National Internal Security Policy

2014-2018

Ministry of Interior

In the Name of Allah the most beneficent the most merciful

National Internal Security Policy - 2014 - 18

1. This first ever National Internal Security Policy (NISP) is formulated to protect national interests of Pakistan by addressing critical security issues as well as concerns of the nation. It is based upon principles of mutual inclusiveness and integration of all national efforts and includes three elements *viz* i) dialogue with all stakeholders, ii) isolation of terrorists from their support systems, iii) enhancing deterrence and capacity of the security apparatus to neutralise the threats to internal security of Pakistan. This requires integrated efforts through an institutionalized monitoring framework under democratic leadership to elicit support and cooperation of local and international stakeholders.

2. Global terrorism and armed conflict in Afghanistan have changed the internal security paradigm of Pakistan. Pakistan's economy has suffered a loss of more than US$ 78 billion in last ten years only. More than 50,000 Pakistanis, including civil, Armed Forces and law enforcement agencies (LEAs) personnel, were affected or sacrificed their lives. This challenges the resolve and resilience of people of Pakistan for peace.

National Internal Security Environment

3. Internal security environment is dominated by non-traditional threats of extremism, sectarianism, terrorism and militancy. In present form, the internal security apparatus is inadequately equipped and enormously strained to tackle these threats. This elucidates the dire need for a comprehensive and inclusive response plan, as no single state agency is capable of dealing with such threats on its own.

Scope

4. Whereas it is critical to define the composite picture concerning threats to National Security, NISP essentially remains focused on Internal Security. National Internal Security (NIS) paradigm, however, would be incomplete without identifying

its linkages with external diplomatic initiatives and various other dimensions of human security. In some parts of the country hostile networks have also challenged the writ of the state. Nonetheless, national security apparatus including Ministry of Defence (MoD), is dealing with this situation under political oversight. Other, relevant state institutions will address social, economic, environmental and external security aspects.

Vision

5. Create a safe environment where life, property, civil liberties and socio-economic rights of the citizens are protected and the people of Pakistan are able to live and prosper in harmony, freedom, respect and dignity as enshrined in the Constitution of Pakistan.

Threat Perception

6. Pakistan is facing serious traditional and non-traditional threats of violent extremism, sectarianism, terrorism and militancy. This has adversely affected economic stability and social harmony, and continues to instil a sense of insecurity among the people at large.

7. Subversive activities and a pattern of targeting the national security apparatus and key installations by the terrorists and non-state armed groups have compounded the challenge. Faced with the complexity of the situation, use of chemical and biological substances by terrorist and non-state armed groups cannot be ignored and MoD is equipped to deal with these extreme threats.

8. Terrorist networks lurk in shadows and thrive on a strategy of invisibility and ambiguity. They operate in an ideologically motivated network of networks to embroil the State on physical, psychological and ideological levels.

9. The widespread spectrum of internal threats is a critical impediment to economic development and social cohesion. Traditionally, the entire internal security apparatus acts in a reactive rather than proactive manner. In the absence of an integrated internal security response, the terrorists are expanding their network to the detriment of national integration and economic betterment of the people of Pakistan.

Policy Objectives

10. To establish the writ of the state and protect the people from all internal threats.

11. To protect the life, property and fundamental rights of the citizens of Pakistan.

12. To promote pluralism, freedom, democracy and a culture of tolerance.

13. To prevent, deter and contain threats to internal security in a transparent, accountable and just manner.

14. To resolve and manage disputes with hostile elements peacefully without compromising the rule of law.

Policy Framework

15. The soft component of policy framework outlines an integrated process of research and coordination on key issues. It highlights primacy of the political process, supported by a Comprehensive Response Plan (CRP). CRP is focused on winning over trust and confidence of general public to combat extremism and terrorism. The hard component of NISP comprises of Composite Deterrence Plan (CDP). It complements the existing internal security apparatus to combat terrorism.

Comprehensive Response Plan (CRP)

16. CRP is a composite process based on dialogue with all sections of society. It includes infrastructure development, Rehabilitation of victims of terrorism, National Narrative Reconciliation, Reintegration and Legal Reforms. All these encompassing elements of social, economic, and ideological domain require utmost attention and careful execution.

Reconstruction

17. Terrorism has not only affected the socio cultural environment but it has also damaged the scarce existing infrastructure in Pakistan by way of frequent attacks on educational institutions, healthcare facilities, communication networks, and supply of energy within the country. NACTA will coordinate with all relevant agencies for fair assessment of losses, monitor and recommend plans for securing the infrastructure.

Rehabilitation

18. Sustainable and integrated development for rehabilitation of affected regions is fundamental in collaboration with respective Provincial Governments. Though such efforts are already in place but need vigorous follow up for timely implementation and quick impact. It will also ensure that victims of terrorism are provided sufficient support through similar programs.

19. Towards this end, enormous support of various public and international organizations is available, but requires synergy and improved communication. NACTA will analyse the shortcomings of planning and execution and recommend appropriate strategies in this process. An integrated evaluation and monitoring mechanism shall be established within NACTA to coordinate the process of rehabilitation.

National-Narrative

20. Constructing a robust national narrative on extremism, sectarianism, terrorism and militancy is the corner stone of an ideological response to non-traditional threats. Such a narrative is essential for coming up with common ideological denominators in a diverse society. Religious scholars, intelligentsia, educational institutions and media are the key stakeholders for constructing and disseminating the National Narrative. NACTA will facilitate a dialogue with all stakeholders to strengthen democratic values of tolerance respecting diversity of the society.

21. NACTA in consultation with other institutions supporting NISP will develop a National De-Radicalization Program.

Reconciliation

22. NACTA will devise strategy options in consultation with experts and relevant departments for peace building with extremist elements and terrorist groups opting to submit to lawful authorities and reconcile their differences on key issues within the legal framework.

Reintegration

23. The reintegration aspect of CRP is a holistic people centric process. This has direct bearing on economic security of the citizens and it needs an integrated

response from public, private and development sector and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs).

24. First, it envisages a Youth Engagement Strategy (YES) imparting technical and vocational education, creating jobs and offering soft loans in collaboration with respective Provincial Governments to ensure decent livelihood opportunities for all.

25. Secondly, this reintegration also envisions the incorporation of madrassas in the mainstream educational framework. Understanding the critical role played by these institutions for a pluralistic society, it is important to integrate them within the national educational system by supporting their administration, financial audit and curriculum accreditation. The same applies to other private sector educational institutions.

26. NACTA will conduct research and consultations to come up with an implementation strategy and road map to fill the gaps in the existing process taking along all stakeholders, educational institutions and other relevant provincial and federal authorities.

Legal Reforms

27. Implementing of NISP requires a comprehensive review of existing legal framework. This reform process will respond to imperatives of criminal justice and ensure the protection of fundamental rights of the citizens of Pakistan. Among other reforms in criminal justice, it also requires review of the regulatory capacity of the state to monitor, evaluate and prevent the misuse of existing laws under which mosques and madrassas are functioning.

28. NACTA will conduct detailed research and consultation with relevant stakeholders including Ministry of Law & Justice, Judiciary, Police, prosecution, prisons and legal experts to recommend a futuristic legal framework capable of addressing all contingencies of NISP.

Composite Deterrence Plan (CDP)

29. The National Internal Security Apparatus (NISA) suffers from inadequacies to identify the threat, analyse it, and respond quickly at all tiers. Best practices suggest that CDP would remain elusive without synchronization of national efforts and democratic oversight.

30. Despite all material constraints the overall performance of law enforcement agencies is inconsistent and needs improvement. CDP will provide a consistent approach through integration of specialized skills and capabilities to combat traditional and non-traditional threats to internal security. This needs restructuring and capacity building of NISA on urgent basis for enhanced service delivery of justice and security.

31. NISP aims at performance enhancement of existing apparatus and filling the capacity gaps of NISA by creating new but cost effective and efficient institutions. CDP seeks to change the posture of national internal security apparatus from reactive to proactive. The immediate objective is to eliminate growing menace of terrorism by, inter alia, filling the coordination gaps in intelligence regime to develop proactive systems.

32. While tackling non-traditional security threat, it would be imperative to address traditional threats by using conventional law enforcement apparatus more effectively. Towards this end, identification and mapping of critical security threats to public is essential to articulate a response strategy under a unified command and control.

Contours of NISP

33. The contours of response mechanism of NISP hinge upon the major activities under taken by various stakeholders implementing the CRP and CDP.

34. Construct a national narrative on extremism, terrorism, sectarianism and militancy to dispel the wrong perceptions created by the terrorists on ideological basis by engaging media, civil society organizations, overseas Pakistanis and international community to elicit support and cooperation.

35. Design and implement national de-radicalization program for the people vulnerable to extremism that can be rehabilitated and reintegrated in the society.

36. Integrate the mosques and the madrassas in the national and provincial educational establishment by mapping and thereafter mainstreaming the existing and new madrassas and private sector educational institutions.

37. Develop social and physical infrastructure in terrorism-affected regions through sustained and inclusive efforts by all state institutions at federal and provincial levels.

38. Rehabilitate all victims of terrorism especially vulnerable groups like women, children, elderly, minorities and people with special needs.

39. Improve worsening law and order situation by eliminating trends of targeted assassinations, extortion, kidnapping for ransom and other serious and organized crime.

40. Ensure protection of key installations and places of national importance.

41. Enforce a comprehensive arms control regime across the country.

42. Prevent misuse of social, electronic and print media; mobile phone Sims and electronic devices, and prevent cyber crimes for any purpose threatening internal security.

43. Integrate national database and registration plan to identify people residing in Pakistan and their assets.

44. Design and implement plans to regulate lawful movement of Afghan refugees within the country.

45. Enforce a robust border control regime to interdict illegal cross border movement of persons, goods, drugs and precursors, weapons or any other material threatening internal security.

46. Capacity building and modernization of all pillars of Criminal Justice System including judiciary, police, prosecution and high security prisons in all geographic entities of Pakistan.

47. Establishment of Directorate of Internal Security (DIS) under NACTA where thirty three civilian and military intelligence and operational agencies are represented having clear articulation of command and control by integrating all grids of tactical, operational and strategic intelligence, civil and military, under one roof.

48. Capacity building of DIS for collection, analysis and dissemination through integrated qualitative intelligence gathering efforts having direct bearing on Internal Security to develop operational capability of conducting 'Intelligence Based Operations' to contain, pre-empt and eliminate terrorism and other threats to public safety.

49. Establishment a modern, well-equipped Federal Rapid Response Force (RRF) comprising of Counter Terrorism Departments and Police with experts from other security institutions with nationwide reach and capability to interface and operate in close coordination with Police, CAFs and Pakistan Armed Forces.

50. Reorganization and activation of Counter Terrorism Departments (CTD) within Police organizations of all the Provinces, Islamabad Capital Territory, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, preferably with uniform structure and unified command at provincial, regional and field level.

51. All CTDs to comprise of intelligence, operations, investigations, Provincial Rapid Response Forces (RRF) and other technical sections enabling themselves to tackle the entire spectrum of internal security threats including terrorism and subversive activities.

52. Modernization of RRFs under CTDs with matching capabilities as that of Federal Rapid Response Force (RRF) for ensuring uniformity.

53. Establishment of a dedicated CAF headquarter under MoI for integrated border management and modernization and coordination of CAFs, i.e. Pakistan Rangers (Punjab and Sindh), Frontier Corps (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan), Frontier Constabulary, Gilgit-Baltistan Scouts, Pakistan Coast Guards, and Anti-Narcotics Force.

54. Modernization of law enforcement components of Pakistan Customs besides Levies in FATA and Balochistan and other LEAs.

55. Making concerted diplomatic efforts for international cooperation to break transnational affiliations of terrorists through prevention of money laundering,

organized crime and transnational movement of substances used in biological and chemical terrorism.

International Cooperation

56. NACTA will liaise with international actors for fostering cooperation to counter terrorism and extremism.

Policy Directives

57. Peaceful resolution of disputes with all the sections of society is the cardinal principle of NISP, through dialogue from a position of strength.

58. Ministry of Interior (MoI) is the lead ministry for National Internal Security Policy implementation.

59. For NISP implementation, all CAFs will be directly responsible to MoI.

60. Each ministry, organization, intelligence agency and department shall furnish such information and intelligence as solicited by NACTA and shall clearly outline and pursue a roadmap in support of NISP within 30 days.

61. Incentives will be available for specialized functions at all levels for the organizations dedicated to NISP implementation.

62. Restructuring of Ministry of Interior, Police and CAFs and other LEAs will be undertaken to rationalize their mandate and resources to implement the NISP framework. Whereas all the existing well functioning structures will remain intact, any overlapping and/or redundant units in Police and CAFs will be integrated to fill the gaps in the relevant organizations.

63. Political consensus for NISP will be solicited through consultative process with all the stakeholders.

64. Public support for NISP will be solicited through all communication channels. Valuable suggestion and input from intelligentsia, media and CSOs will be invited by NACTA for improvement in the NISP and mid course corrections where needed.

NISP Implementation Plan (NISPIP) - 2014 -18

Para	Activity	Responsibility	Timeline	Approximate Cost
10	Establish the writ of the state and protect the people from all internal threats. **(End State Objective of the Policy)**	National Internal Security Apparatus (NISA) including NACTA, Armed Forces, CAFs, Police with support of national and provincial Intelligence Agencies.	On going	Initial cost of Rs. 32 Billion kept in the NISP 2014-18 for raising and capacity building of NACTA, CTDs, CAF HQ and RRF. Further investments are subject to approval of developmental strategies of NISA's organs.
11	Protect the life, property and fundamental rights of the citizens of Pakistan.	(National Security Apparatus) including NACTA, Armed Forces, CAFs, Police.	On going	Linked to para 10.
12	Promote pluralism, freedom, democracy and a culture of tolerance.	NACTA to construct and disseminate the national narrative on extremism, sectarianism, terrorism, and militancy in consultation with scholars, Media, academia, Religious Leaders and CSOs.	On going	Funds are allocated to NACTA for research purposes.
13	Prevent, deter and contain threats to internal security in a transparent, accountable and fair manner. (Spectrum Traditional and non-traditional Threat)	National Internal Security Apparatus (NISA) including NACTA, Armed Forces, CAFs, Police with support of national and provincial Intelligence Agencies.	2014-18	Linked to para 10 and 11.
14	Peacefully resolve and manage disputes with hostile elements without compromising the rule of law.	Democratic leadership / MoI.	2014-15	-

17	Reconstruction of Social and Physical Infrastructure in affected areas	NACTA, MoF, Mo P& D and Provincial Governments	2014-15	Funding by Federal / Provincial Governments..
18	Follow up for timely implementation of sustainable and integrated development for rehabilitation of affected regions	NACTA, MoF, Mo P&D and Provincial Governments	On going	Linked para 17.
20	Construct a National Narrative	Linked to para 12.	06 Months dissemi nate on going	Linked to para 12.
21	National de-radicalization program	NACTA, academia and CSOs.	12 months implem entatio n on going	Linked to para 12 and 20.
22	Reconciliation	Linked to para 14.	On going	Linked to para 14.
24	Youth Engagement Strategy (YES)	NACTA, Ministry of Education & Trainings & Standards in Higher Education, NAVTPC, NAVTEC and NCHD, ,	On going	NACTA will utilise fund of its R&A to devise strategy options in consultation with experts and relevant departments. Funds would be subject to the proposed investment by NACTA, and Ministry of Education & Trainings & Standards in Higher Education, Prime Minister's Easy Loans Scheme
25	Integrate Mosques and Madrasas in National educational system	NACTA, MoI Ministry of Religious Affairs and Inter Faith Harmony, CII, Ittehad-e-Madaris Pakistan, Educational Establishments in Federal and Provincial Governments.	12 Months	NACTA will utilise fund of its R&A to devise strategy options in consultation with experts and relevant departments to support this initiative.
27	Legal Reforms	NACTA, Ministry of Law and Justice, Judiciary, Police, prosecution, prisons and legal	06 Months	NACTA will utilise fund of its R&A to devise legal framework in consultation with experts and relevant

		experts.		departments.
29	Restructuring and capacity building of NISA on urgent basis for enhanced service delivery of justice and security (CDP).	MoI, NACTA, Ministerial Response and Provincial Governments	06 Months	Linked to paras 10 and 11.
34	Construct a National Narrative	Linked to para 12 and 20		
35	Design and Implement Linked to para 21 De-Radicalisation Plan			
36	Integrate the mosque and madrassa	Linked to para 25		
37	Develop social and physical infrastructure	Linked to para 17		
38	Rehabilitate all victims of terrorism specially vulnerable groups	Federal/Provincial Governments	On going	
39	Improve law and order and eliminate trends of targeted assassinations, extortion, kidnapping for ransom.	MoI, Police, Judiciary, Prosecution and Prisons and entire national security apparatus. NACTA and national and provincial Intelligence Agencies.	2014-15	Linked to paras 10, 11 and 29.
40	Protection of key installations (Protective Response to compliment NISP)	MoD, MoI, CAFs, Police and Ministerial Response.	06 Months	Linked to paras 10, 11, and 33.
41	Arm Control Regime	MoI, CAFs, Police, NADRA, ASF, Pakistan Customs (FBR), Provincial Governments	2014-15	
42	Prevent misuse of IT and cyber crimes, media	NACTA, Ministry of Information, Broadcasting & National Heritage, Ministry of Information Technology & Telecom, PTA, PEMRRA and Provincial Governments (PIDs).	Plan in 03 months Implementation on going	NACTA will utilise fund of its R&A to suggest to workout proposal and plans in coordination with various ministries.
43	Integrate National database of persons and their assets	NADRA, FBR, Federal and Provincial governments	On going	

44	Regulating the movement of Afghan refugees within Pakistan	NACTA, MoI, MFA, SAFRON, NADRA, Police, CAFs, Commissioner Afghan Refugees.	Plan 06 Months , Implementation on going	Based on worked out proposal and plans by NACTA in coordination with various ministries. Initial cost of research catered in NACTA's budget.
45	Enforce a robust border control regime to interdict illegal cross border movement of persons, goods, drugs and precursors, weapons or any other material threatening internal security.	NACTA, MoD, MoI, SAFRON, Pakistan Customs (FBR), CAFs / LEAs, NADRA, ASF.	On going	
46	Capacity building and modernization of all pillars of Criminal Justice System including judiciary, police, prosecution and prisons departments in all geographical entities of Pakistan.	MoI, NACTA, Ministry of Law and justice and Provincial Governments.	Planning in 6 Months	Linked to paras 10, 11 and 13.
47	Establishment of Directorate of Internal Security (DIS) under NACTA for integrating all grids of tactical, operational and strategic intelligence as found in civil and military intelligence of operational agencies of NISA.	MOI and NACTA, linked with para 48	6 Months	Funds allocated in NISP.
49	Establish a modern, well equipped Federal Rapid Response Force (FRRF)	MOI, NACTA	06 Months	Linked to para 46.
50	Reorganization and activation of Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) within Police.	MOI and Provincial Governments	06 Months	Funds kept in NISP.
51	All CTDs comprising intelligence, operations, investigations, Provincial Rapid Response Force and other technical sections enabling to tackle the entire spectrum of internal	MOI, NACTA	06 Months	Funds kept in NISP.

	security threats including terrorism and subversive activities.			
52	Modernization of Provincial Rapid Response Force under CTDs.	MOI and Provincial Governments	06 Months	Funds kept in NISP.
53	Modernization of CAFs	MoI and CAFs	12 Months	Fundingbased on approved development plan of CAFs.
54	Modernization of law enforcement components of Pakistan Customs and other LEAs.	MOI, CAFs, Pakistan Customs (FBR), Provincial Governments / District Administration.	Plan in 30 days	-
55	Making concerted diplomatic efforts for international cooperation to break transnational affiliations of terrorists through prevention of money laundering, organized crime and transnational movement of substances used in biological and chemical terrorism.	MOI and MoFA. NACTA will liaise with international actors for fostering cooperation to counter terrorism and extremism in consultation with MoI and MoFA.	Plan in 30 days	-
56	NACTA will liaise with international actors for fostering cooperation to counter terrorism and extremism.	NACTA, MoFA, EAD	On going	

CONCEPT PAPER

Executive Summary

Global terrorism and armed conflict in Afghanistan changed the internal security paradigm of Pakistan. The economy suffered a loss of more than US$ 78 billion in last ten years only. More than 50,000 Pakistanis, including civilian, Armed Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies' (LEAs) personnel, have been affected. This situation requires integrated efforts through an institutionalized framework under democratic leadership to elicit support and cooperation of local and international stakeholders.

1. The first National Internal Security Policy (NISP) of Pakistan is formulated to protect national interests of Pakistan and addresses critical security issues and concerns with an institutionalized response through National Counter Terrorism Authority.

2. It is based on the principle of mutual inclusiveness and integration of all national efforts and includes three elements;

    a. Dialogue with all stakeholders,

    b. Isolation of terrorists from their support systems,

    c. Deterrence enhancement by capacity building of the security apparatus to neutralise threats to internal security of Pakistan.

3. First element of NISP, dialogue, includes a comprehensive approach to deal with all segments of society from citizens to adversaries. The government will take steps to address the ideological and material aspects of internal security of Pakistan.

4. It will ensure protection of basic rights of the people and will focus on reconstruction, rehabilitation, victim protection to building a national narrative on extremism and terrorism with the help of all stakeholders.

5. For isolating those who do not want to see Pakistan as a prosperous and progressive state, a robust border management framework will be put in

place to secure borders of the country. It will also require concerted diplomatic efforts to build international support and cooperation for desired results.

6. Whereas peaceful resolution of all disputes is the first priority, it is also vital to develop a deterrence capacity to neutralise all threats to national internal security. Capacity building of Police and Civil Armed Forces is the corner stone of this policy.

7. NACTA to comprise of two directorates for implementing soft and hard components of NISP. Directorate of Research and Coordination will work on national narrative, rehabilitation, reconstruction, rehabilitation, integration, mosques and madrassa mapping, legal reforms and policies related to internal security.

8. NISP also envisages filling existing gaps in coordination and intelligence sharing by establishing a Directorate of Internal Security within the existing legal framework of NACTA. Directorate of Internal Security will disseminate proactive plans for intelligence based upon operations with all components of national internal security apparatus.

9. The implementation of NISP will require an estimated cost of 32 billion rupees and it will be implemented till December 31, 2014. Provincial component of this estimated cost is Rs. 22 billion and Rs. 10 billion is estimated cost of federal components though it will be also supporting the provinces. Timely implementation of NISP will help in proactively dealing with threats to internal security.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

NATIONAL INTERNAL SECURITY POLICY - 2014 - 18 4
NISP IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (NISPIP) - 2014 -18 13
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 19

ACRONYMS **23**

INTRODUCTION **25**
SCOPE **25**
THREAT PERCEPTION **26**
THREAT SCENARIOS **29**
INTERNAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT **29**
CAPACITY OF NATIONAL INTERNAL SECURITY APPARATUS (NISA) **30**
SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS **32**
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION **34**
GLOBAL COUNTER TERRORISM MODELS **35**

NATIONAL INTERNAL SECURITY FRAMEWORK (2014-18) **36**

DIALOGUE 37
ISOLATION 40
DETERRENCE 40
CAPACITY BUILDING OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 41
CAPACITY BUILDING OF POLICE 41
CAPACITY BUILDING OF CAFS AND OTHER LEAS FOR BORDER MANAGEMENT 42
DIRECTORATE OF INTERNAL SECURITY (DIS) 42
INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS CENTRE (IAC) 43
NATIONAL INTERNAL SECURITY OPERATIONS CENTRE (NISOC) 44
OPERATION PLANNING CENTRE (OPC) 44
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE TEAM (CIT) 44
RAPID RESPONSE FORCE (RRF) 44
AIR WING (AW) 45
PUBLIC SUPPORT 45

WAY FORWARD - NACTA **46**

ANNEX A: THREAT ALERTS 2013 48
ANNEX B: AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN 49
ANNEX C: GLOBAL TERRORISM: MOST AFFECTED AREAS 50
ANNEX D: TERRORISTS INCIDENTS: 2001---13 50
ANNEX E: WORST TERRORISTS INCIDENTS IN PAKISTAN: 2002---2013 51
ANNEX F: HUMAN LOSSES: VICTIMS AND LOCATIONS OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS 52
ANNEX G: VICTIMS AND LOCUS TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN 53
ANNEX H: UNEMPLOYMENT AND PER CAPITA INCOME 54
ANNEX I: PAKISTAN CRIME PROFILE: 2008---13 54
ANNEX J: PAKISTAN: SECTARIAN VIOLENCE (2001---2013) 55
ANNEX K: PROSCRIBED ORGANISATIONS 58
ANNEX L: REGISTERED MADRASSA IN PAKISTAN (30TH SEPTEMBER, 2013) 61
ANNEX M: URBAN CENTERS OF PAKISTAN 62
ANNEX N: LOCUS OF TERRORISM INCIDENTS IN PAKISTAN 63
ANNEX O: INTERNAL THREAT LINKAGES 64
ANNEX P: PAKISTAN POLICE: HUMAN RESOURCES 64
ANNEX Q: PAKISTAN CIVIL ARMED FORCES HUMAN RESOURCES 65
ANNEX R: POLICE BUDGET – 2009---13 65
ANNEX S: COUNTER TERRORISM LAWS IN PAKISTAN 66
ANNEX T: STATUS OF ATC CASES: 2008---12 68
ANNEX U: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: AGREEMENTS / MOUS AND DECLARATIONS 69
ANNEX V: GLOBAL COUNTER TERRORISM MODELS 72
ANNEX W: NATIONAL INTERNAL SECURITY APPARATUS (NISA) 74
ANNEX X: IMPACT OF RULE OF LAW ON PRODUCTIVITY 80
ANNEX Y: YOUTH IDENTIFIES TERRORISM AND LAW & ORDER AS MAJOR ISSUES 80
ANNEX Z: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: COUNTER TERRORISM LAWS IN PAKISTAN 81
ANNEX AA: NATIONAL COUNTER TERRORISM AUTHORITY ACT : NO. XIX OF 2013 85
ANNEX BB: NACTA ORGANISATIONAL SRUCTURE AND MANDATE 93

Acronyms

Air Wing	AW
Air Intelligence	AI
Anti-Narcotics Force	ANF
Airport Security Force	ASF
Australian Security Intelligence Organization 1949	ASIO
Azad Jammu and Kashmir	AJK
Baluchistan Levis	BL
Civil Armed Forces	CAF
Comprehensive Response Plan	CRP
Combined Deterrence Plan	CDP
Islamabad Capital Territory Police	ICTP
Counter Intelligence Centre	CIC
Counter Terrorism Department	CTD
Counter Terrorism Coordinating Agency (Indonesia)	CTCA
Directorate of Internal Security	DIS
Federal Investigation Agency	FIA
Federal Board of Revenue	FBR
Rapid Response Force	RRF
Frontier Corps (KP)	FC (KP)
Frontier Corps (Baluchistan)	FC (Baluchistan)
Frontier Constabulary	FC Const
Gilgit-Baltistan Scouts (former Northern Areas)	GBS
Gilgit-Baltistan	GB
Inter Services Intelligence	ISI
Intelligence Bureau	IB
Intelligence and Analysis Centre	IAC
Inland Revenue Security (FBR)	IRS
Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (UK)	JTAC
Joint Counter Terrorism Centre (Singapore)	JCTC
Law Enforcement Agencies	LEA
Military Intelligence	MI
Ministry of Defense	MoD

Ministry of Interior	MoI
Maritime Security Agency	MSA
Naval Intelligence	NI
National Internal Security Operation Centre	NISOC
National Internal Security Policy Action Plan	NISPAP
National Internal Security Policy	NISP
National Internal Security Apparatus	NISA
National Counter Terrorism Authority Pakistan	NACTA
National Highways and Motorway Police	NH & MP
National Police Bureau	NPB
National Counter Terrorism Centre	NCTC
National Security Coordination Secretariat	NSCS
Office for Security and Counter Terrorism	OSCT
Pakistan Coast Guards	PCG
Pakistan Railway Police	PRP
Provincial Rapid Response Force	PRRF
Special Branch	SB
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan	TTP

Introduction

After the maiden peaceful democratic transition of power in the history of Pakistan, the first formidable challenge for the newly elected government is internal security. Aspirations of the political government to deliver results for betterment of people of Pakistan based on principles of good governance cannot be realised without changing the present security situation which is result of multiple factors over a long period of time. It is a precondition for economic recovery and resolving the energy crisis with the help of local and international support. This can be achieved by integrated efforts of all stakeholders and setting realistic targets and timelines. It is, therefore, in the best national interest of Pakistan to give a clear direction to civilian and armed forces security institutions and other stakeholders by presenting a progressive National Internal Security Policy (NISP) (**p. 4**) and NISP Implementing Plan (NISPIP)(**p. 13**) by the political leadership.

This concept paper outlines, inter alia, the internal security environment, a synopsis of existing internal security apparatus and way forward in the forms of National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) to address the traditional and non-traditional threats to internal security and stability of Pakistan (**Annex A**).

Scope

National Security aspects need a comprehensive approach to deal with full spectrum of internal and external concerns to the state. However, this paper focuses on Internal Security which is a critical aspect of human security of the people of Pakistan. It is also pertinent to mention that in some parts of the country hostile terrorist networks have also challenged the writ of the state. National security apparatus of the state, in which Ministry of Defence (MoD) has a critical role, is dealing with this situation on a short-term basis under the political oversight. Other strands of human security like social, economic, environmental and external security need dedicated attention and remain out of the scope of this paper.

Threat Perception

1. Global terrorism and armed conflict in Afghanistan have changed the internal security paradigm of Pakistan. The country is facing serious traditional and non-traditional threats of violent extremism, sectarianism, terrorism, and militancy in addition to worsening crime situation in urban areas. Continuous presence and influx of approximately 1.64 million Afghan refugees is a key factor for arms proliferation and a strain on limited resources of the country (**Annex B**)[1].

2. Terrorist networks lurk in shadows and thrive on a strategy of invisibility and ambiguity. They operate in an ideologically motivated network of networks to embroil the state on physical, psychological and ideological levels. Keeping in view global terrorism and facing the complexity of the situation in Pakistan, use of chemical and biological substances by terrorist cannot be ignored and MoD is equipped to deal with these extreme threats.

3. Pakistan is the most affected country by terrorism in the world, after Iraq[2]. If the severity of the incidents is considered, then Pakistan even surpasses Iraq[3] (**Annex C**). From 2001 to 2013, there were 13897 incidents in Pakistan which is marginally less than Iraq (**Annex D**). From 2001 to 2005, there were 523 terrorist incidents in Pakistan but since 2007 to November 2013, the total number of incidents has risen to 13,198. During the year 2013, there have been 1361 incidents of terrorism. A trajectory of terrorist incidents in Pakistan shows that after Marriott bombing in Islamabad and Lal (Red) Mosque incidents the number suicide attacks in Pakistan increased alarmingly (**Annex E**). From 2001 to 2007, there were only 15incidents in Pakistan but since 2007 to November 2013, the total number of incidents has risen to 358, which is highest than any other place in the world[4]. Another lethal trend is use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) against the LEAs and it has emerged as a 'weapon of choice' of terrorists[5].

4. Direct consequence of terrorism is irreparable loss of human lives. More than 50,000 Pakistanis were affected or lost their lives due to these terrorist attacks[3]. The terrorists have indiscriminately targeted children, women, elderly people and minorities. Armed Forces personnel and members of Police and LEAs have been martyred and maimed.

5. So far, 5272 Armed forces personnel and Police officers have laid their lives in the line of duty across the country (**Annex F**)[3]. Majority of them were front line soldiers, first responder constables and officers from all ranks[6] who sacrificed their lives to protect their homeland. Religious minorities, foreign tourists and people belonging to other ethnic communities have been targeted by the extremist elements. Non-sparing policy of terrorists targeted, students, journalists, educationists, doctors and even health practitioners of polio campaigns (**Annex G**). This has also resulted in indirect causalities which cannot be estimated so for in any reliable database. These sacrifices speak volumes about the resolve and resilience of people of Pakistan for peace.

6. Pakistan's economy has suffered a loss of more than US$ 78 billion in the last ten years[3]. Non-traditional threats have posed serious challenges of governance and provision of basic services to the people in remote and undeveloped areas. Subversive activities and a pattern of targeting the physical infrastructure, national security apparatus and key installations by the terrorists and Anti-state armed groups have compounded the challenge. As part of their obscurantist policies a number of mosques belonging to various sects, schools, colleges, bridges, electric supply lines and police stations and the military posts have been destroyed by subversive activities. Besides, deprivation of livelihood opportunities for poorest of the poor, health hazards and psychological trauma of all sections of society are incalculable losses.

7. Combinations of socio economic factors and demographic changes have adversely affected the quality of governance (**Annex H**). Economic stability, sustainable development and social harmony are adversely affected, and have resulted in an alarming increase in crime and security threats to the people at large (**Annex I**). Organised crime including drug trafficking, money laundering, human trafficking and smuggling are common and multinational gangs and mafias are exploiting technological advancement to further their aims.

8. In recent years, a surge in sectarianism is alarming. There have been various incident of sectarian nature in Quetta, GB and other parts of the country (**Annex J**). Overlapping of sectarianism and terrorism is partly due to the recruitment patterns of the terrorist organisations and ideological underpinnings. The terrorists' networks are becoming a Frankenstein with the help of growing ideological convergence of local terrorists, sectarian extremists, foreign fighters and the financial support from local and international accomplices. Although the Government has taken steps to proscribe certain organisations but implementation gaps and metamorphism of these organisations remains a challenge for the National Internal Security Apparatus (NISA) (**Annex K**).

9. Terrorists are trained in spreading fear through propaganda. They run hate campaigns designed and implemented through various channels of communication including videos, brochures and social media. In the absence of cyber crimes prevention legislation[7], the legal response remains confined to limits of Pakistan Electronic Media and Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) which has limited capacity and role in checking the illegal activities on electronic media.

10. Religious rhetoric is used to motivate the young people to commit suicidal missions. Many political leaders were assassinated in such attacks[8]. The narrative of extremism revolves around the religious discourse and is presented, to comparatively less educated people, with great zeal and primitive logic. Many scholars are afraid to challenge the archaic views of extremists and some of them have been martyred for speaking the truth and exposing the fallacy of terrorists' narrative.

11. The education system of Pakistan needs structural overhauling and it is regarded as one of the least effective systems in the world with deplorable physical infrastructure[9]. Less than half of the women have never attended school[10]. At structural level, parallel systems of education in terms of elite private schools, government schools and religious seminaries were liable for development of strata in a society that fails to find any common bonds. These parallel structures open different avenues for graduates of respective streams and breed disharmony and grievances. Serious cleavages have appeared in the society as a result of these systems and continued existence in parallel spheres compounds the possibilities of violence among divided youth.

12. The madrassa, as an institution of education, has a long history and tradition in Pakistan and the subcontinent. It is important to mention upfront that not all Madrassas are a problem and therefore these must not be viewed negatively as a whole. In local environment most of them are exceptional non-governmental organisations engaged in provision of food and shelter to children who cannot afford expensive education (**Annex L**).

13. However, there were problems within some madrassas, which have spread extremism. There are some troublesome aspects of these madrassas, which impinge on national internal security, include financing from unidentified sources; publication and distribution of hate material. Overtime not only have they dated curriculum but some of them have also taken a dangerous turn in cultivating non-tolerant and violent religious attitudes. Lack of employment opportunities for students of these madrassas can cause frustration and make such youth vulnerable to prejudices and polarisation, which can lead to extremism[11]. Earlier, it was limited to madrassas for boys but Jamia Hafsa incident has brought madrassas for women also under the microscope of security analysts. Mostly these madrassas operate outside the ambit of the government specified structures.

14. Social harmony and national integration of Pakistan are the prime targets of extremists, terrorists and separatists. The concept of 'radicalisation' literature in madrassas, wherein the complete rejection of other beliefs and sectarian indoctrination plays a critical role in dividing society and adding emotive fuel to existing divisions in the society. Also a large number of terrorists, either are, or have been students of madrassas where they were brainwashed to take up arms against the state. Therefore, madrassa and mosque remains and important point of focus for any government policy to stem the spread of violent extremism in Pakistan.

15. Amidst these internal security threats, there is a lot of talk about talks. Hostile anti state elements like Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and terrorist organisations like Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and affiliated groups keep dialogue as an option to settle their disputes with the state, prima facia. Whereas it seems a noble idea to proceed on a non-violent path, it also creates confusion in the minds of the foot soldiers and police officers how to respond to suspected elements. Moreover,

without holding a strong position in negotiations, it is difficult for any party to reach at a favourable conclusion.

Threat Scenarios

16. This internal security environment and threat spectrum may lead to following scenarios.

I. **Leading Scenario**. Internal threat gradually weakening national political, economic and psycho - social power potential.

II. **Dangerous Scenario**. Continuous internal weakening for shaping environment for external aggression, or posing an existential threat to the integrity and sovereignty of State.

Internal Security Environment

17. Pakistan is a diverse country and the nature of internal security environment also varies substantially from one part of the country to the other. Approach of the terrorist in the country has depended on the comparative advantage available in the specific location of their operations. In Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan proximity of Afghanistan and presence of Taliban has made them ideal targets and abodes for terrorists. In Punjab, Sindh and other parts of the country the focus has been more on urban centres through various tactics ranging from suicide attacks to targeted killings and IEDs implantation (**Annex M**). Analysis of Ministry of Interior, National Crisis Management Cell, indicated that during 2010 – 2013, terrorists largely targeted seven agencies of FATA, Karachi, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Hangu and Swabi districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Quetta, Dera Bugti, Turbat and Kech districts of Balochistan with 2,820 terrorists Incidents. This also defines the locus of terrorism in Pakistan (**Annex N**).

18. It is hard to draw lines among traditional threats like organised crime, kidnapping for ransom and non-traditional threats like terrorism, sectarianism, extremism, militancy and insurgency under Taliban and Al-Qaida networks (**Annex O**). In Balochistan, in addition to terrorism, another critical factor is limited influence of anti-state elements in the Baloch majority districts. Amalgamating, subnational movements with sectarian terrorism, people belonging to the Shia sect and the Punjab are targeted along with the security personnel. Similar to terrorism trends in KP, boundaries of terrorism, sectarianism, militancy and organised crimes also merge, apparently, for political aims in Balochistan. These Anti-State elements have even created problems during humanitarian relief campaigns in the aftermath of recent earthquake in Balochistan[12]. In addition, drug trafficking and unmonitored cross border movement on western border remains a challenge despite the heavy presence of NATO forces in Afghanistan.

19. Karachi attracts attention being the economic hub of Pakistan. It is locus of urbanised crime and political violence in Sindh. Political violence is claiming lives of the people and armed members of political parties are behind the unrest in the city. In first eleven months of 2013, the death toll has risen to 2600 which means one person dies in every three hours due to violence[13]. Government of Pakistan has taken immediate steps through an integrated action with the help of the provincial government, Police and Pakistan Rangers Sindh. Other big cities like Lahore, Rawalpindi, Faisalabad, Gujranwala, Multan, Sukkur, Hyderabad, Peshawar, Quetta, and Islamabad are also attracting people and urban population is increasing.

20. In addition to the four province, it is the responsibility of the federal government to manage the internal security situation of three federating units; Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT), FATA, Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) and State of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). Other than Islamabad, three territories have adjoining international borders with Afghanistan, China and a Line of Control with India respectively. Therefore, the critical linkages of internal security with external security planning are very important. GB is also gaining importance as a hub of trade prospects anticipating development of the Gawadar Port. Sectarian terrorists are particularly targeting GB. Historically, these were low criminal activity areas. AJK remains a terrorism free zone in Pakistan.

Capacity of National Internal Security Apparatus (NISA)

21. One important output of this exercise of NISP is comprehensive mapping of internal security apparatus. There are thirty three (33) organisations in Pakistan at provincial and federal level dealing with internal security. Total strength of these agencies exceeds 600,000 and it is more than standing army of Pakistan. However approximately 56,000 vacancies are still lying vacant in Police and Civilian Armed Forces (CAFs) (**Annexes P & Q**). Pakistan is spending approximately Rs. 155 Billion on Policing every year and this is seventy six per cent increase since 2009 (**Annex R**). Extra expenditures have also incurred on maintaining CAFs and other LEAs deputed for NIS purposes.

22. Law enforcement capacity of state has been put to test to counter militancy at times, however, it has not always managed to succeed against the terrorists. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa the police was attacked in District Swat and CAFs were rendered ineffective in some of the tribal areas. The need for a military operation clearly underlined the inability of civil institutions to deal with the problem in these areas as well as exposed the scale of threats to internal security. In other parts of the province police has demonstrated some exceptional individual acts of bravery.

23. In Punjab the police have not faced a similar level of pressure primarily because of the nature of the terrain and the fact that, unlike KP, it neither abuts with the tribal belt nor any borderland communities living on the peripheries of the

province. However, attacks within urban centres, especially, have been extremely ferocious and well organized.

24. The metamorphosis of crime accompanied by non-traditional challenges has prompted Law Enforcement Agencies to realign their preparation and posture accordingly. In those parts of the country which are less affected, the police have generally maintained the traditional model of policing. In Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan the police forces have gone into an operational mode with other important areas of police work being relegated to back seat. Currently police training in these provinces mostly revolves around the tactical sphere[14].

25. The Police Rules 1934 describe no ratio between number of police officers assigned for population in rural and urban areas[14]. It guides that in towns where the population exceeds 30,000 one constable is prescribed for every 450 citizens (see Police Rule 2.2(2). The situation on ground in Pakistan is most favourable in ICT with one policeman for every 114 citizens followed by Balochistan (1:223), Gilgit-Baltistan (GB-1:234), KPK (1:411), Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK-1:467), Sindh (1:504) and Punjab (1:514). However, in the 21st century this is not the only yardstick to determine the human resource requirements of a modern Police department in Pakistan.

26. The armed forces have been successful in 'clearing' the captured territories by the terrorists. The army met with serious resistance and has had to face losses. The military operations in Swat and South Waziristan have removed any doubts about the inability of terrorists to withstand a well coordinated attack in open areas. However, the armed forces' capacity beyond 'clear' remains a major question mark. The security apparatus has been unable to demonstrate other capabilities essential to successful counter-insurgency: hold, build and integrate. For the latter three effective civilian follow up capacity is required. Unfortunately it has appeared inadequate so far.

27. Pakistan has a large number of Civil Armed Forces (CAF) as an intermediate arrangement between Armed Forces and Police to complete the paradigm of increasing response to internal security threats as well force multipliers in case of external aggression. The CAFs, now operating under Ministry of Interior with established linkages with Pakistan Armed Forces, have rarely been employed in a lead role like their present deployment in Karachi. They have specific capacity and dedicated resources and following further capacity building, utilization of CAFs inclusively and efficiently becomes more important.

28. Various civil and military intelligence agencies have been working in the domain of internal security however, they do not follow the same processes for intelligence management and sharing. By far, quality of military intelligence is superior to civilian agencies. This differential stems from resource allocation for the same purpose in both the organisations and working patterns and culture of civilian

and military organisations explains it further. However, there is no integrated mechanism for civil-military intelligence sharing on internal security threats.

29. The internal security paradigm relies on a legal system which needs continuous improvements. Despite international support, the physical infrastructure and legal framework needs overhauling to pose an adequate response to internal security threats. However, this is not limited to criminal procedure code, Pakistan Penal Code, The Evidence Act or other regime of Anti-Terrorists Acts (**Annex S**). It also requires a solid framework that ensures accountability of the state institutions by the citizens and guarantees protection of their civil liberties.

30. On top of this internal security environment, the proverbial absence of a consolidated data bank, and poor analytical base makes the task even more difficult for policy development in any arena. In the absence of an integrated internal security response, space between terrorist and the terrorized is continuously shrinking besides fuelling societal fault lines. The non-traditional threats, as a consequence, have also inspired insurgency of ethnic, political, economic and sectarian in nature, thus confronting the challenges of war by proxy, subversion and worsening law and order situations.

Situational Analysis

31. The origin, evolution and relative strength of each internal security threat is different. Therefore for the formulation of a coherent national internal security policy, each one of them has to be understood and analysed in its own context. At close examination one finds that all internal security threats have been seen through the prism of external political dynamics and overlooked the declining capacity of the state institutions and poor governance.

32. All categories of the terrorist groups in Pakistan have hierarchical leadership, organisation and multiple sources of funding. They have weaved a religion based narrative and have carved out a domestic support base through which they operate. One important feature that all of them share is more troublesome: all of them have foreign connections of varying degrees with the external adversaries of the state. Some of them, like the radical Islamists like the TTP, have transitional affiliations and support networks along faith and ideological lines.

33. The groups and organisations, which are involved in one from of political violence or another, have proliferated in the country over the past three decades. They are ethnic-subnational, sectarian and religious-radical in character. Even, some political entities which contest elections and speak the language of constitution and democracy have created armed wings. They use them for politically motivated target-killings and territorial turf battles in some parts of the country.

34. Pakistan's response to counter terrorism has primarily been reactive since all these years. Armed forces, intelligence agencies, CAFs and LEAs have been the key organisations employed by the state to neutralise the internal security threats. Each one of these has played critical role and lost personnel, martyred in the struggle against terrorism. The result has been clearance of large area under control of the TTP in Swat arrests of many terrorists and foiling of various plots of terror against the state. In the absence of these efforts the state of Pakistan would have been under much greater threat.

35. Total reliance on armed forces and law enforcement agencies to counter terrorism is a major weakness in the counter terrorism response by previous governments. A more comprehensive approach to counter terrorism and insurgency remains a necessity. Moreover, Police and other civilian LEAs require additional budgetary allocation for modernisation. Modernisation includes skills development, process management and application of technologically advanced gadgetry in NISA.

36. There is no forum for coordination between NIS operational and intelligence agencies in Pakistan. There has been a deficit at various levels: across provinces, within law enforcement agencies and among intelligence agencies. Provincial coordination remains non-existent and even interrogation methods vary across each province. There is no process for cross learning or sharing pre-emptive or investigation methodologies.

37. Information sharing and analysis remains a weak area. While some information does get shared individually, there is no institutionalized mechanism at provincial or federal level. The provincial law enforcement agencies do not coordinate with each other and even within each province a standardized information sharing and coordination mechanism across districts remains elusive. The second level of coordination weakness remains across the various intelligence agencies of civil and military organisations.

38. Criminal Justice system is ill equipped to deal with the internal security threats. Inability to successfully prosecute cases of terrorism remains a matter of serious concern (**Annexure T**). Also, the absence of basic investigation and case preparation skills in Police results lack of convictions by the courts.

39. There is trust deficit between the people and public institutions and due to fear of reprisals people are not prepared to become witnesses in cases of terrorism. At times police officers encourage people to come to court as witnesses but they do not depose in the absence of state protection. Very recently some witness protection bills are introduced in the provinces but their effective implementation remains questionable. Similarly, the compensation for victims of terrorism is inadequate.

40. Terrorism financing goes unchecked. In the past, a critical failure has been the inability of the governments to plug sources of financial support to the terrorists and extremists. These sources appear as a support system to some public welfare and disaster relief organisations used by extremists. Certain purportedly charitable organisations are a 'nexus between organised crime and extremists'. No major structure, or strategy, of the state exists to undertake this task. However, this government has already taken concrete steps and promulgated laws to counter terrorist financing.

41. State has been unable to respond to the ideological discourse of the extremists and Media has been the only conduit for any alternate views but these too have focused more on the acts of the terrorists instead of their ideological discourse and the inherent threat to the society and the state. While there has been no coherent response from the state there have also been no measures to block various options used by the terrorists to propagate their views. The failure includes inability to stop or counter internet based campaign of the militants and also prevent spread of their literature which is easily available all over the country with no counter narrative presented by the state.

42. Pakistan is still waiting for a coherent response to counter terrorism, extremism, sectarianism and militancy**.** Any effort at this point in history by civil and military leadership to develop an integrated response to protect national interests is *sine qua non*. For this, civil society, media, intelligentsia and faith leaders need to join hands with the elected representatives and NISA. Only then, this NISP shall bring change and hope.

International Cooperation

43. In the post-2001 era, the international community has viewed Pakistan as a key ally to counter terrorism and extremism. Pakistan has been among the leading recipients of international assistance Post 9/11, however, counter terrorism related aid to Pakistan was not commensurate to make up the losses incurred.

44. Other than the US, Narcotics Affair Section (NAS), Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) and United Nations office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), DFID UK, United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and GIZ are working with LEAs and are involved in the capacity building of NISA. Turkish government is also taking a keen interest in this arena and assisting in the developmental process of CTD in the Punjab (**Annex U**).

45. There is a dire need to coordinate all these efforts at federal and provincial level to avoid duplicity of efforts and evaluate the impact of these trainings. There

are twenty four Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) being signed by government of Pakistan but their potential is not fully realised. Pakistan values the indigenous capabilities to design local training plans for strategic benefits.

Global Counter Terrorism Models

46. A realistic analysis of the situation will inform that a comprehensive response to the present internal security threats is the need of the hour. It is a formidable challenge for a newly elected government who is facing huge challenges of governance at an unprecedented scale. The range of internal security threats varies from street crimes to nuclear terrorism. In order to opt for an appropriate response, it is prudent to examine the existing global models of counter terrorism efforts in other countries of the world. A comparative analysis is provided in (**Annex V)**. Again, before reaching any conclusion, it should be understood, that it is mandate of the elected representatives of the state to define the determinants of National Internal Security Policy. Before defining the main elements of the NISP, it is important to have brief overview of the Internal security apparatus (**Annex W**).

National Internal Security Framework (2014-18)

47. Pakistan is facing formidable internal security challenges. Political leadership and military commanders have expressed their resolve to tackle this challenge with full vigour. It should not be construed that external threats have disappeared, but compared to internal threats from multiple actors, they are relatively manageable and can be addressed through military deterrence and diplomacy and the people of Pakistan have full confidence in the capability of Pakistan Armed Forces.

48. Failures, mistakes, domestic and foreign disorientations of the past decades are no excuse for escaping responsibility for addressing the challenge of internal security at this point in time. Not taking on this challenge is not an option; rather the new democratic government considers it a primary responsibility. Independent experts believe that wide range of internal security threats at the moment present an existential threat, and if not addressed in time, these would continue to hold peace and progress a hostage. These threats have already retarded economic growth, prosperity and social harmony. The country cannot afford to deal with this threat in a reactive and disjointed manner anymore.

49. Reason and history inform that terrorism and extremism cannot subjugate the will of the free people; while the terrorists meet their natural end, states survive all traumas and travails. The objective is to restore internal peace and stability by creating a national atmosphere free of threats, intimidation, fear and violence.

50. This calls for creating a moderate, tolerant and a harmonious society; giving hope to citizens and re-establishing trust between the individual and the state. It can be done by reforming and restructuring the state institutions, forces, laws and policies created for the purpose of internal security. The vision is to make Pakistan a progressive and a developed state capable of delivering basic services to people of Pakistan, and establishing writ of the state and rule of law (**Annex X**).

51. This maiden NISP is formulated with a determination and resolve that Pakistan can and must eliminate all internal threats and challenges by employing all necessary and relevant means. This would include dialogue, social and economic development and use of force where necessary and appropriate.

52. The NISP brings clarity of responsibility with accountability. In worst security situations, Armed Forces will come and CLEAR the area. After that for HOLD purpose, Civilian Armed Forces will join and take over to assist the Police and Levies to BUILD and restore the writ of the state. In peace times, Police is the lead agency to detect, arrest and prosecute the criminals. Courts will have a constant check that all actions and policies are according to the law of the land. However, the overall accountability mandate lies with the democratic leadership who will give a direction to the National Security Apparatus and elected representatives are

accountable to people of Pakistan who have given them this mandate to protect the fundamental rights of the people and bring peace in homeland.

53. Inclusiveness, integration, human rights and gender mainstreaming are core themes of NISP under political oversight. It is imperative to reiterate that respect for life, liberty and dignity of all human beings is enshrined in the article 9 and article 14 of the constitution of Pakistan and Government of Pakistan is committed to implement these highest principles in all its policies. Similarly, without participation of women and young people, any policy in Pakistan cannot succeed. They are the future of Pakistan and vision of NISP can only be realised with the participation of present and future leadership of the country.

54. NISP framework envisages immediate measures and strategies that will stem the tide of terrorism, weaken it and eventually defeat it. Medium term policy initiatives will address structural issues that have contributed to the evolution and growth of extremism, radicalism, militancy and use of violence as a political weapon. Contours of NISP (**p. 9**) outline key measurable actions for NISA. These actions range from a thorough arms control regime to consolidation of database of all residents in Pakistan from internal security perspective. There are three elements of this NISP framework: Dialogue, Isolation and Deterrence.

Dialogue

55. Dialogue offers political means to end internal disputes but this is not the only option, though it is the most preferred way to bring peace and reconciliation. Doors are open for negotiations with all anti-state and non-state groups within the limit of constitution and without compromising the primary interests of the state-territorial integrity and sovereign of the state. Political leadership has a consensus on dialogue option as the unanimous resolution of the All Parties Conference reflects[15]. This mandates and empowers the Government to engage with the militant groups.

56. Dialogue, however, should not be taken in its literal sense only. The government will negotiate with all sections of society through an agenda of development, rehabilitation, reintegration and reconciliation. The government will make concerted efforts to work out all differences and settle the disputes peacefully. The government will make flexible and pragmatic choices about who will lead and represent the Government and which agencies, experts and stakeholders will assist this process. Government of Pakistan expects the negotiating process to be productive and meaningful and not a time gaining tactics by the hostile elements.

57. In present time of free media, narratives have great power to influence all segments of society including children and young people. There is also a need for countering propaganda of the terrorists that rests primarily on imagined grievances,

exaggerated accounts of victim hood and irrational justification of use of violence. Narratives weaved by groups sympathetic to extremists and terrorists have harmed society by incentivising intolerant attitudes and creating a comfort social abode for such elements. Using national reach of the media, public opinion can be formed against the terrorist groups by showing how they have damaged the national culture and values of tolerance and why they are enemies of the people and the state.

58. There is a need to develop a National Narrative based on tolerance, harmony and right of the people to make religious, political and social choices. Respect for diversity, humanity and service to mankind and national duty to protect the homeland are some of the values that will shape this national narrative. Constructing a robust national narrative is an essential part of this dialogue with all sections of society.

59. This will also lead to de-radicalization programs applicable in the local context with the help of the most suitable institutions and experts. There are examples of reintegrating extremist and violent persons in Swat. Pakistan Army has developed and applied an organic, national model of de-radicalization. The model programme of instruction combined with skill-development was very supportive in purging out radical ideas from the minds of terrorists, juveniles and women. The same model with further improvisation and refinement will be replicated in other specified areas of the country. De-radicalization programmes will be conducted in jails for prisoners and convicts of terrorism.

60. Poor infrastructure in terrorism affected areas needs immediate improvement and reconstruction. Similarly, victims of terrorism, without any discrimination of gender, religion, age and ethnicity, also need rehabilitation. Development connects the state with its citizens. However, human development includes social, economic and personal security and progress. Through this process of dialogue, all these aspects as well as legal rights and civil liberties of the people of Pakistan will be guaranteed.

61. The 15–29 year olds form 28 per cent of Pakistan's population–defined as the youth cohort. Between 2006-07 and 2008-09, this cohort increased by 1.8 million. The need to provide education, health and livelihood for the growing youth population will now increasingly become important16. The youth describes terrorism as one of the top issues of Pakistan (Annex Y). If these young people are not provided with the opportunities for progress, they will be unable to play a positive role. Under Youth Engagement Strategy (YES), Prime Minister's Business Loans program for youth will be implemented to attract the young people towards positive activities and prevent them from joining the terrorist organisations. Young people will be provided with soft loans, skills development opportunities and professionals will be encouraged towards entrepreneurial avenues.

62. The madrassa system cannot be excluded from the internal security parameters of the country. All madrassas derive their inspiration from some specific sect. It appears that the madrassas are in competition to proliferate for more influence and power.

63. There were various efforts made to streamline the registration of these two critical institutions, which are the main source for poorest of the poor for obtaining affordable "education" and shelter. So far all the efforts have been restricted to quantitative aspects. It is critical to bring these institutions in the mainstream and establish them as functioning bodies without external and unregulated funding. NISP will include broad based madrassa and mosque integration process in the mainstream education system so that students and alumni of these institutions can also become active members of a plural society and play a positive role in the national economy being part of a productive workforce.

64. There is also another reason for their horizontal expansion: the incentive of raising funds in the name of a madrassa locally and receiving covert funding from foreign sources. Sectarian and terrorist groups of the country receive funds through formal as well as informal money transfer channels. Controlling funding of the terrorists is a major challenge especially when the curriculum in these madrassas does not prepare the youth for the job market. By involving banks, Federal Board of Revenue and taxation departments for monitoring flow of money to suspected organisation; it is expedient to implement the laws to tighten control over foreign funding to non-governmental organisations and madrassas to distinguish between the legal and illegal flow of money.

65. One of the priorities of the Government is to amend laws, enact new laws, development of better prosecuting mechanism and create a secure environment for judges, prosecutors and witnesses to enable our anti-terrorism legal and judicial procedures to be strong and effective enough to handle the menace of terrorism. In this respect, this government has already taken some useful steps. These include, amendments in Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) 1997 and the Investigations for Fair Trials Act and rules 2013 (IFTA). The most recent addition is The Protection of Pakistan Ordinance 2013 and 2014 that aims at facilitating effective prosecution (**Annex Z**).

66. In an uncertain and fluid climate of terrorism with so many groups and forces involved, legal regime must remain adaptable. The Government and the parliament is alive to the need of revising existing laws and writing new ones to be able to cope with the prevailing state of terrorism. Convicting individuals for their crimes is universally accepted as an effective mean of deterring and discouraging more crime in the society. Under this policy government will continue to examine efficacy of laws and judicial process and make necessary changes when and where required.

Isolation

67. It is the first and foremost responsibility of the state to safeguard the core and fundamental rights like life, liberty and property of the citizens. The purpose of this policy is to protect the nation, entities, social groups and individual citizens, their assets and freedoms from harm by violent, militant individuals, groups and organisations. Isolating the terrorists group socially, legally, economically and politically remains the prime function of all internal security apparatus locally as well as diplomatic channels at international level. By target hardening, it will be impossible for the terrorists to accomplish their designs.

68. A long porous border with Afghanistan has become a major security challenge. National internal security arrangements will continue to fail without an effective and practical border management regime. This will include biometric system, identity papers and visa system for Afghan groups that are not covered by old agreements.

69. In this direction establishment of CAF HQ is the way forward to improve coordination among CAFs and brining them under the umbrella of a Pakistan Border Service but keeping the existing traditions intact under MoI.

70. A comprehensive plan will be prepared to create more effective system of their documentation as refugees, and steps will be taken to confining them to specific areas and zones in the country. NACTA will coordinate to prepare a time-bound repatriation framework for Afghan refugees.

Deterrence

71. It is to acknowledge that till present day, Pakistani Police, CAFs, LEAs and Armed forces have performed their jobs on the frontlines and thousands of them have sacrificed their lives for protecting the homeland. Government of Pakistan pays tribute to all those men and women who embraced martyrdom for this noble cause. Although dialogue is the cardinal principle of NISP but it is important to start negotiations from a position of strength by improving the deterrence capability to address present and future threats to national internal security.

72. There is no sectoral mapping of critical infrastructure-food, water, agriculture, health, energy, transportation, information, telecommunication and national monuments. Mapping up these sectors will help us identify and prioritize the structures for 'hotspot policing'. This would help the Government in hardening targets, reducing vulnerability and preventing terrorists' attacks.

Capacity Building of Criminal Justice System

73. In the absence of a well functioning criminal justice system comprising of police, prosecution services, high security prisons and probation departments and courts, it will be naïve to expect that mere modernizing the Police, LEAs and the military intelligence agencies will neutralize the internal threats. People of Pakistan also need better security services and justice in their everyday life. It is critical that a holistic approach is adopted to improve the service delivery. Resources will be dedicated for this purpose and respective departments will be able to improve their performance and capabilities.

Capacity Building of Police

74. Police is the largest and premier law enforcement agency in Pakistan and the foundation block of NISA. This will be the primary objective of NISP to modernise and organise the Police to make it service oriented and people friendly. Appropriate budgetary allocations and filling of 42000 existing vacancies in the Police all over the country is a priority. Besides capacity building of operations, investigations, intelligence, highways and traffic police; the monitoring and evaluation capacity of working of local police stations is highly desired. Establishment of specialised units and people oriented working environment in Police departments is the only way forward.

75. For proactive security measures, quality intelligence collection and dissemination will be the main weapon against preventing, countering and fighting terrorism in the country and maintaining peace. The policy rests on bottom-up approach in intelligence gathering, starting from the local level. Presently, their capacity, skills and resources are inadequate to handle the terrorist threats. Local, district to provincial level Police personnel (CTD and Special Branch) must have resources to ensure comprehensive intelligence management systems. Police will be provided with modern gadgetry, skilled and qualified human resources at all levels in all provinces.

76. Another aspect of Police reorganisation is re-examining all the efforts toward reforms and restructuring and what is cumulative experience in this respect, and what best measures can be taken for future reforms. The Police system of every province is functioning under different Police Acts but somewhat uniform judicial set up. That might be in the nature of federalist system, but for the sake of harmony and in view of the fact that traditional and non-traditional threats are growing, a uniform and coordinated response needs uniformity in Police Laws and enforcement procedures. NACTA will make policy recommendation in this aspect.

Capacity Building of CAFs and Other LEAs For Border Management

77. Deficiencies and weaknesses of the Police and CAFs have increased reliance on the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) and Military Intelligence (MI). This has overburdened them and may reduce their efficiency and effectiveness for strategic national security issues. Some part of their resources will remain committed to internal security but that should not be a substitute for the essential work of civilian intelligence agencies and LEAs. All have a significant role in NIS and have functional autonomy within their own hierarchical structures. Capacity building CAFs and other LEAs including Pakistan Customs and Airport Security Force is an essential element of NISP and each agency will make detailed action plans for implementation of NISP.

78. Traditionally, Civilian Armed Forces (CAFs) are not trained and equipped for a protracted action against the terrorists in addition to their border management duties. They have to play the role of second responders after police and the state relies on their capability. As last resort, under the constitution, the Military can be called in support of the civilian authority but practicing this excessively will be counter productive. Rebuilding all the CAFs elements with a view to enhance their capacity to meet the current and future challenges of terrorism is a viable option. The CAFs are in the federal domain and can provide assistance to the provincial governments, when required.

79. The clarity about command and responsibility of CAFs whether deployed on regular border management duties or when deployed for aid and services to the provinces, is necessary. Marking down clear jurisdictional boundaries of command and responsibility will increase efficiency and coordination between the federal and provincial governments for result-oriented performance of CAFs. Therefore, establishing a CAF headquarter headed by a senior officer under MoI will improve policies, processes and coordination mechanism between CAFs and other stakeholders.

Directorate of Internal Security (DIS)

80. Intelligence coordination among all the civilian and military intelligence agencies is one of the most important tasks under this policy. For this purpose under Section 4(a) of the NACTA Act Directorate of Internal Security (DIS) will be established at the federal level. For the intelligence to be an effective tool against the present security challenges, it must be capable and integrated at tactical, operational and strategic levels. Its full integration and utility is possible only under one central command, in one place and hierarchy of power to direct and supervise.

81. Thirty three (33) civil and military operational and intelligence agencies will contribute centralised intelligence sharing and dissemination to NISA. The DIS will integrate the intelligence community that will work towards a common purpose of neutralising threats to Internal Security by sharing information and intelligence. In many ways the DIS will prevent duplication of efforts by intelligence agencies and pool their resources for better and effective use. All intelligence agencies will be bound to provide any intelligence solicited by NACTA.

82. One of the tasks of DIS will be to provide early warnings to LEAs and other specific recipients with regard to violent-terrorist groups and organisations. A through analysis of the objectives, organisational strength, ideologies, human assets, operational networks, sources of funding and leadership of terror networks is necessary for the intelligence agencies and government to shape its responses. The analysis of intelligence data sets by DIS will help in assessing and forecasting violent trends in the society as they emerge. Without threat analyses and proactive action plans, utility of DIS would be limited.

83. An experienced and a well-reputed Director General shall head the DIS. The officers and personnel of the DIS will come from IB, MI, ISI, MoI, FIA, CAFs, and provincial Police, CTDs and from specialized fields of public and private sector on fixed term basis.

Intelligence and Analysis Centre (IAC)

84. The DIS will have one Intelligence and Analysis Centre (IAC), Planning Center and Operation Center. IAC comprises of four intelligence groups replicating the intelligence agencies-ISI, MI, Federal LEAs and Police intelligence departments. IAC will be headed by one of the heads of four groups, in addition to his own duties, on rotation basis

85. Each group in IAC will get information from relevant field units, collate and analyse at one place by sharing the connecting pieces with other agencies. Each group will have five further specialised teams head by one Team Leader and two Research Analysts from respective organisations leading the cell:

I. Anti State Groups
II. Non-State Armed Groups
III. Armed Wings of Political Parties

V. Criminal Gangs and Organised Crime Mafias

86. In addition, specialised sub-units will be established under respective group in IAC. For example, Federal group of IAC will be comprising of following teams:

I. Cyber Crimes
II. Border Control and Immigration

III. Financial Trails and Money
Laundering IV. Organised Crimes
V. Interpol Coordination and International Cooperation

National Internal Security Operations Centre (NISOC)

87. National Internal Security Operation Centre (NISOC) is the hub of information and intelligence collection from all human, technical, covert and overt sources of all agencies. It will share this information and intelligence with relevant groups. Refined intelligence from Intelligence and Analysis Centre (IAC) of DIS will also be disseminated through NISOC.

88. For improved coordination with field units, Provincial and Federal Police and CTDs personnel will be managing the NISOC.

Operation Planning Centre (OPC)

89. There will be one Operation Planning Center (OPC) where heads of four intelligence groups, Chief of Operations of DIS and DG DIS will prepare and plan operations. Execution of all these operations will be contingent to agreement of field units who have specific mandates and legal authority to conduct operations, investigations and prosecution as per existing laws of the land. DIS will be coordinating and supporting all such possible integrated operations.

Counter Intelligence Team (CIT)

90. DG DIS will also assisted by a lean but effective Counter Intelligence Team (CIT) to protect the intelligence process of internal security.

91. Like any effective intelligence organisation DIS will require continuous retraining of its personnel and re-equipping in terms of software and hardware that all modern agencies do to stay ahead of the enemies. All Police, LEAs and CAFs intelligence units will have to go through proper professional analysis of strengths and weakness to fill the gap in resources, training and equipment in order to develop their full capacity to counter and eliminate violent-terrorist networks.

Rapid Response Force (RRF)

92. The RRF will be the premium Counter Terrorism force of the Federal Government and it will complement the CTDs all over Pakistan. Provincial CTDs will also develop their RRFs on the same model.

93. The Rapid response Force (RRF) is conceived as a commando force unit to be deployed in the field at a very short notice to handle high-risk situations. This Force will respond to real-time incidents of terrorism and also pre-empt any terrorist attack by conducting Intelligence Based Operations.

94. This force being specialized and task-oriented will be trained and provided with combined arms capability. The fighting equipment and gear for this Force will be according to international standards. The first batch of RRF will be quickly organised and deployed by drawing 500 persons of professional skills from Military, Police and CTDs.

Air Wing (AW)

95. Presently, the Air Wing (AW) in MoI, with international support, is providing service to a number of CAFs and provinces for internal security purposes. The available Air Wing aircraft resources are inadequate for the task assigned to the FRRF. Presently, the AW has three Cessna and fourteen helicopters. All these assets have night-flying and airborne operations capabilities. The Force will need eight additional helicopters, and at some point, additional and improved aircrafts that some of the friendly counties are willing to provide.

96. To fully develop and equip the AW, there is a need to increase the numbers of existing aerial assets, aircrafts and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), and create more field facilities. In addition to the three operational airfields in Islamabad, Lahore and Quetta, four existing airfields can be utilised at Kohat, Bahawalpur, Fateh Jang and Ormara. These facilities will bring the entire country under operational cover of RRF.

Public Support

97. Success of NISP will depend on how people of Pakistan will respond to this framework and come forward to play an active role for saving present and future generations from the menace of terrorism, extremism, militancy and sectarianism. This is the key to winning the war against extremism and terrorism.

98. An effective communication campaign will be of utmost importance and NACTA will be making all efforts to take NISP to all stakeholders and construct positive public opinion through integrated efforts. However, this is only possible if all key pillars of the state are prepared to develop a unified narrative and support each other for building a better future for the People of Pakistan.

Way Forward - NACTA

99. NISP visualizes NACTA as the central institution in combating non-traditional threats of terrorism and extremism to internal security. It is a statutory authority that will function in all relevant areas of policy formulation, strategy and implementation.

100. Headed by the Prime Minister, Board of Governors of NACTA approves the policies and Minister of Interior plays a critical role in the implementing process as head of Executive committee in addition to his role as member of the Board of Governors.

101. In NACTA, government will create necessary capacity to develop an integrated and unified response to terrorism and extremism to protect its national interests. Lack of coordination and unified response has been a major weakness in our efforts to counter terrorism and extremism. The Authority will ensure coordination among all relevant departments and structures of NISA.

102. NACTA will be an organisation with civilian command, integrated tasks and capacity to guide the NISA to strike against the targets. In this respect, the Authority will work as a think-tank for the federal government to produce policy recommendations, monitor and supervise policy implementation, and concurrently provide support to intelligence-based operational departments at federal and provincial level. Although every element of NACTA is based on learning, experience and appropriate to national environment, but it also draws conclusions from international best practices and consultations with various experts and policy institutions.

103. The Authority will carry out, among others, the following four core functions:

I. Integrating NISA for intelligence sharing and operational purposes to proactively neutralise threats to internal security of Pakistan from terrorist and extremist elements.
II. Communication with provincial governments, intelligentsia, media, private industry and general population about threats and necessary response preparedness.
III. Preparing capacity building plans, coordinating and equipping the NISA through their respective operational units.
IV. Communication with all sections of society and other stakeholders including international donors to elicit their support in implementation of NISP.

104. Early last year, through promulgation of the NACTA Act-2013, NACTA has been conceived to be a focal organisation for coordinating Counter Terrorism efforts in Pakistan (**Annex AA**). After due process of deliberation and examination,

the 'National Internal Security Policy-2014-18' has been developed and would be placed before the Board of Governors of NACTA for final approval. The NACTA has prepared a detailed organisational set up to implement the NISP which will be presented to the first meeting of its Board of Governors for approval (**Annex BB**).

105. For *Dialogue* element of NISP, NACTA will have a Directorate of Research and Coordination (DRC) which will oversee the implementation of the soft component of NISP. In order to counter the discourse of the terrorists, a national narrative based on values of peace, tolerance and inclusiveness, will be developed and disseminated in the society. Similarly, while evolving counter terrorism measures, mosque and madrassa remains an important focus. NACTA will coordinate and make necessary plans to combat non-traditional threats to internal security of Pakistan.

106. For *Isolation* and *Deterrence* implementation of NISP, NACTA will have an integrated grid of tactical, operational and strategic intelligence under the Director General of DIS. This would generate actionable intelligence, leading to precise intelligence based operations (IBOs).

107. Rapid Response Force of Federal Government and Counter Terrorism Departments of provincial police would be in a lead role during execution of joint operations. The required manoeuvrability, for such operations, would be provided to RRF by the Air wing facility. Necessary surface support would also be available in order to realize the objectives of such 'Intelligence based operations' through CTDs and police.

108. Chief of Staff will be responsible for coordinating all policy and implementation issues of NACTA. The COS would head Principal Staff Office of NACTA and act as coordinator for supporting wings of the NACTA. He will oversee all financial, administrative, policy, training and media communication aspects of NACTA through directors of NACTA. COS enhances organizational operations, internal and external communications, keep functions orderly and focused, allowing executives to better focus on issues of strategic importance to the organization.

109. The implementation of NISP will require an estimated cost of 32 billion rupees and it will be implemented till December 31, 2014. Provincial component of this estimated cost is Rs. 22 billion and Rs. 10 billion is estimated cost of federal components though it will be also supporting the provinces.

110. With the public support and cooperation of state institutions, timely implementation of NISP will help in proactively dealing with threats to internal security of Pakistan.

Annex A: Threat Alerts 2013

Threat Alert Analysis

1st Sep – 20th Nov 2013

Province	September	October	November*	Total Threat Alerts
Punjab	18	21	33	72
Sindh	10	10	26	46
KPK	46	50	47	143
Baluchistan	21	18	27	66
ICT	8	17	25	50
FATA	18	47	47	112
AJK	3	4	22	29
Gilgit Baltistan	6	6	25	37
TOTAL	**130**	**173**	**252**	**555**

*Till November 20, 2013





Annex B: Afghan Refugees in Pakistan

According to Country Profile of Pakistan, prepared by UNHCR, there are approximately 1.64 million Afghan Refugees in Pakistan along with other entities spread over in Pakistan. The map prepared by UNHCR indicates spread of capmps in Pakistan.

Annex C: Global Terrorism: Most Affected Areas

Annex D: Terrorists Incidents: 2001---13



(Source: Ministry of Interior, NPB)

Annex E: Worst Terrorists incidents in Pakistan: 2002---2013



Source: NPB

Annex F: Human Losses: Victims and Locations of Terrorist Incidents



(Source: Ministry of Interior)

Human Losses: Approximately, 50,000 (49,994) people of Pakistan including 5,272 personnel of Law Enforcement Agencies have laid down their lives.



Since 2011---13, a total of 17, 642 people of Pakistan including 2,114 personnel of Law Enforcement Agencies laid down their lives.

Annex G: Victims and Locus Terrorism In Pakistan

'Fact Sheet' placed below facilitates a quick grasp of various dimensions of terrorism, in Pakistan.





(Source: Ministry of Interior)

Annex H: Unemployment and Per Capita Income



Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan, various issues

Annex I: Pakistan Crime Profile: 2008---13



(Source: Ministry of Interior, NPB and Oper Sources)

Annex J: Pakistan: Sectarian Violence (2001---2013)





Pakistan: Sectarian Violence DATA

YEAR	NO.OF INCIDENT	All Pakistan			
		SUNNI	SHIA	OTHERS	TOTAL
2001	69	44	34	29	107
2002	47	19	46	17	82
2003	30	20	21	125	166
2004	19	45	78	60	183
2005	68	41	27	59	127
2006	20	65	40	0	105
2007	27	12	16	1	29
2008	74	54	123	19	196
2009	145	78	137	49	264
2010	93	51	76	117	244
2011	121	88	150	1	239
2012	218	124	221	11	356
2013	42	27	269	4	300
Total	**973**	**668**	**1238**	**492**	**2398**

(Source: Ministry of Interior)

Punjab, Sindh and KPK: 2001---11 July 2013

YEAR	NO.OF INCIDENT	PUNJAB				NO.OF INCIDENT	SINDH				NO.OF INCIDENT	KPK			
		SUNNI	SHIA	OTHERS	TOTAL		SUNNI	SHIA	OTHERS	TOTAL		SUNNI	SHIA	OTHERS	TOTAL
2001	22	17	22	20	59	0	0	0	0	0	43	19	9	2	30
2002	12	7	31	13	51	29	12	15	0	27	0	0	0	0	0
2003	1	0	1	0	1	21	20	17	0	37	1	0	2	0	2
2004	8	40	30	7	77	4	3	47	0	50	1	0	1	0	1
2005	4	1	1	11	13	7	9	2	0	11	7	2	3	0	5
2006	1	0	1	0	1	3	49	2	0	51	11	9	8	0	17
2007	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	1	2	23	10	16	0	26
2008	1	0	1	0	1	6	0	3	0	3	52	32	91	4	127
2009	4	0	41	2	43	9	10	2	0	12	91	56	83	3	142
2010	3	1	42	4	47	40	33	11	1	45	19	14	17	0	31
2011	4	7	1	0	8	51	38	13	0	51	23	5	10	1	16
2012	9	4	20	1	25	8	13	3	2	18	9	15	45	0	60
2013	6	2	8	0	10	1	0	47	0	47	14	5	43	3	51
Total	**75**	**79**	**199**	**58**	**336**	**181**	**175**	**112**	**2**	**289**	**294**	**167**	**328**	**13**	**508**

Balochistan, FATA and Gilgit Baltistan

YEAR	NO. OF INCIDENT	BALOCHISTAN				NO.OF INCIDENT	FATA				NO. OF INCIDENT	GB			
		SUNNI	SHIA	OTHERS	TOTAL		SUNNI	SHIA	OTHERS	TOTAL		SUNNI	SHIA	OTHERS	TOTAL
2001	3			7	7	1	8	3	0	11					
2002	6			4	4	0	0	0	0	0					0
2003	6			125	125	0	0	0	0	0	1		1		1
2004	5			53	53	0	0	0	0	0	1	2			2
2005	13			46	46	0	0	0	0	0	37	29	21	2	52
2006	0			0	0	1	5	27	0	32	4	2	2		4
2007	0			0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1			1
2008	13			15	15	1	17	28	0	45	1	5			5
2009	23			42	42	0	0	0	0	0	18	12	11	2	25
2010	22			111	111	1	1	0	0	1	8	2	6	1	9
2011	16	11	87	0	98	14	19	34	0	53	13	8	5		13
2012	87	49	129	5	183	19	1	49	0	50	34	24	19	5	48
2013	21	20	171	1	192					0					0
Total	**215**	**80**	**387**	**409**	**876**	**37**	**51**	**141**	**0**	**192**	**119**	**85**	**65**	**10**	**160**

Note: Sindh report is upto 31 December, 2012

KPK Report is upto 31 July---2013

Gilgit Baltistan is upto 31 Dec, 2012

Punjab upto 21 March 2013

Balochistan upto 28---Aug---2013

FATA upto 19 March 2013

Annex K: Proscribed Organisations

S. No	Organizations	Proscription Date	Group Leader
1.	Lashkar---e---Jhangvi (LJ)	14 Aug 2001	Malik Ishaq
2.	Sepha---e---Muhammad Pakistan (SMP)	14 Aug 2001	Allam Syed Muhammad Raza Naqvi
3.	Jish---e---Mohammad (JM)	14 Jan 2002	Moulana Muhammad Azhar
4.	Lashkar---e---Tayyaba (LT)	14 Jan 2002	Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, Zia---Ur---RehmanLakhvi alias Chachaji
5.	Sipah---e---Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)	14 Jan 2002	Maulana Muhammad Ahmed Ludhianvi
6.	Tehreek---e---Jaafria Pakistan (JTP)	14 Jan 2002	AllamaSajidNaqvi
7.	Tehreek---e---Nifaz---e---Shariat---e---Mohammadi (TNSM)	14 Jan 2002	Maulana Sufi Mohammad
8.	Tehreek---e---eIslami	14 Jan 2002	Allama Arif Hussain Hussaini
9.	Al---Qaeda	17 Mar 2003	
10.	Millat---e---Islamia Pakistan (Ex SSP)	15 Nov 2003	Maulana Muhammad Ahmed Ludhianvi
11.	Khuddam---ul---Islam (Ex JM)	15 Nov 2003	Maulana Masood Azhar
12.	IslamiTehreek Pakistan (Ex TIP)	15 Nov 2003	AllamaSajid Ali Naqvi
13.	Jamia---ul---Ansar	20 Nov 2003	MaulanaFazal---ur---Rehman Khalil
14.	Jamial---ul---Furqan	20 Nov 2003	Commander Jabar&Yar Muhammad
15.	Hizb---ul---Tehrir	20 Nov 2003	NaveedAzhar Hussain Butt
16.	Khair---un---Naas International Trust	27 Oct 2004	Abu Shoiab
17.	Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA)	07 Apr 2006	HabiyarMarri
18.	Islamic Students Movement of Pakistan	21 Aug 2006	

19.	Lashakr---e---Islam	30 Jun 2008	ManagalBaghAfridi
20.	Ansar---u---Islam	30 Jun 2008	MaulanaQaziMahboob---ul---Haq
21.	Haji Namdar Group	30 Jun 2008	Haji Namdar (Former)
22.	Tehrik---e---Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	25 Aug 2008	---
23.	Balochistan Republication Army (BRA)	08 Sep 2010	BrahamdaghBugti
24.	Balochistan Liberation Fron (BLF)	08 Sep 2010	Bebrag Baloch
25.	Lashkar---e---Balochistan (LeB)	08 Sep 2010	
26.	Balochistan Liberation United Front (BLUF)	08 Sep 2010	KhairBakhshMarri
27.	BalochstanMusallaDefahTanzeem (BDMT)	08 Sep 2010	
28.	Shia Tulaba Action Committee, Gilgit	10 Oct 2011	Agha Zia---u---Din
29.	MarkazSabeel Organization, Gilgit	10 Oct 2011	Agha Zia---u---Din
30.	TanzeemNaujawanan---e---Sunnat (TNA), Gilgit	10 Oct 2011	QaziNisar
31.	Peoples Aman Committee (Lyari), Karachi	10 Oct 2011	
32.	Ahl---e---SunnatWalJamat (ASWJ)	15 Feb 2012	
33.	Al Harmain Foundation (AHF)	06 Mar 2012	
34.	Rabita Trust (BT)	06 Mar 2012	
35.	Anjuman---e---Imamia Gilgit Baltistan (AIGB)	24 Apr 2012	Agha Rahat Hussain
36.	Muslim Students Organization (MSO) Gilgit Baltistan	24 Apr 2012	Shafaatullah Tariq
37.	TanzeemAhl---e---SunnatWalJamat, Gilgit---Baltistan	05 Jun 2012	Ahmed Raza Khan Barelvi& Mustafa Raza Khan
38.	Balochistan BunyadParast Army (BBPA)	04 Aug 2012	
39.	TehreekNafaz---e---Aman (TNA)	04 Aug 2012	
40.	TahafuzHadudullah (TH)	04 Aug 2012	
41.	Balochistan Waja Liberation Army (BWLA)	04 Aug 2012	
42.	Baloch Republican Part Azad (BPRA)	04 Aug 2012	
43.	Balochistan United Army (NUA)	04 Aug 2012	
44.	Islam Mujahidin (IM)	04 Aug 2012	

45.	Jaish---e---Islam (Jel)	04 Aug 2012	
46.	Balochistan National Liberation Army (BNLA)	04 Aug 2012	
47.	Khana---e---Hikmat	13th Mar 2013	
48.	Tehrik---e---Taliban Swat (TTS)	15th Mar 2013	
49.	Tehrik---e---Taliban Mohammad (TTM)	15th Mar 2013	
50.	Tariq Geedar Group (TGG)	15th Mar 2013	Tariq Geedar
51.	Abdullah Azam Brigade	15th Mar 2013	
52.	East Turkmenistan Islamic Movement (ETIM	15th Mar 2013	
53.	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)	15th Mar 2013	
54.	Islamic Jehad Union (IJU)	15th Mar 2013	
55.	313 Brigade	15th Mar 2013	
56.	Tehrik---e---Taliban Bajaur (TTB)	15th Mar 2013	Faqir Mohammad
57.	Amar bilMaroofWaNahi Anil Munkir (Haji Namdar GP)	15th Mar 2013	Haji Namdar (Former)
58.	Baloch Student Organization Azad (BSO---A)	15th Mar 2013	Bashir Zeb
59.	United Baloch Army (UNA)	15th Mar 2013	
60.	Jeay Sindh MuttahidaMahaz (JSMM)	15th Mar 2013	

ENLISTED UNDER UNSCR 1267

61.	Jamaat---ul---Daawa	10 Dec 2008	Hafiz Muhammad Saeed
62.	Al---Akhtar Trust	10 Dec 2008	Muhammad Mazhar
63.	Al---Rashid Trust	10 Dec 2008	Sheikh---Ul---Mashaikh Mufti Rasheed

SUMMARY

- Proscribed Organization --- 60
- Enlisted Under UNSCR 1267 --- 03

Total --- 63

(Source: Ministry of Interior)

Annex L: Registered Madrassa in Pakistan (30th September, 2013)

Status	Punjab	Sindh	KPK	Balochistan	ICT	Total
Total applications processed	8294	4466	1400	748	172	15,080
Registered before Ordinance --- 2005	6660	Data not available	Data not available	499	15	7174
Total Registered	14,954	4264	1400	1247	187	22,052

Source: Ministry of Religious Affair and Inter Faith Harmony, pertaining Madrassa Registration as per Societies Registration (Second Amendment) Ordinance --- 2005.

Annex M: Urban Centers of Pakistan

Serial No.	City More than 1 million	Population 2030 ('000)
1.	Karachi	27993
2.	Lahore	14626
3.	Faisalabad	6192
4.	Rawalpindi	4149
5.	Multan	3025
6.	Hyderabad	3005
7.	Gujranwala	3143
8.	Peshawar	2778
9.	Islamabad	3175
10.	Quetta	2038
11.	Sargodha	1074
12.	Bahawalpur	1903
13.	Sialkot	1087
14.	Larkana	1174
15.	Sheikhupura	1019

Source: Survey by CDRSP, Mentioned in Pakistan: Framework for Economic Growth, 2011

Urban Population in Pakistan is increasing at a fast pace. Theseprojections show that the NISP should be futurists and able to pre---empt the possible traditional threats as well.

Annex N: Locus of Terrorism Incidents in Pakistan



FATA (1259)	KP (710)	Balochistan (623)	Sindh (228)
All Seven Agencies	1. Peshawar 2. Kothat 3. Bannu 4. Hango 5. Swabi	1. Quetta 2. DeraBugti 3. Kech 4. Turbat	Karachi

(Source: Ministry of Interior)

Annex O: Internal Threat Linkages



Annex P: Pakistan Police: Human Resources

Human Resources	Punjab	Sindh	KPK	Bal	ICT	GB	AJK	Total
Sanctioned	177662	109604	65400	35427	10341	5457	8276	412167
Present	149704	101618	62857	32850	9832	5404	7546	369811
Shortage	27958	7986	2543	2577	509	53	730	42356

Annex Q: Pakistan Civil Armed Forces Human Resources

Force	Strength Authorized	Strength Held	Vacancies
Frontier Corps KPK	50866	45763	4058
Frontier Corps Balochistan	52015	48637	3734
Pakistan Rangers Sindh	24247	23332	2976
Pakistan Rangers Punjab	19865	19791	74
Frontier Constabulary KPK	26166	21396	2705
Pakistan Coast Guards	4067	3699	368
Gilgit Baltistan Scouts	2480	2460	20
Total	179,706	165078	13935

(Source: Ministry of Interior February 22, 2014)

Annex R: Police Budget – 2009---13



Annex S: Counter Terrorism Laws in Pakistan

1.	**The Anti---Terrorism Act 1997** – Provides broad definition of terrorism. Established timelines for investigation and trial with specific tenure of judges. Amendments were introduced to make the law more pragmatic abiding the courts by the same procedural rules of regular courts. Appeals were to be made to respective High Courts and ultimately Supreme Court thus disbanding the special Appellate Tribunals. These amendments disallowed a parallel judicial system. The ATA 1997 has been amended 22 times with the most recent amendment in 2013.
2.	**Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Ordinance 2000**The Ordinance extending to the whole of the country disallows the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling or retaining a chemical weapon. Also no person can transfer, directly or indirectly, a chemical weapon to anyone, use a chemical weapon, engage in any military preparations to use a chemical weapon, assist, encourage or induce any other person to engage in any activity prohibited to a state party under the convention, or use a riot control agent as a method of warfare. The violator would be guilty of an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term, which may extend to 25 years.
3.	**Anti Money Laundering Act 2010 ---** The law replaced the Anti Money Laundering Ordinance 2007 and provided the basic legal framework to counter money laundering and terrorist financing. A powerful Financial Monitoring Unit (FMU) was established along with a high powered body comprising four federal ministers, Governor State Bank of Pakistan, Chairman Securities and Exchange Commission and Chairman NAB.
4.	**National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) Act 2013 –** Approved by the Parliament on March 26, 2013 the Act provided a structure for developing counter terrorism strategies, facilitating coordination and integration of counter terrorism efforts.
5.	**The Investigations for Fair Trials Act 2013** – The law allows intelligence and law enforcement agencies to tap phone calls, SMS, e---mails, internet communication and carry out covert intelligence on anyone suspected to be involved in terrorist acts after acquiring a warrant from a High Court judge.
6.	**Anti Terrorism (Amendment) Act 2013** – to establish a number of new Anti Terrorist Courts in Karachi to deal with hundreds of cases of heinous crimes and sternly deal with extortionists, target killers, kidnappers for ransom and members of mafias in Karachi. Giving CAFs shoot on sight powers for maintenance of peace while providing a very short period for investigation.
7.	**Anti--- Terrorism (Second Amendment) Act 2013 –** The law expands the definition of terrorism to include, intimidating and terrorising the public, social sectors, business community and preparing or attacking the civilians, media persons, government officials, installations, security forces or law enforcement agencies. It also included keeping pre---charged detention period for suspected terrorists at 90 days, denying passports and arms licences to members of banned outfits, considering the carrying of explosives without reason to be an illegal act, running illegal FM radio stations etc.

8.	**Protection of Pakistan Ordinance 2013**– Reinforced the Anti Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance 2013 targeting millions of non---Pakistanis living in the country for any reason including distressful conditions in their parent country (especially since 1979). Defines 'enemy alien' to be a person who fails to establish citizenship of Pakistan and is suspected to be involved in waging war or insurrection against Pakistan or depredation on its territory. It gives power to police officers, armed forces and civil armed forces to arrest without warrant, enter and search without warrant any premises likely to be used in the commission of scheduled offences.
9.	**Protection of Pakistan Ordinance (Amendment) 2014------** Reinforced the Protection of Pakistan Ordinance 2013 targeting Pakistanis involved in waging war against Pakistan and extending their detention period beyond 90 days limit of Article 10 of the constitution by stripping them of their nationality. It defines 'Combatant Enemy' to be a person who fails to establish citizenship of Pakistan and is suspected to be involved in waging war or insurrection against Pakistan or any other country through an act which is also a crime in Pakistan.It also regulates the 'internment Centres' and addresses issues of Missing persons.

(Source: NACTA)

Annex T: Status of ATC Cases: 2008---12

Province	No of Courts	No of Cases	No of Cases Under Trial	No of Cases Decided	Pending Inv	Under Trial Prisoners	No of Persons Challaned	No of Persons on Bail	No of Persons Acquitted
Punjab	14	3372	1560	2485	329	4551	10397	3912	5775
Sindh	11	4627	1810	1809	73	29070	11518	4444	4551
kPK	11	2975	1417	1261	297	733	4206	1631	2433
Balochistan	0	2001	557	980	464	260	1363	59	1044
ICT	2	78	25	42	12	179	455	268	231
AJ&K	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gilgit Baltistan	10	0	311	84	0	313	386	73	81
Total	**48**	**13053**	**5680**	**6661**	**1175**	**35106**	**28325**	**10387**	**14115**

(Source: Ministry of Interior)

Annex U: International Cooperation: Agreements / MoUs and Declarations

Ser No.	Country	Spirit and essence of Cooperation
1.	Afghanistan (MOU) 12---07---2004: At Kabul	Conventional Agreement to fight against Terrorism and Organized Crimes
2.	Azerbaijan, (Agreement), 08---07---2004: At Islamabad	Conventional Agreement to fight against Terrorism and Organized Crimes
3.	Australia, (MOU), 05---06---2005: At Canberra	Convening of Meetings, Seminars, Workshops and Conferences Joint Training • Capacity Building • Specialized Training and Technical Assistance • Share Best Practices • Visits by Official Experts • Cooperation in fighting against Organized Crimes
4.	ASEAN (Joint Declaration), 27---09--- 2005 : At Vientiane – Loa PDR	Strength and Capacity Building efforts through Training and Education Consultations between officials, analyses and field operators and Seminars and Conferences and other Joint efforts Continue to explore cooperation with South East Asia Regional Centre for Counter Terrorism (SEARCCT) in Malaysia,the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA), in Thailand and Jakarta Central Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC)
5.	Brunei Darussalam, (MOU), 19---05---2004 : At Islamabad	• Capacity Building through Training and Education in exchange of knowledge and experience
6.	China (Agreement), 05---04---2005, Islamabad, (Working Rules), 09---06---2009, At Beijing	• Exchange of Intelligence and Information promote cooperation in the fields of Scientific Research, Technological Exchanges, Development and Improvement and Provision of necessary Technology in Material Assistance • Provide Police Training for Federal, Central and Local Law Enforcement Agencies of the Pakistani side • Strengthening cooperation on Capacity Building
7.	Cambodia (MOU), 27---04---2004 Phnom Penh	Conventional Agreement to fight against Terrorism and Organized Crimes
8.	Hellenic – Republic, (Agreement) 12---05---2005 : Islamabad	Training and Education of Police officers Information and experience sharing on the use of Forensic Technology Border Controls, Material and Technical Support
9.	Indonesia (MOU), 16---12---2003, Islamabad. (Letter of Intent) 11---2005, Islamabad	Intelligence and Information sharing Capacity Building through networking and programs of training and education, exchange of visits of high officials and field operators Seminar, Conference and etc. Establishment of joint working group
10.	Lao PDR (MOU), 23---04---2004, Vientiane	Conventional agreement for prevention and separation of crimes

11.	Libya, (Agreement), 15---03---1996	• Exchange of information about activities and crimes of terrorist groups / organisations in both countries, their organisational structures, leaders, members, networks, linkages, location, armaments / equipment, means of finance, supply, training, modus operandi and other pertinent matters
12.	Philippine (MOU), 19--- 04---2005, Manila	Exchange cooperation between the security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Strengthen capacity building and capabilities through networking and program of training and education, exchange of visits of high officials, analysts and field operators, seminars and conferences and joint operations
13.	Russia, (MOU), 05--- 02--- 2003, Moscow	Exchange of expertise, consultations and seminars Exchange of legislative and legal acts Exchange on a mutual beneficial basis, scientific and technical literature
14.	Sri Lanka, (Agreement), 13---09--- 2003, Islamabad	• Training of police personals in the field of inter alia, counter terrorism, forensic science and modern investigation techniques • Developing affective police force
15.	Singapore, (MOU), 10---05---2005, At Singapore	• Capacity building through training and education • Exchange of knowledge and experience
16.	Turkey, (Agreement), 20---01---2004, Ankara	• Organizing joint meetings • Exchange of experts • Exchange of knowledge and experience in legislative and regulatory documents
17.	Thailand, (MOU), 29--- 04---2004 Bangkok	• Periodic consultation
18.	Uzbekistan, (Agreement), 06---03--- 2005, Tashkent	Rendering technical assistance Exchange of information and organizing study programs
19.	Yemen, (Agreement), 06---12---2005, Sanna	• Establishment of joint working group to strengthenthe cooperation
20.	Sudan, (Agreement), 18---05---2007, Islamabad	• Exchange of visits for related security issues
21.	UAE, (Agreement), 12---06---2007, Islamabad	• Exchange of information to enhance the ability in the field of investigation • Advance techniques and methods related to equipments and systems used in the field work of police • Exchange of experience, experts, legal documents and any technical information
22.	Kyrgyzstan, (Agreement), 03--- 2005, Bishkek	• Mutual assistance in training and improvement of professional skills, practical experience, legislative and executive orders, training literature on matters of activities of law enforcement bodies scientific and technical

23.	Qatar, (Agreement), 02---2012, Doha	• Establishment of joint working committee to chalk out the cooperation fields
24.	Iran, (Agreement), 18---02---2013, Tehran, (MOU), 15---11---2001, at Tehran	• Establishment of joint working groups • Exchange of experts, experience, training courses for experts joint scientific researches • Management and controlling of border

(Source: Ministry of Interior)

Annex V: Global Counter Terrorism Models

Organisation	Elements	Strategy and Methodology
National Counter Terrorism Centre (USA) 2003	Director NCTC reports to ODNI (Office of the Director of National Intelligence) Operates In partnership with CIA, FBI and Dept. of Justice supported by all Federal Government agencies. Manages a Joint Operations Centre.	Analyzing the threat (home & abroad), Sharing information and integrating instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort. Comprises a highly skilled workforce. Advances business practices to improve collaboration, communication and integrity. Enhances the use of information technology resources to strengthen NCTC core capabilities.
Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) (UK) 2007 Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre JTAC (UK) 2003	Director General reports to the Home Secretary, Minister of State for the Home Office and the Parliamentary under Secretary of State for Counter Terrorism. The Head of JTAC is accountable to the Director General of the Security Service, who in turn reports to the Government's Joint Intelligence Committee on JTAC's activities. An Oversight Board, chaired by the Cabinet Office, ensures that JTAC meets customer requirements.	The Joint Intelligence Analysis Centre (JTAC) collates and evaluates intelligence about potential threats and provide early warning. Strategy is based on the following elements: **Prevent**: Counter radicalization and violent extremism **Protect**: Defend critical national infrastructure and UK's borders. **Prepare**: Develop a response to any terrorist attack in UK. **Pursue**: Detect, disrupt and prosecute terrorists at home and abroad.
National Counter Terrorism Centre NCTC (India) 2010	Part of Intelligence Bureau . Director NCTC will report to Director IB and the Home Minister.	Empowered to analyse intelligence, execute counter terrorism operations, collect, collate and disseminate data. Maintain database on terrorists, power to conduct searches in any part of India. (Not functional due to apprehensions by States over sweeping operational powers and jurisdiction).
Counter Terrorism Coordinating Agency (Indonesia) 2010	Reports directly to the office of the President. Coordinating responsibilities are with minister for security, political and legal affairs.	Preventing terrorism, protecting civilians, de---radicalizing terrorists, and building national preparedness. The agency has its own budget and staff including members seconded from the police, State Intelligence Agency and Military.
Joint Counter Terrorism Centre Germany 2004 Act on Joint Databases 2006	Reports to the Ministry of Interior	Comprises officers from police and intelligence services. Centre was not implemented through any formal act therefore represents informal cooperation between various agencies and government organisations. Act 2006 Counter---Terrorism Database is an information network for the cooperating

		intelligence and police services. The database is run by the Federal Police Office but other security services have online access and can feed in new data.
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) 1949.	ASIO reports to the Attorney General. Not a law Enforcement organisation.	ASIO collects, analyses and reports intelligence on threats to Security.
National Security Coordination Secretariat (NSCS). Joint Counter Terrorism Centre (JCTC) Singapore	Established within the Ministry of Defence in 1999Reports to the Coordination Minister for National Security.	To strengthen inter---agency links through the strategic convergence of these organisations and other relevant government ministries, directing efforts against the emerging threats of non--- conventional warfare and transnational terrorism.
National Security Coordination Secretariat (NSCS). Joint Counter Terrorism Centre (JCTC) Singapore	Established within the Ministry of Defence in 1999Reports to the Coordination Minister for National Security.	To strengthen inter---agency links through the strategic convergence of these organisations and other relevant government ministries, directing efforts against the emerging threats of non--- conventional warfare and transnational terrorism.
National Security Coordination Secretariat (NSCS). Joint Counter Terrorism Centre (JCTC) Singapore	Established within the Ministry of Defence in 1999Reports to the Coordination Minister for National Security.	To strengthen inter---agency links through the strategic convergence of these organisations and other relevant government ministries, directing efforts against the emerging threats of non--- conventional warfare and transnational terrorism.
Directorate of Counter Terrorism Coordination Turkey	Reports directly to the Prime Minister's office.	Entire National Internal Security structured including disaster management has been organised under Prime Minister.
Canadian Security and Intelligence Service 1984	Answerable to the parliament through Minister of public safety. Overseen by Security Intelligence Review Committee and Federal Court System.	Collecting, analysing, reporting and disseminating intelligence on threats to Canada's national security and conducting operations, covert and overt, within Canada and abroad.

(Source: Ministry of Interior)

Annex W: National Internal Security Apparatus (NISA)



Synopsis and Profile of National Internal Security Apparatus (NISA)

Ser	Reporting Lines	Agencies	No	Coord	Intel	Only LEAs
1.	Prime Minister	Inter Services Intelligence	1		✓✓	
2.	Prime Minister	Intelligence Bureau	1		✓✓	
3.	Prime Minister	National Counter Terrorism Authority	1	✓✓		
4.	Federal	Police: GB, AJK	2		✓✓✓✓	
5.	Federal	Police: AJK Border Police	1			✓✓
6.	Ministry of SAFRON	Khasadar (FATA)	1			✓✓
7.	Ministry of Defence	MI, AI, NI, Maritime Security Agency and Airport Security Force	5		✓✓✓✓✓✓ ✓✓✓✓	
8.	Ministry of Interior	FIA, 2 x FC, 2 x Pakistan Ranger, Coast Guard, GB--- Scouts, ICTP, ANF, Frontier Constabulary	10		✓✓✓✓✓✓ ✓✓✓✓✓✓ ✓✓✓✓✓✓ ✓✓	
9.	Ministry of Interior	Federal Levies	1			✓✓
10.	Ministry of Communication	MW & NHP	1			✓✓
11.	Federal Board of Revenue	FBR Intelligence (Custom and IRS)	1		✓✓	
12.	Ministry of Railway	Railway Police	1		✓✓	
13.	Provincial Government	Four Police (SB and CTD) and Balochistan levies	5		✓✓✓✓✓✓ ✓✓✓✓	
14.	Provincial LEAs Only	Border Military Police Dera Ghazi Khan and Chitral Border Police	2			✓✓✓✓
Total			33	1	26	6

*Intelligence capacities, methodology, purposes and application of the agencies vary in various ways and are incomparable.

NISA Org	Role in Internal Security Apparatus	Structure
Federal Direct Reporting Organs		
Inter Services Intelligence (ISI)	Pakistan's premier intelligence organisations, only part of its responsibilities deal with law enforcement work. ISI's internal wing, the Counter Terrorism Centre, focuses on intelligence gathering and analysis and provides intelligence assessments to the government. The ISI is responsible for sharing relevant information with all relevant organizations dealing with concerned subject including ministries and Police in the country through the federal government.	Led by a serving Lieutenant General from the Pakistan Army (designated as Director General). The ISI reports directly to the Prime Minister of Pakistan. However, DG ISI during army corps commanders' meetings briefs the forum and administratively it is attached with Joint Staff Headquarters. Approximately, 3,500 employees of ISI work for counterterrorism related subjects.
Intelligence Bureau (IB)	Its responsibilities include gathering of intelligence (including for counterterrorism) within the country and disseminating it through the Ministry of Interior to political leadership and various police Organizations.	Led by a Director General who is either a serving police officer, or a serving Major General from the army. Its employees supporting police work are around 2,000.
National Counter---Terrorism Authority (NACTA)	This newly established institution will focus on preparing national threat assessment reports on extremism, terrorism, and insurgency and will help the government formulate a National Action Plan for counterterrorism. It will primarily focus on research, data collection, and analysis of terrorism---related issues, in addition to serving as a liaison with international organizations focusing on the counterterrorism. For details visit on line NACTA Act of 2013.	Led by Police or PAS officers. Existing organization has three wings: Counter Extremism, Counter Terrorism, and the Research, Analysis and Training Wing. Currently it has critical short fall officers and supporting staff against sanctioned strength of 203. A restricting plan is part of NISP. Administrative control of NACTA lies with MoI.
Federal Ministerial Organs (Ministry of Interior)		
Frontier Corps (KP and Balochistan)	The Frontier Corps supports local law enforcement in maintaining law and order when requested by the Federal government. The corps' primary task is to monitor and obstruct smuggling along Pakistan's borders with Afghanistan and Iran, besides manning western borders.	These CAFs are commanded by Major General from Pakistan Army. Increasingly, these forces are involved in counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency operations. FC KP is playing an important role in FATA. The strength of FC KP and Balochistan is 50,866 and 52,015 respectively.
Pakistan Rangers (Punjab and Sindh)	This organization secures Pakistan's eastern borders and assists when called in by respective provincial governments to maintain law and order. Sindh Rangers also provide security to VIPs visiting Sindh and are especially active in Karachi. Both organizations regularly assist police in border regions and focus on intelligence gathering. An antiterrorist wing,	The director general, an army officer with the rank of Major General, leads both forces. Commanders of these forces closely coordinate with local military commanders in Karachi and Lahore. Deputy Director Generals are appointed by provincial governments. The Rangers' strength in Punjab is

	trained by the army's Special Services Group, was incorporated in 2004 in both organizations.	19,865 and in Sindh, 24,247.
Anti---Narcotics Force (ANF)	It is primarily tasked with eliminating the trafficking and distribution of narcotics in Pakistan, enhancing international cooperation against drugs, and liaising with international organizations on the subject.	It is led by a serving army officer of the rank of a Major General with the designation as Director General. Its strength is around 3,100. Currently, it is organized under Ministry of Interior.
Pakistan Coast Guards (PCG)	Pakistan Coast Guards is a law enforcement service and one of the six uniform services of the Paramilitary command functioning and operating under the civilian control of the Interior Ministry. The Coast Guard's mandate includes securing the coastal areas of Balochistan and Sindh Province, which delineates its functions from Maritime Security Agency (MSA).	Led by a Brigadier of Pakistan Army and the organization coordinate closely with military deployed in the area against riverine warfare as part of defense policy. Its strength is 4067 personnel.
Gilgit---Baltistan Scouts (former Northern Areas)	This paramilitary force secures areas that borders Gilgit---Baltistan and provides assistance to local police forces for law---and---order duties.	It is led by a serving army Brigadier, and the organization coordinates closely with military deployed in the area. Its employees are 2480.
Frontier Constabulary	This paramilitary force (formed after the merger of Samana Rifles and Border Military Police in British India), though largely drawn from KP, can be deployed anywhere in Pakistan by the Ministry of the Interior. The majority of its units operate in KP, FATA, and Islamabad.[1]	It is led by a senior police officer designated as Commandant. The Inspector General of police can request support from this force during any crisis. Its current strength is 26,166.
Federal Investigation Agency (FIA)	The FIA investigates offenses committed in Connection with matters that concerns the federal government, are of interprovincial scope, or involve transnational organized crime. Its jurisdiction encompasses economic crimes, terrorism, cyber crimes, banking offenses, and enforcement of immigration laws and exit control lists. It also maintains a Redbook of high---profile criminals and terrorists. For details visit on line Federal Investigation Agency Act of 1974.	It is led by a senior police officer (Inspector General) designated as Director General. The agency has offices in all four provincial headquarters including FIA Headquarters in Islamabad. Its total strength is around 3,500.

[1] Historically, the Frontier Constabulary's basic job was to man the border between the tribalareas of FATA and the settled districts of the North---West Frontier Province.

Capital Territory Police (Islamabad)	www.islamabadpolice.gov.pk. It performs standard police duties in Islamabad (divided into thirteen police station areas) and operates directly under the control of the Ministry of the Interior. The total population of Islamabad is close to two million.	Led by an Inspector General of police, its current strength is 10,995. The Police Act of 2002 has not been fully enforced in Islamabad.[2]
Federal Ministerial Organs (Ministry of Defence)		
Services Intelligence Agencies	This includes Military Intelligence, Air Intelligence and Naval Intelligence. These agencies provide operational intelligence to their respective services. Their organization is tailored according to services needs.	Part of respective services headquarters of Pakistan Armed Forces. The Intelligence of these agencies pertains to the collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence that is required for forming policy at the national and international level. It helps in defining the foresight, the ability to understand trends that present threats or opportunities for an organisation, visioning, and the ability to conceptualize an ideal future state based on foresight.
Pakistan Maritime Security Agency (MSA)	It is responsible for enforcing maritime law, maintenance of seamarks, border control, and anti smuggling operations in coordination with Pakistan Coast Guards. It is deployed in the coastal areas of Sindh and Balochistan Provinces.	Operates under the Ministry of the Defense Its strength is 4,067.
Airport Security Force (ASF)	It is responsible for protecting all the airports in the country. Besides safeguarding the civil aviation industry, it is responsible for maintaining law and order within the limits of airports. In recent years it has been trained for counterterrorism measures at airports.	A serving army Brigadier is appointed by the Ministry of Defense as director general of the ASF. The ASF's strength is estimated to be around 4,500. Currently, it is likely to be organized under Cabinet Division.
Federal Ministerial Organs (Ministry of Communication)		
National Highways and Motorway Police (NHMP)	Established in 1997, it is specifically assigned traffic control functions and policing on national highways. The organization is reputed for its efficiency, integrity and discipline.	Led by an Inspector General of police, its officials are drawn from the police service as well as through direct recruitment. It operates under the Ministry of Communications, and its

[2]The Police Act of 2002 significantly improved the laws and rules that govern the police organizations of Pakistan. It emulated the Japanese National Safety Commission system to ensure oversight of police by both elected and nominated members at local (district), provincial, and national levels. It also provided for an independent prosecution service to place additional checks on the police. It provided police with operational autonomy in administrative as well as investigative spheres, while the various responsibilities of the police service (ranging from investigations and intelligence to watch---and--- ward and guard duties) were divided among separate police departments to improve the efficiency of the system. Its various provisions were further amended in 2004.

		total strength is estimated to be around 5,000.
Federal Ministerial Organs (Ministry of Railway)		
Pakistan Railways Police (PRP)	The PRP is responsible for law---and---order duties on trains and at train stations across the country. Since 2008, the PRP has assumed police duties in 1,500 railway employees colonies (covering a 2,000 square kilometer area) and in other areas owned by the Railways Department.	It is led by a senior police officer designated as Inspector General. The total number of PRP employees is around 7,000 (according to 2007 records). The PRP also has a 600---strong commando unit for counterterrorism tasks.
Provincial Organs		
Pakistan Police	Whether it is to combat insurgency or terrorism, a good police force is any state's best bet. It is also believed in Pakistan that police force is failing to combat crime effectively, uphold the law, provide basic security to citizens, and fight growing militancy. Despite nontraditional threat and sharp rise in terrorist attacks across the country, no significant investment has been made in specialized expertise. Police still has primitive training, inadequate mechanisms for analytical competence, foresight and intelligence tasks. Human resource requires capacity building for investigation and there is need to remove institutional disconnects between Federal and Provinces.	Led by an Inspector General of police of the Provinces. The police force has 412,167 strength with over 42,000 vacancies. Punjab Police has Border Military Police and Baloch Levies at DG Khan and KP Police has Chitral Border Police in addition to regular police. Similarly, AJK has Border Police and FATA has Levies and Khassadars (KP and Balochistan).

Main sources: Ministry of Interior and, Special Report, Reforming Pakistan's, Police and Law Enforcement Infrastructure, by Hassan Abbas for United States Institute of Peace www.usip.org.

* Baloch Levies is not mentioned in NISP approved by the Cabinet on February 25, 2014. (Amended onFebruary 27, 2014)

Annex X: Impact of Rule of Law on Productivity



Source: Pakistan Growth Framework: 2011

Annex Y: Youth Identifies Terrorism and Law & Order as Major Issues



Source: Survey by CDRSP, Mentioned in Pakistan: Framework for Economic Growth, 2011

Annex Z: Historical Overview: Counter Terrorism Laws in Pakistan

i) Pakistan Penal Code 1860

Terrorist related crimes were dealt under the provisions of Pakistan Penal Code 1860 (PPC) which contained offences of waging / attempt to / wage or abetment of waging war against Pakistan (Section 121 PPC), collection of arms etc. with the intention of waging war (Section 122 PPC), assaulting President, Governor etc. (Section 124 PPC), Sedition (Section 124---A PPC) and Mutiny (Section 131 PPC, High---jacking (Section 402---B and C of PPC and Mischief (Section 436---PPC)). These sections of law still form part of the Pakistan Penal Code.

ii) Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Acts (1974 to 1997)

History of special legislation regarding terrorism in Pakistan starts with the legislation of Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act 1974. Thereafter, Special Courts for Speedy Trial Ordinance 1987, Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Ordinance 1990, Special Courts for Speedy Trials Ordinance 1991 and Special Courts for Speedy Trials Act 1992 were promulgated /enacted.

iii) The Anti ---Terrorist Act 1997 and Amendments

Efforts were continuously made for improvement of these laws and finally after the repeal of these laws of 1974 to 1992 from time to time, the Anti---Terrorism Act No. XXVII of 1997 was legislated. The major task was to define the "acts of terrorism" and "Terrorism" and for this purpose, scope of offences was extended to different new forms of terrorist related crime through continues amendments. These amendments were introduced through following enactments:---

1. Anti---Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance IV of 1999.
2. Anti---Terrorism (Second amendment) Ordinance XIII of 1999
3. Anti---Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance XX of 1999.
4. Anti---Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance XIX of 2000.
5. Anti---Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance XXIX of 2000.
6. Anti---Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance XXXIX of 2001.
7. Anti---Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance VI of 2002.
8. Anti---Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance CXXV of 2002.
9. Anti---Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance CXXXIV of 2002.

11. Anti---Terrorism (Amendment) Act 2004 (Act II of 2005).
12. Anti---Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance XXI of 2009.
13. Anti---Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance I of 2010.
14. Anti---Terrorism (Amendment) Act, 2013.
15. Anti---Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance, 2013

All Ordinances mentioned at Sr. No.1 to 9 above were covered by Article 270---AAof the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. The laws mentioned at Sr. No.12 and 13 stood repealed in view of Article 89 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 as life of these Ordinances was 120 days.

iv) Special Courts and Protection of Judges & Witnesses etc

For the trial of offences under Anti---Terrorism Act, 1997 and other terrorism related offences, Special Courts have been established U/s 13 of the Act as "Anti---Terrorism Court". The court has been empowered, subject to the availability of resources,! to make such necessary orders and take such measures, as it deems fit forth protection of witnesses, judges, public prosecutors, counsels and other persons concerned in the proceedings.

v) Administrative Actions under ATA 1997

Following administrative actions can be taken under ATA, 1997:

(a) Calling in and use of Armed Forces and Civil Armed Forces in aid of civil' power. (S.4&5)
(b) Defining organisations "concerned in terrorism". (S.11--- (A)
(c) Issuance of observation orders. (S.11---B)
(d) Proscription of organisations. (S.20)
(e) Measures to be taken against proscribedorganisations i.e. sealing offices, freezing accounts, seizing of literature etc. (S.11 ---E)
(f) Security of good behaviour. (S.11---EE)
(g) Arrest and detention of suspected persons. (S.11---EEE)
(h) Membership, support and meetings of proscribedorganisation. (S.11---F)

vi) Anti Money Laundering Act, 2010

This Act was enacted for the prevention of money laundering, combating financing of terrorism and forfeiture of property derived from, or involved in money laundering or financing of terrorism or for matters connected thereto.

vii) Counter Insurgency (In Aid of Civil Power)Regulations 2011

This regulation was specifically meant to curb the menace of terrorism especially in areas of FATA and PATA where the armed forces have been called in aid of civil administration. This regulation also provides mechanism of keeping the suspects in custody as internees.

vi) The Investigation for Fair Trial Act, 2013

This was enacted to prevent the Law Enforcement and Intelligence Agencies from using their powers arbitrarily and also to provide for their permissible and fair uses in accordance with law. Rules have been framed under this act.

viii) Anti Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance, Ordinance VII of 2013

It deals with Detention issues, JITs composition under SP, Faceless trials and through video Links, Witness Protections Programs are allowed.

ix) Anti Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance, Ordinance VIII of 2013

It is to ensure Compliance of FATF (Financial Action Task Force) to counter Terrorism Financing and allowing for taking action against properties/assets of proscribed organisations involved in the terrorist activities.

x) Protection of Pakistan Ordinance, 2013

This was enacted to provide for protection against waging of war and prevention of acts threatening the Security of Pakistan and also for the speedy trial of offences falling in the schedule annexed with this Ordinance. Rules have been framed under this act.

xi) Protection of Pakistan (Amendment) Ordinance, 2014

This is enacted to introduce the concept of enemy combatants and addressing the issues of missing persons. Under the constitutional limits, it gives authority to LEAs to detain suspects for longer period of time.

Summary

1. Offences punishable under Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860)
2. Offences punishable under the Arms Act, 1878 (XI of 1978)
3. Offences punishable under the Explosive Act 1884 (IV of 1984
4. Offences punishable under the prevention of seditious meeting act, 1911 (X of 1911)
5. Offences punishable under the official Secret Act, 1923 (XIX of 1923)
6. Offences punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act 1930 (II of 1930).
7. Offences punishable under the Foreigners Act, 1946 (XXXI of 1946)
8. Offences punishable under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act of 1947 (VII of 1947)
9. Offences punishable under Imports and Exports (Controls) Act, 1950 (**X**XIX of 1950)
10. Offences punishable under Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965 (W.P Ordinance XX of 1965)
11. Offences punishable under Customs Act, 1969 (IV of 1969)
12. Offences punishable under High treason (punishment Act, 1973 (LXVIII of 1973)
13. Offences punishable under prevention of Anti National Activities Act, 1974 (VII of 1974)
14. Offences punishable under Passports Act, 1974 (XX of 1974)
15. Offences punishable under Drugs Act, 1976 (XXXI 1976)
16. Offences punishable under Emigration Ordinance, 1979 (XVII of 1979)
17. Offences punishable under Exit from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, 1981 (XLVI of 1981)
18. Offences punishable under Employment of Children Act 1991 (V of 1991)
19. Offences punishable under surrenders Illicit Arms Act, 1991 (XXI of 1991)
20. Offences punishable under Pakistan Telecommunication (Re organisation) Act, 1996 (XVII of 1996)
21. Offences punishable under Anti Terrorism Act, 1997(XXVII)
22. Offences punishable under control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997 (XXV of 1997)
23. Offences under National Data base Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 (VIII of 2000)

24. Offences punishable under Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Ordinance 2000 (LIV of 2000).
25. Offences punishable under Electronic Transaction ordinance, 2002 (LI of 2002)
26. Offences punishable under Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority ordinance, 2002 (XIII of 2002)
27. Offences punishable under Prevention and Control of Human Trafficking Ordinance 2002 (LIX of 2002)
28. Offences punishable under Export control on goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery System Act, 2004 (V 2004)
29. Offences punishable under Anti Money Laundering Act, 2010 (VII of 2010)
30. Offences punishable under all existing applicable laws, orders, rules and regulations enforced in FATA.
31. National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) Act 2013.

Annex AA: National Counter Terrorism Authority Act : No. XIX of 2013

An act to establish National Counter Terrorism Authority in Pakistan

WHEREAS, the menace of terrorism and extremism is becoming an existential threat to the state and needs to be responded to and addressed comprehensively;

AND WHEREAS, in order to eliminate this me, a focal institution to unify state response by planning, combining, coordinating and implementing Government's policy through an exhaustive strategic planning and necessary ancillary mechanism is needed;

It is hereby enacted as follows:

PRELIMINARY

1. **Short title, extent and commencement.--- [1]** This Act may be called the National Counter Terrorism Authority Act, 2013.

(2) It extends to the whole of Pakistan.

(3) It shall come into force at once.

2. **Definitions.---**In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject of context,---

(a) "Authority" means the National Counter Terrorism Authority Pakistan established under section 3;

(b) "Board" means the Board of Governors constituted under section 5;

(c) "Chairman" means the Chairman of the Board of Governors;

(d) "Executive Committee" means a Committee constituted under section 8;

(e) "National Coordinator" means the National Coordinator of the Authority;

(f) "Deputy National Coordinator" means the Deputy National Coordinator of the Authority;

(g) "rules" means the rules made under the Act;

(h) "regulations" means regulations made under this Act;

(i) "prescribed" means prescribed by rules or, as the case may be, regulations.

3. **Establishment of the Authority.---** (1) As soon as may be, but not later than ninety days after the promulgation of this Act, the Federal Government shall, by notification in the official gazette, establish an Authority to be known as the National Counter Terrorism Authority Pakistan for carrying out the purposes of this Act.

(2) The Authority shall be an independent body answerable directly to the Prime Minister.

(3) The Authority shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal with powers, subject to the provision of this Act, to acquire and hold property, movable and immovable, and to sue and be sued by its name. The Authority shall have administrative and financial powers to carry out the functions of the Authority.

(4) The headquarters of the Authority shall be at Islamabad and it may set up offices at such other places in Pakistan.

4. **Functions of the Authority.---** The Authority shall have the following functions, namely:---

(a) to receive and collate data or information or intelligence, and disseminate and coordinate between all relevant stakeholders to formulate threat assessments with periodical reviews to be presented to the Federal Government for making adequate and timely efforts to counter terrorism and extremism;

(b) to coordinate and prepare comprehensive National counter terrorism and counter extremism strategies, and reviews them on periodical basis;

(c) to develop action plans against terrorism and extremism and report to the Federal Government about implementation of these plans, on periodical basis;

(d) to carry out research on topics relevant to terrorism and extremism and to prepare and circulate documents;

(e) to carry out liaison with international entities for facilitating cooperation in areas relating to terrorism and extremism;

(f) to review relevant laws and suggest amendments to the Federal Government; and

(g) to appoint committee of experts from Government and non---Government organisations for deliberations in areas related to the mandate and functions of the Authority.

5. **Board of Governors.---** (1) The Authority shall have a Board of Governors comprising:---

(a)	Prime Minister	---	Chairman
(b)	Minister for Interior	---	Member
(c)	Chief Ministers of Provinces	---	Members
(d)	Chief Minister of Gilgit Baltistan	---	Member
(e)	Minister for Law and Justice	---	Member

(f)	Minister for Finance	---	Member
(g)	Minister for Defence	---	Member
(h)	Prime Minister of Azad Jammu and Kashmir	---	Member
(i)	One Senator (to be recommended by Chairman Senate)	---	Member
(j)	One MNA (to be recommended by Speaker National Assembly)	---	Member
(k)	Secretary, Ministry of Interior	---	Member
(l)	DG Inter Services Intelligence	---	Member
(m)	DG Intelligence Bureau	---	Member
(n)	DG Military Intelligences	---	Member
(o)	National Coordinator	---	Member
(p)	Chief Secretaries of the Provinces, Gilgit Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir	---	Members
(q)	DG Federal Investigation Agency	---	Member, and
(r)	Inspector General of Police of Provinces, Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan	---	Members

(2) The National Coordinator shall act as the Secretary to the Board.

(3) The Board may invite any person to the meeting on special invitation.

6. **Procedure of the meeting of the Board.---** (1) The Prime Minister Azad Jammu and Kashmir or the Chief Ministers shall attend the meeting themselves, however, in case of un---avoidable circumstances, may nominate a member of their cabinet to attend the meeting of the Board to represent them.

(2) The Federal Ministers shall attend the meeting themselves, however, in case of un---avoidable circumstances, the Secretary of their Ministry shall attend the meeting.

(3) The quorum to hold a meeting shall be fifty per cent of the total membership:

Provided that notwithstanding anything contained in sub---clause (6) the presence of heads of various intelligence agencies who are members of the Board shall be mandatory in every meeting of the Board while taking decision on any policy matter.

(4) The Board may meet as and when required but it shall meet at least since in each quarter of a year.

(5) No act or proceedings of the Board shall be invalid by reasons only of the existence of a vacancy in, or defect in the constitution of the Board.

7. **Power and functions of the Board.---**(1) The powers and functions of the Board shall include, but would not be limited to, the following, namely:---

(a) the Board shall exercise all the powers and functions of the Authority;

(b) to provide strategic vision and oversee activities of the Authority;

(c) to recommend rules and approve policies and manuals in order to carry out the purpose of this Act; and

(d) to approve the annual budget prepared by the Authority.

8. **Executive Committee.---**(1) The Board shall be assisted by an Executive Committee comprising of the following, namely:---

(a)	Minister for Interior	---	Chairman
(b)	Secretary, Ministry of Interior		Member
(c)	Secretary, Ministry of Finance	---	Member
(d)	Secretary Ministry of Law and Justice;	---	Member
(e)	Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	---	Member
(f)	Secretary, Ministry of Defence	---	Member
(g)	National Coordinator	---	Member
(h)	Additional Chief Secretary (FATA)	---	Member
(i)	Chief Secretaries of Provices, Gilgit Baltistan and Azad Jammu & Kashmir	---	Members
(j)	Secretaries Home Department of the Provinces, Gilgit Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir	---	Members
(k)	Additional Inspector General incharge of Counter---Terrorism Departments of the Provinces, Gilgit Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir	---	Members.

(2) The National Coordinator shall also act as Secretary of the Executive Committee.

(3) The quorum to hold meeting of the Executive Committee shall be fifty per cent of the total membership.

(4) The Executive Committee may co---opt any other relevant person to the Executive Committee.

(5) The Executive Committee shall ensure effective implementation of the decisions of the Board.

(6) The Executive Committee shall perform such other functions as are assigned to it by the Board.

9. **National Coordinator.---**(1) There shall be a National Coordinator of the Authority to be appointed by the Federal Government for tenure of three years.

(2) The National Coordinator shall be a professional of known integrity and competence in BPS---22 or equivalent and may be appointed in rotation form bureaucracy or Police Service of Pakistan.

(3) The National Coordinator shall have the following powers, namely:---

(a) to execute the policies and plans approved by the board and instructions issued by the Federal Government:

(b) to prescribe terms and conditions of the employees and grant additional allowances or any other incentives;

(c) to have full financial and administrative power for effective administration of the Authority, as approved by the Board;

(d) to engage any person or entity on contract basis to carry out assignments for the consultancy in accordance with acclaimed best practices;

(e) to establish administrative structures at the field level for efficient implementation and accessibility of the Authority;

(f) to submit quarterly progress reports to the Board on the Financial and functional aspects of the Authority;

(g) to perform such other functions as may be delegated by the Board;

(h) to undertake any other assignments given by the Board in the respective fields; and

(i) produce periodical journals relating to counter terrorism and counter extremism issues.

10. **Deputy National Coordinator.---** (1) There shall be a Deputy National Coordinator of the Authority to be appointed by the Federal Government for a tenure of three years.

(2) The Deputy National Coordinator shall be an eminent professional of known integrity and competence in BPS---21 or equivalent and may be appointed in rotation from bureaucracy or Police Service of Pakistan.

(3) The National Coordinator may delegate any of his powers under subsection (1) of section 9 to the Deputy National Coordinator with the approval of the Board subject to such conditions and limitations as may be specified in this behalf by the board.

11. **Appointment of officers, staff etc., by the Authority.---**(1) The Authority may, from time to time appoint, either through direct recruitment or through deputation, such officials, experts or consultants as it may consider necessary for the performance of functions in the prescribed manner.

(2) The Authority shall prescribed service regulations, with the approval of the Board for the appointment, promotion and transfer of officers, staff, experts and consultants, their terms and conditions of service including additional financial incentives such as special salaries, allowances, pension or gratuity etc., constitution and management of pension and gratuity and shall be competent to take disciplinary action against them.

(3) All appointments of officers and staff etc., shall be made with the approval of the Board and their security clearance shall be carried out by Directorate General ISI.

12. **Appointment of officers, staff etc., in cases of special requirement.---** Subject to the provisions of this Act, the National Coordinator may, in case of urgency, appoint officers, staff, experts and consultants on prescribed terms and conditions, provided that every such appointment shall be laid before the Board in the next meeting.

13. **Delegation of powers.---**The National Coordinator may by special order delegate his powers and functions to the Deputy National Coordinator or any other senior officer of the Authority:

Provided that the National Coordinator may delegate his powers and functions under this provision sparingly and not as a rule.

14. **Fund.---**(1) There shall be established a fund to be known as NACTA Research and Development Fund.

(2) The Fund shall consist of,---

(a) funds or budget amount received from the Federal Government;

(b) grants made by the international bodies, organisations and entities, in accordance with procedures laid down by the Federal Government;

(c) such other sums as may be received by the Authority.

(3) The Fund shall be administrated by the National Coordinator in such manner as prescribed.

(4) The Authority may receive international assistance in the field of counter terrorism and counter extremism under the prescribed manner.

15. **Budget for the Authority.---** (1) The National Coordinator shall, in respect of each financial year in accordance with the financial procedures approved by the Board, prepare the annual budget estimates of the Authority and submit the same to the Federal Government after the approval of the Board.

(2) The National Coordinator shall have full powers to incur expenditures and re--- appropriate funds as per system of financial control and budgeting of the Federal Government with the approval of the Board.

16. **Maintenance of accounts and internal control.---** The Authority shall maintain complete and accurate books of accounts in connection with the discharge of its responsibilities as may be prescribed by the Auditor---General of Pakistan.

17. **Audit.---** (1) The accounts of the Authority shall be audited every year by the Auditor---General of Pakistan in such manners as may be prescribed.

(2) The Authority shall appoint its own financial advisor to regulate the financial matters and for internal audit.

18. **Annual Report.---**The Authority shall compile and submit an annual report on its activities and accounts to the Board.

19. **Assistance and provision of information.---**(1) The Federal Government and Provincial Governments and their Departments shall assist the Authority in carrying out its functions, subject to applicable laws.

(2) All Federal Ministries and Provincial Departments including Corporations, bodies, set ups, controlled or administered by or under the authority of Federal or Provincial Governments shall provide information and data required for carrying out the purposes of this Act, subject to applicable laws.

20. **Indemnity.---**No prosecution, suit or other legal proceedings shall lie against the Authority or its officers and consultants for anything done in good faith for carrying out the purposes of this Act or rules and regulations made there under.

21. **Power of the Federal Government to issue directives.---**The Federal Government may, as and when it considers necessary, issue directives to the Authority on matters of policy and such directives shall be binding on the Authority, Federal, Provincial and Local Governments and if a question arises whether any matter is a matter of policy or not, the decision of the Federal Government thereon shall be final.

22. **Power to make rules and regulations.---**(1) The Federal Government may on the recommendation of the Board, make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act.

(2) The National Coordinator may make regulations for the following purposes, namely:---

(a) effective and smooth functioning of the Authority;

(b) internal working of the Authority;

(c) terms and conditions of the employees and grant of additional allowances or any other incentives.

23. **Provisions of this Act.---**The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation to any other law for the time being enforced.

24. **Employees deemed to be Public Servants.---** The employees of the Authority shall be deemed to be Public Servants within the meaning of section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code (Act XLV 1860).

Annex BB: NACTA Organisational Sructure and Mandate



!NACTA:!Revised!Human!Resource!

Offices!	Basic!Pay!Scale!							Total!
	22!	21!	20!	19!	18!	17	Fixed! Pay!	
NC!!	1!	E!	E!	E!	E!	E!	E!	1!
DNC!	E!	1!	E!	1!	E!	E!	E!	2!
COS!	E!	E!	1!	2!	6!	5!	6!	20!
DRC!	E!	E!	1!	5!	5!	5!	E!	16!
DIS!HQ!	E!	1!	E!	2!	2!	E!	E!	5!
I!&!P!Center!	E!	E!	4!	20!	40!	3!	E!	67!
NISOC!	E!	E!	1!	2!	2!	10!	E!	15!
Staff!	E!	E!	E!	E!	E!	E!	E!	188!
Total!	1!	2!	7!	32!	55!	23!	6!	314!

[1] Country Operation Profile, UNHCR, 2013

[2] National Consortium for the study of terrorism, University of Maryland, USA http://www.start.umd.edu/start/

[3] National Crisis Management Cell (NCMC), Ministry of Interior, 2013

[4] http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/Fidayeenattack.htm

[5] Major General Sana ullah Khan Niazi, General Officer Commanding, Swat was martyred on September 15, 2013 by a roadside improvised explosive device. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/16/world/asia/insurgent---attack---kills---senior---pakistani--- general.html? r=0

[6] Inspector General of Frontier Constabulary SafwatGhayyur was martyred on August 4, 2010 http://tribune.com.pk/story/34601/frontier---constabulary---chief---killed---in---suicide---hit/

[7] Prevention of Electronic Crimes Ordinance, 2008 law was lapsed in 2010 in Pakistan

[8] Most notably Ex--- Prime Minister of Pakistan Benazir Bhutto was martyred on December 27, 2007. Many prominent leaders and workers of other political parties have also been martyred in the suicide terrorist attacks.

[9] AK Kronstadt, 'Education Reform in Pakistan,' Congressional Research Service Report, Washington DC, 2009.

[10] Pakistan: Framework for Economic Growth, Planning Commission, 2011

[11] R Winthrop and C Graff, 'Beyond Madrasas: Assessing the Links Between Education and Militancy in Pakistan,' Working Paper 2, Centre for Universal Education at Brookings, Washington DC, 2010

[12] Earthquake hit District Awaran and other districts of Balochistan, 2013

[13] Statement of Karachi Police Chief, Mr. Shahid Hayat, Geo News, December, 05, 2013

[14] Police Capacity Assessment Report, National Police Bureau, 2013

[15] Resolution of All parties Conference in Pakistan, September 09, 2013

[16] Pakistan: Framework for Economic Growth, Planning Commission, 2011