DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITY POLICY AND STRATEGY OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC 1990-2009

Study

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FOREWORD

Since 17 November 1989, Czechoslovakia and, subsequently, the Czech Republic have gone through a dynamic two decades, a time equal to the duration of the first Czechoslovak Republic, from its inception in 1918, after the end of the First World War, to its *de facto* breakup following the signing of the Munich Agreement in late September 1938. On 28 October 2008 we celebrated the 90th anniversary of our republic's existence. Approximately a half of this time we have lived in a democracy, while the other half we spent under Nazi and, later, Communist autocracy.

The changes following the "Velvet Revolution" were thus bound to be very complicated: it was necessary to reform not only the political and economic system, but also the armed forces, including their strongly repression-oriented components. The hardest part of the job was therefore to implement changes at the Interior Ministry sector, especially those concerning state police (counter-intelligence) and intelligence services.

The sector headed by the Ministry of National Defence with quarter of a million personnel, including 200,000 soldiers, did not present an easy task either. The armed forces had 3,500 tanks, 4,500 infantry combat vehicles and 500 planes, i.e. there were more of certain weapon systems than in some of the European great powers. The professional military corps had a clear political profile: all generals, 82% officers and 51% warrant officers were members of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Being an officer *de facto* entailed being a Communist. This was also a weak spot of the system.

Most professional soldiers did not regret losing their party membership very much. E.g. 70% air force military personnel returned their party cards even before the adoption of the 1990 law prohibiting party membership of soldiers.

Despite all the aforementioned troubles, the armed forces were gradually transforming itself, initially under the management of former generals and later, more markedly, under civilian control, especially after the 1991 adoption of a military doctrine. The division of the armed forces after the split-up of the state at the turn of 1992 went very smoothly, with good discipline: the army thus did not follow in the footsteps of the Yugoslav army, nor – at least in some aspects – the Soviet army.

The transformation has been influenced above all by the newly adopted legislation, renewed activities of the State Security Council, accession to NATO and to the European Union, participation in missions abroad and professionalization of the armed forces. The whole process has been facilitated by the acceptance and implementation of a broader concept of security.

In this respect, the Czech academic community is inspired by the approach of the London Centre for the Study of Global Governance (London School of Economics and Political Science). The Centre, led by Professor Mary Kaldor, launched the discussion on human security whose ensuring is one of the key aims of European security policy. This led

the Centre for Security Policy of CESES (Centre for Social and Economic Strategies), Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, to collaborate with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung on the Czech translation of two key documents prepared by the Centre for the Study of Global Governance: *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe* (2004, Czech translation 2007) and *A European Way of Security* (2007, Czech translation 2008). In the Czech Republic these documents have already become the subject of expert public debate that is extremely important at a time when the future course of the European Security and Defence Policy is at stake. This topic is also expected to be in the forefront during the Czech presidency of the EU in the first half of 2009. The expert debate, including the study presented here, reflects *inter alia* the complicated Czechoslovak and Czech experience of armed forces transformation. It can thus, to some extent, provide guidance to countries that have embarked on the road to democracy and are struggling with the legacy of totalitarian and autocratic regimes.

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INTRODUCTION

Security policy in Czechoslovakia and later in the Czech Republic has undergone fundamental changes since the "Velvet Revolution" in November 1989. In the field of international policy it was influenced by the end of the Cold War, the break-up of the Soviet empire and, in particular, by end of the Warsaw Pact. The key internal political influences included transition to democracy, division of the Czechoslovak Federation with its security services and the Armed Forces into two independent wholes, and the country's integration into NATO and later the EU. Last but not least, the country's defence policy naturally reflects the ongoing adaptation of the Euro-Atlantic and European security structures to new security challenges.

The aim of the study is to brief conference participants on Czech security policy and the relation of the Czech public to their own country's, European and global security, especially from the viewpoint of the European concept of "human security". The text is written primarily for foreign readers and conceived accordingly.

The study does not have a clearly analytical and evaluative character. Rather, it is a combination of factual information drawn from official sources, opinions of the Czech public on the country's practical security policy as they appeared in contemporary Czech press, and opinions of the authors as independent political science experts active in the academic field. The opinions, evaluations and conclusions expressed in the study thus do not in any way reflect the official position of the government of the Czech Republic or any other institution.

The study is divided into three chapters. The first one traces the development and content of the security policy of Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic after 1990, its projection into practical foreign and security policy and the Czech society's developing perceptions of its own and global security. The second chapter contains facts on the Czech Republic's engagement in managing both military and non-military crises in various countries around the world. In the third chapter, the authors present various views concerning security policy that could be heard in the Czech society in the recent past or are currently relevant for the security policy of the Czech Republic and for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), especially in the light of the European concept of human security.

1. BASIS OF CZECH DEFENCE AND SECURITY POLICY

When discussing the concepts underlying the present-day orientation of Czech defence and security policy, it is necessary to sum up, however briefly, its development and the background of this development. The development was marked by changes of legislation adopted under the totalitarian regime, government changes and shifts in policy orientation, adoption of strategic documents and their subsequent amendments. All these changes that influenced the defence and security sector in Czechoslovakia and, as of 1990, the Czech Republic must be viewed in the context of evolving external and internal conditions in which the Czech Republic found itself.

1.1. Development of Security Policy of the Czech Republic[1]

The development of independent Czechoslovakia since its establishment in 1918 and, later, the Czech Republic has never been smooth and uncomplicated. This has left its deep mark on state security policy, but has been even more deeply engraved on the citizens' consciousness and their attitude to security issues. The successive failures of Czechoslovakia's political representatives, especially in 1938-1939, 1948 and 1968, the failure of the state's allies to honour their commitments, including even the occupation of the republic by "allied" forces in 1968 – all this has contributed to the citizens' very detached attitude to the state and its security structures. Still, in times of crisis the Czech society has shown admirable unity. This has proved true even in relation to events abroad. Great tragedies or war suffering of people anywhere in the world have always provoked a wave of solidarity.

The period following the division of Czechoslovakia in 1993 saw feverish efforts to find an adequate way of ensuring the new Czech state's defence. The favourable security climate in Europe, conducive to democratic development and economic transition, afforded the state enough time to seek how it might best ensure its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The view that NATO was the main security pillar soon prevailed, though it was occasionally coupled with the naive belief that the Alliance will supply us with "ready-made" security, without demanding anything in exchange.

These stages are already behind us: the Czech Republic is a sovereign state, a fully-fledged, active member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union. It must be added, however, that the country has so far shown a rather lukewarm attitude to ESDP. The Czech Republic hopped onto an already fast-moving European train and is still looking for its proper place in it. This sometimes shows in the content of its strategic documents and in the practical foreign and defence policy steps.

[1] Identifying all the landmarks of security policy development over the nearly two decades that the new Czech democracy has been in existence and describing the whole context of the present-day Czech security policy is a much more ambitious task than can be tackled in this study. The authors are thus aware of a certain simplification they had to embrace to make the study accessible, particularly to foreign readers.

Defence Policy and Strategic Management of the Czech Republic Defence



The influence of actors at the strategic level of state administration on the formation and practical implementation of the state's defence function is exercised on three tiers (Figure 1): the legislative tier, setting up the legal framework for the state's defence function, the executive tier, forming the strategic concept of state defence, and the state's defence system as such, whose elements ensure the practical implementation of security policy.[2]

Figure 1: Strategic management tiers on which the Czech Republic defence policy is realized

In line with the logic of security system building in the Czech Republic, its institutional make-up, roles, tasks and aims of the institutions and legality conditions for their activities are anchored in a set of documents of varying legal force including:

- Documents published in the Collection of Laws (laws, governmental decrees, ministerial regulations);
- Documents issued by the government and coordinating the exercise of individual state functions (government resolutions) and documents issued by individual ministries which either translate the content of government documents into conditions within individual sectors (directives, methodologies), or evaluate the progress achieved (yearbooks);
- Government documents, such as the government's policy statement, visions, strategies and white papers in which the government presents its intentions, aims and positions.

The state's defence strategy is defined – and state defence policy is being formed and implemented – primarily through executive acts of the government. From among these, key importance is assigned to *security strategies* and *military strategies* of the Czech Republic (see Annex 1/1).

The basic aim of the state's defence function as defined by contemporary legal framework has remained the same throughout the period on which the study focuses: guaranteeing sovereignty, territorial integrity, democratic principles and the rule of law, protection of people's lives and their property against external attack.

[2] The term "state's defence system" is not synonymous with the term "security system". Despite this, they may be presented as synonymous in the light of the study's focus and historical context.

Development of Security Legislation

The state is required, in ensuring the defence of the Czech Republic, more strictly that in other fields, to act solely upon express authorization by law. In formulating defence policy and creatively developing the measures necessary to implement it, the executive branch may only act within the limits set by law. The Czech parliament legally defined and (in the focus period of this study) reviewed the defence functions of the state by passing legislation concerning state defence; it defined the content of this concept and created instruments for its implementation (see Annex 1/2).

The development of security legislation in the Czech Republic is characterized by a certain continuity of the legal system with the former communist Czechoslovakia. The main reason is that, after the break-up of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic on 31 December 1992, the Czech Republic became a successor state to the former Czechoslovakia. The fundamental laws that initially governed the defence and security policy of the Czech Republic had been adopted between 1949 and 1989, but were amended as early as 1990 by the Czechoslovak parliament or, if found unsatisfactory, later replaced by newly drafted laws.

The modifications made at that time removed the references to the leading role of the Communist Party, depoliticized the armed forces and security services (police, fire and rescue service, customs officers, prison guards), humanized the service in these security forces, limited the power of and improved the control over intelligence services. Radical changes were made especially in the field of security services. The former National Security Corps included repression-oriented intelligence services (State Security Service, Military Counter-intelligence) and it was necessary to eliminate the influence of these power structures. Other radical changes in security services were made after 2004 when the Czech Republic joined the EU.

What was somewhat paradoxical about the development of Czech security policy was the long-time absence of a central coordinating body and the necessary law regulating the security field. The relevant piece of legislation – a constitutional law on the security of the Czech Republic – was adopted in 1998, setting the basic rules for operation of the security system in various emergencies and listing the institutions responsible for security of the Czech Republic. The law also re-established the State Security Council[3] as the government's security and defence body, chaired by the Prime Minister.

Another paradox in implementing the defence and security policy of the Czech Republic was that it continued to be "strictly confidential". This changed as late as 1998 with the establishment of the National Security Office, whose position, however, was

[3] The original State Defence Council was abolished in 1992 (with the demise of Czechoslovakia). The abolition later came to be viewed as a mistake.

significantly strengthened only in 2006 after the adoption of a new classified information law.

Basic Principles of Czech Defence Policy

The defence function of a state is exercised through the formation and implementation of its defence policy. The core principles defining the basic framework for defence policy formation were in place already in 1990, anchored in the relevant laws and regulations:[4]

- The defence of the country is considered a supreme duty and a matter of honour for every citizen;
- Defence is ensured through the building of the armed forces, tasked to improve their combat readiness to meet the requirements of contemporary warfare; simultaneously, defence-oriented measures are envisaged in the national economy and at regional and district level, including protection measures against enemy air attacks and civic defence training;
- Defence is based on defence duty, conscription and service duty. A reserve shall be created for special occasions;
- The law introduces a special situation of "national defence alert": the country enters this state by mobilizing its armed forces or declaring war or receiving such a declaration;
- State defence includes the Civil Defence: measures to protect and defend the population. The duties imposed by law for the benefit of the armed forces may also be imposed on behalf of allied armed forces;

Within the bounds of the law, the aforementioned basic principles have later been repeatedly modified to reflect the real-life development of the society.

Development and Nature of the Changes in the State Defence Function

Military Doctrine of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic (1991)

After the independent Czech Republic came into being in 1993, state defence was for some time ensured along the principles of the 1991 *Military Doctrine of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic*, which served as a basis for all subsequent strategic documents. The doctrine elaborated the following principles and fields:

[4] For more details see the relevant legislation.

- General defence of the state's constitutional make-up, its sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity;
- The use of the armed forces to preserve or restore sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state;
- Rebuilding the armed forces in the disarmament process in line with the results of that process;
- Readiness to take part in multilateral collective defence actions if more countries are threatened simultaneously;
- Resolve not to own and not to produce nuclear weapons nor other weapons of mass destruction and never allow the deployment of such weapons on the state territory;
- Providing armed forces for UN peace operations and in cases of environmental and other natural disasters;
- Developing civil defence as part of the state defence system;
- Developing a system of economic mobilization, creating state material reserves and ensuring operational readiness of the state territory;
- Taking advantage of the support that stems from the European collective security system.

To respect the citizens' fundamental rights and freedoms, civilian service was introduced to provide an alternative to the compulsory military service[5]. *The Military Doctrine of the CSFR* was historically important primarily because it clearly stated the country was moving away from the strategic principles of the Warsaw Pact and the earlier communist military policy.

The White Paper on Defence of the Czech Republic (1995)

The issuance of the *White Paper on Defence of the Czech Republic* in 1995 marked the end of the first stage of armed forces building and paved the way for the Czech Republic's accession to NATO as the most viable option for safeguarding the country's security and sovereignty. The White Paper was a significant initiative which enhanced the army's transparency and helped clarify questions concerning civilian control of the armed forces. However, it also showed the ever-increasing need for a clear political definition of the role, status and character of the Armed Forces in relation to the country's interests.

[5] The civilian service had been used till 2004 when it was abolished together with the abolition of conscription.

National Defence Strategy of the Czech Republic (1997)

Approved by the government in 1997, the *National Defence Strategy of the Czech Republic* formulated some basic systemic changes that were to transform the exercise of the state's defence function. It declared the intention to create an integrated security system based on a comprehensive defence strategy and recognized full NATO membership as an important tool for enhancing the security and defence capability of the Czech Republic (the country joined NATO on 12 March 1999). The strategy also expressly acknowledged the possibility of sending troops outside state territory (a decision conditioned by the approval of both parliamentary chambers). Another part worth mentioning was the prudent plan to create special mission units, e.g. special counter-terrorist teams.[6] The strategy also set the goal of creating an integrated rescue system.

Security Strategy of the Czech Republic (1999) and Military Strategy of the Czech Republic (1999)

The 1999 *Security Strategy of the Czech Republic* brought qualitative changes of the state's defence function, which were further elaborated in the 1999 *Military Strategy of the Czech Republic*. Credible deterrence backed by sufficient military capabilities became the basic defence tool and NATO was seen as the instrument of such credible deterrence. The defence strategy was built around the principles and tasks formulated by the government, with regard to the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty and the NATO coalition strategy. This meant a transition from individual to collective defence with the simultaneous preservation of self-defence capacity within the meaning of Article 51 of the UN Charter. The Czech Republic newly declared its readiness to use force in defending its own and its allies' territory as a necessary condition for eliminating any threat, and also envisaged possible acceptance of assistance from allies. The country also declared its readiness to take part in peace operations, including those involving a preventive use of military force to stop escalation of an existing conflict. For this purpose – and in line with the NATO defence planning commitments – the Czech Republic has been building and training forces for military operations conducted by the Alliance's multinational forces.

Security Strategy of the Czech Republic (2001, 2003) and Military Strategy of the Czech Republic (2002, 2004)

Other systemic changes of the state's defence function were introduced by *Security Strategy of the Czech Republic* from 2001 and 2003[7], which was subsequently developed in *military strategies of the Czech Republic* adopted in 2002 and 2004. The Czech Republic has newly declared its readiness to contribute to peace operations that do not ensue from its treaty-based commitments or any direct threat, but are in line with the country's interests. The strategies defined more precisely what is meant by preventive

[6] The fact that the measure was envisaged in relation to situations defined as "state of peril to the country" does not diminish the importance of the decision.

[7] *Security Strategy of the Czech Republic 2003* is an amended version of the *Security Strategy of the Czech Republic 2001*.

operation of the defence system. A new element was added: the country's participation in the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and, within its framework, in the European Security and Defence Policy, all this with a simultaneous strengthening of the transatlantic link and support for complementary development of NATO and EU capabilities. In view of the continuing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile technologies and because of some countries' refusal to honour the relevant international commitments, the Czech Republic declared its willingness to work toward (potentially) joining the projects or systems that would ensure its protection against these devices.

Opinions regarding the future nature of the Czech armed forces underwent an interesting change. While the 1999 *Security Strategy* declared the intention to build a semi-professional Armed Forces, *Security Strategy of the Czech Republic 2003* already set the goal of forming a fully professional, highly mobile and flexible army with state-of-the-art equipment, capable of taking part in a broad range of NATO-led and, possibly, other international operations including those outside Czech territory.[8]

Military Strategy of the Czech Republic (2008)

At present the defence function of the state is defined by the *Military Strategy of the Czech Republic 2008* which spells out basic principles of defence policy. Defence is ensured primarily through the Czech Republic's active membership in organizations it has joined, especially NATO and the EU, but also the UN and OSCE: a membership based on security interests shared with other member countries.

The Czech Republic assumes the appropriate share of responsibility for the security and defence of its allies and for defending and pursuing the shared security interests of NATO member states. Defence is ensured first of all by active participation in the NATO collective defence system with a strong transatlantic link. This applies to the whole geographical range of NATO operations. The Czech Republic declares its readiness to develop its own armed forces – which, however, will not have the full range of capabilities – and to maintain the capability to receive and support NATO forces on its own territory, should such need arise.

The Czech Republic will join international projects focusing on defence against WMD and WMD carriers, especially ballistic missiles. The general defence duty and the basic task of the armed forces – defence of the Czech Republic against attack from outside – remain unchanged.

The Czech Republic intends to deploy its armed forces in operations outside Czech territory and minimize the impact of threats to its security interests. To support crisis management bodies on state territory, the armed forces should maintain their capability to provide (to the extent necessary and according to actual availability) forces to

[8] Compulsory military service was abolished in the Czech Republic as of 31 December 2003.

support the operation of the Integrated Rescue System or the Police of the Czech Republic (PCR), even where this means the mobilization of reserves. Outside Czech territory the extent of support depends on the actual possibilities of the armed forces.

1.2. Development of Views Regarding National Security and Military Strategy and Discussion about its Practical Implementation

Valuable Experience

While the period from November 1989 to the division of Czechoslovakia at the turn of 1992-1993 is already history for our new state, these years have, nevertheless, had their consequences which are still relevant for the present. The more recent development of the Czech Republic also has had its international and foreign policy context and consequences. Lessons that can be drawn from our development concern at least four areas:

- Manner of transition from a communist-type totalitarian state to a democratic one;
- Division of the state into two independent republics, Czech Republic and Slovak Republic;
- Transformation of a totalitarian armed forces into a democratic one and its division following the division of the country;
- The gradual creation of basic conditions for security policy formation and implementation.

This experience can prove valuable both for ongoing transitions in other post-cvommunist countries and for changes that might eventually come to pass in a range of other totalitarian or autocratic regimes. The developed democracies must prepare for these changes, because they can influence their course. The degree of controversy and conflict surrounding such changes and their consequent impact on the global security situation depends on the support of the developed world.

Basic Principles of Czech Republic Defence Policy Development

The defence policy of Czechoslovakia before 1989 was based on the bipolar world model and subordinated to commitments ensuing from the Warsaw Pact. After November 1989 the situation changed profoundly.

In the early 1990s the security system was being built by people who have never lived under any other than a communist regime. Although they mostly made sincere effort to transform the armed forces into institutions serving a democratic society, they lacked experience. “Dissident” experts were scarce and their experience was rooted in the 1960s. It was therefore natural that the transition steps in many aspects reflected the Cold

War, bipolarity-based attitudes. The same was true for the content of the first strategic and doctrinal documents, practical policies and, finally, the thinking of a majority of the Czech population. It should be added that the above problems were not limited to the Czech Republic and that even "experienced" democracies, the NATO countries, had to seek a new way ahead.

The political representatives of a small country dependent on its neighbours have always had to adjust to the developments eastward or westward of its border. The first years of the transition in the early 1990s were thus marked by an already characteristic effort to dismantle and destroy the "old" structure and processes, tainted by the past.

The basic task of the post-1989 period was to formulate a security policy and a strategy ensuing from it. The strategy had to be based on a synthesis of the international policy concept, defence concept and internal security concept to ensure that defence would not be seen solely as the task of the army and the Ministry of Defence, but of the whole state and society – of every citizen.

Responses to security threats and risks reflected two basic attitudes. The first, stronger tendency, which was eventually embraced by most of the population, favoured a clear western orientation, regarding NATO as the only safeguard of European security. The second, "historical" approach, warned against one-sided orientation, pointing to the fact that it never paid off in the past: in 1938 our freedom was buried by the western powers in Munich, while in 1968 we were actually occupied by our ally, the Soviet Union, together with other Warsaw Pact armies. The advocates of this approach drew two conclusions from this experience: firstly, we should not be too dependent on others in ensuring our security and rely more on our own resources and, secondly, we should develop a more balanced cooperation with all potential partners in Europe and in the already existing security organizations.

The orientation on NATO has prevailed. It has been preferred by the political right (with the exception of extreme right), the centrists and even part of the left. Its chief opponent was the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia. This tendency has proved to be more viable.

The Czech Republic's Path to NATO

Accession to NATO meant the country had to meet a number of requirements, not only of military nature. Accepting the conditions of the Alliance's Partnership for Peace programme was the first step to membership. This entailed e.g. earmarking sufficient funds for army transformation that would make its forces more compatible with the NATO armies. While seeking membership it was also necessary to keep in mind that joining meant not only having a safeguard of our security, but also sharing all the security threats relevant for NATO and the ensuing security risks.

The 1994 military strategy was based on the assumption that the Czech Republic and its Armed Forces must be prepared to face a military attack by an adversary of any strength from whatever direction, and under any conditions of commencement and further development of the war, while taking advantage of the international security structures and aid from allies.

It was therefore becoming increasingly clear that there was an urgent need for a political clarification of the role, status and character of the Armed Forces in relation to Czech Republic security interests.

However, the Chamber of Deputies of Czech Parliament, particularly its Defence and Security Committee, concentrated more on limiting the power of the Armed Forces, on personnel changes and criticism. The MPs one-sidedly emphasized NATO membership, expecting that it alone would sufficiently define the future focus of the army's activities. The leaders of the country had supposed the Czech Republic would join NATO very soon, an assumption that proved wrong after the adoption of the Partnership for Peace project. The erroneous expectation of a rapid accession to NATO had been one of the reasons why the rebuilding of the Armed Forces was not begun in time. Here, too, there was a clearly perceived need for a political concept of security policy.

The other post-communist states have had similar experience. Their armed forces, too, have long stood on opposite sides of the barricade in the time of heightened ideological antagonism. The burden of this long past could not always be removed easily in all fields where new realities required it. Just like the others, the Czech Republic was only one of the post-communist countries that had just got rid of a totalitarian regime and whose armed forces in many respects did not meet the criteria for membership. It has taken great efforts to persuade the member countries of the Alliance that we are partners worthy and capable of becoming allies.

On 12 March 1999 the Czech Republic joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. After the break-up of the Warsaw Pact and the departure of Soviet troops, this was another historic security landmark on the path toward reliable defence.

As the role of the Czech armed forces changed between 1993 and 2008, so did the role of some state administration bodies set up before 1990 to conduct potential war operations against NATO. This was true especially for the Administration of State Material Reserves and the Civil Defence Commission of the Czech Republic. The latter was first renamed Civil Protection Agency of the Czech Republic and its function was later (as of 31 December 2000) transferred from the department of the Ministry of Defence to the Ministry of Interior: from the Armed Forces to the Fire and Rescue Service of the Czech Republic.

Czech Republic is a NATO Member

In the long run, the Czech Republic's accession to NATO can truly be considered a landmark for the country's security. Still, it was only a logical continuation of the process that began with preparations for membership and only took on a new quality with the country's formal accession.

The actual integration of the Czech Republic into Alliance structures took place at two levels or stages. The first was the period of preparations, successfully concluded on 12 March 1999. This phase was vital for our country since it co-determined our post-Cold War international policy orientation. The purpose of our efforts at that time can be summed up in the words of Confucius: "Tell me, and I will forget. Show me, and I may remember. Involve me, and I will understand."

However, we wanted to be part of an "elite" club without having a precise notion of what it entails. We wanted to enjoy the advantages of NATO membership without realizing all the concomitant duties and commitments.

The second stage of our relationship with the Alliance is completely different. It stems from our new role as a fully-fledged member that assumes direct responsibility to help ensure the everyday existence of the Alliance in a new security environment. It is no longer the security of the Czech Republic alone that is at stake, but the security of our allies and the broader international community. The present-day situation can perhaps be best characterized by the words of Seneca that "usus est magister optimus – practice makes perfect".

Integration of the Czech Republic into NATO

The Czech Republic expected a lot from its NATO membership. Given our often tumultuous history and the newly emerging system of European security architecture, we strove to obtain adequate – and, most importantly, long-term – security guarantees. In trying to secure them we have not always clearly perceived that the potential NATO enlargement would have more far reaching consequences than was evident at first sight.

First of all, all stakeholders were seeking a way to fill the security vacuum that emerged after the break-up of the Warsaw Pact. Negotiations went on about a new Euro-Atlantic security system, and NATO, too, was looking for a way to define its position within such a system. Such was the context that largely co-determined the somewhat more cautious and reflective approach of the NATO countries, an attitude we did not quite understand at the time, perhaps due to our impatience. We often mistook it for an unfounded, arbitrary unwillingness to accept us as allies. Only growing involvement in concrete NATO activities during membership preparations helped us to understand our role.

It was becoming ever more evident that NATO membership concerns not only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence, but must be projected into the whole system of state administration. It was e.g. necessary to prepare extensive amendments to our defence legislation: the Defence Act, the Armed Forces Act and many others.

In addition to this, fundamental changes had to be carried out directly in the army. The Armed Forces of the Czech Republic were conceived and built as Soviet-type armed services. The underlying assumption was that during mobilization professional officers would create the organizational core of the war troops, which would then be quickly "fleshed out" with conscripted soldiers. This concept was also reflected in the rank composition of the professional military personnel.

First of all it was necessary to change the established ways of thinking of the officer corps and the Defence Ministry representatives. We were about to enter the most successful political and military organization in the past fifty years. Its nature stems from collective security building, but based on somewhat different principles that those to which we had grown accustomed within the Warsaw Pact. The Pact was more or less a military organization with authoritarian type of decision making. Decisions were made in the alliance's Moscow headquarters and only implemented on our territory. The North Atlantic Alliance is a political as well as military organization, making decisions based on political consensus. No directives from above, but a national position with a veto option. The Alliance was getting ready for defence, including the defence of individual allies, under Articles 3 and (especially) 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty; the Warsaw Pact prepared for attack. Moreover, the Warsaw Pact plans did not regard the territories of individual members as territories of sovereign states and the front strategy reflected this fact. This type of thinking had to change completely. Those who remember the Warsaw Pact times claim that in that era it was typical to say "THEY" when referring to the Pact's command structures, while today we say "WE", feeling a real part of the Alliance's decision making.

Other problems emerged in connection with classified information protection and the related security screenings or soldiers' linguistic capabilities that did not meet Alliance standards. The year 1995 brought an important landmark: the *Study on NATO Enlargement* that finally defined some criteria for states seeking NATO membership. The criteria were transparent: establishment of democracy, market economy, respect for human rights, good relations with neighbours, civilian control over the armed forces, a minimum level of army interoperability.

Czech Republic and Global Security

The following security policy activities have been crucial for active participation of the Czech Republic in ensuring global security:

- Support positively oriented international organizations (UN, EU, Council of Europe, European Parliament, NATO, OSCE, World Bank, International Monetary Fund etc.) and influence them in line with Czech national interests, especially as regards strengthening security and defence, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and disarmament;
- Influence the formation of the NATO strategic concept of security and defence and the European Security and Defence Policy within the European Union, especially in relation to the Central European and East European area;
- Promote transatlantic cooperation within NATO and the EU;
- Take part in various types of expeditionary operations in the framework of NATO, UN and EU activities;
- Raise public awareness of the country's security policy and of the practical measures for its implementation;
- Strengthen civilian control of the armed forces and create an environment that will generate civic and political support for the Armed Forces;
- Support cooperation between foreign policy, defence and interior departments in the comprehensive management of the security system.

1.3. Influence of the Strategic Documents on Security and Defence Budget and the Defence Industry

One of the factors co-determining the viability of any strategy is its economic backing which must be adequate to enable implementation of all envisaged plans and measures. This applies above all to state budget resources, arms acquisition, formation and maintenance of an industrial base of defence and related research and development. Any strategic document is workable only if it is based on the real potential of these sources. Otherwise it risks becoming a mere political and ideological proclamation.

Developments in the above-mentioned fields reflected changes in the public perception of security threats relevant for our country and, in particular, changes in the Czech population's opinion as to our need for armed forces. Regardless of the momentary party make-up of either government or parliament, official political representatives have since the early 1990s always declared the country's security and defence policy to be a matter of grave import; at the same time, however, they have had to face pressures on finding funds for other, especially economic and welfare aspects of the new state's development. The defence and security sector was being gradually marginalized and transfers from its budget chapters often served to expand funding for other priorities. Decisions about earmarking funds for security were often not governed by the content of strategic documents: instead, things were done the other way around and the documents were formulated based on the funds the government was willing to provide.

Budgetary Spending in the Czech Republic Security Sector

The money that goes to ensure the comprehensive security functions of the state is recorded in those chapters of the state budget dedicated to the relevant departments or agencies. Publicly available information sources give most transparent information on the following four departments: Security Information Service, Ministry of Defence, National Security Office and Ministry of Interior. However, there are many activities within the state security system that are carried out in other departments or agencies and are not subject to specific monitoring.

Table 1: Cumulative security sector spending in the Czech Republic (expenses approved within the state budget)

Sector	Ministry of Defence		Ministry of Interior		Security Information Service		National Security Office	
Year	CZK million	Year-on year dynamics in %	CZK million	Year-on year dynamics in %	CZK million	Year-on year dynamics in %	CZK million	Year-on year dynamics in %
1993	22,617.1	-	14,876.5	-	•	•	•	•
1994	26,791.9	118.4	17,732.4	119.2	828.4	-	•	•
1995	27,044.7	100.9	21,040.9	118.6	828.9	100.2	•	•
1996	30,538.4	112.9	26,323.1	110.8	880.5	106.1	•	•
1997	32,000.0	104.7	26,367.0	100.1	681.3	77.3	•	•
1998	36,877.0	115.2	26,093.3	98.9	688.1	100.9	•	•
1999	41,483.9	112.5	28,420.4	108.9	749.4	108.9	172.9	-
2000	43,952.5	105.9	30,332.6	106.7	744.5	99.3	202.1	116.8
2001	45,078.3	102.5	35,705.0	117.7	873.6	117.3	544.2	269.2
2002	47,505.5	105.4	39,332.2	110.1	817.0	93.5	225.9	41.5
2003	52,320.3	110.1	43,536.0	110.6	954.3	116.8	245.8	108.8
2004	50,725.9	96.9	45,186.7	103.8	968.9	101.5	228.2	92.8
2005	52,953.2	104.4	51,872.1	114.8	1,177.1	121.5	243.2	106.6
2006	55,694.0	105.2	51,170.0	98.6	1,182.7	100.5	255.2	105.0
2007	53,906.4	96.1	54,302.5	106.1	1,178.3	99.6	277.5	108.7
2008	54,048.9	100.3	58,165.5	107.1	1,262.7	107.2	281.0	101.3

This overview of information on security related-expenses scattered in multiple chapters of the state budget shows that since 1993 the volume of budgetary funds spent in the main departments of the security sector has grown by 303.4 % (in average prices) and in 2008 it reached almost CZK 114 billion. The growth has been the fastest in the budgetary spending of the Interior Ministry (390 %), which is followed by the Ministry of Defence ("military expenses" of the Czech Republic) with a much lower growth dynamics of 238 % and the two departments established later – the Security Information Service (1994) with total growth of 152 % and the National Security Office (1999) with 162 %.

In 2007 the approved budget of the Ministry of Interior for the first time exceeded the budgetary expenses of the Ministry of Defence, a phenomenon highly unusual in developed democratic countries.

In a situation where state expenses in the main areas of the Czech Republic's security sector exceeded CZK 100 billion in 2005 and continue to grow (with the average annual dynamics of over 104 %), the crucial problem is not the continually harped-upon insufficiency of budgetary allocations, but their *efficient and rational use*. The latter may be doubted.

Budget of Ministry of Defence

The changes in security orientation of the Czech Republic, from a state oriented on defending its own territory in case of armed conflict to a state pursuing its own political and military ambitions within a system of collective security guaranteed by the UN, NATO and the EU, can be documented by the development of the military budget, by changes in the structure of the armed forces and their technological equipment. The following chart represents the development of financial resources allocated to the defence department over 16 years.



Figure 2: Resources allocated to the Ministry of Defence in 1993-2008

The chart enables us to make the following conclusions:

- During the first years after its accession to NATO the Czech Republic tried to observe the general principle ensuing from defence planning requirements within NATO, i.e. keep defence expenses approximately at 2 % of the GDP.
- A great impulse for the development of the armed forces was the decision to reform them, adopted in 2002.
- Since 2002 the government has been gradually abandoning its commitments and lowering the percentage share of defence-related funds in relation to GDP. The justification was that the real sum in CZK was actually growing or staying the same.

In this light, the last (and still valid) *Security Strategy 2003* appears to be more a declarative than an executive document. The modernization of the armed forces has slowed down and in some areas (e.g. ground forces) it has actually stopped. The armed forces have been and still are able to fulfil that part of the country's ambitions which concerns participation in NATO and EU military operations and can do even more. However, the expert community and the general public have questioned specifically the army's ability to fulfil the tasks of common defence (under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty), often not without foundation[9].

[9] One of the claims commonly used to defend the lowering of the Czech Republic's defence budget spending has been the fact that the Ministry of Defence is incapable of spending the whole sum allocated for the given year. This is true only in part, since in many cases the

From the early 1990s the pressure to reduce spending has almost always forced the Ministry to try to save on costs of armed forces personnel. Lowering what is called mandatory expenses, i.e. salary costs, and curbing other welfare and social security measures has reduced personnel numbers to the minimum necessary level. This has been one of the main arguments used to justify the abolition of conscription as of 1 January 2005.[10]



Figure 3: Development of the number of AF Czech Republic personnel from 1993 to 2008[11]

As is evident from Fig. 3, since 1993 the number of armed forces personnel has been reduced by more than two thirds. This reduction applied most of all to military non-professional personnel, the conscripts.

Financing Czech Participation in Expeditionary Operations

In evaluating military spending one should pay special attention to operations contributing importantly to the performance of our obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty and tasks within the ESDP. The following chart sums up costs of military operations abroad covered from the Ministry of Defence budget.

acquisition system in place in the Czech Republic does not even enable the Ministry to make full use of the funds.

[10] The claim that a professional army is less costly than a conscripted one has not been validated. This experience is in line with that of our allies who decided to professionalize their armies earlier.

[11] www.army.cz



Figure 4: Total state budget spending on crises/peace support operations from the Ministry of Defence budget

Over the given decade, the Czech Republic has spent CZK 13.6 billion from the Ministry of Defence budget on operations abroad. The amount spent on these operations has grown by 178 % from 1999 to 2008. The total budgetary spending of the Ministry of Defence has grown by 227 % over the same period, with the cost of expeditionary operations representing 3.8 % of the total spending in 1999; in 2008 the share was less than 3 %.

Over the above-mentioned decade the Czech Republic has taken part in 26 operations, of which the costliest have been deployments of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic in SFOR (CZK 2.7 billion), KFOR (CZK 5.5 billion), "Permanent Freedom" (CZK 1.4 billion) and ISAF (CZK 1.1 billion). Other operations include NATO, EU and UN-led initiatives, but also other actions and measures such as deployment of a field hospital, humanitarian aid etc.)

Expenses on Defence-related Research and Development

Defence research and development (R&D) is financed from a separate chapter, outside the budget of the Ministry of Defence. While in the 1990s there was not a clear system in the distribution of these funds, since 2000 the situation has been improving. Annually, approximately CZK 500 million is allocated to defence research and development. These funds serve all actors (including foreign companies) capable of meeting the requirements of individual users: "capability managers" of Czech Armed Forces as they are called. Over the last eight years total allocated sum has not been increasing, but remains steady. The problem is that sequence between R&D projects and acquisition process is decreasing. The effort to expand these projects to international level has failed, thus rendering them unable to succeed in a broader competitive environment.

In 2008 Czech government decided on a fundamental reform of the research and development system and a comprehensive policy framework for security research and development is currently being finalized. The reformed system should be closer to

European standards and, theoretically, could raise R&D efficiency. It is assumed that funds allocated to this area will increase, but, most importantly, they should go to areas with competitiveness potential and good prospects for future development.

Armament, Defence Industrial Base and Market with Military Material in Relation to Security Policy

The *Security Strategy of the Czech Republic* from 2003 mentions support of "defence industrial base", but this reference is, in fact, meaningless since the Czech Republic does *not* have a defence industrial base in the sense in which the concept is used in "Old Europe", especially in the member states of the former Western European Union (WEU), and in which it is promoted today in the European Defence Technology and Industrial Base integration project. Such a base is formed through close cooperation of the state with a selected sector of the industry and the cooperation must be based on relevant state industrial policies and coordinated military acquisitions.

The Czech Republic not only lacks industrial policy conceived in this way, but does not even contemplate putting it in place. So far, any urgent need has led only to *ad hoc* Cabinet-level resolutions on the purchase of individual high-cost items, mostly from abroad. These decisions (often improvised and controversial) are not based on any thought-out concept and have no influence on the development of the defence industry sector.

This long-term trend leaves us with a fragmented industrial sector which does not exhibit any tendencies toward integration and lacks the necessary prerequisites for it. It consists mostly of small and medium-sized businesses with limited potential for development and merely subsisting, which pin their development hopes on what is called "offset programmes" and occasional cooperation, i.e. commissions connected with large-scale army purchases from foreign contractors (who, it return for getting the contract, are required to generate economic benefit by investments in the Czech Republic – transl. note). This heterogeneous cluster also includes numerous trading companies (including those acting as sub-dealers) and various other actors. The current situation makes it difficult to fulfil integration obligations and form a common EU arms policy, a commitment that the Czech Republic voluntarily accepted.

The above-mentioned long-term development of the Czech armament sector, the insufficient interest of the state in active formation of a defence industrial base (which is considered to be "an industry like any other") and the present-day low numbers of the armed forces have jointly led to the disappearance of many branches of domestic industry. The surviving companies have lost their status of final contractors and the share of arms production in their business activities is continually decreasing. Given the fact that army acquisitions are contracted with firms from abroad, domestic arms producers are left to survive on co-operation projects of marginal importance and accidental technological

transfers; moreover, their reliance on offset programmes is ever more problematic in the changing EU framework.

Illusions about Czech armament exports are disappearing, too. Past export volumes have been high due to the sale of surplus technology and material from liquidated army stock to "developing countries" and other less demanding markets. This source of income has now been almost exhausted and exports to EU countries, which would bear witness to our gradual integration into European cooperation structures, remain (with the exception of Slovakia) marginal. This reflects unflatteringly on Czech industrial companies with their apparent lack of ability and courage and on the state authorities that seem unwilling to take an active part in European cooperation programmes or EDA (European Defence Agency) projects. While most European countries have already started to draw up their own documents concerning these programmes and projects and try to find a use for their domestic capabilities, no such work is being done in the Czech Republic.

All the aforementioned facts should be analysed and taken into account in the preparations of the new Czech security strategy to make sure that a strategy for the whole arms sector is not packed into one forced, meaningless phrase and dismissed, with complete reliance on our Alliance partners. In this context one can mention e.g. the too high hopes that are currently being pinned on a special technological and industrial cooperation with the US, when many legal barriers and other protectionist measures hampering such cooperation are, in fact, insurmountable (see e.g. the experience of those European countries that took part in the *Joint Striker Fighter Program*).

1.4. Czech Republic and International Security Organizations

Considering the size of its territory, its location in the heart of Europe and its economic and military strength, it is logical that the Czech Republic has been, is and always will be a part of international or multinational security organizations. It is a pre-condition for maintaining our sovereignty and territorial integrity. Paradoxically, historical lessons are inscribed mostly in black letters in the minds of most Czechs, teaching them that exclusive reliance on these organizations or on allies generally has not always paid off. What the man on the street sometimes does *not* realize is that without the complex and sometimes clumsy system of international security, the independent Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic would not only never have come into being, but would not have seen the relatively long periods of peace and certainly would not have developed the present-day democracy and achieved the comparatively high living standard existing in the Czech Republic.

The Czech government and other political representatives pay much attention to the Czech Republic's involvement in international organizations, including security formations. After a period of passivity or kowtowing before the "Great Brother", the Soviet

Union, which *de facto* determined our foreign policy, the new democracy is learning to act independently. On the one hand, the awareness of our limitations sometimes prevents us from speaking up at large international forum. On the other hand, we occasionally have to witness the excesses of politicians trying to demonstrate not only *national*, but also their own supposed *intellectual* sovereignty. This would be all right if their views stemmed from clearly defined national interests and priorities, supported by precise arguments that have been discussed in both political and broader public circles.

Security of the Czech Republic is based primarily on our NATO membership. Great importance is ascribed to the development of ESDP, another pillar of Czech security policy. The UN, OSCE and other organizations with global or regional significance are also considered crucial.

United Nations

A majority of the Czech public and the country's political representatives consider the UN a key and indispensable actor in matters of global security. All strategic documents and positions of the Czech Republic thus stress the mandate of the UN (or its Security Council) as the necessary pre-condition for sending Czech armed forces to operations abroad, outside the territory of the NATO countries.

On the other hand, the Czech Republic realizes that the UN is a slow-moving colossus with limited ability to reach consensus on key issues of regional and global security. The above principle – the necessity of a UN mandate – is thus being often discussed and sometimes it is circumvented, especially as regards NATO policy making.

Since it has come into being in January 1993, the Czech Republic has continued in the footsteps of former Czechoslovakia, actively sending the members of its armed forces to peace missions, operations and specialized UN commissions. Czechoslovakia began taking part in "blue-beret" operations trying to solve international security problems in the early 1989 when it sent representatives to observer missions in Angola (UNAVEM I) and Namibia (UNTAG).

In 1994 the Czech Republic was elected a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. Here it played an important part in "awakening" the UN (however late) to its duty to stop the orchestrated genocide in Rwanda.

Up to now the Czech Republic has participated in more than thirty UN missions, sending out approximately 3,000 Armed Forces members. The country has also gradually joined in the peacekeeping effort by providing civilian police forces.

At present there is no whole Czech Armed Forces unit deployed in UN peace operations. The Czech military is now involved more in operation under NATO (the Balkans – the states of the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq) and EU (Bosnia and Herzegovina) command.

NATO

The relation of the Czech and Slovak political representatives and the public to NATO has been ambivalent since the break-up of the Warsaw Pact. The general trauma and disillusionment caused by the Munich Agreement of 1938 and by the "brotherly aid" of the Warsaw Pact countries in 1968 provoked a strong aversion to political and military blocs, on which our country's security had once been founded. After 1989 the citizens of the young Czech democracy thus largely sympathized with the view expressed by the then-President, Václav Havel, who suggested that not only the Warsaw Pact, but also NATO could be dismantled. The euphoria of the newly gained freedom led us to believe that nothing can any longer stand in the way of mutual understanding and cooperation between people across state borders and national or ethnic boundaries. It seemed that organizations designed to ensure defence by military means had lost their *raison d'être*. NATO itself contributed to this belief by efforts to redefine its mission. Many listened to those who claimed that security in Europe can be guaranteed by an OSCE-like organization.

Nevertheless, the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein and the events in former Yugoslavia showed that NATO was still needed and this was one of the reasons why the Czech public began to view the Alliance differently. The Czech Republic joined in the activities of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, sent its representatives to international forces in the Balkans and adopted a programme designed to improve interoperability with NATO forces.

The invitation to join NATO extended to the Czech Republic at the 1997 Madrid summit and the subsequent integration of the Czech Republic into NATO structures as of 12 March 1999 was a logical culmination of the focused security policy of the Czech political elite, supported by most democratic forces. Since the beginning of the integration effort up to the present the only opponents of the country's NATO membership have been Communist Party members and certain smaller interest groups at the margins of the political spectrum.

Today, NATO is a fundamental pillar of national security for the Czech Republic. The majority of Czech citizens realize that, in spite of the negative lessons of history, in today's globalized world there is no other alternative to joining this defence organization if we want to ensure our security. The rise in terrorist activities worldwide after 11 September 2001 has contributed to a shift in views, but has also polarized the society. Not all the citizens see the current US "war-on-terrorism" policies as adequate. Not everyone understands that security of the Czech Republic depends on forcible elimination of risk sources directly in areas where they emerge, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. Another fact that has to be often repeated is that we cannot just enjoy the advantages of NATO membership, but, as an integral part of this international organization, must also invest in its efforts.

The security-related foreign policy of the current political representation is characterized by a close link to the US in the framework of NATO policy making. This political orientation makes the government's foreign policy increasingly controversial, not only for the opposition, but also for a large part of the Czech public. Needles to say, this situation complicates the attitude of the Czech Republic to European integration and to the development of ESDP.

European Union

The Czech public and its political representatives have a sympathetic understanding of the philosophy that underlies EU security and defence policy, especially its humanitarian aspect. Despite the negative experience with totalitarian regimes where state (or party) interests were put before those of individuals and human rights were interpreted from a "class warfare" viewpoint, the aspects of human security are well understood in the Czech environment. It is a pity that practical EU policy in this field often remains unclear for a majority of Czech population, a problem made worse by the government's steps in support of the ESDP which can hardly be called systemic.

Czech organizations and other actors have not yet fully learned how to succeed in the competitive European environment. One can thus often hear complaints that the Czech Republic is regarded as a second-class country. The ESDP is associated with high ambitions fulfilled more by administrative or even bureaucratic measures than by practical steps. The slowness of attaining any consensus undermines the credibility of Union efforts in the eyes of the Czech population. On the other hand, everyone realizes there is no other way but to live and work jointly and peacefully in Europe.

Despite all reservations and hesitation, the Czech Republic's support for the ESDP is still visible. Building a joint Battle Group with Slovakia or participating in operations such as ALTHEA, EUPM EUJUST LEX or Proxima makes a contribution to the EU-led effort to make Europe more secure, a contribution which, though relatively small, is still important for the Czech Republic.

The Czech Republic is working hard to be ready to assume EU presidency as of 1 January 2009. The main priorities have already been formulated; institutions and their representatives are preparing to take on new responsibilities. Important priorities of the Czech Presidency will include efforts to improve NATO-EU cooperation, especially in developing military capabilities. This will also include support for increased EDA efficiency which has so far come across as a viable organization with good potential for future development. Attention also focuses on ensuring security in Chad, the Balkans or Georgia.

OSCE

The Czech Republic has always regarded the OSCE as an important part of the European security architecture. Supporting OSCE activities is one of the long-term foreign policy priorities of the Czech government. The Czech Republic supports a balanced arrangement of all three OSCE dimensions (the political and security dimension, the economic and environmental dimension and the human rights focus) and the observance of standards adopted within these three dimensions by all OSCE member states.

The Czech Republic sees the role of the OSCE especially in conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction and fight against terrorism and in its practical policies seeks to strengthen cooperation of the OSCE security dimension with NATO and the EU.

We see the strength of the OSCE particularly in the fact that the EU member countries make up almost half of its membership (27 out of 56) and their contributions represent two thirds of OSCE resources.

Despite its limited potential to solve crises, the OSCE is an internationally accepted tool for tackling some aspects of "human security" in fields where the effectiveness of NATO and UN intervention would be limited. Fields such as armed forces control, limiting the proliferation of small arms, fight against the use of anti-personnel mines are unique to this organization, just as its focus on countries seen as potential risk and threat sources (especially post-Soviet countries).

Still, the OSCE does not attract much attention in the Czech Republic. For one thing, it is known that many political negotiations on important issues have been deadlocked for years, and even where progress *is* achieved, it does not have such a breakthrough effect as action taken under the auspices of the UN.

Other Platforms for International Cooperation

Visegrad cooperation. After an inauspicious beginning, the V4 format has come to be regarded as a natural and respected form of regional policy making in Central Europe. Since the accession of the Visegrad countries to the European Union, EU matters have become an integral part of the common agenda, including coordination of national policies in relation to ESDP.

Regional Partnership (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Austria, Slovakia and Slovenia) is a formation that has since its establishment in 2001 concentrated on cooperation in fields falling within the responsibility of interior departments (internal security, asylum and consular matters), culture and also common infrastructure projects; its primary foreign policy concern was development in the West Balkans.

2. THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

The Czech Republic is one from the countries actively involved in tackling global crises at source. Compared to large states, our allies, our contribution to peacekeeping effort may seem small. However, if put into perspective, related to the country's population size and its relative economic power, it is in many aspects above average, as can be seen from the data in the following chapter.

2.1. Involvement of Czech Armed Forces in Crisis Response Operations Worldwide

The end of the Cold War was a determining factor for the development of global political and security reality: the countries of the former military blocs gradually became significantly involved in joint crises response / peace support operations (CRO/PSO). The development in the Czech Republic was similar to that in many other countries of the Euro-Atlantic area. It was driven by the desire to help extend the area of stability, security and democracy and contribute to peaceful resolution of crises worldwide. At the present stage of their development, the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic (AF CR) are undergoing fundamental changes designed to implement basic principles of the security and military strategy of the Czech Republic. The strategic security principle adopted by the Czech Republic corresponds with the development of the security environment, obliges the Czech Republic to take an active part in solving conflicts and crises all over the world and requires Czech armed forces to be fully prepared for deployment in operations outside national territory.

Military Policy Ambitions of the Czech Republic

CRO/PSO conducted within their framework – become one of the most important and most demanding peacetime activities of the AF CR as regards organizational, material and financial requirements. The country's military policy ambitions, which form part of the *Military Strategy of the Czech Republic*, are also oriented on fulfilling the aforementioned tasks. Using the troops of AF CR in future operations is not, in principle, limited geographically, except operations in the Arctic. Apart from collective defence operations under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Czech Republic declares the ambition to participate in operations with the following formations[12]:

- A brigade task force or its equivalent without rotation;

[12] It should be noted that in providing troops that would correspond to these ambitions no distinction is made as to the kind of operations in which they will be deployed. Tasks fulfilled in these operations thus can be peacekeeping or humanitarian in nature or have a combat character.

- A battalion task force rotated after a six-month period. Within deployment of a battalion task force, the armed forces are capable of providing headquarters for up to one year for a multinational brigade task force;
- A company task force rotated after a six-month period or an equivalent air task force for three months without rotation;
- Stand-by task forces up to the level of a battalion earmarked for NATO Response Forces (NRF) or EU Battle Groups (BG EU);
- Specialized task forces or expert groups, e.g. special missions units or training and consultancy expert teams;
- Assets and capabilities according to actual availability in support of civilian authorities and organizations and air transport capabilities for humanitarian and rescue operations outside the Czech territory;

In line with the Istanbul commitment[13], 40 % of Czech Armed Forces is deployable and 8 % of this number will be deployed permanently, if needed. So far the Czech Republic has managed to keep this commitment and even go significantly beyond its extent.

Operational Practice

Since the early 1990s the democratic Czechoslovakia and, after its division, the Czech Republic, have actively participated in sending armed forces to crisis management operations in the Balkans, but also in the Middle East and elsewhere. An overview of these engagements is given in the table below.

Apart from participation in humanitarian and stabilization missions to solve crises outside national territory, the members of Czech armed forces have served and sometimes still serve as UN and OSCE military observers in UNGCI (Iraq), UNMOP (Croatia), UNOMIG (Georgia), UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone), MONUC (DRC), UNMEE (Ethiopia – Eritrea), UNMIK (Kosovo), UNMIL (Liberia) – 15 to 20 persons on average. Since 2005 the Czech Republic has made some of its assets and capabilities available for UN SBAS – United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System.

The decision of the Czech Republic to form a joint EU Battle Group with Slovakia, the BGs being one of the ways to build EU response forces, is one of the country's active contribution to the development of ESDP.

[13] This is a commitment that the Czech Republic has adopted at the NATO summit in Istanbul, 28-29 April 2004.

Table 2: Participation of Czech Armed Forces in CRO/PSO since 1990 [14].

Mission/Operation	*Time Period and Maximum Size of the Armed Forces Deployed*	*Characteristics/mission of Deployed Forces*	*Note*
Desert Shield, Desert Storm Saudi Arabia, Kuwait	*200 persons* *06/1990 - 07/1991*	Special anti-chemical unit	Special chemical protection unit
UNPROFOR, UNCzech RepublicO Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina	*500 persons, from 2004 1000 persons* *04/1992 - 12/1995*	Monitoring mission expert medical aid humanitarian aid	Reinforced battalion, field hospital
IFOR / Joint Endeavor Bosnia-Herzegovina	*1000 persons* *02/1995 - 03/1996*	Ensuring the implementation of the Dayton Agreement	Reinforced battalion, staff headquarters
SFOR / Joint Guard, Joint Forge Bosnia-Herzegovina	*600 persons* *01/1997 - 12/2001*	Ensuring the implementation of the Dayton Agreement	Mechanized battalion, helicopters, staff headquarters
AFOR / Allied Harbour Albania, Kosovo	*200 persons* *04/1999 - 09/1999*	Expert medical aid, care of refugees	Field hospital, civil defence unit
KFOR/ Joint Guardian Kosovo	*200-800 persons* *07/1999 up to the present*	Ensuring reconstruction and security	Mechanized battalion
Enduring Freedom Kuwait	*400 persons* *07/2002 – 12/2003*	Monitoring and liquidating the consequences of WMD use, aiding Kuwait's Civil Defence authorities	Reinforced chemical protection battalion
Iraq	*250 persons* *04/2002 – 12/2003*	Medical aid within the framework of CIMIC	Field hospital
FINGAL Afghanistan	*150 persons* *05-12/2002*	Medical aid within the framework of CIMIC	Field hospital
EUFOR / Althea Bosnia-Herzegovina	*up to 100 persons* *01/2004 - 07/2007*	Aid during reconstruction and stabilization	Guard, support and monitoring troops
ISAF, Afghanistan	*gradual increase, now 400 persons* *01/2006 up to the present*	Airport control (KAIA), medical aid, PRT in Loghar	Air force specialists, field hospital, support troops
NNF-I, NMT-I - Iraq	*now 100 persons* *01/2004 up to the present*	Guard service, training of Iraqi troops	Guards unit, military policemen

The Importance of Czech Republic Participation in CRO/PSO

The participation of Czech armed forces in crisis management operations abroad has been, and still is, meeting with ambiguous response. On one hand, citizens of the Czech Republic realize that the country must take part in collective efforts to enhance global security, whereby it also indirectly strengthens its own. On the other hand, certain groups of the population and political parties (especially the Communist Party) point to the fact that too active an engagement in conflicts outside the Czech Republic territory may generate internal security risks. The second argument is economic: stressing that the funds used to cover the costs of missions abroad could find far more "appropriate" uses. There is also a relatively

[14] Source – www. army.cz

unimportant group of activists who reject the use of force in any form, even the very existence of the armed forces.

Despite this and notwithstanding the changes in the political make-up of governments since the early 1990s and changes in party rhetoric on going into opposition, the official foreign policy of the Czech Republic remains largely consistent and compatible with general trends.

Over the whole period dealt with in this study there has been a marked stress on the humanitarian aspect of missions. The Czech public tends to regard more favourably the participation of troops in peacekeeping missions than combat deployment. For this reason, the Czech Republic usually sends medical workers, military policemen or guards and training units ensuring stabilization and further peaceful development in crisis areas. Fulfilment of offensive combat tasks has been, and still is, rare, although the troops are well-trained for it.

Fulfilment of mission tasks is one of the main factors that help raise the prestige of the armed forces in the eyes of the Czech public. The citizens appreciate especially humanitarian acts, such as providing aid to refugees, protecting civilians, assistance in school building or saving civilian lives, especially children's lives, in Czech field hospitals. They also welcome the growing ability of the armed forces members to cooperate with allies in the framework of the multinational command and control system. What tends to go unnoticed by the public is the part the Czech armed forces play in attaining overall strategic and political goals of operations, which take longer to achieve and increase the cost of missions.

Some Consequences of Czech Involvement in CRO/PSO

The political-military ambitions and other commitments express the maximum of what the Czech Republic can ensure and in many cases they even go beyond the country's potential, considering the rotation frequency of troops made available for missions and for the rapid response system, the commitment to sending personnel to posts within NATO and EU military structures and the permanent territorial tasks of the AF CR. Still, an analysis of the recently adopted strategic documents[15] shows that the Czech Republic intends to continue its policies in this respect. Clearly, the trend toward a largely expeditionary use of the Czech armed forces is a logical outcome of the political changes and the country's political orientation after 1990.

The security situation in the Czech Republic and deployments of AF CR in operations abroad will be basically determined by development within the European security framework. The ongoing integration of the Czech Republic into Euro-Atlantic political and security structures means that any consideration of security issues and commitments is ever more closely connected with the development within NATO and the EU. In the context of this development, any participation of the Czech Republic in operations abroad, especially peace

[15] The Military Strategy of the Czech Republic and the Long-term Vision of Development of the Ministry of Defence sector.

operations, becomes an integral part of the tasks of the AF CR, a trend which is bound to grow stronger. As the area of primary security interest for NATO grows, so does the likelihood of Czech troops being deployed in a culturally, climatically and geographically remote environment.

Peace operations consist of a broad range of political, diplomatic, economic and military activities. To ensure flexible and adequate crisis response within a given coalition of states, the Czech Republic sees peace operations in the full diversity of their types. It is well understood that peace operations enable the creation of a framework for sharing responsibility, roles, efforts, functions and costs by states, international and non-governmental organizations. They also ensure legitimacy and transparency of all activities and create a framework for the fulfilment of civilian and military tasks during operations.

Responding to current development in crisis areas, the Czech Republic has embraced the concept of provincial reconstruction teams (PRT), which is at present applied in the Loghar province of Afghanistan. PRT represent a new ambition of the Czech Republic as regards models of participating in peace operations, making greater demands on inter-departmental coordination and synergy with international NGOs both within and outside the Czech Republic.

2.2. The Czech Republic and Non-military Humanitarian Aid

Although especially in the early 1990s the Czech Republic has been struggling with economic problems of transition from the Socialist command economy to a free market model and the population's living standard was relatively low, humanitarian aid to afflicted countries or regions organized at both governmental and non-governmental level has always been perceived as positive and generally supported. While state administration initiatives in this field, especially in the framework of official development assistance, can be precisely documented, the activities of private actors, independent of the state, i.e. above all those of non-profit NGOs, can only be estimated. [16]

Official assistance can be divided into humanitarian aid and foreign development assistance. Humanitarian aid is a rapid, short-term response to an emergency, aimed at averting immediate dangers that threaten the population in afflicted areas. Development assistance seeks to ensure long-term social and economic development of the less developed parts of the world.

Official Humanitarian Assistance

The Czech Republic is an active provider of humanitarian aid to foreign countries, whether in the form of *urgent aid* aimed at immediate saving of people's lives and health from

[16] It is necessary to distinguish between NGO and ODA activities. While projects funded e.g. from government grants are registered as ODA, projects financed from "private" sources, e.g. public collections, do not come under the ODA heading.

the consequences of an emergency, or in the form of *reconstruction aid*, i.e. aid in ensuring basic living conditions, hygiene, shelter and food provision for several months or, in exceptional cases,[17] years after the emergency.[18] The Czech Republic uses the whole range of humanitarian aid types – financial aid, material assistance, rescue and consultancy aid or combinations of the above.

Institutional backing of humanitarian aid in the Czech Republic is regulated by law.[19] Decisions on providing humanitarian aid amounting to a maximum of 5 million CZK are made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs after consultation with the Minister of Interior; larger-scale aid or aid requiring the cooperation of several ministries is decided on by the whole Cabinet or, in cases of utmost seriousness, the Central Crisis Management Staff.

Funds Available for Humanitarian Purposes

State budgetary funds allocated for humanitarian purposes annually amount to several dozen million CZK. However, as situations requiring humanitarian intervention occur unpredictably, this sum is in cases of great import enlarged by a Cabinet decision from "governmental budgetary reserve". This practice has been common especially in recent years. If the reserve is not used by the end of the year (as e.g. in 2002 and 2003), the leftover funds are sent as a one-off contribution to international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross or UNHCR.

The following figure provides a basic insight:



Figure 3: Development of the Czech humanitarian aid from 1997 to 2007[20]

[17] The Czech Republic does not have a fixed upper limit on the duration of humanitarian aid projects. However, it embraces the internationally recognized principle of aid continuity, from urgent emergency aid in immediate danger through reconstruction assistance up to development assistance. In extreme cases the boundaries between humanitarian and development aid thus may be purely administrative.

[18] Procedure for engaging the Czech Republic in rescue operations and providing humanitarian aid abroad: <http://www.mzv.cz/wwwo/mzv/default.asp?id=42963&ido=18888&idj=1&amb=1>

[19] Act No. 239/2000 Coll., on the integrated rescue system.

[20] Compiled from data made available by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic.

Reasons for Providing Humanitarian Aid

In most cases the Czech Republic provides humanitarian aid in connection with natural disasters (earthquakes, droughts, floods, hurricanes etc.); conflict-related humanitarian aid is less frequent. Situations such as a disease epidemic (Angola 2006) or industrial disasters (e.g. Georgia 2002) are exceptional.

As regards conflict-related and post-conflict humanitarian aid (a topic central to this study), it is possible to identify 46 of the total 129 cases of humanitarian aid provided from 2002 to 2007[21]. These 46 cases were related to only 13 conflicts; in two other cases the Czech Republic contributed to general programmes of international organizations (UNHCzech Republic – aid to refugees in Africa, Red Cross – mine removal). Czech humanitarian aid is thus relatively focused, with help being often distributed repeatedly in connection with the same conflict. What is also positive is that conflicts are looked at from a regional perspective and aid related to one conflict often targets several different states (typically aid to refugees in neighbouring states, e.g. in connection with the political situation in Myanmar or Somalia).

Aid distributed in connection with individual conflicts differs greatly in volume: from dozens of millions of CZK over six years (the "war on terrorism" in Afghanistan, the second war in the Persian Gulf and the subsequent crisis in Iraq, Darfur in Sudan) to a symbolic contribution of USD 1,000 toward food relief connected with the "African world war" in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The share of post-conflict humanitarian aid in the total volume of humanitarian aid provided has fluctuated greatly between years. In 2003, 2006 and 2007 conflict-related aid prevailed, while in 2002, 2004 and 2005 the prevalent form of assistance was aid connected with natural disasters. The fluctuation clearly reflects the accidental nature of events that require humanitarian response.

The following table gives an overview of conflict-related and post-conflict humanitarian aid:

Table 3: Assistance provided by the Czech Republic in connection with conflicts in 2002-2007 (in millions of CZK) [22]

Conflict / Year	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Total
Afghanistan	5. 1		4.8		33	10.2	53.1
Iraq		29.4				5.2	34.6
Darfur			10.0			10.5	20.5
Sri Lanka					1.9	5.2	7.1
Russia (Beslan)				6.3			6.3
Myanmar					3.0	2.4	5.4
Palestine	1.3					3.0	4.3
Somalia					2.0	2.2	4.2
Multilateral projects		4.0					4.0

[21] Annual humanitarian aid summaries. (www.mzv.cz/wwwo/mzv)
[22] Compiled from data made available by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic.

Conflict / Year	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Total
Kosovo			2.0			1.4	3.4
Angola	0.6		1.5				2.1
Liberia		1.0					1.0
Lebanon		0.3					0.3
Total	7.0	34.8	18.3	6.3	39.9	40.1	146.6
Share of the aid in the total volume of humanitarian assistance (%)	36.50%	87.03%	35.48%	5.05%	61.38%	61.19%	39.94%

In most cases, assistance is not provided directly by the Czech Republic authorities, but e.g. through financial aid to an international organization, support to local NGOs or through projects run by Czech non-governmental organizations. The only relatively important humanitarian aid activity that was implemented directly was the QIP (Quick Impact Projects) initiative in Kabul in 2007 and activities such as donation hand-overs.

Foreign Development Assistance

Before 1989 Czechoslovakia's engagement in the developing world had been relatively large scale. The nature of the relations reflected the realities of the Cold War. While much emphasis was put on cooperation in military and security matters (armed forces training, supplies of "special material"), the cooperation did include some important industrialization projects (supplies of complete plant equipment); there had also been extensive scholarship programmes for foreign students.

The first few years after the fall of communism saw a marked reduction of contacts with the developing world at most levels. The relations started developing again in the second half of the 1990s, as the resumption of development assistance was a necessary condition for the Czech Republic's 1995 admission to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

During the second half of the 1990s the Czech foreign development assistance was largely fragmented along territorial as well as sectoral lines: relatively large-scale projects were being implemented in more than 40 countries. A list of 20 priority countries, drawn up after 2002, was further reduced after 2004. The long-term priority countries included Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Yemen, Moldova, Mongolia, Serbia and Montenegro[23], Vietnam and Zambia; Afghanistan and Iraq were classified as medium-term priorities.

The choice of long-term priority countries is usually explained by the requirement that the selected countries should have a long-standing strong tradition of relations with the Czech Republic (Czechoslovakia) and, at the same time, a history of Socialist-oriented development (to give the Czech Republic an opportunity to pass on its transition experience). The strong tradition of mutual relations definitely exists with countries of the former Yugoslavia, Moldova, Mongolia and Vietnam.

[23] After division only Serbia remained a priority country.

However, it must be noted that the formal selection of priority countries does not fully correspond with the actual ODA allocation, because in 2002-2006 Angola, Yemen and Zambia never appeared among the ten most important recipients of Czech aid.

Table 4: Ten largest recipients of Czech aid in 2002-2006 (data in millions of USD)[24]

Year	2002		2003		2004		2005		2006	
Ranking	Country	USD	Country	USD	Country	USD	Country	USD	Country	USD
1	Serbia and Montenegro	3.42	Iraq	39.96	Iraq	13.66	Iraq	8.13	Iraq	11.80
2	Ukraine	2.15	Afghanistan	6.12	Serbia and Montenegro	6.88	Serbia and Montenegro	6.89	Serbia	6.00
3	Romania	1.78	Serbia and Montenegro	4.15	Afghanistan	6.08	Ukraine	4.62	Afghanistan	4.20
4	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.50	Bosnia and Herzegovina	3.93	Ukraine	4.58	Pakistan	3.70	Indonesia	3.28
5	India	1.43	Vietnam	2.04	Russia	3.96	Mongolia	3.04	Mongolia	2.72
6	Moldova	1.36	Mongolia	1.68	Vietnam	3.05	Afghanistan	1.96	Ukraine	2.69
7	Georgia	0.99	Russia	1.64	China	2.94	Vietnam	1.42	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2.13
8	Macedonia	0.98	Moldova	1.62	Mongolia	2.88	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.34	Vietnam	1.91
9	Vietnam	0.91	China	1.31	Georgia	1.36	India	1.31	Belarus	1.71
10	Mongolia	0.78	Ukraine	1.07	Kyrgyzstan	1.14	China	1.30	Egypt	1.35

In the future one can thus expect a further decline in the number of Czech priority countries.[25] Also, the ongoing reform of the Czech ODA system should be completed by 2010.

The Czech Republic has been actively involved in the international efforts to tackle the crisis in Iraq and Afghanistan and the subsequent social and economic reconstruction in these countries. Regrettably, the information available on development assistance to those two countries is fragmented, especially in the case of Iraq[26].

Iraq

For example, in 2004 the Czech Republic implemented the following "transitional cooperation" projects (education, justice, healthcare, development of civic society and democracy, support of Czech-Iraqi economic cooperation)[27] in Iraq:

- Supplying additional equipment to the Police Academy in Az Zubayr in Southern Iraq;
- A stay for 2 Iraqi doctors and 2 medical workers in Czech healthcare establishments;
- Aid to Southern Iraq in the care of children suffering from heart disease;
- CERGE-EI educational programme in the framework of a two-month preparatory semester for 7 selected Iraqi students and a three-month introductory programme to

[24] http://www.mzv.cz/servis/soubor.asp?id=31013

[25] This assumption is based on the recommendation of OECD-DAC.

[26] The thematic page of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mzv.cz/irak, contains almost no information more recent than from 2004.

[27] http://www.mzv.cz/wwwo/mzv

doctoral studies for 2 best students from the preparatory semester. The programme will continue as a development assistance initiative (2-4 years);

- Training for senior employees of the Civilian Airport Administration in Baghdad and of the Iraqi Ministry of Transport for 20 experts; support of the transition of Iraqi society through training courses for the representatives of Iraqi non-profit organizations run by People in Need (implemented in Jordan);
- Expert workshop "Contracting in Iraq";
- Training for 50 Iraqi judges in a non-profit educational institute, CEELI (Central and Eastern European Lawyers Initiative); in total 200 judges should go through the training course;
- Publishing materials in Arabic on elections and issues concerning tolerance to support free elections in Iraq in January 2005;

Czech projects in Iraq mostly target the southern part of the country. The sector priorities are the following:

- Rebuilding the educational system – both through the reconstruction of schools or erection of new ones and by educating experts in fields crucial for the transition process (e.g. in economics and state administration);
- Healthcare – including expert medical care provided to Iraqi children in the Czech Republic;
- Training of Iraqi police;
- Building a democratic judiciary;
- Restoration of cultural heritage;
- Support of the non-profit sector and civic initiatives.

Afghanistan

Table 5: Foreign development assistance projects of the Czech Republic in Afghanistan

Name of the project	Institution responsible	Implemented by	Total approved budget (in CZK ´000)	Implementation period
Rehabilitation of the Afghan National Museum in Kabul – providing know-how in the field of cultural heritage management	MCult	National Museum in Prague	520	2004
Drilling for drinking water and hand pump installation in the Farah province of Afghanistan	MEnv	VARA Czech Republic	1,680	2004
Construction of a secondary school in Kandahar – erection of the school building, aid during refugee return	MForAff	VARA Czech Republic	2,378	2004
Restoration and development of the educational system in central Afghanistan; the building of a pedagogical institute and "teaching improvement" courses for teachers of primary and secondary schools	MEdYouCult	People in Need, public benefit comp.	6,880	2004-2005
Sustainable raising of education standards in the Chohi district in northern Afghanistan	MEdYouCult	People in Need, public benefit comp.	10,952	2005- 2006
"Development of city public transport in Kabul": a study	MTran	IKP	8,000	2005-2007

Name of the project	Institution responsible	Implemented by	Total approved budget (in CZK ´000)	Implementation period
"Building a new railway from the Iranian border to Kabul": a study	MTran	SUDOP Praha a.s.	10,000	2005-2007
Development assistance to Afghanistan in restarting the work of geological institutions focusing on natural resources exploitation	MEnv	Get, s.r.o.	9,804	2005-2007
Restoration and support of a secondary agricultural school in Baghlan in northern Afghanistan	MEdYouCult	People in Need, public benefit comp.	13,500	2006-2007
Training centre for city public transport personnel	MTran			2006-2009
Improving the quality of secondary agricultural education establishments in Afghanistan	MForAff	People in Need, public benefit comp.	5,000	2008-2009

Generally speaking, foreign development assistance in Afghanistan focuses on the school system and the development of education, on building transport infrastructure, ensuring drinking water for the local population, development of agriculture as the main source of living, natural resources exploitation and safeguarding of cultural heritage. Territorially, the projects concentrate on the Kabul area and on central and northern Afghanistan.

Better information is available for the Czech Republic's long-term priority countries in a post-conflict stage of development. According to the volume of aid, the most important recipient is Serbia, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina; Angola, on the other hand, is in a rather marginal position. Basic information on projects and, more generally, on the focus of foreign development assistance in individual priority countries can be obtained from the Czech publication, *Foreign Development Assistance of the Czech Republic*[28].

Activities of Independent, Non-Governmental Actors

Non-state actors such as NGOs, businesses or academic institutions are very active in providing humanitarian aid. Their activities only partly overlap with the official development assistance of the Czech Republic.

2002 saw the establishment of an important NGO and academic platform, FoRS (Forum for development assistance). At present it groups together 29 member organizations: its main aim is to coordinate selected development activities of its members targeting the public, political representatives and other groups[29]. Based on the initiative of the Industry and Transport Union of the Czech Republic, the business sector founded a similar forum in 2006, the Business Platform for Foreign Development Assistance[30].

[28] http://www.czechembassy.org/servis/Soubor.asp?ID=20493
[29] http://www.fors.cz/21aktivity.htm
[30] http://www.spcr.cz/cz/infoservis/platforma/letak_cz.doc

It is relatively difficult to get a whole picture of independent NGO activities, but the overview of activities of the three most important organizations dedicated to humanitarian and development assistance in Annex 3 provides a good illustration of the current state of affairs. Funds are accumulated mainly through public collections.

3. PUBLIC DISCUSSION ON NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

After accession to NATO in 1999, the Czech Republic's accession to the EU in 2004 brought to an end the external dimension of the transition and changed the country's *de iure* position in the political and security environment. Our security has indisputably been enhanced; what has also grown is our responsibility for formulating and implementing security policy that will in the short as well as the long term influence the security and defence capability not only of the Czech Republic, but also of its allies. Without realizing it clearly upon our accession to NATO in 1999, we have soon found ourselves "between millstones", not least due to the very dynamic global and European development that has accelerated over the last decade of the previous century and, even more so, in the first years of the new one. This dynamics has caught us by surprise; it still is surprising and sometimes challenging. Such conditions make it difficult to build security policy around a single transparent and strong idea. However, we should still attempt to do so.

3.1. Evaluating Different Approaches to Security

For nearly a decade the EU has been tackling a major task: trying to keep pace with globalization, a many-faceted process with a political, economic, technological, cultural and, last but not least, security dimension. The Union's intentions have been translated into plans to develop effective military tools and capabilities to ensure its security. The aforementioned process is going on against the backdrop of a more or less evident disunity of the Western world: Europe, or the European Union (especially its leaders, France and Germany) and the US.

The disunity stems from different perception of geopolitical and strategic interests, although the two actors actually face almost identical security threats: actors of international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the existence of "failed states". The difference between the two security concepts is also reflected in the content of the two parties' main doctrinal documents: National Security Strategy of the US (NSS, 2002) and Security Strategy of the European Union (SS EU, 2003).

The main point where the two strategies differ is their orientation: the US strategy declares a unilateral orientation, while the European Union embraces multilateralism. The United States bases its strategy on an actually existing robust military power: its armed forces spending accounts for 50 % of the total world defence costs (defence spending in the new US budget is set at USD 716 billion), it has 50 % of world military capabilities and is able to intervene anywhere in the world. In confrontation with the new threats to US security (especially terrorist acts), the unilateralist orientation stems from the belief that the United States should neutralize such a threat before it can be carried out, through what is called pre-

emptive strike. This approach can be applied even if US partners or allies disagree. The American strategy deals openly with the theme of power: the US declares its interest in keeping its power status, whereby it wants to prevent a new competition of world powers. However, it does not rule out making new alliances with major global actors such as Russia or China, mentioned in the NSS. Europe, on the other hand, is not given much prominence in the NSS (one cannot fail to notice that there are only two references to the EU and the word Europe can be found in just two or three places). However, the limits of the unilateralist strategy have been indicated by Henry Kissinger in his 2004 analytical article for Newsweek, "America's Assignment": no nation, however powerful, is capable of organizing the international system by itself. In the foreseeable future this is beyond the psychological and political capacity of even the most dominant state in the world. Kissinger has emphasized that American foreign policy must aim to turn dominant power into shared responsibility, quoting the Australian political scientist, Coral Bell, who said that even while being aware of its strategic pre-eminence; the US must conduct policy as if the international order were composed of many centres of power.

The European strategy does not rule out the use of force based on the support of timely, fast and, if necessary, even massive intervention. At the same time it acknowledges that security challenges must be viewed from a much broader perspective. SS EU thus states that none of the new threats is purely military nor can any be tackled by purely military means. As an alternative to American approaches the EU posits effective and efficient multilateralism, rooted in the very essence of EU functioning and the realities of its global status. What should not be overlooked is also the emphasis the SS EU puts on the role of the UN. A key concept of the SS EU is that of "preventive engagement", which largely contrasts with the American concept of pre-emptive strikes. At the same time the strategy indicates that the extent of the engagement depends on the given region's proximity to Europe, or, in the words of the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana that Europe must "think globally and act locally".

What is clearly important from our viewpoint is the specification of the "triad" that should form the core of EU engagement:

- Mobile, flexible military forces,
- Police and civilian capabilities for post-crisis situations,
- Use of the two above-mentioned components in combination and coordination with humanitarian, trade and development policy.

We believe that the EU Security Strategy is the first collective political step toward adequate balancing of hard and soft security, a step that, in a way, helps distinguish the EU approach from that of NATO.

The United States and Europe really differ in doctrinal approaches and priorities of their security policy. However, the real-life problems that both Americans and Europeans have to face when pursuing their security policy aims, especially in military operations, can, perhaps

paradoxically, contribute to a closer cooperation of the two parties. For both have their strong and weak points: while Europeans cannot match the American capacity to conduct high intensity operations, e.g. with the use of state-of-the-art technologies, they have, on the other hand, much more developed procedures for ensuring post-conflict stabilization in the affected region (American deficit in this respect is now evident particularly in Iraq). Exchanging experience is therefore desirable.

If we take the two above-mentioned strategies, together with the NATO strategy of 1999 and 2002, as points of reference for Czech foreign policy, some contradictions will inevitably emerge. While the perception of threats is more or less the same with all three actors, and to some extent they agree even on the necessity to eliminate them by military force, there are different perceptions of what should be the political aim of these strategies. It is telling that none of the three actors pays any attention in its strategy to how it could be coordinated with the plans of the other two. The question is whether this is at all possible in a situation where the European Union acts like a political organization lacking the necessary coercive tools, when NATO is going through a political crisis and the US still plays a dominant role in transatlantic security policy. With regard to the declared foreign policy aims of the Czech Republic it is surely somewhat paradoxical that while political weight has clearly been shifting from NATO to the European Union and the United States, these two actors have not as yet been able to find a new framework for future cooperation. Finding this framework is, however, crucial for maintaining a working transatlantic link.

What does all the above mean for Czech security policy? Our security policy should do the utmost to help maintain the transatlantic link, which should be supported by the development of EU defence policy and, above all, the Union's own defence capabilities. A key question for the formation and implementation of our security policy is to what extent and within what time horizon the EU will have real military capabilities ready to assume partial responsibility for the security of individual member states, including the Czech Republic. This is an important question, especially with regard to the problems the Union faces when building and broadening its capabilities (efficiency of arms spending, supra-national arms projects, research and development expenses, ensuring strategic transport etc.). Also, it should not be ignored that, apart from the "gaps" in armed forces capabilities that exist between the US and the EU, there are also similar "gaps" between capabilities of individual EU states, a reality that became more evident especially after EU enlargement.

3.2. Czech Republic in Relation to ESDP

The EU Security Strategy provides an opportunity to initiate a broader discourse on European security. In the Czech Republic, this discourse could be taken up by the local security community, as the EU Security Strategy is a starting point for an important debate on the Union's strategic orientation and its priorities. Attention could be centred on such questions as whether the Security Strategy can help the EU get past security policies defined by national

interests, what are the prospects of further transfer of security responsibilities to a supra-national model or questions related to the pooling of the existing European defence resources and their efficient use. What should also be discussed is the potential preparation of a European Military Doctrine, the military aspects of European Neighbourhood Policy and preparation of an internal security strategy of the European Union (the EU Security Strategy does not address problems of internal security). In the face of the terrorist threat, especially after the terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005), the EU states must clearly integrate a broad range of security policy tools – intelligence, justice, army, police and civil defence – to be able to counter terrorism effectively, and such a thing is difficult to implement on a purely national basis. The American concept of "homeland security" could thus provide some inspiration for the EU.

In assessing threats one should not slip into a certain automatism or rigidity. Overemphasising a certain type of threats, e.g. terrorism or WMD proliferation, should be avoided while there is no appropriate assessment of other rising threats such as underestimation of dictatorships, socio-economic threats (extreme poverty), influence of organized crime, corruption, technological breakdowns, environmental threats (global warming), cultural threats (rise of nationalism, fundamentalism), information security, vulnerability of financial markets etc.[31]

Responding to the aforementioned acts involves seeking consensus on what is adequate. E.g. one must understand that asymmetric threats from terrorist organizations require asymmetric responses. The complexity of internal and external security threats that can jeopardize social stability calls for improving the country's comprehensive security management system. Only this system can ensure defence against an attack that does not target primarily state territory (in the traditional territorial sense), but its infrastructure, the essence of the community, functioning of its institutions and even people's lifestyle.

This is a difficult task which has its historical, political, economic, legal and psychological dimension. The last two dimensions have crucial importance in an era of respect for human rights: a balance must be sought between ensuring security of the citizens and the state and keeping one's civil rights and freedoms.

3.3. Approaches to Practical Management of Czech Security Policy

When speaking of the need for a system of comprehensive security management it is also appropriate to look at the concept of "human security". It seems that, in our views of

[31] Here it is interesting to mention the total turnover of global organized crime: approximately 500 billion dollars. Organized crime is more prominent that other threats because of its so evident and immediate impact on human lives and because it is easily "exported". Its international nature, scope and capacity to undermine state administration make it a real national security problem for any democratic country. Intertwining of organized crime and politics and society is at least as serious a problem as terrorism itself.

security and ways to ensure it, we are beginning to witness a transition from one approach to another. In the earlier, "traditional" model, the citizen as the basic social entity fulfils his or her duties, while the state (representing the society) has the right to demand their fulfilment. A more modern concept sees the citizen to some extent as a customer whose demands are fulfilled by the state, but also as a partner who shares the responsibility for ensuring security. In the latter case, security becomes a public service. Nearly two decades after November 1989, saying this perhaps still amounts to a "small revolution" which will require above all a change in people's traditional ways of thinking. In the face of army professionalizing this will be a difficult task.

However, the basic challenge in the formation and implementation of security policy is still the extent to which we will manage to project all its complexity into decision making processes and thus attain the main goal: ensure as fully as possible the security of the Czech Republic. The focus must be especially on the capabilities and on the quality of security policy decision making, which is influenced by many actors – first and foremost by the government and the parliament, then by political parties and, to some extent though still not sufficiently, by the security community.

A brief look at the past two decades shows that the necessary basis and framework for the formation and implementation of our security policy have already been created: it is the new security legislation and basic strategic documents on the security of the Czech Republic.

The past development has shown the key importance of communication between actors directly involved in security policy formation and implementation (government, ministries, parliament, and political parties). In our conditions, working toward a political consensus – and finding such a consensus – often remains problematic and security policy suffers in consequence. This state of affairs is due to many factors, of which the following deserve to be mentioned:

The country lacks a "strategic culture", a fact due primarily to historical reasons.

So far, security policy, its formation and implementation have represented only a relatively unimportant segment of public policy and public service: it has been limited by the insufficient professionalism of its actors and by the relatively low level of public participation.

The Czech society is divided in relation to state security, a fact which is made manifest by some citizens' pacifist attitudes to internal and foreign policy measures or decisions with a security dimension. These attitudes, which attract extensive media coverage, are subsequently taken up by politicians and reflected negatively in concrete political positions and decisions.

Political controversies between political parties and within them concerning strategic priorities of security policy have, apart from a political and security dimension, also their economic context.

Due to the absence of a well-informed expert and public discussion of security policy and its priorities, security policy issues are eventually left to narrow (often *ad hoc*) political decision making. The system of confidentiality applied to decision making processes in this field is very extensive and evidently overstrict.

Security policy formation is plagued by "departmentalism", a phenomenon manifested in the rivalry of "power departments" and in the clashes within each of them over competences in drawing up security documents and implementing security policy.

The country lacks a real civilian control of the armed forces, a mechanism that cannot be perceived only through its formal manifestations (a civilian minister of defence), but above all through actual participation of political representatives in the process of strategic defence and armed forces management[32].

Partly due to the above-mentioned influences, there are hidden reserves in the system and preparation of security documents, both in the theoretical development of problems and in application.

The above factors eventually lead to a lack on unity and coordination among actors responsible for security policy decision making.

In view of the present-day global security situation, current threats and risks, it is a positive thing that the foundations for a concept of the country's comprehensive security system are finally being laid. It is not without significance that one of the impulses for this step has come from the academic community: in 2002 CESES drew up what was called a "strategic move", a document entitled "Comprehensive Security Management System of the Czech Republic[33]. We are clearly at the outset of a complicated journey toward building such a system.

The Security Strategy currently in place e. g. addresses the issues of defence policy only in the context of pursuing the country's security interests and defines only the core principles of such policy. It provides no comprehensive conceptual framework for either the content or the management of state defence.

The unsuccessful start of armed forces reform in 2003 (caused largely by insufficient attention that was paid to economic calculation of cost and effect) has shown the importance of yet another element of security policy formation and implementation: the often discussed "political tasking". The primary responsibility for "tasking" the security experts lies with the politicians. One problematic factor is their limited term of office and political mandate (a four-year period for both the deputies and the Cabinet members), which prevents them from

[32] In 19 years the Ministry of Defence has been headed by 13 ministers, with one minister lasting on average less than one and half a year, and the same period has seen the adoption and implementation of 8 transitions and reforms.

[33] CESES – Centre for Social and Economic Strategies is part of the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague. It is an interdisciplinary research and teaching centre developing theory, methodology and practice of exploring possible futures and applying the outcomes of analyses and prognoses to practical management.

gaining in-depth insight into security problems. In the end, a large part of the responsibility for preparing and formulating the political assignment lies with the soldiers, policemen and state officials.

3.4. Security Community

In discussing political consensus and political tasking one must not forget to mention the activities of the security community as an important factor influencing the formation of security policy. After almost fifteen years since it first began to emerge, the Czech security community has already become a relatively well-respected partner, especially for state administration bodies. At present it can be described as a voluntary, informal and relatively stable community of representatives of both expert circles and the general public, the non-profit sector, universities, scientific and research institutions that actively participate in discussions of state security and security policy problems.

The security community can be a natural ally of soldiers, policemen and other state officials seeking to achieve the highest possible efficiency in ensuring the country's security. In this context it is high time to start thinking about setting up a relatively independent analytical and research facility that would serve the needs of strategic management of the country's security system, cooperate with the government and be co-financed by it. Such a facility should not *replace* the structures of strategic decision making in the defence and interior departments; it would only support them with the results of its work – detailed analytical background materials which the ministries as central state administration bodies burdened with many operative tasks simply cannot manage to prepare.

The security community should also function more as an expert base for dealing with security policy issues in parliament, i.e. provide expert backing to deputies and senators. This is closely connected with the overall willingness and readiness of political parties to modernize their internal mechanisms, including an overhaul of their expert support structures. They should be able to generate not only able and competent politicians, but also consultants and assistants. After the expiry of their mandate – or after ending their active political career – the representatives of different political streams could work more actively for the common goal: raising public awareness of the importance of security. This could be an effective tool for influencing the attitudes of the decision makers to security at all levels of government.

The security community should also serve as a platform for seeking broader consensus in security policy matters. In any case, the discussions and controversies concerning the content and direction of our security policy must not remain just on the ideological and political level, where, because of the realities of politics, the very subject of discussion – the real-life effectiveness of the security system and its constituent parts – can get overshadowed by other concerns. It is crucial to have well-working standard mechanisms that will be able to describe and analyse the real condition and requirements of the security system.

3.5. Partial Conclusion

The future political and security development in the world and the Czech Republic will clearly call for greater emphasis on qualified approach to security policy formation and implementation. Drawing up new security documents should be based above all on long term thinking. This type of thinking requires broader and more in-depth expert discussion *among* the actors that form and implement security policy and also *within* their own internal structure. What is also highly desirable and urgently needed is a more active participation in discussions within international structures, including academic ones. A failure to do so would clearly diminish our ability to play an active and effective role in the supranational process of political communication and decision making in security matters, especially within the EU, but also NATO.

The most important ideas that should guide the formation and implementation of our security policy can be summed up as follows:

It is evident that there is no sense in drawing up concepts and strategies that are too general to have relevance for security policy decision making; equally, it is of little use to prepare detailed plans of reform, e.g. for the armed forces, without a broader idea of how we want to ensure our security.

The most immediate challenge we face is the need to modify and amend the Security Strategy of the Czech Republic. It should be the primary task not only of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also of a much broader forum of experts from other departments, including those not immediately concerned, and from the whole security community. A key element will be the strategic-conceptual and coordinating role of the Office of the Government with its team of qualified professionals.

With a view to formulating a new national security strategy, our efforts at present should concentrate on a proper reflection and evaluation of the new Security Strategy of the EU (2008) and what it implies for our security policy formation and implementation.

A key priority is to reach a stage in which security policy decisions will be made on the basis of real expertise. This can be achieved e.g. by initiating two steps: the establishment of a relatively independent analytical and research centre that would fulfil the strategic management needs of the Czech Republic security system, would cooperate with the government and be co-financed by it, and setting up a system of expert education for security policy actors, a system which, in a comprehensive form, does not as yet exist in the Czech Republic.

CONCLUSION

After almost twenty years of transition effort, the Czech Republic has a stabilized police and professional Armed Forces – armed services of a NATO and EU member country, which take a very active part in the activities of these organizations and their foreign missions. The Czech public prefers missions with a strong peacekeeping and humanitarian dimension. Already in the first Iraqi conflict we sent a chemical protection unit to the Kuwait border. We have also preferred to send military hospitals to areas of tension.

The above does not imply, of course, that there are no problems in the security field. The crime rate is still high, having tripled over the past two decades. Meanwhile, the police lacks several thousand men and women and attracting new employees is growing more and more difficult. International crime also poses a serious threat, as does the intertwining of organized crime and state administration, a phenomenon whose extensive media coverage undermines the sense of social cohesion.

Fighting corruption and making a more efficient use of the military budget funds is a prerequisite for getting the government and the public to agree to an increase of these funds that would enable us to fulfil our commitments to NATO. The more efficient financial management should result above all in improved combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

In the first half of 2009 the Czech Republic will assume the presidency of the EU. The development of ESDP is one of important priorities it will try to focus on. We do not expect the Czech Republic will significantly modify the European concept of “human security”. We will see continuing discussions about the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty; the EU will continue to take part in solving crises all over the world, especially in Africa, and will seek ways to improve cooperation with NATO. It can thus be assumed that the present study, if we decided to develop it further – could soon see the addition of a new chapter.

ANNEXES

Annex 1: Laws and strategic documents of the Czech Republic in the field of security and defence

Annex 2: The Czech Republic in UN peace operations

Annex 3: An overview of activities of selected independent private actors

Annex 1

LAWS AND STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY AND DEFENCE

1. LAWS

The Czech Parliament legally defined and (in the focus period of the study) reviewed the defence functions of the state by passing legislation concerning state defence; it defined the content of this concept and created instruments for its implementation (acts of the legislative branch as a strategic defence management tier of the highest importance and authority). The legislation included the following:

- Constitutional Act No. 1/1993 Coll., Constitution of the Czech Republic, as amended by later legislation;
- Decree of the Minister of Foreign Affairs No. 30/1947 Coll., on the United Nations Charter and the Statute of the International Court of Justice, negotiated on 26 June 1945 at the United Nations conference on international organization held in San Francisco, as amended by later legislation; [34]
- Communication of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs No. 36/1999 Coll.; [35]
- Communication of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs No. 66/1999 Coll.; [36]
- Announcement by President of the Republic of 9 July 2003 No. 206/2003 Coll., on declaring the results of the referendum on the accession of the Czech Republic to the European Union, held on 13 and 14 June 2003; [37]
- Constitutional Act No. 110/1998 Coll., on security of the Czech Republic, as amended;
- Act No. 2/1969 Coll., establishing ministries and other central state administration bodies of the Czech Republic, as amended;

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[34] At the United Nations conference on international organization, held in San Francisco on 25 April – 26 June 1945, the participating states negotiated and on 26 June 1945 signed the United Nations Charter and the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The Charter and the Statute were ratified by President of the Republic on 19 September 1945 and ratification instrument was deposited with the government of the United States of America on 19 October 1945.

Under Article 110, the Charter and the Statute took effect on 24 October 1945.

The Charter and the Statute were originally ratified by the following states (original UN members): Republic of China, France, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Argentina, Brazil, Soviet Socialist Republic of Belarus, Chile, Cuba, **Czechoslovak Republic**, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Salvador, Haiti, Iran, Lebanon, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Yugoslavia, Greece, India, Peru, Australia, Liberia, Costa Rica, Colombia, South African Union, Mexico, Canada, Panama, Ethiopia, Bolivia, Venezuela, Guatemala, Norway, Netherlands, Honduras, Uruguay, Ecuador, Iraq and Belgium.

[35] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs informs that on 4 January 1993 the Czech Republic asked the UN Secretary General to be accepted as a member of the United Nations and declared its readiness to acknowledge and fulfil the commitments spelled out in the UN Charter, negotiated in San Francisco on 26 June 1945. On recommendation of the UN Security Council, adopted by Resolution S/RES/801 of 8 January 1993, the UN General Assembly at its 47th session on 19 January 1993 decided in accordance with Article 4 Para. 3 of the UN Charter to admit the Czech Republic as a member of the UN by Resolution A/RES/47/221 .

[36] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs informs of the North Atlantic Treaty, adopted on 4 April 1949 in Washington, which has been approved by the Parliament of the Czech Republic. In relation to the Czech Republic it took effect, in line with its Article 10, on 12 March 1999.

[37] III. Accession of the Czech Republic to the European Union has been approved in the referendum.

Act No. 10/1969 Coll., on the State Defence Council [repealed by Constitutional Act No. 4/1993 Coll., on measures related to the demise of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic];
- *Act No. 92/1949 Coll., Defence Act* [repealed by Act No. 218/1999 Coll., on the extent of defence duty and on military administrative authorities (Defence Act)];
- Act No. 218/1999 Coll., on the extent of defence duty and on military administrative authorities (Defence Act) [repealed by Act No. 585/2004 Coll., on defence duty and its fulfilment (Defence Act)];
- Act No. 585/2004 Coll., on defence duty and its fulfilment (Defence Act), as amended by later legislation;
- *Act No. 73/1990 Coll., on civilian service* [repealed by Act No. 18/1992 Coll., on civilian service];
- *Act No. 18/1992 Coll., on civilian service* [repealed by Act No. 587/2004 Coll., abolishing civilian service and amending or repealing certain related laws];
- Act No. 587/2004 Coll., abolishing civilian service and amending or repealing certain related laws;
- *Act No. 40/1961 Coll., on defence of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic* [repealed by Act No. 222/1999 Coll., on ensuring defence of the Czech Republic];
- Act No. 219/1999 Coll., on armed forces of the Czech Republic, as amended by later legislation;
- Act No. 222/1999 Coll., on ensuring defence of the Czech Republic, as amended by later legislation;
- Act No. 124/1992 Coll., on military police, as amended by later legislation;
- Act No. 153/1994 Coll., on intelligence services of the Czech Republic, as amended by later legislation;
- Act No. 289/2005 Coll., on military intelligence;
- Government Regulation No. 51/2004 Coll., on state defence planning, as amended by later legislation.

2. Strategic documents

On the strategic level, the concept of state defence is defined – and defence policy is formed and implemented – primarily through executive acts of the government. In the given period, the most important strategic documents of this kind have been the following:
- Security Strategy of the Czech Republic, approved by Government Resolution (GR) No. 123 of 17 February 1999 (hereinafter referred to as SS Czech Republic 1999) [repealed by GR No. 80 of 22 January 2001];
- Security Strategy of the Czech Republic approved by GR No. 80 of 22 January 2001 (hereinafter referred to as SS Czech Republic 2001);
- Amended Security Strategy of the Czech Republic, approved by GR No. 1254 of 10 December 2003 (hereinafter referred to as SS Czech Republic 2003);
- National Defence Strategy of the Czech Republic, approved by GR No. 177 of 26 March 1997 (hereinafter referred to as NDS Czech Republic 1997) [repealed by GR No. 257 of 29 March 1999];
- Military Strategy of the Czech Republic, approved by GR No. 732 of 21 December 1994 (hereinafter referred to as MS Czech Republic 1994) [repealed by GR No. 257 of 29 March 1999];
- Military Strategy of the Czech Republic, approved by GR No. 257 of 29 March 1999 (hereinafter referred to as MS Czech Republic 1999) [repealed by GR No. 438 of 29 April 2002];
- Military Strategy of the Czech Republic, approved by GR No. 438 of 29 April 2002 (hereinafter referred to as MS Czech Republic 2002) [repealed by GR No. 578 of 9 June 2004];

- Military Strategy of the Czech Republic, approved by GR No. 578 of 9 June 2004 (hereinafter referred to as MS Czech Republic 2004) [repealed by GR No. 907 of 23 July 2008];
- Military Strategy of the Czech Republic, approved by GR No. 907 of 23 July 2008 (hereinafter referred to as MS Czech Republic 2008).

An exceptional task for the legislative branch, necessitated by the exceptional situation after the revolutionary changes in November 1989, was the declaration of the *Military Doctrine of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic* by the CSFR Federal Assembly on 20 March 1991.

Annex 2

THE CZECH REPUBLIC IN UN PEACE OPERATIONS

The Czech Republic has taken part in the following UN peace operations and observer missions:

UNCRO	(UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia)
UNTAES	(UN Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium)
UNMIBH	(UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina)
UNMOP	(UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka)
UNMOT	(UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan)
UNOSOM I	(UN Operation in Somalia I)
UNOMSIL	(UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone)
UNTAG	(UN Transition Assistance Group)
UNUMOZ	(UN Operation in Mozambique)
UNOMIL	(UN Observer Mission in Liberia)
UNAVEM I	(UN Angola Verification Mission I)
UNAVEM II	(UN Angola Verification Mission II)
UNGCI	(UN Guards Contingent in Iraq)
MINURSO	(UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara)

Current missions with Czech Republic participation:

UNOMIG	(UN Observer Mission in Georgia)
MONUC	(UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo)
UNMIL	(UN Mission in Liberia)
UNAMA	(UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan)

Annex 3

AN OVERVIEW OF ACTIVITIES OF SELECTED INDEPEDENT PRIVATE ACTORS

People in Need, public-benefit comp.

The 2006 annual report [38] shows that in 2006 People in Need, the largest humanitarian organization in the Czech Republic, implemented humanitarian and development projects in sixteen countries of the world, in particular in Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. Sums spent on humanitarian and development cooperation reached CZK 194 million (70.6 % of the company's total costs), while income from public budgets of the Czech Republic amounted only to CZK 91 million (33 % of income). More than CZK 100 million were acquired from private or non-governmental sources and approximately CZK 70 million from international organizations (EU, UN) or foreign governments.

Table 1: Structure of humanitarian aid and development cooperation, "People in Need", 2006

Sector	Expenses in CZK
Water and public health – development aid	20,780,000
Welfare programmes	19,326,000
Healthcare development	7,733,000
Education development	64,557,000
Local development and sustenance	40,951,000
Agricultural development	4,615,000
Coordination and support	1,423,000
Development of civic society and good governance	9,583,000
Economic development	7,000
Informing about development aid	3,945,000
Development cooperation total	172,920,000
Water and public health – humanitarian aid	4,836,000
Shelter and basic life needs	8,874,000
Food and nutrition	577,000
Psychosocial support	6,395,000
Medical aid	8,000
Humanitarian aid total	20,690,000
Humanitarian aid and development cooperation	193,610,000

[38] http://www.clovekvtisni.cz/download/PIN_2006_web.pdf

Charita Česká republika (Charity, Czech Republic)

In the humanitarian field the Czech branch of Charity was active in 10 countries in 2007. In 2006 it implemented the following projects, apart from Czech ODA[39]:

Table 2: Activities of Charity Czech Republic abroad[40]

Countries	Activities
Indonesia	Support of victims after tsunami disaster, earthquake in Jogyakarta, floods in north-western Sumatra and in the province of Aceh
Pakistan	Building and support of schools in the area of Muzaffarabad
Senegal	"Profemme" project – support of women
Russia (Chechnya, Ingushetia)	Pre-school education, HIV/AIDS-related projects, consultation centres
Sri Lanka	Pre-school education

The total sum spent by Charity Czech Republic on projects abroad was more than CZK 65 million in 2006, of which less than CZK 6 million came from subsidies.

ADRA

The humanitarian organization ADRA at present carries out humanitarian projects in three countries and development projects in ten. In 2007 it ran projects worth approximately CZK 20 million, a sum acquired from public collections and donations.[41]

Summary

It can be estimated that Czech NGOs active in the humanitarian and development field are capable of accumulating several hundred million CZK on foreign aid from private sources (i.e. outside the framework of official development assistance). This is a relatively significant amount compared to the sum of official bilateral foreign development cooperation (approx. CZK 1.8 billion). In addition to their independent activities, actors from the non-profit sector also play a major part in running government-subsidized foreign development cooperation schemes.

NGOs are usually able to respond very flexibly to humanitarian crises and often very successfully raise money e.g. through public collections. A significant portion of experienced humanitarian and development workers is concentrated in these organizations. Still, even humanitarian-oriented NGOs – especially the smaller ones – suffer from some general problems of the still-very-young Czech non-profit sector: the limited range of experience compared to many long-established foreign NGOs, and limited ability to generate income apart from grants and subsidies, a problem that often forces the NGOs to suspend running projects for lack of money.

[39] http://www.charita.cz/Data/files/vyrocka2006/VZ2006.pdf
[40] Annual report 2006, Charity Czech Republic, http://www.charita.cz/Data/files/vyrocka2006/VZ2006.pdf
[41] http://www.nadace-adra.cz/files/os-adra/vz/Vyrocni-zprava-nadace-ADRA-2007.pdf

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Born in 1952, he graduated from a military academy, worked in Prague at the former Ministry of National Defence and from 1979 to 1982 served at the Czechoslovak Embassy in Paris. In the 1980s he studied and evaluated the military policy of the French armed forces; in 1991-94 he was employed by the Strategic Studies Institute. At present he works as a security specialist at the Institute of International Relations in Prague, simultaneously teaching a course, "International security relations", at the Faculty of International Relations of the University of Economics. In 1990 he published a book, *The French Army from de Gaulle to Mitterrand* (in Czech); in 2004 a collection of study texts, *International Security Relations*. He contributes to a number of expert publications, e.g. international policy and international relations journals, Défense nationale, Défense et stratégie (both published in France). In April 2004 the Brno Military Academy conferred on him the title of associate professor in the field of state defence theory.

Ing. Josef Fučík, (Ret. Col)

Born in 1933, he graduated from the Brno Military Academy and completed a four-semester post-graduate course at the same establishment. He has held many command, staff and economic posts in the army. In 1971, after being forced to leave the General Staff, he worked at the State Planning Commission. In 1990-1992 he headed the department of defence and security at the Federal Ministry of the Economy and represented the CSFR at the negotiations on Confidence and Security Building Measures in Europe and at regular consultations in the NATO Economic Committee. After the split of the Czechoslovak federation he went into the private sector, working as a consultant in the arms industry. He has written a number of publications, studies and articles on the general development of the military, financial backing of defence and arms production.

Ing. Vladimír Karaffa, CSc. (Ret. Col)

Born in 1950, Vladimír Karaffa graduated from the Military College of the Ground Forces, Vyškov, and pursued postgraduate studies of financial management in the armed

forces at the Brno Military Academy. He also studied at the Marshall Centre for Strategic and Economic Studies in Garmish-Partenkirchen, Germany, and took a general staff course at the Military Academy. His dissertation focused on operational logistics. Mr. Karaffa has held a number of logistic posts in the army at all levels of command and management and headed a department at a military higher education establishment. He has worked at the Institute for Operational Arts Research in Brno and Defence Studies Institute in Prague. For five years he has held management posts at the Ministry of Defence in the field of defence planning and for three years he has headed the department of logistics operations at the subregional NATO headquarters in Heidelberg. He ended his military career as director of Doctrine Management Centre of the Army of the Czech Republic in Vyškov. Mr. Karaffa now works at the Ministry of Defence in the field of strategic decision-making support.

Ing. Vladimír Krulík, (Ret. Col)

Born in 1953, Vladimír Krulík is a graduate of the Secondary Technical School of Electrical Engineering and Radio Location Services in Liptovský Mikuláš, Slovakia, and of the Brno Military Academy, where he majored in technical support of anti-aircraft missile forces. He also attended the course Economics and management in emergency situations at the University of Economics, Prague, (completed in 1996); a course on the European Union at the Brno Military Academy (completed in 2000); course in security policy and defence management of the Brno Military Academy, the Defence Studies Centre of the Aberdeen University and Security Studies Centre of the Groningen University (completed in 2000). He has held technical and command posts at radio technology units and anti-aircraft missile units of State Air Defence (SAD) and also management posts at military administration authorities and the Ministry of Defence, including the General Staff of the Army Czech Republic. He worked e.g. as deputy commander of a SAD anti-aircraft missile brigade or deputy government commissioner for armed forces reform. At present Mr. Krulík works as an advisor to the Deputy Minister of Defence.

Ing. Vladimír Kváča, Ph.D.

Born in 1977, Vladimír Kváča graduated from the Prague University of Economics, having majored in international trade and international policy and diplomacy. He has worked at the EuropeAid Cooperation Office of the European Commission in Brussels; during his stay at the Danish Institute of International Studies in Copenhagen he analysed Danish experience in the field of development aid. At present he teaches at the Jan Masaryk Centre of International Studies at the Faculty of International Relations of the Prague University of Economics. His long-term field of interest is development assistance and political problems of developing countries, with territorial focus on sub-Saharan Africa.

Lt-Col Ing. Bohuslav Pernica, Ph.D.

Born in 1973, Bohuslav Pernica graduated from the Army Military College, where he specialized in funding mechanisms of the AF Czech Republic (1997). In 2003 he got a doctor's degree at the Army Military College with a dissertation entitled "The problem of efficiency and professionalizing of the Czech Republic Army". After finishing school he worked as head of financial service of an anti-aircraft missile regiment; from 1998 to 2007 he was a lecturer (Department of Finance and Commerce of the Faculty of State Defence Economics and Logistics at the Army Military College in Vyškov, Department of Economics of the Faculty of Economics and Management at the Brno Defence University). At present he works at the forces planning department of the Ministry of Defence, specializing in defence and armed forces funding and in human resources in the armed forces. He has written two monographs, is a member of the Czech Economic Society and the Association for Public Economics.

PhDr. Antonín Rašek (Ret. Major General)

Born in 1935, Antonín Rašek graduated from the First Infantry Training School and from the Faculty of Arts of Charles University. He served in the air force, became a military

journalist, worked in civic society organizations. After the 1968 Soviet invasion he was discharged from the army and for his activities during the “Prague Spring” included in the list of “anti-Socialist elements”, persecuted by the secret police in the framework of “Operation Norbert”. He worked as consultant and researcher; after November 1989 he was judicially rehabilitated and from 1990 to 1992 held the post of civilian Deputy Defence Minister for welfare and humanitarian affairs and Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies (1993). Mr. Rašek attended the NATO Defence College course in Rome and is a honorary member of the Association for Security, Defence and Protection of Society and State and of the Brno Defence University’s Institute of Strategic Studies. Working as a researcher at the Centre for Social and Economic Strategies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, he has written several expert books, dozens of studies and hundreds of articles on sociology of management, army, security and politics. As an expert on security and military matters, he also appears in television and radio programmes, including foreign media. He was awarded the 2005 Jaroslav Janda Prize in the main category, a distinction conferred on him by the State Security Council for significant contribution to security policy of the Czech Republic.