Estonian Long Term Defence Development Plan 2009–2018

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Dear reader,

On 22 January 2009, the Government of the Republic of Estonia approved the "Estonian Long Term Defence Development Plan 2009 – 2018" (hereafter Plan 2018), which establishes the main development areas of the Estonian Defence Forces for the next decade. Below you will find an overview of how the Plan 2018 was drafted, what will be the main capability development areas and which investments will follow.

To reach the goals of Estonia's national defence, our defence policy is based on principles as agreed by the Parliament in June 2004: indivisibility of security, solidarity and cooperation, credible military deterrence, unity of national defence and total defence, collective security, support to development of European Union capabilities in the framework of European Security and Defence Policy and taking part in ESDP; and democratic control of Estonian Defence Forces.

Estonian military defence is part of integrated national defence and is based on two equally important pillars – developing essential capabilities for initial self-defence and collective defence with Estonia's NATO membership as its cornerstone. These two together will create adequate deterrence to prevent any potential aggression. The defence of Estonian territory against any large-scale attack will be conducted as a NATO collective defence operation together with Allies.

What are essential capabilities for initial self-defence?

This means having the capacity to resist to potential aggression until the arrival of Allied forces as set out by the principles of collective defence. For Estonia this will mean instant reaction to a possible crisis of military nature or sudden attack; reception of Allied forces by air, sea, or land

and to support their actions in Estonia; defence of strategically important areas and objects; conduct of air defence, conduct of mine clearance and mine hunting in Estonia's territorial waters; and conduct of mobilisation. The Plan 2018 is directed towards building the necessary security net for maintaining Estonia's national security.

National defence documents

As the Plan 2018 was drafted, the hierarchy and coherence of Estonian defence planning documentation was put in order with amendments to the Peacetime National Defence Act and the planning process as a whole was organised.

The backbone of Estonian defence planning is formed by the following documents: the National Security Concept, National Military Strategy, Long-Term Defence Development Plan, Mid-Term Defence Development Plan, and Defence Forces Operational Plan.

The development of the National Security Concept is led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in coordination with other governmental agencies, and approved by the parliament of Estonia. The National Security Concept forecasts potential security risks threatening the country, defines objectives for the development of all actors in security arena and supports stable development of the nation's security. The current National Security Concept dates from June 2004.

After that, the Ministry of Defence prepares the National Military Strategy, which is approved by the Government. The National Military Strategy defines threat scenarios, level of ambition in national defence, discusses general defence model of Estonia and sets priorities of national military defence. The current National Military Strategy dates from January 2005.

As a further development from the National Military Strategy, the Ministry of Defence and the Estonian Defence Forces jointly develop the Long-Term Defence Development Plan which is approved by the government. This document defines military capabilities to be developed in longer term,

and describes the necessary requirements for human, time and financial resources for their achievement. The Long-Term Defence Development Plan is reviewed every four years. The current plan, the Plan 2018 was approved on January 22, 2009.

The method for detailed development of capabilities as set out in the long-term plan is established within a four year Mid-term Defence Development Plan, approved by the Minister of Defence, and reviewed each year.

The last planning document in this chain is the Defence Forces Operational Plan approved by the Chief of Defence. This establishes how specific military tasks will be carried out with existing military capabilities and units.

How was the Plan 2018 drafted?

The Plan 2018 was drafted in close cooperation between the experts of the Ministry of Defence, Headquarters of the Estonian Defence Forces, Headquarters of the Defence League, and the Information Board.

The first step in drafting of the Plan 2018 included compilation of potential threat scenarios. The scenarios were based on the newest strategic threat assessment and were done in cooperation of experts from the Information Board, the Security Police Board, the Defence Forces Intelligence Department and the Ministry of Defence. The scenarios addressed potential threats to Estonia in the near future requiring the use of the defence forces and the Defence League.

We have analysed the full spectrum of potential threats to Estonia. The strategic threat assessment and threat scenarios are confidential due to obvious reasons, but in general it can be said that in the current security environment there is no threat of a large-scale military attack to Estonia as a member of NATO. Still, the threat scenarios illustrate that Estonia must be ready to defend herself in case of external pressure and show of force, for which it is necessary to create a credible and functioning deterrence together with Allies. In general terms, the threats to nation's security remain as described in the National Security Strategy.

Based on these illustrative scenarios operational analysis was conducted. This identified military capabilities required for national defence. In the following step capabilities required were compared with capabilities existing – this identified capability gaps. The assessment of current and required military capabilities was carried out to establish an overall picture of the current situation and desired end state. Capabilities required were then prioritised after weighted risk analysis. The main logic behind the prioritization was wide usability of capabilities while minimizing the risk to national defence, taking also into account possible resource implications – hence focusing on usable, flexible and interoperable capabilities. In the following programming stage we determined the level to which any capability should be developed and their resource implications: in terms of finances, personnel and time.

The programming resulted in three categories of capabilities:

1. **Capabilities that are necessary for national defence, but are too expensive for Estonia and can be achieved only in cooperation with NATO and Allies.** In the case of Estonia, such capabilities are, for example, fighter aircraft and attack helicopters. Strategic Airlift Capability is another example of capabilities in this category, and to ensure this, Estonia has joined NATO's Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) project.

2. **Capabilities that are necessary for national defence, but are unreachable within the next 10 years.** Such capabilities identified during programming are, for example, multiple launch rocket systems with a range of up to 70 kilometres and surface-to-surface missile systems required for destroying surface naval targets. The development of such capabilities could be considered after 2018 or in case some other projects in development will have significantly lower resource implications than originally planned.

3. **Capabilities that are necessary for national defence and the development of which can be launched within the next 10 years.** Those capabilities form the basis of the Plan 2018.

All in all, such a planning model guarantees that the Plan 2018 corresponds to the current security environment, is drafted considering both military and civil expertise, and is consistent with existing resources.

ESTONIAN LONG TERM DEFENCE DEVELOPMENT PLAN 2009 – 2018

Which capabilities will be developed 2009 – 2018?

Communication and intelligence systems will improve

One of the main priorities of the Plan 2018 is to develop the command and control, intelligence, surveillance and communications systems of the EDF. In modern warfare, uninterrupted, encrypted and jam proof communications play an especially important role. Without proper communications it is impossible to conduct effective command and control of military units. In order to develop this capability, large scale investments are planned for the next 10 years for all levels of command, starting with a single soldier on battlefield equipped with modern systems all the way to leadership of defence equipped with modern command- and communications assets. The development of modern command, control and communications capabilities is not only important for effectively commanding our own forces, it must also be interoperable with those of our Allies. In a way we are talking of "invisible" capabilities for average citizen, capabilities that cannot be seen on parades – but at the same time they require huge financial investments that cannot be substituted with anything less.

The development of intelligence and surveillance capabilities will provide the senior military-political leadership with situational awareness on events taking place on Estonian territory, in airspace, and territorial waters. These capabilities should guarantee adequate advance warning in case of potential threats and will provide military-political leadership with enough time to make respective decisions and necessary preparations. In order to develop these capabilities, additional medium-range radar systems and various types of sensors will be acquired.

Figuratively speaking, the intelligence and surveillance systems will provide the EDF with eyes and ears to collect important information in real-time. Command, control and communications systems will ensure that decisions are based on optimal information and will reach all levels of command in real-time.

Ämari Air Base will be transformed into a modern NATO airfield

Estonia will complete the reconstruction of Ämari Air Base, which will enable fighter aircraft of our NATO Allies to reside in Ämari, just as they do in Lithuania today. Within the 10-year planning period Estonia will not develop her own air policing capability, while a study for search of solution after 2018 has been launced in cooperation with Latvia and Lithuania.

Ämari Air Base will also play an important role as a host nation support (HNS) air base whenever a need for Allied reinforcement would be required to guarantee security of Estonia. Upon completion of reconstruction works, Ämari will have the capability to receive strategic transport aircraft and the capability to process cargo.

Air defence will improve significantly

According to the Plan 2018, a mobile short to medium-range air defence capability will be developed during the next decade, and the existing short-range air defence capability will be improved. The medium-range air defence includes relevant surveillance and command systems and assets that can destroy targets at a distance of up to 30 km. When short-range air defence is considered only for protection of a specific object or unit, then the planned short to medium-range air defence will be suitable for defending the airspace of an entire large city and its surroundings. As Estonia is developing a mobile system, this capability is not related to the defence of a specific area, but will be located according to requirements, for example to defend the airspace of Tallinn, or to defend a specific battle area or to secure an HNS operation.

According to the Plan 2018, the short-range air defence capability will also be improved. Currently, the short-range air defence capability is comprised of the air defence battalion (as part of the infantry brigade), equipped with the SAM system Mistral and the anti-aircraft twin autocannon ZU-23-2. According to the Plan 2018, the existing number of missile systems will be increased and additional air defence units will be established in defence districts.

ESTONIAN LONG TERM DEFENCE DEVELOPMENT PLAN 2009 – 2018

Infantry brigade as the spearhead of the Army

The development of a high readiness infantry brigade will remain as one of the main priorities for the land forces. In addition to the professional Scouts Battalion, the brigade is comprised of reserve infantry battalions and support units. Similarly to today, one infantry battalion and about a third of all support units of the brigade will be formed and trained from conscripts during an annual training cycle.

Over the following years, reserve trainings will also be enhanced to better guarantee combat readiness of the units of the defence forces.

Mechanised units will improve combat capability

According to the Plan 2018, mechanised units will be developed within the brigade framework over the next decade. This will be achieved by acquiring either tanks or infantry fighting vehicles and by training a respective unit. In conclusion, mechanisation will give the infantry brigade a better defence, increased firepower and greater mobility on battlefield.

The PASI armoured personnel carriers used by the Scouts Battalion currently are primarily meant for transport of the infantry. Whether the formation of mechanised units will take place through the procurement of tanks or infantry fighting vehicles will be decided based on additional analysis.

The development of mechanised units will become one of the most challenging and resource-heavy projects during the planning period that would require training of additional personnel and development of complex logistic support.

Further upgrading of anti-tank capabilities

One of the important priorities of the Plan 2018 is to further upgrade the anti-tank capabilities of the EDF. This includes additional acquisition of one-shot anti-tank weapons, recoilless rifles and the anti-tank guided missile systems Milan. Also, additional units will be established both in the EDF and in the Defence League. The goal for the development of these capabilities will be to increase the general firepower of the infantry in combat.

The voluntary Defence League as a broad and effective military organisation

During the next decade, the funding and equipping of the Defence League will improve, which aims to increase active membership of the Defence League. While previously the Defence League has not been a first priority, then the Plan 2018 foresees equipping the Defence League with assets similar to those of the EDF. The aim is to move from the formation of big and cumbersome territorial battalions to formation of smaller, company-sized units manned according to the territoriality principle of the Defence League – combatants from one area form the same units. The Defence League will be the basis for training of better equipped and prepared company size combat capable infantry units and internal defence companies for the defence of specific objects.

Navy keeps its focus on mine countermeasures capabilities

The Navy will continue to develop mine clearance capabilities that are necessary for participating in international operations and for guaranteeing host nation support. As a new development program, new multirole high-speed patrol vessels will be procured for the Navy during the planning period. The purpose of the latter will be to enhance the control of Estonian territorial waters and to improve maritime surveillance. The Navy's command and control capability will also be improved.

The Air Force will receive tactical transportation capability

In addition to the requirement for additional radars mentioned above, a clear need for transport helicopters was identified during the planning process. The helicopters to be acquired should be multifunctional. In peace time they should enable the transportation of personnel, performance of monitoring flights, support medical evacuation, and support to other government agencies. An adequate search and rescue (SAR) capability is one of the preconditions for potential basing and operating air policing assets in Estonia.

Where will the defence forces be located and what kind of infrastructure will there be?

The infrastructure of the EDF – barracks, warehouses, headquarters, and training fields – must be such that they would enable the forces to focus on their main task – to prepare for national defence and to train units.

In the course of drafting the Plan 2018, the Ministry of Defence carried out an evaluation of real estate under the jurisdiction of the ministry. Based on the capabilities described by the Plan 2018 an infrastructure development plan was developed for the next decade.

One of the major construction projects in the next decade will be the reconstruction of Jägala Training Centre where, up until the beginning of the 2000s, the Kalevi Infantry Battalion was based.

The Soviet era buildings on the Viru Infantry Battalion's training centre in Jõhvi will be demolished and the training centre will be completely renovated. Complete renovation will also take place at the Kuperjanov Infantry Battalion in Võru, the Tapa Training Centre in the North-East Defence District and the Kalev Infantry Battalion in Paldiski. The infrastructure of the Naval Base, the Estonian National Defence College and the Defence Forces Võru Battle School will be renovated.

All training areas for the EDF will be developed during the planning period to ensure proper training conditions.

The plan includes renovating or establishing all headquarters and support centres of the Defence League by the end of the next decade. The plan is also to construct at least ten 300-metre long firing ranges that conform to all requirements, so that every unit of the Defence League would have basic possibilities for proper firing training in their territory.

What will be the size of the Estonian Defence Forces?

The Estonian Defence Forces currently has approximately 3000 professional servicemen and –women, and during the next decade this number will increase to about 4000.

The increase in the number of regular members of the EDF is necessary for the development of new military capabilities, but also for more qualitative training of the reserves and manning of professional units. According to the Plan 2018, the number of officers being trained in the Estonian National Defence College and the number of non-commissioned officers being trained in the Estonian Defence Forces Võru Battle School will increase. This will be an ambitious task, requiring focused and successful recruiting and retention of personnel.

During the planning period, the annual number of conscripts called up for compulsory military service (currently approximately 2500) will remain at the same level or slightly increase. Conscription will remain the main resource for manning of reserve units and form a recruiting base for regulars of the Defence Forces. The deteriorating demographic situation in Estonia will influence the number of conscripts called up annually, leading to a decrease in the number of young men fit for compulsory military service. Greater emphasis must thus be placed on the quality of training during conscription.

While the Plan 2018 was drafted, a joint working group of the Ministry of Defence and the EDF analysed the possibility to replace the existing 8 and 11 month long conscription with the so-called "6-9-12 model", as used in Finland. In such a system, the conscripts belonging to ranks of private would serve for six months, specialists for nine months and conscript junior non-commissioned officers and reserve platoon commanders for 12 months. Even though this system would reduce the time of conscript training, and would use the infrastructure of the defence forces more intensively, it would also require a larger number of instructors. This is not achievable in the short-term and therefore cannot be implemented before 2014. The issue will be further addressed in 2012.

The number of the EDF personnel available for crisis management, including reservists, will increase during the planning period from today's 16 000 to 25 000, with additional the units of the Defence League. In 2018, the EDF will consist of centrally subordinated units, a mechanise d infantry brigade in the Army with all its support units, reserve units formed in Defence Districts and the units of the Defence League. The war time structures of the Navy and Air Force will remain similar to their peace time structure.

How much will it cost?

A planning assumption for drafting the Plan 2018 was the increase of defence budget to 2 percent of GDP by 2010 and keeping this level in the following years.

In general, the defence budgets for the next 10 years should add up to a total of 60 billion EEK. About 40% of that amount is planned to be spent on procurement and construction, and the remaining 60% on operating and personnel costs.

The capability projects and the resulting investments will be detailed with a four year Mid-term Development Plan, which will be approved by the Minister of Defence and reviewed annually. These plans will consider in more detail the existing capabilities and current economic situation, which directly influences the defence budget. Estonian defence planning has enough flexibility to adjust to a changing economic environment.

The end result: what will the Estonian Defence Forces look like in 2018?

The EDF of 2018 will have adequate surveillance and intelligence capabilities to detect potential threats to Estonia, a high-readiness and partly armoured/mechanized infantry brigade, Defence Districts formed of Defence League and reserve units, adequate air defence for defending strategic objects and army units, as well as an organised reserve training and mobilisation system enabling the increase of the number of personnel in case of any potential threat.

The Estonian Air Force, by 2018, will be able to accommodate fighter aircraft of NATO at Ämari and receive Allied transport aircraft for a potential HNS operation, as well as conduct tactical transport with helicopters. The Estonian Navy, by 2018 will have a modern mine countermeasures capability and will participate in international cooperation with her MCM vessels continuously and sustainably.

We should keep in mind that the Plan 2018 is focussed solely on development of Estonia's military defence. National defence is a wider issue, based on the principle of total defence in Estonia – which includes nation's military, civil, economical, social and psychological defence. This requires wider attention and planning that solely within the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence.

Upon successful implementation of the Plan 2018, The EDF of 2018 will be larger in size, will have better training, more advanced equipment, will be more interoperable with NATO. In one word, the EDF 2018 will be more capable.

The Long-Term Defence Development Plan 2009 – 2018 (Plan 2018) summary

1. Development of defence planning in Estonia can be characterised as the search for a perfect plan that would solve all questions related to national defence. It is clear that – against a background of limited resources and changing security environment – the requirement is rather for an organised process offering modern solutions: "evolution instead of revolution".

2. Today we have achieved a clear vision of what a suitable defence planning model for Estonia should look like; one that considers the specificities of Estonia as a small state, but also considers the requirements for interoperability with Allies in defence of our common values. That being said, the Plan 2018 is not a document giving answers to all the challenges rising today or in the foreseeable future. It is rather a tool translating today's strategic security and defence policy guidelines into military capabilities and respective development programmes within specified resources and timeframes.

3. The policy guidance for the Plan 2018 was derived from the following documents: National Security Concept (2004), National Military Strategy (2005), NATO's Strategic Concept (1999), NATO's Comprehensive Political Guidance (2006) and The European Security Strategy (2003).

4. The foundations of Estonia's national defence rely on two strategic pillars: NATO membership and initial self-defence capability. These pillars together create a credible deterrence. Upon need, Estonia's military defence will be conducted as a collective defence operation of NATO, as prescribed in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

5. As the first step in developing the Plan 2018, scenarios requiring the use of Estonian Defence Forces (EDF) and the Defence League, based on the National Military Strategy and strategic threat assessment, were drafted. These scenarios covered the full spectrum of operations. Based on scenarios, operational analysis was conducted, and further more detailed planning situations were developed. This – with consideration to established assumptions, exceptions

and limitations – identified minimum military capabilities required to fulfil previously established tasks. The comparison of existing and required capabilities identified capability gaps, or shortfalls. These were prioritised based on risk analysis of threat assessments and the usability of capabilities in planning situations. The subsequent programming stage established recommended development levels and resource requirements for these capabilities. As a result of programming process, three categories of capabilities were identified: capabilities militarily valid, but disproportionately costly for Estonia – these could be developed in cooperation with NATO and/or Allies; capabilities militarily valid, but not feasible to be developed within the planning cycle; capabilities militarily valid and feasible within the 10-year planning period.

6. In terms of financial resources, the planning assumption was the increase of defence expenditures to meet 2% of GDP by 2010, and sustaining that level thereafter.

7. In terms of human resources, the Plan 2018 foresees an annual increase of regular EDF members by 125. The priority is to significantly increase the training capacity of the Estonian National Defence College and the Estonian Defence Forces Võru Battle School. Also, the number of active members of the Defence League is expected to increase. To improve the capabilities of staff- and senior officers, the priority is to further develop the Baltic Defence College and to continue to fulfil the responsibilities of Estonia as Host Nation.

8. Compulsory military service will remain the basis for manning the units and for recruiting to the EDF. While drafting the Plan 2018, an analysis of compulsory military service was conducted – this suggested retaining of the current compulsory military service model also for the near future.

9. To achieve goals of the security policy the Plan 2018 foresees continued participation of Estonia's military capabilities and units in operations led by NATO, EU and/ or coalitions of the willing outside of national territory. The planning assumption to achieve this includes NATO's usability criteria. Participation in operations outside of Estonia serves as a development instrument for the EDF and the Defence League.

10. All capabilities covered by the Plan 2018 were analysed and assessed according to NATO capability statements. This gives better preconditions to achieve interoperability with Allies. The planning

goals, agreed upon in NATO's collective defence planning process, are achievable. New and usable capabilities will be provided through planned development process, and these can later be declared as part of collective defence. The deployability of capabilities and units will be agreed upon in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs while drafting the Mid-Term Development Plan.

11. In order to increase Estonia's commitment to NATO's collective security, it is vital to fully develop NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) into an organisation that will bring together competence on cyber security and that will help NATO and Allies to develop military capabilities in this field.

12. According to the Plan 2018, investments to command and control, intelligence, surveillance and communications systems will increase. Creating modern command and control, intelligence, surveillance and communications capabilities is a strategically important goal. This will ensure early warning to prepare for crisis and also adequate command and decision making process of military units in times of crisis.

13. Estonia continues to invest to Ämari Air Base in order to enable the execution of air policing operations and achieving the capacity to base fighter aircrafts at Ämari. The allocations of costs relating to air policing will be agreed with Allies. The visible presence of NATO and Allies on Estonian territory and airspace continues to be important.

14. One of the priorities in military defence is the development of capabilities to ensure air defence. According to the Plan 2018, a limited mobile short-to-medium-range air defence capability will be developed and the existing army short-range air defence capability will be enhanced through the procurement of additional weapons systems and creation of new air defence units.

15. The priority for the Army is the development of a high readiness infantry brigade. In order to increase the readiness of brigade, the reserve period of the units will be extended. Additional measures will include a significant increase of reserve training, improvement of the reserve personnel registry, as well as formation and mobilisation system. Battalion level leadership training and maintaining of qualifications will be improved.

16. The Plan 2018 foresees a need for developing mechanised units, the task of which is to support ground operations. The program

analyses the procurement of tanks or infantry fighting vehicles for at least one battalion.

17. The further development of anti-tank capability remains a priority. The Plan 2018 foresees modernisation and further procurement of existing anti-tank weapons systems. It also foresees the formation of additional anti-tank units in the EDF and the Defence League.

18. The voluntary defence organisation – the Defence League is the main provider of capabilities for territorial defence. Development priorities of the Defence League during the planning period include the increase of the number of active members, the establishment of necessary command and control capabilities for battalion and Defence District level, the development of rapid reaction units and the improvement of combat capabilities.

19. The Defence League will focus on the preparation of infantry companies, internal defence companies and formation units. The measures foreseen by the Plan 2018 will enable the Defence League to become even more significant military deterrent.

20. In terms of naval and air operations, the Plan 2018 foresees the focus on development of capabilities crucial for the prevention of crisis and ensuring of Host Nation Support.

21. Among new development programs for the Navy is the procurement of multirole fast patrol boats to ensure defence of territorial waters and to improve maritime surveillance. The Navy's capabilities for command and control and shore-to-vessel communications will be improved.

22. The Plan 2018 identified a need to launch a multi-role helicopter program. The main goal will be to ensure the tactical transport for rapid reaction units, to perform monitoring and identification flights and to establish medical evacuation capability.

23. The implementation of all development programmes by the end of the planning period will result in an interoperable National Defence organisation that corresponds to NATO's usability criteria. The defence organisation will be a significant deterrent and will have necessary capabilities to fulfil all required tasks.

24. By the end of the planning period the size of the EDF consists of 4000 regulars. The EDF strength, including the reserve units, will be 25 000 persons, and additional Defence League units.

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