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Certified translation from Polish

THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

DEFENSE STRATEGY

OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND

Sector strategy of

the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland

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INTRODUCTION

1. At the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries important changes occurred in the global security environment which significantly impacted the security of our state. Poland has consolidated its position in the international arena, becoming an important member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and of the European Union. During that time, Poland has been actively involved in international operations to stabilize global security and has taken measures to turn its armed forces into a professional army.
2. In the global security environment a low probability of eruption of a large-scale armed conflict has been maintained, while at the same time an increasing possibility of eruption of local conflicts has been observed. There have been major changes in the course of armed conflict: the dynamic stage of strictly combat operations has been shortened, while the post-conflict stage of stabilizing and reconstruction measures has been drawn out.
3. Effectively counteracting modern-day threats and challenges requires a comprehensive approach to security on international and national levels. It calls for the ability to use diplomatic, economic and military instruments in synergy with a view to identifying, preventing and solving conflicts in their early stages. It also signifies a need for a wider approach to understanding security and for basing it not only on military capabilities and political efforts, but also to factor in such components as economic, technological or educational aid.
4. Thinking about state defence has been evolving. Recent years have seen many changes in the organization of national defence, so that now it is perceived in broader terms not just the traditional categories. At present, defence is a field of national security that constitutes the sum of all civil-military undertakings aimed at preventing and counteracting any potential security threats to a state, both military and non-military ones, which could potentially lead to a political and military crisis.
5. The Republic of Poland, together with its partners and Allies, will respond to present-day challenges and threats, guided by its national interests identified in the *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland.*
6. *The Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland* outlines assumptions underlying the operation of the state's defence. It identifies the functions and structure of the state's defence system and maps out the main directions of the development of its subsystems.
7. *The Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland* is a document that details and develops the defence provisions laid down in the *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland* adopted by the Council of Ministers, and subsequently approved by the President of the Republic of Poland on 13 November 2007. Provisions of this Strategy formulate guidelines for documents in the area of defence that are drafted at lower levels.

CHAPTER I. EXTERNAL CONDITIONALITIES OF DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND

1.1. International security environment

Global security

8. The global security environment has become increasingly dynamic and complex. In the wake of changes of the economic, population and military potential of key states, the post-Cold War world order has been evolving in the direction of a multi-polar order.

9. The intensity of the globalisation process in international relations enables states and regions situated at great distance from each other to cooperate and makes the international system increasingly more interdependent and integrated. International policy is becoming a resultant of complicated political, economic and financial relations.

10. Globalisation has made us perceive national security in a different light, blurring the borderline between internal and external dimensions of security. The growing international interdependency of today's world often results in our inability to predict many phenomena and their developments, the extent of which is not limited by geographical barriers or political and economic systems. In such arrangement of relations, the emerging threats and risks are global in nature, while non-state entities that could disrupt this arrangement, are gaining importance.

11. The security environment is marked by the concurrence and two-way penetration of military and non-military threats, often asymmetrical in nature. The risk of a large-scale conflict has been drastically reduced, but the threat of regional and local conflicts has not disappeared. The conflict in Georgia has demonstrated the topicality of traditional military threats and the importance of military force, also in Europe's backyard. The continuation of conflict prone developments in the post-Soviet region and intensification of disputes in the Balkans cannot be excluded. Tensions along the West – the Muslim world line and the existence of an extensive instability area covering the Near and Middle East also pose a serious global security risk.

12. The fact that states are holding back from implementing international agreements in the area of non-proliferation, arms reduction and disarmament as well as in confidence and security building measures can also have far-reaching consequences. Nuclear and missile technology development programmes implemented in breach of UN Security Council resolutions also remain a significant threat to international security. The disruption of a regional military balance resulting from such programmes could pose a significant threat to global security.

13. Economic security risks, especially those relating to energy security, top the list of non-military threats. A growing demand for energy resources accounts for the fact that they are used to exert political pressure and increasingly replace military power as a state's policymaking instrument. Tensions resulting from temporary shortages of gas supplies experienced by some countries indicate that the energy supply market has weaknesses and that politics

negatively impacts the economy. The integration of global economy, apart from its undeniable benefits, also carries the risk of economic crises and of the destabilization of financial markets. Climate change carries both humanitarian and political consequences and the struggle for access to natural resources has become a growing cause of conflicts. Other areas of potentially global risks include uncontrolled population migrations from less developed countries and infectious disease epidemics.

14. Asymmetrical threats feature prominently among security risks. In most cases, they are generated by failing or failed states. The most serious threats continue to be: international terrorism, including cyber terrorism and terrorism that uses weapons of mass destruction; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of transporting them; organized international crime involved in the smuggling of arms and dual-use materials, drug and human trafficking, illegal financial operations and maritime piracy.

15. Local ethnic, religious and cultural conflicts the causes of which are found in historical, geographical or national disputes continue to pose a serious challenge for the system of international security. Non-state entities through their ability to effectively use armed force are increasingly involved in conflicts, which threaten the foundations of national and international security. This complex basis of modern-day armed conflicts and the mutual penetration of different threats and methods of combat compel states and international organizations to adopt a comprehensive approach to conflict resolution and to invite a wide participation of civilian entities in the process of security building.

National security

16. The Republic of Poland, being a member of NATO and the European Union, with its significant economic and population potential, is an important actor on the international arena. Membership in both organizations as well as our strategic partnership with the United States of America demonstrably enhances Poland's security. Our country wishes to further develop friendly and partnership relations with all our neighbours.

17. Poland's security is primarily determined by processes and developments occurring in our vicinity. The stability of Central and Eastern Europe, but also of the entire Euro-Atlantic region and its neighbourhood bears upon Poland's security.

18. There is little likelihood of a large-scale armed conflict erupting in the foreseeable future. However, the probability of a local conflict occurring close to Poland's border cannot be excluded.

19. Threats to Poland's security are closely related to global threats. The catalogue of threats impacting Poland's security is, in principle, identical with the threats that its allies see in the surrounding world – the only differences are in where the stress is laid. Counteracting threats to energy security and a potential weakening of bonds linking the European and transatlantic communities are priorities for Poland. International terrorism is a growing threat for the security of Poland's citizens. Counteracting and fighting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other asymmetrical and non-military threats remain the fundamental functions of the state's defence system (SDS).

1.2. Conditions of the security and defence policy

20. Membership in the North Atlantic Alliance and in the European Union and the strategic partnership with the United States are the main reference points for Poland's foreign and defence policy. NATO's and the EU's positions have been enhanced globally, which is vitally important, because this raises the level of security of their member states.

21. Regardless of the enlargement of NATO's and the EU's sphere of geographic influence, the political stability and the social and economic development of the entire region of Eastern and Central Europe are in Poland's national interest. The development of good-neighbourly relations, based on mutual understanding with Poland's eastern neighbours: Russia, Belarus and Ukraine remain one of the foundations of Polish foreign policy, Developments in these states and their security policy, especially Russia's policy, directly impact Poland's security.

22. The North Atlantic Alliance remains a key organization in the area of international security and the most important guarantor of Poland's external security. An evolution of the North Atlantic Alliance's directions and methods of operation, including the continuation of its open-door policy, ensures that the day-today and long-term security interests of its members are being effectively implemented.

23. The development, together with other NATO members, of instruments aimed at enhancing collective security remains a priority for Poland. These instruments involve the Alliance's preparation of an effective set of High Readiness Forces, as well as the Allies' active participation in NATO Response Force operations. It also requires effective involvement in international operations and efficient consultation mechanisms within the North Atlantic Alliance.

24. The Alliance's ongoing debate about its transformation and the work on a new strategic concept bear out the fundamental dilemmas surrounding NATO's role in the changing international environment. These dilemmas primarily involve the issue of balance between maintaining and enhancing the collective defence function and the Alliance's involvement in crisis management operations in distance operational theatres.

25. The development of the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy, including the European Security and Defence Policy, is significantly important for Poland. The state of cooperation in this area is a determinant of European integration in a broad sense. At its root lies a desire to ensure peace, stability and greater prosperity for European Union Member States and of its neighbours. Rapid reaction forces engaged in military operations and the conceptual development of the EU Battlegroups in which Poland takes an active part serve this purpose.

26. The European Union provides a framework for cooperation in the procurement of military capabilities and in the consolidation of the defence industry. Poland will support and will be actively involved in further development of the European Defence Agency, regarding it as a basic centre of stimulation and coordination of the development of capabilities and of the European defence market.

27. The Republic of Poland has been developing political and military cooperation bilaterally, including, in particular, a deepened political and military cooperation with the United States of America and relations with its neighbours, and on a multilateral level, in the Weimar Triangle and the Visegrad Group, in particular.

28. Poland supports United Nations operations to maintain international peace and security. A manifestation of which is the participation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland in UN peacekeeping operations. Poland has emphasized the need to enhance international institutions by creating mechanisms to enforce standards of international law.

29. Poland has been actively involved in the work of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), an important international institution responsible for Euro-Atlantic security issues in three dimensions: political and military, economic and environmental and the human dimension (human rights). Poland is a state party to all international agreements entered into under the OSCE auspices concerning conventional arms reductions, disarmament and confidence and security building measures, including the *Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty*, *the Treaty on Open Skies and the Vienna Document* on confidence and security building measures. These agreements are an important element of the security system in Europe. The start of a new dialogue by member states on European security, which could contribute to the enhancement of this Organization is a positive development.

Chapter II.CONCEPT OF DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND

2.1. Strategic defence goals

30. Pursuant to the *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland,* the supreme strategic goal of the Republic of Poland is to ensure favourable and secure conditions for the realization of national interests by eliminating external and internal threats, reducing risks and rightly assessing undertaken challenges and ably using existing opportunities. The Republic of Poland's main strategic goals in the area of defence include:

- ensuring independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Poland, its integrality and inviolability of its borders;
- defence and protection of all the citizens of the Republic of Poland;
- creating conditions to ensure continuity of implementation of functions by public administration authorities and other entities competent in the area of national security, including entities responsible for running the economy and for other areas important for the life and security of its citizens;
- creating conditions for improvement of the state's defence capabilities and ensuring defence readiness in the national and Allied structures;
- developing partnership military cooperation with other states, especially neighbouring ones;
- implementing commitments arising from Poland's NATO and European Union's membership;

- engagement in international crisis response operations led by NATO and the EU in the first place, as well as by the UN or as part of emergency coalitions.

2.2. Basic tenets of the Republic of Poland's Defence Strategy

31. The basic tenets of *the Republic of Poland's Defence Strategy* originate from values and principles laid down in the *Constitution of the Republic of Poland* and from guidelines adopted in national strategic documents, including the *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland's* and the *Political and Strategic Defence Directive of the Republic of Poland.*

32. Care for security is an elementary duty of the state. The nature of security is indivisible – its internal dimension is interrelated with the external dimension, and the national one with the Allied one.

33. Regardless of the adopted projections of international environment development and the related assessments of the real chance of eruption of armed conflicts, the protection of state's independence and integrity of its territory and a common defence against aggression continue to remain a Constitutional obligation and duty stemming from the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) ratified by the Republic of Poland.

34. The Polish state maintains continuous defence capability, and to this end uses all available means and subordinates all of its political, economic, diplomatic and military measures to this goal. The state's defence will be implemented by an efficiently running and continuously improved state defence system. The Republic of Poland's defence capability level is a product of national needs and Allied commitments.

35. The Republic of Poland's security and defence architecture is based on an Atlantic and a European pillar. An important element enhancing our state's security and defence is a strategic bond with the United States of America.

36. Security and defence activities are and will be carried out mainly within the Allied structure, although independent operations are not excluded. Participation in military and non-military operations outside Poland's borders is a manifestation of responsibility for our common security and its aim is to prevent threats of asymmetrical and global nature.

37. The Republic of Poland's Armed Force's main mission is to protect the state and to participate in the protection of its allies. A transformation process in the AFRP involving their professionalization and technical modernization is now underway for the purpose of fulfilling this mission. Such changes are aimed at increasing the military potential and operational capabilities of the forces and the enhancement of their defence and out-of-area nature.

38. Integration of defence response with crisis management is required in order to effectively counteract modern-day threats. Further harmonization of planning procedures and projects as well as the improvement of coordination of authorities competent in the respective areas are required.

39. The unpredictability of today's security environment necessitates advance planning with respect to hypothetical threat scenarios, the ability to respond

flexibly corresponding to the nature, scale and location of threats and a comprehensive approach to state security and defence.

40. Our concept of defence provides that specific strategic actions are undertaken commensurable with our state's defence readiness condition, having regard for our strategic goals and relying on our adopted tenets.

2.3. State defence during peacetime

41. During peacetime, when no significant external security threats to the state are identified, a condition of permanent readiness to defend the state is maintained. During such time, state defence consists of implementing two types of strategic operations: maintenance of good performance and improvement of SOP integrated with the Allied security system and the development of the international environment with a view to enhancing state defence.

42. As part of maintaining good performance and improving SOP, functions involving preparations to defend the state are carried out which include, in particular:

- analyses and assessments of challenges and threats against international and national security;

- identification and neutralization of intelligence operations against state defence and security;

- advance defence planning, covering operational planning and defence programming;

- improvement of common (national and Allied) operational procedures in crisis situations and during wartime;

- enhancement of the Republic of Poland's Armed Force's rapid reaction capabilities against direct threats to state security, including enhancement of their capability to wage operations independently;

- maintenance and improvement of an integrated system of national security control, including state defence control;

- maintenance of capabilities to institute states of higher defence readiness commensurate with the scale and nature of threats;

- ensuring conditions for the acceptance on our territory of Allied Reinforcing Force through the realization of functions resulting from host-nation support obligations (HNS);

- maintenance of readiness to carry out production and service functions laid down in the *Economy Mobilization Programme* (EMP);

- maintenance of the required level of state and personnel reserves to meet the needs of state defence and security;

- development and maintenance of the defence infrastructure;

- education in the scope of defence and patriotic formation of the public.

43. As part of our efforts to affect the international environment in order to enhance state defence, the following activities are carried out intended to:

- ensure that Poland occupies a strong international position and that Polish interests on the international arena are being effectively promoted by supporting the improvement of Allied mechanisms, the effectiveness of international institutions and international law, by developing friendly relations with partners and neighbours, and by supporting transformation processes in Central and Eastern Europe;

- enhance inspection mechanisms with respect to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, dual-use materials and technologies, and arms control;

- participate in actions to promote democracy and respect for human rights;

- assemble and maintain forces and resources that will participate in Allied crisis response operations, humanitarian, search and rescue operations, as well as in possible coalition and national operations;

- actively affect potential sources of threats relating to global terrorism, by conducting preventive foreign policy, social and economic policy, and by being ready to participate in anti-terrorist operations.

2.4. Reacting to external threats against the state

44. In the event of an external threat against the state, the Republic of Poland will undertake actions to bring a crisis/conflict under control so as to keep its effects to a minimum. In particular, it will act to prevent the crisis from turning into a direct threat of war against Poland or its allies.

45. Depending on how a crisis develops, authorized bodies will take decisions to carry out specific operations laid down in the *National Crisis Management Plan*, and in the event of a growing threat of armed aggression – in the *Republic of Poland's Defence Response Plan* (RPDRP). Such decisions will enable public administration bodies to institute a state of defence readiness in the state during crisis and to implement related measures.

46. In the event of a crisis occurring in Poland's more distant neighbourhood, when NATO or the EU become involved in it, the Republic of Poland, pursuant to a decision of authorized bodies, will be ready to participate in Allied operations. Poland's Armed Forces' engagement in crisis response operations will be in line with priorities and tenets laid down in the *Strategy of the Republic of Poland's Armed Forces' participation in international operations.* In line with the comprehensive approach concept, in addition to armed forces, political, diplomatic and economic instruments will be used, in cooperation with non-governmental organizations.

47. In the event of a crisis occurring in Poland's immediate neighbourhood, national authorities will undertake appropriate measures on a national and international scale in order to activate crisis response mechanisms. A state of alarm and/or higher state of defence readiness corresponding to a specific degree of threat will be instituted in the territory of the Republic of Poland. Public administration bodies and the AFRP will institute selected crisis management measures and will carry out functions resulting from operational plans.

48. In the event of a deepening crisis, authorized bodies will take a decision to institute a state of defence readiness of the state during wartime. Following that, martial law will be imposed, combat readiness of the AFRP will be raised and a partial or general mobilization will be declared and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces will be appointed.

49. As part of counterterrorism measures, the Republic of Poland will launch, independently and as part of Allied response, comprehensive military and non-military operations to minimise a threat. In the event that information is obtained about a threat of a terrorist attack directed against the population, the state's critical infrastructural property and systems, functions which are specified in a list of operations and procedures of the crisis management system and in crisis management plans will be implemented. Authorities competent in crisis management will mobilize the necessary force and assets in order to eliminate the effects of terrorist attacks and to enhance the protection of the state's critical infrastructural property

50. Operations carried out by state services responsible for counteracting terrorism may be supported by forces and assets assembled by the armed forces. Depending on the degree of terrorist threat or the prevailing crisis situation, the Council of Ministers may adopt a resolution to address a motion to the President of the Republic of Poland to impose martial law in a part of or in the whole country.

51. In its defence against terrorism Poland will become engaged in Allied and international counterterrorist operations outside its territory. Such actions will be carried out in the form of military operations or in the form of support provided to the other country's authorities to mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks.

2.5. Defence against armed aggression

52. To protect the territory of the Republic of Poland against armed aggression missions arising from national and Allied operational plans will be carried out and these include: activation of a mobilizing system of deployment of the AFRP, their regrouping to regions of operational assigned capacity and demonstration of public determination and the state's political will to oppose armed aggression. The scale of engagement of forces will depend on the development dynamics of a crisis.

53. In the event that a crisis leads inexorably to a military confrontation, Allied Reinforcing Forces will be deployed in the territory of Poland, at the request of Polish national authorities. The AFRP will also be assigned to the defence grouping of joint Allied forces. The grouping's mission will be to counteract aggression, to retaliate against armed aggression and to prevent the deployment of offensive operations.

54. SOP non-military subsystem operations will be directed mainly at maintaining and regeneration of the state's defence potential. As part of these operations, functions will be carried out to ensure that public administration and the economy function effectively during wartime, to meet the basic needs of the population and to provide all-around support to armed forces (our own and Allied), including a proper functioning of transportation and communication.

55. In the event that Poland participates in a defence operation under Art. 5 of the NAT outside the state's territory, the AFRP may commit out of their order forces declared as part of the Alliance's defence planning.

Chapter III. STATE DEFENCE SYSTEM

56. To ensure the realization of national interests and strategic goals in the area of security, the Republic of Poland organizes and develops an integrated system of national security. The state's defence system established to counteract threats to vital national interests is a component of this system. This system has been integrated with the Allied security system through common operating procedures in crisis situations and during wartime and by participating in Allied defence planning.

57. The state's defence system is a coordinated set of control and execution elements, as well as functions and processes realized by them and their interrelations. All forces and resources assigned to execute defence tasks, which are organized, maintained and prepared adequately to their tasks, form SOP. The organization and running of SOP is abased on generally applicable provisions of law as well as on provisions of international agreements and treaties to which Poland is a party.

58. SOP consists of three subsystems:

1) the state defence control subsystem – formed by public authorities and administration bodies together with offices that service them and the necessary infrastructure and the Republic of Poland's Armed Force's command authorities;

2) two executive subsystems:

   - a military subsystem – formed out of the AFRP;

   - a non-military subsystem – formed out of the executive structures of public administration, entrepreneurs and other organization units.

3.1. Demands on the state's defence system

59. To ensure proper realization of the tasks it was called upon to perform, the SOP should be organized and maintained in a way that would guarantee:

   - the capability to deter, protect and defend, and to execute tasks of collective defence;

   - the capability to cooperate with Allied structures, while preserving the capability to effectively act alone;

   - effective cooperation of all public authorities and administration bodies and entrepreneurs that execute defence tasks, non-governmental organizations and individual citizens for the purpose of defending the state;

   - efficient operation in any condition through adequate organization, equipping and circulation of information;

   - the capability to monitor and counteract threats and to respond to

emerging threats in their early stage, as well as to eliminate their consequences;

- tapping into the competencies, skills and expertise of persons who participate in the work of the respective subsystems.

3.2. State defence control subsystem

60. The state defence control subsystem is a core element of the national defence control subsystem. This system is formed by public authorities and administration bodies which are related by organizational and information (together with the offices that service them and the necessary infrastructure) and the heads of organizational units, which perform defence related tasks and the Republic of Poland's Armed Force's command authority, adequately to their hierarchical subordination and powers under the law. This subsystem is intended to ensure optimal conditions for effective decision-making and for an ongoing and permanent coordination of operations by public authorities and administration bodies at all levels and by the Republic of Poland's Armed Force's command authority during peacetime, crisis and, first and foremost during wartime. Emergency and standing crisis management structures (groups and centres) will be used to deploy elements of the state defence control subsystem.

61. Pursuant to the *Constitution of the Republic of Poland*, the President of the Republic of Poland and the Council of Ministers – as the executive branch of the government – are the supreme authorities to control defence. The President of the Republic of Poland is the guardian of state sovereignty and security as well as the inviolability and indivisibility of its territory and is also the supreme commander of the AFRP. The Council of Ministers runs the Republic of Poland's internal and foreign policies, ensures Poland's internal and external security and exercises overall leadership in the area of defence. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers (the Prime Minister) ensures that defence policy is implemented by determining ways in which it is carried out.

62. State defence control essentially involves decision-making by competent state authorities and actions taken to activate state military potential by imposition of states of heightened defence readiness in the country and by initiating the implementation of operational tasks to counteract emerging threats. State authorities – the President of the Republic of Poland acting jointly with the Council of Ministers – direct state defence consistently with their powers laid down in the *Constitution of the Republic of Poland* and in acts of Parliament. Interdependencies between the Republic of Poland's authorities and NATO and the UE bodies (including also between the AFRP command authority and the relevant NATO commands) arising from adopted treaties and protocols are accounted for in the decision-making process relating to state defence.

63. Competent ministers, heads of central offices (and other government institutions), voivodes and local government authorities execute state defence control missions. Such authorities control the implementation of tasks, assisted by competent offices which have with a properly prepared organization structure, based on a system of control posts. During war, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces nominated by the President of the Republic of Poland commands the AFRP and other subordinated organization

units, using the War Command System links and elements of control of mobilization and deployment of forces.

64. Armed forces in a crisis are commanded pursuant to the rules of command during peacetime by relying on the Ministry of National Defence's crisis management structures. Forces assigned to international formations, which perform crisis response missions will be commanded by operational commanders of such formations. Troop units used in support of organizational units subordinated to or supervised by a minister competent for internal affairs remain in the organization structure and the command system of the AFRP.

3.3. The military subsystem – the AFRP

65. The military subsystem is formed by the AFRP. They perform missions arising from the *Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Poland's National Security Strategy* and from *the Republic of Poland's Defence Strategy,* detailed in the *Republic of Poland's Political and Strategic Defence Directive* and in the relevant national and Allied operational plans. The AFRP are apolitical and are subject to civil and democratic oversight. *More on the Republic of Poland's Armed Forces in Chapter IV.*

3.4. The non-military subsystem – non-military defence structures

66. The non-military defence structures are made up of: government administration, local self-government administration and other government entities and institutions, as well as entrepreneurs that are required to execute tasks to defend the state. This subsystem implements tasks comprising: ensuring an efficient and secure running of the state, providing human and material resources to the AFRP and to organization units responsible for the state's internal security, as well as tasks arising from host nation's obligations, ensuring protection and securing basic needs of the population and creating conditions for its survival.

67. Defence tasks, which form part of national security tasks cover activities carried out by the executive branch of government and other state authorities and institutions, entrepreneurs and citizens involved in the preparation of the state for efficient action and for survival in conditions of external threat against the state, of crisis and war, as well as the elimination, after warding off a threat, of its effects in order to restore normalcy in the state.

68. The execution of defence tasks permits the attainment of an appropriate state of defence readiness in the country and ensures a response in the event of a crisis. The basic kinds of defence tasks include: general tasks of preparatory nature; diplomatic tasks; information tasks; protective tasks aimed to ensure efficient running of the state and to ensure the basic material, spiritual and population protection needs; economic and defence tasks.

69. General tasks of preparatory nature serve to create organizational conditions to enable non-military structures to operate in different states of defence readiness of the country and during times when they are raised. They comprise mainly: defence planning; defence training; defence education and the fulfilment of the general duty to defend in a wide sense of the term.

70. Diplomatic tasks are aimed at limiting to a minimum a risk of threat against fundamental national interests and of foreign policy and security threats, as well as diplomatic support during an armed conflict including extinguishing it.

71. Information tasks serve to protect and promote Polish interests, to weaken the enemy by means of information, to strengthen willpower, morale, the determination to defend and the society's perseverance.

72. Defence tasks relating to ensuring efficient running of the state cover, in particular: protection of state borders; protection of persons subject to special protection and the installations and transport that serve them; the protection of delegations and missions of other states; ensuring communication; protection of especially important installations; protection of cultural and national heritage property; ensuring security and public order; fire protection and oversight over compliance with the rigor of the law during martial law.

73. The protection of and ensuring the material needs of the population essentially covers: the supply of food products, water, medicine and medical devices, basic general purpose industrial goods; electricity and energy resources; alerting; evacuation; rescue; shelters; ensuring supplies of materiel, materials and security means to civil protection formations; elimination of contaminations; health protection; passenger and freight transport; child, young people and disabled persons care.

74. The purpose of the implementation of economic and defence tasks is to ensure a material basis for the realization of defence tasks, including: maintaining production and repair capacities necessary to implement tasks arising from the EMP; preparation for production and services and the realization of tasks set out in the EMP; creation and maintenance of reserves; preparation of transportation to meet defence needs of the state; preparation to operate in conditions of limited supplies; activation of personal and in-kind performances; evacuation of state reserves; acceleration of investments of strategic importance; imposition of restrictions in transportation, communication; reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure; ensuring supplies of materiel, materials and protection agents to civil defence formation; monitoring of the economic potential in industry, agriculture, transportation, power industry, forestry and health protection.

Chapter IV. THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND'S ARMED FORCES IN THE STATE DEFENCE SYSTEM

75. The AFRP constitute the fundamental element of the state defence system, designated to effectively conduct the security and defence policy. The expanding spectrum of armed force's tasks forces changes in the defence planning process and periodic updating of the underlying planning assumptions, including in particular the armed forces' missions and tasks.

4.1. AFRP's missions and tasks

76. In consideration of the assessment of security threats against the state and the strategic goals in the area of defence adopted in the *Republic of Poland's National Security Strategy*, the AFRP maintain their readiness to realize three

types of missions: guaranteeing defence of the state and counteracting aggression; participation in the process of stabilization of the international situation and in crisis response and humanitarian operations; supporting the internal situation and assisting the population.

77. In their mission to ensure that the state has the capability to defend and counteract aggression as part of Allied obligations, the AFRP maintain their readiness to realize tasks relating to defence and protection of the inviolability of the RP's borders; by participating in counterterrorist operations at home and abroad; by participating in the resolution of local or regional armed conflicts within or outside of NATO's area of responsibility; by participating in defence operations outside the country according to Allied obligations under Art 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty; by conducting a strategic defence operation in the RP's territory.

78. Participation in a mission to stabilize the international situation and in crisis response and humanitarian operations requires that the AFRP maintain forces and capabilities to: participate in peacekeeping and crisis response operations led by NATO, EU, and the UN as well as in other operations arising from international agreements; participation in humanitarian operations conducted by international, government and other organizations; military cooperation in the area of development and the use of confidence building and security measures.

79. In order to fulfil their mission of supporting internal security and assisting the population, the AFRP maintain their capabilities to realize tasks involving: the monitoring and protection of air space and support of the protection of land borders and territorial waters; the conduct of reconnaissance and intelligence operations; the monitoring of radioactive, chemical and biological contaminations in the country's territory; conducting search and rescue operations; assisting government authorities, public administration and the population in responding to threats.

4.2. The level of operational capabilities of the AFRP

80. For future operations to be successful, key operational capabilities, most important when it comes to effectively performing tasks by the AFRP have to be achieved (developed or improved). The need to maintain such capabilities derives from obligations under the Constitution, Allied commitments and the resulting necessity to prepare and assign armed forces components to participate in multinational joint operations in the territory of Poland and abroad.

81. The AFRP maintain the necessary level of operational capabilities, which should ensure:

    - during peace– territorial integrity and inviolability of state borders, as well as the protection and defence of the country's air space which is an absolute priority; effective transition to implementation of tasks in the event of an armed conflict; the possibility of engagement in international operations in line with undertaken commitments;

    - in the event of a small-scale armed conflict – the defence of the state with defence potential maintained during peace in one operational direction;

- in the event of a large-scale armed conflict – strategic deployment of the entire force and strategic holding of important areas of the state, acceptance of Allied Reinforcing Forces in the territory of Poland and participation in a strategic Allied defence operation in order to create conditions for a political resolution of the conflict in line with the Polish raison d'état.

82. Waging of defence operations in the territory of Poland excludes the possibility of a concurrent use of the AFRP in crisis response operations outside the country's territory. Assignment of forces and resources to participate in operations outside of Poland has to be subordinated to the need to maintain capabilities ensuring security and inviolability of the Republic of Poland's borders.

83. Moreover, the AFRP maintain the necessary potential of forces which specialize in counterterrorist operations, in countering asymmetrical and non-military threats and which realize tasks in crisis situations in support of operations led by civil authorities.

84. The capability to act effectively, the level and quality of technical equipment and the training of commands and staffs; possibilities of an integrated logistics and medical protection; out-of-area capabilities; the ability to act in a network-centric environment; proper counterintelligence protection; extended civil-military cooperation and professionalization will all impact fundamentally the achievement of the desired state of the AFRP's operational capabilities and their further development.

85. The realization of Allied commitments, including the attainment of capability of armed forces components to participate in multinational joint operations and engagement in operations outside Poland's borders requires efforts to achieve full interoperability.

86. To ensure command capability, an integrated, fully automated and efficient class C4ISR system (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) has to be implemented and gradually developed. Such system has to be based on modern information and communication technologies and comprises all levels of command and types/components of armed forces. This system is intended to ensure information advantage, which will allow a commander to obtain a decision-making advantage and, as a result, take over initiative on the battle field. Acting in conditions of future network-centric warfare, the system should integrate weapons, reconnaissance and decision-making centres, make available information about resources and use mechanisms enabling data transmission in real-time, while at the same time ensuring continuity of work and the required level of security. This aim is served by electronic counterintelligence operations and cryptographic protection measures.

87. We should strive to meet the Allied requirements regarding making forces available for operations. This will require increasing the quantity of units capable of movement and fully interoperable with the Allied forces. They should be adequately trained, equipped and have the necessary materiél. They should also comply with NATO standards regarding procedures, doctrines and command and have an adequate quantity of supplies, weapons and material resources.

88. In order to enhance the effectiveness of logistical and medical support, a system of medical supervision and medical intelligence will be deployed and specialized subunits to support and secure operations in the same readiness and availability category as the combat units which they serve will be maintained.

89. The capability of troop movement will be realized by increasing the strategic transportation potential to move forces the size of a brigade. To this end, strategic transportation means (by air and sea) will be insured and the potential of swift movement of land components of air force units will be enhanced. Air and sea transport will be insured by: the procurement of air transportation means, including utility transport aircraft and air refueling aircraft; procurement by naval forces of transport vessels through their purchase, charter or otherwise; the participation in multinational programmes which guarantee strategic sea and air transport; and through contacts with commercial entities.

90. The development of troop survivability and protection capabilities will aim at increasing the operational effectiveness of means of combat identification system by improving resistance to jamming, increasing the probability of correct identification of targets, expanding the information potential of the system and insuring electromagnetic compatibility of installations. The scope of the identification of targets on the battlefield comprising a land component and, in particular, artillery and missile weapon systems, armoured and mechanized detachments, as well as the identification of a single soldier. The Special Forces Command will be provided with this capability, in the first place. Moreover, the capability to protect and defend military bases and convoys will be gradually enhanced.

91. In order to insure security of persons involved in international operations and to shape high morale and readiness to take risks, the capability to prevent, recapture and minimize the effects of isolation of military personnel in a hostile environment will be developed. In this regard, the implementation of procedures of response by commands and staff to an event of isolation, equipping troops with individual means of survival in isolation and the dissemination of training on recapturing military personnel will be crucial to achieving this capability.

92. To insure an effective defence against weapons of mass destruction, priority will be given to the creation of an integrated system, operating in a data communications network, of agent detection, telling, warning and alerting troops. Equipping troops with modern means of individual and collective protection against contaminations will remain crucial. It will also be important to gain the capability of detecting biological agents, including remote detection, as well as the capability to neutralize explosive materials and hazardous items containing weapons of mass destruction.

93. To insure effective means of air defence, the capability to operate in a national and Allied integrated system of air defence will be developed to enable detection and destruction of aerial attack vehicles, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), cruise missiles and tactical ballistic missiles.

94. The aforementioned operational capabilities of armed forces will be developed on the basis of the following principal functional systems: reinforcement,

reconnaissance, strike, logistical support, command and communications support, securing training, air defence, medical support, engineering support, defence against WMD, information technology and IT and data communication system development, meteorological support.

95. The fact that it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish between the military aspect of a resolution of a crisis situation and non-military entities reaffirms the need for an across-the-board approach to crisis situations. A determined development of capability for extended civil-military cooperation, both on a political and military level as well as on an operational and tactical level will be crucial for the success of such operations.

96. The professionalization of the AFRP will lead to their increased capability to respond to emerging new threats and challenges and to enhance their quality, while rationalizing their running costs.

97. The process of professionalization of the AFRP will be supported by a new model of military training, covering, i.a.: enhancement of the role of military universities, training and in-service courses for soldiers aimed at continually raising the professionalism of military and civilian staff; the implementation of the desired standard of professional training at universities; training of reserve personnel.

4.3. The organization structure of the AFRP

98. The structure, composition, dislocation and equipment of the AFRP should follow from the nature and specifics of the missions they have been assigned to perform and the need to insure appropriate operational capabilities. They have to enable the realization of tasks during peace, crisis and war.

99. The AFRP's organization structure should insure the required degree of autonomy of operation, effective strike capacity and appropriate standards of supply and support. Combat autonomy should be maintained from an appropriate organization level upwards to enable the creation of combat modules – task teams/groups.

100. The AFRP are composed of:

a) the operational army, comprising forces and assets of types of armed forces prepared to wage joint operations at home and abroad, in the Alliance's structures and as part of other international security organizations and of emergency coalitions. Depending on the nature of performed tasks, the following units are distinguished in the operational army structures:

   – combat units: general military, airborne, special, tactical air force, missile air defence and groups of assault ships;

   – combat support units: reconnaissance, intelligence, electronic warfare, psychological activities, rocket and artillery; air defence; chemical, engineering, air defence radio engineering, ships of anti-mine defence; antisubmarine warfare and hydrographical support;

   – combat service support units: command, communication and information technology, logistical, medical, civil-military cooperation and other support vessels.

b) the support army, intended to support the operational army and to carry out defence tasks mainly in the territory of Poland in coordination with non-military components of the state's defence system. They are composed of territorial defence units, the Military Police, military administration bodies and station logistical units, station medical posts and other securing posts in a stationary system. In special situations, it is possible to temporarily subordinate a part of such forces – in the area of direct operations in the territory of Poland – to Allied and coalition commands.

101. The National Reserve Forces (NRF) will be an important addition to the armed forces. Eventually they will enhance the operational army and the support army. The NRF is composed of a selected volunteer corps of reserve soldiers who have crisis assignments to specific service posts in military units which they were awarded after they had entered into contracts, on a voluntary basis, to perform reserve military duty and who put themselves at the army's disposal to be made use of in the event of real military and non-military threats, both at home and abroad.

102. The AFRP's units are graded into one of the following readiness states: forces of different readiness (high readiness and lower readiness) and of extended readiness time.

103. The AFRP comprise the following types of forces: the Land Forces, the Air Force, the Navy and Special Forces

104. The Land Forces defend against land and air strikes in any region, at every direction of operation and in the face of any form of military threat. Additionally, it is prepared to execute tasks arising from Poland's international commitments to ensure security. The Land Forces' specialized forces and resources are prepared to eliminate non-military threats. Its structure is based on tactical relations, units and subunits. The core of the Land Forces is composed of mechanized and armoured cavalry divisions, brigades: airborne and air cavalry and other units of types of forces, command and support and military training. The Land Forces are composed of the following types of units: armoured and mechanized; airmobile; missile and artillery; air defence; engineering; chemical; communications and IT. In addition, the Land Forces also comprise: units and subunits of reconnaissance and electronic warfare; logistical and medical support units and subunits and subunits of psychological activities and civil-military cooperation.

105. The Air Force is a force intended mainly to insure air defence of the country. It operates in the national system of air defence, which is integrated with the Allied system and with the relevant European civilian and military system. Selected Air Force units are prepared to execute tasks arising from Poland's international security commitments. The core potential of the Air Force is formed by tactical and transport air wings and Air Defence missile brigades, and the Radio Engineering Brigade. The Air Force comprises the following types of units: air; air defence, and radio engineering. The Air Force also comprises: support and securing units and military training units.

106. The Navy defends the interests of the state in Polish maritime areas, defends the seacoast from the sea and participates in the defence of the seacoast from the land in coordination with other types of forces as part of a strategic defence operation. Under its international commitments, the Navy maintains

capabilities to execute tasks relating to the provision of security both in and outside the Baltic Sea region. The Navy is principally tasked with defending and maintaining maritime communication lines of the state during a crisis and war and with preventing a naval blockade of the country. During peace, the Navy supports Border Guards in their operations in the maritime area of territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone. In its efforts to align the naval forces of the Republic of Poland with Allied requirements, the Navy will possess vessels enabling it to actively participate in the projection of the joint forces of NATO and the EU. The core of the Navy's structure consists of flotillas of ships, the Navy's Air Brigade, as well as coastal support and service vessels and training centres.

107. Special Forces carry out special operations both at home and abroad during peace, crisis and war. Operations carried out in coordination with conventional forces or independently can be strategic or operational. The structure of Special Forces is based on independent units and subunits composed of especially selected, trained and equipped soldiers prepared to operate in a heightened risk environment, capable of executing tasks which conventional units are incapable of doing. The expansion of special units is a natural development of the modern military doctrine, which assumes the formation of highly specialized forces, capable of executing different and special tasks.

108. The AFRP is also composed of:

- the Armed Forces Operational Command, which is tasked with: operational planning and operational command of a part of the AFRP, separated from the Land Forces, Air Force and the Navy and assigned under its command to carry out operations, including in foreign countries; the performance of tasks of the Minister of the National Defence relating to state border protection in the Republic of Poland's air space; the preparation of the AFRP's operational command bodies and their synchronization with commands of organizational unions and military units intended to be assigned under its command;

- the Armed Forces Support Inspectorate, which is tasked with: organization and control of a system of logistical support of the armed forces, including provision of military units used or stationed outside the state borders to provide host-nation support and to perform the role of the sending state; the management of territorial defence, separated military engineering forces and defence forces against weapons of mass destruction; directing regional executive bodies of the Minister of National Defence in operational and defence matters and government administration not linked together;

- the Military Health Service Inspectorate, which manages the AFRP's system of provision of medical services is tasked with directing the military health service, programming the development of the system of provision of medical services and with civil-military cooperation in the medical sector;

- the Military Police, being a separate and specialized service, is tasked mainly with: the protection of the public order in areas and facilities of

military units and in public areas; participating in the national crisis response system; participating in search, rescue and humanitarian operations and executing tasks supporting military operations;

- the Command of the Warsaw Garrison is principally tasked with: a comprehensive preparation of conditions insuring efficient deployment and functioning of strategic-level command posts during peace, crisis and war; protecting and defending facilities and securing the functioning of the Ministry of National Defence and organization units subordinated to the Minister of National Defence.

In addition, after mobilization is announced, the AFRP will be composed of: the Military Counterintelligence Service and the Military Intelligence Service.

109. Regional authorities of military administration, especially voivodeship military staffs and military draft offices play an important role in securing mobilization needs and in coordinating with non-military elements of the state's defence system. Their adjustment to new functions and tasks results from the process of professionalization of the AFRP.

4.4. Place and role of the AFRP command organization in the defence control subsystem

110. An integral part of the defence control system in all of the states of defence readiness in the country is the AFRP's strategic-level command organization. This system is composed of strategic-level control and command organization, i.e. the Minister of National Defence, the Chief of General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces when nominated. Other elements of the AFRP operational- and tactical-level command system also participate in the defence control system.

111. The goal of commanding the AFRP is to maintain them in permanent combat readiness and capability and to create adequate conditions in which commands and military units can prepare for active exercise of their missions and tasks during peace, crisis and war, in the national, Allied and coalition systems.

112. The President of the Republic of Poland is the Commander-in-Chief of the AFRP through the Minister of National Defence. The Minister of National Defence directs overall activities of the armed forces during peace. The Minister performs his tasks assisted by the Ministry of National Defence, which comprises the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces.

113. During peace, the AFRP – on behalf of the Minister of National Defence – are commanded by the Chief of General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, who in terms of his function is the highest ranking soldier in active military duty. The principal bodies of the AFRP's command system during peace are: the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, the Operational Command of the Armed Forces, Commands of the Different Types of Forces of the Armed Forces, the Armed Forces Support Inspectorate, the Military Health Service Inspectorate, the Military Police Headquarters and the Command of the Warsaw Garrison.

114. In the event of crisis situations whose occurrence does not pose a direct threat to the security of Poland, no material changes in the AFRP's command system are envisaged. Only additional assets and procedures of the crisis management system will be activated. Forces assigned to international formations that perform crisis response tasks outside Poland will be commanded by the operational commanders of such formations.

115. During a crisis, the AFRP are controlled and commanded pursuant to the rules adopted for peacetime and by using the crisis management system forces, assets and procedures of the Ministry of National Defence. This system is fully integrated with the national and Allied crisis management systems.

116. During war, the Minister of National Defence (MNA) controls subordinated organization unit from the Control Post of the MNA and performs the role of a planning and coordinating body supporting and securing the operations of the AFRP and Allied forces that participate in operations counteracting and resisting armed aggression against the Republic of Poland.

117. In a defence operation, the Minister of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces commands armed forces from the Command Post of the Supreme Commander of the AF, who: commands the AFRP to fight back armed aggression in the territory of the RP; insures coordination of armed forces under his command with Allied forces in planning and waging warfare; identifies within the scope of his competencies, the needs of the armed forces with regard to supporting them by the non-military part of the state's defence system, assigns military bodies to execute central and local government tasks in the area of direct wartime operations.

CHAPTER V. DEFENCE PREPARATIONS OF THE STATE

118. Defence preparations are intended to ensure the functioning of SOP in the event of an external security threat and during war and they include the planning of economic and defence activities and tasks executed for the AFRP and Allied forces. The planning, organization and implementation of defence preparations of the state fall under the competencies of the Council of Ministers. The Minister of National Defence plays a coordinating role in this process.

119. Defence planning is a common field integrating the SOP implementing subsystems. It covers operational planning and defence programming and is directed by the provisions of the *Political and Strategic Defence Directive of the Republic of Poland* and the *Council of Ministers' Guidelines to the Programming of Defence Preparations of the Republic of Poland*, respectively.

120. The following plans are developed as part of operational planning: the DRP RP operational plans of the armed forces, operational plans of running government administration bodies, central government offices, voivodeships and local government bodies, plans of special protection of facilities especially important for state security and defence as well as plans of technical cover of the country's transportation infrastructure.

121. Defence programming is done pursuant to rules applicable in NATO, in a four-year planning cycle for a ten-year planning period. Defence planning involves

the development of programs crucial for the state's defence and security, namely: *Programme of Development of the AFRP* (based on guidelines taken from the *Main Directions of Development of the AFRP and their preparation to defend the state* as well as the tenets found in the *Detailed Directions of Reconstruction and Modernization of the AFRP),* the *Programme of Non-Military Defence Preparations of the RP,* the *Civil Defence Upgrading Plan* and the EMP. As part of defence programming, defence review is also carried out as a result of which non-military defence preparations are assessed and a *Report on the State of Defence of the Republic of Poland* is drafted.

122. The implementation of defence preparations requires adequate financing. Defence spending is planned under the procedure of drafting the budget law. Military defence preparations are financed pursuant to arrangement adopted in an up-to-date *Programme of Development of the AFRP,* and in the non-military area, financing is based on arrangements adopted in the *Programme of Non-Military Defence Preparations,* the EMP and in the *Civil Defence Upgrading Programme.*

5.1. Preparations of the state defence control subsystem

123. The purpose of defence preparations of the defence control subsystem is the creation of organization and technical conditions to control the state in the event of external threats to the state's security. Efforts are undertaken to build a uniform system of control, insuring consistent operations regardless of the type and nature of threats, during all states of the state's defence readiness, run from prepared control posts. A Central Control Post is organized for specific state authorities comprising control posts of the President of the RP, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers (the Prime Minister), and ministers and heads of central government offices designated by the Prime Minister.

5.2. Preparations of the military subsystem

124. Activities aimed at enhancing the AFRP's potential within the existing financial means of the government are carried out in the area of defence preparations of the military subsystem, with emphasis placed on quality. A process of transformation is underway involving, among others, the professionalization and technical modernization of the AFRP.

125. It is necessary to adapt the assumptions underlying possible use and operation of the AFRP to changing conditions. Efforts should mainly be focused on achieving a high readiness to use combat modules, particular mobile components of different types of armed forces in operations outside Poland. The AFRP should be prepared in a planned way to swiftly move and remain in distant and geographically and climatically different regions. It is sound to prepare an adequate and modern defence infrastructure (control, communications and transportation) to carry out tasks arising from host-nation support obligations and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC).

126. Preparations of the military subsystem have to factor in the need to develop capabilities and formations that perform rescue tasks (including those that specialize in search and rescue of military personnel), humanitarian and law and order tasks, as well as specialized units that eliminate chemical,

biological, radiological and nuclear contaminations (CBRN) and subunits protecting and defending installations.

5.3. Preparations of the non-military subsystem

127. The following are the basic areas of defence preparations carried out in the non-military subsystem: state reserves; mobilization of the economy; militarization; protection of installations especially important for the state's security and defence; preparation, use and protection of transport to meet the state's defence needs; the preparation and use of public and non-public health service to meet the state's defence needs; the preparation and use of communications systems to meet the state's defence needs; defence training; inspection of the execution of defence tasks; the preparation and running of observation, measurement, analyses, forecasting and telling systems about radioactive, chemical, and biological contaminations in the territory of the RP.

State reserves

128. The state in order to effectively implement economic and defence tasks has to maintain an appropriate level of strategic state reserves. The system of strategic reserves constitutes an important link in the process of satisfying the most urgent needs of the national economy, the population and the armed forces. State reserve resources may be used in case of an external threat to state security and during war, as well as during time of heightened defence readiness of the state, as well as in the event of a crisis characteristic of a natural disaster and when there are disruptions in the running of the economy

129. Reserves serve to meet the basic raw materials, material and fuel needs of the economy, to maintain continuity of supplies to the population in basic farm and food products, medical goods and devices and to provide the AFRP with resources need to implement their tasks Reserve resources may be used for peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, crisis response operations and to implement tasks arising from international commitments and agreements.

130. Assessment of national security threats, global business cycle projections and the economic and social situation of the state are accounted for in the process of developing, management, administration, financing and control of strategic reserves.

Mobilization of the economy

131. One of the core elements of mobilization of the country is the shifting of output of industrial plants from peacetime to wartime production. This is done in accordance with the *Economy Mobilization Plan*, which is developed as part of defence programming and covers tasks of selected branches of the economy to provide for the defence needs of the state in conditions of an external threat to its security and during war. The EMP developed at the time of peace significantly impacts the operation of the armed forces and other institutions that realize defence tasks. Within a relatively short time, it permits the start of production of weapons, military equipment and materiél and the maintenance of equipment to meet the increased needs arising from the deployment of the armed forces to tables of organization and equipment during "W" time and to bear war losses.

Militarization

132. An important element of defence preparations is the creation of conditions for militarization of organization units performing tasks of special importance for the state's defence and security. The purpose of militarization is to raise the preparedness of the staff resources of militarized organization units and to enhance the effectiveness of control over such units. The Council of Ministers on the motion of ministers and voivodes who perform tasks under the DRP RP draws up a list of organization units to be militarized. The preparation of units to be militarized involves several organization and planning activities, insuring the readiness of such units to implement task laid down in branch ministry and voivodeship specifications of tasks relating to militarization.

Protection of installations of special importance to state security and defence

133. Tasks relating to the protection of installations of special importance to state security and defence are realized as part of the universal duty to defend the RP. Installations under special protection are determined by the Council of Ministers on the motion of ministers and voivodes and other state authorities. Special protection of installations is prepared by authorities, institutions, formations and entrepreneurs or organization units which have authority over such installations, The protection of installations of special importance to state security and defence is done by militarized units assigned to perform defence tasks independently or with the participation of the AFRP, the Police, the State Fire Service and civil defence formations. .

Preparation of transportation and transportation infrastructure

134. The preparation of the country's transportation and transportation infrastructure to meet the defence requirements consists of organization and economic tasks undertaken with a view to using transportation comprehensively during times of raising the state's defence readiness. They involve, in particular, planning the provision of transportation services, preparation of maritime transportation, car, rail and air transportation, as well as inland navigation to meet the state's defence needs, preparation of the country's transportation infrastructure to meet its defence needs and its protection and technical cover. Transportation will be used by the AFRP and – as part of support – by Allied forces, militarized organization units and units which serve as a base for especially formed militarized organization units, organization units subordinated to and supervised by a competent minister of the interior and civil defence formations.

Preparation of the health service

135. Defence preparations also cover issues relating to planning and implementation of tasks relating to the preparation and use of public and non-public health service to meet the state's defence needs. These include increasing the hospital base and changing its profile, the creation of substitute hospital places, activities relating to outpatient care, the organization of public blood service, sanitary and epidemiological protection, rules on how to proceed in case of radiation and other effects of the use of weapons of mass destruction and the provision of benefits to certain organization units. The

minister competent for health care, voivodes and local governments have been charged with these tasks.

Communications systems

136. The preparation and use of communications systems to meet the state's defence requirements in communications is intended to provide the required telecommunication services to the system users in a reliable and secure way, enabling them to effectively implement tasks during peace, when the state's security is threatened and during war. Communications systems for the purposes of defence should enable the applied means of communication to be integrated on a uniform communications platform. Branch ministries' and telecommunication companies' network resources are used to create them. Inspiring and supporting the development of modern telecommunications technologies, especially those that are failure- and interference-proof, as well as their implementation in the existing communications systems expected to be connected in an integrated telecommunications system is crucially important. The preparation and use of the communications systems for the state's defence purposes with regard to the post is intended to ensure the provision of required postal services to system users in an uninterrupted and secure way, enabling them to effectively implement tasks during peace, when the state state's security is threatened and during war. Postal operators' infrastructure, military field post, post subordinated to the minister competent for internal affairs and courier services subordinated to the minister competent for foreign affairs are used to prepare this system.

Defence training and inspection of defence tasks

137. Defence training is an element of non-military defence preparation. It significantly contributes to raising the level of competence, skills and expertise of employees and management staff responsible for the efficient operation of individual elements of the SOP. The coordination of defence training courses conducted by ministers directing government administration divisions and voivodes is exercised by the Prime Minister through the Minister of National Defence. Defence training at a central level is conducted through Higher Defence Courses for public administration authorities and for public administration personnel. Training is also provided to employees of organization units that implement defence-related production and service tasks. Major organizing functions relating to planning, conducting and financing defence training fall under the competencies of government authorities, while training courses for local government falls under the competencies of marshals, voivodes, district governors (*starosta*), heads of municipalities (*wójt*), town and city mayors. Defence training is also conducted in the form of practical exercises, including trainings and games. They are an important element of the state's defence preparations which serves the purpose of verifying adopted operational and strategic concepts and organization and functional arrangements in the area of national defence.

138. Training in general self-defence of the population is also conducted and its purpose is to prepare the population for self-defence against weapons of mass destruction, including also teaching practical skills of health, life and property self-protection and of providing aid to injured persons. Training of the

population in general self-defence is done in the form of basic courses or practical exercises.

139. “LEADERSHIP” (“KIEROWNICTWO”) Strategic Defence Games play an important role in the process of upgrading the skills of making decisions on key national security issues of government authorities and administration. This activity is carried out under the formula of an extended meeting of the Council of Ministers, attended by the President of the RP or his representatives. The “LEADERSHIP” SDG are held cyclically on the basis of entries in the summary of record of proceedings and decisions of the Council of Ministers and are included in the *Programme of Non-Military Defence Preparations of the RP.* The Council of Ministers in recommending holding successive games, determined each time their subject matter. A fixed element of these games is an assessment of the current state of the country’s security.

140. Inspections of the performance of defence tasks serve the purpose of assessing the state’s defence preparations. The purpose of inspection is to check whether defence tasks are carried out correctly and to determine the state of defence preparations in the country. Inspection activities are performed regularly under an ad-hoc inspection procedure. The Prime Ministers orders the inspections and the Minister of National Defence coordinates them. Individual organization units may not be subject to a comprehensive inspection more than once in five years and to inspection to find a problem more than once a year. These limitations do not apply to ad-hoc inspections.

Research and industrial potential

141. The Polish industry remains the main source of supply of materiél and military equipment to the armed forces and Polish research and development institutions are the main suppliers of production technology and engineering ideas in the area of defence technology.

142. The integration of the Polish research and industrial potential in the area of defence should be directed at EU and NATO member states and the European Defence Agency and NATO Research and Technology Organization should be platforms for the exchange of experience and the procurement of state-of-the-art production technologies. The procurement of state-of-the-art defence technologies for the AFRP and strengthening Poland’s research and industrial potential should be the main goals of integration.

143. Research and industrial units should focus their efforts in the area of defence technologies at developing production technologies that enhance the security of troops, providing a big deterrent effect, permanently raising their combat potential and ensuring manoeuvrability of armed forces.

CHAPTER VI. DIRECTIONS OF TRANSFORMATION OF THE STATE'S DEFENCE SYSTEM

144. Transformation of the SOP is one of the most important strategic goals realized by the government and public administration. Requirements of a constantly changing security environment impose directions of transformation.

145. New laws regulating defence should be passed and the existing ones should be perfected, especially with a view to improving the operation of SOP. Transformation should extend to the cover the troublesome area of national defence planning. Measures taken should be focused on the internal harmonization of defence planning elements and the synchronization of national planning with Allied planning. Improved planning system should contribute to an effective decision-making in the area of defence. Planning should be done in a methodical way, starting with planning at a strategic level and ending with effective expenditure of the budget. Plans and programmes developed as a result of the realization of defence planning should be constantly monitored.

146. Transformation processes should lead to the enactment of a law providing for a uniform legal basis for all activities relating to defence planning. The law should define the basic terms, identify strategic and doctrine documents which are the basis for defence planning, list planning documents and the rules regulating their drafting, execution and approval as well as define the role and tasks of state authorities in these matters. A uniform system of defence planning will be sought that covers: political guidelines, long-term planning, operational planning, defence programming (medium-term), budgeting based on tasks and defence reviews.

147. Strategic Defence Reviews will be done in the Ministry of National Defence as a component part of Strategic Reviews of National Security or independently. They are an instrument of the defence policy aimed at guiding and rationalizing choices in the process of transformation of the state's defence potential, in which the AFRP play the leading role..

6.1. Transformation of the military subsystem

148. The adaptation of the AFRP to new conditions will be made possible through their constant transformation. The transformation of the armed forces is a process of ongoing and proactive development through the integration of innovative concepts and doctrines conductive to the adaptation of the armed forces to changes taking place in the security environment. Their adaptation to these changes is intended to attain the desired operation capabilities of the armed forces.

149. The development of capabilities is done by means of formulating and implementing doctrines, shaping the organization, providing training and supplying technology, creating leadership, selection of personnel, building infrastructure and achieving interoperability. The transformation involves all areas of operation of the AFRP and their environment, accounting for the existing political, economic, organization, legal and social conditions. The

point of transformation is to look for and introduce innovative changes, to use acquired knowledge and experience and to thoroughly change the way of thinking about armed forces, from a quantitative to a quality-oriented approach.

150. Transformation is a long-term process which relies on technological progress and modern armed forces management and control methods. The following transformation tools are applied: the development of new concepts and their verification through experiments, defence planning based on the development of capabilities and a system of tapping into experience.

151. As a result of transformation, the AFRP are to become a major instrument of building Poland's credibility and its international position through an ongoing process of adjustment to the requirements of the security environment in the wide meaning of the term. They should become professional and universal forces of modular nature. The AFRP should be characterized by a high degree of combat readiness, it should possess modern combat technology and military equipment and they should have in place integrated reconnaissance, command and logistical support structures.

152. Meeting Allied commitments and implementing tasks entrusted to the military requires an intensive transformation effort and thorough changes in the operation and structure of the AFRP. The ongoing professionalization which represents not only turning the armed forces into a professional army, but most importantly its qualitative upgrade will be conducive to its transformation. The professionalization of the army is intended to raise its operational capabilities and potential and to rationalize costs.

153. Improving the control and command structure of the AFRP will involve the reduction of unnecessary command levels, separation of planning functions from command and training functions and the introduction of modern management based on a transparent division of powers. The flattening out of the command structures and creating joint structures is part of a general tendency to pool forces and resources intended to enhance the synergy and integration effect.

154. An important goal of transformation has to be the development of capabilities enabling the AFRP to participate in international conflict prevention operations and resolving crises of different intensity. This will take pace in compliance with the provisions of the *Strategy of Participation of AFRP in International Operations.*

155. Attainment of the desired state of the AFRP will be possible not only through technical modernization or structural and organization changes, but primarily through the introduction of thorough changes in the organization culture which the armed forces are. Cooperation with Allies and coalition partners will contribute to the implementation of best operating practices of the AFRP.

156. Allied (coalition) and multinational operations driven by effects, in which identification and planning of the effects of operations will take place prior to their commencement and will be done comprehensively is what the future holds. Operation participants jointly define the end effect and assign responsibility for the implementation of tasks and their coordination. Consequently, planning and waging of international operations, including the

preparation of an adequate civil-military component is the responsibility of the entire state and requires the cooperation of many entities.

6.2. Transformation of the non-military subsystem

157. The changing definition of security and defence and the nature of present-day and future operations require a comprehensive approach. On account of the fact that the post-conflict stage is lasting increasingly longer, the role of non-military instruments and of the civil component in military operations is gaining in importance. This prompts us to seek adequate procedures and mechanisms that harmonize the activities of all entities taking part in an operation at all levels: strategic, operational and tactical. Thus, political, economic, social and military instruments of influence have to be synchronized.

158. The transformation of the non-military subsystem of SOP should involve mainly its upgrading so that it can perform tasks relating to mission fulfilment. This translates into focusing our efforts on tasks relating to ensuring our state's capabilities to counteract threats and challenges found in today's security environment; guaranteeing a continuity of running the most important state institutions (authorities and administration, important economic installations and public utilities) in times of crisis and during war; maintaining the appropriate level of support of operations of armed forces during peace, crisis and war..

CONCLUSION

159. *The Defence Strategy of the RP* is addressed to all public administration bodies and entities that perform defence tasks. Government administration bodies, entrepreneurs and other entities that perform defence tasks, as well as commands and military staffs are responsible for its implementation. Local government bodies are recommended to fulfil the provisions of the *Defence Strategy of the RP.* Its provisions will be developed and detailed in implementing documents: directives, strategic and operational plans and in defence preparation programmes, including programmes of development of the AFRP.

160. Arrangements laid down in this strategy will be systematically verified in the course of defence planning, in particular during Strategic Defence Reviews and during strategic games and defence exercises. The *Defence Strategy of the RP* will remain in force for the duration of the *National Security Strategy of the RP.* Pursuant to a decision of the Council of Ministers of 24 November, 2009, adopting the *Plan to Systematize the Development Strategies*, this strategy will become part of t*he National Security Strategy of the RP* or its implementing document.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

C4ISR	command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
CBRN	*chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear contaminations*
CFE	Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CIMIC	*civil-military cooperation*
HNS	Host Nation Support
NATO	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NRF	National Reserve Forces
OSCE	Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe
UN	The United Nations Organization
AD	air defence
EMP	Economy Mobilization Programme
DRP RP	*Defence Response Plan of the Republic of Poland*
RP	The Republic of Poland
SGO	Strategic Defence Game
SDS	state defence system
AFRP	Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland
NAT	The North Atlantic Treaty
EU	The European Union

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I, the undersigned, KATARZYNA GÓRSKA-ŁAZARZ sworn translator of the English language in Warsaw, license no. TP/117/05, hereby certify that the above is a true and complete translation of the original document in the Polish language presented to me on February 1, 2010.