NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Capable Force

Strategic Concept for the Norwegian Armed Forces

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I am pleased to present the new Strategic Concept for the Norwegian Armed Forces under the title "Capable Force". In this Concept, the political guidelines for the further development of the Norwegian Armed Forces (hereafter: NAF) are laid out. The Concept corresponds largely to the Government's current long-term plan. The key goal is to contribute to the establishment of a consistent and common understanding of the NAF's roles, tasks and organisation. This will underpin the relationship between the objectives of the Government's defence policy and the military means to carry them out. This will also ensure that the further development of the NAF is conducted in line with political guidelines, and that the use of military force is exercised in accordance with political decisions and provisions.

The Concept is based on the security and defence policy framework laid out in the current long-term plan for the period 2009-2012 (St.prp. nr. 48 (2007-2008), Innst. S. nr. 318 (2007-2008)).

The main features of Norwegian security policy remain constant over time. However, there is a need for a continuous adaptation of policy in order to reflect changes in the international environment. **Three areas have been given particular priority: The High North, participation in peace operations within the framework of the United Nations (UN), and continued adaptation and modernisation of the NAF:**

• **The increased emphasis on the High North** underlines this area's strategic importance seen from a Norwegian perspective. The challenges are increasing on issues like the exploitation and management of resources, particularly petroleum, but also with regard to fisheries and the environment. We are also witnessing a gradual transformation of the global security policy landscape, which also underlines the need for a sharper focus on our interests in the High North.

• **Emphasis is put on active Norwegian participation in operations abroad, conducted within the framework of the UN.** International military operations must be vested in the principles of the UN Charter, in order to secure necessary legality and

legitimacy for the use of military force. This will ensure the overall legitimacy of participating forces, both morally and with regard to international law. This will also contribute to the strengthening of multilateral cooperation and the international legal system. NATO will continue to be the central pillar for collective defence. Norwegian authorities will continue to underpin the Alliance as a key instrument to further develop the transatlantic dialogue, partnerships and peace keeping, as well as disarmament, arms control and conflict prevention. NATO's Article 5 constitutes Norway's fundamental security guarantee.

• **The prospects for reaching the objectives set out above depend on the further modernisation of the NAF.** The NAF is a crucial instrument for promoting Norwegian values and interests, at home and abroad. This requires modern and flexible forces which alone, or in cooperation with others, are able to promote Norwegian interests in times of peace, crisis, armed conflict and war. However, it is of great importance that the use of military force is considered in a broader political context, in accordance with the principles of civil-military cooperation, and as part of the Norwegian Total Defence Concept. Today's multi-faceted challenges underscore this point.

Preservation of our political sovereignty and defence of territorial integrity are the core elements in Norway's fundamental security policy interests. These interests include the protection of Norway's territory, population, critical infrastructure and also essential civil functions. The legitimacy of the NAF today also depends to a large extent on the role played towards the civil society at large. The Norwegian system of general conscription is upheld as a basis for the NAF. This system is vital in order to secure personnel with proper qualifications. The ability to assist the civilian society in case of emergency constitutes an important prerequisite for the NAF's legitimacy. The NAF have an important role to play as far as societal security is concerned, in close cooperation with civilian authorities.

The modernisation of the NAF will continue. We will soon reach the point where most of the structural adaptations have been implemented. The further development of the NAF will thereafter be carried out in a more incremental manner, adapting to new and

continuously changing circumstances. We also need to have a long-term perspective with regard to the future development of the NAF. In a constantly changing world, a key function of a credible defence force is its general role in conflict prevention. A continued ability to adapt to new circumstances is therefore a prerequisite for the NAF's role as an important security policy instrument for defence and conflict prevention. In times of change, it is of great importance that we take good care of our personnel and their families, as well as volunteers and veterans. A successful outcome of the current modernisation process will consolidate the NAF's capability to protect Norwegian interests and values, including in the High North, and with regard to contribute to international peace and security.

The main purpose of this strategic concept is to contribute to a consistent and general understanding of the NAF's roles, tasks and organisation. Such an understanding is a precondition for a successful completion of the current transformation process. The modernisation and transformation of the NAF is based on guidance reflected in key strategy documents issued by the Ministry of Defence. The Strategic Concept for the Norwegian Armed Forces is valid not only for units under the command of the Chief of Defence, but also the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), the Norwegian National Security Authority (NSM) and the Norwegian Defence Estates Agency (Forsvarsbygg). The Strategic Concept is an important document within the hierarchy of documents for the defence sector [1]. The concept is subordinated to strategic-political documents like the long-term plan, but superior to documents like the Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine and concepts for the structural development of the NAF.

[1] The term Norwegian Armed Forces (NAF) is used throughout the document. The term should be interpreted in a wide sense as it comprises the whole Norwegian Defence Sector.

The Strategic Concept for the Norwegian Armed Forces defines the security and defence policy framework for the NAF's doctrines and operational activities. As such, it constitutes the basis for all activities of the NAF.

Oslo, 13 November 2009

Grete Faremo

The main components of the Strategic Concept for the Norwegian Armed Forces are [2]:

The Fundamental Objectives of Security Policy

- To prevent war and the emergence of various kinds of threats to Norwegian and collective security.
- To contribute to peace, stability and the further development of the international rule of law under the auspices of the UN.
- To uphold Norwegian sovereignty, rights, interests and values, and protect Norwegian freedom of action in the face of political, military and other kinds of pressure.
- To defend, together with our Allies, Norway and NATO against assault and attack.
- To protect the society against assault and attack from state and non-state actors.

In support of these objectives, the NAF constitute one of several important security policy instruments at the disposal of Norwegian authorities.

Defence Policy Objectives

The defence policy objectives represent the essence and basic purpose of our defence policy. They prescribe what the NAF will have to contribute in order to secure the implementation of Norway's fundamental security objectives. The defence policy objectives are as follows:

- Alone and together with Allies, secure Norwegian sovereignty, rights and interests, as well as ensure Norwegian freedom of action in the face of military or other pressure.

[2] The term strategic concept is similar to the term used by NATO in its corresponding concept (The Alliance's Strategic Concept). The term used by EU in its overarching document is Security Strategy (A Secure Europe In A Better World. European Security Strategy), which comprises EUs common security and defence policy (ESDP). However, this document has a wider scope, as it also describes EU's foreign policy and the use of, inter alia, economical and diplomatic instruments. The corresponding US document (The National Security Strategy of the United States of America) is published by the White House. The term strategic concept is chosen in this document, since it in a better way indicates that the document is focussed on the guidelines for, and the use of military instruments.

- Through participation in multilateral peace operations and through international defence cooperation, contribute to peace, stability, the enforcement of international law and respect for human rights, and prevent the use of force by state and non-state actors against Norwegian and international security.

- Together with Allies, contribute to the collective defence of Norway and other Allies in accordance with NATO treaty obligations, and counter different kinds of assaults and attacks in order to safeguard Norwegian and collective security.

- Contribute to safeguarding Norwegian societal security, rescue lives and consequence management in the wake of accidents, natural disasters, assaults and attacks from state and non-state actors.

The Defence Concept

The Defence Concept constitutes the main framework for the development of the Norwegian Defence Sector. The overall aim is to further develop the NAF into a modern, flexible and Alliance-adapted instrument of security policy, based on a balance between tasks, organisational structure and funding. The activities of the NAF will be based on close cooperation with relevant civilian authorities and on military conscription adjusted to current needs. Focus will be on securing and promoting Norwegian interests through the ability to handle a broad range of challenges, both nationally and internationally.

The Total Defence Concept

Since the end of the Cold War, the Norwegian Total Defence Concept has undergone modernisation, as a reflection of changes in the security environment and a new and broader concept of security. A key element in today's concept is mutual civil-military support and coordination. The aim is to make sure that the resources of the society are utilised in the most effective manner with regard to prevention, emergency planning and consequence management. Challenges related to societal security have increased the requirement for the NAF's unique capabilities and resources with regard to crisis management. The Total Defence Concept has been expanded to comprise the whole spectrum of mutual support and cooperation between the NAF and the civilian society. This applies to the whole range of challenges, spanning from peace time situations to crises, armed conflict and war. Application of the concept is no longer contingent upon a formal entry into force of the emergency legislation.

The Tasks of the Norwegian Armed Forces

The NAF have a wide spectrum of tasks, related both to peace time, crisis situations, armed conflict and war. The key task is to contribute to the prevention and handling of security challenges against Norway and areas under Norwegian jurisdiction. In our globalized world, these tasks must be carried out, both at home and abroad. The ability of the NAF to solve the whole range of tasks will determine the structure and force posture. The current tasks are divided into three categories:

(i) National tasks which, as a general rule, must be undertaken nationally and without Allied involvement
(ii) Tasks carried out in cooperation with Allies and/or Partners
(iii) Other tasks which are under the responsibility of other Norwegian authorities, with the NAF in a supporting role

National tasks which, as a general rule, must be undertaken nationally and without Allied involvement:

Task 1:

To ensure a good basis for national political and military decision-making through timely surveillance and intelligence

Task 2:

To uphold Norwegian sovereignty and sovereign rights

Task 3:

To exercise Norwegian authority in designated areas

Task 4:

To prevent and manage incidents and crises in Norway and adjacent areas

Tasks carried out in cooperation with Allies and/or Partners:

Task 5:

To contribute to collective defence of Norway and other parts of NATO against threats, assault or attack

Task 6:

To contribute to multinational crisis management outside Norway, including peace support operations

Other tasks which are under the responsibility of other Norwegian authorities, with the NAF in a supporting role:

Task 7:

To contribute to international military cooperation, including prevention of proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), disarmament, arms control and support to security sector reform

Task 8:

To contribute to societal security and other key societal tasks

Tasks 1-6 will determine the development of the NAF's structure and force posture.

The Different Roles of the Norwegian Armed Forces

The spectrum of tasks laid out above illustrates the two main roles of the NAF. Firstly, the role of conflict prevention. Secondly, the role of handling a wide spectrum of tasks, such as continuous surveillance and the upholding of Norwegian sovereignty and authority, and, if necessary, also the handling of episodes and conflict. The spectrum of tasks is a direct consequence of the complexity of challenges facing Norway today. These challenges are to a large extent decisive for the force posture and for the application of the NAF. The absence of a single and precise challenge has as its consequence that military forces must be capable of handling a number of different tasks. The role of military power is first and foremost to contribute to the construction of a framework for political solutions. This aspect is of great importance for the development of the NAF's capabilities and competence, and corresponding tasks.

SECURITY IN A GLOBAL WORLD

1.1 Key Trends

1. Norway, like the rest of the world, currently finds itself in an era of globalisation. What occurs in one part of the world might affect people and countries in other – even distant parts. State borders no longer play an important role for interaction between states and people. This is illustrated by enhanced levels of travel, commercial trade and cultural exchange. The increased degree of interaction is most visible within the global economy. An integrated world economy has increased the level of interdependence, but also mutual vulnerability. The current financial crisis illustrates that in a global world, dramatic shifts in the world economy can have security consequences. A number of former developing countries have achieved significant economic growth, leading to improved standards of living. This is due to better access to international markets, but also to transfer of knowledge and technology between various countries and markets.

2. For some countries however, the inability to adjust to a globalised world has contributed to increased tension and polarisation. The authorities of these countries have encountered problems with regard to managing their own states. Developed countries are generally sufficiently robust to withstand external pressure and economic turbulence, while less affluent states might encounter more dramatic consequences. Stark increases on the price of such commodities as food, fuel and medicines might contribute to instability and social unrest. Competition for limited resources, such as water and energy supplies, might lead to conflict, in particular if effective national and international governing systems are lacking.

3. Globalisation also has an impact on political, cultural, ideological, religious and communication issues. Satellites, internet, commercialised culture, migration, increased levels of travel, and access to new ideas and knowledge, can affect communities which until very recently were shielded from outside influence. Thus, globalisation leads to rapid change within a number of societies. In several countries, these trends are not necessarily perceived as progress and development. Rather, the new values and ideas in the wake of globalisation are considered as an attack on their traditional culture, identity and autonomy. Ideologically or culturally based resistance to globalisation, including fundamentalist religious beliefs, might lead to various forms of counter-reactions. This

also includes terrorist activities, whose main objective is to intimidate or apply pressure on decision-makers in countries which are perceived to be key representatives of globalisation and "secularisation".

4. At the beginning of the 21st Century, global developments are also characterised by increased competition for a number of strategic resources, such as minerals, grain, fish, oil and gas. This competition is reinforced by rapid economic growth in emerging powers like China and India. This increased competition has led to increased prices on key resources and also intensified exploitation of these limited resources both on land and at sea. Basic resources such as grain and water are likely to become scarce, as witnessed through higher price levels globally on food. This imbalance is partly due to higher living standards and increased levels of consumption in several non-Western countries. It is also due to climate change, which has led to a decrease in areas suitable for growing food and raising stocks, and to switching the use of arable land from grain production for human consumption, to fuel.

5. Global developments are characterised by rapidly growing environmental challenges, which are to a large extent man-made. In our vicinity the polar ice cap is receding, with an ice free Arctic as a possible outcome. The long term implications are uncertain, but they may be serious. Possible consequences might be rising temperatures and sea levels as well as erosion, flooding, deforestation and desert-proliferation in areas closer to Equator. These potential developments might affect living conditions for millions of people who already inhabit the world's poorest countries. This might in turn have security implications for other countries and continents.

6. In addition, we see significant changes in global demographic trends. Low birth rates in many developing countries have resulted in increasingly older populations, whereas in less developed countries, we witness a rapid population growth. This development causes increased demands on food products, overpopulation and increased urbanisation. At the same time, AIDS and other epidemics are a serious concern. The overall outcome is degraded living conditions and demographic changes which threaten stability in different regions of the world. This in turn has implications for international security. In the longer term, global population growth will increase the challenges the richer part of the world is likely to face.

7. Another aspect of globalisation is the development and availability of advanced technology. This contributes to economic growth, but it also leaves modern societies more vulnerable. The increased availability of modern technology has direct implications also for military developments, not least in relation to regimes that are more inclined to pursue their own power aspirations, than safeguarding the living conditions of their own population. Access to modern military capabilities, including long-range weapon systems, will to a lesser extent than before be limited to a small number of developed countries. In spite of efforts to ensure non-proliferation and export control of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and missile technology, the spread of such weapons and technology has increased over the last 30 years.

8. We are also witnessing important changes in the geopolitical landscape. In the first decade after the end of the Cold War, the US, NATO and the other Western countries emerged as dominant on the international scene. This notion of a uni-polar world dominated by USA is no longer appropriate. The emergence of China as a global power, Russia's revitalisation as a regional power and also India's economic growth and aspirations, all have an impact on the global landscape. The relative shift of power has already resulted in a more multi-polar world. The relative power base and role of the West might gradually be weakened – demographically, economically, and in terms of resources. The consequences of this may, in the longer term, be significant.

9. The 1990's represented a transition period after the end of the Cold War. Most conflicts were fought within a country's borders. This is still the case for many armed conflicts. International terrorism and conflicts within countries still represent a signi-

ficant security problem, creating both substantial human suffering and regional instability. These internal conflicts are also a threat to the international norms and legal rules on which the UN is based.

10. One consequence of new geopolitical trends is that inter-state conflicts and realpolitik have re-emerged as more important factors in international politics. This in turn means that we have to take a balanced approach with regard to the attention which should be directed at international terrorism and intra-state conflicts in relation to inter-state conflicts. Rivalry between great powers might jeopardise international stability. We already see re-newed tendencies by great powers to establish spheres of influence. We also face a zone of potential conflicts from Northern Africa to the Middle East and the Caucasus in the West, via Iraq and Iran to Afghanistan and Pakistan in the East. This vast area is characterised by a changing political landscape and regional instability, and also danger of increased great power rivalry linked to regional conflicts.

1.2 Grey Zones between War and Peace

11. Since the end of the 1990's, and in particular after 11 September 2001, the threat posed by international terrorism, WMD and non-state actors has been high on the agenda. Terrorist attacks in Nairobi in 1998, Bali in 2002, Madrid and Beslan in 2004, London in 2005, Mumbai in 2008 and Lahore in 2009 illustrate the importance of being able both to prevent and defend against such threats. The global and de-centralised character of the threat, however, implies that this will be a demanding task, requiring coordination at both national and international level, and between the justice and defence sector.

12. International terrorism seeks to create fear through the use of violence or the threat of such use with the aim to achieve political changes. Striking at open and vulnerable societies by attacking civilians or critical infrastructure is considered by terrorists as an effective way of influencing those countries' political leaders. Terrorism is conducted in a grey zone between armed attack and criminal activity. It is therefore crucial to ensure cooperation between civilian and military authorities in countering threats emerging within this grey zone. In Norway, this cooperation comprises the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

13. A crisis related to countering a terrorist act must be seen in a broad context, i.e. beyond that of traditional criminal activity. The territorial integrity and political sovereignty of affected states may be at risk, even if we are not dealing with attacks in the traditional sense. The following characteristics apply:

- The crisis is assessed to be within the grey zone between war and peace, and both civilian and military resources are used to prevent, counter and minimise the effects of the threat.
- The crisis is assessed to have an international dimension.
- The attack, or the likelihood of an attack, creates considerable fear among the population. Life and health as well as basic values are being threatened.
- The attack is carried out, or is feared to be carried out, by the use of means, including WMD, which have significant physical and psychological power and potential for intimidation and influence.
- There is a need for close cooperation between the NAF and the police (Cf. the Total Defence Concept).

14. The more a terrorist attack is considered to have a security policy dimension, the more reason there is to consider it as an armed attack, and also to counter it in accordance with the inherent right to individual and collective defence based on Article 51 of the UN Charter. In case of doubt, the Ministers of Defence and Justice, and if necessary the Government as such, will decide on who will carry the responsibility for handling the crisis. The Police has the task of countering terrorist activities on Norwegian territory which are not considered as armed attacks. In such cases the police may draw on capabilities provided by the armed forces, in accordance with predetermined guidelines set out in Instructions on Military Assistance to the Police.

15. In the event of more serious terrorist activities on Norwegian territory, this may trigger a crisis with security policy implications. If so, the full spectrum of military capabilities may be brought to bear. Such terrorist activities may be considered as armed attacks in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. In such instances, the NAF will have the principal responsibility for carrying out relevant defence measures. The NAF have the main responsibility for handling so called renegade situations, i.e. the deployment of fighter aircraft on quick reaction alert with the aim of countering civilian

aircraft which threaten or are carrying out terrorist attacks. Such emergency situations are time critical, and countering such threats requires resources unique to the NAF.

16. The fight against terrorism is a battle of values and human rights. It is therefore important that this fight and the measures chosen are in accordance with the norms and rules on which the Norwegian society rests. In this way we will ensure that our own basis of values is safeguarded.

1.3 A broader Concept of Security

17. In a complex security environment, our understanding of the concept of security must be correspondingly broad. The new global challenges open up the possibility of serious attacks on civil society and individuals living within the borders of a state. Today's concept of security consists of three basic elements:

18. Firstly, state security, which represents a fundamental security requirement. It describes a situation where the state is facing an existential threat which legitimises the use of all its available resources in defence of the state. Traditionally, state security has been linked to territorial defence (territorial integrity), but it also comprises the state authorities' political sovereignty. State security may therefore also be challenged through political and military pressure and intimidation, or through more limited attacks against the interest of the state. In situations where the state's survival or vital interests are at stake, states have traditionally been willing to bear considerable casualties and costs [3].

[3] There are 3 features of a state: (1) a geographically defined area (territory) with its own population, (2) an independent and sovereign political entity with its own political institutions, and (3) an entity internationally recognised by international law and diplomacy. These criteria separate a state from non-state actors.

19. Secondly, societal security, whose importance has increased against the background of global security challenges and threats. Societal security aims to provide the civilian population with security, including the protection of key functions and infrastructure against attacks and damage, in a situation where the state's survival, sovereignty and territorial integrity are not at stake. Threats against such societal security may be created by man, but natural disasters and grave accidents or catastrophes may also threaten societal security.

20. Societal security is safeguarded through effective prevention of crises by adequate crisis management organisations and procedures. This element of security is further safeguarded through physical protection of critical assets and by making sure that critical functions remain operational. Societal security is primarily the responsibility of civilian authorities. The armed forces, however, must be able to contribute if and to the extent necessary. This applies particularly in areas where the NAF possess special competencies and equipment, for example the ability to disarm explosives and protect against chemical and radiological weapons. It can also be relevant in cases of reinforcement, including the possible use of the Home Guard for securing critical infrastructure and in case of natural disasters.

21. Developments since 1990 have led to increased focus on the third aspect of security, human security. This relates to the protection of individuals, where human rights and the right to life and personal security are paramount (cf. Sections 2.1 and 4.5). Human security is closely linked to the principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which is gaining ground. The Final Document from the UN World Summit in 2005 confirmed the principle that every state has the responsibility to protect its own population against genocide, crime against humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes. The document also confirms that the international community has a responsibility to protect when the state is no longer able or willing to protect its own population. In extreme cases, the international community may have the right to use military force to secure and safeguard basic human rights, when diplomatic and economic means do not suffice, or when the authorities of a state do not have the will or ability to protect their own citizens. This principle originated during the Kosovo conflict in 1999, and at that time it was related to a discussion on the modalities for military intervention without authorisation from the UN Security Council. Today, we

see an emerging consensus that Responsibility to Protect should be considered within the framework of international law, i.e. as a supplement to the Security Council's room of manoeuvre. Generally, the importance of UN authorisation has been gaining political ground, particularly in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Norway's position is that all use of power must be carried out in accordance with the UN Charter, (cf. Section 4.5).

22. There are close links between the three elements of security. This is reflected in the ever closer relations between civilian and military authorities in ensuring societal security. The division into three types of security should therefore principally be seen as a working tool, to describe the complexity of the security challenges we face, and our ability to adapt to those challenges and a new global environment. Our understanding of security has a considerable impact on our defence policy and the tasks which the NAF are expected to perform. This in turn has consequences for the way the NAF are organised and equipped, for training levels and operational patterns, including within the field of civilian-military coordination (cf. Parts IV and V).

1.4 Threats, Risk and Damage

23. Threat is typically created by man, and has to be seen in light of both capabilities and intentions. Norway is currently facing no clear or imminent threat. The possibilities for limited military pressure against Norway with the aim to alter Norway's policy cannot be ruled out however. Non-state actors and distant states may also represent potential threats.

24. Risk is linked to damage inflicted by both man and nature. Risk is the product of the consequences of an event, and the likelihood that the event will take place. In an international system characterised by interdependence, crisis and conflicts which are not directed against a particular country, may nevertheless have indirect effects. In these cases, intention becomes secondary. The security of a particular country may be subject to considerable risk even when the country is not facing a direct threat.

25. Damage inflicted is the product of the severity of the attack/event, and the system's vulnerability. Normally, it will take events of a grand scale to inflict damage on a resilient

state. Intimidation and pressure with the aim of exploiting vulnerabilities may however still be able to inflict substantial damage. The possibilities for exploiting the vulnerability of democratic and open societies represent real security challenges which are closely related to societal security.

1.5 Exercising of Sovereignty, Sovereign Rights and Authority

26. Norway's state security is directly linked to NATO's collective defence, in the event that Norway would be subject to armed attack or any other form of use of military force by a state. Serious terrorist attacks against Norway might in extreme cases lead to NATO conducting collective defence operations. Under normal peace time circumstances, state security is linked to Norway's efforts to uphold its sovereignty. Any attempt by other states to undermine Norway's right to exercise authority on Norwegian territory or in areas where Norway has sovereign rights, will also affect state security.

27. The term upholding sovereignty denotes the defence, if necessary by military force, of Norwegian basic rights as a state in relation to other states, which directly or indirectly threaten Norwegian sovereignty on its territory, or in geographic areas outside its territory where Norway has sovereign rights. The concept of sovereign rights denotes Norway's rights in areas outside Norwegian territory, as set out in international law and treaties, inter alia the Convention on the Law of the Sea.

28. The term exercising authority refers to the enforcement of official rules and regulations provided by law, regulations or other legal documents, applicable to individuals

or other private legal subjects. In principle, the exercising of authority is a civilian responsibility, but in clearly defined areas it may be delegated to the NAF in accordance with domestic legislation.

29. Exercising sovereignty does not raise questions of whether these actions have a basis in domestic law. Concrete measures against an external enemy do not need a legal basis in Norwegian law. Active use of force related to the exercising of sovereignty is primarily a question of international law and is, therefore, in general not regulated by domestic law. Regulations governing port calls by foreign naval and civilian vessels in Norway regulate certain aspects of the NAF's task of exercising sovereignty in Norwegian territorial waters. The same applies to the air space. Any use of military force by the NAF aimed at exercising sovereignty, is applied within the framework of Norway's rights and obligations in accordance with international law. It is based on the principles and interpretations of sovereignty in international law. Consequently, it is not necessary to refer to a specific act of law if fighter aircraft intercept an aircraft approaching Norwegian air space without permission, or if an incoming missile targeting Norwegian territory is shot down.

30. Exercising sovereignty in the face of challenges directed against Norwegian territory, air space or territorial waters is a key task for the NAF. Proper surveillance and intelligence are crucial for the exercising of sovereignty, as well as for effective crisis management. This requires various kinds of surveillance from all the services, on land, in the air and over the ocean areas where Norway has rights, as well as in the virtual room. Exercising of sovereignty involves the physical presence of military forces, supplemented by various types of sensors. In addition to information gathering within areas of Norwegian interest, the task of exercising sovereignty involves the permanent and continuous processing and analysis of information about various state and non-state actors which operate, or are likely to operate in areas of Norwegian interest.

31. According to international law, only the armed forces may engage combatant forces from a foreign country. The task of fighting combatant opponents is, therefore, the responsibility of the NAF. Personnel belonging to the police are not defined as combatants. This means that civilian police cannot legally participate in hostilities against a combatant enemy. The exercising of self-defence according to international law against armed attacks is therefore a task for the NAF.

32. In certain geographic areas where Norway does not have territorial sovereignty, Norway still enjoys sovereign rights according to international law. The concept of sovereign rights is most often used to describe the rights Norway enjoys as a costal state. The Convention on the Law of the Sea is among the most comprehensive multilateral agreements within the UN system. The Convention includes rules that cover all ocean areas, the airspace above, and the ocean floor and structures underneath. It also regulates states' rights and duties in these areas and provides rules about environmental protection, oceanic research and transfer of technology. According to the Convention, Norway enjoys sovereign rights within the 200 nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone. This pertains in particular to the right of exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing living and non-living natural resources within this area. As a costal state, Norway also has several obligations, including sustainable management of resources, and the obligation to cooperate with states that are affected by decisions relating to these areas.

33. Exercising of sovereign rights according to international law also implies the right to regulate private legal subjects of foreign nationality outside Norwegian territory. This is the case for example with regard to Norway's regulations of fishery quotas outside own territorial waters. Exercising of authority may acquire a security dimension, in particular if a foreign state has a different interpretation of the extent of Norwegian sovereign rights, or if a state decides to challenge these rights.

34. In certain defined areas, units of the NAF, in particular the Border Guard and Coast Guard, have responsibility for exercising authority and law enforcement on behalf, or in support of other civilian government agencies. Such exercising of authority will often be complementary to the other tasks of the NAF. The relationship between exercising sovereignty and exercising authority may entail a violation of both Norwegian sovereignty, and a violation of the Norwegian border and immigration laws. Upholding the law is primarily a civilian task. However, the intention behind a border violation and the origin of the perpetrator will be a key criterion. There is a major difference between a situation where a foreign military unit is operating on the wrong side of the border, and one in which a few soldiers have fled across it. The more a violation is deemed to have a national security dimension, the more reason it is for handling the incident as a case of national sovereignty.

1.6 Norway's Security Policy Objectives and Interests

35. The principal aim of Norway's security policy is to ensure the country's fundamental security interests and objectives. Maintaining Norway's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political freedom of action constitutes a fundamental security interest. These interests are reflected in Norway's emphasis on the High North.

36. Another fundamental security interest is the establishment of an effective multilateral international order in which the UN plays a key role. The emphasis on international law and human rights is a clear and present expression of international solidarity. It also reflects Norway's own interest in having clear international rules for the use of military means and other instruments of power. Norway is therefore focused on the need for these rules and regulations to apply – and be abided by – internationally. This of course also means that Norway will apply the rules firmly.

37. As a country facing potential security threats which far exceed Norway's own defence capabilities, Norway has a strong interest in strengthening the transatlantic security community through NATO. The Alliance is a key pillar in Norway's security policy by linking our security to a broader international framework. However, this also carries obligations on our part, inter alia, through the sharing of solidarity and through actual Norwegian participation in NATO-led crisis management and peace operations. In today's World, it is paramount that NATO remains strong, also to prevent a renationalisation of defence. Within NATO, security is indivisible.

38. Globalisation has resulted in new cross border threats and challenges. This means that the challenges facing Norway are no longer limited to adjacent areas, but to threats originating in regions far beyond. The vast area spanning North Africa, the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Balkans and Central Asia is characterised by inter-state rivalry, internal strides, serious breaches of human rights, acts of war and humanitarian crises. A number of these challenges can have sudden and significant consequences well beyond their place of origin. In some cases, these challenges can only be solved through active participation and intervention by the international community.

39. As a consequence of our location, Norway also has a fundamental interest to contribute to Russia having peaceful relations with its neighbours, including NATO countries. This is decisive both for the general international climate, as well as for stability in our region. Drawing Russia into a constructive cooperative framework will contribute to openness and confidence. Ensuring that Russia takes co-responsibility for international security is of great importance, and it is one of the key challenges facing the world community today.

40. The NAF operate on the basis of certain principal security policy objectives, which are closely tied to Norway's fundamental interests and values. The NAF is one of the key instruments available to the Norwegian authorities to implement these security policy objectives, which can be summarised as follows:

- To prevent war and the emergence of various kinds of threats to Norwegian and collective security.
- To contribute to peace, stability and the further development of a UN-led international order.
- To uphold Norwegian sovereignty, rights, interests and values, and protect Norwegian freedom of action in the face of political, military and other kinds of pressure.
- To defend, together with our Allies, Norway and NATO against assault and attack.
- To protect the society against assault and attack from state and non-state actors.

PART II

THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

2.1 The United Nations

41. The UN and international law are more important than ever in solving the security challenges facing the international community. This includes the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the regulation of use of military power. The UN has a wide spectrum of instruments for conflict resolution, including humanitarian, diplomatic, developmental and military. After certain setbacks in the mid 1990's, high expectations are attached to the role of the UN in international conflict resolution, cooperation and development. The UN is still facing a number of challenges, both institutionally and due to capacity constraints. The UN has however recognised the challenges, and in recent years considerable progress has been made.

42. The increased role of the UN is in large part due to an increased willingness by member states to provide the organisation with stronger mandates to protect civilians in conflict areas. Internal reforms have improved the UN's ability to plan and execute operations. The UN has developed further its concept for peace operations by establishing more robust rules of engagement, including by improving military capabilities and the ability to rapidly deploy and command peace keeping operations. With active Norwegian support, the UN has also developed its concept for multi-dimensional and integrated peace operations. The philosophy behind this concept is the close integration of political, military, humanitarian and developmental instruments.

43. Through the Security Council, the UN has proven its willingness to issue robust mandates for international peace operations. This has strengthened the credibility of the organisation as an effective political and military actor. For this credibility to be sustained, it is essential that the military contributions of member states are properly trained and equipped to handle

a broad range of challenges. The credibility of the UN is also dependent upon the willingness of member countries to participate in the operations.

44. The UN itself does not have sufficient resources to conduct all the operations required to safeguard international peace and security. In many instances the UN has therefore mandated groups of member states or regional organisations to assume the responsibility for conducting operations on its behalf. On a number of occasions, UN-mandated operations, for instance in Africa, Afghanistan and the Balkans, have been conducted by coalitions of member states or regional organisations. Through such division of labour, organisations like NATO, the EU and the African Union (AU) strengthen the role and credibility of the UN. At the same time, a UN mandate gives the regional organisations a legal basis on which to operate.

45. Even if the nation state has become a more prominent actor in international politics, most of today's security challenges are global in nature. As such, they can only be solved in a global or regional context. In the formulation of Norwegian security policy, it is therefore important to build on multilateralism and international institutions, with the UN, NATO and EU as the most important pillars. The UN, as the only multilateral institution with a global mandate, has a unique position as a framework for multilateral security arrangements based on international law and human rights.

46. Challenges related to intra-state conflicts, violation of human rights, international terrorism and regional instability, have led to an increased awareness of the international community's right and duty to intervene in certain cases, based on the principle of Responsibility to Protect (cf. Section 1.3). This new principle challenges the traditional principles of national sovereignty and non-intervention, which are no longer seen as absolute. The principle of Responsibility to Protect means that for the sovereignty of a state to be respected, that state has to take care of the basic needs and rights of all its citizens. The Norwegian view is that all use of force must be in accordance with the UN Charter (cf. Sections 1.3 and 4.5). The experiences of recent years, including the attack on Iraq in 2003, illustrate that a foundation in the UN Charter is essential, both to ensure the legal authority to initiate an operation, and to create legitimacy for the duration of the operation. We need more than ever an international consensus on when and how force can and should be used. The current international development with more emphasis on the nation state, also underlines the importance of making sure that the overarching principle is international law, and not the right of the strongest.

47. Today's challenges can best be solved by principles which also are central to Norwegian security, and where the UN has a key role. We cannot, however, take for granted that this will be the dominant view. The future of the UN will to a large extent depend on its authority in situations where fundamental norms are questioned. The number of challenges is increasing in a dynamic environment, which in turn influences the UN's ability for collective action. The UN Millennium Declaration provides for fundamental reform of the UN system. Norway has taken active part in strengthening the role of the UN. This can be seen by our support for improving its capability to plan and conduct operations, and by our lead role in developing the concept for multi-dimensional and integrated peace operations.

2.2 NATO and Transatlantic Cooperation

48. Within the overarching framework of a UN-led world order, NATO is the cornerstone of Norwegian security and defence. NATO has since 1990 shown a great ability to adapt to the changing security environment. Clear expressions of this are several rounds of enlargement, the establishment of partnerships with a number of countries including Russia, and the establishment of formalised cooperation with the EU, while at the same time taking responsibility for the collective defence of its member states. NATO has taken on an increased responsibility for crisis management beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. As a result of all of this, NATO continues to be the main forum for transatlantic security cooperation and collective defence, combined with an increasing political role and an extended geographic area of responsibility.

49. Today, the Alliance has 28 member states. The door is still open for new members when they are able and ready. Most NATO countries are also members of the EU. NATO and EU enlargement have been mutually reinforcing and have led to the establishment of an extended zone of stability and democracy throughout most of the European continent. This is not least important in times of economic recession, where the danger of protectionism and unilateralism could increase.

50. The handling of many of today's security challenges requires close coordination and cooperation between civilian and military actors at all levels. This has led to increased cooperation between NATO and other international actors, like the UN, the EU, the AU

and the OSCE. Within the framework of Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Alliance also cooperates closely with partner countries on issues like political dialogue, security and defence reform, and on participation in peace operations. Partner countries like Sweden and Finland are substantial contributors to NATO-led peace operations. A dialogue has been established with a number of countries in the Middle-East and in North-Africa, within the framework of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. The Alliance has also established a separate agreement with the UN, in order to simplify cooperation between the two organisations in peace operations.

51. In recent years, we have witnessed a more strained relationship between NATO and Russia, and this has surfaced on a number of issues like NATO enlargement and missile defence. The armed conflict between Russia and Georgia in the summer of 2008, put further strains on the relationship. At the same time, there is a recognition that NATO and Russia have mutual interests in a number of areas, including the fight against international terrorism, proliferation of WMD's, the fight against illegal drug production and smuggling, and challenges related to climate change. Russia is vital for European security. Against this background, it is important that the recent prospects for an improvement in relations are transformed into practical policy.

52. The new security challenges after 1990 have turned much of NATO's focus towards crisis management outside Allied territory, and towards new global threats. Crisis management and peace operations have become central to Allied activities. NATO today operates well beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, from Afghanistan through the Balkans, to the Mediterranean and Africa. However, NATO's fundamental task is still related to the

collective defence of member states and as the central forum for transatlantic consultation and cooperation. Considerable significance is attached to territorial defence of member states, not least by the new members, but also by members like Norway, Iceland and Turkey.

53. As a consequence of changing security challenges, there is an increased recognition among Allies of the need for strengthening NATO's core function, including Article 5 and the defence of member states. Norway is actively engaged in this debate, and we have presented a number of concrete proposals. These include giving NATO's operational commands a clear regional responsibility, improving the knowledge within the commands about regional challenges, and increasing NATO exercise and training activity. The basic purpose of our initiative is the need for upholding the full range of Alliance tasks, and improve NATO's ability to meet security challenges close to the territories of the member states. This will increase the credibility of the Alliance, without undermining the ability to operate in other parts of the world. Increased awareness about NATO's role in collective defence, will enhance support in member states for operations far away.

54. The modernisation of NATO's military forces is a long process. Member states have achieved good results, not least in terms of making forces more deployable and ready for action at short notice. The transformation from static territorial defence to expeditionary capabilities is, however, very expensive. Multinational solutions are therefore increasingly important in order to deploy modern and capable forces. A number of multinational cooperation projects in NATO have been launched, including strategic air transport, airborne ground surveillance and strategic sea transport.

55. NATO is the main expression of transatlantic security cooperation, and also a cornerstone of the international security system. The strains on transatlantic relations caused by the Iraq invasion in 2003, is now largely behind us. There is a strong recognition on all sides of basic common interests related to global security challenges. With the Obama-administration, we also see a new American policy which emphasises Allied consultation and multilateral solutions. The full re-integration of France in NATO in the spring of 2009 is also important, both politically and militarily, and could give a new momentum to the NATO-EU relationship.

56. At the same time, it is clear that the transatlantic relationship has changed in character. This is both due to a larger security and defence role for Europe within the framework of the EU, and to a changed status for the US internationally. This has resulted in a more balanced transatlantic relationship. However, herein lies also a potential for increased tension. The new US Administration has raised expectations for increased cooperation with Allies, in order to meet challenges outside Europe. The further development in NATO-EU relations and EU-US relations will be of importance in this respect.

57. Norway's security outlook is both Atlantic and European. Norway is, however, outside the EU. We therefore have a basic interest in supporting transatlantic cooperation within the framework of NATO. NATO's Article 5 represents the fundamental security guarantee for Norway, and the North Atlantic Treaty provides a multilateral framework for transatlantic security cooperation and consultation. Among the Allies, the US continues to play a key role for Norwegian security, both within NATO and bilaterally. At the same time, the significance of European Allies like the UK, Germany and the Netherlands, is increasing. The North Sea strategy, which is an arrangement of defence cooperation between Allied countries around the North Sea is important both militarily, and because it comprises European Allies that are major importers of Norwegian energy resources.

58. A prerequisite if NATO is to maintain its role as the central forum for transatlantic security cooperation, is that the organisation remains relevant in relation to the major security challenges. This requires a continued ability to transform, both politically and militarily. Norway will contribute actively to this. The challenges in our own region make it important to preserve the Alliance as an organisation based on collective defence and consensus as the key principles. Ensuring Allied attention to our region will be demanding and it will be closely related to our own willingness to contribute to NATO operations. Norwegian support for further multinational capability cooperation will also be important, because that is the only way smaller countries will be able to ensure access to critical capabilities. Norway will continue to support the NATO Response Force (NRF) with the aim of providing contributions to all contingents.

59. In spite of considerable ability to transform, NATO still faces a number of challenges. This is particularly true in the field of crisis management, where there are challenges

related to providing sufficient number of forces to ongoing operations. There is a need for a better mechanism for the financing of operations and exercises. Enlargement has also had an influence on working procedures in NATO, in the sense that consensus is increasingly complemented by informal bilateral channels. In tandem with NATO enlargement, it will be important to preserve the depth of the cooperation, including the principle of consensus.

60. In many ways, NATO is at a crossroads. The French re-integration into the Alliance is expected to have positive consequences for the further transformation process and for NATO's ability to act. However, the Alliance has yet to clarify its exact role in relation to new challenges like international terrorism and proliferation of WMD. There are fundamental questions related to the role of deterrence in the 21st Century. The relationship between NATO and the EU is a continuing challenge. There are also questions whether NATO's internal organisation and command structure is efficient enough. Altogether, the time has come to take a new fundamental look at the Alliance strategic concept. The NATO Summit in spring 2009 at Strasbourg/Kehl provided the mandate for such a review. The aim will be no less than to look at the role and relevance of the Alliance in a globalised world. As part of this, it is also important that NATO contributes to re-vitalise efforts on disarmament and arms control.

2.3 The European Union

61. Since 1999, the EU has made further progress in the implementation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Progress has been particularly visible in the area of security and defence, through the development of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The importance of the ESDP has increased through institutional as well as practical steps. With the Lisbon Treaty ratified, the EU's ability to act in a coordinated manner will be further strengthened. All indications are that ESDP will develop further, if need be through intensified cooperation by a limited number of member states in specific areas.

62. A milestone for CFSP and ESDP was the adoption in 2003 of the EU security strategy; "A Secure Europe in a Better World". This strategy was updated in 2008, and it constitutes the EU's political platform for its foreign, security and defence policy.

It confirms the EU's ambition to become a global security actor based on multilateral cooperation. ESDP has already given the EU an independent ability to execute limited crisis management operations, within and outside Europe. Of particular importance is the EU Battle Groups (BG), which provides a military capability to respond to emerging crises. Since 2007, two BG's are on alert at any one time. Norway contributed to the Swedish-led Nordic BG in 2008 together with Finland, Estonia and Ireland. On a parallel track, the EU is developing civilian capabilities for international crisis management.

63. As part of the further development of ESDP, the EU in 2005 established an inter-governmental agency, the European Defence Agency (EDA), for harmonisation and development of military capabilities, research and technology, materiel cooperation, and defence industrial development. The EDA will support ESDP ambitions by providing critical military capabilities in accordance with EU Headline Goal 2010. The Norwegian Ministry of Defence signed a cooperation arrangement with EDA in March 2006 to get access to particular projects of interest.

64. The EU has established a strategic partnership with NATO through the Berlin Plus arrangements. These arrangements mean that NATO temporarily can transfer military capabilities to the EU for use in EU-led operations. In parallel, the EU has developed an ability to conduct autonomous operations without NATO support. A number of recent EU-led operations in the Balkans and in Africa show that the EU now has the ability to take more of an independent operational role. The EU has also strengthened its co-operation with the UN and regional organisations, both in Asia and Africa. Because of this development, the significance of the Berlin Plus arrangements has been reduced.

Photo: European Parliament

Photo: European Parliament

65. Within the framework of our non-membership, Norway has a clear interest in cooperating closely with the EU in the area of security and defence. Norway's formal influence on ESDP is limited to the arrangements for third country participation. In 2004, Norway signed a framework agreement with the EU on participation in civilian and military ESDP operations, and also a security agreement on the exchange of classified information. It is important to use these arrangements to their full extent, including through visible participation in EU-led operations. Continued participation in the Nordic BG's is another important measure. From a Norwegian perspective, close cooperation between NATO and the EU is very important, not least to avoid the establishment of competing structures. The NATO-EU relationship is still facing serious challenges, however, and these must now be solved.

2.4 Russia

66. Russia has changed considerably since the 1990's. From the turn of the century to the recent financial crisis, the Russian economy grew substantially due to high export prices on oil and gas. This made it possible for Russia to re-establish much of her role and position in the world, economically and politically as well as militarily. We see a revitalised great power, able and willing to promote her interests regionally and to some extent also globally. Russia has, however, been hit hard by the financial crisis. This will have consequences, also for the planned modernisation of the Russian armed forces. Internally, the development has been characterised by centralisation of power and state control, combined with a wave of nationalism directed particularly against NATO and Western countries. Relations between Russia and NATO have gradually worsened, and this has come to the fore on issues like NATO enlargement and missile defence. Following presidents Obama and Medvedev's initiative to create a new climate between the two states, there is now hope of an improvement in this relationship. A lasting improvement of relations will require active engagement by all parties and an ability to convert political goals into practical policy.

67. The re-vitalisation of Russia can be seen also in the form of military modernisation. In the last decade, defence funding has increased considerably. The strategic nuclear forces are given high priority, as a signal of Russia's global ambitions. Sea based nuclear weapons play an important role, with the Kola Peninsula as Russia's most

important base complex. The High North will therefore continue to be of great strategic importance. Russia's conventional forces are also undergoing modernisation. Conscript soldiers are gradually replaced by contract personnel. This will improve mobility and readiness, and give an availability for ready deployment in all parts of the federation. The High North has re-gained its importance as a test and exercise area, and for the first time in 15 years, Russian air and naval forces operate routinely in the North Atlantic. Following large reductions of personnel in the 1990's, Russia now aims for a leaner structure, more expeditionary, better trained and to a large extent based on contract personnel.

68. Russia's re-vitalised role as a great power may have consequences for our bilateral relationship in the High North. We can expect a more persistent Russian foreign and security policy, where national interests are pursued more vigorously. Russia's operational pattern in our neighbourhood has become more persistent. However, Russia should not be seen as a military threat to Norway. The resumption of Russian military presence in the High North should be seen as a return to normality from a period of extremely low activity during the 90s. The level of military activity is also meant to signal Russia's return as a great power, directed both at the international community and its own population. Russia's main security challenges in the coming years will be in the South and East. In economic terms however, the High North is expected to increase in importance. The relationship between Russia and Norway is basically good, and we have a common interest in maintaining the Arctic as an area of cooperation to ensure a responsible management of natural resources. The danger of pollution from military activity, oil and gas production, and from nuclear power plants in North-West Russia has potentially serious consequences for Norwegian societal security. These challenges can, however, only be met through bilateral or multilateral cooperation. In the defence sector, Norway has actively worked to maintain a good bilateral relationship with Russia. This is done through annual cooperation plans between the military establishments of both countries, and through high-level meetings.



69. At the same time, there is a potential for conflict of interest between the two countries in the area of resource exploitation and management. If the general relationship between Russia, USA and other NATO countries deteriorates, this could spill over on the Russian-Norwegian relationship in the High North. This relationship will continue to be characterised by asymmetry between a great regional power and a small neighbouring country. It is consequently of importance for Norway also in the future to avoid bilateralisation of our relations with Russia.

70. Today's challenges in the High North are different, but no less demanding than those of the Cold War. Future risks to our security are likely to be linked to resource management, issues of jurisdiction and the environment. These challenges have implications primarily for societal security. However, we cannot exclude situations where our state security also may be threatened. The most likely future challenges to our sovereignty will be in the form of episodes and limited assaults or crises. There may also be attempts to restrict our political freedom of action. These challenges could materialise very quickly, and they require an immediate response by Norwegian authorities. Here, the NAF will play a central role. For these reasons, the High North will remain the Government's primary strategic focus area also in the future. It underlines the general need for Norway to demonstrate that it is able to protect vital national interests in the High North.

71. Norway's basic security still has to be taken care of in a multilateral context, with NATO as a cornerstone. Different forms of Allied and multinational presence on Norwegian territory are therefore important. At the same time, many of the challenges in the High North, particularly related to resource management, must be handled nationally. The NAF must therefore have capabilities for surveillance and intelligence, for exercising of jurisdiction and sovereign rights, and for crisis management. The totality of our challenges in the High North underlines the importance of military presence, both in the form of routine operations in peacetime, national and Allied training and exercising, and infrastructure to support such activity.

72. The key to stability in the High North lies in the continuation of the cooperation and mutual trust that has characterised the relationship between Russia and Norway. Norway therefore has a fundamental interest in maintaining and deepening this cooperation, both bilaterally and through multilateral institutions like the NATO-Russia Council (NRC).

2.5 The Nordic and the Baltic States

73. There is currently a broad cooperation between the Nordic states on defence. In today's security climate, there are many arguments in favour of expanding this cooperation further. Sweden and Finland cooperate ever closer with NATO within the framework of PfP. This means that the formal obstacles for cooperation between Norway and our two Nordic neighbours are largely gone. From a Norwegian perspective, Nordic cooperation is a fruitful supplement to NATO. The Nordic states have different affiliations, and the Nordic dialogue is an important gateway for Norway to the EU and the ESDP. Nordic defence cooperation across different institutional affiliations is therefore forward-looking and welcomed by both NATO and the EU. Nordic cooperation has benefits both from a political point of view, and in terms of increased operational capability and cost effectiveness.

74. A key element in Nordic defence cooperation is participation in peace operations. Regardless of institutional affiliation, the Nordic states participate in both NATO and EU operations. In 2008, Sweden, Finland and Norway cooperated in the Nordic Battle Group, together with Estonia and Ireland (cf. Para 62). This cooperation will resume when the Battle Group is set up again in 2011. The Nordic countries also have a close cooperation in Afghanistan, and work is ongoing to develop this further. There is also an ambition to provide a common Nordic contribution to a UN-led operation in Africa, and to assist in the establishment of African capabilities for conflict prevention.

75. The Nordic defence cooperation structure today consists of three pillars. Firstly, the operational cooperation in NORDCAPS (Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Peace Support). Secondly, the material cooperation in NORDAC (Nordic Armaments Cooperation) and thirdly, the NORDSUP (Nordic Supportive Defence Structures). NORDSUP was established in 2008 as a recognition of the increasing challenges facing small nations in retaining capabilities on their own. A number of potential multinational initiatives have been identified in many areas, including sea, air, logistics, personnel and education, and research and development. Tasked by the Nordic Foreign Ministers, former Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg presented a report in February 2009 with a number of proposals for a strengthened Nordic cooperation on foreign- and security policy. The report includes a number of specific proposals for cooperative projects and was well received in all Nordic capitals.

76. For a number of years, the Baltic States have received military assistance from the Nordic countries. Following NATO membership for these states, Norwegian bilateral assistance has been reduced and transferred to the Allied framework. The regional cooperation between the Nordic and Baltic states will, however, continue to be close, related, inter alia to mutual assistance and security sector reform in the Balkans and in the Ukraine. This cooperation will be expanded to include Georgia. Norway today has a military action plan with Latvia.

77. The reduced American military presence in Iceland led to a need for support from the Nordic neighbours. Against this background, Norway and Iceland signed a bilateral agreement in spring 2007, focusing on contingencies and search and rescue in the North-Atlantic. Norway attaches great importance to this cooperation. Iceland is a close Nordic neighbour, and the cooperation reinforces the general focus on the High North. The bilateral cooperation does, however, not include any security guarantees, and from a Norwegian perspective it is desirable that defence cooperation with Iceland continues to be seen primarily within a multinational NATO framework.

2.6 Norway's Freedom of Action in the Field of Security Policy

78. A state's freedom of action in the security policy field can be measured by the ability to independently pursue its declared security policy objectives. Being a small state in terms of population and economy, Norway has in principle limited freedom of action. Our security environment is determined primarily by other and bigger states, and by institutions like NATO and the EU.

79. Norway's strategic location, with a long coastline from the North Sea to the Barents Sea, is of fundamental importance. Our situation is also influenced by regional relationships and power politics, especially the interaction between NATO, the US, the EU and Russia. The relationship between these actors varies over time. NATO's role has changed in light of new security challenges and enlargement. The role of the EU is also developing as a result of enlargement, global partnerships and better coordination of the Common Security and Defence Policy. Russia is back as a re-vitalised regional great power. US policy has for many years been influenced by the 11 September terrorist attacks, which brought about the military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and the

global war on terror. The Obama administration has signalled important changes to US foreign policy, in particular on the US' partnership with multilateral institutions.

80. For smaller states, the multilateral room is vital. In multinational foras such as the UN, NATO, OSCE and the EU, national interests are promoted through cooperation with others. Particularly for smaller nations, the costs of promoting national interests become lower, and the legitimacy higher. Multilateral foras and agreements regulate how individual states apply their national freedom of action, based on common rules and norms.

81. International rules and norms are particularly important for international security and conflict prevention. With a large territory and a small population, Norway puts particular emphasis on international law and the UN Charter. The right to self defence is embedded in Article 51 of the UN Charter. The UN Security Council has a key role when it comes to legitimise actions against other states or actors which threaten international peace and security. NATO's Article 5 on collective defence builds directly on Article 51 of the UN Charter, and remains a fundamental security guarantee for Norway. The Alliance framework provides both security and more increased freedom of action for Norway.

82. Norway's ability to influence the international environment and maximise her freedom of action is a function of her ability to draw on all available security instruments. The NAF is a central instrument, also in situations where active use of military force is not necessarily required. Routine military activity is in itself a contribution to stability and conflict prevention, by influencing not just our own freedom of action, but also that of a potential adversary.

SECURITY POLICY CONSEQUENCES

3.1 A Clear Framework for the Use of Military Force

83. The NAF are one of the most important instruments of security and foreign policy. Fundamental Norwegian security interests, the international framework, international peace and security, Alliance solidarity and human security – these are all key factors for Norwegian authorities when making a decision to use the NAF as an instrument of security policy. One key principle is that Norway should be able to participate actively and meaningfully in operations that NATO, based on consensus, decide upon. It is also important that the operations Norway chooses to participate in, enjoy broad national support.

84. The NAF, and in particular the active use of military force, represents the state's strongest instrument of power. The risk of loosing lives is always present in military operations, and the use of military force may have unforeseen consequences. The cost of military operations outside Norway will always be of great importance. The decision to employ military force, and the risks involved, must be considered as acceptable in light of the desired political goals. The use of military force should be regarded as a last resort when all other economic, diplomatic and political options have been exhausted. It is of utmost importance that the military effort can be defended both legally and morally.

85. The need for legality and political legitimacy, both in a national and an international context, will be decisive for Norway's use of military power. The question of legality and legitimacy is closely connected to international law. The rules concerning when military force should be applied, how it can be applied, and which military actions should be authorised to fulfil the political and military goal, are essential. International law must be complied with and practised both nationally and internationally (cf. Section 4.5). It is important to stress that the decision to use military force is a political responsibility. Compared to legality, which is basically a legal issue, legitimacy must not only be established at the outset, but maintained over time. This applies not least to military operations outside Norway, where the legitimacy to a large extent will depend on the population's perception of the operation as "justified". The manner in which an operation is conducted can both strengthen and undermine its legitimacy.

86. The responsibility of the NAF is primarily linked to the actual use of military force. This means that the use of force must be in accordance with political guidelines and international law. Norwegian officers and soldiers participating in operations must have knowledge of, and adhere to, the Law of Armed Conflict. Prior to being deployed to operations outside Norway, all Norwegian personnel are given mission-specific training in the Law of Armed Conflict. Normally, a legal adviser will also be deployed in theatre.

87. The development towards establishing restrictions on the use of military force can be seen also in the area of disarmament, which has a high priority in Norwegian security policy. As a result of a Norwegian initiative, 100 states adopted an international ban on cluster munitions in May 2008. The convention, signed in Oslo in December 2008, prohibits all types of cluster munitions with unacceptable humanitarian consequences. Cluster munitions have caused serious civilian suffering, both during and after a conflict. The convention is important in signaling that the use of military force is not a goal in itself, but an instrument to reach a political goal. Military operations must be perceived as legitimate. Use of weapons with unacceptable humanitarian consequences does not strengthen the legitimacy of military operations, neither at home nor in the field or within the international community. The convention is an important humanitarian breakthrough, and it is the first disarmament agreement in more than a decade. Experience from similar agreements gives hope that a norm has been set which will be followed also by states which have so far not signed the convention, as the use of cluster munitions henceforth will be regarded as unacceptable and stigmatising.

3.2 Closer National and International Coordination

88. New global threats and increasing mutual dependence, ties Norwegian security closer to international and global affairs. Distant conflicts may have direct and indirect consequences also for us. It is therefore important that potential challenges and threats can be handled effectively at an early stage. This will reduce the possibility of regional instability and conflict spreading to our part of the world. Prevention of conflicts abroad is consequently a good investment in our own security. Norway has the necessary competence and economical means to actively engage in the international work on promoting peace and conflict prevention.

89. However, these challenges cannot be solved by any one state alone. The need for close international coordination is important. At the same time, the need for close civil-military coordination is vital. This is illustrated by multidimensional and integrated peace operations where the military effort is seen in conjunction with the political and economical development, as well as humanitarian assistance. In parallel with an increase in the number of UN-lead operations, the UN also authorises organisations like NATO, the EU and the AU to conduct operations on its behalf. Coordination is also vital with regard to the fight against international terrorism which transcends both national and civil-military areas of responsibility.

90. The current security challenges cannot be handled on the basis of a state security perspective or a societal security perspective alone. In a globalised world, the threat will affect both types of security. The clearest example is an act of terror with the intention of putting political pressure on national governments. This type of assaults may have consequences that exceed the resources of the civilian sector. Consequently, an effective coordination between civilian and military units will be crucial to manage the consequences of the assaults (cf. Section 1.2).

91. Norwegian security is closely connected to the need for effective multinational security arrangements, and it is important to cooperate actively with Allies and partners in meeting common challenges. In this context, different types of peace support and stabilising operations are central. However, faced with a complex security environment, peace operations cannot be limited to military operations alone. Contributions to reform and modernisation of the security sector are of equal importance. Educating police and armed forces is crucial in many parts of the world as a precondition for political, economic and social development.

3.3 Increased Focus on the High North

92. The international development has led to a new focus on the Arctic Ocean and the surrounding areas. For Norway, it is of importance to ensure security, stability and sustainable development in the High North. This requires a predictable and long-term policy. Active cooperation, through political and military channels, both in a bilateral and multilateral framework, is fundamental. Even if interests are not always identical, good relations with our Allies and neighbours are crucial.

93. During the Cold War, Europe north of the Polar Circle was mainly of interest due to its military and strategic importance. Today, resource management, environmental concern and economic interests are the main focus. The interest of other states in the High North has changed accordingly. Natural resources and economic interests make the challenges more complex. This has led to a dynamic development in the region, with potential security implications. Maintaining Norwegian interests will comprise elements of both security policy, resource management, and commercial interests. The different policy areas and interests must be balanced and seen in relation to each other.

94. Maritime resources in areas under Norwegian jurisdiction are important also to other states. The demand for oil and gas is increasing globally, and energy resources are of great importance both to industrialized and developing countries. This has implications also for security policy. Norwegian authorities must be prepared to deal with different types of political pressure, for instance

as a result of assaults against oil and gas installations. They must also be able to meet possible military challenges against our sovereign rights at sea. Norwegian energy export could make our petroleum installations attractive targets for those who may want to inflict harm on the recipients of Norwegian oil and gas.

95. The competence and capabilities of the NAF are of direct importance and relevance to the many challenges we face in the High North, and which go far beyond the military domain. One important example is the need for surveillance and situation awareness, robust command and control systems, and easily accessible and deployable military capabilities. The presence of Norwegian military capabilities has a stabilising effect, and is a prerequisite for handling incidents and crises in an effective way. Access to a broad spectrum of capabilities is important in order both to increase the sustainability of our forces in a demanding climate, and to increase our situational awareness in a vast and politically sensitive area. The NAF provide the Norwegian political authorities with a sound basis for decision making. This will increase our political freedom of action, and also facilitate the resolution of episodes and crises in accordance with Norwegian interests. Without effective surveillance and a sound basis for decision-making, Norway's ability to maintain own sovereignty and exercise authority could be severely affected.

96. Crisis situations in our region may occur suddenly, even if they will most likely be limited in scope. Consequently, Norwegian authorities must have an independent ability to cater for own security. Simultaneously, we must be prepared to cooperate with Allies, if the situation so demands. The likely absence of warning time when security related episodes or situations occur, underlines the continued need for relevant military presence and further modernisation of the NAF.

97. A predictable and visible military presence in the High North is of fundamental importance, in order to uphold sovereignty and exercise authority, surveillance, intelligence and crisis management. Regular military patrols and exercise activities have a stabilising effect that cannot be compensated for by other civilian instruments. A certain level of military presence in the High North should be considered as normal, as an expression of Norway's long-term interests, and the will to defend these interests. Regular military presence, the capability to respond quickly to emerging situations and the ability to receive reinforcements, will all be of vital importance in handling incidents

at a lower level. It is important that the Norwegian military presence in the High North is seen as predictable and consistent.

3.4 Implications for the Different Roles of the Norwegian Armed Forces

98. Today's complex security environment and the wide spectrum of challenges, both abroad and at home, have implications for the different roles of the NAF. This is important for the composition and use of the NAF as a political instrument.

99. Our security environment is constantly evolving. Changes in the overall threat assessment must be taken into consideration in the long-term development of the NAF. The absence of one single determining challenge has as its consequence that military forces must be flexible and capable of handling a number of different tasks. This is of great importance with regard to the development of the NAF's capabilities and competence, and the tasks that the NAF are expected to solve.

100. Particularly in our own region, the NAF have an important role in contributing to stability and war prevention. Relevant military presence in the High North, the ability to quickly respond and receive Allied reinforcements, all create predictability and stability. Surveillance, maintaining sovereignty and exercising authority are essential in this regard. Military presence provides an opportunity to support civilian authorities in situations that they cannot handle alone.

101. Remote states and non-state actors might inflict damage upon free and open societies like Norway. Damage could be done by acts of terrorism, including by the use of WMD or through cyber-attacks. It is therefore important that Norway has capabilities to prevent and oppose such threats and to limit their consequences. In this context, the NAF has an important preventive role.

102. The NAF must also be capable of contributing with capabilities and competence to protect Norwegian societal security and other important security interests. Intelligence, Coast Guard, border guard, search and rescue services and assistance with regard to larger accidents and natural disasters are examples where the NAF have an important role.

103. The NAF's role with regard to state security, i.e. conventional collective defence, is not as predominant as during the Cold War. However, the NAF must maintain a basis for regeneration in case more extensive threats should re-emerge. In this connection, it is important to maintain the institutional competence of the personnel. It is important that our security and defence policy does not ignore conventional build-up in other states, which over time could represent a threat to Norway and NATO. Our state security is also ensured through the upholding of sovereignty in peace time and the ability to handle episodes and crises.

104. The traditional division between national and international security has to a certain extent been erased. Tasks outside Norway will therefore have relevance also for security at home. The NAF will have an important role in international crisis management, as one of several security policy instruments. International military operations must be based on the principles of the UN Charter, as well as on broad international and domestic support. They must contribute to international peace and stability. New geopolitical trends have led to a greater need for dialogue and cooperation between the NAF and emerging powers, such as China. As a result of this, Norway in 2009 established a new position as defence attaché at the Norwegian Embassy in Beijing.

PART IV

DEFENCE POLICY GUIDELINES

4.1 Defence Policy Objectives

105. Defence policy is the central link between overall security policy, and the development of the NAF's organisation, structure, capabilities and operational concept. The defence policy objectives state what the NAF should contribute in order to secure the best possible implementation of Norway's fundamental security objectives. The defence policy objectives are as follows:

- Alone and together with Allies secure Norwegian sovereignty, rights and interests, as well as ensuring Norwegian freedom of action in the face of military or other pressure.

- Through participation in multilateral peace operations authorised by international law and through international defence cooperation, contribute to peace, stability, the enforcement of international law and respect for human rights, and prevent the use of force by state and non-state actors against Norwegian and international security.

- Together with Allies, contribute to the collective defence of Norway and other Allies in accordance with our NATO commitments, and counter different kinds of assaults and attacks in order to safeguard Norwegian and collective security.

- Contribute to safeguarding Norwegian societal security, save lives and limit the consequences of accidents, natural disasters, assaults and attacks from state and non-state actors.

106. In order to guide the actual development of the NAF's structure, these objectives must be made operational. In this respect, the Defence Concept plays a central role. The Concept lays out the fundamental principles for the development of the NAF's structure, organisation and activities (cf. Section 4.2), as well as the tasks and level of ambition (cf. Section 4.3).

4.2 The Defence Concept and the Fundamental Principles of the Defence Posture of the Norwegian Armed Forces

107. The Defence Concept outlines how the NAF will be structured in order to carry out the tasks in an optimal way, and to contribute to the fulfilment of our national security objectives. The concept describes the fundamental direction and purpose of the NAF, and the principles upon which the future development of the NAF is to be based. On these points, the Stortinget (Parliament) has endorsed the following key formulations:

> The NAF are to be developed as a modern, flexible and Alliance-adapted instrument of security policy, with a balance being sought between tasks, structure and funding. The NAF's activities are to be based on close cooperation with relevant civilian authorities and on conscription adapted to the needs of the NAF. Focus will be on securing and promoting Norwegian interests through the ability to handle a broad range of challenges, both nationally and internationally.

108. The Defence Concept is based on the following main principles:

- The further development of a defence based on flexible reaction forces

  In this context, the term "reaction force" denotes a military force that is capable of solving its tasks in a rapid and flexible manner. These tasks could be of a national character, or tasks that are solved in cooperation with Allies within the context of both peace support operations and collective defence of national and Allied territory. This implies that the NAF must have an appropriate level of readiness and a high quality with regard to competence and equipment. The NAF must be based on modern standards regarding management and ethics. Norwegian forces must be able to operate in a modern combat environment and handle complex situations, and at the same time have the technological standard necessary for self protection. The NAF must have the flexibility for adjusting to incremental changes in the environment.

- The ability to handle challenges nationally and internationally

  The NAF must be able to solve its tasks, both at home and abroad. There is a close connection between national tasks and tasks which have to be solved in cooperation with Allies and partners. Participation in international peace support operations is a contribution to international peace and security, which is of increasing importance also to our national security. Within a small defence structure, emphasis must therefore be put on synergies and on the development of capabilities which can be used both at home and abroad.

- An Alliance-adapted Defence Force

  NATO is a cornerstone in Norwegian security. The NAF must be able to operate effectively together with Allies, nationally and internationally. Our ability to cooperate with Allied forces must be reflected in the equipment, competence and culture. This does not mean that the NAF's level of technology must be identical with our Allies in all areas, but our forces must be able to operate closely with Allied forces. This must be reflected in the technological level. A further consequence of an Alliance-adapted Defence Force is that the NAF must be able to contribute actively to NATO's collective tasks, based on a principle of reasonable Alliance burden-sharing.

- Long-term balance between tasks, organisational structure and funding

  The development of the NAF must be based on a long-term perspective where the financial framework reflects the tasks and the level of ambition. It is of utmost importance to obtain a stable and predictable framework for the further development of the NAF, including harmony between ambitions and resources. Such a balance presupposes that the NAF conduct the activities in a cost-effective manner, that maximum resources are utilised to support the sharp end, and that the logistics and support structure is tailored to meet the operational requirements of the sharp end.

- Close cooperation between military and civilian authorities

  In accordance with the Norwegian Total Defence Concept, the NAF must be able to support civilian authorities. This applies to the whole spectrum of crisis situations. This support will be conducted on the basis of the competence, capabilities and resources already in place for the execution of the NAF's primary tasks related to the employment for military force. When necessary, civilian authorities should also be able to support the NAF's role with regard to crisis management. Based on the Total Defence Concept, the aim is to develop coordinated and mutually reinforcing cooperation mechanisms that are relevant for the whole spectrum of crisis situations (cf. Section 4.7).

- Conscription

  Conscription is maintained as a central pillar for the NAF, adapted to current needs and requirements. Conscription constitutes an important premise for the further development of the NAF, based on solid operational arguments. Compulsory military service is the central mechanism for recruitment and selection of personnel (officers and privates) doing service both at home and in international operations. In addition, conscription is an important instrument to anchor the NAF in society at large, and also for the population to relate to the defence sector. It is of great importance that the personnel doing compulsory military service regard it as positive and meaningful.

4.3 The Tasks of the Norwegian Armed Forces

109. The key benchmark for the evaluation of the NAF is the ability to accomplish 8 distinct and clearly defined tasks. By solving these tasks, the NAF will also be able to fulfil the Defence Policy Objectives, outlined in Section 4.1. The tasks reflect what the NAF should be able to achieve, based on the force posture described in Section 4.2. The operational capability is evaluated on a yearly basis, in terms of fulfilment of the different tasks.

110. The tasks of the NAF are divided into three categories:

- National tasks which, as a general rule, must be undertaken nationally and without Allied involvement
- Tasks carried out in cooperation with Allies and/or Partners
- Other tasks which are under the responsibility of other Norwegian authorities, with the NAF in a supporting role

111. The ability to solve the full spectrum of tasks will determine the NAF's structure and force posture. The principal function of the NAF is to protect and defend Norway's security, interests and values. The tasks related to the Norwegian territory and areas under Norwegian jurisdiction are therefore given priority. In this connection, the ability to conduct tasks related to surveillance, intelligence, the exercise of sovereignty and crisis management is of fundamental importance. The ability to contribute to collective defence, at home and abroad, as well as participation in peace support operations is however also important. These are all dimensioning tasks decisive for the force structure and force posture. These priorities do not mean that other tasks, such as contributions to societal security and the exercising of authority are insignificant. Such tasks, however, will be executed based on the force structure established to carry out the NAF's dimensioning tasks.

112. The dimensioning tasks, as a balanced whole, are decisive for the further development of the NAF. National and international tasks are regarded as complementary, and there is no conflict between them. On the contrary, together these tasks will increase the operational capability of the NAF. The capabilities of the NAF must be able to

deploy both at home and abroad. There is in principle no difference between military units intended for national and international deployment, with the exception of units that are comprised primarily of conscripts.

113. Tasks 1-4 are of a national character and require availability of Norwegian operational capabilities on a permanent basis. Tasks 5 and 6 must be solved in cooperation with Allied, and possibly other forces. In such circumstances, Norway's military contribution will normally constitute a limited part of the total force.

114. Tasks 7 and 8 will be solved on the basis of existing capabilities and competence developed for the accomplishment of the other main tasks.

4.3.1 National Tasks which, as a General Rule, must be undertaken Nationally and without Allied Involvement

115. The NAF's national tasks are derived from Norway's responsibilities and rights as an independent state, related closely to our sovereign responsibility on Norwegian territory and in areas under Norwegian jurisdiction. Therefore, they must be undertaken nationally and, as a general rule, without Allied involvement. These tasks require permanent and high availability of operational military capabilities under Norwegian control:

Task 1: ***To ensure a good basis for national political and military decision-making through timely surveillance and intelligence***

116. A primary task for the NAF is surveillance of Norwegian territory, including land, sea and air, as well as of certain sea areas where Norway has sovereign rights, in accordance with international law or agreements. This task also requires a national intelligence capability. Norway's ability to conduct surveillance and intelligence operations in its own areas is of great significance. This is crucial both with regard to the formulation of national policy in our own region, as well as for our ability to provide information and assessments to Allies and other partners. Efficient surveillance in combination with effective decision-making is also a prerequisite for the NAF's ability to solve some of the other tasks, including the upholding of national sovereignty, exercising of authority, crisis management and collective defence.

117. As a general rule, the NAF must have the ability, within the framework of NATO's integrated air defence system, to conduct continuous surveillance of Norwegian air space and adjacent areas. The NAF must also be able to carry out surveillance of specific activities in our territorial and adjacent waters and in designated areas at sea under Norwegian jurisdiction. Furthermore, the NAF must have the ability for continuous surveillance of selected parts of own land territory, and the Norwegian-Russian border where the Border Guard has the main responsibility. In case of episode and crisis management, the entire structure with regard to gathering, analysing and distributing information will be brought to bear. In connection with participation in peace operations, it is necessary to support Norwegian military units with intelligence, both at the strategic and tactical level.

Task 2: ***To uphold Norwegian sovereignty and sovereign rights***

118. The NAF have a primary role in upholding Norwegian sovereignty and defending Norwegian territorial integrity. The task of upholding sovereignty includes the defence, if necessary by military means, of Norwegian rights as a state in confrontation with other states which directly or indirectly challenge Norwegian territorial sovereignty. It also includes the defence of Norwegian sovereign rights in areas outside Norwegian territory which are under Norwegian jurisdiction. This task includes deterrence, and management of episodes, as well as denying intruders access to Norwegian territory. In today's security environment, non-state actors may also challenge Norwegian sovereignty. This task may also include securing Norwegian embassies and Norwegian shipping.

119. With regard to exercising sovereignty at sea, the Coast Guard and the Navy will have important roles to play, based on their presence in priority areas, including territorial waters. As far as the air space is concerned, the task of exercising sovereignty will be carried out within the framework of NATO's integrated air defence system. In this respect, the NAF will, on a continuous basis, provide radar

surveillance and fighter aircraft on high readiness. Through continuous presence and information gathering, the Border Guard along the Norwegian-Russian border is also capable of reacting quickly in situations where Norwegian sovereignty is violated. His Majesty the King's Royal Guard provides permanent and necessary protection of the Royal Family.

Task 3: ***To exercise Norwegian authority in designated areas***

120. The NAF shall exercise authority in order to uphold sovereign rights and enforce Norwegian law in areas where such authority has been delegated. This includes preventive measures.

121. The exercising of authority is understood as the execution of public authority according to national law, in order to enforce public orders and prohibitions based on laws and regulations directed at persons or other private subjects. Exercising of authority is a national task normally carried out by the Police and other civilian authorities. The NAF are however assigned authority in specific functional areas.

122. The NAF are exercising authority in two major areas: Resource management and control at sea, and border control along the Norwegian-Russian border. The activities of the NAF within these areas are carried out in close cooperation with civilian authorities. The challenges related to the management of resources in the High North indicate that exercising of authority at sea will be a major task for the NAF in the years to come. In this context, it is important that the NAF have the ability to quickly detect and react on violations within areas where the NAF have been delegated authority. This execution of authority must be clear and consistent in order to have the desired preventive effect.

123. The Norwegian National Security Authority (NSM) is a directorate which is administratively subordinated to the Ministry of Defence. With regard to issues concerning the civilian sector, the NSM is reporting to the Ministry of Justice, and in military matters to the Ministry of Defence. The NSM has a coordinating role with regard to preventive security and a supervising role for the state of security within a number of relevant authorities/agencies.

Task 4: ***To prevent and manage incidents and crises in Norway and adjacent areas***

124. The NAF is a vital instrument for the handling of episodes and policy crises in Norway and adjacent areas, which by their nature must be handled by Norwegian authorities without Allied involvement. Such episodes and crises must quickly, and at minimum costs, be brought under control, if necessary in parallel with initiatives to involve NATO. Permanent presence of military force improves the ability to handle episodes and crises up to a certain level, without having to deploy additional military capabilities. Such presence also increases the cost to any opponent of employing military forces. As such, military presence is a contribution to conflict prevention, and cannot be replaced by a civilian presence alone. The NAF must, however, also be able to quickly deploy forces to areas without any prior Norwegian military presence, in order to establish a military threshold.

125. Episodes and crises which must be managed nationally will most likely occur at sea. This has to be reflected in our military presence also in waters where Norwegian jurisdiction is disputed. The NAF must be able to handle simultaneous episodes and limited crises. This will have implications for the NAF's volume and sustainability.

126. Outright military aggression against Norway, even on a limited scale, will normally be a matter for the Alliance. One important aspect of episode and crisis management will therefore be to quickly bring the situation to the attention of NATO, if necessary in order to evoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This task will also include the ability to prepare for Allied reinforcements.

4.3.2 Tasks carried out in Cooperation with Allies and/or Partners

127. The most demanding tasks related to the defence of Norway and NATO, as well as tasks related to international crisis management and peace support operations, must be undertaken in cooperation with others. In these situations, Norway will only be able to contribute a limited share of the military capabilities. These tasks are as follows:

Task 5: ***To contribute to collective defence of Norway and other parts of NATO against threats, assaults or attack***

128. The defence of Norway, with the exception of tasks that are handled on a national level, will be conducted within the framework of NATO. The NAF shall, together with our Allies, meet threats, assaults and attacks against Norway and other parts of NATO that are covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This includes conventional attacks, attacks with WMD, as well as other types of assaults and attacks from state and non-state actors, which cause sufficient damage for NATO to invoke collective defence measures.

129. The level of ambition and operational requirements with regard to Norway's contribution to NATO's collective defence are based on the fact that we have only one set of forces. Forces deployed in operations outside Norway will to a large extent be the same as those intended for the defence of national territory. The structure of the NAF will therefore not be determined solely on the basis of collective defence of Norway. Rather, the NAF must be able, within an Allied context, to contribute with relevant forces to collective defence efforts, including the defence of Norwegian territory. In light of the current security environment, Norway's contributions to NATO's collective defence will consist of a broad spectrum of contributions, which are all relevant to Article 5. This also involves making the bulk of own reaction forces available in advance to NATO's reaction forces.

Task 6: ***To contribute to multinational crisis management outside Norway, including peace support operations***

130. Norwegian participation in multinational peace support operation is an important contribution to international peace and security. It also supports the credibility of the UN, NATO and the security of Norway. Norwegian forces will, as a rule, only participate in operations in a multinational framework, normally under the authority of the UN or NATO. Our ambition is to increase Norwegian contributions to UN-led operations, and periodically also to EU-led operations. Norwegian military participation abroad shall be based on international law, either through consent of the parties, through the individual or collective right to self-defence in accordance with Article

51 of the UN Charter, or through a UN Security Council mandate in accordance with Chapter VI or VII of the UN Charter.

131. The current international challenges mean that contributions to peace operations abroad will be one of the NAF's most important and demanding tasks in the years to come. Within a limited force structure, the aim must be to make the larger part of the force structure usable, both at home and abroad. This implies, as a general rule, that the main part of the units and permanently employed military personnel, in addition to certain categories of civilian personnel, must also be available for missions abroad.

132. The NAF must be in a position to contribute capable forces to the whole spectrum of peace support operations, including preventive stabilisation operations, traditional peace keeping operations and also peace enforcement operations. Our forces must have the ability to operate effectively with Allied forces. In addition, the forces must have a sufficient level of mobility, fire power, readiness and self-protection. The NAF must also be able to handle challenges related to cooperation with non-military actors in integrated peace operations.

4.3.3 Other Tasks which are under the Responsibility of other Norwegian Authorities, with the NAF in a Supporting Role

133. These are tasks where other Norwegian authorities have the primary responsibility. They will not in themselves determine the military structure of the NAF, and must instead be executed on the basis of the capabilities already available for tasks 1-6. These other tasks are:

Task 7: ***To contribute to international military cooperation, including prevention of proliferation of WMD, disarmament, arms control and support to security sector reform***

134. The NAF shall support Norwegian and multinational diplomacy as part of our contribution to international peace and security, including preventing the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. Information gathering, analysis, arms control, confidence building and verification are parts of this overall effort. The task also includes

assisting selected partners in building up capabilities for self-defence, contributions to international security, and democratic control over the armed forces.

135. This task will be carried out on the basis of the resources and competence that are established in order to solve other tasks of the NAF. Priority will be on specific tasks which are required to fulfil Norway's international obligations.

Task 8: ***To contribute to societal security and other key societal tasks***

136. As a part of the Total Defence Concept, the NAF will support the civilian society in the event of accidents, natural disasters, terrorist attacks or other situations where life and health, as well as material resources, are at risk. The NAF shall be able to prevent and counter attacks against the population, infrastructure and vital societal functions. Upon request from the Police and in accordance with the Assistance Instruction, relevant and flexible contributions from the NAF will assist the civilian sector.

137. Challenges related to societal security illustrate the importance of cooperation between the NAF and the civilian society. The NAF will assist the civilian sector in cases where the sector's resources are inadequate for the handling of the situation at hand. The NAF's support to the civilian society will be based on the structure, competence and capabilities that are developed for solving the dimensioning tasks.

4.4 Political Control of the Use of Military Force

138. According to § 25 of the Norwegian Constitution, the "Supreme Command over the Land and Naval Forces of the Realm" is the prerogative of the King, which means the Government. On a day-to-day basis, command authority is exercised through the Minister of Defence. The Constitution does not, however, specify to which extent the Government may delegate its command authority [4].

[4] The third clause of the paragraph does state that the Government may not transfer Norwegian Forces to the service of "Foreign Powers".

139. The Chief of Defence has been delegated "full command", which is the highest military authority of command, without affecting the Government's constitutional command authority. The constitutional responsibility for use of the NAF, therefore, at all times rests with the Government through the Minister or Defence. Furthermore, the Minister of Defence is accountable to the Storting (Parliament) for all activities of the NAF. The Minister of Defence, therefore, has full authority to instruct the Chief of Defence.

140. Transfer of command of Norwegian forces to NATO's command is based on the fact that NATO's decision-making process is subject to political control through the North Atlantic Council. Decisions in the North Atlantic Council are based on consensus. Norway is permanently represented by our ambassador to NATO. The NATO command structure does not require Allied military operations on Norwegian soil to be directed through a Norwegian commander. However, when NATO members make forces available to the Alliance, they transfer limited command authority only – operational command or operational control. As a result, no NATO commander will exercise full command over Norwegian forces.

141. In situations where Norwegian forces are made available to UN or EU-led operations, the same principles apply as in NATO. Norwegian forces will not participate in missions that are not approved in advance by Norwegian political authorities.

142. The requirement for political control over the use of military force is reflected in the command and control arrangements. Close and persistent politico-military coordination is required, and political guidance will be provided during all phases of a military operation. Crisis management requires short lines of command in order to ensure political control and military efficiency. The integrated Ministry of Defence is important in this regard, in order to ensure close and persistent politico-military coordination.

4.5 The Use of Military Force – Legality and Legitimacy

143. Wide political support to the NAF's national and international engagement is important. This support is, home and abroad, related to the terms legality and legitimacy. Use of military force based on international law is considered to be legal. Such use is in addition considered to be legitimate if it can be justified from a political and moral point of view. In the public debate, politics, moral and law are often mixed together, however. In cases where the Security Council has authorized the use of military force, such use must be considered to be both legal and legitimate. The same applies to situations where military force is used for self defence against attacks on own or Allied territory (cf. Para 130).

144. The need for legality and political legitimacy, both domestically and internationally, is vital for a Norwegian decision to employ military force. Protection of Norwegian security interests, the international framework, the impact on international peace and security, the humanitarian aspects and Allied solidarity are all key factors when a decision to deploy parts of the NAF in operations is made.

145. Obtaining jus ad bellum legality is first and foremost a political responsibility. Norwegian forces are obliged to carry out all operations in accordance with international humanitarian law/the Law of Armed Conflict (jus in bello). There is consequently also a duty not to execute orders that are in conflict with international law. Adequate knowledge of international humanitarian law/the Law of Armed Conflict is crucial in order to be able to execute military tasks in accordance with political guidelines.

146. An international order based on the UN is in the interest of Norway. A clear UN mandate or another basis in international law ensures the necessary legality and moral legitimacy for the NAF's participation in military operations. Concrete examples are the individual or collective right to self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter, a UN Security Council mandate in accordance with Chapter VI or VII of the UN Charter or the invitation from the parties to a conflict.

147. There is an increasing acceptance of the international community's obligation to act in situations of severe humanitarian disaster. This also includes situations where the disaster is caused by the authorities of the country – and these authorities fail to protect its own citizens. This is the principle of Responsibility to Protect. In extreme cases, this could entail the right to employ military power in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, when the use of diplomatic and economic means has proven to be inadequate, cf. Sections 1.3 and 2.1.

148. The complexity of modern warfare has consequences for the composition of the forces, in the form of strict requirements with regard to personnel, competence and equipment. As far as legitimacy of the operation is concerned, it is important that the personnel have the necessary qualification for solving the tasks in accordance with international law and Norway's international commitments.

4.6 A Comprehensive Approach to the Use of Military Force

149. Military force should be seen as one of several instruments for conflict prevention and peace promotion. Political, economical, humanitarian and developmental measures are just as important. The UN, NATO and the EU therefore base their military operations on a comprehensive approach. This requires coordination and cooperation between many participants with different characteristics. Such cooperation increases the possibilities for taking advantage of the different actor's distinctive characteristics, increasing the quality and effect of the international effort as a whole. There is today a greater consciousness regarding the need for coordination of the participants' different roles. A coordinated effort, based on a common overall strategy, makes the work of the individual actors more focused and effective.

150. The importance of a comprehensive approach to peace support missions is particularly evident in Afghanistan. Here, the military effort alone is insufficient as far as rebuilding and stabilising a war-torn society is concerned. However, military means will play a vital supporting role in establishing conditions for economic development, humanitarian aid and political consolidation. This is decisive for a successful stabilisation of the country. Functioning national institutions and voluntary organisations have an important role to play in building trust between the state and the citizens. Only on such a basis will the state be able to cope with challenges related to development and security without external assistance.

151. The role of military forces in integrated operations is normally related to ensuring security. An adequate level of security for the population, national authorities, the UN and other organisations is a prerequisite for economic and political reconstruction. A gradual normalisation of the society, including the establishment of legal system and security forces, will eventually make it possible for the local authorities to regain internal control. The establishment of national security forces is in many cases a prerequisite for gradual reduction of the international military presence.

152. The UN also has recognized the need for a more holistic approach, under the term multidimensional and integrated peace operations. In NATO, the term comprehensive approach is used. A comprehensive approach to an operation means that the implementation of different programs – political, military, developmental and humanitarian – is coordinated as a part of a strategic plan, respecting the distinctive character of each actor. A comprehensive approach increases the possibility of achieving positive synergy effects, as well as establishing the basis for a stable political development. The interaction between the military, political, developmental and humanitarian actors is decisive for the international community's ability to contribute effectively in stabilising and rebuilding post-conflict societies. Comprehensive approach is not identical with Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), which is a more limited concept for cooperation between military forces and civilian units at the tactical operational level.

153. Comprehensive approach shall be the basis for the participation of Norwegian forces in peace operations. This will have an impact on the culture within the military organisation, as well as the development of the organisation and capabilities. Coordi-

nation and role specialisation between the different actors requires a new mind set and new management systems. Traditional divisions between military branches and services must be reduced. The operation in Afghanistan illustrates that military means alone are not sufficient in order to ensure stability and good governance. Used in isolation, military forces can be counter-productive. Experience also shows that lack of coordination can complicate the relationship with the civilian population. Norway will therefore continue to stress the need for better coordination of military, political, developmental and humanitarian efforts.

154. As a general rule, military forces should not have a role with regard to development aid and reconstruction. However, this is not clear-cut. As a consequence, the NAF shall promote the UN guidelines regarding military contributions to humanitarian operations. The distribution of roles must be as clear as possible, in order to secure a humanitarian space" in conflict situations. Humanitarian actors must be regarded as impartial to the conflict, and given the opportunity to operate without restraint. There is also a distinction to be drawn between humanitarian and long-term development efforts. Long-term reconstruction in a post-conflict area is often a part of a comprehensive political strategy, as is the military presence. It is therefore too simplistic to make this into a debate on "the military" versus "the civilian" roles in post-conflict situations. However, it is important to have clear definitions of roles, in order to secure effective interaction, while at the same time avoiding unfortunate role confusion.

155. Women and children have a particular need for protection in armed conflict. UN Security Council Resolution 1325 states that women have the equal right to participate in decision making procedures related to conflict resolution, peace and security. It further states that women and girls shall be protected against sexualised violence. Against this background, the gender perspective shall be integrated in all training of Norwegian military personnel designed for international missions.

4.7 The Total Defence Concept

156. In order to reflect both changes in the security policy environment and the broader concept of security, the Total Defence Concept has since 1990 undergone modernisation. The expanded Concept comprises mutual civil-military support and coordination in the whole spectrum of crises, from peace time via crisis to armed conflict and war. Formal entry into force of the emergency legislation is no longer a prerequisite for the application of the Concept. The modernisation is motivated by the increased requirement for unique military capabilities and resources in crisis management. There is also an ambition to keep the Concept relevant in light of today's broad definition of security (cf. Section 1.3). The aim is to make sure that the resources of the society are utilised in the most effective manner with regard to prevention, contingency planning and consequence management. Support from the NAF is based on the understanding of clear lines of responsibility and cost-sharing. Contributions from the NAF will be based on available capabilities, competence and resources for solving the primary tasks of the NAF.

157. The Total Defence Concept in the widest sense includes civil-military management and coordination, civilian support to the NAF, and the NAF's support to the civilian society in order to protect societal security. "Civil-military cooperation" is a wider term than the Total Defence Concept, as it also comprises any cooperation between civilian and military authorities which is not directly related to crises and war.

158. The principle of civilian support to the NAF in times of crisis and war is still relevant. Comprehensive and compulsory civil support to the NAF will normally imply the implementation of the emergency legislation. Security policy changes and changes in the economic and commercial structures of the society influence the possibility to obtain support from the civilian society. The NAF have also been given responsibility for an increased number of tasks, both at home and abroad, without the implementation of the emergency legislation. In such situations, civilian support to the NAF must be based on commercial arrangements and cooperation.

159. Emergency planning and crisis management are based on the principles of liability, conformity and decentralisation. This also applies to the Total Defence Concept:

- The principle of liability means that the authority having a particular field of responsibility, assumes that responsibility in cases of crisis as well.

- The principle of conformity states that organisational structures handling crisis situations should to the extent possible be the same as the normal peace time organisation.

- The principle of decentralisation states that the responsibility for crisis management should be handled at the lowest possible level. However, security policy crises and nuclear accidents affect the relationship with other states, and will therefore always be handled at the central level.

PART V

GUIDELINES FOR THE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY OF THE NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES

5.1 The Development of the Operational Structure of the NAF

160. The further development of the NAF must be based on a reasonable balance between expectations, and the NAF's ability to deliver. In a changing security environment, the NAF must have the ability to adapt. Such adaptations must be conducted on the basis of our security and defence policy, the defence planning system, and the actual force structure and capabilities. The defence policy is important in this regard, as it represents the link between the overall security policy objectives, and the development of a relevant structure, organisation and activities.

161. The point of departure for adjustments to the NAF's structure must be the whole spectrum of security challenges facing Norway. Provided the necessary resources are made available, continuous adjustments should produce a defence that is capable of managing all defined tasks in an effective manner. In this regard, the force structure must be designed to meet both current tasks and requirements, and serve as a basis for long-term development and modernisation.

162. The further development and modernisation of the structure of the NAF shall be based on the following overall considerations:

- The ability for good management and continuous renewal and improvement.
- Relevance in relation to current tasks that must be solved alone or in cooperation with Allies and partners.
- Long-term balance between resources, operational structure, force production, infrastructure and support activities.
- Continued close cooperation between the defence sector and the civilian society, with the aim of utilising defence resources for the benefit of the society as a whole.

163. The most important criteria for a modern defence force is the ability to handle a wide spectrum of challenges. The bulk of military units must be able to operate in a national, as well as an international context. Norwegian forces must be relevant also in a NATO context. This underlines the need for interoperable and deployable forces with high readiness and suitable logistics.

164. Norway's membership in NATO means that several fundamental Norwegian security interests are taken care of in a multilateral framework (tasks 5 and 6). Against this background, Norway must contribute with relevant, flexible and interoperable forces, in order to secure fair burden-sharing within the Alliance, and strengthened NATO cohesion and solidarity.

165. Requirements related to both NATO's common and national force contributions have been endorsed by Norway. Hence, there is in principle no conflict of interest between national and Allied requirements, including Norwegian force goals. Allied requirements serve as a benchmark for the NAF's ability to solve the full spectrum of tasks. Cooperation within NATO also has positive effects in increasing the competence, knowledge and operational capability of the NAF.

166. A number of tasks will, as a general rule, be solved nationally and without Allied participation (tasks 1-4). The NAF must be able to solve these tasks on the basis of available military capabilities under Norwegian control. As a rule, such capabilities should also be available for multinational operations.

167. In determining the ability of the NAF to solve the full spectrum of tasks, it is important to consider the overall structure and operational capabilities, rather than the individual services. Modern military operations require contributions from several services within a joint operational framework. The importance of joint capabilities is increasing, at the expense of the traditional focus on the different services.

168. The operational requirements of the NAF force structure can be expressed as follows:

- The NAF must be developed in order to tackle a multitude of challenges, both at home and abroad. Based on the reform process initiated in 2001, the transformation from a mobilisation defence to a defence based on flexible reaction forces is largely accomplished. However, an active follow-up is required.

- The NAF should, if necessary with civilian support, be able to conduct surveillance and intelligence operations, as well as upholding sovereignty and sovereign

rights. The NAF must also be able to contribute to credible episode and crisis management. All these tasks require a spectrum of readily available military capabilities which give the ability for calibrated response.

- There is a requirement for forces with adequate level of common training, capable of executing missions in the whole spectrum of conflicts in a joint operational framework. This requires forces with high quality, high readiness, strategic and tactical mobility, self-protection, sustainability, as well as flexible command and control.

- Episodes, as well as terrorist attacks will normally occur with little or no prior warning. In order to meet such challenges, a sufficient part of the NAF must have short response time.

- Sustainability is important. Sustained deployment of combat and support forces is the general rule in operations abroad. Crisis management at home may also require sustained deployment of combat forces.

- Conscription will remain of great importance, in order to anchor the NAF in society, and to secure competent personnel. Conscription is also important for force generation and sustainability. This is of great importance for the availability of Norwegian forces for national and Allied tasks.

- With the aim of reducing the vulnerability of modern society, the NAF must have a capability to support the civilian society. Such activities will take place within the framework of the expanded Total Defence Concept.

- Challenges related to Norway's adjacent areas underline the fact that the security of Norway is dependent upon the Western security community. The NAF structure must to the extent possible be based on NATO standards, and link NATO to our part of Europe through exercises and training, regular presence, maximum interoperability and host nation support arrangements.

- Active participation in peace support operations within the framework of the UN and NATO are important. This is a contribution also to the security of Norway. Such participation is therefore decisive for the NAF structure and force posture. Norwegian forces must be able to participate in the whole spectrum of peace support operations, from preventive via peace keeping to peace enforcement operations. In this respect, Norwegian forces must be able to cooperate closely with both Allied and partner countries.

169. Taken together, the NAF must have the whole spectrum of basic military capabilities, in order to be capable of handling a broad range of challenges in a national, as well as in an international context. Within a limited defence structure, it will be important to avoid overlapping capabilities. With regard to national tasks, a balance must be struck between the ability for continuous surveillance and military presence, and the ability to quickly concentrate forces on land, at sea and in the air. With regard to international tasks, emphasis is put on the ability to contribute with substantial units of high quality which are able to cooperate with Allied and partner forces. Logistic and support functions must be tailored according to the needs of the combat units.

5. 2 Personnel and Competence

170. The most important resource of the NAF is the personnel and their competence. Significant changes to personnel structure and competence are time consuming. It is therefore critical to have a comprehensive and long-term perspective on the development of the personnel structure and its competence. This is a precondition for the availability of personnel with relevant qualifications in sufficient numbers to man the future structure. An adequate balance between the various personnel categories has to be struck. In order to ensure the resilience of the organisation, it is also essential to develop and to maintain relevant capability. Vertical as well as horizontal career paths must be ensured. Network-Enabled Defence must be given priority, in order to allow all employees to share relevant information regardless of where they are in the organisation. A precondition for getting maximum effect out of Network-Enabled Defence, is the targeted development of competence throughout the organisation.



171. The NAF must be an attractive work place also in the future. Recruiting and retaining personnel in today's labour market is a question of both overall economic trends, and the status and reputation of the NAF. Competition for personnel is expected to increase, and recruitment has to be adjusted to this reality. There is a need for diversity of personnel, in order to secure the necessary spectrum of qualifications and requirements for international operations. The NAF must recruit, retain and develop both military and civilian personnel that are able and highly motivated, and with the appropriate competence. With diversity in professional background, age, ethnic origin and gender, the population will better relate to the NAF. This will enhance the NAF's legitimacy within society. The NAF has zero-tolerance for harassment and discrimination based on gender, sexual orientation or disability. The NAF has a general obligation to care for its personnel through career planning and working environment measures. Personnel deployed to international operations will be given support and follow-up, both before, during and after the operation.

172. The organisational culture must support the general development of the defence sector and influence its overall attitudes and values. The NAF face continuous dilemmas and questions of ethical behaviour and attitudes. Military conflict is in most cases a question of values. It requires an organisational culture with ethical awareness reflecting the norms and rules of our society, and in line with Norway's national and international obligations. Clear examples of this are the promotion of human rights and the security of both men and women in conflict areas.

173. The future development of the NAF will become more predictable, as a result of a more continuous defence planning process within the framework of the integrated Ministry of Defence. Further adjustments to the structure and the organisation will be an integral part of the normal political decision making process. We will not examine the whole structure every fourth year, as was done in the past. This new planning system must also be reflected in the culture. A key component will be leadership open to change, which of course has to be balanced with a level of continuity among leaders. The NAF also have to develop practical measures necessary for change. Proper meeting places and transparency are essential in this regard. Loyalty towards political decisions is also important.

174. There is a potential for further development of the educational system in order to meet new demands for competence, including effective resource management and increased focus on joint operations. However, there is a need to differentiate between the requirement for NAF's in-house competence and the type of competence that can be obtained through civil-military and multinational cooperation.

175. The NAF will, to the extent possible, and in accordance with political priorities, seek new competence through multinational cooperation. Civil-military cooperation should also be utilised to ensure specific competence, where this is possible and cost effective.

176. The military profession puts specific physical and psychological demands on its personnel. The demand for new competence is constantly evolving. As a result, personnel are changing positions or functions within the NAF, and there is also a need for proper arrangements for those leaving the Armed Forces.

177. Civilian personnel are a critical resource for the NAF. Civilian employees in the defence sector represent a necessary and complementary competence to military personnel. Civilian personnel also represent continuity and institutional memory.

178. In order to reach the target for female recruitment to the NAF, mandatory screening sessions for women are being introduced. The purpose is to ensure that women have equal access to information on the opportunities offered by the NAF, and to increase the portion of women completing conscription service.

179. Military conflict affects men and women differently. Consequently, this must be reflected in the approach to men and women in war, conflict, peace and security. Norway is committed to increase the number of women in international operations, and to ensure that gender experience and needs are reflected in the operation. It is also important to ensure the participation of women in all phases of a peace process. Increased participation by women in international operations will enable the NAF to establish relations with the civilian population, including women and women's organisations. This is important in building confidence and credibility between the mission and the civil society. A gender perspective in operations means that female and male perspectives are incorporated in all phases of an operation, including in the planning, training and composition of force structures, and through the implementation and evaluation of operations, both nationally and internationally.

5.3 The Use of New Technology

180. The development of new weapons systems, equipment and mode of operation of military forces is to a large extent determined by the technological development. New information technology in particular, provides better interaction in networks across levels, sectors and services. This ensures a more flexible and coordinated use of resources with increased efficiency as a result. The Network-Enabled Defence Concept is a product of this development. Procurement of capabilities and structural elements in support of Network-Enabled Defence are now being implemented in the NAF.

181. The technological development has a huge impact on how military forces are composed and how operations are conducted. A consequence of the technological

development is the constant need for updated and relevant competence. This has to be reflected in the NAF's education and training system. Technology also has implications for the safety and security of personnel in operations, both in terms of the need for more efficient protection, but also in terms of vulnerability. New technology does not in itself reduce the need for force protection. However, technology can be used as an instrument for more efficient protection. It is therefore essential to have the ability to understand, utilise and influence the technological development, both operationally and in long-term defence planning.

182. Technological development has a huge impact on costs of military equipment. On the one hand, cost increase on military equipment creates pressure on the NAF's budgets and leads to uncertainty regarding the long-term structural development. Commercially available technology is generally less expensive than technology developed specifically for military use. The adaptation and use of commercially acquired technology can, however, also carry extra cost. The unit cost for modern defence equipment has a tendency to increase from one generation to the other. Smaller states have limited influence on this development, compared to bigger countries. The extent of cost-increase is difficult to predict, particularly in a long perspective.

183. Future risks and the technological development point in the same direction as far as the structural development of the NAF is concerned. A relevant force must have a technological level that enables it to operate efficiently, both alone and together with Allied forces. An increase in operational capacity through the use of new technology can in certain situations and operational environments be decisive for a successful outcome. This does not imply that the NAF must have the same technological level in all areas as other Allies. However, the ability to interact with Allies across services and the whole spectrum of operations must be secured.

5.4 Division of Labour and Multinational Cooperation

184. Multinational defence cooperation provides for cost-effective acquisition and management systems. Such cooperation also promotes the development of critical competence, new technology and improved defence capabilities. Multinational military

cooperation is therefore considered as a crucial instrument to develop and ensure the defence capability of the NAF. At the same time, it is important to ensure national control over crucial operational capabilities, first and foremost those that are necessary for solving tasks 1-4.

185. Multilateral defence cooperation has traditionally focused on operational aspects. This is important for the ability to interact, efficiency and interoperability. However, this cooperation has to be supplemented by cooperation in the areas of force generation, equipment, maintenance and logistics. This type of cooperation can also yield substantial savings, thereby contributing to improved operational capability. Maximum effects will normally require system similarity, based on identical weapon and force production systems.

186. In November 2008, the Nordic defence ministers established a new forum for Nordic defence cooperation, NORDSUP. This cooperation forum represents the political and administrative framework for the implementation of the 2007 Norwegian-Swedish feasibility study and the 2008 trilateral Norwegian-Swedish-Finnish report. These studies are based on the assumption that the Nordic countries are facing similar challenges regarding the development of military capabilities within a force-structure in long term balance. The studies indicate that a closer, mutually reinforcing cooperation in areas of capability development, force production and logistics can have considerable long-term operational and economical advantages. From a Norwegian perspective, the development of Nordic military cooperation is a supplement to our defence cooperation in NATO.

187. Within the NATO framework, Norway already participates in a wide range of bilateral and multilateral cooperation arrangements in areas such as command and force structures, operations, exercises and capability development. Examples are NRF, the German-Netherlands Corps, the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, NATO Integrated Air Defence System, AWACS, NATO Standing Naval Forces, as well as multilateral cooperation on Strategic Airlift (C-17). In addition, Norway has a close collaboration with the other European NATO countries operating F-16 fighters, including the Netherlands, Denmark and Belgium. In addition to the close defence cooperation with the USA,

Norway over the years also has gained valuable experience from the cooperation with a number of European Allies surrounding the North Sea, including the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark (the North Sea Strategy).

188. In the future development of multinational defence cooperation, emphasis will be put on developing integrated solutions, based on the principle of mutually reinforcing defence structures. This will strengthen the ability of participating states to meet new challenges jointly in a more cost-effective manner. Such solutions will also ensure that small countries have at their disposal capabilities across the entire defence structure, by giving them access to capabilities they could otherwise not be able to maintain.

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The international development is evolving rapidly. Norway, as any other country, is affected by world events. Unexpected challenges may occur. Norway will contribute to a development where such challenges are handled effectively within a multinational framework. The NAF also has a role to play in this respect. Norway will continue the transformation of the NAF into a modern defence based on flexible reaction forces, as an efficient instrument of security policy.

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