FRENCH WHITE PAPER

DEFENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY

2013

foreword by

François Hollande

President of the French Republic

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Preface by the President of the Republic

Shortly after my election, I commissioned a new White Paper on Defence and National Security, as I considered that the state of the world called for new strategic guidelines. Who among us does not see that the context has changed appreciably since 2008? Europe is moving towards economic and financial integration, but at the cost of stringent controls on public spending as introduced by the main EU member countries. The United States is preparing to bring a decade of military engagement to an end and is reviewing its priorities, with the goal of restoring public accounts. The emerging powers, especially China, have embarked on a rebalancing of their economy to respond to the aspirations of their middle classes. Lastly, the Arab world has entered into a new phase of history, a phase that brings both promise and risk, as the tragic events in Syria have shown. At the same time, the threats already identified in 2008 – terrorism, cyber-attacks, nuclear proliferation, pandemics, etc. – have become even more pressing. The vital need for international coordination to respond to them becomes more apparent every day.

France is not unprepared for this situation. Its history has always been closely intertwined with the history of the world. Through its economy, its ideas, its language, its diplomatic and military capabilities and its seat at the United Nations Security Council, France is fully engaged on the international scene, in accordance with its interests and its values. It acts in close concert with its European partners and its allies, but retains its capacity for independent initiative.

I am grateful to the Commission tasked with writing the White Paper on Defence and National Security for its contribution to informing our choices. For the first time, this Commission, which brings together MPs, representatives of the state and independent experts, has also included two Europeans, a German and a British representative. This opening-up is meaningful.

The White Paper highlights the three priorities of our defence strategy: protection, deterrence and intervention. They reinforce each other and are inseparable. We must guarantee the protection of French citizens, including against cyber-related threats, preserve the credibility of our nuclear deterrence and explicitly affirm our right to take the initiative in actions that defend our interests and those of the international community. Our aim is to guarantee France's security

by mobilising all forces in a nation-wide effort, which must itself be embedded in the broader framework of building an effective European defence policy.

The White Paper takes into account the evolution of our defence capabilities set against the budgetary constraints we are experiencing today. It conveys a clear will to retain autonomous, swift-reaction deployment military means relying on well-trained, well-equipped and well-informed forces. They must be able to have a decisive impact in regions where the greatest threats to our interests and those of our partners and allies are located. They enable France to assume its responsibilities, as it did in Mali.

This mission is not only the responsibility of the state. It is also the responsibility, in part, of local and regional governments and - where their interests are on the line - that of companies. In 2008, this observation led to the formulation of the concept of national security. The White Paper on defence and national security therefore outlines a blueprint for the future of our country's defence. Today, if France is to fulfil its potential, this mission calls for the commitment of everybody: military personnel, intelligence personnel, the police, gendarmes, diplomats, public agents and volunteers, as well as ordinary citizens, for we are all actively responsible for our national security.

François Hollande

Introduction: The case for a White Paper

It is five years since the last White Paper was published. Major events have occurred in the intervening period and the volatile strategic context alluded to in the 2008 White Paper has been confirmed. France needs to assess the implications of this for its defence and national security strategy. In a rapidly changing world, France needs to be able to react swiftly, whilst ensuring that its response is part of a strategic vision. The timeframe for this White Paper is thus a long-term one, extending over some 15 years. The defence and national security strategy aims to set out the principles, priorities, action frameworks and resources needed to ensure France's security for the long term. The strategy will now be revised regularly, every five years, while continuing to take a long-term perspective.

The financial crisis that has befallen the world marks a break with the context described in the previous White Paper, forcing many States to amend their security and defence arrangements. It has highlighted the economic aspect of national security: the Nation's independence is threatened if public deficits make it dependent on its creditors. Decisions relating to public expenditure on defence and security must not only take account of the threats to which our forces are required to respond, but also the risks to our economic independence. The right balance must be struck between these two priorities so that our defence and security arrangements are consistent with the need for fiscal consolidation, and to ensure that our defence and national security system is compatible in the long term with our international responsibilities and the development of our strategic environment.

The crisis has had a significant impact on our key partners and allies. The United States are cutting back on military spending and partly refocusing their military efforts on the Asia-Pacific region. Consequently, our US allies are likely to become more selective with regard to their foreign commitments. It also puts more pressure on the Europeans to shoulder responsibility for the security issues that concern them most directly. In Europe, the crisis has prompted the European Union to take major economic and financial steps towards much closer integration, which could ultimately open up a new political perspective.

However, with regard to security, budgetary constraints have so far resulted in a steady reduction in defence budgets, in the absence of any Member State coordination that might attenuate its impact on the EU's overall defence effort.

These changes are taking place as our defence and security forces are called upon to deal with a highly unpredictable range of challenges. Some surprises and perhaps even strategic shifts are possible, or even probable. Among the recent political events that have major, unpredictable consequences for the strategic landscape, the political and social revolutions in the Arab world are of particular significance. They have paved the way for a new phase of history on Europe's doorstep, a phase that brings both promise and risk, as the situation in Libya and the tragic events in Syria have shown. For France and for Europe, with their historic links to the Arab world, the peaceful development of this region of the world is a key issue. In some respects, the issue is similar to the challenge presented by the successful return of the former communist countries into the European democratic fold at the end of the Cold War.

Military threats have not disappeared. The rapid growth in defence budgets in many countries, particularly in Asia, confirms this. Furthermore, the numerous military operations in which France has been involved in recent years (Afghanistan, Ivory Coast, Libya, Mali) show that military action remains an important part of our security efforts. At the same time, the risks and threats facing the Nation are more numerous and more diverse. Terrorism, cyber threats, organised crime, the spread of conventional weapons, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the risk of pandemic and technological and natural risks may all have serious repercussions for the security of the Nation. This was alluded to in the 2008 White Paper and has been confirmed by the events of recent years.

The concept of national security, introduced by the 2008 White Paper and enshrined in the Law of 29 July 2009, is a response to these changes. Instead of simply focusing on protecting our territories and population against external aggression from other States, its scope has been broadened to include the need for France to manage any direct or indirect risks and threats that might impact on the life of the Nation. The term "threat", here, refers to any situation in which France needs to deal with a potentially hostile intent. The term "risk" refers to any danger that does not include any hostile intent but which might impact on the security of France: they therefore include political events as well as natural, industrial, health and technological risks. In the complex, interconnected world in which we live, it is unrealistic to think that absence of risk is possible. The concept of national security expresses an intention to adopt a holistic approach

to identifying risks and threats, as well as to the response required, using a combination of tools including knowledge and foresight, protection, prevention, deterrence and intervention. In favouring this approach, France has adopted a similar stance to that of most of its major partners and the European Union.

We live in a world in which the development of networks and the ever-increasing circulation of people, goods, capital and information make national borders less relevant and lead to greater interdependence. These developments could be a factor of vulnerability since they make it more likely that crises will spread as well as potentially increasing their impact. They may also be an asset since, once we have taken on board all the implications of the fact that our security issues are not circumscribed within our borders, we can construct joint responses with our partners and allies. Since they face the same risks and threats as we do, we must build on our solidarity and seek shared capabilities that reflect our mutual interdependence.

Our partners are, first and foremost, the Member States of the European Union, whose common destiny France has shared for more than half a century. For France, this is a further reason to pay careful attention to its own national capabilities. In a strategic context in which Europe is expected to shoulder greater responsibility for its own security, a move towards a more collective EU response will require pooling of resources and strong, coordinated commitment from all its Member States; the financial crisis makes this even more urgent. For its part, France believes that it will be able to contribute more effectively to a collective response if it is able to retain its capacity for initiative and leadership.

For while every player must be fully engaged in the response to various threats and risks, no single player can expect to be able to go it alone. At the national level, responsibilities are increasingly shared between the State, local and regional government and operators of essential infrastructure. Although the State is still responsible for organising and operating its own civilian and military capabilities, it now also has to enable a much wider range of resources to be mobilised and coordinated. The defence and national security strategy must provide greater organisational efficiency and consistency in mobilising all stakeholders to bolster the resilience of the Nation. At the European level, in clarifying the direction that France has decided to take in order to safeguard its security, the White Paper seeks to establish an in-depth dialogue with the EU Member States, calling for a new ambition. This dialogue aims to replace de facto interdependencies with organised interdependencies, thus reconciling sovereignty and mutual dependence. At the global level, it seeks to explain how

the French strategy fits into the broader perspective of its contribution to an international order based on peace, justice and the rule of law.

When dealing with risks and threats, success is primarily dependent upon a determination to face up to them by taking the necessary action. The defence and security of the Nation are underpinned by intervention of public institutions (civilian and military). It requires awareness-building and the involvement and support of all our fellow citizens. The French people are actively responsible for their own security. In this respect, a "defence mind-set", in the broad sense, is the first pillar of national security. It demonstrates a collective resolve that is underpinned by the cohesion of the Nation, and a shared vision of its destiny.

Chapter 1

France: a European power with global reach

A. France: a European power with global reach

Without wishing to underestimate the potential of certain states for doing harm, or ignoring the risk of a strategic shift, France no longer faces any direct, explicit conventional military threat against its territory. Unlike many other countries, for the first time in its history it has the good fortune to find itself – along with its European partners – in an exceptional climate of peace and stability. It is a member of the European Union, a political entity that has made any prospect of internal conflict quite unthinkable. Furthermore, since the end of the Cold War, the European continent has ceased to be the epicentre for global strategic confrontation. This is without precedent in the history of our continent: for more than 500 years, Europe has been at the heart of historic global power struggles, either of its own making through its colonial ventures, or which it has suffered during the two world wars and the long Cold War that marked the last century. Nowadays, Europe contributes to collective security by helping to contain regional crises. It does this by defending universal values. It is difficult today to imagine that it might be the source of a major conflict. This is a new situation for Europe and for France in particular.

In light of its geography, its history, its language, the openness of its economy and the political role that it wishes to continue playing on the international stage, France's destiny is closely linked to the changes taking place in the world. Its future and its prosperity depend upon them.

France is present in every ocean and in most continents, thanks to the overseas territories which – in addition to their economic and strategic importance – provide a special relationship with countries far away from Europe, making us a recognised partner – and often the only European one – for numerous regional organisations. The French exclusive economic zone, which covers some 11 million km2 – i.e. 3% of the surface of the world's seas – is second only to that of the

United States. It contains numerous fisheries, mineral and energy resources, whose exploitation constitutes a major asset for our economy.

France maintains a global presence on the international stage, where it has the second largest diplomatic network in the world, after the United States. A recognised military power, it retains a credible intervention capability, which it has used on numerous occasions.

France's influence can also be seen in the widespread use of its language and the dissemination of its culture and its values. More than 220 million people speak French on a daily basis – hence the political significance of the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie. Over 10% of all books in translation are translated from the French. Likewise, France is responsible for 4.2% of the world's scientific publications, which puts it in sixth place globally. Additionally, irrespective of the vagaries of international political relations, many nations still expect France, the birthplace of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, to remain true its best values.

Furthermore, for many centuries France has experienced a constant intermingling of its population: it is present all over the world and the world is present in France. Almost two million French citizens live abroad, including over 70,000 young students. They help us to channel French influence and enable France to be alive to the world. Some four million foreigners live in France, and almost one in five French nationals has at least one foreign parent. This intermingling, providing it is controlled and does not put a strain on the solidarity and values that bind the national community, is an asset to the country, which has always been enriched by these differences. It shows that France is still a beacon of hope for many young people, who see in our country the promise of a better life. One consequence of this is that France has a far younger population than the European average – it must be able to fulfil their hope and harness their enthusiasm.

Although it represents less than 1% of the world's population, France generates 4% of the world's Gross National Product, which puts it in fifth place in the world rankings. Its economy is increasingly dependent on international trade: despite the increasing importance of emerging countries, France is still the fifth largest exporter of goods and accounts for 3.4% of world trade.

The social situation and economic power of France are therefore inseparable from world affairs. This has been true for centuries and the internationalisation

of trade flows has further highlighted the intensity of this interdependence. In pushing its trade boundaries, our country finds the resources it needs for a dynamic economy. Through its openness to the diversity of the world's people, it gains a source of cultural enrichment and vitality for its society. In return, the power it represents, the interest it attracts and its capacity for action give France considerable ability to influence its environment.

France's numerous strategic partnerships and its defence partnership agreements with several countries confirm its influential status in the world. These agreements are power multipliers for the furtherance of global peace and stability. They stem from France's desire to nurture, deepen and consolidate the lasting bilateral relations that provide France and each and every one of its partners with opportunities to strengthen their security.

France's open approach to the world is also underlined by its active participation in numerous multilateral organisations (the Bretton Woods institutions, Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, International Labour Organisation, Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, etc.) and, particularly with respect to its defence and security, its membership of three major institutions that were established in the aftermath of the Second World War, namely the UN, NATO and the European Union.

B. France is committed to institutional structures that enhance its security but also increase its responsibilities

As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, France plays an active role in crisis prevention and management. The privileged position which it enjoys is all the more valuable in that the Security Council remains the key body for collective security and world peace. France is the fifth largest financial contributor to the United Nations and has, on many occasions, demonstrated its ability as a policy driver, whether in terms of ending the war in the Lebanon in 2006 or, more recently, its intervention in Libya, Ivory Coast and in Mali. France believes that the Security Council's legitimacy depends on its being both representative and effective; it is therefore in favour of a reform of its membership and strives to enhance the effectiveness of its work.

The United States and France share a two hundred year link that has proved its worth on many occasions, not least over the course of two world wars. This link acquired an institutional dimension with the creation of the Atlantic Alliance,

which expresses the profound commonality of values and interests between the United States, Canada and Europe. France has played an active part in NATO operations, particularly in the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Libya. Since fully re-joining the integrated military command structure, it has led one of the two major strategic commands. It intends to make an active contribution to the vitality and future of the organisation, which is an essential collective defence alliance and, as such, a major part of its defence and security.

As a founder member of the European Union, France belongs to a community of 500 million citizens united by shared values of democracy, justice and peace. The European project was made possible by Franco-German reconciliation and marked a historic turning point for our country, which has chosen to link its destiny to that of its European partners. The European Union is a unique venture: a joint project for a democratic, market economy, it brings together a number of nations that wish to preserve their national identities whilst remaining determined to manage their differences by focusing on negotiation and the rule of law rather than the use of force. By providing its members with an opportunity to hammer out together the conditions for a shared future, the European Union enhances their ability to retain control of their destiny in a globalised world. The project has proved its worth and relevance, as has been demonstrated by its ability to withstand the serious euro crisis. The world continues to expect things of Europe – a situation from which France can only benefit: the European Union is still the biggest economic and commercial power in the world, the second monetary power and the first in terms of humanitarian aid and development policy. Despite the backdrop of economic crisis, the European model remains an exceptional one. For France, which has actively contributed to forging the values that define the European Union, and for the other Member States, the EU's ability to remain an effective role model is a major issue.

Consequently, there can be no long-term prosperity for the European Union in an international environment that rejects these values. Its future depends primarily on the reputation of the project, whose success will determine the way other aspects of its power play out. The European project must make continuous progress if the model it embodies is to retain its credibility and influence in other countries, whether they wish to join the EU under its enlargement policy or to use the European method as a template to set up their own regional political bodies. The internal success of the European Union is not just a crucial factor for the political and economic future of France; it is also a cornerstone of its security, as it helps to build a world that reflects its values.

There is no doubt, however, that the crisis of recent years has, for the time being, weakened the appeal of the European project. The crisis has highlighted the Member States' different economic and financial situations and approaches. Differences also exist in the field of security. Although the Lisbon Treaty's inclusion of solidarity and collective defence clauses was a recognition of the fact that the Member States are equally concerned by most threats, their perceptions, strategic cultures and national ambitions remain very diverse. The specific history of each Member State is reflected in the links forged in every continent, and sometimes in their contrasting visions of the role of military force in international relations. This diversity can be an asset, inasmuch as each country brings its own experience to the common project, but it can also be a source of mutual suspicion and make any hopes of rapid integration appear unrealistic. In this respect, the slow progress of the European defence and security policy shows that national perceptions cannot be transformed by institutions alone. The support of the people is essential. It can only be created through democratic debate, a common political will, shared experience and an awareness that we all have interests and strategic priorities in common. In the economic sphere, the crisis has confronted the European Union with difficult choices, giving rise to lively debate in all its Member States. Under the pressure of events, significant progress towards greater integration now stands to be achieved in budgetary and financial matters. This closer policy integration should eventually extend to security and defence. France sees this as a key objective, and it is in this perspective that it envisions its future and the exercise of its sovereignty.

Chapter 2

The foundations of the strategy for defence and national security

Sovereignty is dependent on the State's autonomy to make decisions and take action. In an interdependent world, it can only be genuine if a Nation retains its ability to influence an external environment from which it cannot insulate itself. But the Nation can only contribute sustainably towards international security if the actions undertaken are recognised as legitimate. Respect for the rule of law enhances the sovereignty of States. France intends to preserve its sovereignty, by providing itself with the resources to act and influence events, and contribute to international security, by ensuring its action enjoys national and international legitimacy. Sovereignty and international legitimacy are therefore two essential and complementary pillars of its strategy for defence and national security.

A. Preserving our independence and our sovereignty

As an essential attribute of the Nation, sovereignty is a key pillar of national security. Article 3 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen states that "The source of all sovereignty lies essentially in the Nation. No corporate body, no individual may exercise any authority that does not expressly emanate from it", thus underlining the point that preservation of national sovereignty is a basic responsibility of the political authorities. It underpins the mission of the armed forces and can justify mobilisation of other public resources whenever the situation so requires. If the Nation ceases to be able to protect its sovereignty, it loses control of its destiny, and the democratic nature of its national project is put in jeopardy.

The defence and national security strategy helps to ensure the Nation can decide its future within the framework of the interdependencies to which it has freely consented.

The effectiveness of the action undertaken to that end by the defence and security forces depends, in all circumstances, on the retention of an autonomous ability

to assess situations, total independence in decision-making and freedom of action. Nuclear deterrence is the ultimate guarantee of our sovereignty.

Our ability to preserve our sovereignty, in France and in our overseas territories, is never definitively guaranteed. For centuries, France has worked to build and maintain it. It is rooted in our ability to wield influence on the international stage and to mobilise the quantitative and qualitative resources needed to deal with risks and threats. It depends, first and foremost, on national cohesion and a dynamic economy – the reservoir of our resources and expertise. It also depends on our ability to develop the scientific skills, appropriate technologies and complex weapon systems that will enable France to deal with potential adversaries. Consequently, it also depends on the highly skilled men and women who work to produce these instruments, implement them or operate them. Given the rapid pace of change in science and technology, these skills can only be maintained and enhanced through constant investment in the industrial and technological base that delivers the resources underpinning our sovereignty, especially equipment for intelligence gathering, nuclear deterrence and the security of our information systems.

In the absence of these resources and without a proactive national will to acquire them, sovereignty becomes meaningless, reduced to a mere statement of intent devoid of any practical significance. In addition to helping guarantee our policymaking autonomy in general, the economic and financial recovery of the nation is key to our national independence.

France's strategic autonomy is underpinned by national ownership of its essential defence and security capabilities. Its current capabilities together with the action it envisages to maintain them enable it to meet its collective security commitments, not least in the context of the Washington Treaty, which established the Atlantic Alliance. This wholehearted commitment to NATO is fully compatible with the preservation of France's decision-making autonomy and freedom of action, promoting the French vision of an Alliance of responsible nations in control of their destiny and accepting their national responsibilities.

France's capability also enables it to commit to policies of mutual dependence with its EU partners. France is determined to retain its own capacity for initiative and leadership and believes that better coordination between the EU Member States will remove any capacity deficiencies and duplication. These freely agreed interdependencies will strengthen the sovereignty of each Member State by increasing the resources available at the European level. This vision underpins

our European choice and the mutual dependencies to which we shall continue to commit with our closest partners.

The Élysée Treaty signed with Germany 50 years ago is an act of historic importance: it paved the way for unprecedented cooperation between two great European nations that had long been enemies. Its implementation has led to many joint initiatives that have marked the progress of the European project, culminating in the establishment of common structures such as Eurocorps, which has gradually been opened up to other countries. The evolution of the strategic context and the on-going changes to the German defence system, not least the professionalization of its armed forces, make it possible to envisage fresh progress between our two nations, as part of the same logic of mutually agreed dependence. France supports a reform of the United Nations Security Council that would make room for new permanent members, including Germany.

With the establishment in 1992 of a joint commission on nuclear policy and doctrine, France and the United Kingdom declared that there could be no situation in which the vital interests of one party could be threatened without the vital interests of the other party being threatened too. The Saint Malo (1998) and Le Touquet (2003) summits, followed by the Lancaster House agreements (2010) have gradually led to close cooperation between France and the United Kingdom in defence matters, and required – particularly in highly sensitive areas such as nuclear deterrence, missiles and drones – joint programmes, shared facilities and reciprocal technological transfers. On the operational front, the increase in strength of a combined joint expeditionary force is a sign of the deepening cooperation between our two countries. These agreements confirm the high level of mutual trust that has been established with our British allies.

These privileged partnerships are intended to be opened up to other EU Member States, as illustrated by the approach which led to the creation of the Weimar triangle between Germany, Poland and France, as well as the extension of the discussions to include Italy, Spain and the Visegrad countries[1]. France shares common security interests with all EU Member States and has appropriate defence and security links with each of them. These inter-State partnerships contribute to consolidation of a European defence strategy and are conducted in complementarity with European Union initiatives.

1 Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia

The changed geopolitical, economic and budgetary context calls for a more in-depth approach to the proactive development of strategic convergence between EU Member States. The refocusing of American policy, the deterioration in public finances in Europe and the common nature of the threats and risks to which we are exposed increases the need for EU Member States to take the collective action enabling them to wield greater influence on their environment. They must therefore take advantage of the current situation to address the capabilities that they can no longer develop or maintain on a purely national basis, and consequently to organise mutually agreed capability interdependencies.

This approach is particularly appropriate for the defence industries. France is ready to support greater specialisation in Europe, based on the recognition of centres of excellence, in order to avoid the duplication of effort and piecemeal approach that can lead to waste. The bilateral framework and format of the six signatory nations to the Letter of Intent (LoI)[2] , together with all appropriate solidarity initiatives, must be fully mobilised in order to develop stronger partnerships between nations that share this approach. The European Defence Agency (EDA) should also play a leading role in implementing such an approach.

B. Ensuring the legitimacy of our actions both nationally and internationally

There can be no effective defence and security without the support of the nation, which legitimises efforts in this field and guarantees common resilience.

Defence and national security are the concern of all French people; they need to have confidence in the action of the public authorities and be convinced that the latter are doing all they can to guarantee the independence of France and protect its population.

Under the aegis of the President of the Republic, all the public authorities are involved in shaping and implementing the defence and national security strategy, thus ensuring that it expresses the will of the Nation. Its main architect is the State, by virtue of its inter-ministerial action, and it is the Prime Minister's responsibility to see to its execution, ensuring that the resources committed are consistent with the objectives. Since it involves a set of public policies and calls into play the fundamental interests of the Nation, the defence and national

2 Letter of Intent: signed by the Defence Ministers of the six main arms manufacturing nations in Europe (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) with a view to establishing a favourable climate for an integrated defence industry.

security strategy is approved by the President of the Republic. Its presentation to Parliament establishes its legitimacy and opens the necessary public discussion on the choices to which the Nation, in all its components, commits.

This collective ownership of the defence and national security strategy is the pre-requisite for the resilience of the Nation. In addition to the role of the relevant ministries in implementing the strategy, the State must also involve other players, without whom crisis management cannot be envisaged. Local and regional authorities have skills, resources and local knowledge that may help to protect the population and rally the public in times of crisis. It is important for local politicians and administrators to be fully involved in the collective effort. Similarly, the nation cannot return to normal activity without involving the essential infrastructure and network operators.

International legitimacy is the necessary complement to national legitimacy in the implementation of a defence and national security strategy. Like the other members of the European Union, France believes that an international order based on the rule of law rather than on the use of force is an essential condition for international security. It therefore considers the legal regulation of relationships between States as a cornerstone of its security. Similarly, it sees the fact that the internal operation of States is also gradually being subjected to international standards as a sign of progress towards international security.

France is committed to consolidating the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter that prohibit threats or the use of force in relations between States, other than in self-defence and application of Security Council resolutions. Compliance with international law is an intangible prerequisite for any use of force by France, whether acting on a purely national basis or within the framework of its alliances and defence agreements. It reaffirms its determination to maintain the capabilities necessary for its self-defence and for the defence of its allies, and to contribute to operations authorised or decided by the Security Council.

The creation of the International Criminal Court and the emergence of new international principles such as the "Responsibility to Protect" are indications of ethical progress and represent a strategic shift. The growing number of States party to the treaty that created the International Criminal Court, the progress made by the Court in defining the crime of aggression and the deterrent effect produced when war criminals or perpetrators of crimes against humanity are convicted, are all contributions to international security. The consensus on the Responsibility to Protect, as expressed at the UN World Summit in 2005,

remains fragile, but France intends to make consolidation of this principle a priority of its external action.

More generally, consolidation of international legitimacy calls for the strengthening and development of standards corresponding to a world that is both more interdependent and more mutually supportive. Respect for and promotion of international humanitarian law, the protection of women and children, the fight against sexual violence and the ban on recruiting minors to serve in armed forces and groups are all obligations that advance peace and international security. Treaties and conventions prohibiting the use of certain weapons[3], as well as those concerning the protection of certain categories of people and property[4], also contribute towards achieving this objective.

The UN, as well as other regional and sub-regional organisations, will be called upon to play an increasing role in the legitimisation and strategic conduct of external operations. In this regard, the success of the operation is often partly linked to the legitimacy of the institution that promotes it. In a world where great inequalities of power and resources persist, external intervention must not be suspected of being a new instrument for the abusive projection of power. In order to obtain the support essential to their success, they must respond to the expectations of the populations concerned and be piloted by organisations with which these populations can identify themselves. In Africa, the African Union and the sub-regional organisations have thus become players in the security of the continent, making a major contribution towards peace and international security.

France fully understands the implications of these developments and the operations in which it takes part will, as far as possible, be conducted within a

3 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, of 17 June 1925; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction of 10 April 1972; Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects of 10 October 1980 and its 5 protocols; Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction of 13 January 1993; Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction of 18 September 1997; Convention on Cluster Munitions of 30 May 2008.

4 Four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their two Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977; the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989; Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict of 25 May 2000; Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954.

multilateral framework. It will ensure that these operations are subject, under the aegis of the UN, to a wide-ranging agreement on their political objectives and that they are part of focused, coordinated action involving the appropriate multilateral organisations, in particular the regional or sub-regional organisations concerned.

Furthermore, France believes that collective security and disarmament are linked. It therefore considers that a sustained effort is necessary in support of disarmament, enhanced monitoring of technological transfers and conventional equipment, the fight against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, likewise the combat against arms and ammunition trafficking. The international instruments available in all these areas are key regulators for national and international security when dealing with State-level threats and also those posed by non-State armed groups and potentially terrorist organisations. France will therefore continue to be an active member of all the international organisations and forums working for disarmament, without restricting its efforts to any specific category of weapon. It will support effective inspection regimes and sanctions for violations.

Chapter 3

The State of the World

The previous White Paper gave pride of place to globalisation, which it defined as a situation of widespread interactions and interdependencies between a multitude of State and non-State players, furthered by the dissemination of new technologies. This assessment, made in 2008, has lost none of its relevance, but intervening events have revealed, with a new intensity, the ambivalent nature of the transformations in progress, and the shifts that they have caused confirm the difficulty in generalising from the trends observed.

A. Strategic shifts and developments

The first shift on a global scale came with the economic and financial crisis. Mainly affecting developed economies, it has not compromised the ascent of emerging economies, in particular Brazil, India and China. The latter, which is already a major power economically, scientifically and militarily, is well on the way to becoming the biggest economy in the world by 2030. It continues to accumulate trade surpluses but it suffers from the impact of the downturn in Europe and the United States. The new Chinese leadership is faced with complex political choices and the need to control the expression of its power – military in particular. It needs to invent an economic strategy that can satisfy the aspirations of a rapidly expanding middle class and rethink its development model, which is largely based on exports and on the impetus provided by the big state-controlled corporations. It also needs to address the issue of a rapidly ageing population from 2020 onwards. Strategic shifts are therefore still possible, and the political implications are difficult to predict.

As a result of the economic crisis, the United States and Europe have seen a reduction in their room for manoeuvre, thus contributing to their relative loss of influence. Following several decades during which their growth was largely fuelled by debt – both public and private – they are now forced to change tack and make painful compromises with regard to several imperatives: support

for economic activity, preservation of a social security system, prevention of systemic crises and the risk of a loss of financial credibility if their public finances are not straightened out in the short term. This change of direction often gives rise to negative reactions: the rejection of unbridled globalisation by certain quarters of Western opinion encourages a populist reflex that hampers the construction of a political consensus.

A second major change was provided by the Arab revolutions, which have demonstrated the uncertainty and complexity of the strategic landscape, together with the difficulty of influencing developments. The countries concerned have entered into a protracted revolutionary period, against a backdrop of social unrest and protests against inequality. On the one hand, these on-going revolutions are a global phenomenon, a testament to the power of the notions of justice and democracy in an interconnected world in which no regime can be permanently isolated from the general flow of ideas. They express the dissatisfaction of people who feel they have been betrayed by the powers that be, and who are now challenging their legitimacy – a challenge that derives special significance from the fact that, in most Arab States, between two thirds and three quarters of the population are under 30 years old. But, on the other hand, every national situation is unique, and the outcome will be determined by the specific characteristics of the country – its ethnic and religious make-up, any economic and social reforms that are carried out, and the nature of the regime.

In the case of the Middle East, these national characteristics are compounded by intercommunity and inter-faith tensions, which are currently feeding the destructive escalation in Syria. Despite the progress made by the UN, the lack of a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict that would allow the creation of a Palestinian State living in peace and security with Israel and its neighbours further complicate the fragile situation in the region. It is therefore very difficult to predict the outcome of these on-going revolutions, or the future of regimes that have thus far escaped the revolutionary wave; they could result in peaceful transitions, civil war, the installation of extremist regimes or the restoration of military dictatorships are all possibilities.

The strategic development of the United States is a third determining factor for international security. Confirmed by the end of the Cold War, the US's unparalleled military advantage is set to last for some time yet, given the sheer size, in absolute terms, of its defence budget (41% of global defence spending in 2012) and the scale of its investment in Research and Development, which have widened its technological lead over the rest of the world. The US

economy, which is beginning to recover from the 2008 crisis, has considerable strengths, not least the exploitation of shale gas and unconventional fuels, which could make the United States energy independent within the next few years. Nevertheless, returning the nation's finances to health is a major challenge. All in all, despite broad political support for military spending, it seems set to receive a declining share of the federal budget, with implications for the United States' strategic posture.

The first signs of these potential changes are beginning to appear as the United States refocuses its geopolitical priorities. Other than in the case of the legitimate defence of an ally, the US could become more selective about its external commitments as a result of financial constraints, but also owing to the doubts the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have raised about the effectiveness of long-term, heavy-footprint foreign intervention.

For the United States, Europe remains a zone of prime importance, but it understands the implications of the fact that the continent is no longer at the heart of global strategic confrontation. It has therefore begun to reduce its military and naval presence in Europe, whilst its anti-missile defence system is being set up. This lower military priority also extends to the Mediterranean and to Africa. The United States continues to have an interest in the area, as witness the creation of a specialised AFRICOM command and by the assistance it provides in terms of training and equipment. It believes, however, that the Europeans must play a greater role in its security, since they are more directly concerned by its stability and have the resources needed to take on this responsibility.

On the other hand, the strategic importance of Asia and the Pacific to the United States continues to increase, as defence budgets swell in the region and tension escalates between States in north-east and south-east Asia. The current rebalancing of the US military towards the Asia-Pacific region is therefore likely to continue, and will be an important factor for France's commitment as a sovereign power and a player in the security of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific.

Turning to the Middle East, the US stance will probably be driven by the need to ensure the security of the region. Faced with the threat from Iran which, in violation of its international undertakings and of six United Nations Security Council resolutions, continues its nuclear enrichment programme without any civilian justification with the objective of mastering a military nuclear capability, the United States has stepped up its presence in the area, where it has permanent bases and has installed anti-missile systems. The strategic

alliance with Israel and the United States' economic interest in free circulation of goods and hydrocarbons in this area are, in any case, sufficient reason for the US to maintain a strong presence.

Financial constraints and the lessons learned from recent conflicts will also have a strong influence on methods of intervention: the United States will probably seek more systematically to share the burden of foreign operations with its European allies, even if this means, in some cases, ceding power of initiative and command to them. The circumstances of the operations conducted in Libya and in Mali could provide a template for situations where American interests are less directly involved. Although not in the front line politically and militarily in such situations, the United States could support European action, although Europeans would not have any guarantee as to the capabilities that might be made available to them.

When intervening themselves, the Americans will doubtless be keener to ensure that the scale of their involvement and commitment of ground forces is proportionate to the extent to which their interests are threatened. In this context, it is likely that rapid operations and indirect action will be preferred to heavy, extended campaigns. Targeted operations conducted by special forces and remote strikes – cybernetic, where applicable - are likely to become more frequent, given their flexibility in a context in which conventional intervention will continue to be more difficult politically and sometimes less effective.

The multifaceted crisis that has befallen the European Union is also a major factor. As a result of the euro crisis that followed in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, Europe has temporarily lost some of its appeal and influence, in a context characterised by stubbornly low growth rates and ageing populations. Whereas it used to be seen as a model by many countries, the originality of its system of governance has at times been seen as a barrier to solving its problems. The crisis has highlighted the economic fragility of some countries and the need for structural change. Experienced to various degrees by its Member States, it affects the political equilibrium within the European Union and puts its mutual solidarity to the test, undermining public support for European integration.

Europe does not yet seem willing to take on a greater share of responsibility for the security of the continent and the wider world, despite encouragement in this direction from the United States. On the contrary, in several European countries the defence effort has dropped below the bar of 1% of GDP. Despite the real progress made under the Common Security and Defence Policy, some

ten years after its introduction the European Union is struggling to take the next step, which would enable it to make a more decisive impact on a changing world.

This change of circumstances in the United States and Europe has implications for crisis management policies and for the institutions responsible for international security. Whether the result of a growing aversion to risk-taking, doubts about the effectiveness of recent operations or the impact of financial constraints, Europe and the United States have greater misgivings about committing to large-scale, extended foreign intervention. Furthermore, despite the development of regional organisations, the international institutions are struggling to pick up the baton: they reflect the will of their members and it is increasingly difficult for them to forge a consensus. This impacts on their legitimacy and effectiveness, whilst the attempts at reform launched in the first decade of the 21st century have not achieved the expected results. UN reform has thus far been a failure. The G20 has managed to improve economic and financial coordination, but it was never intended to play a role in security. The ambition supported by France to overhaul the foundations of global governance is today stymied by reduced international mobilisation. Some Western powers have in fact succumbed to fatigue or political realism, while the major emerging nations are not always ready to assume the global responsibilities that go with their growing demographic and economic strength.

This relative inadequacy of the instruments of global governance has become apparent at a time when the principles underpinning the international order need to be clarified and consolidated. Some of the questions currently raised call for a more focused international debate at the United Nations: how should self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter be interpreted in relation to cyber-attacks or terrorism conducted by non-State groups from States that are too weak to control their territory effectively? How can we reconcile the urgency which, in certain situations, applies to the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect, with the patience that is essential to achieving an international consensus? How can we combine such urgent action with a more long-term political strategy that aims to consolidate the authority of a State as the only legitimate and lasting guarantor of the protection of its population? The answer to these questions emerges all too slowly in crisis situations, when these principles are put to the test. The international consensus that could support and channel the necessary changes remains inadequate, while new situations rapidly transform the strategic landscape and open up the range of possibilities.

The strategic implications of these changes impact profoundly on the security of France and its EU partners. Although the spectre of a major conflagration in Europe has receded, Europeans cannot afford to ignore the unstable world around them and to which they are inextricably linked. Both stakeholders in and major beneficiaries of the globalisation process, they have to deal with a systematic increase in major risks and the vulnerability of the European Union to threats from beyond its borders. For example, a major crisis in Asia would have considerable economic, commercial and financial consequences for Europe.

All the more, owing to geographic proximity, to the depth of the human relations and to the strength of the economic and energy ties between Europe and the southern shores of the Mediterranean, the Arab revolutions pose an even greater challenge for Europe. In the long term, Europe's security will be enhanced if its Mediterranean neighbours are democratic and prosperous. In the short term, the transitions may nonetheless give rise to tensions and the actions of extremist forces may encourage European opinion to prefer the status quo. In any case, external players can have only limited influence over the outcome of events, which essentially play out along national lines.

In the absence of a shared vision and common principles, no power, no coalition and no international institution has the ability to control global developments. The world has become genuinely multipolar, but also more fragmented. For France, this transformation has some positive aspects: it means that while certain events are influenced and sometimes triggered by global developments, every situation must be assessed according to its specific characteristics. This leads to a more regional approach to crisis management. But given the absence of any system to control global events, the lack of global regulation may also lead to chaotic situations.

Future scenarios therefore remain wide open and it would be simplistic to reduce the analysis to over-generalisations. In order to give every opportunity for change to be positive, we need to conduct a differentiated prospective analysis that addresses the different types of risks and threats that might stand in its way.

B. Threats related to power

Throughout its history, France has had to face up to powers that challenged its position and posed a threat to its territory and security. It has had to match power with power, forging alliances and developing its military capabilities in

proportion to the threats with which it was confronted. Thanks to the creation of the European Union, its relationship with its western European neighbours is no longer based on the balance of power as a means of guaranteeing peace. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, American power went unrivalled for two decades. This particular situation may have helped turn the page on the balances of power on which world order had been based for centuries, especially in Europe, where the European project was advanced and developed with its successful enlargement to include central Europe. Nevertheless, peace is often still underpinned by the balance of power between nations, and the European situation is exceptional in this respect. The large and rapid increase in military spending and conventional arsenals in some regions of the world is a stark reminder that there could be a resurgence of conflict between States and that France and Europe cannot afford to ignore threats related to power.

Any assessment of these threats related to power must not underestimate the role played by national sentiment. In those regions of the world where the ambition to build a nation goes hand-in-hand with a burning desire to escape from poverty, this sentiment remains a broadly positive driver, rallying the energies of the population and contributing towards their development: memories of bygone humiliations under foreign occupation or during a colonial past fade as pride is recovered through rapid economic growth. However, the journey from this patriotism to a dangerous nationalism is a short one: if growth slows and the social and political structures fail to keep pace with economic change, an aggressive nationalism may become a convenient outlet for their frustration.

As the main area of economic growth in the world over the last thirty years, Asia has enjoyed significant economic development. While it accounted for less than 20% of global GDP in 1980, by 2030 it should become the main source of wealth creation and scientific, likewise technical innovation, accounting for over a third of global GDP.

This economic growth has taken place in a political context that remains fragile. Unlike other regions that are characterised by relatively homogeneous political organisations and social structures, Asia has a wide variety of political systems and arrangements for economic activity. In addition, it is also the scene of sometimes quite ancient geopolitical disputes which feed tension and recurring conflicts.

The Korean peninsula, for example, remains divided by one of the last borders resulting from the Cold War. It is the most heavily militarised border in the world

and one where incidents occur most frequently. The China Sea is also a major source of tension, with competing territorial claims from several bordering States. The resurgence of a Sino-Japanese dispute over the sovereignty of the Senkaku / Diaoyu islands is only the latest manifestation of this type of disagreement, and should not be allowed to overshadow other stubborn areas of contention in the region: the Taiwan Straits, China's claim to sovereignty over the entire South China Sea, the territorial dispute over the Kuril Islands / Northern Territories between Russia and Japan, and the tension between South Korea and Japan, in particular over the Liancourt Rocks.

In the Indian sub-continent, the absence of any lasting solution to the Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir remains a destabilising factor in a region that includes several nuclear powers. Although relations remain extremely strained in the wake of the Mumbai attacks in November 2008 and occasional incidents along the Line of Control, India and Pakistan are showing restraint and now seem to prefer dialogue as a means to resolve their disputes. India, whose close cooperation with France has been formalised in a strategic partnership, provides an element of stability in the region.

With the withdrawal of coalition forces, replaced by a limited international military presence, the presidential elections in 2014 and the general elections in 2015, Afghanistan is preparing for a defining moment in its history. However, the future of the nation is still currently dependent on a successful reconciliation process and the security situation. It is in this context that France has concluded a 20-year Friendship and Partnership Treaty with Afghanistan, which commits it to providing long-term support. Meanwhile, several States in the region are strengthening their bilateral relations with Afghanistan and stepping up their efforts to promote security and cooperation in the region.

It is difficult to predict the way geopolitical tensions will evolve in Asia. The economic dynamics are rapidly altering the balance of power throughout the whole region. Moreover, despite some major progress, notably by the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asian regional cooperation organisations do not as yet have the means to take effective action to defuse crisis risks and conflicts over sovereignty.

Economic development and continuing geopolitical tension are causing a significant push towards armament. Over the past decade, military spending in the Asian countries has doubled, with a significant increase in pace since 2005. China in particular has pushed ahead with defence modernisation at an

even faster rate, especially as regards developing and modernising its nuclear arsenal and its power projection and cyber-attack capabilities. In 2012, the total military budgets of the four largest countries in the region - China, India, Japan and South Korea – overtook, for the first time, those of all the countries of the European Union put together.

However, this increase in military expenditure needs to be qualified, since some of the modernisation involves armed forces whose initial equipment levels were considerably behind those of western armies. Neither is it always aggressive in scope: in enhancing their naval capabilities, the countries in the region may also be helping to secure our shipping lanes, which are crucial to our industrial supplies and our trade. However, the intensity of the arms race in Asia is primarily a reflection of the antagonisms that divide the continent. In that respect, one cannot entirely exclude the hypothesis that the combination of persistent sovereignty conflicts, the sharp increase in military expenditure and the rise of nationalism could pose a risk of instability in Asia; a risk which could be exacerbated if economic growth, which has made the region a driver of the world economy, were to slow dramatically.

Like its European partners, France is not directly threatened by potential conflicts between Asian powers, but it is nevertheless very directly concerned, for several reasons: it is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and of UNCMAC (United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission, Korea) and a power with a presence in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. It is also a US ally that plays a key role in the security of this strategic part of the world. Its companies and its citizens are present in increasing numbers in the region and its prosperity is now inseparable from that of the Asia-Pacific region.

Russia's military budget is growing rapidly. It is modernising its nuclear arsenal and working to provide its conventional forces with enhanced intervention capabilities. This rearmament is taking place against a backdrop - since 2006 - of increasing displays of strength involving, for example, the political exploitation of its energy resources, pressure on its neighbouring environment and recognition of secessionist entities in Georgia. At the same time, warmer relations with the United States and other western nations have not achieved all the declared objectives, as witness the continuing disputes over NATO, disarmament and the resolution of the Syrian crisis within the UN Security Council.

The energy issue has become a key plank in Russia's foreign policy. Russia is seeking to establish a monopoly over supply routes, thus complicating European

efforts to diversify their imports. In 2010, one third of the crude oil and natural gas imported by EU countries came from the countries of the former USSR.

These developments show that Russia is equipping itself with the economic and military clout that will enable it to engage in power politics. The outcome of this plan, however, remains uncertain. The 2008 crisis and the development of non-conventional fuels are subjecting Russia to the vagaries of the energy market, whilst exports of energy and raw materials continue to be an important part of the Russian economy.

In a context such as this, relations with EU countries can only be mixed. With France, relations include aspects of cooperation (military equipment, logistics support during the withdrawal from Afghanistan), agreements (Mali, Afghanistan) and disagreements (Syria). For France, as for the rest of Europe, the delicate balance that currently exists between all these aspects of its relations with Russia is probably set to continue. France has made close cooperation with Moscow one of its political objectives for the NATO Summit Declaration in Chicago.

The non-proliferation policy initiated in 1968 by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has, thus far, disproved the pessimistic predictions that foresaw a world consisting of twenty nuclear powers by the year 2000. However, recent developments, which globalisation has facilitated by providing easier access to the technologies and materials required to manufacture weapons of mass destruction, give legitimate cause for concern. The ability of some States to use illegal private networks to obtain transfers of knowledge and know-how increases the risk of circumventing international non-proliferation policies.

At the strategic level, nuclear proliferation is developing in an area that extends from the Middle East to North Korea. The risk stems from the fact that pre-existing regional crises are compounded by the acquisition of or attempts to acquire nuclear weapons. As a result it will be very difficult to resolve these proliferation crises without first or simultaneously resolving the regional problems that caused them. Furthermore, it is certain that any increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons in those politically unstable regions will further complicate the resolution of the underlying crises. If Iran, a State party to the NPT, were to acquire a military nuclear capability, not only would the NPT be seriously weakened, but other States in the region, which are also parties to the NPT, could be persuaded to do the same. This would undermine the Non-Proliferation Treaty and permanently dent the prospects of reducing tension. In addition, it would increase the risk of uncontrolled

escalation leading to a collapse of the nuclear taboo. If nuclear weapons become more common, some nations could start to see them as battlefield weapons. Finally, the collapse of a State with a nuclear capability would pave the way for particularly dangerous scenarios.

This increased risk also concerns the proliferation of delivery systems, which has intensified since 2008. Iran, Pakistan and North Korea have been working to increase their range. Iran already possesses ballistic missiles with sufficient range to reach EU and NATO territory. Some of our forces currently deployed in foreign operations (Lebanon and Afghanistan), several of our staging posts and military bases as well as some countries with which we have ties through defence agreements (Djibouti, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates) are currently within the range of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles that could be launched by certain regional players. But a focus on ballistic threats must not divert our attention from the threat posed by cruise missiles. The States concerned are seeking to diversify their range of delivery systems in view of the versatility and precision afforded by these missiles.

As the Syrian crisis demonstrates, the threat posed by chemical weapons is a very real one. Chemical weapon proliferation is difficult to detect, due to the ease with which the civilian capabilities of a rapidly evolving global chemical industry can be used for military purposes, and to the fact that its development on an international scale is gradually changing the geography of risk. In the past, several countries have launched offensive chemical weapons programmes, while others are suspected of doing so today. In the biological field, several countries are believed to be conducting offensive Research and Development programmes, although none has officially admitted to doing so thus far. The dual nature of the biological field is even greater than that of the chemical field: biotechnology R&D programmes may have legitimate applications for public health or the agri-food sector, but they are just as likely to be exploited for military purposes.

In addition, some States are developing offensive IT capabilities that already pose a direct threat to essential institutions, companies and sectors for the Nations' life.

Behind power rationales based on the always uncertain search for a balance of power, the prospect of another kind of future for the world could take shape - one that runs counter to the world of organised interdependencies for which the European project is a beacon. Consequently, France cannot afford to give

the impression that it is not concerned by threats to use force without running the risk of losing its credibility and thus undermining its security.

C. Risks of weakness

The fact that a State's weakness can become a threat is a new, strategically important factor: for centuries, the powerful saw weakness as an opportunity to extend their territory and expand their domination. This no longer applies when the progress of the rule of law and the legitimate desire of populations to decide their own destiny make state sovereignty the linchpin of international order. This assumes however, that States have the ability to exercise their sovereignty, which means the ability to defend their borders, ensure the security of their population and maintain order within their territory.

If States are seen to be incapable of exercising their sovereign responsibilities, the very foundations of the international order on which we base our own security are threatened. The risks and threats that they are unable to deal with on their territory may quickly spill over and undermine our own security. Even if we step up the protection of our borders, no border can be completely impermeable, especially in a globalised world with its constant flows of people, goods and information. An epidemic can quickly turn into a pandemic if it is not eradicated at source. Hostage-taking involving our nationals can become a type of remote aggressions. A State that can no longer control its borders and its territory can become a haven for criminal groups, a transit platform for trafficking, or a rear-guard base where terrorist groups can plan action on a large scale. These activities fuel crime and rebel movements in the areas where they develop, and may give rise to conflict between States. International order requires every State to guard its sovereign territory, not just on behalf of its own people, but on behalf of the international community as well. When dealing with threats and risks, the State is the first line of defence, the first level of response. If that level is found wanting, if it is breached, then the problem immediately takes on a new, much less manageable dimension.

The first decade of the 21st century has shown that the failure of many States to exercise the basic functions of sovereignty is a lasting, widespread phenomenon. This failure concerns States of varying levels of development and size and applies to all or part of their territory. It affects, for example, areas that are far from the capital and which escape the control of central government, as in the Sahel, Yemen, Pakistan and Afghanistan. In many countries, their partial

inclusion in international trade flows has weakened traditional solidarities, while new legitimate structures have yet to be properly consolidated. Meanwhile, growth in all types of trafficking on the territory of fragile States provides the groups organising these activities with economic and military resources that often outstrip those of the authorities, thereby weakening them even further.

When these upheavals occur in a country with a fragile sense of national unity, where the borders resulting from decolonisation enclose considerable ethnic, linguistic or religious diversity, and where there is no strong national project to replace the struggle against the colonisers, the likelihood of civil war is further increased.

A failed State leads to great suffering for the populations who are its victims, due to the physical violence of civil war, including mass sexual violence. But it also leads to much higher natural mortality rates, since the destruction of infrastructure and the absence of basic levels of healthcare means that the slightest disease can be fatal.

For Europe and for France, this political and humanitarian challenge is also a strategic issue, since many of the States concerned are on Europe's doorstep, in Africa, a continent which is now at a crossroads. If the next few decades confirm the economic take-off in sub-Saharan Africa, where 5% annual growth has been achieved over the last five years, the continent may become an engine of global growth and make a strong contribution to European prosperity. The growing interest shown by many emerging powers (Brazil, China, the Gulf States, India) in Africa – whose population is predicted to exceed that of China by 2030 – is not confined to energy products and raw materials. It illustrates the new awareness of Africa's potential.

However, sub-Saharan Africa is also an area of major fragility: between 2003 and 2012, some ten States have been shaken by political crises or civil wars, and this is where most UN peacekeepers have been deployed, sometimes for over ten years. Two potentially very different futures could take shape over the next twenty year horizon, depending on whether the continent sees a reduction or an increase in the number of ungoverned or weakly governed areas. But one thing is certain: nowhere is the range of possibilities as wide open as on the African continent.

The risks associated with weakness are more insidious than threats related to power, since they are not as tangible as traditional power struggles and their

impact is felt much later, when the international community is confronted with a breakdown in order which it needs urgently to resolve. It is then faced with a dilemma: either to let chaos set in or, on the contrary, to intervene and risk becoming the focus of hostility, without being able to rely on any solid national partners. In the new strategic landscape, it is therefore particularly important to identify any risks of weakness as early as possible, in order to counter them before they can wreak most havoc.

D. Threats and risks intensified by globalisation

The 2008 White Paper had already identified the multiplier effects of globalisation, which shrinks and unifies the strategic landscape and brings closer both threats related to power and risks of weakness. It acts both as an accelerator and an amplifier, for better or for worse.

Globalisation has thus generated an unprecedented movement of trade, releasing the considerable growth potential that has led to the remarkable development of the emerging countries. It has enabled hundreds of millions of people, chiefly in Asia, to escape from poverty, swelling the ranks of the middle classes in the developing countries at a rate unprecedented in the history of humankind: the OECD estimates that, by 2030, over half of the world's middle classes will be in the developing countries. The distinction between developing and developed countries could therefore gradually lose its relevance.

Several decades of sustained growth on a global scale have, however, been accompanied by an ever-increasing pressure on resources and an environmental impact that is spiralling out of control. The resulting tensions coalesce around access to water, land and agricultural products, mineral and energy raw materials including strategic materials, and control over the routes used to transport them.

Globalisation has also brought with it an increase in inequality. Within individual countries, especially the developed countries, technological progress seems to be leading to an increase in the income of the best qualified workers and a fall in the income of lesser-skilled workers. Globalisation is also contributing to an increase in inequality between nations, where some of them are not included in global trade. In the most fragile countries, the inequalities this generates may be an additional destabilising factor.

The explosion in tangible and intangible flows makes it increasingly difficult for States to control their content and destination, as they were able to do previously in the circumscribed areas over which they held sway. This makes it more difficult to combat illegal trafficking, which is consequently tending to spread. The increasing share of maritime transport in international trade gives rise to new asymmetric threats, as the spread of piracy shows. Owing to the availability of rapid transport systems, which enable health risks to spread faster and on a larger scale, States are compelled to look for new ways of preventing pandemics. Likewise, the instant communication enabled by the Internet forces them to mobilise against the spread of computer viruses, whose effects can be devastating.

Furthermore, the speed with which information can circulate and the impact it has in all areas of activity has enabled all manner of crisis - whether political, economic or financial - to spread rapidly. It also makes it more complicated to manage these crises which, for the most part, recognise no borders and can cause chain reactions whose consequences are difficult to predict.

The spread of technologies that accompanies globalisation has major implications for the way threats can develop. At the lowest level, this could involve using cell phones to trigger improvised explosive devices (IEDs). At an intermediate level, it could be the acquisition of advanced weapon systems by second-tier powers, as well as by non-State groups - as when Hezbollah launched missiles against an Israeli ship. At the highest level, it could facilitate the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

These different developments could, especially in the event of a breakdown in security, create the conditions for terrorist groups to obtain weapons of mass destruction. While it remains highly unlikely that non-State players will be able to acquire nuclear weapons, the manufacture of "dirty bombs" from radioactive materials cannot be ruled out. Manufacture and use of chemical weapons have an even higher degree of probability. Although manufacture of biological weapons for military purposes demands complex know-how, the potential use of biological agents by terrorists remains possible and could have very serious consequences.

Fortunately, the most likely acts of terrorism do not include the extreme scenario involving weapons of mass destruction. But even if weapons of mass destruction are not used, these acts of terrorism can have a destabilising effect

that goes well beyond their direct impact, since the power of the modern media considerably magnifies their psychological and political impact.

Faced with States that have powerful defence and security resources, but whose populations are alive to the risk, terrorism has become a mode of action utilised by adversaries who ignore all the rules of conventional warfare to offset their inadequate resources and to achieve their political objectives. Striking civilians indiscriminately, the violence they deploy aims first and foremost to take advantage of the fact that their brutal impact can sway public opinion and thus constrain governments. The immediate, global coverage these attacks receive ensures maximum resonance amongst the population of the States targeted in this way, and also throughout the world.

The publicity that they thus enjoy also helps to maintain the terrorist phenomenon. It encourages the self-radicalisation of isolated individuals who are attracted by the idea that their actions will have a global impact reflecting the extent of the resentment that they harbour. The role of the Internet should be stressed here: it enables these individuals to join virtual communities with which they can identify, thus providing terrorist organisations with an effective recruitment channel.

More than ten years after the 9/11 attacks and despite the major progress achieved in the combat against terrorism worldwide, the level of threat remains extremely high. Systematic action by the United States and its allies against Al-Qaida has achieved substantial results, with the removal of Osama bin Laden and the weakening of the movement he created. Despite the media impact they generate, acts of terrorism have not achieved the political effects hoped for by their perpetrators. Nevertheless, there are no signs of the terrorist threat diminishing in the short or medium term; indeed, it appears to be evolving and spreading geographically. Against a backdrop of fragile or failed States, terrorist groups are operating in hitherto safe regions where they latch onto local conflicts and attempt to radicalise them; this is happening in the Sahel-Sahara region as well as in northern Nigeria, Somalia, Syria, Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula and the Afghanistan-Pakistan area. Claiming allegiance to Al-Qaida, they have an independent operational capability and seek to achieve a global impact by directly targeting Western interests. They may incite radicalised individuals present on our territory to turn to action and join them in their efforts. Some States could also be tempted to return to the terrorist fold. The threat of home-grown terrorism likely to damage national security exists even on our own territory.

Operating modes have also evolved since 2008, particularly with respect to explosives, which are now easier for groups or individuals to acquire or make, thanks to the Internet and information technologies, and the growth in trafficking. At a time when targeted killings and kidnapping have become more common, the hypothesis of a major terrorist attack identified in the previous White Paper cannot be ruled out.

Information systems are now part and parcel of our societies, but alongside the considerable opportunities it brings, the interconnection of information systems presents a new source of vulnerability. As identified in the previous White Paper, the threats and risks posed by universal access to cyberspace have been confirmed, whether in the form of attacks on systems resulting from deliberate acts, or accidental failures that jeopardise the operation of critical digital infrastructure.

The rapid development of digital infrastructure has not always been accompanied by a corresponding effort to protect it, with the result that cyber-attacks are relatively easy and cheap to carry out. The stealth with which they are performed makes it difficult to identify the perpetrators, who may be State or non-State actors, although the most sophisticated attacks require complex organisation. A large-scale attack on a digital infrastructure demands detailed knowledge of the intended target, knowledge that can be acquired through previous smaller-scale attacks intended to test the target, or through information obtained by other means.

Several types of threat are developing in cyberspace. At the lowest level, they are a new form of criminality and do not specifically concern national security: theft of personal data for purposes of blackmail or embezzlement, identity theft, trafficking of prohibited products, etc. On the other hand, national security is threatened by attempts to infiltrate digital networks for purposes of espionage, regardless of whether they target State IT systems or those of companies. An attack designed to destroy or take remote control of computer systems used to manage essential infrastructure, automated control systems of potentially dangerous industrial systems, not to speak of weapons systems or strategic military capabilities, might have very serious consequences.

Cyberspace has thus become an area of confrontation as such. The possibility - envisaged by the previous White Paper - of a major cyber-attack on national information systems in a scenario of cyber warfare constitutes an extremely serious threat for France and its European partners.

Outer space has become crucial to the operation of essential services. In the military field, our strategic autonomy is dependent on free access to and use of space, which make it possible to preserve and develop the technological capabilities on which the quality of our defence system and, not least, the credibility of our nuclear deterrent, depend.

The possibility of aggression in space is more likely as progress is made in anti-satellite weaponry, especially low-orbit satellites. Furthermore, the risk of collision to which they are exposed grows as the number of objects - especially debris - increases in the orbits where they are stationed. France and Germany possess the resources that could serve as a basis to develop a European space surveillance capability.

The 2008 White Paper identified some natural, health and technological risks that are liable, owing to their scale, to disrupt our societies. Events since then have confirmed the reality of these risks. Several events have shown how vulnerable our societies are to natural risks: the outbreak of the A/H1N1 influenza epidemic in 2009; in 2010, the particularly deadly earthquake in Haiti and the eruption of the Icelandic volcano, Eyjafjöll, which disturbed international air traffic; in March 2011, the Fukushima disaster, brought about by a natural disaster and leading to a major nuclear accident, and Hurricane Sandy in the autumn of 2012.

Certain climate change studies suggest that the scale or frequency of extreme events may increase and further weaken the regions that are already most vulnerable to them. The precise regional consequences of global warming over the next few decades are still very uncertain. However, the reduction in Arctic Sea ice already has strategic consequences and the prospect of regular use of new Arctic shipping lanes is drawing closer.

In the area of health, the movement of people and goods, the concentration of people in mega-cities and the failure of healthcare systems in some areas all provide fertile ground for major crises to occur. We face the risk, in particular, of a new highly pathogenic and lethal pandemic caused, for instance, by the emergence of a new virus that crosses the species barrier, or by the escape of a virus from a biocontainment laboratory.

Being dependent on complex vital infrastructure, working on the "just in time" principle and in daily contact with the entire world, our societies may be rapidly and severely disrupted by events that initially affect a mere fraction of the population. A lack of organisation that is initially quite limited may rapidly spread and grow into a threat to national security.

Our country remains exposed to risks and threats that vary in their nature and intensity. Being difficult to quantify, they are all the more insidious and help to maintain a pervasive feeling of insecurity. Consequently, we need to reassess our priorities and tailor our responses accordingly.

Chapter 4

The strategic priorities

The growing complexity of possible scenarios calls for a strict prioritisation of our strategic options. What are the most probable risks and threats? What impact might they have on our security? A comprehensive analysis must take another criterion into account: will we be alone in facing risks and threats or can we, in certain cases, count on the help of our Allies and our European partners?

Answering these questions enables us to prioritise threats and risks and direct France's strategic choices accordingly. The scale of priorities governing the level and intensity of our potential engagements is therefore structured as shown below:

- protect the national territory and French nationals abroad, and guarantee the continuity of the Nation's essential functions;
- guarantee the security of Europe and the North Atlantic space, with our partners and allies;
- stabilise Europe's near environment, with our partners and allies;
- contribute to the stability of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf;
- contribute to peace in the world.

A. Protect the national territory and French nationals abroad, and guarantee the continuity of the Nation's essential functions

On this issue, the defence and national security strategy takes the following threats and risks into account:

- aggression by another State against the national territory;
- terrorist attacks;
- cyber-attacks;
- damages on scientific and technical potential;
- organised crime in its most serious manifestations;
- major crises resulting from natural, health, technological, industrial or accidental risks;
- attacks on French nationals abroad.

Protection of the national territory, its population and French nationals abroad is a vital and fundamental obligation of the State, which must also guarantee the continuity of the Nation's essential functions.

Preventing any direct aggression against the national territory by another State will always be an absolute priority. Although, fortunately, such a scenario appears unlikely today, we cannot rule out the possibility that a chain of circumstances could lead to a serious deterioration in the international situation: major terrorist or cyber-attack, closing of a maritime or air space compromising the strategic supply routes of numerous powers, implosion of a State with spillover effects on the region around it; military aggression against an ally or a country crucial to the stability of our environment. France's engagement in the process of crisis resolution could then trigger aggression by a hostile State, precipitating our country into a war situation. This threat has a low degree of probability, but it cannot be ignored given its extreme potential seriousness. In addition, some nuclear powers – recognised or de facto – could be tempted to brandish threats or use blackmail in the context of an international crisis, against us or our allies.

The terrorist threat is still high up on the list of the most probable threats: a large-scale terrorist campaign would result in substantial material, psychological and human damage. If it were to strike several locations simultaneously or successively, it would have a much greater impact on the population and the risk of security forces being overwhelmed. This impact would be vastly magnified if it were to involve NRBC (nuclear, radiological, biological, chemical) attacks.

Cyber-attacks do not have the same impact as terrorist acts, given that they have not to date resulted in any fatalities. However, today and even more over the timeframe of this White Paper, they represent a major risk given their high probability and potential impact. Attempts to infiltrate digital networks (hacking) targeting the State, operators of vital importance and large national or strategic companies occurs on a daily basis, although we cannot always distinguish with certainty between attacks initiated by non-State players and those emanating from State-led players. Large quantities of information of great strategic, industrial, economic or financial value are stolen, often unbeknownst to the victims. The recurrence of this type of infiltration today, notably on the part of States, could suggest that information is being methodically collected to facilitate a large-scale attack in a conflict situation. Such an attack could easily paralyse whole swathes of a country's activity, trigger technological or ecological disasters and claim numerous victims. It could therefore constitute a genuine act of war.

The Nation's scientific and technical potential consists of all the tangible and intangible goods contributing to fundamental and applied scientific activity and technological development. Numerous attempts are made to attack this potential, with the aim of diverting scientific and technical data. They are likely to harm the Nation's economic interests and can also contribute to an increase in foreign military arsenals, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or diversion for the purposes of terrorist action. Given these risks, it is vital to protect this potential.

Organised crime networks can irrigate illegal underground economies. In most cases, they may have international connections and in some cases links – including financial links - with terrorist groups. The dissemination of weapons of war and explosives is likely to reinforce the capabilities of certain criminal groups and may even, in extreme situations, lead to serious attacks on public order compromising the normal functioning of institutions.

The probability of natural (earthquakes, storms, tsunamis, floods, etc.), health (massive pandemic) or technological and industrial (notably chemical or nuclear) risks is more difficult to assess, but they can have a major impact. The State has an obligation to prepare for such risks, in continental France and in its overseas territories. A natural or technological disaster can bring about serious dysfunctions in public and private structures and even lead to a great number of victims, with those injured often requiring highly specialised care and treatment, particularly in the event of exposure to chemical products or nuclear radiation. They can also trigger disturbances creating an additional factor of insecurity: panic among the population, refusal to obey security instructions or stay out of forbidden areas, looting, increase in delinquency, etc.

The risks and threats to which the overseas territories - where almost three million of our fellow citizens live - are exposed pose specific problems to do with their geographical distance and their specific characteristics. They call for specific responses from the State. Particular attention is required given their strategic situation, notably because of the many substantial resources existing in their maritime spaces and the illegal activities being carried on in their immediate vicinity.

The Antilles-French Guiana region is a hub exposed to multiple influences. The United States has a strong presence, as do Central and South American countries (Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, etc.) and some European countries that retain interests there (Holland, Spain, the United Kingdom). The region represents

a strategic challenge not only for France, but also for Europe, because of the Kourou Space Centre in French Guiana. It is also a region beset by substantial security problems due to numerous illicit transnational trafficking activities: drugs (half the world's cocaine is produced in the region), illegal gold prospecting, money laundering, clandestine immigration and fishing, etc., which impact on the security of our fellow citizens in the overseas territories. Furthermore, the risk of natural disasters is particularly high in the Antilles. Lastly, the presence of numerous French and European nationals in neighbouring countries increases the need for a fast-response capability for evacuation operations or operations to restore security. Over and above issues of sovereignty and protection of the French population living in these territories, France must therefore assume the responsibilities arising from its presence in this complex region.

New Caledonia and the communities living in French Polynesia and Wallis-et-Futuna make France a political and maritime power in the Pacific. France has substantial fishing and mineral resources in this region, a situation that gives it access to many regional organisations: the South Pacific Forum, the Fisheries Agency, etc. It is our responsibility to defend our sovereignty in this part of the world and also to guarantee the security of our fellow citizens in regions exposed to climatic risks, notably through the FRANZ Agreement (France – Australia – New Zealand). France contributes to the general protection of populations and resources in the Pacific Ocean. In this capacity, it develops relations of cooperation with many neighbouring States, particularly Australia, with which it has established a strategic partnership.

Reunion Island and Mayotte in the Indian Ocean are pockets of relative prosperity in the midst of a less privileged environment, and strategically signifiant. As a neighbouring power, France has a responsibility to protect the French population and contribute to freedom of navigation and the combat against piracy and human trafficking. The Iles Éparses (Scattered Islands) located in the maritime navigation zone of the Mozambique Channel give France an exclusive economic zone coveted by other countries due to the possible presence of oil and gas resources. The same is true for the French Southern and Antarctic Lands (TAAF), which offer substantial fishing resources.

The archipelago of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon is located close to the Arctic and North Atlantic shipping lanes in an area with substantial hydrocarbon resources. The development of the archipelago and protection of its population require regional cooperation with Canada and its Atlantic provinces that respects the interests of all parties.

The number of French nationals traveling or residing abroad is continuing to rise. Their security can be threatened in poorly controlled areas, either countries with inadequate State structures or maritime zones vulnerable to piracy. While attacks aimed collectively at a particular expatriate French community were rare between 2008 and 2012, kidnapping has, conversely, become a structural risk in numerous countries. Furthermore, our fellow citizens are regularly caught up in extraordinary situations (coup d'état, civil war, natural disasters, etc.) that call for emergency action. The State will always be obliged to conduct operations to protect French citizens exposed to threats throughout the world. In most cases, where necessary, emergency evacuation will also concern other nationals from European or allied countries and may give rise to shared operations between the countries concerned.

B. Guarantee the security of Europe and the North Atlantic space, with our partners and allies

Most of the risks and threats to which France is exposed are very largely shared by the other countries of the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance. Indeed, the systemic dimension of major risks and the transnational nature of the threats have both increased.

The same trend towards de jure and de facto solidarity with our European partners can be observed regarding the threat of a State-led aggression. While none of the European countries, including France, is today threatened by a declared State-level enemy, the probability of direct military aggression against another European country must be taken into account in the global range of risks and threats. In this event, France will comply with its commitments, in espect of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty[5], and Article 42.7 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union[6].

5 This article states «that an armed attack against one or more [of the parties to the Treaty] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.»

6 This article states that « if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation."

Likewise, most of the risks and threats are of identical concern on both sides of the North Atlantic. The very close, in-depth nature of our bilateral relations with the United States and Canada, our collective defence commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty and the commonality of our values structure a de jure and de facto solidarity between us, which has been demonstrated several times in the last few years. France will continue to fully assume its responsibilities in this framework and act in accordance with this spirit of solidarity.

Awareness of this shared exposure to risks and threats has prompted the Member States of the Union to develop common instruments to confront this risk together whenever possible. Hence, after the terrorist attack in Madrid on 11 March 2004, the European Council adopted a declaration on the combat against terrorism, stating that terrorist acts are attacks against the values on which the Union is founded. This declaration laid the groundwork for the solidarity clause introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force on 1 December 2009. The clause, which covers a wide spectrum of risks and threats, states that "The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster." The Treaty provides for the possibility of mobilising a very wide range of means, including military, to this end.

The Stockholm Programme, which identifies a set of internal security priorities[7], and the corresponding strategy adopted by the European Council are important milestones towards achieving this end. They reflect the determination of all the States of the Union to provide a common response to risks and threats that might jeopardise their internal security.

Europe must, in particular, have the capacity to protect its vital infrastructure and its industrial, scientific and technical potential against attacks or cyber-attacks conducted by States or organisations motivated by espionage or sabotage.

Furthermore, the stability of all the countries in the European space is an important priority. The Balkan wars are receding into the past, but the persistence of unresolved territorial or inter-community tensions, which are likely to be exacerbated by the economic crisis, may have destabilising effects: resolving a crisis situation in this near space is therefore a primary responsibility for Europeans.

7 The Stockholm Programme, adopted in 2010, establishes the European Union's priorities for the 2010-2014 period in the areas of police and customs cooperation, civil protection, legal cooperation in criminal and civil matters, the visa policy and questions of asylum and migration.

C. Stabilise Europe's near environment, with our partners and allies

The security of the European Union is closely linked to that of the European continent as a whole. It is in Europe's – and France's – interest that no threat emerges in its near environment. Hence, the security of the European Union's neighbours is a priority for France. Like its other European neighbours, France cannot afford to choose between the different "borders" of Europe – they are all of equal importance for the continent's long-term security.

Europe's eastern neighbours continue to require special vigilance. Some of the States emerging from the break-up of the USSR and Yugoslavia, some of which have applied to join the European Union, remain fragile. Europe's energy dependence on Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia is still high. Relations with Russia must be continually maintained and consolidated, in a context where power issues and interdependencies coexist and are sometimes in opposition.

The European Union now counts Russia as a neighbour, since some of its members share a common border with it. Consolidating stability on the eastern margins of Europe, based on relations of cooperation with Russia in the framework of solemnly agreed principles imposed over 20 years ago by the Charter of Paris, is a vital challenge for the security of Europe and hence of France.

Turkey, an active member of NATO, occupies a singular place in the security of Europe: due to its geographical position and its history, it straddles several strategic areas. Its action and regional influence, economic dynamism, industrial and technological potential and the dense web of relations between it and the European Union countries, including France, make it a valuable ally.

The Mediterranean, a strategic border of the European Union, has been at the centre of a common history for over three millennia and strategic, economic, cultural and human relations are particularly dense. The very close human bonds established with the countries of the Mediterranean's southern shores and the dense web of trade and exchanges make the Mediterranean Sea a strategic space. We enjoy multiple common interests (many bi-national citizens, French investments, strategic supplies) and we share common security interests, particularly as concerns terrorism and trafficking. In this respect, the Maghreb (North Africa) has particular importance for France and for Europe, notably given the unstable conditions following the Arab revolutions. The risk of a security void in some countries or regions is a potential challenge for the whole of the Mediterranean and Southern Europe. France and Europe have regularly been

involved in crises arising in the eastern Mediterranean, including Lebanon, crises linked to the Israel-Arab conflict, Libya and, today, Syria.

The Sahel, from Mauritania to the Horn of Africa, together with part of sub-Saharan Africa, are also regions of priority interest for France due to a common history, the presence of French nationals, the issues at stake and the threats confronting them. In addition, the Atlantic façade of Africa is of special interest to Europe given the development of relations with Latin America.

In a region where States often struggle to control their territory, transnational dynamics give rise to criminal flows and very destabilising illegal trafficking (drugs, human beings, weapons, etc.). The possibility that whole territories can escape the control of a State over a long period is a strategic risk of crucial importance for Europe.

The crisis in Mali, which required intervention by France, is an excellent case in point. It illustrates the importance of the region and the seriousness, for Europe, of the threats emerging there. Internal tensions in the north of Mali and between the north and south of the country, combined with a weakening of Mali's government, fostered the establishment of terrorist groups. After capitalising on the trafficking endemic to this part of the Sahara, these groups were able to establish rear bases before then seeking to take control of the whole country, threatening to transform the whole of this sub-region into a hotbed of international terrorism.

These risks of terrorism are emerging at a time when the Gulf of Guinea is becoming a major focus of African development given its demographic and economic development. For France, and also for the other European countries whose human and economic presence in the region is increasing, the security of land and maritime spaces is a strategic priority.

Support for establishment of a collective security architecture in Africa is a priority of France's cooperation and development policy. As a complement, eight defence partnership agreements (Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Comoros, Djibouti, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Togo) and 16 technical cooperation agreements support African States in taking responsibility for controlling their security. These agreements also offer our armed forces facilities for anticipation and reaction. Lastly, two emerging regional powers, South Africa and Nigeria, are leading potential partners for Europe and France. These countries have many strengths: thanks to their influence and their demographic, economic

and military clout, they are now in a position to make an effective contribution to the operational capacities of the African Union.

Not all our partners and allies give the same weight to the strategic importance, for Europe, of its eastern neighbours, the Mediterranean and the part of Africa from the Sahel to Equatorial Africa. However, for France there is no doubt that these regions are of priority interest for the whole of the European Union, and that a common vision of the risks and threats is both desirable and urgent. It is even more important to affirm this collective European priority in that our American and Canadian allies expect us to assume an essential share of our responsibilities in regions where they consider themselves to be less directly concerned.

D. Contribute to the stability of the Middle East and the Arabo-Persian Gulf

The area stretching from the eastern shores of the Mediterranean to the Arabo-Persian Gulf is a priority in itself. Each of the different conflicts prevailing in the region have their own dynamic, but they cannot be understood in isolation from each other and the security of this region must be looked at in its globality. The Arabo-Persian Gulf has particular strategic importance: its stability is a major challenge not only for France and all the European countries, but also for the United States and the big emerging powers. This region, where Iran's race to acquire nuclear military capability engenders a risk of proliferation, concentrates risks of serious conflict that would have a global impact on the planet. Apart from the existence of still substantial energy reserves, it is one of the main transit routes for the world economy: the Strait of Hormuz is the mandatory point of passage for approximately 30% of global oil exports.

A conflict in the Arabo-Persian Gulf could have serious and varied repercussions: obstacles to freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, firing of ballistic missiles, destabilisation of countries in the region. Through the play of alliances, it could immediately take on a strong international dimension and would directly involve our country. The United States has dominant strategic influence in the region, but France is stepping up its presence and defence cooperation. It has defence agreements with three States in the region (Qatar, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates) and has established a joint military base in Abu Dhabi. A military cooperation agreement has been signed with Bahrain and France entertains close relations with Saudi Arabia. In the event of conflict, the Iranian ballistic missile threat would immediately affect all the countries in the region and hence

the French bases and staging posts installed there. In this context, our capacity to implement our agreements in close coordination with our allies is crucial.

E. Contribute to peace in the world

France has global interests justifying preservation of an extensive diplomatic network. Its political positioning in the world, the values it defends, its territorial and maritime reach thanks to its overseas territories and its special cultural influence give our country interests on all continents.

The demographic, economic, political and military clout of Asia today make it a region that concentrates important security challenges and interests. Two economic giants – China and India – have emerged. Numerous other countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand are demonstrating remarkable dynamism and accepting growing responsibilities. Japan, a member of the G8 group of countries, is a crucial player. Asia therefore plays a vital role in globalisation. Today it is the main driver of growth worldwide, but also a region where the risks of tension and conflict are among the highest in the world.

The security of the Indian Ocean, a maritime access to Asia, is a priority for France and for Europe from this point of view. As a transit region for international trade, the Indian Ocean is at the heart of world strategic challenges, as illustrated by the permanent presence of the US, Asian and European navies. The fact that the European Union's first large-scale naval operation was the Atalanta operation against piracy clearly illustrates the importance of the Indian Ocean, not only for France but for Europe as a whole. As a neighbouring power in the Indian Ocean, France plays a particular role here, reinforced by the development of privileged relations with India. A strategic partnership signed in 1998 enables cooperation in areas that concern the major interests of both countries. France supports a reform of the United Nations Security Council that would create a place for new permanent members, including India.

In South Asia, the engagement of the international community in Afghanistan has contributed to combating international terrorism and reinforcing legitimate institutions. But regional stability remains precarious and political engagement necessary to stabilise certain fragile countries and reduce the risk of inter-State conflict. France considers the combat against terrorism and nuclear proliferation to be primordial, together with the security of its energy supplies.

These considerations make this region one in which our country retains strategic interests.

The equilibrium of East Asia has been radically transformed by the growing might of China. As the major driver of economic growth in the world and a leading financial, diplomatic and military player, China is one of the powers that structures globalisation. Chinese-French bilateral relations have, since 1997, been characterised by a global partnership leading to a regular flow of high-level political exchanges and dialogue encompassing all topics and areas, commensurate with China's new importance.

The strengthening of the American military presence in the region may contribute to control of tensions in Asia and facilitate rollout of stabilising instruments aimed at ensuring peaceful management of disputes. But American engagement does not relieve France, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and a signatory of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia[8], of its responsibilities. France supports the role of the European Union in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and is keen to play a more active role with regional security organisations. It enjoys relations of confidence with all the countries in the region, notably with South Korea and Japan, and supports Japan's bid to become a member of the UN Security Council. For our country, the stability of Asia and freedom of navigation are diplomatic and economic priorities. Alongside its allies, France would, in the event of an open crisis, make a political and military contribution at the appropriate level.

Through defence cooperation, France contributes to the security of several countries in the region, notably Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam. It bolsters its political engagement through an active presence, development of strategic partnerships and intensification of its cooperation networks. With Singapore, our leading commercial partner in South-East Asia and number three in Asia (after China and Japan), it conducts regular political dialogue and very close cooperation in defence and security.

In the Pacific, France fully assumes its responsibilities as a political and maritime power with a presence in the region. It signed a strategic partnership agreement with Australia in 2012, which marks the growing convergence of the two countries' interests on a great many international and regional matters relative to the Pacific

8 The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia was signed at the first ASEAN summit on 24 February 1976, in Bali (Indonesia).

and the Indian Ocean. It also confirms a renewed interest in a French presence on the part of countries in the region, seen as a factor of stability and a source of immediate assistance, particularly in the event of a natural disaster, thanks to France's pre-positioned resources in the overseas territories in the region.

France's engagement in Latin America is not confined to its territorial presence on the South American continent. Latin America's growing importance on the international stage is now a geopolitical given that reflects the genuinely multi-polar nature of the new strategic landscape. It can be seen in the economic, political and cultural renaissance unfolding in the countries of this region and is expressed through a multipolar vision shared largely by France.

The long-standing relations between France and Brazil moved into a new chapter with the launch in 2006 of a multi-faceted strategic partnership covering military, space, energy, economic and educational issues. France also supports Brazil's ambition to play a growing role on the international stage and its bid to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.

Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru are also key regional countries with which France is keen to establish more in-depth dialogue on strategic challenges and defence cooperation. Through the exchanges and cooperative agreements they have established between themselves but also in the Asia-Pacific region, these five democracies bear witness to successful integration in globalisation, marked by the dynamism of relations between emerging countries.

Chapter 5

France's engagement in the Atlantic Alliance and in the European Union

Our defence and national security strategy cannot be conceived outside the framework of the Atlantic Alliance and our engagement in the European Union.

In the new strategic environment, which is both more unstable and more uncertain, there are three options that would be illusory for France:

- going it alone, in other words defending solely our own vital interests and abdicating any regional or global responsibilities. Our status in the United Nations, our history and the scale of our interests throughout the world make this option unrealistic and inopportune;
- delegating our future security to the USA and NATO. The Atlantic Alliance is a pillar of the French defence policy, but it must take into account the differences of priorities that require each member of this Alliance to assume their own responsibilities;
- the option of an integrated European defence. France reaffirms its ambition for a credible and effective European defence strategy, but it cannot ignore the stumbling blocks to development of the European framework.

The defence and national security strategy aims to combine the most positive aspects of each of these three options: the sovereignty of our decisions, full engagement in a dynamic Atlantic Alliance, a proactive and ambitious stance with respect to the European Union.

NATO and the European Union are different types of organisation. NATO is a political-military alliance, whereas the European Union is, for its members, a global project with political, economic, commercial, diplomatic and military dimensions.

A. France in NATO

By re-joining NATO's integrated military command structures, France intended to take back its rightful place in the functioning of an organisation of which it is one of the founding members. For France, now fully engaged in the Atlantic Alliance, this fulfils three essential functions. First, it guarantees the collective defence of its members. Secondly, it is an important instrument of the strategic partnership between the two sides of the Atlantic. Thirdly, it acts as the common framework for military action whenever the Allies agree to intervene together to respond to shared risks and threats.

France is keen to increase the strength of the military alliance, which brings together 28 nations determined to provide a joint defence against any armed aggression. It will be particularly vigilant as concerns preservation of an appropriate combination of nuclear, conventional and anti-missile defence capabilities, in accordance with the engagements stated in the Strategic Concept, which reaffirms the role of nuclear weapons as the supreme guarantee of security and pillar of the Alliance's defence doctrine. The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have their own role of deterrence, contribute to global deterrence and the security of the Allies.

The strength of the Atlantic Alliance resides in the fact that it is a political-military alliance between countries sharing common values. In this respect, France intends to fully exploit the political framework of the Alliance to discuss with its allies the common security challenges facing them.

As a framework for military action, NATO develops in times of peace the procedures and common standards essential for the interoperability of its forces. It is organised to take action in response to different types of conflict, ranging from collective defence to conducting stabilisation operations. Collective defence must remain the cornerstone of the Alliance, but it must also be able to take action in crisis management operations, against cross-cutting threats and in collective security operations. This engagement is essential when it reflects a common will on the part of the Allies to act together in a concrete manner and when the added value of the Alliance is clearly established. The Alliance's interventions must, of necessity, be embedded in the framework of international law. They may benefit from the support of the regional organisations concerned. The feasibility and political expediency of such interventions will be assessed on a case-by-case basis and accompanied by a political post-crisis strategy.

France is convinced that a strong and effective Alliance serves its own interests and those of Europe. The decision to award the position of Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) to a French general officer enables France to participate actively in the process of overhauling the Alliance's means for action. In this capacity, France will continue to give priority to adapting organisation of command to the most probable operational engagements, rationalising its agencies, and improving forecasting and financial management. As a major ally on the political, military and financial levels, France is also convinced that the vitality of the Alliance depends on each of its members being assured that their own interests are fully recognised and encouraging them to assume all their responsibilities. Common funding must be strictly controlled and reserved for priority projects and activities that benefit all the Allies and reinforce their interoperability, which is core to the added value provided by the Alliance. In this context, France will take care to ensure that the capacity of Nations wishing to act independently in other frameworks is guaranteed. France itself, while fully engaged in the allied military command, intends to preserve the means of its sovereignty in all circumstances. On the industrial level, the cooperation framework arising from smart defence[9] should take into account the need to promote projects initiated by the European defence industry, in order to preserve its strengths in cutting-edge technologies and high-added-value production.

NATO and the European Union are not in competition. The two organisations are complementary, whether in external operations or initiatives such as capability pooling and sharing[10] and smart defence. Thanks to their different specific characteristics, they offer a palette of responses allowing France and its Allies to face up to an increasingly broad spectrum of risks and threats. Close and pragmatic cooperation between these two organisations is an important objective for France. The USA's engagement to participate in Europe's security will be stronger if Europe heeds their call to share the burden of military spending. This sharing cannot be envisaged satisfactorily unless it fosters development of the European defence industry. France therefore intends to play its full role in both organisations to contribute to collective security.

9 The smart defence initiative was launched by NATO's Secretary General. It aims to optimise the Allies' military spending through pooling, multinational acquisitions and common funding of allied capabilities. Based on three principles (multinational cooperation, specialisation where it makes sense and priority capabilities), this initiative is developed by the organisation's Supreme Allied Command for Transformation (SACT).

10 The pooling and sharing initiative, developed within the European Defence Agency under the authority of the EU High Representative for foreign affairs and security policy, aims to develop pooling and sharing of military capabilities between Member States of the European Union. One of its objectives is to preserve the industrial and technological base of European defence and combine research and technology efforts (R&T) to preserve robust European capabilities.

B. France in the European Union

France shares the majority of the threats and risks facing it with its European partners, the pragmatic corollary of this fact being that our action will be more effective if we are able to respond to them together. This is why, in the framework of its defence and national security strategy, France considers that building a European approach to defence and security is a priority. Convinced that a European response would be greater than the sum of national responses, it looks towards the European Union with the determination to contribute France's knowledge of crises and its proposals concerning the responses to be made to them. In return, it is keen to benefit from the knowledge and proposals of its European partners, but also from an external action service playing a stronger role, notably in crisis management, together with the strengths of European Union agencies (such as, for instance, the European Defence Agency and the Torrejon satellite centre).

France will act to ensure emergence, in the European framework, of a strategic vision grounded in shared analysis of the risks and threats, whether they concern challenges affecting the internal security of the States of the Union or the common security and defence policy. Contacts between national parliaments and discussions within the European Parliament will contribute to enhancing public understanding and acceptance of the strategic challenges involved.

The current context makes a pragmatic revitalisation of the common security and defence policy (CSDP) both possible and urgent. Budget constraints are prompting a search for greater efficacy in public spending on security and defence. The reorientation of US military capabilities in favour of the Asia Pacific region, at a time when pockets of instability have developed along Europe's borders require the States of the Union to face up to their responsibilities. In the next 15 to 20 years, crisis situations will probably result from scenarios calling for a multidimensional response, notably in the form of complex stabilisation operations. On this perspective, the European framework is set to become the reference framework in situations requiring mobilisation of the whole range of civil and military instruments required to implement a global approach to crises. Furthermore, France considers that the partnership between the United States and the European Union will be strengthened by the latter assuming the responsibilities incumbent on it in managing crises affecting its security.

France considers the common security and defence policy not as an end in itself, but as a – civil and military – instrument serving the vital interests of

the European Union. Europe cannot take a back seat in the great power game if it wishes to contribute to building a more stable international order in which it promotes the values on which its identity is based. The impetus must come from the highest political level of the Union, i.e. the European Council. It must determine the role that Europe intends to play on the international stage and the nature of the world order that Europe wishes to promote in international forums and organisations and with respect to other States. It must, notably, initiate guidelines on three major topics: the missions of the CSDP, the capabilities to be developed in common and industrial strategies relating to defence. At a later time, a European Union White Paper, which would more clearly define the Union's interests and strategic objectives, could contribute to the European debate on security and defence and would be an opportunity to express a shared vision.

This impetus given at the highest political level must be supplemented by resolutely pragmatic implementation including prevention actions, joint external actions, common weapons programmes and, eventually, pooling of capabilities.

Since stabilisation of Europe's neighbourhood represents a major element of security for all the member countries of the Union, it is the responsibility of the Europeans to act preventively in emerging crisis flashpoints. Following on from initiatives already taken, security in the countries of a region spanning the Sahel to Equatorial Africa, combatting all forms of terrorism, the Middle East peace process, assistance for successful political transitions in some Arab countries, settling conflicts in the Caucasus, and peace-building in the Balkans, notably in Kosovo, are areas in which the European Union must continue to develop its actions.

With 28 civil and military operations having been conducted since 2003, the European Union has already acquired real experience in crisis management and peacekeeping. These operations have shown that Europe is capable of engagement in external theatres of action. They have made it possible to test the effectiveness of operational concepts, whether the combat against piracy, assistance with rebuilding the rule of law, reform of security systems or post-crisis stabilisation.

However, these external operations have so far highlighted the limits of the Union's political will. They have often been conducted in support of larger operations or operations with a very limited timeframe. Hence, even though it is increasingly confronted with crises calling for multi-dimensional responses, the European Union has not yet capitalised on all the means available to the

Commission and the Member States to roll out a global response to crises. Better coordination of civil and military resources is required and the Union's procedures must be adapted to its operational role.

France is keen for the Union to take a pragmatic approach to strengthening the responsiveness and intervention capabilities of the forces that can be deployed under the CSDP. Common education, training, availability and a force generation benefitting from better coordination between European States are areas where progress is both urgent and feasible. The need for the Europeans to better integrate civil and military management of crises is one of the lessons learned from the experience of the last 10 years.

France will strive to make progress in this area with Union Member States that share the same ambition. It suggests making better use of existing institutions and structures for consultation and capitalising on all the possibilities opened up by treaties, including permanent structured cooperation and enhanced cooperation. Bilateral cooperation between Member States must also contribute to development of better-integrated capabilities, as illustrated by the agreements signed by France with Germany, the United Kingdom or other countries, or by the one which links the Benelux countries.

The will to project power and influence only makes sense if it is built on the capacity of States holding this ambition to mobilise credible civil and military resources. Given its capabilities, France is one of the Member States likely to play a driving role in the development of a European defence capability. It will ensure that it has the critical capabilities required for deployment (intelligence, surveillance, in-flight refuelling, strategic transport, etc.), while also seeking to pool the corresponding programmes with the States best equipped to make a contribution to them.

This period of sharp budget contraction in all the European countries should be seized as an opportunity to organise mutually agreed capability interdependencies. For existing capabilities or those currently being acquired, France firmly intends to engage in the pooling and sharing initiative adopted by Defence ministers of the European Union in 2010. As concerns this objective, it emphasizes the important role played by the European Defence Agency, which must take responsibility for identifying programmes that could be developed in common, testing their feasibility and putting the strategy into practice.

France notes that with OCCAR (joint organisation for armaments cooperation), Europe can offer States that are members of the organisation an appropriate instrument for managing programmes. Furthermore, it considers that cooperation initiatives with one or more States in the field of armaments must be envisaged not only as alternatives or substitutes but as additional levers for encouraging a European capability dynamic that might also attract States with more modest resources.

Development of the European defence market and consolidation of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) in the weapons sector is one of our country's strategic priorities. In the framework of smart defence, implemented within NATO, France intends, with its European partners in the Alliance, to promote capability initiatives that contribute to support of the EDTIB. In this respect, it is important for the NATO smart defence and European Union pooling and sharing initiatives to be coordinated, primarily through solid dialogue between NATO and the EDA. Furthermore, France is pleased that in the run-up to the European Council meeting of December 2013, the Commission has initiated work on specific defence issues, thereby illustrating the specific nature of the defence industry sector in the European market.

Substantial progress in integration and coordination has already been made in the field of security. The 2010-2014 Stockholm Programme and the internal security strategy approved by the European Council has given Europe a holistic approach to the major internal security issues that recognises the continuity between internal and external security and expresses the solidarity existing between Member States. However, the internal security strategy has not yet tackled certain programmes for action whose implementation requires a specific approach (for instance, protection of critical European infrastructure, reinforcing political coordination in the event of a major crisis, etc.). France would like to see continued and more intensive efforts to build a European approach in internal security, and extension of this approach to other areas, leading to formulation of a more integrated strategy. It is therefore keen to develop common projects along the same lines as the cooperative initiatives already conducted in the legal, migration and health sectors. It would also like to see development of initiatives leading to pooling of internal security equipment made available by Member States.

Chapter 6

Implementing the strategy

France's strategy has evolved over time. In the 1972 White Paper, its chief focus was nuclear deterrence. In the 1994 White Paper and the decision made to professionalise our forces in 1996, our capability for conventional external action was seen as the core of our policy and our resources. The 2008 White Paper was marked by extension of our strategy to national security. Today, changes in the international and security environment call for greater convergence between the five main strategic functions identified in 2008, which remain fully valid: knowledge and anticipation, deterrence, protection, prevention and intervention.

To achieve the objectives defined by our strategy, protection, deterrence and intervention structure the action of the defence and national security forces. Protection remains the primary objective of our defence and national security strategy. It cannot be guaranteed without the capability for deterrence and intervention. Nuclear deterrence protects France from any State-led aggression against its vital interests, of whatever origin and in whatever form. It rules out any threat of blackmail that might paralyse its freedom of decision and action. Our capability for intervention outside the national territory gives strategic depth to France's security stance. It bolsters the credibility of our deterrence capability and allows the country to defend its strategic interests and honour its alliances.

Protection, deterrence and intervention are therefore highly complementary. Their implementation entails a capacity to know and anticipate the risks and threats to which we are exposed, even if strategic shifts are always possible. They also require an upstream capacity to prevent crises that could negatively impact our environment.

This is the foundation for the policy enabling rationalised use of State resources and coherent orchestration of the role to be played not only by the different State administrations, but also by local and regional government, companies

and institutions belonging to strategic sectors (energy, communications, health, food, etc.).

A. Knowledge and anticipation

The knowledge and anticipation function has particular importance since a capacity for autonomous assessment of situations is key to free, sovereign decision making. This function covers intelligence and foresight, in particular, and permits the strategic anticipation that informs action. It is also a condition of the forces' operational effectiveness and contributes to economic use of the resources available to them to perform their missions.

This capacity enables us to engage, in full knowledge, in actions that are increasingly coordinated or even conducted in common with our partners and allies. From information gathering to well-informed preparation of political and operational decisions, good knowledge of the strategic and tactical environment is essential for preventing risks and threats and neutralising them when prevention has failed.

Intelligence plays a central role in the knowledge and anticipation function. It irrigates each of the other strategic functions of our defence and national security strategy. It must be used both to guide political and strategic decision-making and to plan and conduct operations on the tactical level. More globally, it informs our foreign policy and our economic policy. A particular effort must therefore be devoted to it in the coming period, taking in both human resources and the technical capacities for gathering and exploiting data. Human intelligence (HUMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT) are complementary and indivisible. The full value of intelligence is derived from combining the data gathered from these three channels.

In accordance with the recommendations formulated by the 2008 White Paper, governance of the intelligence services has been reorganised around the national intelligence coordinator. As advisor to the President of the Republic and carrying out some of his missions on behalf of the Prime Minister, he coordinates the action of the intelligence services and ensures cooperation between them. His role must be strengthened, notably as concerns pooling of resources and budget appropriation.

Also established in 2008, the national intelligence council, which meets under the chairmanship of the Head of State, is responsible for strategic steering of intelligence. In the future, it will formulate a national intelligence strategy whose main outlines will be made public. This strategy, a reference document, will strengthen the legitimacy of intelligence activities.

Cooperation between the different services has also been encouraged by the emergence of an "intelligence community" composed of six services: two with a general remit, the DGSE (external security) and the DCRI (internal intelligence), and four specialised services, the DRM (military intelligence), the DPSD (defence protection and security), the DNRED (customs intelligence and inquiries) and TRACFIN (money laundering and financial fraud). The experience of the past four years has showed that this intelligence community encourages trust between the different services and better organisation of information sharing. The Intelligence Academy, created in 2010 and placed under the authority of the Prime Minister, is tasked, notably, with designing, organising and rolling out initial and continued training programmes for intelligence services personnel. It contributes to strengthening bonds and to the emergence of a shared culture within the French intelligence community. This community is the backbone of a more global structure which can, where required, call on numerous other State services and departments.

In view of the evolution of threats, particular attention will be paid to internal intelligence gathering. It is necessary to strengthen the DCRI (internal intelligence) given the high priority of some of the missions entrusted to it, notably for preventing terrorist acts on the national territory. A process of reflection will be initiated on the organisation of this directorate, the human resources available to it and its place in the organisation of the Ministry of the Interior. This reflection will include the conditions for better coordination between internal intelligence and operational intelligence-gathering by all the services responsible for national security missions, particularly the gendarmerie.

France must also take care to preserve an intelligence-gathering and processing platform commensurate with its international ambitions and the threats with which it is confronted. It must devote the resources necessary to pursuing the efforts already made to secure an intelligence gathering and exploitation capability essential for autonomous assessment of situations. It must also pursue pooling of technical intelligence acquisition resources, a key principle for equipping its services, while also taking care to strengthen the associated human expertise.

Among these resources, space intelligence capacities have a privileged place, whether national or shared with our European partners, since satellites enable acquisition of information over the whole surface of the globe and guarantee a satisfactory level of monitoring and alert. Efforts to pool resources must also make it possible to deliver the products required for planning and conducting operations. The life cycle of satellites is such that they have to be regularly replaced, a point that must be taken fully into consideration. The development of a space observation capability will be rationalised to coordinate dual-use military and institutional projects and facilitate complementarity with useful products available in the market, wherever possible.

Electronic intelligence (ELINT) is a key component of this platform. The first identification of a site of interest or the first perception of a threat is very often obtained through electronic intelligence gathering. As concerns imagery intelligence, space capacities are a priority. They are necessary to identify, localise precisely, discriminate and target the material reality of risks and threats. In the field of imagery intelligence (IMINT), space capabilities are a priority, since they can identify, precisely locate and target the tangible reality of risks and threats. Space capabilities are also necessary for sovereign assessment of the ballistic threat and early warning, hence deterrence.

The cost of space-related intelligence and the political advantages of shared understanding of situations should prompt European countries with capabilities in this field to undertake much more systematic pooling of resources. France is willing to apply an approach based on mutual interdependencies in the field of space intelligence.

Acquisition of intelligence also relies on the combined implementation of air, land and naval platforms, whether or not dedicated, that allows acquisition of real-time information.

Analysis of the requirements highlights France's need to field a permanent capability in several types of equipment. The medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) drones equipped with IMINT and ELINT sensors can detect, locate and track potential targets. Tactical drones provide direct intelligence support for forces present in crisis regions. Light surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft and new-generation reconnaissance pods are also indispensable, with recent operations confirming the importance of these airborne sensors.

The new importance of cyber-threats calls for developing our intelligence activity and the corresponding technical expertise in this area. This effort should allow us to identify the origin of attacks, assess the offensive capabilities of potential adversaries and in this way counter their action. Identification and offensive action capabilities are essential to implementing a possible and appropriate response to such attacks.

Intelligence activities and secret operations are becoming more important in a strategic context marked by the growing role of non-State players. The increase in resources imposed by these developments must be accompanied at the same time by a reinforcement of strategic piloting and assessment of intelligence by the executive arm and an extension of the role of the parliamentary delegation for intelligence[11] to enable Parliament to exercise its control over government policy in this field, in accordance with the Constitution. This vigilance is essential to preserve and reinforce the legitimacy of an activity that is making a growing contribution to the security of the Nation.

Due to the development of the Internet, the knowledge and anticipation function increasingly relies on exploitation of open sources to supplement gathering and exploitation of confidential information, both in the framework of strategic analysis and during a crisis. We must therefore have specific tools for analysing multimedia sources – in particular for crisis-management assistance – and developing tools for sharing open sources at the ministerial and inter-ministerial levels.

According to the 2008 White Paper, strategic foresight, which entails detection of major trends liable to generate potential crises and strategic shifts, was to be the focus of a "significant and priority" effort. However, despite the quality of the agencies involved and the recognised expertise of the players, the State has not devoted sufficient effort to giving this function a place commensurate with its importance.

11 The parliamentary delegation for intelligence, created by the Law of 9 October 2007, is composed of four deputies and four senators. The chairmen of the standing committees of the Assemblée Nationale and the Senate responsible respectively for internal security and defence matters, are automatically members of the delegation. The other members are appointed by the chairman of each Assembly to guarantee representation of all viewpoints. The chairman of the delegation will be alternately, an deputy or a senator, automatically members of the delegation and presiding for a one-year term.

A mechanism must be set up in the ministries concerned to ensure internal coordination of forward-looking research, aimed at identifying the needs, defining a work schedule and validating the conclusions and recommendations. The coherence of this work will be ensured by an inter-ministerial process under the authority of the Prime Minister by the SGDSN (general directorate for defence and national security). It will be tasked with defining the priorities and strategic guidelines, formulating an annual inter-ministerial work schedule and coordinating the forward-looking research conducted in the ministries concerned. The SGDSN will coordinate the work of validating the inter-ministerial recommendations and will ensure that they are taken into account in decision-making processes.

The State's strategic-foresight approach must be supported by independent, pluri-disciplinary and original strategic reflection, capitalising on the research carried out in universities and specialised institutes. Despite the progress accomplished over the last few years, French strategic research continues to be hampered by inadequate critical mass, which limits its international resonance. Efforts aimed at promoting strategic reflection and supporting research in the fields of defence and security will be pursued.

However, reinforcement of research resources will not produce all the hoped-for effects on the State's capacity for anticipation unless it becomes more open to independent reflection. The State can only benefit from increased access to the expertise of academic research, together with that of non-governmental organisations and companies. For their part, university researchers will make a contribution more closely adapted to the needs of the State if they are given the opportunity to experience the reality of administrative responsibilities. This reciprocal openness is essential to improve our capacity for anticipation, which requires an open mind, curiosity and a willingness to challenge dominant views.

B. Deterrence

Nuclear deterrence is intended to protect France from any State-led aggression against its vital interests, of whatever origin and in whatever form. France's deterrence capability contributes by its very existence to the security of the Atlantic Alliance and that of Europe. The exercise of our nuclear deterrence capability is the responsibility of the President of the Republic.

Our deterrence capability is strictly defensive. The use of nuclear weapons would only be conceivable in extreme circumstances of legitimate self-defence. In this respect, nuclear deterrence is the ultimate guarantee of the security, protection and independence of the Nation. It ensures, permanently, our independence of decision-making and our freedom of action within the framework of our international responsibilities, including in the event of any threat of blackmail that might be directed against us in the event of a crisis. Nuclear deterrence is therefore embedded in the more global framework of the defence and national security strategy, which takes into account the entire spectrum of threats, including those considered to be under the threshold of our vital interests.

The nuclear forces include an airborne and an ocean-going component and their effectiveness, adaptability and complementarity enable preservation of an instrument that remains credible over the longer term in a fast-changing strategic context, while being structured in accordance with the principle of strict sufficiency. The simulation facilities set up by France after the halt to nuclear testing guarantees the reliability and safety of its nuclear weapons.

France intends to continue fully assuming its responsibilities and duties as a nuclear power on the international stage. In this capacity, it works actively in favour of "general and complete disarmament under strict and effective control", the objective set forth in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It pursues its efforts to promote quantitative reduction and limit qualitative upgrading of nuclear arsenals throughout the world and to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, notably nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. Likewise, it strongly advocates that these efforts be generalised at the international level. To this end, it actively supports the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and initiation of multilateral negotiations concerning a treaty to ban production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, together with implementation of an immediate moratorium on production of these materials.

Since dismantling its nuclear testing site in the Pacific, France has continued to set an example by taking unilateral measures, such as the irreversible dismantling of its installations for producing fissile materials for nuclear weapons. It has indicated that its arsenal includes fewer than 300 nuclear warheads. France was the first country to take these concrete steps towards nuclear disarmament. In this respect, it applies the principle of strict sufficiency in maintenance of its nuclear deterrence capability, i.e. at the lowest possible level in view of the strategic context.

There are strong links between nuclear deterrence and conventional capabilities. Deterrence, which guarantees protection of our vital interests, gives the President of the Republic freedom of action in exercising France's international responsibilities, in defence of an ally or application of an international mandate. In this sense, it is directly linked to our intervention capability. Furthermore, some of the resources assigned to the nuclear forces can be used for conventional operations on the decision of the President of the Republic. This has been the case in numerous recent operations. The credibility of a force of deterrence would be weakened without conventional capabilities. Preservation of a credible, independent and autonomous force of deterrence enables us to invest in capabilities that are valuable for other strategic functions. Because of its high-level requirements in terms of effectiveness, reliability and safety, nuclear deterrence feeds our research and development efforts and contributes to the excellence of our defence industry. It also plays a driving role in improving our technological aptitudes.

C. Protection

Our defence and national security strategy must guarantee our territorial integrity, provide effective protection for French citizens against all the risks and threats that could have a major impact, preserve the continuity of the Nation's major vital functions and strengthen its resilience. Implementation of the function of protection concerns, first of all, the national territory and regions with large or vulnerable overseas French communities. The existence of such communities is likely to give rise to interventions outside the national territory, which may be conducted in cooperation with partners, notably where French nationals abroad live in close contact with overseas nationals of partner or allied countries who must also be protected. The protection function may also be implemented in operations on the territory of European Union States, pursuant to the solidarity clause contained in the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union.

A global approach is essential given the protean and diffuse nature of the risks and threats, their diversity and uncertainties as to how they may evolve. We must be able to anticipate appearance of risks and threats, prevent them materialising and react rapidly if they do materialise. This requires mobilising and organising the action of numerous State and non-State players.

The greater our capacity to anticipate major crises, assess their implications and repercussions in advance and hence prepare the response to be implemented, the greater will be our aptitude to deal with these crises. The function of protection cannot be fully assured unless we reinforce our capacity to analyse risks and ensure that this analysis is methodically taken into account in the national intelligence strategy.

The nature of the risks also requires responsive and flexible methods of intervention to guarantee the resilience of the Nation. A crisis of low or medium intensity can degenerate very rapidly. The public authorities must therefore be capable of intervening without delay to initiate rescue operations for victims and restore normal living conditions or the functioning of activities that might have been seriously compromised, as quickly as possible. To deal with very different contexts and rapid changes in the intensity of threats and risks, the public authorities must be able to rely on the most versatile and interoperable resources. Restoration of the normal functioning of the country cannot be achieved without advance preparation of all the players involved in crisis management. In practice, it is crucial to formulate operational plans for intervention as a function of the different types of foreseeable situations and to draw up an inventory of the resources to be called on.

The diversity of the players involved in crisis response derives from the choices France has made in the organisation of society and in its diplomatic commitments. Accordingly, the State must conceive and conduct its action in liaison with several players and at different levels: on the national level, where it orchestrates the action of the public services, local and regional government and operators of vital infrastructure and networks; and on the international level, particularly in the framework of the European Union.

The primary responsibility for ensuring protection against the risks and threats that might affect the lives of French citizens on the national territory is borne by the civil ministries and their regional outposts, in coordination with local and regional government and public and private operators. The national police, the gendarmerie, customs, civil security, the municipal police and the intelligence services operating on the national territory contribute to this mission.

The primary mission of the armed forces is to ensure the protection of the Nation against any threat of a military nature. They are responsible for permanently ensuring the security of the territory, its air space and its maritime approaches. They contribute to the State's action in the maritime environment. In the event

of a major crisis and at the request of the civil authority, the armed forces can provide assistance, including planning, command and deployment resources, which are particularly suited to the most serious situations. They may also be called on in implementation of certain preventive campaigns, such as the Vigipirate plan, the Héphaïstos missions to combat forest fires, or the participation of land resources specialised in NBC protection.

The scale of acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia has prompted States to deploy naval units to counter this phenomenon. France has played an important role in this response by deploying French Navy vessels and participating in the action of the European Union (the Atalanta operation). In addition, protection teams consisting of armed marines can be posted on non-military vessels. To respond to the needs of maritime transport security, and where it is not possible to call on French Navy protection teams, we will be studying appropriate alternative solutions.

Close cooperation between civil and military players is essential in preparing the response to the most serious crises that might require the involvement of the armed forces. An effective and coordinated response must be organised in advance. In the framework of preparation of operational intervention plans, it is important that the security forces and the armed forces benefit from appropriate common training to give them the practical know-how required for large-scale intervention on the national territory.

Our protection needs also require preservation or reinforcement of a certain number of critical capabilities: for the Ministry of Defence, which intervenes in support of the civil authorities, but also in the framework of permanent structures addressing the function of protection in continental France and the overseas territories, and also for the other ministries concerned.

In accordance with the Chicago Summit of 20 May 2012, France participates - in the framework of NATO - in the programme for common development of a system of command aimed at coordinating resources contributing to defence against ballistic missiles. This capability, which is purely defensive, cannot take the place of deterrence, but it may, under strict political control and on conclusion of a reasonable effort shared with our allies, play a complementary role against a limited ballistic threat. In this respect, France considers anti-missile defence in a theatre of war and early warning systems a priority. It intends to encourage the involvement of European industry in this project.

D. Prevention

Prevention concerns both the national territory and France's action outside its borders. Implementation takes in formulation of national and international norms as well as the combat against trafficking, disarmament and peace-building.

The development of norms ensuring satisfactory protection against natural and technological risks is a crucial aspect of prevention. Activities having an impact on the environment and public health are already governed by a solid set of norms with a strong European dimension.

On the international level, the lessons drawn from the crises of the 1990s led to development of legal instruments to combat proliferation, improve control of sensitive technologies and arms control. The tools available to the international community have been supplemented by the action of the G8 and the Proliferation Security Initiative against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. France will continue to participate actively in reinforcing and harmonising these standards, monitoring compliance with them and broadening their scope of application.

Prevention calls for a capacity of anticipation grounded in accurate knowledge of the risks and threats that enables the State to identify risks before they become threats. Our analyses and forecasts are intended to be shared and discussed with countries or organisations concerned by the same challenges, and particularly with our European Union partners, likewise our prevention and peace-building strategies.

Prevention is particularly relevant when applied to stabilisation policies aimed at States in crisis. It is generally less costly and, ultimately, less difficult to consolidate the stability of a country that has not tipped over into civil war, than to restore peace in a country that has experienced it. Furthermore, any external intervention in a situation of open conflict is inevitably exposed to unpredictable developments, including the risk of exacerbating the conflict that one sought to remedy. France therefore considers it a priority to assist fragile States located in regions likely to affect its security.

The peace-building strategy, an essential component of prevention and crisis resolution over the longer term, responds first to the political objective of consolidating a legitimate State authority capable of exercising its sovereignty over a territory. Hence, free and transparent elections are one dimension of legitimacy. However, they can exacerbate tensions if the winner misuses his

victory or if the results are contested. A process of political accompaniment is necessary to establish a minimum degree of trust – if not full approval – between the different components of a country and with regard to the State's authority. If this minimum trust is not built up, the State will encounter the greatest difficulties in establishing a monopoly over the use of force, and each ethnic, political or religious group will prefer to rely on their own forces to ensure the security of their members. However, a State's capacity to ensure the security of the entire population is an essential element of its legitimacy.

Peace-building therefore requires a global approach that includes in a consistent political strategy all the levers available to the international community to come to the aid of countries in crisis or threatened by a crisis. It may, in varying proportions depending on the situation, include military, police, judicial, civil administration and development aid components.

In the framework of this global approach, France attaches particular importance to the political dimension of prevention, on the one hand, and on the other to consolidating the rule of law and reforming security systems. Here, France will continue to actively support the United Nations' political facilitation efforts.

Reform of a State's security systems according to an integrated approach must take in reform of the police, the army, customs, the justice system and prison administration. Cooperation in the field of internal security is of crucial importance for the stability of the States in which it is conducted and must be pursued. In countries where the army continues to play a key role, reform of the defence apparatus takes on particular importance. France has long experience in this field. Political-military dialogue, defence and security cooperation and assistance in training foreign armed forces are the traditional tools of its international action. This defence and security cooperation must be differentiated between States that simply need to reinforce their military and security apparatus and those in which the very foundations of State authority are not assured. It must take into account the potential fragility of the States concerned. It is therefore important to ensure that these cooperative ventures are better coordinated in a global approach to consolidation of State structures.

Peace-building and prevention strategies are multi-form strategies calling on diversified resources. Their chances of success will be increased if they are perceived by the populations concerned as legitimate and if they answer their needs. In this respect, implementation, wherever possible, in the wider framework of coordination of efforts at the European level, will increase both

available resources and their legitimacy. The emergence of a shared vision of the Union's interests in the field of prevention should facilitate a global European approach to crisis management, together with formulation of a common concept for training armed forces and security forces. This will increase the effectiveness of the action conducted by Member States of the European Union.

The positioning of military forces in countries with which we enjoy privileged links or in certain maritime regions is at the point of convergence of the strategic functions of prevention, intervention, knowledge and anticipation. These forces can deter State or non-State players from instigating open conflicts or actions of regional destabilisation. They have the ability to engage in actions contributing to control of territory and peace-building or in operations to evacuate French nationals. They contribute to the knowledge and anticipation function thanks to the specialised resources available to them and their contact with local players. Along these lines, France is able to rely on permanent naval deployment in one or two maritime regions, on its United Arab Emirates base and on several sites in Africa. As concerns Africa, these sites will be restructured to give us a flexible and rapid-reaction capability adapted to the present and future needs of this continent. This restructuring should, in particular, privilege a better contribution by our forces in assisting our allies, to increasing Africans' capacity to manage the crises occurring in the continent, to intelligence gathering and the combat against trafficking and terrorism.

E. Intervention

External intervention responds to a triple objective: ensuring the protection of French nationals abroad; defending our strategic interests and those of our partners and allies and exercising our international responsibilities. It gives the crucial strategic depth to France's security stance, whether this means preventing exacerbation of a crisis or putting an end to a situation of open conflict that might endanger our security interests.

Over and above the resources required to protect the national territory, France intends to have military capabilities enabling it to take action in priority areas to its defence and security: the regions on the fringes of Europe, the Mediterranean basin, part of Africa (from the Sahel to Equatorial Africa), the Arabo-Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. These capabilities enable France to make its contribution to international peace and security in other parts of the world.

The French armed forces must be able to intervene in three types of operations in these regions:

- operations conducted on an autonomous basis, such as evacuation of French or European nationals, counter-terrorism operations or response to attacks;
- operations as part of a coalition – in the framework of the European Union, an established alliance such as NATO or on an ad hoc basis – in which France may take the initiative and command or in which it will exercise a dominant influence;
- operations as part of a coalition in which France will make a contribution, but where command is entrusted to an allied nation, most commonly the United States.

Changes in the strategic context may make it necessary for our country to take the initiative in operations or, more frequently than in the past, assume a substantial share of the responsibilities inherent to conducting military action. France therefore makes the principle of strategic autonomy the main pillar of its external intervention strategy. It will develop the critical capabilities allowing it to take the initiative and act autonomously, but also to mobilise its allies and partners.

The majority of external operations will, however, continue to be conducted in coalition. To ensure its position as a leading player in a coalition in which it does not have command, France must be able to rely on capabilities allowing it to retain its freedom of decision and action in all circumstances and exert an influence on the general conduct of operations.

Our armed forces must be able to respond to the diversity of threats and crisis situations liable to affect our security, our values or our interests.

They must be able to conduct coercive operation in a high-intensity situation, notably in a scenario where a deterioration of the international situation might oblige them to enter into military combat with the armed forces of another State. In these conventional conflicts, military action will aim to use superior force to counter the political will of the adversary, by neutralising – through a campaign of attrition, for instance - the sources of its power (military apparatus, centres of power, high-value economic targets, etc.). Our forces may be confronted by an adversary possessing organised, well-commanded and complementary capabilities that might be backed by effective weapons systems, such as submarines, fighter planes, sophisticated ground-air defence systems, cruise

missiles and remote-controlled vehicles. The mission of the armed forces is envisaged over a short period, from several weeks to several months.

In order to acquire and retain operational superiority over our adversaries, conduct of these coercive engagements will be coordinated in all five environments (earth, air, sea, outer space and cyberspace). Technological superiority in the fields of intelligence, range, power, precision and coordination of the resources of the three components of the armed forces will be essential.

Faced with situations arising from the fragility of certain States, the armed forces must also be able to engage in crisis management operations. In this capacity they may be confronted with irregular adversaries using asymmetrical operating methods (suicide-attacks, ambushes, hostage-taking, improvised explosive devices, acts of piracy, etc.). Such adversaries, non-State players in most cases, will dispose of forces of varying degrees of coordination or with primarily unsophisticated weapons. They will enjoy strong resilience and will seek to bog our forces down in terrain where they can melt away but which are unfavourable for our forces (e.g. urban and coastal regions or, conversely, desert or mountainous regions). In this type of operation, our forces are obliged to operate in a complex legal environment, given the absence of declaration of war, confronting adversaries that refuse to obey the legal rules governing armed conflict.

These crisis management operations are likely to take varied forms, including peace-keeping, interposition, securing the maritime or air approaches of failed States, combating trafficking, piracy or terrorism, assistance to a government or counter-insurrection. Their principal political objective will be to restore and maintain the security conditions required for normal life. In a difficult process that can give rise to surges of violence, the aim will be to force adversaries to lay down their arms rather than to seek to destroy them. These operations will require our forces, in all their components, to establish control over vast areas, which in turn requires deploying a sufficient number of forces. They will be characterised by long-term engagement that might continue over several months or even several years.

There are also intermediate or temporary situations in which our forces will have to adapt to the emergence of "hybrid threats". Whether on a one-off or more permanent basis, some non-State players might combine asymmetrical means of action with State-level resources or high-tech capabilities, acquired or stolen. These hybrid threats, which can reduce the technological advantage

of the more advanced countries, are facilitated by the growing availability of low-cost technologies and the facilitation of arms trafficking due to globalisation. The forces of certain States, hampered by operational inferiority, may have recourse to asymmetrical methods of action, leading to a hybridisation of the threat in conventional conflicts. These adversaries' methods of action may combine simultaneous use of conventional and unconventional approaches. In the framework of crisis management operations, they may lead to a hardening of the conflict. Our forces could, on an irregular basis, be forced to conduct several types of operation simultaneously. They must therefore be capable of deploying both permanent resources allowing actions of coercion and local attrition in centres of population, and resources responding to the need to control vast areas, often in support of local security forces. To this end, they must be able to demonstrate great responsiveness, a high-level capacity to adapt, and benefit from appropriate protection against possible tactical surprises. Their primary objective will be to create conditions for a cessation of hostilities on the part of all belligerents.

Crisis resolution increasingly requires an integrated approach entailing close coordination of civil and military actions at all levels including on the ground. As crisis resolution progresses, the military operation should supplement primarily civil operations involving reconstruction, re-establishing the operation of public institutions and restoring basic economic capacities.

Chapter 7

The resources required to implement the strategy

The 2009-2014 military programming law, which broke the priorities of the preceding White Paper down into planning objectives, provided for the resources allocated to Defence missions to be stabilised initially, then to increase by 1% annually over inflation beginning in 2012. Budget allocations were supplemented by revenues from the sale of state property and frequencies. The law also provided for the savings generated in personnel and operating expenses due to substantial reduction in the size of the armed forces and reform of support functions to be reallocated in favour of equipment.

Implementation of the military programming law since 2009 has enabled continued modernisation of France's military capability, which has contributed to the success of the French armed forces, notably in the Ivory Coast and Libya in 2011 and also in Mali in 2013.

However, the economic crisis has invalidated the forecasts used as a basis for this programme. As early as 2010, the pluriannual public finances act for 2011-2014 officially recognised lower growth in the Defence budget than that initially projected. As the Cour des Comptes (Court of Auditors) noted in July 2012, the planned reductions compromised the achievement of the objectives of the 2008 White Paper and the investment programme of the 2009 military programming law. Furthermore, the reforms initiated produced only part of the hoped-for operational savings, despite full compliance with the intended reductions in personnel.

This new financial situation called for a major readjustment of the 2009 military programming law. The adjustments made in 2010 (the deferred launch of some programmes, reductions in scheduled equipment maintenance) were not sufficient to restore the balance between contractual commitments and available resources.

This balance must be re-established. In a difficult context for the Ministry of Defence, confronted with the need to renew most of its major equipment and maintain an operational capability essential to the effectiveness of the armed forces, it must be consistent with the Government's objective of restoring the balance of public accounts by 2017, to initiate the reduction in the national debt and preserve the country's sovereignty and strategic autonomy. This objective requires a substantial reduction in the growth of public spending.

France's defence spending will amount to €364 billion (2013 value) for the 2014-2025 period, of which €179 billion (2013 value) between 2014 and 2019, the period covered by the next military programming law. This appropriation, which will combine budget allocations for the Defence mission and exceptional resources, will allow for the construction of a new armed forces model that meets the requirements of general and military strategy as described above and is adapted to defence and national security requirements.

A. An operational contract and an armed forces model adapted to the new context

Our armed forces must be organised, equipped and trained to carry out their missions of protection, deterrence and intervention outside the national territory. The changes in our international environment determine four guiding principles for our armed forces, which taken together outline a new military strategy.

■ Four guiding principles

Preservation of our **strategic autonomy**, which guarantees freedom of decision and action, is the first principle of our strategy. This strategic autonomy must allow France to take the initiative in operations that it may deem necessary to preserve its security interests and, where applicable, federate the action of its partners, particularly within the European Union. This principle requires us to preserve the resources that give us freedom of assessment, planning and command, while also favouring the critical capabilities that form the basis of our freedom of action. These capabilities are essential to defending our vital interests and allowing us to take the initiative in simple, predictable operations (joint force command, intelligence and targeting capabilities, special forces, combat resources in contact with the adversary); they are also crucial to our capacity to play an important role in a coalition in order to preserve our autonomy (campaign of precision strikes deep into hostile territory, independent

capability of first entry in a theatre of operation, command capability enabling us to assume the role of lead nation in a medium-scale inter-allied operation or an influential role preserving our sovereignty in a multi-national operation). These capabilities must, in particular, enable us to play a full role within the European Union and assume all our responsibilities within the Atlantic Alliance and NATO command structures.

The second principle is **the consistency between our armed forces model and predictable scenarios requiring engagement of our forces.** They must have high-level capabilities allowing them to respond to threats of use of force by foreign states: our forces must be able to respond in the event that a member state of the European Union or NATO is targeted by direct aggression on the part of another state, and also in the event that we may be prompted to take action pursuant to our defence agreements or against a country in breach of international law. They must also, and sometimes simultaneously, be able to conduct long-term crisis control operations faced with threats arising from the existence of fragile or failed states. Lastly, our forces, in collaboration with other state agencies, must have the capacity to react rapidly to protect the country and the infrastructure or institutions essential to its economic and social life, against global threats (cyber-threats, terrorism, acts that endanger security of supplies and natural, health or technological risks).

The principle of differentiation of forces as a function of the missions they are called upon to carry out is intended to preserve and develop our capacity for action over the entire spectrum of possible actions. Our armed forces are confronted with crises or conflicts with widely differing military characteristics, whether they involve preserving a deterrence capability, protecting the national territory, participating in crisis control operations or combating state-supported armed forces. This principle of differentiation entails as its first priority equipping and training the forces engaged in protecting the national territory, those preserving our means of deterrence, those involved in crisis management and those involved in coercive actions, as a function of the requirements specific to their mission, thereby rendering them more effective in their particular field of action. It also enables substantial savings by financing the most expensive or modern capabilities only where they are indispensable and, in particular, for the forces tasked with combating state-level adversaries. It is crucial to define this critical core for decisions involving renewal and modernisation of our equipment.

Lastly, the **principle of pooling** scarce and critical capabilities over several missions meshes with that of the differentiation of forces. This principle consists in allocating the core of multi-purpose capabilities to several functions (protection, deterrence, outside intervention), depending on the needs to which they must respond. For the intelligence services, it leads to the application of a rule for pooling some of their most advanced technical resources to the benefit of all the agencies engaged in national security, under the supervision of the national intelligence coordinator. Lastly, it entails particularly significant developments at the level of European defence, allowing us to rapidly seek a pooling of the capabilities essential for action from our European partners without directly impacting our strategic autonomy and freedom of action. Applications and developments of this principle are to be found, most notably, in the fields of space observation, air transport and air-to-air refuelling, monitoring theatres of operations and logistics in regions impacted by crises.

■ Operational contract

The armed forces' operational contract is based on the implementation of these principles. It describes the resources available to the nation and Commander in chief to conduct the missions assigned to the armed forces. The effectiveness of our armed forces is governed by three conditions. They must, first, be able to rely on the cohesion of the different units, itself based on military values and on the competence of personnel thanks to high-level training. Secondly, they must possess an enhanced capacity to operate in synergy across the land, sea and air components, down to the lowest tactical levels. Thirdly, they must be able to rely on strong leadership in the different units consistent with their missions, in order to guarantee preservation of know-how and act effectively within prescribed alert thresholds, while also controlling the risks associated with engagements.

The first duty of our armed forces involves **permanent missions**. Deterrence will continue to be built around two permanent components – sea and air. In the framework of the strategic function of protection, the permanent missions tasked with land, air and maritime security will be preserved under the same conditions as today. The engagement of the armed forces to support homeland security and civil security in the event of a major crisis could involve up to 10,000 personnel from the land forces, together with appropriate resources provided by the navy and the air force. To carry out these different protective missions, we may, where necessary, call on resources that can be seconded in particular circumstances by our intervention forces. This global stance will

be supplemented by cyber-defence resources, which are set to expand in the next few years.

In the field of prevention, the armed forces model allows permanent deployment in one or two maritime regions, use of the United Arab Emirates base and pre-positioning facilities in several bases in Africa.

The permanence of the strategic knowledge and anticipation function will be guaranteed by strategic intelligence capabilities as well as reinforced surveillance and electromagnetic interception resources (notably via a combination of satellites, theatre and tactical surveillance drones, interception systems and payloads specially adapted to aircraft, naval vessels and land vehicles).

To guarantee its capability for autonomous reaction in the event of a crisis, France will have a **national emergency force** of 5,000 troops on standby, enabling it to constitute **an immediate reaction joint force** (FIRI) of 2,300 troops, that can be mobilised to intervene over a radius of 3,000 km from the national territory or a foreign base, in seven days. France remains capable of immediate action within this seven-day deadline through use of airborne resources.

The immediate reaction joint force (FIRI) will be composed of special forces, a combined land group of 1,500 men equipped with armoured vehicles and helicopters, a naval group consisting of one force projection and command vessel (BPC), 10 fighter jets, tactical transport planes, maritime patrol aircraft and air-to-air refuelling aircraft, along with the associated command and control means.

The armed forces must also carry out **non-permanent missions of intervention** outside our borders. In this capacity, they may, first, be engaged, simultaneously and on a long-term basis, in more than one **crisis management operation.** They must be capable of conducting this type of operation on a long-term basis in two or three distinct theatres, one as a major contributor.

All the forces engaged in this capacity in all the theatres concerned will be composed of the following resources, together with the associated command and support functions:

- special forces and the support functions required to accomplish their mission;
- the equivalent of a combined forces brigade representing 6,000 to 7,000 land troops, equipped primarily with wheeled armoured vehicles, medium tanks,

fire support and battlefield organisation resources, as well as attack and tactical helicopters;
- a frigate, a combined force projection and command vessel (BPC) and a nuclear attack submarine, depending on the circumstances;
- twelve or so jet fighters, attached to the different theatres of operation.

The nature of the operations or the need to enhance their security may require use of additional resources enabling long-range strikes from air or naval platforms.

Lastly, our forces must have the capability to engage in a **major coercive operation,** while retaining the ability to fulfil part of their responsibilities in existing theatres of operation. With adequate notice (currently evaluated at approximately six months), and after restructuring the resources already engaged in ongoing operations for a limited period, the armed forces must be capable of carrying out a primarily coercive operation involving high-intensity combat in a coalition. They must be capable of assuming partial or full command of such an operation. French participation in these operations will be based on engagement of a joint force with an independent capacity to assess the situation, informational superiority, and a capacity for targeted and high-penetration strikes. In this respect, the French armed forces will retain the capacity to participate in a first entry operation in a combat theatre involving all three forces.

In this framework, France must be able to deploy the following resources, together with the associated command and support functions:
- special forces;
- up to two combined brigades representing around 15,000 land troops, possibly reinforced by allied brigades to constitute a NATO-type division, of which France could assume the command;
- up to 45 fighter jets including naval ones;
- the aircraft carrier, two combined force projection and command vessels (BPC), a key core of national escort vessels comprised primarily of frigates, a nuclear attack submarine and naval patrol aircraft. The permanence of this joint air and sea capability could be assured by the Anglo-French joint expeditionary force provided for by the Lancaster House agreements;
- resources needed to guarantee the functions of command, intelligence and logistics for the operation (transport, health, fuel, munitions, spare parts).

On completion of this engagement, France should retain its capacity to deploy a combined joint force capable of participating in a crisis management operation over a long period.

■ **The armed forces model**

Looking to 2025, the French armed forces will possess **command** and control **capabilities** enabling them to guarantee - at all times and at the strategic level - operational command and national control of the forces deployed. They will also be able to plan and conduct operations autonomously or as lead nation in a multi-national operation, and to contribute at the highest level to multi-national operations. The armed forces will therefore be able to deploy theatre of operations-level command and logistical coordination systems in all three environments[12] for division-level or equivalent operations[13]. In the framework of a major engagement, notably within NATO, the armed forces will preserve the capacity to set up command structures for land, sea and air forces at army corps level[14] or equivalent.

Development of our capabilities in **intelligence**, information processing and dissemination is a priority for the period of planning up to 2025. Technical intelligence-gathering systems will be reinforced, relying, in particular, on systematic pooling of the capabilities of the different services. Initiatives to modernise human resources management will be strengthened. To bolster our capacity for autonomous assessment of situations, efforts will focus on space and air components, both in terms of imaging and electromagnetic interception (electromagnetic space intelligence CERES and the optical component of the MUSIS space imaging system, surveillance and observation drones, and specially-equipped aircraft). We will propose pooling of satellite-derived intelligence to our European partners, likewise the capacity to deploy and exploit surveillance drones. Lastly, automated processing of information and interoperability between intelligence-gathering services will be another avenue for action.

Priority will also be given to development of military **cyber-defence capacities**, in close liaison with intelligence activity. France will develop an approach based on a cyber-defence organisation closely integrated with the armed forces, made up of defensive and offensive capacities to prepare or support military operations The operational organisation of the armed forces will therefore incorporate an operational cyber-defence platform, consistent with the operational organisation and structure of our armed forces and adapted to the specific characteristics of this sphere of combat: unified to take in the lesser importance of borders in this

12 Land, sea and air forces, as well as special operations.

13 Level described as Smaller Joint Operations in NATO vocabulary.

14 Equivalent to the NATO level of Major Joint Operations.

space; centralised from the planning and operations centre of the joint general staff to guarantee a global vision from the outset and a quick mobilization of the needed resources; and specialised, since it requires appropriate expertise and practices. The mission of the technical component entrusted to the DGA (Defence procurement agency) will be the ability to understand and anticipate threats, develop upstream research and contribute its expertise in the event of an IT crisis affecting the Ministry of Defence.

The **special forces** have proven to be an element of utmost importance in all recent operations. They are particularly suited to the growing need for flexible, in-depth emergency reaction to hostile or complex situations. They offer the military command and the political authorities a range of suitable options, often based on surprise. They have a direct chain of command and specific recruitment criteria. Their personnel and command resources and their coordination with the intelligence services will be reinforced, together with the joint character of their command.

The land **forces** will have units adapted to the diversity, duration, geographic dispersal and hardening of operations. They will provide an operational capability of approximately 66,000 deployable troops, including special land forces, seven combined brigades, back-up and operational support, pre-positioned units and units in the overseas territories. The combined-force combat brigades will be organised around three complementary components. Two brigades will be trained for first entry and coercive combat against heavily armed adversaries. Three other multi-purpose brigades will be primarily equipped and trained for crisis management. Lastly, two light brigades will be capable of intervening in specific and difficult environments or at very short notice to assist pre-positioned forces or within dedicated emergency modules. Continued efforts to improve digitalisation and appropriate operational preparation will guarantee cohesion between these three components and their capacity to provide reciprocal reinforcement. These forces will, in particular, have at their disposal around 200 heavy tanks, 250 medium tanks, 2,700 multi-purpose armoured and combat vehicles, 140 reconnaissance and attack helicopters, 115 tactical helicopters and some 30 tactical drones.

The **navy** will contribute to nuclear deterrence with the naval aviation nuclear force and through permanent nuclear-powered, ballistic missile-carrying submarine patrols. They will also have the capacity to undertake high-intensity or major-crisis operations thanks to their high-level, multi-purpose combat capabilities with powerful and accurate firing systems, easily integrated in

multi-national operations, and with the ability to assume command of such operations. They will be organised around our aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered attack submarines, combined force projection and command vessels (BPC) and anti-aircraft and multi-mission frigates, supplemented by less powerful combat units to avoid prematurely wearing out the potential of more powerful forces and preserve sufficient resources to ensure a maritime presence. The naval forces also include light units equipped to control the maritime space around continental France and its overseas territories: surveillance frigates, patrol boats and support vessels. They will therefore have at their disposal four nuclear-powered, ballistic missile-carrying submarines, six nuclear-powered attack submarines, one aircraft carrier, 15 front-line frigates, some 15 patrol boats, six surveillance frigates, three combined force projection and command vessels (BPC), maritime patrol aircraft and a mine-warfare capacity suitable for the protection of our approach and for deployment in operations outside the national territory.

The **air force** will continue to ensure permanent deployment of the air component of the mission of deterrence and protection of national air space and its approaches. They will continue to be modernised to have available a fleet of top-class, multi-purpose aircraft giving them the capability for first entry, situation assessment, interoperability, deep-penetration strikes, strategic and tactical transport and supporting ground manœuvres as required in a major conflict. They will also continue to field a sufficient number of aircraft, thanks to the extension of the service life of older but high-level specialised aircraft, notably for missions of territorial protection and crisis management. Operational preparation will be differentiated, with particular emphasis on fielding an initial array of very rapid-reaction forces over the whole spectrum of operations. This approach will be supported upstream by upgrading fighter pilot training. Relying on a permanent command and operational centre, interoperable with our Allies, the air force will include 225 fighter aircraft (air force and naval aviation), together with some 50 tactical transport aircraft, 7 detection and surveillance aircraft, 12 multi-role refuelling aircraft, 12 theatre surveillance drones, several light surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft and 8 medium-range surface-to-air missile systems.

The **gendarmerie nationale**, an armed force attached to the Ministry of the Interior and employed on a day-to-day basis for internal security missions, is a major asset thanks to its military organisation, the military status of its personnel, its presence throughout the territory, its operational reserve and its mobile gendarmerie forces. It constitutes a government-controlled reserve

accustomed to carrying out operations in chaotic environments. It will deploy its pivotal capabilities – helicopters, armoured law enforcement vehicles, secure national transmission network – which supplement the resources of the armed forces and which will be preserved. It provides essential support to the armed forces thanks to specialised gendarmerie units (sea, air, armament, nuclear weapons security), through the military police service and its on-going engagement in external operations. On the national territory, its unique status as an armed force attached to the Ministry of the Interior enables it to respond rapidly to crisis situations or natural disasters, and it can therefore be deployed alongside the armed forces.

Lastly, the armed forces will continue to rely on the joint agencies that contribute to their effectiveness, in theatres of operation and on the national territory. They include, among others, the Fuel Service, the Joint Directorate for Infrastructure and Information System Networks, the armed forces supplies department, support services such as the joint structure responsible for maintaining defence aviation equipment and land-based equipment in operational condition and the fleet support department.

The **joint forces health service** also plays a crucial role in supporting troops and in our defence and national security strategy. It plays a vital role in guaranteeing the operational engagement of the armed forces and its capacities are also used in crisis management operations. It has unique capacities for acting in NBC environments, in both overseas operations and on the national territory. It will be capable of implementing an operational health intelligence platform composed of a set of intervention modules that can be deployed at short notice and over a long period for all types of armed forces missions, notably to protect populations. This role will be consolidated, in particular, by an ambitious reform fostering new synergies and better coordination and complementarity with the public health service.

Looking to 2025, the new armed forces model will help fill some existing gaps in capability, for instance in the field of intelligence and drones. However, it does imply lengthening the service life of some equipment, with a sharp increase in average age, together with temporary limitations in capabilities, which could be partly mitigated by European support or pooling initiatives. It corresponds to a ramping up of our defence investment, the effects of which will feed through from the end of the next military programming law, and will enable the renewal of deterrence capability and conventional equipment. This is why the armed forces will be organised, in the framework of the principle of differentiation of

forces, to make better use of older equipment, while at the same time making use of the capacities of modern equipment as deliveries proceed.

This new armed forces model will generate further restructuring and adaptation of its format. These measures will allow our armed forces to execute all defined operational contracts, while also implementing substantial measures to rationalise and modernise public action. As a consequence of modifications in operational contracts, some 34,000 positions will be eliminated in the Ministry of Defence over the 2014-2019[15] period. They will primarily concern support functions, administration and services.

B.The global approach in managing external crises

Consolidating fragile states or restoring their stability requires implementing a set of complementary and consistent actions in every field. Greater coordination is necessary in the framework of a global inter-ministerial and multilateral approach with the aim of optimising the use of limited resources.

A credible capability for prevention and civilian-military crisis management is of the utmost importance to our defence and national security strategy, which must be able to rely on strengthened civilian resources and consolidated organisation. The 2008 White Paper already observed this fact and in 2009 an inter-ministerial strategy for civilian-military external crisis management was formulated, under the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The experience gained in recent crises has shown that our civilian capacities for actions of prevention and in post-conflict reconstruction are still inadequate due in part to the failure to create conditions allowing effective and coordinated mobilisation of the ministries involved. It is therefore advisable to re-energise the inter-ministerial strategy.

France's prevention policy aims to prevent the emergence of hot spots, particularly in our near environment. It is directed, in priority, towards fragile states whose situation has a direct impact on Europe and our overseas territories. A substantial share of our development aid must therefore be directed towards these countries, in the framework of a global inter-ministerial policy. Defence and security cooperation, operational assistance to foreign armed forces and our pre-

15 Including more than 10,000 under the 2009-2014 military programme act.

positioned forces are all instruments that must contribute to the consistency of our approach to prevention.

This effort at bringing different parts of the administration together will be based on shared analysis of risks by the agencies concerned and will give rise to regular updating of "regional-based strategies" validated at inter-ministerial level. Likewise, our capacity to react will rely on an inter-ministerial intelligence and early warning system, that must detect and analyse as early as possible the indicators presaging a crisis.

If, despite these preventive efforts, France is called on to participate in a crisis management operation, the intervention forces must be supplemented, as soon as possible, by specialised civilian capacities. Such deployment must be closely coordinated with military action, which in turn must create the minimal security conditions required for sustainable stabilisation allowing civilian personnel to conduct their operations.

The modus operandi for implementing this global approach in crisis management must be anticipated and planned as early as possible, ideally upstream of any intervention. Prior definition of post-crisis strategies and mobilisation of the corresponding human and material resources demand rigorous coordination at the inter-ministerial and multilateral levels, which must be supported by tried-and-tested organisation and procedures.

To this end, French intervention should be organised according to the following principles:

- at the strategic level, geographical priorities, particularly in terms of intelligence, anticipation and prevention, must be clearly determined and validated/authorised at the political level. The Committee for civilian-military crisis management will coordinate the monitoring and yearly updating of these priorities. A document will be published detailing our inter-ministerial strategy in the area of prevention and civilian-military management of crises;
- at the operational level, the approved intervention must be supported by an operational policy and validated inter-ministerial procedures. It must allow for medium- and long-term action drawing on both diplomacy of influence and economic diplomacy. It must also be capable of rapid ramp-up up in the period preceding a crisis. It will be supported in such situations by the establishment, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of rapid-response structures composed of seconded personnel representing the different ministerial

departments concerned. These light, rapid-reaction structures will remain operational throughout the critical period;
- This global inter-ministerial approach must translate into delegation and shared shouldering of responsibilities in the crisis theatre so as to make sure that the actions taken are adapted to the reality on the ground.

The reinforcement of civilian action on the ground entails, first and foremost, rapid mobilisation of civilian expertise, notably in critical specialities (public security, customs, public administration, judicial authorities, civil engineering, etc.). A proactive approach that recognises international expertise in the public administration should enable us to ensure the availability of civilian capacities commensurate with our ambition. The roster of volunteer experts we can call on must therefore be consolidated, broadened and regularly updated in coordination with the administrations and specialised operators (France-Expertise Internationale, CIVIPOL, etc.). This work of identification and mobilisation must also be accompanied by an effort in the field of training for agents in civilian crisis management operations, simplification of administrative procedures and adaptation of the status of the agents deployed.

This inter-ministerial approach must be embedded in the framework of our efforts to improve the European Union's crisis management capabilities. Effective implementation of the global approach, which is a priority theme of the European Union's external action, will allow us to transcend the disagreements that may arise between member states about giving priority either to civilian or military management of crises. It will therefore reinforce the common security and defence policy (CSDP).

The European Union enjoys political legitimacy and the institutions and resources enabling it to intervene in the full spectrum of crises. The Treaty of Lisbon, which established the European External Action Service (EEAS) under the direct authority of the Vice-President of the Commission / Senior representative of the European Union for foreign policy and security, gave the Union structures and resources allowing it to exercise its responsibilities in the international arena. The Union has therefore become one of the few international organisations that possess all the resources enabling it to play an effective role in potential or confirmed crisis spots.

There is a need to work towards better coordination of institutional players, intergovernmental and EU policies and crisis management instruments, whether civilian or military. In particular, coordination between the EEAS and all the units

that remain under the control of the Commission, notably those concerned with issues of development, humanitarian aid, civil protection and public health, must be simplified and strengthened. Likewise the EEAS must be able to rely on direct links with the agencies attached to the CSDP, and especially with the European Defence Agency and the European Union Satellite Centre. It is also essential to improve the structure of crisis management financing by the European Union to ensure that it responds to these requirements of decompartmentalisation and operational efficiency.

With the aim of strengthening the operational dimension of the common security and defence policy, we should strive to achieve a better balance between civilian and military capacities of strategic planning and conduct of operations, with a minimum requirement that they be based in the same location. More generally, parallel development of civilian and military crisis management capabilities guarantees the possibility of a global approach, which should lead to a reinforcement of the powers of the European Union's special representative in theatres of crisis. The military committee, supported by the work undertaken by the European Union Joint Staff, must continue to be a source of proposals for the military contribution to the global approach, both in operations and in available capacities.

While awaiting a common strategic vision and a foreign policy consensus, a European defence policy will be built up through operations in which civilian and military capabilities will complement and mutually reinforce each other.

C. Means for prevention and management of crises in the national territory

Based on risk assessment, our national security strategy must organise diversified responses to prevent and manage major crises in the national territory.

■ Risk assessment

Risk assessment must be the cornerstone of protection policies implemented in the framework of our defence and national security strategy. By assessing the likelihood of occurrence of the different risks that could be posed to national security, together with the nature and intensity of their potential impact, it can enlighten the public authorities on the priority actions to be put in place.

Risk assessment is closely linked to knowledge about the vulnerabilities of potential targets and the capacity to direct, gather and exploit intelligence. It makes it possible to prepare and adapt relevant prevention and protection procedures (for such needs as organisation, planning, acquisition and development of technical capabilities).

The national risk assessment approach initiated in compliance with the recommendations of the previous White Paper constitutes a priority avenue for work. It must lead on to formulation of a global assessment, all risks and sectors combined, by associating all the ministries and public and private organisations crucial to the resilience of the nation. Launched in 2010, this work should be completed before 2014. It will supplement national security planning and enrich the capacity-based approach that will be initiated by the state at the level of defence and security zones in the main reservoirs of risks. It will also give France, in this timeframe, the capacity to contribute effectively to formulating an improved interior security strategy at the European level. This approach must be fed by more specific analyses. Sector-based strategies by type of target or essential function (transport, logistics chains, communication, etc.) will allow for an adjustment of the protection policies for the sectors under consideration. Theme-based analyses will be aimed at improving knowledge of and assessing risks with a high technical or technological component (nuclear, radiological, biological, chemical, explosive – NRBC–E – risks and cybernetic risks, for instance), and directing development of new prevention, detection and protection technologies. Cooperative initiatives established with our European and international partners pursuing similar approaches will enable pooling of sector-based risk analyses and increase the reliability of our respective methods.

- **Protection of the territory and its surroundings**

Territorial protection implies, first of all, guaranteeing control and surveillance of national areas and of their surroundings (continental France and the overseas territories), to prevent undesirable intrusions, illegal flows and hostile acts. The mission incumbent on the state governs our permanent security stance, i.e. all the measures imposed on land, at sea and in the air, space and cyberspace to protect the country in all circumstances from aggression, even of a limited nature, against its territory or its interests.

Thanks to their coverage of the territory, the national police and the gendarmerie ensure continuous surveillance that should enable the anticipation of threats

to national security. In the event of a confirmed threat or of a serious crisis, these forces can be supplemented by the armed forces.

The state's action in the marine environment, by nature inter-ministerial and coordinated at the central level by the General Secretariat for the Sea, is intended to guarantee the protection of national interests, the safety of life and property at sea, the combat against illegal activities and the protection of the environment. France will support the development of integrated marine surveillance by the European Union to enhance our knowledge of and capacity to analyse the activities taking place in these environments, while taking care to ensure that this common policy takes into account our country's particular maritime characteristics.

The resources currently implemented by the French Navy are, to a large extent, directed towards the accomplishment of this mission and other missions contributing to the different strategic functions. Hence, the combat against drug smuggling outside territorial waters resorts to such resources as light frigates, maritime surveillance aircraft and the special forces. A limited number of specific capabilities are required for some of these missions, such as the prevention and the treatment of pollution.

Air security guarantees the respect of France's sovereignty in its air space and the defence of the territory against any aerial threat. The accomplishment of this mission requires national capabilities for assessing the threat and countering it with adapted and proportionate resources. It also requires in-depth strategic expertise to assess an aerial threat with sufficient advance notice, as provided by cross-border agreements and the setting up of the new NATO Air Command and Control System. France will, moreover, ensure that defence and security risks are taken into account in the "Single European Sky" project. It will, notably, ensure that this initiative will preserve training areas for its military aircraft. It will closely monitor any technical modifications that may be imposed on these aircraft by the European Union in this framework.

With the multiplication of debris in space and the emergence of potential direct attacks on satellites, the protection of outer space is now a major challenge given the importance of the services and missions carried out by spacecraft. France will support international initiatives aimed at promoting the sustainable development of space. It will continue to develop space surveillance capabilities in order to preserve its independent assessment of the situation in space. A European approach to this topic of mutual interest will be promoted, taking

advantage of existing resources such as the GRAVES radar and developing new concrete projects. A blueprint will be established organising the space surveillance mission and the different actors contributing to it. The protection of the land infrastructure used to operate space systems will be reinforced.

■ The fight against terrorism

Terrorism is a major and persistent threat requiring maintenance at a high level of alert of the systems put in place by the state. This platform is embedded in a global approach that aims to:

- prevent risks, by detecting and neutralising illegal flows, protecting the territory against hostile intrusion and developing government initiatives to combat radicalisation;
- protect particularly vulnerable areas, air, land and sea transport networks, the country's essential infrastructure and sensitive information systems;
- anticipate changes in the threat by preserving technological superiority in the detection of explosives, telecommunications, video surveillance, protection of information systems, biometrics and protection against nuclear, radiological, biological, chemical or explosive risks (NRBC-E).

The government Vigipirate anti-terrorism plan enables a global approach to the terrorist threat both on the national territory and to our interests outside France. It ensures the mobilisation of the different ministries, local and regional authorities, operators of essential infrastructure and institutions, and citizens, to reinforce our level of protection. This platform must be modernised to bolster its effectiveness.

Bilateral and multilateral cooperation must be reinforced to enhance the exchange of information and assessments between countries exposed to the same threat. This cooperation will, in addition, enable better integration of the continuity between internal and external security.

■ Guaranteeing the continuity of vital functions

Since 2006, the state has been deploying a policy to enhance the security of activities of vital importance, which applies to 12 sectors of activity[16] and aims

16 The activity sectors considered to be of vital importance, as defined by the ruling of 2 June 2006, are: State civil activities – Judicial activities – State military activities – Food – Electronic communications, audiovisual and information systems – Energy – Space and Research – Finances – Water management – Industry – Health - Transportation.

to assess and prioritise risks and, subsequently, to formulate measures to deal with them. This policy, based on the close association of the different operators, will be upgraded to take better into account all the risks and threats and ensure the continuity of essential functions. This upgrading will also aim to further raise the awareness of all public and private actors and provide better information to citizens. To this end, educational, training and communication initiatives will be conducted for targeted groups.

■ **The fight against cyber-threats**

The actions initiated in connection with the analyses and recommendations contained in the 2008 White Paper in the field of cyber-defence have enabled France to reach a crucial milestone in recognising this threat and rolling out the necessary responses. However, the continued growth of this threat, the continuing increase in the importance of information systems in the life of our societies and the very rapid development of technologies, require us to move onto yet another level to maintain the protection and defence capabilities responding to these changes. These factors now require a very substantial increase in the level of security and the means to defend our information systems, both in order to preserve our sovereignty and also to defend our economy as well as employment in France. The human resources devoted to this task will therefore be appreciably reinforced, on the same scale as the efforts made by our British and German partners.

The capacity to detect and protect ourselves against cyber attacks and to identify those responsible for them has become an element of national sovereignty. To succeed in this endeavour, the state must support high-level scientific and technological expertise.

The capacity to produce security systems, on a fully autonomous basis, notably in the fields of cryptology and attack detection, is, in this respect, an essential component of national sovereignty. An annual budget allocation earmarked for investment will enable design and development of high-level security systems. Special attention will be paid to the security of electronic communications networks and the equipment they rely on. Preservation of an effective national and European industry in this sector is an essential objective.

Reinforcing the security of state information systems is essential and an ambitious security policy will be put into place. It will be based, most notably, on maintaining the high-security networks serving state authorities, an appropriate policy of

public procurement and appropriate management of mobile communications equipment. It will be supplemented by a policy of awareness-building directed at decentralised state administrations, regional authorities and their public establishments and at the principal users of the cyberspace. State cyber-security also depends on that of its product and service suppliers, which must be reinforced. Clauses will be included in contracts to guarantee the required level of security.

As for activities of vital importance for the normal functioning of the nation, the state will define the security standards to be met with respect to IT threats, by means of an appropriate legislative and regulatory procedure, and will ensure that operators adopt all necessary measures to detect and handle any such incident affecting their sensitive systems. This procedure will specify the rights and obligations of public and private actors, particularly in relation to audits, the mapping of their information systems, notification of incidents and the capacity of the national agency responsible for the security of information systems (ANSSI), and, where applicable, of other state agencies, to intervene in the event of a serious crisis.

The national policy of response to major IT attacks is based on the principle of a global approach, itself based on two complementary aspects:

- the implementation of a robust and resilient posture to protect state information systems, operators of essential infrastructure and strategic industries, paired with an operational organisation to defend these systems, coordinated by the office of the Prime Minister and supported by close cooperation of the different state agencies, to identify and qualify as early as possible any threats to which our country is exposed;
- a capacity for a global and appropriate governmental approach to attacks of varied nature and magnitude, relying initially on all diplomatic, judicial or police resources, but without ruling out progressive use of Ministry of Defence resources in the event that national strategic interests are threatened.

Within this national policy, a proactive IT capacity associated with an intelligence capability makes a substantial contribution to a cyber-security platform. It contributes to qualifying the threat and identifying its origin. It can also anticipate certain attacks and configure the required means of defence. A proactive IT capability enriches the palette of possible options available to the state. It takes in different stages, more or less reversible and more or less discreet, proportionate to the magnitude and seriousness of the attacks.

More generally, the security of the information society as a whole requires each individual to be made aware of the risks and threats and to adapt their behaviours and practices in consequence. It is also important to increase the number of experts trained in France and to ensure that IT security is integrated in all advanced IT training and education.

An ambitious cyber-defence policy requires the development of close relations between trusted international partners. Relations with privileged partners, and in first place the United Kingdom and Germany, will be strengthened. At the European level, France supports the implementation of a European policy aimed at strengthening protection against cyber-risks for essential infrastructure and electronic communications networks.

■ **The protection of the nation's scientific and technical potential**

As for the protection of the nation's scientific and technical potential, in 2012 France adopted a new procedure aimed at preventing the diversion or capture of knowledge and know-how vital to its fundamental interests. This procedure relies especially on setting up a network of restricted regime zones (ZRR) governed by common rules of special protection in the most sensitive research and production units, in both the public and private sectors.

■ **The fight against weapons' proliferation and trafficking**

France actively participates in multilateral action aimed at combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, most notably that conducted at the European level to harmonise provisions aimed at criminalising activities of proliferation and hence increasing the common deterrent effect.

Substantial efforts must also be made to combat arms trafficking, in particular small arms and associated ammunition. Apart from reinforcing national and European legal means, we will reinforce assistance to countries that have become victims of arms trafficking but do not possess the means to control arms trade. Implementation of the treaty on the arms trade, to which the European Union and France have made a considerable diplomatic contribution, will be facilitated.

At the national level, France has implemented a set of procedures to control the export of these goods, technologies and know-how, but the procedures are not yet sufficiently integrated. Inter-ministerial reflection will be initiated to reinforce the efficiency of control and synergies between the different existing

procedures. It could aim to bring the different instruments for control of civilian and military technologies intended for defence and security applications together under a single authority.

■ The fight against drug trafficking and human trafficking

The combat against these types of trafficking must be reinforced by consolidating the actions pursued since 2008. Essential coordination between administrative action (including that of the intelligence services) and judicial action will be reinforced. It is, moreover, essential to reinforce the role and capabilities of the European agency FRONTEX, which must be developed in keeping with the need to control the use of our resources.

The efforts undertaken to step up the fight against drug trafficking will be developed in the land, air and maritime environments. With respect to the latter environment, France will seek to promote the possibility of destroying intercepted cargos at sea at the international level. In this framework, it will strive to enter into individual agreements with the states under whose flag the vessels are sailing, an initiative that aims to dissociate the treatment of the intercepted cargos from that of the ship and persons aboard. It will also seek to develop bilateral or regional agreements allowing judicial proceedings to be brought by neighbouring states following interception at sea.

This objective implies the availability of capacities of intervention in our territorial waters and beyond, in particular against high-speed craft, and increasing operational capacities for implementing public action to detect breaches of the law and apprehend the perpetrators. In the overseas territories, France will reinforce the monitoring of inter-island traffic to guarantee better use of limited intervention capacity.

■ Improving the state's capacity to respond to crises

Under the impetus of the preceding White Paper, the state's capacity to respond effectively to major crisis situations has made substantial progress. The inter-ministerial crisis unit (CIC) allows the Prime Minister, in liaison with the President of the Republic, to take political and strategic control of government action, with operational control being placed under the responsibility of a specially appointed minister (in principle the Minister of the Interior for crises affecting the national territory and the Minister of Foreign Affairs for external crises). Our territorial organisation, whose architecture is structured on the départements

and defence and security zones (seven in continental France and five in the overseas territories) has proven its worth. It must continue to be ramped up by consolidating the zoning level through reinforcement of the inter-ministerial general staff of defence and security zones.

In a crisis situation justifying their intervention, the armed forces will act at the request of the civilian authority, under military command, to support or supplement the internal security forces (police and gendarmerie, fire brigade and civilian security organisations).

The consolidation of crisis management organisation must be supplemented by adapting government and regional planning instruments. Planning should make it possible to identify all the actors that can contribute to crisis resolution and list all the capacities on which the state must be able to count. It must take into account the abilities and capacities of local and regional governments and involve them in preparing and implementing these crisis management procedures. Information and communication actions must be incorporated in this planning and regular government exercises must test its validity. Feedback generated from past crises must be systematically taken into consideration.

It also appears necessary to foster coordination mechanisms within the European Union. In this respect, France advocates the development of instruments and procedures for joint risk assessing and better defining of common crisis management prevention, preparation and coordination procedures. Furthermore, a standardisation procedure will be initiated around questions affecting continuity of essential functions to set up common rules in terms of organisation, systems and procedures at the national and European levels.

■ French overseas territories

In the context of tensions around access to resources, France must have the capacity to affirm its sovereignty and defend its interests in its overseas territories. In other words, it must be able to monitor, control and if necessary take military action to counter a threat that could jeopardise the integrity of its national territory. This threat, which would most likely be of a non-state nature, calls for a visible, deterrent presence of military forces. In the less likely case of a state-led threat, France must be able to rapidly deploy appropriate means of intervention. This requires preserving points of entry (ports and airports) and maintaining certain capabilities.

The 2008 White Paper established the principle of aligning the size of the military presence in the overseas territories with the needs corresponding strictly to the missions of the armed forces and a reinforcement of civilian resources. This principle should provide a global guarantee of the continuity of the defence and security missions incumbent on the state. It should ensure the preservation of sovereignty (in remote and isolated regions), the fight against trafficking, the fight against illicit fishing, the fight against illegal gold prospecting, the protection of the French Guiana space centre, and the management of natural disasters and of public order crises.

The new breakdown of contributions demanded from each ministry has only partly taken effect and major equipment questions remain to be addressed, both in the naval and air sectors. Hence, today there is a significant risk of inadequate short- and medium-term capability, which could prevent the state from continuing to satisfactorily fulfil all the missions incumbent on it in these overseas territories.

The recommendations of the 2008 White Paper, which provided for a ramping up of civilian capabilities, are confirmed and the relevant ministries must take steps to ensure they have the necessary equipment. For each type of mission, pooling of capacities will be a priority concern and the stakeholders must, as of 2013, formulate a five-year programme of pooled equipment. Military presence in the overseas territories must be structured to take into account the defence and security problems specific to each territory.

Defence and security in the overseas territories must systematically take into account their particular regional environment. For instance, in the fight against illicit fishing and gold prospecting in the French Guiana or irregular immigration in Mayotte, France must endeavour to involve its neighbours, notably Brazil and the Union of the Comoros, in combatting these threats and their consequences.

■ **Capacity objectives for the national territory**

The protection and security objectives defined by the defence and national security strategy must prompt public authorities to determine the capacities, notably in terms of equipment, to be made available to the civilian and military forces to effectively perform the missions incumbent on them in this respect. The civilian ministries have not yet fully implemented this approach.

To this end, it is advisable, initially, to identify all the critical capabilities that should be available to the civilian ministries. In this way they should be able to programme the development, acquisition or replacement of those deemed to be inadequate or even lacking. This is essential to guarantee the ability of the administrations in question to respond effectively to the objectives of the defence and national security strategy and to improve civilian-military planning in the event of a crisis on the national territory. Under the authority of the Prime Minister, the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security (SGDSN) will take responsibility for this approach in collaboration with all the relevant ministries (interior, overseas territories, ecology and sustainable development, economy and finance, health, agriculture). This should result, from 2013, in the establishment of a general, inter-ministerial contract that will define the civilian capacities required for missions relative to national security.

In parallel with this process, the Ministry of the Interior, in liaison with the other civilian ministries, will foster the coordination of all the public and private agencies that bear some responsibility for ensuring the country's capacity for resilience. In priority, this means the regional authorities to which the laws of decentralisation have transferred critical competencies, especially in terms of local public services. Major operators of vitally important services and infrastructure which have specific responsibilities in maintaining the continuity of the country's essential functions will also be associated. Based on a census of existing resources and know-how and using an assessment of common risks and security objectives for each defence and security zone, this work should identify the efforts to be made by each actor to guarantee the availability of appropriate capacities for crisis management in the national territory. This will give prefects a clear vision of all the capacities available to them under such circumstances. The process must be conducted between now and 2016. It will be accompanied by the reinforcement of the inter-ministerial general staff for each zone by the relevant ministries.

■ The European dimension of national security

France intends to seize the opportunities arising from the review of the Stockholm Programme in 2014 to promote a European security project. We must also capitalise on the creation of the Internal Security Fund, the implementation of the "security" component of Horizon 2020, and the work concerning the solidarity clause and the remodelling coordination arrangements in the event of a crisis to pursue this objective. On this point, France proposes strengthening the consistency of the different sector-based policies currently implemented by

the Union in the fields of protection (terrorism, crisis management, business continuity, NRBC-E, cyber-security) and development of security technologies. This type of global project can be carried out within the Union's current legal framework and is likely to reinforce the effectiveness of national policies of particular importance for the European peoples. Rollout of this project is an essential step towards the emergence of a common, shared consciousness of Europe's superior interests.

Since numerous security missions (police, customs, marine surveillance, civil security, fire brigade, etc.) need to benefit from reliable and precise positioning and navigation facilities, France will continue to support the European Galileo navigation satellite programme.

D. The women and men serving defence and national security

In order to guarantee the permanent security and defence of the nation, the state possesses forces capable of intervening at its command. They consist of the women and men working for the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior (police, gendarmerie and civilian security). These personnel are recognised for their competence and are trained to deal with multiple challenges. They share common values and have chosen, each according to her/his status, to serve their country. Thanks to them, the country is able to deal with all types of crises and therefore has a duty of solidarity towards them. The security and emergency intervention forces are organised to provide complete and permanent coverage of the territory in the areas of intervention, intelligence and emergency assistance. In exceptional circumstances, local and regional government and non-profit organisations may be asked to contribute their efforts alongside the state.

Since 2008, defence and national security structures have undergone major changes in accordance with the recommendations of the preceding White Paper. Organisational changes have obliged the women and men working for the defence and national security forces to deal with radical transformations. For the Ministry of Defence, these changes led, between 2008 and 2012, to the loss of approximately 40,000 jobs, a programme implemented rigorously according to the defined timetable. These reforms could not have been implemented without the mobilisation of all personnel, civilian and military, but have nevertheless had an effect on their living and working conditions and, hence, on their morale.

Over and above the conditions in which they perform their work, defence and national security personnel, whether civilian or military, must be able to fully play their role as citizens in the life of the community. For military personnel, these rights and obligations must be exercised in compliance with the preservation of the neutrality of the armed forces, which must not participate in any partisan debate.

Society awards the monopoly of armed force to arms-bearing citizens to guarantee the security of all. The Republic assigns a singular mission to these citizens, which imposes discipline, loyalty and a spirit of sacrifice, in return for which they benefit from the gratitude of the nation and a protective status. Military personnel, called on to serve at any time or in any place and even to sacrifice their own lives, constitute a specific group: they may be called on to serve in combat situations, in the name of the nation, in the framework of strict rules of engagement. This particular positioning confers rights and responsibilities on military personnel which are codified in a special status that must be preserved – even while it must adapt to changes in society – and guaranteed to people involved in armed service or whose particular conditions of employment warrant their being covered by this status, including in the field of interior security or civilian security. Military personnel, who are all liable to mobilisation and bound to respect the same obligations, benefit from the principle of unique military status, recognised by the law in 1975 and reaffirmed in 2005.

By virtue of the inherent requirements of operational missions (availability, mobility, distance), the armed forces must at all times be able to count on young personnel with the physical ability to perform these missions. The requirement of youth has a crucial and restrictive impact on the management of military human resources as it imposes a high turnover of operational forces. This need for permanent and well-organised flows of recruitment and departures calls for the reinforcement of the current policy which gives preference to recruitment under contract over career-based recruitment.

Potential recruits must be clearly informed of the particular constraints of employment in the armed forces. To foster the recruitment of young people in the armed forces, the precarious nature of the early part of a military career must be offset by opportunities for promotion in rank and in military units and access to training to develop their skills and qualifications that also prepare them for a return to civilian life. Working and living conditions, together with direct and indirect remuneration, must remain attractive.

The 2008 White Paper recommended a new balance, within the Ministry of Defence, between military and civilian personnel, by calling for military personnel to be refocused on operational functions and specialisation of civilian personnel in administrative and support functions. Implementation of the programme to cut 40,000 jobs between 2008 and 2012, out of the 54,900 provided for by the 2008 White Paper for the period between 2009 and 2015, did not do enough to complete this rebalancing, which must be pursued in a proactive manner. The goal is to have each category of personnel, civilian and military, refocus on their core activity.

Officers recruited by competitive examination must benefit from career status, but the flow of such recruitments must take into account the new format of the armed forces. This new format will lead to a target pyramid of personnel by rank and a defined trajectory for achieving it. For non-commissioned officers and petty officers, the transition from contract-based employment to career-based employment must allow the selection of the best elements, who will eventually occupy technical and supervisory functions. Apart from perpetuating the critical competencies essential to the satisfactory functioning of the armed forces, this possibility of promotion is one of the main drivers of social mobility within the armed forces.

The continued fall in applications for non-commissioned military personnel despite a depressed labour market often prevents the military establishment from guaranteeing a sufficiently rigorous selection of candidates, who must demonstrate unquestionable physical capacities and psychological equilibrium. Another difficulty is the fact that young enlisted uniformed soldiers are present for too short a time, whereas encouraging longer engagement of these young people would not only generate savings in recruitment and training but is also an important driver for enhancing the professionalism of our armed forces.

The human resources model for the defence sector must now meet two imperatives. Structurally, it entails continuous personnel turnover, which means that incoming and outgoing personnel flows must always be adequate with the needs of the Ministry of Defence. On the shorter term, we must in the next few years adapt the Ministry's workforce to the new armed forces model and the need to modernise public action. Tools for steering the reduction in personnel are today inadequate to respond to this second imperative. The Ministry's human resources policy will therefore include a major programme of reform to accompany the social, human and economic impact of the coming changes. New procedures will be put into place for managing and steering the reduction

in personnel, together with an appropriate platform of assistance for officers returning to civilian life. These permanent measures could include new rules of status, alongside an efficient system for supporting officers and facilitating their return to civilian life. These instruments are intended to guarantee the robustness of the Ministry's new human resources model over the longer term, and must respect the rules of equity and transparency.

Optimised management of Ministry of Defence personnel must take particular account of the requirement to control payroll costs and the related expenditures, which was lacking in the period just completed. To this end, the reduction in personnel and changes in organisation of the Ministry of Defence must prompt a "flattening" of the workforce pyramid. Reformed governance of human resources management will enable better control and consistency between organisation, workforce and payroll costs.

The Ministries of Defence and the Interior must continue to take into account certain important personal constraints and facilitate the balance between military life and private life: spouse's work, children's education, acquisition of a home. Furthermore, military personnel must enjoy better visibility concerning their mobility and career prospects. This requires setting up a clear policy for forward-looking jobs and skills management, in the short and medium term.

Civilian personnel in the defence sector are the second pivot guaranteeing the consistency of our defence system. The major challenge in managing these personnel is to guarantee the employability of operatives over the longer term and develop their potential. Selective recruitment procedures, the high-level technical competencies of these personnel and the fact that they exercise a wide range of activities in the administrative, technical, social and paramedic functions are valuable assets for the defence community, of which they are an integral part. The civilian human resources management policy must guarantee the continued recruitment of a sufficient number of high-level civilian operatives. Forward-looking jobs and skill management must allow the identification of positions where a functional analysis shows that they could be held by civilian personnel. Recognition of the jobs, role and positioning of these operatives requires formal structuring of open-ended professional paths, associated with a proactive policy of continuing training. Mobility of civilian personnel must be encouraged; it must not prejudice promotion and must be supported in an equitable manner. This is a major challenge in the adaptation of our defence capability.

Training of defence and national security personnel is of primary importance, both in terms of the degree of formal structuring of professional paths and the number of training sessions conducted. Since initial training of the personnel recruited constitutes only a very basic platform, it must be supplemented by additional training during their employment and be better recognised in the assessment of personnel.

The policy conducted in this area is a major factor of attractiveness. For the armed forces, it introduces a cost that is justified but which must be contained. Substantial efforts have recently been made to introduce pooling between the armed forces and establish closer relations between the military training system and the national education system. This approach should be pursued by further developing interactions between the needs of the armed forces and the recognition of individual skills acquired, which will facilitate the return of military personnel to civilian life. It would also be desirable to supplement these training actions with an inter-ministerial mobility policy for management personnel fostering professional development and sharing of best practices.

Special efforts must be made to establish links between officer-training institutions, while respecting their military identity, and civilian institutions at the same level, in line with current plans to bring about a grouping of elite colleges and universities and thereby create a standard system of diplomas. Other alliances can be envisaged for non-commissioned officer technical training schools and schools attached to the DGA (Defence procurement agency). Likewise, training programmes that cannot be provided in civilian institutions will continue to be conducted in military training centres and colleges, but must also be open to civilians, including people from the private sector.

In parallel, we should aim for the recognition of every training programme in the field of defence and security, wherever possible, by the delivery of a civilian diploma. Closer links between the Ministry's training centres and national education institutions would facilitate this convergence of diplomas and, notably, their recognition through registration in the national index of professional certification (RNCP). This establishment of closer links could also be accompanied by a policy aimed at encouraging and supporting personnel to obtain validation of their professional experience (VAE). We need to give a strong impetus to implementing an across-the-board policy of distance learning, which will, in particular, enable the optimisation of training time and costs and reduce the leaves of absence from their units for personnel undergoing training.

Training for civilian personnel is intended not only to adapt operatives to their job and work station but also to guarantee their employability throughout their professional lives. In a context characterised by the trend towards a lengthening of the active working life, it also supports their plans to set up professional projects through a careers-advisory service and this service should be improved. To this end, we should be seeking a better fit between the training needs expressed by operatives and those expressed by ministry employers. The formulation of an inter-ministerial training catalogue, the establishment of a system that encourages civilian operatives to apply for training and that, in return, guarantees advancement in their professional lives are among the measures that should contribute to a global improvement of the training system.

Consultation and internal dialogue within the defence and national security armed forces is based on specific institutions and rules that give military personnel a voice at the national and local levels, while respecting the limitations imposed by their general status in terms of the right to strike and form trade unions. This original organisation must be given further impetus in the current context of reforms. A capacity for dialogue is indispensable in order to maintain trust between all the echelons of the chain of command and reinforce the legitimacy of consultation structures. Consultation and internal dialogue also help support change by allowing supervisory personnel to explain the objectives pursued and the methods adopted. It also allows them to report the concerns of personnel to the ministries involved in a useful and effective manner. General trends in society are encouraging aspirations to self-expression and direct participation. Existing communication techniques allow for the development of complementary methods of internal dialogue (theme-based forums, online consultation tools) and can usefully broaden participation.

Military personnel are not indifferent to trends affecting their condition or the constraints attached to armed service. All these factors are leading to a change in internal dialogue within the armed forces.

While military personnel, like all civil servants[17], have a duty of discretion and respect of the hierarchy, consultation structures are an area allowing direct and free expression between the ministry and the military community. The role of consultation will be developed to enlighten the ministry in decision-making on fundamental issues concerning the condition and status of military personnel. The methods for organising such consultation are described in a consultation

17 pursuant to Article 26 of the law of 13 July 1983

Charter that provides assurances protecting free expression and the work of members of these structures. To ensure freedom of expression within such structures, these assurances will be reinforced. Implementation of the Charter will be assessed to check that it responds correctly to the objectives pursued. Simultaneously, support will be given to the entire hierarchy in its fundamental responsibility to conduct consultation and take into account the expectations of the military community. To maintain this direct link between members of the military community and the chain of command and ensure its consistency, local consultation structures will be reformed and strengthened. This reform will aim to establish a point of equilibrium that does not compromise either the basic principles of the general status of military personnel or the obligations specific to their activity, or the responsibilities and command capacity of the military hierarchy.

The credibility of these structures, both national and local, must be bolstered by strengthening their legitimacy. This requires a change in their composition and methods for appointing members. It must also involve developing the expertise of representatives of military personnel by providing specific training. At the same time, communication concerning the advances achieved through the work of representatives in these consultation structures must be strengthened, to inform the entire military community and acknowledge the action of these structures' members. Work will also be conducted between sessions in a permanent liaison group. The creation of participative online tools would enable on-going reporting of information and authorise continued exchanges on themes relating to the military condition. At the ministerial level, efforts must be made to fully integrate these new media in the internal communication policy, notably by developing an active reaction and response capacity.

The Ministry of Defence participates in civilian social dialogue in the framework of the reform of social dialogue resulting from the Bercy accords of 2 June 2008. The law of 5 July 2010 provided for numerous consultation structures, at both the central and local levels, which enables dense local coverage in keeping with the new ministerial structures. Adaptation of the structure of social dialogue must continue, taking into account the specific features and changes in organisation of the Ministry of Defence.

It is advisable to encourage military personnel to speak up and make a contribution to the public or internal debate. This right must be offered to all military personnel, particularly those called on to serve in research centres or training facilities.

This freedom of expression must be exercised in accordance with their duty of reserve and the obligations attached to their status.

Reserve forces demonstrate the strong desire of all sections of the nation to guarantee our country's security and contribute to its defence. They are also an integral part of the new armed forces model defined in this White Paper, since they provide support for the defence and national security forces – indeed, the latter would be unable to perform all their missions without the reserve forces, notably in the national territory or in the event of a crisis.

The military reserve forces are made up of an operational component and a citizen component. The operational component itself has two components: first, an engagement reserve composed of volunteers (civilians or former military personnel) called on to serve in external operations or on the national territory. They act in support of personnel in active units, maintain the defence mindset and contribute to maintenance of the link between the Nation and its armed forces. The second operational reserve is comprised of former military personnel bound by an obligation of availability for service during the five years following their departure from the armed forces. In the event of a major crisis, the Prime Minister may, pursuant to the law of 28 July 2011, call on the national security reserve (RSN), which entitles the state to mobilise reservists attached to the armed forces, the gendarmerie and the national police, as well as those attached to the different civilian reserve forces.

To ensure that the operational reserve has the capability to perform the missions entrusted to it, it should, in priority, attract men and women prepared to serve at least 20 days a year over a period of several years. Some of them may, by virtue of their operational duties, be called up for much longer periods (from 90 to 120 days) and be deployed under the same conditions as military personnel in the active forces. This means that appropriate budget resources must be allocated for training and leadership actions and to finance the operational deployment of these reservists. It also means simplifying all the procedures, particularly administrative, that authorise such deployment. The availability for service reserve, used exclusively in the event of a serious crisis, must be reformed to allow more rapid and better-targeted mobilisation. We should in addition organise the ramping up of new components of the operational reserve specialised in areas in which the defence and security forces lack strong expertise. This is the case, notably, for cyber-defence and a dedicated component will be set up within the operational reserve. It will contribute to the resilience of the nation

and will be planned and organised specifically to give the Ministry of Defence a enhanced cyber-defence capacity in the event of a major IT attack.

The citizen reserve is composed of men and women with a strong awareness of security and defence issues, who volunteer their time to serve the armed forces. The people participating in this reserve promote a defence mindset and pass on their knowledge of the defence sector to the civilian sector. These bridges between the defence sector and civil society are essential: this reserve must be developed and its use optimised to serve the Ministry of Defence. In view of the many and growing challenges in the field of cyber-defence, a citizen reserve will be organised and developed in this area, mobilising, in particular, young technicians and IT experts interested in security challenges. Particular attention will also be paid to developing the network of local reservists involved in youth and citizenship education. This network, rolled out in underprivileged neighbourhoods and rural areas, is an important connection to the world of defence and national security for young people.

Reserve capacities and personnel must simultaneously respond to the needs of the armed forces and adapt to the possibilities of civil society. The requirements of military and leadership training must take into account the difficulties experienced by companies when they are obliged to forego the services of an employee over a long period. This is the main reason why the reserve forces cannot replace the active forces of defence and national security. However, efforts must be pursued to ensure strong support from public and private leaders for the principle of the military reserve and encourage them to make a concrete contribution. It would also be advisable to increase the proportion of reservists who are not former military personnel, to enhance links between the nation and the armed forces. Efforts to solidify the continued loyalty of operational reservists will be reinforced through recognition of their importance for defence and national security within French society.

The nation's support for the policies implemented in the field of defence and national security is crucial to justify the efforts they entail. Likewise, recruitment and recognition of the military professions, the population's support for the action of the armed forces, together with the capacity for resilience in the event of a crisis depend largely on the bond between these forces and French society. It is therefore of vital importance to maintain and develop, among our citizens, a defence and security mindset, which is the expression of a collective will based on the cohesion of the nation. Reservists have a particularly important role in this respect. The initiatives taken in this area by teachers, thanks to the

"trinômes académiques" (structure set up to establish closer links between defence and education) and by elected representatives, through the Defence correspondents, must also be better recognised and promoted.

Apart from raising children's awareness during their schooling, an important way of developing this defence mindset is provided by the Defence and Citizenship Day (JDC). While refocusing this initiative on its primary remit to build awareness of the defence mindset, some improvements could be introduced. It could be made more efficient if the content of the event were adapted and the event itself repositioned as part of global civil education. More active participation by the Ministry of the Interior (police and fire brigade) and the Ministry of Education must also be considered, especially in the framework of revamped protocols with the Ministry of Defence.

There are also other channels for preserving and reinforcing links between the armed forces and society. Thanks to its rich heritage (historic monuments, museums, archives, libraries, etc.), which should be showcased, defence is the state's second most important cultural contributor. This heritage, made available to the greatest number of people, can nourish a strong link between the French and the defence mission. Likewise, the policy aimed at promoting remembrance of past events must continue to evolve to modernise the image of national commemorations, which are an important relay of Republican values. Communication on the meaning of the message conveyed by these ceremonies must be adapted to contemporary society, thereby promoting the concepts of self-sacrifice, dedication and national unity.

Defence education must address generations that have not performed military service. Centres and institutions training young people for public service and the IHEDN (Institute of advanced national defence studies), including their regional outposts, must play a key role here. The citizen reserve could also participate in this mission.

A special, priority effort must be addressed to future public and private managers. We consider it essential that these groups benefit, at one or more times during their training and education, from classes on the defence and national security strategy. We should develop opportunities for ad hoc training modules or periods of immersion in units of the armed forces for secondary school and university students. While it might be advisable for this type of initiation to eventually be provided across-the-board in all higher education institutions, it will need to be implemented on a gradual basis. To begin with, it could be rolled out in a limited

number of establishments whose students have the status of civil servants (the National school of administration (ENA), the Ecoles normales supérieures in Paris, Cachan, Lyon, Rennes, the Ecole nationale de la magistrature and the Ecole polytechnique).

Due to the recent defence restructuring, the armed forces are no longer present in certain parts of the national territory. This situation must be offset by adapting communication to foster shared knowledge and in-depth dialogue between the nation and its armed forces. Furthermore, in the framework of initiatives aimed at rejuvenating the Education-Defence protocol, we might consider introducing modules on defence-related subjects in initial and ongoing teacher training, to give teachers the required knowledge to subsequently teach defence to young people.

Military personnel, like many other professions, are today increasingly coming under the observation of the criminal justice system. While this fact does not pose any difficulties in principle with respect to the activity deployed by military personnel in the framework of the preparation of the armed forces, it does, conversely, arouse anxieties in the military community with respect to military operations and actual combat. Given this situation, while taking into account families' needs for information and recognition, we should protect military personnel from unnecessary "judicialisation" of their action. This could for instance take the form of reinforcing the procedural guarantees given to military personnel engaged in external operations, together with reflection on adapting criminal procedures applicable to action in combat when they organise, command or participate in military intervention.

E. The defence and security industry

The defence industry is a key component of France's strategic autonomy. It also contributes to a coherent political, diplomatic and economic ambition. It alone can guarantee the secure supplying of equipment supporting our sovereignty and of critical weapons systems and ensure that it matches operational needs as defined by the Ministry of Defence. The same reasoning is valid for the European Union, whose strategic position will be strengthened by preserving on its territory a defence industry that covers all the weapons systems required for a modern defence capability.

The French defence industry, the fruit of continuing investment dating back many years supported by a national ambition for strategic and technological autonomy, covers all the sectors that contribute to building a coherent defence capability (nuclear, aviation, space, missiles, land operations, electronics, optics, etc).

The defence industry also makes a significant contribution to the French economy and enjoys a level of excellence placing it among the world leaders, especially for export. It comprises over 4,000 companies, with a large number of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which generate an overall revenue of €15 billion and employ around 150,000 people including 20,000 highly qualified experts. Depending on the year, it exports 25% to 40% of its output and therefore makes a positive contribution to our country's balance of trade. Characterised by a very high level of research and development, it bolsters our technological competitiveness, including in the civilian sector, where it permeates large sections of national and European industry (aviation, space, security, electronics, information and communication technologies, energy, etc.). In return, the defence industry's growing recourse to dual-purpose technologies and components developed by the civilian market opens up the supply chain to other suppliers, both national and European.

Budget cuts in France and the rest of Europe will have a major impact on the French defence industry, an impact that may be felt even more sharply in that it is concentrated in a few basins of employment. Today, the European defence industry has evident over-capacity compared to anticipated demand in the European market. Furthermore, contraction of the national and European market is occurring at a time when international competition is increasing, whether from the United States – where budget pressure is prompting the US industry to increase its export effort – as well as from European Union countries, Russia and some emerging countries keen to develop their positions in the world armaments market.

Two objectives must be pursued: we need to preserve a certain number of key technological capacities essential to our strategic autonomy, and to secure the future of the defence industry for economic and social reasons. Our response must therefore combine support for scientific training, research and development, changes in the defence equipment maintenance policy, an active export policy, a new approach to European cooperation in the defence industry, and an industrial defence policy adapted to the new economic and strategic situation.

Preserving research and development capabilities in certain key technologies is a priority and justifies periodic assessment being carried out by the Ministry of Defence. At a time when the battlefield is seeing rapid changes, a particular effort is required to maintain the expertise commanded by French industry at a high level of global excellence and to preserve our capacity to develop new technologies and new types of weapons. In the absence of an immediate strategic threat, but confronted with a fast-changing and very unpredictable environment, the development of prototypes will be maintained, to consolidate our capacity to integrate the innovative technologies, whether of civilian or military origin, required for weapons systems and equipment. In order to anticipate innovations and the breakthroughs they may bring about, continuous technology monitoring must cover all the countries with high technological capacity and include in its scope civilian technologies of potential military interest.

In this context, maintaining a significant volume of public credits to finance upstream studies and developments is of strategic importance. An interruption of work in strategically important design and engineering offices would lead to irreversible losses of expertise and would have long-lasting social repercussions.

This risk is aggravated by the lengthening service life of equipment, which can leave research and development teams without any new projects for several years. A development aimed at systematically incorporating - from initial conception of armaments programmes - the possibility of successive versions or standards, along the lines of the civilian equipment model, could partially mitigate this danger. It would also have the advantage of delaying equipment obsolescence and offering export clients the possibility of inclusion in a process of progressive improvement of their equipment, fostering the establishment of sustainable partnerships.

The operational readiness services of equipment must be tackled through a proactive policy aimed at increasing the efficiency of the process. Delivery of new equipment with maintenance costs that may be higher than for older equipment and the mandatory lengthening of the service life of existing equipment make this a particularly important issue. We should, therefore, carry out an analysis of maintenance activities to determine the most effective breakdown between equipment whose maintenance should continue to be the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence for reasons of operational availability, and equipment whose maintenance can be entrusted to industry. We must also look at the merits of innovative contractual arrangements with the defence industry.

Given the ongoing shrinking of national and European markets, an active export policy, outside Europe in particular, is crucial. France's armaments export policy is an important aspect of our defence and security policy and also of our growth strategy. It provides effective and competitive solutions meeting the needs of allied and friendly countries. The largest contracts obtained will support sustainable political, military, economic and industrial partnerships at a strategic level over the longer term.

France will continue to support companies' export efforts. In strict compliance with its European and international commitments, it will mobilise its governmental, industrial and technological expertise to develop the capacity to assist major partners. Structured in such a way as to preserve the know-how essential to our security and to the long-term competitiveness of our companies, the technology transfers that may result will allow us to reinforce the industrial base of France's defence sector, by stabilising our presence in high-growth markets over the longer term. French SMEs will be given specific guidance by professional defence organisations, with the support of the state, to allow them too to benefit from these technology transfers.

The control of transfers of equipment, technologies and know-how in the field of armaments and dual-use goods, apart from contributing to the preservation of international security and to the prevention of proliferation, helps protect our technological expertise in a context of fierce competition, where protecting intellectual and industrial property has become an extremely important strategic issue. We need to reflect on establishing closer links between the different instruments for control of civil and military technologies with defence and security applications, with a view to making the system more effective, both for the state and the industrialists concerned.

We must take on board the growing integration of European strategic interests and the European defence industry. The transfer of defence goods within the European Union has already been simplified. This streamlining of procedures should also cover exports outside the European Union. Here, consultation with our European partners is necessary to harmonise national export procedures concerning equipment developed in common.

An active research and development policy together with additional efforts to develop exports are vital, but these efforts will not suffice to guarantee the vitality of the French defence industry, in view of the scale of the changes it is facing. Radical qualitative breakthroughs entailing in-depth changes in cooperation

in the area of defence programmes, and also industrial restructuring are inevitable, in France and the other European countries, to secure the future of the defence industry. This challenge is the same for all European countries with a sizeable defence industry. The European Commission has launched a major initiative regarding the European defence industry. This initiative should be an opportunity to reaffirm the strategic role of this industry, which requires a specific approach, notably in view of Article 346 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union.

Armament programmes conducted on a cooperative basis can bring benefits, provided that we can avoid certain dangers. Too often in the past, cooperative programmes have led to a build-up of multiple specifications and spiralling costs due to the absence of a project manager or project owner with the necessary authority to impose discipline. Likewise, the principle of fair return has been perverted: instead of giving preference to the best of existing expertise and capacities, the concern to acquire new expertise has often led to duplications, resulting in redundant and scattered capacities. Sharing of development and production activities must now be organised according to a strict principle of industrial efficiency and economic performance.

The progress recently made by France and the United Kingdom in the missile industry illustrates both the feasibility and relevance of this approach between partners willing to embark on a path of freely consented interdependence. France is willing to extend the setting up of common frameworks to support common technological and industrial capacities into other fields and to other European partners. The goal must be to build up an economically viable industrial base for European defence, relying on specialised and complementary centres of excellence, the distribution of which takes into consideration real existing expertise and the investments already made, in a fair and balanced way.

Harmonisation, between European countries, of the operational specifications and timetables for equipment replacement will facilitate setting up such programmes. Experience shows that it will not go ahead without strong political impetus. France affirms its willingness to implement such an approach. The advantages of the process of industrial pooling and sharing initiated in the European framework are very real and further work on the pooling of testing and experimentation resources must be pursued.

Different institutional frameworks exist to support cooperation in the field of armaments. France will continue to support NATO initiatives concerning acquisition, and will take care to ensure that the European industry plays a strategic role here. Furthermore, it considers that it is urgent to exploit all the potentialities of the European Defence Agency (EDA) and OCCAR (Organisation for joint armament cooperation). These two agencies offer an appropriate and effective framework for strengthening the quality of European cooperation in the defence industry, whether this means harmonising requirements or formulating and managing programmes. France considers, in particular, that the EDA should play the role of a catalyst capable of setting in motion – very far upstream – future technological and industrial cooperative initiatives between EU partners. In the future, a European arrangement, based on the current cooperation between the EDA and OCCAR, should allow States that so wish to acquire equipment in common under the same conditions as NATO agencies. Furthermore, France will strive to implement the code of conduct on cooperation adopted in the framework of the EDA.

Cooperation in armaments programmes will not prevent industrial restructuring on the European scale. The last major reorganisations of the French industrial scene in the field of defence date back, for the most part, to the end of the 1990s. Changes are inevitable.

The state today holds large direct interests in several top-ranking defence companies, public and private. Its policy as shareholder, which will not be limited to a conservative management of its assets, will be reconsidered, company by company, in a dynamic management approach. The main priorities will be supporting companies in their strategic choices, controlling sovereignty-related activities, reinforcing the European dimension of the defence industry and supporting development and protection of critical technologies.

The state will take care to preserve centres of excellence in France while also facilitating European consolidation, whenever economic and strategic rationales converge. In this context, the state will use all the means available to it, as shareholder, client and source of orders to facilitate the necessary changes. It may, where applicable, take stakes in the capital of critical SMEs to contribute to their development.

In view of the challenges associated with command of critical defence technologies, France will, with its European partners, examine instruments that should be put in place to reinforce the protection of sensitive European activities involving

defence and security interests. We will be examining procedures for enhanced information between member states so as to inform their decisions in this field. These instruments must for instance be adapted to the special case of small and medium enterprises which constitute a major source of technological innovation and which make a vital contribution to preserving our lead in this field.

Efforts must also be made to implement a long-term policy for securing supplies to France and Europe, particularly with respect to strategic materials. At the national level, this must lead to strengthening relations between the state and companies to build a shared vision of the risks and the solutions that can be envisaged. At the European level, it is advisable to strengthen consultation between member states and implement a European policy of risk analysis and preservation of companies possessing rare expertise.

Despite the overlap between technologies applicable to defence and those applicable to security, the two industrial realities are very different. The business model of the security industry is posited on a much wider range of potential customers (states, regional authorities, public and private operators).

Supported by rapid world growth, the French security industry currently represents €6 billion in turnover and a substantial number of highly qualified jobs. It also represents around €3 billion in turnover from related services. It enjoys very strong positions, witness the dynamism of its exports (55% of its output). It has both economic and strategic importance: the state and operators of essential infrastructure must be able to rely on trusted suppliers capable of satisfying their needs at the right cost and in a timely manner. We must therefore take a strategic and global approach to the security industry, enabling us to develop and support an economic activity with a high export component in a market experiencing very fierce competition.

Security is now recognised as an important field of research. The implementation of a policy of research and innovation is a prerequisite for positioning our industries in niche markets with strong potential.

France's strategy will integrate the European dimension, which is very important in this field. All the different players (industrialists, researchers and end users) will now be able to call more systematically on the European security research programme.

However, the security market remains fragmented, both in terms of supply and of demand. We must create the conditions to favour the industrialisation of innovative security solutions that are affordable and competitive in the export markets on a larger scale. Consequently, an inter-ministerial policy will be formulated with the aim of organising a global industrial security industry. It will be steered by a global committee bringing together the main stakeholders in the development of technologies and the market in this sector.

This global-sector policy will formulate a forward-looking vision of our needs, which will be regularly updated. It will identify the critical technologies and capacity requirements on which the sector should focus. It will organise the different sources of R&D funding to guarantee support for projects throughout their development. It will set up platforms for the evaluation of technologies by users and will harmonise the expression of public requirements with the aim of pooling procurement. Lastly, it will develop a policy of export support and a policy of standardisation at the national, European and international levels. It will eventually be integrated in efforts made at the European level.

Summary and conclusion

The White Paper on Defence and National Security describes a national defence and security strategy that rests on two essential and complementary pillars: **France will preserve its sovereignty**, by making sure it retains resources to act and influence events; and **it will contribute to international security,** by ensuring its action enjoys national and international legitimacy.

Given that the level of risk and violence in the world is not decreasing and that defence spending is rising sharply in many regions, particularly in Asia, **the risks and threats that France must face up to are continuing to diversify**: traditional threats of force, given the ambiguous nature of the development of military power by some states; the threat to our own security posed by weak states unable to exercise their responsibilities; risks or threats amplified by globalisation: terrorism; threats to French nationals abroad; cyber-threats and organised crime; the spread of conventional weapons; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the risk of pandemics and technological and natural disasters. Faced with these risks and threats, the military operations in which France has been involved in recent years (Afghanistan, Ivory Coast, Libya, Mali...) show that military action remains an important part of our security.

The White Paper confirms the relevance of the concept of national security as a way of responding to these developments. Going beyond mere protection of the territory and the population against external aggression attributable to States, this concept embodies a larger ambition, i.e. the need to manage all the risks and threats, direct or indirect, likely to have an impact on the life of the nation. The White Paper adopts a holistic approach based on the combination of five strategic functions: knowledge and foresight, protection, prevention, deterrence and intervention. Protection, deterrence and intervention are closely linked and structure the action of the defence and national security forces. Their implementation entails a capacity to know and anticipate the risk and threats to which we are exposed, even if strategic surprises remain possible. They also require an upstream capacity to prevent crises that could negatively impact our environment.

Our defence and national security strategy cannot be conceived outside the framework of the Atlantic Alliance and our engagement in the European Union. These two complementary organisations provide a range of responses enabling France and its Allies to face up to a very broad spectrum of risks and

threats. Having regained its complete place in the functioning of NATO as full-fledged member, France promotes a strong and effective Alliance serving its own interests and those of Europe. At the same time, it believes that in the current context, wherein Europe is called on to assume a greater share of responsibility for security, a pragmatic overhaul of the European security and defence policy is vital. By clarifying the direction that France has decided to take in order to ensure its security, the White Paper offers the basis for in-depth dialogue with EU member states with a view to promoting a new ambition relying on organised – rather than de facto – Interdependencies. France will continue to support European initiatives aimed at sharing and pooling military capabilities.

■ Protection

Protecting the national territory, our fellow citizens and the continuity of the Nation's essential functions are core to our defence and national security strategy. The armed forces are responsible for permanently ensuring the security of the territory, its air space and its maritime approaches. In addition, the civilian ministries, in coordination with local and regional governments and public and private operators are responsible for ensuring protection against the risks and threats that may affect the lives of our fellow citizens on the national territory. In the event of a major crisis, the armed forces can deploy up to 10,000 personnel from the land forces in support of interior security and civilian security forces, together with appropriate resources provided by the sea and air forces. The White Paper provides for a **global inter-ministerial contract**, formulated under the authority of the Prime Minister starting in 2013, which will define the civilian capabilities required for national security missions. In parallel, looking to 2016, the Ministry of the Interior will devise an approach that aims to involve regional governments, together with operators of vital importance with specific responsibilities in ensuring the continuity of essential functions and in preserving the resilience of the nation.

With respect to the **protection of France's overseas territories**, the military presence deployed in these areas will be structured on the basis of a rigorous analysis of the security and defence problems specific to each territory concerned. In parallel, civilian capabilities will be ramped up. A five-year programme of pooled equipment will be defined as early as 2013 to optimise the capabilities available in the overseas territories.

Beyond the terrorist threat, which has not decreased in importance since 2008 and is still one of the most clear threats, the White Paper highlights

the frequency and potential impact of cyber-attacks against our information systems. This situation requires us **to upgrade very significantly the level of security of information systems and our means for defending them**. In view of this fact, a significant effort will be made to develop our capacity to detect attacks in cyberspace, identify their origin and, where our strategic interests are threatened, implement an appropriate response. Legislative and regulatory measures will be initiated to reinforce the obligations of operators of vitally important services and infrastructure to detect, notify and deal with any IT incident affecting their sensitive systems.

■ Deterrence

Being strictly defensive, nuclear deterrence protects France from any state-led aggression against its vital interests, of whatever origin and in whatever form. It rules out any threat of blackmail that might paralyse its freedom of decision and action. In this sense, it is directly linked to our capacity of intervention, and indeed the credibility of our force of deterrence would be weakened if we did not have conventional resources for intervention. The nuclear forces include an airborne and a seaborne component and their effectiveness, adaptability and complementarity enable the preservation of an instrument that remains credible over the longer term in a fast-changing strategic context, while being structured in accordance with the principle of strict sufficiency.

■ Intervention

The external intervention of our forces responds to **a triple objective**: ensuring the protection of French nationals abroad, defending our strategic interests and those of our partners and allies, and exercising our international responsibilities. To this end, France intends to have at its disposal military capabilities enabling it to take action in **regions of vital importance** to its defence and security: the periphery of Europe, the Mediterranean basin, part of Africa (from the Sahel to Equatorial Africa), the Arabo-Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. These capabilities enable France to make its contribution to international peace and security in other parts of the world.

Changes in the strategic context may make it necessary for our country to take the initiative in operations or, more frequently than in the past, assume a substantial share of the responsibilities inherent to conducting military action. **France considers that the greater its autonomous capacity for initiative and action, the greater will be its contribution to a collective response and its ability**

to mobilise allies and partners. France therefore considers the **principle of strategic autonomy** as the main pillar of its external intervention strategy. It will ensure that it has the capabilities giving it freedom of assessment, planning and command, together with the critical capabilities that form the basis of its freedom of decision and operational action.

Our armed forces must be able to respond to the diversity of threats and crisis situations. They must be able to engage in **coercive operations** where the goal of neutralising the adversary's political-military platform calls for a very high-level technological response; they must also be able to engage in **crisis management operations** aimed at restoring conditions for normal life and involving control of large areas over a long period. In intermediate or temporary situations, our forces must also adapt to the emergence of "**hybrid threats**", where certain non-state adversaries might combine asymmetrical means of action with state-level resources or high-tech capabilities.

To guarantee its capability for autonomous reaction in the event of a crisis, **France will have a permanent national emergency force** of 5,000 men on alert, enabling it to constitute an immediate reaction joint force (FIRI) of 2,300 men that can be mobilised to intervene over a radius of 3,000 km in seven days. France will be able to rely on permanent naval deployment in one or two maritime regions, on its United Arab Emirates base and on several bases in Africa, structured in such a way as to allow a flexible and rapid-reaction response adapted to the present and future needs of this continent and our security.

As concerns **non-permanent missions,** the armed forces will be capable of **engaging, simultaneously and on a long-term basis, in crisis management operations in two or three distinct theatres,** one as a major contributor. The forces engaged in this capacity will be composed of the equivalent of a joint-force brigade representing 6,000 to 7,000 land troops, along with special forces, the required sea and air components and the associated command and support means. With adequate notice, and after restructuring of the resources already engaged in operations in progress, the armed forces should be capable of **engagement within a coalition and for a limited term in a single theatre of action in a major coercive operation**, with the ability to assume command of this operation. France will be able to deploy up to two combined brigades representing around 15,000 land troops, special forces, naval and air components and the associated command and support means.

■ Knowledge and anticipation

Our capacity for sovereign decision and autonomous assessment of situations relies on the knowledge and anticipation function, in which a key role is played by **intelligence, a field in which we will be stepping up our efforts**. Technical intelligence gathering and exploitation capacities will be reinforced, while the principle of pooling of acquisition capacities between services will be systematically applied. We will also be developing our space electromagnetic and image intelligence capability, and France will be willing to implement an approach based on freely consented interdependences between European partners. France will be equipped with a permanent capability in medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) drones and tactical drones. In view of the evolution of threats, particular attention will be paid to internal intelligence gathering. The greater resources devoted by the nation to intelligence gathering will go hand in hand with a reinforcement of the executive arm's capacity for strategic steering and assessment of intelligence and an extension of the role of the parliamentary committee for intelligence to enable Parliament to exercise its control over government policy, in accordance with the Constitution.

■ Prevention

The defence and national security strategy is based on a credible prevention and civilian-military management of crises capability, which must be supported by a reinforced **inter-ministerial strategy and organisation** allowing effective and coordinated mobilisation of the resources of the ministries involved. This approach, steered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will be grounded in the framework of France's efforts to improve the European Union's crisis management capabilities.

■ A budget effort commensurate with our strategy

Although the financial crisis that has befallen the world could have prompted it to lower its guard, **France will continue to devote substantial resources to defence.** Defence spending will amount to €364 billion (2013 value) for the 2014-2025 period, including €179 billion (2013 value) for 2014-2019, the period covered by the next military programme act. This appropriation will allow the construction of a new armed forces model that meets the requirements of our strategy and is adapted to defence and national security requirements, while being consistent with the Government's objective of restoring the balance of public accounts and hence preserving our sovereignty and strategic autonomy.

■ The armed forces model

The conception of our armed forces model is structured around four guiding principles, which taken together outline a new military strategy:

- the preservation of our **strategic autonomy,** which requires us to have the critical capabilities to take the initiative in the most probable operations;
- **consistency** between our armed forces model and predictable scenarios requiring engagement of our forces in conflicts and crises, i.e. the capacity to undertake both coercive, first entry operations in a theatre of war, and crisis management operations across a wide range of scenarios;
- **the differentiation** of forces as a function of their missions of deterrence, protection, coercion and crisis management. This new principle of relative specialisation, which also aims at increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the forces in each type of mission, consists in assigning the most expensive capabilities only to those forces tasked with combating state-level adversaries.
- **pooling,** which consists in using those capabilities which are scarce and critical for several missions (protection of approaches, deterrence, external intervention) or seeking from our European partners a pooling of the capabilities essential for action.

Looking to 2025, the French armed forces will possess command and control capabilities enabling them to guarantee – at all times and on the strategic level – operational command and national control of the forces deployed, and to plan and conduct independent operations or as lead nation in a multi-national operation. Particular importance will be placed on developing intelligence and targeting capabilities, special forces, accurate deep-penetration strike and combat in contact with the adversary, and an autonomous capacity for first entry operations in a theatre of war.

The **special forces** have proved to be an element of utmost importance in all recent operations. Their personnel and command resources will be reinforced, along with their capacity for coordination with the intelligence services.

The **land forces** will offer an operational capacity of 66,000 deployable troops, including, in particular, seven combined brigades, two of which will be trained for first entry and coercive combat against heavily armed adversaries. These forces will, in particular, have at their disposal around 200 heavy tanks, 250 medium tanks, 2,700 multi-purpose armoured and combat vehicles, 140 reconnaissance and attack helicopters, 115 tactical helicopters and some 30 tactical drones.

The **naval forces** will have at their disposal four ballistic missile-carrying submarines (SSBN), six attack submarines, one aircraft carrier, 15 front-line frigates, some 15 patrol boats, six surveillance frigates, three force projection and command vessels, maritime patrol aircraft and a mine-warfare capacity to protect our approaches and for deployment in external operations.

Supported by a permanent command and operational centre, interoperable with our Allies, the **air forces** will include, most notably, 225 fighter aircraft (air and naval), together with some 50 tactical transport aircraft, seven detection and air surveillance aircraft, 12 multi-role refuelling aircraft, 12 theatre surveillance drones, light surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft and eight medium-range surface to air missile systems.

■ The women and men serving defence and national security

The nation's defence and security rely on women and men with recognised competencies, who share common values and have chosen, each according to their status, to serve their country and fellow citizens. In accordance with the recommendations of the preceding White Paper, defence and national security structures have undergone major changes since 2008. For the Ministry of Defence, these changes led, between 2008 and 2012, to the loss of approximately 40,000 jobs out of the 54,900 provided for by the 2008 White Paper for the 2009-2015 period. In order to adapt the Ministry of Defence workforce to the new armed forces model and the need to modernise public action, some 34,000 jobs will be eliminated between 2014 and 2019 (including over 10,000 in respect of the downsizing already decided in 2008).

New procedures will be put in place for managing and steering the forthcoming changes. They will include a major programme of reform to accompany the social, human and economic impact of these changes, including an adapted platform of assistance for the return to civilian life. In this framework of reform, we will be developing consultation and internal dialogue within the defence and national security forces, notably by overhauling military consultation structures.

■ The defence and security industry

The defence industry is **a key component of France's strategic autonomy**. With over 4,000 companies, it makes a significant contribution to our economy, scientific and technological innovation and job creation. In a context marked by the shrinkage of the national and the European market and fierce international competition, the White Paper reaffirms the crucial need to preserve a world-class defence industry in France, enabling our country to retain the technological capacities crucial to its strategic autonomy. This policy will be developed around four principal themes:

- preserving a substantial research and development budget;
- supporting the efforts of our companies abroad to increase the volume of their exports, within the strict framework of our mechanisms of control and our European and international commitments;
- systematically exploring all avenues for cooperation in the field of armaments. The progress recently made by France and the United Kingdom in the missile industry illustrates the feasibility and relevance of this approach. France is willing to extend the setting up of common frameworks to support an economically viable industrial base for European defence into other fields and to other European partners;
- capitalising on all the resources available to the state, as shareholder, client and source of orders, to facilitate the industrial restructuring required on the European scale.

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