LATVIJAS VĒSTNESIS
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PROJECTS, CONCEPTS, PLANS

Defense concept of the Republic of Latvia

Approved by the decision of the National Security Council of 22 May 1995.
Basically accepted at the sitting of the Cabinet of Ministers on June 13, 1995,
instructing the Ministry of Defense to prepare
draft legal acts necessary for the implementation of the concept

Introduction

The need for Latvia's military defense

It seems hopeless for a small country with limited military potential to resist a much stronger aggressor militarily. However, the Latvian people are not able to survive foreign occupation. If the Latvian people do not defend themselves against aggression by all possible means, Latvia will be occupied and Latvians will soon cease to exist as a nation. State defense by military means may require great human sacrifices, but Latvia has no other choice if it wants to exist as an independent state.

Documents related to national defense

Laws of the Republic of Latvia:

On national defense.

About the Defense Forces.

About the National Guard of the Republic of Latvia.

On compulsory public service of the Republic of Latvia.

Participation of the Latvian National Armed Forces in international operations

Other legal acts:

Security concept of the Republic of Latvia.

The foreign policy concept of the Republic of Latvia.

State threat analysis.

Analysis of potential military threats to the country.

Additional documents:

Development plan of the National Armed Forces.

Draft budget of the Ministry of Defense.

Perspective material purchase plan of the Ministry of Defense.

Financial constraints and assumptions

Given the burden on the state budget, significant defense spending is currently not considered eligible. It is therefore necessary to find a compromise between the military-political situation that determines the country's threats and the country's capabilities. The current budget allocation is limited and hinders the development of the NAF. In order to ensure the necessary development of the NAF, it must be assumed that:

- the necessary budgetary resources will be found, possibly by combining a more targeted use of existing resources with a real increase in national defense resources. The speed of implementation of the force structure development plan and their successive establishment depend on the budget resources allocated for national defense.

- Latvia's defense budget as a percentage of the country's gross domestic product will not exceed the defense budgets of Western European countries.

Public restrictions

Currently, there is a lack of public and political support for the significant development of the NAF, as a significant part of the population is still reminiscent of the service in the Latvian NAF in the USSR Armed Forces and the military occupation of Latvia. There is also no consensus on what Latvia's security situation should be, although national defense is considered important. All this is reflected in the attitude of young people towards compulsory public service and voluntary military service. To the Ministry of Defense:

- step up the debate on defense issues in the media;

- explain why armed resistance to aggression is needed;

- demonstrate that armed resistance is possible and necessary;

- to ensure that the public change their views on the Latvian NAF and the service in them.

The aim

The purpose of this document is to establish an effective defense system and to determine the Latvian defense policy and the corresponding structures of the National Armed Forces in order to create a basis for the development, financial and operational plans of the National Armed Forces.

Restriction.

Only the potential internal and external military threats against the state system, ie the organized use of armed force for political purposes, are taken into account in drafting the document.

Security in the Baltic region

Latvia's security is inseparable from Baltic security in general. This is emphasized by the work of the Baltic Co Ministers in coordinating the solution of security and defense problems in the Baltic States. The threat to on state threatens all.

As a crisis situation arises in one of the Baltic States, pressure is expected on the other two countries to prevent concerted action by the Baltic States. However, it is in the interests of all three Baltic States to act in concert. Coordinated military action should facilitate this cooperation. From a purely military point of view, only together will the Baltic States be able to resist aggression.

To the Ministries of (National) Defense of the Baltic States:

- develop common National Security and Defense Concepts;

- ensure close cooperation between the headquarters of the armed forces;

- develop weapons and communication systems capable of working together;

- ensure coordinated action on borders, territories, maritime economic zones

and airspace control;

- provide similar military training;

- create joint units, such as BALTBAT.

Analysis of military tasks

Latvia's security situation is determined by a set that includes military force, the Western economic presence and international obligations, in which Latvia's membership in the family of European nations must be emphasized. The military elements of this situation can be divided into two groups of tasks: those tasks related to peacetime and those that the NAF must perform in a state of war. As a basic principle, it should be emphasized that under no circumstances should Latvia's political and military action create the impression of obedience.

Protection of the state and population in peacetime

The NAF peacetime tasks (M) are:

M1:

Participate in the creation of a deterrence factor, showing the NAF's determination and ability to protect the entire territory of Latvia:

- maintain a small and well-trained resilient rapid reaction force

an unexpected attack or armed border crossing;

- provide relevant training;

- perform intelligence tasks;

- confirm readiness to mobilize;

- prepare for additional forces by cooperating to support its friendly countries

and / or organizations to send additional forces;

- to protect and secure military installations.

M2:

To protect the Latvian border, territory, sea area and airspace:

- to ensure the inviolability of the land territory of Latvia;

- to ensure the inviolability of the Latvian sea area and airspace;

- carry out surveillance in cooperation with civilian authorities and friendly countries;

- to establish the intentional borders, territories, sea waters and airspace of Latvia

harassment and respond to it.

M3:

To support the civilian authorities in overcoming the crisis in accordance with the procedures prescribed by law:

- to prevent the violent overthrow of the legitimate government and the provisions of the Satversme

change of state equipment;

- be ready to use the NAF as a crisis management tool;

- to acquire skills in limiting incidents;

- help prevent the situation from deteriorating;

- respond to requests for assistance in the fight against terrorism.

M4:

To support Latvia's wider security interests by participating in international activities:

- Participate in UN peacekeeping and humanitarian operations

or within the OSCE;

- to support international security together with the other Baltic States

with the help of BALTBAT;

- maximum participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace program.

M5:

To undertake other tasks in the interests of the Government of Latvia and the population:

- Participate in civil protection measures, natural disasters and major

elimination of the consequences of technological accidents;

- carry out search and rescue operations using naval and air force units;

- to perform transport tasks of the NAF and the government;

- carry out environmental monitoring and protection together with civil authorities;

- provide staff with honors and other ceremonies.

Protection of the state and population during the war

The tasks of the NAF during the war (K) are:

Q1:

Immediately determine the fact of armed aggression:

- guard the whole border;

- to resist any cross-border attack on the Republic of Latvia by armed force.

K2:

Protect critical objects:

- those few objects that are of crucial political or practical importance to Latvia

reasons, must be vigorously protected for as long as possible.

Q3:

Immediately repay the enemy for aggression:

- Defend or destroy objects suitable for invasion, such as aerodromes

and landing areas;

- block, repel and prevent the movement of the enemy;

- Fight where the attacker can inflict the most damage with the least

harm to themselves;

- Avoid decisive battles.

Q4:

If the attack cannot be repelled, take long, convincing resistance:

- divide into small groups and continue local resistance with the actions of small units;

- small units must be able to fight independently using the aggressor's weaknesses,

even if the command structure is not functioning;

- to prevent the intruder's freedom of action in the occupied territory;

- to attract as many enemy forces as possible;

- continuously cause damage to the aggressor;

- ensure lasting organized and armed resistance.

Q5:

Providing a legitimate government:

- assist in the deployment and possible evacuation of key government components;

- to ensure the legitimate government's communication with the world's leading citizens

individuals and the international press;

- protect the legitimate government.

Necessary military structures

In general

Whenever possible, units should perform as many tasks. This is most clearly the case for units with different peacetime and wartime missions. The list mentions the components of the NAF that are necessary for the performance of the previously defined tasks. Their main responsibilities are indicated:

One Mobile Rifle Brigade (MSBr). (M1, M3, M4, M5, K2, K3.)

National Guard. (M1, M3, M5, K2, K3, K4.)

Naval Forces. (Separate concept.) (M2, M5, K1.)

Air force. (Separate concept.) (M2, M3, M4, M5, K1, K5.)

Special Task Force (SUV). (M3, M5, K4, K5.)

BALTBAT group [ornament; battalion headquarters and support elements]. (M4.)

NAF Headquarters and Staff Battalion. (M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, K1, K5.)

[Border Guard Brigade (Rbr). (M1, M2, K1, K4)]

NAF team composition

The total number and structure of the NAF indicate that no more than one Commander-in-Chief, Commander-in-Chief (NATO 2 *), would be required. It is necessary to have several candidates for the position of Commander.

Staff tasks

The NAF headquarters performs most of the management functions. Subordinate headquarters, especially Naval and Air Force headquarters, should be as small as possible and deal exclusively with matters of their specialty. There must be no duplication in the core functions of the headquarters. The supply of NAF components must be unified. A headquarters battalion is needed to support the activities of the NAF headquarters. At present, it also performs the duties of a guard of honor.

MSBr

Tasks M3, K2 and K3 require light rifle battalions the most. The rapid reaction requirements state that one battalion must always be well trained and fully operational. The only way to guarantee such quality and readiness is to assemble one battalion and its support elements from full-time, professional soldiers. The MSBr must include the following elements:

A headquarters capable of operational operation.

One professional rifle battalion group.

Two compulsory service rifle battalions.

Battle support and combat support unit.

It is necessary to maintain the skills and knowledge of specialists in specific military functions. This should be done by the Combat Support and Combat Supply Support Unit, which should also participate in specialist training.

Staff

Staffing policy

The NAF consists of three main elements: professional volunteers (conscripts), conscripts and volunteers (non-conscripts). There is also a civilian support element. After completing full-time or compulsory service, soldiers become mobilizable reservists. The principle of interchangeability between the various elements must be observed. For example, regular National Guard and MSBr soldiers must be able to replace each other, taking into account suitability and qualifications. The NAF must introduce uniformity - the concept of a unified army.

Full-time forces and compulsory service

Although some tasks of the NAF require well-trained, professional soldiers, who are always at a high level of readiness, many other tasks require compulsory service units, which play an equally important role in the defense of Latvia. Soldiers who have completed compulsory service join the National Guard or assume the responsibility of a reservist. However, the following elements must be for ordinary professionals:

For one group of the Rifle Battalion.

SUV.

BALTBAT group.

For the management of the National Guard (about 10%).

For officers, some instructors and specialists in other units (about 50%).

National Guard

The composition of the outer line of the National Guard must be as large as the state can afford and supported by the population by volunteering.

Reserves and mobilization

Soldiers who have completed full-time or compulsory service shall be mobilized as reservists in the local National Guard Battalion. Soldiers trained by the NAF are mainly prepared for mobilization in order to develop Latvia's military practice and ethics and not rely on the methods of the former Soviet army. This means that at the beginning there will be few reservists, but their number will increase together with the NAF's ability to arm and supply reservists.

Equipment

Weapons must meet the needs of the NAF tactical doctrine: mainly "hit and run" tactics. The acquisition policy next five years will be to continue to use Soviet-era weapons and fill gaps, but to do its utmost to bring NATO i

with electronic standards, especially communications.

Small arms and battalion level support weapons

Initially, Soviet-era small arms are used because they are cheaper, more accessible and ammunition cheaper. In particular, the following must be provided:

Chsa distance light anti-tank weapons.

Medium range guided anti-tank weapons.

Low level anti-aircraft weapons: machine guns and missiles.

Light and medium mortars.

Ammunition.

Heavy weapons

Heavy weapons units (such as tanks and artillery) are too complicated for training, expensive to care for, and unjustifiably vulnerable to a militarily developed, air-dominated opponent. An exception could be 100 mm cannons donated by the Czech Republic, which could be used as anti-tank or coastguard weapons.

Contact

Every effort should be made to ensure that all NAF communication systems are able to co-operate with the other Baltic States and with NATO. Equally important is the national communication plan for overcoming the crisis and ensuring that the legitimate government communicates in the event of aggression.

Mobility and armor

Initially, MSBr mobility can be ensured by supplying one full battalion with unarmed wheeled vehicles. In the future, it would be ideal to provide the entire brigade with armed wheeled transport - if finances allow it. The following sequence is observed:

Provide one battalion with unarmed transport.

Create two more battalions.

Provide all battalions with unarmed vehicles.

To provide a professional battalion with armed wheeled vehicles.

Provide the entire crew with armed wheeled transport.

Mobility in the air

In order to be able to move quickly to any part of Latvia, SUV and MSBr need air mobility. At the beginning, it is enough to be able to move one wire in full combat readiness to any point in Latvia in a short time.

States

New staff should be prepared on the basis of actual rather than intended composition. Uniformity must be intr
in the states of different NAF units for the sake of simplicity and cooperation. As far as possible, the states sh

coordinated with Estonia and Lithuania.

Information security

There seems to be a contradiction between the security requirements of intelligence and the openness needed to convince a potential aggressor of a willingness to resist. This contradiction can be resolved by using the directive team style without unnecessary detail and by using flexibility in military planning.

Summary and conclusions

Acceptance of this concept means that the following is accepted:

- The necessary resources to implement the necessary changes will not be allocated immediately. The force development plan together with the budget allocation will determine the implementation process.

- Military co-operation between the Baltic States will gradually become closer. BALTBAT will require continued support.

- The tasks of the NAF peace and war are recognized.

- The concept of a united army is recognized. The NAF consists of:

A small professional element.

Limited compulsory service.

Strong National Guards.

For light, mobile forces without heavy weapons, armed with Soviet-era small arms, but using a communications system that ensures cooperation with NATO.

- Next required works:

Force development plan.

Operational protection plan.

Five - year budget expenditure plan.

On the
tasks and functions of the National Security Council
arising from the Law on State Security Institutions

1. Evaluate the state of national security and protection of the population, the degree of danger of internal and external threats, determine the possible means and methods for the prevention and neutralization of these threats (Section 8.1).

2. Determine the priority main directions and tasks of the activities of the state security institutions (Section 8.2).

3. Controls the activities of state security institutions and the fulfillment of the main tasks of these institutions (Article 8.3).

4. Examines and accepts the proposals submitted by the state security institutions regarding their numerical composition, structure, list of positions, remuneration, the necessary budget resources (Section 8.4).

5. Hear the reports and statements of the heads of state security institutions, examine the results of the inspection of the activities of these institutions (Section 8.5).

6. Consider issues of improvement of the activities of state security institutions (Section 8.6).

7. The SAB Regulations (Article 8.7) are approved.

8. Submit proposals to the Saeima regarding the appointment and dismissal of the director of the SAB, as well as approve the members of the board of this bureau (Section 8.8).

9. Approves the Regulations of the Council of State Security Institutions (according to Article 12.2)

10. The SAB is subordinate to the National Security Council (Section 13.5).

11. To instruct the SAB to perform inspections of state security institutions (according to Section 13.7.10).

12. To examine complaints of employees of state security institutions against the director of the SAB in cases when he or she has initiated disciplinary proceedings against these persons (according to Section 13.8).

13. In the case of criminal proceedings, a permit shall be provided for the disclosure of information which has become known to officials or is available in connection with the performance of official duties (according to Section 17.1).

14. Permits shall be provided to foreign citizens, citizens who have several nationalities and stateless persons in exceptional cases to perform the duties of an expert or consultant of state security institutions on the basis of an employment contract (according to Section 18.2).

15. Approve the numerical composition, structure and position of the personnel of the state security institution (developed by the head of the institution) (according to Section 24.1).

16. The remuneration of SAB officials (salaries, allowances, benefits) shall be determined within the allocated state budget funds upon the proposal of the Director of the Office. The remuneration of other officials of state security institutions shall be determined by the Cabinet (according to Section 24.2).

17. The directions and tasks of the activities of state security institutions shall be determined, which is a state secret, unless the NDP has decided otherwise (according to Section 24.5).

18. Controls the performance of the main tasks of state security institutions (Section 25.1).

19. The NDP is entitled to listen to the reports and statements of the heads of state security institutions, as well as to become acquainted with the service documents and information of these institutions, except for documents regarding secret sources of information (Section 25.3).

20. Coordinate inspections of state security institutions and their scope, get acquainted with the results of inspections (according to Section 26.3).

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