapons**.

5.- Globalisation, the Media and Public Opinion

The **globalisation** phenomenon has a considerable impact on the **media**, which in turn influences governments and political leaders significantly as they seek to meet the demands of the **public opinion**.

In the **new information era** the media also plays a key role in transmitting information to the public. It helps create opinions and

modify citizen conduct and attitudes, thus influencing the process of **decision-making concerning military actions**.

In sum, new technologies (such as the internet, mobile cell phones, satellite networks, etc.) are changing the way the media covers world news and how citizens receive information from the media. This information-providing effect has shown itself to be so powerful that in many cases it determines leaders' actions in the area of security, which in turn has fostered an **information warfare**.

6.- A Shared Process

The current Spanish Strategic Review process is not an isolated phenomenon, since Spain logically shares the same security conditions and is exposed to the same changes in its strategic environment as the rest of its allies. All have perceived the need to adapt their defence orientation and structures, and have dealt with this in different ways since the beginning of the nineties, when it was clear that the Cold War had been left behind.

The term "Strategic Review" was first officially used in 1998 by the **British Government** led by Tony Blair, which published a document that inspired the Labour party's new era in security and defence matters. Since the beginning of the nineties the **United States** has also gone through successive revisions of its strategy and defence. Recently the Pentagon developed its second Quadrennial Defense Review, presented to Congress in September of 2001 after the change in Administration. On September 20, 2002, the White House made public "The National Security Strategy of the United States", describing the new strategic model for American defence and its vision of the structure of international society after September 11th.

Other countries such as **Germany, Belgium, Finland, Norway, Italy, Greece and Japan** have also recently completed their defence reviews.

It is important to recall that in 1991 the **Atlantic Alliance** elaborated its own **"Strategic Concept"**, reflecting the changes in the Eastern Block, the disappearance of the massive threat and the appearance of new multi-dimensional and omni-directional risks. It also proposed decreasing force structure size while at the same time making them much less static. After the experiences of the nineties and the need for peace support intervention in the Balkans and other regions of the world, NATO once again elaborated a **"New Strategic Concept"** in 1999. Approved at the Washington summit commemorating the 50th anniversary of the creation of the Alliance, this time the concept was oriented much more towards new peace exporting missions. The approval of the "military concept for defence against terrorism" at the **Prague Summit** introduced important elaborations on the 1999 text in areas such as prevention measures, actions "wherever they are needed", and inter-allied consultations in accord with the progression of the crisis.

Along with its impact on strategy and defence, **September 11th** has forced nations to redesign their strategic concepts. Of particular importance was the publication of a new chapter in the Strategic Review carried out by the **United Kingdom's** Ministry of Defence. Finalized in 1999, it focussed exclusively on the new terrorist threat. At that time **Spain** was in the midst of the review process and was able to directly incorporate the lessons learned. Although several prior documents already considered terrorism as a threat, its international appearance has clearly been more virulent and dramatic than expected.

7.- A New Cycle for Spain

The Strategic Review is not simply an adaptation to changes in strategic circumstances. It is also a response to the increasing **role that Spain should play in the concert of nations, and the weight that defence and Armed Forces carry in fulfilling this**.

Thus, one phase of Spanish defence has ended and another has begun. Spain has been firmly anchored in the institutional framework of the Atlantic Alliance since its full incorporation into the newly renovated NATO command structure. Presently, Spain is also actively committed to developing a series of **military capabilities for autonomous action within the European Union** in an effort to help consolidate it as a full-fledged global actor. The mixed Services model of conscripts and volunteers was left behind in the early nineties with the disappearance of compulsory military service and the full professionalisation of the Spanish Armed Forces, along with the corresponding **incorporation of women** into all jobs and assignments.

Merely extending present tendencies will hardly be sufficient to meet the demands on our Armed Forces for more dynamic external action on Spain's part. The internationalisation of defence, along with the professionalisation and modernisation of the Services towards the end of the nineties, were appropriate responses to the needs of the times. Tomorrow's Armed Forces will need to take these changes into account, not merely assuming their present status or a simple projection of present tendencies, but decidedly opting for concepts, structures, and equipment that respond to future problems.

8.- Looking Ahead to 2015

The Strategic Review is intended as a guide for Spanish Defence Policy in the mid- and long-range. It is an exercise in

reflection and analysis of the factors that will determine the strategic possibilities open to our nation, which depend in good measure on the international situation and the evolution of our context. Therefore, its objective is to **define the security and defence needs of our country**, as a sovereign nation and in conjunction with our partners and allies, **and to determine the capabilities needed** to ensure our national defence while seeking to fulfil the role that Spain would like to play in the international arena.

The Strategic Review expresses a future vision that gives meaning to the decisions that will be progressively adopted. The **year 2015,** which has been set as the temporal horizon for this study, is undoubtedly far off, especially in light of the accelerated rate of change in almost all spheres of our lives. But it is also prudent, since defence building is a gradual process, and many of today's decisions have far-reaching implications.

Finally, the Strategic Review seeks to **open a broad political, technical and social debate on the future of defence and the Services**. A new phase is beginning for Spain in the area of strategic culture and defence consciousness. While this will not be addressed here, we may simply point out that throughout this process we are making an **effort at transparency** with the sole objective of providing a better and deeper understanding of the options before us, as Spaniards and Europeans, in the areas of defence and international security.

II

NATIONAL INTERESTS AND SECURITY RISKS

1.- Basic Security Interests

As a fully sovereign nation, **Spain defends the interests that are vital to its survival**. These include **Spain's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and constitutional order**, along with ensuring **the life, liberty and prosperity of the Spanish people**, according to the terms established in the preamble to the Constitution. Within the context of our geographical and cultural setting, our Nation should enjoy the vital conditions and opportunities for prosperity that are in accord with the dignity and lifestyle of the Spanish people.

In a global world it is also fundamental to achieve, in a manner that reflects solidarity, a **stable international order** of peace, security and respect for human rights. It is our social duty to guarantee that intrinsic human values are respected. This is also a form of self-protection, given that conflicts erupt when societies fall apart, thus causing instability.

To the extent that Spain is increasingly active on the international scene and our society is increasingly open and interconnected with the rest of the world, the process of **ensuring an arena for peace, liberty and prosperity** constitutes another of our national security interests.

Spain shares with its European neighbours and other allies a **global objective of contributing to international stability and peace**. This requires both readiness and willingness to participate

with its forces in the framework of multinational operations. **Spain is willing to become involved in the scenarios that require our presence**, within the limits established by international law and our own possibilities and resources.

2.- Shared Security

Spanish national security is intrinsically and primarily linked to the security of the European continent. In this sense, Spain desires to directly contribute to safeguarding and increasing European peace and stability, while also reducing its vulnerability.

Spain supports a united Europe with the capability for autonomous decision-making and action in the military arena, and in consequence, advocates the goal of endowing the **EU** with military capabilities to meet contingencies and crises of varying extent and intensity.

Nonetheless, Spain recognises that at present **the Atlantic Alliance continues to be the spinal column of European defence**. The final objective of a European defence by Europeans will not endanger the Atlantic relationship but should tend to reinforce it. For this reason **Spain also supports an enlarged and transformed NATO**, with greater military capabilities for action and openness to new global challenges such as external terrorism.

3.- Regional Stability

Spain's security is also **linked to the general stability of the Mediterranean area**. In order to transform the Mediterranean into an area of peace, stability and shared prosperity, the dialogue and cooperation process known as Euromediterranean partnership was initiated with the Barcelona Declaration of 1995. Due to our unique geographical situation as a veritable crossroads of two

worlds, Spain finds itself playing a highly relevant and increasingly influential role in **North Africa** and the **Mediterranean Sea**, fostering a growing dialogue and understanding between peoples on both shores.

In addition, the location of the Canary Islands and their geostrategic importance underscore the need to ensure stability in that area of the Atlantic.

4.- The Main Risks to our Security

At present it does not seem likely that Spain will experience a **large-scale armed aggression against its national territory** or maritime and air space, at least in the classical sense.

However, the rise of the **external terrorism** phenomenon, of global reach and great capacity to inflict harm, exposes us to new situations of national vulnerability. In order to face this new risk **from beyond our borders**, it will be necessary to make use of the Armed Forces' capabilities whenever governmental authorities consider it appropriate.

Along with external terrorism, the greatest threat to our stability may come from the **proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological (NBCR) weapons of mass destruction** and their delivery systems, especially ballistic and cruise missiles. So **Spain must give priority to the establishment of collective measures and actions** that include anti-missile defence systems, **in order to halt this proliferation phenomenon** of both the NBCR weapons and their delivery systems.

It is also evident that the geographical situation of Spain's **national territory**, which includes **its islands and rock formations and** the Spanish cities of **Ceuta and Melilla** in North

Africa, can be a source of greater risks to our own integrity. This undoubtedly constitutes one of the key factors of our nation's defensive strategy.

The main **lines of communication that supply basic resources** to our country, particularly energy, run through the straits of Gibraltar. The geographical concentration of these commercial routes makes them unavoidably vulnerable, and an interruption of them would necessarily be considered a very serious potential risk, both in regards to the ease of interruption and its repercussions.

The British colony on Gibraltar and the **limitation of the exercise of sovereignty** that it implies constitutes not only a distorting factor for Spain's external action but may also present other problems. Certain military operations can be undertaken from the Rock without Spanish participation and carried out upon spaces of strategic interest to our country, such as the accesses to Mediterranean and Atlantic waters.

5.- Other Risks

Among the new emerging risks we may emphasize the **negative effects of globalisation**. To the extent that it links some actors and regions more closely with others, globalisation acts as a risk multiplier, permitting a rapid propagation of effects.

Among these global phenomena are **environmental attacks and aggressions**, which may have very serious consequences, particularly in the case of nuclear installations or military vessels or aircraft, carrying nuclear weapons systems or using nuclear propulsion.

It is also important to consider problems potentially derived from **extraordinary and uncontrolled migratory movements**, mainly caused by the displacement of people groups affected by

shortages, conflict or catastrophes, and encouraged by transnational organisations dedicated to trafficking in human beings.

Given the extreme dependence of modern societies on information and communication systems, there is also a growing risk of serious harm from assaults on communications nodes through **cyber attacks**. In the area of defence, the Armed Forces must ensure the protection of their own capacity for action and the operative survival of their basic infrastructures, especially communications, command and control systems.

The September 11 attacks have clearly shown that **an unperceived threat is not any less real or dangerous**. Even in the absence of a defined threat, it is every government's responsibility to encourage and ensure basic defence measures aimed at avoiding catastrophic surprises. Therefore, Spain's primary interest is a **sufficiently robust defence** that is not hostage to actions that could decrease its **flexibility and capacity for adaptation**.

Finally, it is important to have **Armed Forces that are open to change**, since a focus on the familiar can be counterproductive in times of uncertainty.

6.- Scenarios of Action

The position of Spain in the international arena necessarily forces it towards **high priority geostrategic locations** for action due to geographical, historical, cultural, economical and other factors. These areas constitute our preferred scenarios for action.

This does not mean that in defending our national interests we cannot act anywhere in the world if necessary. But action **outside our preferred scenarios** must be considered as **exceptional in character** and cannot be the rule for determining the size of our Armed Forces.

III

THE ARMED FORCES' MISSIONS

1.- From Territorial Defence to Force Projection

Following the suffering caused by the two World Wars in the first half of the 20th century, the **United Nations Charter** codified a principle **generally condemning war** and the use of force, with **legitimate defence** as the only exception. This conception has endured up through the present: Armed Forces are to be instruments for repelling and defending oneself from an aggressor, responding in order to protect the territory and borders of the national State. During its first forty years of existence, the Atlantic Alliance proved to be the best expression of this strategic conception by the UN.

To a certain degree this logic broke down during the nineties with the surfacing of civil conflicts in the so-called **"failed states"**. NATO itself recognised in its 1999 **Strategic Concept** that first magnitude military means dedicated to the defence of its members' territories were no longer sufficient to guarantee international peace and stability. In this new context, armies are now seen as ideal instruments to **alleviate the suffering of countries torn by civil conflict**, and also to **impose a peaceful and stable order in those countries**.

The development of the **new peace missions of the nineties** meant a shift from an essentially static defence of national and allied soil to a much broader geographical area of action and to military capabilities based primarily on the projection and deployment of forces over prolonged periods of time in more or less far-off settings. Among their missions, armies created for national defence now have

the principal task of **projecting stability**, with all the consequences that this implies for their means and structures.

The **September 11 terrorist attacks** clearly marked a new phase in the evolution of defence. By activating the **article 5** commitments expressed in its **foundational Treaty**, the Atlantic Alliance is willing to assume an active role in non-conventional defence and in an area removed from its zone of activity and interest. Furthermore, interpreting the fight against global terrorism as a war, NATO has reinforced the defence of its basic principles and the rights and liberties of citizens in the face of new threats. This will require the acquisition of new capabilities.

This **potential for projection**, which allows us to meet the enemy as quickly as possible and wherever necessary, characterises the present phase in which defence is seen and understood as an active, flexible and dynamic instrument. In the absence of a clearly identifiable and defined enemy, defence will not be determined based on the counterweight required for a specific threat. Rather, it will be built upon a series of **generic capabilities aimed at meeting all the demands now placed upon the Armed Forces**, from **national defence** to **collective defence**, including **peace missions**; as well as maintaining a capacity to evolve when unexpected requirements arise.

2.- National Defence and Collective Defence

The Armed Forces are undergoing a second process of change in tandem with the one just outlined: **the transition from an autarchic concept of defence** - where each State relied exclusively on its own forces to meet its own risks and threats - **to one in which defence is understood as a collective effort** involving the contributions of several States and their Armed Forces to achieve the common and linked goal of shared security.

Today it is difficult to foresee a military situation in which several countries do not act jointly. Although this requires uniting efforts in economies of scale, it is easier to guarantee a sustained effort over many months if several nations express political solidarity. This may result in temporary ad hoc coalitions, since the maintenance of international peace involves all, particularly those most benefited by it.

In addition to the effort Spain must make at a collective level, contributing to solidarity through the resources and material and human means that it has available, it is still necessary to ensure **self-defence,** as an ever-present requirement for our Armed Forces given the present international panorama.

In sum, although the ultimate decision to commit national troops and endanger their lives in a conflict continues to be a matter in the field of national political sovereignty, the realities of military experience point towards a consolidation of **collective defence**. The need to be able to respond to collective demands, and to operate with the Armies of allied countries, leads to the **internationalisation or multinationalisation of defence**. This is expressed in new concepts, forms and procedures as well as material programs that can only be developed and understood from a perspective that extends beyond the national arena. The missions of the Armed Forces will be determined by this vision of defence as a collective endeavour.

3.- Lines of Strategic Action

In order to adequately face the realities of the new national and international context, the goal of the Spanish strategy is to support the national objectives and share them with a group of nations and institutions that pursue the common goal of contributing to international peace and security.

With this objective in mind, the **national security policy** should be based on the following instruments:

- **Deterrence**

Deterrence is built upon the exercise of power as a means to maintain peace, spanning every area that falls within the realm of State action. National and alliance-based **military capabilities of sufficient strength and preparation** are necessary for this purpose; and the corresponding national, international or allied community with their various leaders must demonstrate unequivocally a firm and decisive will to use them.

The fundamental aspects that give credibility to deterrence are the **maintenance** of a national military capability, and its **readiness and availability** to act jointly through collective defence or in coalition with allies and other friendly countries.

- **Cooperation**

Cooperation is the act of interdependence of individuals and organisations seeking certain objectives through a rapprochement in their policies instead of using physical or material coercion.

At present it is clear that no nation can expect to be successful in meeting the current multiplicity of risks alone. Thus it is necessary to **reinforce links with other countries that share common interests**, in order to find **multilateral solutions** through joint efforts. It is also important to strengthen peaceful relations with these nations, especially in our own geographical setting, recognising that cooperation is based on communication, coordination and convergence of efforts in areas of interest for those involved.

Clear and unequivocal support in areas of cooperation such as education, instruction, training, joint production and aid in

sustainability pave the way for peace and goodwill, even with countries that have conflicting interests with us.

- **Prevention**

In the new security conception, prevention is **action intended to avoid the tensions, instabilities and crises that lead to conflicts** and, in situations where conflicts do arise, to address their causes and seek to contain them in their early phases and places of origin in order to limit the efforts and means required once they develop.

Therefore it is important to respond to specific situations in a timely and ad hoc manner, using an adequate combination of political, diplomatic, economic and military instruments.

- **Stability projection**

This is the **capability to exert influence in other regions** in order to reduce tensions and instabilities while fostering the establishment of stable democracies and market economies.

Military participation in peace missions has established an **external Spanish presence** and can serve as an example for reducing political tensions, increasing economic interdependence and achieving greater mutual trust in other regions.

- **Response**

This is the **capability to react**, in an adequate fashion, **in the face of any possible aggression** against the national interests or those of allies and friendly countries. This would imply that preventive measures have been inadequate, leading to the unleashing of response procedures that may be in solitary or in alliances or coalitions with other States.

4.- General Missions of the Armed Forces

The ultimate purpose of an army is to ensure national security in the face of any risk that may threaten to endanger it. But this function of defence can and should be broken down into more concrete missions. Hence, the **general missions of the Armed Forces** are organised into various **other missions derived from the general ones**.

The new Armed Forces see their usefulness outlined in **three broad missions**: defensive missions, missions related to international cooperation, and missions to support States' civil administrations.

So the **first general mission** of the Armed Forces can be no other than to **impede any type of aggression and respond to it if necessary**.

From a purely defensive perspective the Armed Forces should be endowed and organised to project a **deterrence** capability upon any potential aggressor, discouraging any possible attack as early as possible. But if deterrence fails and an armed aggression occurs, the Armed Forces should be capable of **repelling that aggression** before it causes irreparable harm. They should also be able to carry out operations until success in the confrontation has been achieved according to the terms set by the Government.

As seen in the events of September 11, 2001, it is possible for an international aggression to materialise and strike national soil without clearly penetrating the national borders or presenting a specific enemy battle line. So it is important to realise that national defence may not always occur on or close to home soil. Another strategic requirement is **force projection** to far-off places, along with the defence of national territory, air and maritime spaces.

Although **military intelligence** is essential in every type of mission, in this general mission it is particularly relevant as an indispensable element of an effective prevention policy and of the eventual exercise of any legitimate defence action.

Spanish security does not depend only on what occurs in our immediate environment. It is also highly dependent on the **security of the European area** and on **world stability**. As a result, Spain is committed to regional defence organisations such as the Atlantic Alliance, and clearly favours the development of a security and defence policy within the European Union; Spain is also willing to take part in multinational coalitions. For these reasons, the Armed Forces' **second general mission** is to have a **military contribution to international peace and stability**.

Formerly, collective defence commitments required military solidarity when faced with a direct aggression against a member of the organisation, whether NATO or the Western European Union (WEU). After September 11, this generic task of solidarity in re-establishing the *ante bellum* status quo may require military and combat activities in places other than the site of the initial aggression. Thus, **the Spanish Armed Forces must be prepared to act wherever the situation requires it and in the multinational framework most appropriate at the time, while always maintaining respect for international legality**.

During the nineties it became evident that local conflicts can threaten the stability of an entire zone and, once they become regional, can affect the entire world. This involves not only the direct or indirect repercussions of wars, such as refugee movements; there are also other outcomes which are considered morally unacceptable by Western societies, such as the violence unleashed during tribal and ethnic wars, and continuous violations of human rights. In the

nineties a new moral imperative for **intervention** in defence of third parties was developed in order to **impose** - if necessary - **a peaceful solution to conflicts**, even by the use of force.

It is also important to highlight the tasks of **defence diplomacy**, oriented towards fostering friendly relations and collaboration with the Armed Forces of other countries. This is expressed in cooperation agreements, exchanges of officers in academies, visits to installations and units, etc.

Finally, the Armed Forces assume as their **third and last general mission** a role in **contributing** alongside other State and Public Administration institutions to the **preservation of citizen security and well being**.

Due to their organisation, structure, preparation and means, the Armed Forces can sometimes participate in certain **tasks that are characteristic of the civil administration**. These tasks mobilise military resources but do not require the use of force, in contrast with other types of missions.

The Armed Forces play a very important role in **civil emergency situations** caused by natural or human catastrophes, ranging from flood relief interventions to soil decontamination, such as took place in Doñana after the Aznalcóllar dam broke in 1998. More recently all the Spanish Armed Forces have participated in joint efforts to resolve the ecological catastrophe resulting from the sunken **oil tanker "Prestige"**.

The Armed Forces are at the National Government's disposal for general use in tasks deemed appropriate for its form of functioning or when other institutions are temporarily unable to carry them out. For example, **Army** troops have been involved in border control in Ceuta and Melilla, as well as protecting

communication lines within the Peninsula from possible terrorist attacks. The **Navy** has agreements with the Ministry of the Interior to participate in capturing ships suspected of transporting drugs, and is involved in surveillance to ensure the enforcement of environmental protection laws against potential threats from ships carrying hazardous or contaminating materials. The **Air Force** participates in emergency or priority transport needs, and also aids in fire-fighting missions with the Autonomous Communities.

Since the September 11 attacks, **the Armed Forces** have also been involved in providing security at large international events held in this country, such as the recent meetings of the European Council in Barcelona (March 2002) and in Seville (June 2002).

IV

THE ARMED FORCES IN THE 21ST CENTURY

1.- Basic Requirements and Critical Capabilities for the Armed Forces

In **1999 the Atlantic Alliance's work led to the development of six basic characteristics** of modern Armed Forces capable of responding to the challenges of the new strategic environment. These characteristics are:

- **Mobility and capability for projection**

Given that the foci of instability and potential theatres of operation are far removed from the permanent bases of the forces, and due to the need to act as quickly as possible in a crisis, it is important for forces to have not only tactical but also strategic mobility. They must have the capability to be deployed and placed at a considerable distance in a short period of time; the recent events in the Persian Gulf (1991) and Afghanistan (2002) are some of the clearest examples of this.

- **Sustainability**

The deployment of troops far from national territory, normally in areas lacking the necessary infrastructures, requires a significant logistic effort to maintain supplies and materiel for these forces. This is especially the case when the original time frame for missions is prolonged in far-off theatres.

- **Availability**

Along with permanent training and equipping, military units must have a level of readiness in accord with the probable needs of their job, the mission or missions assigned to them, and the expected period of assignment to larger forces.

- **Superiority in the conflict**

Even during peace missions forces cannot always expect to operate in a permissive environment, especially when imposing peace. The systems they use should guarantee superiority, to assure victory in case of a conflict. Intelligent weapons and remote controlled firing systems, which are highly lethal and provide low exposure to the enemy, help create an advantageous situation from the outset.

- **Protection**

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, along with the potential for exposure to highly contaminating elements, require that special attention be given to the protective equipment needs of our forces, both collectively and individually (i.e. use of NBC suits and masks); also requiring protection are the command structures and the troops themselves (by tactical anti-missile systems, etc.).

- **Integrated command and control**

In an information-dominated world, an essential key to military success involves knowing what is happening on the ground and gaining advantage over the opponent during the decision cycle. It is therefore necessary to have systems capable of gathering and analysing information from the battlefield, as well as disseminating intelligence and the resulting instructions to those involved. This

must all be done in real time, making it crucial that all elements supporting the decision cycle be perfectly integrated: command, control, communications, computers, surveillance, reconnaissance and intelligence.

The latest campaigns have confirmed these six basic characteristics defined by NATO but have also highlighted **certain capabilities** that are **critical** for future success in the new Armed Forces missions. Though they may fit within some of the prior points, they have now acquired greater relevance. These include:

- **Continual surveillance, reconnaissance, intelligence and target acquisition (ISTAR)**

When faced with an evasive enemy, forces should be able to obtain information control through permanent surveillance, which requires a sufficient number of reconnaissance and surveillance systems. Although unmanned vehicles become increasingly important as they gain sophistication and capabilities, permanent coverage of a theatre of operations will only be possible through the integration of diverse and overlapping systems, from space-based elements to ground units.

- **Modularity and interoperability of forces**

Responding to very diverse contingencies requires highly flexible command elements along with troops capable of reconstitution and effective operation, such as a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). This in turn requires interoperable communications elements, a joint action doctrine and common procedures.

- **Joint action**

Joint action is based on the use of specific forces under one same command, with unified procedures and mutual support criteria,

which permit more efficient and effective accomplishment of their assigned missions.

Recent experiences in Afghanistan and other more or less remote military conflicts have reinforced the idea that joint action is indispensable for carrying out military operations.

- **The importance of Special Forces**

Manifestly suitable jobs for special operations forces include reconnaissance, target acquisition, and search and rescue, along with other liaison, training and non-conventional tasks. Special forces training and doctrine of use fit excellently with new generation combat, where mobility, dispersal and invisibility are important.

- **Net-centric capability**

The events following September 11, 2001 confirmed a series of ideas and concepts developed in prior years. The new multidimensional concept of conflict led by globalisation in the information and communication fields, combining traditional means with the latest technological advances, require the principal actors to stay permanently interconnected, that is, network-centric.

The latest campaigns, carried out over a broad low-density theatre, required at all times a high degree of interconnection between the forces deployed in order to achieve the desired results. The future need to link all combat elements in real time requires a veritable fusion of today's information networks.

2.- Asymmetric Warfare

Since the **September 11 attacks** and their dramatic demonstration of catastrophic terrorism, traditional armies face the new phenomenon of an enemy that uses an asymmetrical approach:

the enemy itself is essentially asymmetrical and non-conventional. Modern armies must be prepared to deter or disrupt actions by similar conventional forces, while also being able to respond to a whole gamut of **non-conventional threats** that are continually increasing in number, lethal power and accessibility to States and substate groups.

The fact that traditional military superiority does not automatically mean increased security or effectiveness in stopping asymmetrical attacks creates an entirely new situation on the strategic panorama and requires a thorough revision of modern defence's tenets and means.

3.- General Tendencies

Tomorrow's wars will not be like those of the past, nor will future strategic environment conditions be like those of today. However, this Strategic Review focuses on a temporal horizon that is relatively short, and this makes it possible to discern the changes required of our Armed Forces and defence.

Thus, **the Army** must continue its transformation towards units that permit easier projection, have greater deployment capability, and are modularly organised ad hoc for the specific mission. In order to combine greater tactical mobility with sufficient strike capability, it will be necessary to lighten the heavy armament. The key to success lies in rapid projection capacity, pursuing effectiveness in combat.

The transformation of the **Navy** involves a re-orientation of its fleet away from its oceanic and anti-submarine focus. It must become a force primarily capable of power projection in littoral and coastal waters, reaching all the way into the interior as well.

The **Air Force** must move towards acquiring precision-guided strike weapons, along with the air transport means for projecting forces. It should also take advantage of new unmanned vehicle technologies, and particularly of space–based systems.

In any case, the true transformation of military and defence capabilities will come about as a new way of understanding the effort of each Service within a **joint and integrated action**.

4.- A New Mentality

In the Armed Forces the material element is important, but the human factor is even more decisive, if possible. It is men and women who make armies, not their machines. In this sense, new systems and technological elements - in and of themselves - are insufficient for meeting the defence challenges of the 21st century. What is needed above all else is a **mindset open to changes**, able to explore and experiment when faced with a changing and uncertain future. This new mentality must emphasize joint and multinational approaches by means of a reformed and revised educational system and structure.

V

PARAMETERS OF THE REVIEW

1.- The Human Factor

Even in the highly technical and automated Armed Forces of the future, **the key and determining factor will still be the quality of its human resources**. In this regard the final objective of the personnel policy is not only to meet the numerical needs of the Services, but most of all to **recruit and retain** quality personnel who will receive regular training. This would consolidate a professional Armed Forces model composed of human resources that are perfectly integrated into an organisation operated on principles of effectiveness and efficiency.

The Armed Forces should have professional military personnel **in** accord with the **quantity and quality** required for the missions assigned. These include the usual missions in times of peace and others involving immediate responses to contingencies, in order to provide a sufficient presence in areas of national sovereignty and to deter possible threats.

For this reason it is important to articulate measures that take into account the following parameters:

- The **resource planning process** will be carried out with special emphasis on: **redefining the rate of cadre** in relation to neighbouring countries; **empowering the category of non-career officers**[1] for greater flexibility in determining and

[1] Translator's note: Militar de complemento, in Spanish.

adjusting staff; having technically prepared **civil personnel** available to respond to the needs of the Armed Forces, which requires training activities to incorporate and maintain them in adequate numbers; adopting and developing the **concept of reserves**, both in their quality and availability in order to permit a supplementary influx of human resources in an agile, constant and timely fashion.

- **Improving the integration of the Armed Forces within society**, providing motivating factors for each personnel group; establishing an equivalence between their specific regimes and civil servants in regard to income, pension plans and social support; establishing equivalencies with the national educational system for military degrees; maintaining the unique characteristics of the military career and fostering geographical mobility.

- **Optimising human resources by outsourcing services**, thus liberating operational personnel from tasks that can be carried out by specialised companies.

- Adopting the necessary steps to **reincorporate** temporary-service military professionals into **civilian life**, including them in ministerial job finding programs and specifying their possibilities in the corporate realm.

2.- Material and Technological Factors

A series of technologies that had been developing at an unprecedented rate were progressively incorporated into weapons systems in the nineties, in what has been labelled a **Revolution in Military Affairs**, giving rise to **Services that actually constitute a system of systems**. Especially notable among these technologies are: **reconnaissance and surveillance systems**, that seek to make the

battlefield transparent; **software programming applied to command and control systems** in order to process all the information and thus maintain an adequate decision-making rate; and long-range **intelligent weapons** that are very precise and lethal.

Even though the **Revolution in Military Affairs** obviously implies a serious budgetary effort, any Service seeking to act jointly with other allies must develop in areas linked to **new technologies**. In Spain's case **the modernisation of the Armed Forces' materiel is a continual process** that is primarily determined by the global strategic situation, our international commitments, and the available economic resources. The intent is to **meet the needs of our Armed Forces by supplying them with the best weapons systems, equipment and support infrastructure to be able to effectively fulfil their assigned missions**.

In any case, Spain must accelerate the process of achieving full **compatibility of its communications, intelligence and command and control systems** between its three Services and with its allies.

Acquisition commitments for important platforms during the next fifteen years represent a very high portion of the budget destined to new materiel; which means that it will be important to find an adequate **balance between the present number of existing platforms and the acquisition of new ones**.

Even though the main programs' platforms are soon to be operational and will be a milestone for Spain's defence, the Armed Forces also require **new equipment and infrastructure programs**, that are equally necessary in order to respond to future challenges and threats to national and international security needs.

Those programs should include developing and acquiring **unmanned systems** equipped with various sensors and systems that

allow **the detection, surveillance, identification and acquisition of targets**; incorporating new types of sensors that permit **remote detection capacity**; and increasing the **capability for satellite communications**, both for general and exclusively military use.

It is also important to support the political objective of a **European Armaments Policy** for the European Union, in order to create a competitive and technologically advanced industrial base. Therefore, it is necessary to continue consolidating demand in Europe by **harmonising operational requirements, cooperating in Research and Development (R&D) matters as well as Innovation, and developing multinational weapons programs**.

In the face of undeniable threats due to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, **it is indispensable that we improve the self-defence capabilities of the contingents** exposed to this risk by providing updated individual and collective protection equipment against NBCR agents.

3.- Towards Greater Projection, Mobility and Interoperability

The key to success in any future military operation, and to Spanish participation, lies in our **capability for early response** by rapid deployment of the required forces in an increasingly vast theatre of operations. For Spain this basically means three things:

- Increasing **air transport capability**, which will be achieved at some point with the new A400M aircraft.

- Improving the capability to **project amphibious and ground forces**, adding new elements to amphibious assault ships so as to enable projection of an entire Brigade, as well as providing the necessary logistic support for other operations through ground contingents proximate to the littoral.

- Increasing the deployment capability of **combat aircraft**, in order to send them and their support wing anywhere in the world in the shortest possible timeframe.

There are four priority measures to adopt concerning **mobility**:

- The acquisition of a new generation **attack helicopter** equipped with the latest all-weather day/night navigation systems, self-protection and intelligent weapons systems; which is ultimately the only way to guarantee superiority over anti-helicopter systems and tanks.

- Replacement of the **transport helicopter fleet** to ensure tactical transport and logistic support for land units.

- A progressive incorporation alongside heavy tanks of a new type of **wheeled vehicle** with similar firepower and, above all else, transportable by air.

- Replacement of the **submarine units** in order to maintain freedom of action and force mobility.

Interoperability has become increasingly important over the last decade and is now being considered as a means of multiplying the combat capability of 21st century armies. Spain's vision of Armed Forces that are interoperable with our allies has led our efforts to be directed towards the following areas:

- Use of common **doctrine** and **procedures**, interoperability in **communications** and **information systems** (CIS) and equipment, as well as the capability to interchange **combat supplies** to facilitate mutual collaboration.

- **Reducing the technological gap** between European countries and the United States by increasing and improving

interoperability, in order to minimise the consequences of this technological distance as much as possible.

- **Standardisation of equipment, supplies and procedures**, considered as a critical factor that must be taken into account in designing and producing new systems and equipment.

4.- A Rationalisation of Structures

Both to generate the capabilities required by the Services in the coming years and to continue meeting contingencies effectively and efficiently as successive international crises arise, **a more simplified structure is necessary in order to coordinate administrative procedures and direct operations**. The new model for this will undoubtedly be the **creation of a single centre** that jointly and individually integrates the Central Organ[2] and the Service Headquarters. Progress must also be made to streamline the organisation **of the chain of military command and the force's units**, resulting in a **more integrated** and simplified structure. Therefore:

- The Central Organ of the Ministry of Defence must assume full responsibility for defence systems acquisitions. The present **Directorate General for Armament and Materiel**, dependent on the **Secretary of State for Defence,** must be empowered to autonomously manage defence acquisitions and procurement, centralising all purchases and directly assuming **non-operational logistics** under terms yet to be specified, independently of the specific logistics that are channelled through the individual networks to each Service.

- A clear division of responsibilities will be established between the **Service Chiefs of Staff** in charge of force preparation and **operations commands** responsible for the final use of the force.

[2] Translator's note: Administrative headquarters.

- An **Operations Command** will be created for planning and executing all operations. **This Command will be subordinate to the Chief of the Defence Staff (CHOD)**, who is to advise the Government as well as being responsible for strategic oversight and direction.

- The process of **rationalising** the **intelligence** capabilities of the Defence Staff and the three Services, which began with the creation of the **Armed Forces Intelligence Centre (CIFAS)**, will be consolidated into an integral system under the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff.

- **Territorial structures will be eliminated** (Regions, Zones and peripheral structure), **to be replaced by a functional organisation**.

- **The peripheral organisation** of the Ministry of Defence **will be reorganised** for greater coordination and effectiveness.

- **The rationalisation process of the Education Centres will continue** in order to achieve greater unification.

- **The Armed Forces will continue the process of reducing the number of units deployed**, in order to concentrate on fewer sites as determined by its operational needs.

- **Land Forces will be organised operatively in a modular fashion** for easier, more flexible potential use in multinational structures.

- **The present defence attachés regime will be reformed** to better fulfil the responsibilities arising from modern Defence Diplomacy.

5.- A New Strategic Dimension

Spain left behind its **strategic isolation** and **autarchy** in the area of defence with membership in NATO and the WEU, in 1982 and 1988 respectively. This allowed Spain to become actively involved alongside European countries and allies in the **architecture of shared security and collective defence**, in order to meet serious potential threats to its security.

Nonetheless, certain experiences have shown the need for **military capabilities** to prevent any *fait accompli* policy and ensure respect for international law. Even with the support of the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union, it is evident that our Armed Forces need to have a permanent capability to handle **self-defence** tasks.

In recent years there has been increasing development of an autonomous European Union capability for decision-making and action in defence. Spain should strongly support a **Union with defensive capacity**. But it should also go beyond the present limits defined by the Helsinki commitments of 1999.

In fact, Spain should defend:

- **Broadening missions** beyond the limits of the so-called **Petersberg** tasks. The European Force can and should be called upon to act in other types of contingencies such as external terrorism.

- Establishing a more autonomous planning capability within the EU as well as developing certain capabilities that are considered **"necessary duplications"** with NATO, especially in areas such as communications and command and control.

At a transatlantic level, Spain will support reinforcing the Alliance's role in **defence against international terrorism,** in addition to executing its traditional missions, by developing the necessary **military capabilities** to meet this threat and by establishing **new relations** with member countries and international organisations.

Specifically, our country should encourage:

- **Improving anti-terrorist capabilities**, in line with the efforts of the EU and NATO.
- **Cooperation in intelligence matters** with other agencies and organisms.
- **Defence against weapons of mass destruction** (NBCR).
- Establishing an **adequate chain of command and control** for military units deployed in operations against external terrorism.
- **Protection and survival of the force** in allied operations.

PART TWO

BASIC CRITERIA OF THE STRATEGIC REVIEW

BASIC CRITERIA OF THE STRATEGIC REVIEW

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1ST BASIC CRITERION

"The Armed Forces, as the essential element of Defence within the framework of the Ministry of Defence, constitute a single cluster entity that integrates the actions of each of its components: the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. Its activity is directed by the Minister of Defence, under the authority of the President of the Government, within the framework of Defence Policy and subject to Parliamentary control."

In the last few years the conception of the **Armed Forces** has evolved towards that of a **single entity** composed of the Army, Navy and Air Force, not merely the sum of them. The **Common Corps** are also included within the Armed Forces and are essential to their normal functioning.

The present orientation and functioning of the Armed Forces tends towards **joint action**, due to the fact that an operational mission generally requires military forces from more than one Service. But the term "joint action" normally expresses an intentional integration of diversity, seeking the necessary synergy of efforts by coordinating and optimising actions, in order to reach optimal results for the whole.

The Armed Forces fit within the organic framework of the **Ministry of Defence**. They must possess the flexibility to develop the necessary capabilities for action wherever it is required, according to the guidelines established by the Government.

The **President of the Government**, exercising his or her constitutional powers as **the person responsible for governmental action, uses this authority to direct the actions and use of the Armed Forces**.

The **Minister of Defence assumes the execution of Security and Defence objectives set by the Government**, developing the corresponding Defence Policy from which the Defence Objectives and basic lines of action are derived.

As a result, the Minister of Defence defines and formulates a **National Defence planning process** to ensure coordination of efforts between the Armed Forces and the other organisms in this Ministry, thereby making its contribution to Security and Defence. Force level, available resources, priorities for investment programs and other measures to supply the necessary material and human means for the Armed Forces missions will be established based on these directives.

2ND BASIC CRITERION

"The defence effort should be oriented towards the Force, which is reason for the existence of the entire organisation."

The first premise of Defence must be to orient its effort towards **the Force**, which is the final reason for the existence of the entire Ministry and its organisation. For this purpose it will be necessary to redefine, in a balanced way, the dimensions of Force Support, the Service Headquarters and the Central Organ[3].

Just as the Force must be defined according to the Armed Forces Missions and Tasks, so the Support of the Force and the Service Headquarters must be constituted according to the needs of the Force, with the sole objective of facilitating its adequate preparation and rapid and efficient action. The same may be said for the rest of the Ministry's organisation, involved with prioritising, coordinating and executing the general guidelines.

Past needs for a large number of forces to defend against massive conventional enemy attacks have given way to new needs for forces capable of rapid deployment to meet crises as they arise, in order to control, limit and deter their development.

Although in the last few years the Spanish Armed Forces have made significant efforts to **adapt to the new situation**, this process must continue until adequate force is achieved, which is one more reason why **defining the force should be one of the key objectives of this Review**.

[3] Translator's note: Administrative headquarters.

3RD BASIC CRITERION

"All units should be prepared for the most demanding combat actions, even though they may carry out other types of missions."

All Armed Forces units, especially those that constitute the main combat forces, must be **sufficiently trained and adequately supplied in personnel and materiel**.

The **quality of the Armed Forces**, in personnel preparation, equipment and training must be comparable to allied forces.

Its structure, along with the empowering of interoperability, will permit force groupings **capable of being integrated within multinational forces**, as a contribution to the allied effort, if the need arises.

The Atlantic Alliance's Defence Capabilities Initiative, approved at the Washington, D.C. summit of 1999, and the Prague Capabilities Commitment of 2002, are intended to provide the allied nations with forces **that have deployment and combat capabilities to face an armed conflict in any environment**, especially long-term missions in far-off locations. Once these capabilities have been acquired, the Forces will also be ready to act successfully in lower risk situations such as the **"Petersberg" missions,** to be developed by the **European Union** according to the military capabilities defined in the 1999 **"Headline Goal"**.

A characteristic of current conflicts is the fact that they are initiated from increasingly large distances, so that the use of military power must rely on means and procedures that provide **greater range and precision**. Units capable of carrying out special operations gain importance, and the search for information has become a crucial factor in modern conflicts. For this reason, neighbouring countries are developing concepts that link the activities involved in Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance.

The tremendous destructive power of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and the difficulty in limiting their effects require not only **protection** for the forces but also detection, evaluation and decontamination measures to prevent their effects and reduce their consequences.

Even though they may carry out other types of missions, **all units must be organised and prepared for the most demanding combat situations**. Quality is a higher priority that quantity. They must all be provided with sufficient protection and adequate means to contribute information concerning the situation.

Rotation during long-term operations is necessary to provide rest and retraining for personnel and to carry out the necessary maintenance and replenishment of materiel.

Sustaining the effort requires Reaction Forces that are larger than the ones deployed, so they can be relieved in the operational area by an adequate rotation of units.

4TH BASIC CRITERION

"The Armed Forces should be structured to respond effectively to the new missions assigned to them in a joint and combined context."

The **Armed Forces** must **be organised to respond effectively to new missions** that result from our national and international commitments, becoming an instrument in the State's foreign policy capable of making Spain's presence visible in the world.

The future **role** of the new Armed Forces will be conceptualised **within a joint and combined frame**. The Services must be capable of placing the units, and the command and control capabilities necessary for the established structures, at the disposal of the Commands in charge, whether national or multinational.

For this reason the capabilities of the units contributed by Spain must have **characteristics similar to those contributed by the most advanced countries**.

Armed Forces intervention in the new conflicts must ensure **rapid deployment** and **sustainment capability**. This is an indispensable capability in all phases of the conflict: before, during and after. This will enable the Armed Forces to fulfil all its assigned missions, from humanitarian aid to those of highest intensity, as needed for the resolution of the conflict.

In the 21st century Armed Forces must be a powerful tool capable of achieving **maximum effectiveness in resolving conflicts**

as quickly as possible with minimum damage, a step ahead of the adversary. For this purpose they will have high strike capability and the **most modern materiel and equipment,** providing maximum precision, avoiding unnecessary collateral damage and increasing the protection provided for our forces.

The Armed Forces will also be prepared to **cooperate with civil authorities and other State organisms**. New national requirements, such as supporting the civil population in certain situations and protecting the environment, will give rise to new commitments for the Armed Forces.

Military operations will be increasingly conditioned by **new factors**, such as public opinion and the media. In order to achieve maximum effectiveness in the use of available resources, the Armed Forces must be capable of acting in coordination and harmony with **new actors,** who are increasingly relevant in different conflicts, such as international and non-governmental organisations.

Therefore the military organisation of **21st century Armed Forces must be increasingly functional, joint, operational and have greater capability for external projection,** so as to better defend national interests and the values Spain shares with its partners and allies.

5TH BASIC CRITERION

"The Chief of the Defence Staff, as Operational Commander of the Armed Forces, will be responsible for the strategic execution of operations, exercising command over the components of the operational structure of the Armed Forces. A new Operations Command will be created, directly subordinate to the Chief of the Defence Staff, and delegated the responsibility of carrying out the execution of operations."

The responsibility for crisis or conflict resolution lies at the **Political Level** (referred to as the Great Strategy or the General Strategy), which is controlled by the National Government. At this level the Chief of the Defence Staff acts as an advisor regarding the possibilities of a military response in situations that might require the use of the Armed Forces.

The Chief of the Defence Staff is situated at the lower, **Strategic Level** (or Military Strategy level), and guides strategy under the leadership of the President of the Government and the Ministry of Defence, with the advice of the Service Chiefs of Staff. At this level the political objectives determined by the Government become strategic objectives, which are then transmitted by a strategic directive sent by the Chief of the Defence Staff to the operational commands.

The Chief of the Defence Staff heads the planning, strategic development and **command of operations** (the operational direction), which is then normally delegated to a directly subordinate authority that acts at the **Operational Level.**

Presently the Chief of the Defence Staff is the Commander of the Joint Operational Command, assuming the operational command of land, naval and air forces assigned to carry out operational missions, and may also be involved in the strategic development of the operations.

The Chief of the Defence Staff's role at a strategic level involves:

- Acting as the Government's **military advisor**.

- Acting as the military authority in charge of transforming the political decisions received from the Minister into **directives** that order and direct the actions of the Armed Forces in operational missions. Responsibilities include general planning, establishing the required operational organisation, determining the forces to be assigned to the operational plans and transferring authority to the national or allied commands who will ultimately make use of it.

Along with these functions in the area of operations, are others derived from simultaneous actions at the **operational level**, which is the most obvious arena for carrying out Joint Action. This requires highly detailed, dedicated planning and direction of military operations involving our Armed Forces; that is the projection, sustainment and redeployment (i.e. the participation) of Spanish forces in operations that fall under Allied command.

In order to adequately meet responsibilities at both the strategic and operational levels, the Chief of the Defence Staff needs an authority upon whom to delegate the management of the operations, which include the ones that presently are carried out by the Service Chiefs of Staff.

In order to develop this, the operational structure of the Armed Forces is composed of a permanent section (Chief of the Defence Staff/Operational Command with its Staff) and other subordinate sections that may be established by the **assignment of forces**.

The Chief of the Defence Staff will have a **Headquarters** that includes:

- An **Operations Command with its corresponding** operational **Staff**.

- A **Staff** to provide support in defining and developing the Military Strategy, and in the other responsibilities.

The **Chief of the Operations Command** will conduct the necessary operations, delegated by the Chief of the Defence Staff, in order to fulfil the operational missions in times of peace, crisis, war or armed conflict.

In addition to conducting operations delegated by the Chief of the Defence Staff, the **Chief of the Operations Command** will have the following specific responsibilities:

- Operational planning.

- Monitoring operations when Spanish forces are involved.

- Planning and conducting the necessary evaluations of active operational plans and joint and combined training.

- Monitoring the level of training and operational effectiveness of the Services Forces.

At present the three Service Chiefs of Staff are responsible for **permanent specific missions** in times of peace. Missions related to

the exercise of sovereignty will now fall under the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff, who will generally delegate their execution to specific Commands.

The three Service Chiefs of Staff are responsible for the **designation of** any Service **forces** to be assigned by the Chief of the Defence Staff to a specific plan. Once designated, coordination with the specific Commands of these forces can be undertaken by the Chief of Operations.

The Chief of the Defence Staff, advised by the Service Chiefs of Staff, will issue the **general guidelines** for preparing the Forces for operational involvement, in accord with the plans and missions to be carried out.

6th BASIC CRITERION

"There will be a 'Joint Rapid Reaction Force' established upon the basis of a 'pool' of forces."

Rapid Reaction Forces can be defined as a set of units that are prepared for rapid deployment.

In the **present strategic scenario**, Reaction Forces, due to their higher level of readiness and availability, are most likely to supply the necessary instruments for acting in peace-support and crisis control operations, and in the initial phases of a larger conflict.

From a doctrinal and conceptual point of view, it is clearly desirable to have a Joint Rapid Reaction Force built upon a **set of land, naval and air units prepared for rapid deployment,** enabling the Government to react quickly in any crisis.

Along with those already mentioned, other common characteristics of the Reaction Forces are great strategic mobility, flexibility and combat power as well as a capability for sustained action in accord with the type of mission they are to carry out. Rapid deployment depends on their readiness for action and this in turn depends on a consistently high level of training, maintenance of material effectiveness and continual availability of the necessary levels of supplies.

These forces must be configured to allow their deployment and sustainment in accord with their specific operational contingency plans, in order to meet the operational requirements for carrying out,

up to an intermediate level of effort, national or multinational operations under the auspices of NATO, the EU, the UN, the OSCE or ad hoc coalitions.

Given the foreseeable strategic scenario, the present Spanish Armed Forces capabilities, and the fact that in most operations we would act within the Atlantic Alliance or European Union framework, **it is not considered necessary or convenient to have a permanent Joint Rapid Reaction Force**. This should not be seen as a move to relinquish real reaction capability and effective forces projection.

The use of the "Joint Rapid Reaction Force" concept **does not imply creating a new organic structure**. It simply means that a set of truly deployable, flexible and highly available forces with strike capability should be at the disposal of the Armed Forces Operational Command, constituting a package of capabilities for joint planning and training purposes.

Developing this concept will require procedures, use of the permanent structure for operational execution, and the existence of a highly available set of forces. The three Service Chiefs of Staff exercise the organic command and are responsible for the formation, specific ongoing **training** and the **state of availability** required by **the forces in this pool**. When the Chief of the Defence Staff orders that certain forces from this pool are to be at the disposal of the Armed Forces Operational Command for a specific operation, the Service Chiefs of Staff will transfer the authority to that Commander.

In any case, this pool will be configured according to the existing **Operational Plans** that are continuously updated by the Joint Headquarters.

7TH BASIC CRITERION

"The Service Chiefs of Staff will carry out the Organic Command of their Service, without exercising the Operational Command."

Activities on the operational level resulting from the execution of the Armed Forces missions defined in the conceptual phase of this Strategic Review are essentially of a joint or combined nature.

In addition, the **missions** that the Armed Forces carry out **permanently** in times of peace and that affect sovereignty need to be integrated and controlled by one single operational structure, to better profit from the information and capabilities supplied by each Service.

This confirms the need for a **joint operational command** for planning, control, execution and monitoring of operations. It also implies that the Service Chiefs of Staff relinquish responsibility for the operational missions that are currently assigned to them; in other words, that they cease to be Operational Commands.

According to this, the current configuration of Land, Naval and Air Operational Commands (MOT, MON and MOA, respectively) will disappear, and their structures and resources may become part of the Joint Headquarters.

The **Service Chiefs of Staff** will have the **Organic Command** of their Services, responsible for the technical, tactical and logistical preparation of their Services. Among other things, this includes

technical doctrine and education, as well as Force organisation and training, in order to guarantee that the forces are generated whenever the Chief of the Defence Staff orders certain units to be moved to his Operational Command.

For this purpose the Service Chiefs of Staff will have a Staff within their headquarters to assist in exercising the Organic Command.

8TH BASIC CRITERION

"A functional structure will be established for the Services."

In the Ministry of Defence, several projects were carried out in tandem with the Strategic Review process for restructuring the **traditional territorial organisation of the Services**. The objective behind these projects was to empower the operational capability of each Service, increase the flexibility of Force support and promote joint action.

The organisation of the Services will be structured according to the **following three areas**: Command assistance, the Force, and Force support.

As a consequence of this new **functional organisation**, the territorial organisation of the Services will disappear at all levels. Functional organs of the three Services will assume functions which were essentially logistical and administrative in nature, formerly exercised by the military, maritime or aerial Regions, Zones, Command Headquarters, Sectors, etc. The administrative functions just mentioned will be transferred to the **Defence Head Offices**. However, the unique location and characteristics of the Balearic and Canary Islands as well as the cities of Ceuta and Melilla require a singular and separate treatment.

Based on these principles, a **corresponding Royal Decree** was developed in order to introduce the reforms necessary for a future **new Law on Basic Criteria for Defence,** to update the principles that inspired the present legal framework.

We are fully aware that this entire functional reform must be compatible with the need to maintain a **military presence throughout the national territory**, and for this purpose appropriate decisions have been made. Therefore, certain functional Commands will assume these representative tasks, which until now have been carried out by each Services' Territorial Commands.

9TH BASIC CRITERION

"Human resources constitute the key element in Defence. Therefore, the necessary actions must be carried out to achieve a sufficient number of highly motivated and prepared personnel."

In this **profession** with a clear **vocational nature, prioritising human resources** as a guarantee ensuring Armed Forces effectiveness requires **military personnel** with professional qualities compatible with the demands of the missions to be carried out. **Quality** shall be achieved by an adequate **selection process** adjusted to the commitments to be developed, with integral and rigorous **training** and permanent **motivation** that fosters a willingness to assume the risks inherent to this profession.

Civil personnel that provide services to Defence should be valued along similar lines and will therefore be selected, prepared and motivated so as to effectively fulfil their responsibilities.

To reach these objectives and progress towards **full professionalisation**, all aspects of military personnel careers will be **programmed**. Areas to be developed are **recruiting,** solid **military education and training**, and possible job **placement** in the labour market after leaving the service. Areas to be improved include **quality of life** and **social action**. A possible reform of the present **Branches and Rank level** structure, and of military posts, will be considered.

In order to optimise **military personnel performance** and dedication to their specific professional responsibilities, they will be

liberated from those tasks that can be effectively carried out by specialised companies through **outsourcing**.

Permanent personnel should always be adjusted to the needs of the Armed Forces, according to the missions and the level of ambition determined by the Government. The maximum number of soldiers, sailors and marines will be set annually in the **Law on the State's General Budget**, taking into account not only available resources but also international conditions and internal sociological variables. The dimensions will be set in accord with the criteria mentioned and determined **periodically as approved personnel figures**, for officers and for soldiers, sailors and marines.

The concept of **reserves** included in the Law will be developed to establish a procedure for obtaining the necessary numbers to meet the demands of the moment. Specifically, **volunteer reserves** will be developed **in cooperation with other Public Administrations**, allowing for greater interconnection between Society and the Armed Forces while providing additional resources in a manner that is **gradual and proportional** to the demands of a conflict situation.

Spanish and allied experience in the past, the foreseeable trends in the Armed Forces environment, its full professionalisation, and the expected improvements in soldier, sailor and marine personnel quality, indicate that the **rate of cadre**, the ratio between the number of active officers and troops, **will tend to move towards** the figure of **50%**.

10th BASIC CRITERION

"The logistical integration of Defence will be fully pursued."

As top authority in charge of developing the Policy on Armament and Materiel, Infrastructure and Telecommunications Systems, the Secretary of State for Defence will accomplish this using the **criterion of "centralised direction and decentralised execution"**.

This **"decentralised execution"** criterion will be carried out through the present **Headquarters' Commands**, who are **responsible for the execution** of the policies mentioned, under **the Secretary of State's direction**.

The Force, its needs and Logistical Support of the Force, will be determined at the highest level in the context of the Military Defence Planning Process. **The Chief of the Defence Staff is ultimately responsible for determining needs and operational priorities, and the Secretary of State for Defence's responsibility is to determine the financial, industrial and technological framework** for meeting these needs. **These activities will be carried out in tandem** throughout the entire planning process with the objective of optimising joint action capabilities.

In order to **rationalise the Logistical Process** of acquisition and support during the life cycle of weapons, infrastructures, and information and telecommunications systems, the following general principles will be applied:

- **Handling the Logistical Process in four distinct phases**: planning, programming, budgeting and execution. This last phase includes procurement, logistical support during the life cycle and disposal.

- **Expanding the time frame for planning in order to examine the Armed Forces' long-term needs (up to 20-25 years)** so as to guide the use of available resources and investments in R+D while allowing Industry to prepare for future programmes.

- **Applying the principle of joint action to logistical organisation, process and procedures,** only allowing technically necessary distinctions between its components (the three Services, the Defence Staff and the Central Organ).

- **Organising the logistical activity of the Armed Forces so that the Ministry of Defence is identified as a "single client"**, thus taking advantage of its enormous potential to negotiate contracts with the various companies as a preferred client.

- **Addressing in a global fashion the weapons and materiel programmes, with multidisciplinary teams of experts to examine their operational, technological, industrial, economical or other aspects** throughout the various phases of the Logistical Process.

- **Carrying out arms systems maintenance by systems families**, rather than by Services.

In order for the Secretariat of State for Defence to carry out its functions according to the principles described and the criterion of "centralised direction and decentralised execution", its **Management Centres and Headquarters must adjust their organisations to the**

new logistical responsibilities. In addition to the recent creation of the position of Commissioner for the CIS Management Plan, the Secretariat of State will **study the possible creation of the following new organisations:**

- **A Management Office or similar organism for obtaining the Principal Programmes,** dependent on the Directorate General for Armament and Materiel (DGAM), to standardise procedures, optimise resources and adequately programme the operational phase of the life cycle.

- **A Management Office or similar organism for maintenance,** dependent on the DGAM, to standardise procedures, optimise resources and supervise and control the industrial maintenance of the Armed Forces and of outsourcing.

- **An Organisation to support Defence Industry exports** and capitalise externally on the sales of Armed Force's materiel and services.

11TH BASIC CRITERION

"To advance toward maximum interoperability with European partners and allies."

Along with compatibility, the capacity to interchange and use common doctrines, procedures or equipment, **interoperability** constitutes one level of **standardisation** and is closely linked to the former.

The goal of **standardisation** is to increase operational efficiency and performance in the use of available resources. Improvements in this area should be considered a key element of Defence planning.

Interoperability is understood as the Armed Forces' capacity to train, drill, and then operate effectively in carrying out the joint and combined missions assigned.

Common doctrine and procedures, interoperability of communications, information systems and related equipment, and the interchangeability of combat supplies are necessary to attain **interoperable multinational forces**.

Operational interoperability directly influences the combat effectiveness of allied forces, especially those that participate in multinational formations. The standardisation of equipment, supplies and procedures is clearly a global force multiplier that must be considered when **designing and producing systems and equipment**. The minimum objectives for achieving this combat effectiveness are interoperability of main equipment,

interchangeability of supplies and the use of common procedures. These requirements are directly related to logistical support for standardised equipment.

The importance of interoperability has increased over the last decade. It is the basic tool for achieving the **two main objectives** that European countries should pursue: to be able to operate effectively with the **United States** and with **each other**, and to have the capabilities to act in operations within the framework of the **Atlantic Alliance** or the **European Union**.

The European countries should acknowledge their limitations and accept this new reality, focussing their efforts on **increasing and improving interoperability** in order to reduce as much as possible the effects of the indisputable **technological gap** with the United States. The answer does not lie simply in increasing investment, but also in improving its effectiveness. For example, the **European Capability Action Plan (ECAP),** carried out by the **European Union** in order to overcome the present shortfalls, should be concurrent with the **Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI),** which is presently under review through the **Alliance's Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC)**. It is important that the two initiatives be complimentary, reducing costs by avoiding unnecessary overlapping and duplication.

One of the main objectives of the European countries, both through the **Defence Capabilities Initiative** and the **Prague Capabilities Commitment** as well as the **European Union Capability Action Plan** must be to **reach a certain degree of interoperability**, especially in Command and Control and Information systems, allowing the European nations to operate jointly and with other partners or allies such as the United States.

The lack of resources is undoubtedly a problem in this area, and requires a redoubling of efforts. Each of the nations must make a greater commitment of resources, even though this will not solve the entire problem. Better use of these resources is also important and is achieved by fostering alternatives that enable greater cooperation in multinational projects, shared resources and capabilities, greater specialisation, and greater concurrence of processes such as the European Union Capability Action Plan. These help to avoid duplicating efforts, thus favouring **interoperability** and **standardisation**.

12TH BASIC CRITERION

"The Land Forces must have the greatest projection, deployment, tactical mobility and strike capabilities."

The Army will maintain its criterion of being organised, equipped and trained for use in the entire spectrum of the conflict, in order to contribute decisively in the management of national or international crises of diverse nature or intensity.

The **Land Forces** must combine adequately protected light units with others that have adequate strike capability.

Although the **armoured and mechanised forces** still provide the greatest strike capability in Surface Manoeuvres and continue to be the main factor in deterrence and superiority, progress must be made towards a Land Force with significant projection capability.

So in addition to **light forces** with a sufficient degree of protection, there is also a need for **intermediate forces**. While these forces will not have the combat power of the armoured/mechanised units, they have sufficient strike and rapid reaction (projectability) capability. In addition to rapid location on the scene of the crisis, this would permit crisis control when the need is not for decisive force but for superiority from the outset.

Therefore, to be ready to respond to any potential crisis, **tomorrow's Land Forces must include protected light units, armoured/mechanised units and intermediate units with light armoured/mechanised capabilities**. Light units should be

sufficiently protected and armoured/mechanised units should be as light as possible through state-of–the–art technology to facilitate their transport while maintaining sufficient power, protection and strike capability.

Along with Surface Manoeuvre, **Airmobile Manoeuvre** must be empowered as a fundamental element of Land Manoeuvre, to increase mobility and the reach of military action during Land Manoeuvre. For this purpose the **appropriate airmobile platforms** are required.

13TH BASIC CRITERION

"Naval Forces, while maintaining their capacity for controlling the maritime spaces that are under our national sovereignty and within our interests, must be oriented towards operations in far-off littoral theatres, placing special emphasis on the projection of Naval power over land."

Since World War II and particularly after the fragmentation of the USSR, Western navies have gradually moved away from great oceanic naval operations, downsizing their naval forces to concentrate their capabilities on the littoral operational environment.

At a time when projection needs are in the spotlight, it is important to emphasize that naval forces are particularly equipped for this type of operations.

Their **capability for self-sustainment,** not requiring the support of a host nation, their **strategic mobility** and their **enormous flexibility,** make them invaluable in allowing precise and quick intervention in any crisis.

The very presence of an **amphibious force** has a deterring effect, obliging the enemy to carry out defensive deployment and distracting a disproportionate number of forces.

Therefore it is important to acquire a **greater capability for naval power projection over land**, a fundamental capability that the Navy can contribute to joint and combined strategy. The

capability for action in maritime spaces of sovereignty and interest must also be empowered, especially in the areas of maritime surveillance and strategic transport and projection capabilities.

14TH BASIC CRITERION

"The Air Force must have all-weather, day/night combat capability, greater transport capability and greater reach and precision."

The lessons learned in recent armed conflicts demonstrate the necessity to achieve and maintain **air superiority** as a pre-requisite for initiating a military campaign.

In order to carry out aerial operations against the enemy's air power and potential, as well as against political, industrial, economic and military power centres, or in support of one's own surface forces, **offensive aerial means** are necessary based on combat platforms with day/night, all-weather operating capability. Air weapons systems must be equipped with remote-launched **intelligent weapons** so as to operate with an acceptable degree of security and precision, while reducing collateral damage whenever stipulated.

In addition, since air attacks are one of the greatest threats to the security of a nation and its combat forces, an **effective air defence system must be in place and operational** at all times.

Aerial operations not only require the availability of combat units but also the **transport means necessary** to support an advanced deployment. Both capabilities should be developed simultaneously. Air transport is one of the pillars of the strategic mobility of rapid action forces. Their necessary empowerment should include air transport means, given that the Armed Forces will probably act in far-off places and over undefined periods of time.

The reach of these **air weapons systems** is critical, especially since the weapons load determines the distance it can be transported or vice versa, the distance to its objective limits the platforms' firepower. Reach is also an essential aspect of deployment in far-off theatres. Therefore it is indispensable to increase the capability for **in-flight refuelling,** which acts as a force multiplier when there are a sufficient number of refuelling units and they have adequate fuel transfer capability.