Chapter 1

Aim and Focus of the Defence Review

1. In May 1996 the Minister of Defence presented to Parliament the White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa. Parliament approved the document, with strong support expressed by all political parties.

2. The overarching theme of the White Paper is the transformation of defence policy and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in the light of the momentous political and strategic developments which have occurred at national, regional and international levels following the demise of the Cold War and the ending of apartheid.

3. At national level these developments include the establishment of a democratic government; the introduction of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to address poverty and socio-economic inequality; the policy of national unity and reconciliation; and the adoption of a new Constitution which outlaws discrimination, enshrines fundamental human rights and lays thebasis for democratic civil-military relations.

4. After two and a half decades of isolation, South Africa has been welcomed back into the international community and has joined a host of important regional and international bodies. South Africa now engages in defence co-operation with a number of countries and participates in regional security arrangements under the auspices of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

5. In the light of these developments and the integration of the former statutory and non-statutory forces, the challenge of transformation is substantial and complex. The White Paper addresses this challenge at the level of broad policy. It establishes a policy framework and the main principles of defence in our new democracy.

6. The White Paper also provides for a Defence Review, the aim of which is to elaborate on this policy framework through comprehensive long-range planning on such matters as posture, doctrine, force design, force levels, logistic support, armaments, equipment, human resources and funding.

7. More specifically, the White Paper provides that the Review will encompass the following:

7.1 It will present options with respect to the size, roles and structure of the SANDF.

7.2 It will address the implications of the core force approach, described in Chapter 5 of the White Paper, for the size, doctrine, posture, weaponry, equipment and other features of the SANDF.

7.3 It will address the strategic and technical implications of the constitutional provision that the SANDF "shall be primarily defensive in the exercise or performance of its powers and functions".

7.4 It will deal with the implications of the principles of defence in a democracy , described in Chapter 2 of the White Paper, for the orientation of the SANDF.

7.5 It will present, for the consideration of Parliament and the public, detailed and well-motivated budgetary forecasts and proposals; specific policies regarding the provisioning of logistic resources; and the identification of appropriate technology to optimise the cost-effectiveness of the core force.

7.6 It will deal with the size and structure of the Part-Time Component (PTC).

7.7 It will include an examination of prevailing conditions in the SANDF with the view to rationalising current spending, eliminating waste and unnecessary duplication, and determining the most cost-effective means of managing human and material resources.

7.8 It will provide details on the rationalisation, redesign and right-sizing of the SANDF given the absence of a foreseeable conventional military threat.

7.9 In the context of demobilisation and rationalisation, it will outline a formula and guidelines for ensuring that the former statutory and non-statutory forces are equitably represented in the SANDF.

Process of conducting the Defence Review

8. The drafting of the Defence Review was the responsibility of a Working Group appointed by the Minister of Defence and co-ordinated by the Secretary for Defence. The Working Group established specialist sub-committees on defence posture, functions and force design; human resource issues; the PTC; the arms industry; legal issues; and land and the environment.

9. The Working Group and its sub-committees comprised members of Parliament, the Defence Secretariat, the regular and part-time components of the SANDF, Armscor and the defence industry, the academic community, and non-governmental organisations.

10. In the interests of achieving a national consensus on defence matters, the Minister decided at the outset that the Review should be subject to a process of consultation with defence stakeholders and interest groups.

11. To this end, national consultative conferences were held on 12-13 February 1996, 12-13 August 1996 and 16 May 1997. Two rounds of regional workshops were held in Gauteng, KwaZulu/Natal, Western Cape, Free State, Eastern Cape, Mpumalanga, North West, Northern Cape and Northern Province in both July 1996 and May 1997. The conferences and workshops were open to the public. They were attended by national and provincial parliamentarians, members of political parties and government departments, and a broad cross-section of the defence establishment and civil society.

12. The Work Group presented several briefings on the Defence Review to the parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Defence. The Working Group has endeavoured to address the questions and concerns of committee members in the Defence Review.

13. The Defence Review has been reviewed by the decision-making bodies of the Department of Defence and by the Minister of Defence. The reports submitted by the Work Group were submitted to Cabinet and Parliament for their consideration.

14. In addition to the Defence Review, the Minister established a Transformation Project which is intended, *inter alia*, to redesign the non-combat structures of the Department in the light of budgetary constraints, new defence policy and approved force design. The goal is to ensure adequate, appropriate, accountable and affordable defence for South Africa. This entails an investigation aimed at eliminating inefficiency and minimising costs through, *inter alia*, the rationalisation of units and headquarters and the development of sound administrative, command and management principles.

Scope of the Defence Review

15. The Defence Review considered and presented proposals on the following subjects:

15.1 Defence posture and doctrine. [Chapter 2]

15.2 The primary function of the SANDF, namely the defence of the RSA and its people against military threats; defence tasks and contingencies in relation to this function; the §core force§ approach; and the implications thereof for the structure of the §peace-time force§. [Chapter 3]

15.3 The secondary functions and tasks of the SANDF with respect to regional security [Chapter 4]; international peace support operations [Chapter 5]; internal deployment in co-operation with the SA Police Service (SAPS) [Chapter 6]; and non-military activities [Chapter 7].

15.4 Force design options for the structure, weaponry and equipment of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Medical Services of the SANDF, and the budgetary implications thereof. [Chapter 8]

15.5 Force structure which examines the support structures of the Department of Defence in the light of pronouncements thus far in the Transformation Project. These are preliminary indications and may change as the Transformation Project develops further. [Chapter 9]

15.6 The Human Resource vision of the Department of Defence, including its policies currently under formulation. [Chapter Ten]

15.7 The Part-time Force vision of the Department of Defence. [Chapter Eleven]

15.8 The land and environment policies of the Department of Defence as informed by national policy. [Chapter Twelve]

15.9 Acquisition management which outlines the processes pertinent to acquisition management in the Department of Defence. [Chapter Thirteen]

15.10 The revision of defence legislation which will be taken forward in the revision of the Defence Act and the Military Disciplinary Code. [Chapter Fourteen]

15.11 A conclusion which examines the Medium Term Expenditure Framework and the impact of constraints on national resources on the attainment of the Department of Defence§s policy vision. [Chapter Fifteen]

Logic of the Defence Review

16. The Defence Review seeks to determine the appropriate size, structure and force design of the SANDF into the next century. To make such determination, it is necessary to first establish the following:

16.1 The tasks which the SANDF will and may have to perform in the future.

16.2 The manner in which these tasks should be undertaken.

16.3 The equipment and weaponry required by the SANDF to fulfil these tasks.

17. The identification of SANDF tasks is based on the following:

17.1 The Constitutional provisions on defence.

17.2 The policy contained in the White Paper on Defence.

17.3 An analysis of the internal and external security environment. This analysis entails the following steps:

17.3.1 identifying defence contingencies (ie situations in which the SANDF will or may have to be employed);

17.3.2 assessing the probability of such situations arising;

17.3.3 assessing the impact on South Africa if the SANDF does not or cannot take the necessary steps to address these situations; and

17.3.4 prioritising the contingencies in the light of the above.

18. The determination of the manner in which the SANDF will fulfil its tasks is based on the following:

18.1 The national policy and foreign policy of government.

18.2 The provisions in the Constitution and the White Paper on Defence regarding the posture and functions of the SANDF. The most important provisions in this regard are that §South Africa shall abide by international law on armed conflict§ and that §the SANDF shall have a primarily defensive orientation and posture§.

19. The size, structure and weaponry of the SANDF will be based not only on the considerations outlined above, but also on budgetary restraints. Defence planning can therefore be described as §**needs-driven and cost-constrained**§. Budget constraints will make it necessary to prioritise and stagger major weapons procurement programmes.

20. The force design proposed in Chapter 8 of the Defence Review takes cognisance of the process described above. The initial Defence Review reports were presented in such a way that decision-makers (ie the Minister, Cabinet and Parliament) were able to review and, if necessary adjust, the reasoning which led to the force design.

21. The vision force structure described in Chapter 9 of the Defence Review is firmly rooted in a holistic understanding of transformation of the defence function, and is not limited to merely addressing organisational restructuring. The vision force structure described in the chapter is not cast in stone, but is open to amendment as the transformation project progresses.

22. Both Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 set a policy vision for the force design and the force structure of the SANDF. This will be tempered by national priorities and the budgetary realities presented in Chapter 15, the concluding chapter of the Defence Review.

23. Defence policy on human resource management and the part-time force are outlined in Chapter 10 and Chapter 11. These chapters encapsulate broad pronouncements on these issues, setting the foundation for a range of topical issues and firmly locates the management of defence personnel within Constitutional requirements and a cognisance of fundamental human rights.

24. Policy on defence land, facilities and environmental management is developed in Chapter 12, within the framework of national policy on land and environment management.

25. Defence acquisition management processes and structures are outlined in Chapter 13. These attempt to bring the acquisition of defence capital equipment in line with the demand for accountable and transparent governance and also gives expression to strategic technologies and equipment required by the SANDF.

26. The process adopted to revise defence legislation is outlined in Chapter 14. This relates to the process identified to revise both the Military Disciplinary Code and the Defence Act, a process which exists outside of this Defence Review.

Key concepts underpinning the Defence Review

27. The following key concepts, drawn mainly from the White Paper on Defence, underpin the Defence Review.

Approach to Security

28. The government has adopted a broad, holistic approach to security, recognising the various non-military dimensions of security and the distinction between the security of the state and the security of people. The greatest threats to the security of the South African people are socio-economic problems like poverty and unemployment, and the high level of crime and violence.

Approach to Defence

29. The government has adopted a narrow, conventional approach to defence. The primary function of the SANDF is defence against external aggression. The other functions are secondary.

30. The Defence Review therefore sets a policy vision for the size, structure, weaponry, equipment and funding requirements of the SANDF, mainly on the basis of its primary function. Where the self-defence capabilities are insufficient for certain secondary functions - such as peace support operations and internal deployment in co-operation with the SAPS - additional capabilities may be required.

Arms Control and Disarmament

31. South Africa is committed to the goals of arms control and disarmament at national, regional and international levels. It has introduced new policy on conventional arms transfers, banned the manufacture and export of anti-personnel mines, and endorsed the international prohibitions on the manufacture, use and export of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and related technology.

International Law on Armed Conflict

32. The Constitution provides that South Africa will conduct its defence policy, and the SANDF will execute military operations, in accordance with international law on armed conflict.

33. International law prohibits the initiation of armed hostilities by states. This does not preclude the exercise of the right of self-defence if South Africa is subject to an act of aggression. [Chapter 2]

34. The Review also provides that deterrence - which seeks to dissuade aggression by promising to inflict severe harm on an attacker - will be based on a counter-force rather than a counter-value

doctrine. In other words, deterrence threatens to destroy enemy forces and capabilities rather than civilian institutions and populations.

Defensive Posture

35. The government does not currently, and will not in the future, have aggressive intentions towards any state. It regards the use or threat of military force as a measure of last resort in the face of aggression when non-violent forms of conflict resolution have failed. The emphasis lies on preventing conflict through co-operation with other states, particularly in Southern Africa.

36. In the light of the above and South Africa§s commitment to abide by international law, the SANDF will have a primarily defensive orientation and posture. This has implications for doctrine, training and force design. For example, manifestly offensive armaments and systems have been excluded from the force design. Other potentially offensive weapons systems which give undue strategic reach have been limited in number.

Defence spending and the Peace-Time Force

37. The Department of Defence accepts the national imperative of channelling the financial resources of the state to the RDP in order to alleviate socio-economic problems like poverty and unemployment. In the light of this imperative, and in the absence of any foreseeable external military threat, the Defence Review seeks to establish an affordable peace-time force.

38. The peace-time force will comprise a relatively small regular component backed up by a sufficiently large part-time component. These components should constitute a balanced and sustainable §core force§ capable of dealing with small-scale defence contingencies which arise in the short-term. Since the long-term future is inherently uncertain, it is also necessary to maintain the capabilities required to expand the core force if the security situation deteriorates significantly.

39. The SANDF§s annual budget makes provision for the maintenance, development and preparation of the peace-time force. As a general rule, it does not provide for operations due to the unpredictable nature thereof; special budgetary allocations therefore have to be made where the President authorises the employment of the SANDF in operations, including peace support operations and co-operation with the SAPS in the maintenance of law and order. Currently, the SANDF does budget for its internal deployments because of the on-going nature of this task.

International Peace Operations

40. With the advent of democracy, South Africa has moved from an isolationist position to one of engagement in international fora and participation in regional, continental and international peace initiatives. This will lead, in time, to South Africa§s involvement in multi-national peace support operations.

Regional Security

41. South Africa§s relations with neighbouring states have shifted from animosity to friendship and co-operation. South Africa is committed to strengthening common security arrangements, defence co-operation and confidence- and security-building measures within the framework of SADC and the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC).

Internal Deployment

42. The government regards the on-going deployment of the SANDF in an internal policing capacity as undesirable. Ideally, the military should be utilised only in extreme situations, such as a state of emergency and against threats to the constitutional order.

43. Notwithstanding the above, deployment in co-operation with the SAPS is likely to persist for some time because of on-going public violence and the relative shortage of police personnel.

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Policy Framework

1. The Constitution provides that the primary object of the SANDF is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people, in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force.

2. In respect of defence posture, the White Paper provides the following additional directives:

2.1 National security shall be sought primarily through efforts to meet the political, economic, social and cultural rights and needs of South Africa s people, and through efforts to promote and maintain regional security.

2.2 South Africa shall pursue peaceful relations with other states. It will seek a high level of political, economic and military co-operation with Southern African states in particular.

2.3 The SANDF shall have a primarily defensive orientation and posture.

2.4 South Africa is committed to the goals of arms control and disarmament at national, regional and international levels.

3. The White Paper states that South Africa does not now, and will not in the future, have aggressive intentions towards any state.

4. The White Paper asserts further that governments have an inherent right and responsibility to ensure the protection of the state and its people against external military threats. South Africa will employ the following principal strategies to this end:

4.1 Political, economic and military co-operation with other states. In this context, a common security regime, regional defence co-operation and confidence- and security-building measures in Southern Africa are particularly important.

4.2 The prevention, management and resolution of conflict through non-violent means. Conflict resolution, in the form of diplomacy, mediation or arbitration, may take place on a bilateral basis or under the auspices of an international or regional body.

4.3 The deployment of the Defence Force. The use or threat of force against external military aggression is a legitimate measure of last resort when political solutions have been exhausted.

5. It is thus clear that the government s preferred and primary course of action is to prevent conflict and war. South Africa will only turn to military means when non-violent strategies and deterrence have failed.

6. Deterrence requires the existence of a credible defence capability to inhibit potential aggressors. Although South Africa is not confronted by any foreseeable external military threat, this capability cannot be turned on and off like a tap. It is therefore essential to maintain a core defence capability with the potential for expansion should this ever be necessary.

7. In summary, South Africa has turned away from an isolationist and offensive posture to one of common security in Southern Africa; defence co-operation with other states; respect for international peace and security; and adherence to international law.

8. In terms of domestic security, the SANDF is currently employed in co-operation with the SAPS in the maintenance of law and order and in border protection against non-military threats. Ideally, the SANDF should be deployed in the former role only in the most exceptional circumstances.

Deterence

9. As noted above, the White Paper requires the maintenance of a defence capability which is sufficiently credible to deter potential aggressors. Deterrence plays a crucial role in preventing armed conflict.

10. The maintenance of this capability should take account of the following:

10.1 A potential aggressor must believe that South Africa has the capacity to apply sufficient force to thwart an act of aggression.

10.2 A potential aggressor should also believe that South Africa has the political will to apply such force if it is compelled to do so.

11. The Constitution states that the security services will adhere to international law on armed conflict (Articles 198(c), 199(5) and 200(2)). This includes the Geneva and Hague conventions and protocols, referred to as international humanitarian law, which provide, *inter alia*, that armed forces may only attack military targets and must refrain from attacking civilians and civilian property. These rules necessarily circumscribe deterrence doctrine.

12. South Africa s approach to deterrence encompasses the following:

12.1 South Africa will pursue military co-operation with other states in such a way that potential aggressors run the risk of encountering collective military capabilities in response. Collective capabilities would also deter threats to the region as a whole.

12.2 Capabilities to neutralize possible threats should be at a level of readiness commensurate with the lead time for such threats to develop. This should be clearly visible. Care must be taken not to open strategic gaps in the capability of the SANDF when reducing force levels.

12.3 Deterrence will not only be pursued against potential short-term aggression through immediate force readiness. Potential aggression in the

longer term will also be deterred by maintaining the capability for expansion.

12.4 Even if South Africa is not strong enough to ensure dominance in defensive actions, the risk to any potential aggressor should be unacceptably high.

12.5 Deterrence should not be counter-productive in that it triggers an arms race. This has implications for doctrine, force design and force levels.

SANDF Doctrine

13. Operational doctrine consists of the main principles and concepts by which armed forces guide their actions in military operations in support of national objectives. Doctrine derives from, and must be consistent with, defence policy and posture.

14. The doctrine of the SANDF should therefore reflect the international prohibition on acts of aggression; the exercise of the right of self-defence in a manner which is consistent with international law; a defensive posture at strategic level; and the employment of the SANDF as a measure of last resort.

15. The policy of non-aggression and the constitutional commitment to international law, which outlaws the initiation of armed hostilities by states, constitute the basis of SANDF doctrine. International law does not preclude the exercise of the right of self-defence against external aggression.

16. In the light of the above, the doctrine of the SANDF will be based on a strategic defensive posture with sufficient capabilities to protect military and economic assets against offensive actions by an aggressor.

17. Further, capabilities to reverse the effects of offensive actions are required. The SANDF must be able halt, contain and roll back such actions. Accordingly, appropriate offensive capabilities will be required at operational level.

18. This approach will be complemented in times of conflict by government spelling out clearly the threshold for offensive action by the SANDF. In practice this may take the form of a declaration of appropriate exclusion zones or similar mechanisms.

19. Finally, it is important to note that the defensive orientation of the SANDF is reinforced by Executive and Parliamentary control over its employment.

Implications for Force Design

20. The above provisions, and particularly the requirement that the SANDF shall have a prmarily defensive orientation and posture, impact directly on force design. The rationale for a small but efficient and sustainable core force is in line with this requirement (Chapter 3). The implications for force design are as follows:

20.1 The size and capabilities of the SANDF, in the context of government s defence policy, should not be seen as threatening by other states in Southern Africa. The emphasis will be on confidence-building defence in the regional context.

20.2 Force levels will be limited to what is needed to maintain essential capabilities and expertise. These will serve as a basis for expansion if required.

20.3 The potential for expansion should be consistent with a realistic appreciation of warning times for the development of military threats. Participation in regional early warning structures will reinforce such appreciation.

20.4 SANDF doctrine requires an emphasis on defensive rather than offensive force elements. Manifestly offensive armaments and weapon systems have therefore been excluded from the force design. Other potentially offensive weapon systems which give undue strategic reach have been limited in number.

20.5 The design of the SANDF should allow for dispersion of own forces. This leads to a reduction in target concentration and therefore less vulnerability in the event of an attack. It also contributes to regional confidence-building since mobilisation can easily be observed.

20.6 Great reliance will be placed on the PTC. This ensures that mobilisation will be more visible and thus less threatening than a large standing force.

20.7 Where practically possible and financially viable, mobile and offensive forces will be drawn away from border areas to deeper internal bases.

20.8 Training and force preparation should be consistent with defence policy, posture and doctrine.

Chapter 3

Self-Defence and the Peace-Time Force

Introduction

1. The White Paper on Defence states that the size, design, structure and budget of the SANDF will be determined mainly by its primary function of self-defence.

2. The White Paper states further that the absence of a foreseeable external military threat provides an opportunity to rationalise, redesign and right-size the defence force. The size and features of the SANDF should be consistent with that of a peace-time force.

3. In identifying and designing the capabilities of the peace-time force, a range of considerations have to be taken into account. The previous chapter discussed defence posture and doctrine. This chapter considers the following:

3.1 the SANDF s tasks related to the self-defence function;

3.2 the core force approach outlined in the White Paper;

3.3 defence contingencies (ie situations in which the SANDF will or may have to be involved in the exercise of self-defence);

3.4 the key characteristics of the peace-time force; and

3.5 the capabilities required by the SANDF in the light of the above.

Tasks

4. For effective and efficient planning it is necessary to translate the self-defence function into specific tasks. This serves to allocate responsibility, assists government to define the output it expects to achieve from military expenditure, and provides a system for categorising and prioritising such expenditure.

5. The following tasks relate to the self-defence function:

5.1 To provide a core defence capability against external military threas and execute military operations in defence of the Republic, its interests and its citizens when ordered by the President.

5.2 To provide a defence capability against internal threats to the constitutional order and execute operations in a state of emergency when ordered by the President.

5.3 To promote regional security through defence co-operation within the SADC framework.

5.4 To promote international security through participation in peace operations and military co-operation in support of foreign policy.

Defence Contingencies

Method

10. A major consideration in designing the peace-time force and the capabilities it requires is the nature of the defence contingencies against which the SANDF may have to act.

11. The White Paper asserts that South Africa is not confronted by an immediate conventional threat and does not anticipate external aggression in the short- to medium-term (approximately five years). The longer term future cannot be determined with any certainty because international relations are inherently unpredictable.

12. The examination of defence contingencies must therefore rely ona threat-independent, as opposed to a threat-specific, approach. If a concrete threat were to emerge, the examination would naturally become more specific.

13. The threat-independent approach should be rooted in an analysis of the external environment. It should take account, in particular, of the political, strategic and geographic situation in Southern Africa. The current reality is that Southern Africa is a region of allies. South Africa is a member of SADC and the ISDSC, and participates in common security arrangements under the auspices of these bodies (Chapter 3).

14. Further, planning for defence contingencies should be based on a realistic appreciation of the probability of such contingencies occurring and the impact on South Africa should the SANDF be unable to meet a contingency. This will help to prioritise contingencies for which the Defence Force should prepare.

15. Certain contingencies may occur with little warning, but in the Southern African context other contingencies are likely to be of a longer term nature where early warning will be obtained. This will allow for timely preparation and expansion.

16. Although the SANDF must ultimately be ready to deal with a range of contingencies, it need not maintain forces at immediate readiness for the longer term contingencies. However, it must retain the core for expansion.

17. The advantage of this approach is that substantial savings will be effected. As noted above, the core force will comprise a relatively small full-time component and a sufficiently large part-time component.

18. There are inherent risks in this approach, however. The warning period required to expand the core force may not be available due to strategic or operational surprise as a result of intelligence failure or an unwillingness of deciion-makers to heed the warning. After warning has been received, such expansion might be thwarted by sanctions and the inability of the defence industry to deliver equipment timeously.

19. Defence contingencies are examined below on a continuum from major contingencies such as an invasion to lesser contingencies such as threats against off-shore assets. For the sake of comprehensive analysis, all possible contingencies related to the primary function of self-defence are considered.

Analysis of Contingencies

20. ***Invasion***. Invasion is defined as a major attack aimed at occupying the South Africa or part of it, replacing the government by force and conquering its people. This contingency is considered to be fairly remote since South Africa has no present or foreseeable enemies.

21. Further, a potential enemy does not stand to gain a major advantage from an invasion:

21.1 Although South Africa is relatively rich in resources, these do not have sufficient strategic importance given the resources available in other parts of the world.

21.2 The isolated geographic position of the Republic diminishes the possibility that it may be used by an external force as a springboard, base area or thoroughfare for military operations elsewhere. The only exception is the remote possibility of a world war where a belligerent has the capability to attack shipping on the Cape sea route. If an aggressor desires to launch an attack against a neighbouring state in Southern Africa, it would be far simpler to avoid South African territory.

21.3 The international situation would have to change considerably before an external power seeks to impose its ideology on South Africa through the use of force.

22. The probability of an invasion is therefore extremely low. However, the impact of a successful invasion would be so catastrophic that it cannot be ignored totally as a contingency.

23. From an operational perspective, an invasion can take place over the landward border, from the sea or a combination of the two.

23.1 An invasion over the landward border would require a major military build-up to the north. For a number of decades into the future, an operation of this kind could not be undertaken solely by an African state or alliance of African states. It would require the participation of a major power. It would also require coercion or invasion of one or more states to the north. The terrain to the north would present the attacker with logistic problems and restrict its mobility. These constraints provide a substantial warnin period for defensive action.

23.2 An invasion from seaward would require substantial specialist resources and could be undertaken only with the involvement of a superpower or coalition of major powers. Opportunities for strategic and deep interdiction in such a case would be more restricted. Factors favouring South African defences are natural obstacles to the attacker and ocean conditions favourable to defensive counter-strikes. As in the previous scenario, these factors provide a substantial warning period for defensive action.

24. **Limited neutralising attacks**. In this scenario a third party, such as a major power, wants to prevent the Republic from interfering militarily in that party s designs in Southern Africa. South Africa s approach to common security implies that it would threaten a major act of aggression against a SADC state.

25. The aggressor might therefore seek to neutralise South Africa s ability to project military power. The targets of an attack might include air and naval transport assets, air and naval attack assets, and mobile ground forces. Capabilities to defend these assets should thus be provided for in the peace-time force.

26. Such a scenario would probably entail UN, OAU and SADC condemnation of the aggressor, and would obviously be preceded by diplomatic efforts to avert a crisis. The development into an attack on the South Africa is therefore unlikely, although this scenario has a higher probability than the invasion contingency. The impact would be much smaller, however, making the total risk lower than that of an invasion. Nevertheless, force design should take note of this contingency.

27. **Internal military threats to the constitutional order**. The SANDF may be employed to combat internal military threats to the constitutional order. Such threats could take the form of civil war or general insurrection on a national or provincial scale. Such threats might be supported by external agents or forces. While the probability of this contingency is low, the impact would be considerable if it were not met successfully. This is therefore a contingency for which the SANDF should be prepared.

28. **Raids**. Raids of lesser intensity may occur against the RSA for the purpose of coercion or castigation. Coercion would aim to force South Africa to change its behaviour which is in conflict

with another state s interests or goals, and castigation would be retaliation against South African actions regarded as offensive by such a state.

29. Raids could be launched by a major or smaller power. They could take many forms, such as air raids by aircraft or missiles; landward raids by mobile or unconventional forces; and maritime raids by surface vessels, amphibious craft or clandestine forces.

30. The impact of such raids, although considerable, would be lower than that of the previous scenarios. In contrast, the probability of such actions by irresponsible and irrational governments is higher than for the contingencies of invasions and limited neutralising attacks. Since raids may also be launched by non-governmental, radical organisations, the probability must be considered as real. The SANDF should therefore plan for these contingencies in designing the core force.

31. **Blockades**. Blockades may be invoked to coerce South Africa to change its behaviour which is in conflict with the interests and goals of another power. Blockades may take the form of interference in South Africa s sea lines of communications through mining of harbours or attacks on shipping within South Africa s maritime zone; landward blockades of trade routes to neighbouring states; or the enforcement of no-fly zones.

32. Given South Africa s dependence on trade, especially maritime trade, this could have an extremely negative effect on the well-being of the country and its people. The impact would thus be considerable and should be taken into account in designing the peace-time force.

33. **Attacks on embassies, ships and aircraft**. South Africa has a responsibility to protect its embassies, ships and aircraft outside its national borders. The threat against these assets is mainly one of piracy and international terrorism. Protection by host nations may not always be forthcoming or effective.

34. Although the impact of such contingencies is relatively low, the probability of their occurrence is relatively high. The capability to protect and release captured embassies, ships and aircraft should therefore be provided for in the core force. This capability must be at immediate readiness since the contingency may arise with little or no warning.

35. **Law enforcement of marine resources and maritime zone**. Maritime law enforcement is not a primary defence task and is discussed in chapter 7. However, a state may use military force to back up its exploitation of South African resources. The impact of such a contingency might be significant although the probability can presently be considered as low. This contingency requires capabilities similar to those needed to protect sea lines of communication.

36. **Islands**. The level of threat against South African islands (the Prince Edward Island group) and the impact if this threat materialises are such that no special or additional defence capabilities are required. However, it should be noted that the South African sea areas around these islands are rich in potential food sources.

Characteristics of the Peace-Time Force

37. The peace-time force should be designed and structured to meet the strategic realities of South and Southern Africa. The following discussion considers the geographic, technological, organisational and operational factors in force design.

Geography

38. The features of the SANDF s likely area of operations should obviously serve as a force design determinant. Assuming that this area will be mainly South Africa, Southern Africa (for regional defence co-operation) and the surrounding seas, key factors to be taken into account include:

38.1 The large geographical area to be defended by relatively small forces.

38.2 Low infrastructure development which can be exacerbated by adverse weather conditions.

38.3 A scarcity of natural obstacles such as rivers and mountains.

38.4 Frequently adverse sea conditions.

38.5 Underwater ocean conditions which are favourable to submarines.

38.6 Access to and from South Africa largely dependent on sea and air transport.

38.7 A hostile health environment.

39. The peace-time force should thus have the following characteristics:

39.1 Mobility, including air and sea transport; self-contained ground forces suitable to rugged terrain and all-weather conditions; and ships with good sea-keeping capability.

39.2 Good underwater detection, location and attack capabilities.

39.3 Capabilities to ensure appropriate control of air and sea areas.

39.4 Operational medical support.

Technology

40. The technology employed by the peace-time force should be appropriate and affordable. Two main factors underpin this policy:

40.1 Given the lack of clarity on the possible enemies that the SANDF might have to counter, it would be imprudent to assume that a potential enemy will be unsophisticated. With the present proliferation of armaments and military technology, it must be anticipated that any future enemy will have sophisticated weapons and systems.

40.2 South Africa s regional obligations require the maintenance of a relatively high level of technological sophistication.

Balance and Flexibility

41. The SANDF must be a balanced force. A balanced force is one with the capabilities to meet a wide range of contingencies rather than one with equal numbers of all possible weapons systems.

42. Balance implies that the force should not be over-specialised to the extent that strategic gaps, which could be exploited by an enemy, are created. This is especially important in view of the uncertainty regarding future threats.

43. Balance also means that force structure elements should complement each other since a specific capability may be rendered ineffective because of technological advances, surprise attack or other factors.

44. The aim is to achieve a balanced defence force rather than a balanced Army, Air Force and Navy. For this reason, jointness between the arms of service will be promoted. The SANDF must also be a flexible force which allows for expansion or reduction of force levels according to operational requirements and budgetary considerations.

Expansion Potential

45. Maintaining a viable expansion potential is critical to the defence of South Africa.

46. The major determinants of expansion potential include the following:

46.1 A realistic determination of warning lead times.

46.2 The procurement times of main equipment. This depends on the nature of the specific equipment but is typically in the order of ten years from conceptualisation to operational availability. This period may exceed warning lead times provided by intelligence.

46.3 The time required to train and prepare leader groups and troops. This will influence the relative size of the full-time force and the part-time force.

46.4 The critical mass to which force structure elements can be reduced and below which no expansion would be possible.

Sustainability

47. The SANDF force structure must be sustainable. In other words, the SANDF must live within its means .

48. The aim is to have both a stable force and a stable defence budget commensurate with the threat situation and the lead times available for expansion. Should the threat situation change, a new force design and funding level would have to be determined.

49. An appropriate balance should be found between operating expenditure and spending on capital renewal or upgrading. Fluctuations in the capital budget should be equalised by long-term budgetary scheduling rather than through fluctuations in annual budgets. Fluctuationsand uncertainty in planning result in substantial fruitless expenditure. A long-term view is necessary and multi-year budgetary guidelines are highly desirable.

Capabilities Required by the Peace-Time Force

50. In the light of the previous discussion, it is possible to list the specific capabilities required by the peace-time force.

50.1 Defence intelligence capability. Intelligence is an overarching capability required by the DoD. Strategic intelligence is the basis for force design, as well as early warning to ensure maximum time for expansion and defence preparation. Good tactical intelligence is a force multiplier during operations.

50.2 Landward defence. Capabilities to counter attacks over land should be mobile and largely self-contained.

50.3 Air defence. Air defence, including fighter-based capabilities and localised anti-aircraft capabilities, is needed to counter air attacks.

50.4 Maritime defence. Maritime defence capabilities to counter attack from seaward and on shipping should include mine clearance and the ability to act against air, surface and submarine attacks.

50.5 Biological and chemical defence. Subject to the provisions of the chemical and biological weapons conventions, the SANDF should maintain the capability to detect the use of chemical and biological weapons in a given area, to protect its personnel against such weapons, and to decontaminate forces and equipment which have been under such attack.

50.6 Interdiction capabilities. Once armed hostilities have begun, the SANDF should have the capability to interdict the battlefield.

50.7 Counter-offensive capabilities. On halting aggression, the SANDF should have the capability to drive the enemy from own or friendly territory.

50.8 Command and control. This is critical to the effective execution of the self-defence function at all levels. The diversity of military tasks performed by the different combat, combat support and supporting elements of the SANDF requires both single service and joint command and control capabilities. Great emphasis should be placed on electronic warfare and command information systems.

50.9 Force preparation. The SANDF must be able to prepare its forces continuously for self-defence. Force preparation should concentrat on two categories: i) formal training of personnel at all ranks for conventional operations; and ii) training and exercising force structure elements at arms of service level, as well as joint and combined operations.

50.10 Support capabilities. The SANDF must maintain effective support capabilities. These include operational medical support; operational logistics support and technology development; land, air and sea transport; personnel and chaplaincy services to maintain the morale of soldiers engaged in operations; and legal support to commanders during operations.

51. In summary, the defence capability of the SANDF should be cost-effective; sustainable; capable of appropriate expansion; technologically appropriate; balanced and flexible; and highly motivated and prepared.

Chapter 4

South African Defence Review 1998

Regional Security Co-operation

Policy Framework

1. After decades of isolation, South Africa has been welcomed back into the international community and has joined or returned to a host of regional and international organisations. The most important of these are the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

2. South Africa has also entered into a number of international, regional and bilateral or trilateral defence agreements. These generally entail reciprocal obligations and an undertaking to engage in some form of co-operation.

3. The most significant strategic development over the past few years is South Africa s new status in Southern Africa, previously an arena of intense conflict. With the election of a democratic government in April 194, relations with neighbouring states changed from suspicion and animosity to friendship and co-operation.

4. For political, strategic and geographic reasons, the government regards security and defence co-operation in Southern Africa as a priority.

5. Since the end of the Cold War the region has undergone substantial change. Considerable progress has been made towards the resolution of internal conflicts, the establishment of democracy, and disarmament. The prospects for regional peace and stability are greater today than at any other time in recent decades.

6. Nevertheless, much of the sub-continent is stricken by underdevelopment and the attendant problems of poverty, illiteracy and unemployment. There are large numbers of refugees and displaced people; an acute debt crisis; and disease and environmental degradation. Certain states remain politically volatile. The worst case scenario, as experienced intensely in Angola and Mozambique, is civil war.

7. These phenomena are not confined to national borders. They impact negatively on neighbouring states in the form of a range of non-military threats: environmental destruction; the spread of disease; the burden of refugees; and cross-border trafficking in drugs, stolen goods and small arms.

8. Following trends in other parts of the world, South Africa is committed to the development of a common security approach in Southern Africa. In essence, this will entail the SADC states shaping their political, security and defence policies in co-operation with each other.

9. Common security arrangements have many advantages. They can facilitate sharing of information and resources; early warning of potential crises; joint problem-solving; implementing confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs); negotiating security agreements; and resolving inter-state conflict through peaceful means.

10. Certain of these endeavours are the responsibility of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Chief amongst them is the prevention, management and settlement of conflict through negotiation and mediation.

11. Other types of activity, some of which are already under way, will be undertaken by the Department of Defence (DOD).

11.1 Regional defence co-operation can be promoted in the fields of logistics; training and education; aviation; protection of marine resources; intelligence; combined exercises;

secondment of personnel; goodwill visits; and the development of combined doctrines and operational procedures.

11.2 The government may be called on by neighbouring countries to play a number of supportive roles. For example, the SANDF can provide assistance with respect to disaster relief; controlling cross-border trafficking in small arms; clearing minefields; training; field engineering; medical support; and maintaining and upgrading weaponry and equipment.

11.3 The DOD will pursue the implementation of CSBMs. These are measures which provide greater transparency in military matters in order to alleviate mistrust, prevent misunderstandings from developing into crises, and thereby promote collective confidence and stability. Appropriate CSBMs might include the following:

11.3.1 Annual consultation and exchange of information on defence budgets, force structure, modernisation plans and troop deployment.

11.3.2 Consideration of national threat perceptions which inform force structure and modernisation plans.

11.3.3 The establishment of a regional arms register which records imports, exports, production and holdings of conventional arms and light weaponry.

11.3.4 Notification and on-site observation of military exercises and other specified activities.

11.3.5 Verification procedures in respect of the above.

11.3.6 A communications network and a crisis hotline .

11.3.7 Procedures for dealing with unusual or unscheduled military incidents.

Peace Support Operations

12. Situations may arise in Southern Africa where inter- or intra-state conflict poses a threat to peace and stability in the region as a whole. If political efforts to resolve the conflict are unsuccessful, it may become necessary to deploy the SANDF in multi-national peace support operations.

13. South Africa shares the view of many of its neighbours that the creation of a standing peacekeeping force in the region is not required or feasible. The SADC countries are more likely to engage in peace support operations on an ad-hoc basis if the need arises.

14. Nevertheless, the SADC states are committed to regional co-operation in preparing for peace support operations. It may therefore be worthwhile to establish a small peace support operations centre, under the auspices of regional defence structures, to develop and co-ordinate planning, training, logistics, communication and field liaison teams for multi-national forces.

Posture

15. South Africa has a common destiny with Southern Africa. Domestic peace and stability will not be achieved in a context of regional instability and poverty. It is therefore in South Africa s long-term security interests to pursue mutually beneficial relations with the other SADC states and to promote reconstruction and development throughout the region.

16. Given South Africa s relative military strength on the sub-continent, the adoption of a defensive and non-threatening posture would contribute to building confidence and positive relationships. Reductions in force levels and weapons holdings might stimulate a broader process

of regional disarmament. However, force reductions should be kept within reasonable proportions if South Africa is to play an active support role in the region.

17. South Africa will support the conclusion of multi-lateral treaties on disarmament, arms control and foreign military involvement in the region. The most important agreement would be a non-aggression pact which endorses the prohibition in international law regarding the threat or use of force.

Regional Structures

18. South Africa is a signatory to the SADC Treaty and participates fully in all the structures of the organisation. These include the following:

18.1 The Summit, comprising Heads of State and Government.

18.2 The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, comprising the ministers responsible for foreign affairs and defence, which reports to the Summit.

18.3 The Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), comprising the ministers responsible for defence, policing and intelligence, which reports to the Organ. The ISDSC has defence, public security and state security sub-committees.

19. The main functions of the defence sub-committee of the ISDSC are as follows:

19.1 to review and share experiences on the military-security situation in member states;

19.2 to explore areas for multi-lateral defence co-operation and the practical implementation thereof; and

19.3 to exchange views and propose mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict in Africa in general and in Southern Africa in particular.

20. The defence sub-committee has sub-sub-committees on specialist areas, including operations; intelligence; personnel development; logistics; maritime and aviation co-operation; and chaplains, legal and medical associations.

Chapter 5

International Peace Support Operations

Policy Framework

1. As a fully fledged member of the international community, South Africa will fulfil its responsibility to participate in international peace support operations.

2. In the short-term, however, such participation will be regarded with caution since the political and military dynamics of these operations are new to South Africa and the DoD.

3. In order to prepare for peace support operations, the DoD is investigating the development of appropriate doctrines, operational procedures and training programmes in co-operation with foreign partners.

4. Public awareness and parliamentary debate on the complexities and different types of peace support operations are equally important.

5. South Africa will only become involved in specific peace support operations if the following conditions are met:

5.1 There should be parliamentary approval and public support. This requires an appreciation of the associated costs and risks, including the financial costs and the risk to military personnel.

5.2 The operation should be authorised by the UN Security Council.

5.3 Operations in Southern Africa should be sanctioned by SADC and undertaken with other SADC states. Similarly, operations in Africa should be sanctioned by the OAU.

5.4 The operation should have a clear mandate, mission and objectives.

5.5 There should be realistic criteria for terminating the operation.

6. Involvement in peace support operations will not be limited to the deployment of troops. It could also take the form of providing equipment, logistical support, humanitarian aid, engineering services, communications systems and medical personnel and facilities.

7. The acquisition and maintenance of military equipment will take account of the particular requirements of peace support operations.

Types of Peace Support Operations

8. **Preventive diplomacy** involves diplomatic action taken in advance of a predicted crisis to prevent or limit violence. In particularly tense situations, preventive deployment of military forces may support such action. The deployment may be aimed at deterring violence; assisting local authorities to protect threatened minorities; securing and maintaining essential services; and ensuring access to an area of operation.

9. **Peacemaking** is a process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation or other form of peaceful settlement of conflict that seeks to end disputes and resolve the issues which give rise to conflict. Military forces may be required to support this process.

10. **Peace building** consists of post-conflict actions that strengthen and rebuild civil infrastructures and institutions in order to provide a lasting peace. Military forces may assist in restoring the civil authority; rebuilding physical infrastructures; conducting elections; demobilising former belligerents; and collecting and controlling small arms.

11. **Peacekeeping** involves military or para-military operations undertaken with the consent of the disputant parties. The operations aim to monitor and facilitate the implementation of an existing peace or truce agreement, and to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term settlement. Peacekeeping activities include observation, monitoring and supervision of the provisions of peace agreements. These typically relate to cease-fires; arms control; withdrawal and demobilisation of combatants; denial or freedom of movement; and elections.

12. **Peace enforcement** is the application or threat of military force, authorised by the UN Security Council, to compel compliance with Security Council resolutions. The aims are to maintain or restore peace and to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term settlement. Unlike other peace support operations, peace enforcement may include combat action. Military missions may include the restoration and maintenance of order and stability; guarantee or denial of movement; enforcement of sanctions; establishment and supervision of protected zones; and forcible separation of belligerent parties.

13. **Humanitarian or relief activities** may constitute a discreet operation or be part of the operations described above. Such activities, in which military support may be required, include provision of humaniarian aid, disaster relief, health care and assistance to refugees and displaced persons.

14. It is evident from the preceding paragraphs that peace support operations may require the involvement of medical, communications, engineering, logistical, administrative, transport, combat and other components of armed forces.

Authority and Decision Making

15. As a rule, the UN Security Council decides on the establishment of a peace support operation and is responsible for extending or terminating the mission. (Peace enforcement operations which take place under the auspices of the OAU or SADC require prior endorsement by the UN Security Council.)

16. A resolution of the Security Council authorises the operation and determines the mandate. The resolution typically covers the terms of reference for the mission; the appointment of the Force Commander; force levels and contributing countries; and administrative, logistical and budgetary arrangements.

17. The overall direction of the operation is in the hands of the Secretary-General who acts on behalf of, and reports to, the Security Council. The Secretary-General delegates the daily operational management to a Head of Mission, but will usually retain direct control over policy matters and major decision-making.

18. The Secretary General is assisted in the exercise of these functions by a secretariat of political and military advisers in the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs (OUSGSPA).

19. The Force Commander, who may or may not be the Head of Mission, is responsible to the Secretary General for the efficient operation and administration of the multi-national force. He/she exercises this responsibility through OUSGSPA which actually runs the mission.

20. The Force Commander exercises operational control of the national forces of participating countries. He/she gives direct orders for execution by these forces, without resort to the contributing countries. The contingents execute his/her orders without clearance from their governments. The Commander does not maintain formal contact with contributing countries. Such contacts are maintained by the Secretary General through OUSGSPA.

21. National commanders are directly responsible and answerable to the Force Commander for the effective operational and administrative functioning of their units. Personnel serving in these units remain under the command of their national commanders.

22. Where South Africa is requested to participate in a peace support operation, the following will apply:

22.1 The request will be routed to the Department of Foreign Affairs. That Department will liaise closely with the National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee and the Department of Defence, through the Minister of Defence, with regard to the nature of South Africa s potential involvement.

22.2 Additional agreements relating to the determination of the mission and objectives of the operation will also be negotiated by the Department of Foreign Affairs in consultation with the Department of Defence.

22.3 The Departments of Foreign Affairs and Defence will advise Cabinet on the matters referred to above. Cabinet is responsible for final decisions.

22.4 In terms of the Constitution, the employment of the SANDF in peace support operations requires the authorisation of the President.

22.5 In terms of the Constitution, Parliament is empowered to review the President s decision regarding such employment.

Departmental and Operational Considerations

23. The following issues should be addressed before committing SANDF forces to a peace support operation:

23.1 There must be a realistic appreciation of the extent of the SANDF s involvement in the light of its capabilities and other commitments.

23.2 Liaison channels must exist with UN peacekeeping structures. A clear command and control system must be established, and rules of engagement must be determined.

23.3 Channels of finance must be opened both with the UN and between the relevant South African government departments, and financial arrangements must be finalised in the contract.

23.4 Standardisation and compatibility must be established with other peacekeeping forces regarding drills; telecommunications; language; and doctrine and procedures for combined operations.

23.5 A time scale for the period of involvement must be established, and a disengagement plan for own troops must be in place.

23.6 South African forces must be supported logistically from own resources for at least 28 weeks, after which UN support shoul be available.

23.7 Planning and execution of operations must be compatible with UN operating procedures.

23.8 Forces must be familiar with the conditions prevailing in the area of operations.

23.9 South African Military Health Services (SAMHS) support for own troops must be in place.

24. The SANDF has particular skills and expertise in communications, field engineering (including mine-clearing), medical, and command and control functions which are relevant to peace support operations. Consideration should be given to designating these areas as the preferred mode of participation in the short- to medium-term. Decisions in this regard will depend on the nature of the operation and the country of deployment.

25. The following considerations must be taken into account with regard to the area of operations: the potential political risk to South Africa if it deploys forces in neighbouring countries; and the need for foreign assistance should forces be deployed beyond the operational reach of the SANDF.

26. The Defence Act currently provides that SANDF personnel may only be compelled to serve outside the borders of the RSA "in time of war... against the enemy". The legal implications of deploying personnel in peace support operations will therefore have to be addressed in new defence legislation.

Training

27. Peace support operations are fundamentally different from traditional approaches to fighting wars. The differences are manifest in the mission, objectives and doctrine of these operations, and in the role and tasks of the forces involved therein. Offensive action by these forces is usually prohibited, although it may receive limited expression in peace enforcement.

28. The skills, attitudes and expectations of SANDF personnel therefore need to be addressed through thorough training prior to deployment. They must be briefed properly on the political, cultural, linguistic and geographic features of the country of deployment. Failure to understand and respect the nuances of local culture and politics will undermine the efficacy and perceived impartiality of the peacekeepers.

29. All personnel involved in the operation must know and understand the rules of engagement. If possible, they should have an opportunity to practise the rules through simulation exercises prior to deployment.

30. Personnel also require training in mediation, negotiation and consensus-building skills. They should be psychologically prepared to back down and lose face in certain circumstances. They should appreciate the importance of impartiality, patience, tolerance and political sensitivity.

31. Training should be based on typical peace support operation tasks. These include cease-fire monitoring and maintenance; checkpoint operations; medical assistance to the civilian population;

crowd control at food distribution points; apprehension of criminals; and performing certain of the responsibilities of the civil authority if it has collapsed.

32. Military forces involved in peace operations should comply strictly with international humanitarian law, and may be mandated to oversee compliance with this law by the belligerent parties. It is therefore essential that SANDF personnel deployed in such operations are familiar with the relevant provisions of the law and with the application thereof in situations of conflict.

33. Combined training should be undertaken with the forces of countries with which South Africa is likely to be involved in peace support operations.

Force Design

34. In terms of the mandate of the SANDF, participation in international peace support operations is a secondary function. The SANDF will therefore not normally create special structures for such operations, but will rather provide for them within the primary structure.

35. More specifically, peacekeeping and peace enforcement are secondary functions of the Army s Rapid Deployment Ground Force which includes mechanised, parachute and motorised forces. Two motorised infantry battalion groups will be prepared for *peacekeeping* operations on a relay basis. The capabilities of the mechanised and parachute forces will be used in *peace enforcement* operations if required.

36. Similarly, the Air Force, Navy and SA Military Health Services will not provide dedicated force components for peace support operations but will ensure that the components which might be deployed in these operations are equipped and trained appropriately.

Chapter 6

Co-operation with the SA Police Service

Policy Framework

1. South Africa is characterised by a high level of crime and criminal violence which affects all sectors of society and is exacerbated by a proliferation of light weapons in private hands. Violence in certain parts of the country remains unacceptably high and poses a serious threat to public order and the security of citizens.

2. The government is tackling this problem through efforts to strengthen the criminal justice system, community policing and a National Crime Prevention Strategy. Long-term solutions include upgrading the conditions of impoverished communities through the RDP, and supporting economic growth and development in Southern Africa.

3. Public order policing is primarily the responsibility of the SAPS. Given the relative shortage of police personnel, a large number of troops are currently deployed to assist them in the maintenance of law and order.

4. Despite public calls for greater military involvement in combatting crime, the government regards this tendency as undesirable. The history of South Africa and many other countries indicates that it is inappropriate to utilise armed forces in a policing role on a permanent or semi-permanent basis. This perspective is based on the following:

4.1 Armed forces are not trained, orientated or equipped for deployment against civilians. They are typically geared to employ maimum force against an external military aggressor.

4.2 On-going employment in a law and order function may lead to the defence force becoming politicised and increasingly involved in non-military activities.

4.3 Such employment may also undermine the image and legitimacy of the defence force amongst sections of the population.

4.4 Internal deployment places a substantial burden on the defence budget. It also has a disruptive effect on the economy when large numbers of part-time soldiers are called-up.

4.5 Efforts to apply military solutions to political problems are inherently limited and may undermine resolution of these problems.

5. The Departments of Defence and Safety and Security are formulating plans for the withdrawal of the SANDF from a policing role. The SANDF would then be deployed only in exceptional circumstances, such as a state of emergency or national defence or a breakdown of public order beyond the capacity of the SAPS.

6. Until this goal is attained, the employment of the SANDF in co-operation with the police will continue. Such employment will be authorised by the President, regulated by legislation and subject to the Bill of Rights and parliamentary approval and safeguards. Officers and other ranks deployed in internal operations will be equipped and trained appropriately.

7. To ensure effective deployment and maximum co-operation with the SAPS, the following steps should be taken: the creation of formal liaison committees; analysis and determination of the role, method of employment and duties of the SANDF; the establishment of a clear chain of command and control, a code of conduct and appropriate rules of engagement; agreement on the duration

of the SANDF deployment; and a thorough review of the deployment if the objective of the mission is not achieved within the agreed time-scale.

8. The Department of Defence will establish mechanisms to facilitate communication and liaison between the SANDF and provincial and local authorities regarding the internal deployment of troops. However, these authorities will have no decision-making powers over such deployment. Command of the SANDF remains centralised at national level.

9. The SANDF is currently employed in border protection in co-operation with the police. Those activities which relate to combatting crime and controlling the flow of illegal immigrants into South Africa are more properly the responsibility of the SAPS. This matter is similarly under review by various government departments in the context of the National Crime Prevention Strategy.

Strategic Approach

10. The internal employment of the SANDF will take place within the framework of the National Crime Prevention Strategy. This will ensure effective co-ordination, an integrated approach and synergy of effort.

11. In implementing this strategy, a clear distinction between the roles of the military and the police will be maintained.

11.1 Types of activity. The defence force will not perform police functions such as criminal investigation, arresting suspects, preparing dockets and involvement in the criminal justice system.

11.2 Powers. The SANDF does not have normal powers of arrest, detention and search and seizure; these are legally the preserve of the SAPS. Certain exceptions may be made by government regulation in a state of emergency.

11.3 Geographic focus. SANDF employment should be concentrated in rural and border areas since these coincide with the military s conventional theatre of operations. As an interim measure, an expansion of the military s role in border protection will free police resources for combatting routine and priority crimes.

11.4 Types of crime. The SANDF should not be involved in combatting routine crime but should rather focus on i) crimes which constitute a threat to the constitutional order; ii) crimes where military employment is consistent with international practice; and iii) serious crime. These categories are described below.

Crimes Constituting a Threat to the Constitutional Order

12. Crimes which constitute a threat to the constitutional order might include extremist political groupings which are armed; the expansion of para-military forces; large scale political instability; mass civil disobedience; and a complete breakdown of law and order.

Crime Combatting in Accordance with International Practice

13. It is acceptable internationally to deploy armed forces to counter certain types of crime which have serious socio-economic, security and/or environmental implications.

13.1 The SA Army is deployed, in co-operation with the SAPS and other state departments, in border protection. This is intended to prevent illegal immigration and the smuggling of drugs and weapons across landward borders.

13.2 Smuggling, illegal entry, plunder of marine resources and other crimes occur along the coast of the Republic. The Navy is deployed in co-operation with the SAPS and the departments of environmental affairs, home affairs and revenue services in patrolling the coast to prevent such activities.

13.3 The Air Force has air space surveillance and control capabilities which assist in the protection of the country s air space against smuggling and illegal entry.

13.4 The SA Military Health Services provides medical support to the SANDF and SAPS during crime prevention operations.

Serious Crime

14. The SANDF can contribute to combatting serious crime such as attacks on farms; stock theft by armed groups; illegal trafficking in drugs, arms and ammunition; car hijackings; and taxi violence.

15. Such SANDF activities include monitoring and surveillance; providing air transport support to the SAPS; providing logistic and personnel support to police engaged in roadblocks, cordons and vehicle and foot patrols. The SANDF also provides reaction force back-up to the police where this is required.

Cost-Effective Utilisation of Resources

16. The SANDF has a range of capabilities which can be utilised to assist the police. In the interests of cost-effectiveness, these assets are put at the disposal of the police and therefore need ot duplicated by the SAPS.

17. Relevant capabilities include fixed wing and helicopter transport; specialised aerial and naval reconnaissance; naval transport; air space control; operational medical support; communications; and logistic support.

Force Design and Force Levels

18. Employment in co-operation with the SAPS is not a primary factor in determining force design. The SANDF relies mainly on its core defence capabilities to prepare and equip for the above tasks.

19. The extent of military deployment is determined by the security situation and is reviewed periodically. Where core defence capabilities are insufficient, additional personnel are required. In 1997 approximately 6 000 soldiers were deployed on a daily basis in co-operation with the police.

Chapter 7

South African Defence Review 1998

Non-Military Tasks

Policy Framework

1. The SANDF is designed and equipped chiefly to fulfil its primary mission of defence against aggression. Nevertheless, it has personnel, skills and resources which are utilised for various non-military tasks, normally in support of the civil authority. They are regarded as secondary functions and are not a major factor in the determination of force design and force levels.

2. The SANDF does not budget for the execution of these functions since they derive from existing defence capabilities. In some cases the Department of Defence claims from the users the cost of activities which are undertaken on a regular basis. There are exceptions where provision of a service by the SANDF is the most cost-effective option for the state. This is normally the case where an extension to existing SANDF capabilities is preferable to creating the same capabilities in another department. Examples are VIP air transport, hydrographic services and the national codification bureau.

3. Government regards inappropriate use of armed forces in non-military activities as economically inefficient and politically unwise Such activities are appropriate in extreme situations and where they derive from capabilities which are unique to the Defence Force.

4. More specifically, government is disinclined to employ the SANDF in socio-economic development. Such employment blurs the distinction between the military and civilian spheres; it contributes to the militarisation of civil society; and it undermines the preparedness of the force with respect to its primary function.

5. However, there may be exceptional circumstances which mitigate against the delivery of services by line function departments. The support of the SANDF may be required as a matter of urgency because of its specialised skills and resources; an example of this might be assisting with emergency provision of water to a rural community. The details of such support are currently under review by a ministerial task group.

6. The following guidelines will govern these situations: the employment of the SANDF should be requested by the relevant government department; it should have the consent of the affected community; it should have a limited time duration; and it should be subject to civilian control.

7. The SANDF makes an important contribution to developing human resources through its education and training programmes. Special training programmes are associated with integration, demobilisation and rationalisation. For example, the Service Corps trains its members in a range of vocational and other skills to prepare them for employment in civil society (see paragraphs 23 and 24 below).

8. The rest of this chapter describes the main non-military tasks of the SANDF.

Description of Non-Military Tasks

Maritime Services

9. The SANDF provides surveillance and enforcement support to the relevant authorities for the protection of marine resources against illegal plunderig; the protection of the marine environment against pollution; and maritime law enforcement with respect to piracy and smuggling of drugs and weapons.

10. The magnitude of these tasks is such that the Navy and the Air Force are required to support other state departments. This state of affairs is expected to continue indefinitely since government is unlikely to establish a new organisation for maritime protection.

11. Marine resources are steadily gaining importance and the marine environment is under growing pressure. The scope of the protection task is therefore expected to increase. Maritime aircraft and naval vessels currently conduct extensive patrols on a regular basis as part of their normal employment.

Air Space and Traffic Control

12.The SANDF may be required to provide support to air space and air traffic control where the relevant civilian body lacks capability. An example is the service provided by the Air Force to augment Civil Aviation in Mpumalanga.

Disaster Relief

13. The SANDF provides support for the preservation of life, health and property in emergency situations which exceed the capacity of the civil authorities. These situations typically arise from fires, floods and other disasters, such as forest fires. Assistance is subject to financial reimbursement, as determined by the Department of Defence.

Maintaining Essential Services

14. The SANDF provides emergency support to the civil authority for the maintenance of essential services which have been temporarily disrupted through natural disaster, large-scale failure or sabotage. Examples include drought relief; the provision and distribution of purified water; and the continuation of hospital services during large-scale labour action.

Search and Rescue

15. The SANDF provides search and rescue support to the relevant authorities and in terms of South Africa s international obligations. It is a major participant in the national search and rescue structure (SASAR) co-ordinated by the Department of Transport.

VIP Air Transport

16. The SANDF provides VIP air transport for the President, the Deputy President, the Minister and Deputy Minister of Defence and, where capacity allows, other cabinet ministers and provincial premiers.

Antarctic Transport Support

17. The Navy and the Air Force provide the Department of the Environment and Tourism with transport support to the Prince Edward Island group and the Antarctic. This is a long term national commitment because South Africa is a signatory to treaties governing the management and preservation of the Antarctic, and because the marine resources in areas over which the Republic has sovereignty will gain importance in years to come.

Hydrographic Services

18. The Navy provides hydrographic services for its own purposes, to South Africa s mariners and to other mariners in terms of international obligations. The Hydrographer of the Navy charts the Republic s territorial waters and maritime zone, as well as international waters for which South Africa has responsibility in terms of the International Hydrographic Organisation.

19. The Hydrographer promulgates radio navigation warnings, notices to mariners, and tidal and related meteorological data to seafarers passing through South African waters. Requests have been received from the coastal states in Southern Africa for assistance in surveying their coasts, harbours and harbour-approaches.

Medical Services

20. The SA Military Health Service (SAMHS) provide medical management and health services and support to various departments (eg the SAPS and the departments of health, foreign affairs, the environment, transport and correctional services).

21. Such support can include the provision and distribution of medicine to national and provincial authorities; the provision of specialised facilities (eg air medical, dive medical and hyperbaric treatment facilities); immunization campaigns; maintaining essential medical services during labour unrest; assisting in disaster relief operations; training primary health care personnel; health service management and treatment of SAPS and Department of Correctional Services personnel and animals; and social upliftment programmes where required.

22. SAMHS also provides medical care to the President, the Deputy President, the Minister and Deputy Minister of Defence and, at the request of the Department of Foreign Affairs, foreign VIPs visiting South Africa.

Service Corps

23. The SANDF provides the infrastructure for the management of the Service Corps which equips former combatants for re-entry into civilian society through the provision of vocational skills training and adult basic education.

24. In March 1996 Cabinet tasked an inter-departmental committee to investigate the extension of this structure into a National Service Corps to train youth and unemployed people. The investigation will determine the appropriate place of the new initiative within government structures, probably outside the Department of Defence.

Communication Security Service

25. The SANDF provides and maintains an infrastructure for ensuring that government communication is secure.

Election Support

26. As in previous elections, the SANDF may be required to deploy large numbers of troops to support the police during the 1999 elections. It may also be requested to provide support during elections elsewhere in Southern Africa.

Chapter 8

South African Defence Review 1998

Force Design Options

Introduction

1. During peace-time the SANDF must maintain, develop and prepare forces that form the basis of its conventional defence capabilities. It must also employ such forces in the execution of secondary functions, as described in the White Paper and preceding chapters of this report. At all times, the SANDF must be ready to act in defence of South Africa in response to various defence contingencies. This is reflected in the vision of the Department of Defence:

To ensure, in accordance with the Constitution, effective defence for a democratic South Africa, enhancing national, regional and global security, through balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced defence capabilities.

2. Accordingly, the Department has the following mission:

To provide, manage, prepare and employ defence capabilities commensurate with the needs of South Africa as regulated by the Constitution, national legislation and parliamentary and executive direction.

Tasks

3. To plan and prepare for the execution of the above mission, the tasks associated with the defence needs of South Africa need to be defined. The following tasks are derived from the previous chapters of this report:

3.1 Providing core defence capabilities for defence of South Africa against external military threats, and the execution of military operations in defence of South Africa, its interests and its citizens when so ordered by the President.

3.2 Providing defence capabilities against internal threats to the constitutional order, and the execution of such operations in a state of emergency when so ordered by the President.

3.3 Promoting regional security through defence co-operation within the SADC framework.

3.4 Promoting international security through military co-operation in support of South Africa s foreign policy.

3.5 Providing a military capability for participation in regional and international peace support operations.

3.6 Providing and applying forces for land, air and maritime border protection against non-military threats.

3.7 Providing a capability to maintain law and order in co-operation with the SAPS on an ongoing basis. This will remain necessary until the police are able to fulfil the ask without assistance from the military, other than in exceptional circumstances.

3.8 Providing surveillance and enforcement support to relevant authorities for protection of marine resources, control of marine pollution, and maritime law enforcement.

3.9 Providing air traffic control services in support of civil aviation authorities.

3.10 Providing military support for the preservation of life, health and property in emergency situations where the scale of the emergency temporarily exceeds the capacity of the relevant civil authorities.

3.11 Providing emergency capabilities for the maintenance of essential services which have been temporarily disrupted and where the capacity of the relevant civil authorities is exceeded.

3.12 Providing medical and health services in support of relevant authorities in accordance with approved policy.

3.13 Providing search and rescue support to the relevant authorities in accordance with domestic agreements and South Africa s international obligations.

3.14 Providing an air transport service for VIPs and other officials in accordance with approved policy.

3.15 Providing support to other state departments for missions to the Antarctic and Southern Ocean.

3.16 Providing hydrographic services to South African mariners and in compliance with the international obligations of the RSA.

3.17 Providing an infrastructure for the management of the service corps.

3.18 Providing a communications security service to other state departments.

3.19 Administering the National Key Points Act.

Force Design Logic

4. Notwithstanding this extensive list of tasks, the White Paper provides that force design should revolve chiefly around th SANDF s primary function of defence against military aggression. While the process of force design involves considerable military technical detail, the design is determined largely by decisions regarding three parameters: the level of defence required; the approved defence posture; and the defence budget.

5. The level of defence is reflected in the definition, scale and intensity of military operations associated with the defence contingencies and tasks discussed in Chapter 3 of this report. The size and configuration of the defence capabilities are in turn strongly influenced by the choice of defence posture, as elaborated in Chapter 2. The process is further constrained by budgetary guidelines and the costs associated with particular capabilities. In summary, the force design of the SANDF is needs driven, but cost constrained.

6. While the process is intended to produce a force design representing the best defence value for money within the selected parameters, it may not be possible to ensure the capabilities for a required level of defence within a restrictive budget. The resulting imbalance or inadequacy in defence capability represents a risk to the country, which must either be accepted or reduced by other means. Throughout the process there is thus an interplay of political judgement and military expertise.

Force Design Options

7. The Department of Defence developed various force design options, reflecting different permutations of level of defence, defence posture and cost, for public consideration during the consultative conferences of the Defence Review. Four options were presented to the parliamentary defence committees and cabinet and were discussed in detail. Option One, as set out in this report, was approved subject to available finances.

Status of a Force Design

8. The approval of a force design by the parliamentary defence committee, Cabinet or Parliament does not constitute blanket approval for all implied capital projects or an immutable contract in terms of the exact numbers and types of equipment. At best, it constitutes approval in principal for the maintenance of the specified capabilities at an approximate level. There are several reasons for this.

9. The affordability of the force design, which is central to its implementation, is subject to certain assumptions and qualifications. The long-term sustainability of the design requires a continuous investment in the periodic upgrading and replacement of equipment. The costing of the design thus incorporates annualised upgrade and replacement costs over the life span of the equipment. This is based on realistic assumptions, under present conditions, of the anticipated life span and cost of such equipment. Since the life span of major equipment is measured in decades and many replaement projects will commence many years hence, it is impossible to predict with absolute accuracy the actual annualised cost of equipment.

10. The process further assumes that the current imbalance in the so-called tooth-to-tail ratio of the SANDF will be corrected by the transformation process, thus releasing a greater portion of the

budget for combat capabilities. The ratio on which the calculations are based is an estimate of the anticipated result of transformation.

11. The numbers and costs of equipment in future replacement projects will also be affected by technological developments which may improve future equipment capabilities. On the other hand, less capable equipment may be available at a lower unit cost. During each procurement project a trade-off will thus have to be made between the required overall capability, the equipment available to the SANDF, cost, and available funds. These details can only be determined under the conditions prevailing at the time, and all major acquisition projects will thus be subject to the processes and levels of approval provided for in the White Paper on Defence.

12. The processes and assumptions on which the force design is based will be reviewed in successive planning cycles. This is bound to produce new insights that will require a periodic revision of the force design. The planning assumptions also reflect perceptions of the geopolitical environment, which will inevitably change. While no major discontinuities are anticipated, even gradual, relatively orderly change will require adjustments to defence planning on a continuous basis.

13. The force design thus reflects a dynamic environment and is itself dynamic. It represents the best present indication of the type and scale of defence capabilities that South Africa should establish and maintain, but its future orientation makes deviations inevitable. The transformation process in particular will impact directly on the force structure required to support the force design: force structure is subject to the Department s transformation project which will be discussed in detail in the course of the Defence Review process.

Option 1: Recommended Growth-Core Force Design

14. The absence of any immediate military threat to South Africa, the low probability of a significant threat within the foreseeable future, the reductions in the defence budget since 1989 and the likelihood that the budget will remain restricted for some time, have created a situation where the maintenance of extensive military capabilities is neither necessary nor affordable. Option 1 therefore represents the minimum force level that can be maintained as a growth core, in accordance with the core force approach detailed in Chapter 3, without the permanent loss of capabilities. This growth core will enable limited force employment, but will maintain the expertise and technological base for growth when warranted by the strategic or economic situation.

15. This option provides for a range of defence contingencies but excludes higher-level contingencies in the category of invasions and neutralising raids as described in Chapter 3. It also assumes substantial warning periods for the more severe contingencies. It allows for reasonable freedom of action for the SANDF at operational level, including interdiction and counter-offensive actions within a broadly defensive orientation. It also provides for peace support operations at a level of up to one infantry battalion group, for border protection and other secondary tasks, and for internal commitments in the short term.

16. At the broadest level of detail, this peace-time force will require some 22 000 full-time and some 70 000 part-time members; this includes only combat units and does not include non-combat personnel. The annualised cost of the combat units of this force will be in the order of R5 000 million in 1996 rand value[1].

17. Defence is conducted jointly, with each Combat Service providing specialised capabilities to Landward, Air and Maritime Defence. Organisationally, however, land assets reside in the SA Army, air assets in the SA Air Force and naval assets in the SA Navy. The discussion below is thus structured in terms of Landward, Air and Maritime Defence, indicating under each heading

the contribution of the Combat Services to defence in that dimension. The contribution of the SA Military Health Services is common to all the dimensions and will be discussed independently.

18. **Landward Defence**. Landward defence is conceptualised in terms of Conventional Defence (mobile operations) and Area Defence. Mobile conventional forces provide the first and main line of defence against external military threats. Area Defence comprises border safeguarding (border protection and border control) and area protection. Border protection entails defending the border against military threat and against crossings by armed and unarmed individuals or groups.

19. Area protection provides defence in depth against military incursions by external military forces, as well as a firm base from where mobile operations can be conducted. Within the primarily defensive orientation of the SANDF, a high premium is placed on firepower, night fighting ability, manoeuvring, quick reaction, surprise and tactical mobility. These features are reflected in the requirements of Option 1 regarding the land forces of the SA Army, which is the main provider of landward defence capability.

20. **SA Army in Landward Defence**. The basis for conventional defence is the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). This comprises of a mechanised infantry brigade, a parachute brigade and a special forces brigade, which maintain immediate readiness for all shorter term contingencies. Potential for expansion is provided by the Part-Time Component mobile division, consisting of three balanced brigades at various levels of preparedness.

21. These conventional, mobile forces are supplemented by border and area protection forces. Their main purpose is the protection of landward borders and interior assets against enemy mobile, airborne and special forces. During peace-time they form the backbone of SANDF participation in border protection and maintenance of law and order tasks. These forces consist principally of 14 light infantry battalions, 12 territorial infantry battalions and 183 area protection units. Command and Control is currently effected through 27 Group Headquarters within nine Command Areas of responsibility throughout South Africa[2].

22. Army main equipment associted with the force design includes the following:

22.1 Main Battle Tanks. Tanks provide a unique combination of mobility, firepower and resilience, and are the main combat element of the conventional land battle. The SA Army presently has 224 Olifant Mk1A/1B tanks on inventory, while Option 1 requires 154. The capability of tanks is vastly improved by using tank transporters for deployment over distances. The Olifant is due for replacement by a new generation main battle tank system from the year 2009[3].

22.2 Armoured Cars. Armoured cars are used in reconnaissance, attacks and counter-attacks against minor enemy strongholds, and in rear areas against lines of communication, providing high mobility and firepower in situations where heavy armour is uncalled for. They are a vital component of peace support/enforcement operations. Armoured cars cannot replace tanks and will only be used against tanks from defile positions or in static direct fire support. The Eland armoured car system is largely being phased out and replaced by the Rooikat. In 1989 the SA Army had 1 268 Eland and 18 Rooikat, compared with the present 235 Eland and 176 Rooikat. Option 1 requires 146 Eland and 242 Rooikat.

22.3 Anti-Armour Missile Systems. The ZT-3 anti-tank missile system, mounted on the Ratel 6 x 6 chassis, provides effective, highly mobile defence against tanks and other armoured vehicles. There are presently 53 systems on inventory, meeting the Option 1 requirement. Replacement by a new-generation system is anticipated from 2008.

22.4 Artillery Systems. Artillery provides indispensable indirect fire support to the land battle. This capability is provided by the G5 155mm towed medium artillery gun, the G6 155mm self-propelled medium artillery gun and the Bateleur 127mm multiple rocket

launcher. There are presently 72 G5, 43 G6 and 25 Bateleur on inventory, compared with the Option 1 requirement of 45 G5, 43 G6 and 25 Bateleur.

22.5 Infantry Combat and Mine Protected Vehicles. The present Ratel infantry combat vehicle (ICV), in service since 1976, provides mobility for the infantry and command and control elements of the mechanised forces of the SA Army. The present inventory of 1 243 is close to the 1 214 required by Option 1. It will be replaced by a new generation ICV from 2005. The mobility of the bulk of the infantry units is presently dependent on a range of vehicles, including the mine-protected Casspir, Buffel and Mamba (numbering 3 227 in total) and the unprotected Samil/Kwe 20 and the Samil/Kwe 50. The Option 1 requirement is for 4304 protected vehicles due to a greater emphasis on protection against mines, small-arms fire and shrapnel. These vehicles are essential for mobility in conventional operations, area protection and peace support operations, and are due for replacement from 1999.

22.6 Anti-Aircraft Systems. Air attacks can have a devastating effect on unprotected ground forces and the mere threat of air attack can seriously inhibit mobility and combat effectiveness. The present SA Army air defence capability consists of a variety of towed and vehicle mounted anti-aircraft guns and associated radars. This is inadequate, however; some systems are obsolete and need to be supplemented and extended by new systems to fulfil the concept of layered air defence. The Opton 1 requirement thus includes towed guns, man-portable missiles, short range missiles and search- and fire-control radars.

23. **SA Air Force in Landward Defence**. The SA Air Force is a vital participant in landward defence, defending land forces against air attack and providing surveillance, mobility (air transportation) and firepower in support of landward operations. Fixed wing aircraft and helicopters provide the following capabilities toward landward defence:

23.1 Combat Support Helicopters (CSH). These provide direct fire support to land forces. They greatly enhance anti-tank capability and provide rapid support to the parachute and special forces brigades. Option 1 thus provides for 12 CSH as a core capability.

23.2 Fighter Aircraft. Fighters are the main means of ensuring a favourable air situation over an area of operations, thereby preventing enemy air operations and enabling aerial support to own ground forces. Their employment in air defence thus has important benefits in landward defence. Direct fighter support includes fire support, interdiction of the battlefield and enemy rear lines of communication. Both medium and light fighters are included in Option 1 (32 and 16 aircraft respectively). Light fighters can, however, only be used in a relatively benign air defence environment.

23.3 Aerial Surveillance. Knowledge of enemy dispositions and movements is essential to the successful conduct of defence. Aerial surveillance gives a unique vantage point, covers both large and selected areas rapidly, and enables a quick response to requests for information. This capability is provided in Option 1 by 16 light reconnaissance aircraft, 4 electronic warfare aircraft (see paragraph 27.5) and a squadron of remotely piloted aircraft. (See Note 2 above).

23.4 Air Mobility. Air transport is essential to the mobility of forces engaged in landward defence and is a critical component of the rapid deployment force concept. Fixed wing aircraft of various types provide mobility over longer distances, the most cost-effective type of aircraft being determined by distance and load considerations. Light and medium helicopters provide tactical mobility for troops in the field, and contribute to logistic support and casualty evacuation. VIP aircraft provide rapid, efficient transport of senior staff to and from theatres of operations. Option 1 thus provides for 44 transport aircraft of various types, 9 VIP aircraft, 96 transport helicopters and nine Voluntary Squadrons. (See Note 2 above).

24. **SA Navy in Landward Defence**. The SA Navy can provide fire support to landward defence operations in coastal areas and can transport forces, equipment and supplies to harbours serving an area of operations.

25. **Air Defence**. The use of the air for surveillance, mobility and firepower is a basic tenet of modern conventional warfare. Air superiority is the ability to make unhindered use of the air, while denying an enemy that capability. Air defence is the protection of assets against all forms of enemy air interference and involves both defensive and offensive measures.

26. The active component of defensive counter air measures include the early detection and warning of enemy air activity, ground- or shipboard-defence by means of gun or missile systems, and the use of fighter aircraft to intercept enemy aircraft. The passive component comprises the hardening of potential targets, the dispersion of assets, camouflage, damage repair capabilities, and so forth. Offensive counter air measures consist of direct attacks on enemy air assets including bases, aircraft, air defence systems, radars and command and control centres to neutralise enemy air capabilities. As detailed in Chapter 2, offensive action at an operational level in response to an enemy attack would not violate South Africa s primarily defensive posture. Offensive counter air measures are thus not excluded from the range of possible air defence actions.

27. While each Combat Service is responsible for the local defence of its own assets and the Navy can assist in harbour protection using the capabilities of ships in port, the SA Air Force is responsible for area defence and the defence of National Key Points against air attack. The SA Air Force is thus the main provider of air defence capabilities.

28. **SA Air Force in Air Defence**. The defence of South African airspace is the primary task of the SA Air Force. Flexible air defence is provided for in this force design option through a combination of airspace control radars (both static and mobile), point defence missile systems, and aircraft.

28.1 Command and Control. The Air Force employs an integrated command and control system linking subsidiary structures to a central Air Force Command Post. This provides an integrated picture of air operations and enables the efficient use of air resources.

28.2 Sensors. Radar coverage is essential to detect and track enemy air operations and to direct own operations. Present radar deployments provide only limited coverage of the country s airspace and borders. Option 1 makes provision for 3,5 radar squadrons, which constitute the required core capability.

28.3 Medium Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft. Medium fighters are essential for air defence. Obsolescence and dfence cutbacks have led to a reduction in medium fighter numbers from 89 in 1989 to 51 aircraft. The F1 s are to be phased out in 1999 subject to annual review, while the Cheetah C will stay in service until 2012. The Option 1 requirement is for 32 medium multi-role fighters.

28.4 Air Defence Missile Systems. The Cactus missile system, used for the defence of primary air bases, has been retired from service. One system is being kept functional as a technology and capability retention programme. Option 1 makes no provision for missile defences.

28.5 Electronic Warfare/In-Flight Refuelling. Electronic surveillance provides vital early warning of air attacks and other enemy actions, while in-flight refuelling extends the range and endurance of fighter aircraft employed in air, land and maritime defence. Retention of this capability thus makes a vital contribution to the other limited capabilities of Option 1 in all dimensions of defence. The recommended option includes five aircraft, reflecting the retention of four equipped aircraft, with a fifth unmodified aircraft used for training and transportation.

29. **SA Army in Air Defence**. The responsibility of the Army toward air defence consists of self-defence of its own assets, as detailed above.

30. **SA Navy in Air Defence**. The responsibility of the Navy toward air defence consists of self-defence of its own assets and harbour defence by ships in port, as detailed above.

31. **Maritime Defence**. South Africa s dominant position on a vital global trade sea-route, its dependence on sea trade and its vast maritime area make maritime defence a matter of great importance. The protection and defence of maritime life lines of commerce during times of conflict and hostilities may prove crucial to the survival and well-being of our people.

32. South Africa has six major commercial ports and two main naval bases - in Simon s Town and Durban. It is of vital importance that these ports be kept open to shipping during times of war or tension. The present lack of finance for defence, however, has determined that two critical areas - comprising Durban and Richard s Bay on the east coast and Cape Town, Saldanha Bay and Simon s Town on the west coast - should be prioritised. To this end, two maritime defence areas have been planned, based on these two areas.

33. Maritime warfare is multi-dimensional and effective maritime defence requires balanced air, surface and sub-surface capabilities. Surface vessels can conduct sustained operations, maintaining a presence unequalled by other systems, and have substantial capabilities in countering aircraft, other surface vessels and submarines. Submarines can control their visibility and pose a threat to even the most sophisticated surface forces, thus providing great deterrent and defence value. Aircraft provide area coverage and a rapid response capability that ships and submarines cannot equal. There is thus a complementary relationship between these elements and the neglect of any one has a disproportionate effect on the overall defence capability. Maritime defence is vested primarily in the capabilities of the SA Navy.

34. **SA Navy in Maritime Defence**. The maritime defence areas are defended by means of a layered approach where vessels with different capabilities are used in concentric layers extending outward from the harbours. The capabilities of each class of vessel contribute uniquely to overall defence capability.

34.1 Frigates/Patrol Corvettes. Frigates or corvettes are the workhorses of any navy. They are capable of countering aircraft, submarines and other surface vessels and can conduct sustained operations in sea conditions like those off the South African coast. They will patrol to the outer layer of about 200 nautical miles (370 kms) from the coast. Such ships, as a rule, carry helicopters which significantly improve and extend their defence capabilities. The SA Navy has no ships in this class, having lost its destroyers and frigates between the mid-1970s and late 1980s. Option 1 includes four corvettes.

34.2 Submarines. Submarines have built-in stealth, mobility, firepower, endurance and an ability to control their visibility that present significant problems for hostile naval forces. They patrol throughout the outer and inner layers of defence, providing early warning and a great deterrent against even the most powerful of surface forces. Without submarines, a navy would have to have a considerably larger surface fleet with higher sophistication at a significantly higher cost to provide the same deterrent and defence value. The three Daphne-Class submarines in service at present are coming to the end of their economical service life and their replacement should be seriously considered. Option 1 includes four submarines.

34.3 Inshore and Harbour Patrol. Inshore patrol vessels patrol the inshore waters of the maritime defence areas, primarily in the approaches to harbours. Harbour patrol boats are ski-boat sized vessels used for patrol purposes in the harbours themselves. These vessels form the inner layer of defence against smaller enemy forces that may have infiltrated through the outer defences. Option 1 provides for two inshore patrol boats and 39 harbour patrol boats.

34.4 Rapid Reaction Vessels. A number of strike craft or corvettes should be kept on stand-by to react against enemy forces encountered by the outer layers of defence and to patrol the intermediate area. The SA Navy has nine strike craft facing block obsolescence, six of which will have to be replaced shortly after the turn of the century. Option 1 therefore includes six strike craft.

34.5 Mine Countermeasures Forces. Mine hunters and minesweepers are required to keep the harbour approaches clear of mines. Option 1 includes four of each of these vessels, corresponding to the number presently in service. However, the minesweepers, being almost 40 years of age, require a life extension program and upgrade of their minesweeping gear to make them operational.

34.6 Combat Support Ships. Combat Support Ships provide replenishment at sea for combat ships and submarines, enabling operations on a sustained basis with minimal base support. These helicopter carrying ships are capable of performing multiple tasks and are vital in peace support operations because of their inherent cargo and personnel carrying capacity. Option 1 includes one such sip.

35. These forces will be divided up equally in defence of the two Maritime Defence Areas when so required. They can, however, be regrouped as required to meet other contingencies.

36. **SA Air Force in Maritime Defence**. Air participation in maritime defence provides enhanced surveillance capabilities and firepower, and plays a significant role in layered defence.

36.1 Maritime Patrol Aircraft. Maritime Patrol Aircraft have area coverage and long-range rapid reaction capabilities that enable surveillance far beyond the capabilities of naval vessels. Some are also fitted with weapons that enable attacks on surface ships or submarines. They can patrol throughout and far beyond the maritime defence areas, providing an outer layer of defence, giving early warning of approaching hostile forces, tracking those that have been detected, and assisting in the direction of maritime engagement. Such aircraft are a vital component of maritime warfare. Option 1 therefore includes six long range and 10 short range maritime patrol aircraft. The need for maritime patrol aircraft is, however, presently driven by surveillance requirements rather than full surface and sub-surface combat capability. In view of budgetary restrictions it may therefore be expedient to consider long range maritime patrol aircraft with downgraded combat capabilities, but with a possibility of upgrading when so required, rather than more combat capable medium range aircraft. The early warning capability provided by these aircraft can be supplemented by the surveillance capability of the electronic warfare aircraft of the SA Air Force.

36.2 Shipborne Maritime Helicopters. Helicopters increase the range of ships detection systems and weapons and may possess systems to help counter hostile surface warships or submarines. They therefore vastly improve the defence value of ships that carry them. Option 1 provides for five such helicopters to be carried on the patrol corvettes.

36.3 Fighter aircraft. Fighters provide rapid reaction to a naval threat and can substantially complement naval fire power, thereby compounding the self-defence problem of the enemy. While Option 1 makes no special provision for this role, multi-role fighters dedicated primarily to air and landward defence can be employed in this capacity.

37. **SA Military Health Services**. The medical services support the three combat services during operations. This support entails operational health services during deployments. The SAMHS participate actively in search and rescue missions, and provide casualty evacuation during missions. Direct support is given to the Army rapid deployment forces through the full-time force medical battalion group, and the part-time medical battalion groups provide direct support to the part-timeforce mobile division. The SAMHS also provide early warning of chemical and biological

agents being used against own forces and carry out decontamination of personnel and equipment.

38. **Strategic gaps and risks**. The major strategic gaps in this force design are as follows:

38.1 Interventions by major powers and neutralising attacks can only be defended against in a limited way. This will require armed action, regular and irregular, supported by civilian based defence if military resistance fails. This limits the deterrence value of the SANDF.

38.2 Limited strategic mobility in the ground forces due to a low force to space ratio.

38.3 Limited strategic reconnaissance capabilities in the Air Force, exacerbated by the absence of high-speed autonomous unmanned aircraft.

38.4 Insufficient air defence capabilities for a classical defensive counter-air posture.

38.5 Restricted maritime capabilities for defence of all harbours and maritime areas outside the two mentioned critical areas.

38.6 Restricted maritime reconnaissance, limiting the operational options of naval surface and submarine forces.

38.7 If large scale forces are employed for peace support operations, this will further restrict capabilities for self-defence.

39. These strategic gaps limit the political freedom of the government in times of crisis and conflict and must be kept in mind during conflict management.

Option 2: Department of Defence Long-Term Vision Force Design

40. This option provides for a broad range of defence contingencies, excluding major interventions by major powers as described in Chapter 3 under "invasion". It is based on the assumption that reasonable warning would be received for such contingencies to develop and that time for expansion of capabilities would be available. It allows for reasonable freedom of action for the SANDF at operational level, including interdiction and counter-offensive actions. It makes ample provision for peace support operations, border proection, and other secondary tasks but scales down on internal commitments in line with national defence policy.

41. At the broadest level of detail this peace time force will require some 36 000 full time and some 98 000 part time members (for combat units only). The annualised cost of the combat units of this force will be in the order of R6 000 million in 1996 rand value. As qualified in the discussion of Option 1, the cost does not include common support costs.

42. **Land forces**. This force design includes all the components of the conventional land forces but significantly scales up the parachute and special forces brigades relative to Option 1.

43. The territorial forces include 20 motorised infantry battalions and 205 area protection units. Command and Control is effected through 18 group headquarters throughout South Africa.

44. Army main equipment remains the same as in Option 1 with slight increase in quantity.

45. **Air Forces**. The concept of air operations in this force design is the same as for Option 1. Major changes in force elements are the inclusion of four long-range maritime patrol aircraft and high-speed autonomous unmanned aircraft. This enhances the effectiveness of the maritime defence and reconnaissance capabilities of the SANDF.

46. Numbers of light reconnaissance aircraft are reduced since their dual use as transport aircraft is made unnecessary through an increase in light transport aircraft. Two point defence systems are included, thereby improving this capability from technology retention to a limited operational capability. The airspace control radar squadrons are slightly reduced since there is less reliance on fighter interception for air defence.

47. **Maritime Defence**. Naval forces in this option differ only slightly from the previous option. The minesweepers and mine hunters remain the same in number but readiness levels are slightly improved. The inclusion of the long range maritime patrol aircraft will however substantially improve maritime defence capabilities.

48. **SA Military Heath Services**. The operational capabilities of the medical services are the same in this option as in Option 1.

49. **Strategic gaps and risks**. The strategic gaps of Option 2 remain largely in force, with the following reductions:

49.1 Neutralising attacks can be successfully countered, leaving only invasions as a strategic gap.

49.2 Maritime reconnaissance is significantly improved, enhancing the operational options of naval surface and submarine forces.

49.3 Strategic reconnaissance is enhanced by the inclusion of high speed autonomous unmanned aircraft.

50. The reduction in the strategic gaps improves the political freedom of the government in times of crisis and conflict somewhat, but significant gaps till exist and must be kept in mind during conflict management.

Option 3: Lower Level Demonstration Option

51. Option 3 demonstrates the effect of a reduction below the level considered to be the minimum growth-core. This force design also provides greater emphasis on the secondary functions than Options 1 and 2.

52. This force design requires some 26 000 regular force members and 78 000 part-time members (for combat units only). The annualised cost of the combat elements of this force design is approximately R4 000 million in 1996 rand value.

53. The general characteristic of this force design is the removal of certain capability areas rather than simply the reduction of capabilities over a broad range. Conventional capabilities in particular are traded for non-conventional territorial forces. Conventional air and naval capabilities are severely curtailed.

54. This option reduces the Army s conventional forces and increases the area protection units and the readiness level of the groups. In the Air Force, fighter capability is lost, combat support helicopters are excluded and transport helicopters are halved in relation to the previous options. The Navy loses its submarines, corvettes and the combat support ship. No provision is made for defence against chemical and biological attack.

55. The operational effect is to shift the emphasis from conventional to non-conventional operational concepts. It is for this reason also that personnel numbers are increased despite the reduced cost of this force.

56. **Strategic gaps and risks**. This force design has all the strategic gaps of Option 2. In addition the following gaps are evident:

56.1 The absence of fighters, combat support helicopters, corvettes and submarines, as well as the reduced conventional capabilities of land forces, severely limits the deterrent value of this force design.

56.2 The emphasis on the non-conventional elements of the Army implies a severe restriction on the operational concepts open to it.

56.3 No provision for defence against air attack.

56.4 The elimination of larger surface vessels and submarines severely restricts the effective radius at whch the Navy can operate effectively, and seriously compromises its ability to protect the sea lines of communication.

56.5 The design leaves South Africa vulnerable to any form of chemical and biological attack.

56.6 The strategic mobility of the SANDF is severely limited.

56.7 The force has a greatly reduced capability to contribute specialised capabilities to peace support operations.

56.8 In times of conventional conflict, South Africa will be forced into adopting non-conventional methods of defence which will be costly in terms of lives and territory lost.

57. These strategic gaps imply serious political risks for government. Since the SANDF cannot provide the deterrent capability outlined in the White Paper, the political management of conflict will require special attention. South Africa will be open to punitive and coercive actions by future enemies due to a lack of air and maritime defence.

Conclusion

69. The Department of Defence considers Option 2 to be the most prudent force design for the SANDF in the long term. This should remain the vision of the Department.

70. In the shorter term, however, due to financial restrictions and other national priorities, Option 1 will form an acceptable growth-core for the maintenance of military capabilities and skills.

71. Option 3 is considered unacceptable by the Department, and leaves strategic gaps and risks that should be unacceptable to government. It is well below the minimum growth-core for any future expansion.

72. Option 4 involves major deviations from present capabilities and doctrine, and will require more study before it can be recommended. If future tendencies are in this direction, Option 1 will be an acceptable base for such development.

73. In the light of the above, Option 1 is the recommended force design for the SANDF.

74. The chosen forces design option will become the object of implementation planning for the next decade or longer. However, the realisation of this force design will be influenced by periodic revisions of the Defence Review and subsequent planning to reflect the continuously changing strategic environment and prevailing circumstances. The result is that the exact details regarding the type and quantities of main equipment will inevitably deviate from the vision. Such deviations will be subject to parliamentary oversight and the stipulations of the acquisition process.

SANDF Force Design Options

ARM OF SERVICE AND ELEMENT	*Option 1 Recommended*	*Option 2*	*Option 3*	*Option 4*
Total Cost, SANDF (Rm)	5 010	6 014	4 084	5 912
Personnel				
Full-Time Component	22 000	36 000	26 200	27 200
Part-Time Component	69 400	98 000	77 900	82 000
SA Army	1	1	1	1
Mobile Division	1	1	1	1
Mechanised Brigade (RDF)	1	1	1	1
Parachute Brigade (RDF)	1	1	1	1
Special Forces Brigade				
Territorial Forces :	27	18	32	18
Group Headquarters	14	10	8	10
Light Infantry Battalions	12	20		20
Territorial/Motorised Infantry Battalions	183	205	205	205
Area Protection Units				
Total Cost (Rm)	**2 517**	**3 289**	**2 869**	**2 998**
SA Air Force				
Fighters	16	16	16	16
Light Fighters	32	32		44
Medium Fighters				
Reconnaissance				
Light Reconnaissance Aircraft	16	16	16	16
Medium Sigint Aircraft		3		4
Long Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft	6	4		4
Medium Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft		8	8	8
Short Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft	10			
Remotely Piloted Sqns	1.00	1.50	0.75	1.25
Helicopters				
Combat Support Helicopters	12	12		16
Maritime Helicopters	5	6		6
Transport Helicopters	96	96	48	64
Transport Aircraft				
Transport Aircraft	44	64	64	64
VIP	9	9	9	9
Voluntary Squadrons	9	9	9	9
In-Flight Refuelling/Electronic Warfare A/C	5	3		4
Airspace Control				
Radar Squadrons	3.50	2.50	1.00	5.67
Point Defence Squadrons		2		4
Mobile Ground Sigint Team	3	6		1
Total Cost (Rm)	**1 725**	**1 941**	**868**	**2 070**
SA Navy	**4**	**4**		**4**
Submarines	**4**	**4**		**4**
Corvettes	**6**	**6**	**8**	**6**
Strike Craft	**1**	**1**		**1**
Combat Support Ships	**8**	**8**	**3**	**8**
Minesweeper/Hunter	**2**	**2**		**8**
Inshore Patrol Vessels	**39**	**39**	**16**	**39**
Harbour Patrol Boats				
Total Cost (Rm)	**715**	**731**	**309**	**790**
SA Military Health Services	**1**	**1**		**4**

CB Defensive Programmes Medical Battalion Groups (FTC) Medical Battalion Groups (PTC)	**1.00** **1.50**	**1.00** **1.50**	**1.00** **1.00**	**1.00** **1.00**
Total Cost (Rm)	**53**	**53**	**38**	**54**

The Transformation of the Department of Defence

1. The transformation of the Department of Defence (DoD) takes place against the broader backdrop of the transformation process in South Africa generally. The post-1994 period has ushered in a series of challenges for South Africans which require a fundamental transformation of economic relations, political structures, and culture and values of South African society. This is reflected in key government policy documents including the Reconstruction and Development Programme, the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy, the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service and the Defence White Paper. It is also reflected in the fact that the posture of the country has changed from that of an aggressive stance - as reflected in the doctrine of "Offensive Defence" - towards the region to a posture of co-operative and confidence-building defence.

2. Although the transformation of the organization and structures of the DoD is an important process with which the DoD is currently underway, structural transformation consittutes part of a much braoder process of transformation within the DoD generally. The transformation of the DoD covers four major areas:

2.1 **Civil-Military Relations** : This entails transforming the relationship between the armed forces, the defence function and its constitutional and legal status. The two critical areas of civil-military relations transformation cover the following :

2.1.1 **Constitutional and Legal Transformation**. This refers to the reorientation of the defence function in light of new constitutional and legal realities. The Constitution outlines the political channels of accountability governing the DoD, the functions of defence, its organizational outline and its composition. The institution of a new Constitution has required a corresponding revision of the Defence Act, the creation of appropriate Codes of Conduct and the internalization of these values in the education and training culture of the DoD. The key constitutional principles upon which the defence function is based are outlined in the Constitution. The key legal principles and laws governing the defence function are in the process of being revised - the process of which is outlined in the Legal Environment chapter of this Review.

2.1.2 **Oversight Mechanisms**. A key feature of democratic civil-military relations is the inviolability of the principle of civil control over the armed forces. This is reflected in the primacy afforded to parliament in approving the finances for the armed forces, the legislation governing the activities of the armed forces, and the approval of the policy framework within which the armed forces will function. To ensure that effective civil control is maintained over the armed forces, and that the activities of the armed forces are harmonized with broader government policy, a range of

additional mechanisms are instituted to ensure robust and effective civil-military relations. These include the following:

2.1.2.1 Legislation passed by parliament which determines the defence mandate of the Department of Defence.

2.1.2.2 The creation of Parliamentary Committees responsible for the oversight of the defence function. The Joint Standing Committee on Defence and the defence committees in the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces fulfill this function.

2.1.2.3 The Parliamentary Committees of Finance and Public Accounts which has the authority to summon any public account holder with concerning their expenditure of funds.

2.1.2.4 The Auditor General and his staff who report directly to parliament on the handling of finances by the Department of Defence.

2.1.2.5 The creation of a Ministry of Defence responsible for ensuring political control over the DoD and ensuring that the activities of the DoD are consistent with government policy.

2.1.2.6 The creation of a largely civilian Defence Secretariat responsible for formulating policies, programes and budgets and controlling the execution of the mandate of the SANDF.

2.1.2.7 The creation of additional mechanisms to ensure that the activities of the DoD are consistent with the letter and the spirit of the new democracy - the role of the Public Protector and the Military Ombuds for example.

2.2 **Normative and Cultural Transformation.** This refers to the transformation of the culture of the DoD in relation to its values, traditions, human resource practices and managerial practices. Cultural transformation, therefore, refers to a wide range of activities reflected in a diversity of policy and programmes within the DoD including the following:

2.2.1 The institution of equal opportunity and affirmative action programmes within the DoD. This will ensure that the DoD will be broadly representative of South Africa s demographic composition. These programmes are reflected in the Human Resources and Part Time Component chapters in this Defence Review.

2.2.2 The transformation of the traditions of both the full-time and part-time components of the DoD. This will ensure that the emerging South African military culture will be reflective of the diverse military traditions within South African society. It is significant to note that a DoD

Committee has been established to oversee the transformation of the traditions of the new Department of Defence.

2.2.3 The creation of a military professional ethic which is consistent with the moral imperatives of the new political dispensation and accords with the ethical obligations of a soldier functioning in a democracy. This is reflected in the current Civic Education Programme within the DoD.

2.2.4 The transformation of the management practices of the DoD to ensure that such practices are normatively and practically consistent with the ethos of a new democracy. This is reflected in the design and institution of a Civic Education Programme within the DoD and the design of new Leadership, Command, Administrative and Management practices for use within the DoD.

2.3 **Organizational Restructuring.** Organizational restructuring refers to the rationalisation and right-sizing of the DoD so as to ensure the more efficient and effective utilisation of state resources. This entails a range of measures including the disbanding of units, demobilisation and rationalisation of defence personnel, elimination of wasteful practices, eliminating the duplication o services, and the more efficient co-location of military bases and units. This component of transformation is addressed in greater detail in this chapter.

Civil Control over the Military

3. Armed forces play an important role as an instrument of state policy in contributing towards the realization of the goals of our new democracy. The armed forces, however, like all government departments, and particularly in light of their coercive powers, must remain subordinate to elected government and respectful of the principle of civil supremacy. This done through the institution of appropriate oversight and control mechanisms as both a parliamentary and executive level and via programmes within the armed forces such as highlighting the need for military professionalism and the inculcation amongst members of the armed forces respect for civil control through training programmes.

4. With the advent of democracy in South Africa in 1994, government undertook to establish civil control over the armed forces in line with democratic practice throughout the world.

5. Civil control is established by the elected democratic authority appointing a political head over the respective forces and department. In South Africa the Constitution mandates the Minister of Defence to exercise control over and be accountable for the entire defence function.

6. To support the Minister, civilians are appointed in the department to assist policy functions. This includes setting the ends of defence, establishing the ways and means of defence through programming and budgeting and assisting the Minister in control of the

Defence Force to ensure that it fulfils its mandate in line with the Government s directions.

Management of the Defence Function

7. The SANDF s mandate is firstly that of the defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. It should be able to meet this obligation with force should it be called upon to do so.

8. Management of the defence force is established constitutionally and through the Defence Act in the following way:

8.1 The SANDF must be structured and managed as a disciplined military force (Constitution 200(1)).

8.2 The President as head of the national executive is Commander-in-Chief of the defence force, and must appoint the Military Command of the force (Constitution, 200 (1)).

8.3 Command of the defence force must be exercised in accordance with the directions of the Minister of Defence under the authority of the President (Constitution, 202 (2)).

8.4 C SANDF shall have the powers and be charged with the duties functions and be responsible to the Minister for the efficient management and administration of the SANDF, including the effective utilisation and training of all members of that force [Defence Act, 8(3)(b)].

8.5 The Secretary, by virtue of the Defence Act and Public Service Act, shall exercise his functions and powers as Head of Department and Accounting Officer with reference to the SANDF by providing C SANDF with comprehensive instructions for the issuing of orders and directives and the giving of commands (Defence Act 7C(e)).

8.6 The Chief of the Defence Force:

8.6.1 Is responsible for the issuing of such orders and directives and the giving of commands and for ensuring that such orders, directives and commands are complied with (Defence Act 8(3)(e)).

8.6.2 Must also see to the execution of all budgetary programmes relating to the SANDF (Defence Act 8(3)(d)).

8.6.3 Has to supply all information and inputs with regard to the SANDF to the Secretary to enable him or her to perform his or her functions properly (Defence Act 8(3)(f)).

The Defence Secretariat

9. The role of a Department of State is to formulate policies, programmes and budgets and to control the execution of the mandate of the defence force.

10. The Constitution establishes a Defence Secretariat to assist the Minister with the above mentioned functions. Section 204 of the Constitution states: A civilian Secretariat for Defence must be established by national legislation to function under the direction of the Cabinet member responsible for defence .

11. The national legislation referred to in the Constitution is provided in Section 7A and 7B of the Defence Act by virtue of item 2, Schedule 6 of the Constitution. The Defence Secretariat is established by Section 7A(1)(a): There is hereby established in the Department of Defence a Defence Secretariat .

12. Section 7A(1)(b) of the Defence Act states: the officers and employees within the meaning of the Public Service Act 1994 (Proclamation No 103, 1994) which are necessary for the performance of the work connected to the functions of the Secretary shall be appointed to posts in the Defence Secretariat in consultation with the Minister .

13. This section clearly indicates that the members named here are civilian members as envisaged in the Constitution. Section 7A(2) also allows for members of the SANDF with their consent to be placed at the disposal of the Secretary to serve in posts in the Defence Secretariat. These personnel do not lose their identity as members of the SANDF.

Role of the Secretary for Defence

14. Section 7C of the Defence Act defines the role of the Secretary for Defence. The Secretary shall be a citizen of the Republic and may not be a member of the SANDF. The Secretary shall:

14.1 Be the head of the department and accounting officer of the DoD.

14.2 Be the head of the Defence Secretariat and as such be responsible for the management of and administrative control over the staff of the Defence Secretariat.

14.3 Be the principal departmental adviser to the Minister with regard to defence policy matters as well as any matter which may be investigated by the Joint Standing Committee on Defence of the Parliament under section 228(3)(d) of the Constitution and in respect of which that committee may make recommendations.

14.4 Advise the Minister on any particular matter referred by Minister to the Secretary.

14.5 Perform such duties and functions as may from time to time be assigned or referred to him or her by the Minister, in particular any function or duty necessary or expedient to enhance Parliamentary oversight and Miisterial control over the SANDF.

14.6 Provide C SANDF with comprehensive instructions for the issuing of orders and directives and the giving of commands with regards to the functioning of the Secretary as head and accounting officer of the DoD.

14.7 Monitor compliance with directions issued by the Minister under the Constitution, to C SANDF and report thereon to the Minister.

14.8 Perform all functions of head of department regarding the effective management and administration of the DoD.

Establishment of the integrated head office

15. The integrated head office was established in order to achieve synergy between the work of the Defence Secretariat and that of the SANDF. The Secretariat has to fulfill its functions in conjunction with the SANDF. International practice has evolved from a position where the functions were performed in parallel to one where they are fulfilled in interaction with each other. It is pointless for policy formulators to suggest ends which the military do not agree with or are unable to fulfill, and to allow for a practice of going back and forth between the Secretariat and the SANDF to come to acceptable solutions.

16. Accordingly, it was decided that military and civilian personnel should work closely together with regard to the Secretariat function in determining departmentally with the approval of the Minister the ends, ways and means of defence, and to effect savings and avoid duplication of effort. Similarly, civilians work closely with military personnel in establishing accountability and checking on proper utilisation of state resources.

17. Civilian personnel, however, do not intervene in the military operational chain of command, ie when military personnel are implementing military operations.

18. Diagram 1 (Diagram 1 : Reporting Responsibilities in the Integrated DoD Headquarters) sets out the newly established organisation of the integrated head office and serves to identify the reporting functions and lines of control between the Secretary and C SANDF. The blocks indicated in white in the diagram are those functions which the Secretary needs to control to fulfil his function as Head of Department - to formulate policies, programmes and budgets and to control the execution of the mandate of the defence force. The black blocks are indicative of force functions and the incumbents report to C SANDF.

19. Further studies on the clarification of these primary lines of responsibility and accountability for these functions (whether they report to the Secretary for Defence or the Chief of the National Defence Force) will have to be investigated in further work of the Transformation process and duly approved by the Minister of Defence.

20. The Transformation Project will need to determine which of the posts in the integrated head office are civilian, and which are military. Ideally, those functions which are the responsibility of the Secretary should have chiefs of division which are civilian, while those which are the responsibility of C SANDF should be military posts. Those which are their joint responsibility could either be civilian or military.

Organisational Transformation

21. The DoD is being organisationally transformed to ensure that it carries out its roles and functions efficiently and effectively and within the framework of national values and policies. A key aspect to this is to enhance performance management and to improve cost effectiveness. This section sets out a vision for an organisationally transformed DoD.

This vision will need to be elaborated on, modified and improved through planning and consultation in line functions and costed in terms of implementation.

Key Concepts

22. The following key concepts underpin the transformation of administrative, command and control and supporting structures of the DoD:

22.1 A systems approach to the management of defence.

22.2 Maximum synchronisation between arms of service (known as jointness) while preserving essential service uniqueness.

22.3 A focus on the core business of defence and the out-sourcing of non-core functions.

22.4 Civilianisation where uniformed posts are not required.

22.5 Maximal reliance on the Part-Time Component.

22.6 Exploiting information technology.

Systems Approach

23. The DoD adopts a systems approach to organisational restructuring. In terms of this approach, the DoD consists of elements or sub-systems which work together to produce a specific output - in the DoD s case this is output is defined as being those combat-ready forces that can be employed on operational missions. The combat forces can, in turn, be viewed as systems.

24. The systems approach is based on four main processes: Strategic Direction, Support Forces, Provide Forces, and Employ Forces. The latter three are executive processes. Diagram 2 (Diagram 2: Core departmental processes with inputs and outputs) presents the relationship between these processes and are explained below.

25. The **Strategic Direction** process is vested in the integrated MoD, and directs the three executive processes through ministerial direction, the policy framework of the DoD, and the departmental strategy and plan.

26. The **Support Forces** process aims at providing forces, material and personnel to the combat forces so that these can be used operationally.

27. The **Provide Forces** process integrates and converts force components into combat-ready forces. This has three distinct sub-processes:

27.1 Force components are integrated and converted into combat-ready units, such as battalions, squadrons and ships.

27.2 Combat-ready units are integrated and converted into combat-ready single service forces such as brigades(ie forces drawn from one arm of service).

27.3 Combat-ready single service forces are integrated and converted into combat-ready joint forces (task forces).

28. The **Employ Forces** process involves the deployment of forces in an operational capacity. Combat-ready forces are used to accomplish specific missions as ordered by the appropriate presidential directions.

29. The systems approach aims to achieve effectiveness, efficiency and economy and to facilitate the following policy objectives, although these objectives will only be achieved through careful planning and costing:

29.1 Performance management is facilitated and accountability enhanced.

29.2 Total costs of outputs are made visible.

29.3 Empowerment of lower hierarchical levels can take place and bureaucracy can be reduced.

29.4 Control over military power is enhanced through separation of the Provide Forces and Employ Forces processes.

Jointness

30. Jointness seeks to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of all military operations by synchronising the actions of the four arms of service (army, navy, air force and military health service) and the civilian component of the DoD at every level. In developing force components and preparing forces, joint integrators such as technologies, command and control sub-systems and administrative and training procedures, will be nurtured. However, jointness will not be achieved by destroying the unique features of the arms of service: service cultures are necessary for the different operating environments and will be maintained, although some adaptations may be necessary.

Organisational Structure

31. It is envisaged that the DoD, as indicated in Diagram 3 (Diagram 3: Organisational Structure of the DoD), will be a three-tier organisation with five levels. The three tiers are:

31.1 The Ministry of Defence (MoD) [level 0] tier with the Department of Defence Headquarters (DoD) levels [levels 1 and 2]

31.2 The intermediate tier [level 3]

31.3 The unit level [level 4].

Structural building blocks

32. The three-tier organisational structure will comprise the following building blocks:

32.1 **The DoD HQ** as an integrated head office and the highest military headquarters.

32.2 **Task forces** as the intermediate level force employment structures.

32.3 **Type formations** as the intermediate level force providing structures.

32.4 **Support formations** as intermediate level force support structures.

32.5 **Bases** as unit level supporting structures for units and satellite DoD offices in a specific geographical location.

32.6 **Combat and supporting units.**

32.7 Regionally decentralised **DoD satellite offices.**

32.8 **Service centres** that perform high volume repetitive transactions on a centralised basis as an agency service.

32.9 A state corporation as an **acquisition agency.**

Ministry of Defence and the Department of Defence Headquarters

33. The DoD is an integrated organisation comprising all the elements that together form the departmental head office and highest military headquarters. The DoD is small and focuses predominantly on policy, plans and control (directing and not operating activities). All the elements of the DoD are co-located in a single building complex.

33.1. The Office of the Minister of Defence (MoD) is responsible for the following:

33.1.1 Ensuring political control and direction over the activities of the DoD.

33.1.2 Ensuring that government policy is communicated to the DoD and the activities of the DoD are consistent with government policy.

33.1.3 Determination of defence policy.

33.1.4 Ensuring that the needs of the DoD are communicated to government.

33.2 The Office of the Secretary for Defence and CSANDF (including their respective deputies)

33.3 Corporate divisions reporting primarily to the Secretary for Defence

- The Policy and Planning division
- The Finance division
- The Defence Inspectorate
- The Personnel division (including Joint Training Division)
- The Legal Services division

- The Command and Management Informa- tion (CMI) division
- The Logistics division
- The Departmental Acquisition and Procure- ment division
- The Corporate Communication division.

33.4 Corporate divisions reporting primarily to the C SANDF- The Joint Operations Staff division

- The Defence Intelligence division includ- ing Foreign Relations division
- The Chaplain General
- The Army division (comprising Chief of the Army and Staff)
- The Air Force division (comprising Chief of the Air Force and Staff)
- The Navy division (comprising Chief of the Navy and Staff)
- The Military Health Service (MHS) division (comprising Surgeon General and Staff)
- The Military Policing agency
- The Part Time Component advisor
- The Service Corps.

Task forces

34. Task forces are employment structures under task force commanders, which are created for executing specific operations or exercises. They disband on completion of the operation or exercise although some forces may be relatively permanent if the operations for which they have been created are enduring.

35. Combat-ready units and formations constituting task forces are usually prepared and provided by arms of service, although there may be minor exceptions. Task forces are generally joint structures. Task force commanders are intermediate level (operational) commanders appointed for the duration of the operation, and will exercise unified command over assigned forces, under the overall command of C SANDF.

Type formations

36. A type formation is a structure responsible for the preparation and development of a specific type of combat-ready unit. As far as possible type formations have the following features:

36.1 Integration within a type formation of all units and support elements required to make the formation work.

36.2 The ability to provide fully supported units to a commander in either a land, air, maritime or military health capacity.

36.3 The ability to provide fully supported units to a task force commander appointed by C SANDF.

36.4 A type formation improves on the cost effectiveness of providing combat-ready systems. It does this via a consolidation and rationalisation of functions and structures, eliminating duplication and providing more integrated management practices.

36.5 A type formatio has a specific geographic location where as many as possible of its combat and support units are concentrated, and is usually supported by a base which in some cases may form part of the type formation itself. Type formations can also have satellite units and may be co-located with other type formations, sometimes sharing a base.

No	Base	No	Base
1	Bloemfontein	14	Middelburg
2	Bloemspruit	15	Mmabatho
3	De Aar	16	Mtubatuba
4	Ellisras	17	Phalaborwa
5	De Brug	18	Potchefstroom
6	Durban	19	Port Elizabeth
7	Grahamstown	20	Simon's Town
8	Ladysmith	21	Tek Base (Pretoria)
9	Kimberley	22	Upington
10	Langebaanweg	23	Thaba Tshwane (Voortrekkerhoogte)
11	Lohatla	24	Waterkloof
12	Louis Trichardt	25	Wonderboom
13	Messina	26	Youngsfield

Table 2 : Possible option for 26 bases after transformation.

37. The functions of type formations include:

37.1 Providing combat-ready user systems of its specific type, including the training and exercising of the systems and their personnel.

37.2 Acting as a centre of excellence for its specific types of user system, developing expertise on the systems and providing advice on their use. This includes administrative, operating and technical expertise and policies.

37.3 Managing a business plan for the type formation. The commander compiles a plan as a subset of higher order plans within the DoD, is a budget holder for the user systems and manages the finances of the formation.

37.4 Career management for personnel responsible for specific user systems takes place within the type formation below the level of Colonel (or Captain in the navy). The formation also provides personnel for other DoD clients.

37.5 Managing user system logistics if the product is unique to the type formation (e.g. torpedoes).

37.6 Managing quality assurance to ensure that the required outputs are met and that documentation is provided.

37.7 Managing command, control, communications, computers, information and intelligence within the type formation.

38. A table of envisaged type formation per Arm of Service and their proposed associated units is described in detail in Appendix A to this chapter.

Support formations

39. Support formations are intermediate-level support structures. They are similar to type formations except that they do not provide combat-ready forces, but give support to type formations and other system structures. Examples would be a formation providin logistical and administrative services for a wide range of units.

Bases

40. Formations and units are clustered on or around bases and share their common facilities and services. Bases are provided by the army, air force or navy, but may have attached support units from other arms of service, MoD satellite offices or service centres.

41. Units attached to a base are concentrated at that base as far as possible although some satellites may exist. Studies indicate that optimal economies of scale will be achieved with approximately 26 bases covering South Africa. A list of these proposed bases is shown in Table 2 while Map 1 (Map 1: Location of Bases) indicates their location. Final decisions on these and the closure of the other bases are still to be taken after more detailed evaluation and consultation. It is important to note that base closure is a process that affects the careers and livelihoods of not only military personnel but also communities within which bases are located. Detailed guidelines governing the process of base closure and the consultations requires to ensure that this is conducted in a free and fair manner are contained in the Land and Environment chapter of the Defence Review.

42. Bases may be tasked to support specific operations or exercises, but do not have command over attached units although they exercise administrative control for specific purposes. Base commanders may be type formation commanders or may be appointed as task force commanders. Bases have self-accounting status and support attached units for accounting purposes.

Combat and supporting units

43. Units, which are clustered on or around bases may be combat units (eg artillery regiments, air force squadrons, ships or medical battalion groups) or support units (eg depots or schools).

MoD satellite offices

44. DoD satellite offices are extensions of DoD divisions located outside headquarters to provide services on a geographically dispersed basis. They are located on bases and share common facilities and services with units. The legal services regional offices and defence inspectorate regional audit offices are examples of these.

Service centres

45. Service centres are unit-level structures that perform high-volume repetitive transactions on a centralised basis as an agency service. They are located on bases and share common facilities.

Acquisition agency

46. It is foreseen that Armscor will remain the state corporation responsible for the acquisition of complex defence equipment as long as it remains unfeasible to attract the required engineering specialists within the constraints of public service salary scales.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

47. One of the cornerstones of DoD transformation is the use of appropriate communication and information technology. This promises significant efficiency improvements and will also give operational and combat advantage to the SANDF.

48. The Command and Management Information system takes into account the erosion of the distinctions between strategic, operational and tactical systems and between information and communication systems. Such systems are therefore being integrated into one coherent system which serve the needs of DoD business as a whole.

PART-TIME COMPONENT

49. The core force approach of the DoD relies extensively on the expansion capability inherent in the part-time component. All structures that may require expansion at a more rapid rate than normal recruiting and career development timescales will allow will have a part-time component. The part-time component will be organised around two concepts: the multi-regiment battalion, and the expandable single permanent structure.

50. The multi-regiment battalion concept is used mainly in the army (both conventional and territorial) and military health service. It calls for the maintenance of virtual units at low levels of readiness across different type formations which maintain the necessary equipment. Permanent training staff in the type formations manage force preparation cycles while personnel are maintained in part-time units.

51. There should be no limit to the number of part-time units provided funds are available in terms of the order of battle of the type formation. To encourage volunteers, the unique cultures, traditions and individual identities of part-time units should be encouraged.

52. Parts of full-time units may also be designated as virtual parts to be staffed by part-time units, for example by maintaining full-time personnel for two squadrons of an armour regiment and filling the third from part-time units.

CIVILIANISATION

53. In general civilians are considerably less expensive than uniformed personnel in the same post due to the higher cost of military service conditions. Civilians should therefore be used where uniformed posts are not justified. Considerable improvements indepartmental education and training opportunities for civilians will need to be made.

54. An holistic systems view will however be maintained: availability of rotation posts for operational personnel, feasibility of career patters and availability of a ready internal reserve are essential factors to consider in the civilianisation process.

CORE BUSINESS FOCUS AND OUTSOURCING

55. A policy of focusing on core business and outsourcing of non-core functions will be followed in line with international practices in improving efficiency in armed forces and the significant achievements in public and private enterprises. Areas within which outsourcing can be done include the logistics arena (vehicle maintenance, catering etc) and aspects of administrative and financial services for example.

56. It is foreseen that the volume and scope of services brought in from outside the DoD will expand considerably, with commensurate savings.

57. A section will be set up in the Acquisition Division to manage the administrative complexities and to support and promote outsourcing.

IMPLEMENTATION

58. Implementation of structural transformation has already begun and it is envisaged that the process will be completed within three years, with some exceptions. As the implementation phase is already under way (although detailed design will need to continue until the end of 1998) the process is no longer being managed as a separate project, but is integrated into the mainstream strategic management process of the DoD. Divisional chiefs have been appointed project officers for implementation and this task has been incorporated into their work plans.

Annual Budget Required

59. Two graphs illustrate the annual budget required.

59.1 The first, "transformation sustainable cash flow", illustrates what should ideally be invested annually to ensure sustainability. It is clear that the budget is not available to fund this.

59.2 The second graph illustrates what is available for capital, should operating and transition cost be funded first. Capital planning will have to take this limit into account. Depending on the speed of transition, a sustainable situation could be reached between 2004 and 2012.

60. Ongoing monitoring of Transformation, both in its broader sense and in relationship to organizational restructuring, will be a key factor in ensuring its success. This will be effected outside the DoD via such structures as the JSCD, Cabinet and other appropriate executive oversight mechanisms and within the DoD via the Secretary for Defence and the relevant staff.

Appendix A: Proposed Type Formations and Units

Structure	Association	Name
Joint Training Division	Joint Training Formation	Defence Institute Defence Institute (Satellite)
CMI Division	Command Management Information Formation	CMI Formation HQ School of Signals Regional Services Centres (CMI) 1 Siganl Regiment 2 Signal Regiment 3 Electronic Workshop 5 Signal Regiment 8 Signal Unit Mobile Communication Unit SAAF Telecom Centre 44 Signal Unit 71 Signal Unit 73 Signal Group 84 Signal Unit

Logistic Division	Log Formation	DoD Log Formation HQ Log School including Auction Centre Catering School Technical Training Centre SAFI Base Production Depot 97 Ammo Depot including Ammo School Main Ordnance Depot (With satelllite units in Durban and Grahamstown) Central cash store and Auction Centre Mobilisation Centre including Auction Centre Mobilisation Centre (Satellite) Regional Log Services 101 Air Supply 4 Maint Unit 44 Maint Unit 7 Maint Unit 11 Maint Unit 15 Maint Unit 19 Transit Maint Unit 7 Field Workshop 30 Field Workshop 31 Field Workshop 32 Field Workshop 38 Field Workshop 71 Field Workshop
Militray Policing Agency	Military Policing Formation	Provost Marshall and Staff Base Offices (including DB's) Provost Company PTC 7 Provost Company 8 Provost Company 9 Provost Company

SA ARMY TYPE FORMATIONS WITH PROPOSED ASSOCIATED UNITS	
Army Base Support Formations	Base: Bloemfontein Base: De Aar Base: Ellisras Base: Grahamstown Base: Kimberley Base: Lohatla Base: Matubatuba Base: Messina Base: Middelburg Base: Mmabatho Base: Phalaborwa Base: Potchefstroom Base: Pretoria (TEK) Base: Pretoria (Thaba Tshwane) Base: Pretoria (Wonderboom) Base: Upington Base: Wynberg/Youngsfield
Anti-Aircraft Formation	Anti Aircraft (AA) Formation HQ AA School

	AA Regiment (Composite) - 10 AA Regiment Mobile AA Regiment PTC Towed AA Regiment PTC 6 Light AA Regiment Cape Garrison Artillery Regiment Oos Transvaal Regiment Vaal River
Armour Formation	Armour Formation HQ School of Armour Tank Regiment(at School of Armour) Tank Transporter Regiment (at school of Armour) Armoured Car Regiment (Rooikat) - 1SSB Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment - 1SSB Tank Regiment PC Tank Transporter Regiment PTC - 7TTR Armoured Car Regiment (Rooikat) PTC 1 Light Horse Regiment 1 Natal Mounted Rifles Pretoria Regiment Pretoria Highlanders Regiment Mooirivier Regiment Oranjerivier Regiment Pres Steyn Umvoti Mounted Rifles
Army Battle School	Army Battle School HQ 12 Field Engineer Regiment
Artillery Formation	Artillery Formation HQ School of Artillery 4 Artillery Regiment (Composite) Self Propelled Medium Artillery Regiment PTC Towed Medium Artillery Regiment PTC Multiple Rocket Artillery Regiment PTC Cape Field Artillery Natal Field Artillery Regiment Potch Universiteit Transvaal Horse Artillery Transvaalse Staatsartillerie Vrystaatse Artillerie Regiment
Brigade Headquarters Formation	73 Brigade HQ Mechanised Brigade Headquarters
Engineer Formation	Engineer Formation HQ School of Engineers 2 Field Engineer Regiment 35 Engineer Support Regiment 1 Construction Regiment 1 Military Printing Regiment 4 Survey & Mapping Regiment Field Engineer Regiment PTC 3 Field Engineer Regiment 6 Field Engineer Regiment 19 Field Engineer Regiment
Infantry Formation	Infantry Formation HQ Infantry School Basic Training Depot (3 SAI)

Infantry Formation	Mechanised Infantry Battalion Group Mechanised Infantry Battalion (1 SAI) Motorised Infantry Battalion - Middelburg 1 (4 SAI) Motorised Infantry Battalion - Grahamstown (6 SAI) Motorised Infantry Battalion - Phalaborwa (7 SAI) Motorised Infantry Battalion - Upington (8 SAI) Motorised Infantry Battalion - Wynberg/Youngsfield (9 SAI) Motorised Infantry Battalion - Mmabatho (10 SAI) Motorised Infantry Battalion - Wonderboom/Wallmanst (115 SAI) Motorised Infantry Battalion - Messina (116 SAI) Motorised Infantry Battalion - Ellisras (118 SAI) Motorised Infantry Battalion - Mtubatuba (121 SAI) Mechanised Infantry Battalion PTC Motorised Infantry Battalion PTC Motorised Infantry Battalion PTF (minus Equipment) National Ceremonial Guard 1 Battalion Regiment De La Rey 1 Battalion Regiment Northern Transvaal 1 Battalion Transvaal Scottish Cape Light Infantry Cape Town Highlanders Cape Town Rifles Durban Light Infantry Durban Regiment First City Johannesburg Regiment The Buffalo Volunteer Rifles Regiment (Kaffrarian Rifles) Kimberley Regiment Koeberg Battalion Natal Carbineers Prince Alfred s Guard Rand Light Infantry South African Irish Regiment Witwatersrand Rifles Wynberg Battalion Regiment Bloemspruit Regiment Botha Regiment Christiaan Beyers Regiment Congella Regiment De Wet Regiment Groot Karoo Regiment Langenhoven Regiment Louw Wepener Regiment Natalia Regiment Oos Rand Regiment Piet Retief Regiment Port NatalRegiment Pres Kruger Regiment Skoonspruit Regiment Western Province GP HQ - Bloemfontein 1 GP HQ - Bloemfontein 2 GP HQ - Bloemfontein 3 GP HQ - Durban GP HQ - Grahamstown 1 GP HQ - Grahamstown 2 GP HQ - Langebaanweg

	GP HQ - Matubatuba GP HQ - Messina GP HQ - Middelburg 1 GP HQ - Middelburg 2 GP HQ - Mmabatho GP HQ - Phalaborwa GP HQ - Potchefstroom GP HQ - Upington GP HQ - Thaba Tshwane 1 GP HQ - Thaba Tshwane 2 GP HQ - Youngsfield/Wynberg Commandos
Intelligence Formation	Intelligence Regiment FTC Intelligence Regiment PTC
Parachute Formation	Parachute Formation HQ Parachute Packing & Training Wings Parachute Battalion - 1 Parachute Bn Parachute Pathfinder Platoon - 44 Pathfinder Platoon Parachute Battalion PTC - 2 Parachute Bn Parachute Field Workshop PTC (37 Field Wksp) Parachute Maintenance Unit PTC Parachute Signal Unit PTC
Special Forces Formation	Special Forces Brigade Headquarters Special Forces Landward Battalion (FTC) Special Forces Seaborne Battalion (FTC) Special Forces Maintenance Unit Special Forces Landward Battalion (PTC) Special Forces Seaborne Battalion (PTC)

SA AIR FORCE TYPE FORMATIONS WITH PROPOSED ASSOCIATED UNITS	
Basic Flying Training Systems Group (BFTSG)	BFTSG HQ BFTSG Functional Training Unit BFTSG Intermediate Maintenance & Supply Support Unit Central Flying School 80 Air Navigation School
Air Force Command Posts	New AFCP New Lohathla FACP New SAFCP New FACP #1 (Attached to TFC) New FACP #2 (Attached to TFC) New FACP #3 (Attached to TFC) New FACP #4 (Attached to TFC)
Ground Systems Group (GSG)	Ground Systems Group HQ GSG Functional Training Unit GSG Intermediate Maintenance & Supply Support Unit 120 Sqn (Point Defence) 140 Sqn (Transportable Long Range Radar) 142 Sqn (Tactical Mobile Radar) Tactical Airfield Unit Air Space Control School Ellisras Reporting Post Mariepskop Reporting Post
Helicopter Systems Group (HSG)	HSG HQ

	HSG Functional Training Unit HSG Intermediate Maintenance & Supply Support Unit 87 HFS 15 Sqn 17 Sqn 22 Sqn 19 Sqn
Maritime Systems Group (MSG)	MSG HQ MSG Functional Training Unit MSG Intermediate Maintenance & Supply Support Unit 35 Sqn xx Sqn
Transport Systems Group (TSG)	Transport Systems Group HQ TSG Functional Training Unit TSG Intermediate Maintenance & Supply Support Unit 28 Sqn (12 Medium Heavy) 44 Sqn (12 Medium Transport) 44 Sqn (8 Medium Light) 21 Sqn (6 VIP) 42 Sqn (16 Light Recce) 101 Sqn (Louis Trichardt) 102 Sqn (Louis Trichardt) 104 Sqn (Waterkloof) 105 Sqn (Durban) 106 Sqn (Bloemspruit) 107 Sqn (Bloemspruit) 108 Sqn (Port Elizabeth) 110 Sqn (Langebaanweg) 111 Sqn (Waterkloof) Joint Air Recce & Int Centre
Fighter Systems Group (FSG)	Fighter Systems Group HQ FSG Functional Training Unit FSG Intermediate Maintenance & Supply Support Unit 2 Sqn 8 Sqn 60 Sqn 85 Combat Flying School

SA NAVY TYPE FORMATIONS WITH PROPOSED ASSOCIATED UNITS	
Fleet Command	Fleet Cmdr & Staff Naval Base SMST Naval Base SMST: Band Naval Base SMST: Ops Diving Team Naval Base Durban Prod Support Depot: Dockyard Prod Support Depot: Engineering Services Prod Support Depot: Fleet Maint Unit Prod Support Depot: Supply Support Services Publications Unit Hydrographer Quality Assurance: Naval Weapons Analysis Section Quality Assurance: Electronic Warfare Analysis Section

	Communication Centre (Dbn) Communication Centre (SMST) Armament Depot Functional Schools: Military Training for Ratings Functional Schools: Technical Training Functional Schools: Warfare Training Functional Schools: Initial Military Training for Officers Corvettes Submarines Mine Hunters Coastal Mine Sweepers Combat Support Ships Harbour Patrol Boats Air Sea Rescue Launches Hydrographic Vessels Tugs

SA MILITARY HEALTH SERVICE TYPE FORMATIONS WITH ASSOCIATED UNITS	
Medical Training Formation	SAMHS Academy
Medical Support Formation	Medical Base Depot
Tertiary Health Formation	Tertiary Health Formation HQ 1 Mil Hosp 2 Mil Hosp 3 Mil Hosp Institute of Aviation Medicine Institute of Maritime Medicine Military Phycological Institute
Area Military Health Formation	MHS Form HQ EC MHS FN/MP MHS FS/NC MHS GT MHS KZN MHS NW MHS WC MHS
Mobile Medical Formation	Mobile Medical Form HQ 7 Med BN Gp (Including CB Wing) 8 Med BN Gp 1 Med BN Gp 3 Med BN Gp 6 Med BN Gp

SERVICE CORPS TYPE FORMATION A WITH PROPOSED ASSOCIATED UNITS	
Headquarters	SA Service Corps Head Office
Service Corps Training Centres	Service Corps Centre for Advanced Training Service Corps Training Institute Service Corps Practical Business School
Service Corps Units	North West Service Corps Unit Western Cape Service Corps Unit Northern Cape Service Unit Free State Service Corps

	Eastern Cape Service Corps Unit Kwa Zulu Service Corps Unit Northern Province Service Corps Unit Mpumalanga Service Corps Unit Gauteng Service Corps Unit

Chapter 10

South African Defence Review 1998

Human Resources

Policy Framework

1. The DoD's most valuable resource is its personnel. Human resource policies are directed at ensuring maximum efficiency, effectiveness, appropriateness, accountability and affordability, and providing job satisfaction, fairness and equity. The members of the DoD shall be non-partisan, subject to the control and oversight of the duly elected and appointed civil authority and obliged to perform all functions and conduct all operations within the parameters of the Constitution, domestc legislation and international humanitarian law and the law on armed conflict.

2. The DoD upholds a non-racial, non-sexist and non-discriminatory institutional culture. The DoD aims to be broadly representative of the human resources available in South Africa.

3. The rights and dignity of all members of the DoD shall be respected but the uniformed members who serve in the SANDF will voluntarily accept limitations of their rights which are reasonable and justifiable within the constraints of military discipline and training and are specified in terms of the Defence Act.

4. The HR practices and policies are based on the broad philosophy that the DoD is managed as a coherent focused entity in which the uniformed component is governed, regulated and administered in terms of the Constitution, the Defence Act, the Military Disciplinary Code, General Regulations and SANDF Orders. The civilian component is similarly managed in terms of the Public Service Act, the Public Service Staff Code and the Public Service Regulations.

5. The SANDF has a full-time and a part-time component. In this chapter, where the human resource practices and policies are similar for both components no special mention is made of the Part-Time Component (PTC) as the ‚one force concept' is the overriding principle. Where special measures or issues pertain to each component, a clear indication is given under a separate heading.

Composition of the DoD

6. In terms of Section 224 and 236 of the Interim Constitution (1993), the SANDF at its establishment consisted of

6.1 all members of the South African Defence Force (SADF)

6.2 all members of any defence force forming part of a national territory (ie the former Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei defence forces)

6.3 members of a defence force or armed force of a political organisation under whose authority and control it stands, initially only uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and later also the Azanian Peoples' Liberation Army (APLA), who entered into an agreement for temporary or permanent appointment, in accordance with normal employment policies and terms and conditions of service.



7. Section 236(2) of the 1993 Constitution further stated that any person who was employed by an institution (ie the SADF and the TBVC defence forces) shall continue in such employment.

8. As indicated in Figure 10.1 (Figure 10.1: Schematic Representation of Integrated SANDF and DoD as on 1 April 1998), selection and placement in the case of members of the non-statutory forces (MK and APLA), has brought them into the training and deployment phase as an integral part of the single Regular Force.

9. Adaptations were made to insignia of the old SADF, principally the introduction of a nine point star to designate rank in the place of a castle. Members of statutory forces are

permitted to wear their old ribbons and medals and a new series of ribbons and medals have been instituted for previous MK and APLA service respectively.

10. **Population group and gender**. Figure 10.2 (Figure 10.2: The SANDF Composition (including civilians) per race and gender)) indicates population group and gender composition as on 15 February 1997 compared to the original SADF on 26 April 1994.

11. **Present composition per rank, population group and gender**. In Figure 10.3 (Figure 10.3: SANDF strength per rank*~, race and gender: 1 April 1998) the present staffing of the SANDF is reflected as on 1 May 1997.

12. **Former force distribution**. The formal procedure whereby former non-statutory force members enter into an agreement for service in the SANDF has now virtually drawn to a close. A few individuals who are studying overseas may however still exercise their right to apply to enter into service at a later date. The figures shown in Figure 10.4 (Figure 10.4: SANDF Composition by Former Force of origin, including civilians, as on 1 April 1998) refer to members of the DoD per force of origin (civilians included), on 1 May 1997. Since the creation of the SANDF normal recruitment has continued outside the integration process, although in a limited way and mainly in those musterings which could not be staffed adequately through integration. Uniformed members indicated as SANDF therefore do not have a former force connection.

13. **Placement in posts**. The progress in eliminating the backlog of members involved in bridging and other training specifically related to integration (‚integration posts') is reflected in Figure 10.5 (Figure 10.5: Placement of Ex Non-Statutory Forces as on 1 April 1998). Placement in an Arm of Service is followed by bridging training and supplementary training. A career path is mapped out for each member. Members have two chances to succeed in their designated bridging training courses: the Minister of Defence approves the termination of service of members who do not succeed.

14. An Integration Committee (IC), on which all Arms of Service, representatives of all former forces and functional staff divisions are represented, has met regularly since the formation of the SANDF, to oversee the integration process on a day to day basis. The proceedings of the IC have been characterised by a practical approach to solving the myriad problems associated with integration.

15. A Parliamentary Integration Oversight Committee (PIOC) of the Joint Parliamentary Standing Committee for Defence has been regularly briefed by the DoD on the integration process and has also visited units of the SANDF to monitor progress. Special taskings and instructions from the PIOC have received immediate attention in the SANDF. Both the IC and the PIOC will continue to monitor the integration process for the foreseeable future.

16. The SANDF has to become broadly representative of the population that it serves, as soon as possible. The SANDF has introduced ‚fast tracking' for those individual members who display potential to qualify sooner than would normally be the case. This will be achieved by the priority placement of identified members on qualifying courses in a succession of posts in order to gain the necessary experience.

17. A team of British military officers has been assigned to assess (and then to validate) syllabi and standards, to monitor training and selection and to advise and adjudicate in the case of disputes between the integrating forces. The British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) is evaluating SANDF training and selection standards in terms

of their experience of international military standards. As members of placement and training boards, they also assess and validate the criteria against which individuals are placed to undergo bridging training and evaluate the competencies and qualifications of individuals. The commander of BMATT periodically reports to the Minister and the Deputy Minister.

Demobilisation

18. In terms of Section 224(2)(c) read with 236 8 (d) of the 1993 Constitution all members of MK and APLA whose names appear on a Certified Personnel Register or Namelist respectively, were eligible to enter into an agreement to serve in the SANDF if they met certain criteria. To cater for those members who were unable or unwilling to serve in the SANDF due to advanced age, ill health or other reasons as well as those cadres who had found alternative employment, a Demobilisation Act was approved by Parliament and signed into law on 1 December 1996. This retrospectively authorised previously paid demobilisation benefits. It stipulated that the demobilisation should be concluded within one year. Figure 10.6.a. (Figure 10.6.a : Categories and Commensurate Gratuities in respect of Demobilisation) denotes gratuities payable.

19. The statistics presented in Figure 10.6.b (Figure 10.6.b : Amounts involved and the number of persons in the respective categories who have benefited from demobilisation) indicate the amounts involved and the number of people in the respective categories who had benefited from this dispensation by 1 May 1997.

Staffing the SANDF

Service Systems

20. When determining how available human resources can be utilised in the military, the force design, structure and technological level of the force needs to be considered.

21. Drawing from the concepts in Chapters 2 and 8 of the Defence Review, the following are human resource determinants:

21.1 Notwithstanding the imperative for high technology in certain fields as elaborated in Chapter 3 of this review, there is a requirement for a low technology, human resource-intensive, mobile army of regulars, capable of safeguarding extensive terrain on a continuous basis.

21.2 The requirement for capable junior leaders who can command small groups of military personnel effectively is clear, due to the characteristics of low intensity operations in outlying deployments, ie border patrols.

21.3 The present low military threat in the region, coupled with the reconstruction and development priority, restricts military expenditure.

21.4 The possibility that the security situation could change for the worse in a relatively short time cannot be discounted. Therefore although the Regular Force should be relatively small it should be backed up by a sufficiently large Part-Time Concept to augment the military capability at relatively short notice.

21.5 The technologically advanced nature of modern weaponry requires highly skilled groupings in all Arms of Service. This expertise is not available and has to be developed in a selected group of recruits. The development and retention of this personnel component is extremely costly.

22. DoD human resource procurement policy is not based on conscription, but on voluntary military service. Policy in this regard is based on a mixed system of career options.

22.1 A small number of the highest ranking leader group in both the officer corps and the other ranks, with long experience and extensive training, serve until a retirement age.

22.2 Lower ranks have limited periods of service coupled to their rank level and possibly also their age.

22.3 Large numbers at the lowest rank levels serve for a short, fixed, limited period.

22.4 Recruiting for the long term and the medium term is principally (but not exclusively) from the short term component. Recruitment directly into the medium term is essential to attract tertiary qualified personnel for the officer corps.

22.5 This is the staffing strategy preferred in most modern defence forces, for example, in Australia, the UK, the USA and Canada. Countries in Europe which are switching from a conscript system at present, eg France and Belgium, are also contemplating a similar staffing strategy.

23. Parliament should consider imposing a liability to serve in a state of national defence. Notwithstanding the imperative to train sufficient personnel, former specialist defence personnel will be required to serve, by recommendation of Parliament, for a limited period of time, also during a time of peace, in exceptonal circumstances, where the capacity of the SANDF is insufficient.

Staffing Flow

24. Figure 10.7 (Figure 10.7: Staffing flow within the SANDF) below indicates how the uniformed component of the force, both full-time and part-time, is structured in one force and procurement, utilisation and a reserve form a coherent whole. The concepts are explained in full below.

25. **One Force**. Although members of the Part-Time Component serve on the basis of a daily pay rate, compared to the Full-Time Force's monthly rate, there are no other differences in their standard of training and equipment. The two components are trained and equipped to operate as one force. Relative strengths of each component are reflected in Figure 10.8.

Regular Force	Part-time Component	Reserves*
LTS 37 969	Conventional 8 378	
MTS 9 801	Territorial 44 167	
STS 25 523		

AUX 233		
TOTAL 73 526	**52 545**	**363 857**

Figure 10.8: Relative Strenghts of the Uniformed Component of the SANDF
** The subdivision as recommended in paragraph 35 below has not been made as yet.*

26. Only persons who are 17 years old and who will be turning 18 in their first year of service are allowed to enter service in uniform in the SANDF. They cannot be taken into active combat or the front-line until they have turned 18.

27. A Grade 10 or commensurate technical qualification is considered for service in the military but it is more cost effective to recruit for the Regular Force from the Recruits Training Pool where Grade 12 is the minimum qualification. Minimum medical standards with which applicants have to comply are prescribed for each mustering.

Full-Time Force

28. The full-time staff of the DoD consists of 77,76 per cent Regular uniformed service personnel and 21,85 per cent civilians. (The balance of 0,39% is the remnant of the uniformed Auxiliary Service which has been allowed to atrophy naturally.) Both these branches serve in 128 different Personnel Administrative Standards (PAS) although 94,5 per cent of the uniformed branch serve as Military Practitioners. Each PAS has its prescribed entry and promotion standards coupled to pay and salary gradings.

29. A South African may enter into the Full-time Force of the SANDF in any one of the service systems through the following channels, if selected:

29.1 A recruits training pool (known as the Voluntary Military Service) for untrained recruits without any previous military experience.

29.2 Orientation training for professionally qualified individuals in specific occupational categories.

30. The present Flexible Service System for the Full-Time uniform component consists of three distinct parts:

30.1 **Short Term Service**. The maximum term of service in this system is six years consisting of three terms of two years each. In this way force levels can be increased or decreased swiftly to predetermned operational requirements. The system is suitable for ranks and musterings in the occupational class Military Practitioner. The post structure primarily makes provision for combat services and training is focused on combat training skills. Investment per member is limited, except for junior leaders who are earmarked to serve more than one term. Members who are earmarked for bridging courses to attain certain enrolment standards must undergo it in this system. This system serves as a selection medium and feeder for the Medium Term Service. It has a high turnover to maintain youthfulness and offers only temporary career opportunities. It is suitable for school leavers: the maximum age for enrolment is 27 years.

30.2 The large number of former non-statutory force members who were initially placed in this system have up to now not had the benefit of a structured career path. The migration of these members from the Short Term Service to the Medium Term and the Long Term Service is enjoying continued attention. Figure 10.9 reflects the number of non-statutory force members who were originally

appointed to the Short Term Service and are now serving in the Medium and Long Term Service as at 01 May 97.

30.3 **Medium Term Service**. The aim of this system is to procure Human Resources for the middle management echelon to facilitate upward mobility. With the exception of members in specialist classifications the first term is between three and ten years, although consecutive terms may be entered into on specific conditions, subject to a selection process. This system also prepares a member for a permanent appointment in the long term service. The training offered is advanced.

30.4 **Long Term Service**. The top echelon of the SANDF is eventually staffed from this system.

Part-time Component

31. The Part-time Component consists of conventionals and territorials. Entry into this component can take place through the channels as indicated in Figure 10.7 by means of a negotiation process between the SANDF and the individual, to determine the availability for service for a specified period. Four categories of service are available as indicated in Figure 10.7.

32. The Part-Time Component is staffed as follows:

32.1 Members of the Reserves who have completed their previous military commitments, but who are willing to volunteer for further service.

32.2 Members who leave the Full-Time Component at the end of their contract and who wish to be enlisted in the Part-Time Component through the negotiation process.

32.3 Direct entry from outside the military environment. Modular training for new recruits takes place on a decentralised basis.

33. Upon leaving the Part-Time Component the individual's particulars will be transferred to the Reserves as indicated in Figure 10.7.

Reserves

34. The Reserves should be divided into three groups (see figure 10.7) - regular, conscript and voluntary.

34.1 **Regular Reserves**. If a member leaves the Full-Time Component and, for whatever reason, does not enlist in the Part-Time Component, such a member's personal particulars are placed on the Regular Reserve. This is done for record purposes until the individual reaches the age of 65 years.

34.2 **Voluntary Reserve**. The Voluntary Reserve should consist of members who exit from the Recruits' Training Pool or the Part-time Component of the SANDF as is shown on the accompanying diagram. Their personal particulars are placed in the envisaged Voluntary Reserve for record purposes.

35. Reserves are only viable if accurate records are kept. It is therefore essential that the organisation of data in these suggested manageable components be approved. It is recommended that the SANDF maintains records of all personnel who have previously served in whatever capacity with a view to facilitating their service in the Part-Time

Component and ultimately in a voluntary reserve. If sufficient consensus can be reached in this regard, an appropriate amendment will be included in the new draft of the Defence Act which will be brought before Parliament for consideration in due course.

Civilians in the DoD

36. Civilians, who comprise nearly 23 pe cent of the personnel employed in the DoD, serve in terms of the Public Service Act. The breakdown of civilian employees is indicated in Figure 10.9.

Post Class	Africans		Whites		Coloureds		Asians		Total		Total
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	
Dir Gen	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Dep Dir Gen	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
Chief JDir	0	0	5	2	0	0	1	0	6	2	8
Dir	3	1	18	0	0	0	1	0	22	1	23
Dep Dir	7	4	58	39	2	2	7	5	74	50	124
Asst Dir	4	4	97	108	8	1	2	2	111	115	226
Lower Gradings*	7261	3115	857	3984	2904	1217	34	41	11056	8358	19414
Total	**7277**	**3124**	**1036**	**4133**	**2914**	**1220**	**45**	**48**	**11272**	**8526**	**19798**

Figure 10.9: Civilian Employees per post class in the DoD as on 1 April 1998. ** Civilians in the DoD lower than Assistant Director serve in 439 differentiated post classes.*

37. The higher level civilian component has increased substantially since the creation of the Defence Secretariat. The potential for a greater number of affirmative action appointments increases as the civilian component expands, as it is expected to do. The traditional military service staffing policy of ‚bottom-up' is not necessarily applicable, as civilian expertise can be acquired for specific appointments for specialist services eg auditors, medical doctors, language practitioners.

38. The career opportunities for civilians in the DoD have previously been limited. There are however many posts at base depots and headquarters where civilian appointees could prove to be less costly and well suited to fulfil the function. The development of civilian career possibilities within the DoD will continue to receive attention without in any way affecting operational readiness. A Director Civilian Career Management has recently been appointed for this purpose.

Future size, composition and management of the DoD

Size and Composition

39. The appropriate number of serving members and employees of the DoD can be calculated in terms of the following:

39.1 The force design and number of troops required to perform the designated functions (see Chapter 8).

39.2 The organisation of the Department to achieve maximum cost efficiency yet ensuring effectiveness. One aspect of this is the re-engineering of the SANDF combat: support ratio to optimise the number of combat and command elements. This is being investigated via a range of management interventions.

39.3 In 1996/97 the defence expenditure was as indicated in Figure 10.11 below:



39.4 A further determinant is what proportion of the total budget is spent on personnel. One suggested target is that personnel, operating costs and capital renewal could each receive approximately 40 per cent, 30 per cent and 30 per cent of the total appropriation respectively. (See Figure 10.12.)

39.5 In terms of the present budget allocation and the average personnel cost per individual a figure of approximately 70 000 is considered a viable Full-Time personnel component for the DoD. A reduced support to combat ratio will have to be achieved through transformation to sustain Force Design 2 as detailed in Chapter 8 of this review. This would accord with the type of force design envisaged and would allow for an appropriate distribution between personnel, operating and capital costs. This would also be an appropriate and sustainable benchmark, allowing for sufficient capital renewal.

Down-Sizing

40. As anticipated during the negotiations that led to the formation of the SANDF, the integrated Regular Force exceeds the numbers required for the tasks which the SANDF has to perform in a low threat scenario and is unaffordable, especially in the light of the reconstruction and development needs of the country. It is therefore necessary that the force is down-sized.

41. When trying to determine a formula for down-sizing, it is essential to ensure that the former statutory and non-statutory forces achieve an equitable representation. A proposed formula for down-sizing would result in the composition reflected in Figure 10.12 (Figure 10.12: Down-sizing using Representivity by Former Force as the proposed formula in the SANDF (not necessarily per Arm of Service)). Due regard shall, however, be given to the maintenance of technological expertise.

42. Personnel strengths have been increasing through successive intakes of non-statutory personnel, the negotiated intake of a planned 2 000 persons from the Kwa-Zulu Self-Protection Force, and the selection of a young leader group from the Voluntary Military Service (recruits training pool). However normal attrition through resignation, retirement and death has been taking place all the time.

43. **Voluntary Severance.** The down-sizing of the DoD has been facilitated by the Voluntary Severance Initiative which has been available throughout the Public Service and for which uniformed members have also been allowed to apply. This mechanism is much cheaper than forced retrenchment. The calculation of the severance package does not make it a viable option for members and employees with limited years of pensionable service. Figure 10.13 (Figure 10.13: Voluntary severance applications approved between 31 August 1996 and 1 April 1998) reflects the numbers of approved applications for severance (to 1 May 1997).

44. **Contract expiration**. As explained in the staffing concept for the Regulars, the cheapest method of rapidly scaling down the Full-Time Component is not to re-enlist short term members when their contracts expire. Recruits should enter the force in the knowledge that only a small percentage of the intake may be offered the opportunity to re-enlist if they qualify. This would facilitate the scaling up and down of the SANDF and would be a suitable way of strengthening the Part-Time Compoent and the Reserves, as well as justifying the existence of a comparatively large training capacity.

45. At present, the Minister must approve all non-renewals of short term contracts. A board, on which a BMATT representative also serves, makes recommendations to the Minister according to a set of criteria. Most of the recommendations for not re-enlisting members concern those members who have adverse disciplinary records.

46. **Employer-initiated retrenchment**. The Interim Constitution (1993) provided for three phases in the process of creating the SANDF, namely integration, consolidation and rationalisation. The staggered integration process has resulted in an overlap with the consolidation phase. During this latter phase all members are being given the opportunity to prepare themselves for posts in the new structure. The identification of members for retrenchment will be done in a fair and equitable manner which will satisfy the goals of representativeness, affirmative action and equal opportunities and ensure that the SANDF is seen to be legitimate and representative of the total South African population. Efficiency considerations, for example scientifically based assessments of potential; rank/age appropriateness and non-transferability (area-boundness) will also be taken into account.

47. It is envisaged that the bulk of retrenchments will take place before the year 2000. Right-sizing processes are usually preceded by uncertainty and misconception among personnel. Accurate and effective communication will therefore be actively pursued throughout the DoD.

48. **Mechanisms already instituted**. A Personnel Rationalisation Work Group (PRWG) has been established in order to oversee the rationalization process from within the DoD. The composition of the PRWG includes all constituent forces and a representative of the Secretary for Defence and BMATT, and is aimed at ensuring a transparent process within the framework of fair labour practices. This work group has

recently instituted a sub-work group to make proposals regarding regionalised psychological and social support to members and their families who are to be affected by the rationalisation process. A special Consultation Forum has been established to liaise with employee organisations about civilian members who could be affected by the rationalisation process.

49. Various procedures relating to down-sizing are already in place:

49.1 The broad process has been designed by the DoD, and was accepted by Cabinet in 1995.

49.2 An identificationprocedure for retrenchment has been designed and employee organisations consulted.

49.3 An intra departmental representation/appeal procedure has been designed and employee organisations consulted.

49.4 The administrative procedure for a Special Tribunal sitting as a Labour Appeal Court in terms of Section 237 of the Interim Constitution(1993) has been established. The tribunal will determine any claims stemming from the retrenchment of a member or employee.

50. **Principles governing retrenchment**. The approach to down-sizing will be guided by the following principles:

50.1. The selection criteria, used for deciding who will be retrenched, should be as objective as possible.

50.2 No member shall be considered for retrenchment while disciplinary action against the member concerned is contemplated, or is in progress, or he/she is detained pending disciplinary action, suspended from service, or is serving a sentence of detention for a first offence.

50.3 Consistency in the application of a general SANDF policy shall be maintained in the DoD.

50.4 Members who are still participating in bridging training, while the retrenchment process takes place, shall not be considered for separation unless the member is not capable of performing at the required level to meet the course requirements.

50.5 Irrespective of his/her period of service in the SANDF, all members and employees shall be entitled to at least one month's notice prior to their last day of service in the SANDF.

51. **Increase of Pension Benefits**. Ex-non-statutory force members who entered into an agreement for service in the SANDF and who are either unsuccessful in meeting the required standard of training or who wish to terminate their service for whatever reason, or who cannot be retained in service any longer, have had very little time to accrue a sizeable pension pay-out. Amounts similar to the demobilisation benefits of their former comrades could be utilized to buy back pension for serving members.

52. It is recommended that Parliament give serious attention to approving such an enhancement of members' termination of service benefit. The amount would have to be especially appropriated outside the Defence budget.

Representivity

53. **Former Force**. The SANDF has endeavoured to eliminate any difference in the standard of training and performance among its members as speedily as possible. Cohesion is one of the principle success factors in any armed force. It is therefore suggested that as soon as the right sizing of the force has been achieved representativeness per former force should not be further monitored.

54. **Population Group**. The population group composition of the SANDF was artificially manipulated in the past as a result of the staffing policy of the apartheid era. It is thus a consequence of history that differentiation on the grounds of race has skewed representativeness. The White Paper has made the specific pronouncement that the SANDF should be broadly representative of the South African population.

55. Figure 10.14 (Figure 10.14: Present population mix of the SANDF as on 1 May 1997) indicates the present population group mix within the DoD. In Figure 10.15 (Figure 10.15: Future population mix of the SANDF) the possible population mix which could exist if rationalization were to follow expected guidelines.

56. In Figure 10.16 (Figure 10.16: Present population mix in the DoD ito Officers, NCOs and Privates as on 1 April 1998) the present population group mix in the Regulars of the SANDF is reflected. From these figures it is clear that although the integration process has had some effect in changing the imbalances of the past, the challenge for the future lies in implementing policies which will achieve representativeness in all ranks which broadly reflects the demographics of the country.

57. **Gender**. Figure 10.17 (Figure 10.17: DoD and SANDF by gender as on 1 April 1998) indicates the percentages of men and women in the DoD and the SANDF respectively.

58. **Non-discrimination in respect of Gender**. In the former SADF women were not eligible to serve in all musterings or corps. This restriction has been removed and women can now serve in all uniformed posts throughout the SANDF. The elimination of backlogs in the training of women especially for command positions in combat related musterings is receiving attention.

59. Problems associated with retaining the services of women to bring them in line for senior appointments include aspects such as day-care for young children and family disruption when both parents are serving members and have to attend long courses or be deployed away from home. The requirement to supply pre-study material long before the start of a course to give parents with full home care responsibilities enough time to prepare adequately has been identified. These problems are receiving serious attention within the DoD.

60. Any unfair discriminatory practices or attitudes, past and present, involving women employed in the DoD shall be identified and dealt with as a high priority.

61. More training facilities for women, especially at the lowest level, should be made available to increase the number of recruits in order to compensate for the inevitable loss rate so that the number of senior women can be increased.

Affirmative Action, Equal Opportunity and Management of Diversity

62. Affirmative action and equal opportunity are fundamental principles of public sector transformation as reflected in the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service. These principles are particularly applicable in the DoD as they are essential for the operational readiness of the SANDF.

63. Members of the SANDF are challenged to adapt their lifestyle, attitudes and behaviour to a specific military culture. The SANDF will have to gradually evolve an acceptable military culture in which all members, irrespective of their own culture, can coexist, and in which operational readiness can be assured.

64. A work group on civic education has produced six educational modules for implementation at all levels within the DoD. One of one of these modules concerns the management of cultural diversity (see paragraph 93).

65. The newly-established Chief Directorate Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action in the DoD will be responsible for managing Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action training, monitoring and implementation and dealing speedily and effectively with cases of discrimination. Active and ongoing awareness training for all employees but especially for officers commanding will be systematically introduced throughout the DoD.

66. The Department has also established a work group on Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action, which is in the process of formulating policy in line with the provisions in the White Paper on Defence. In addition, training modules have been introduced on all courses to make all DoD personnel conscious of what constitutes discriminatory or offensive behaviour towards other members of the Department. The DoD will not tolerate discrimination, victimisation or harassment, irrespective of the rank or position of the perpetrator(s). The Equal Opportunity Policy shall also contain specific prescripts concerning sexual harassment which will have to be strictly complied with by all employees.

Language

67. The DoD Work Group on language is considering language policy for the department. Such a policy will have to strike a delicate balance between the operational requirements and the constitutional provisions on language.

68. The need for a ‚thread' or ‚link' language in the command and control environment appears to be a *sine qua non* for operational efficiency. The following will have to feature prominently in a projected language plan :

68.1 The promotion of multilingualism in the Department, in respect of the national and regional languages.

68.2 The training and utilization of language facilitators (interpreters, translators), particularly in the training environment.

68.3 The provision of an adequate language service in the Department.

68.4 Continuous monitoring, review and revision of the policy in the light of national policy and changing circumstances.

68.5 Continuous liaison with other state departments, NGOs and the Pan South African Language Board.

69. Departmental language policy will be practical and future oriented with thorough language planning and monitoring components. Planning to ensure maximum efficiency in communication irrespective of the language or combination of languages being used will be an ongoing task in the DoD. Members of the department will be sensitized to equity and to the fact that language diversity is to be considered an advantage rather than a disadvantage. Mechanisms will be introduced to ensure effective and clear communication.

Religion

70. The Defence White Paper states: 'In accordance with the Constitution, the SANDF shall respect the right of its members to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion; it shall promote freedom of religion; and it shall cater for the different religious views of its members on an interdenominational basis. Religious observances shall be conducted on an equitable basis, and attendance at such observances shall be free and voluntary. The Chaplains' Service shall regulate religious policy and practice in accordance with departmental policy and in consultation with the Religious Advisory Board which represent different faiths'.

71. The Religious Advisory Boards represent various religious bodies. They advise on religious policy and monitor the ministry to their members. Advisory Boards have been formed for the Christian, Islamic and Hindu faiths, and the African Independent/indigenous churches. The existing Jewish Board of Deputies represents all Jewish interests. These Boards meet regularly. In addition each religious body (ie denomination) is entitled to address its concerns on religious matters independently.

72. Since the large majority of defence personnel are religious and the individual has a constitutional right to the exercise of religion, religious observance is accommodated in the highly regulated life of military personnel and forms part of ceremonials. Such religious observance is sensitively planned and conducted to cater for religious diversity.

73. Since all religious observance is free and voluntary, the opportunity of non participation in religious observance is allowed and addressed. The >freedom of religion= principle allows for a number of alternative approaches and these were narrowed down to the following two:

73.1 To have a parade with religious observance for a homogeneous religious group.

73.2 Where religious diversity is prevalent, a minute of silence may be given for personal prayer or meditation.

74. The equality clause of the 1996 Constitution (Section 9(3), (4)), stipulates that the state may not discriminate against anyone, inter alia on the basis of sexual orientation. This is reiterated in the White Paper on Defence. The Work Group on Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action is formulating policy proposals to enforce these provisions. Such policy will include the following provisions:

74.1 Appointment and promotion will depend on ability, competence and potential of individuals and will not take unrelated sexual orientation factors into account.

74.2 Harassment on the grounds of sexual orientation will not be tolerated. Mechanisms will be established to deal with any incidents.

74.3 Education and training programmes will ensure that all members of the SANDF and all employees of the DoD are sensitised to issues of discrimination and sexual orientation.

74.5 The DoD will take cognisance of any possible changes made in Public Service benefits pertaining to same-sex partnerships, e.g. in respect of housing loans and pension benefits. At present, specific benefits such as free medical treatment for a same-sex partner or transfer arrangements taking same-sex couples into consideration are not formal policy.

Education and Training

75. The White Paper on Defence has established the broad parameters within which education and training will take place in the SANDF. Within this normative and qualitative framework, the following guidelines apply:

75.1 Training shall be competency based as far as practicable.

75.2 Training shall be based on sound educational technology principles.

75.3 Training will be used to improve the individual=s performance and not as a disciplinary tool.

75.4 Training in the SANDF will recognise the dignity of the individual and will be conducted in an environment conducive to learning.

75.5 Training in the SANDF shall be based on clearly identified training needs, linked to work or international standards. The SANDF=s training course content is being scientifically developed through course design.

75.6 All training will be reviewed periodically to make it more cost effective while maintaining or improving standards. Options include combining of training facilities, providing training on an agency basis or providing common training at joint schools.

76. Since April 1994 the SANDF has experienced an abnormal training load due to the integration of the seven constituent forces, especially with regard to bridging training. As at October 1996, over 16 800 members had completed or were engaged in bridging training although this overload was expected to decline from 1997 onwards as integration training was completed. Training is, however, the main focus of SANDF activities when operational deployments are low.

77. Training is directed towards equipping its members with the necessary skills, knowledge and attitudes for service in the SANDF. Effective force preparation is the firstand foremost consideration when determining the content, scope and cost of training. However provision will be made to obtain accreditation for training within the framework of the South African Qualification Authority (SAQA), including training obtained outside of South Africa. As the SANDF is committed to providing the individual member with the greatest mobility in the work environment, it has established a Defence Training Board which will be affiliated to SAQA, thereby gaining access to the National Qualification Framework (NQF).

78. Each member of the SANDF has an equal opportunity of attending applicable scheduled courses. Training is hierarchically structured to allow for career development. Training shall therefore qualify an individual to rise to the highest level within his/her ability. In order to make training accessible to those previously educationally disadvantaged, programmes are introduced to enable those who display potential to qualify on the applicable courses.

79. The SANDF currently presents over 2 000 formal courses per year, ranging from military development courses to war fighting skills training, some lasting a week while others last a year or more. In addition the SANDF also trains a large proportion of its personnel in industry-related skills. While the starting level for most courses is at Grade 12, some senior courses are presented on the level of a post-graduate degree.

80. The question of standards within the SANDF has various meanings amongst the different stakeholders. Training standards in the SANDF will be measured in three dimensions.

80.1 The first dimension is that derived from the competency (based on the operational requirement) to do work, ie that which is required of a person to perform a given operational mission.

80.2 The second dimension refers to internationally verifiable standards, which is particularly important to ensure inter-operability, for example in peace support operations.

80.3 The final dimension refers to statutory standards, ie those that are laid down by statutory bodies, such as medical councils, or international bodies, such as the International Civil Aviation

Organisation (ICAO). Those members of the SANDF who are to be engaged in these types of work will be trained to the standards set by those statutory or international bodies.

81. The SANDF is committed to improving the standard of training. To achieve this it will institute specific programmes :

81.1 A possible drop in training competencies resulting from the currently unfavourable instructor/student ratio will be overcome by utilising those members who have completed their bridging training as instructors.

81.2 The SANDF will develop programmes aimed at retaining instructors to stem currently unacceptably high losses.

81.3 The SANDF will endeavour to gain additional recognition for the skills and workload of instructors. To this end the Chief of the SANDF has instructed a special work group to investigate the role and functioning of the instructor cadre.

81.4 The SANDF is to review its instructor training programme to bring it up to date with the latest developments in educational technology while ensuring that any instructor qualification accords with the standards set by the National Training Board.

81.5 The SANDF will also improve the standard of training by ensuring that training courses are scientifically developed. In this regard the SANDF will upgrade its educational technology skills through the SANDF College for Educational Technology.

82. Control of training in the SANDF is vested in the Chief of SANDF (C SANDF) in terms of the Constitution (1996) and the Defence Act. C SANDF determines overall defence force training policy and may in turn delegate the execution of specific training to a combat or support arm, or provide for joint training where such training concerns more than one arm of service.

83. The SANDF is committed to providing for the upward mobility of every individual and recognises the need to provide basic adult education (ABET). A SANDF order has been issued to institute adult education programmes in conjunction with the regional Departments of Education. Each Command area is to establish, with the local education authorities, an educational centre for the provision of ABET.

84. The SANDF also recognises that many members, by virtue of their employment, are already functioning at the prescribed academic level required for promotion yet do not hold the appropriate certificate. The SANDF will therefore liaise with SAQA in order to grant those members who have already passed specific military courses, academic recognition to level two or possibly level three.

85. The SANDF needs officers with tertiary qualifications and will therefore make it possible for selected officers to study for a tertiary qualification during their term of service.

86. One of the tertiary education schemes is the Uniform Bursary Scheme, or the so-called Mildent/Engineering scheme, whereby selected candidates study full time, with retention of their salaries, for the medical or engineering profession. A variation to this scheme is that used to qualify members of the SANDF for entry into a mustering which requires a diploma before that member may be used within his/her chosen field of employment. In the latter case the training takes place at a technicon.

87. Tertiary qualification is also available through the Military Academy, which provides selected candidate officers with both further military officer development and academic training to the bachelor level soon after the commencement of the candidate=s military career. It is also geared to those young officers who are expected to fill senior ranks. Study at the Military Academy is full time and allows students to study in the human, natural and management sciences, conferring on successful students the Bachelor of Military Science degree.

88. A further method of providing for a tertiary qualification is through the part time study bursary scheme. Members of the DoD may apply for a bursary to study part time for both undergraduate as well as post graduate degrees or diplomas.

89. Under the civilian bursary scheme successful civilians are granted a bursary to study for the medical profession. This scheme is similar to the Public Service bursary scheme, and on successful completion, the graduate must render commensurate service to the DoD.

90. To remain abreast of military developments and to improve its operational standards, the SANDF will make

use of international training. No foreign country will provide the total requirement for training in a particular field. The SANDF will rather make use of such training opportunities to gain expertise in a particular field in order to introduce the newly acquired knowledge and skills into the SANDF.

91. To improve co-operation between the Southern African countries, and to facilitate combined peace support operations in Africa, the SANDF will make available to foreign countries places on SANDF courses, with priority given to Southern African countries. It will also consider seconding trainers to countries which so request.

92. To ensure that the SANDF acts at all times in a military professional manner, the SANDF is committed, in terms of the White Paper on Defence, to the introduction of civic education on all its development courses and appropriate operational training courses. Training in the Law on Armed Conflict (International Humanitarian Law) has been implemented since January 1997 with the assistance of the International Committee of the Red Cross and other modules are being introduced during 1998.

93. The six modules of the Civic Education programme are: key features of the democratic political process; the Constitution and the Bill of Rights; civil - military relations; the law of armed conflict; multi - cultural diversity; and military professionalism.

94. Since the inception of the SANDF particular attention has been given to the psychological impact of the process of integration on all personnel. A Psychological Integration Programme (PIP) has been run for about three years but has now been replaced with a more structured Leadership, Command and Management Principles, Processes, Procedures and Philosophies (LCAMPS) course.

Labour and Service Relations

95. The White Paper endorses a prohibition on membership of trade unions and participation in strikes by SANDF members, although it states that >members of the SANDF are entitled to effective and just grievance procedures, channels of communication, and mechanisms of ensuring that their aspirations and complaints are heard and addressed=. Labour relations which affect civilian members of the DoD are governed by the Public Service Act and related legislation and regulations.

96. The bases for amendments to pay and benefits are established and controlled by the Department of Public Service and Administration and are intended to maintain parity between SANDF personnel and public sector personnel. No mechanism however exists to provide the SANDF with direct influence in the determination of pay and benefits. The unique circumstances of the members of the SANDF are not always recognised and catered for.

97. Improvement of service relations for the SANDF could involve the establishment of an appropriate independent authority to assist in the determination of pay, benefits and conditions of service. Cabinet has recognized that an effective mechanism to deal with the question of SANDF pay and service benefits may have to be instituted pending the findings of a special investigation in this regard. The findings of the investigation are expected in due course.

98. Those placed in authority in the military accept the responsibility of resolving grievances, providing protection against abuse of authority and acting within the established channels of communication and formalised disciplinary principles. The ability to maintain discipline within the SANDF depends on avoiding circumstances which could give rise to the perpetration of peculiarly military offences such as insubordination or mutiny.

99. Section 134 of the Military Discipline Code provides for the resolution of grievances. This procedure enables a uniformed member to appeal through the hierarchy of service channels up to the President. The President=s decision is final. The mechanism has led to the equitable resolution of many diverse grievances, irregularities, abuses of power and incorrect managerial decisions, but the procedures are time consuming. This provision will be streamlined in new defence legislation.

100. **Grievance resolution**. Effective communication is ensured through procedures that have been set up and forums established for the different rank groups at unit level. These forums allow military personnel to communicate their needs not only to the unit commander but also to the Chief of the Arm of Service and the Chief of the SANDF. Feedback after a trial period has shown that this system succeeds in solving most of the problems at unit level where such problems originate.

101. **The Military Ombudsperson**. The White Paper on Defence motivates for a Military Ombudsperson *inter alia* to investigate complaints against the SANDF by military personnel. It is envisaged that the ombudsperson will address any military personnel matters which cannot be resolved through other existing mechanisms.

Medical, Psycological and Social Services

102. The South African Military Health Service (SAMHS) provides comprehensive medical, psychological and social services within the DoD and makes many of its services available to the families of DoD members.

103. The Directorate of Medical Service maintains a developmental approach to facilitate health. The ethos of the medical profession and the regulations laid down by the Medical and Dental Council of South Africa are adhered to at all times.

104. The SAMHS provides medical services wherever possible through its own facilities and capabilities, referring patients to provincial hospitals where it cannot render appropriate service, or in some cases to private facilities where provincial hospitals do not have the necessary facilities.

105. The SAMHS provides primary, secondary and tertiary health care in close co-operation with the national health system which is based on a multidisciplinary approach. Primary health care is seen as a priority.

106. The SAMHS also provides specialist diving medicine and aviation medicine services.

107. The Directorate Psychology provides a military psychological service that is comprehensive and self-supporting, to provide for the psychological well-being of the entire military community.

108. The Directorate Psychology aims to assist the SANDF in the selection, recruitment and development of personnel. It aims to be academically and ethically accountable and to utilise up to date technology and to maintain the highest levels of legal, ethical and professional accountability.

109. Current priorities include operational psychology (optimal selection and utilisation of military personnel, commander training and management of operation-related symptomology); transformation of the SANDF; integration of component forces; personnel selection; gender sensitivity and equal opportunities and management of the psycho-social aspects of rationalisation and demobilisation.

110. The Social Service Directorate is an integral part of the SAMHS. It maintains a developmental approach which facilitates human capacity and self-reliance in order to contribute to the mission readiness of the SANDF. A needs-based people-centred approach is maintained. The service is output orientated and service excellence is the objective.

110.1 **Operational support**. The primary function of the SAMHS is to render operational medical support to the SANDF. Support for peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations and humanitarian and relief operations are also undertaken.

110.2 **Productive work force**. To prevent or minimise social malfunctioning of members and families, emphasis is placed on preventive and developmental interventions rather than curative measures. Health promotion programmes receive high priority.

110.3 **Healthy military families**. The DoD accepts the importance of healthy military families as an important prerequisite for the provision of an acceptable quality of life within the military.

110.4 **People development**. Capacity-building programmes implemented by the military social work department aim to promote the social well being of members and families in the military community.

110.5 **Team approach**. Within the SANDF the social work officer functions as part of the human resource team acting as specialist consultant/advisor to command structures regarding social welfare issues. Social work services are decentralised to unit level to ensure the availability and accessibility of services.

110.6 **Confidentiality**. In accordance with the code of conduct for social work as stipulated by the Interim Council for Social Work, the national controlling body, no confidential information regarding any >client= may be made public without written permission.

111. **Military Community Development Committees** (MCDC=s). All Regular Force units have a Military Community Development Committee or may, according to the size of the unit, be grouped together with other Regular Force units for this purpose. The purpose of this committee is to promote a healthy environment and lifestyle within the organisation for members and their dependants.

112. **Transfer policy**. The changing composition of the SANDF has led to a reassessment of the previously rigid transfer policy that laid down that members could be transferred anywhere in the country. The adequate allocation of military housing, the sympathetic deployment of members in the event of both parents being members of the SANDF and the limitation of unnecessary relocation of families will receive renewed attention. However, ineligibility for transfer is likely to reduce career opportunities.

113. **Domestic violence**. This term is used to refer to violence between spouses or sexual partners or among members of one family. The prevalence in the SANDF is not clear due to the fact that victims are not coming forward, although if the SANDF is considered to be a microcosm of South African society, domestic violence is likely to occur. Indeed a study conducted by POWA (People Opposing Women Abuse) has indicated that police and military personnel are more likely to engage in partner abuse, due in part to the stress that they experience in the workplace.

113.1 The DoD has become part of the national interdepartmental network on violence against women to improve the social, medical and legal procedures for women affected by violence. The Director Social Work is represented on the Interdepartmental Networking Committee on Women Abuse, established by the Ministry of Social Welfare.

113.2 In the SANDF, close networking between the legal, welfare, psychology and nursing departments is taking place to encourage victims to come forward. User-friendly reporting channels, supportive services and educational programmes will be introduced.

114. **Day care centres**. Provision is made for the founding of day care centres for pre-school children of mothers and single parents who work for the State. The SANDF recognises that such centres could enable more trained members of the force to continue in service. Parents are responsible for the costs of day to day care as this is not considered to be a service benefit. Presently a total of twenty-two day care centres/ playgroups exist in the SANDF for use by working mothers and single parents.

Sport and Recreation

115. Sport is practiced in the SANDF to ensure healthy and fit members. Approved and structured sport and recreational activities in which members take part augment force preparation. Self-confidence and self esteem, good team spirit, the integration of cultures and the enhancement of the SANDF=s image are achieved through participation in sport. Physical training (PT) is an integral part of sport management.

116. International liaison is dealt with at Defence Headquarters level and there are regional defence sport offices in each of the regional commands. A Director Sport serves full-time on the staff of the Chief of the SANDF.

117. Facilities, eg fields, courts, changerooms and certain equipment, are provided at state expense as well as some transport and other costs. Sport is financed by a combination of state (budgetary) funds, sports fees deducted from members' pay, club fees, sponsorships and grants. Civilian employees are granted permission to practice in biokinetic centres outside normal working hours on payment of a tariff laid down by the treasury. Full-time SANDF members may take part in sport during official working hours.

118. The creation of a research and development capability to ensure that SANDF sport keeps up with the technological advances in training has now become a priority. Director Sport ensures that the standard of training, coaching and refereeing is facilitated. Requests for the use of SANDF facilities, especially by disadvantaged communities, are considered sympathetically.

119. The SANDF has been granted full membership of *Counseil Internationale du Sport Militaire* (CISM), the international organisation for military sport. The CISM Office for Africa has been transferred to Pretoria as the SANDF is seen as one of the leading African military sporting forces and has been given special responsibilities for African military sport development.

Other Related Military Organisations

120. Although a needs analysis for military veterans still has to be conducted, a Military Veterans= Bill which is being drawn up for presentation to Parliament could include the following:

120.1 The State recognises the sacrifices made by the military veterans of South Africa over many decades and acknowledges its responsibility for the care and welfare of all those veterans and their dependants.

120.2 All military veterans= affairs will be managed holistically by a unitary organisation.

120.3 Compensation for disablement is to be viewed as reparation and not as a welfare matter.

120.4 The role played by military veterans in democratising South Africa will be recognised through national commemorations.

120.5 Any structures which are devised and put into operation for veterans are to provide for interaction and consultation between the state and the stakeholders.

120.6 Military heritage matters are viewed as a national issue and will be dealt with holistically. War graves, cemeteries, memorials, museums and rolls of honour are to be dealt with in an integrated way to promote our military heritage.

121. Previously the SADF gave administrative and logistic support for school cadets training at white schools. This consisted of drill, leadership and bearing, supplemented by target shooting and band performances.

122. Since 1993 cadet activities at schools have been optional, voluntary, extra-mural and accessible to all scholars of all population groups. Currently 484 schools participate in school cadet activities, involving 40 000 pupils made up of approximately 450 drill teams, 240 brass bands and 490 target shooting teams. The figures are declining, however, due to the absence of a clear national policy for school cadets.

123. There are differences of opinion regarding cadets in civil society. While some individuals and organisations regard them as promoting militarism, others view them in a positive light. The DoD will liaise with the National Youth Commission and other stakeholders to develop a national policy.

124. The SANDF=s currently revised objectives for cadets are to instil a spirit of adventure and enhance the development of leadership amongst the youth; present assertiveness and leadership training and a self-disciplining activity

with an alternative form of recreation; allow the youth to make contact internationally; and provide skills in >house and hearth= protection, first aid and fire prevention.

125. Three forms of cadet system are being investigated :

125.1 **Voluntary school cadets** along the lines of the previous system. If reintroduced, this model must be extended to disadvantaged communities.

125.2 **Naval cadets**. The existing programme of the Navy League could be encouraged and extended as a model for the other Arms of Service, and should incorporate disadvantaged communities.

125.3 **Community cadet detachments** which are not linked to schools. These run successfully in the UK and could be applied in South Africa. They involve recruiting youth in their mid-teens as members of local military units, and training them in order to cultivate recruits for the regiments and units.

126. The Service Corps was launched by the Minister of Defence on 31 January 1995 after Cabinet approval was given for its establishment. Its mission is to assist with the reintegration of ex-service members into civil society by upgrading the standard of education, vocational and life skills to enable members to find employment or start their own enterprise in the private sector; provide career guidance on a continuous basis and assist with the social reintegration of members where possible. Its priority is to reintegrate ex-service members.

127. The planning phase for the establishment is complete and implementation is now in process. The Service Corps has received a public service dispensation to function as an auxillary service of the SANDF. Forecasts, taking into account demobilisation and rationalisation, indicate an increase in members who will opt to join the Service Corps.

128. Ex-service members will undergo training including literacy and numeracy training and vocational training. Trainees will work on different projects for a period of twelve months, e.g. RDP projects; National Public Works Programme; SANDF projects; private sector projects.

129. The Service Corps head office is in the process of establishing a trainee support and guidance system in close co-operation with SAMHS, Director Social Welfare.

130. The Service Corps structures make provision for the establishment of a head office, Service Corps units in each province and a Vocational Training Centre for the training of ex-service members in various categories of trades.

131. The first trainees to Join the Service Corps and commence their training at 1 Construction Regiment were the intakes in September 1995, January 1996 and September 1996. The numbers under training in the different provinces exceed 1 000. The Service Corps is staffed by 137 full-timers in the different provinces.

132. The Service Corps has received the support of NGOs, businesses, churches, community based organisations and civic organisations. For the Service Corps to achieve its mission, it is imperative that it becomes an independent organisation in respect of logistics and human resources, facilities, commodities, service and applicable policies and directives.

133. Service Corps implementation costs for 1996/97 were funded from the carry through funds of the SANDF budget. Future funding of the Service Corps will be addressed in the normal budgetary process.

Introduction

1. The part-time component (PTC) is an integral and essential part of the SANDF. During mobilisation or times of war, it will be required to provide substantial numbers towards the personnel component of the defence force.

2. The SANDF's core defence capability will include both the full-time component (FTC) and the PTC which will be structured and staffed in accordance with the requirements of the SANDF.

3. The current and future budget constraints on the DoD will continue to impact upon both the full-time and part-time components.

4. Although the PTC system is in place and functioning, it requires revision and refinement. Many of the recommendations contained in this chapter are already being pursued.

5. The transformation and restructuring of the PTC has two broad goals: to ensure that the new PTC reflects the principles of the Constitution and the policies contained in the White Paper on Defence; and to ensure that the PTC meets the requirements of the SANDF.

6. More specifically, the aims are to ensure that the PTC reflects the composition and cultural diversity of South Africa; that it remains an integral part of the SANDF's force design and structure; that it is capable of fulfilling its functions in an efficient and effective manner; and that the service conditions of the PTC are designed to attract and retain sufficient volunteers to meet the SANDF's force level requirements.

Aim and scope of this chapter

7. This Chapter considers a range of issues which are critical to the successful functioning of the future all-volunteer PTC, regardless of its ultimate structure and size.

8. This Chapter has the following aims and covers the following topics:

8.1 To present the necessary background information and perspective on the PTC: the history and proposed structure of the PTC; the legislative and policy

framework; the 'one force concept'; the PTC as a national asset; and a vision of the future PTC.

8.2 To advise the Minister and Parliament on the following policy issues: roles of the PTC; command and control; decision-making on the PTC; cultural transformation; representativeness; recruiting and retention; voluntary military service; community support; youth; structural transformation; territorial units; resource allocation; service conditions and benefits; training; employer and organised labour support; marketing; international affiliations; and military veterans.

History of the PTC

9. The current PTC is the proud heir of an ancient South African tradition, that of the committed and resolute citizen-soldier usually serving as a volunteer and occasionally as a conscript. With only a few exceptions, South Africa's wars at home and abroad have been fought by citizen-soldiers from all communities. The struggle for democracy over the past few decades is a prime

example of this.

10. Sometimes these soldiers fought alongside each other and sometimes they fought against one another. Yet they shared one thing through the centuries: when the war was over they did not return to military barracks but, being volunteers, went home to their tasks in the field, the factory and the office.

Proposed structure of the PTF

11. The PTC component of the SANDF forms an indispensable and integral part of the SA Army, Air Force, Navy and the Military Health Services. Historically the PTC has provided mainly the 'teeth' (combat and combat-support) elements and little of the 'tail' (administrative and non-operational) elements of the Army.

12. The term ‚part-time component’ is a new and inclusive name for previously separate part-time components, namely the citizen force (which may be tasked to operate anywhere) and the commandos (which are usually tasked to operate on an area-bound basis).

13. The PTC Units in the Army are currently being rationalized as a result of the structural transformation of the SANDF and because of the budget constraints on the DoD. The proposed structure of the PTC is described below.

Army

14. About 85 per cent of the PTC is part of the Army and consists of two main elements: conventional units (citizen force); and territorial units (citizen force and commandos, including their support elements).

14.1 **Conventional Units.** The PTC conventional units listed below will comprise one division consisting of three PTC brigades.

14.1.1 Towed Medium Artillery Regiments

14.1.2 Multiple Rocket Artillery Regiments

14.1.3 Self Propelled Medium Artillery Regiments

14.1.4 Towed Anti-Aircraft Regiments

14.1.5 Mobile Anti-Aircraft Regiments

14.1.6 Mechanised Infantry Regiments

14.1.7 Motorised Infantry Regiments

14.1.8 Tank Regiments

14.1.9 Armoured Car Regiments

14.1.10 Various support units (eg Engineer Regiments, Signals Units, Logistic Units, Technical Service Units etc).

14.2 The units are trained and equipped to fight a conventional land battle, and the required standard of technical proficiency is high. Intensive training and regular refresher courses on highly sophisticated equipment are therefore vital.

14.3 A substantial portion of the Army's conventional warfare capability resides in the PTC, which consequently forms an essential part of the Republic's fighting force. The conventional units are also trained in secondary roles.

14.4 The Army's parachute brigade includes a number of PTC paratroop units:

14.4.1 Light Artillery Regiment

14.4.2 Parachute Anti-Aircraft Battery

14.1.3 Parachute Battalions

14.4.4 Various support units (eg Engineers, Field Workshop and Maintenance Units).

14.5 **Territorial Units.** The Territorial Units of the Army will comprise those units which have a citizen force or a commando origin, both rural and urban. They form the largest part of the operational forces of the regional commands and are mainly light infantry elements.

14.6 The citizen force component and some elements of the commando component operate as the regional commands' reaction or mobile force. The territorial units are usually tasked to secure their local or home areas. In terms of the strategy for land battle, both components are responsible for area defence.

14.7 These units are very cost effective. They are lightly armed and do not use expensive equipment.

14.8 In peace-time the units may be tasked to perform a secondary role in co-operation with the local community, local authorities and the South African Police Service (SAPS). They played a vital role in elections, in flood and snow relief, and in support to the SAPS in crime prevention.

14.9 They are active on an ongoing basis in the community and their individual service commitments are shorter but more frequent, according to local defence and security needs.

Air Force

15. The PTC volunteer air squadrons in the SA Air Force are responsible for communication and reconnaissance flights. The pilots in these squadrons must hold at least a civilian private pilots licence with an instrument rating, and have a minimum of 500 hours flying time. They must either own an aircraft or have unrestricted access to one. The aircrew of the squadrons are trained and tested to Air Force standards.

16. There is also a pool of specialist personnel who are used to support the FTC. These include other PTC pilots and experts in technical and professional disciplines.

Navy

17. The Navy PTC structure consists of naval reserve units and a naval staff reserve.

18. Naval reserves are used in the following roles:

18.1 To reinforce and sustain the SAN at its full wartime complement.

18.2 To staff ships and submarines to full complement.

18.3 To staff Naval shore establishments to full wartime complement.

18.4 To perform tasks such as port and coastal defence, including naval control of shipping and the staffing of harbour and coastal defence vessels.

19. All naval reserve units are involved on a daily basis in administering and training their ships' companies in order to fulfil their role.

SA Military Health Service

20. The SAMHS PTC consists of medical battalion groups which are deployed with operational forces, both conventional and otherwise, as well as with the PTC elements of the Special Medical Battalion.

21. At each medical command there is a PTC territorial wing which consists of centralised and decentralised wings.

22. The SAMHS PTC provides a cost-effective and highly specialised medical, dental, psychological, welfare and veterinary capability.

Constitutional and Policy Framework

23. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996), read with the 1993 Constitution in terms of Schedule 6 of the new Constitution, provides:

23.1 The security services of the Republic shall consist of a single defence force... established in terms of the Constitution.

23.2 The Defence Force shall comprise both a permanent force and a part-time reserve component.

23.3 The establishment, organisation, training, state of preparedness, calling up and conditions of service of the part-time reserve component shall be as provided for in an Act of Parliament.

24. The White Paper on Defence states that ,for political, strategic and economic reasons, the SANDF will be an all-volunteer force. It will comprise a relatively small Full-Time Component (FTC), including a civilian component, which is backed by a sufficiently large PTC. A basic structure of this nature is extremely cost-effective and allows for flexibility in force levels according to the internal and external security environment'.

The 'One Force Concept'

25. The 'one force concept' is intened to ensure that the FTC and the PTC constitute an integrated defence force which is capable of defending South Africa. The FTC and the PTC together provide the SANDF's core capabilities which can be expanded if required by calling into service additional trained part-time volunteers.

26. The 'one force concept' provides for flexible utilisation of human resources and reduces the necessity to maintain a large and un-affordable full-time component.

27. The essence of the concept is that all SANDF personnel enjoy fair and equitable treatment regardless of whether they are full-time or part-time members, and that they are all expected to render the same high standard of service notwithstanding the differences in the dynamics, functioning and requirements of the two components.

28. The concept will enable South Africa to make best use of available defence funding by maintaining a force in which the FTC is optimally sized and equipped, and backed up by a PTC able to fulfil those tasks which do not require a full-time capability.

29. In order to achieve the 'one force concept', the future SANDF should be based on the principle of fairness and equity for all its members, whether from the full-time or part-time components, with due recognition of the different dynamics, functioning and requirements of the two components, as well as the inherent differences of service between the Arms of Service.

National Asset

30. A substantial, representative, trained, funded and equipped PTC is a national asset because it is a guarantee of national sovereignty, costs very little to maintain, and benefits the country by its very existence.

Vision

31. The future PTC will be a loyal, non-partisan, disciplined and professionally competent body of volunteers, both men and women, maintaining and upholding South Africa's many military traditions, representative of the population, and forming an integral part of the SANDF.

Roles of the PTC

32. The functions of he SANDF are defined in the Constitution and White Paper on Defence. The PTC's primary and secondary roles derive from these sources.

Self Defence

33. The PTC is a vital component of the SANDF's capability to perform its primary function of self-defence.

Peace Support Operations

34. The PTC should be used in peace-support operations. Many armed forces make extensive use of part-time members in this role. The Scandinavian countries are a prime example. Peace-support service could be a vital training aid and an incentive to enlist in the PTC because it would provide operational experience and the prospect of actual rather than theoretical soldiering.

35. Because voluntary service by PTC members in peace support operations can be cost-effective and a motivating factor for the PTC as a whole, these personnel should be employed alongside FTC members in such operations whenever practicable. In the event that long periods of service are required, volunteers who do not have time constraints should be used.

Co-operation with the SAPS

36. PTC regiments, units and personnel have been used extensively in co-operation with the SAPS. Because of their dual role as citizens and soldiers, PTC members have displayed a high level of maturity and have been a stabilising influence in these operations.

37. The territorial units have always played a major role in this respect. The conventional PTC forces can also be used in this capacity, but only in their special areas of skill and training.

Other Secondary Functions

38. The PTC participates in many of the SANDF's non-military tasks. Part-time soldiers have always come forward in times of emergency.

39. The legislative basis, policy and procedures for taking PTC members into temporary full-time service must be made simple, expedient and accessible so as to facilitate the utilisation of PTC members in any support role to the FTC.

A Balanced Command Structure

40. In the past very few PTC members had the opportunity of rising above the rank of lieutenant colonel or commander (ie regimental commander level) to serve in senior SANDF command structures. There were virtually no posts for them to do so. Senior positions for PTC members were mainly liaison rather than command posts or true staff appointments. The PTC did not have meaningful representation at senior levels in the line function dealing with PTC matters.

41. Officers with strong leadership ability were discouraged from staying in the PTC because of this career ceiling, and the management and technical skills of senior PTC officers and non-commissioned officers who left the service because of this were lost to the SANDF.

42. The White Paper states that the SANDF will investigate on a continuous basis the need for, and the creation of, command and other posts for PTC members in order to provide them with greater responsibility for command and control of this component. The SANDF has conducted such investigation in consultation with the PTC and the Part-Time Force Council (PTFC).

43. This has led to the creation of the PTC post of a major general who, as Chief of the Part-Time Component (CPTC), reports directly to the Chief of the SANDF on all PTC matters and is a member of all the top departmental bodies. The CPTC will be assisted by other senior PTC and FTC officers and warrant officers who will occupy posts which have also been created.

44. The presence of these senior PTC members in the chain of command and in the Part-Time Force Council (PTFC) structures will enhance the motivation of the PTC, raise the standing of the PTC in the community, and help to create a climate of support for service in the SANDF.

45. For the 'One Force Concept' to become a reality, more PTC officers and warrant officers should become eligible for promotion into senior command structures with status equal to their FTC counterparts. This will demonstrate that they have a meaningful role to play in the management of the SANDF.

46. Additional posts should be created for members of the PTC to be promoted to the ranks of colonel and above over specified periods of time. The filling of these posts should be a structured and planned process of career progression for PTC officers.

47. A range of further senior command and staff posts within the SANDF should therefore be identified for officers and warrant-officers of the PTC, according to need-driven requirements and the approved operational command and support structures of the SANDF.

Decision-making on PTC matters

48. The PTC currently has an indirect but growing influence on, and participation in, decision-making on SANDF matters which affect it. This occurs through the Part-Time Force Forum, the Part-Time Force Council, the Reserve Officers Association of South

Africa (ROASA) and the Senior PTC Liaison Officers of the Arms of Service. The role and functions of these bodies are being reviewed in the light of DoD re-engineering.

Part-Time Force Forum

49. The Forum co-ordinates PTC activities at Chief of the SANDF (C SANDF) level, and affords PTC representatives direct access to the C SANDF.

50. The Forum provides advice and direction in respect of PTC matters within the framework of defence policy in general and C SANDF policy in particular.

51. Under the chair of Chief of Staff Personnel, the Forum consists of the Chiefs of Staff Personnel of the Arms of the Services, Chief Director of Corporate Communications, Director of Human Resources Policy of the Defence Secretariat, Chair and Deputy Chair of the PTFC and the Senior PTC Liaison Officers of the arms of the service. Co-opted members consist of the directorates of the Personnel Division and ROASA.

52. The Forum co-ordinates and advises the CSANDF in respect of the following PTC functions and activities:

52.1 Identifying prominent supporters of the PTC outside the SANDF.

52.2 Co-ordinating and regulating comprehensive investigations into PTC matters.

52.3 Making recommendations in respect of PTC policy and prioritizing PTC matters.

52.4 Ensuring that the PTC remains updated on developments in the SANDF.

Reserve Officers Association of South Africa

53. The main objective of ROASA, being a voluntary society not for gain, is to support the national security policy of South Africa.

54. ROASA endeavours to establish international relations with similar organizations such as the Inter-Allied Confederation of Reserve Officers (‚COIR') and the Inter-Allied Confederation of Medical Reserve Officers (‚CIOMR').

55. The active members of ROASA consist of PTC serving or retired officers from the different Arms of Service.

Part-Time Force Council

56. The Part-Time Force Council (PTFC) is recognised as an important mouthpiece of the PTC. It is an elected body based on corporate rather than individual membership (ie its members in the nine regions of the council are elected by the PTC regiments and units of all arms of service). Former non-statutory force members participate equally on the PTFC, in order to represent their constituents.

57. The PTFC enjoys ministerial recognition and the appointment of its chairperson was ratified by the Minister of Defence in December 1994. The Minister has also ratified the

appointment of eight former statutory force members and ten former non-statutory force members to the PTFC National Council.

58. The constitution of the PTFC has been accepted by the Department of Defence (DoD), including the Council on Defence (CoD) and the Defence Command Council (DCC).

59. The PTFC has the following aims:

59.1 To secure durable collaboration with the Minister, the Defence Secretariat, the SANDF, the Chiefs of the arms of service and command and formation commanders on all matters affecting the PTC, and to secure a standing which is commensurate with the role of the PTC as an important component of the SANDF.

59.2 To help secure general and broad-based community and private sector support for the PTC and the voluntary service system.

59.3 To help promote a ‚one force concept' between the PTC and the FTC within the SANDF.

60. The main roles and functions of the PTFC are as follows:

60.1 To advise and consult within the DoD on matters affecting the PTC, and to contribute in an advisory capacity to the decision-making process of the DoD regarding such matters.

60.2 To promote the development of PTC support structures involving employers and employer organisations at national and regional levels.

60.3 To assist with the development and implementation of the PTC volunteer system, and to actively support the SANDF in the recruitment of volunteers.

60.4 To advise and assist with marketing, advertising and publicity in relation to the PTC.

60.5 To liaise with veterans' and other organisations on PTC matters.

60.6 To liaise with organisations representing part-time forces internationally.

60.7 Within the ambit of the mission and aims of the PTFC, to provide guidance and advice to the PTC or any unit thereof on any matter, and to undertake any tasks or projects at the request of the DoD.

61. The PTFC should become a statutory body within the DoD as soon as possible in order to give effect to its constitution, secure recognition for its office bearers, and obtain appropriate financial and other resources.

Aspects of Command and Control

62. The PTC and the PTFC should be involved in force design and rationalisation initiatives affecting the PTC.

63. The restructuring of the command and control structures of the PTC within the SANDF similarly requires the involvement of the PTC and the PTFC.

64. As a transitional measure, the suitability and seniority of all PTC volunteers should be determined by a formula which includes the following criteria: age; command experience; operational experience; on-the-job (rather than formal) training; and specialist civilian training, experience and qualifications.

65. The ranking of PTC personnel should be investigated with the aim of placing them in appropriate ranks, correcting inequities suffered by serving PTC personnel as a result of deficiencies in the previous PTC's training and career planning, and catering for former non-statutory force leaders.

66. A programme for accelerated training and development of PTC members should be designed and implemented.

Transformation

67. The transformation of the SANDF, including the PTC, should be addressed in respect of cultural transformation, representativeness and recruiting and retention.

68. The main aim is to foster a common military culture amongst all members of the SANDF, whether full-time or part-time component.

Cultural Transformation

69. The PTC of the future should have a broad and common military culture which is based on the greatest degree of inclusivity.

70. In order to make the PTC fully representative of the composition of South Africa, a cultural transformation of the PTC should be effected.

71. The regimental traditions followed by many PTC regiments, especially the traditional regiments, should be seen as a valuable aid in this regard. Studies have shown that soldiers' loyalty lies with their comrades, their regiments and the state, in that order.

72. Regiments have proved time and again their unquestionable loyalty to the state, irrespective of the government in power.

73. Transformation of the SANDF should be aimed at fostering a common military culture amongst both full-time and part-time members.

74. There should be a cultural audit of the diverse historical and military traditions of South Africa, including those of the existing PTC, the former non-statutory forces and the former ‚homeland' forces.

75. The future PTC's military culture should be based on the principle of maximum inclusivity of the customs and traditions of all the forces involved in its formation.

76. It is essential to build on regimental traditions and customs and to mould them so that all sectors of the community, irrespective of race, gender and creed, are accepted as an integral part of the regiment.

Representivity

77. The PTC is in ananomalous situation regarding composition of its personnel. On the one hand, there is a vast number of white males who were trained under the national service system. Many of them have not volunteered for PTC service and will not respond to any call-up because of the ministerial moratorium on prosecution for failing to comply with a call-up. On the other hand, very few non-statutory force members have volunteered to join the PTC. The integration process to merge the present PTC with part-time volunteers from the former non-statutory forces is not generally known and needs to be communicated to both the PTC and the under-represented sectors of the community.

78. The Minister said the following in his budget speech in 1996: "Although all sections of our people are joining the part-time forces, special attention will have to be given to attracting former MK, APLA and TBVC members into the part-time regiments and area-based units. We can look forward to the day when there is a Luthuli Regiment of Soweto, the Tambo Regiment of Kwa Mashu and the Chris Hani Regiment of Khayelitsha, and when black, brown and white serve equally in all".

79. The SANDF should establish specific methods, plans and implementation programmes for integration within the PTC, including an on-going recruiting campaign in black communities.

80. As part of the attestation process, the SANDF should formulate and implement selection procedures for the PTC similar to those in place for the FTC. The British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) should be involved in this process.

81. A programme for accelerated training and development of PTC members to achieve pre-determined standards should be designed and implemented.

82. The Chief Directorate Equal Opportunities should be tasked to investigate and monitor the programme if this is considered to be appropriate.

83. If feasible, the Service Corps should be tasked to identify suitable recruits for the PTC from those who leave the SANDF through the demobilisation process.

84. A multi-pronged approach with regard to regiments and units should be adopted:

84.1 Existing regiments should be retained where feasible, albeit in a down-sized form. Plans should be made to ensure representativeness within these units.

84.2 Where new units are required to be established or greater representativeness needs to be achieved, such units can be established from sub-units of existing units.

84.3 PTC units should be established within budget constraints to become more representative and to even out the demographic and geographic distribution of the PTC.

Recruiting and Retention

85. Recruitment and retention of suitable personnel is the life-blood of any volunteer part-time force. In the case of South Africa, the Minister has mandated additional requirements, namely that recruiting must encourage nation-building and must ensure a balanced mix of members in terms of race, ethnicity and gender.

86. Persuading the right calibre of people to volunteer and stay in uniform will be accomplished by offering an attractive, challenging and rewarding part-time military career.

87. It is more economical to encourage people to stay in the PTC than to find and train or re-train replacements from scratch. It is difficult to replace lost experience which comes from long service.

88. While the SANDF has made much progress with regard to recruiting, various issues still have to be considered and resolved:

88.1 Many PTC units currently believe that their only means of survival is to recruit as soon as possible. This situation will be corrected once the current rationalisation of units has been finalised.

88.2 Recruiting should be planned, programmed and implemented in an orderly fashion. The delineation of recruiting areas for particular units should be included in the plan.

89. All arms of service should determine the number of recruits required for each regiment or unit depending on its geographic location, task, training commitment etc.

90. The regional marketing forums which have been established in each command area should be tasked to produce regional personnel marketing programmes.

91. The national advertising campaign envisaged by the SANDF at corporate level should precede recruiting at regional level. Community awareness of the PTC needs to be established prior to widespread recruiting.

92. Recruiting should be decentralised to the lowest practical level.

93. The proposals described above are being pursued by the SA Army.

Voluntary Military System

94. The Voluntary Military System (VMS) was originally established as a substitute for the defunct national service system. In terms of the VMS, volunteers undergo twelve months basic military training, followed by a further obligation of eight annual commitments of 30 days in the PTC. The objective is to create a feeder system for the PTC conventional forces.

95. In its current form, however, the VMS does not achieve this objective. Very few PTC units receive personnel from this source, especially in the leader-group category. If anything, the VMS has become a feeder group for the FTC.

96. The VMS should be reviewed and adapted to achieve the aim of creating a feeder system for the PTC.

Ex Full-Time Component Members

97. Active measures should be taken to recruit members leaving the FTC into the PTC.

98. The policy in terms of which FTC members who have taken a voluntary severance package on leaving the service are entitled to join the PTC as volunteers should be communicated to such members.

Community Support

99. Many people regard service in the Defence Force as a privilege. However, successful recruitment of volunteers requires the support of all sections of the community.

100. Two problems in particular have to be solved in order to achieve this support: historically, many citizens have had a negative attitude towards the SANDF; and years of conscription have impacted on the ethos of voluntary military service. Former conscripts, their families and their employers have a negative attitude towards military service. Such perceptions have to be changed if the voluntary part-time service system is to be effective and successful.

Youth

101. The new PTC will need to launch a systematic out-reach programme for youth, including school-going youth, in order to create awareness of the PTC, cultivate future recruits, and contribute to nation-building by offering young people the opportunity of self-betterment, a disciplined environment, access to new experiences, comrdeship and access to role models.

102. The DOD should act in concert with the PTC and the Commission on Youth in each province to develop and sup-port youth programmes which have the purpose of enriching youngsters' lives, developing leadership qualities and skills, and teaching them elementary military values related to future PTC service.

Structural Transformation

103. The future PTC will have to satisfy three requirements:

103.1 It must fit the eventual force design of the SANDF as a whole.

103.2 Where possible, existing units must remain in place to assist the integration process and transfer their expertise.

103.3 New units must be established to broaden the geographic and demographic base of the PTC.

104. The disbandment of existing units is a sensitive subject which is linked to both community sentiment and PTC transformation.

105. The existing PTC could be made to fit almost any force design without disbanding a significant number of units, and still remain cost-effective. Various alternative procedures have proved successful in South Africa and elsewhere in the world, and would enable the SANDF to accommodate both existing and new units within a reasonably-sized force design.

106. The PTFC and existing PTC units should continue to be consulted on rationalisation and optimisation affecting the PTC.

107. Procedures for closing down, amalgamating and merging structures should continue to be agreed on by all the PTC stakeholders before decisions are taken in respect of particular regiments and units.

108. In any rationalisation of the PTC, consideration should be given to, inter alia, the regiment's current effectiveness, future force design, history, traditions, civic honours, current location, representativeness and recruiting potential.

109. The recommendations outlined above are being incorporated into the Army's guidelines regarding the investigation and implementation of the restructuring of PTC regiments and units.

Territorial Units

110. Special mention needs to be made of the commandos, which now form part of the territorial units, in view of the sensitivity surrounding their name and perceived role. This sensitivity derives from the perception in certain quarters that the commandos were politicised during the apartheid era through frequent deployment in support of the police.

111. However, these community-based units proved their loyalty to the government of the day through a strong voluntary turnout to guard polling stations and voting materials in the 1994 national election and the 1995 and 1996 local elections. The units have also provided valuable support to local authorities in flood and snow relief. They have co-operated on a large scale with the SAPS to fight crime.

112. In fulfilling these functions the territorial units proved that a nation-wide community-based organisation can play an important and cost-effective role in peace-time and provide an internal security service for the defence force in times of war or emergency.

113. The concept of territorial units is of immense importance for both the transformation and defence needs of the Republic. They are intimately integrated into, and drawn from, the community, and can contribute to the transformation and representivity of the PTC. Such units, being community-based, will reflect the communities from which they are drawn and which they serve.

114. Many of these units have been racially integrated for some years, and are in the process of extending their operational capabilities to cover all sectors and areas of the community. For example, 12 new units have been established in the former ‚homelands'.

115. The transformation of the territorial units into units which are fully representative of South Africa's population makes them an important priority for the future PTC.

116. It is of utmost importance that the territorial unit system be extended to cover all communities, including former disadvantaged communities, that the units be broadly representative and integrated to perform the task of area defence, as well as cooperating with the local community, local authorities and the SAPS; that all members adhere to the constitutional imperative that military personnel must be politically non-partisan; and that all members be exposed to the civic education programme on defence in a democracy.

Resource Allocation

117. Allocation of resources to the PTC is still based on the pre-1990 era which consisted of compulsory service, operational deployment, long annual training camps and minimum expenditure on headquarter facilities. As a result, there is insufficient emphasis on the aspects which are essential for the success of the all-volunteer PTC. Although many items in the SANDF budget are utilised for or in support of PTC administration, training and infrastructure, the direct apportionment of resources to the PTC should be improved. The current level of funding is far below the minimum level required.

118. PTC unit commanders should be involved in the structuring and management of the budgets of their units.

119. An investigation should be undertaken to determine the capital and operating budgets per PTC unit. Within the operating budgets of each unit there is a need to differentiate between fixed and variable overheads. Units should have control over their budgets and must be given the tools to manage actual expenditure against their budgets; however, higher authority should continue to exercise control over their financial planning and expenditure.

120. Unsuitable accommodation for PTC units should be upgraded. This is a source of contention for some regiments and units. Volunteers are attracted to the units with which they associate. Units require adequate accommodation to succeed with their recruiting plans. In many countries unit headquarters are seen as a major drawcard in attracting volunteers.

121. PTC units should have access to weapons, vehicles and equipment for training.

122. Funds for uniforms for traditional regiments should be made available and the issue of camouflage uniforms for PTC members should be expedited.

123. Adequate funding for the Voluntary Part-time Military Service System which is focused on the recruitment and training of PTC volunteers is essential to ensure its success.

Service Conditions and Benefits

124. One of the important factors which will determine the success or failure of the voluntary PTC of the future will be the pay, allowance, benefits (including medical benefits) and legal protection offered to its members while rendering continuous or non-continuous military service.

125. As in the case of the FTC the conditions of service of the PTC should be adequate to attract and retain sufficient volunteers to maintain anticipated force levels, and may therefore need to be revised periodically.

126. The provision of adequate pay, allowances and other incentives, would facilitate the recruitment and retention of quality people in the PTC and would encourage more binding service contracts being instituted.

127. PTC pay should be on a par with FTC remuneration, including fringe benefits which are appropriate to PTC service, and should take into account the member's length of service.

128. The establishment of a pension or a provident fund for PTC volunteers should be addressed based on the number of PTC volunteers whose length of service indicates a commitment to long term PTC service.

129. The volunteer service bonus system should also be revised based on the above information. The bonus should be sufficient to allow the acquisition of a major appliance by the recipient or contribute significantly towards an annual holiday, as originally envisaged. The bonus should be increased substantially in the third year of service to encourage retention. In the UK the ‚bounty system' operates on this basis and personnel turnover is reduced substantially after the third year.

130. PTC pay should be tax free or taxed at the lowest marginal rate of taxation and should be taxed separately from the member's civilian salary so that he/she is not pushed into a higher tax bracket. These matters should be taken up by the DoD with the Department of Finance.

131. Suitably qualified young people should be granted full or partial study bursaries for university, technikon and other courses if they undertake military training for a certain period after graduation. Britain applies this system successfully in conjunction with Sandhurst and officer training for the Territorial Army.

132. To attract the right calibre of PTC volunteers from all communities and especially from disadvantaged groups, the travel allowance scheme should be improved and simplified.

133. Legal protection for volunteers should be strengthened through a moratorium on certain debts during periods of extended call-up; protection against summary termination of a lease by a landlord in the absence of a volunteer while on call-up; and discrimination in the civilian work place.

Training

134. The following concepts are contained in the Army's training philosophy for the PTC, and the implementation of several of these concepts is in an advanced planning stage.

135. While attractive service conditions and adequate resources can do much to ensure the maintenance of high standards and efficiency in the new PTC, the only way to attain these standards is through proper training.

136. Training in an all-volunteer force differs vastly from that in a conscript organisation. It has to be interesting, challenging and user-friendly. Above all, it must take account of severe restrictions on the time of PTC personnel. It should also make provision for the greatest degree of decentralisation.

137. The period of annual training must be balanced carefully so as to achieve the required efficiency goals without being so onerous as to lead to a falling-off of enthusiasm.

138. The PTC should be involved in the planning and design of training down to regimental or unit level.

139. Negotiations should be initiated with the relevant controlling bodies to gain ciilian recognition for the widest possible range of military skills (eg drivers, medical orderlies, military police).

140. The PTC should be involved in planning and designing training programmes.

141. Training should be decentralised as far as possible.

142. The following training should be implemented in the long-term:

142.1 Basic training for untrained recruits, decentralised to command, formation and unit levels.

142.2 Non-continuous training on week nights and weekends.

142.3 Continuous training of up to 14 days in the member's local area or further afield.

142.4 Short training courses of 7 to 14 days to instruct members in new skills or to qualify them for promotion.

142.5 Extended training courses of 21 days in modules to qualify members for senior promotion. General training courses and staff training for senior promotion should be conducted in modules of short enough time periods to suit senior civilian executives.

142.6 Distance training through correspondence to supplement the above and reduce time scales. A practical phase is also essential.

143. The desirability and feasibility of re-establishing University/Technikon Units should be considered as a means of attracting leaders into the PTC.

144. Training schemes along the lines of the Reserve Officer Training Corps Scheme in the USA could also be considered.

145. The necessary training facilities, equipment, instructors and funding to carry out meaningful

PTC training will have to be provided.

Employer/Organised Labour Support

146. In a large number of cases, private and public employer attitudes towards the PTC are negative. There are several reasons for this: insensitive handling during the national service era; the perception that employees ‚waste' their time in service; the perception that the PTC is no longer needed; and a lack of tangible incentives for employers.

147. As a result of these negative attitudes, certain government and other public and private institutions have restrictive human resource policies which prevent or discourage their employees from volunteering for military service.

148. The establishment of a national employer support committee will go a long way to changing employer attitudes to the PTC. Organised labour should become part of such a committee and launch an initiative to support their members who volunteer for part-time service.

149. The national employer support committee initiatives should be supported by employers and organised labour in both the public and private sectors to encourage employees to volunteer for PTC service thereby contributing to the establishment of a successful and effective PTC.

150. The Minister should propose to Cabinet that an urgent audit of the human resource policies of all government departments and state-owned corporations be undertaken in relation to part-time military service, and that restrictive practices be eliminated.

151. Strategies should be developed in conjunction with the national employer support committee and the PTFC to establish a feasible, affordable and easily administered agreement regarding minimum concessions and job-protection policies for workers who are PTC members, and incentives for employers who support voluntary part-time service.

Marketing

152. Marketing is an integral part of voluntary part-time service. The SANDF has instituted a marketing plan under the direction of the Chief Director Corporate Communications.

153. There should be a detailed marketing plan established at corporate level involving the entire DoD. The plan should incorporate the following:

153.1 Co-ordination with and involvement of the PTFC.

153.2 A national awareness campaign promoting the benefits of voluntary part-time service for South Africa and the reconstruction and development process.

153.3 Decentralised regional campaigns set up in conjunction with the recruiting programmes and involving the regional marketing forums.

153.4 Co-ordination of marketing with the establishment and promotion of the national employer support committee.

153.5 The SANDF should determine a specific budget for marketing. The amount should be substantial, and outside agencies should be consulted.

International Affiliations

154. Up to 1961 a long-standing network of formal affiliations and alliances existed between South African regiments and full-time as well as part-time regiments of the British Army. These lapsed when South Africa left the Commonwealth but were unofficially maintained in almost all cases. The SANDF has now re-instated these affiliations.

155. However, there is not yet clear policy on new affiliations and alliances which have arisen during the past 30 years within both the SADF and the former non-statutory forces. These represent important relationships for the PTC and the entire SANDF.

156. Bodies within the PTC have forged links with several overseas organisations. For example, the Reserve Officers Association of South Africa has linked up with the International Confederation of Reserve Officers. Such contacts are extremely important and useful for the SANDF.

157. The DoD should develop a coordinated policy with regard to international PTC affiliations, based largely on the priorities determined by the SANDF military diplomatic plan and its policy in respect of affiliation with foreign military units.

Military Veterans

158. Members and formers members of the PTC are members of various veterans organisations. Although PTC veterans qualify for veteran benefits, there is no clear definition of how or when a PTC member qualifies as a veteran (eg do all ex-servicepersons, irrespective of origin, qualify as veterans?)

159. There are internationally accepted definitions of veteran qualifying service.

160. Veteran programmes require support from both government and veterans organisations.

161. The DOD, in conjunction with the Council of Military Veterans' Organisations, should define who qualifies as a PTC veteran and then create benefits for these people.

162. Benefits for PTC veterans should be the same as for any other military veterans, and details of these benefits should be contained in PTC service conditions.

163. Medical and social care should be provided for full-time and part-time veterans who suffered disabilities in service (whether in action, on training or in accidents).

Conclusion

164. In an era when many nations are turning to the part-time citizen-soldier as a means of maintaining defence capabilities in a cost-effective way, South Africa is fortunate in having a PTC and an immense treasure of experience in maintaining and using such a force.

165. The PTC, and especially the conventional component thereof, currently faces its major challenge to date: to move away from a conscript-based system for white males to a voluntary system which mirrors the ‚Rainbow Nation'. (The commandos have already made substantial progress in this regard).

166. Achieving the ideal of a ‚Rainbow PTC' as an integral and productive part of the SANDF will require the co-operation and participation of a broad range of stakeholders. These extend from the Ministry of Defence, the Joint Standing Committee on Defence, the SANDF, the PTFC and the ROASA, to members of the community.

167. While an effective PTC can be very economical, there is a certain level of funding below which it cannot be expected to fulfil its obligations. Whatever the level of funding required by the PTC, it is a relatively small percentage of the overall defence budget.

168. In the final analysis, the success of the PTC will depend on its ability to recruit and retain volunteers to fill the required number of posts within the PTC as an essential component of the SANDF.

Chapter 12

Land and Environment

Overview of Department of Defence land

1. The Department of Defence (DoD) controls land in each of the nine provinces of South Africa. These properties range from the larger training areas, Army bases, Air Force bases and ammunition depots, to smaller properties such as communication sites, shooting ranges and even remote observation posts of only a few square metres.

2. The bulk of the land currently under DoD control is classified as State Land which is reserved for DoD purposes. This land is legally owned by the South African Government with the Department of Defence having a reservation of use, although the deeds are held by the Department of Public Works which is the national custodian of all state land and facilities. Some DoD land is Defence Endowment Property received from the Government of the United Kingdom in 1922 which is also classified as State Land. Such property is governed by an Act of Parliament, Act no 33 of 1922 (the Defence Endowment Property and Account Act)1.

3. The second largest category of DoD controlled land is property which is leased for use by the DoD. These properties include shooting ranges used by local Part Time Force members as well as many of the sites used for the countrywide communication network which are leased from farmers in rural areas.

4. The DoD also has "rights of use" agreements with land owners that allows certain land to be used for DoD purposes. For example in Northern Kwazulu-Natal the DoD's right of use on Forestry property amounts to approximately 53 000 hectares.

5. The DoD is one of the largest users of property in South Africa, holding approximately 0,4 per cent of the country's surface for a wide range of defence-related purposes. In comparison, the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence holds approximately 1,2 per cent of the country's surface and also leases a large training area in Canada. The United States DoD controls 1,1 per cent of the country's land, while the real estate of the French armed forces represents 0,4 per cent of the country's surface.

6. The property requirements of the DoD stem from its core functions and activities. The SANDF is in a transitional phase regarding its functions, posture and force structure. The Defence Review envisages a primarily defensive posture with new tasks such as regional security co-operation and peace support operations being taken on. These changes will have a significant impact on the composition and extent of the departments' property. The DoD's current property portfolio mostly reflects the previous era that was characterised in part by operations in Angola and Namibia and adversarial relations with neighbouring countries. With the shift to a defensive posture the property portfolio is sure to be downsized.

7. The DoD is continually striving to improve its efficiency and effectiveness, driven by the need to fulfil its constitutional obligations to the people of South Africa, at the least

possible cost. The transformation process and the introduction of new management models in the department are likely to result in the disposal of excess facilities and infrastructure.

8. The DoD currently has approximately 493 200 hectares of land under its control. For easy reference, this is around a quarter the size of the Kruger National Park. This figure excludes small pieces of military land in the former TBVC states (the exact size of these cannot be determined, as the title deeds of state land in these areas are not available).

9. Since 1986, the DoD has returned approximately 234 000 hectares of land to the Department of Public Works, largely as a result of urban and agricultural pressures, internal DoD rationalisation, and restitution claims. Appendix 1 (Appendix 1: The larger DoD terrains handed back to PWD since 1986) provides an indication of the larger terrains that have been handed back since 1986.

10. The distribution of current defence land, as well as the land returned to the Department of Public Works per province (excluding former TBVC states) is reflected in Map 1(Map 1: Defence land per province). Appendix 2 (Appendix 2: Distribution of land within the Arms of the Service) indicates the DoD land in each province which is allocated to the different Arms of Service (excluding the Surgeon General). It also provides a breakdown of the three main categories of DoD property (Defence Endowment Property, lease agreements and State Land reserved for DoD purposes). Map 2 (Map 2: The large tracts of Defence land (distribution wrt size) shows the spatial distribution of property controlled by the three Arms of Service in the various provinces.

11. The division of total defence controlled land per province is as follows: Mpumalanga 2 per cent, Gauteng 5 per cent, Western Cape 1 per cent, Eastern Cape 4 per cent, Free State 7 per cent, Northern Province 13 per cent, Kwazulu-Natal 3 per cent, North West Province 8 per cent and Northern Cape 48 per cent. The Northern Cape thus has almost as much DoD land as all the other provinces combined. However, only three military areas represent the bulk of this total area: Army Battle School at Lohathla (135 000 hectares), Vastrap Weapons Range (50 000 hectares) and Schmidtsdrift Training Area (35 000 hectares).

12. Armscor controls four pieces of land in South Africa which are indicated in Table 1. Since the 1980's, Armscor has been implementing a comprehensive environmental management plan for all its facilities in co-operation with external experts.

NO	LOCATION	TERRAIN	AREA
1	Prieska	Alkantpan	76 735 ha
2	Simon's Town	Institute for Maritime Technology	1 ha
3	Hartebeespoort Dam	Gerotek Testing Range	130 ha
4	Pretoria	Armscor Building, Erasmusrand	25,6 ha
5	Broederstroom	Proteknik Research Laboratory	1 ha
TOTAL			**76 892,6 ha**

Table 1: Land controlled by ARMSCOR

DoD land and use requirements

13. The DoD acquires land with a specific primary operational purpose in mind. These purposes include the following general categories, each of which implies certain major considerations that have to be taken into account in determining the size of properties. However, it should be noted that more than one of these activities can take place on any portion of DoD land.

13.1 **Training areas**

13.1.1 **Specific force design to be trained**. The specific force design for which training is required (for example deployment of mechanised or motorised infantry in conventional, peace-keeping or area protection roles) will determine the area of land needed to train the force. The effective use of DoD forces necessitates competency in more than one type of deployment. This means that the area needed for training will be determined by the force design which requires the largest portion of land for training.

13.1.2 **Type of training to be conducted**. The types of training to be conducted also have an effect on the area of land needed for training. Smaller areas are required for dry training, field craft training and vehicle training than are required for training with live ammunition. A variety of geographical features and veld types should be present to simulate different scenarios within which skills are to be acquired.

13.1.3 **Type of weapons to be used**. The types of weapons and the combinations in which they are deployed have a profound influence on the area of land required. The safety arc for each weapon is clearly defined and should be strictly adhered to.

13.1.4 **Expansions in force design and development of new weapon systems**. Provision is made for expansions in force design and the development of new weapon systems although this is difficult to predict.

13.1.5 **Spatial implications of safety templates**. Safety templates drawn up for specific weapons systems and ammunition form an integral part of any military base where armed training takes place (see Appendix 4: Spatial implications of safety templates). The size of a military base where armed training is performed is to a large extent determined by the ammunition used in training and the linked safety templates. The size of a military training area usually increases with the use of higher order ammunition, which requires larger safety templates.

13.2 **Base areas, administrative areas, maintenance areas and stores depots**. The sizes of these facilities are to a large extent determined by the amount of infrastructure needed to perform their functions.

13.3 **Ammunition depots**. Ammunition depots are used to store large quantities of ammunition for DoD use. Variables that have an influence on the size of these depots include the types of munitions to be stored and the prescribed safety margins. Different types of munitions, for instance pyrotechnics and projectiles, are stored in separate bunkers for safety reasons. Clearly defined safety distances are maintained between bunkers, as well as on the perimeter.

13.4 **Weapon ranges**. The size of weapon ranges is determined by the maximum application distance and safety arcs of weapons to be employed.

13.5 **Naval bases**. The size of these facilities is to a large extent determined by the amount of infrastructure needed to perform their function and to allow for the training of personnel.

13.6 **Air Force bases**. Apart from runways and infrastructure provision, a large number of variables, such as restricted air space, aerial approach zones, safety areas on the perimeter and radio frequency requirements, are taken into account in determining the size of an air force base.

13.7 **Telecommunication installations**. A major consideration in determining the size of telecommunication installations is the required presence of a magnetically clear spectrum around the facilities.

13.8 **Rifle ranges**. Rifle ranges are designed and established according to a set of clearly defined guidelines. Variables which might come into play include land use activities on adjacent properties and the distance from residential infrastructure.

14. Map 3 (Map 3: Defence land allocated to the Arms of Service) shows the spatial distribution of the larger DoD properties, and also provides an indication of their relative size. The legend to the numbering used on this map is the same as reflected in the preceding map. Table 2 indicates the category into which the facilities fall. This table accounts for approximately 422 000 hectares which represents 86 per cent of the total DoD property portfolio. The remaining 14 per cent is made up of numerous smaller properties.

PRIMARY FUNCTION	NUMBER ON MAP	SIZE
Training Areas	7, 12, 13, 15, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 37, 39, 41, 43, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 53,	335 144 ha
Military Bases	56.	922 ha
Ammunition Depots	2, 3, 4, 35.	11 117 ha
Weapons Ranges	1, 16, 23, 40.	55 910 ha
Naval Bases	18, 22, 42.	1 575 ha
Air Force Bases	8, 55.	11 738 ha
Telecommunication Installations	10, 14, 44, 50.	3 085 ha
Rifle Ranges	6, 36, 38.	2 729 ha
	5, 24, 45, 54.	
TOTAL		**422 220 ha**

Table 2: Distribution of primary functions of DoD terrains

General considerations taken into account in determining the size of DoD land

15. A number of less well-defined variables applies when determining the actual size of land acquired for DoD purposes.

15.1 **Size of properties on offer or available.** When State Land becomes available for DoD use, the size might exceed minimum departmental needs. The properties constituting this land may be of such a nature that sub-divisions are deemed detrimental to future non-DoD utilisation of the land. The same principles come into play when land is acquired on the open market.

15.2 **Sustainable area of land**. The principles of sustainable use are adhered to in determining the area of land needed for DoD purposes, for example rotational use of different portions of the property to allow for regeneration of vegetation. Larger portions of land are usually be required in semi-arid areas than in areas of a higher rainfall and more vibrant vegetation in order to execute the same DoD activities.

15.3 **Maintaining the spatial integrity of land**. The spatial integrity of land, with regard to previous and current utilisation practices in the surrounding areas, must

be maintained. This implies that land no longer needed for DoD purposes should be handed back in a condition that favours previous and current utilisation practices in the surrounding areas. In the case of agriculture, subdividing existing economically viable properties to fit minimum DoD requirements would be inappropriate.

15.4 **Topography**. The topography of a region where a DoD facility is to be established has an effect on the size of the property. For example, it may be necessary to acquire larger portions of land to obtain sufficiently large, relatively flat areas of land when a clear line of fire is required.

Factors which have an influence on the location of DoD properties

16. Location has an influence on the area of land needed to execute the DoD function. The location of DoD land is determined by a number of factors:

16.1 Command responsibility
16.2 Strategic considerations
16.3 Distance from infrastructure
16.4 Accessibility
16.5 Availability of state land
16.6 Socio-economic considerations
16.7 Regional development considerations
16.8 Climatology
16.9 Altitude
16.10 Environmental considerations

17. The approved Force Design of the transformed DoD will serve as the basis for considering the logistic support requirements of the department. This re-definition of core military activities and design will subsequently influence existing military land and facilities. This may result in land and facilities that are redundant and the disposal thereof will have a right-sizing effect on the DoD's facility and land portfolio.

Disposal of DoD land and facilities

18. The Department of Public Works is responsible for providing and managing land and facilities for other government departments. This entails acquisition, leasing, administration and disposal of all State Land in South Africa. State Land which is surplus to the requirements of other government departments is usually handed back to the Department of Public Works.

19. As extensive rationalisation is anticipated in view of the DoD's transformational goals, the handing over and subsequent disposal of redundant state land will need to take place in a coordinated manner. As discussed above, the new force design will provide the planning framework for determining the nature and extent of rationalisation.

20. In October 1997, Cabinet approved proposals to establish two inter-departmental committees to deal with various aspects of base closure, conversion and the disposal of

redundant defence land. Further proposals will be tabled with Cabinet for its consideration as this process develops.

Challenges in the closure of defence facilities

21. The closure of military bases presents both opportunities and serious challenges. Some of the major problems associated with military base closure are the following:

21.1 The loss of employment opportunities in the military and associated industries as well as within local supporting economies.

21.2 Some military properties are environmentally contaminated and often require very costly clean-up operations.

21.3 Maintenance and protection of the bases before reuse or ultimate disposal can be costly.

22. The development opportunities arising from the reuse of bases can be plentiful depending on the geographic location and infrastructure of the base concerned. Developmental factors will be a major consideration taken into account when evaluating the various land use and conversion options for redundant bases.

23. Base closure is a complex issue requiring careful consideration of processes, role players and time frames. The complexity of the issue is such that it would be premature to try to finalise the process of disposal or give an indication of which bases are to close within the time frame of the Defence Review. It is envisaged that the process will be taken forward through interdepartmental committees which will:

23.1 Analyse the Defence Force's property holdings and utilisation and align these to the DoD's strategic direction and rationalisation imperatives. This will be executed within the ambit of the line function of the Department of Defence and the oversight function of parliamentary committees.

23.2 Develop a strategic plan that will locate military base conversion within micro and macro economic development and other policies of government.

23.3 Contextualise base reuse within the broader context of defence downsizing and the transformation of South African society.

23.4 Assess the existing resources, opportunities and constraints presented by individual or collective properties.

23.5 Collect and collate baseline data relating to each property's reuse abilities and time frames.

23.6 Compile feasibility studies pertaining to various potential uses and users.

23.7 Provide a real estate and general marketing service for base reuse.

23.8 Act as a focal point for facilitating all stakeholders interested in and affected by base closure and reuse.

23.9 Monitor and evaluate base reuse.

Multiple use of DoD facilities

24. The maintenance of DoD facilities is costly. There is great pressure on the department to become more cost-effective in its facilities management, while at the same time ensuring that it does not lose its autonomy and proficiencies. The reduced defence budget necessitates that alternative ways of financing maintenance be explored, especially as most facilities were developed for a higher frequency of use than is currently experienced. In particular, the conscription of National Servicemen is no longer taking place and the number of aircraft in the South African Air Force has almost halved. Certain elements of the DoD (for example, hospitals, training centres, runways) have to be strategically distributed across South Africa so that in many cases bases will be downsized rather than closed.

25. Under-developed land and under-utilised facilities can be made available for other uses, providing there is coherence with existing defence facilities and DoD activities are not compromised. The principal restricting factor in this regard is security and safety. In many cases, alternative use will require a portion of land or facilities to be isolated from the main defence activities.

26. Several requests from the private sector for the co-use of defence facilities have been received in recent years. The South African Air Force has approved the co-use of AFB Hoedspruit by the private sector. The objective of these development ventures is to minimise the cost of managing these facilities and to improve the infrastructure without drawing on additional state funds.

27. The DoD will enter into joint ventures with developers to ensure maximum utilisation of Defence Endowment Property. By law, both the Ministers of Defence and of Finance have to approve all forms of re-use of endowment property.

Land claims and restitution

28. The Restitution of Land Rights Act was approved by Parliament in 1994 and the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights was established in 1995. By the end of January 1997, 13 520 claims had been lodged, of which 10 507 were urban ones. The DoD is affected as certain restitution claims have been made against defence land.

29. The Government has set itself the following time limits (as set out in the White Paper on Land): a three year period for the lodgement of claims; a five year period for the Commission and the Court to finalise all claims; a ten-year period for the implementation of all court orders.

30. The restitution process provides a framework and various options which can be used to arrive at an appropriate solution through negotiation by the parties or adjudication by the Land Claims Court. Restitution can take the following forms: restoration of the land from which claimants were dispossessed; provision of alternative land; payment of compensation; alternative relief including a package containing a combination of the

above, sharing of the land, or special budgetary assistance such as services and infrastructure development where claimants presently live; or priority access to state resources in the allocation and the development of housing and land in the appropriate development programme.

Principles guiding the DoD

31. The DoD has accepted the following principles to guide the resolution of restitution claims.

31.1 The DoD reaffirms its commitment to the Constitution and the Land reform programme of the Government.

31.2 A pro-active approach towards restitution is adopted.

31.3 Preference will be given to the restoration of land rather than other forms of restoration.

31.4 The DoD is committed to a speedy resolution of restitution cases.

31.5 Creative alternatives need to be explored in cases where land cannot be restored.

31.6 The DoD will not insist on alternative land being made available in cases where defence land is handed back to claimants, but will assess its requirements in terms of the core functions and activities of the department, i.e. no settlement will be dependent on the automatic substitution of land for land.

31.7 The DoD is committed to transparency in this process.

31.8 The DoD is committed to the resolution of land claims through negotiations and will only use the Land Claims Court as a last resort.

31.9 Any need for alternative land for the DoD arising from settlement transfers will be determined consensually amongst all relevant government departments and ministries on the basis of the line function of the DoD.

31.10 The land under claim will be made available for restitution unless the Department of Defence deems it not feasible. This non-feasibility could be due to the fact that :

* It might not be financially cost- effective

* The specific location of the facility might be unique in terms of military requirements

* The facility might be in the national interest from a strategic point of view.

32. All relevant state departments involved in any particular restitution claim decide on the state’s position with respect to the claim. The Department of Land Affairs conducts

all negotiations with the Land Claims Commissioner and the claimants on behalf of the state.

33. A summary of Department of Defence land subject to restitution claims is reflected in Appendix 3 (Appendix 3: Restitution claims against the SANDF as at 6 May 1998). These claims have been submitted for evaluation to the Land Claims Commissioner. The largest area already restituted to claimants is Riemvasmaak, measuring approximately 70,000 hectares. The DoD has also decided, in principle, to vacate the Schmidtsdrift and Mosita areas. The vacating of Schmidtsdrift is dependent on resolving the acquisition of alternative land between the Departments of Land Affairs and Public Works.

Environmental management

34. The DoD's Environmental Services function, which was established in 1977, aims to ensure the environmentally sustainable management of military activities and facilities. An early emphasis on conservation of military training areas has expanded into a more advanced and comprehensive approach of military integrated environmental management. This means that the planning and execution of military activities takes into account the impact it will have on the environment.

35. The department is currently in the process of formally implementing military integrated environmental management over the whole spectrum of military activities at all military training areas to ensure that these activities do not jeopardise the long-term potential of land and other natural resources. One way of doing so is by formulating and implementing an environmental management plan for each training area in which training activities, environmental constraints and environmental management are integrated.

Clean-up of training areas

36. Military training activities have a variety of environmental impacts on land, water or air. One of these impacts is the contamination of training land with unexploded ordnance (UXO), shrapnel, targets and remains, as well as general waste. UXO can pose direct health risks to personnel as well as civilians entering contaminated land, while all forms of waste or pollution threaten the integrity of the physical environment and natural resources. Such contamination may restrict current military utilisation of the land, as well as sustained future military use and current or future non-military utilisation.

37. Current ad hoc instructions and procedures, mainly based on safety considerations, make provision for the regular clearing of training areas immediately after training exercises, as well as on an annual basis. This entails the clearing of all UXO and other debris which is detected visually. The DoD is currently in the process of drawing up more comprehensive corporate policy and guidelines to include underlying principles, environmental considerations, the standardisation of cleanup practices, the formulation and execution of waste management plans, the establishment of liaison forums, the introduction of community education programs, and the issuing of a Land Environmental Quality Statement when properties are disposed of.

Graves and burial sites

38. Some of the areas under military control contain burial sites. Relatives and descendants are allowed to visit these graves when training activities permit and with due

regard to their safety. The DoD has always been very sensitive in this regard and this practice will continue. An inventory of all graves on military controlled areas is being compiled. Standardised procedures regarding access to such burial sites on military properties are currently being drafted.

External environmental expertise

39. The DoD has been participating in external environmental forums since the 1970's. This ensures that the department's environmental policy and activities are consistent with national environmental policy, and promotes co-operation with environmental bodies.

40. Since 1993 the DoD has initiated Military Environmental Advisory Forums to enlist the support of external experts in the management of military properties. In some areas these forums are well established, and it is the department's intention to extend this initiative to cover all military properties.

Conclusion

41. By effectively integrating environmental considerations into the planning and execution of all military activities, the DoD can minimise the adverse effects of its activities as well as make a substantial contribution towards the conservation and sustainable utilisation of environmental resources in South Africa.

Chapter 13

South African Defence Review 1998

The Acquisition Management Process

Introduction

1. The White Paper on Defence forms the basis for the Defence Review.

2. The White Paper on Defence, as approved by Parliament on 14 May 1996, states that the SANDF will be a balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced military force, cpable of executing its tasks effectively and efficiently (Chapter 2: para 11.7). It further states that:

2.1 The government will not endanger the lives of military personnel through the provision of inadequate or inferior weapons and equipment (Chapter 3: para 43.6).

2.2 The SANDF has to maintain a core defence capability because of the inherent unpredict-ability of the future. Such capability cannot be created from scratch if the need suddenly arises. The maintenance and development of weapons systems is necessarily a long-term endeavour (Chapter 4: para 6.2).

2.3 Deterrence requires the existence of a defence capability which is sufficiently credible to inhibit potential aggressors. Although South Africa is not confronted by any foreseeable external military threat, this capability cannot be turned on and off like a tap. It is therefore necessary to maintain a core defence capability (Chapter 5: para 7). A core defence capability includes a balanced and sustainable nucleus with, amongst other features, the maintenance and, where necessary, the adequate and appropriate upgrading or replacement of equipment and weaponry (Chapter 5: para 8).

2.4 The services of an efficient defence industry are required to maintain, upgrade and, where necessary, replace weapons and equipment of the SANDF. The industry will permit the cost-effective purchase of certain products and systems, ensure life-cycle maintenance and support of such systems, and perform refurbishment and upgrades of existing equipment (Chapter 8: para 3). However, the defence equipment required by the SANDF cannot and should not be procured exclusively from the local industry. Many complex systems cannot be produced domestically and will have to be imported. Management expertise for the specialised procurement functions is located within the DoD (Chapter 8: para 5).

3. The Defence Review will also address the strategic and technical implications of the constitutional provision that the SANDF will be "primarily defensive in the exercise or performance of its powers and functions" (Chapter 5, para 11).

4. For a more detailed reference guide to aspects addressed in the White Paper, referring to the industry, see Appendix A.

5. The White Paper on Science and Technology, *Preparing for the 21st Century*, states that the essence of the new strategy of the SANDF is to convert the current force into a small, but technologically more capable one. Refer to Appendix A for a more detailed extract from the White Paper, referring to defence technology.

Defining the Defence Industry

6. For the purpose of the Defence Review, the South African defence industry is defined as those sectors of organisations in the public and private sector, commercial companies and business units of such companies, mainly involved in the electronic, mechanical, aerospace, maritime and chemical sectors of the manufacturing industry, which are, directly or indirectly, active in research, design, development, production, assembly, test, evaluation, upgrading, procurement, export, import, maintenance, logistic support, human support and project management, of goods and services for security forces, local and overseas.

Department of Defence Requirements

Core Defence Capabilities

7. Defence contingencies, posture and finally the characteristics required in the core defence capability of the SANDF, eventually lead to those specific capabilities which should be provided for in such a force. These capabilities are:

7.1 Intelligence is an overarching capability required by the SANDF (both strategic and tactical).

7.2 Landward defence capabilities to counter attacks from over land. These forces should be mobile and largely self-contained.

7.3 Air defence capabilities to counter air attacks, including both fighter-based capabilities, as well as localised anti-aircraft defence capabilities.

7.4 Maritime defence capabilities to counter attack from seaward and attacks on seaward trade, including mine clearance capabilities and capabilities to act against air, surface and submarine attacks.

7.5 Defence against chemical and biological warfare (CBW) with the emphasis on detection of CBW agents and the protection and decontamination of forces and equipment.

7.6 Once operations have begun, the SANDF should have an interdict capability for interdiction on the battlefield.

7.7 On halting enemy aggression, the SANDF must have a counter- attack capability to drive the enemy from own or friendly territory.

8. Command and Control (C & C) is critical to the effective execution of the self- defence function at all levels. This is required at individual Arms of Service as well as joint C & C. Emphasis should be placed on electronic warfare and command information systems.

9. The SANDF must maintain an effective supporting capability which includes operational medical support, operational logistics support, land, air and sea transport and operational personnel services to ensure the high morale of soldiers engaged in operations.

Categories of Local Support Required

10. A local industry capability to support the SANDF, can be divided into three categories.

10.1 **Strategically Essential**. Technological capabilities can be classified strategically essential if they potentially satisfy a unique environment-dependent need which cannot be satisfied through procurement of standard equipment, provide an operational winning edge, or ensure self-sufficiency in technologies for which high-priority operational requirements exist, but which are effectively unavailable to the RSA due to political, economic and other considerations.

10.2 **Cost-Effective Local Sourcing and Export**. Due to already established local capability, where the RSA has a global competitive edge, certain niche systems are more cost-effective, over the life cycle of the system, to source locally than to buy them from foreign suppliers. These capabilities can ensure faster turn-round times for the servicing or upgrading of systems, battle damage repair, lead to import replacement (i.e. foreign exchange savings and local employment) and to export opportunities.

10.3 **Non-Strategic Capabilities**. Some components, sub-systems and systems are neither strategically essential nor economically viable to source locally. In these cases, the local capability should be to understand and support these systems in order to enable informed specification and selection, and to maintain and upgrade them locally with support from the overseas supplier.

11. Within the context of the above categories, the SANDF's requirements for technological support capabilities are described hereunder.

SANDF Requirements for Local Industry Support Capabilities
***Strategically Essential Capabilities*.**

12. Capabilities that will provide the SANDF with a distinct combat advantage: The latest generation equipment is often not available from foreign suppliers, or where available, their combat effectiveness is reduced through the common knowledge of their performance characteristics and counter-measure susceptibility. Examples of strategic systems requiring self-sufficiency in local design, development and production capabilities are:

12.1 Command and control systems.

12.2 Secure communications systems.

12.3 Electronic warfare systems.

12.4 Fusing systems for missiles, bombs, projectiles.

12.5 Sea mines.

13. Capabilities to ensure the survival of combat platforms. Battle tanks, fighter aircraft, attack helicopters, combat vessels, etc. need a self protection capability to survive enemy attack. Examples of such requirements are:

13.1 Surveillance and threat detection systems.

13.2 Short-range air-to-air missiles.

13.3 Point defence surface-to-air missiles for naval vessels.

13.4 Ground-based air-defence systems.

13.5 Minor calibre guns.

13.6 Armour protection capabilities.

13.7 Camouflage and other signature control capabilities to reduce platform observability.

13.8 Electronic counter-measures (ECM).

13.9 IFF (Identification of Friend or Foe) systems.

14. Capabilities to satisfy unique, environment-dependent needs: Equipment available from foreign suppliers is often not optimized for local use due to our different climatic conditions (hot, dry, dusty), terrain features, existing equipment, human factors or operational doctrines. The ability to develop equipment or to adapt bought-out equipment to suit the SANDF's requirements locally is therefore essential. Such capabilities include:

14.1 Ergonomic design, i.e. the design of man-machine interfaces such as driver cabins, cockpits, gun control mechanisms, etc. to suit future SANDF operators.

14.2 Engine performance enhancement, i.e. the ability to develop or adapt engine sub-systems, such as cooling systems, dust filters and air conditioning to fit local climatic conditions.

14.3 Vehicle mobility upgrades - local terrain characteristics demand the use of wheeled (rather than tracked) combat vehicles, requiring specific attention to tyres, suspension and drive train performance.

14.4 The integration of new or improved weapons, sensors or other systems on SAAF aircraft requires specialised aerodynamic, electromagnetic interference and structural dynamics expertise in order to qualify the combined systems and release them to service. Similar expertise is required for the integration of any new systems on vessels, tanks, command and control systems, etc.

14.5 The development or adaptation of medical equipment to suit local conditions and SANDF operational requirements as well as for support of peacekeeping or peace support operations or disaster relief.

15. Capabilities to detect and counter rapidly emerging threats require a flexible engineering capability to develop a variety of systems and counter-measures to fit an evolving force design and threat assessment. Systems with such capabilities include:

15.1 Reconnaissance and surveillance systems, including unmanned aircraft.

15.2 Air space control systems which include advanced radar systems and sensor fusion technologies.

15.3 Multi-purpose stand-off weapons.

15.4 Chemical and biological defence, including the ability to detect and identify hazardous agents, to protect soldiers against, and to decontaminate equipment of such agents.

16. Capabilities to maintain and upgrade equipment currently in service with the SANDF. The maintenance of existing equipment in a serviceable state, or the upgrading of equipment in order to extend the useable life-time, requires specialised technological capabilities in industry. Major systems for which long-term maintenance support capabilities are required include the following:

16.1 All aircraft and helicopters.

16.2 All combat vehicles.

16.3 155mm Gun systems and Multiple Rocket Launchers (MRL), including upgrades to their ballistic characteristics.

16.4 Tanks and armoured cars.

16.5 All command, control and communications systems, including radars, computers, etc.

16.6 All guided weapons systems.

16.7 Combat vessels.

16.8 The ability to upgrade or alter specific sub-systems and components in selected areas (e.g. the implementation of repairs to jet engines outside the original engine manufacturer's (OEM) specifications).

16.9 The ability to repair battle damage to a wide variety of weapon systems.

17. Requirement for a technology and knowledge base in the defence industry: The cost and complexity of most modern military equipment demand a sound technology base in industry to support the SANDF to operate and deploy such equipment in the most effective way. Capabilities required include:

17.1 Systems engineering capability for a broad range of weapon systems. (i.e. a thorough scientific understanding of the functional characteristics of all the sub-

systems and their complex interactions, which make up the characteristics of the overall system.)

17.2 Modelling and simulation capabilities, which are indispensable tools for the analysis and design of complex systems.

17.3 The capability to test and evaluate at various levels of systems complexity is essential for all new or improved equipment in order to verify performance to specification, irrespective of whether such equipment originated from local or foreign sources. This requires specialist expertise and test facilities.

17.4 The capability to specify equipment requirements. In order to ensure that the DoD will remain an intelligent buyer of military equipment from foreign and local sources, the aforementioned capabilities - to analyse the needs, to specify the right equipment and to verify conformance to requirements - are all essential. The purchase of systems as complex and as expensive as modern combat vessels, fighter aircraft or battle tanks cannot be done solely on the basis of marketing information.

Cost-Effective Local Sourcing of Non-Strategic Equipment

18. System requirements for which local capabilities exist and for which local sourcing will be considered on a life-cycle cost basis, include:

18.1 Electronic and electrical components and subsystems, including computers.

18.2 Electro-optical equipment such as night vision systems.

18.3 Ammunition for selected weapons; bombs, mortars, etc.

18.4 Small arms.

18.5 Vehicles.

18.6 Small boats.

18.7 Diving support equipment.

18.8 Navigation systems.

18.9 Military engineering equipment.

Non-Strategic Capabilities

19. Some systems are neither strategically critical nor economically viable to source locally. In these cases, the local capability should be to understand and support these systems in order to enable informed specification and selection, and to maintain and upgrade them locally with the support of an overseas supplier, e.g.:

19.1 Hulls and propulsion machinery for naval vessels

19.2 Medium and large calibre naval gun systems

19.3 Complete airframes and engines for fighter aircraft

19.4 Hulls and propulsion systems for battle tanks

19.5 Specialized ground support equipment for aircraft.

DoD policy for the Defence industry

20. The SANDF requires the services of an efficient defence industry to address the needs of the SANDF for maintenance, upgrading and where necessary, the replacement of its weapons and equipment. The industry will ensure the cost-effective purchase of certain products and systems, ensure the life-cycle maintenance and support of such systems, and perform refurbishment and upgrades of existing equipment.

21. The DoD is by far the largest, and in many cases, the only client of the defence industry. Most of the products produced by the industry are also developed to the specific requirements of the SANDF. The SANDF funds a large portion (approximately 50%) of research and development spending in the industry and therefore owns much of the immaterial rights of the products manufactured in the industry. The SANDF also contracts a large portion of the logistic and operational support of its equipment to the industry. The technology and know-how and capacity for the maintenance of the weapon systems and supply of services such as informatics, command and control, etc., resides within the industry. This makes the industry part of the SANDF's logistic and operational capability and capacity, during peace and war.

22. The industry is also controlled by Government in terms of conventional arms control measures and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, i.e. national policy.

23. The defence industry is also part of the larger industrial base of the RSA and as such, participates and is guided by national industrial policy.

24. The defence industry is, however, part of the SANDF's logistic and operational capability. The DoD, in its strategic planning, has the responsibility to determine and ensure the required technology, services and industrial capacity and capability it requires from industry, i.e. departmental policy.

25. The defence industry is therefore regulated and supported by both national and departmental strategy and policy. Most of these strategies, guidelines and policy already exist (refer to the Policy Environment section of this chapter). These policies, however, need to be placed in context, coordinated and support each other.

26. Policy is dynamic. There is at present a policy environment regulating and guiding the SANDF and the industry in place. Policy is also in the process of development.

27. This document takes all present DoD strategies, guidelines and policies into consideration.

28. A White Paper on the SA Defence Industry is currently being drafted and will be submitted to Parliament for acceptance and approval during 1998.

DoD acquisition policy

Acquisition Management Policy

29. The Joint Standing Committee on Defence makes recommendations on the defence budget, functioning, organisation, armaments, policy, morale and state of preparedness of the SANDF and performs other functions related to parliamentary supervision of the defence force.

30. For the SANDF to carry out its primary role, the availability of armaments is essential. Optimal modern armaments for the SANDF are obtained through a process of armament acquisition. This section describes the approach to be followed by members of the DoD and Armscor in the acquisition of armaments.

31. This entails the management of the total spectrum of activities to be carried out by the participating organisations within the defence family to meet the armament requirements that will ensure that the SANDF has the necessary user systems for maintaining a combat-ready capability. The four role players involved in armaments acquisition are the Minister of Defence, the Secretary for Defence, the Chief of the National Defence Force, and the Chairman of Armscor. They are partners and decision-making at all levels allows for the viewpoints of the four partners. Armscor will be the acquisition agency of the DoD. Control bodies in the process allow for participation by nominated members of the partnership.

The Role of the MoD and the DoD HQ

32. The ultimate political authority and responsibility for theacquisition function rests with the Minister of Defence. The Minister of Defence is responsible for the defence function of Government and is accountable to the President, the Cabinet and Parliament for the management and execution of this function. The Arms of Service Chiefs are responsible for stating the armaments requirements of the Defence Force which are approved by the Minister. These stated requirements are satisfied through the acquisition of optimised user systems and final acceptance of these systems against the stated needs in a procurement plan.

33. The Chief of the SANDF states and specifies the equipment and services it requires to fulfil its specified obligations, roles, functions and tasks. The arms of service participate in the various acquisition planning and approval forums as the users of the equipment and services.

34. The Secretary for Defence is responsible for ensuring that all acquisition activities are executed within national objectives, policies and constraints. The Secretary is furthermore primarily responsible for high level programming and budgeting and in-year control and auditing of defence expenditure, and also for inter-departmental and political and industrial co-ordination. The Secretary is the Accounting Officer of the DoD. The Secretary will perform such duties and functions as may be necessary for civil control of the defence acquisition function and to enhance parliamentary and ministerial control over SANDF acquisition programmes.

35. The Departmental Acquisition and Procurement Division (DAPD), consists of an HQ division, responsible for specialist acquisition/procurement, to ensure the acquisition of

equipment and services on behalf of the DoD. The chief of DAPD and his support staff are responsible for directing and co-ordinating all acquisition and procurement activities between the Arms of Service and Armscor. DAPD serves as a single nodal point between DoD and Armscor. Chief of DAPD is the process leader for acquisition and procurement of Category 1 and Category 2 items within the DoD. The Chief of Acquisition is also the chief policy adviser to the Head of the DoD on acquisition matters and reports to the Secretary for Defence.

36. Armscor is the acquisition agency of the DoD, responsible for professional programme management and the drafting of tender documentation for the contracting of industry on behalf of DAPD during the execution of armament acquisition programmes. This is in order to ensure that technical, financial and legal integrity in contract management is in accordance with DAPD requirements. The DoD and Armscor will jointly oversee industrial development of the industry in order to support DoD acquisition programmes.

Acquisition Management

37. Within the framework of defence management, the acquisition function satisfies the need to provide armaments to the SANDF. Defence management seeks the optimum combinations of personnel and equipment which will provide the maximum defence capability for available funds. A structured decision-making and authorisation process for the acquisition of armaments by means of baseline management and consequent phased contracting is followed, resulting in transparency and accountability. The armament acquisition process is fundamentally a systems engineering process, requiring good programme management.

38. Program management requires the management of many logistic, technical, financial and legal disciplines such as engineering, resource management, contracting, quality assurance and design assurance. To cope with the many acquisition functions, project teams will, where appropriate, consist of members from Armscor, the SANDF, and the Defence Secretary (DoD Acquisition Division). The appointed project officer will be the project team leader. The project teams shall consist of members from the arms of service and Armscor allocated to DAPD and shall preferably be collocated under DAPD.

Requirements Planning

39. The Defence Budget is a result of a sequence of events. The Defence Policy is described in the White Paper on Defence. The Defence Review was compiled from the White paper on Defence. This Defence Review spells out what tasks the SANDF is required to execute, what course(s) of action and with what force structure and force support the SANDF can afford to execute these tasks. These planned activities will be converted into programmes to ensure that personnel and equipment are maintained in an orderly and economical fashion. Finally, annual budgets will be developed in such a manner as to be able to manage the allocated finances in an audit-able and efficient manner. The process of requirements planning therefore consists of three distinct actions, planning, programming and budgeting, which are executed through an iterative process.

Inter-relationships

40. Through acquisition management, a balance is maintained between technology development, design development, industrial development and international marketing. The process is guided by departmental policies, procedures and practices. To achieve the lowest cost of acquisition and to maintain production technology, it is essential to increase production quantities (economies of scale). Since the quantities required by the SANDF are generally small, increases in quantities can only be achieved by international marketing and export. Government and the defence family have a direct interest in the successful export of armaments.

Acquisition Management Process

41. Technology development and industrial development are closely related to armament acquisition and are therefore part of the overall acquisition process. The model used for structuring the armament acquisition management process allows for sequential and parallel phases separated by formalised baselines. Underlying the above phased approach is the systems engineering process. This process systematically translates functional needs stated by the operational user into technical design and manufacturing parameters. It also ensures that, parallel to the functional process, all other stakeholders and interest groups are kept involved. This process is managed by appointed project teams, representing all members of the DoD and Armscor. A project team is responsible for the execution of a project and for the submission of project milestone documents, as prescribed, to the approval committees and boards for acquisition programmes.

42. The approval structure for project submissions consists of three levels. The highest level of approval for acquisition is the Armament Acquisition Council (AAC) (chaired by the Minister of Defence). The final selection of the equipment and supplier, as well as monetary commitments for Cardinal Projects, is undertaken at this level (Cardinal Projects are defined as those worth R80 million or more, as well as projects with political implications). The AAC will identify major armaments procurement projects that will be presented to Parliament for appoval. The second level of approval for acquisition is the Armament Acquisition Steering Board (AASB) (chaired by the Secretary for Defence). This board approves non-Cardinal projects and screens Cardinal projects. The selection of the successful contractor and monetary commitments for non-Cardinal projects and the screening of the successful contractor and monetary commitments for Cardinal projects is undertaken at this level. The Armament Acquisition Control Board (AACB) (chaired by the Chief of Acquisition), is the third level of control and screens all projects and all other routine programmes in terms of requirements and amendments. The present constitutions of the above forums will have to change to reflect the new participants of the newly-structured MoD and DoD HQ.

43. The Armscor Board serves as a decision-making board for tender adjudication and ensures that all contractual obligations of project management are in accordance with national procurement legislation, and that these decisions are made in the best interests of the state.

44. No approval of any project may be given unless monies have been budgeted for by the DoD. No placing of contracts may be undertaken unless approved by DAPD.

45. Once projects have been approved by the AAC, AASB and AACB, contracts are placed on industry for project execution. All such contracts have to then be authorised by formal Contracts Authorisation Committees with respect to legal, financial and technical integrity. The composition of these Authorisation Committees must reflect adequate and appropriate representation of all relevant stakeholders in the acquisition programs and must include members from Armscor, the SANDF, the Secretary for Defence (MoD Acquisition Division), and other relevant divisions of the MoD.

46. Organised defence industry should be involved timeously in the acquisition process in order to ensure local defence industry participation and industrial cost-effective solutions for the DoD's requirements.

47. All technical review teams will include, where appropriate, members from Armscor, DAPD, and the SANDF.

48. All other routine acquisition projects (capital provisioning of spares etc) or programmes dealing with weapon systems and/or equipment which do not serve before the AAC, AASB, AACB or DRDB, must obtain Secretary for Defence (DoD Acquisition Division) approval and support before contracts can be awarded to successful suppliers by Armscor. The principle of single nodal point between Armscor and DoD through DAPD must be ad-hered to for all acquisition related activities.

49. The DoD transformation programmes may make further recommendations to the DoD for the adjustment or changing of the present acquisition approval process as indicated in the MODAC studies. The MODAC studies must be reviewed to make recommendations on the roles and functions of the members of the Joint Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence in the acquisition approval process. The proposed draft Green Paper on the State Tender Board Procurement System may necessitate changes to the process followed thus far by the DoD in its acquisition management process. On acceptance by Parliament of the proposals of this Green Paper and the final re-engineering of the DoD acquisition function, the relevant Armscor Acts must be reviewed to reflect the new functions and authority of the Armscor Board and the powers of the corporation.

Limited Self-Sufficiency in Arms Development

50. South Africa should not strive for self-sufficiency in arms development, but only limited self-sufficiency in key areas, as determined during the Defence Review and the subsequent DoD strategic planning process. Defence industry studies to indicate development, purchase or partnership options will be executed from time to time.

51. DoD acquisition guidelines will form the basis for defence industry planning. Technology development will be targeted primarily at those areas where self-sufficiency is to be maintained. The acquisition guidelines will guide acquisition decisions and will therefore be included in the value systems for tender evaluation.

Long-Term Requirements Statement

52. The DoD may publish an annual Acquisition Master-Plan to indicate all new acquisition projects required for political approval from the Minister and to inform the

Joint Standing Committee on Defence and Parliament. The Department of Defence will publish a medium-to long-term Defence Requirements Statement (LTDRS) to guide long-term technology and industrial planning.

Domestic Procurement

53. It could be more cost-effective and operationally expedient to have the technology and capability to manufacture (if economies of scale can be achieved), upgrade and maintain equipment locally. Local manufacture allows understanding of the technology and processes, which again allows modifications to be made to improve serviceability, turn-round times and operational capability through upgrades, etc. It also has the advantage of stimulating the local economy through investment and savings on foreign exchange and in some instances, earn foreign exchange through exports. It also ensures independence from possible foreign coercion in times of tension. In certain strategic areas, such as electronic warfare, secure communications, equipment developed specifically for local conditions, etc., systems and services are not available on the international market.

54. Preference may therefore be given to the procurement of defence products and services from local suppliers, providing such procurement represents good value for money.

Competitive Procurement

Open Competition

55. Fair and open competition will be used as far as is practicable in the procurement of armaments. This will include the invitation of foreign tenders.

Tender Adjudication

56. Adjudication of tenders will not necessarily be based on the lowest price, but on value for money and industrial development goals. Life-cycle costs, DoD requirements, local industrial development goals, social responsibility (economic empowerment of previously disadvantaged persons), and subcontracting will be taken into consideration in the awarding of contracts. The DoD affirmative procurement policy will be administered by the Secretary for Defence and will be considered during contract negotiations.

57. Where practical and not contrary to commercial confidentiality or security interests, companies who lost in the tender process should be informed of the reasons.

Competition on Sub-Contracts

58. Suppliers of major systems or items will be required to allow the maximum amount of competition on the sub-system and parts level in an offer (i.e. reduce vertical integration).

Bench-marking

59. In the adjudication of single source offers, Abench-marking@ against comparable foreign systems or products should be employed to ensure value for money. The basis for single-source offers should not include intellectual abilities, technical performance, previous work performance, additional work requirements, etc. Single-source offers

should only be considered when no other suppliers respond to tender invitations or when there is a single supplier of specified equipment.

Contracts Bulletin and Accredited Suppliers

60. Requirements and tenders will be announced for a minimum of 21 days in a monthly contract bulletin published by Armscor. These bulletins will consist of both electronic and printed media. The ability of suppliers to meet the technical, schedule, financial and other contractual requirements of armament acquisition projects will be carefully evaluated before they are contracted. Rather than repeating the complete evaluation for every contract, companies that meet the basic requirements will be accredited as defence suppliers for a five-year period. This procedure will substantially improve the efficiency of supplier evaluation during the tendering process. All local and foreign companies that meet the basic requirements, including companies owned and managed by members of previously-disadvantaged communities, are eligible for accreditation. The accreditation of companies will be administered by Armscor and jointly approved by the Secretary for Defence and Armscor. Only companies registered as accredited defence suppliers will be allowed to compete for defence contracts.

Assistance to New Entrants

61. Armscor will assist new companies, including companies owned or managed by members of previously-disadvantaged communities, in planning the development of their competence to meet the criteria for accreditation. The Secretary for Defence will be responsible for monitoring and guiding this process to ensure that adequate representation in the defence industry is achieved.

No Preference to Public Sector Suppliers

62. There will be no preference for the public sector industry versus the private sector industry in the allocation of tenders.

Foreign Procurement

Logistic Support

63. Foreign procurement will be considered when a requirement for a new product or system is at issue or when follow-up requirements for commodities can be satisfied from abroad. This would require the foreign commodity to be fully interchangeable with the local equivalent, e.g. ammunition. The logistic support implications of acquiring imported equipment will be considered in detail.

Industrial Participation

64. In the case of the import of defence equipment and related items, all contracts with a value of greater than US$2m and less than US$10m will be subject to a counter-trade requirement of at least 50%. This counter- trade obligation will be jointly monitored and implemented by Armscor and the Secretary for Defence (MoD Acquisition Division). All contracts with a value of greater than $10m will be subject to National Industrial Participation Policy, which is administered jointly by the Department of Trade and Industry and the Department of Defence. There is a DoD Industrial Participation policy (DIP) and a national Industrial Participation policy (IP) that will affect foreign procurement greater than $10 million. The IP programme will be managed and

administered by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), while the DIP obligations will be jointly managed and administered by Armscor and the MoD Acquisition Division.

65. Government has drawn up a national industrial participation policy, while the DoD, with the DTI, has established a DoD policy.

66. Offshore companies supplying armaments to the SANDF will be encouraged, through a Local Industrial Participation Programme (counter-trade/offset), to involve local industry, thereby ensuring maximum local content and support of the Government's macro economic growth plan.

Procurement Programmes

67. The Joint Standing Committee on Defence will have an oversight function to assist the DoD in its acquisition programmes. This oversight function will include guidance to the Department of Defence with respect to timing of tenders, submission of Requests for Proposals (RFP), counter-trade obligations, value-system, affirmative procurement, acquisition prioritisation, and the acquisition master-plan. The DoD will submit bi-annual and ad-hoc reports to the JPSCD on all acquisition activities. The DoD will keep the JSCD abreast of developments in all its Cardinal acquisition programmes, and will inform the JSCD at all relevant stages of such acquisition.

Confidentiality Requirements

68. The primary sources of reference for determining a transparency policy in respect of acquisition programmes and exports of armaments are the 1996 Constitution, the proposed Open Democracy Bill and the White Paper on Defence. A balanced approach between the right of access to information versus the limitation of rights must be respected. The Open Democracy Act makes provision for grounds for refusing access to a record or information in the following circumstances:

68.1 The protection of third party commercial information.

68.2 Defence and security of the Republic.

68.3 Harm to South Africa's ability to conduct international relations.

68.4 Protection of the economic interests of the Republic and commercial activities of government bodies.

69. The Constitutional obligation with regard to the right of access to information will be enforced via the Secretary for Defence.

Contracting

70. Contracting will take place at the highest level in the system hierarchy, not excluding the possibility that contracting can be conducted on lower systems level, thus allowing for the promotion of previously-disadvantaged contractors. System suppliers will be contracted for the development, production and maintenance of defence systems. This will not, however, prevent Armscor and the DoD from contracting suppliers of sub-systems, components or materials directly if this proves to be more cost-effective. The

same applies to commercially available equipment, spares and consumable items. Contracting will always ensure that the best value for money is obtained.

Tender Adjudication

Value Analysis

71. All tender adjudication for armaments will be based on a value analysis methodology and procedures. This value analysis methodology and procedures will be formulated jointly by the members of the DoD (DoD Acquisition Division), including Armscor and organised industry. The value analysis system per project must be approved and supported by the Secretary for Defence (DAPD). The value analysis system should not be used to exclude previously-disadvantaged contractors and should not limit national strategic considerations which can override technical performance parameters. This value analysis system must be above reproach and should not be a subjective analysis.

Acquisition Support

72. On request of the Minister of Defence, Armscor will assist other Government Departments, the Reconstruction and Development Programme, the United Nations Organisation, or any other public body, in the acquisition of equipment.

Defence technology development policy

The Defence Industry

Process to Determine the Required Industrial Capability

73. Local industry development will be promoted where practical and economically justifiable. Where required by strategic considerations (technical, economic, political), special organisational solutions will be pursued. It is neither affordable nor necessary to strive for complete self-sufficiency in armaments production. In certain areas the policy is to procure overseas, in other areas it is to procure on a competitive basis, while in certain strategic areas limited self sufficiency is maintained.

Needs Analysis

74. The need for retaining the appropriate capabilities at the appropriate level to support the above-mentioned policy is justified from the vantage points described below.

75. **Military-strategic importance**. From a *military-strategic* point of view, the defence industry is a strategic asset. The aim of the defence industry is to ensure the supply of armaments **and services** to the SANDF.

76. **Military-operational importance**. From a *military-operational* point of view, a local defence industry has important operational advantages for the SANDF. These fall into three categories:

76.1 **Technological advantages.** Having access to a local capability, which is able to implement unique solutions, ensures that a winning edge over adversaries is possible.

76.2 **Tailor-made equipment.** The RSA has unique climatic, geographic, demographic and doctrinal circumstances, requiring tailor-made equipment to operate in this unique environment.

76.3 **Logistic support.** All armaments, whether procured overseas or locally, require cost-effective logistic support throughout their operational life. A local capability is the only guarantee that this support will be available as required.

77. **Socio-economic importance**. From a *socio-economic* point of view, the defence industry contributes significantly to the general standard of technical sophistication of the local industry and therefore its ability to produce high value-added goods and services.

78. The above aspects are taken into consideration by the DoD and Armscor during the formal analysi process which determines the required industrial capabilities. The primary role-players in the process are the SANDF, the Secretary for Defence (DoD Acquisition Division) and Armscor within the DRDB and AASB structures. As circumstances change, this analysis is updated.

Defence Research

The Nature of Defence R&D

79. The high risk, advanced technology nature of defence equipment development programmes, coupled with the current world-wide decline in the production demand for such equipment, often results in very high development cost to production cost ratios, making such programmes unattractive for private funding by industry. As a consequence, the funding of defence research and development programmes by governments is a world-wide phenomenon.

80. The SANDF currently spends approximately 15 percent of its capital acquisition budget on local research and development programmes. A comparable figure for the UK (1994) is 28 percent.

81. Development times for major weapon systems are typically from four to eight years, after which follows production and commissioning for an operational life of a further 15 to 20 years, before replacement is required. Barring one or two mid-life upgrades, the supply of spare parts and scheduled maintenance support, the original supplier of the equipment might therefore have to wait 15 years or more for a major replacement contract (unless the supplier is able to provide other products or services in the meantime.)

82. These inherently long time-scales shape the long- term relationship between the DoD, Armscor and industry. On the one hand, the department must have the assurance that it can depend on the support of a mature and experienced indstry throughout its product life-cycle, while on the other hand, industry must have enough insight into and confidence in the long term plans of the department for it to commit the necessary resources and to co-invest in such future plans.

83. The DoD and Armscor’s commitment to industry is furthermore based on the realisation that just as capital assets depreciate, skills and technology also age and become obsolete (often at a much faster rate than the wear and tear on machines), unless

they are continuously and consciously renewed through specific technology development efforts. A co-operative effort between the department on the one hand, identifying future needs for technology (requirement pull) and industry on the other hand, identifying the future capabilities and opportunities (technology push) could satisfy the anticipated requirements. As a by-product, such technology development programmes should also enable industry to field technologically competitive products for export.

Core Programmes

84. The DoD and Armscor will support, direct and contract the defence industry to run a limited number of long-term core programmes to enable it to maintain the necessary width and depth of engineering and production skill to provide support and produce products for local use and export.

Technology Demonstrators

85. In selected areas, key technologies will be maintained at an advanced level through the concept of advanced concept technology demonstrators.

86. The concept requires the almost continuous development and upgrading of prototypes of new weapons systems with state-of-the-art technology, without necessarily going into full-scale development or production, unless there is a need for the replacement of equipment due to age or obsolescence, or for force expansion. This strategy has become one of the cornerstones of the strategies of major arms producing countries such as the UK and the USA and has been employed to good effect by South Africa, e.g. the Rooivalk helicopter, the Tank Technology Demonstrator and Advanced Artillery Demonstrator.

Defence Technology Acquisition Management

87. The aim of defence technology acquisition management is to identify technologies on a long-term prediction basis that will support the future needs of the SANDF and take into account South Africa's Foresight Initiatives for advanced technology equipment and services. This management system will take into account threat analyses and required operational capabilities arising from the force structure plan and will develop, obtain, establish and maintain technologies according to certain priorities, for employment during the acquisition and operation of user systems. Technology management is regarded as the activity of planning, approval, execution and assurance of technology establishment projects and plans.

88. The DoD remains committed to the development of new technology in South Africa and more specifically, to the application of science and technology in industry. The department is thought to be the largest source of state funding for R&D in the private sector.

89. To meet the standards of a technologically capable military force, funds need to be allocated for defence research and development programmes.

90. These programmes will be selected and managed so that a technology base is sustained within the armaments industry in areas that are of strategic and/or economic importance to South Africa and that will support the SANDF in:

90.1 The development of new equipment with superior performance.

90.2 Upgrades and life extension programmes for existing equipment.

90.3 Operational problem solving.

90.4 Specification, test and evaluation of sophisticated procured equipment.

90.5 Trend and impact analyses of technology development.

Management Structures for Technology Development

91. As regards equipment acquisition programmes, the highest level of approval for armaments technology acquisition is the AAC, chaired by the Minister of Defence. Cardinal technology programmes and long-term plans are approved at this level. At the next level, the Secretary for Defence (as chairperson of the AASB) is responsible for implementing national technology requirements, for political control over all projects, and for ensuring that spending in the R&D environment is in keeping with all Government policies.

92. The structure for the approval of technology development programmes is multi-layered (AAC, AASB, DRDB). The Defence Research and Development Board (DRDB) (chaired by the Chief of Acquisition) and the Armament Technology Acquisition Secretariat (ATAS) represent the operational level of management, providing detail structure to all plans and budgets, as well as the management of the execution of technology development projects. Further organisational structures are deployed by ATAS to ensure involvement of SANDF user groups, as well as specialist representatives from industry in the identification and planning phases of programmes.

Technology Project Approval

93. The DRDB will provide an annual technology acquisition master plan to the Armaments Acquisition Steering Board (AASB) for approval and recommendation.

94. The Armaments Technology Acquisition Secretariat (ATAS) will screen all technology project proposals and make recommendations to the Defence Research and Development Board (DRDB). All policy, financial implications, and control will be factored into the decision at the ATAS meeting for project funding approval. The Secretary for Defence DoD Acquisition Division) is responsible for implementing national technology requirements and for political control over all projects.

95. Contract management and authorisation for contracting of technology development projects are exactly the same as for equipment acquisition projects.

96. The DoD and Armscor have a well-established structure and system for managing technology development programmes in accordance with current legislation:

96.1 The system focuses on addressing the future needs of the SANDF.

96.2 It endeavours to involve major R&D contractors in the planning process to ensure utilisation of expert knowledge.

96.3 It is managed on a payment-for-progress basis, ensuring focus on the end result, as well as continuous interaction between developer and user.

Technology Policy Considerations

National Technology Programmes

97. The DoD is committed to full co-operation with other Government structures for science and technology and to provide transparency of its technology development programmes within the bounds of military security.

98. The National Technology Foresight Initiative should be taken into account by Department of Defence technology planners when embarking on annual budgeting of projects. The National Technology Foresight indicators may influence technology drivers and technology funding to achieve national technology objectives. This exercise may necessitate mechanisms whereby greater technology spin-offs from the defence establishment to other Foresight sectors are achieved. Such initiatives are to be directed and coordinated by the Secretary for Defence.

99. The DoD and Armscor undertake to promote greater collaboration between members of the DoD and South African universities. Universities, technikons and other previously-disadvantaged R&D institutions will also be allowed to submit project proposals to ATAS for work to be contracted directly.

100. The national technology drivers which require the maximisation of spin-off technologies and greater university involvement in defence technologies spheres, will be taken into consideration at the annual defence technology planning sessions.

Strategic Capabilities

101. Technology development in the armaments industry tends to be driven by military considerations rather than profit motives, with the result that the maintenance of certain key capabilities becomes a financial burden to private companies. Such capabilities (which may include specialised test and evaluation facilities such as wind tunnels and chemical defence evaluation laboratories), which are of strategic importance to the SANDF and the defence industry, will be grouped in non-profit defence institute(s) funded by the DoD.

Centres of Expertise

102. The management of long-term strategic interests such as national defence technology development programmes, requires the selection of Apreferred suppliers@ and Acentres of expertise@ to achieve the necessary long-term commitment from both the state and industry to build up and maintain certain levels of expertise. This commitment will also be evident in the minimum level of funding that is made available for R&D to maintain the required levels of competence.

Annual Reviews

103. The Core Defence Technology Programmes will be reviewed annually by the Armaments Acquisition Council (AAC) under the chairmanship of the Minister of Defence.

Multi-year Budgets

104. Defence programmes will be budgeted for on a multi-year basis to ensure continuity and proper industrial development.

Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDTE) Facilities

105. Strategic non-profitable facilities with limited commercial application could be retained in the public sector. These include facilities such as specialised defence research and development facilities, test ranges and test laboratories.

Immaterial Rights

Ownership

106. The state will retain the immaterial rights to state-funded technology and will make such technology available to any of ts contractors in either the public or private sector, or sell it to foreign institutions at its discretion.

107. The sale of South African defence industries to foreign industries will require the approval of the Minister of Defence where such sales will result in the transfer of state-owned technology from the South African industry to the foreign purchaser.

Royalties

108. The state may invoke its rights to a certain percentage of the value of the contracts for the export of products or technology where the state paid for the technology or product development. This decision to invoke a royalty claim rests with the Secretary for Defence and the members of the AASB. In cases where companies contributed own funds to R&D projects, the Intellectual Property Rights should be shared between the company and the State in a *pro rata* ratio of their respective contributions. In the case of multi-purpose technology, the company may be required to pay royalties to the state if the technology is used in commercial applications.

International Alliances and Partnerships

Government Support

109. The Government will enter into agreements with other governments to enable the industries to co-operate and each government will financially support and maintain its own industry to enable it to participate in the partnership.

Foreign Participation Through Partnerships

110. Foreign companies wishing to enter the market will be encouraged to form partnerships or enter into joint ventures with local companies. Foreign companies are encouraged to engage with previously-disadvantaged communities or companies to ensure that all sectors of the community are empowered. The defence industry will form more alliances with local and foeign businesses to transfer technology and to market products. DoD consent must be obtained before companies, which have developed and/or possess technologies funded by SANDF research or development programmes, enter into any international alliance, partnership or change in ownership.

Social responcibility of the industry[1]

111. Affirmative Action is defined and used in the context of a deliberate and sustainable anti-discrimination strategy that owes its existence to the principle of compensatory

justice, equity and fairness in order to redress inequalities and imbalances within the defence industry beyond simple moral considerations to the realm of reconstruction.

Economic Empowerment in the Defence Industry

112. DoD policy will give preference to those companies that have a strong element of progressive empowerment policies and practices within themselves.

113. Support should be given to capacity-building measures in disadvantaged communities by the defence-related industries.

114. The defence industry should be committed to affirmative action and in a broader context, to economic empowermentof previously-disadvantaged groups. This encompasses redressing the imbalances created by previous practices arising from all forms of discrimination to include race, gender and disability.

115. The industry should be committed to redressing previously-created imbalances in the working population of South Africa.

116. The industry should support Government initiatives to encourage previously-disadvantaged persons as entrepreneurs, owners and managers of productive assets and wealth.

117. For an affirmative action programme to succeed, an organisational climate conducive to effectively managing diversity must be created within the defence industry.

118. This affirmative procurement exercise will be guided, monitored and controlled by the Secretary for Defence (DoD Acquisition Division).

Environmental Conservation

119. Before any military industrial facilities for the manufacturing, demolition, test and evaluation of armaments are established, operated or closed down, a comprehensive environment management plan will be drawn up and published for public scrutiny. Companies will be obliged to take all necessary action, at own cost, to conserve the environment and control pollution of all kinds, inluding noise pollution, to comply with national legislation.

Arms trade

120. The South African Government of National Unity has, since its inauguration in May 1994, committed itself to a policy of arms trade and transfer control which would reinforce and promote South Africa as a responsible producer, possessor and trader in this field.

121. South Africa is convinced that effective and responsible arms trade and transfer control practices will contribute to bringing about international peace and security, particularly for the states of the sub-region and the continent of Africa.

122. Conventional arms trade and transfer and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, control principles and criteria have consequently been established to ensure that South Africa’s policy on this issue conforms to internationally accepted norms and

practices. (Guide to the Terms of reference of Conventional Arms Control, dated 1 May 1996 and the Non- Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act No 87 of 1993)

123. South Africa is committed to a policy of responsibility and accountability in the trade and transfer of all arms. This policy on transparency in armaments exports reflects, in particular, South Africa's commitment to promoting international peace and security, its adherence to international arms control and disarmament agreements and respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms.

124. Arms trade and transfer will be governed by foreign policy and national security interests, a system of permit adjudication, arms classification, and a specific code of conduct relating to the criteria applied when considering trade with and transfer to countries in this respect.

125. As South Africa is a signatory to various international arms control and non-proliferation agreements, it exercises a dual process for the purposes of control of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of other arms and related dual-use capabilities that could be used in the development and production of weapons of mass destruction and/or conventional arms. This will require that in some cases, application will have to be made, by the industry, for a dual permit to be issued by the specific appointed authorities.

Appendix A
The national policy issues
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa

1. The Constitution requires that when organs of state contract for goods or services, they must do so in accordance with national or provincial legislation that establishes a system which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective. This does not prevent the implementation of a procurement policy by organs of state providing for categories of preference in the allocation of contracts, and the protection or advancement of persons, or cateories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. National legislation must prescribe a framework within which this policy may be implemented (Section 217).

The White Paper on Defence[2]
A Technologically Advanced National Defence Force

2. The White Paper on Defence, as approved by Parliament on 14 May 1996, states that the SANDF will be a balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced military force, capable of executing its tasks effectively and efficiently (Chapter 2: para 11.7). It further states that the government will not endanger the lives of military personnel through the provision of inadequate or inferior weapons and equipment *(Chapter 3: para 43.6)*.

Core Defence Capability

3. The White Paper states that the SANDF has to maintain a core defence capability because of the inherent unpredictability of the future. Such a capability cannot be created from scratch should the need suddenly arise. The maintenance and development of weapons systems is a long-term endeavour *(Chapter 4: para 6.2)*.

4. The White Paper notes that deterrence requires the existence of a defence capability which is sufficiently credible to inhibit potential aggressors. Although South Africa is not confronted by any foreseeable external military threat, this capability cannot be turned on and off "like a tap". It is therefore necessary to maintain a core defence capability *(Chapter 5: para 7).* A core defence capability includes a balanced and sustainable nucleus with, amongst other features, the maintenance and, where necessary, the adequate and appropriate upgrading or replacement of equipment and weaponry *(Chapter 5: para 8).*

5. The White Paper states that the services of an efficient defence industry are required to address the need for maintenance, upgrading and, where necessary, the replacement of weapons and equipment of the SANDF.

6. The industry will permit the cost-effective purchase of certain products and systems, ensure the life-cycle maintenance and support of such systems, and perform refurbishment and upgrades of existing equipment *(Chapter 8: para 3).* The defence equipment required by the SANDF, however, cannot and should not be procured exclusively from the local industry. Many complex systems cannot be produced domestically and will have to be imported. Management expertise for the specialised procurement functions is located within the DoD *(Chapter 8: para 5).*

Regional Co-operation

7. The White Paper recognises that the government might be called upon by neighbouring countries to play a number of supportive roles. The SANDF could, for example, provide assistance as regards the maintenance and upgrading of weaponry and equipment *(Chapter 4: para 20).*

Equipment for Peace Support Operations

8. The White Paper indicates that South Africa's consideration of involvement in specific peace support operations will not be limited to the possible deployment of troops. The involvement could also take the form of providing equipment, logistical support, engineering services, communications systems and medical personnel facilities *(Chapter 5: para 25).* The acquisition and maintenance of military equipment will take account of the particular requirements of peace support operations *(Chapter 5: para 26).*

Approval of Major Procurement Projects

9. The White Paper states that the approval of major weapons procurement projects is the prerogative of Parliament on an annual and long-term basis *(Chapter 7: para 5).*

Budgetary Forecasts

10. The White Paper requires the Defence Review to present, for the consideration of Parliament and the public, detailed and well-motivated budgetary forecasts and proposals; specific policies regarding the provisioning of logistic resources; and the identification of appropriate technology to optimise the cost-effectiveness of the core force (*Chapter 7: para 6*).

Foreign Procurement

11. It is stated that within budgetary constraints, the DoD will engage in co-operative ventures with its counterparts throughout the world in such fields as training and education, defence planning, exchange visits, combined exercises and procurement of arms and equipment (*Chapter 4: para 6.3*).

Conversion of the Defence Industry

12. The White Paper states that in circumstances of diminishing domestic defence expenditure and falling global arms sales, the industry will be encouraged to convert production capability to civilian manufacture without losing key technology capabilities needed for military production. Policies will be formulated to establish the specific and limited conditions under which the defence industry will be subsidised (*Chapter 8: para 6 and 7*).

Arms Exports

13. The White Paper states explicitly that the defence industry must have access to international markets in order to facilitate cost-effective performance and reduce the unit costs of producing items for the SANDF (*Chapter 8: para 4*). The government will support the export initiatives of the defence industry by permitting it to contract and honour obligations which have been duly approved (*Chapter 8: para 11*). It is vital that there be transparency in decision-making in this regard (See 1.2.11).

Arms Control

14. Chapter 8 of the White Paper deals specifically with arms control. On 30 August 1995, Cabinet approved new interim policy on arms control. Chapter 8 of the White Paper is based largely on that policy, as contained in the Cabinet Memorandum on the "Rationale and Proposed Principles Governing Conventional Arms Control" (*Chapter 8: para 1*).

Arms Trade Principles and Guidelines

15. The White Paper establishes a number of principles and guidelines governing conventional arms trade. In essence, these require that:

15.1 The import and export of conventional arms, and the transit of arms through South Africa, will be subject to a control process and permit system under the auspices of a cabinet committee, the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC); and will be subject to oversight by the relevant parliamentary committees (*Chapter 8: para 9*).

15.2 The principle of openness and transparency relating to arms trade will apply. This will be limited only by national security interests consistent with the need for confidentialty (*Chapter 8: para 12*).

15.3 New arms control measures are based on the principles of the United Nations Charter, international law, recognised international arms control systems, and a balance of economic, ethical, military and security considerations (*Chapter 8: para 13*).

15.4 South Africa will promote and exercise due restraint in the transfer of conventional arms and related technologies by taking into account factors such as

respect for human rights, the international security situation, and the degree to which arms sales are supportive of South Africa's national and foreign interests (*Chapter 8: para 15*).

15.5 South Africa will avoid transfers and trade which would be likely to be used for purposes other than the legitimate defence and security needs of the recipient country (*Chapter 8: para 17*).

Arms Control Processes and Structures

16. The White Paper established certain arms control processes and structures. Conventional armaments and related technology may not be imported, transferred through South Africa, or marketed or exported abroad without a duly approved permit. The applications will be subject to a multi-departmental review process. The newly-established NCACC will serve as the ministerial control, policy and decision-making authority. An independent Inspectorate will be established to ensure that all levels of the process are subject to scrutiny and oversight (*Chapter 8: para 18-27*).

International Arms Control Regimesand Treaties

17. As regards international arms control regimes and treaties, the White Paper states that South Africa is committed to the international cause of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (i.e. nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and related technology, as well as advanced missile systems and missiles as defined by the Missile Technology Control Regime) (Chapter 8: para 28-38).

White Paper on Science and Technology

The Defence Industry

18. The White Paper on Science and Technology deals with defence research. It notes that although our industries are spending financial resources on Research and Development (R&D), our balance of trade in medium and high technologies remains negative (*Section 8.2.5*). A notable exception is the armaments industry, which currently has a positive annual balance of trade.

Technologically Advanced Core Force

19. The White Paper on Science and Technology states that the essence of the new strategyof the SANDF is to convert the current force into a small, but technologically more capable one. The reliance on quality intelligence will be high to allow for the timeous scaling-up of the force to meet potential threats, as will be dependence on a broad technology base.

20. Insurance against threats will take the form of maintaining small, but sophisticated forces which can be mobilised quickly and which rely on technology to increase the flexibility and responsiveness of a smaller military establishment.

Defence Technology Base

21. The White Paper on Science and Technology notes that the maintenance of a strong technology base is therefore a prerequisite of the new SANDF strategy and must serve a number of purposes, namely:

21.1 Maintaining the capability to detect threats.

21.2 Being aware of trends in military technology and their implications for the SANDF.

21.3 Being capable of producing technology demonstrators that can rapidly be turned into military technology if necessary.

21.4 Being capable of providing expert advice for procurement purposes.

21.5 Providing test and evaluation services.

21.6 Supporting upgrade and maintenance activities.

22. The White Paper on Science and Technology states that the future of the South African defence industry cannot be seen as distinct from that of its civilian manufacturing counterpart and that dual concepts should be understood and applied. The view that defence technology should be phased out in favour of civilian technology, or converted into it, is not tenable. Instead, the defence industry must make special efforts to leverage spin-offs in the civilian sector and to develop relationships with civilian institutions in the National Science Initiative (NSI) to promote spin-on's.

23. The White Paper on Science and Technology states that the Department of Defence, Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, and the Department of Trade and Industry should co-operate closely to develop a strategy for optimal promotion of the local defence industry.

24. The Defence Research and Development Board budget should be displayed in the government SET (Science, Engineering and Technology) budget, as well as in the Department of Defence budget. This would give government and the public the opportunity to evaluate the entire SET expenditure programme in an unfragmented way.

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24. The Defence Research and Development Board budget should be displayed in the government SET (Science, Engineering and Technology) budget, as well as in the Department of Defence budget. This would give government and the public the opportunity to evaluate the entire SET expenditure programme in an unfragmented way.

The Defence Review as a policy process

1. The White Paper on Defence, as approved by Parliament in May 1996 set the stage for further defence transformation by establishing a policy framework for defence in a new South Africa founded on the principles of democratic governance. The White Paper also lay the basis for a more detailed Defence Review. The review was conducted in stages and each component was comprehensively debated with the Joint Standing Committee on Defence and presented to Cabinet and Parliament for final approval. This process has culminated in this document which was similarly approved by Parliament.

2. Defence Transformation has, in South Africa, been a comprehensive and dynamic process that has led to a clear formulation of defence policy and the establishment of comprehensive Parliamentary oversight on defence matters. This has been coupled to reductions in defence expenditure and a review of defence business processes, force design and force structure.

3. When embarking on the Defence Review process, the Department of Defence set out to design a consultative process that would both inform the people of South Africa of current defence thinking, and would also allow the Department to glean an understanding of what South Africans expect of their defence force. By so doing, the Department of Defence sought to migrate to a position where a common understanding could be achieved on the roles and function of the SANDF, its future size and shape. The primary objective was therefore to develop and establish a national consensus on defence issues.

4. During the Defence Review process, the Department of Defence sought to gain an understanding of the expectations and vision for defence from all South African people and to successfully translate that into defence policy, including force structure and force design. Thus, in keeping with South Africa's emergent civil-military relations tradition, Parliament and the Joint Standing Committee on Defence were extensively consulted. Consultation, however took place far more extensively, extending into the provinces of South Africa where church leaders, non-governmental organisations, academics, labour, business and community leaders were consulted, thus bench marking the Defence Review as an example of true government consultation.

5. The Defence Review has been a significant defence policy process in that it expresses a holistic understanding of defence policy in a synchronised and integrated manner. Defence policy has traditionally been fragmented with little harmonisation across policy boundaries. The Defence Review has, for the first time, expressed broad defence policy in a manner which demonstrates a progression of thought and logic transcending sectoral focuses.

6. Operational policy, force design and force structure, human resource and par-time component policy, land and environmental policy and acquisition policy is presented in a manner that expresses a South African vision for defence into the new millennium. Similarly, the Defence Review expresses defence policy that is congruent with the democratic traditions that are being established post-1994.

7. The Defence Review also has successfully attempted to describe and address the challenges of an African country that seeks to position defence, and the roles and functions of a defence force, in a post-Cold War environment where there is no longer

polarisation of society around East/West traditions. This environment poses new challenges for all defence forces, including the SANDF. The Defence Review thus presents not just an examination of the primary functions and tasks of the SANDF, but also presents an amelioration of South Africa's expectations of the SANDF in other roles. This is in keeping with the White Paper on Defence, which elucidates a broad concept of security, encompassing all aspects of human security, stating unambiguously that the greatest threats to the South African people are non-military.

The Defence Review as a model for civil-military relations

8. The eight constituent forces of the SANDF all entered into the SANDF with different traditions and understandings of civil-military relations. One of the challenges facing the Department of Defence has been to agree on and establish a uniquely South African civil-military relations tradition. While embracing the principles of civil-military relations in western societies, the South African Department of Defence has been seeking to establish a model of civil-military relations that has a distinctly African character.

9. The Defence Review has provided the opportunity for the Department of Defence to implement facets of civil-military relations as yet unexplored in South Africa. In terms of process, the Defence Review was not only extremely consultative, but also made extensive use of skills outside of the Department such as academia and NGOs. This is significant in that it expresses an acknowledgement by the Department of Defence of two critical factors:

9.1 Firstly, it acknowledges that the Department is not the sole repository of skills on defence issues and acknowledges that the defence debate can be strengthened by outside consultation and involvement.

9.2 Secondly, it acknowledges for the first time that, in a democracy, defence cannot be a closed shop arrangement, but by definition must take cognisance of the many and diverse opinions that exist outside of the Department.

10. The Defence Review has been instrumental in shaping the way that civil-military relations will unfold in South Africa, contributing both to a common understanding of defence and to the development of a model for future South African civil-military relations. Extensive consultation with Parliament and with broader civil-society in the form of business, labour, clergy, non-governmental organisations and community leadership took place. By so doing, the Defence Review benchmarked the concept of responsible and accountable governance by the Department of Defence and has formed a framework for transparent defence in a democracy.

11. In terms of the relationship between the Department of Defence and Parliament, the Defence Review process established the basis for a collaborative partnership on defence management between elected oversight authority and the Department. The Defence Review underscored the nature of the Department of Defence's responsibilities to Parliament in the minds of both soldiers and civilians alike.

The medium term expenditure framework

12. The first report of the Defence Review (chapters one to eight of this document) elaborated on the Constitutional imperative that the SANDF will have a primarily defensive posture and orientation, as well as elaborating on the constitutionally derived functions and roles of the SANDF. The Defence Review has as a result developed new defence doctrinal and design criteria.

13. The determination the SANDF's size and shape is guided by South African defence and other national policy. The tasks of the defence force relating to self-defence are categorized under four broad headings:

13.1 Defence against external military threats.

13.2 Defence against internal threats to the constitutional order.

13.3 The promotion of regional security.

13.4 The promotion of international security, including participation in PSO's and military co-operation in support of foreign policy.

14. Chapter Eight presents options for the future design of the SANDF and recommended a design that was approved by Parliament on 20 August 1997. This force design is based on the concept of a peace-time force containing those elements required to serve as the core for future expansion, should this be required, and those elements required for ongoing peace-time tasks.

15. It is essential for the core force approach to rely on the expansion capability inherent in a part-time component which is extremely cost-effective and allows for flexibility in force levels. Part-time units are to be transformed to be fully representative of South Africa's demography.

16. Throughout the Force Design Chapter, a needs driven, but cost constrained, approach was used as the underlying principle for design.

17. Both the Force Design Chapter and the Force Structure Chapter of the Defence Review express a policy vision for defence. Although force design and structure should be based on real defence needs, in reality these are constrained by costs and monies available to meet these visions. The force design and force structure of the Defence Review thus reflect a vision for defence, but in reality, this vision must be tempered with the financial constraints placed on the defence budget.

18. Towards the latter stages of the Defence Review, government expressed a vision of future government spending and how the allocation of public monies to Departments will take place. This Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) of multi-year spending (three year period), outlined the base-line funding that Departments can expect from central government.

19. Government identified the following six prioritised areas of focus for the Department of Defence in the MTEF.

19.1 Border protection and border control.

19.2 Support to the SAPS in terms of the National Crime Prevention Strategy, including Area Protection.

19.3 VIP flights

19.4 Search and Rescue.

19.5 Maintenance of essential services.

19.6 Essential force preparation.

20. Initial indications are that the allocation to the Department of Defence will be in the order of 1.5% of GDP. (This translates into Rm 9 201 in 1997 rand-value and Rm 9 721 in 1998 rand-value.) Government is however aware that although the establishment of a base-line percentage of GDP does assist the Department of Defence with its long-term plannin, this allocation may fluctuate as specific defence programmes require attention.

21. Since the completion and approval by Parliament of the vision force design, it has become apparent that national priorities and budgetary restrictions place constraints on defence expenditure. This means that the achievement of a sustainable force design of the magnitude envisaged in the Defence Review will not be possible in the short to medium term. The Department of Defence will maintain the Defence Review force design as its vision to be pursued, but will make the necessary short-term adaptations to ensure the maintenance of the required capabilities and expertise within the financial allocation to defence.

22. This will be managed within the MTEF vision for the Department of Defence and the Minister of Defence will regularly report to Parliament and Cabinet on the status of defence capabilities in relation to the Defence Review requirements.

23. In the light of national priorities and budgetary constraints, the Department of Defence will be testing, and where necessary, adapting its force design according to these. Defence scenarios will also be undergoing revision in the light of changing international trends.

24. The Defence Review visualises a 40:30:30 ratio for defence spending on personnel, operating and capital costs after the transformation process is completed. The question of the correct balance between maritime, air and landward defence, based on the strategic realities of South Africa, is still bein studied. Should defence spending remain at approximately 1,5% of GDP, or Rm 9 721 in 1998 Rand-value, the allocation of the defence budget at a 40:30:30 ratio should be in the order of:

a. Rm 3 889 for personnel expenditure,

b. Rm 2916 for operating expenditure and

c. Rm 2 916 for capital expenditure.

This ratio will remain the Department of Defence’s vision once transformation is completed. Table 1 and Figure 1 describe this ratio.

	1997/98 Rm	1998/99 Rm	1999/00 Rm	2000/01 Rm	2001/02 Rm	2002/03 Rm	2003/04 Rm	2004/05 Rm	2005/06 Rm
Personnel	50334	5477	5155	4478	4190	4050	3889	3889	3889
Operating	3169	3311	3049	2954	2917	2917	2916	2916	2916
Capital	1076	808	1227	2173	2489	2754	2916	2916	2916
Rationalisation	125	290	125	125					
Total	54704	9886	9556	9730	9596	9721	9721	9721	9721

Table 1: Department of Defence visio for spending on personnel, capital and operating.



Future Defence policy initiatives that arise from the Defence Review

25. The Defence Review initiated a number of ancillary and corollary defence policy processes within the Department of Defence. These are described hereunder.

White Paper on Peace Missions

26. The White Paper on Defence's analysis of the strategic environment indicates that there is no apparent or foreseen conventional threat against South Africa. Instability and inter-state conflict originating in socio-economic factors, however, pose a considerable immediate and long-term threat to the region. While the deployment of the military does not provide a solution to these threats, their deployment is nevertheless often essential to create or maintain conditions in which solutions can be sought by other means.

27. The post-1994 era in South Africa has seen an increase in pressure for South Africa to become involved in United Nations driven conflict prevention initiatives in Africa. The Great Lakes conflict, the Zaire (DRC) conflict and the Congo Brazzaville conflict demonstrated that the international community expects South Africa to become involved in multi-national forces constituted under a UN mandate. This involvement may range from support services (medical, military engineering, air transport, communications etc) to placing combat troops on the ground.

28. To this end, the Departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs have been developing a White Paper on Peace Missions which seeks to guide future South African involvement in peace missions.

29. Conflict on the African continent, rooted in non-military, socio-economic factors, has shown itself in the recent past to be primarily intra-state, although inter-state conflict of a limited scale and intensity is also a possibility, but potentially less so. Recent continental conflict has manifested itself mainly as civil unrest, domestic insurgencies and civil war. Such conflicts are extremely destructive and are characterised by large numbers of displaced people and refugees.

30. The changing security environment has not however eradicated conflict and violence. These continue to manifest themselves in a variety of different forms and pose profound challenges for the manner in which international security is managed and maintained.

31. There is an increased deployment of civilian, military and NGO personnel in a wide spectrum of operations ranging from peace-building and peace-making to humanitarian relief and peace-enforcement operations. Traditional peace missions have moved from being relatively homogenous exercises - observer missions and peace-keeping missions for instance - into being complex and multi-functional missions spanning the entire globe. In the process, the diplomatic and political components of peace missions have assumed an increasing importance as against the more military emphasis of traditional "peace operations".

32. It is therefore important for South Africans to determine the political, normative, military and resource implications of involving ourselves in peace support operations in the future, and the White Paper on Peace Missions seeks to establish the framework of such an understanding.

33. Critical capabilities relevant to working in an African environment would include:

33.1 Comprehensive land, air and maritime capabilities that address the functions of mobility, surveillance and firepower.

33.2 The focus of peace support operations should be on land, with naval and air support.

33.3 The emphasis should be on light, mobile forces. Air mobility and sea-lift would be essential.

33.4 Air defence that provide efficient defence against a limited air threat.

33.5 The ability to maintain long external lines of logistic support is essential.

33.6 The ability to operate away from main bases and maintain equipment far from support infrastructure is vital.

33.7 Logistics, medical support and engineering services assume an even more prominent position.

33.8 A vital maritime defence component is required to protect marine resources.

33.9 The ability to independently (remotely) sense the movement and intent of belligerent parties in an unfamiliar setting, far away from own fixed infrastructure, is very important. From this data, information must be extracted, distributed, processed and used in an efficient command and control system.

Defence Industry Green Paper

34. The Department of Defence is, together with input from other role-playing Departments, producing a Green Paper on the South African Defence Industry for the National Conventional Arms Control Committee. This initiative has its genesis in a Cabinet Decision in 1996 to produce a White Paper on the Defence Industry.

35. The Green Paper will be significant, in that it will not only give a descriptive overview of the Defence Industry and those policies which govern it, but will be a seminal document that, for the first time, captures a holistic understanding of the Defence Industry. The Defence Industry in South Africa has historically been shrouded in secrecy and the Green Paper will aim to provide the first comprehensive analysis of the business processes that take place within the industry.

36. The Green Paper will form the basis of a White Paper that will aim to provide cogent and integrated policies for the Defence Industry. This is an important development in that fragmented policy and legislation will be identified and harmonised, so that a coherent expression of Government's approach to the industry will exist. It is envisaged that a number of legislative, management process and policy amendments will arise as a result of the White Paper.

37. The Green Paper, will seek to position the Defence Industry within a South African normative and policy framework, expressing both mechanisms for Government control of the industry and mechanisms for supporting a legitimate and transparent Defence Industry. The Green Paper will also provide a strategic analysis of future defence requirements and as such, will articulate how the industry should position itself to meet South Africa's future defence needs, providing a vision for the industry within the South African macro-industrial base.

Defence Conversion Within A National Conversion Framework

38. The Department of Defence, in its transformation process, identified a number of key strategic issues which face the Department. One of these was a meaningful way of expressing the Department's support of the Reconstruction and Development Programme.

39. Apart from the more obvious contributions of the SANDF to the National Crime Prevention Strategy and the conducting of Border Control, the conversion of defence assets to civilian assets and capabilities is the most significant measure by which the Department can support the RDP.

40. Although it is necessary to establish a National Conversion Framework, the elements of future Defence Conversion can be articulaed as the following:

40.1 **Base Conversion**, this being the return of bases earmarked for closure during the transformation process to civilian or government use. This process includes not only the closure of bases but the environmental clean up of terrains which have been contaminated or soiled by military use.

40.2 **Human Resource Conversion**, this being the process of addressing the reintegration of rationalised soldiers back into civil society through a number of programmes which would typically include en-skilling of those soldiers that facilitates their re-entry into economic society.

40.3 **Community Economic Adjustment**, this being the process of economically adjusting communities adjacent to military facilities earmarked for closure, who have traditionally been reliant on the presence of the SANDF for their survival or prosperity.

40.4 **Inventory Clean-up**, this being the consolidation and disposal of the SANDF's capital inventories in alignment with the accepted force design and current and future defence realities. Remarkable progress has already been made in this arena with the clean-up of the SANDF's anti-personnel landmine inventory, resulting in the destruction of these weapons. This positioned South Africa as a world leader in this arena. Equally pressing on the international agenda is the initiation of measures to prevent the non-proliferation of small arms. The SANDF is similarly consolidating its inventory of arms and ammunition and will initiate disposal, even destruction, of these weapons in accordance with South African Foreign Policy and a number of Cabinet decisions that exist in this regard.

41. Once clarity has been achieved in the transformation process with regard to the SANDF's future land, facilities and armaments requirements, an integrated strategy for Defence Conversion can be developed and articulated. It is important that this not be done in isolation, but take place in a deliberate, responsible and coordinated manner within the context of a National Conversion Strategy. The Department of Defence has already entered into discussions with other role playing departments, such as Public Works in this regard.

Glossary of Military Ranks with Corresponding Civilian Appointments

Ranks as used in SA Army, SA Air Force and SA Military Health Service	RANKS AS USED IN SA Navy	Corresponding Civilian Appointments
General	Admiral	Director General
Lieutenant-General	Vice-Admiral	Deputy Director General
Major-General	Rear-Admiral	Chief Director
Brigadier-General	Rear-Admiral (Junior Grade)	Director
Colonel	Captain	Deputy Director
Lieutenant-Colonel	Commander	Assistant Director
Major	Lieutenant-Commander	Civilians Lower than Assistant
Captain	Lieutenant	Director serve in 439 Differentiated
Lieutenant	Sub-Lieutenant	Post Classes
Second-Lieutenant	Ensign	
Candidate Officer	Midshipman	
Chaplain	Chaplain	
Warrant Officer Class 1	Warrant Officer Class 1	
Warrant Officer Class 2	Warrant Officer Class 2	
Staff Sergeant (Army, SAMHS)	Chief Petty Officer	
Flight Sergeant (Air Force)		
Sergeant	Petty Officer	
Corporal	Leading Seaman	
Lance Corporal	Able Seaman	
Private (Army, SAMHS)	Seaman	
Airman (Air Force)		