NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY OF THE GAMBIA 2019

His Excellency

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President of The Republic of The Gambia

Commander-in-Chief of The Armed Forces

FOREWORD

The Gambia's maiden National Security Policy (NSP) is the product of a long, collaborative effort initiated from My Office as the President of the Republic of the Gambia. It was prepared at the Office of National Security under the supervision of the SSR Steering Committee chaired by my Vice President. It is the result of the combined and meticulous efforts of Gambians and international partners. I wish to recognize the contributions of the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), European Union (EU), and the United States of America (USA). My special thanks goes to the Drafting Committee assembled from key Security Institutions and the Editorial Team who painstakingly worked to produce this comprehensive document. This is the first National Security Policy ever produced in The Gambia. It is an overarching policy document that aims at streamlining mandates, roles and responsibilities of Security Institutions. It is my desire that the NSP will engender a clear division of labour that would serve the nation and its citizens in our march towards building a better Gambia.

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President of The Republic of The Gambia
Commander-in-Chief of The Armed Forces

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Rising popular expectations for a streamlined, cohesive, participatory, civilian-controlled and transparent National Security Policy (NSP), for the Gambia, predicated on human-security is a timely and necessary endeavor. A first of its kind since independence in 1965, the Gambia's new NSP spells out key roles, responsibilities, and mandates of vital security institutions, organs, agencies, and personnel in order to reconfigure the security sector to meet evolving national state and human-security needs, challenges, risks and opportunities well into the next decade of the Twenty-first Century. Fundamental to achieving this is a foreign-policy pivot that prioritizes Gambia-Senegal relations to strengthen existing bilateral agreements to secure porous national borders, defend maritime boundaries, as well as explore existing and future resource discoveries for mutual gain. Addressing gender, youth, and social inequality, nationally, while leveraging the Gambia's "soft-power" regionally and globally to mitigate environmental, cyber security, "radicalization" money-laundering and other challenges multilaterally, bodes well for the "New Gambia," and its security institutions. Yet crucial to the success of the Gambia's new NSP, is popular ownership and changed perceptions that long gone are the days when the security sector was an instrument in the hands of political actors who utilized it to deny Gambians of their fundamental rights, and for self-aggrandizement of the highest order.

The Gambia's NSP positions the country and its security services to meet changing human security needs of Gambians. And, by spelling out the division of labor among the three branches of government and their oversight functions, the Gambia's new NSP will avail itself to periodic review and evaluation to reflect changing national, regional and global dynamics. Resulting institutionalized checks and balances to strengthen various security service responsiveness will make for a cohesive policy-strategy which at its core is driven by Security Sector Reform (SSR) principles in pursuit of human and national security."

ABBREVATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AIDS - Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome

CED - Custom and Excise Department

CSO - Civil Society Organizations

DLEAG - Drug Law Enforcement Agency

ECOSOCC - Economic, Social and Cultural Council

EEZ - Exclusive Economic Zone

GAF - Gambia Armed Forces

GBoS - Gambia Bureau of Statistics

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

GFRS - Gambia Fire and Rescue Services

GG – Gambia Government

GID - Gambia Immigration Department

GPF - Gambia Police Force

GPS - Gambia Prison Services

GRA - Gambia Revenue Authority

HE – His Excellency

HIV - Human Immunodeficiency Virus

IFIs - International Financial Institutions

IUU - Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated

MoD - Ministry of Defence,

MoFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MoFEA – Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs

MoI – Ministry of Interior

MoICI – Ministry of Information and Communication Infrastructure

MoJ – Ministry of Justice

NA - National Assembly

NDP - National Development Plan

NDSC - National Deficit Syndrome Culture

NSA - National Security Adviser

NSC - National Security Council

NSP – National Security Policy

PBF- Peace Building Fund

SGVB - Sexual and Gender-Based Violence

SIS - State Intelligence Service

SSR - Security Sector Reform

TVCR - Threats, Vulnerabilities, Challenges and Risks

UN - United Nations

UNDP – United Nations Development Program

UNGA – United Nations General Assembly

CHAPTER ONE: THE FOUNDATIONS

BACKGROUND

1. The protection of the State as well as the promotion of human security and the core values from which they emerge remain the single most important responsibility of any responsible government. They are in turn inextricably linked to economic stability, adequate resources, good governance and social cohesion. Twenty-two years of dictatorial rule in the Gambia effectively eroded government capacity to protect the citizens, derailed economic development efforts, and undermined core national values, in part, because the security sector was used as a tool for political repression.

2. In the aftermath of The Gambia's December 2016 presidential election and assumption of the presidency by H.E. Adama Barrow there was a clear need for a new people-centered national security policy to address Gambia's glaring security deficit. With support from the United Nations (UN) Peace Building Fund (PBF) Security Sector Reform (SSR) a thorough assessment was undertaken in consultation with the general public and relevant development partners. The resulting Security Sector Assessment Report, December 2017, highlighted the need for a security policy and a civilian-controlled security sector founded on democratic institutions, norms and processes to promote human rights and rule of law. In light of changing domestic and global security landscape where emphasis has now shifted from National to Human Security, Gambia needs a well-crafted and clearly articulated National Security Policy that is predicated on popular participation, and international best practices. The President simultaneously serving as Commander-in-Chief and Minister of Defense is common practice in The Gambia. In the last two decades,The Gambia witnessed saw blatant abuse of Gambians and use of the state security apparatus primarily for political repression and self-interest. This culminated in a culture of silence and of impunity, which in turn severely eroded public trust and confidence in the security services. The New Face of Gambia's Security Policy seeks to reverse negative public perceptions of the security services to engender confidence and regain public trust in this vital sector.

3. However, the Gambia's national security objectives cannot be achieved in the absence of a transparent and accountable government. It is important that the state takes appropriate measures

to safeguard people's socio-economic security. These include but are not limited to the following: access to quality education, vocational training, job creation, improved energy sector, access to justice, food security, viable financial sector, industrialization, infrastructural development, improved public safety and emergency response preparedness.

NATIONAL (CORE) VALUES

4. Gambians place high premium on the following core values among others:

4.1. Faith in their Creator,

4.2. Love of the family,

4.3. Integrity;

4.4. Internal Peace , communal peace, self-respect, human rights and the dignity of persons,

4.5. National unity, and

4.6. Religious and ethnic tolerance.

5. It is these shared values and principles that form the bedrock of Gambian culture, yet Gambian culture is not monolithic. It is the sum-total of various sub-cultures and, in a rapidly changing global security landscape propelled by shifting economic, technological and cultural changes. The Gambia's core national valuesare changing at an unprecedented pace. These could pose potential threats to national unity.

6. As a result of these therefore, Gambians have a collective responsibility and role to play when it comes to securing the nation. Building a security system that is ready to detect, deter and

defeat any eventualities in an inclusive manner is of paramount importance. This is fundamental to protecting the country's national security interests.

NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

7. The Gambia's overarching national interests lie in the prosperity and wellbeing of her peoples and the socio-economic transformation of the country. Such an interest is contingent on national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Furthermore, as a sovereign nation, the Gambia is committed to global peace, interdependence, security, stability and peaceful resolution of conflict. Similarly, the Gambia's peaceful existence and strengthening of the "Special Relationship" with its neighbors, is not only a foreign policy priority but a national interest as well. Shared cultural values, geo-political contiguity and socio-economic and common cultural interests make relations with its neighbor, vitally important.

NATIONAL POWER

8. The Gambia's national power include: Diplomacy, the Economy, National Cohesion, Information Communication Technologies, and Military/security Preparedness. These are fundamental to defending the country's national interests. These attributes of national power will serve as vehicles to achieving national goals and interests both internally and externally. Therefore, the Gambia's ability to advance its national interests is largely dependent on the effective use of the above-mentioned instruments to achieve National Strategic Objectives. The elements of National Power are enumerated below:

8.1. **Diplomacy.** It is the principal instrument that The Gambia uses to engage with other states or foreign bodies to advance its values, interests and objectives, and to solicit foreign support for socio-economic advancement. Considering its national interest for peace and security within the state and outside its borders, the Gambian government will primarily use diplomacy:

8.1.1. To settle any dispute through negotiation and other peaceful means.

8.1.2. To promote mutual respect and cooperation between states in order to reduce tension and potential for conflict within and outside the region.

8.1.3. To integrate defense, security and intelligence in foreign policy activities and engagements.

8.2. **Economy.** The Gambia operates not as an island but as part of the global political-economy. It is primarily a market-driven economy. Due to its small size, which is externally-dependent, and as a producer of primary commodities, the Gambia's economy is vulnerable to external shocks. Its economic behavior is shaped largely by the behavior of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), and the goodwill of International Partners and multinational corporations. To address this deeply embedded dependency, it is important that agriculture, marine resources, and tourism be well managed with great amount of prudence. This is vital if the country would enhance employment opportunities especially for young people, as well as propel economic growth and development. Prudent and effective use of Gambia's natural and human resources could position the country well to become an attraction for foreign direct investment. The ultimate objective would be to enhance competitiveness, explore the untapped resources that the country is endowed with, and reduce the country's vulnerability to external shocks and the vagaries of dependency.

8.3. **National Cohesion**. Gambia believe in fostering co-existence to enforce family ties and values and the infusion of social cohesion. There exists strong willingness of Gambians to cooperate with one another to promote national security objectives and to unite to promote economic advancement. Religious tolerance and ethnic harmony have, likewise, contributed positively to promoting national cohesion, and the maintenance of peace and security in the country. In the interest of national cohesion and harmony, it is crucially important that government assures religious minorities, that they remain

important and contributing members of society. Promoting Inter-faith dialogue among Christians and Muslims could allay mutual fears and break walls based on ignorance. Furthermore, it is in the Gambia's vital national interest to curb rising ethnic, and religious chauvinism ("tribalism") to avert inter-ethnic, as well as inter-religious conflict. These are looming threats that must not be overlooked.

8.4. Information and Communication

8.4.1. Technological globalization in the Twenty-first Century is advancing at an accelerated pace. It is pushing countries to not only keep abreast with these changes but harness them to protect, and promote vital national security interests both internally and globally. The Internet offers the Gambia numerous opportunities for better communication, and effective coordination of security and vital intelligence gathering instruments. Use of these technologies for monitoring and information gathering have the additional benefit of keeping policy-makers informed about threats and latest international best practices in the security sector. These technologies could also play a catalytic role in promoting national economic development.

8.4.2. Paradoxically, these same technologies could become instruments of crime and terrorism. Modern technology can present clear dangers to the Gambia's national security and cohesion. Misinformation and disinformation via social media, remain a potential national threat. Care must be exercised, therefore, in dealing with these potential threats to safeguard national, sectoral and institutional interests. It is, therefore, critical for The Gambia to keep abreast with these global technological innovations. However, this technological innovations

are very useful platforms to enhance communication among Gambians.

8.5. Defence and Security

8.5.1. This instrument is by far the most crucial among attributes of national power. It refers to the defense and security posture capable to successfully resist and repel hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert. This instrument of the Gambia's national power is obviously not limited to the Armed Forces. A well-structured and managed defence and security sector with clear delineations of competencies and definition of mandates will contribute to the achievement of peace and security as part of the national interest.

8.5.2. In addition to their primary constitutional mandates, the Gambia will use its Armed and Security Services to strengthen the country's participation in the UN, AU, and ECOWAS and Peace Support Operations in other parts of the World. Through defense and security agreements,international conventions and obligations, the Gambia should carve a niche of its own to boost professionalism, training and expertise of its security services. If effectively and adequately leveraged this could give the Gambia a vital platform to advance its interest, globally.

OPPORTUNITIES

9. **Political Will.** The Gambia more than any other time in its existence, has never enjoyed greater goodwill from the international community. The new government's commitment to a culture of tolerance, democracy, good governance, rule of law and human rights, augur well for the country's future. If this goodwill is squandered for lack of effective policy directives and vision, it could evaporate and plunge the country into further economic difficulties.

10. **Youth Mobilization.** More than half of the Gambia's population are youth under the age of 25. This represents a huge potential human resource that could be used advantageously to foster growth and development of the country. Indeed, to realize this potential resource, youth must have better access to education, health care, and financial resources. A well-articulated Youth Policy that address the perennial neglect of this demography could make the difference in the life of The Gambians. For too long, youth have not featured prominently in national policy, or when they did, it was an afterthought. Their integration and inclusion of issues pertaining to youth, is well overdue.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

11. Global and Regional Outlook

11.1. Polarization along economic, ethnic, religious, regional, and other fault lines has often resulted in national disintegration with adverse effects on human, national and global security. These have led to rising numbers of internally displaced populations, irregular migration, human-trafficking, terrorism, money-laundering, organized crime, and other global human security challenges. Indeed, these represent the new frontiers of national and global security threats and challenges in the first two decades of the Twenty-first Century.

11.2. Additionally, rise in insurgency, extremism and radicalized groups have occasioned a more violent global society. This has irreversibly altered the theatre and techniques of conventional war more significantly into non-conventional forms. Thus, perceptions about the utility of force as a technique of conflict resolution has given way to the proposition that constructing sustainablepolitical and democratic institutions are, in the end, a more enduring basis for peace and development.

12. National Geo-political Situation

12.1. Located on the West Coast of Africa, The Gambia has a total land area of about 11,300 square kilometres. It is surrounded by its much larger neighbour Senegal, with a land border of 748km except on its80km Atlantic coastline. The Gambia's maritime spacecovers 12 nautical miles of territorial waters with an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles (equivalent to 142000 km^2).The continental shelf of the Gambia is about 3900 km^2 (equivalent to 14% of the total combined shelf area of The Gambia and Senegal).

12.2. Consequently, in order, to protect the Gambia's sovereignty, and interest, adherence to old and new security agreements with Senegal is necessary. Though with few existential external threats, it is of paramount importance for the Gambia to strengthen its national security through joint-security arrangements with Senegal and through International partners support especially in areas ofland, air and sea border control and management. This renewed joint-security arrangement could promote the Gambia's re-export trade, reduce Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing in our waters and other related cross-border crimes.

12.3. Closer security ties with Senegal are importantto protectThe country's maritime spaces and borders. Therefore, there is an urgent need, as well as an opportunity to establish a common maritime policy between the Gambia and Senegal to

collectively pursue and protect mutually beneficial interests. This can help to mitigate current and likely future disputes over maritime resources and new natural resource discoveries.

12.4. The Gambia,is a multi-lingual, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious country with well over twelve ethnic groups with English as its official language. According to the 2013 Gambia Bureau of Statistics Report, the country has a population of approximately 1,882,450.

12.5. According to GBOS (2013)Muslims constitute about 90% of the population with approximately 9% Christians and 1% other faiths. It is in the national security interest of the Gambia tostrengthen existing socio-cultural fluidity across ethnic, religious and political lines as well as to avert social dislocation.

12.6. Fluid inter-ethnic relations underpinned by healthy "joking" relationships remain one of Gambia's, as well as Senegal's major strengths. This serves as asocial mechanismthat help to mitigate potential ethnic and communal conflict. It is therefore important, for both governments to simultaneously pursue policies and practices that promote, inter-state, inter-ethnic harmony and patriotism and avoid macro-nationalist sentiments.

13. The Socio-Economic Landscape

13.1. According to the2015/16 Integrated Household Survey conducted by the Gambia Bureau of Statistics, the proportion of the Gambian population living below the poverty line is onthe increase. The Poverty Index increased slightly from 48.1 percent in 2010 to 48.6 percent in 2015. While this increase is considered statistically insignificant, poverty rate increased substantially by 18.2 percent from 0.79 million in 2010 to 0.94 million in 2015.

13.2. In spite of favorable conditions for food production to meet the needs of the people in The Gambia, the country is still proneto food insecurity. Estimates based on the 2015/16 Integrated Household Survey suggest that close to 55 percent of the population cannot meet the daily required minimum calories of 2400 per day per person.

13.3. Fifty Five percent of Gambians live in the urban area while 45% live in the rural area. This high urban concentration explains the congestion and overcrowding in the urban area with its attendance, problems. Overcrowding leads to emergence of illegal structures and settlements which have implications on safety and security in the urban areas.

13.4. The overall contribution of agriculture to GDP growth has been on the decline since 2010. This is traceable to factors such as climate shocks leading to food shortages. This trend has made peasant farmers economically vulnerable. High fertility in the country, which is the cause of the population growth rate of 3.2% per annum, might have been the cause of the rapid increase in poverty rate.There is the need for crafting of policies that will boost economic growth and ensure food security for all citizens.

13.5. UNDP findings support the fact that the country registers high levels of unemployment and under-employment, with 40% of women and 20% of men falling into this bracket. This has raised the level of vulnerability to crime and radicalization as well as the incidence of gender-based violence and gender inequality. Irregular migration and substance abuse have also tended to increase. Unequal access to resources such as land for agriculture and construction which favors men, perpetuates pre-existing disparities between men and women. Only a small percentage of Gambian women hold strategic positions in both the private and public sectors, and in particular the security sector.

13.6. In spite of the negative indices of unemployment, irregular migration and unequal access to resources, tourism, construction and telecommunication sectors contribute significantly to the national economy. Revenuefrom these sectors in 2016, accounted for about 22% of GDP. There are reports of oil and other natural resource deposits in The Gambia, but the country is yet to benefit from them economically as initial exploration of SAMO 1 (offshore oil well), the first well to be drilled, did not meet commercial expectations. There is the need to continue exploration of all-natural resource deposit in The Gambia.

The Security Environment

13.7. The security instruments used and applied during the colonial era had continued in post-independence Gambia and was used to model or shape the security institutions. This explains why security was designed to focus on the protection of the political and economic interests of the elite as opposed to meeting the needs of the citizenry. This situation continued into the First Republic, worsening during the second republic.

13.8. After the change of government in 1994, The Gambian security forces were less adequately prepared for the real and emerging security challenges within the country. When not being used for regime security, they were merely oriented to execute routine procedures in the barracks. This, coupled with professional stagnation and bad governance rooted in corruption, rivalry among service/ agency institutions and political patronage, negatively impacted their integrity, capacity, and professionalism.

13.9. In the Second Republic, the President abuse his power as Commander-in-Chief and Minister of Defence and made himself sole policy and decision-maker for the Armed and Security services. Appointments to key positions and elevation to higher ranks were mostly based on nepotism and personal loyalties. There was

also a dark chapter in the Gambia's security sector that needs further unveiling to engender national healing and glean important lessons from this troubled legacy.

13.10. Such legacies, even long after colonial rule ended, remained entrenched. In fact, the former President of the second republic perpetuated the culture as a tool to entrench himself in power. As a result, the new political leadership, following the national polls in December 2016 inherited a security apparatus that was not oriented to meet the needs of the people.

13.11. In addition, there were instances of widespread human rights abuse and a culture of impunity perpetrated by elements of the security sector. This has led to the erosion of public trust and confidence. This security lapse resulted in many human rights abuses orchestrated with impunity by the authorities who were supposed to defend and protect the people and act in accordance with the law. Important lessons have been gleaned from the dark days of dictatorial rule that include the following:

13.11.1. It is vital that comprehensive training modules for security personnel, including gender mainstreaming, international conventions on Human and People's Rights, as well as an outreach program to enlighten security personnel will be most important in changing attitudes towards human rights concerns;

13.11.2. Another lesson learnt is, vibrant national security in the Gambia, is contingent upon political order, good governance, effective foreign policy and true democracy. These national security objectives cannot be achieved in the absence of a transparent and accountable government;

13.11.3. To be proficient and effective, the security sector must possess standard structures, quality personnel, modern equipment and sufficient resources necessary to respond to the legitimate security needs of the state andcitizens;

13.11.4. Furthermore, this transformation process requires unambiguous and transparent strategy to facilitate smooth interaction, coordination and cooperation between security sector actors consistent with constitutional roles and responsibilities, and,

13.11.5. Consequently, unlike the traditional regime-centered approach to security in the Gambia, the modern concept should focus more on human-security as the basis for an enlightened national security policy. This is important for the reasons enumerated below.

BROAD STRATEGIC GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

14. Inspired by our national security vision and interests, the objectives of this national security policy are to:

14.1. Protect The Gambia's sovereignty and territorial integrity;

14.2. Present The Gambia's positive image and prestige regionally and globally.

14.3. Promote socio-economic development and prosperity;

14.4. Ensure empowerment and equal participation of women in the decision-making processes, including at the strategic level.

14.5. Conduct security sector reform to ensure efficient and effective governance and oversight of the security system as well as to ensure the definition of mandates and delineation of competencies of security forces, services and institutions.

14.6. Enhance the cooperation, collaboration and coordination between the Security Forces and agencies for seamless interoperability bythe establishment of a National Joint Operation Center for internal and external operation.

14.7. Enhance the cooperation, collaboration and coordination between the Intelligence agencies for seamless interoperability bythe establishment of a National Joint Intelligence Operation Center for coordination of all intelligence activities.

14.8. Enhance the peace time role of the Armed forces and Security Services through the development of their productive potential.

14.9. Participate and contribute to global and regional peace and security.

14.10. To have a structured and professional Armed and Security Services that is proportionate to the security needs of the Gambia.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

15. The Gambia's National Security Policy and conduct of its international relations shall be guided by the following principles:

15.1. Protection of national sovereignty and independence

15.2. Promotion of national ownership, responsibility and commitment.

15.3. Fostering national unity and integration by developing a security sector which is fully representative of Gambians and promotes the welfare and prosperity of all persons in The Gambia.

15.4. Promotion of human security that is responsive to the security and justice needs of The Gambian people.

15.5. Promotion of democratic principles of good governance, accountability and the rule of law.

15.6. Respect for Human rights and mainstreaming gender issues in all aspects of governance including the recruitment, retention, full participation in decision-making and training curriculum of all security institutions.

15.7. Ensuring civilian oversight and democratic control of the security sector in line with international standards of human rights and the rule of law including parliamentary approval of security legislation.

15.8. Approving states of emergency, security sector budget, and inviting the Heads of Security Agencies for testimonies when necessary.

15.9. Ensuring the delineation of competencies between different security services, such as between the defence and internal security forces and services, excluding militarization of the police and the interference of the Armed Forces in internal/public security and safety, except supportive roles when the need arises.

15.10. Exclusion of perpetrators of serious human rights violations in the security sector through vetting and selection procedures.

15.11. Ensuring the separation of the executive, legislative and judiciary powers;

15.12. Ensuring access to justice and right to security for people in The Gambia.

15.13. Be guided by Public Finance Management (PFM) principles, including the affordability of the security sector and its balanced budget in relation to other public sectors.

15.14. Fostering respect for the constitution, international law, treaty obligations and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

15.15. Integration of informal and customary security providers and traditional justice actors into SSR processes where appropriate.

15.16. Integration of the goals and principles of international and regional organizations which The Gambia is a signatory.

15.17. Adoption of international principles of transparency and inclusiveness.

CHAPTER TWO: THE ASPIRATION

NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

16. The Gambia's overarching national interests lie in the prosperity and wellbeing of her peoples and the socio-economic transformation of the country. Such an interest is contingent on our national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

17. Furthermore, the Gambia as a bastion of peace and tolerance desires, as a sovereign nation, to effectively participate in the promotion of global peace, security, stability and integration. Equally desirous is to foster deep-rooted commitment to an unbreakable special bond and peaceful coexistence with the country's neighbors.

THREATS, VULNERABILITIES, CHALLENGES AND RISKS ASSESSMENT(TVCR)

18. The Gambia's population is confronted with a range of TVCR that have direct impact on security. These include: poverty, unemployment, social and economic inequality, low and uncompetitive wages, inadequate education, limited access to health care, limited access to justice, and food insecurity. Also, the country's bulging and under-utilized or unemployed youth population and the inability of the private sector to grow or launch business ventures represents a vulnerability and a risk. The worst-case scenario is the combined effects of all these threats occurring at the same time, which has the potential of causing civil unrest,youths engaging in irregular migration, and in all sorts of crime, including theft, drug abuse, sexual violence, possession of small arms and light weapons and murder.

19. **Disputed Land Borders**

19.1. The distortion of the demarcation of the Senegal-Gambia borders inherited at independence pose a threat to the territorial integrity of the country. According to the Security Sector Assessment Report, The Gambia and Senegal have had tensions over border issues. Residents of the affected areas repeatedly disagree on land ownership and possession rights. Over the years, bilateral diplomatic

efforts have been made to resolve this issue, which led to the establishment of the "Senegalo-Gambia Boundary Commission" under the auspices of the 'Senegalo-Gambian Secretariat.' This Commission has already conducted preliminary assessment aimed at finding a permanent solution. However, the recommendations are yet to be implemented. If the situation is not duly addressed, it could result to renewed tensions that could severely undermine the harmony between the two countries.

19.2. The vast and sparsely monitored border between the Gambia and Senegal, coupled with the lack of capacity of the security operatives to effectively curb mounting crime rates, (such as armed banditry, sanctuary for dissident groups, robbery and wide spread cultivation and supply of cannabis) represent challenges or risks. The Casamance insurgency along the border could spill over into the border communities which may provoke a pursuit of these insurgents into the Gambia by the Senegalese security forces. Porous and poorly monitored borders are a recipe for transnational crime.

20. Political Threat

20.1. Partisan political threats that include political violence, politicizing traditional leadership institutions, (chiefdoms and Alkaloship) and risks of political violence remain real and must be addressed head on. Accordingly, the Security Sector is at risk of political polarization, especially, when past patron-client relationships seep into the new political dispensation. In addition, complications and regime risks and vulnerability will likely intensify if security personnel sympathetic to the former president possess large caches of weapons and ammunition. These combined with ethnic-based loss of ill-gotten favors, preferences and privileges are a lethal recipe for national fragmentation.

21. **OrganizedTrans- National and Cross- Border Crimes**

21.1. Organized transnational crimes such as "terrorism, "human" and "drug-trafficking, "smuggling," and "money-laundering" within the African continent are emerging challenges for the Gambia's security. Recent terror attacks in the sub-region make terrorism and insurgency a real threat to the country's security. Although, the country has not experienced a terror attack yet, the rising terror tendencies in the region poses a huge security challenge particularly to the tourism sector. This could adversely impact tourists and investors.

21.2. Therefore, there is the need to effectively operationalize the Joint Security Pact between the Gambia and Senegal to stem cross-border criminal activities, as well as address the right of hot pursuit. A Joint IntegratedBilateral-national Border Management Structure between the security institutions to deal with illegal cross border activities is vital.

22. **Human Rights and Justice**

22.1. Further delays to set up a mechanism for dealing with members of the past regime accused of committing atrocities has resulted in deep-seated grievances amongst sections of the civilian population. Importantly, alleged perpetrators still actively involved in the security sector must be brought to account for alleged crimes in a strengthened Transitional Justice Process to ensure accountability and justice.

22.2. Similarly, the manner in which security sector personnel handle disaffected groups that violently express grievances through acts of public disorder can have serious implications on national cohesion. The increased level of political and social awareness now enjoyed in the democratic opening of the New Gambia represent both an opportunity and a challenge.

23. **Gender Discrimination and Violence**

23.1. The Gambia like many other countries is a male-dominated society with social constructs that inhibits the development of women and girls. However during the years, issues of women have been .

23.2. Notwithstanding the Government's recognition of the constitutional requirements of gender mainstreaming and making use of all available talents pursuant to section 28 (1) and (2) of the Constitution, a lot more needs to be done to bring women up to par in politics, especially in the National Assembly, high-powered civil-servant jobs, the security sector and professions. Resolution 1325 of the UN General Assembly also calls for women participation in the maintenance of global peace and security. It is vitally important, therefore, to recruit women and marginalized men into the security services and also introduce training modules that focus on different conceptualizations of "security"informed by women's perspectives.

23.3. The notion that women's rights are human rights must filter up to the service brass, who in turn, must insist upon it in their specific institutions. Women in the security services must also be availed the space to express, without fear of retribution, their thoughts and concerns on a range of issues that include, but not limited to: pay, promotion, respect,and institutionalized bias (sexism). All security institutions must re-examine "old-boy" networks, reassess women's "gendered roles" within their institutions, and train personnel accordingly to shed entrenched attitudes and practices.

24. **Health**

24.1. The occurrence and re-occurrence of infections and diseases such as malaria, cholera, child/ Infant and maternal mortality, Ebola and the scourge of HIV/AIDS infections is a grave security concern for the state considering the

porosity of the Gambia's borders coupled with the weak capacity to respond to disease outbreaks. These epidemics have had serious negative impact on the country's tourism industry. The 2015 Ebola outbreakin some neighbouring countries (Manu River Union) shows evidence of the impact caused.

24.2. The upsurge of life-threatening diseases such as cancer, diabetics and hypertension also pose serious security challenges relative to the lives and productivity of the work force. Effective control requires strengthening the national surveillance and response systems. There is need for the Security sector in collaboration with both local and international health care agencies and research institutions to develop appropriate capacity for intervention.

25. Environment

25.1. It is of paramount importance for the Gambia to strengthen its national security environment, through joint-security arrangements with Senegal and the support of International partners especially in the areas of land, air and sea border management and control.

25.2. The indiscriminate cutting of trees for both economic and domestic use coupled with unregulated and uncontrolled fishing and mining, and bush fires has resulted in the destruction of the environment. This has endangered the flora and fauna of the country as well as human habitation. It is now generally agreed that human activity is largely responsible for climate change. In the Gambia's case this has resulted in erratic rainfall patterns that negatively impact on sustainable agricultural activities leading to scarcity of resources, which pose a threat to national security.

25.3. Human activities should be controlled to minimize the destruction of the environment. The effects of global warming and environmental degradation are the direct consequences of human activities.

25.4. To effectively deal with these threats, there is need for the government to adopt effective information dissemination strategies to enlighten the public about the environmental rules and regulations. Through these, government could help minimize the threats of deforestation and other detrimental environmental effects or consequences.

MARITIME SECURITY

25.5. It is important to protect maritime spaces and borders. Therefore, there is an urgent need to formulate and implement a maritime policy and strategy for the Gambia to promote, pursue, and protect her re-export trade, reduce Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing and other related cross-border maritime crimes. This can help to mitigate current and likely future disputes over maritime resources and new natural resource discoveries

NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS

26. To be a nation that will have a professional and apolitical security system able to protect the country and its people in line with fundamental human rights and rule of law, and a security system that will become empowered and motivated to defend national sovereignty against all forms of threats, committed to contributing to the building of peace, national unity, tolerance and social cohesion, and promoting respect for diversity and equal opportunities irrespective of gender, age, ability, ethnicity and religion in the interest of socio-economic development and prosperity.

LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORKS

27. The Gambia's NSP should strive to establish linkages between the National Assembly, the Constitution, National Development Plan (NDP), International Covenants and other legally binding national instruments. Sequencing the Gambia's NSP policy/strategy and legislation, to ensure that it is aligned with national priorities, and are realistic in terms of the national capacity required to support and implement it, is of great importance.

28. The Gambia has eight security institutions, all of which have their primary and secondary mandates to maintain peace, security and the territorial integrity of the country. Without prejudices to the under mentioned mandates which they currently have, there is need to review the existing legal frameworks and align them to the current national security realities of the Gambia.

29. There is also need to provide a legal framework for the National Security Council.

GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE OF THE SECURITY APPARATUS

30. **National Security Council (NSC).**

30.1. The NSC, chaired by the president, is the highest authority for providing strategic guidance and direction in national security issues. To make it more effective, the composition of the NSC should include the membership of the policy makers of key institutions of the instruments of National power, such as the Ministries of Defence, Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Finance and, Information and Communication Infrastructure.

30.2. With the establishment of the Office of National Security which will provide secretarialservice for the NSC and coordinate Security Sector activities, this will enhance the oversight function of the NSC.

31. **Office of National Security (ONS)**

31.1. The Office of National Security will essentially be performing the following tasks:

31.1.1. Act as the executive secretariat of the National Security Council and carrying out regular secretariat duties for the NSC

31.1.2. Developing regular briefings and papers for NSC meetings

31.1.3. Keeping the chairman of the NSC (The President) informed of emerging issues and assessments that require the council's attention.

31.1.4. Analyzing the security environment – both internal and external – to be reported regularly to the NSC so that it can take informed decisions.

31.1.5. Coordinating security sector activities to ensure that the directives and decisions emanating from the NSC are implemented; and that timely feedback from the sector is presented to apprise the NSC of developments.

31.1.6. Generating periodic reports for the NSC on the basis of decisions of previous meeting of the Council

31.1.7. Coordinating intelligence agencies to deliver joint assessments and, ensuring the veracity of assessed intelligence.

31.1.8. Coordinating and supporting Joint Inter Departmental, Inter Agency and Multi National operations.

31.1.9. Developing and monitoring the implementation and evaluation (Management) of the National Security Policy;

31.1.10. The management of all national security related policies and strategies.

31.1.11. The development of Integrated National Security Outcome Base Plans for the Short and Medium term.

31.1.12. Report on quarterly and annual basis on the achievements and expenditure of the security sector.

31.1.13. Responsible for the management of the SSR Process in the security sector that include the Management (Policy development, review, monitor and evaluation) of the SSR policy.

31.1.14. Responsible for the management of the national security planning process.

31.1.15. Provide strategic direction guidelines for the security sector for the Short and Medium Term.

31.1.16. Responding to any other needs identified by the President and NSC.

32. **Statutory Organs of theNSC**

32.1. The next layer in the governance of the security sector shall be at the Office of the President and ministerial level. The Office of the President, ministries of Defence and Interior have the primary responsibility to manage and administer the defence and security institutions and hence should be established with the requisite administrative, technical and operational competence. Each sector should be able to develop and review policies/strategies for military defence, intelligence and internal security.

32.2. In view of the NSP as the overarching concept encompassing the national defence and internal security and related strategies, the Ministry of Defence (MoD)will define the national defence strategy related to the sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Ministry of Interior will establish the internal security concept and strategy towards ensuring effective Law Enforcement, and the protection of livesand property.

32.3. The Ministry of Defence will manage the Defence Council and define relevant strategies, whilst the Ministry of Interior manages internal security issues and strategies within the established councils of the respective security institutions.

Consequently, this policy directs the establishment of Security Service Councils/Boards which will provide governance and oversight of the respective security institutions on matters relating to appointment, promotions and dismissal.

32.4. The other statutory ministries of the NSC, namely Ministries of Finance, Foreign Affairs, Justice and Information and Communication Infrastructure are to perform significant role in pursuit of national security. These six (6) Ministries including Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior will constitute the first level of civil authority over national security matters. All other ministries in government are to ensure that their policies and activities are consistent with the pursuit of national interests.

MANDATES OF THE SECURITY FORCES AND SERVICES

33. The Gambia has eight security institutions, all of which have their primary and secondary mandates to maintain peace, security and the territorial integrity of the country. Without prejudice to the under-mentioned mandates which they currently have, there is need to review the existing legal frameworks and align them to the current national security needs. Hence the need for a cultural change in the security sector requires shifting attention from the traditional regime-centric approach to the concept of modern security, which focuses on human security as the basis for national security. The quality of training for the security sector will ultimately determine the output, behavior and level of professionalism.

33.1. <u>The Gambia Armed Forces (GAF)</u>

33.1.1. According to the 1997 Constitution, Section 186, the Armed Forces of the Gambia consist of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force and such other services for which provision is made by an Act of the National Assembly.

33.1.2. According to section 187 of the 1997 constitution, the principal functions of GAF are:

33.1.2.1. To preserve and defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of The Gambia;

33.1.2.2. To aid the civil authority at their request, in emergencies and in case of natural disasters; and;

33.1.2.3. To engage at the request of civil authorities, in productive activities such as agriculture, engineering, health, and education for the development of the Gambia.

33.1.2.4. The National Youth Service shall be organized with co-operation and assistance of the Armed Forces

33.1.2.5. The Armed Forces shall establish training program for their members at all levels to equip them with skills and trades, and a program of secondment to civilian occupations, so as to enable members of the Forces to return, after their service, to a full and productive civilian life.

33.2. **The Gambia Police Force (GPF)**

33.2.1. The GPF was established under section 178 of The 1997 Constitution which defines the powers of the police as follows:

33.2.1.1. The preservation of law and order;

33.2.1.2. Protection of life and property;

33.2.1.3. The prevention and detection of crime;

33.2.1.4. The apprehension of offenders and;

33.2.1.5. The due enforcement of all laws and regulations with which they are charged with.

33.2.1.6. Oversee the implementation of private security act, supervision of all private security companies and training of personnel of private security company.

33.3. **State Intelligence Service (SIS)**

33.3.1. The National Intelligence Agency (To beState Intelligence Service) was established by Decree 45 of 1995 and incorporated in the 1997 Constitution.

33.3.2. State Intelligence Service shall-

33.3.2.1. Have the lead role in intelligence on national security matters both internal and external;

33.3.2.2. Gather, analyze and collate intelligence to protect The Gambia from all external and internal threats;

33.3.2.3. Closely work and collaborate with the ministries of Defense, Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice, and

Finance, Labor Organizations and any other organization as may be deemed necessary;

33.3.2.4. Closely work with other services to provide protection to the President and his properties, First Family, and all other VIPs as may be necessary;

33.3.2.5. Provide the Government and other relevant consumers with accurate and verifiable intelligence relating to external and internal threats;

33.3.2.6. Provide advice for our domestic and foreign policy matters as they relate to national security;

33.3.2.7. Share Intelligence and cooperate with international partners where necessary in the interest of national security;

33.3.2.8. Screen, vet, and clear all private security firms before registration;

33.3.2.9. Screen and vet personnel of all national security institutions before enrollment and as may be deemed necessary, as well as prospective holders of sensitive public service positions;

33.3.2.10. Perform such other functions as may be assigned to it by the President or by any other Act of the National Assembly.

33.4. **The Gambia Immigration Department (GID)**

33.4.1. GID, which was established under the Immigration Act 1965, is mandated to execute the following functions:

33.4.1.1. Facilitate, control, monitor and regulate entry, residence and exit of persons at entry points and localities within the country.

33.4.1.2. Control and regulate residency through issuance of residence and work permits as prescribed in the Immigration Act and other international legal instruments relating to migration;

33.4.1.3. Enforce the Citizenship and Nationality Act 1965 and its amendments;

33.4.1.4. Enforce the Registration of Aliens Act 1977 and its Amendments;

33.4.1.5. Issuance of Passport, Identity Card and other Travel Documents;

33.4.1.6. Enforce the Refugee Act 2008;

33.4.1.7. Implement bilateral, multilateral and international conventions such as the ECOWAS framework on free movement of persons and goods;

33.4.1.8. Deployment of officers to visa sections of various Embassies and Consular offices of the Gambia to enhance accurate visa issuance.

33.5. Drug Law Enforcement Agency (DLEAG)

33.5.1. Drug Law Enforcement Agency, The Gambia (DLEAG) is the lead agency mandated to regulate and control Drug Abuse, Illegal Drug Trafficking and related activities by enforcing the Drug Control Act 2003 and all international protocols and conventions relative to drugs signed and ratified by The Gambia. The functions of the Agency are to:

33.5.1.1. Enforce all laws, rules, regulations and policies regulating or controlling the abuse and trafficking of illicit drugs.

33.5.1.2. Advice government through the ministry on drug related matters.

33.5.1.3. Control the abuse and misuse of controlled drugs.

33.5.1.4. Sensitize the general public particularly the youth on the dangers of drug abuse.

33.6. The Gambia Fire and Rescue Services (GFRS)

33.6.1. The Gambia Fire Service Act No. 19 of 1948. The mandate of the Fire and Rescue Service is to:

33.6.1.1. Perform the function of saving life in fire and other disasters,

33.6.1.2. Protecting life and property from destruction and catastrophe (Manmade or natural),

33.6.1.3. Render humanitarian services, and;

33.6.1.4. Assist in the protection of the environment.

33.7. **The Gambia Prison Services (GPS)**

33.7.1. The GPS is established under Section 182 of the constitution with the mandate to:

33.7.1.1. Maintain the safety of inmates under custody which includes their welfare, shelter and food and

33.7.1.2. To reform and rehabilitate.

33.7.1.3. To reintegrate inmate back to the society.

33.8. **The Gambia Revenue Authority (Custom and Excise)**

33.8.1. The Gambia Revenue Authority is a merger of the former Customs & Excise and Domestic Taxes Departments for the purpose of maximizing revenue collection and also brings about economic

sovereignty and self-reliance as a country. It was established in 2004 by an Act of the National Assembly.

33.8.2. The main mandate of the department are as follows:

33.8.2.1. Collect revenue on all taxable imports;

33.8.2.2. Collection of trade statistics for GBOS and other stakeholders;

33.8.2.3. Preventing illegal exports and imports.

33.8.2.4. Processing of cargo, including documentary checks and physical examination of goods imported into the country.

33.8.2.5. Surveillance of coastal and land borders to prevent smuggling activities.

33.8.2.6. Protection of external borders from illegal aliens, drugs and other criminal activities.

33.8.2.7. To implement and manage free trade agreements with other Customs Administration with a view to facilitate international trade and the free movement of persons across our national border.

33.8.2.8. Protecting intellectual property rights.

33.8.2.9. To collaborate with other security agencies to conduct joint security operations.

SECURITY SECTOR RESPONSE

34. In pursuance of its aspirations to enhance professional competence, effectiveness and collaboration, this policy directs the establishment and implementation offlagship programs as follows:

34.1. Support the establishment and operationalization of the Office of National Security.

34.2. Reorganization, right-sizing and restructuring of defense and security forces into professional, representative and balanced forces;

34.3. Judicial and correctional reforms to ensure access to justice for all people in the Gambia;

34.4. Rehabilitation and (re) construction of infrastructure;

34.5. Building of material and human capacities;

34.6. Strengthening civilian oversight and the democratic control of the defence forces and security services, including the reform of governance and security institutions;

34.7. Fight against the proliferation of weapons

34.8. Fight against impunity, ensure transitional justice

34.9. Rehabilitation and reconstruction of administrative structures

34.10. Strengthening of the administration in regions and districts

34.11. Promotion of national unity and cohesion

34.12. Promote and institutionalize democratic governance

34.13. Coordinate institutional reforms

34.14. Support capacity building of the administrative and local authorities

34.15. Strengthen diplomacy (bilateral, multilateral and international relations and cooperation)

34.16. Fight against corruption, favoritism and nepotism

34.17. Respect, protect and fulfil human rights principles and standards

34.18. Improve public financial management

34.19. Advocate for a transparent and accountable management of natural resources

34.20. Support capacity building of civil society and the media

34.21. Encourage the promotion of gender equity

34.22. Create an enabling environment for economic recovery and sustainable growth

34.23. Advocate for the expansion and strengthening of public services (water, electricity, etc.) and basic social services (health and education) throughout the country

34.24. Advocate development of basic infrastructure (roads, telephone networks and internet services, Seaport)

34.25. Promote environmental management and climate change mitigation

34.26. Mobilize resources

34.27. Create employment opportunities

JOINT HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT

35. **Joint Human Resource Development Center.** The establishment of a Human Resource Development Center is required to provide a joint holistic capacity. This joint facility shall be under the purview of the National Security Council. The focus of this joint facility shall be:

35.1. To attract and retain quality personnel.

35.2. To enhance the professionalism of security personnel.

35.3. To enhance inter-operability of the security sector.

35.4. To enhance the judicious use of resources.

36. **Appointments**. The appointment of the following members is essential for the Gambia Security Sector governance and management forward:

36.1. The minister of defense.

36.2. National Security Adviser (NSA), and a Deputy NSA.

37. **Joint Medical Facility.** This provides for the establishment of a joint medical facility to cater for personnel of all the security institutions.

OVERSIGHT AND REVIEW MECHANISM

38. An effective oversight body will help to deter corruption, promote independent and unbiased monitoring and investigation and ensure that public officials correctly exercise the power conferred upon them. In other words, a proficient oversight will also help to reduce incidents of human rights violations by members of the security sector and foster better relationship between them and the civilian population.

38.1. **Oversight Architecture.**

38.1.1. The priority of the oversight framework is to ensure that the security sector bodies do conform to laws, policies, rules and regulations that govern them.

38.1.2. A critical requirement for the implementation of this policy is a functional democratic control and enhanced oversight mechanisms that are effective and efficient through a legitimate governance framework or architecture. This will facilitate the creation of a highly professional and law-abiding security sector that is responsive to the security needs of the people and subordinate to civilian authority, by adhering to the principles of human rights and committed to the rule of law.

38.2. **The Legislature.** The role of the National Assembly with respect to the security sector resides in its function as the source of legitimacy of all security institutions. According to the 1997 Constitution, "no person shall raise any police service except by and under the authority of an Act of Parliament." A subsequent article makes a similar statement concerning raising an armed force the key mandate of the standing committee on Security is to provide parliamentary oversight to ensure accountability and transparency in the Security sector.

38.3. **The Judiciary**. The Judiciary controls and oversees the security sector by ensuring that the use of intrusive powers without constitutional and legislative justification are curtailed. The judiciary will also support the prohibition of the limitation of the rights and freedoms of the citizens through the use of unlawful intrusive operational methods.

38.4. **The Executive.**The Gambia's political and institutional systems are based on a separation of powers between the Executive, Legislature and the Judiciary. The 1997 Constitution adequately stipulates the authority of executive oversight of the security sector. As the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the President has the constitutional mandate to oversee the security services. In keeping with good governance principles, the executive should ensure that all institutions establish internal checks and balances or internal monitoring mechanisms.

38.5. **Independent Civil bodies.**In keeping with the spirit of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, which, among other things, underscores the need for peace, security, stability and human rights based on people's participation, inclusion and ownership of democratic processes, empowers the office of the ombudsman as a designated civil institution to investigate complaints from the public and service members, and to monitor compliance of the security sector with applicable national and international law, including international humanitarian and human rights law.

39. A review mechanism should be established to examine the NSP on regular basis, at least every 5 years, and upon major changes in the national, regional and international security arena. A committee of major national stakeholders shall conduct these periodic reviews of the NSP. The purpose of the review is to align existing policy with prevailing political, economic and social realities of the country.

CHAPTER 3: POLICY SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS

PARTNERSHIP AND COLLABORATION

40. The NSP is the overarching framework of National Security directing, amongst others, what strategic pathways each individual security organ must follow to enable the collective achievement of the national security aspirations of the people of The Gambia. While the realization of these objectives primarily lie with the people of the Gambia, it is nonetheless critical that strategic, tactical and technical partnerships through bilateral/multilateral security protocols/agreements are sought for this journey.

41. On the other hand, and particularly important will be the need to galvanize partnership and collaboration with the donor community/partners for both the NSP and the subsequent security sector wide reforms necessary to implement the Policy.The already demonstrated fervor, from donor partners and specialized agencies through the deployment of critical resources is well noted and quite encouraging. Such commitment needs to be harness to deliver the resultant values aspired in the policy document, as well as, embedded in the follow-on SSR.

42. Similarly Inter Services Technical and Social/Welfare partnership and collaboration,should be an integral part of the institutional relationships.Technical cooperation as it relates to joint operations and coordination of separate but overlapping functions are a prerequisite for sector wide effectiveness and efficiency. Mutually reinforcing and therefore very important is the need for the development of inter-services socialization and welfare partnerships and collaborations for the primary purpose of enhancing Esprit de Corps amongst the services.

43. The Services should build bridges with the NGOs, CBOs/CSOs and the public at large as a conduit to enhance aiding civil defence capacity and resilience.Invariably,such a close relationship will facilitate the development of the necessary environment for the Services and the people to complement each other for greater national security.

44. **The Role of Civil Society Organizations.**

44.1. In the spirit of the objectives and principles of the constitutive Act of the African Union and the Statues of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), the Government of The Gambia remains committed to ensure the participation of CSOs in the needs assessment, formulation, adoption, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the security sector policy. The civil society organizations (CSOs)can address communal violence and promote human security through development, human rights monitoring and mitigate environmental degradation.

44.2. In this regard, government encourages CSOs to play a positive role in enhancing security sector responsiveness to the security and justice needs of the state and people within the ambit of the law. Furthermore, they are urge to continue to alleviate social tensions and conflict, through the facilitation and promotion of dialogue, tolerance and the culture of peace.

45. **The Gambia - Senegal Relationship**. As mentioned earlier the Gambia, being contiguous to Senegal on all sides except to the west (Atlantic Coast), provides ample opportunity for security cooperation and socio-economic development of both countries.

46. **International Cooperation and Collaboration.** The support of the international community to the security sector reform and the transitional justice process, offer viable opportunities for the country to establish strong national cohesion, unity, peace and security upon which national development could be anchored. This is an invaluable opportunity that should be effectively exploited.

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RESOURCE MOBILIZATIONAND COORDINATION

47. Over the years, National Treasury has been the major source of funds for security activities, therefore all resources allocated must be used prudently. The wellbeing of the country depends on how the country is protected, hence the Gambian people expect effective delivery of defence and protection. Thepercentage of the annual budget allocated to the security sector should therefore be prudently utilized through sustainable spending by security institutions. In the same vein, it should be realistically based on the security needs and requirements of the country.

48. It must be understood that security capabilities and preparedness are tied to the availability of resources. This should call for a regular review of the financial and material resources management that will enhance effective and efficient service delivery by the security sector. Therefore, mobilization strategies should explore an expanded range of resources from both localand international sources by focusing on the deepening of relations with existing and prospective donor partners.

COMMUNICATION

49. A comprehensive Communication strategy is vital to incorporate the media outfits, Internet services and satellite/cable television channels, think-tanks, civil society organizations and other platforms as a mechanism for information sharing, advocacy, innovation and feedback on key security issues with national and international dimensions.

50. This will address the need to inform the people of the concerns and security challenges affecting their well-being, livelihood and their future. This will foster cooperation to ensure safety and help restore public trust in the security sector.

51. Therefore, this policy directs that the government devotes the required resources to efficiently manage the information and effectively communicate its message to the public at all times. This policy directs that all security institutions comply fully with the above requirements.

WAYFORWARD

52. The development of this NSP will be followed by the development of National Security Strategy and other polices/strategies, such as Defence Policy, Safety and Security Policy, Judicial Policy, Maritime Security Policyetc.

53. There should be the establishment of a National Security Policy Monitoring Committee to be chaired by the Secretary General and Head of Civil Service. The committee shall be responsible for the management of the NSP and Subordinate Security Policies.