On the Publication of Defense of Japan 2008

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Minister of Defense

Last year's "Defense of Japan 2007" was our first white paper since the transition of the Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense. The white paper demonstrated the resolve of the Ministry to become an organization more resilient to crisis and more capable of contributing to the international peace.

However, we cannot say that the roughly one year that has passed from that time to the publication of this white paper has been a bright one for the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces. During this period, there occurred a wide range of problems as follows: problems related to thorough implementation of civilian control such as the mistaken reporting of the amount of fuel replenished and the mistaken destruction of log books; problems related to establishment of a strict information security system, such as an information leakage via the Internet and leakage of a Special Defense Secret regarding the Aegis system; problems related to transparency of defense procurement such as excessive billing by suppliers; and misconducts such as the arrest of a former Vice-Minister of Defense on suspicion of bribery. These serious problems have deeply undermined the trust of the people, and I once again offer my sincere apologies for such incidents.

Regarding the collision of the MSDF destroyer *Atago* with the fishing boat *Seitoku Maru*, which occurred on February 19, 2008, it is unacceptable that the SDF, whose mission is to protect the lives and property of the people, caused such an incident. We deeply regret the occurrence of this accident. We intend to take all preventative measures to ensure that we will never cause any similar incident again.

Based on this series of problems, discussions involving experts were conducted at the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense which had been established within the Prime Minister's Office, and a report was compiled in July of this year.

This report thoroughly assessed and analyzed each of the problems and presented proposals based on the reform principles of: 1) Thorough adherence to rules and regulations, 2) Establishment of professionalism, and 3) Establishment of a management of works that prioritizes the execution of duty, with the aim of total optimization.

Moreover, the report states that organizational reform is also necessary in order to enable the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces to more steadily and effectively implement these three principles and present proposals for specific reforms to enhance the command functions of the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of Defense.

The purpose of this reform is not restructuring of the Ministry of Defense itself, but to prevent the recurrence of problems and accidents in the future as well as to try to build a system that enables the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces to respond more quickly and appropriately to a wide range of challenges such as new threats and diverse situations including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism and the continued severe security environment surrounding Japan. We will proceed with further reviews within the Ministry of Defense and steadily implement drastic reform of the Ministry.

Concerning protection of the independence and peace of Japan, it is the Ministry of Defense and the SDF alone which provide the ultimate defense for the people of Japan. That is why I believe that it must be an organization with strict discipline that can earn confidence from the people and must live up to the trust of the people. The majority of SDF members solemnly devote themselves to engaging in international peace cooperation activities in the Indian Ocean and other places in the world, as well as day-to-day missions in various regions throughout Japan. This is why I believe that the Ministry of Defense and the SDF should be revitalized for the sake of the people of Japan, for each and every SDF member, and in order to contribute to international peace and security.

We have written the "Defense of Japan 2008" in an accessible manner so as to promote an understanding of the SDF's activities among the people of Japan and other countries, while incorporating our resolve for the reform of the Ministry of Defense. Furthermore, we have made efforts to convey the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces as they are through columns highlighting the voices of SDF members engaging in their day-to-day duties.

It is my hope that this "Defense of Japan 2008" will be read by many people, and that we will obtain their understanding of the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces as well as their attention to and support for the steady implementation of reform of the Ministry.

2008 As seen in photographs

DEFENSE OF JAPAN

DIGEST

Part I

Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Part II

The Basics of Japan's Defense Policy and Build-up of Defense Capability

Part III

Measures for Defense of Japan

Part IV

Reform of the Ministry of Defense

Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Chapter 1 Issues in the International Community

Various countries have formed an international alliance, and the fight against terrorism is ongoing. However, terrorism continues to occur at locations throughout the world. The transfer and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is also cause for concern, and efforts regarding the North Korean and Iranian nuclear issues are continuing.

Although the security situation in Iraq remains difficult, the number of attacks and the number of terrorism-related casualties have fallen, indicating some degree of improvement.

Discussion between the U.S. Military and the Iraq Military Officer concerning joint operations [U.S. Department of Defense]

Chapter 2 National Defense Policies of Countries

The United States continues to promote the review of its military stance and troop withdrawal. In view of the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States is aiming to increase the number of troops in the Army and Navy in order to expand military capabilities and lighten the burden on divisions.

North Korea's issues of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles pose serious threats to the peace and stability of East Asia and the international community.

Against the backdrop of higher national defense spending, China is working to further modernize its military, and there is a need for vigilant analysis of such implications. Furthermore, China's breakdown of military spending remains unclear, therefore improved transparency is desirable.

Russia continues to promote military reforms and increased activity by the Russian military can be observed in the Far East region.

Tu-95 bomber that invaded Japanese airspace on February 9, 2008

Part II The Basics of Japan's Defense Policy and Build-up of Defense Capability

Chapter 1 The Basic Concepts of Japan's Defense Policy

Peace, security, and independence cannot be ensured by aspirations alone; they must be supported by a wide range of policies, including diplomatic efforts, and cooperation with allied nations along with self-defense capability.

Prime Minister Fukuda gives instructions at a meeting of upper-level SDF officials (November 2007)

Defense Minister Hayashi giving instructions to officials (August 2008)

Under the Constitution, Japan's basic philosophy is to maintain an exclusively defense-oriented policy and not become a military superpower that poses a threat to other nations. In line with this basic philosophy, while continuing to maintain the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, Japan continues to ensure civilian control, uphold the three non-nuclear principles, and voluntarily maintain an appropriate self-defense capability.

While the Ministry of Defense continues to uphold the principles of defense policy, it is necessary at all times to make efforts to play a suitable role in response to the changing security environment.

The transition of the Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense in January 2007, as well as Japan's participation in international peace cooperation activities, are part of such efforts to respond appropriately. Through these activities, the Ministry of Defense is aiming to become an organization that is more resilient to crisis and that can contribute to world peace.

Additionally, in recent years, there have been a number of debates regarding the preparation of the "general law" for international peace cooperation. The Ministry of Defense will take into account the views of the ruling parties and the people of Japan in considering these issues.

An MSDF destroyer (left) providing fuel to a Pakistani destroyer (February 2008)

Chapter 2 The National Defense Program Guidelines and Build-up of Defense Capability

The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2005 and Beyond (NDPG) enacted in December 2004 set forth two security goals for Japan: to prevent and eliminate direct threats to Japan and to improve the international security environment so it will not pose a threat to Japan. In order to achieve these goals, Japan will pursue a three-pronged approach combining its own efforts with the cooperation of allied nations and the international community.

A newly-introduced air refueling and transportation aircraft (KC-767)

A destroyer launches an anti-aircraft missile

In addition, in order to realize the new defense capability stipulated in the NDPG, the Ministry of Defense has drawn up a Mid-Term Defense Program for FY 2005-2009, and is proceeding with efforts to improve its defense capability in accordance with the program.

In FY 2008, taking into account the security environment surrounding Japan, the Ministry of Defense is proceeding with the modernization of defense capability, construction of organizations to strengthen policy formation and information security functions, and efforts for the peace and security of the international community, while taking into account the efficiency and priority of the build-up of defense capability.

A next-generation fixed-wing patrol aircraft during a test-flight (XP-1) (test model)

New combat vehicle undergoing research and development

Part III Measures for Defense of Japan

Chapter 1 Operations of Self-Defense Forces for Defense of Japan and Responses to Diverse Situations

The SDF makes efforts to be able to respond appropriately for the defense of Japan as laid out in the NDPG, including response to ballistic missile attacks, response to attacks by guerilla or other special forces, response to air surveillance or invasion of Japan's airspace or incursion of armed vessels, response to large-scale or extraordinary disasters, and response to new situations or serious aggression.

The SDF is making various efforts to be able to respond effectively to ballistic missiles and other situations in the event of changes in the emergency response regarding operations, including the addition of BMD capability to the MSDF Aegis destroyer *Kongo* in December 2007 and the addition of Patriot PAC-3 to the anti-aircraft troops stationed in the Tokyo area.

In addition, Japan is preparing legislation to ensure the peace and security of the nation and the people in situations in which Japan is under attack, and accordingly, the SDF is building up operational structures, and working on an ongoing basis to conduct rapid and effective self-defense operations in a range of circumstances.

An Aegis destroyer (aiming to add BMD functions and improve capability)

An airborne early warning and control system in flight (E-767)

GSDF members transport a casualty to a helicopter transport in the wake of the Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake

GSDF personnel undertaking training in the U.S.

Chapter 2 Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and the Japan-U.S. Alliance, which forms the basis for the arrangements, are of great significance for Japan's defense and the peace and stability of the region, as well as for the improvement of the international security environment.

In recent years, both Japan and the United States, in order to develop the alliance relationship even further, and in response to changes in the security environment, have conducted Japan-U.S. consultations regarding the future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, including the realignment of military forces. At the 2+2 meeting in May 2006, the two countries compiled a Roadmap for the Realignment of Forces.

Former Minister of Defense Ishiba and U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates hold a joint press conference after the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Talks (November 2007)

GSDF troops hold a meeting on joint operations with U.S. Navy forces

U.S. Air Force minesweeper helicopter conducts a landing drill on an MSDF minesweeper tender (MH-53E)

An ASDF fighter (F-15) conducts a fuel supply drill with a U.S. Air Force refueling aircraft (KC-135)

Currently, based on the Law Concerning Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and Related SDF Forces, established in May 2007, various measures are being steadily implemented in Japan, including promotion of the realignment of forces.

Even as these efforts progress, Japan is making efforts to maintain the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and improve trust through such means as various Japan-U.S. consultations and preparation of legislation, Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises, exchange in the fields of equipment and technology, and various efforts related to U.S. facilities and base areas in Japan.

Part III Measures for Defense of Japan

Chapter 3 Improvement of the International Security Environment

The National Defense Program Guidelines aim at improving international security so that threats will not come to Japan along with the defense of Japan.

In Iraq, based on the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, the SDF is currently contributing to the reconstruction and stability of Iraq by providing support to the U.N. and allied forces.

In the international fight against terrorism, based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law established in January 2008, the MSDF is conducting refueling and water supply activities in the Indian Ocean to the vessels of various countries participating in maritime interdiction operations.

Concerning international peace cooperation activities, in June 2008, Japan decided to dispatch SDF personnel to the U.N. Sudan Mission (UNMIS) headquarters. In addition, the SDF continues its activities under the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights and the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN).

Moreover, through deepening in terms of quality and expanding in terms of quantity security dialogues and defense exchanges, Japan is actively working toward the improvement of the international security environment.

Furthermore, Japan is playing a leading and active role in efforts for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, including the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).



GSDF troops conduct a briefing at UNMIN headquarters

An MSDF air cushion vessel conducts a beaching

12th Tokyo Defense Forum (September 2007)

ASDF transportation aircraft loading supplies (C-130H)

Chapter 4 Citizens of Japan, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF

In order to perform their duties, it is essential for the SDF, which is at the core of Japan's defense capability, to gain the understanding and support of the people of Japan. Establishing the human and material infrastructure is also vital.

The base of defense capability is organizational and human infrastructure. Ultimately, the management of the organization depends not on equipment or systems operations, but on the ability of each SDF member.

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF have formed a variety of organizations, centered around the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, which comprise the true power of the organization. In order to secure the human infrastructure, various necessary measures are conducted at all stages; troop recruitment and enlistment, and training exercises to retirement and reemployment.

In addition, information communications is the foundation of the control and command infrastructure, from central command and various levels of command through to the end troops. The Ministry of Defense and SDF place importance on strengthening this capability. In the area of technological research and development, while grasping operational needs, through new research and development methods and introduction of outstanding technologies resulting from industry-academic-public sector cooperation, efforts are being made to incorporate the latest science and technology.

The SDF operates in various forms in local communities with the support and cooperation of the people of Japan. The SDF also conducts cooperative activities to support the livelihood of the people of Japan. These activities further solidify the mutual trust between local communities, the people of Japan, and the SDF.

In addition, in order to fully uncover the functions of defense facilities, with the understanding and cooperation of local residents, it is necessary to maintain such facilities in a condition for stable use at all times. The SDF consciously endeavors to minimize the impact of establishment and operation of defense facilities on the lives of local residents.

A matriculation pep rally held by a cooperating organization (Ehime Prefecture)

SDF Ready Reserve personnel participate in disaster drills

GSDF troops search for missing persons at Komano-yu in the wake of the Iwate/Miyagi Earthquake (June 2008)

An MSDF member teaches semaphore code to children (August 2007: Ichigaya)

Part IV Reform of the Ministry of Defense

The 6th meeting of the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense, attended by Prime Minister Fukuda (March 2008) [Cabinet Public Relations Office]

The unwavering trust of the people of Japan is the most important factor in order to display defense capability and its associated functions. However, in recent years, starting with the arrest of a Vice-Minister suspected of accepting bribes, a succession of incidents have come to light.

To address these incidents, the Ministry of Defense and SDF must launch a comprehensive review of standard operating procedures and construct full-fledged policies to prevent a recurrence.

The Ministry of Defense and SDF resolve to make wholehearted efforts for reform in order to restore the organizations' ability to support the peace and independence of Japan.

The Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense, which was established in the Prime Minister's Office, has convened meetings since November 2007, and in July 2008 a report was released.

Taking into account analysis and investigation of the misconducts, the report recommended the following three basic principles for reform: (1) Thorough adherence to rules and regulations, (2) Establishment of professionalism, and (3) Establishment of a management of works that prioritizes execution of duties, with the aim of total optimization.

The Ministry of Defense intends to make efforts towards concrete reform of the Ministry at the earliest possible date.

Former Minister of Defense Ishiba gives New Year's Address on the need to reform the Ministry of Defense (January 2008)

A meeting on countermeasures for information leaks headed by former Minister of Defense Ishiba (December 2007)

In addition to the discussions of the Reform Council, the Ministry of Defense has also held discussions at committees established within the Ministry.

Preserving secrecy is an indispensable platform for the national defense. Therefore, the Ministry is investigating and implementing various measures to prevent the leakage of information.

In addition, the Ministry of Defense has in the past endeavored to acquire equipment in an appropriate and efficient manner. Taking into account the efforts for the promotion of Comprehensive Acquisition Reform in March 2008, going forward the Ministry will continue steady implementation.

Table of Contents

Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Overview

1. General Situation 2
2. Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region 3

Chapter 1 Issues in the International Community

Section 1. International Terrorism 6
1. General Situation 6
2. Fight Against Terrorism in and around Afghanistan 6
3. Terrorist Attacks around the World 7

Section 2. Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 9
1. Nuclear Weapons 9
2. Biological and Chemical Weapons 9
3. Ballistic Missiles 9
4. Growing Concerns about Transfer or Proliferation of WMDs 10
5. Iran's Nuclear Issue 11

Section 3. Situation in Iraq 13
1. Security Situation in Iraq and Security Measures 13
2. Trends in Multinational Forces in Iraq 13
3. Efforts by the Iraqi Government and International Community toward Reconstruction 14

Section 4. Complex and Diverse Regional Conflicts 16

COLUMN
(COMMENTARY) The Impact of Climate Change on the Security Environment 19

Chapter 2 National Defense Policies of Countries

Section 1. The United States 24
1. Security and Defense Policies 24
   Assessment of Security Environment/Defense Strategy/Priority Areas for Capability Development/
   Force Planning/Defense Posture Review of U.S. Forces/Nuclear Strategy/FY 2009 Budget
2. Military Posture 30
3. Military Posture in the Asia-Pacific Region 31

Section 2. Korean Peninsula 33
1. North Korea 33
   WMD and Ballistic Missiles/Military Posture/Domestic Affairs/External Relations
2. The ROK 39
   General Situation/Military Affairs
3. U.S. Forces Stationed in the ROK 41

Section 3. China 43
1. General Situation 43
   General Situation/Relations with Taiwan/Relations with the United States/Relations with Russia/
   Relations with North Korea/Relations with Other Countries/Overseas Activities/International Transfer of Weapons

2. Military Affairs 48
General Situation/Military Transparency/National Defense Budget/Military Posture/Education and Training/National Defense Industry Sector/Maritime Activities
3. Military Capabilities of Taiwan 57

Section 4. Russia 59
1. General Situation 59
2. Security and Defense Policies 59
Basic Posture/Military Reform/The Chechen Issue
3. External Relations 61
Relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)/Relations with the United States/Relations with NATO/Relations with Asian Countries/Exportation of Arms
4. Military Posture 63
Nuclear Forces/Conventional Forces and Other Issues

COLUMN
(COMMENTARY) Large-scale Exercises by the Russian Military Units in the Seas of the Mediterranean and the North Atlantic 64

5. Russian Forces in the Far East Region 65
General Situation/Russian Forces in Japan's Northern Territories/Operations in the Vicinity of Japan

Section 5. Southeast Asia 71
1. General Situation 71
2. Relations with the United States 71
3. Relations with China 72
4. Regional Issues and Cooperation 73
5. Military Modernization in the Region 74

Section 6. South Asia 75
1. India 75
General Situation/Foreign Policies/National Defense Policy
2. Pakistan 78
General Situation/Foreign Policies/National Defense Policy
3. The India-Pakistan Relationship 79

Section 7. Australia 80
1. National Defense Policy 80
2. Foreign Relations 80
Relations with the United States/Relations with Other Countries

Section 8. Europe 82
1. General Situation 82
2. Enhancement and Enlargement of Security Frameworks 82
Enhancement of Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Peacekeeping Functions/Geographical Expansion and Partnership of Security Frameworks
3. Efforts by Individual Countries to Maintain the Capability to Respond to Various Conditions 85
The United Kingdom/Germany/France
4. Efforts toward Stabilization in Europe 87
Arms Control and Disarmament/Confidence Building Measures (CBM)

Section 9. Efforts to Stabilize the International Community by the U.N. and Other Scheme 88
1. General Situation 88
2. Developments in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) 88
3. Organizational Reform of the U.N. 90

Part II The Basics of Japan's Defense Policy and Build-up of Defense Capability

Chapter 1 The Basic Concepts of Japan's Defense Policy

Section 1. Measures to Ensure Japan's Security 108

Section 2. The Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense 109
1. The Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense 109
2. The Government's View on Article 9 of the Constitution 109
The Permitted Self-Defense Capability/Requirements for Exercising the Right of Self-Defense/Geographic Boundaries within which the Right of Self-Defense may be Exercised/The Right of Collective Self-Defense/The Right of Belligerence

COLUMN
(COMMENTARY) Discussions Involving the Constitution 110

Section 3. The Basis of Defense Policy 111
1. National Defense Policy 111
2. Other Basic Policies 111
Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy/Not Becoming a Military Power/The Three Non-Nuclear Principles/Ensuring Civilian Control

COLUMN
(COMMENTARY) Civilian Control 113

Section 4. Transition to a Ministry and Stipulation of International Peace Cooperation Activities as SDF's Primary Mission 114
1. Significance of Transition to a Ministry 114
Significance of Transition to a Ministry/Adherence to the Basics of Defense Policies
2. Significance of Stipulation of International Peace Cooperation Activities as SDF's Primary Mission ... 115
Concepts Prior to the Stipulation as Primary Mission/Review on Positioning of Missions/Operations Newly Stipulated as Primary Missions
3. Debate Concerning the General Law 116

Chapter 2 The National Defense Program Guidelines and Build-up of Defense Capability

Section 1. Basic Concepts of Formulating the National Defense Program Guidelines 120
1. Background to Formulating the NDPG 120
Changes in the International Situation and the Diversifying Roles of Military Capability/Remarkable Developments of Scientific Technology/Expansion of SDF Activities and the Improvement of Japan's Emergency Response Mechanism/Characteristics of Japan
2. The Basic Concept of the National Defense Program Guidelines 122
Two Objectives and Three Approaches/New Concept for Defense Capability (Shifting emphasis from "deterrent effects" to "response capability")

Section 2. Contents of the National Defense Program Guidelines 125
1. Basic Principles of Japan's Security Policy 125
Japan's Own Efforts/The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements (Cooperation with Allies)/Cooperation with the International Community
2. Vision for Future Defense Capabilities 126
Role of Defense Capabilities/Fundamental Elements of Japan's Defense Capabilities
3. Specific Posture for Defense Capability 130
Ground Self-Defense Force/Maritime Self-Defense Force/Air Self-Defense Force/Major Equipment and Major Units Also Available for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

4. Additional Elements for Consideration 135
Fiscal Conditions, Procurement of Defense Equipment, and Maintenance and Operation of Defense Facilities/Time frame for Achieving Defense Capability Objectives and Its Review
5. Three Principles on Arms Exports 135

Section 3. Mid-Term Defense Program 136
1. Policies for the Program 136
2. Organizational Review of the Defense Ministry and SDF 136
3. Main Projects Concerning Capabilities of the SDF 137
4. Measures to Strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements 137
5. Scale of Build-up and Necessary Budget 137
Scale of Build-up/Necessary Budget

Section 4. Build-up of Defense Capabilities for FY 2008 140

COLUMN
(COMMENTARY) New Equipment (Successor Fixed-Wing Patrol Aircraft) 142

Section 5. Defense-Related Expenditures 143
1. Defense-Related Expenditures and Changes 143
2. Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures 144
3. Comparison with Other Countries 145

Part III Measures for Defense of Japan

Chapter 1 Operations of Self-Defense Forces for Defense of Japan and Responses to Diverse Situations

Section 1. Frameworks for Responses to Armed Attack Situations 150
1. The Basic Framework for Responses to Armed Attack Situations 150
The Background to Laws for Responses to Armed Attack Situations/Responses to Armed Attack Situations/ Responses to Emergency Response Situations other than Armed Attack Situations
2. Measures Based on the Armed Attack Situation Response Law and other Relevant Laws 155
Measures to Protect the Lives etc. of the People and to Minimize the Effects on the Daily Lives of the People/ Measures to Terminate Armed Attack Situations/Guarantee of Appropriate Implementation of International Humanitarian Laws/High Readiness for Armed Attack Situations
3. Measures for Civil Protection 157
Measures for Civil Protection in Armed Attack Situations (Civil Protection Measures)/ The Basic Guidelines for Civil Protection/Roles of the SDF in Civil Protection/ Activities by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF to Facilitate the Civil Protection Measures

COLUMN
(COMMENTARY) Joint Training for Civil Protection 162

4. The Operations of the Self-Defense Forces 162
Outline of Joint Operational Structure/Establishment of Infrastructure to Enhance the Joint Operational Structure/ Placing the Defense Intelligence Headquarters under the Direct Command of the Minister of Defense

COLUMN
(VOICE) Voice of an SDF Officer Working as the Defense Attaché in India 165

Section 2. Effective Responses to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies 167
1. Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks 167
Japan's Ballistic Missile Defense/Improvement in Legislation and Operations/Missile Defense of the United States and Japan-U.S. BMD Cooperation

2. Response to Attacks by Guerrillas and Special Operations Forces 175
Response to Attacks by Guerrillas and Special Operations Forces/Response to Armed Agents/ Response to Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Weapons
3. Response to Aggression on Japan's Offshore Islands 181
Operations to Respond to Aggression on Islands
4. Warning and Surveillance of the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan and Response to Violation of Airspace and Armed Special Operations Vessels 181
Warning and Surveillance in Sea Areas Surrounding Japan/Warnings and Emergency Takeoffs (Scrambles) in Preparation against Violation of Territorial Airspace/Response to Submarines Submerged in Japan's Territorial Waters/Response to Armed Special Operations Vessels
5. Response to Large-Scale and Unconventional Disasters 184
Mechanism of Disaster Relief Dispatches/Initial Operations Posture and Implementation Status of Disaster Relief Dispatches/Efforts Made in Peacetime in Preparation for Disaster Relief

COLUMN
(VOICE) Voice of SDF Personnel Working at the Joint Staff 189
(VOICE) Voice of SDF Personnel who Participated in Relief Efforts for the Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake (GSDF) 191
(VOICE) Voice of SDF Personnel who Participated in Relief Efforts for the Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake (MSDF) 192
(VOICE) Voice of SDF Personnel who Participated in Relief Efforts for the Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake (ASDF) 193
(VOICE) Letters of Appreciation from Local People for Disaster Relief Efforts 194

6. Response to Other Events 195
Improvement in Guard Postures for SDF Facilities/Maintaining Posture to Transport Japanese Nationals Overseas/ Response to Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan/Military Intelligence Gathering

Section 3. Preparation against Full-Scale Aggression 198
1. Air Defense Operations 198
2. Operations for the Defense of Surrounding Sea Areas 200

COLUMN
(VOICE) Voice of SDF Personnel on Dispatch at Other Ministries and Agencies 201

3. Operations for Defending Japan's Territory (Response to Landing of Invading Forces) 202
4. Operations for Ensuring the Safety of Maritime Traffic 204

COLUMN
(COMMENTARY) Basic Plan on Ocean Policy 204

Chapter 2 Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

Section 1. The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements 212
1. The Significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements 213
Maintenance of Japan's Security/Maintenance of Peace and Stability in the Region Surrounding Japan/Improvement of International Security Environment
2. Presence of U.S. Forces in Japan 214
Significance of Presence of U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ)/USFJ Facilities and Areas and Local Communities which Host such Facilities and Areas/USFJ in Okinawa

Section 2. Japan-U.S. Security Consultation on the Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and other Matters 217
1. Outline of Recent Japan-U.S. Consultations 218
Post-Cold War Developments Concerning the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements/Activities since the September 11th Terrorist Attacks/Recent Developments

2. Results Achieved by the Japan-U.S. Consultations 221
Common Strategic Objectives (the First Stage)/Roles, Missions and Capabilities of Japan and the United States (the Second Stage)/Force Posture Realignment, Including USFJ (the Third Stage)
3. Initiatives for Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of USFJ 237
Overview of the USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law/Measures based on the USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law
4. Various Measures Concerning USFJ Facilities and Areas 241
USFJ Facilities and Areas Located in Japan, Excluding Okinawa/USFJ Facilities and Areas in Okinawa

Section 3. Policies and Measures for Enhancing Credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements ... 247
1. Japan-U.S. Policy Consultations 247
Major Forums for Japan-U.S. Consultations on Security/Recent Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States
2. Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation and Policies to Ensure their Effectiveness 252
The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation/Various Policies for Ensuring the Effectiveness of the Guidelines
3. Japan-U.S. Bilateral Training and Exercises 257
4. The Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between Japan and the United States (ACSA) 258
5. Mutual Exchanges of Equipment and Technology 258
6. Measures to Ensure the Smooth Stationing of USFJ 260
Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ/Ensuring the Stable Use of USFJ Facilities and Areas/ Efforts to Preserve the Environment Surrounding USFJ Facilities and Areas

COLUMN
(COMMENTARY) USFJ Local Employees 262
(VOICE) Voice of SDF Personnel who Completed a Flight Training Course with the U.S. Air Force 263

Chapter 3 Improvement of the International Security Environment

Section 1. Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities 268
1. Proactive Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities on Japan's Own Initiative ... 269
History of Japan's Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities/ Systems to Effectively Undertake International Peace Cooperation Activities/ Welfare and Mental Health Care of Dispatched SDF Personnel
2. Cooperation in Global Efforts to Reconstruct Iraq 271
Details and Significance of Japan's Efforts to Support Iraqi Reconstruction/Outline of the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq and the Basic Plan/SDF Operations/Evaluation of Japan's Efforts by Other Countries

COLUMN
(VOICE) Voice of SDF Personnel who Participated in Replenishment Activities in the Indian Ocean 271
(VOICE) Voice of SDF Personnel Working in the Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, Airlift Wing 275

3. Activities Responding to International Terrorism 276
Efforts of International Community/Japan's Efforts in the Fight Against Terrorism/Outline of the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law and Implementation Plan/Replenishment Support Activities by the Maritime Self-Defense Force/Evaluation of Japan's Activities
4. Efforts to Support U.N. Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) ,etc. 282
Outline of International Peace Cooperation Law, etc./United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)/International Peace Cooperation Activities in the Golan Heights/The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)/Dispatch of SDF Officers to the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations

COLUMN
(VOICE) Voice of SDF Personnel Working for the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) 287

5. International Disaster Relief Operations 289
Outline of the Law Concerning the Dispatch of International Disaster Relief Teams/International Disaster Relief Operations by the SDF and the SDF's Posture

COLUMN
(VOICE) Voice of SDF Personnel who Participated in Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks (MLST) 290

Section 2. Promotion of Security Dialogue and Defense Exchanges 292
1. Significance of Security Dialogue and Defense Exchanges 292
2. Bilateral Defense Exchanges 292
Japan-Republic of Korea Defense Exchanges/Japan-Russia Defense Exchanges/Japan-China Defense Exchanges/Japan-Australia Defense Exchanges/Japan-U.K. Defense Exchanges/Japan-India Defense Exchanges/Defense Exchanges with Southeast Asian Countries/Defense Exchanges with Other Countries

COLUMN
(VOICE) Voice of Staff Member in Charge of Japan-China Defense Exchanges 297
(VOICE) Voice of a Participant in Defense Exchanges with the Royal Australian Air Force, Transportation Unit 300

3. Multilateral Security Dialogue 307
Significance of Multilateral Security Dialogue/ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)/Multilateral Security Dialogue Sponsored or Participated in by the Japan Defense Ministry and the SDF
4. Multilateral Exercises 308
Significance of Multilateral Exercises in the Asia-Pacific Region/Efforts on Multilateral Exercises in the Asia-Pacific Region

COLUMN
(VOICE) Voice of MSDF Personnel Who Participated in the Maritime Multilateral Exercise Malabar 311

Section 3. Efforts for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation 312
1. Efforts on Treaties related to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 313
Nuclear Weapons/Chemical Weapons/Biological Weapons/Delivery Means (Missiles)
2. Efforts on Arms Control-Related Treaties on Certain Conventional Weapons 314
Related Treaties/Japan's Efforts
3. International Efforts for Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Others 315
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)/Security Council Resolution 1540 Concerning the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Chapter 4 Citizens of Japan, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF

Section 1. Sustaining Defense Capabilities 324
1. Organization of the MOD/SDF 324
Organization of the MOD/SDF/System to Support the Minister of Defense/Restructuring of the Ministry of Defense
2. Recruitment and Employment of Personnel in the Ministry of Defense and the SDF 327
Recruitment/Employment

COLUMN
(VOICE) Voice of a Staff Involved in the Disbandment of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency and Compilation of its History 329
(VOICE) Voice of a Newcomer (a General Officer Candidate, GSDF) 330
(VOICE) Voice of a Newcomer (Student Pilot, MSDF) 331
(VOICE) Voice of a Newly Enlisted SDF Personnel (ASDF General Candidate for Enlisted (Upper)) ... 332
(VOICE) Voice of a Crew Member of the Icebreaker *Shirase* 334

3. Daily Education and Training 335
Education of SDF Regular Personnel/SDF Training
4. Working Conditions of Personnel, Measures on Personnel Matters, and Other Related Issues 338
The Panel to Examine Comprehensive Reform in the Personnel Field of the Defense Force/Efforts to Prevent Suicide among SDF Personnel/Commemorating Personnel Killed in the Line of Duty
5. Retirement and Outplacement of Personnel, and Related Issues 340
Retirement and Outplacement of Personnel/Regulations on Outplacement of Personnel after Retirement/Reappointment System
6. Enhancing Information and Communications Capabilities 342
Response to the Information Technology (IT) Revolution/Future Policy for Information and Communications (Action Plan)
7. Enhancement of Technical Research & Development 343
Research & Development of the Technical Research & Development Institute (TRDI)/Strengthening Relations with the Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS) Technology Field

COLUMN
(VOICE) Voice of an Engineering Official Involved in Developing a New Tank 345

Section 2. Interaction between the Ministry of Defense & the SDF, and the Local Community & Japanese Citizens 346
1. Cooperation from Local Public Organizations and Other Related Organizations for the SDF 346
Cooperation in Recruitment of SDF Regular Personnel and Support for Outplacement/Support for SDF Activities
2. Activities in Civic Life and Contributions to Society 346
3. Harmony between Defense Facilities and the Local Community, and Environmental Conservation 347
Scale and Features of Defense Facilities/Defense Facility Issues and Various Measures/Environmental Conservation/Base of Defense Administration in Regional Areas
4. Public Relations Activities, Information Disclosure, and Related Activities 351
Various Public Relations Activities/Appropriate Operation of the Information Disclosure System and Personal Data Protection System/Appropriate Operation of the Whistle-Blower Protection System/Engagement in Policy Evaluation

Part IV Reform of the Ministry of Defense

Section 1. Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense 360
1. Considerations within the Ministry of Defense 361

COLUMN
(COMMENTARY) Keywords for the Reform of the Ministry of Defense 362

2. Report of the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense 364
Introduction/Incidents of Misconduct - Identifying the Issues/Reform Proposal (1): Reform of the Consciousness of Personnel and Organizational Culture/Reform Proposal (2): Organizational Reforms for Modern Civilian Control/Conclusion
3. Future Efforts 367

COLUMN
(COMMENTARY) Statement by the Prime Minister at the 11th Meeting of the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense 368

Section 2. Fundamental Efforts to Ensure Thorough Civilian Control 369
1. Recent Incidents 369
Incident of Mistakes in Reporting the Amount of Refueling/Mistaken Destruction of Ship Deck Log/Collision between the Destroyer *Atago* and the Fishing Vessel *Seitoku Maru*
2. Efforts at the Ministry of Defense 370

Section 3. Efforts to Prevent the Leakage of Information 371
1. Recent Incidents 371
Incident of Information Leakage via the Internet/Incident of Leakage of Special Defense Secret Concerning the Aegis System
2. Efforts at the Ministry of Defense 372

COLUMN
(COMMENTARY) New Establishment of the "Self-Defense Forces Intelligence Security Unit" (Provisional Name) 373

Section 4. Efforts for Effective, Efficient, Open, and Transparent Procurement 376
1. The Ministry of Defense's Efforts to Date 376
Comprehensive Acquisition Reform/Enhancement and Strengthening of the Defense Production & Technological Infrastructure
2. Recent Incidents 377
Excessive Billing by Yamada Corporation/Selection and Procurement of C-X Engines and Other Equipment
3. New Initiatives at the Ministry of Defense 378
Recent Actions/Efforts for Comprehensive Acquisition Reform/Steady Implementation of Measures

COLUMN
(Q&A) What is the procedure for equipment selection? 381
(Q&A) What are the concrete measures for cost reduction? 382

Section 5. Other Measures 383
1. Efforts in Response to the Fire on the Destroyer *Shirane* 383
2. Efforts to Uphold the Self-Defense Forces Personnel Ethics Code and Act 383
3. Measures against Drug Abuse 384

Reference 387

Part I

Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Overview

Overview

1. General Situation

In the international community today, with relations of mutual dependence between sovereign states growing ever stronger, matters of security or the potential for instability emanating in one country have increasing potential to transcend national borders and spread globally, impacting on other countries. As such, it is to the common benefit of each country to secure global and regional peace, stability and prosperity through the promotion of a more stable international security environment. Therefore it becomes more important for multinational cooperation in the resolution of issues to the benefit of the international community as a whole.

The activities of non-state actors, including international terrorist organizations, present a serious threat. Acts of terrorism are occurring in every region of the world.

The United States and other countries are continuing efforts in the fight against terrorism and have achieved some success, but have confronted severe challenges presented in Iraq and Afghanistan – which are regarded by the United States as front lines in this fight – and a crunch in the numbers of deployable troops to missions overseas is becoming a significant issue. Consequently, the U.S. government has requested an increase in ground and naval forces in order to expand military capacity and reduce the burden on deployed troops. Additionally, given the recent resurgence of Taliban activities and other groups in Afghanistan, it has become necessary to reinforce the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and the deployment and dispatch burden has been brought to the attention of members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

In addition to terrorism, the issue of proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as well as ballistic missiles and their means of delivery, represent a continued and significant threat to the international community. The issue of North Korea's nuclear weapons and missiles remains unresolved, which not only affects the security of Japan, but has become an issue of concern for the international community from the perspective of the non-proliferation of WMD. Despite the issuance of numerous U.N. Security Council Resolutions, Iran's nuclear problem poses an additional concern to the international community.

These days, the relation between sovereign states, which cannot be overlooked in today's security environment, has some issues to watch.

While the U.S. and NATO-led fight against terrorism requires a persistent, long-term approach, the emergence of China and India fueled by a robust economy and the resurgence of Russia, may lead these countries to pursue more influence in the international community. Such developments should be regarded as major opportunities for international collaboration and cooperation. Simultaneously, interest has risen in their policies, mutual interaction and relations with other countries since any developments by these powers may have a significant impact on the security environment.

It has also been pointed out in the international community that there is potential for competition for energy resources among sovereign states and also for climate change to become more prominent in the future, becoming new factors that influence the global security environment.

As seen above, today's international community confronts a range of issues from traditional inter-state relations to new threats and diverse contingencies. These issues could arise independently or in combination. In order to respond to such issues, the roles of military forces are diversifying beyond deterrence and armed conflicts to include a broad spectrum of activities from conflict prevention to reconstruction assistance. Moreover, unified responses that incorporate military as well as diplomatic, police, judicial, information and economic measures are becoming necessary. Accordingly, each state continues to enhance its military capabilities in line with its resources and circumstances, and pursue international cooperation and partnership in security areas.

2. Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region

The Asia-Pacific region has been getting more global attention, due to the rapid development of economies such as China and India resulting in enhanced coordination and cooperation among countries, mainly in economic affairs. On the other hand, this region is considerably rich in political, economic, ethnic, and religious diversity, and conflicts between countries/regions remain even after the end of the Cold War, unlike Europe. Because of these reasons major changes in the security environment have yet to emerge and long-standing issues of territorial rights and reunification continue to plague the region.

On the Korean Peninsula, the Korean people have been divided for more than half a century, and the face-off continues between the military forces of North Korea and the Republic of Korea. There are issues concerning Taiwan and the overlapping territorial claims on the Spratly Islands. Japan also confronts unresolved territorial disputes over the Northern Territories and Takeshima, both of which are integral parts of Japanese territory.

Concerns over North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles have grown more serious, and in 2006, its ballistic missile launch and the announcement of an underground nuclear test further underscored the threat posed by North Korea, not only to the peace and security of Japan, but also to the international community. With regard to the North Korean nuclear issue, a halt to activities at the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon was achieved based on a document reached at the Six-Party Talks, but complete disablement of the Yongbyon facilities and a declaration concerning North Korea's nuclear programs are still pending, and careful monitoring of the nuclear issue, including North Korea's reaction, will continue to be necessary. North Korea's abduction of Japanese nationals is also yet to be resolved. It is a major threat to the lives and security of the Japanese public and its resolution will require sincere and concrete actions by North Korea.

In the Republic of Korea, President Lee Myung-Bak was inaugurated in February 2008, and there are expectations that he will step up partnerships with the U.S. and Japan towards denuclearization by North Korea.

Moreover, many countries in this region have taken advantage of economic growth to expand and upgrade their military forces by increasing their defense budgets and introducing new weapons systems.

In particular, China, a regional power with tremendous political and economic clout, is increasingly drawing the close attention of many countries. China has been continuously boosting its defense spending and has been modernizing its military forces, with this significant increase in total defense spending. However, with clarity on neither the present condition nor the future image, Japan is apprehensive about how the military power of China will influence the regional state of affairs and the security of Japan. Moreover, due to the insufficient transparency, it is noted that other nations might have distrust and misunderstandings about the process of decision-making concerning the security and the military of China. In this fashion, improvement on the transparency relating to China's national defense policies is demanded, and it has become an important task to pursue dialogues and exchanges, and strengthen the mutual understanding and the trust relationship with China.

Under the administration of former President Vladimir Putin, Russia reemerged in the international community as a "strong state," and backed by recent economic development Russia is developing a military posture commensurate with its national strength. In the Far East too, the Russian military has been demonstrating dynamic movements with its aircraft, following resurgence in aircraft sophistication, and in February 2008, Japan's airspace was violated by Russian bombers, underlining the severity of the situation which we must monitor carefully. (See Fig. I-0-0-1)

Terrorism and piracy in Southeast Asia have seriously affected regional security. Terrorist organizations and separatist/independence groups have been a threat of terrorism in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. The Malacca Straits and the Singapore Straits, important international sea lanes of transportation, suffer from frequent piracy incidents. Joint efforts are underway to combat these threats, and improvements are being witnessed.

Fig. I-0-0-1 Major Military Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region (Approximate Strength)



Notes: 1. Source: "The Military Balance 2008" publications of the U.S. Department of Defense and others (actual numbers as of the end of FY 2007 are shown for Japan)
2. U.S. ground forces in Japan and the ROK are combined figures of Army and Marine Corps personnel
3. Combat aircraft includes Navy and Marine aircraft
4. Figures inside parentheses show the number of divisions

In the Asia-Pacific region, where elements of uncertainty and a lack of transparency still exist as described above, to achieve regional stability the presence of the U.S. military remains extremely important. Japan and other countries have established bilateral alliances and friendly relations with the U.S. and, accordingly, they allow the stationing or presence of U.S. forces in their territories.

Recent years have also seen an increase in opportunities for bilateral defense exchanges between countries in the region. Efforts are being made to engage in multilateral security dialogues, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and conferences hosted by non-governmental institutions with the participation of relevant defense ministers, as well as bilateral and multilateral joint exercises. Promoting and developing such multi-level approaches among countries is important to ensure security in the region.

Part I

Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Chapter 1

Issues in the International Community

Section 1. International Terrorism
Section 2. Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Section 3. Situation in Iraq
Section 4. Complex and Diverse Regional Conflicts

Section 1. International Terrorism

1. General Situation

The 9/11 attacks that took place in 2001 prompted the entire world to reaffirm the threat of international terrorism, and became the spark that ignited the current fight against terrorism by the United States and other countries.

In the invasion of Afghanistan launched by U.S. and U.K. forces shortly after the 9/11 attacks, many of the leaders of Al Qaeda, who were believed to have directed the 9/11 attacks, and the Taliban, who harbored Al Qaeda, were killed or captured. However, Osama bin Laden, Mullah Mohammed Omar and the remnants of their respective organizations are believed still to be hiding in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region[1], and the U.S.-led multinational forces, the Afghan, the Pakistani and other militaries are continuously engaged in clearing operations.

Recently in particular, international terrorist organizations have been organized into more decentralized cells, while local terrorist organizations and individuals sympathetic to their ideology have been carrying out terrorist activities on their own or in concert with these international terrorist organizations. Police investigations revealed, for example, that the July 2005 subway and bus suicide bomb attacks in London (U.K.) were not carried out by foreign terrorists, but rather by the sons of Muslim immigrants born and brought up in the U.K.[2] Furthermore, in September 2006, the Algerian organization Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) formally announced a merger with Al Qaeda, and subsequently changed its name to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). This organization is considered to have carried out terrorist attacks last year that targeted the United Nations and Algerian government organizations.

In light of the present situation, many countries have enacted stronger counterterrorism measures through domestic legislation. For example, the Russian government passed a new anti-terrorism law in March 2006 that authorizes the downing or sinking of passenger aircraft or vessels hijacked by terrorists, where there is a danger posed of loss of life or a large-scale disaster. On the other hand, in February 2006, the German Federal Constitutional Court decided that the provision of the Aviation Security Law stipulating that hijacked planes may be shot down is unconstitutional and called for its repeal, underlining the fact that views on counterterrorism measures vary from one country to another.

Furthermore, countries have banded together in an international coalition, continuing to commit not only military forces, but also diplomatic, law enforcement, judicial, intelligence and economic resources, and counterterrorism measures are also being implemented through multinational frameworks such as the United Nations, the G8, and regional cooperation organizations. Specifically, these efforts include ensuring stability and supplying recovery/reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan and Iraq, enhancing systems for exchanging counterterrorism intelligence, reinforcing international legal frameworks to sternly punish terrorists, cutting off terrorist funding and strengthening air security (including the prevention of hijacking), tightening immigration controls, adopting more effective approaches to ensure the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and regulation of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), assisting developing countries with inadequate counterterrorism measures to enhance their capabilities, and taking steps to reduce or eliminate poverty, economic and social disparities and inequality in developing countries.

2. Fight Against Terrorism in and around Afghanistan

The United States together with other countries has continued military operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in and around Afghanistan since October 2001, shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In the Arabian Sea, naval vessels from various countries have endeavored to keep these international terrorists from relocating to other areas by sea and to prevent the proliferation of terrorism from Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan, attacks orchestrated by the Taliban have been increasing, and the security situation remains unstable. The number of terrorist bombings and attacks are particularly prevalent in the southern and eastern

areas adjacent to the border with Pakistan. In addition, there have also been scattered terrorist bomb attacks in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, and in the northern and western areas, which were relatively stable and peaceful. This situation has led the Afghan military, multinational forces and others to collaborate in mopping-up operations mainly in the south and east of the country. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF[3]) has set up five Regional Commands under the General Headquarters in Kabul, and provides support for the Afghan government in maintaining peace in the whole of the country. There are also 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to improve the security of the environment, and to conduct reconstruction assistance activities in the whole of Afghanistan. Similar activities are also continuing through the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).

Pakistan, which borders Afghanistan, is cooperating in the fight against terrorism, with the implementation of terrorist mopping-up operations in border areas. In addition, it has been confirmed that Pakistan will also cooperate with Afghanistan in enhancing cooperation to counteract terrorist activities[4]. However, it is assessed that Al Qaeda and other groups have been providing training to terrorist operatives in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan[5], and it is pointed out that Al Qaeda has reestablished itself in the border area and now seems to have turned its focus toward Pakistan and attacks on the Pakistani government and people[6].

3. Terrorist Attacks around the World

In Iraq, since Saddam Hussein's regime was brought down by U.S. and U.K. military operations in 2003, it seems that terrorists have been flowing into Iraq due to degraded security and insufficient border controls, and terrorist attacks are occurring frequently, targeting not only U.S. and other soldiers, but also Iraqi citizens and foreign nationals. While the attack capabilities of terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda-affiliated armed groups are being lowered due to mopping-up operations by multinational forces and Iraqi Security Forces and also due to a confrontational attitude of the local residents, the activities of these terrorist organizations continue to be a major obstacle to the rebuilding of Iraq. (See Section 3)

Terrorist attacks have also continued in countries surrounding Iraq. In Turkey, from May to June 2007, a number of terrorist incidents occurred in Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir on the Aegean Coast, that were considered to be the work of anti-government organizations such as the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). In December, in response to a PKK attack on Turkish army troops in October 2007 near the border with Iraq, the Turkish army initiated a mopping-up operation, focusing on PKK bases in the Kurdish region of Northern Iraq. In Lebanon also, against the backdrop of an unstable political situation, in June 2007, a member of parliament was assassinated by terrorists, and in December 2007, Army General Francois al-Hajj was assassinated.

In Algeria, last year there were a series of terrorist attacks targeting the government and army, including simultaneous bomb attacks on government buildings, the attempted assassination of the President of Algeria, a suicide bombing on the barracks of the Algerian Coast Guard, and bombing of U.N. organizations. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) claimed responsibility for these attacks. Furthermore, the scope of activities of AQIM has not remained exclusively in Algerian borders, with it being pointed out that the group is recruiting and providing training[7] for Islamic extremists in North African countries and plans to expand its mission throughout the entire region and beyond[8].

Southeast Asia is still a region subject to frequent terrorist threats, although some progress has been made in controlling terrorist organizations. Between 2002 and 2005, Indonesia suffered large-scale terrorist attacks, in which the involvement of Jemaah Islamiya (JI), a radical Muslim organization, is suspected[9]. Since 2006, however, there have been no large terrorist attacks. In 2007 the leaders of JI Zarkasi and Abu Dujana were arrested, which are notable successes in controlling terrorist activities. In the Philippines, the Communist group the New People's Army has long been the largest threat to domestic security. While the Philippine government has continued to engage in consultations with the Molo Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) towards peace, it

conducts mopping-up operations against the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), leading to a number of results, including the killing of ASG leaders and reduction in membership. At the same time southern Thailand has witnessed frequent attacks and bombing/arson incidents by radical Muslim separatists against military and police facilities, and there is currently no prospect of the situation being alleviated.

South Asia, too, has witnessed frequent large-scale terrorist attacks. In particular, in Pakistan last year former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was assassinated and terrorist attacks targeting government organizations and security-related facilities such as the military and police frequently occurred. In 2008 there have been suicide bombings at a High Court building and at the Naval College. In addition, in 2007 in Sri Lanka, a terrorist attack occurred in the center of Colombo that is suspected to have been perpetrated by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In January 2008, the ceasefire agreement broke down between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE, and it is feared that this will lead to a future rise in terrorist attacks. (See Fig. I-1-1-1)

Fig. I-1-1-1 Major Terrorism Incidents Around the World (May 2007- May 2008)



Section 2. Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The transfer or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear, biological or chemical weapons (NBC), or ballistic missiles carrying such weapons has been regarded as a significant threat since the end of the Cold War. In particular, there have been growing threats that non-state actors, including terrorists, against whom traditional deterrence works less effectively, could acquire and use weapons of mass destruction (including radioactive materials).

1. Nuclear Weapons

During the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 made it clear that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union could take place. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that took effect in 1970 prohibited countries other than those that had conducted nuclear tests in or before 1966[10] from having nuclear weapons, and required nuclear-armed countries to control and reduce nuclear weapons through bilateral negotiations[11].

Under the NPT signed by 190 countries, the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China are designated as nuclear-armed countries. While some countries that previously had nuclear weapons became signatories of this treaty by abandoning these weapons[12] some countries still refuse to sign this treaty[13]. In addition to the five countries permitted to have nuclear weapons, there are other countries that have declared the development and possession of nuclear weapons. North Korea announced it had conducted a nuclear test in October 2006.

2. Biological and Chemical Weapons

It is easy to manufacture biological and chemical weapons at a relatively low cost. Because most of the materials, equipment and technology needed to manufacture these weapons can be used for both military and civilian purposes, it is also easy to disguise them. Accordingly, biological and chemical weapons are attractive to states or terrorists who seek asymmetric means of attack[14].

Biological weapons have the following characteristics: 1) manufacturing is easy and inexpensive, 2) there is usually an incubation period of a few days between exposure and onset, 3) their use is hard to detect, 4) even the threat of use can create great psychological pressures, and 5) they can cause heavy casualties depending on circumstances and the type of weapons[15].

As for chemical weapons, asphyxiants such as phosgene have been known since World War I. In the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq repeatedly used mustard gas as an erosion agent and tabun and sarin as nerve agents[16] against Iran. In the late 1980s, Iraq used chemical weapons to suppress Iraqi Kurds[17]. Other chemical weapons include VX, a highly toxic nerve agent, and easy-to-manage binary rounds[18].

North Korea (See Chapter 2, Section 2) is one country seeking such weapons. The Tokyo subway sarin attack in 1995, and mail incidents in the United States containing anthrax bacillus in 2001 and ricin in February 2004, have showed that the threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists is real and that these weapons could cause serious damage if used in cities.

3. Ballistic Missiles

Ballistic missiles can carry heavy payloads over long distances and can be used as a means of projecting weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. Once launched, a ballistic missile makes a trajectory flight and falls at a steep angle at high speed, which makes it difficult to effectively defend against the missile.

If ballistic missiles are deployed in a region where military confrontation is underway, the conflict could

intensify or expand, and tension in a region where armed antagonism exists could be further exacerbated leading to destabilization of that region. Furthermore a country may use ballistic missiles as a means of attacking or threatening another country that is superior in terms of conventional forces.

In recent years, in addition to the threat of ballistic missiles, attention has been increasingly paid to the threat of cruise missiles, because they are comparatively easy for terrorist and other non-state entities to procure[19]. Although the speed of a cruise missile is slower than that of a ballistic missile, it is difficult to detect when the cruise missile is launched and while in flight[20]. Because cruise missiles are smaller than ballistic missiles, they can be concealed on a ship to secretly approach a target. Furthermore, a cruise missile carrying a weapon of mass destruction could present an enormous threat.

4. Growing Concerns about Transfer or Proliferation of WMDs

Weapons that were originally purchased or developed for self-defense purposes could be easily exported or transferred once domestic manufacturing became successful. For example, certain states that do not heed political risks have transferred weapons of mass destruction and related technologies to other states that cannot afford to invest resources in conventional forces and intend to compensate for this with weapons of mass destruction. Some of these states seeking weapons of mass destruction do not hesitate to put their land and people at risk, and allow terrorist organizations to be active due to their poor governance. Therefore, the chance of actual use of weapons of mass destruction may generally be high in these cases.

In addition, since it is unlikely that such states can effectively manage the related technology and materials, the high possibility that chemical or nuclear substances will be transferred or smuggled out from these states has become a cause for concern. Terrorists without related technology can use a dirty bomb[21] as a means of attack once acquiring a radioactive substance.

There are shared concerns among countries regarding the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and other non-state entities. Based on these concerns, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 in April 2004, declaring that all states should adopt and enforce appropriate and effective laws to prohibit non-state actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivery thereof, as well as to refrain from assisting such non-state actors. (See Chapter 3, Section 3) The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was also adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in April 2005 and entered into force in July 2007.

Activities related to weapons of mass destruction were secretly pursued in some countries. Such activities have come to light since 2002, revealing the fact that nuclear weapon technologies have been transferred and proliferated. Meanwhile, the international community's uncompromising and decisive stance against the transfer and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has put enormous pressure on countries engaged in activities related to such weapons, leading some of them to accept inspection by international institutions or to abandon their programs to develop weapons of mass destruction.

When U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kerry visited North Korea in October 2002, the United States announced that North Korea had admitted the existence of a project to enrich uranium for use in nuclear weapons, pointing out the possibility that North Korea had pursued development not only of plutonium-based weapons but also uranium-based nuclear weapons[22]. It was also pointed out that North Korea had given support to Syrian secret nuclear activities[23]. (See Chapter 2, Section 2)

It became clear in 2002 that Iran had been long engaged in uranium enrichment-related activities without a declaration for the IAEA and the international community has made an effort to resolve this issue. (See Section 5)

As a result of behind-the-scenes discussions with the United States and the United Kingdom since March 2003, Libya abandoned all programs of its weapons of mass destruction in December 2003 and accepted inspections by

international organizations. Subsequently, in August 2006, the country ratified the additional IAEA protocol.

Pakistan seems to have launched its nuclear development program in the 1970s, and nuclear-related activities of Iran and Libya have been pointed at to be supported by suspicious technology transfers from Pakistan since 2003. In February 2004, it came to light that nuclear-related technologies, including uranium enrichment technology, had been transferred to North Korea, Iran and Libya by Dr. A. Q. Khan and other scientists for personal gain. These transfers have been shown to have been secretly conducted using global networks covering Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia[24]. IAEA Director-General Mohammad ElBaradei has reportedly stated that this network involves more than 30 countries[25].

Ballistic missiles have been significantly proliferated or transferred as well. The former Soviet Union exported Scud-Bs to many countries and regions, including Iraq, North Korea and Afghanistan. China and North Korea also exported DF-3 (CSS-2) and Scud missiles, respectively. As a result, a considerable number of countries now possess ballistic missiles. Pakistan's Ghauri and Iran's Shahab-3 missiles are said to be based on North Korea's No-Dong missiles[26]. Libya, which agreed to abandon its weapons of mass destruction programs, reportedly disclosed production lines for Scud-Cs and other facilities built with technological assistance of North Korea[27]. It has been reported that Ukraine illegally exported cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads to Iran and China around 2001[28].

5. Iran's Nuclear Issue

Since the 1970s Iran has been pursuing a nuclear power plant construction project with cooperation from abroad, stating that its activities would be for peaceful purposes in accordance with the NPT. In 2002, however, it was announced by a group of dissidents that Iran was secretly constructing a large-scale uranium enrichment facility. Subsequent IAEA inspection revealed that Iran, without notifying the IAEA for a long time, had engaged in uranium enrichment and other activities potentially leading to the development of nuclear weapons. In September 2005, the IAEA Board found Iran's non compliance with NPT Safeguards Agreement in its resolution. Since Iran's nuclear activities were revealed, Iran has insisted that it has no intent to develop nuclear weapons and that all of its nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes. On the other hand, the international community has expressed strong concerns about obtaining assurances of Iran's claims, and has demanded that Iran suspend all of its enrichment related and reprocessing activities until it can confirm that its nuclear development activities are exclusively for peaceful purposes.

The EU-3 (the United Kingdom, France and Germany) held discussions with Iran in hopes of resolving this issue; an accord (the Paris Accord) was reached in November 2004 on issues including the halt of uranium enrichment related activities; and Iran accordingly ceased its nuclear-related activities. However, Iran rejected as unsatisfactory the proposal for a Long-Term Agreement presented by the EU-3 in August 2005, and resumed uranium conversion activities which are at the precursory stage of uranium enrichment. It announced the start of preparations for the resumption of uranium enrichment in January 2006 (Iran resumed uranium enrichment in February). The IAEA then convened an emergency Board of Governors meeting in February 2006 and by a majority vote adopted a resolution to report the issue to the U.N. Security Council. In March 2006, the U.N. Security Council approved a Presidential Statement calling on Iran to halt its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities, but in April, Iran announced that it had successfully achieved low-grade (3.5%) uranium enrichment[29] and pursued its policy to continue uranium enrichment-related activities.

In June 2006, a comprehensive proposal was presented to Iran as an agreement with the EU-3, and U.S., China and Russia (EU3+3). The proposal included cooperation in the event that Iran sufficiently resolved international concern[30]; however Iran continued its nuclear activities. In view of these responses, the U.N. Security Council in July adopted Resolution 1696 demanding Iran to suspend all of its uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. Since Iran continued its enrichment-related activities, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1737[31] in December 2006 and Resolution 1747[32] in March 2007, followed further by Resolution 1803[33] in March

2008, to impose stricter sanctions in accordance with Article 41, Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Meanwhile, the U.S. released a National Intelligence Estimate, "Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities." Judgments of the report included "Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons. In fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program. Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons."

Despite the demands by the international community including the U.N. Security Council Resolutions, Iran's nuclear issue remains unresolved. For example, in April 2008 President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had started tests of new centrifuges which are five times faster than the present models. The international community including the U.N. Security Council is continuing to pursue peaceful and diplomatic solutions through negotiations in order to resolve the issue.

Section 3. Situation in Iraq

1. Security Situation in Iraq and Security Measures

In 2006, the bombing of a Shiite mosque in Samarra in central Iraq triggered an intensification of sectarian violence, leading to deterioration in the security situation particularly in Baghdad, and presenting a serious obstacle to political processes and economic reconstruction in Iraq. In response to this situation, and based on consultations with the Government of Iraq and others, U.S. President George W. Bush announced a new policy for Iraq in January 2007, which included a "surge," with the dispatch of more than 20,000 U.S. military personnel. In addition, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki of Iraq launched renewed public security measures in Baghdad and other regions in February 2007.

Through the cooperation of Iraq, the United States and other countries, some improvements have been witnessed in the overall public security situation from the latter half of 2007, with reductions in the number of security incidents and casualties of terrorist attacks. In particular, Al Anbar Province in western Iraq, which was formerly a hotbed of terrorism second only to Baghdad, has shown significant improvements in public security. Factors for this improvement in public security include: the increased numbers of multinational forces and Iraqi security forces, the conduct of counterinsurgency operations to safeguard the Iraqi people and to pursue terrorists, and the collective efforts of the Iraqi people who have come to contribute to local security through the attitudinal shift, and the declaration of a ceasefire by a Shiite leader al-Sadr[34].

Attacks on multinational forces, Iraqi security forces and civilians by terrorists and Islamic extremists continue by a variety of means such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). The security situation in Iraq is therefore still fragile and unpredictable. In addition, the influence of neighboring countries has also been noted. In particular, it is reported that Iran has been providing weapons and training to Iraqi militia organizations, and also that Islamic radicals are infiltrating Iraq from Syria regardless of the effort of the Government of Syria[35].

2. Trends in Multinational Forces in Iraq

As of May 2008, military units from 26 countries, including approximately 150,000 U.S. troops, are deployed in Iraq tasked with maintaining security and reconstruction assistance. The basic idea underlying the activities of the multinational forces is that the presence of such forces is necessary until Iraqi security forces are able to maintain security on their own[36]. Consequently, the multinational forces assert that they cannot set out in advance a deadline for terminating their activities, even while insisting that their involvement in Iraq is not indefinite. In general terms, while the capability of Iraqi security forces is improving, it is thought that more time will be needed until these forces are able to maintain order and stability in Iraq independently.

Meanwhile, the transfer of security responsibilities from multinational forces to Iraqi authorities is proceeding in the provinces in which the capabilities of Iraqi security forces have been enhanced and local conditions have improved. Thus far, the security responsibility has been transferred in 10 provinces, including southeastern Muthanna Province, in which the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) was engaged in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities. (See Fig. I-1-3-1)

Fig. I-1-3-1 Countries' Primary Areas of Operation and the Authority Delegation of Law and Order



Based on these changes in the situation in Iraq, there have also been changes in the scale of multinational forces. In April 2008, the United States announced that given progress in the security situation in Iraq, the "surge" troops would be returned home by the end of July. Following that, it was noted that time would be required to assess the overall situation before an additional judgment was made on further troop reductions. In October 2007 the United Kingdom announced the reduction of 2,500 troops stationed in Iraq. However, following clashes between Iraqi security forces and militias in Basra Province in southeastern Iraq, in April 2008 the United Kingdom announced a temporary halt to troop reductions, stating that it would maintain a force of around 4,000 troops for the time being.

In December 2007, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1790, extending the mandate of the multinational force until the end of 2008. However, in a document submitted to the United Nations Security Council requesting an extension of the stationing of multinational forces, Prime Minister al-Maliki announced that the Government of Iraq considers this to be its final request for the extension of the mandate of multinational force. Based on these developments, the Governments of Iraq and the United States are proceeding with deliberations concerning the future stationing of multinational forces.

3. Efforts by the Iraqi Government and International Community toward Reconstruction

Breakthroughs in the situation in Iraq will require not only security measures, but also political efforts by the Iraqi government on its own initiative to promote national reconciliation. In January 2008, the Iraqi Council of Representatives adopted a number of significant laws, including the Accountability and Justice Law, which enables former Ba'ath Party members who were purged from public offices since 2003 to reassume public

positions. This represents a significant step forward toward the realization of national reconciliation in Iraq.

In addition, many countries have contributed to Iraqi reconstruction through the dispatch of troops and bilateral and multilateral assistance programs. Since 2005, the United States and others have deployed Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) made up of military and civilian personnel to provide support to local governments in Iraq. The United States has also increased the number of PRTs as part of a process giving greater emphasis to military and non-military cooperation, and currently PRTs led by the U.S. and others conduct activities in all provinces of Iraq. The United Nations has also been coordinating reconstruction, development and humanitarian assistance through the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).

The Iraq Compact, an international framework to build a new partnership between the Iraqi government and the international community, was launched in May 2007. The Compact stipulates the common policy objectives and the measures to be taken, of both the Iraqi government and international community for the next five years in the areas of governance, security, and economic reconstruction.

Discussion between the U.S. Military and the Iraq Military Officer concerning joint operations [U.S. Department of Defense]

Section 4. Complex and Diverse Regional Conflicts

Complex and diverse regional conflicts are emerging around the world. The characteristics of regional conflicts differ from one to another, whether they be inter-state or intra-state conflicts. They may result from various ethnic, religious, territorial, or resource-related issues, and may range in form from armed conflict to sustained armed confrontation. Besides, it is often seen that human rights violations, refugees, famine, poverty, and terrorism resulting from the conflicts become international issues. For that reason, it has become increasingly important for the international community to examine the character of complex and diverse conflicts and to determine appropriate responses, including the form of international frameworks and the way of international involvement depending on the character of conflicts. (See Fig. I-1-4-1)

Fig. I-1-4-1 Main Areas of Conflict and Dispute



Sources: "The Military Balance 2008" and others

The Middle East has witnessed four wars between Israel and Palestinians or Arab states since the foundation of Israel in 1948. Israel concluded peace treaties with Egypt in 1979 and with Jordan in 1994; however, has yet to realize peace with other states.

The Oslo Agreement concluded in 1993 marked the beginning of a peace process through comprehensive negotiations; however, the Israelis and Palestinians subsequently suspended negotiations due to the intifada that started in 2000 and resulted in reciprocal violence between the two parties. In 2003, agreement was reached between the Israelis and Palestinians on a "Road Map" that laid out a course leading to the establishment of a Middle East peace initiative between the Israelis and the Palestinians based on the principle of the peaceful coexistence between the two nations. However, the Road Map has yet to be implemented. The Israelis will not compromise on ensuring their own security and have demanded that the Palestinians disband terrorist groups. Furthermore, the Israeli government has taken a stern approach toward the Palestinians, stating that in the event that they do not make appropriate responses, the government will no longer regard the Palestinians as a dialogue partner and will unilaterally build a barrier and draw *de facto* borders. On the Palestinian side, the Islamic

fundamentalist organization Hamas, which does not recognize Israel and which advocates a continuation of armed conflict against Israel, won the Palestine Legislative Council election in January 2006 and established a Hamas-led administration in March. Political turmoil continues as the rivalry between Fatah, the largest faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and Hamas has intensified, and as clashes among Palestinians have led to an increasing number of deaths. In June 2007, President Mahmoud Abbas declared a state of emergency for the entire autonomous region after Hamas seized the Gaza Strip. Thereupon, an emergency cabinet constructed of non-Hamas ministers was established; however, the Hamas *de facto* rule of Gaza continues.

The United States hosted the Annapolis Conference in November 2007, where agreement was reached between Israel and the PLO to commence dialogue towards the conclusion of a peace treaty within this year. However, both Israel and the PLO continue to engage in behavior that could negatively impact the peace process, such as rocket attacks by Palestinian insurgents in Gaza targeting Israeli territory, military campaigns by the Israeli army in response to those attacks and the Israeli Government's announcement of a plan to build houses in the settlements.

Israel has yet to sign peace treaties with Syria and Lebanon. Israel and Syria disagree on the return of the Golan Heights which Israel has occupied since the 1967 Arab-Israel War. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) is deployed in the Golan Heights region to observe the implementation of ceasefire and military disengagement between the two nations.

Concerning Israel and Lebanon, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) increased its presence following the 2006 clash between Israel and Hezbollah, a Shiite Muslim organization. There have not been any prominent conflicts since, however political instability has continued in Lebanon, such as in the inability to elect a president—a situation that began in November 2007 and has lasted to May of this year. Furthermore, there have been indications that Hezbollah is enhancing its military strength again.

India and Pakistan separated and gained their independence after World War II. Thereafter, large-scale armed conflicts have broken out three times between the two countries over the Kashmir dispute and other issues. Nevertheless, a certain degree of progress regarding bilateral relations has been made in recent years.

On the Korean Peninsula, there are currently tense confrontations between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), with a presence of approximately 1.5 million ground forces. This military confrontation has been ongoing since the Korean War (1950-1953) armistice. (See Chapter 2, Section 2)

In Nepal, armed conflict with the Maoist faction of the Nepal Communist Party has resulted in a significant number of casualties since 1996. As a result of the pro-democracy movement, a new government was formed in April 2006, and a Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in November between the Nepalese Government and the Maoists. In response to this agreement, the United Nations Political Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) has been deployed in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1740, and among its duties are to monitor the status of weapons and soldiers.

In Africa, numerous civil wars have erupted after the achievement of independence in various nations. Although there have been some pushes for national reconstruction efforts in recent years, some nations are still suffering from severe conflicts.

In Sudan, the Sudanese Government, which is predominantly composed of Muslim Arabs from northern Sudan and anti-government forces comprised of African Christians from southern Sudan demanding autonomy, distribution of revenue from oil, and religious freedom, continued a 20-year north-south civil war that stemmed from a 1983 declaration by the Government to apply Islamic law to all of Sudan. In response to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that was signed between the north and south in 2005, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), established by Resolution 1590 of the United Nations Security Council, has been deployed and is conducting truce monitoring activities to assist the implementation of the CPA.

In the Darfur region of western Sudan, in addition to the traditional opposition between the Arabic nomadic tribes and the settled African population, disputes over local autonomy and developmental disparities, led to intensified fighting in 2003 between the Arab government and the African anti-government forces (both Muslim). The conflict in Darfur has produced a large number of internally displaced persons and an outflow of refugees into neighboring nations, which the international community, including the United Nations, regards as a serious humanitarian crisis. Following the ceasefire agreement in 2004, the African Union (AU) dispatched the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS); however, their efforts to halt the conflict were unsuccessful. For this reason, after the government and a fraction of the major anti-government forces signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1769 in July 2007, which stipulated the creation of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). However, instability in the Darfur region continues as some of the anti-government forces refuse to sign the DPA and as the deployment of UNAMID units has been delayed.

UNMIS personnel in Sudan [©U.N. Photo/Fred Noy]

As to Chad and Central Africa, which have seen an outflow of refugees from the Darfur region, the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1778 adopted in September 2007 authorized the deployment of the European Union (EU) forces and the creation of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). Although the deployment of EU forces and others is currently underway in Chad, activities by insurgents also continue. For example, insurgency forces invaded N'Djamena, the capital of Chad, to battle the government forces.

Somalia had been in a state of anarchy since 1991, but in June 2005, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) established in Kenya returned to Somalia. Fighting intensified from 2006 between the TFG and the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), an Islamic fundamentalist organization. The TFG forces along with the Ethiopian forces deployed in Somalia at the request of the TFG, brought order to the south central area including the capital of Mogadishu in January 2007. In the same month, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was established. Although armed attacks against the TFG and Ethiopian forces continued, the peace agreement was signed between the TFG and Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) which was formed by UIC and other groups, this June in Djibouti, on condition of the dispatch of U.N. peacekeeping operation within 120 days and the withdrawal of the Ethiopian forces. However, the situation remains fragile, as piracy and armed robbery acts occurring in the surrounding waters of Somalia exacerbate the country's situation[37], making it difficult to predict.

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

The Impact of Climate Change on the Security Environment

In November 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) of the United Nations announced a report claiming that warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice, and rising global average sea level.

Against a background of increasing interest in climate change caused by global warming, a movement to consider the impact of climate change on security has become pervasive. In April 2007, a panel discussion on the impact of climate change on security was held at the U.N. Security Council, in which 55 nations including non-Council member states participated, representing the above-mentioned movement. In addition, at the EU Summit in March 2008, a report proposing enhancement of crisis management capabilities including military to contribute to the response to the security risks posed by climate change was submitted and placed on the agenda. Furthermore, climate change was raised as a potential security threat in the British National Security Strategy published in March 2008.

As pointed out in these discussions and documents, climate change is believed to have a wide range of impacts on the security environment.

For example, the lack of water, food, and land caused by rising sea level and increasing extraordinary weather, combined with population growth, is believed to trigger large-scale migrations, thereby inciting and worsening ethnic and religious antagonisms and resource-related conflicts. The Darfur crisis may be attributed to the migration of Arabic nomads facing serious droughts and land scarcity caused by climate change into the neighborhoods where black inhabitants follow the plow.

In addition, increasing extraordinary weather is believed to increase large-scale disasters. Accordingly, each country's military is expected to have more opportunities to be dispatched for such duties as rescue operations, humanitarian and reconstruction assistance operations, and security duties. The U.S. has pointed out the importance of military support as its own lessons learned from dealing with Hurricane Katrina in August 2005.

Furthermore, as melting of sea ice in the Arctic Sea can lead to easier access to undersea resources, coastal nations, trying to ensure ocean interests, begin to embark on seafloor investigations to claim extension of continental shelves and enhance military posture in the Arctic areas.

Thus, the perception that climate change can affect the security environment in various ways has been increasingly shared. It is important for Japan to pay attention to the impact of climate change on the security environment.

Notes:

1) The U.S. "National Intelligence Estimate" (July 2007), and the "2008 Annual Threat Assessment" of the Director for National Intelligence (February 2008), point out that the leaders of Al Qaeda are being harbored in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of the Pakistan border region.
2) Three of the four suicide bombers were sons of Pakistani immigrants and the fourth was born in Jamaica; all were British nationals.
3) Under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001), the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established with the principal mission of maintaining security in Kabul and surrounding areas. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1510 (October 13, 2003) gradually expanded the area of deployment from December 2003. In October 2006 it covered the entire territory of Afghanistan. As of April 2008, approximately 47,000 troops from 40 countries have been dispatched to the ISAF.
4) The Pakistan-Afghanistan Joint Declaration adopted on the occasion of the official visit to Pakistan of President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan on December 26, 2007.
5) "2008 Annual Threat Assessment" of the Director for National Intelligence of the U.S. (February 2008).
6) Comment made during a press conference on December 21, 2007, by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates.
7) "2008 Annual Threat Assessment" of the Director for National Intelligence of the U.S. (February 2008).
8) Testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on June 6, 2007, by Assistant Secretary of State Welch.
9) For instance, in October 2002, terrorist bomb attacks in two clubs on the island of Bali killed 202 people. In October 2005, terrorist bomb attacks against restaurants and other locations on the island of Bali killed 23 people.
10) The United States, the former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China. France and China signed the NPT in 1992.
11) Article 6 of the NPT sets out the obligation of signatory countries to negotiate nuclear disarmament in good faith.
12) South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus.
13) Israel, India and Pakistan are non-members.
14) A means of attacking a country's most vulnerable points other than by conventional weapons of war. (e.g. weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, terrorist attacks, cyber attacks, etc.)
15) Former Defense Agency, "Basic Concept for Dealing with Biological Weapons" (January 2002).
16) Mustard gas is a slow-acting erosion agent. Tabun and sarin are fast-acting nerve agents.
17) It was reported that a Kurdish village was attacked with chemical weapons in 1988, killing several thousand people.
18) When this weapon is launched or exploded, two kinds of chemical agents are mixed, generating a lethal chemical agent. The handling and storage of this weapon is easy because its lethality is low before being used.
19) In the July 2006 conflict between Israel and Lebanon, it is believed that Hezbollah used an anti-ship missile to attack an Israeli naval vessel.
20) U.S. Department of Defense "Proliferation: Threat and Response" (January 2001).
21) Dirty bombs are intended to cause radioactive contamination by spreading radioactive substances.
22) J. Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence of the U.S., stated at the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2008 that, "The IC (Intelligence Community) continues to assess that North Korea has pursued a uranium enrichment capability at least in the past, and judges with at least moderate confidence that the effort continues today."

23) Statement made by U.S. White House Press Secretary Dana Perrino (April 24, 2008).
24) In May 2004, a man regarded as the right hand of Dr. A. Q. Khan from the same network was arrested in Malaysia.
25) Statement at a press conference with Japanese reporters (September 29, 2004).
26) James A. Kelly, then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said before the Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 2004: "There are no longer any military dealings between North Korea and Pakistan. However, that was obviously not the case in the past… Iran had some kind of cooperative relationship [with North Korea] in military affairs." "What I can say publicly is limited," he added.
27) Testimony of then Director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency George J. Tenet before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (February 24, 2004).
28) Accusation made by the Deputy Chairman of Ukraine's Parliamentary Committee on Combating Organized Crime and Corruption (February 2, 2005).
29) It is said that the uranium enrichment level for nuclear power generation is 3.5 to 5.0 percent, and for nuclear weapons is 90 percent or more.
30) This urged Iran to abandon its enrichment-related reprocessing in exchange for assistance in a civilian-use nuclear power program that would guarantee a fuel supply for light-water, assistance in the export of civilian aircraft to Iran and parts, and support for Iran's admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO), etc.
31) This resolution blocks the supply, sale or transfer to Iran of materials and technology that could contribute to Iran's enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water-related activities and freezes financial assets of persons or entities supporting its proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear activities or the development of nuclear-weapons delivery systems.
32) In addition to the above measures, this resolution freezes assets of additional persons or entities, bans procurement of weapons and related items from materials by Iran, and monitors/restricts the supply, sale or transfer of tanks, fighter aircraft, missiles and other such armaments to Iran.
33) In addition to the above measures, this resolution freezes assets of additional persons or entities and bans the entry of designated individuals into U.N. member states, for their involvement in Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
34) Congressional testimony by General Petraeus, the Commanding General, Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I) April 2008.
35) "2008 Annual Threat Assessment" of the Director for National Intelligence of the U.S. (February 2008).
36) Vice President Hashimi of Iraq stated in a press conference on March 18, 2008, that if U.S. forces were to withdraw, it would result in the security situation being left in a vacuum, which would lead to a further deterioration in security.
37) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1816 determines that incidents of piracy and armed robbery in the territorial waters of Somalia and the high seas off the coast of Somalia exacerbate the situation in Somalia, and, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Council decided that States cooperating with Somalia's Transitional Federal Government may take all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery within the territorial waters of Somalia.

Part I

Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Chapter 2

National Defense Policies of Countries

Section 1. The United States
Section 2. Korean Peninsula
Section 3. China
Section 4. Russia
Section 5. Southeast Asia
Section 6. South Asia
Section 7. Australia
Section 8. Europe
Section 9. Efforts to Stabilize the International Community by the U.N. and Other Scheme

Section 1. The United States

1. Security and Defense Policies

The United States recognizes that even with its geographic insularity surrounded by uncontested borders and shielded by two oceans, the insularity no longer confers security for the country against direct attacks, as the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks showed. Against this backdrop, the United States has decided to give top priority in its national security to homeland defense.

The National Security Strategy[1] released in March 2006 states that the United States can protect its nation by leading efforts of the international community to end tyranny and promote democracy. The United States, however, cannot achieve such idealistic goals alone, and so it is committed to taking a realistic approach that relies on cooperation with allies, partners, and the international community.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)[2] released in February 2006 states that the United States is in a "long war" against terrorist networks and needs to reorient the capabilities of U.S. forces to address the new security challenges and to improve capabilities dealing with irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges (See 1 below) while sustaining capabilities to address traditional challenges.

Furthermore, the QDR repeatedly stresses that, as the Department of Defense cannot independently win the "long war" that the United States faces today, it is essential to bear all elements of national power at home and to work in close cooperation with allies and partners abroad.

1. Assessment of Security Environment

The United States considers that the security environment of today is different from that of the Cold War era in that it is difficult to predict who, where, and when will pose threats to and attack the United States, while during the Cold War the Soviet Union was clearly recognized as the enemy. The National Defense Strategy[3] identifies four challenges that the United States is expected to face in today's uncertain security environment in the course of protecting its freedom and interests. These challenges overlap, and can occur simultaneously.

1) Traditional challenges: Threats of military conflicts among nations employing conventional forces;
2) Irregular challenges: Threats employing such irregular methods as terrorism and insurgency to erode U.S. influence;
3) Catastrophic challenges: Threats involving the acquisition, possession, and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or methods producing WMD-like effects;
4) Disruptive challenges: Threats coming from adversaries who are seeking to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities by using technology, etc., to offset the present U.S. advantage on the account of technical advancement in the fields of biotechnology, cyber operations, space weapons, and such.

2. Defense Strategy

The United States outlines the strategic objectives in the security environment as follows: 1) securing the United States from direct attack; 2) securing strategic access and retaining global freedom of action; 3) strengthening alliances and partnerships; and 4) establishing favorable security conditions. In addition, the National Defense Strategy describes the following four measures to accomplish these strategic objectives:

1) Assure allies and friends by fulfilling alliance and other defense commitments;
2) Dissuade potential enemies from adopting threatening capabilities, methods and ambitions by sustaining and developing the military advantage of the United States;
3) Deter aggression and coercion by maintaining capable and rapidly deployable military forces and, when necessary, demonstrating the strong will to resolve conflicts;
4) Defeat adversaries by employing military power, as necessary, together with other instruments when deterrence fails.

Furthermore, the National Defense Strategy shows the following four implementation guidelines to be followed in pursuing the aforementioned strategic goals:

1) Active, layered defense: It is necessary to defeat challenges to the United States early and at a safe distance. Therefore, preventive actions such as security cooperation, forward deterrence, and non-proliferation initiatives are critical. As these actions cannot be implemented solely by the United States, cooperation with allies and friends is essential. It is also necessary to improve the capabilities to defend the homeland by strengthening missile defense and other defensive measures.
2) Continuous transformation[4]: In order that the United States ensures its advantage, it is necessary to continuously transform U.S. forces by changing long-standing business processes within the Department of Defense and its relationship with interagency and international partners as well as methods of fighting (concepts or warfare, definition of threat, operation style, organization, and composition of weapons).
3) "Capabilities-based" approach: In the current security environment, it is difficult to predict when and where threats to the United States will emerge. However, it is possible to predict the capabilities that enemies will employ to attack the United States. Therefore, the United States focuses on what capabilities are needed to counter enemy capabilities.
4) Managing risks: The United States identifies various risks that may arise in pursuing the strategic objectives with limited resources, and controls them properly[5].

3. Priority Areas for Capability Development

The 2006 QDR states that it is necessary to improve capabilities dealing with irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges while sustaining capabilities to address traditional challenges on the basis of the security environment and the defense strategy described above. Specifically, it lists the following four priority areas for capability development:

1) Defeating terrorist networks: In order to win the fight against terrorism, it is necessary to deter the terrorist networks from securing their sanctuaries by attacking them relentlessly. Therefore, in addition to developing intelligence gathering capabilities and special operation capabilities, U.S. forces strengthen their cooperation with interagency partners and provide training to security forces of other countries. To defeat terrorist networks in a battle of ideas as well as in a battle of arms, U.S. forces will strengthen their Strategic Communication and improve language and cultural awareness.
2) Defending the homeland in depth: In order to cope with threats to the homeland of the United States, it is essential to strengthen cooperation with interagency partners as well as to maintain the posture to deter invasion. To implement this, U.S. forces need not only to strengthen their deterrence by missile defense and other defense measures, but also to increase capabilities of consequence management in response to emergencies.
3) Shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads: While the United States encourages the countries that have the potential to affect future security to become constructive partners by expanding its security cooperation and other measures, it hedges against the possibility that cooperative approaches may fail by strengthening the capabilities of allies and partners, further diversifying its basing posture, and maintaining its military primacy in key areas.

4) Preventing the acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction: The United States needs to take both preventive and responsive measures so that it addresses the threat of WMD by adversaries. U.S. forces develop capabilities to lessen the damage in case of WMD attacks while they strengthen their capabilities to identify and track WMD and their related materials as preventive measures. (See Fig. I-2-1-1)

Fig. I-2-1-1 The Four Challenges and Priority Areas of 2006 QDR



4. Force Planning

The 2001 QDR described that the United States adopted an approach to construct its forces for the following four objectives: 1) to defend the United States; 2) to maintain forward-deployed forces in four critical regions (Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asia littoral, and the Middle East/Southwest Asia); 3) to defeat adversaries swiftly in two types of operation in overlapping time frames and to defeat an adversary decisively in one of the two theaters; and 4) to conduct a limited number of small-scale contingencies.

However, since the lessons learned from experiences in the fight against terrorism suggest that U.S. forces need to operate around the globe and not only in and from the four critical regions and that "swiftly defeating" or "winning decisively" against adversaries may be less useful for some types of operations, such as a long duration, irregular warfare campaign, the 2006 QDR concludes that while continuing to take the capabilities-based approach, the United States has refined its force planning construct, dividing its activities into three objective areas: 1) homeland defense; 2) fight against terrorism/irregular (asymmetric) warfare; and 3) conventional campaigns.

1) Homeland defense: In steady state, U.S. forces deter external threats to the homeland of the United States and

provide necessary support to interagency partners by conducting joint training and other measures so that they can contribute to homeland defense. In surge, they respond to attacks by means of WMD and other weapons, and also take measures to minimize the damage from them.

2) War on terror/irregular warfare: In steady state, U.S. forces deter transnational terrorist attacks through forward-deployed forces, and also strengthen capabilities of allies and friends and conduct counterinsurgency operations. In surge they conduct a potentially long-duration irregular warfare campaign, whose level of effort is equal to that of the operations presently conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan.

3) Conventional campaigns: In steady state, U.S. forces deter invasions or coercion by other countries through forward-deployed forces, and also strengthen capabilities of allies and friends through security cooperation such as military exchanges and joint exercises. In surge, they wage two nearly simultaneous conventional campaigns (or one conventional campaign if already engaged in a large-scale, long-duration irregular campaign), while reinforcing deterrence against opportunistic acts of aggression. (See Fig. I-2-1-2)

Fig. I-2-1-2 Concept for Force Planning in 2006 QDR



5. Defense Posture Review of U.S. Forces

The United States is currently working on the review of its global defense posture. The Bush administration explained in August 2004 that, over the next 10 years, the plan "will bring home about 60,000 to 70,000 uniformed personnel and approximately 100,000 family members and civilian employees." By reviewing the posture of its forces, the United States will redeploy most of its large-scale forces that have been stationed forward to cope

with threats in the Cold War era to homeland, and strengthen its cooperation with allies and others, while making efforts to further improve rapid reaction capabilities by moving its most rapidly deployable forces forward in case of emergencies in unpredictable locations. Also, by capitalizing on force transformation, the United States aims to improve the capabilities of the forward-deployed force, while attempting to restore the morale and readiness of the military forces by sending many service members who are stationed abroad back to the United States. (See Fig. I-2-1-3)

Fig. I-2-1-3 U.S. Forces Deployment Status



Note: Materials are taken from published documents of the U.S. Department of Defense (as of December 31, 2007) and others.

As specific measures in this posture review, in Europe the United States will deploy Striker Brigade Combat Teams[6], reinforce the airborne brigade, and create a joint task force as well as build new bases and training facilities in Eastern European countries. On the other hand, with regard to personnel, two army divisions will be sent back to the homeland and U.S. forces stationed in Europe will be reduced to 24,000 personnel[7]. However, as preparations for the living quarters of troops returning home remain unfinished, and due to security requisites in the European theater, it has been decided that the plan to reduce two U.S. brigade combat teams in Germany will be postponed for several years[8].

As for Asia, the United States announced that it would improve the capabilities of U.S. forces to deter, dissuade, and defeat challenges in the region through strengthened long-range strike capability, streamlined and consolidated headquarters, and a network of access agreements. Specifically, the United States is working on: 1) the forward stationing of additional expeditionary maritime capabilities in the Pacific[9]; 2) deployment of advanced strike assets in the Western Pacific[10]; 3) restructuring U.S. military presence and command structure in Northeast Asia (See Section 2-3 and Part II, Chapter 2; and 4) establishing a network of sites to provide training opportunities and contingency access in Central and Northeast Asia[11].

In Africa, in October 2007, the United States established the United States Africa Command with the area of responsibility covering Africa, which was previously covered by three Commands – the U.S. European

Command, U.S. Central Command and U.S. Pacific Command – and preliminary operations were launched under European Command[12]. U.S. Africa Command is a joint command that aims to improve the capacity of African nations to deal with conflicts in their own region, through the provision of military assistance in the form of training for peacekeeping, etc., and the purpose of its establishment is to help African leaders to deal with Africa's problems[13].

6. Nuclear Strategy

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) announced in 2002 declares a U.S. shift in nuclear force planning from an approach based on threats of Russia: the United States should maintain the minimum required nuclear forces for the security of the United States, its allies, and friends, and the United States must have new deterrent force composed of nuclear forces, conventional forces, and defense systems (missile defense). The NPR asserts that deterrence should shift from the old triad in the Cold War era comprising: 1) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM); 2) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM); and 3) strategic bombers; to a new triad of: 1) non-nuclear and nuclear strike capabilities; 2) active and passive defense systems; and 3) defense infrastructure (defense industry, procurement system, and others). The new triad depends less on nuclear weapons by emphasizing the importance of missile defense and conventional forces (advanced weapons in particular), and makes deterrence more reliable in an environment where WMD are proliferating. The 2006 QDR follows the concept of the new triad defined in the NPR and declares that the United States holds a wider range of conventional strike capabilities and missile defense capabilities, while maintaining a nuclear deterrent[14]. The Secretary of Defense is to review the NPR within 2009 and to submit a report to Congress based on the National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2008[15].

7. FY 2009 Budget

The United States faces the challenge of how to distribute limited resources between the dual requirements of fighting the war on terror and securing its military advantage into the future. The defense budget for FY 2009 represents the base budget of the Department of Defense, excluding the budget for the Global War on Terror (GWOT), and attaches importance to: 1) maintaining a highly trained fighting force and increasing ground forces; 2) improving quality of life for personnel and families such as pay increases and health care; 3) procuring

Fig. I-2-1-4 U.S. Defense Budget



Note: Expenses are shown in the Department of Defense Budget based on Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2009; the amount for FY 2008 is an estimate

and maintaining an arsenal of the world's most advanced weapon systems; 4) improving war fighting capabilities and investing in science and technology; 5) maintaining facilities at sites in the U.S. and around the globe; and 6) maintaining vital intelligence capabilities. The concluded budget for FY 2009 represents an increase in legislative terms of 7.5%, amounting to $515.4 billion.

Furthermore, the budget for the GWOT has been included in the Department of Defense base budget from FY 2008, and as an emergency allowance for the GWOT the defense budget for FY 2009 has allocated $70 billion[16]. (See Fig. I-2-1-4)

2. Military Posture

Regarding nuclear forces, the United States completed the reduction of the number of its strategic nuclear weapons in accordance with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) by December 2001, the deadline set in the treaty. The current nuclear forces of the United States consist of 550 ICBMs, 14 SSBNs (Ballistic Missile Submarine, Nuclear-Powered), 432 SLBMs, 113 strategic bombers, and 5,914 nuclear warheads. In addition the United States intends to decrease the number of its operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by the end of 2012 in accordance with the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty ("Moscow Treaty"). Furthermore, in December 2007, President Bush approved a significant reduction in the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile by the end of 2007[17].

The U.S. ground forces consist of approximately 520,000 soldiers, and approximately 190,000 marines, which are forward-deployed in Germany, the ROK and Japan, among other countries. To cope with the fight against terrorism, U.S. ground forces are reorganizing their combat and support troops into brigade-sized modular units[18]. The U.S. Marine Corps is enhancing its special operations forces, which have been playing an important role in the fight against terrorism and in military operations in Iraq. It newly established the Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC[19]) in February 2006, thereby improving its ability to cope with irregular warfare. Furthermore, to meet operational demands in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in order to expand the capabilities of armed forces and to reduce stress on the force and the personnel caused by deployment in the GWOT, the U.S. government asked Congress that ground forces be increased by 65,000 and Marine Corps forces by 27,000, with Army end strength being increased to 547,000 and Marine Corps end strength to 202,000 by 2012[20].

SM-3 launched from the U.S. cruiser to shoot down an uncontrollable reconnaissance satellite (February 21, 2008) [U.S. Department of Defense]

U.S. maritime forces consist of approximately 950 vessels (including approximately 70 submarines) totaling about 5.77 million tons. The 2nd Fleet is deployed to the Atlantic Ocean, the 6th Fleet to the Mediterranean Sea, the 5th Fleet to the Persian Gulf, Red Sea and northwest Indian Ocean, the 3rd Fleet to the eastern Pacific, and the 7th Fleet to the western Pacific and Indian Ocean. It has been announced that the 4th Fleet, which has jurisdiction over Central and South America, the Caribbean and surrounding waters, will be redeployed from July 2008[21]. In addition, the 2006 QDR announces that the United States will deploy at least six operationally available and sustainable carriers and 60% of its submarines in the Pacific in order to increase its military presence in the ocean.

The U.S. air forces consist of roughly 3,940 combat aircraft across the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. In addition to carrier-based aircraft deployed at sea, part of the tactical air force is forward-deployed in Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan and the ROK. In the 2006 QDR, it is noted that the United States will strengthen its offensive capabilities with conventional weapons by developing a

new land-based, penetrating long-range strike capability to be fielded by 2018, modernizing B-52, B-1, and B-2 bombers, and accelerating the procurement of unmanned aerial vehicles. On the other hand, it states that the number of the Air Force end strength will be reduced by about 40,000 full-time equivalent personnel.

As for mobility to deploy U.S. forces to distant locations, the United States is procuring C-17 transport aircraft and modernizing C-5 transport aircraft to improve the transport capabilities of the forces[22], and pre-positioning equipment at various theaters.

Furthermore, the United States is aiming to introduce a Missile Defense (MD) system to Europe around 2011 or 2012, and negotiations are ongoing with the Czech Republic and Poland with regard to the partial deployment of the system in their territories[23].

The U.S. forces are increasingly depending on space systems for intelligence collection and communications. The country announced the U.S. National Space Policy in 2006, in which it states that space capabilities are vital to its national interests and that it will preserve its freedom of action in space, deter others from impeding its space systems, take those actions necessary to protect its space systems, and deny, if necessary, the use of space that is hostile to the United States[24].

3. Military Posture in the Asia-Pacific Region

The United States, which is also a Pacific nation, continues to play an important role in ensuring the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region by deploying the Pacific Command, a joint command consisting of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

The Army is composed of two divisions and deploys a total of approximately 18,000 personnel split between the 25th Infantry Division deployed in Hawaii, and the 2nd Infantry Division and 19th Sustainment Command in the ROK, in addition to approximately 2,000 personnel in Japan, including from the I Corps (Forward) and the Commander, U.S. Forces Japan[25].

The Navy consists of the 7th Fleet, which is in charge of the area including the western Pacific and Indian Ocean, and the 3rd Fleet, which is in charge of the area including the eastern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, under the Pacific Fleet, the headquarters of which is located in Hawaii, totaling approximately 180 vessels. The 7th Fleet is comprised mainly of one carrier strike group, with main bases in Japan and Guam. Its major mission is to defend and protect the territory, citizens, sea lanes, allies, and other vital interests of the United States, and ships assigned to the Pacific Fleet including carriers, amphibious ships, and Aegis cruisers.

The Marine Corps deploys one Marine Expeditionary Force in each of the U.S. mainland and Japan under the Pacific Marine Corps, which has its headquarters in Hawaii. Of this force approximately 14,000 personnel are in the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, which is equipped with F/A-18 and other aircraft and are both deployed in Japan. In addition, maritime pre-positioning ships loaded with heavy equipment and others are deployed in the western Pacific.

The Air Force deploys three air forces under the Pacific Air Force, the headquarters of which is in Hawaii. It deploys three air wings equipped with F-15, F-16, and C-130 aircraft in the 5th Air Force stationed in Japan, and two air wings equipped with F-16 fighters in the 7th Air Force stationed in the ROK.

Section 2. Korean Peninsula

On the Korean Peninsula, people of the same ethnicity have been divided into two – north and south – for more than half a century. Even today, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea pit their ground forces of about 1.5 million against each other across the demilitarized zone (DMZ).

Maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is vital for the peace and stability of the entire East Asian region, to say nothing of Japan. (See Fig. I-2-2-1)

Fig. I-2-2-1 Military Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula



		North Korea	ROK	U.S. Forces in ROK
Total armed forces		Approx. 1,100,000 personnel	Approx. 690,000 personnel	Approx. 26,000 personnel
Army	Ground troops	Approx. 1,000,000 personnel	Approx. 560,000 personnel	Approx. 18,000 personnel
	Battle tanks	T-62, T-54/-55, etc. Approx. 3,500	88, M-47, M-48, etc. Approx. 2,330	M-1 Approx. 120
Navy	Naval vessels	Approx. 650; 107,000 tons	Approx. 180; 153,000 tons	Supporting corps only
	Destroyers		7	
	Frigates	3	9	
	Submarines	23	10	
	Marines		2 divisions; approx. 28,000 personnel	
Air Force	Combat aircraft	Approx. 590	Approx. 610	Approx. 60
	3rd and 4th generation fighters	Mig-23×46 Mig-29×20 Su-25×34	F-4×130 F-16×152 F-15×40	F-16×40
Reference	Population	Approx. 23,300,000	Approx. 49,000,000	
	Military service	Army: 5-12 years Navy: 5-10 years Air Force: 3-4 years	Army: 24 months Navy: 26 months Air Force: 27 months	

Note: The Military Balance 2008, etc.

1. North Korea

North Korea has been advocating the construction of a "powerful and prosperous nation" as its basic national policy, aiming to create a strong socialist state in all areas – ideology, politics, military affairs, and economy – and it adopts "military-first politics" to realize this goal. The "military-first politics" has been defined as a form of leadership that advances the great undertaking of socialism by resolving all problems that arise in the revolution and national construction on the principle of military first and stressing the importance of the armed forces as the pillar of the revolution[26]. Indeed, General Secretary of the Korean Workers' Party Kim Jong Il is in a position to completely control North Korea's military forces as Chairman of the National Defense Commission[27] and regularly visits military forces. It would appear that he intends to continue running the country by attaching importance to, and relying on, the military forces.

Although North Korea faces serious economic difficulties to this day and depends on the international community for food and other resources, the country seems to be maintaining and enhancing its military capabilities and combat readiness by preferentially allocating resources to its military forces. For example, military personnel represent a high proportion of the population, with active-service military personnel estimated to account for nearly 5% of the overall population[28]. It is noteworthy that North Korea deploys most of its armed forces along the DMZ. According to the official announcement made at the Supreme People's Assembly in April this year, the proportion of defense budget in this year's national budget is 15.8%, but it is estimated that the official defense budget represents only a portion of real defense expenditures.

Furthermore, North Korea seems to maintain and reinforce its so-called asymmetric military capabilities by developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles and by maintaining large-scale special operation forces.

North Korea's military behavior has increased tension over the Korean Peninsula, and constitutes a serious destabilizing factor for the entire East Asian region, including Japan.

1. WMD and Ballistic Missiles

Concerning WMD, issues of North Korea's nuclear weapons program have been pointed out, as well as its chemical and biological weapons capabilities. In particular, North Korea's nuclear issue has serious influence on Japan's national security and it is also a critical problem for the entire international community in terms of non-proliferation of WMD[29].

As for ballistic missiles, North Korea seems to be conducting R&D to extend the range and to use solid fuel[30]. Also, it has been pointed out that North Korea is proliferating ballistic missiles. Combined with the nuclear issue, North Korea's missile issue is thus becoming a destabilizing factor not only for the Asia-Pacific region but also for the entire international community, and there are strong concerns about the movement of the country.

Furthermore, following the launch of seven ballistic missiles on July 5, 2006, North Korea claimed to have conducted a nuclear test on October 9 of the same year[31]. These series of acts by North Korea pose serious threats to the peace and stability not only of Japan but also of East Asia and the international community, and have evoked considerable debate in Japan.

(1) Nuclear Weapons

With regard to suspicions over North Korea's development of nuclear weapons, the Agreed Framework[32] signed between the United States and North Korea in 1994 once showed a roadmap to settle this issue through dialogue.

However, in October 2002, the announcement by the United States that North Korea had acknowledged the existence of a uranium-enrichment program for nuclear weapons raised concerns among the international community over North Korea's nuclear issue. In this situation, North Korea announced in December 2002 that it

would resume operations at its nuclear-related facilities in Yongbyon that had been frozen under the Agreed Framework, and, at the end of February 2003, it was confirmed that the operation of the graphite-moderated nuclear reactor (5-MW nuclear reactor)[33] in Yongbyon had been resumed. Subsequently, North Korea claimed that it needed to maintain a "nuclear deterrent" and indicated reprocessing of spent fuel rods[34] in April 2003, declared completion of the reprocessing of spent fuel rods in October 2003, released the statement of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs that North Korea had already produced nuclear weapons in February 2005, and announced completion of the extraction of 8,000 spent fuel rods from the restarted graphite-moderated nuclear reactor in May 2005. Thus, North Korea has increased international tensions through its words and actions.

Meanwhile, in pursuit of a peaceful solution to this problem and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Six-Party Talks[35] have been held since August 2003. At the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks in 2005, a joint statement was adopted for the first time, which stated the verifiable abandonment of "all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs" by North Korea. Subsequently, however, North Korea strongly reacted to the United States' designation of a bank in Macao dealing with North Korea as a "financial institution of primary money laundering concern," suspended its participation in the Six-Party Talks, and, in 2006, launched seven ballistic missiles and announced that it had implemented a nuclear test. Against these actions by North Korea, which further increased international tensions, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolutions 1695 and 1718 imposing sanctions on North Korea. In December 2006, North Korea finally returned to the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks and, in February 2007, the parties reached an agreement on "Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement" to implement the joint statement made at the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks. After the initial actions including shutting down of nuclear facilities in Yongbyon had been implemented, in October 2007, the "Second-phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement" were announced as the outcome of the sixth round of the Talks. The agreement includes completion of the disablement of nuclear facilities in Yongbyon and "a complete and correct declaration of all its (North Korea's) nuclear programs" by the end of 2007. However, the implementation of the agreement has not been completed.

Regarding North Korea's response to the nuclear issues described above, some people argue that it is resorting to brinkmanship by intentionally heightening tension to receive compensation. Others argue that North Korea's ultimate objective is to possess nuclear weapons. Because the ultimate goal of North Korea is believed to be the maintenance of its existing regime, it appears that the two foregoing views are not incompatible.

In light of the series of North Korea's words as well as the fact that North Korea's suspected development of nuclear weapons is not yet elucidated, the possibility that North Korea has already made considerable progress in its nuclear weapons program cannot be excluded[36]. In addition, it was concluded in 2006 that the probability that North Korea had conducted a nuclear test was extremely high (See note 31). This implies that there is a high possibility that the country has further advanced its nuclear weapons program. In general, downsizing of a nuclear weapon enough to be loaded on a ballistic missile requires an extremely high degree of technological capacity. However, considering the fact that the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China succeeded in acquiring such technology as early as the 1960s, it is difficult to eliminate the possibility that North Korea, in a relatively short time, has realized downsizing of nuclear weapons and deployment of nuclear warheads[37]. It is necessary to keep an eye on all related developments.

(2) Biological and Chemical Weapons

Because North Korea is an extremely closed country and most materials, equipment, and technology used for manufacturing biological and chemical weapons are for dual-use, which makes camouflage quite easy, details of biological and chemical weapons developed or held by North Korea are not clear. However, it is believed that North Korea has a certain level of production base for biological weapons although it ratified the Biological Weapons Convention in 1987. As for chemical weapons, it is estimated that North Korea has several facilities capable of producing chemical agents and has substantial stocks of such agents. It has not acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention[38].

(3) Ballistic Missiles

It is believed that, since the middle of the 1980s, North Korea has manufactured and deployed Scud B and Scud C[39], a variant of Scud B with extended range, and has exported these missiles to Middle Eastern countries and others. By the 1990s, North Korea allegedly began developing longer-range ballistic missiles, such as Nodong missiles. It is highly probable that the ballistic missile that North Korea test-launched over the Sea of Japan in 1993 was a Nodong missile. In 1998, North Korea launched a ballistic missile based on Taepodong-1 over Japan. Furthermore, on July 5, 2006, completely lifting its freeze on the launch of ballistic missiles since 1999, North Korea fired seven ballistic missiles. The third missile is assessed to have been Taepodong-2 and others to be Scud and Nodong missiles. The launches of the Scud and Nodong missiles displayed more operational characteristics, which implies that the operational capacity of North Korea's ballistic missiles has been improved. (See Fig. I-2-2-2)

Fig. I-2-2-2 Improvements in North Korea's Ballistic Missile Operational Capabilities

Examples of the characteristics of the Scud and Nodong launches in July 2006
❍ Launches began before dawn ❍ Different types of ballistic missiles were launched in a row within a short period of time ❍ Transporter-Erector-Launchers (TELs) were used ❍ Ballistic missiles with different ranges landed within a certain geographical area

Partly because North Korea is an extremely closed country, details of its ballistic missiles are still unclear. It, however, appears that North Korea gives high priority to ballistic missiles in terms of enhancing its military capabilities, political and diplomatic consideration, and earning foreign currency[40]. At present, the country is believed to be developing a new intermediate-range ballistic missile and a new solid propellant short-range ballistic missile[41] in addition to existing inventory of ballistic missiles. Also, it is necessary to pay attention to the possibility that North Korea is improving existing Scuds and Nodongs, for example, to extend their ranges. (See Fig. I-2-2-3)

It appears that Nodong, which is believed to have already been deployed, is a liquid propellant single-stage ballistic missile. It is assessed to have a range of about 1,300km, and may reach almost all parts of Japan. Nodong specifications have not been confirmed in detail, but, as it is believed to be based on the Scud technology, it seems, for example, not to have the accuracy to carry out pinpoint attacks on specific target installations.

Because it is extremely difficult to verify the intention of North Korea's military activities due to its closed system, it is believed that underground military facilities have been constructed across the country, and Nodong, as is the case with Scud, is thought to be loaded onto a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) and operated with mobility, it would be difficult to detect concrete signs of a Nodong launch in advance, such as its specific launch site and timing.

Fig. I-2-2-3 Missile Ranges from North Korea



Note: Jane's, etc.

Also, North Korea has been developing Taepodong-1 with an estimated range of at least 1,500km. The Taepodong-1 missile is assumed to be a two-stage, liquid propellant ballistic missile with a Nodong as its first stage and a Scud as its second stage. The missile launched in 1998 is assessed to be based on Taepodong-1. It is surmised that North Korea was able to verify the performance of the technology concerning separation of a multistage booster, altitude control, and thrust control through the launch. North Korea seems to have shifted focus to the development of Taepodong-2 with a longer range: Taepodong-1 might have been a transitory product to develop Taepodong-2.

In July 2006, North Korea launched a Taepodong-2 missile from the Taepodong district located in the northeastern coastal area of the country. The missile is believed to be a two-stage missile with a new booster as its first stage and a Nodong as its second stage, and with a range of approximately 6,000km. It seemed to fail in mid-flight at a height of several kilometers after several tens of seconds without separating the first stage and fell near the launch site. North Korea, however, would learn lessons from this failure and would continue to extend the range of its ballistic missiles. It might even develop derivative missiles of Taepodong-2[42].

As the background of North Korea's rapid strides in the development of its ballistic missiles with only a few test launches, it is assumed that the country imported various materials and technologies from outside. It is pointed out that North Korea transfers and proliferates ballistic missiles or related technologies including the main body of Nodong and its related technologies to Iran and Pakistan, and that North Korea promotes the development of missiles using funds procured by such transfer and proliferation[43]. In light of this, it is necessary to monitor the transfer and proliferation of ballistic missiles by North Korea in addition to the development and deployment of the missiles.

2. Military Posture

(1) General Situation

North Korea has been building up its military capabilities in accordance with the Four Military Guidelines (extensive training for all the soldiers, modernizing all the armed forces, arming the entire population, and fortifying the entire country)[44].

North Korea's armed forces are comprised mainly of ground forces, with total troop strength of roughly 1.1 million. North Korea is believed to have been maintaining and enhancing its military capabilities and operational readiness, and it seems to have continued infiltration exercises[45]. However, most of its equipment is outdated.

Meanwhile, North Korea has large-scale special operations forces that can conduct various operations ranging from intelligence gathering and sabotage to guerrilla warfare. These forces are assessed to reach approximately 100,000 personnel[46]. Moreover, North Korea seems to have many underground military-related installations across the country.

(2) Military Capabilities

The North Korean Army comprises about one million personnel, and roughly two-thirds of them are believed to be deployed along the DMZ. The main body of the army is infantry, but the army also maintains armored and artillery forces including at least 3,500 tanks. North Korea is believed to deploy long-range artillery along the DMZ, such as 240mm multiple launch rockets and 170mm self-propelled guns, which can reach cities and bases in the northern part of the ROK including the capital city of Seoul.

The navy has about 650 ships with total displacement of approximately 107,000 tons and is chiefly made of small naval vessels such as high-speed missile crafts. Also, it has about 20 Romeo class submarines, about 60 midget submarines, and about 140 air cushioned landing crafts, the latter two of which are believed to be used for infiltration and transportation of the special operation forces.

The Air Force has about 590 combat aircraft, most of which are out-of-date models made in China or the former Soviet Union, but some fourth-generation aircraft such as MiG-29s and Su-25s are also included. North Korea has a large number of outdated An-2s as well, which are believed to be used for transportation of special operation forces.

North Korea continues to give various types of training to its forces to maintain and strengthen their operational readiness. Meanwhile, given the serious food situation, the military forces seem to be engaged in agricultural assistance as well.

3. Domestic Affairs

Some point out that in recent years North Korea's regime is not as stable as in previous years due to loosening of social control resulting from both an increasing disparity between the rich and the poor and a trend of money-worshipping, and declining military morale. However, in view of the fact that national events[47] and diplomatic negotiations have been held in an orderly manner, the regime based around Kim Jong Il, Chairman of the National Defense Commission, is considered to be still on the right track.

On the economic front, North Korea has been facing chronic economic stagnation and energy-food shortages in recent years as a result of a number of factors including fragility of its socialistic planned economy and

decreased economic cooperation with the former Soviet Union and East European countries following the end of the Cold War. In particular, it seems that North Korea still has to rely on food assistance from foreign countries[48]. It is also pointed out that many North Koreans are starving and their sense of morale has declined.

In response to these various economic difficulties, North Korea has tried some limited but realistic reform measures and changes in its economic management systems. It is believed that, since July 2002, North Korea has raised wages and commodity prices and devaluated exchange rates[49]. However, as North Korea is not likely to undertake a structural reform that could damage its current regime, the country would face various difficulties in fundamentally improving its current economic situation.

4. External Relations

Although North Korea has made efforts to improve its external relations, its activities related to nuclear and missile issues have raised international concerns.

The United States made it clear that it would make efforts to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear program in close cooperation with other countries, aiming to resolve the issue through the Six-Party Talks. North Korea has claimed that the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the "dying wish" of Kim Il Sung and promised to abandon "all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs." North Korea, however, continues to criticize various policies of the United States, insisting that the United States has yet to abandon its "hostile policy" toward North Korea. Thus, there exists a significant gap between the two countries' stances. In addition, the United States has repeatedly expressed concerns over the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear-related materials, and the development, deployment, and proliferation of ballistic missiles by North Korea.

Furthermore, the United States has pointed out the unresolved issue of Japanese abductees and North Korea's providing a haven to the hijackers of Yodo in the Country Reports on Terrorism[50]. At the same time, the United States has designated North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism[51].

While international concerns over North Korea have been increasing regarding nuclear and other issues, North Korea and the ROK have continued talks, and economic and human exchanges, including the second North-South Summit Meeting in October 2007 after seven years. On the military front, a defense ministerial meeting was held in November 2007 and generals-level meetings were held on three occasions in 2007. The meetings agreed on military safeguards related to passage, communications, and customs in the Kesong Industrial Zone. Thus, some progress has been seen in military safeguard measures toward North-South cooperative projects. However, following the inauguration of President Lee Myung Bak in the ROK, no further progress has been made in North-South dialogue or exchange.

Concerning relations between North Korea and China, the "China-North Korea Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance" concluded in 1961 is still effective. Since China and the ROK established diplomatic relations in 1992, North Korea's relations with China have seen a change from the close relationship they had enjoyed during the Cold War. Subsequently, however, the leaders of the two countries made mutual visits and the relationship has improved again. Regarding North Korea's nuclear issue, China has repeatedly expressed its support for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and has played an active role in resolving this issue by, for example, acting as chairman of the Six-Party Talks and contributing to the conclusion of agreements. Some, however, point out that the relationship between China and North Korea seems not to be as close as it was.

Although relations between North Korea and Russia have become less close since the end of the Cold War, some signs of improvement have been seen. The two countries signed the "Russia-North Korea Treaty on Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation" in February 2000, which lacked articles on military alliance[52] unlike the previous treaty. Subsequently, in July of the same year, then Russian President Vladimir Putin visited North

Korea. In return, Kim Jong Il, Chairman of the National Defense Commission, visited Russia in 2001 and 2002. Relations between North Korea and Russia have thus been strengthened in recent years.

Since 1999, North Korea has made an effort to establish relations with West European countries and others, including establishment of diplomatic relations with European countries and participation in ARF ministerial meetings. Meanwhile, the EU and ASEAN have traditionally expressed concerns over North Korea's nuclear and other issues.

In order to solve North Korea's nuclear issue, it is important for Japan, the United States, and the ROK to work together. At the same time, other nations such as China and Russia, which are also participants in the Six-Party Talks, and international organizations including the United Nations and the IAEA, should play important roles in this regard.

It is quite natural to prohibit North Korea from possessing nuclear weapons. However, we also have to pay attention to other security concerns regarding North Korea: it is necessary to closely monitor military antagonism on the Korean Peninsula and the development, deployment and proliferation of ballistic missiles by North Korea.

Because North Korea is a closed country, it is difficult to verify the trends of its policies and activities. It is, however, necessary to continue to pay close attention to such trends to understand the true intentions of North Korea.

2. The ROK

1. General Situation

In the ROK, democracy has taken root through such means as the direct presidential election adopted by the 1987 amendment to the constitution. With regard to North Korea, the administration of President Lee Myung Bak, inaugurated in February 2008, upholds a policy of "Vision 3000: Denuclearization and Openness," which plans to offer large-scale economic assistance to North Korea on the premise that the country will abandon its nuclear program and open up its society.

U.S. forces, mainly the Army, have been stationed in the ROK since the ceasefire of the Korean War. The ROK has established close security arrangements with the United States primarily based on the United States-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty. In view of the progress in the North-South relations, improved national strength of the ROK, and changes in the U.S. strategy, the two countries have been committed to solving the issues such as realignment of the U.S. forces stationed in the ROK and transition of the operational control authority in wartime[53] over ROK forces to the ROK. As for the realignment of U.S. forces in the ROK, the relocation of U.S. forces Camp Yongsan located in the center of Seoul to the Pyongtek area in the south of Seoul and the relocation of U.S. forces stationed in the northern side of Han Gang to the southern side of the river were agreed upon in 2003. It has, however, become difficult to complete the relocation to the Pyongtek area by the targeted deadline of the end of 2008 primarily due to delayed purchase of land. As for the transition of the operational control authority in wartime, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the ROK Minister of National Defense agreed at their meeting in February 2007 that the two sides would disestablish the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command and complete the transition to the ROK on April 17, 2012. In talks between the leaders of the U.S. and ROK in April 2008, both countries agreed to develop the ROK-U.S. Alliance into a new strategic alliance conforming to the 21st century. It is necessary to monitor how the transition to a new "supporting-supported" command relationship between the U.S. and ROK forces will be implemented.

To assist U.S.-led military operations in Afghanistan, the ROK had dispatched engineering and medical units, but it put an end to the duty and withdrew these units in December 2007. Regarding the units dispatched to Iraq in response to the request of the United States, the ROK continues the dispatch with the scale reduced to 650,

approximately one-sixth of the initial size. The ROK, however, plans to complete the duties and withdraw by the end of 2008.

Between the ROK and China, efforts have been made to promote military exchanges between the countries, including mutual visits of naval vessels and air force planes. In April 2007, then ROK Minister of National Defense Kim Jang Soo visited China and discussed with then Chinese Minister of National Defense Cao Gangchuan the establishment of hotlines between the navies and air forces of the two countries. At the ROK-China summit meeting held in May 2008, it was agreed for the two countries to upgrade the "all-around cooperative partnership" to a "strategic cooperative partnership." Their relations in the security area, however, remain primitive compared with ones in the other areas, including the economic area.

Between the ROK and Russia, military exchanges have been made in recent years, including exchanges between senior military officers and mutual visits of naval vessels, and the two countries have also concluded agreements on cooperation in the areas of military technology, defense industry, and war materials. In February 2004, the navies of the two countries conducted joint search and rescue exercises for the first time, and, at the ROK-Russia summit meeting held in September 2004, it reached a common understanding that the bilateral relations had been shifted from a "constructive and mutually complementary partnership" to a "comprehensive partnership of mutual trust." In addition, the ROK has been importing tanks and armored vehicles from Russia since 1995 as a part of redemption of debt.

2. Military Affairs

(1) Defense Policies

The ROK has a defensive weakness in that its capital Seoul, where a quarter of the country's population is concentrated, is situated close to the DMZ.

The ROK has set the defense objectives as follows: "defending the nation from external military threats and invasion, upholding the peaceful unification, and contributing to regional stability and world peace." As one of the "external military threats," the ROK had designated North Korea as its "main enemy," but, since the Defense White Paper 2004, North Korea has no longer been described as such[54].

The ROK intends to promote "National Defense Reform 2020" to satisfy its defense needs such as maintenance of its military capabilities in line with the development of information and scientific technologies, balanced development of its Army, Navy, and Air Forces, elimination of inefficiency, and build-up of barrack culture in accordance with social trends. The reform program is based on the following ideas and the bill on the National Defense Reform incorporating the main ideas was enacted in December 2006.

1) Expansion of civilian base for national defense: Establish the structure in which civilians play the central role in deciding and implementing defense policies and the military forces focus on executing combat missions.
2) Build-up of military structure and system of the forces in conformity with characteristics of modern wars: Enhance its war potential by such means as modernizing equipment while reducing the size of the standing forces, mainly the army, from 680,000 personnel to the level of 500,000 personnel and that of reserved troops from 3 million personnel to the appropriate level in line with the reduced size of the standing forces.
3) Reorganization of the national defense management system into a low cost and highly efficient system: Improve the organization and system to ensure transparency of procurement service and expertise, and strengthen infrastructure for computerization, and promote outsourcing in the areas of logistic support.
4) Improvement of barrack culture in accordance with trends of the time: Take measures to improve environment of military personnel's service and establish the system to prevent accidents.

(2) Trends in Defense Build-up

As for the ROK military capacity, the ground forces consist of 22 army divisions and two marine divisions, totaling 590,000 personnel; the naval forces consist of about 180 vessels with a total displacement of approximately 153,000 tons; and the air forces (Air Force and Navy together) of approximately 610 combat aircraft.

In recent years, the ROK has been trying to modernize its Navy and Air Force with the introduction of submarines, large transportation ships[55], multi-role helicopters, and F-15Ks. Also, the ROK plans to procure four Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) by 2012. The ROK is introducing domestically manufactured destroyers (KDX-IIs and KDX-IIIs) and a KDX-III (an Aegis-equipped destroyer) is expected to be put into service in 2008. In addition, the ROK is believed to be promoting domestic production of missiles.

The 2008 defense budget amounts to approximately 26,650 billion won, approximately 8.8% over that of the previous fiscal year. (See Fig. I-2-2-4)

Fig. I-2-2-4 ROK's Defense Budget from FY 2004 to 2008



Note: ROK Defense White Paper 2006 for FY 2004 to 2006; press release from the Ministry of National Defense for FY 2007 and 2008

3. U.S. Forces Stationed in the ROK

Combined with the ROK's own defense efforts, U.S. forces stationed in the country play a vital role in preserving the military balance on the Korean Peninsula and providing a deterrent against large-scale armed conflicts on the peninsula.

The United States has been changing the posture of its forces stationed in the ROK based on the agreement in June 2003 to reposition them to the southern side of Han Gang in two stages and the agreement in October 2004 to reduce the number of its stationed military personnel, approximately 37,500, by 12,500. As for the personnel reduction, at the U.S.-ROK leaders' meeting in April 2008, it was agreed to retain the current level of 28,500 personnel as an appropriate size. In the course of these changes, the United States has invested in modernization of the U.S. forces stationed in the ROK and made efforts to maintain and strengthen the deterrence capabilities of U.S.-ROK allied forces based on the United States-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty. (See Fig. I-2-2-5)

The United States and the ROK have engaged in joint exercises in order to increase their combined defense capabilities in dealing with contingencies on the Korean Peninsula. Among these is the "Foal Eagle" exercise, a large-scale joint logistics support field exercise, which was staged in March 2008 concurrently with the "Key Resolve" joint wartime reinforcing exercise[56].

Fig. I-2-2-5 Agreement on the Transfer and Relocation of the U.S. Forces in ROK



Note: ROK Defense White Paper 2006

Section 3. China

1. General Situation

1. General Situation

China has the world's largest population and a vast landmass surrounded by 14 countries. It has long borderlines and a long coastline facing the Pacific Ocean. China is also a nation with various races, religions, and languages. Most of its ethnic minorities populate the borderlands often with the same ethnic groups living across the borders. China, with a long history, has been shaping and maintaining a distinct culture and civilization, and pride of its unique history and the experiences of semi-colonization after the 19th century is driving a desire for a strong nation as well as fueling their nationalism. China is a state with a socialist regime, and aims at building a modern socialist state under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

In recent years, China has significantly increased its international trade, continued to attract much overseas investment, and the economy is persistently and dramatically growing. However, China faces various domestic hurdles including the great political problem of corruption within central and local communist party leadership. Furthermore, as a result of rapid economic growth, issues such as wealth gaps among urban residents and environmental pollution are emerging, in addition to a widening urban-rural and coastal-inland disparity. Moreover, issues in the future associated with the rapid aging of the population are forecasted to arise. China also has ethnic minority issues, such as the March 2008 clash between minorities and the authorities in the Tibet Autonomous Region that stemmed from minority protests. International attention is paid to China's domestic situation due to the earthquake in May 2008, which caused immense damage mainly in the Sichuan Province and the Beijing Olympics in August. Under the guiding principle of the "Scientific Outlook on Development," the Hu Jintao administration aims to build a "Harmonious Society" as its fundamental policy and is committed to giving priority to the solution of the aforementioned domestic problems[57]. China also aims to improve its current economic structure, where it is dependent on exports abroad and foreign investment creating a dearth of domestic demand, in order to maintain stable economic growth.

On the diplomatic field, it is believed that China is aiming to secure its necessary interests for economic development in order to maintain national stability. These interests include stability in a strategic international environment by sustaining favorable relations with major powers such as the U.S. and Russia, maintaining favorable relations with neighboring countries and stable situations in those countries, and energy supply.

On the military front, China has been modernizing its military capabilities, backed up by the high and constant increase in defense budget. China gives priority to the Taiwan issue as an issue of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and for the time being it will probably aim for the modernization of military capabilities to acquire the capability to prevent some movements including the independence of Taiwan. The military trends of China draw attention from countries in the region, as the country has been steadily growing as a political and economic power in the region.

2. Relations with Taiwan

China holds the principle that Taiwan is a part of China, and that the Taiwan issue is therefore a domestic issue. The country maintains that the "one-China" principle is the underlying premise and foundation for discussions between China and Taiwan. China also claims that it would never abandon efforts for peaceful unification, expressing that it will take policy and measures to solve issues of Taiwanese interest and protect their due authority, while it has also repeatedly stated that it has not renounced the use of force from the standpoint of strong opposition to any intervention in the unification of China by foreign powers as well as any move toward independence. The Anti-Secession Law, enacted in March 2005, provides that China will not renounce the use of force, stating that China will employ non-peaceful means if a serious situation occurs which would lead to Taiwan's separation from China.

Chen Shui-bian, who was inaugurated as president (Democratic Progressive Party) of Taiwan in 2000, took actions strongly oriented to the Taiwanese independence, such as the Campaign for Rectifying the Name of Taiwan, which changed the names of various groups and other entities to "Taiwan," and advocacy of a national referendum for U.N. participation under the name "Taiwan." This incited sharp reaction by China. In comparison, Ma Ying-jeou, who was elected as president (Kuomintang) in March 2008, advocates a policy of pursuing Taiwanese economic development through economic exchange with China and the status quo rather than independence. In May 2008, President Hu Jintao visited Beijing for a meeting with KMT Chairman Wu Po-hsuing, and the two parties agreed on a prompt re-commencement of the dialogue concerning China and Taiwan, and the trends in future China-Taiwan relations will attract attention.

3. Relations with the United States

There are various outstanding problems between the United States and China, such as human rights issues in China, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the Taiwan issue, and trade issues. Also, China appears to be wary of the U.S. inclination towards "unipolarization." However, since a stable U.S.-China relationship is essential for China in building its economy, it is believed that China will wish to maintain that relationship.

The United States believes that international peace and stability and the expansion of free and fair trade are beneficial for China as well as for other countries in the international society, and thus China has a responsibility to support these common interests in cooperation with the United States and other major powers in the world. Based on this recognition, the United States makes it an objective of its policy towards China that China will continue to be its economic partner and become a "responsible stakeholder[58]." At the same time, the United States recognizes that China is facing a strategic crossroads and has the greatest potential in the long run to compete militarily with the United States and build disruptive military technologies that could offset U.S. military advantages. Accordingly, the United States is urging China to become a constructive partner in the international community, while recognizing it necessary to hedge against the case that such effort would fail[59].

In response, Chinese President Hu Jintao stated on his visit to the United States in April 2006 that China shared strategic interests with the United States in a wide range of areas, and that the country would promote a constructive and cooperative relationship with the United States. China is thus showing an attitude of attributing importance to a stable China-U.S. relationship.

Military exchanges have also been promoted between China and the United States. The countries conduct various policy-related dialogue, and China dispatched an observer to a U.S. military exercise (U.S. Pacific Command exercise "Valiant Shield") for the first time in June 2006. Moreover, joint exercises have been conducted between the Chinese and United States navies on mutual port visits by naval vessels since September 2006.

The United States is concerned that the lack of transparency of the Chinese military increases the possibility of misunderstanding and miscalculation and endangers stability[60]. The U.S. refers to improve mutual understanding with China and to prevent conflict by communicating U.S. resolve to maintain deterrence and stability in the Asia-Pacific region[61] as goals in U.S.-China military exchange.

4. Relations with Russia

Since 1989 when China-Soviet confrontation ended, both countries have continuously maintained a stance of placing importance on their bilateral relationship. Deepening the "strategic partnership" between China and Russia, which was established in the middle of the 1990s, has been emphasized through regular exchanges of visits by their leaders. In 2001, the China-Russia Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation[62] was concluded. Subsequently in 2004, the long-standing issue of border demarcation between the two countries, which once evolved into a military clash, came to a settlement.

The two countries share a common awareness that they will promote world multi-polarization and the building of a new international order. In addition, economic motives have driven the good relationship between them in recent years.

On the military front, since the 1990s, China has purchased modern weapons from Russia, including Su-27 and Su-30 fighter aircraft, Sovremenny-class destroyers, and Kilo-class submarines. Russia is currently the largest supplier of weapons to China; however, some point out that trade amounts have been on the decline in recent years due to the advancement of indigenous weapon production in China. Some also point out that Russia, which shares a land border with China, has noted that it has policy that prevents the supply of certain sophisticated weapons to China that would cause a threat to Russia itself.

China-Russia military exchanges include regular visits by the highest-ranking defense officials. Also, the two countries have held a joint military exercise. They conducted their first joint exercise mainly on the Shandong Peninsula in China in August 2005. In August 2007, a joint exercise consisting of anti-terrorism operations was conducted in the Lanzhou Military Region in China and in the Volga-Ural Military District in Russia by the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)[63]. In September 2007, a unit of the Chinese People's Armed Police Force visited Russia to participate in "Cooperation 2007," a China-Russia anti-terrorism exercise conducted in Moscow. Through these joint military exercises with Russia, it is believed that China can deepen mutual understanding and build confidence between the two forces, show the presence of China and Russia as one pole in a multi-polar world, and learn operational methods of Russian weapons and military operational doctrines.

5. Relations with North Korea

China regards relations with North Korea as "traditional friendship," and North Korea seems to heavily rely on China for a great portion of its food assistance and energy supply. Accordingly, China is believed to have a stronger influence on North Korea than other countries do[64]. China supported U.N. Security Council Resolution 1695, which condemned the launch of ballistic missiles by North Korea in 2006 and Resolution 1718, which imposed sanctions on North Korea in relation to the country's nuclear tests. In addition, China has played an active role serving as the chairman of the Six-Party Talks that have been held in Beijing since 2003, and the international community expects that China will continue proactive efforts towards resolving the nuclear issue.

6. Relations with Other Countries

(1) Relations with Southeast Asian Countries

As for its relations with countries in Southeast Asia, China has been developing bilateral relations with all the countries in the region through active mutual top-level visits and other means[65]. China is also actively involved in multilateral frameworks such as ASEAN plus 1 (China), ASEAN plus 3, and the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum). Through these diplomatic forums, the country is deepening economic and cultural cooperation with ASEAN countries while, recently, also proactively advancing cooperation in the security sector.

In addition, China also strengthens relationships via military aid, such as providing army engineering equipment to the Philippines and patrol boats to Cambodia.

(2) Relations with Central Asian Countries

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, a western province in China, is situated next to Central Asia. It directly shares borders with the three countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and has ethnic minorities settled in the areas straddling borders. Naturally, the region hosts lively exchanges between the people of those countries. Thus China is greatly concerned about the political stability and security situations in Central Asian states, which might be influenced by terrorism caused by Islamic extremists and other factors. Chinese engagement in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which was established in June 2001, is viewed as an indication of such concerns held by China. (See Fig. I-2-3-1)

Fig. I-2-3-1 SCO Member and Observer Countries



(3) Relations with South Asian Countries

China has continued a hostile relationship with India due to issues such as border conflict. However, it has traditionally maintained a favorable relationship with Pakistan, which has a hostile relationship with India as well. The relationship extends to cooperation in the military sector, such as the export of weapons and transfer of military technologies. On the other hand, in recent years China has been committed to improving its relationship with India while also paying consideration to maintaining balance with Pakistan. Through active mutual visits by leaders, China regards relations with India as a strategic partnership and states that the issue of border demarcation between the two countries, which once culminated in military clashes, is also progressing. It is believed that the development of relations with India can be attributed to the stance of placing importance on Chinese and Indian economic growth as well as response to the move in the strengthening of U.S.-India relations.

Regarding military exchanges, China has conducted joint naval search and rescue exercises with Pakistan and India since 2003. In December 2007, "Hand-in-Hand 2007," the first anti-terrorism joint exercise since the 1962 China-India border conflict, was conducted between both countries' army in China's Yunnan Province.

(4) Relations with EU Countries

Trade between China and EU countries has grown remarkably in recent years. For China, the EU is now as important as Japan and the United States as a partner, especially in the economic sector. China, through these diplomatic opportunities, strongly demands EU countries to lift their arms embargo against the country, which has been imposed on China since the Tiananmen Square incident that took place in 1989. Although some EU countries voiced their readiness for the lifting, Japan has expressed its objection to it.

Regarding information and communications technology, avionics equipment, and air-independent propulsion systems for submarines, EU member countries possess more advanced technologies than that of China or Russia, which exports weapons to China. Therefore, if the EU weapons embargo on China was lifted, it is possible that the weapons and military technologies of EU countries would transfer to China, and that said technologies would be utilized as a bargaining chip in gaining the edge in weapons transactions with Russia. It is necessary to pay attention to future discussions made within the EU about the arms embargo on China.

7. Overseas Activities

China states that it will consistently support and actively participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations, and according to the "China's National Defense in 2006" white paper, the country has sent a total of 5,915 military personnel to participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations and eight lost their lives in these operations. According to the United Nations, as of May 2008, China has dispatched a total of 1,977 personnel, police officers, and military observers to 12 U.N. peacekeeping operations, including the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), thus showing its presence in these operations to a certain degree. China's proactive approach to U.N. peacekeeping operations appears to be attributed to their aim to strengthen relations with the region that the PKOs are being conducted in, particularly in regards to relations with various African nations. In addition, China is engaged in international disaster relief operations. For example, the Chinese military personnel participated in international assistance to conduct relief activities in the area devastated by the tsunami in the Indian Ocean at the end of 2004. (See Fig. I-2-3-2)

8. International Transfer of Weapons

China has provided developing countries in Asia and Africa with weapons such as small arms, tanks, and aircraft, and it is reported that the main recipients are Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Thailand, and Myanmar while weapons are also being exported to African countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. It has been pointed out that China is supplying weapons to countries that have problems in terms of democracy and human rights, and attention will be paid to whether China will improve the transparency of international weapons transfer in response to the concerns of the international community.

Fig. I-2-3-2 U.N. Peacekeeping Operations of China's Dispatched Personnel

As of April 2008

		Troop	Police	Military observer
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	0	0	14
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti	0	134	0
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo	218	0	16
UNAMID	African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur	147	0	0
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon	343	0	0
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	0	0	2
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo	0	18	0
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia	566	10	5
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan	444	8	14
UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste	0	23	2
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire	0	0	13
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization	0	0	4
Total	1,981	1,718	193	70

(Unit: persons)

Note: According to the United Nations.

2. Military Affairs

1. General Situation

China, as its basic objectives and obligations for national security, declares to defend its national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and maritime rights and interests, to further develop its economy and society, and to continuously strengthen its comprehensive national power. In order to achieve these objectives and obligations, the country is committed to balanced economic and defense construction.

The adoption of the "four modernizations line"—a decision to promote the modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology made at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held in 1978—triggered and has been promoting the modernization of military power under the broad concept of prioritizing the country's economic development and then returning the successful results to the military sector.

The initial impetus for China's modernization of military power is believed to be the fact that the military technical level was comparatively behind that of other countries. From the 1990s onward, China has aggressively promoted the "Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics," which mainly consists of furthering military technology and informatization, based on its military strategy[66] to win the informatized war in order to cope with global trends in military developments, including those observed in the Gulf War, the Kosovo conflict, and the Iraq War. Backed by the stable relations with bordering countries such as Russia, China is believed to give the top priority to handling of the Taiwan issue, more specifically to acquiring the capability to hinder the independence of Taiwan and foreign military support for Taiwan[67].

As regards a more long-term objective for China's military modernization, China pursues a three-step development strategy in modernizing its national defense and armed forces, in accordance with the state's overall plan to realize modernization. The first step is to lay a solid foundation by 2010, the second is to make major progress around 2020, and the third step is to basically reach the strategic goal of building informatized armed forces and being capable of winning informatized wars by mid-21st century[68]." In the long term, China appears to be aiming to develop a military force alongside improving national strength, as this is compliant with the development plan for the overall country[69].

China has reduced the number of its military personnel, mainly in the army and has been modernizing equipment of its entire armed forces, especially its naval and air forces, and nuclear and missile capabilities. In addition, China is working to improve joint operational capabilities among services and arms, conduct practical exercises, cultivate and acquire highly-capable human resources for administering operations of a technologically advanced and informatized force, and to improve the foundation of the domestic defense industry. Much of the equipment used by the People's Liberation Army is still outdated, and the current military modernization efforts are believed to be undertakings that will thoroughly improve the military's capabilities. Nevertheless, China does not show a clear, specific future vision. From this perspective, there is concern about how China's military strength will impact the regional situation and Japanese security which is to be carefully analyzed.

2. Military Transparency

Historically, China has not disclosed information on its possession of specific equipment, procurement objectives or past procurements, the organization and deployment of major units, records of main military operations and exercises, or the detailed breakdowns of the national defense budget.

China released a white paper on defense titled "China's National Defense in 1998," which has since been published every two years. In December 2006, China published "China's National Defense in 2006," and the nation also conducts a lot of dialogue with the national defense authorities of other countries[70]. (See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2-2)

Furthermore, in August 2008, China expressed its will to return to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and its participation in the United Nations Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures, and has submitted an annual report based on each system. China has continuously published compiled documents on its national security while reintegrating itself into and commencing participation in U.N. systems regarding armaments and military expenditures. This can be assessed as a contribution to improve transparency concerning its military capabilities. However, it needs to be pointed out that the five white papers published in the past have not substantially improved transparency. For example, as for detailed breakdowns of the national defense spending, the papers merely announced the total amount and general purposes for the three categories: personnel living expenses, maintenance costs for operations, and equipment expenditures. Moreover, in regards to the report for the United Nations Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures submitted by China in 2007, details of military expenditure breakdowns were not filled out in the standard format that is used by Japan and many other nations, and it served as merely a brief report with details that were nearly the same as those in the China's

National Defense white paper.

Details have yet to be disclosed regarding the cause of the breach of international law in November 2004 where a Chinese nuclear-powered submarine submerged in Japanese territorial waters. Moreover, in January 2007, when China conducted an anti-satellite weapon test, Japan expressed concerns in relation to the safe use of space and national security, and demanded China give explanations about the test and the country's intentions. The Chinese government, however, did not give sufficient explanations about the details and intention of the test to allay Japan's concerns. In addition, in November 2007, China sent notification indicating the refusal for U.S. naval vessels such as the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk to pull into Hong Kong on the expected day of arrival, but then later revised their notice allowing the vessels to port. However, the U.S. naval vessels had already abandoned their attempt to port and changed course. These incidents incite concern over the decision-making and behavior of China's military.

China is steadily growing into a political and economic power in the region, and has become a presence that attracts attention in the military sector as well from other countries in the region. In order to cast aside concerns over China, it is becoming more and more important for China itself to improve transparency of its national defense policy and military. It is desired that China will increase transparency in its military capabilities through various opportunities in the future.

3. National Defense Budget

China announced that its national defense budget for FY 2008 would be approximately 409.9 billion yuan, up 17.7% from the previous year. Thus China's official defense budget recorded a growth rate of over 10% for 20 consecutive years in terms of the initial defense budget. This pace of increase in official defense expenditures means that the defense budget increases two-fold every five years, and that the size of the official national defense budget of China has nominally grown 19 times in the last 20 years[71]. China's National Defense in 2006 explains that the relationship between national defense and economy shall be "guided by the principle of coordinated development of national defense and the economy," and thus the country regards the build-up of defense capabilities as a task that is as important as economic construction. Accordingly, it is believed that China will continue to input resources for the improvement of its national defense capabilities to the extent that it will not hamper its economic construction. It is therefore thought that the country's military capabilities will continue to be modernized. (See Fig. I-2-3-3)

Fig. I-2-3-3 Changes in China's Official Defense Budget



Note: The total defense budgets for FY 2002 and FY 2004 were not disclosed, and there is a discrepancy when we apply the disclosed growth rates and amounts of increase to the initial budgets of FY 2001 and FY 2003. This graph uses 168.4 billion yuan and 210 billion yuan for FY 2002 and FY 2004, respectively. These are calculated on the assumption that the disclosed growth rates and amounts of increase are based on the actual defense expenses for FY 2001 and FY 2003.

In addition, it must be noted that the amount of the defense budget announced by China is considered to be only part of its actual military expenditures[72]. For example, it is believed that not all of the equipment procurement costs and research and development expenses are included in the official figures for defense expenditures.

4. Military Posture

China's military forces are composed of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the People's Armed Police Force[73], and the militia[74], and these bodies are believed to be instructed and led by the Central Military Commission[75]. The PLA, a people's army created and led by the Chinese Communist Party, consists of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Second Artillery Corps. (See Fig. I-2-3-4)

(1) Nuclear Capabilities and Ballistic Missile Forces

China has continued independent efforts to develop nuclear capabilities and ballistic missile forces since the middle of the 1950s, seemingly with a view to ensuring deterrence, supplementing its conventional forces, and maintaining its voice in the international community.

China possesses various types and ranges of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), intermediate range ballistic missiles/medium range ballistic missiles (IRBM/MRBM), and short range ballistic missiles (SRBM). The survivability and readiness of China's missile forces is under improvement by updating liquid propellant type to a solid propellant one. Moreover, it also appears that China is working to increase performance, such as by extending ranges, improving precision of fire, and switching to MIRV[76].

China possesses approximately 30 ICBMs, which are strategic nuclear weapons, and the majority of those have been fixed-type missiles with liquid fuel propellant systems. In general, this type of missile requires time to inject liquid fuel immediately before launching, thus signs of launching can be detected beforehand and may invite preemptive attack. For this reason, China has developed the DF-31 series, which is a new mobile-type ICBM with a solid fuel propellant system that are mounted onto a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL), as well as the DF-31A, the extended model of the DF-31, and it appears that the missiles have already been deployed. Regarding SLBMs, until now, China had only possessed medium range JL-1 missiles along with one nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) equipped with these missiles; however, the country currently appears to be developing the JL-2, a new SLBM with a range of approximately 8,000km, and constructing a Jin-class SSBN to carry the missiles. Now that the DF-31 and DF-31A have been deployed, once the JL-2 reaches a level of practical use, it is believed that China's strategic nuclear capabilities will improve by a great margin.

As for the IBRM/MRBM covering the Asia-Pacific region including Japan, China has traditionally deployed liquid fuel propellant DF-3 and DF-4 missiles. Currently, however, the country has also deployed the DF-21, which can be transported and operated by being mounted on a TEL. These missiles are capable of carrying nuclear warheads. It is believed that China is currently developing conventional warheads for anti-ship ballistic missiles based on the DF-21 that could be used to attack ships at sea, such as aircraft carriers. China also appears to be developing the DH-10, a cruise missile with a range of 2,000km. Once available for practical use, those missiles might complement ballistic missile forces, covering the Asia-Pacific region including Japan. In addition to IBRM/MRBM, China

also possesses over 100 medium range H-6 (Tu-16) bombers that are capable of equipping nuclear warheads.

Concerning the short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) as strike capability on Taiwan[77], China also possesses DF-15 and DF-11, and those numbers appear to be increasing yearly. (See Fig. I-2-3-5)

Fig. I-2-3-4 Deployment and Strength of PLA



Note: Army and Air Force military regions are the same. ● Military region headquarters ⚓ Fleet headquarters

		China	Taiwan (Reference)
Total military forces		Approx. 2,200,000 personnel	Approx. 290,000 personnel
Ground forces	Ground troops	Approx. 1,600,000 personnel	Approx. 200,000 personnel
	Tanks	Type-98A, Type-96, Type-88A/B and others Approx. 8,660 vehicles	M-60, M-48A/H and others Approx. 1,830 vehicles
Maritime forces	Warships	Approx. 860 vessels/1,170,000 tons	Approx. 330/207,000 tons
	Destroyers & frigates	Approx. 75 vessels	Approx. 30 vessels
	Submarines	Approx. 60 vessels	4 vessels
	Marines	Approx. 10,000 personnel	Approx. 15,000 personnel
Air forces	Combat aircraft	Approx. 2,820 aircraft	Approx. 530 aircraft
	Modern fighter aircraft	J-10×62 Su-27×148 Su-30×121	Mirage 2000×57 F-16×146 F-CK-1(IDF)×128
Reference	Population	Approx. 1,322,000,000	Approx. 23,000,000
	Term of service	2 years	20 months

Note: Materials are taken from The Military Balance 2008 and others.

Fig. I-2-3-5 Range of Ballistic Missiles from China (Beijing)



(2) Ground Forces

The size of the Chinese ground forces is the largest in the world with approximately 1.6 million personnel. Since 1985, China has continuously sought to modernize its armed forces by curtailing personnel and streamlining organizations and systems in order to improve efficiency. The country aims to develop highly capable military forces, while reducing units inferior in equipment and technologies. More specifically, China is improving military mobility by such measures as switching from its past regional defense model to a complete national mobile model[78], working to supply its infantry with automobiles, and promoting mechanization. In addition, China is believed to be strengthening its airborne troops and special operations forces. The country is also working on a reform to improve its logistical support capabilities.

(3) Naval Forces

The naval forces consist of three fleets—the North Sea, East Sea, and South Sea Fleets. The Chinese Navy has approximately 860 ships (including approximately 60 submarines), with a total displacement of approximately 1.17 million tons. The navy is in charge of the maritime national defense and protecting the sovereignty of territorial waters and maritime rights and interests. The Chinese Navy introduced modern Kilo-class submarines from Russia and actively constructed new types of domestic submarines to enhance its submarine capabilities. Additionally, the country is promoting the introduction of combatant ships with improved air defense and anti-ship missile capabilities, and is strengthening the capabilities of landing ships and supply ships. In view of how

the navy is being modernized, it is believed that China is trying to build capabilities to perform operations at long ranges from China's shore. Also, China seems to have a strong interest in the possession of aircraft carriers, and it is believed that China is currently conducting research and development on technologies in order to possess aircraft carriers in the future[79].

(4) Air Forces

The Chinese Air Force and Navy have approximately 2,820 combat aircraft in total. The number of fourth-generation modern fighters is rising sharply. China mass produces J-10 fighters domestically and is promoting the import and licensed production of Su-27 fighters as well as the import of Su-30 fighters equipped with anti-surface and anti-ship attack capabilities from Russia. China imports highly sophisticated extended-range surface-to-air missiles from Russia in order to improve air defense capabilities. In addition to the introduction of modern fighters, China is making continuous efforts to acquire in-flight refueling capabilities and an early warning and control system, which are essential for the operation of modern air forces. Furthermore, it is reported that China plans to import a great number of large cargo aircraft from Russia. In view of the way that the Air Force is being modernized, China seems to aim at building air capability such as air-to-surface and air-to-ship attack capabilities in further forward areas, in addition to improving its air defense capabilities[80].

China has also begun to enhance the electronic warfare and intelligence gathering capabilities of its aircrafts in addition to actual reconnaissance flights against surrounding countries. In recent years in particular, there have been Chinese air activities that appear to be some form of information gathering against Japan. Also, in September 2007, H-6 medium-range bombers flew into the Japanese air defense identification zone over the East China Sea to advance near to the Japan-China median line. Further attention needs to be paid to these activities conducted by Chinese air forces in the area surrounding Japan.

H-6 bomber flying over the East China Sea

(5) Military Use of Space and Cyber Warfare Capabilities

China continues to put forth efforts for space development. The country has launched various satellites into space using indigenously produced rockets, successfully conducted manned space flights, and launched a lunar orbiter. As it appears that in China's space development military and non-military sectors are related[81], there is the possibility that China utilizes space for such military purposes as information gathering, communications, and navigation.

China is developing anti-satellite weapons, and the country tested the destruction of its own satellite in January 2007 where ballistic missile technology was applied. It has also been pointed out that China is developing a system that uses lasers to hamper the functions of satellites.

China appears to have interest in the cyber warfare and they seem to have organized and are currently training a cyber warfare-specialized unit[82].

China's interest in anti-satellite weapons and cyber warfare can be attributed to the increasing reliance of information gathering and command and communication in the military sector, which are vital for swift and efficient exercise of military strength, on satellites and computer networks.

5. Education and Training

In recent years, the PLA has been conducting practical exercises in order to advance its operational modernization, as well as large-scale exercises, including cooperative exercises of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and landing exercises. In 2002, the PLA enforced the Outline of Military Training and Evaluation as a revision to the previous training doctrine in order to reform exercises based on science and technology and constantly promote new forms of exercises. Furthermore, the national military training conference held in 2006 emphasized promoting a shift from military training under the conditions of mechanization to military training under the conditions of informatization. In these years, the military training focuses that are indicated by the PLA's General Staff Department each year have emphasized joint exercises by multiple services, match-type exercises, exercises in complex electromagnetic environments such as for electronic jamming, and improving exercise evaluations.

In addition, in the education spectrum, the PLA aims to develop military personnel versed in science and technology. In 2003, a human resources strategy project was launched to develop human resources capable of directing an informatized operation and of building informatized armed forces. The project has a goal of achieving a big leap in the development of military personnel to 2020. In these years, the PLA appears to be increasing its wage standards, and this is believed to be due to their objective of securing highly-capable human resources. Moreover, since 2000, in order to secure highly-capable and highly-educated people, the military has implemented a system where civilian college students are provided with scholarships and then allowed to enter the military as commissioned officers after graduation.

6. National Defense Industry Sector

China imports highly sophisticated equipment and parts that it cannot produce domestically from other countries such as Russia. However, China is believed to now place emphasis on indigenous production of military equipment as the country manufactures much of its equipment domestically and is now also actively making research and development efforts on new equipment. China's national defense industry sector appears to be developing due to its own efforts, an improvement of private industry infrastructure accompanying economic growth, use of dual military-civilian technologies, and the absorption of foreign technologies. The sector is working as a base for the modernization of China's military.

Favorable growth in the Chinese defense industry was once hindered by inefficiency caused by excessive secrecy and other factors; however, in recent years, reform of the defense industry has been progressed. In particular, the emphasis has been placed on two-way technological exchanges where military technologies are utilized for building the national economy, and in turn civilian technologies are absorbed for a build-up of national defense. Specifically, China states that technologies of the defense industry have contributed to the development of civilian space exploration, the aviation industry, and the ship building industry. Furthermore, China maintains that it encourages and supports international cooperation and competition in dual-use industries, thus appearing to have interest in absorbing foreign technologies through dual-use industries.

7. Maritime Activities

In regards to activity in waters near Japan in recent years, in November 2004, a submerged Chinese nuclear-

powered submarine intruded into Japan's territorial waters, violating international law. Including this incident, Chinese naval vessels have been observed conducting what appeared to be exercises and information gathering activities. Other naval vessels as well as Chinese government-owned ships were also observed engaging in apparent oceanographic research within the exclusive economic zone of Japan. Furthermore, China has been exploring and developing oil gas fields such as Shirakaba (Chunxiao in Chinese), whose contract mining field and the structure extend to the eastern side of the intermediate line between Japan and China. In September 2005, Chinese naval vessels were seen navigating near these oil and gas fields[83] [84]. In October 2006, a Chinese Song-class submarine surfaced in the vicinity of the USS Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier in international waters reportedly near Okinawa. The foreign submarine's approach to a U.S. aircraft carrier is a noteworthy military incident in the military context[85].

Moreover, the Chinese navy has begun vessel exercises overseas, including joint exercises with Pakistan, India, and Thailand in November 2005, its first joint exercise with the U.S. Navy in 2006, and its first participation in a multilateral joint exercise in March 2007, a counterterrorism multilateral joint maritime exercise conducted in Pakistan. Chinese naval vessels also visited Singapore in May 2007, dispatched to multilateral maritime exercises for the first time at the Second Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS). In September 2007, deep-sea vessel units visited Russia, the United Kingdom, Spain, and France to conduct joint search and rescue exercises and other activities.

In this way, China has been intensifying its maritime activities in recent years. In addition to activities in Japanese waters, China is enhancing its bases for activities in the Spratly and Paracel islands, over which it has territorial disputes with countries including some ASEAN members. Seemingly China is interested in the Indian Ocean area, which provides a shipping route for transporting crude oil from the Middle East.

China explicitly states in its laws and other means that its Navy assumes the role of safeguarding maritime rights and interests and protecting maritime safety. Moreover, taking into general consideration the conditions of the country, including its geographic conditions and economic globalization, Chinese naval activities are considered to have the following objectives.

The first objective is to intercept naval operations by enemies in waters as far as possible from the country to defend Chinese territory and territorial waters. Behind this, there is an increase in effectiveness of long-range attacks due to recent progress in science and technology.

The second objective is to develop military capabilities to deter and prevent the independence of Taiwan. For example, China maintains that it will not allow any foreign intervention in solving the Taiwan issue and realizing the unification of China. If China aims to hold back by force the foreign intervention into Taiwan, which is surrounded by the sea, it needs to enhance its maritime military operational capabilities.

The third objective is to acquire, maintain, and protect maritime rights and interests. China has embarked on exploration and drilling of oil and gas fields as well as building facilities and surveying for such facilities in the East China Sea and South China Sea. This includes the building of drilling facilities in the oil and gas field, whose geographical structure runs to the eastern side of the intermediate line between Japan and China. It is believed that naval vessels' operation near the drilling facilities in September 2005 aimed to flaunt the capabilities to acquire, maintain, and protect maritime rights and interests.

The fourth objective is to defend the sea lines of communications for China, a lifeline for the increasingly globalized Chinese economy. It depends on future international situations at the time as to how far the Chinese Navy should defend the sea lines of communications by itself, but given recent modernization of the Chinese Navy and Air Force, the scope of its capabilities appears to be expanding beyond waters near China.

Attention must be paid to the trends of Chinese maritime activities with the apparent objectives described above, including the operation of naval vessels and implementation of oceanographic research activities near Japan, and the development of facilities that will serve as bases for these activities[86].

3. Military Capabilities of Taiwan

It is assumed that Taiwan employs a military strategy comprised of "Resolute Defense and Effective Deterrence." Specifically, it is said that this strategy details issues such as forcing enemies to abandon any military attempts towards Taiwan by enlarging their uncertainty for victory and forecasted damage through constructing defense forces for counteracting enemy invasions[87].

Taiwan has been implementing the Jingjing Program, in order to manage the national defense resources more efficiently, to reduce the total number of military personnel, to restructure the organizations, and to shift to a voluntary service system, since January 2004. According to the program, the number of military personnel will be reduced to 275,000 by the end of 2008. At the same time, the Taiwanese armed forces attribute importance to the introduction of advanced technologies and improvement of joint operational capabilities. Taiwan's ratio of its defense expenditure to its GDP remained below 3% since 2000; however, in August 2005, then Taiwanese President Chen Shui-ban announced Taiwan's policy to increase the ratio of the national defense budget to its GDP up to 3% within three years, which was approximately 2.4% in FY 2005, in order to meet increasing demands for national defense. Taiwan states that it reached a ratio of 3% in 2008[88]. (See Fig. I-2-3-6)

Fig. I-2-3-6 Changes in Taiwan's Defense Budget



Note: Based on The Military Balance of the corresponding years.

At present, Taiwan has 41 army brigades and three marine brigades with a total of approximately 215,000 personnel. In addition, it is believed that the total of 1.65 million reserve personnel of air, naval, and ground forces would be available in case of war. Regarding naval capabilities, Kidd-class destroyers imported from the United States have been commissioned, and Taiwan also possesses relatively modern frigates. Regarding air capabilities, Taiwan possesses F-16 A/B fighters, Mirage 2000 fighters, and Jing Guo fighters.

In view of the fact that China is enhancing its missile, naval, and air forces, the Taiwanese military believes it still needs to modernize the equipment. The Executive Yuan of Taiwan formulated a draft budget in June 2004 in order to purchase eight diesel submarines and 12 patrol planes (P-3C), upgrade its existing PAC-2 surface-to-air patriot missiles, and purchase the new PAC-3 type missiles from the United States. However, due to confrontation between the ruling and opposing parties, approval was not given until 2006 in the Legislative Yuan where the opposing party controls the majority. Nevertheless, the ruling and opposing parties were successful in reaching a compromise on the FY 2007 budget, and the FY 2007 and FY 2008 budgets include funds necessary

for equipment purchases from the United States that the parties reached agreement on, including 12 patrol planes (P-3C), upgrading PAC-2 missiles, and PAC-3 missiles. Taiwan currently wishes to purchase F-16 C/D fighters, AH-64D attack helicopters, and other equipment from the United States, and attention will be paid to future trends in this situation.

Taiwan is also promoting the independent development of equipment. Tien Kung II surface-to-air missiles and Hsiung Feng II anti-ship missiles have been deployed and Hsiung Feng IIE cruise missiles are also being developed in order to acquire long-range attack capabilities.

The general characteristics of Chinese and Taiwanese military forces are believed to be as follows:

1) Regarding ground forces, China possesses an overwhelming troop force; however, their capacity for landing on and invading the island of Taiwan is limited. Nevertheless, China is making efforts to improve its landing and invasion capabilities, such as by building large landing ships in recent years.
2) Regarding naval and air forces, China has outnumbered Taiwan in terms of quantity while Taiwan has had qualitative superiority thus far. However, China has been steadily modernizing its naval and air forces in recent years.
3) Regarding missile attack capabilities, China possesses numerous short-range ballistic missiles with a range that covers Taiwan, and Taiwan seems to have few effective countermeasures.

However, in addition to the size of a country's forces and the performance and quantity of equipment, a comparison of military capabilities should take into account various factors such as the objectives and dimensions of envisioned military operations, operational posture, proficiency of military personnel, and logistics. In view of this, attention should be paid to the modernization of both the Chinese and Taiwanese military capabilities and the U.S. weapon sale to Taiwan. As China is rapidly modernizing its military forces, the military balance between China and Taiwan is changing to the advantage of China, and it might cause major changes in the near future in Taiwan's qualitative superiority.

Section 4. Russia

1. General Situation

Russian citizens support the former Putin administration's policy that only a strong nation can deliver order and stability. In December 2007, the ruling party United Russia, with former President Putin atop the candidate list, secured more than two-thirds[89] in the State Duma (lower house), which was regarded as a sweeping victory.

In February 2008, then President Putin delivered a speech entitled "Russia's Development Strategy through to 2020," which set forth the nation's long-term perspective leading up to the year 2020. Thereupon, the former Putin administration has been accredited for breaking away from the crisis of the 1990s and restoring the country to its status as a powerful player within the international community. In the future, the administration aims to promote social and economic reform that departs from a dependence on the energy resources sector under a qualitatively new development strategy.

Furthermore, in regards to security, an unintentional arms race has begun, and the administration has noted that countermeasures against the U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are in need as NATO military facilities are closing in on the Russian border. In addition, against the backdrop of Russia's robust economy[90], the administration has stressed the need to modernize the military in accordance with national strength while also avoiding an excessive arms race.

President Medvedev[91], who took office in May 2008, has designated former President Putin as prime minister in charge of policy implementation. As such, it appears that the Medvedev administration will essentially continue policy implemented by the Putin administration.

2. Security and Defense Policies

1. Basic Posture

Russia revised its "National Security Concept of the Russian Federation" in January 2000[92]. The Concept recognizes that two exclusive trends exist in the current international situation—the trend toward a multipolar world promoted by countries including Russia and the trend toward establishing a world dominated by Western countries. The document lists[93] such phenomena as terrorism, a movement to decrease the role of the United Nations[94] and the eastward expansion of NATO as threats to Russia's security under these international circumstances. It also states that Russia's national security has been weakened by these factors as well as by an increase of hi-tech weapons in Western countries, and by a delay in the reforms of Russia's armed forces and the military-industrial complex. The Concept concludes that from this perspective, Russia should take deterrent measures, including the possession of nuclear forces, to prevent invasions of any scale.

In line with this Concept, the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation was drafted in April 2000 as the basic philosophy underlying Russian national defense policies. The Doctrine states that potential threats remain both at home and abroad and in some areas these latent threats are growing despite the decreased possibility of large-scale wars and the reduced threat of a direct invasion in a traditional form. Based on this recognition, it states that the objective of national defense is to deter aggression by any means including the use of nuclear weapons and that Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in retaliatory attacks in response to a large-scale invasion with the use of conventional weapons.

In addition, The Priority Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was published in 2003 to embody the aforementioned Concept and Doctrine. Concerning military duties, this report points out the possibility of using armed forces not only for national defense but also for the implementation of various peacetime operations[95] including counterterrorism measures. Furthermore, the importance of the inter-theater mobility of permanent combat-ready troops[96] is also pointed out in consideration of the vastness of the Russian territory.

Former President Putin directed the Defense Minister and others to review the National Security Concept, and currently (as of May 2008) amendments to the Concept are being made.

2. Military Reform

Since 1997, Russia has shown progress in the modernization of military forces, including the reduction of the number of soldiers, structural reforms, and the development and introduction of new types of equipment, and in the improvement of combat readiness. The country appears to be nearing its troop reduction goal—a goal set in order to maintain an adequate troop level of one million personnel[97].

In structural reforms, a shift to three services and three independent corps and the integration of military districts are nearing completion. Regarding the modernization of military forces, in October 2006 the president approved the state policy on military equipment for the period of 2007 to 2015, and accordingly, approximately five trillion rubles (approximately 22.2 trillion yen) will be spent in the development and procurement of military equipment by 2015[98]. At the same time, efforts are being made to create an integrated order placement system in order to realize efficient procurement. Moreover, in order to improve the quality of military personnel and maintain highly skilled forces, Russia is implementing measures toward the introduction of a contract-based service, under which soldiers are recruited not by conscription but by contract[99]. Together with the ongoing improvement of the permanent combat-ready troops, a contract-based service would contribute to the improvement of the Russian military's combat readiness. In so doing, Russia recognizes the issues of improving the treatment of soldiers and securing personnel with technical knowledge and abilities[100]. In addition, Russia has been improving the military unit command system, and it is thought that Russia will continue these measures to improve conventional armed forces along with its efforts to maintain its strategic nuclear deterrent capability against the backdrop of the national defense budget that has been increasing in recent years. (See Fig. I-2-4-1)

Fig. I-2-4-1 Russia's Defense Budget from FY 2004 to 2008



Note: Official figures announced by Russian Government.

3. The Chechen Issue

Triggered by the invasion of armed groups of Chechen rebels into the Republic of Dagestan in 1999, the armed forces of the Russian Federation commenced military actions against the groups (the Second Chechen War). There were frequent terrorist attacks by armed Chechen groups, including the occupation of a Moscow theater in October 2002 and the takeover of a school in the Republic of North Ossetia in September 2004. The Russian Federation is promoting anti-terrorism operations with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and NATO members while also conducting thorough mop-up operations against the armed groups.

Meanwhile, in the Chechen Republic, a new constitution was adopted in 2003 and a new president for the Republic was designated by the Russian Federation in March 2007. The Russian Federation has thus been implementing measures to stabilize Chechen. Moreover, as a result of mop-up operations by the Russian Federation, leaders of pro-independence armed forces including Shamil Basayev, regarded as an extreme hardliner, were killed. However, the armed Chechen rebels have not been completely eliminated and the situation still remains unstable.

3. External Relations

1. Relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

Russia promotes military integration with CIS member countries, stating that its vital interests are concentrated in the territories of the CIS. Russia has dispatched its federal forces to remain in Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyz. It has also concluded agreements to form a joint air defense system and joint border security treaties with CIS member countries[101]. (See Fig. I-2-4-2)

Fig. I-2-4-2 CIS Member States

With increasing activities by Islamic armed forces in Central Asia/Caucasia, Russia pursued military cooperation centered on counterterrorism measures in the region, and organized a Collective Rapid Deployment Force in May 2001 within the framework of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization[102]. Since the U.S. and other military forces launched the military campaign in Afghanistan following the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States in 2001[103], Russia has permitted U.S. assistance or U.S. military presence in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz, Tajikistan and Georgia. On the other hand, in 2003, Russia established an air force base in Kyrgyz to enhance the CIS Collective Rapid Deployment Force[104]. Russia also had a division (approximately 8,000 personnel) stationed in Tajikistan, and later made an agreement with Tajikistan in October 2004, securing a Russian military base in the country.

In the meantime, Georgia and Ukraine are aiming to strengthen their relations with Europe and the United Sates for their future accession to NATO. In November 2007, a Russian base located in Georgia[105] was closed and Russian forces withdrew from the area. As for Ukraine, the continued presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet may be a barrier to its future NATO membership.

2. Relations with the United States

The relationship between Russia and the United States has improved in various fields through cooperation in the fight against terrorism and other measures[106]. The United States, however, has expressed concerns about domestic affairs in Russia[107], while Russia has expressed concerns regarding U.S. foreign policy. Russia states that it must take countermeasures against the U.S. in response to such activities as the large investments by the U.S. into next-generation weapons development and deployment of U.S. military bases in Eastern European countries.

The United States, which has been developing its ballistic missile defense program, withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in June 2002. Russia criticized the U.S. decision as a mistake, but did not regard it as a threat to Russia's security. Subsequently, however, the United States agreed with the Czech Republic and Poland to start full-scale negotiations to deploy part of its missile defense system to the countries. Russia is strongly opposed to this, claiming that the system targets Russia and would negatively impact its nuclear deterrent capabilities.

3. Relations with NATO

Russia, as a rule, has been against the accession to NATO of former Soviet Union countries as well as Central and Eastern European countries.

However, Russia took steps to build a new cooperative relationship with NATO following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, and within the framework of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), Russia participates in decision making to a certain degree and acts as an equal partner in areas of common interest[108]. Meanwhile, Russia was dissatisfied that NATO countries would not ratify the Application Treaty of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)[109] because Russian forces would not withdraw from Georgia and Moldova. Thereafter, discussions were held in such forums as the NRC; however, Russia suspended the CFE Treaty in December 2007, halting inspections based on the treaty. Attention is paid whether NATO and Russia will hold any discussion on the CFE Treaty in the future[110].

4. Relations with Asian Countries

Russia is currently implementing a pipeline project to transport Siberian oil to the Far East and developing natural gas fields in Sakhalin. In order to develop these underground resources and revitalize its regional economy and social infrastructure, it is important for Russia to enhance economic relations with Asia-Pacific countries including Japan and China. For this reason, Russia emphasizes relations with these countries in its foreign policy and has joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC[111]), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). (See Section 3)[112] Additionally, Russia signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in 2004. Furthermore, former President Putin actively engaged in summit diplomacy with Asian countries. For example, he maintained close relationships with China and India through annual reciprocal top-level visits and in July 2006, Russia held its first trilateral summit meeting with Chinese and Indian leaders[113].

5. Exportation of Arms

Russia seems to actively promote the export of arms not only to maintain the infrastructure of the military industry and to make economic profit, but also to help promote better foreign policy. The country's export value has been increasing in recent years. In January 2007, the Russian government granted the exclusive right to export arms to the Rosoboronexport State Corporation[114] as part of its lasting efforts to improve its export system. In addition, Russia regards the military industry as an integral part of the nation's military organization and is committed to improving and further developing the military industry by such measures as promoting the integration of aircraft companies such as Sukhoi, MiG and Tupolev.

Russia has exported jet fighters and warships to countries including China, India and ASEAN member countries[115]. In addition, Russia signed agreements with North Korea and Iran on military technology cooperation in 2001.

4. Military Posture

1. Nuclear Forces

The Russian military emphasizes nuclear forces in order to supplement its conventional forces. In addition, it allots focus to nuclear forces to secure a global position in the context of an increasingly multipolar world, and as a balance with the nuclear forces of the United States. It is believed that Russia is working to maintain a state of immediate readiness for its nuclear force unit.

Russia is gradually reducing the number of its strategic nuclear missiles due to issues such as aging. However, it still possesses intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) following the United States in scale, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and long-range bombers (Tu-95MS Bears and Tu-160 Blackjacks).

Regarding the update of nuclear missiles, Russia began to accelerate the development and introduction of new weapons, beginning with the deployment of new Topol-M ICBM (SS-27) units in 2005. In addition, flight trials for the RS-24, which appear to be a multi-headed version of the Topol-M, began in 2007.

In April 2007, Russia launched a Borey-class ballistic missile submarine (nuclear powered) (SSBN); however, it is believed that construction of the new SSBN is delayed in catching up with its initial schedule. Russia also started a flight test in September 2005 for the new-type SLBM Bulava, which appears to mount Borey-class SSBNs. However, it has been pointed out that all flight tests as of 2007 have been unsuccessful, and they have not yet reached the stage of deployment.

In August 2007, then President Putin announced the resumption of regular patrol flights by the strategic bomber unit, since they ceased following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1992. This activated flights by Russian long-range bombers, which, other than large-scale exercises, had been terminated after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Related countries are hurrying to respond to this.

According to the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (better known as the Moscow Treaty), the United States and Russia shall reduce the number of their deployable operational nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by December 31, 2012 (not including stored nuclear warheads). Continued attention should be paid to the progress of the disposal program[116]. At the suggestion of the Russian side, negotiations began for a new treaty (post-START) that would succeed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I that is to expire in April 2008.

As for non-strategic nuclear forces, Russia had scrapped surface-launched short- and intermediate-range missiles with a range of between 500 and 5,500km by 1991 in accordance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and had removed tactical nuclear weapons deployed aboard naval vessels and stored them in onshore missile silos in the following year. Russia, however, still possesses a broad array of nuclear forces[117].

2. Conventional Forces and Other Issues

Conventional forces have concentrated their limited resources on specific units to maintain their combat readiness[118]. The Russian military is working to recover the proficiency of each of its forces and is conducting large-scale exercises using its conventional forces in the direction of Europe (See Column). In addition, the state policy on military equipment for the period of 2007 to 2015 instates plans for developing and procuring equipment for conventional forces. However, there are issues such as difficulties in securing personnel and lax military discipline due to the decrease in the population of young men as well as poor living conditions for military personnel[119]. While the modernization of conventional forces is underway, development is not necessarily sufficient.

The future development of the Russian economy and society remains unclear, and it is necessary to continue to observe future trends of the Russian military.

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Large-scale Exercises by the Russian Military Units in the Seas of the Mediterranean and the North Atlantic

From December 2007 to February 2008, the Russian Navy and Air Force carried out large-scale exercises in the seas of the Mediterranean and the North Atlantic. The country had taken stern stances toward the United States and NATO since last year, opposing the U.S. plan to deploy the missile defense (MD) system in Eastern Europe and suspending the implementation of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.

In August 2007, then President Putin announced the resumption of regular patrol flights by strategic bomber troops. In light of this, the latest pelagic navigation exercises could be seen as a display of Russia's presence in the European region. Accordingly, the United Kingdom and Norway sent their air fighters as a show of force against the Russian Air Force squad maneuvering above the North Atlantic during its joint exercises with the Navy.

At the same time, Russia's latest exercises also included joint training exercises with France, Italy and Portugal aimed at promoting anti-terrorism and mutual friendship. These three countries were apparently on the alert for the spread of terrorist activities en route to the Mediterranean Sea. It appears that Russia is continuing its efforts to build cooperative ties with any European country to combat terrorism and other areas of mutual strategic interest. The latest exercises mark the first deployment into the Mediterranean since 1996 by the Russian Navy's aircraft carrier. They are also the first Russian Navy exercises joined by three fleets since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The commander in chief of the Russian Navy indicated on February 3 that Russia planned to promote navigations similar to the latest one at least biannually, in order to build-up its presence in the global seas.

This remark was made upon the commander's return to Severomorsk, the home port of the Northern Fleet that participated in the latest exercise. Attention is being paid to whether or not Russia will continue to deploy its fleets to the Mediterranean and other distant seas.

Outline of the exercises

- Pelagic navigation exercises by the Russian Navy
  Period: December 5, 2007 to February 3, 2008 (return to port)
  Main routes: The Mediterranean; Bay of Biscay (off France and northern Spain); northeastern part of the Atlantic Ocean (off the United Kingdom); the Arctic Ocean (off Norway)
  Participating warships: A total of 11 vessels including the aircraft carrier *Admiral Kuzunetsov*; the Udaloy-class destroyer *Admiral Levtchenko*; and the Slava-class missile-guided destroyer *Moscow*
- Long-distance aviation exercises by the Russian Air Force
  Period: January 24, 2008 to February 2, 2008
  Main air routes: The northeastern Atlantic Ocean (off the United Kingdom) - the Arctic Ocean (off Norway)

5. Russian Forces in the Far East Region

1. General Situation

The current presence of the Russian military forces in the Far East region is comparatively much smaller than its peak. However, a considerable scale of military forces including nuclear forces still remains in the region. The declining trend of exercise activities has ceased, and in recent years activities have revitalized in association with efforts for recovery of skill levels. Since 2003, Russia has conducted military exercises in the Far East region, including "Vostok," which is a biennial large-scale anti-terrorism exercise, and "Mobility 2004," which was an exercise for the country's permanent combat-ready troops to deploy from the western part of Russia to the Far East region. Additionally, in 2007, an air and logistics exercise called "Krylo 2007" was held in the Far East region.

It is necessary to continue to monitor the positioning and trends of Russian forces in the Far East region in the future while taking into consideration that the overall forces tend to focus on maintaining combat readiness of the strategic nuclear unit as well as dealing with conflicts by inter-theater mobility of its permanent combat-ready troops. (See Fig. I-2-4-3)

Fig. I-2-4-3 Russian Military Deployment in Areas Close to Japan



(1) Nuclear Forces

As for strategic nuclear forces in the Far East region, ICBMs, such as SS-25s, and Tu-95MS Bear strategic bombers are deployed along the Trans-Siberian Railway, and SSBNs, such as the Delta III-class nuclear submarine carrying SLBMs, and others are deployed in and around the Sea of Okhotsk. The readiness of these strategic nuclear forces appears to have been generally maintained.

As for non-strategic nuclear capabilities, Russian forces in the Far East region possess a variety of weapons, including medium-range bombers such as Tu-22M Backfires and sea- (undersea) and air-launched cruise missiles. A total of approximately 70 Backfires are deployed in the west of Lake Baikal and coastal areas, including the area across from Sakhalin.

(2) Ground Forces

Ground forces in the Far East region have continuously shrunk in scale since 1990 and currently consist of 15 divisions of approximately 90,000 personnel[120].

Also, the Pacific Fleet of the Russian Navy has a naval infantry division with an amphibious capability. (See Fig. I-2-4-4)

(3) Naval Forces

The Pacific Fleet is stationed and deployed from its main bases in Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk. The fleet

comprises approximately 240 ships with a total displacement in the region of about 600,000 tons, including 20 major surface ships and about 20 submarines (about 15 of which are nuclear-powered submarines) with a total displacement of approximately 280,000 tons. The forces have been scaled down since 1990. (See Fig. I-2-4-5)

Fig. I-2-4-4 Changes in the Russian Ground Forces in the Far East Region



Notes: 1. 1989 = peak year
2. Far Eastern region of the former Soviet Union until 1992 (and others).
3. Numbers in 1989 and 1990 include those of Russian troops stationed in Mongolia.
4. Source: Based on The Military Balance of each corresponding year (and others).

Fig. I-2-4-5 Changes in the Russian Naval Forces in the Far East Region



(4) Air Forces

Russia deploys approximately 630 combat aircraft from its Air Force and Navy. This represents a drastic decrease compared with numbers at peak times, but existing models are being modified to improve their capabilities. (See Fig. I-2-4-6 & 7)

Fig. I-2-4-6 Changes in the Russian Air Forces in the Far East Region (Fighters)



Fig. I-2-4-7 Changes in the Russian Air Forces in the Far East Region (Bombers)



2. Russian Forces in Japan's Northern Territories

Since 1978 under the regime of the former Soviet Union, Russia has been redeploying ground troops on the Kunashiri, Etorofu, and Shikotan Islands of Japan's Northern Territories. These territories are illegally occupied by Russia although they are an integral part of Japanese territory. However, the numbers of military personnel are considered to be far less than at past peak times. Nevertheless, tanks, armored vehicles, various types of artillery, and anti-air missiles are still deployed in the region. With regard to ground forces in the Northern Territories, then President Yeltsin officially announced during his visit to Japan in 1993 that half of the troops stationed on the four islands had already been withdrawn and the remaining half, with the exception of the national border guard, would also be removed. In the late 1990s, Russia repeatedly stated at various official meetings with Japan that the number of Russian troops stationed in this region had been reduced. The number of Russian military personnel stationed in this region in 1991 was approximately 9,500, and at the Japan-Russia Summit Meeting held in 1997, then Russian Defense Minister Rodionov made it clear that the troops stationed in the Northern Territories had been reduced to 3,500 soldiers by 1995. In July 2005, however, when then Russian Defense Minister Ivanov visited the Northern Territories, he declared that Russia would neither increase nor decrease the troops stationed on the four islands, clearly showing the intention to maintain the status quo.

As mentioned above, Russian troops continue to be stationed in the Northern Territories, which are an integral part of Japanese territory, and it is hoped that the issue will be resolved at an early date.

3. Operations in the Vicinity of Japan

Russian military operations seem to be increasingly more active in the vicinity of Japan, including exercises and training, in association with the recovery of troop skill levels.

The number of exercises carried out by Russian ground forces in areas adjacent to Japan decreased sharply from peak numbers; however, some activities seem to be on the rise again.

With regard to naval vessels, there is a sign of change in naval training and other activities. For example, long-term sea training by submarines and surface ships was conducted for the first time in several years, and nuclear submarines resumed their patrols.

Regarding aircraft, a tendency of revitalization in such activities as flights close to Japan's territorial airspace, exercises and training, can be seen. In July 2007, Tu-95MS Bears flew near Guam, and on February 9, 2008, Tu-95MS Bears entered into Japanese territorial airspace (above Sofugan Island in the southern Izu Islands)[121]. (See Fig. I-2-4-8)

Tu-95 bomber that invaded Japanese airspace on February 9, 2008

Fig. I-2-4-8 Russian Aircraft Tracks Around Japan

Brief activity overview of intruding aircraft of territorial airspace (February 2008)



Section 5. Southeast Asia

1. General Situation

Southeast Asian countries have made efforts for political stability and steady economic growth while deepening interdependent relationships with countries both inside and outside the region. The region is encompassed by the Straits of Malacca, the South China Sea, and the waters around Indonesia and the Philippines, thus occupying a key position for traffic by linking the Pacific and Indian Oceans. However, this region still has destabilizing factors, including the territorial dispute over the Spratly Islands, ethnic minority issues, separatist and independence movements, and Islamic extremist groups. Moreover, there are incidents such as piracy by which the safe passage of ships is obstructed. In response to these situations, the countries in the region are working to build sufficient military forces not only for traditional national defense but also to address the new security issues such as anti-terrorism and piracy. In recent years, against the backdrop of economic development, they have been modernizing their military forces, through the introduction of new warships and other measures to build naval capability and the introduction of new fighters. (See Fig. I-2-5-1)

Fig. I-2-5-1 Military Forces in Southeast Asia (approximate)



2. Relations with the United States

Many Southeast Asian countries have been developing cooperative security relationships with the United States.

Singapore supports the United States' presence in the Asia-Pacific. The two countries signed a memorandum of understanding in 1990 permitting the United States to use military facilities in Singapore. This allows U.S. forces to

promptly respond to an emergency in the Middle East and Africa. The United States ranks Singapore as a Major Security Cooperation Partner. In July 2005, the two countries signed the Strategic Framework Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Singapore for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defense and Security to further strengthen cooperation in areas such as counterterrorism, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, defense technology, joint military exercises and training, and policy dialogues.

The Philippines and the United States maintain a long-lasting cohesive military cooperation[122]. They resumed the large-scale joint military exercise, Balikatan in 2000 and have since conducted the exercise on an annual basis. At Balikatan 08, held from February to March 2008, the two nations conducted command post exercises and civic assistance activities in Mindanao and other areas. The Philippines and United States have also conducted other joint exercises, including Balance Piston and Talon Vision.

Thailand and the United States started joint military exercise Cobra Gold in 1982, and the exercise has been multinational since 2000. In response to the military coup in Thailand in September 2006, the United States announced the suspension of military aid of about $29 million in total to Thailand. However, the military exercise Cobra Gold 07 in 2007 was held as usual. The suspension of military aid was lifted in light of the December 2007 general election. At the joint exercises in May 2008, besides command post exercises, non-combat missions such as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance were held[123].

In 2003, the United States granted Major Non-NATO Ally status[124] to the Philippines and Thailand, since the United States recognized their proactive participation in the U.S.-led War on Terror.

In February 2005, the United States expressed its intent to resume the International Military Education and Training (IMET)[125] program for Indonesia, which had been suspended since 1992. Subsequently, in November 2005, the United States decided to resume weapon sales to Indonesia. In addition, on his February 2008 visit to Indonesia, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates held dialogue with President Yudhoyono and Minister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono, where they agreed to strengthen military cooperation and counter piracy and terrorism.

Regarding relations with Viet Nam, in June 2005 then Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan Van Khai visited the United States. On his visit the two countries concluded an IMET agreement and major developments were seen regarding military cooperation. In June 2006, then U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited Viet Nam where he held dialogue with then Vietnamese Defense Minister Pham Van Tra, and agreement was reached to expand military exchanges between the two countries. Many U.S. defense-related personnel, including the Defense Secretary and Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, visited Viet Nam between 2006 and 2007, and in April 2007, the United States partially lifted its arms embargo on Viet Nam[126].

Medical support for the local people by the U.S. military and the Philippine military at the Exercise Balikatan [U.S. Army]

In this way, the United States is developing relationships of confidence with the Southeast Asian countries and working to strengthen the readiness of them through numerous joint military exercises such as the multilateral military exercise Cobra Gold and the bilateral sea exercise CARAT[127], provision of military technology, and military assistance.

3. Relations with China

There are currently territorial disputes between Southeast Asian countries and China over the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands[128]. At the ASEAN-China Summit Meeting held in November 2002, ASEAN member countries and China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea[129], which aims

for a peaceful settlement of the territorial issue. However, no major development has been seen in the drafting of a Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea[130], which would provide more concrete behavior and possess legal binding force. Moreover, it is said that China conducted military exercises in the Paracel Islands in November 2007 and, in December 2007, the Chinese Government approved the establishment of "Sansha City," which includes the Spratly Islands. In opposition to these actions, there have been public-level demonstrations in Viet Nam.

In recent years, China has actively pushed the related countries to give priority to the development of resources in the waters surrounding the Spratly Islands, setting aside the territorial issue. For example, in September 2004, China and the Philippines agreed on a joint oil field exploration in the waters of the Spratly Islands, and in March 2005, China, the Philippines, and Viet Nam reached an agreement on the launch of a joint exploration of oil and natural gas in the South China Sea. Furthermore, the establishment of a joint working group on resource development in the South China Sea between ASEAN and China was approved by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting held in July 2005.

In recent years, China has been making efforts to develop cooperative relations with Southeast Asian countries by such means as visits by government officials via bilateral and multilateral frameworks.

In the defense sector as well, senior military officials have made visits between China and Southeast Asian countries, and a joint patrol was launched in the Gulf of Tonkin with Vietnamese and Chinese Naval vessels in April 2006 as a unit-level exchange and cooperation. In July 2007, the special forces of China and Thailand came together to conduct Strike-2007, a joint counterterrorism military exercise. In addition, in November 2007, China donated patrol ships to Cambodia as a means for assistance. At the China-ASEAN Summit Meeting in November 2007, Premier Wen Jiabao expressed China was prepared to strengthen cooperation with ASEAN countries in the sector of unconventional security, and it was ready to provide funds for such uses as marine surveying training on the Straits of Malacca.

4. Regional Issues and Cooperation

Southeast Asian nations utilize ASEAN as a multilateral security framework for the region. In addition to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a dialogue forum on the political and security sectors in the Asia-Pacific region launched in 1994, the first ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting was held in May 2006, and the second installment of the said meeting was held in November 2007. Furthermore, at the 13th ASEAN Summit in November 2007, the ASEAN Charter was adopted that contains the basic principles for establishing ASEAN community by 2015[131]. The direction of an organizational reform was the subject for attention since effective measures have yet to be taken against Myanmar, as ASEAN takes a consensus method and the noninterference principle. However, the ASEAN Charter bases itself on the traditional condition of unanimous approval by all member countries and, in the event unanimous approval is not attained, the way of decision shall be made at the summit meeting. The Charter states that if there is a serious breach of the Charter or non-compliance, the matter will be referred to the ASEAN summit for decision and also includes the establishment of a human rights body, strengthening the functions of ASEAN.

In the Southeast Asian region, multilateral cooperation is being promoted in order to deal with transnational issues such as terrorism and piracy. ASEAN countries have continuously discussed the issue of terrorism at various ASEAN meetings, and at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Ministerial Meeting in July 2006, the ministers adopted the ARF Statement on Cooperation in Fighting Cyber Attack and Terrorist Misuse of Cyber Space.

In July 2004, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore started the Trilateral Coordinated Patrols for vigilance against pirates in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. In this effort, the naval forces of the three countries patrol their own territories in cooperation with each other. Subsequently, in September 2005, the countries launched their joint coastline airborne patrols codenamed Eyes in the Sky. Since 2004, Malaysia, Singapore, the United

Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand have conducted joint exercises including maritime interdiction training within the framework of the Five Powers Defense Arrangements (FPDA). In addition, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP[132]), which was proposed and promoted by Japan, entered into force in September 2006 and the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre was established in November 2006 in Singapore based on the agreement[133].

Since August 2007, there have been frequent large-scale anti-government demonstrations in various areas of Myanmar predominantly by monks. The Myanmar government deployed its military to repress the demonstrations. These governmental efforts injured and killed a large number of people. Furthermore, the cyclone in May 2008 victimized and caused extensive damage, including house destruction and severing of transportation systems and lifelines. In response to this disaster, many countries offered to dispatch rescue personnel, but the Myanmar government refused them except those from Thailand, India, China, and Bangladesh. Nonetheless, later on, having been approached by ASEAN and the U.N., the Myanmar government agreed to accept rescue personnel of humanitarian support objectives. In addition, soon after the disaster, the Myanmar government administered a national referendum regarding a new constitution whose content includes maintaining military authority, as was initially planned.

Australia, New Zealand, Portugal, and Malaysia dispatched international security forces to East Timor in April 2006 in response to a worsening security situation, and in August 2006, the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) was established[134]. Beginning in April 2007, there was a presidential election and a parliamentary election, and these elections concluded without any major disturbances as security measures were reinforced by international security forces. However, in February 2008, President Jose Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Xanana Guzmao were assaulted by an armed group. In response to this, a state of emergency was declared in the country[135] and the U.N. extended the mandate of UNMIT until February 26, 2009[136]. It is reported that there has not been any major turmoil following the shooting incident; however, the security situation remains unstable and the country's process for stability in the future will gather attention.

5. Military Modernization in the Region

In recent years, Southeast Asian countries are modernizing their militaries against a backdrop of economic development and other factors. In regards to air forces, in 2004, Viet Nam imported Russian Su-30 fighters and Indonesia imported Russian Su-27 and Su-30 fighters. Indonesia plans to purchase U.S. F-16 fighters as well. In 2005, Singapore concluded a contract with the United States to purchase U.S. F-15 fighters. In 2007, Singapore concluded a contract to purchase additional F-15s, Malaysia imported Su-30 fighters, and Thailand decided to import Swedish JAS-39 fighters.

In regards to naval forces, Malaysia, which had not previously possessed submarines, concluded a contract in 2002 to purchase Scorpène-class submarines, which were jointly developed by France and Spain. Furthermore, in 2005, Singapore signed contracts to purchase Swedish Vastergotland-class submarines. In 2007, Singapore commissioned a French Formidable-class frigate, and also plans to commission a total of six of these, including those produced domestically, by 2009. In 2007, Indonesia commissioned two Sigma-class Corvettes, and plans to commission a total of four by 2009. Moreover, in September 2007, Indonesia and Russia agreed to strengthen military technology and defense cooperation. The two nations signed a statement of mutual agreement concerning the procurement of Russian weapons on the scale of $1 billion through government loans, and this agreement is reported to include weapons such as two Kilo-class submarines.

Some point out that the military modernization of these countries can be attributed to economic growth following the Asian currency crisis, and continued tensions in this region. Although the military modernization does not yet amount to an arms race, in some cases, it can be observed that some Southeast Asian countries watch their neighbors' defense programs and react to them[137].

Section 6. South Asia

1. India

1. General Situation

India is surrounded by many countries and has long coastlines totaling 7,600km. The country has the world's second largest population of more than one billion following China and has great influence in the South Asian region. Also, it has a geographic position that is significant in maritime traffic, connecting the Asia-Pacific region with the Middle East and Europe. In particular, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, located at the east end of the country, are close to the Straits of Malacca, and India is expected to play an important role in maritime security.

India has multiple races, religions, languages and cultures within it, but it has an administration elected through free and fair elections under the multi-party system and is the world's largest democratic nation[138]. Also, India shares a lot with major developed countries including Japan in terms of fundamental values and systems, such as liberalism, democracy and a market economy.

2. Foreign Policies

(1) Basic Posture

India has been promoting economic liberalization and reform since the 1990s. Against the backdrop of a favorable economy, the country is actively engaging in multilateral diplomacy[139], thereby steadily increasing its presence in the international community. In the field of security as well, India's rapid expansion of military cooperation with friendly nations not only strengthens the security environment of the South Asia region, but also is expected to enhance security worldwide. In recent years, India has been making efforts to expand military exchanges, such as by conducting joint exercises with various other countries[140].

(2) United States

India is actively striving to strengthen bilateral relations with the United States, while the United States is also promoting the expansion of involvement in India in line with the economic growth of India, thus leading to increasingly stronger mutual relationships in various fields.

The U.S.-India joint declaration, which was made when then Prime Minister of India Vajpayee visited the United States in November 2001, confirmed that qualitative improvement should be made for future bilateral relations. In January 2004, the two countries announced that they had agreed to expand mutual cooperation in the following three areas: non-military nuclear activities, space programs and high-technology trade, aiming to form a strategic partnership between the two countries. In July 2005, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited the United States and made a joint statement with U.S. President George W. Bush that the relationship between the two countries would transform into a global partnership through which they would cooperate in the fields of space exploration, nuclear energy for civilian applications, and military and non-military technologies. Subsequently in March 2006, President Bush in turn visited India for the first time in his six years as president of the United States[141], and agreed with Prime Minister Singh to strategically strengthen bilateral relations.

In the security field, in June 2005, then Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee and then U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld signed a 10-year military agreement called the New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship, based on the recognition that the U.S.-India defense relationship is an important pillar in the mutually beneficial relations between the two countries, which are changing over time. In March 2006, the U.S. Department of Defense announced its intention to enhance cooperation with India on security issues, including maritime security[142]. Furthermore, in February of this year, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

paid a visit to India and held discussions with Prime Minister Singh and other leaders[143].

India and the United States have made active military exchanges, including joint military exercises. The Indian and U.S. navies carried out the joint naval exercise Malabar 07-1 off the coast of Okinawa in April of last year, and in September also held Malabar 07-2 off the coast of the area surrounding the Bay of Bengal. Malabar 07-2 was participated in by aircraft carriers of the U.S. and Indian navies in which anti-air, anti-submarine, anti-surface warfare, and other exercises were carried out, thus enhancing the joint exercise with the United States in terms of both quality and quantity[144].

As for cooperation in civilian nuclear activities, U.S. President George W. Bush changed the previous policy prohibiting cooperation with countries not participating in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and agreed in July 2005 with Indian Prime Minister Singh on the cooperation in civilian nuclear activities for India, who is not yet a member of the NPT, in reply to India's implementation of various measures in terms of reduction of its military size and non-proliferation of weapons. Subsequently, in March 2006, U.S. President Bush agreed with Indian Prime Minister Singh on specific measures for the implementation of cooperation in civilian nuclear activities. Furthermore, in December 2006, the U.S. Senate and Congress passed the U.S.-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act, which enables cooperation in civilian nuclear activities with India, where comprehensive safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were not applied. The act was signed by President Bush and enacted in the same month.

In July 2007, India and the United States announced that they had completed negotiations on the bilateral agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation. In August 2007, the two countries announced the text of the bilateral agreement on Cooperation for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. In November 2007, India and the IAEA started negotiation to finalize an India-specific Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA.

The "Malabar 07-2" [U.S. Navy]

(3) China

India has been trying to improve relations with China through mutual visits by leaders despite the national border issues between the two countries and concerns over Chinese nuclear weapons and missiles and the modernization of its military force, including naval forces. In June 2003, then Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee visited China for the first time in the past 10 years as Indian Prime Minister and signed with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao the Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation[145] between the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China. In November 2003, the Indian and Chinese navies carried out joint naval exercises for the first time off the coast of Shanghai. Furthermore, when Chinese Minister of National Defense Cao Gangchuan visited India in March 2004, the two countries agreed on the expansion of military exchanges. Subsequently in December 2004, based on this agreement, a visit to China by an Indian Chief of Army Staff was made for the first time by the two countries' Vice Foreign Ministers. When Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited India in April 2005, the two countries reached an agreement on establishing a strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity[146]. In November 2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited India for the first time in 10 years as the Chinese president to meet with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Both agreed that the development of a strategic and cooperative partnership between China and India is commonly recognized as an important issue and announced a joint declaration that includes holding regular summit meetings[147]. Furthermore, in December

of 2007, the first joint military exercise by the armies of the two countries – an India-China anti-terrorism joint exercise – took place in Yunnan Province in China[148]. In addition, in January of 2008, Indian Prime Minister Singh visited China, and with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao signed a joint document aiming for "A Shared Vision for the 21st Century[149]."

(4) Russia

India has traditionally been on friendly terms with Russia and maintains close relations with the country through mutual visits made annually by their leaders. In October 2000, the two countries signed the Declaration of Strategic Partnership to further strengthen their bilateral relations, and have been promoting acquisition of T-90 tanks by India from Russia as well as joint development of a supersonic cruise missile[150]. In January 2007, then Russian President Vladimir Putin visited India and both leaders announced a joint statement as well as signed agreements, including one for the construction of nuclear power plants and an intergovernmental agreement on the peaceful use of the Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS)[151]. In November 2007, Indian Prime Minister Singh visited Russia, and held talks with then President Putin[152].

Russia is a major supplier of weapons to India[153]. In January 2004, then Russian Defense Minister Ivanov visited India and concluded a contract to sell a retired aircraft carrier, the *Admiral Gorshkov*, to India. Also in January 2007, then Russian Defense Minister Ivanov visited India and conducted a consultation meeting on military technology cooperation, joint exercises, and other issues[154].

In addition, the two countries have conducted joint military exercises since 2003[155].

(5) Asian Countries

Since the latter half of the 1990s, India has been emphasizing relations with East Asian countries, including ASEAN members. In October 2003, it signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC)[156]. Historically on good terms with Japan, India has been deepening cooperation with Japan in various fields including economy and security based on a global partnership.

In May 2006, India's then Defense Minister Mukherjee visited Japan and announced a joint statement along with Director General of the DFAA Nukaga. In this statement, the two countries agreed to deepen dialogue and cooperation in the field of defense cooperation.

3. National Defense Policy

India, as its national security policies, lists the possession of military capabilities to protect national interests and the minimum level deterrent against nuclear threats; response to various security challenges ranging from terrorism and low-intensity conflicts to conventional wars and nuclear wars; and enhancement of international cooperation to deal with new threats such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

India intends to maintain minimum credible nuclear deterrence while committing to no first use on nuclear weapons and maintaining the unilateral moratorium (temporary suspension) on nuclear tests that it announced immediately after the nuclear test conducted in 1998. In addition, in its nuclear doctrine released in January 2003, India expressed its commitment to continuing export controls of nuclear weapons and missile-related materials and technologies, and participating in the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations, as well as to creating a nuclear-free world. However, the doctrine declares that India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons in the event of a major attack against India by biological or chemical weapons.

The Indian Armed Forces include ground forces of 12 corps with approximately 1,100,000 personnel; naval forces of two fleets, totaling approximately 355,000 tons, and air forces of 19 combat air wings and others with roughly 570 combat aircraft. India currently possesses one aircraft carrier, and in addition to promoting a construction plan for one new domestic aircraft carrier, will introduce another aircraft carrier from Russia upon

completion of repair work as explained later. In addition, in conjunction with the retirement of the now-degraded MiG-21 fighter-interceptors, India is planning for procurement of multi-purpose fighter-interceptors, and in February of 2007 Indian Defense Minister Antony announced that the country would procure 126 multi-purpose fighter-interceptors through a bidding process[157].

In recent years India has been actively proceeding with the development of a ballistic missile capable of mating with a nuclear warhead. In September 2003, India announced that it would operationally deploy the Agni-2 intermediate-range ballistic missile with the army. Various types of ballistic missiles have been launched for tests in India, and it was reported that in May 2008, the Agni-3 intermediate-range ballistic missile was successfully test-launched for the third time. It has also been reported that India has begun development of the Agni-4 long-range ballistic missile[158].

In addition, India is working toward the practical realization of ballistic missile defense as a defensive response measure to threats against the homeland. In December 2007, a missile interceptor test was conducted, and reported as a success[159]. (See Fig. I-2-6-1)

Fig. I-2-6-1 Military Forces of India and Pakistan (approximate)



Notes: 1. Figures based on The Military Balance 2008.
2. Combat aircraft include naval aircraft.

2. Pakistan

1. General Situation

Pakistan, with approximately 150 million people, borders India, Iran, Afghanistan, and China, and is one of the most geopolitically important countries in Southwestern Asia. Currently, Pakistan's attitude towards the international fight against terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is attracting increasing international attention.

In recent years, Pakistani President Musharraf has been improving relations with India, including over the Kashmir issue, and has also expressed his support for the U.S.-led anti-terrorism measures and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Islamic extremist groups, both at home and abroad, have criticized President Musharraf's policy, and in December 2003 there were two assassination attempts on the president. In addition, the administration of President Musharraf, who has entered his second term as civilian president, is facing direct threats, including the assassination of former Prime Minister Bhutto in December 2007 and serious terrorist attacks.

Going forward, achieving stability in Pakistan is crucial from the viewpoint of enhancing the international fight against terrorism, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and securing stability in South Asia.

2. Foreign Policies

Pakistan, while attaching importance to friendship and cooperation with Islamic countries, maintains close relations with China as a countermeasure against India[160]. Since the 9/11 attacks on the United States, Pakistan has been expressing its intention to join the U.S.-led fight against terrorism[161]. This cooperative attitude was highly appreciated by the international community, and the sanctions that had been imposed on Pakistan by the United States and other countries due to Pakistan's nuclear test in 1998 were lifted[162]. Pakistan strengthened military cooperation with the United States in the fight against terrorism. In March 2005 the United States decided to sell F-16 fighters to Pakistan, lifting its freeze on the sale that had lasted over 20 years. Furthermore, in March 2006, U.S. President Bush visited Pakistan, expressing deep appreciation for Pakistan's support in the global fight against terrorism, and the two countries confirmed their policy of promoting terrorism-related information sharing[163].

Regarding the issue of nuclear proliferation involving Pakistan, President Musharraf disclosed in February 2004 that some Pakistani scientists, including Dr. A. Q. Khan, were involved in nuclear proliferation, although the president denied the Pakistani government's involvement in any kind of proliferation activity[164].

3. National Defense Policy

Pakistan claims that maintaining nuclear deterrence against the nuclear threat posed by India is essential to ensure national security and self-defense.

The Pakistan Armed Forces include ground forces of nine corps with approximately 550,000 personnel; one naval fleet of about 40 warships, totaling approximately 75,000 tons; and air forces including 12 air combat wings with a total of roughly 380 combat aircraft.

In recent years, Pakistan has been actively proceeding with development of a ballistic missile capable of mating with a nuclear warhead and cruise missiles. Pakistan first test-launched the Babur (Hatf-VII) cruise missile in November 2005[165]. It also conducted the test launch of the Shaheen 2 (Hatf-VI) intermediate-range ballistic missile in February 2007. From January to February 2008, in exercises of the Army Strategic Force Command (ASFC), the Strategic Missile Group (SMG), following actions in 2006[166], it consecutively conducted test launches of various intermediate-range ballistic missiles it owns, including the Ghauri (Hatf-V), and the Shaheen 1 (Hatf-IV)[167]. And in April 2008, the first test launch of the intermediate-range ballistic missile Shaheen 2 (Hatf-VI) was conducted. This seems to demonstrate that Pakistan is steadily deploying ballistic missiles to its forces. (See Fig. I-2-6-1)

3. The India-Pakistan Relationship

India and Pakistan, which became independent from the former British India after World War II, have had three large armed conflicts over the Kashmir territorial issue[168] and others.

The territorial dispute over Kashmir has continued, with dialogues repeatedly resumed and suspended, and it constitutes one of the root causes of confrontation between India and Pakistan.

India and Pakistan held vastly different opinions on Kashmir, and the solution of the issues was thought to be difficult. However, in February 2004, "multiple dialogues" for the normalization of relations between the two countries, including on the Kashmir issue, were initiated, and definite progress can be seen in the bilateral relationship[169]. As tensions between the two countries have been mitigated, the question of whether they may solve the issue in the future is attracting much attention from the international community.

Section 7. Australia

1. National Defense Policy

Australia, like Japan and the Republic of Korea, is allied with the United States. Australia has been broadly and actively involved in resolving security issues in the Middle East and Asia-Pacific region in addition to those in neighboring areas such as Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands. (See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2)

In December 2000, Australia announced "Defence 2000 - Our Future Defence Force," which set forth its defense policy for the coming decade. The document states that the missions of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) are: first, to defend Australia; second, to contribute to the security of its immediate neighborhood; and third, to contribute effectively to international coalitions of forces to meet crises beyond Australia's immediate neighborhood in support of Australia's wider interests and objectives.

In order to respond to subsequent changes in the strategic environment, the Howard administration[170] reviewed the national defense strategy approximately every two years, and the results were announced as "Australia's National Security: A Defence Update."

"A Defence Update" issued in February 2003, which took into account the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the bombing in Bali, Indonesia, in October 2002, designated terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and failing states as priority issues for responding to the new strategic environment resulting from progressing globalization, and predicted an increase in opportunities for ADF activities in remote regions.

"A Defence Update" issued in December 2005, taking into account the ADF's participation in the military operation in Iraq that began in March 2005 and the subsequent reconstruction activities, the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) activities that began in July 2005[171], as well as terrorist acts in many parts of the world, indicated the importance of the government's integrated efforts to respond to increasingly complex and diverse situations.

"A Defence Update" issued in July 2007, taking into account factors such as the ADF involvement in the Middle East to that point, the dispatch of the ADF to the uprising in Timor-Leste[172], and nuclear issues in North Korea and Iran[173], stated that the priority issues laid out in the above-mentioned 2003 report would remain in effect. The report expected that the situation will continue where the ADF, while continuing activities in neighboring regions, engages in activities in coalition with foreign forces in remote regions, including Iraq and Afghanistan. In this way, the ADF aims to make a meaningful contribution to international security issues in remote regions, as well as to take a leadership role in the neighboring region, which comprises many unstable island states. For all of these activities, a high readiness posture is required. The report also mentions that although it remains unlikely that Australia will face conventional military threats, in order to allow the country to independently defend its territory without relying on the assistance of other countries in case of such an unlikely event occurring, it continues to be of great importance to retain an edge in leading military capability in the region.

2. Foreign Relations

1. Relations with the United States

Australia attaches importance to its alliance with the United States based on the ANZUS Treaty (the Security Treaty among Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America)[174]. In addition to annual ministerial consultations among their foreign ministers and defense ministers, and joint exercises such as Talisman Saber, Australia has dispatched warships, combat aircraft and special forces to the military operations in Iraq and the war on terror in Afghanistan[175]. While the Rudd administration announced that it would withdraw combat troops stationed in Iraq by mid-2008[176], it also announced that troops stationed in Afghanistan would remain there for the long term. Thus, the close alliance is maintained[177].

Australia decided to participate in the U.S.-led missile defense program in December 2003. Although the concrete forms of participation remain to be decided yet, Australia decided in August 2004 that it would adopt the U.S. Aegis system for its new air defense destroyers. The possibility is indicated that these destroyers will be applicable to ballistic missile defense[178]. In addition, seeking to enhance interoperability with the United States, with the retirement of the F/A-18 Hornet and F-111 main fighters in several years, in June 2002 Australia announced that it would participate in the U.S.-led F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program. In preparation for the delay in that program, in March 2007, it decided to purchase F/A-18 Super Hornet[179], and is expanding U.S.-Australia joint exercise facilities in the country.

Australian military personnel in operation in Afghanistan [Australian Government, Department of Defence]

2. Relations with Other Countries

Australia is strengthening its partnership with NATO, primarily through its ISAF activities in Afghanistan. It also conducts joint exercises with Malaysia, Singapore, the United Kingdom and New Zealand based on the Five Power Defence Arrangements (which came into effect in 1971). In addition, Australia has taken part in U.N. PKOs, such as the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT).

As regards its relations with Indonesia, after the Bali terror bombings in 2002 and 2005, and the one that occurred in front of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in September 2004, the two countries decided to resume suspended joint exercises between their special forces[180]. Furthermore, in November 2006, they signed a security agreement for a broad defense cooperation including counterterrorism and intelligence.

Section 8. Europe

1. General Situation

With the end of the Cold War, many European countries now recognize that the threat of large-scale invasion by other countries has disappeared and regard the outbreak of regional conflict within and around Europe, the rise of terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other developments as new security challenges.

To adapt to new and emerging threats, Europe has sought to stabilize the security environment primarily by strengthening and expanding the frameworks of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO: 26 member states) and the European Union (EU: 27 member states). Moreover, many European countries are proceeding with the development of their own capacity to cope with these new challenges. (See Fig. I-2-8-1)

2. Enhancement and Enlargement of Security Frameworks

1. Enhancement of Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Peacekeeping Functions

(1) Commitment to a New Role

Founded for the primary purpose of collective defense among member countries, NATO has shifted the focus of its activities to conflict prevention and crisis management since the end of the Cold War.

This shift has also been reflected in the Strategic Concept of the Alliance, reviewed in 1999, in which NATO has added including conflict prevention and crisis management[181] to its primary mission of collective defense, based on the view that various dangers difficult to forecast, such as ethnic and religious conflicts, territorial disputes, human rights suppression, and the dissolution of a state, still remain in Europe and surrounding regions.

NATO has led the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan since August 2003, which is the first operation outside Europe, and expanded the area of its mission to all regions of Afghanistan in October 2006. As the demand remains for a strengthening of posture by ISAF, arguments have arisen concerning the provision of additional troops and their regional allocation[182] among countries including the U.S., Canada, the U.K. and the Netherlands, whose forces are deployed in the south and east where attacks are frequent, and countries including Germany and France, whose forces operate in relatively stable areas of the north and west and around Kabul. In April 2008, the Bucharest Declaration announced at the NATO Summit held in April 2008 commended the pledges of additional troops by member countries[183] while also expecting further additional contributions, and stated that NATO would place the highest priority on ISAF's mission.

In Iraq, NATO is providing assistance for the training of Iraqi security forces in accordance with the agreement reached at the NATO Istanbul Summit Meeting held in April 2004, and NATO continues to conduct peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, which declared independence in February of this year[184].

The EU, enhanced its own commitment to security issues, and adopted its first security strategy paper in December 2003, titled "A Secure Europe in a Better World-European Security Strategy." It sets forth the objective of addressing major threats including terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, regional conflict, the collapse of states and organized crime by stabilizing surrounding regions and through multinational cooperation.

In 2003, the EU led its first peacekeeping operation to maintain public order in Macedonia, employing NATO equipment and capabilities[185]. In the same year, the EU carried out its first peacekeeping operation outside of Europe, in the Democratic Republic of Congo—without the use of NATO equipment and capabilities. The EU has since engaged, to a considerable degree, in crisis management and peacekeeping operations[186], continuing the activities of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina in December 2004, and deploying forces in Chad and Central Africa based on a decision made in October last year.

Fig. I-2-8-1 European Security Organization (as of May 2008)



Notes: 1. The Warsaw Pact Military Organization was dissolved in April 1991. The Warsaw Pact was dissolved as a political organization after the signing of the dissolution agreement on July 1, 1991 and ratification of the parliaments of the member states.
2. NATO leaders decided to invite Albania and Croatia to begin accession talks to join NATO at the NATO summit in April 2008. (They will officially be admitted through processes such as ratification.)

(2) Pursuit of Military Capabilities Required for New Roles

NATO's bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999 revealed a capability gap between the United States and European countries. Given this, and based on the agreement reached at the NATO Prague Summit Meeting in November 2002, NATO has moved forward with the reforms of its military capabilities, including organizational transformation[187].

At the core of the reforms of NATO's capability improvements has been the development of the NATO Response Force (NRF), which is designed to rapidly respond to various crisis scenarios around the world. The Force was declared to be at full operational capacity in November 2006. However, with the expansion and extension of troop deployments in Afghanistan and elsewhere, NATO is reconsidering the structure of the NRF

so as to lessen the burden on countries contributing armed forces to the NRF.

Meanwhile, the EU has been making efforts to conduct peacekeeping and other military operations independently in cases where NATO does not intervene. Since January 2007, the EU has made two Battle groups fully ready at all times based on the Battle groups concept proclaimed in "Headline Goal 2010[188]" adopted in 2004. The EU also established its own operation center in Brussels in January 2007. (See Fig. I-2-8-2)

Fig. I-2-8-2 Trend of Capability Build-up of NATO and the EU

	NATO Response Force (NRF)	EU Battle Groups (Combat Groups)
Missions	Swiftly responding to situations worldwide	Responding to EU-led missions, such as peacekeeping operations, in cases where there is no NATO intervention
Organization	• Standing joint task forces formed by mainly brigade-scale ground units (approx. 4,000 troops), plus maritime, air and specialized units • Size of force: approx. 25,000 troops	• Thirteen units of 1,500 troops will be formed. Of these, two units can be emergency deployed simultaneously
Capabilities	• Deployment begins within five days of an order • Capability of 30-day operations	• Deployment begins within five days of an order and is completed within 15 days • Capability of 30-day operations
Operations	• One year rotation (in the case of ground units, six months of training, and six months on standby) • Basic operational concept: to be dispatched as an initial response unit • Segmentation of units is possible depending on the mission	• Units will be formed and on standby by rotation within the unilateral or multinational framework
Force building	• Initiative was formulated in November 2002 • Prototype force was formed in October 2003 • Possession of initial operational capability in October 2004 • Complete operational capability was achieved in November 2006	• Initiative was formulated in June 2004 • Complete operational capability was achieved in January 2007

2. Geographical Expansion and Partnership of Security Frameworks

Since the end of the Cold War, efforts have been made to secure the stability of the so-called security vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe by enlarging the NATO framework[189]. At present, most of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are NATO member states and have borders with Russia, which has consistently opposed NATO's expansion to the east.

At the same time, NATO has pursued a policy of partnership with non-NATO member countries. For example, NATO adopted the Partnership for Peace (PfP)[190], which aims to foster confidence and improve interoperability with non-NATO European countries, and the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD)[191], which seeks stability in the Mediterranean region.

NATO is also strengthening relations with contact countries[192] such as Australia and Japan with a view to conducting activities outside of the region.

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO and Russia have sought to improve relations, and established the

NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in 2002 in light of the need to deal with common issues concerning security. NATO and Russia have continued to pursue dialogue and cooperation in areas such as the fight against terrorism, arms control, and theater missile defense[193].

The number of EU member countries in Central and Eastern Europe is also expanding, with the accession of 10 countries in 2004, including Poland and the Czech Republic, and the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in January of last year. (See Fig. I-2-8-3)

Fig. I-2-8-3 Enlargement of NATO and EU Membership



Note: NATO leaders decided to invite Albania and Croatia to begin accession talks to join NATO at the NATO summit in April 2008. (They will officially become members through processes such as ratification.)

3. Efforts by Individual Countries to Maintain the Capability to Respond to Various Conditions

Since the end of the Cold War, each individual country—conscious of the new threats of terrorism and the proliferation of WMD—have begun to place emphasis on the allocation of personnel to missions other than national defense. As a result, there has been an emphasis on strengthening transport capacity for overseas deployment, giving consideration to the role of NATO and other defense organizations. Moreover, many European countries have implemented quantitative reductions and restructuring of their military power, while channeling efforts into modernizing their military and increasing national defense expenditures[194].

1. The United Kingdom

The U.K. has maintained the perception that it is not subject to any direct military threats and therefore has pursued military reform focused on enhancing capacity in order to cope with new threats with the end of the Cold War. In particular, the U.K. regarded international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD as major threats and improved its overseas deployment capacity and readiness has been advanced[195].

The first National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom was announced in March of this year. The strategy highlights the broadened view of national security to include threats to individual citizens, and it considers transnational crime, pandemics, and flooding, etc., as threats along with terrorism and the spread of WMD. It also cites factors such as climate change, competition for energy, and poverty as the causes of these threats. To cope with these diverse and interrelated threats, the strategy takes a multilateral approach through the U.N., EU and NATO while seeking the cooperation not only of the military and the police, but also the private sector and regional governments, with a view to addressing threats at an early stage.

Amphibious exercises by the NATO readiness units [NATO picture]

As outlined in the strategy, the international security environment has grown more complex and less predictable in terms of state-led military threats, which existing assessments conclude cannot be expected in the foreseeable future[196]. The strategy nevertheless states that while the reemergence of such threats in the long run is unlikely, they cannot be discounted, and thus sets forth a policy for maintaining strong defense capabilities[197]. To be specific, the U.K. will give priority to the procurement of equipment for supporting its current operations, including strategic airlift, support helicopters and protected patrol vehicles. At the same time, it realizes that a complete rebuilding of its aircraft carriers, air defense and anti-submarine warfare will be difficult and therefore plans to invest for the long term in a broad range of military capabilities related to the defense of the United Kingdom. Furthermore, in a white paper, "The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrence" issued in December 2006, the U.K. announced it would maintain its own nuclear deterrence based on submarine-launched ballistic missiles in the 2020s and beyond[198].

These military capabilities will guarantee the United Kingdom's future security while enabling it to make contributions to international efforts on peacekeeping and thus contribute to the international security environment.

2. Germany

In its first national defense white paper in 12 years issued in October 2006, Germany specified that the primary mission of its allied forces remains national defense and collective defense in the traditional sense. In light of the expansion of new threats including terrorism and the spread of WMD, however, it declared that conflict prevention and crisis management, including the fight against terrorism, would likely become the next mission.

To ensure the necessary military capabilities to meet the above mission, Germany plans to give priority in resource distribution to strengthening strategic transport capacity, global reconnaissance capabilities and efficient command capabilities with high interoperability. Specifically, Germany plans to introduce the A-400M transport aircraft and SAR-LUPE, a synthetic aperture radar satellite. It is also restructuring its military into integrated units divided by function: intervention, stabilization and assistance[199], while reducing personnel and relocating its domestic camps and facilities.

3. France

In June 2008, France announced "The White Paper on Defense and National Security," its first in 14 years, which outlines the country's medium- to long-term defense and national security strategy. In addition to specifying the direct threats of mass terrorism and ballistic missiles, the report also identifies risks ranging from cyberattacks

to environmental crises, stating that these threats and risks were becoming increasingly interconnected due to globalization and that the continuity between domestic and foreign security has taken on strategic significance. The regions cited as affecting the stability of France and Europe included the area extending from the Atlantic to the Indian oceans, sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia, which, is growing in its importance. The report specifies three statues of France's national security strategy: prevention, nuclear deterrence[200] protection, and overseas intervention, based on accurate knowledge and anticipation of conditions in a world characterized by uncertainty and instability. The report states that France will strengthen these functions and combine them flexibly in order to adapt to changes in the strategic environment over the next 15 years.

Regarding France's external relations, the report calls for a strengthening of EU security and renovation of transatlantic relations, and advocates full participation in NATO[201] in view of the altered situation existing since France's withdrawal from NATO's military structure and, in particular, the complementary relationship between the EU and NATO. The Defense and National Security Council chaired by the French President with specialized bodies including the National Intelligence Council will be established in France.

With respect to the provision of military power, France intends to meet operational requirements such as enhancing protection capabilities while, at the same time, reducing personnel, and to proceed with a strengthening of its intelligence functions and a modernization of its military equipment.

4. Efforts toward Stabilization in Europe

1. Arms Control and Disarmament

The Treaty of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), which formally entered into force in 1992, set upper limits for five categories of weapons, namely tanks, wheeled armored combat vehicles, artillery, fighters and attack helicopters, for both the East and West[202]. By reducing weapons exceeding these limits, the treaty sought to preclude the capability for launching surprise attacks or large-scale invasions and thereby ensure the safety and stability of Europe.

The disbanding of the Warsaw Pact Organization (WPO) and NATO's enlargement to the east led to the signing of the CFE Treaty at the 1999 OSCE Summit Meeting. The principal aims of this treaty were a change of the existing restrictions on arms possession imposed separately for the East and the West groups to restrictions by country or territory. However, the NATO countries are considering abandoning ratification of the treaty because Russia failed to withdraw its army from Moldova and Georgia as it had agreed to do when it signed the treaty.

In response, Russia, coupled with its reaction to the U.S. Missile Defense Plan in Eastern Europe, suspended its participation in the CFE Treaty from December of last year, and stopped on-site inspections to verify compliance with numerical limits.

2. Confidence Building Measures (CBM)[203]

Talks on Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) negotiations have been held in Europe since 1989, and at the 1992 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Vienna Document 1992, which specified annual exchange of military information along with notifications, inspections and restrictions concerning military exercises exceeding a certain scale, was adopted[204].

The Open Skies Treaty[205], designed to improve openness and transparency of military activities carried out by signatory countries through mutual inspection flights and also supplement arms control verification measures, was signed by 25 countries in 1992 and entered into force in January 2002.

Section 7. Australia

1. National Defense Policy

Australia, like Japan and the Republic of Korea, is allied with the United States. Australia has been broadly and actively involved in resolving security issues in the Middle East and Asia-Pacific region in addition to those in neighboring areas such as Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands. (See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2)

In December 2000, Australia announced "Defence 2000 - Our Future Defence Force," which set forth its defense policy for the coming decade. The document states that the missions of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) are: first, to defend Australia; second, to contribute to the security of its immediate neighborhood; and third, to contribute effectively to international coalitions of forces to meet crises beyond Australia's immediate neighborhood in support of Australia's wider interests and objectives.

In order to respond to subsequent changes in the strategic environment, the Howard administration[170] reviewed the national defense strategy approximately every two years, and the results were announced as "Australia's National Security: A Defence Update."

"A Defence Update" issued in February 2003, which took into account the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the bombing in Bali, Indonesia, in October 2002, designated terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and failing states as priority issues for responding to the new strategic environment resulting from progressing globalization, and predicted an increase in opportunities for ADF activities in remote regions.

"A Defence Update" issued in December 2005, taking into account the ADF's participation in the military operation in Iraq that began in March 2005 and the subsequent reconstruction activities, the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) activities that began in July 2005[171], as well as terrorist acts in many parts of the world, indicated the importance of the government's integrated efforts to respond to increasingly complex and diverse situations.

"A Defence Update" issued in July 2007, taking into account factors such as the ADF involvement in the Middle East to that point, the dispatch of the ADF to the uprising in Timor-Leste[172], and nuclear issues in North Korea and Iran[173], stated that the priority issues laid out in the above-mentioned 2003 report would remain in effect. The report expected that the situation will continue where the ADF, while continuing activities in neighboring regions, engages in activities in coalition with foreign forces in remote regions, including Iraq and Afghanistan. In this way, the ADF aims to make a meaningful contribution to international security issues in remote regions, as well as to take a leadership role in the neighboring region, which comprises many unstable island states. For all of these activities, a high readiness posture is required. The report also mentions that although it remains unlikely that Australia will face conventional military threats, in order to allow the country to independently defend its territory without relying on the assistance of other countries in case of such an unlikely event occurring, it continues to be of great importance to retain an edge in leading military capability in the region.

2. Foreign Relations

1. Relations with the United States

Australia attaches importance to its alliance with the United States based on the ANZUS Treaty (the Security Treaty among Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America)[174]. In addition to annual ministerial consultations among their foreign ministers and defense ministers, and joint exercises such as Talisman Saber, Australia has dispatched warships, combat aircraft and special forces to the military operations in Iraq and the war on terror in Afghanistan[175]. While the Rudd administration announced that it would withdraw combat troops stationed in Iraq by mid-2008[176], it also announced that troops stationed in Afghanistan would remain there for the long term. Thus, the close alliance is maintained[177].

Australia decided to participate in the U.S.-led missile defense program in December 2003. Although the concrete forms of participation remain to be decided yet, Australia decided in August 2004 that it would adopt the U.S. Aegis system for its new air defense destroyers. The possibility is indicated that these destroyers will be applicable to ballistic missile defense[178]. In addition, seeking to enhance interoperability with the United States, with the retirement of the F/A-18 Hornet and F-111 main fighters in several years, in June 2002 Australia announced that it would participate in the U.S.-led F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program. In preparation for the delay in that program, in March 2007, it decided to purchase F/A-18 Super Hornet[179], and is expanding U.S.-Australia joint exercise facilities in the country.

Australian military personnel in operation in Afghanistan [Australian Government, Department of Defence]

2. Relations with Other Countries

Australia is strengthening its partnership with NATO, primarily through its ISAF activities in Afghanistan. It also conducts joint exercises with Malaysia, Singapore, the United Kingdom and New Zealand based on the Five Power Defence Arrangements (which came into effect in 1971). In addition, Australia has taken part in U.N. PKOs, such as the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT).

As regards its relations with Indonesia, after the Bali terror bombings in 2002 and 2005, and the one that occurred in front of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in September 2004, the two countries decided to resume suspended joint exercises between their special forces[180]. Furthermore, in November 2006, they signed a security agreement for a broad defense cooperation including counterterrorism and intelligence.

Section 8. Europe

1. General Situation

With the end of the Cold War, many European countries now recognize that the threat of large-scale invasion by other countries has disappeared and regard the outbreak of regional conflict within and around Europe, the rise of terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other developments as new security challenges.

To adapt to new and emerging threats, Europe has sought to stabilize the security environment primarily by strengthening and expanding the frameworks of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO: 26 member states) and the European Union (EU: 27 member states). Moreover, many European countries are proceeding with the development of their own capacity to cope with these new challenges. (See Fig. I-2-8-1)

2. Enhancement and Enlargement of Security Frameworks

1. Enhancement of Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Peacekeeping Functions

(1) Commitment to a New Role

Founded for the primary purpose of collective defense among member countries, NATO has shifted the focus of its activities to conflict prevention and crisis management since the end of the Cold War.

This shift has also been reflected in the Strategic Concept of the Alliance, reviewed in 1999, in which NATO has added including conflict prevention and crisis management[181] to its primary mission of collective defense, based on the view that various dangers difficult to forecast, such as ethnic and religious conflicts, territorial disputes, human rights suppression, and the dissolution of a state, still remain in Europe and surrounding regions.

NATO has led the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan since August 2003, which is the first operation outside Europe, and expanded the area of its mission to all regions of Afghanistan in October 2006. As the demand remains for a strengthening of posture by ISAF, arguments have arisen concerning the provision of additional troops and their regional allocation[182] among countries including the U.S., Canada, the U.K. and the Netherlands, whose forces are deployed in the south and east where attacks are frequent, and countries including Germany and France, whose forces operate in relatively stable areas of the north and west and around Kabul. In April 2008, the Bucharest Declaration announced at the NATO Summit held in April 2008 commended the pledges of additional troops by member countries[183] while also expecting further additional contributions, and stated that NATO would place the highest priority on ISAF's mission.

In Iraq, NATO is providing assistance for the training of Iraqi security forces in accordance with the agreement reached at the NATO Istanbul Summit Meeting held in April 2004, and NATO continues to conduct peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, which declared independence in February of this year[184].

The EU, enhanced its own commitment to security issues, and adopted its first security strategy paper in December 2003, titled "A Secure Europe in a Better World-European Security Strategy." It sets forth the objective of addressing major threats including terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, regional conflict, the collapse of states and organized crime by stabilizing surrounding regions and through multinational cooperation.

In 2003, the EU led its first peacekeeping operation to maintain public order in Macedonia, employing NATO equipment and capabilities[185]. In the same year, the EU carried out its first peacekeeping operation outside of Europe, in the Democratic Republic of Congo—without the use of NATO equipment and capabilities. The EU has since engaged, to a considerable degree, in crisis management and peacekeeping operations[186], continuing the activities of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina in December 2004, and deploying forces in Chad and Central Africa based on a decision made in October last year.

Fig. I-2-8-1 European Security Organization (as of May 2008)



Notes: 1. The Warsaw Pact Military Organization was dissolved in April 1991. The Warsaw Pact was dissolved as a political organization after the signing of the dissolution agreement on July 1, 1991 and ratification of the parliaments of the member states.
2. NATO leaders decided to invite Albania and Croatia to begin accession talks to join NATO at the NATO summit in April 2008. (They will officially be admitted through processes such as ratification.)

(2) Pursuit of Military Capabilities Required for New Roles

NATO's bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999 revealed a capability gap between the United States and European countries. Given this, and based on the agreement reached at the NATO Prague Summit Meeting in November 2002, NATO has moved forward with the reforms of its military capabilities, including organizational transformation[187].

At the core of the reforms of NATO's capability improvements has been the development of the NATO Response Force (NRF), which is designed to rapidly respond to various crisis scenarios around the world. The Force was declared to be at full operational capacity in November 2006. However, with the expansion and extension of troop deployments in Afghanistan and elsewhere, NATO is reconsidering the structure of the NRF

so as to lessen the burden on countries contributing armed forces to the NRF.

Meanwhile, the EU has been making efforts to conduct peacekeeping and other military operations independently in cases where NATO does not intervene. Since January 2007, the EU has made two Battle groups fully ready at all times based on the Battle groups concept proclaimed in "Headline Goal 2010[188]" adopted in 2004. The EU also established its own operation center in Brussels in January 2007. (See Fig. I-2-8-2)

Fig. I-2-8-2 Trend of Capability Build-up of NATO and the EU

	NATO Response Force (NRF)	EU Battle Groups (Combat Groups)
Missions	Swiftly responding to situations worldwide	Responding to EU-led missions, such as peacekeeping operations, in cases where there is no NATO intervention
Organization	• Standing joint task forces formed by mainly brigade-scale ground units (approx. 4,000 troops), plus maritime, air and specialized units • Size of force: approx. 25,000 troops	• Thirteen units of 1,500 troops will be formed. Of these, two units can be emergency deployed simultaneously
Capabilities	• Deployment begins within five days of an order • Capability of 30-day operations	• Deployment begins within five days of an order and is completed within 15 days • Capability of 30-day operations
Operations	• One year rotation (in the case of ground units, six months of training, and six months on standby) • Basic operational concept: to be dispatched as an initial response unit • Segmentation of units is possible depending on the mission	• Units will be formed and on standby by rotation within the unilateral or multinational framework
Force building	• Initiative was formulated in November 2002 • Prototype force was formed in October 2003 • Possession of initial operational capability in October 2004 • Complete operational capability was achieved in November 2006	• Initiative was formulated in June 2004 • Complete operational capability was achieved in January 2007

2. Geographical Expansion and Partnership of Security Frameworks

Since the end of the Cold War, efforts have been made to secure the stability of the so-called security vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe by enlarging the NATO framework[189]. At present, most of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are NATO member states and have borders with Russia, which has consistently opposed NATO's expansion to the east.

At the same time, NATO has pursued a policy of partnership with non-NATO member countries. For example, NATO adopted the Partnership for Peace (PfP)[190], which aims to foster confidence and improve interoperability with non-NATO European countries, and the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD)[191], which seeks stability in the Mediterranean region.

NATO is also strengthening relations with contact countries[192] such as Australia and Japan with a view to conducting activities outside of the region.

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO and Russia have sought to improve relations, and established the

NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in 2002 in light of the need to deal with common issues concerning security. NATO and Russia have continued to pursue dialogue and cooperation in areas such as the fight against terrorism, arms control, and theater missile defense[193].

The number of EU member countries in Central and Eastern Europe is also expanding, with the accession of 10 countries in 2004, including Poland and the Czech Republic, and the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in January of last year. (See Fig. I-2-8-3)

Fig. I-2-8-3 Enlargement of NATO and EU Membership



Note: NATO leaders decided to invite Albania and Croatia to begin accession talks to join NATO at the NATO summit in April 2008. (They will officially become members through processes such as ratification.)

3. Efforts by Individual Countries to Maintain the Capability to Respond to Various Conditions

Since the end of the Cold War, each individual country—conscious of the new threats of terrorism and the proliferation of WMD—have begun to place emphasis on the allocation of personnel to missions other than national defense. As a result, there has been an emphasis on strengthening transport capacity for overseas deployment, giving consideration to the role of NATO and other defense organizations. Moreover, many European countries have implemented quantitative reductions and restructuring of their military power, while channeling efforts into modernizing their military and increasing national defense expenditures[194].

1. The United Kingdom

The U.K. has maintained the perception that it is not subject to any direct military threats and therefore has pursued military reform focused on enhancing capacity in order to cope with new threats with the end of the Cold War. In particular, the U.K. regarded international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD as major threats and improved its overseas deployment capacity and readiness has been advanced[195].

The first National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom was announced in March of this year. The strategy highlights the broadened view of national security to include threats to individual citizens, and it considers transnational crime, pandemics, and flooding, etc., as threats along with terrorism and the spread of WMD. It also cites factors such as climate change, competition for energy, and poverty as the causes of these threats. To cope with these diverse and interrelated threats, the strategy takes a multilateral approach through the U.N., EU and NATO while seeking the cooperation not only of the military and the police, but also the private sector and regional governments, with a view to addressing threats at an early stage.

Amphibious exercises by the NATO readiness units [NATO picture]

As outlined in the strategy, the international security environment has grown more complex and less predictable in terms of state-led military threats, which existing assessments conclude cannot be expected in the foreseeable future[196]. The strategy nevertheless states that while the reemergence of such threats in the long run is unlikely, they cannot be discounted, and thus sets forth a policy for maintaining strong defense capabilities[197]. To be specific, the U.K. will give priority to the procurement of equipment for supporting its current operations, including strategic airlift, support helicopters and protected patrol vehicles. At the same time, it realizes that a complete rebuilding of its aircraft carriers, air defense and anti-submarine warfare will be difficult and therefore plans to invest for the long term in a broad range of military capabilities related to the defense of the United Kingdom. Furthermore, in a white paper, "The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrence" issued in December 2006, the U.K. announced it would maintain its own nuclear deterrence based on submarine-launched ballistic missiles in the 2020s and beyond[198].

These military capabilities will guarantee the United Kingdom's future security while enabling it to make contributions to international efforts on peacekeeping and thus contribute to the international security environment.

2. Germany

In its first national defense white paper in 12 years issued in October 2006, Germany specified that the primary mission of its allied forces remains national defense and collective defense in the traditional sense. In light of the expansion of new threats including terrorism and the spread of WMD, however, it declared that conflict prevention and crisis management, including the fight against terrorism, would likely become the next mission.

To ensure the necessary military capabilities to meet the above mission, Germany plans to give priority in resource distribution to strengthening strategic transport capacity, global reconnaissance capabilities and efficient command capabilities with high interoperability. Specifically, Germany plans to introduce the A-400M transport aircraft and SAR-LUPE, a synthetic aperture radar satellite. It is also restructuring its military into integrated units divided by function: intervention, stabilization and assistance[199], while reducing personnel and relocating its domestic camps and facilities.

3. France

In June 2008, France announced "The White Paper on Defense and National Security," its first in 14 years, which outlines the country's medium- to long-term defense and national security strategy. In addition to specifying the direct threats of mass terrorism and ballistic missiles, the report also identifies risks ranging from cyberattacks

to environmental crises, stating that these threats and risks were becoming increasingly interconnected due to globalization and that the continuity between domestic and foreign security has taken on strategic significance. The regions cited as affecting the stability of France and Europe included the area extending from the Atlantic to the Indian oceans, sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia, which, is growing in its importance. The report specifies three statues of France's national security strategy: prevention, nuclear deterrence[200] protection, and overseas intervention, based on accurate knowledge and anticipation of conditions in a world characterized by uncertainty and instability. The report states that France will strengthen these functions and combine them flexibly in order to adapt to changes in the strategic environment over the next 15 years.

Regarding France's external relations, the report calls for a strengthening of EU security and renovation of transatlantic relations, and advocates full participation in NATO[201] in view of the altered situation existing since France's withdrawal from NATO's military structure and, in particular, the complementary relationship between the EU and NATO. The Defense and National Security Council chaired by the French President with specialized bodies including the National Intelligence Council will be established in France.

With respect to the provision of military power, France intends to meet operational requirements such as enhancing protection capabilities while, at the same time, reducing personnel, and to proceed with a strengthening of its intelligence functions and a modernization of its military equipment.

4. Efforts toward Stabilization in Europe

1. Arms Control and Disarmament

The Treaty of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), which formally entered into force in 1992, set upper limits for five categories of weapons, namely tanks, wheeled armored combat vehicles, artillery, fighters and attack helicopters, for both the East and West[202]. By reducing weapons exceeding these limits, the treaty sought to preclude the capability for launching surprise attacks or large-scale invasions and thereby ensure the safety and stability of Europe.

The disbanding of the Warsaw Pact Organization (WPO) and NATO's enlargement to the east led to the signing of the CFE Treaty at the 1999 OSCE Summit Meeting. The principal aims of this treaty were a change of the existing restrictions on arms possession imposed separately for the East and the West groups to restrictions by country or territory. However, the NATO countries are considering abandoning ratification of the treaty because Russia failed to withdraw its army from Moldova and Georgia as it had agreed to do when it signed the treaty.

In response, Russia, coupled with its reaction to the U.S. Missile Defense Plan in Eastern Europe, suspended its participation in the CFE Treaty from December of last year, and stopped on-site inspections to verify compliance with numerical limits.

2. Confidence Building Measures (CBM)[203]

Talks on Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) negotiations have been held in Europe since 1989, and at the 1992 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Vienna Document 1992, which specified annual exchange of military information along with notifications, inspections and restrictions concerning military exercises exceeding a certain scale, was adopted[204].

The Open Skies Treaty[205], designed to improve openness and transparency of military activities carried out by signatory countries through mutual inspection flights and also supplement arms control verification measures, was signed by 25 countries in 1992 and entered into force in January 2002.

Section 9. Efforts to Stabilize the International Community by the U.N. and Other Scheme

1. General Situation

The end of the Cold War was accompanied by rising expectations for the peacekeeping system by the U.N., which up to that time had not functioned adequately, and as a result, many U.N. Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) were established. In recent years, efforts through regional frameworks such as the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) have been formed as a means of dealing appropriately with conflict (See Chapter 1). Other efforts include peacekeeping operations and humanitarian and reconstruction assistance by multinational forces mandated by U.N. Security Council Resolutions (See Chapter 1). Efforts aimed not only at peacekeeping but also at conflict prevention and peacebuilding[206] are also increasing.

2. Developments in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs)

Traditionally, PKOs have mainly aimed at preventing reoccurrence of conflict by focusing on monitoring of ceasefires and other tasks after a ceasefire agreement has been reached. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the missions now cover a broad range of operations, including civilian activities such as monitoring of disarmament, monitoring of elections and administration, and humanitarian support for return of refugees. In addition, operations with strong mandates[207] under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter can now be established[208].

The scale of participants in these operations has been marking remarkable increase. The number of personnel dispatched has increased substantially since the end of the Cold War, and in 1993, when large-scale PKO missions were on the move in the Balkan Peninsula and Somalia, the number reached a record of approximately 78,000. Subsequently, the number temporarily reduced to 12,000, but from around 2000, it has begun to rise again due to an increase in large-scale missions mainly in Africa and the Middle East[209]. As of the end of May 2008, 17 PKO missions were being conducted in 117 countries with about 88,000 participants around the world[210]. (See Fig. I-2-9-1)

However, the environment surrounding PKOs in recent years has grown increasingly harsh. Missions dispatched to regions without social infrastructure have increased, and the proportion of PKO personnel fatalities due to illness to the total PKO death toll is increasing[211]. This situation makes it difficult to gather personnel and equipment and to ensure the safety of personnel.

Fig. I-2-9-1 List of presently operating Peacekeeping Operations

Note: According to the U.N. (as of May 2008).

Africa

	Mission	Established Date	Personnel	Top 5 Dispatching Countries (Personnel)
①	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)	1991. 4	230	Malaysia (32), Egypt (29), Russia (15), China, Ghana (14)
②	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)	1999. 11	18,428	India (4,697), Pakistan (3,641), Bangladesh (1,601), Uruguay (1,369), South Africa (1,175)
③	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)	2000. 7	328	India (161), Uruguay (38), Kenya (22), Jordan (18), 3 countries including the U.S. (5)
④	United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)	2003. 9	12,934	Pakistan (3,435), Bangladesh (2,436), Nigeria (1,838), Ethiopia (1,801), Ghana (759)
⑤	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)	2004. 4	9,174	Bangladesh (2,980), Jordan (1,447), Pakistan (1,271), Morocco (725), Ghana (550)
⑥	United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)	2005. 3	9,924	India (2,696), Pakistan (1,611), Bangladesh (1,593), Egypt (852), Kenya (846)
⑦	African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)	2007. 7	9,563	Nigeria (3,093), Rwanda (2,670), South Africa (686), Senegal (624), Ghana (488)
⑧	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)	2007. 9	145	France (19), Egypt (13), Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire (12)

Middle East

	Mission	Established Date	Personnel	Top 5 Dispatching Countries (Personnel)
⑨	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)	1948. 5	153	Finland (15), Ireland, Netherlands, Norway (12), Australia (11)
⑩	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	1974. 6	1,046	Austria (382), Poland (346), India (189), Slovakia (95), Japan (30)
⑪	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	1978. 3	12,383	Italy (2,793), France (1,731), Spain (1,139), India (882), Ghana (871)

Asia

	Mission	Established Date	Personnel	Top 5 Dispatching Countries (Personnel)
⑫	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	1949. 1	45	ROK (9), Croatia (8), Italy, Sweden (7), Finland (6)
⑬	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)	2006. 8	1,543	Malaysia (209), Portugal (200), Bangladesh (197), Pakistan (182), Philippines (133)

Europe/CIS

	Mission	Established Date	Personnel	Top 5 Dispatching Countries (Personnel)
⑭	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	1964. 3	925	Argentina (299), U.K. (270), Slovakia (196), Hungary (84), Ireland (19)
⑮	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)	1993. 8	149	Germany (16), Pakistan (11), Bangladesh (8), 4 countries including Hungary (7)
⑯	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)	1999. 6	1,963	Pakistan, Ukraine, U.S. (185), Romania (184), Germany (135)

The Americas

	Mission	Established Date	Personnel	Top 5 Dispatching Countries (Personnel)
⑰	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)	2004. 6	9,055	Brazil (1,296), Nepal (1,267), Uruguay (1,179), Jordan (1,024), Sri Lanka (993)

3. Organizational Reform of the U.N.

Last year, a number of key measures were taken in the area of organizational reform of the U.N.

To deal with the circumstances concerning PKOs described above, the Department of Field Support, which is responsible for personnel affairs, budget and finance, logistics, and other affairs of PKOs, was established in June by separating a part of the functions of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in order to strengthen the U.N. Secretariat's capabilities for PKO operation and maintenance.

In October, strengthening the Department of Political Affairs was proposed with a view to improving preventive diplomacy and good offices of the U.N. The report by the U.N. Secretary-General concerning this proposal positioned conflict prevention alongside peacekeeping as a pillar of peace and security efforts and called for the building-up of the capacity of the Department's regional offices and an increase in budget and personnel.

Furthermore, the Department of Disarmament Affairs, which is responsible for disarmament and non-proliferation, was reorganized as the Office for Disarmament Affairs last year.

Notes:

1) While the U.S. President is required to submit the National Security Strategy to Congress every year in accordance with Section 404a, title 50 of the United States Code, the release of the National Security Strategy in 2006 was the second submission by the Bush administration following the one in September 2002.
2) The QDR is a document that the Secretary of Defense is required to submit to Congress every four years according to Section 118, title 10 of the United States Code. It foresees the security environment in the next 20 years and clarifies issues including the National Defense Strategy, force structure, force modernization plan, defense infrastructure, and budget plan. The release of the 2006 QDR is the second submission by the Bush administration following the one in September 2001.
3) The National Defense Strategy is a document released by the Secretary of Defense in March 2005 as a guide to implementing the National Security Strategy as well as the basis of the QDR published in March 2006. On July 31, 2008, U.S. Defense Secretary Gates released the new National Defense Strategy, which reflects the results of 2006 QDR.
4) The Transformation Planning Guidance (April 2003) defines transformation as "a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation's advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world."
5) The National Defense Strategy describes that as desirable strategic targets are not always attainable while attainable strategic targets are sometimes not worth the costs, there can be trade-off between strategic targets and scarce defense resources. Therefore, as stated in the 2001 QDR, it notes that the following four risks that are difficult to respond to at the same time should be controlled carefully:
   (1) Operational Risks: Risks associated with the capacity to execute future missions successfully against an array of prospective future challenges.
   (2) Future Challenge Risks: Risks associated with the capacity to execute future missions successfully against an array of prospective future challenges.
   (3) Force Management Risks: Risks associated with managing military forces in the areas of recruiting, retaining, training and readiness.
   (4) Institutional Risks: Risks associated with the capacity of new command, management, and business practices.
6) The Striker Brigade Combat Team is formed as a light unit so that it can be deployed anywhere in the world promptly by C-130 transport aircraft and other transportation means. Unlike heavily armed conventional mechanized divisions, the team is equipped with "Striker," 8-wheel-drive armored vehicles that are loaded with 105mm guns and other weapons and are characterized by strike assets and mobility.
7) In April 2005, then Commander of U.S. Army Europe Bell announced plans to reduce soldiers spread over 13 main operating locations across Europe to approximately 24,000 soldiers concentrated among four Joint Main Operating Bases (JMOB), which would take place over the next 5 to 10 years.
8) News briefing with Secretary of the Army Geren and Vice Chief of Staff of the Army Cody (December 19, 2007).
9) In March 2007 the United States announced that one aircraft carrier would be transferred returning from service in the Atlantic to a Pacific base in San Diego in early 2010.
10) According to the congressional testimony in September 2004 of Admiral Fargo, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. forces deploy bombers in Guam by rotation.
11) White House Fact Sheet (August 16, 2004).

12) U.S. Africa Command is expected to start full operations as a separate unified Command no later than September 30, 2008. However, the U.S. has announced that it does not contemplate to add military bases in Africa.
13) Joint press conference by U.S. President Bush and President Kufor of Ghana (February 20, 2008).
14) As for non-strategic nuclear forces, the Nuclear Posture Review announced by the Clinton administration in September 1994 states as follows: (1) Eliminate the option to deploy nuclear weapons on carrier-based, dual-capable (nuclear/conventional) aircraft; (2) Eliminate the option to carry nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles (TLAM/N) on surface ships: (3) Retain the option to deploy TLAM/N on attack submarines; and (4) Retain the current commitment of dual-capable aircraft based in Europe and Continental United States (CONUS) and the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe.
15) In addition, this Act stipulates the establishment of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the U.S. composed of members designated by Congress, and calls for a review of strategic postures, including nuclear weapons policy, with a report to be submitted to the President and Congress no later than December 1, 2008.
16) The $70 billion allocated in the FY 2009 Defense Budget for fighting terrorism is described as a "bridge fund." The breakdown of major budgetary items under this fund is explained as follows: $45.1 billion for combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, $3.7 billion for expanding Afghan security forces, $2 billion for training for Iraqi security forces, $1.7 billion for Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) in Iraq and Afghanistan, and $4 billion in transfer authority to the Secretary of Defense as well as for other international operations.
17) Although specific reduction volumes are unclear, it is stated that the U.S. nuclear stockpile would be less than one-quarter of its size at the end of the Cold War.
18) In the organizational reform of the U.S. Army, its conventional pyramid structure (army, corps, divisions, and brigades) will be reorganized into the headquarters with command and control functions and self-sufficient combat units (the size of a brigade) so that it can respond to various situations promptly and flexibly by combining headquarters and working units according to the purpose and scale of the mission.
19) Its headquarters is located at Camp Lejuene in North Carolina. As the Marine Corps Special Operation Command was created, the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade was deactivated.
20) With regard to conflict response in regions other than Iraq and Afghanistan, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace stated that even while operations were being carried out in the abovementioned dual theaters, the U.S. still had enormous air and sea capacity as well as large numbers of ground forces that were not currently employed in the Gulf, and that none of their potential enemies should miscalculate the capacity of the U.S. to generate this overwhelming combat power in order to defend its national interests. On the other hand, he also pointed out that the best equipment is left at the frontlines and equipment that is worn out or damaged is returned to the U.S., which makes the units at home not as fully equipped as they could be. Additionally, he stated that as precision weapons are being used in a concentrated manner in both theaters of war, if a response was required in another theater, there could be a situation in which U.S. forces would use "brute force" with non-precision weapons that impose greater collateral damage. (Press conference, October 24, 2006.)
21) The 4th Fleet was once disestablished in 1950, and taken over by the 2nd Fleet, but in order to address the increased role of maritime forces in Southern Command area of operations and to demonstrate U.S. commitment to regional partners, the 4th Fleet was reestablished. (Announcement by Chief of Naval Operations, April 24, 2008.)
22) The C-17 is a large cargo aircraft with excellent takeoff and landing capabilities that can transport about 70 tons of goods to a front-line base located more than 4,000km away. C-5 aircraft with a cargo load of about

120 tons can fly approximately 4,000km, offload, and fly to a second base another 900km away from the original destination.

23) Russia is opposed to the deployment of the MD system, insisting that it will have a negative impact on the country's nuclear deterrent capability, and this opposition was also noted in the U.S.-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration in April 2008. The United States, however, in a move to ease the concerns of the Russia side, has explained that the target of the MD system is not Russia: it will be deployed to defend Europe and other allies from missile threats posed by Iran.

24) China implemented an experiment to destroy one of its own satellites in low earth orbit, approximately 850km from earth in January 2007, without giving prior notice. In the U.S. Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress, "Military Power of the People's Republic of China" (May 2007), the following is stated with regard to the Chinese experiment: "The test raised the resulting debris cloud and put at risk the assets of all space faring nations and posed dangers to human space flight due to the creation of an unprecedented amount of debris."

On the other hand, in February 2008 the U.S. government gave prior notice of a plan to shoot down a U.S. national reconnaissance office satellite which was out of control with hazardous fuel still on board. Later that month a specially modified Aegis ship in the Pacific Ocean fired a standard missile 3 (SM-3) at the satellite and broke it up successfully. The United States stated that with regard to the interception, due to the relatively low altitude of the satellite at the time of the engagement (approximately 247km), debris would begin to re-enter the earth's atmosphere immediately. Nearly all of the debris would burn upon re-entry within a few days and the remaining debris should re-enter within a few weeks.

25) The figure of U.S. military mentioned in this paragraph is the number of active personnel recorded on the publication source of the U.S. Department of Defense, and it could change in accordance to unit deployment.

26) Joint editorial of the Korean Workers' Party's journals "Rodong Shinmun" and "Workers" (June 16, 1999).

27) In North Korea, it seems that various military decisions are made by the National Defense Commission (Chairman Kim Jong Il), which has the ultimate military authority, and the Ministry of People's Armed Forces (corresponding to the Ministry of Defense in other countries) is controlled not by the cabinet but by the National Defense Commission.

28) The approximate percentage of active service members in total population is 0.2% in Japan, 0.5% in the United States, 0.7% in Russia, and 1.4% in the ROK.

29) White House Press Secretary Dana Perino announced in a statement on April 24, 2008 that North Korea had assisted Syria's covert nuclear activities. In addition, Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), stated at the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2008 that North Korea may "have proliferated nuclear weapons-related technology abroad."

30) Generally, missiles based on a solid fuel propellant system are considered to be militarily superior to those based on a liquid propellant system because they are capable of immediate launches with their fuel stored in airframes beforehand and they are easy to store and handle.

31) On October 27, 2006, as a result of the independently collected information and its analysis as well as our careful examination of the U.S. and the ROK analyses, the Japanese government judged that the probability that North Korea had conducted a nuclear test was extremely high.

32) In this framework, measures that the United States and North Korea should take are shown, including North Korea's remaining as a member of the NPT.

33) A nuclear reactor that uses graphite as a moderator.

34) Nuclear fuel rods used in operation of nuclear reactors contain plutonium, which can be extracted by reprocessing the rods.

35) The second and third rounds of the Six-Party Talks were held in February and June 2004 respectively, the fourth round from July to August and in September 2005, and the fifth round in November 2005, December 2006, and February 2007. The sixth round was held in March and September 2007.

36) General Burwell B. Bell, Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, stated at the House Armed Services Committee in March 2008 that "Currently, the intelligence community assesses that North Korea extracted plutonium at its Yongbyon nuclear facility and possesses weapons-grade plutonium sufficient for several nuclear devices."

37) In his statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2008, Lieutenant General Maples, Director of the DIA, stated that "North Korea may be able to successfully mate a nuclear warhead to a mobile ballistic missile."

38) In his statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2008, Lieutenant General Maples, Director of the DIA, stated that "North Korea has had a longstanding chemical warfare program," "We believe that Pyongyang possesses a sizeable stockpile of agents," and that "This biological infrastructure combined with its weapons industry give North Korea a potentially robust biological warfare capability." Also, the ROK Defense White Paper published in December 2006 pointed out that "It is believed that approximately 2,500 to 5,000 tons of a variety of agents, including nerve agents, remain stored in a number of facilities scattered around the country and that North Korea is able to produce biological weapons such as the bacteria of anthrax, smallpox and cholera."

39) The ranges of Scud B and Scud C missiles are estimated to be about 300km and 500km, respectively.

40) North Korea admits that it is exporting ballistic missiles to earn foreign currency. (Comment by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on June 16, 1998, and statement made by a North Korean foreign ministry spokesman on December 13, 2002, reported by KCNA on the same day.)

41) In his statement to the House Armed Services Committee in March 2008, then General Bell, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, stated that "Preparations are underway to field a new intermediate range missile capable of striking Okinawa, Guam and Alaska." Also, in his statement to the same committee in March 2007, General Bell stated that "North Korea is developing a new solid propellant short-range ballistic missile, which it last successfully test-fired in March 2006. Once operational, this missile will be more mobile, more rapidly deployable, and more capable of being launched on shorter notice than current systems."

42) For example, a two-stage missile may be converted into a three-stage missile by installing a propulsion device at the warhead.

43) For example, Director of National Intelligence J. Michael McConnell stated at the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2008 that "North Korea has already sold ballistic missiles to several Middle Eastern countries and to Iran." In addition, it has also been pointed out that North Korea has test-launched missiles that it had exported in Iran and Pakistan and subsequently utilized the data.

44) Four Military Guidelines were adopted at the fifth Plenum of the fourth Korean Workers' Party's Central Committee in 1962.

45) Covert operations to infiltrate enemy's territories by dispersed small units.

46) Reportedly, North Korea has two types of special operations forces: one under the military forces and the other under the Korean Workers' Party. For example, the operation department of the Party is said to be in charge of transporting agents.

47) For example, in April 2007, a large-scale military parade including the march of missile units was held to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the Korean People's Army with attendance of Kim Jong Il, Chairman of the National Defense Commission.

48) In April 2008, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimated that North Korea's production of crops would be approximately 3 million tons, 750,000 tons lower than the past five-year average. It also

estimated that shortfall of crops as of October would amount to 1.66 million tons.

49) It is pointed out that, due to the implementation of these new measures, the following problems have occurred or signs of such problems have been observed in some areas: acceleration of inflation as a result of simultaneous raising of wages and commodity prices despite unsolved shortage of commodities, widening of income gaps, and increasing dissatisfaction with the regime due to information inflows.

50) The Country Reports on Terrorism 2007 published in April 2008 states that "As part of the Six-Party Talks process, the United States reaffirmed its intent to fulfill its commitments regarding the removal of the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism in parallel with the DPRK's actions on denuclearization and in accordance with criteria set forth in U.S. law."

51) On June 26, 2008, after North Korea submitted the declaration of its nuclear programs, U.S. President Bush sent over to the Congress the formal notification of his intent to remove the DPRK from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.

52) The previous treaty contained the provision that if either of the signatories (Russia and North Korea) was attacked, the other would immediately provide military and other assistance by any means. This provision, however, was excluded from the new treaty.

53) The United States and the ROK have been operating the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command since 1978 in order to run the U.S.-ROK joint defense system to deter wars on the Korean Peninsula and to perform effective joint operations in case of emergency. Under the U.S.-ROK joint defense system, the operational control authority over ROK forces is to be exercised by the Chairman of the Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff in peacetime and by the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, who also serves as Commander of the Combined Forces Command, in wartime.

54) The ROK Defense White Paper 2006 described North Korea as follows: "North Korea's conventional military capabilities, nuclear tests, weapons of mass destruction, and forward military deployment pose serious threats to our national security."

55) A KSS-II submarine equipped with Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system was put into service in December 2007 and a large transport vessel with 14,000 tons of displacement was commissioned in July 2007.

56) The name of the exercise was changed from "Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI)" to "Key Resolve" this year.

57) "Scientific Development Concept" chiefly consists of "adhering to standardized plans and consideration for all perspectives, maintaining a people-oriented position of establishing comprehensive, balanced and sustainable development concept and the need to promote complete economic, social, and human development." (As commented by President Hu Jintao at Third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in October 2003)
The construction of a "harmonious society" is defined as a process to continue dissolving social inconsistencies. The "Resolution on Major Issues Regarding the Building of a Harmonious Socialist Society," adopted at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in October 2006.

58) The term "responsible stakeholder" has been quoted in various U.S. Government documents after then Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick used the term in a speech in New York in September 2005. The National Security Strategy, published in March 2006, states that, "As China becomes a global player, it must act as a responsible stakeholder that fulfills its obligations and works with the United States and others to advance the international system that has enabled its success: enforcing the international rules that have helped China lift itself out of a century of economic deprivation, embracing the economic and political standards that go along with that system of rules, and contributing to international stability and security by working with the United States and other major powers."

59) "Quadrennial Defense Review Report" (QDR) (published February 2006).
60) United States Department of Defense "Annual Report on Military Power of the People's Republic of China" (March 2008)
61) Testimony given by then Deputy Undersecretary Richard Lawless at the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission in February 2007.
62) Regarding the military sector, this treaty mentions holding discussions in the event that there is awareness of military confidence building or strengthening of mutual troop reductions in border territories, military cooperation such as military technical cooperation, or any threat to peace.
63) Established in China, Russia, and four Central Asian countries (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) in June 2001. This organization promotes cooperation between various countries in a vast range of sectors, including security, politics, culture, and energy. Since the organization's establishment, it has developed organizationally and functionally, such as in holding regular meetings between national leader-level officials, and establishing the organization's head office along with the Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS).
64) North Korea seems to emphasize negotiations with the United States over the nuclear issue, and it is believed that China, apprehensive that the destabilization of situations in surrounding countries would lead to repercussions within China, hesitates to employ firm measures. In light of this, there is a view that China's wieldable influence on North Korea is limited.
65) Major recent military exchanges between China and Southeast Asian countries include the first joint search and rescue training conducted between the Chinese and Thai Navies in December 2005, the joint counterterrorism military exercise conducted between the Chinese and Thai Armies in July 2007, the first joint patrol conducted by Chinese and Vietnamese naval vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin in April 2006, and visits by then Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan to the Philippines in September 2007 and to Indonesia in January 2008.
66) China traditionally adopted the strategy of a "People's War" based on the recognition that there was a possibility of world-scale war in the future. Under that strategy, the country attributed importance to guerrilla warfare using its vast territory and enormous population. This posture, however, led to harmful effects such as excessively enlarged and inefficient military forces. Under these circumstances, China has come to place importance on local wars that occur over its own lands and waters since the first half of the 1980s based on a new recognition that a world-scale war will not take place on a long-term basis. After the end of the Gulf War in 1991, the country started to implement measures to improve its military operation abilities in order to win local wars under highly technological conditions. In recent years, China has established the strategic objectives of establishing informationalized armed forces and winning the informatization war.
67) For example, in China's National Defense in 2006, published in December 2006, "opposing and containing the separatist forces for 'Taiwan Independence' as well as their activities" is included in the country's national defense policy.
68) According to China's National Defense in 2006.
69) The Communist Party of China's constitution amended in 2002 states, "Upon the 100th anniversary of the party's foundation in (2021), a higher-level, somewhat affluent society shall be created that benefits a population of over a billion, and upon the 100th anniversary of the country's foundation (2049), the nation shall achieve a medium level of development for per-capita gross domestic product, realizing modernization on a basic level."
70) The white paper, China's National Defense in 2006, states that, "In the past two years, senior PLA delegations have visited more than 60 countries, and defense ministers, commander in chiefs of the services, and chiefs of the general and other high-ranking officers and military-related officials from more than 90 countries

have visited China."

71) China's announced national defense budget growth rate is a comparative rate figure of the previous year's actual expenditure with this year's initial budget. When comparing last year's initial budget with this year's initial budget, the growth rate totals approximately 18.0%. Simple conversion of national defense expenditures into foreign currencies based on the market exchange rate does not always accurately reflect the value in light of the country's level of prices. If, however, China's FY 2008 national defense budget is converted into yen at 1 yuan = 15 yen, the amount is equivalent to approximately 6,149.1 billion yen.

72) U.S. Defense Department's Annual Report on Military Power of the People's Republic of China (March 2008) estimates that China's actual military-related spending for 2007 could be $97 billion to $139 billion, although its official defense budget for 2007 is approximately $45.99 billion. The report points out that, "China's published defense budget does not include large categories of expenditures, including expense for strategic forces, (nuclear and missile), foreign acquisition of weapons, military-related research and development, and China's parliamentary forces."

73) The People's Armed Force is responsible for protecting facilities of the party and the state, border patrol, maintaining security, implementing joint government-citizen projects, and conducting firefighting activities. According to China's National Defense in 2002, these troops are to maintain state security and social stability, and assist the PLA in wartime in defensive operations.

74) The militia engages in economic construction in peacetime and logistics support for combat operations in wartime. China's National Defense in 2002 explains, "Under the command of military organs, the militia in wartime helps the standing army in its military operations, conducts independent operations and provides combat support and manpower replenishment for the standing army. In peacetime, it undertakes the tasks of performing combat readiness support, taking part in emergency rescue and disaster relief efforts, and maintaining social order."

75) Formally, there are two Central Military Commissions—one for the CCP and one for the state itself. However, both commissions basically consist of the same membership, and both are essentially regarded as institutions for the CPC to command the military forces.

76) The Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence published in the United States in January 2007 states as follows: "The Chinese are developing maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRV) to attack U.S. aircraft carriers and air stations."

77) U.S. Defense Department's Annual Report on Military Power of the People's Republic of China (March 2008) states that as of November 2007 China had deployed 990 to 1,070 SRBMs on the shore opposing Taiwan, and it is increasing the size of this force at a rate of more than 100 missiles per year, including variants of these missiles with improved ranges, accuracies and payloads.

78) According to the China's National Defense in 2006 white paper.

79) Since the 1980s, China has been purchasing retired aircraft carriers, the decommissioned Majestic-class aircraft carrier Melbourne made in the United Kingdom and Kiev-class aircraft carriers Minsk and Kiev made in the former Soviet Union, nominally for recycling scraps of iron and for using them as leisure facilities. In 2000, China purchased an uncompleted Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier Varyag from Ukraine and reportedly has been repairing it, including repainting. In 2006, it was reported that China was negotiating the purchase of Russian made Su-33 carrier-based fighter aircraft, which can be operated with a Kuznetsov-class carrier, and it was also reported in 2007 that China had plans to purchase arresting wires that are used on aircraft carriers from Russia. There have been reports since 2005 of positive remarks by multiple Chinese government officials and military personnel about possession and construction of aircraft carriers.

80) U.S. Department of Defense's Annual Report on Military Power of the People's Republic of China (May 2006) points out that the goal of the PLA Air Force is "to develop a mobile, all-weather, day-night, low-

altitude, and over-water force that is capable and flexible enough to quickly perform multiple operational tasks and to project power beyond the "first island chain."

81) The Chinese National Space Administration, which was traditionally in charge of the country's space development, was placed beneath the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense, which oversees the defense industry. (It appears that these two bodies were integrated into the newly established Ministry of Industry and Information Technology as a result of the organizational reform in March 2008.) In addition, China's National Defense in 2006 notates that, regarding the national defense science and technology industry, "Major scientific and technological projects such as manned space flights and the Lunar Probe Project, carried out to spur the leapfrogging development of high-tech enterprises and to bring about overall improvement in defense-related science and technology."

82) U.S. Department of Defense's Annual Report on Military Power of the People's Republic of China (March 2008) points out that "The PLA has established information warfare units to develop viruses to attack enemy computer systems plus networks, and tactics and measures to protect friendly computer systems in addition to networks. In 2005, the PLA began to incorporate offensive CNO into its exercises, primarily in first strikes against enemy networks."

83) On September 9, 2005, a P-3C patrol aircraft of the MSDF confirmed that five vessels in total, including one Sovremenny-class destroyer, were sailing near the Kashi (Tianwaitian in Chinese) gas field in the East China Sea, and some of the vessels (a total of three including the Sovremenny-class destroyer) circled around the drilling facilities of the said gas field.

84) On June 18 of this year, the governments of both Japan and China agreed on the cooperation in the East China Sea, including the joint development in the northern sea region, and the participation of Japanese corporate in the development of Shirakaba (Chunxiao in Chinese) gas field.

85) A view has been presented that China has assumed an increasingly confident and assertive stance than before (in the military field), and the anti-satellite weapon test in January 2007 and the Chinese Song-class submarine incident in October 2006 where the submarine surfaced near the USS Kitty Hawk in international waters can be viewed in this context. (According to the testimony of then Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Richard Lawless at the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission held in February 1, 2007.)

86) It is reported that China is constructing a large-scale naval base that has an underground tunnel for nuclear-powered submarines in the city of Sanya located in the southern tip of Hainan Province.

87) According to the National Defense Report published by the Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan of 2008.

88) According to the National Defense Report published by the Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan of 2008.

89) The ruling party United Russia attained 315 seats, or 70%, of Russia's lower house (450 seats total).

90) The economic growth rate was 8.1% in 2007.

91) Medvedev was elected at the March 2, 2008 Russian presidential election after receiving over 70% of the vote.

92) The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, formulated in 1997, was revised in January 2000. This revision was made in response to changed circumstances including NATO enlargement, air strikes on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, NATO's announcement of its so-called "New Strategic Concept," and the emergence of Islamic extremist groups in Russia and other countries. Currently, the Concept appears to be under revision, and discussion about the issue of making Concept revisions was held in January 2008 at a congress on national security jointly hosted by the Russian Military Academy and the Russian Ministry of Defense. The discussion compared awareness of the situation from 2000 until present, emphasized opposition to the U.S. and Europe rather than excessive focus on terrorist countermeasures for Russia and

other countries, and indicated efforts for sustaining and improving strategic nuclear forces in order to pursue military modernization and ensure deterrence.

93) A change can be seen in Russian stance on the NATO enlargement since the National Security Concept was first developed. In recent years, Russia has repeatedly expressed its concern over NATO's expansion, while the country has also stated its intent to focus on promoting cooperation with NATO. In April 2005, a status of forces agreement was signed between Russia and NATO allowing for such measures as permitting the militaries of both parties to pass through each other's territory in consideration of the deployment of International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

94) Additionally, other threats to Russia include trials to weaken Russia as a central player in a multipolar world, movements to weaken the CIS integration process, and territory demands of Russia.

95) Other peacetime operations included preventing and hindering destructive activities, maintaining of a position of readiness for strategic deterrence capabilities and the use of those capabilities, peace-building operations commissioned by the U.N. or CIS, and emergency prevention and repairing damages in the event of an emergency.

96) Troops were reorganized in the reduction of military forces after the launch of the Russian Federation's armed forces, and military personnel were concentrated together into a unit with a higher capability for taking immediate action. As combat-ready troops, this unit is anticipated to promptly respond in the first phase of a large-scale war or in the event of a small conflict.

97) In May 2006, then President Putin commented that Russia would aim to reduce the number to an appropriate level of one million through non-forced retirement.

98) Equipment upgrades based on Russia's state policy on military equipment include acquiring new types of ICBMs and SSBNs as well as strategic bombers in regards to nuclear forces, and acquiring and modernizing new types of aircrafts (Su-34) regarding conventional forces.

99) In April 2007, then President Putin stated that professional servicemen would account for two-thirds of the armed forces in his annual addresses. In addition, the period for conscription was reduced to 12 months as of January 2008.

100) Then President Putin's speech "Russia's Development Strategy through 2020" (February 2008).

101) Some CIS countries want to maintain their distance from Russia. Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova formed a regional alliance named GUAM by combining the initial letters of the member countries, and have been following pro-Western policies to reduce their security and economic dependence on Russia. (Uzbekistan joined GUAM in 1999 after withdrawing from the CIS Collective Security Treaty, but withdrew from the alliance in 2005.)

102) In August 2001, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, and Tajikistan provided one troop unit each (battalion or smaller unit) to form the Collective Rapid Deployment Force that consisted of 1,000 to 1,300 members. The headquarters is located in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyz. In May 2004, Tajikistan provided another two troop units, and Russia and Kazakhstan provided one unit each as well. As a result, the effort has expanded into nine battalions with 4,500 personnel.

103) In November 2005, U.S. forces withdrew from Uzbekistan.

104) The United States and other parties have been using the Manas base, which is located close to Kant Air Base, for anti-terrorism operations.

105) CIS Peace-keeping Units (mainly by Russian forces) have been deployed to Abkhazia in Georgia and Joint Peace-keeping Units (formationally Russian, Georgian and South Ossetian forces) have been deployed to South Ossetia in Georgia.

106) Military cooperation between the two countries, which started with confidence building, is now developing into a state that envisages actual joint efforts. For example, command post exercises codenamed "Torgau

2004" were started between the U.S. ground forces stationed in Europe and Russian ground forces in 2004, "Torgau 2005" was conducted in 2005, and "Torgau 2007," which included field training, was also held in 2007.

107) The United States, in its Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) published in February 2006, states "The United States remains concerned about the erosion of democracy in Russia, the restrictions put on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and freedom of the press, the centralization of political powers and limits on economic freedom."

108) The following nine items have been named as common interests: 1) the fight against terrorism, 2) crisis management, 3) the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their conveyance, 4) measures to increase arms control and confidence, 5) theater missile defense, 6) search and rescue at sea, 7) military cooperation and defense reform, 8) responses to civilian emergency situations, and 9) new threats and challenges.

109) At the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 1999 summit in Istanbul, agreement was met on changing the possession limit by bloc and by country and territory, ensuring transparency and predictability, trust building and verification measures, and compliance with the current CFE Treaty until the CFE Application Treaty took effect. As of present, only Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have ratified the CFE Application treaty, and it has yet to take effect.

110) In February 2008, in response to Kosovo's declaration of independence, Russia stated that it supports the assertions of the Republic of Serbia, taking an opposing position to the independence of Kosovo.

111) Russia plans to hold the 2012 APEC Summit Meeting in Vladivostok.

112) "Peace Mission 2007," an SCO joint exercise for anti-terrorism, was held in August 2007 at Chelyabinsk, Russia.

113) The Overview of Russian Diplomatic Policy, published in March 2007, places emphasis on relations with China and India, showing the development of dialogue between the three nations.

114) "Rosoboronexport" entered the subsidiary of "Rostechnology" of the governmental corporation that had been founded November 2007.

115) From 2003 to 2004, Russia concluded contracts with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Viet Nam to sell its Su-27 and Su-30 jet fighters. In addition, some fighters have already been delivered to the contracting countries, and in January 2004, Russia signed a contract to sell an aircraft carrier to India. In 2006, the country concluded agreements to sell Su-30 jet fighters with Algeria and Venezuela, and some have already been delivered to the countries.

116) At the Kananaskis Summit held in June 2002, the G8 countries including Japan decided to provide up to $20 billion over the ensuing 10 years to assist Russia in the disposing of chemical weapons, dismantling of decommissioned nuclear submarines, and disposing of fissionable materials. The purpose of this decision was to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

117) Considering the fact that countries other than the United States and Russia possess IRBMs, Russia had indicated its withdrawal from the INF Treaty that solely regulated the U.S. and Russia. However, in October 2007, Russia and the U.S. stated to the international community that the INF Treaty would be going global.

118) Some divisions and brigades are designated as permanent combat-ready troops. Others appear to face severe personnel shortages despite possessing a sufficient amount of equipment.

119) In 2000, the nuclear submarine *Kursk* of the Northern Fleet sank in the Barents Sea after an accident. In 2005, a small-size submersible vessel became incapable of surfacing off the coast of Kamchatka Peninsula. In addition, there are also common aircraft and helicopter accidents.

120) Estimated number of military personnel within the Siberian and Far Eastern Military Districts.

121) On February 9, 2008, U.S. aircraft carrier-based planes responded to a situation where Russian bombers (Tu-95) flew above a U.S. aircraft carrier (Nimitz) in the west Pacific Ocean.
122) The United States removed all of its forces from the Philippines in 1992. However, the two nations maintained their mutual defense and military aid treaties. In addition, in 1999, they concluded the U.S.-Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement and the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement in 2002.
123) 21 countries including Thailand, the United States, Singapore, Indonesia etc. participated in the exercise held in May 2008.
124) Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA), which was a status established by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Nunn Amendment of 1987, allows designated countries to receive benefits in military areas such as eligibility to have military equipment. A status of MNNA also strongly represents said country's close military cooperation with the United States.
125) IMET, started in 1976, provides military personnel from U.S. allies and friends with opportunities to study and receive training at U.S. military education institutions. The United States suspended IMET for Indonesia in 1992 as a sanction measure in response to the suppression of the East Timor independence movement by the Indonesian authorities. Although a portion of these sanctions were lifted in 1995, the suspension was reinstated in 1999.
126) This amended International Traffic in Arms Regulations, and allowed for the export of non-lethal weapons to Viet Nam under the condition that said exports are individually authorized and approved.
127) CARAT is a collective term for the bilateral exercises held between the United States and six Southeast Asian countries (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand).
128) Currently, China, Taiwan, Viet Nam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei all claim territorial rights over the Spratly Islands, while China, Taiwan, and Viet Nam claim rights over the Paracel Islands. Chinese and Vietnamese naval forces engaged in an armed conflict in 1988 over the Spratly Islands amongst escalating tensions at the time. However, there have not been any major armed conflicts since.
129) The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea is a political declaration that clarifies general principles for resolving issues related to the South China Sea.
130) The draft of the Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea was proposed by the Philippines at an ASEAN foreign ministers' summit in 1999 and discussion has continued at other meetings thereafter. However, the draft has yet to be adopted as there are major differences in countries' opinions on the draft's details.
131) As of end of April 2008, the six countries of Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, Laos, Viet Nam, and Cambodia have signed. The Charter must be ratified by all 10 member countries in order to take effect.
132) The ReCAAP is designed to enhance cooperation among maritime security agencies of the countries involved through the establishment of a piracy-related information sharing system and a cooperation network among the countries. Its signatory countries include the ASEAN member countries (Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Viet Nam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia), Japan, Bangladesh, China, India, Republic of Korea, and Sri Lanka.
133) According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) (and the International Maritime Bureau (IMB)), the number of piracy incidents in Southeast Asia and on the Straits of Malacca in 2000 was 262 and in subsequent years fluctuated to 170 (2001), 170 (2002), 189 (2003), 173 (2004), 122 (2005), 88 (2006), 80 (2007). The number has been on the decline since 2004.
134) As of end of April 2008, 1,519 civilian police and 31 military observers have been deployed.
135) It was called off on May 8 of this year.
136) U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1802.
137) Military Balance 2008 press release by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the U.K. (February

5, 2008)

138) The country has a Muslim population exceeding 100 million.

139) In October 2007, the 7th China-Russia-India foreign ministers' meeting was held, and the foreign ministers of the three countries agreed to strengthen their collaboration toward the construction of a "just and rational world order."

140) From March to May 2007, the Indian Navy dispatched a fleet and held joint exercises with Singapore, the United States, Japan, China, Russia, and other countries.

141) President Bush called India a "natural partner" of the United States.

142) In cooperation with India, the United States intends to provide India with capabilities and technologies required for the country to improve its defense capabilities to an appropriate level, including the sale of F-16 and F-18 fighters.

143) U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates stated in a press conference that "We're at a very early stage in discussion of missile defense with the Indians. And at this point, we're just beginning to talk about perhaps conducting a joint analysis about what India's needs would be in the realm of missile defense and what cooperation between us might help advance that here in India."

144) In the joint naval exercise Malabar 06, which took place from October to November 2006, U.S. Navy amphibious assault ships participated, and a landing exercise was conducted by Indian Army and U.S. Navy troops. Previous Malabar exercises were bilateral exercises between India and the United States, but in Malabar 07-2 Japan, Australia, and Singapore joined for a total of five participating countries.

145) For the resolution of the pending border issue, the countries agreed to each appoint a special representative. Furthermore, in the declaration, India recognizes that the Tibet Autonomous Region is part of the territory of the People's Republic of China.

146) In the agreement, China recognized that Sikkim belongs to India. Also, the two countries agreed to continue efforts for the early settlement of the pending border issue.

147) The two countries agreed to hold regular summit meetings and established the target of doubling the bilateral trade amount to $40 billion by 2010. They also signed an agreement on such issues as investment protection and mutual establishment of new Consulates General.

148) Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Qin Gang said at a regularly scheduled press conference, "The purpose of this China-India anti-terrorism joint exercise is to increase the mutual understanding and trust between the two nations, particularly the militaries, and enhance cooperation in anti-terrorism and other non-traditional security fields, and to strike at the "three evils" (terrorism, separatism, and extremism), and promote the development of the relationship of strategic partnership between the two countries."

149) In the document, China makes clear its genuine support for India's entry as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.

150) In November 2004, India conducted a test launch of the missile on board.

151) The Indian Prime Minister's special envoy Shyam Saran, referring to President Putin's expression of intention to cooperate in civilian nuclear activities, stated that implementation would take place after the revision of the rules of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

152) At a press conference held after the meeting, President Putin stated that "I have great expectations for the trilateral cooperative framework of Russia, India, and China."

153) It is estimated that weapons from the former Soviet Union or Russia account for about 70 percent of those possessed by India.

154) The two countries signed a document concerning a joint development project for mid-size, multi-purpose transport aircraft and fifth-generation fighters. In addition, study was made of a proposal to provide India with additional T-90 tanks, Su-30MKI fighters, and Mil-17 helicopters within the framework of the agreement

already concluded. It was confirmed to enhance the production capabilities of the Brahmos cruise missiles now under joint nuclear development by the two countries as well as to aim to develop the air launch version of the missile. An intergovernmental agreement was concluded concerning the contract for licensed production of engines for MiG-29 fighters. It was also agreed that the two countries would conduct joint anti-terrorism military exercises in Russian territory in April and September 2007.

155) The joint exercise India has been conducting every other year since 2003.

156) At the same time, India signed the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between India and ASEAN and the ASEAN-India Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism.

157) Regarding the procurement of multipurpose fighters, Defence Minister Antony has cited the provision of the contract which calls for introduction of technology created through joint development.

158) In December 2007, Dr. V. K. Saraswat, Chief Controller at the Defense Research & Development Organization (DRDO) of India's Ministry of Defense said that "Agni-4 is still in the design stage and so we cannot give a date for the trials and several tests remain before we operationalize it."

159) In December 2007, in the Bay of Bengal in eastern Orissa Province, India conducted a test of shooting down a ballistic missile with an interceptor missile, and reported success. It is also said that India successfully conducted a similar test in 2006.

160) In November 2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Pakistan to meet with President Musharraf and both agreed to strengthen military and strategic cooperation and expand economic cooperation, including the Free Trade Agreement (FTA). President Hu Jintao expressed the intention to continue cooperation in civilian nuclear activities. The two countries also agreed on the joint development of air force aircraft, including the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS).

161) Pakistan has supported the fight against terrorism led by the United States and other countries. For example, it provided logistical support for the U.S. operations against Afghanistan, and carried out operations to sweep up terrorists in the border regions of Afghanistan. Also, Pakistan started to dispatch warships to naval operations in the Indian Ocean in April 2004. In appreciation of this support from Pakistan, the United States designated the country as a major non-NATO ally.

162) At the same time, the sanctions that had been imposed also on India by the United States and other countries due to India's nuclear test were lifted.

163) Regarding the possibility of extending nuclear energy cooperation to Pakistan, President Bush only referred to the differences between Pakistan and India in terms of energy needs and history. In response, Pakistan said that it was important for the United States to treat Pakistan and India equally in order to ensure strategic stability in South Asia.

164) In September 2005, President Musharraf reportedly demonstrated his recognition that the Khan network had probably exported a dozen ultracentrifuges to North Korea. In May 2008, BBC News reported that the Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan said that allegations he passed on nuclear secrets are false. In the interview, he said that there was pressure put on him to accept the charges "in the national interest."

165) Pakistan conducted a test launch of the Babur (Hatf-VII) cruise missile also in March 2007.

166) From November to December 2006 Pakistan conducted a series of initial test launches of the Ghauri (Hatf-V) and Shaheen (Hatf-IV) mid-range ballistic missiles.

167) President Musharraf, who observed the launch of the Ghauri missile, congratulated the troops on the high level of skill and the excellent results.

168) The two countries have adopted greatly different positions in relation to solving the Kashmir territorial issue. India's territorial claim over Kashmir is based on the document from the Maharaja of Kashmir to India, while Pakistan claims that the territorial claim over Kashmir should be decided through referendum

in accordance with the 1948 U.N. resolution.

169) In August 2005, the two countries agreed on the prior notification of ballistic missile testing and on the establishment of a hotline between their Vice Foreign Ministers.

170) As a result of the overwhelming victory of the Labor Party led by Kevin Rudd in the general elections of November 2008, a Labor government was launched for the first time in about 11 and half years.

171) Assistance activities for the Solomon Islands. The activities began in July 2003 with participation of South Pacific nations, led by Australia, in response to a request for assistance from the Government of the Solomon Islands, where a deteriorating security situation triggered by a tribal conflict was out of control. The 15 participating countries include Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and Tonga. As of April 2008, approximately 140 Australian troops are stationed in the Solomon Islands.

172) In April 2006 demonstrations by rebellious soldiers in Dili, the capital of Timor-Leste, turned into riots, and the Australian Defence Force (ADF) was dispatched in response to a request from the Government of Timor-Leste. As of April 2008, approximately 750 Australian troops are stationed in Timor-Leste.

173) See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 2.

174) A trilateral security treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, which went into effect in 1952. The United States has suspended its obligation to defend New Zealand since 1986 because of New Zealand's non-nuclear policy.

175) The deployment of ADF to Afghanistan began in 2001, after the 9/11 terror attacks. As of April 2008, approximately 1,000 Australian troops are stationed in Afghanistan.

176) The Rudd administration announced that it would withdraw the Overwatch Battle Group (approximately 550 troops) and the Army Training Team (approximately 60 troops) by the middle of 2008. Other support troops (less than 1,000 people including airlift, maritime patrol, and guard personnel) will remain in Afghanistan.

177) Remarks by Prime Minister Rudd at the U.S.-Australia Summit Meeting on March 29, 2008.

178) In June 2007 Australia decided to adopt the Spanish-made F-100 design for the body of these destroyers. In July, then Prime Minister Howard stated that "If the government decides to do so, it is possible that these destroyers will be equipped with SM-3 missiles in order to conduct ballistic missile defense (BMD)."

179) The Rudd administration announced in February 2008 that the government will reconsider its plan to introduce new fighters including its participation in the JSF program. In March 2008 it was announced that as the interim outcome of the deliberations, F/A-18 Super Hornets would be introduced as scheduled, but no decisions have been made regarding subsequent purchases.

180) Joint exercises between the two countries were suspended from September 1999 until April 2005 over their response to the Timor-Leste issue.

181) In contrast to the mission of collective defense provided for in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the mission of conflict prevention and crisis management is called a non-Article 5 mission.

182) In February 2008, Canada declared that the continued deployment of Canadian forces in Afghanistan would be conditional upon the provision of additional troops by other participating countries in Kandahar southern province of Afghanistan.

183) French President Sarkozy indicated that he would increase troops in Afghanistan's eastern region, which would consequently enable the U.S. to support Canadian forces in the southern region.

184) Based on Resolution 1244 of the U.N. Security Council of 1999.

185) The NATO Ministerial Meeting in Berlin in June 1996 made a decision enabling access to NATO's assets and capabilities in operations led by the Western European Union (WEU). Most of the role and mission of the WEU was transferred to the EU. As a result, it was decided, at the NATO Washington Summit Meeting held in April 1999, to once again permit the use of NATO's assets and capacities by the EU. This decision was called the Berlin Plus. In December 2002, a permanent arrangement concerning the above decision was

established between NATO and the EU.

186) These are called Petersberg Operations. They consist of combat unit missions in crisis management, including 1) humanitarian assistance and rescue operations, 2) peacekeeping and 3) peacebuilding.

187) The two strategic operations forces, i.e. the European Union Force and the Allied Command, Atlantic, were integrated as a single force (Operation Allied Force). This was accompanied by the establishment of the Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, which supervised the reform of NATO military capabilities and the improvement of interoperability.

188) This is the objective for establishment of the military capabilities adopted at the Summit Conference held in 2004, which was renewed at the Helsinki Headline Goal in 1999.

189) In March 2004, four Central and Eastern European countries and three Baltic countries joined NATO, including Romania, Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria and Slovakia. The accession of Albania and Croatia was approved at the NATO Summit Meeting held in April 2008.

190) A separate cooperation agreement has been concluded between NATO and the countries of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which was established in 1994 consisting of non-NATO member countries such as those of Central and Eastern Europe.

191) Established in 1994, MD currently has seven participating countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia). Its objective is to foster stability in the Mediterranean region through political dialogue and engagement in NATO-related activities by the countries of the Mediterranean region.

192) The name “contact country” has been used since the NATO Istanbul Summit Meeting in 2004. Contact countries pursue partnerships on a case-by-case basis with countries which share common interests and concerns.

193) On the other hand, NATO’s approach toward Russia merits attention regarding points on which the two sides disagree, such as the expansion of NATO and the CFE Treaty. EU-Russia relations have been strained over the dispatch of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo). Kosovo declared independence on February 17 of this year.

194) With regard to the details of the Ministerial Meeting of the Defense Planning Committee held in June 2006, NATO’s press secretary stated that member countries have endeavored to meet a target of 2% of GDP for defense spending in accordance with the Comprehensive Political Guidance.

195) The white paper Delivering Security in a Changing World published in December 2003, due to the need for rapid and long-range deployment of military force in order to deal with international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, set the objective of establishing defense capabilities to support three concurrent operations, including one enduring peace support operation.

196) The Strategic Defence Review (SDR) in 1998 stated that a direct military threat to the U.K. did not exist and that recurrence of such a threat could not be predicted.

197) Delivering Security in a Changing World in December 2003 stated that there was no longer a need for capacity to prepare for recurrence of direct, traditional, strategic threats to the U.K. or its allies.

198) The currently operating Vanguard class nuclear-powered submarines are expected to begin decommissioning in the early 2020s. Therefore, the U.K. government considered whether or not to maintain its nuclear deterrent and consequently announced this white paper. In March 2007, the House of Commons adopted the motion submitted by the government to support the policy set forth in the white paper.

199) The intervention force comprises combat readiness troops equipped with state-of-the-art weapons. It is designed to deal with opponents that have well-organized military formations in intensive operations, which are implemented multilaterally by NATO combat readiness troops or EU Battle group units, with the goal of providing the foundation for peace stabilization operations. The stabilization force deals with opponents that

have a certain level of military formations and performs peace stabilization operations in low- and medium-intensity operations that last for a relatively long period. The assistance force supports the intervention and stabilization forces in preparing for and performing operations in Germany and in the target areas, including the management of command, educational and training organizations.

200) At the presentation of Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear, *Le Terrible*, in March 2008, French president Sarkozy expressed the view concerning the country's nuclear capability: given the existing risk of nuclear proliferation and other threats, nuclear deterrence is the ultimate guarantee; nuclear deterrence protects France from any aggression against vital national interests emanating from a state and it is essential to maintain its missile capabilities, both submarine-launched and air-launched. He also announced his decision to reduce France's air-launched nuclear missile capability by one-third, which means its arsenal becomes no more than 300 warheads.

201) France currently does not participate in the NATO Defense Planning Committee or the Nuclear Planning Group. In addition, though France indicated in the Defense White Paper that it will aim for full participation in NATO, it also stated that it will maintain the following principles: (1) complete independence of its nuclear forces, (2) the autonomy of the French government in the assessment of military situations, and (3) freedom in decision-making regarding military involvement.

202) NATO and Warsaw Pact Organization (WPO) member countries as of 1990.

203) Efforts are made to disclose military intelligence, restrict certain military operations, and promote military communication in order to prevent accidental armed conflicts and foster confidence among nations. These are generally called Confidence Building Measures.

204) Subsequently, the Vienna Document 1999 was adopted in 1999, which added the promotion of multilateral and bilateral measures for regional confidence building, the provision of information concerning military exchange, and restrictions on exercises of a scale employing armored infantry tanks and artillery.

205) Inspection flights are performed in accordance with flight plans established by the inspecting country and approved by the inspected country using unarmed aircraft equipped with sensors of a pre-determined type. Data collected by inspection flights can be obtained by all signatory countries.

206) These include a proposal submitted in October 2007 calling for a strengthening of the U.N. Department of Political Affairs which is in charge of conflict prevention and such. (See Item 3 of this section) In addition, the Peacebuilding Commission, established at the end of 2005, began full-scale operations in 2006, and as of the end of last year it had identified Burundi, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau on the agendas of the Commission.

207) For example, some missions established in recent years are authorized to take all necessary measures to protect civilians, to guard U.N. facilities, and to maintain security.

208) A knowledge base is being developed; for example, U.N. Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (the PKOs Capstone Doctrine) concerning the wealth of lessons learned over 60-year history of PKOs and the character and mission of PKOs today was published in March 2008.

209) The past several years have seen a particularly prominent trend toward larger missions. Of the seven large-scale missions comprising more than 8,000 personnel underway at the end of May of this year, five have been established within the past five years, and the remaining two missions were expanded to a scale of more than 8,000 personnel within last five years.

210) Africa is the main area of PKO missions. Of a total of around 88,000 personnel dispatched, approximately 61,000 are in Africa, accounting for 70%.

211) The total number of fatalities among U.N. personnel engaged in PKOs and other operations is so far 2,474 (as of the end of May 2008), with 90 reported last year (of which 43 died of illness). Of the 554 fatalities in the past five years, 275 were attributable to illness, substantially exceeding accident (151) and hostile act (90).

Part II

The Basics of Japan's Defense Policy and Build-up of Defense Capability

Chapter 1

The Basic Concepts of Japan's Defense Policy

Section 1. Measures to Ensure Japan's Security
Section 2. The Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense
Section 3. The Basis of Defense Policy
Section 4. Transition to a Ministry and Stipulation of International Peace Cooperation Activities as SDF's Primary Mission



Prime Minister Fukuda's admonitory speech at the SDF Inspection Parade

Section 1. Measures to Ensure Japan's Security

The peace, security and independence that are indispensable for a country do not happen of their own accord. As countries become increasingly interdependent on one another, attaining peace, security and independence requires a comprehensive approach that includes diplomatic measures, cooperation with allies, as well as the nation's own defense system. As Japan is heavily dependent on other countries for many resources and its development and prosperity depends on free trade, sustained peace and cooperation with the international community is of vital importance.

For this reason, Japan is pursuing both regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and global cooperation through organizations such as the United Nations (U.N.), while strengthening bilateral cooperation with other countries through such measures as the Japan-U.S. Alliance[1]. Japan is thus working to prevent and resolve disputes and hostilities, encourage economic development, promote arms control and disarmament, and increase mutual understanding and trust.

Japan has also been making the country itself more secure by making society more stable, fostering a willingness to defend the country, and through various economic and educational measures. The objective is to avoid being unguarded, which could lead to foreign aggression.

In today's world, however, such measures may not deter real aggression by an outside force, and in the worst case, might not be sufficient to repel an attack on Japan. It is indeed difficult to guarantee national security purely by non-military means.

Defense capability is in itself an expression of a nation's will and ability to repel aggression. It provides the ultimate guarantee of a country's security, and cannot easily be replaced by other means. Therefore, preparation for full-scale aggression is essential, which is the basic role of defense capability. Moreover, the current security environment requires a defense capability that can effectively respond to new threats and various circumstances such as international terrorism and the proliferation and transfer of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. Therefore, the Government has been strengthening its defense capabilities and upholds the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, thereby improving the credibility of such arrangements and bolstering its defense measures. In addition to protecting Japan, defense capabilities have become increasingly important for peacekeeping activities, reconstruction assistance, and other efforts to improve international security.

Recognizing the important role played by its defense capabilities, Japan continues to do its utmost to protect national security, while working to achieve security in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.

Prime Minister Fukuda's speech at the National Defense University graduation ceremony 2007

Section 2. The Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense

1. The Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense

Since the end of World War II, Japan has worked hard to build a peace-loving nation far from the miseries of war. The Japanese people desire lasting peace, and the principle of pacifism is enshrined in the Constitution, of which Article 9 renounces war, the possession of war potential, and the right of belligerence by the state. Nonetheless, since Japan is an independent nation, these provisions do not deny Japan's inherent right of self-defense as a sovereign state.

Since the right of self-defense is not denied, the Government interprets this to mean that the Constitution allows Japan to possess the minimum level of armed force needed to exercise that right. Therefore, the Government, as part of its exclusively national defense-oriented policy under the Constitution, maintains the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) as an armed organization, and continues to keep it equipped and ready for operations.

2. The Government's View on Article 9 of the Constitution

1. The Permitted Self-Defense Capability

Under the Constitution, Japan is permitted to possess the minimum necessary level of self-defense capability.

The specific limit may vary with the prevailing international situation, the technologies available, and various other factors, and it is discussed and decided according to annual budgets and other factors by the Diet on behalf of the people. Whether such capability constitutes a "war potential" that is prohibited by Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution must be considered within the context of Japan's overall military strength. Therefore, whether the SDF should be allowed to possess certain armaments depends on whether such possession would cause its total military strength to exceed the constitutional limit.

The possession of armaments deemed to be offensive weapons designed to be used only for the mass destruction of another country would, by definition, exceed the minimum necessary level and as such, is not permissible under any circumstances. For example, the SDF is not allowed to possess intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), long-range strategic bombers, or attack aircraft carriers.

2. Requirements for Exercising the Right of Self-Defense

The Government has long interpreted Article 9 of the Constitution to mean that armed force can be used to exercise the right of self-defense only when the following three conditions are met:

1) When there is an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against Japan;
2) When there is no appropriate means to deal with such aggression other than by resorting to the right; and
3) When the use of armed force is confined to the minimum necessary level.

3. Geographic Boundaries within which the Right of Self-Defense may be Exercised

The use of minimum necessary force to defend Japan under the right of self-defense is not necessarily confined to the geographic boundaries of Japanese territory, territorial waters and airspace. However, it is difficult to give a general definition of the actual extent to which it may be used, as this would vary with the situation.

Nevertheless, the Government interprets that the Constitution does not permit armed troops to be dispatched to the land, sea, or airspace of other countries with the aim of using force; such overseas deployment of troops would exceed the definition of the minimum necessary level for self-defense.

4. The Right of Collective Self-Defense

International law permits a state to have the right of collective self-defense, which is the right to use force to stop an armed attack on a foreign country with which the state has close relations, even if the state itself is not under direct attack. Since Japan is a sovereign state, it naturally has the right of collective self-defense under international law. Nevertheless, the Japanese Government believes that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense exceeds the limit on self-defense authorized under Article 9 of the Constitution and is not permissible.

5. The Right of Belligerence

Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution prescribes that the "the right of belligerence of the State shall not be recognized." However, the "right of belligerence" does not mean the right to engage in battle; rather it is a general term for various rights that a belligerent nation has under international law, including the authority to inflict casualties and damage upon the enemy's military force and to occupy enemy territory.

On the other hand, Japan may of course use the minimum level of force necessary to defend itself. For example, if Japan inflicts casualties and damage upon the enemy's military force in exercising its right of self-defense, this is conceptually distinguished from the exercise of the right of belligerence, even though the actual actions appear to be no different. Occupation of enemy territory, however, would exceed the minimum necessary level of self-defense and so is not permissible. (See Column)

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Discussions Involving the Constitution

The Law concerning the Procedure to Revise the Constitution of Japan (the national referendum law) was enacted in May 2007 to be substantially enforced in 2010. This law provides the basis of a national referendum for the approval of the Japanese people concerning the revision of the Constitution. In addition, as a partial enforcement of the law, a research commission on the Constitution was installed in both houses in August last year.

Recent years have seen discussions on the Constitution in the Diet and other venues. The commissions on the Constitution of both houses submitted reports in April 2005. The reports referred to security issues, such as Article 9 of the Constitution, the right of self-defense and the Self-Defense Forces, as well as international cooperation. The reports introduce the various opinions that were discussed in these commissions.

Subsequently, the Democratic Party of Japan announced its proposals on the Constitution in October 2005, while the Liberal Democratic Party presented its draft for a new Constitution in the following month. The New Komeito Party advocates that the Constitution should be reinforced by additional concepts. Article 9 of the Constitution is one of the issues raised by parties. These parties clarified their policy to uphold pacifist principles, and the Liberal Democratic Party drafted articles of the "self-defense military forces" and its activities. In addition, the Democratic Party of Japan and the New Komeito Party have also shown their perspective and points about the existence of the Self-Defense Forces and the positioning of its international activities.

Section 3. The Basis of Defense Policy

1. National Defense Policy

Under the Constitution, Japan has adhered to its National Defense Policy, which was adopted by the National Defense Council[2] and approved by the Cabinet in 1957. (See Reference 6)

The National Defense Policy defines policies to establish the foundation of security through international harmonization and peace activities, as well as ensuring the stability of society, and then to establish efficient defense capabilities and to maintain the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

2. Other Basic Policies

Under the National Defense Policy, Japan has been building a modest defense capability under the Constitution purely for defense purposes without becoming a military power that could threaten other countries, while adhering to the principle of civilian control of the military, observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, and firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

1. Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy

The exclusively defense-oriented policy means that Japan will not employ defensive force unless and until an armed attack is mounted on Japan by another country, and even in such a case, only the minimum force necessary to defend itself may be used. Furthermore, only the minimum defense forces necessary for self-defense should be retained and used. This exclusively defense-oriented policy is a passive defense strategy that is consistent with the spirit of the Constitution.

2. Not Becoming a Military Power

There is no established definition for the term "military power." For Japan, however, not becoming a military power that could threaten the security of other countries means that Japan will not possess more military force than is necessary for self-defense and that could pose a threat to other countries.

3. The Three Non-Nuclear Principles

The Three Non-Nuclear Principles are that Japan: will not possess nuclear weapons, will not produce nuclear weapons, and will not allow nuclear weapons into Japan. Japan adheres to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles as a fixed national policy.

Japan is prohibited from manufacturing or possessing nuclear weapons also under the Atomic Energy Basic Law[3]. In addition, Japan ratified the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons), and as a non-nuclear weapons state, is not permitted to produce or acquire nuclear weapons[4].

4. Ensuring Civilian Control

Civilian control of the military means the precedence of political will over the military in a democratic state, and hence democratic political control over the military.

Learning lessons from World War II, Japan has adopted the following systems of uncompromising civilian control that are entirely different from those under the former Constitution[5]. Civilian control ensures that the SDF is operated in accordance with the will of the people.

The Japanese people are represented in the Diet, which makes legislative and budgetary decisions on matters such as the authorized number of SDF Regular Personnel and principal institutions of the SDF. It also approves defense operations. As part of its general administrative functions, the Cabinet has entire authority related to defense. The Constitution requires the Prime Minister and other Ministers of State in the Cabinet to be civilians.

The Prime Minister, acting on behalf of the Cabinet, is the supreme commander of the SDF. The Minister of Defense, who is exclusively in charge of national defense, exercises general control over SDF activities. The Security Council of Japan[6] within the Cabinet discusses important defense matters.

At the Ministry of Defense, the Minister of Defense is in charge of administrative work related to national defense and controls the SDF. The Minister of Defense is assisted in planning political measures and administration by the Senior Vice-Minister and two Parliamentary Secretaries[7].

As mentioned above, the military is under civilian control. The success of the system depends on ongoing political and administrative efforts, as well as a keen interest among Japanese citizens in defense issues. With the emergence of serious issues relating to civilian control in the Ministry of Defense in recent years, fundamental measures are being considered.

In the report of the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense publicized in July of this year, an enhancement of the Prime Minster's Office as well as the Defense Ministry was demonstrated as part of "the structural improvement for the modern civil control." (See Part IV, Section 1)

Akimoto, Former Parliamentary Secretary for Defense at the ceremony to commemorate his term of office

Kitamura, Senior Vice-Minister at the ceremony to celebrate his new post

Takeda, Parliamentary Secretary for Defense at the ceremony to celebrate his new post

Kishi, Parliamentary Secretary for Defense at the ceremony to celebrate his new post

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Civilian Control

While the military is a necessary means to protect the peace and independence of a nation, the military meant to protect the people of a country can, to the contrary, expose them to danger if used wrongly, as the ancient Greek philosopher Plato said. Civilian control was developed as a measure to prevent military intervention in government utilizing the military under political control, and ensures the primacy of the democratic government over the military.

The system of civilian control first emerged in England, in the formulation process of constitutionalism in which a parliament limited the powers of the absolute monarch. In other words, the limitations of the monarch were clearly stated to protect civilian rights in the Magna Carta (Great Charter) established in 1215, and at an assembly in 1628, the Petition of Right, demanding right and liberty by legislation, was conducted. Also, established in 1689 after the Glorious Revolution, the Bill of Rights that formed the basis for British constitutional government made it illegal for a monarch to conscript and maintain a standing army in the country during peacetime without the consent of Parliament. The system remains in place to this day.

Furthermore, the Constitution of the United States of America established in 1787 and the post-French Revolution French Constitution of 1791 also provide for various systems of civilian control. Today, in democratic countries in Europe and the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, not only does the Parliament make decisions on important military matters such as laws and budgets, but the president, prime minister, or other executive civilian leader exercises control over the military. In this way, policies to ensure civilian control have been established in each country.

Such systems of those countries are by no means identical. For example, Germany is particularly careful to exercise military control by the Parliament, while in France, the executive branch of government has stronger control over the military than the Parliament.

Moreover, the national defense organizations that assist the president or prime minister in implementing civilian control vary widely from country to country. In the United States, the central organization (the Office of the Department of Defense) is organized mainly by politically-appointed civilian executives (in this case, the Secretary of Defense), but in the United Kingdom's central organization, the civilian and military executives are positioned in parallel.

Japan has also adopted various systems for strict civilian control, and leaving repentance preceding the end of the war, has put effort in achieving thoroughness in civilian control through maintaining and operating the SDF, a power organization, under democracy.

Today, the SDF has become an organization that is expected to be active in many contexts both within Japan and overseas, including international peace cooperation activities, with the aim of further ensuring Japan's safety and security. These efforts are made in response to the changing times, including the end of the Cold War, the response to global terrorism, and Japan's elevated international status.

From the perspective of how to best utilize the SDF to ensure the nation's interests and fulfill Japan's international responsibility, Japan is currently tasked to further improve and strengthen the various systems of civilian control in order to reconstruct the modality of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF.

Section 4. Transition to a Ministry and Stipulation of International Peace Cooperation Activities as SDF's Primary Mission[8]

The Defense Agency became the Ministry of Defense (MOD) on January 9, 2007. At the same time, international peace cooperation activities were positioned as the primary mission of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). The MOD/SDF is an organization that bears the role of securing the peace and independence of Japan, the most fundamental role to the nation's existence. The two major steps of making the transition to the MOD and stipulation of international peace cooperation activities as the primary mission of the SDF were carried out in order to respond more precisely to today's important challenge of coping with the issues of security and crisis management.

This section discusses the steps and the debate concerning the "general law" for international peace cooperation, which has become an issue of current interest.

1. Significance of Transition to a Ministry

1. Significance of Transition to a Ministry

(1) Bolstering the Defense Policy-making/Planning System

The mission of the SDF has been expanding and diversifying in recent years. The actual number of operations of the SDF has increased. Important defense-related bills have been passed by the Diet almost every year.

The transition to a ministry created a minister with exclusive responsibility for national defense. The Minister of Defense has been granted responsibility and authority appropriate to a policy organ that enables the MOD to present a variety of policy options. This bolstered its policy-making/planning functions and implementation capabilities.

(2) Rapid and Appropriate Response to Diverse Emergency Situations

The transition to a ministry has reinforced Japan's system for responding to emergency situations in the following respects.

a. By giving the Minister of Defense exclusive responsibility for national defense, the line of responsibility for Japan's defense has been clarified

b. Japan's efforts in undertaking national crisis management will be demonstrated clearly at home and abroad

c. Posture of crisis management will be further enhanced and strengthened as the Minister of Defense will directly perform the following tasks as the minister in charge:

1) Requests to the Prime Minister to call Cabinet meetings[9] for enactment and amendment of laws concerning security or the SDF and enactment of ministerial ordinances;
2) Requests to the Finance Minister for budget requests and implementation; acquisition of government properties such as training areas;
3) Requests to the Prime Minister to call Cabinet meetings to make decisions on implementation of important activities to protect the lives and property of the public, such as maritime security operations;
4) Requests to the Prime Minister to call Cabinet meetings for approving personnel appointments to major positions at the Ministry of Defense/SDF.

The authority of the Prime Minister as the head of the Cabinet shall continue to be possessed by the Prime Minister.

(3) Development of a Structure to Engage in Proactive Efforts toward the Peace and Stability of the International Community

MOD has become a ministry equivalent to administrative organs in charge of national defense in other countries for defense talks, international dialogue and in cooperation with other countries in SDF activities conducted overseas. Moreover, engaging in discussions with defense heads of other countries as an equal governmental chief both in name and reality will further deepen confidence-building and cooperative relations.

2. Adherence to the Basics of Defense Policies

The purpose of the transition to the MOD is to prepare a structure suitable for an organization taking on the important function of defense policy-making/planning; it does not involve a change in the fundamental aspects of Japan's defense policy nor in the relationship between the Constitution of Japan and the right of self-defense. (See Chapter 1, Section 3 for a description of these principles)

2. Significance of Stipulation of International Peace Cooperation Activities as SDF's Primary Mission

1. Concepts Prior to the Stipulation as Primary Mission

The first priority mission of the SDF is defense operation against direct and indirect aggression. Missions by the SDF on an as-needed basis are called second priority missions[10]. The primary missions of the SDF are thus comprised of the first priority mission and second priority missions.

The international peace cooperation activities of the SDF, consisting of operations based on the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, as well as minesweeping and evacuating Japanese nationals overseas, were positioned as supplementary activities provided for in Chapter 8 (miscellaneous provisions) or the supplementary provisions of the SDF Law.

2. Review on Positioning of Missions

In recent years, however, these roles—international peace cooperation activities, response to situations in areas surrounding Japan, minesweeping to ensure the safe navigation of ships, and evacuation of Japanese nationals overseas at a time of conflict—have increasingly become the focus of defense capability. A structure is needed so that the MOD can appropriately fulfill these roles. As part of the abovementioned development of such a structure, these operations have been upgraded from the traditional position of supplementary missions to primary missions of the SDF.

For the SDF to proactively undertake international peace cooperation activities, progress will be needed in setting up education/training and other systems, in the area of improving the readiness of necessary units, and enhancing transport capabilities. In order for this to happen, it would be appropriate to review the place of international peace cooperation activities among the SDF's missions and stipulate them as primary missions.

Making Japan's efforts for international peace cooperation activities as a primary mission will send a message not only to the Japanese public but also to the international community. This will also enable SDF members active in a challenging environment to focus on their duties with greater self-awareness and pride.

Stipulation of international peace cooperation activities as a primary mission does not assign new missions to the SDF nor does it alter the nature (e.g., scope and authority) of SDF activities, which will remain unchanged. These activities will continue to be implemented within a constitutional framework in accordance with the provisions of the laws on which these activities are based.

3. Operations Newly Stipulated as Primary Missions

Among those operations historically positioned as supplementary missions, the following were stipulated as second priority primary missions.

(1) Activities that contribute to maintaining the peace and security of the international community including operations based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, and operations based on the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq[11].

(2) Activities conducive to ensuring the peace and security of Japan in situations arising in areas surrounding Japan, such as rear-area support and other activities based on the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and ship inspection operations based on the Ship Inspection Operations Law.

(3) Activities to ensure the safety of the lives and property of the Japanese people, such as minesweeping and the evacuation of Japanese nationals overseas.

Fig. II-1-4-1 Basic Concept on the Mission of the SDF based on Stipulation of Primary Missions



* Underlined items are activities which were added to last year's primary missions

3. Debate Concerning the General Law

Recent years have seen a widening debate concerning the establishment of a general law for international peace cooperation activities.

A report announced in December 2002 by the Advisory Group on International Peace Cooperation established under then Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda proposed the start of study of the establishment of a general law for cooperation by Japan in multinational forces based on U.N. resolutions (e.g. rear-area support such as medical treatment, communications, and transport). In addition, a report announced in October 2004 by the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities established by then Prime Minister Koizumi referred to the establishment of a general law for international peace cooperation activities as a policy issue for achieving a new security strategy.

Meanwhile, on August 2006, the Defense Policy Sub-Committee of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) approved the original draft of the International Peace Cooperation Bill as a suggestion for the party discussion to be held afterwards, whose purpose was for Japan to engage proactively and on its own initiative in international

peace cooperation activities. In addition, the first meeting was held by the project team of the ruling party in May of this year, and as a result of nine sessions of vigorous discussion, a mid-term report[12] was completed in the following month. Frequent discussions have also been held in the Diet on the significance and content of a general law concerning these activities.

Japan has so far engaged in various types of international peace cooperation activities based on the International Peace Cooperation Law and other frameworks. With the diversification of international cooperation activities for maintaining international peace and security, special measures laws have been enacted on an individual basis as the need arises. However, from the perspective of advancing prompt and effective international peace cooperation, it would be desirable to establish a general law that provides in advance for matters including the nature, condition and procedure of activities to be conducted by Japan, who is to appropriately play the role of "the peace-fostering nation." Such a law would also be significant for clarifying Japan's fundamental policy concerning such activities to the outside world.

The Ministry of Defense believes that a general law is an issue that will be studied based thoroughly on the intensification of a national debate, including debate within the ruling parties.

Notes:

1) The Japan-U.S. Alliance signifies the relationship between Japan and the United States in which they, as nations that share fundamental values and interests, work together on political, economic, and security issues, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.
2) The function of this Council was taken over by the Security Council of Japan in 1986.
3) Article 2 of the Atomic Energy Basic Law states that "The research, development and utilization of atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes, aimed at ensuring safety and performed independently under democratic management."
4) Article 2 of the NPT states that "Each non-nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes… not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices…"
5) The Cabinet's control over military matters was limited.
6) Members of the Security Council are the Prime Minister (chairman); Minister designated pursuant to Article 9 of the Cabinet Law (Minister of State pre-designated to perform duties of the Prime Minister temporarily when the Prime Minister is absent, involved in an accident, or in a similar situation); Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications; Minister for Foreign Affairs; Minister of Finance; Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry; Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport; Minister of Defense; the Chief Cabinet Secretary; and Chairman of the National Public Safety Commission. See Fig. III-1-1-3
7) In addition, to help the Minister of Defense successfully handle administrative work related to national defense and to reliably manage the SDF, a system to assist the Minister has been established. See Part III, Chapter 4, Section 1 for the organization of the SDF, including assistance to the Minister.
8) This refers to adopting international peace cooperation activities, which hitherto were regarded as secondary activities, as the primary mission equivalent to the mission of national defense (See Item 2 of this section).
9) This refers to when a minister submits a matter for discussion to the Prime Minister to request a Cabinet meeting.
10) Second priority missions before stipulation of international peace cooperation activities as a primary mission included the dispatch of personnel to protect Japanese people, maintaining public order, guard operations, maritime security operations, measures to destroy ballistic missiles, disaster prevention operations (including earthquake and nuclear power disasters), and measures against airspace violations.
11) Activities based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law (established in January of this year) have also been positioned as a primary mission.
12) The first meeting of the project team came to agreement on issues such as the maintenance of civilian control and adherence to the existing Constitution for examination of general establishments. On top of that, as stated in the interim report the project team is expected to continue discussion on topics concerning the international peace corporation activities in situations without U.N. resolution, new investment on guard duties, in addition to humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, and observation of armistice. (See Reference 7)

Part II

The Basics of Japan's Defense Policy and Build-up of Defense Capability

Chapter 2

The National Defense Program Guidelines and Build-up of Defense Capability

Section 1. Basic Concepts of Formulating the National Defense Program Guidelines
Section 2. Contents of the National Defense Program Guidelines
Section 3. Mid-Term Defense Program
Section 4. Build-up of Defense Capability for FY 2008
Section 5. Defense-Related Expenditures

Section 1. Basic Concepts of Formulating the National Defense Program Guidelines

The National Defense Program Guidelines set forth the basic principles of Japan's security policy and the basic guidelines for Japan's defense capability in the future, including its significance and role as well as the specific organization of the SDF and the target levels of major defense equipment to be built-up based on these principles and guidelines.

The National Defense Program Guidelines have been formulated twice in the past, once in FY 1976 as "The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 1977[1] and Beyond" (NDPG 1976) and again in 1995 as "The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 1996[2] and Beyond" (NDPG 1995). After deliberation by bodies such as the Defense Posture Review Board and the Security Council of the then Defense Agency[3], the current guidelines were formulated in 2004 as "The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2005 and Beyond" (NDPG 2004) in order to respond adequately to the international security environment following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. This section explains the background and basic concepts of the formulation of the National Defense Program Guidelines. (See Reference 8)

1. Background to Formulating the NDPG

1. Changes in the International Situation and the Diversifying Roles of Military Capability

Since the end of the Cold War, the interdependence of states has deepened and expanded, and with the advancement of international coordination and cooperation, the likelihood of a global armed conflict has become even more distant than it was at the time of the formulation of the NDPG in 1995. However, complex and diversified regional conflicts stemming from territorial, religious, and ethnic issues have occurred, and responding to new threats and diverse contingencies[4] has become an urgent task for various nations and the international community.

Against this background, maintaining conventional forms of deterrence remains important in order to prevent inter-state conflicts. However, maintaining conventional forms of deterrence is not always effective against non-state actors such as international terrorist organizations.

In addition, it has become increasingly difficult for a single country to resolve security environment issues, and stabilizing the international security environment has become a common interest of all countries. Therefore, each country has been making a broad range of efforts to resolve such issues through various means including military capabilities, through coordination of various measures, and through international collaboration. In this context, the roles of military capabilities have diversified to include prevention of conflict and reconstruction assistance in addition to the traditional roles of deterrence and response to armed conflict.

Under these circumstances, the United States, while giving consideration to international collaboration, has been engaged in a variety of activities, including the war on terror and activities to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Depending on the nature of these activities, there have been instances in which international cooperative frameworks in the form of "coalitions" have been established that differ from traditional alliance relations. (See Fig. II-2-1-1)

In the midst of these global changes, the countries in areas surrounding Japan are characterized by ethnic, religious, political and economic diversity. The area also features several major countries with a complex structure of interrelated interests and disputes over unification, territorial issues, and maritime interests. Many countries are also modernizing and improving their military capabilities. In particular, North Korea is engaged in the development and deployment of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles as well as maintenance and reinforcement of its asymmetric military capabilities (including large-scale special forces). In addition, China continues to grow steadily as a major power in the region both politically and economically. In the military sphere, the country has been modernizing its nuclear/missile forces as well as its naval/air capabilities, and seeking to

Fig. II-2-1-1 Characteristics of New Security Environment



promote space development and expand the scope of its maritime activities. These trends must continue to be monitored in the future.

2. Remarkable Developments of Scientific Technology

Technological advancement, led by information and communications technology, have not only given rise to significant improvement in combat capabilities, but have also brought about a fundamental transformation of military power, exercising considerable influence on the defense strategies of all countries.

3. Expansion of SDF Activities and the Improvement of Japan's Emergency Response Mechanism

The SDF's activities have been diversifying and expanding to include response to incidents with suspicious vessels, nuclear accidents, various natural disasters, illegal acts, emergency situations, and international activities including both U.N. peacekeeping operations and cooperation in international efforts for preventing and eradicating international terrorism, as well as efforts for the national reconstruction of Iraq. Through the activities being undertaken in response to these situations, coordination with relevant agencies such as police and local communities has been reinforced.

4. Characteristics of Japan

Closely located to major powers of the Eurasian continent, Japan is situated at a strategically important position for the maritime traffic from the northeastern part of the continent to the Pacific Ocean. Japan's territory consists of a long and thin crescent-shaped archipelago with long coast lines and numerous small islands. The country's large population is confined within a very narrow territory, with industry and population concentrated mainly in urban areas, while a large number of facilities essential to economic development are located in coastal areas, all of which can be regarded in terms of topology as vulnerabilities. Due to geographic, geologic, and climate conditions, Japan is also prone to natural disasters of various kinds.

Furthermore, stability in the international security environment is essential for Japan's stability and development, which are based on a market-based economic system and free trade. Above all, Japan depends on imports for many resources, relying on the Middle East for approximately 90% of its crude oil consumption. The maintenance of secure and stable sea lanes are therefore of extreme importance to Japan.

2. The Basic Concept of the National Defense Program Guidelines

1. Two Objectives and Three Approaches

The purpose of Japan's security is to protect the peace, independence, and territory of Japan; to maintain the national system based on freedom and democracy; and to protect the lives and property of the people of the nation.

With a steady trend toward attaching importance to collaboration and cooperation in the international community, as well as from the Japanese perspective of playing a role commensurate with the nation's position and gaining the trust of the international community, Japan must independently and proactively make efforts for the peace and stability of the international community, which are prerequisites for Japan's own peace and independence.

In doing so, due to the unpredictable, complex, and diverse nature of today's security threats, it is important that the government take swift and appropriate responses through a systematic combination of security-related measures, including those of public security, economy, and intelligence, and promotion of diplomatic efforts in times of peace and effective operation of defense capabilities. Furthermore, it must engage in cooperation with the United States, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and promote cooperation with relevant countries and organizations such as the United Nations.

Based on the abovementioned recognition, the National Defense Program Guidelines define the following two objectives for security:

1) Prevention of threats from reaching Japan and, in the event that they do, repelling them and minimizing any damage, and
2) Improvement of the international security environment to reduce the potential that threats will reach Japan in the first place.

In order to achieve the two objectives listed above, three approaches—Japan's own efforts, cooperation with alliance partners, and cooperation with the international community—are to be combined in an integrated manner. (See Fig. II-2-1-2)

To combat the threat of nuclear weapons, Japan will rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent and at the same time will play an active role in efforts for disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons and missiles.

2. New Concept for Defense Capability (Shifting emphasis from "deterrent effects" to "response capability")

(1) Reviewing the Basic Defense Force Concept

With regard to Japan's defense capability, NDPG 1976 set forth the Basic Defense Force Concept. The concept is designed to enable Japan to maintain the minimum necessary basic defense capability as an independent state so as not to turn into a power vacuum and become a destabilizing factor in the region, rather than preparing to directly counter military threats. NDPG 1995 essentially adhered to this concept.

The Basic Defense Force Concept was reviewed for the following two reasons in line with changes in the security environment surrounding Japan.

These changes to the basic defense force are as shown in Fig. II-2-1-3.

Fig. II-2-1-2 Relations between Two Objectives and Three Approaches



Fig. II-2-1-3 Changes in Conception of Defense Force that Should be Retained



a. Effective Response to Contingencies

Under the Basic Defense Force Concept, focus is placed on defense capabilities of an adequate scale in addition to the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements as preventative measures against potential invasion. Behind this idea is the deterrent effect generated by a country that possesses adequate defense capabilities. However, new threats and diverse contingencies are difficult to predict and can occur unexpectedly, such that conventional deterrent effects that derive from the presence of a defense force do not necessarily work effectively. Therefore, future defense capabilities are strongly required to have the ability to prevent such threats from surfacing, as well as the ability to enable effective response to various contingencies and to minimize damage when such events do occur.

b. Proactive Efforts on Japan's Own Initiative for International Peace Cooperation Activities

The Basic Defense Force Concept is based on the assumption that while it is internationally recognized that efforts for stable international relationships will continue despite the existence of unpredictable and uncertain elements, at the same time, mutually cooperative and interdependent relationships among nations have been advancing, and new threats and diverse contingencies are becoming increasingly difficult for a single nation to resolve.

Under these circumstances, Japan, in order to ensure its security, must proactively participate in international collaborative activities for the improvement of the international security environment (international peace cooperation activities) on its own initiative by utilizing its defense capabilities. It has become difficult to build defense capabilities solely on the basis of Japan's Basic Defense Force Concept, which is focused on the defense of Japan.

(2) Multifunctional, Flexible and Effective Defense Capabilities

With regard to future defense capabilities, the National Defense Program Guidelines state that the effective portion of the Basic Defense Force Concept shall be maintained[5] under the new security environment, and that in addition to responding to new threats and diverse contingencies effectively, there is also a need to participate proactively in international peace cooperation activities on Japan's own initiative.

In addition, while the expected roles of defense capabilities are becoming more diverse, a decline in the youth population due to dwindling birthrates and a dramatic increase in the severity of Japan's fiscal condition should be considered as the country plans the future build-up of defense capabilities.

Based on this viewpoint, Japan's future defense capability needs to be equipped with high responsiveness, flexibility, and multi-purpose functionality, and to be supported by advanced technology and intelligence capabilities in line with trends in military technology standards so that it can establish "multi-functional, flexible, and effective defense capabilities" that can respond appropriately to various contingencies through flexible deployment of SDF units and utilization of multifunctional defense equipment.

Thus it is necessary for Japan to shift the emphasis of its defense capabilities from pursuit of conventional deterrence effects to acquisition of ability to respond to various contingencies at home and abroad.

Section 2. Contents of the National Defense Program Guidelines

1. Basic Principles of Japan's Security Policy

As described earlier, there are two objectives for Japan's security: to prevent threats from reaching Japan and to repel them, and to improve the international security environment so as to reduce the chances that threats will reach Japan.

Japan will achieve these objectives by combining Japan's own efforts, cooperation with alliance partners, and cooperation with the international community in an integrated manner.

1. Japan's Own Efforts

Japan's security depends first and foremost on its own efforts. Based on this recognition, it is stated in the National Defense Program Guidelines that Japan will make its utmost efforts, utilizing all available means, to prevent threats from reaching the country directly. The guidelines state that in the event that these efforts fail to prevent the threat from reaching the country, the Government of Japan will take an integrated response by swiftly making the appropriate decisions and bringing together all relevant organizations, such as the SDF, the police and the Japan Coast Guard, and ensuring adequate cooperation among them. In addition, the Government will establish necessary civil defense systems to respond to various emergency situations, and the central and local governments will work together closely to establish adequate systems.

At the same time, Japan will engage in its own diplomatic activities to prevent the emergence of threats by improving the international security environment.

The guidelines prescribe that Japan's defense capabilities, which are the ultimate guarantee of national security, shall be multi-functional, flexible, and effective, and that the improvement of efficiency and rationalization are necessary in order to realize such capabilities.

2. The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements (Cooperation with Allies)

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable to ensuring Japan's security, and the presence of the U.S. military is essential for the maintenance of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Considering the progress made in Japan-U.S. cooperation in dealing with global issues, as exemplified in the fight against terrorism, the close Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship plays a significant role in the effective promotion of international efforts to prevent and respond to new threats and diverse contingencies.

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements do not function simply because of the existence of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States. In order to make this agreement effective, it is essential to make continuous efforts in times of peace. From this perspective, the National Defense Program Guidelines clearly specify the following efforts.

(1) Implementation of Strategic Dialogue between Japan and the United States (Strategic Objectives, Role-sharing and Military Posture)

Based on the posture of Japan's security and defense capabilities clarified in the National Defense Program Guidelines, Japan will proactively engage in strategic dialogue with the United States on wide-ranging security issues such as role-sharing between the two countries and military posture while working to harmonize perceptions of the new security environment and the appropriate strategic objectives[6]. In doing so, the Government of Japan will bear in mind the need to reduce the excessive burden on local communities which host U.S. military facilities, while maintaining the deterrent capabilities that the U.S. military presence in Japan provides.

(2) Various Efforts for Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements shall be enhanced through active promotion of measures including information sharing, various forms of operational cooperation and collaboration on ballistic missile defense (BMD).

3. Cooperation with the International Community

The National Defense Program Guidelines state that in order to improve the international security environment in cooperation with the international community and to help maintain the security and prosperity of Japan, the Government of Japan will actively engage in diplomatic efforts, including the strategic use of Official Development Assistance (ODA). The guidelines also state that based on the recognition that the destabilization of the international community by events such as regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorist attacks would directly affect its own peace and security, Japan will, on its own initiative, proactively participate in international peace cooperation activities as an integral part of its diplomatic efforts.

In particular, stability in the region extending from the Middle East to East Asia is crucial to Japan. Therefore, the Government of Japan will strive to stabilize the region by promoting cooperative efforts in conjunction with other countries concerned in order to deal with common security challenges. Japan will also actively engage in U.N. reforms, as well as promote efforts for multilateral frameworks for security in the Asia-Pacific region such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

2. Vision for Future Defense Capabilities

1. Role of Defense Capabilities

In recognition of the new security environment, the National Defense Program Guidelines define the role of defense capabilities as:

1) Effective response to new threats and diverse contingencies
2) Preparation for a response to a full-scale invasion
3) Proactive efforts, on Japan's own initiative, to improve the international security environment

The guidelines state that Japan will efficiently maintain the SDF posture deemed necessary to carry out missions effectively in each area.

NDPG 1995 clearly stated the maintenance of the defense posture of each branch of the SDF. However, the current National Defense Program Guidelines adopt the idea that a new SDF posture should be formed in the process of joint operations being conducted to respond to each contingency. Based on this concept, the guidelines specify in a comprehensive manner, the role and response to be fulfilled in each contingency and the concept of the SDF posture under "The Role of Defense Capabilities."

(1) Effective Response to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies

The idea behind the response to new threats and diverse contingencies presented in the National Defense Program Guidelines is as follows.

As new threats and contingencies are difficult to predict and have the potential to emerge suddenly, Japan will effectively counter such changes by forming and deploying highly ready and mobile defense force units capable of responding appropriately to the characteristics of each situation in accordance with the characteristics of the units and Japan's geographical characteristics. When contingencies do actually occur, the defense force will act quickly and appropriately to seamlessly respond to the situation and in close collaboration with the police, the Japan Coast Guard and other relevant organizations in accordance with the circumstances and the need for division of labor.

Major responses to new threats and diverse contingencies are as follows.

a. Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

Japan will effectively deal with ballistic missile attacks by maintaining a system to counter such attacks, including a BMD system, to be established at an early date.

Japan will appropriately deal with nuclear threats through efforts to build the BMD system as well as relying on the U.S. nuclear deterrent. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-1)

b. Response to Attacks by Guerillas or Special Operations Forces

In response to guerillas and special operations force attacks, Japan will maintain the necessary defense force structure to effectively deal with the situation by enhancing the readiness and mobility of defense force units, as well as by coping with such attacks in a flexible manner, including swift and concentrated unit deployments. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-2)

c. Response to the Invasion of Japan's Offshore Islands

Because of Japan's geographical characteristics, featuring many offshore islands, invasion of such islands can be envisioned as one method of orchestrating an armed attack against Japan. In this regard, Japan must maintain a defense structure which is capable of dealing with precise guidance attacks by transporting SDF units by sea and air in a flexible manner. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-3)

d. Patrol and Surveillance of Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan, and Responses to Violations of Japan's Airspace and Intrusion of Armed Special Operation Vessels and Other Vessels

In order to effectively respond to new threats and diverse contingencies, early detection is extremely important for the prevention of undesirable events, as well as the prevention of expansion if such an event should it occur. Therefore, around-the-clock patrol and surveillance of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan remains a key role of the SDF. For this reason, Japan will maintain a defense structure that includes warships, aircraft and other equipment necessary to achieve this aim.

Japan will also maintain fighter aircraft units to respond swiftly and appropriately to the violation of territorial airspace. Furthermore, in light of issues concerning armed North Korean special operation vessels and submerged navigation within Japanese territory by Chinese nuclear submarines, Japan will take appropriate actions against such spy ships in the waters surrounding Japan and submerged foreign submarines navigating in Japan's territorial waters. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-4)

e. Response to Large-Scale and Special Disasters

In the event of a large-scale natural disaster or a special disaster such as a nuclear disaster, it is of extreme importance that Japan utilize the capabilities of the SDF to ensure the security of the people. For situations in which protection of life or property are necessary, Japan will maintain an adequate force structure consisting of defense force units and personnel with specialized abilities and expertise with the ability to undertake disaster relief operations throughout Japan. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-5)

(2) Preparations for Full-Scale Invasion

While the likelihood of full-scale invasion is declining, new defense capabilities are required for Japan to effectively respond to new threats and diverse contingencies. Proactive engagement is also required of Japan, on its own initiative, aimed at improving the international security environment.

In recognition of this security environment, the National Defense Program Guidelines state that Japan will depart from the previous defense build-up concept that emphasizes so-called Cold War-type counter-armor warfare and implement a sweeping review of its defense equipment and personnel earmarked for responding

to full-scale invasion with an eye toward reducing numbers.

At the same time, in light of the fact that the primary role of defense capability is to respond to full-scale invasion and that the rearrangement of defense build-up will require time, Japan will secure the most fundamental element of its defense capabilities in order to prepare for full-scale invasion. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 3)

Light armored vehicle that has been assaulted from the Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) during the Northern region training

(3) Proactive Efforts on Japan's own Initiative to Improve the International Security Environment

a. Proactive Engagement on its Own Initiative in International Peace Cooperation Activities

It is stated in the current National Defense Program Guidelines that Japan will proactively participate in international peace cooperation activities on its own initiative with the objective of further ensuring the peace and security of Japan, rather than simply "to make a contribution" as was stated in the previous version of the guidelines.

The scope of international peace cooperation activities is extremely broad, and the Government of Japan as a whole needs to be engaged in these activities in an integrated manner with diplomacy as part of the country's unified efforts. Within the framework of the Government's overall policy, the SDF must be appropriately engaged in international peace cooperation activities drawing on its self-sustainability and organizational capabilities. For this reason, the SDF plans to establish the infrastructure necessary to quickly dispatch and maintain defense force units overseas by developing education and training systems, maintaining a highly ready force posture for relevant units, and improving transport and other capabilities.

In order for Japan to appropriately participate in international peace cooperation activities, it was determined that necessary arrangements would be made including efforts to prioritize these activities within the SDF's overall missions. (See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1)

ASDF transport aircraft C-130H engaging in activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq

MSDF destroyer and Chinese destroyer passing under the Rainbow Bridge

b. Security Dialogues and Promotion of Defense Exchanges

Security dialogues and defense exchanges including bilateral and multilateral training need to be continued in view of the changes in the international security environment and in recognition of the fact that such efforts contribute to the effective implementation of international peace cooperation activities. In addition, activities which contribute to the peace and stability of the international community need to be actively promoted by continuing the implementation of cooperative activities in the area of arms control and disarmament conducted by international organizations such as the United Nations. (See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2-3)

2. Fundamental Elements of Japan's Defense Capabilities

Following are fundamental elements of Japan's defense capabilities that are included in the National Defense Program Guidelines, which are necessary to fulfill the defense missions described earlier.

(1) Enhancement of Joint Operation Capabilities

In order to execute its missions swiftly and effectively and respond to new threats and diverse contingencies without delay in the new security environment, the SDF needs to enhance the joint operational posture so that all SDF services can operate in a unified manner in such situations from the moment they arise.

For this reason, the Joint Staff was established and the infrastructure for joint operations was put in place in such areas as education and training, and information and communications, and the SDF reexamined its existing organizations for joint operations capabilities so as to enhance their efficiency. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 1-4)

(2) Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities

In order for defense capabilities to function effectively with multi-functionality and flexibility, it is imperative for the Government of Japan to retain and utilize advanced intelligence capabilities, including the ability to detect contingencies as early as possible and to collect, analyze, and share intelligence promptly and accurately.

Therefore, Japan will strengthen its advanced and diversified intelligence-gathering capabilities and enhance its comprehensive analysis and assessment capabilities, bearing in mind threats in the security environment and technological trends. Japan will also strengthen its intelligence structure, including the Defense Intelligence Headquarters, which will play a role in supporting these capabilities, and in this regard, Japan will build a sophisticated intelligence capability.

(3) Incorporating the Progress of Science and Technology in Japan's Defense Capabilities

In order to realize multi-functional, flexible and effective defense capabilities, the fruits of various technological innovations resulting from progress in information science and technology should be adequately reflected. In particular, advanced command and communications systems, as well as information communication networks shall be established to develop reliable command and control systems while the rapid intelligence-sharing systems that are indispensable to the SDF's joint operations described above will be enhanced in line with the advanced information and communication technologies available in Japan and abroad.

(4) Effective Utilization of Human Resources

In order to achieve greater outcomes with limited human resources, it is necessary to recruit human resources with high potential and train and educate them to adequately respond to increasingly diverse and international SDF missions and to properly operate rapidly advancing high-tech defense equipment.

Research and education on security issues will be promoted together with a reinforcement of the manpower foundation for promoting such research[7].

3. Specific Posture for Defense Capability

The attached table of the National Defense Program Guidelines clarifies the specific posture for the defense capabilities needed to fulfill the missions described above. The following provides an overview.

1. Ground Self-Defense Force

(1) Formation and Deployment of Basic Strategic Units Responding to the New Security Environment

As regionally deployed units (basic strategic units), eight divisions and six brigades, which are responsive and highly mobile, will be formed in preparation for effective and timely response to new threats and diverse contingencies that are often difficult to predict. The eight divisions and six brigades will each be stationed in one of 14 sections demarcated with consideration given to Japan's geography, which is characterized by mountains, rivers and straits. (See Fig. II-2-2-1)

Fig. II-2-2-1 Deployment of Divisions and Brigades and its Concept under the National Defense Program Guidelines



(2) Securing Personnel Resources (Manpower)

a. A departure from the conventional anti-tank warfare-oriented defense build-up concept will be pursued, and a personnel (manpower)-oriented system will be created in order to enhance the response to new threats and diverse contingencies such as attacks by guerillas and special operations forces, large-scale disasters and participation in international peace cooperation activities.

b. To ensure effective response capability, the number of regular defense officers will be increased from 145,000, set forth in NDPG 1995 to 148,000.

c. Meanwhile, the amount of primary equipment—tanks and artilleries—will be reduced from approximately 900 vehicles to 600 vehicles for tanks, and from 900 to 600 artillery/vehicles for artillery, respectively. (See Fig. II-2-2-2)

Fig. II-2-2-2 Changes in Number of SDF Personnel and Main Defense Equipment



(3) Formation of Central Readiness Force and International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit

In order to prevent the expansion of various contingencies should they occur, the Central Readiness Force will be newly organized, consisting of Mobile Operation Units and various other specialized units. Within this force, the International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit will be newly organized for proactive engagement on Japan's own initiative in international peace cooperation activities.

2. Maritime Self-Defense Force

(1) Posture of New Destroyer Units for More Effective Response

In order to secure as many well-trained destroyers as possible among a limited number of vessels and to enable prompt response to diverse contingencies, destroyer units will be formed according to the level of training rather than the conventional fixed formation.

Mobile Operation Units will be integrated into eight divisions (one division consisting of four vessels) to enable swift and continuous response to contingencies. The formation of Regional District Units will be modified so that one unit is deployed in each of five patrol districts in view of the current security environment.

(2) Formation of Submarine Units Focusing on Response to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies

Submarine units will continue to retain a total of 16 submarines (units are to be consolidated, from six divisions with two or three vessels per division to four divisions with four vessels each). The new formation of submarines to be deployed in important maritime traffic points in the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan for information gathering purposes is intended to detect signs of new threats and diverse contingencies as early as possible to enable a flexible response.

(3) Improving the Efficiency of Combat Aircraft Units

While ensuring the continued surveillance posture of the surrounding sea area, as well as its responsiveness and effectiveness, the number of combat aircraft (including patrol aircraft, and minesweeping and transport helicopters) will be reduced from approximately 170 to 150 as a result of consolidation of units and improvements in efficiency.

For the fixed-wing patrol aircraft units, P-3C successor aircraft (P-1) with improved performance will be introduced, and the current eight squadrons will be integrated into four squadrons for increased efficiency. From the viewpoint of increasing operational efficiency, patrol helicopter units will be consolidated from eight squadrons to five, and will be carrier-based, in principle.

3. Air Self-Defense Force

(1) Improving the Efficiency of Fighter Aircraft Units

Although fighter aircraft units will continue to be major units in order to permit appropriate action in a timely manner against the violation of airspace, in light of the decreased probability of a full-scale invasion of Japan, the number of aircraft will be reduced from approximately 300 to 260 by means of improvements in operational efficiency.

The number of combat aircraft, including fighters, will be reduced from approximately 400 to 350 in line with such developments as the downsizing of air reconnaissance units. (See Fig. II-2-2-3)

Fig. II-2-2-3 Deployment of Fighter Units



(2) Strengthening Transport and Deployment Capabilities

In order to allow Japan to effectively respond to an invasion of its offshore islands and to properly participate in international peace cooperation activities, Aerial Refueling/Transport Units will be newly established, and next-generation transport aircraft (C-X) with superior transport and aviation performance will be prepared. (See Fig. II-2-2-4)

Fig. II-2-2-4 Future Structure of Air Transport Units



(3) Division of Airborne Early-Warning Group into Two Groups

The Airborne Early-Warning Group will be reorganized from the single group described in NDPG 1995 into two groups: E-767 early-warning and control aircraft units and E-2C early-warning aircraft units.

4. Major Equipment and Major Units Also Available for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

The National Defense Program Guidelines state that the posture of the SDF must be capable of taking on various roles to deal with diverse tasks. In particular, it has been deemed important for Japan to attempt to obtain understanding for its BMD system both domestically and abroad by explaining the system as specifically as possible and ensuring its transparency. To that end, the guidelines, in the attached table, specify "major equipment and major units also available for ballistic missile defense[8]." (See Fig. II-2-2-5)

Fig. II-2-2-5 Comparison of Program Outlines and Structures when Mid-Term Defense Program is Complete

Category			S51 National Defense Outlines	H07 National Defense Outlines	National Defense Program Guidelines	Mid-Term Defense Program
GSDF		Authorized personnel Regular Ready reserve	180,000	160,000 145,000 15,000	155,000 148,000 7,000	About 161,000 (Note) About 152,000 About 8,000
	Major units	Regionally deployed units in peacetime	12 divisions 2 combined brigades	8 divisions 6 brigades	8 divisions 6 brigades	8 divisions 6 brigades
		Mobile operation units	1 armored division 1 artillery brigade 1 airborne brigade 1 combined training brigade 1 helicopter brigade	1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 helicopter brigade	1 armored division Central Readiness Force	1 armored division Central Readiness Force
		Ground-to-air guided missile units	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups
	Main equipment	Tanks Main artillery	— —	About 900 About 900/tank	About 600 About 600/tank	About 790 About 830/tank
MSDF	Major units	Destroyer units (for mobile operations) Destroyer units (regional district units) Submarine units Minesweeping units Patrol aircraft units	4 escort flotillas (Regional units) 10 units 6 divisions 2 minesweeper flotillas (Land-based) 16 squadrons	4 escort flotillas (Regional units) 7 units 6 divisions 1 minesweeper flotilla (Land-based) 13 squadrons	4 escort flotillas (6 divisions) 5 divisions 4 divisions 1 minesweeper flotilla 9 squadrons	4 escort flotillas (8 divisions) 6 divisions 5 divisions 1 minesweeper flotilla 9 squadrons
	Main equipment	Destroyers Submarines Combat aircraft	About 60 ships 16 ships About 220 aircraft	About 50 ships 16 ships About 170 aircraft	47 ships 16 ships About 150 aircraft	48 ships 16 ships About 160 aircraft
ASDF	Major units	Aircraft control & warning units Fighter units Fighter-interceptor units Support fighter units Air Reconnaissance Units Air Transport Units Air refueling/ transport units Surface-to-air guided Missile Units	28 warning groups — 1 squadron — 10 squadrons 3 squadrons 1 squadron 3 squadrons — 6 groups	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 squadron — 9 squadrons 3 squadrons 1 squadron 3 squadrons — 6 groups	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 airborne warning squadron (2 squadrons) 12 squadrons — — 1 squadron 3 squadrons 1 squadron 6 groups	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 airborne warning squadron (2 squadrons) 12 squadrons — — 1 squadron 3 squadrons 1 squadron 6 groups
	Main equipment	Combat aircraft (fighter aircraft)	About 430 aircraft (about 350 aircraft)	About 400 aircraft (about 300 aircraft)	About 350 aircraft (about 260 aircraft)	About 350 aircraft (about 260 aircraft)
Main equipment & major units which can also be used in ballistic missile defense		Aegis-equipped destroyers	—	—	4 ships	4 ships
		Aircraft control & warning units Surface-to-air guided missile units	— —	— —	7 groups 4 squadrons 3 groups	7 groups 4 squadrons 3 groups

Note: Regarding the sufficiency of SDF Regular Personnel in the Mid-Term Defense Program, in order to effectively respond to new threats and diverse situations, and for active and major participation in international peace cooperation activities, current levels shall be maintained, with a target of approximately 146,000 personnel.

4. Additional Elements for Consideration

The National Defense Program Guidelines state that the following elements shall be taken into consideration in building up, maintaining and operating defense capabilities.

1. Fiscal Conditions, Procurement of Defense Equipment, and Maintenance and Operation of Defense Facilities

In light of severe fiscal conditions, defense expenditures must be curbed by further rationalizing and streamlining of defense forces, and overall defense capability needs to function smoothly and efficiently through harmonization of operations with other measures implemented by the Government.

In addition, the Government will make the following efforts: promotion of measures to curb the lifecycle cost[9] of procuring defense equipment, implementation of effective and efficient research and development activities, as well as the allocation of limited resources to core technological fields for the establishment of a truly necessary defense production system and technological foundation.

In order to efficiently maintain and upgrade Japan's defense-related facilities, the Government will take various measures to promote more harmonious coexistence between these facilities and the local communities.

2. Time frame for Achieving Defense Capability Objectives and Its Review

The National Defense Program Guidelines provide a clear vision for Japan's defense capabilities for the next decade, based on the idea that it is important to set a concrete timeline for achieving the goals of defense capabilities more clearly.

In addition, in a report of the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities, it was recommended that, "taking into consideration the continuously changing security environment and ever-advancing technological trends, Japan should continually and flexibly review" its defense vision, and therefore it was deemed desirable for Japan to review its defense vision on a regular basis in line with the security environment and technological changes. As such, the National Defense Program Guidelines will be reviewed and, if necessary, will be revised after five years or should there be a significant change in the security environment, taking into consideration such change in the environment, technological progress and other relevant factors at the time.

5. Three Principles on Arms Exports

A statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary released at the time of the formulation of the National Defense Program Guidelines addressed issues related to arms export control. It stated that given the fact that ballistic missile defense (BMD) would contribute to the effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and from the viewpoint of contributing to the security of Japan, the Government would exempt items related to BMD systems from the regulations of the Three Principles on Arms Exports and related provisions, on the condition that those items would be subject to strict export control[10]. (See Reference 10 - 11)

In addition, with regard to cases of joint development and production with the United States as well as cases seen as contributing to counterterrorism and counter-piracy, regarding which questions were raised through the process of developing the National Defense Program Guidelines, it mentioned that the Government would decide whether to take any actions in the future on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the basic principle as a peace-loving nation of avoiding exacerbation of international conflicts[11].

The statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary clarified that Japan would continue to firmly maintain its policy of dealing carefully with arms export control in light of the country's basic philosophy as a peaceful country, which is the basis for the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines.

Section 3. Mid-Term Defense Program

National defense is vital to a country's existence. Therefore, although defense build-up ultimately occurs in accordance with the budget of each fiscal year, defense should be built-up continuously, systematically and steadily based on the security environment surrounding Japan and the role of defense capability in line with a concrete medium-term outlook because research and development of defense equipment, its adoption, improvement of facilities, education of defense personnel, and training of SDF units cannot be realized in the short term.

Therefore, since FY 1986 the Government of Japan has formulated mid-term defense programs, each covering five years, and has built-up the nation's defense capabilities each fiscal year based on these programs.

The "Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2005-FY 2009)" is a plan that defines Japan's policy regarding the build-up of its defense capabilities and the main projects for the five-year period to realize new defense capabilities specified in the National Defense Program Guidelines. The program was approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet in December 2004. (See Reference 9)

This section explains the policies envisaged under the Mid-Term Defense Program, organizational reviews of the Defense Ministry and the SDF, main projects related to the SDF's capability and measures intended to reinforce the Japan-U.S. Security Agreements.

1. Policies for the Program

In line with the National Defense Program Guidelines, the Mid-Term Defense Program has shifted its priority from "deterrence by presence" to "effective response," and has placed emphasis on the improvement of readiness and mobility, an integrated operation of the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF through their joint operations, and the acquisition of new capabilities in line with technological development. Six policies, listed below, form the basis of the program intended to build-up Japan's defense capability in an appropriate manner.

1) Establishment of multi-functional, flexible and effective defense capabilities
2) Organizational reviews of the Defense Ministry and SDF
3) Enhancement of fundamental defense capabilities through joint operations and strengthening of intelligence functions
4) Promotion of various measures that support defense capabilities, such as rational and efficient procurement of defense equipment
5) Further strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements
6) Efforts to streamline and increase efficiency of defense capabilities

2. Organizational Review of the Defense Ministry and SDF

The Mid-Term Defense Program calls for an organizational review of the Defense Ministry and the SDF, as shown below, as a means of swiftly and efficiently transforming their structure into one in which new defense capabilities specified under the National Defense Program Guidelines can be acquired.

1) Ideal structure of internal bureaus will be studied in order to improve and strengthen organizations in charge of administrative defense policies, and necessary steps will be taken.
2) The Joint Staff will be established and the Staff Offices of the three SDF services will be reorganized in order to reinforce the joint operations system. Based on the achievement of the joint operations, evaluations of operations will be undertaken and measures necessary to increase effectiveness will be taken.

   The Defense Intelligence Headquarters will be placed under the direct authority of the Director-General of the Defense Agency at the time.
3) The GSDF, the MSDF, and the ASDF will shift to the structure shown in Fig. II-2-2-5 under the previous section following the conclusion of the Mid-Term Defense Program.

3. Main Projects Concerning Capabilities of the SDF

Concerning the SDF's defense capabilities, the Mid-Term Defense Program calls for effective response to new threats and diverse contingencies, preparations against full-scale invasion of Japan, proactive efforts on Japan's own initiative to help improve the international security environment, promotion of fundamental defense capabilities, and various measures that support such capabilities. Under the program, the main projects as shown in Fig. II-2-3-1 will be implemented in order to achieve these goals.

4. Measures to Strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

Under the new security environment, the following measures will be taken in order to further strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and the close relationship with the United States which is backed by the arrangements.

1) Exchange of information and views on the international situation will be enhanced, and strategic dialogue on the general security situation will be continued.
2) Efforts will be made to establish an effective cooperative framework in the field of defense operations. In addition, joint exercises and training will be enhanced.
3) Cooperation in the field of ballistic missile defense (BMD) will be further promoted.
4) Efforts will be made to promote wide-ranging mutual exchanges in the fields of defense equipment and technologies.
5) Measures will be taken to allow smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan.
6) Japan will proactively participate in international security efforts and will take measures to enable close collaboration with the United States.

5. Scale of Build-up and Necessary Budget

1. Scale of Build-up

Fig. II-2-3-2 shows the specific scale of the build-up of main defense equipment needed for the aforementioned main projects being undertaken to improve the SDF's defense capabilities.

2. Necessary Budget

The total amount of defense-related expenditures required for the implementation of the Mid-Term Defense Program shall not exceed about ¥24.24 trillion under FY 2004 prices. Defense-related expenditures earmarked for each year are to be determined within the framework of the sum listed above, while further efforts are to be made to promote efficient and streamlined defense operations in harmony with other measures taken by the Government of Japan. An additional budget of up to ¥100 billion may be allotted as necessary in order to address various conditions including the need to respond to unforeseen events in the future if said budget is approved by the Security Council.

In addition, the Mid-Term Defense Program will be reviewed three years after its formulation if deemed necessary after taking into account the international situation and other developments.

Although there have been various changes to the situation since the implementation of the Mid-Term Defense Program, including the modernization of defense capabilities in countries surrounding Japan, discussions are being held at such fora as the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense, and it was decided that, as it would be appropriate to take these situations into account when considering the future Mid-Term Defense Program, no revisions to the program would be made at the end of last year. (See Fig. II-2-3-3 & 4) (See Part IV, Section 1)

Fig. II-2-3-1 Major Projects Concerning Capabilities of the SDF under Mid-Term Defense Program

Item		Main Projects
Effective response to new threats and diverse contingencies	Response to ballistic missile attack	❍ Capability improvement of Aegis-equipped destroyers ❍ Capability improvement of surface-to-air guided missiles (Patriot) ❍ Deployment of warning and control radars ❍ Modification to add ballistic missile response capabilities to the JADGE system (Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment)
	Response to guerrillas and special operations force attacks	❍ As reinforcement measures of infantry units which are core human combat capabilities, increase of each rifle unit's standard personnel number and realignment of the sniper team of each infantry unit ❍ Improvement of readiness and mobility by deployment of light-armored vehicles, multi-functional helicopters (UH-60JA, UH-1J), combat helicopters (AH-64D) and others ❍ Improvement of response capabilities to nuclear, biological and chemical weapon attacks (NBC)
	Response to invasion of Japan's offshore islands	❍ Improvement and enhancement of transportation capacities by deployment of successor aircraft of C-1 transport planes, transport helicopters (CH-47JA/J) and others ❍ Improvement of air and maritime interdiction capabilities by deployment of aerial refueling/transport aircraft (KC-767), fighters (F-2) and others ❍ Improvement of rescue capabilities by adding aerial refueling functions to transport aircraft (C-130H) and rescue helicopters (UH-60J)
	Warning and surveillance in sea areas and airspace surrounding Japan, violation of Japanese airspace, and response to armed special operations vessels	❍ Deployment of DDH and DD destroyers, SH-60K patrol helicopters, MCH-101 minesweeping and transport helicopters and replacements of P-3C fixed-wing patrol aircraft ❍ Improvement of E-2C early warning aircraft and E-767 early warning and control aircraft, replacement of F-4 fighters ❍ Introduction of the F-4 fighter successor and modernization and upgrade of F-15 fighters while considering budget conditions
	Response to large-scale and unconventional disasters	❍ Deployment of rescue amphibians (US-2) and rescue helicopters (UH-60J)
Preparation against full-scale invasion	Continuing deployment of tanks, artillery, medium-range surface-to-air guided missiles, destroyers, submarines, minesweepers, patrol aircraft, fighters, and maintaining the most basic capabilities of its defense forces, while curbing spending on defense improvement for a period covered by the Mid-Term Defense Program in line with reductions of sizes of defense equipment indicated by the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG)	
Proactive and independent efforts to improve the international security environment	Appropriate measures for international peace cooperation activities	❍ Realignment of International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Units and Central Readiness Force Regiments assigned to the Central Readiness Force ❍ Procurement of conducive equipment for international peace cooperation activities such as transport aircraft, helicopters and light-armored vehicles
	Enhancement of security dialogues, defense exchanges, and joint exercises with other countries	❍ Promotion of policies on bilateral, multilateral security dialogues and defense exchanges ❍ Support to the U.N. and other international organizations in activities related to arms control and disarmament
Basic tasks for defense capability	Enforcement of joint operations	❍ Establishment of Joint Staff ❍ Reform of the Joint Staff College, implementation of unit drills, and sharing of intelligence and communications infrastructure
	Enhancement of intelligence functions	❍ Strengthening the SDF intelligence structure including the recruitment, development, training and education of highly capable personnel ❍ Strengthening of information gathering instruments and devices ❍ Begin testing and upgrading for the reconnaissance tactics of F-15 fighters ❍ Take necessary measures on endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (EAVES) after deliberation
	Response to advances in science and technology	❍ Enhancement of capabilities such as command and communications (aggregating and conveying command order-related information, intelligence sharing at unit levels, intelligence sharing of cyber attack countermeasure capabilities, and related organizations, deployment of advanced command and communication systems, and information communication networks) ❍ Promotion of research and development (development of a successor for the P-3C fixed-wing patrol aircraft, for the C-1 transport aircraft, replacement of present tanks, development of mobile combat vehicles, various command and control systems, and research of unmanned aerial vehicles and others)
	Effective use of human resources	❍ Improvement of personnel management, education and training policies ❍ Promotion of research and education related to security issues
Promotion of various measures to support defense capability	Rational and efficient equipment procurement	❍ Promotion of Comprehensive Acquisition Reform including the restraining of lifecycle costs, deployment of efficient procurement and supply systems, and the establishment of defense production and a technological basis
	Promotion of cooperation with concerned organizations and regional communities	❍ Enhancement of cooperation with the police, fire department, and the Japan Coast Guard, cooperation with local public organizations and the local community based on the Law Concerning Measures for Protection of the Civilian Population in Armed Attack Situations (Civil Protection Law), and the promotion of measures taken for areas surrounding bases

Fig. II-2-3-2 Scale of Plans to Improve Major Defense Equipment under the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2005-2009) and Their Progress

	Major Equipment	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	Improvement Achievements for FY 2005-2007 / Introduction Planned under Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP)
GSDF	Tanks	12 tanks	11 tanks	9 tanks	9 tanks		41/49 tanks
	Artillery (excluding mortars)	7 vehicles	7 vehicles	8 vehicles	8 vehicles		30/38 vehicles
	Armored vehicles	16 vehicles	23 vehicles	18 vehicles	22 vehicles		79/104 vehicles
	Combat helicopters (AH-64D)	2 units	1 unit	1 unit			4/7 units
	Transport helicopters (CH-47JA)	1 unit	1 unit	1 unit	2 units		5/11 units
	Medium-range surface-to-air guided missiles	2 companies	1 company	1 company	1 company		5/8 units
MSDF	Enhance capabilities of Aegis system-equipped destroyers	1 vessel	1 vessel	1 vessel			3/3 vessels
	Destroyers	1 vessel	1 vessel	1 vessel			3/5 vessels
	Submarines	1 vessel	1 vessel	1 vessel	1 vessel		4/4 vessels
	New fixed-wing patrol aircraft	4 planes					4/4 vessels
	Patrol helicopters (SH-60K)	7 units	3 units	5 units			15/23 planes
	Minesweeping and transport helicopters (MCH-101)	3 units					3/3 units
ASDF	Enhance capabilities of Patriot surface-to-air guided missiles	Amount for 1 anti-aircraft group (used for training)	1 anti-aircraft group	1 anti-aircraft group	Periodic repair reserve		2 groups & required training, etc. / 2 groups & required training, etc. (Note 1)
	Modernize fighter aircraft (F-15)	4 planes	2 planes	20 planes			26/26 planes
	Fighter aircraft (F-2)	5 planes	5 planes	8 planes			18/22 (18) planes (Note 2)
	New fighter aircraft						0/7 planes
	New transport aircraft						0/8 planes
	Transport helicopters (CH-47J)	1 unit	1 unit	1 unit			3/4 units
	Aerial refueling/transport aircraft (KC-767)	1 plane					1/1 plane

Notes: 1. The equipment which requires training differs from the composition of equipment used in unit deployments.
2. The number of F-2 fighters to be procured by Japan during the period covered by the Mid-Term Defense Program was revised to 18 planes from the initially set 22 planes as such a change was approved by the Cabinet on December 24, 2006.

Figure II-2-3-3 Necessary Expenses

Classification	Previous MTDP (FY 2001-FY 2005) [FY 2000 prices]	MTDP (FY 2005-FY 2009) [FY 2004 prices]
Total value	¥25.01 trillion	¥24.24 trillion
Personnel and provisions expenses	¥11.11 trillion	¥10.61 trillion
Non-personnel expenses	¥13.90 trillion	¥13.63 trillion
Other*	¥150 billion*	¥100 billion*

Note: In view of the need for the Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) to show a ceiling on the amount of defense-related expenses for a period covered by the program, necessary expenses under the program are shown on a spending basis, which covers expenditures both for already concluded contracts and new contracts for the period.
* If it is deemed necessary for Japan to respond to unpredictable situations in the future, response actions against such situations can be budgeted after an approval by the Security Council of Japan.

Fig. II-2-3-4 Contract Amounts of Material Expenses

Previous Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2001-2005) [FY 2000 prices]	Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2005-2009) [FY 2004 prices]
¥14,190 trillion	¥13,650 trillion

Note: Contract amount signifies new contracted expenses for procurement of equipment, which starts work during the corresponding Mid-Term Defense Program period.

Section 4. Build-up of Defense Capability for FY 2008

In FY 2008, taking into account the security environment surrounding Japan, modernization of Japan's defense capability will be initiated with the acquisition of fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1) and the modernization and upgrading of fighters. Japan will take into account efficiency and level of priority as it advances the build-up of defense capabilities. Continuing emphasis will be placed on the establishment of organizations to enhance policy planning functions and counter-security functions; efforts towards the peace and stability of the international community; response to ballistic missile launches, terrorist attacks, guerillas, special operations units and large-scale disasters; efforts for the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan; and implementation of advanced research and development.

Major items planned for the FY 2008 defense build-up program are shown in Fig. II-2-4-1. (See Reference 12 -13)

Fig. II-2-4-1 Main Items for FY 2008 Defense Build-up

Classification		Main Projects
Modernization of defense capabilities, based on the security environment	Upgrade capabilities for maritime security	❍ Start procurement of next generation fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1). (See column.) ❍ Procurement of minesweeping and transport helicopters (MCH-101) and special boats (SB)
	Rapid strengthening of air defense capabilities	❍ Modernization of fighter aircraft (F-15) (upgrade radar detection capabilities, missile capabilities, etc.)
	Research on aircraft technologies emphasizing cutting-edge technologies	❍ Research on system integration of aircraft technologies for high maneuverability and stealth
Organizational reform of Ministry of Defense and SDF	Strengthen policy drafting functions	Reorganization of internal departments, with establishment of Space and Maritime Security Policy Office, Gender Equality Promotion Office, Remuneration Division, etc.
	Review of information security organizations	❍ Review of information security organizations, such as establishment of SDF Intelligence Security Force (tentative name). (See column.)
	Reorganization of ASDF fighter units	❍ Deploy fighter unit (F-15) to Naha Air Base (See Fig. II-2-4-2)
Efforts for peace and stability of the international community		❍ Improvement and enhancement of equipment, based on past experience of international peace cooperation activities ❍ Development of education and public relations foundations for international peace cooperation activities, promotion of defense exchanges
Advancement of defense capability developments, based on efficiency and priority.		❍ Seek efficiency and priority by use of bulk purchases of equipment ❍ Reduce costs by extending service lives of minesweepers using new materials (See column.)
Matters related to effective response to new threats and diverse contingencies	Response to ballistic missile attack	❍ Enhancement and improvement of operation foundations of BMD system (improvements to radars etc., building maintenance and development organization, verification of system capabilities, achievement of fast and appropriate unit deployments, upgrade unit training levels) ❍ Continued development of interceptor systems (continued improvements to BMD response Aegis ships, procurement of PAC-3 missiles) ❍ Continued joint Japan-U.S. research and development on Aegis ship missile capability enhancements
	Responses to attacks by terrorists, guerrillas and special operations units	Development of mobile surveillance radar, preparation of Type-89 rifle in all basic fighting units, urban combat training, joint exercises with police, etc.
	Responses to attacks by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons	Develop and secure resources necessary for prevention, detection, identification, protection, diagnosis, treatment, and decontamination
Efforts to realign U.S. Forces in Japan.		❍ Headquarters of GSDF Central Readiness Force Command move to Camp Zama, Air Defense Command etc. move to Yokota Air Base ❍ Measures contributing to reduced burden on local communities, such as Marine Corps move from Okinawa to Guam, and move Futenma Air Station to Camp Schwab ❍ Solid execution of measures set forth in the SACO Final Report

Classification	Main Projects
Advancement of military-related science and technology, and build information and communications preparations	❍ Execute leading research and development, based on trends in future military-related science and technology. ❍ Build a more advanced information and communications system by replacing the central command system (CCS) ❍ Strengthen functions of Department of Current & Crisis Intelligence, by enhancing organization for collection and analysis of information on nuclear, ballistic missiles and terrorism
Efforts to strengthen human resources and advance responses to the environment	❍ Efforts to strengthen human resources: Investigate organizational developments such as create new SDF personnel compensation table and establish new ranks, develop childcare facilities, etc. ❍ Efforts for environmental countermeasures, such as reduce engine noise during the introduction of the next generation fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1), air pollution countermeasures, and waste disposal countermeasures
Promotion of measures to reduce burden of local communities hosting U.S. bases	❍ Implement measures to reduce the burden of local people living near U.S. bases in order to promote harmony between defense facilities and their surrounding areas ❍ Promotion of measures for the smooth and effective stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan

Fig. II-2-4-2 Reorganization of ASDF Units



Modernized F-15 fighter



An actual-size model of the high maneuverability and stealth aircraft currently being researched at the Technical Research & Development Institute

High mobility vehicle modified to engage in international activities

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

New Equipment (Successor Fixed-Wing Patrol Aircraft)

The Maritime Self-Defense Force's inventory of fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-3C) is expected to be reduced below the designated number in FY 2011 and beyond. In response, the annual budget for FY 2008 will start the procurement of the successor fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1) with improved flight and search capabilities and reduced noise. As an attempt for economical procurement, four planes are planned to be produced in a lump, which are otherwise divided into two fiscal years.

This planned procurement will enhance the capabilities of: 1) responding to reduced noise and reverberation of foreign submarines; and 2) detecting and identifying small objects on the water, such as suspicious vessels. In these ways the procurement will contribute to the imminent task of ensuring the safety of the seas.

Section 5. Defense-Related Expenditures

1. Defense-Related Expenditures and Changes

Defense-related expenditures include spending for maintaining and managing the SDF, improving living conditions in the neighborhoods of defense facilities, and supporting U.S. forces stationed in Japan.

The defense-related budget on an expenditure basis for FY 2008 decreased by ¥38.9 billion or 0.8% from the preceding fiscal year for the sixth consecutive year, under the Government's policy to firmly implement the Integrated Reform of Expenditures and Revenues as stipulated in "Basic Policy 2006[12]." (The budget shown in above excludes costs related to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) and the U.S. forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce burden on local communities)).

Including ¥18 billion in SACO-related expenses and ¥19.1 billion in expenses related to realignment of U.S. forces (portion meant to reduce burden on local communities), Japan's total defense-related expenditures for FY 2008 amount to ¥4,779.6 billion, representing a decrease of 0.5% or ¥21.7 billion from the preceding fiscal year[13]. (See Fig. II-2-5-1 & 2) (See Reference 18-19)

Fig. II-2-5-1 Outline of Defense-Related Expenses

Category	FY 2008 Defense-Related Expenses
Defense-Related Expenses (Including SACO-related expenses and U.S. forces realignment-related expenses (portion for reduction of burden on local communities))	¥4,742.6 billion (¥4,779.6 billion)
Fiscal YOY growth % of GDP % of govt. gen. acct. budget	+0.8% (+0.5%) 0.900% (0.907%) 5.7% (5.8%)
Future Obligation	¥3,035.5 billion
• New contracts • Previous contracts	¥1,797.2 billion ¥1,238.3 billion

Fig. II-2-5-2 Trend of Defense-Related Expenses



Note: Does not include SACO-related expenses, nor U.S. forces realignment-related expenses (portion for reduction of burden on local communities)

2. Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures

Defense-related expenditures are broadly classified into "personnel and food provisions expenses," which cover such items as pay and meals for SDF personnel, and "material expenses," which finance the repair and maintenance of equipment, purchase of fuel, the education and training of SDF personnel, and the procurement of equipment and others. Material expenses are further classified into "obligatory outlay expenses[14]," which are paid under contracts concluded in previous fiscal years, and "general material expenses," which are paid under current-year contracts. (See Fig. II-2-5-3)

Fig. II-2-5-3 Structure of Defense-Related Expenses



Notes: 1. Obligatory outlay expenses are the portions of past contracts to be paid that fiscal year.
2. General material expenses are items contracted and paid that fiscal year, and advance payments for payments over several years for items contracted that fiscal year.

The Ministry of Defense terms this classification method as "classification by expenses."

Personnel and food provisions expenses and obligatory outlay expenses, both of which are mandatory expenses, account for 80% or more of the total defense-related budget. A breakdown of general material expenses shows that ongoing or mandatory costs account for a significant portion of the total, including the repair of equipment, education and training of SDF personnel, cost-sharing for the stationing of USFJ, and expenses related to measures to alleviate the burden on local communities hosting U.S. bases in Japan[15].

Personnel and food provisions expenses decreased by ¥7.5 billion (0.4%) from the previous fiscal year. Obligatory outlay expenses for the year decreased by ¥43.8 billion or 2.5% from the previous year while general material expenses rose by ¥12.3 billion or 1.3% from the previous year.

The breakdown of FY 2008 defense-related expenditures classified by organization, such as the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, and also by use, such as personnel and food provisions expenses, and equipment and material purchase expenses is shown in Fig. II-2-5-4. (See Reference 20)

Thus, although Fig. II-2-5-5 displays the defense expenditures of each country shown in dollar terms using the purchasing power parity[16] of each country as published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD[17]), there are limits to make a simple comparison between Japan's defense-related expenditures and those of other countries.

Fig. II-2-5-4 Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenses



Notes: 1. () is budget amount, unit: ¥100 million.
2. In addition to this, there are 12.6 billion yen of SACO-related expenses, and 7.2 billion yen of U.S. force realignment-related expenses (reduce burden on local communities).
3. For example of use breakdown, refer to Reference 19.

Fig. II-2-5-5 Defense Expenses of Major Countries (FY 2006)



	Japan	U.S.	U.K.	Germany	France
	38,634	499,310	50,543	32,034	39,411
	302	1,659	845	387	649
	0.932	3.8	2.5	1.2	2.0

Notes: 1. Defense expenses are from each country's public documents. The dollar exchange rate uses purchasing power parity (OECD publication). US$1 = 124 yen = 0.645 pounds = 0.870 euros (Germany) = 0.915 euros (France).
2. Populations are from the U.N. *State of World Population*, GDPs are from the Ministry of Finance *Major Economic Indicators in Foreign Countries*, etc. Japan's population is from the *Monthly Report of Current Population Estimates* (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications publication).
3. U.S. defense expenses are the narrow definition of expenditures, according to the FY 2009 Historical Tables.

3. Comparison with Other Countries

Understanding the defense expenditures of each country using a single standard is not possible in view of differences in the socioeconomic and budgetary systems of each country. There is not an internationally unified definition of defense expenditures, and breakdowns of defense expenditures are often unclear even in many countries where such data is publicly disclosed. (See Reference 21)

Furthermore, though defense expenditures are generally converted into a dollar-termed value for the comparison, defense spending based on this method does not necessarily reflect the precise value resulted from counting each country's price levels.

Notes:

1) See <http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/1977/w1977_9110.html>
2) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/archives/keikaku/dp96j.htm>
3) "On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures" (approved by Cabinet) (See Reference 23), Report by the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities <http://kantei.go.jp/jp/kakugikettei/2003/1219seibi.html>,etc.
4) Defined in the Cabinet decision referenced in Note 3) as "Increased proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, new threats including activities by international terrorist organizations and others, and diverse situations in which peace and security are affected."
5) (1) Not designed to directly counter military threats (2) The portion of the concept stating that Japan will maintain defense capabilities based on strategic environments and geographical characteristics in order to prevent invasion is deemed to remain effective and thus will be sustained under the new security environment.
6) Regarding the contents of talks Japan held with the United States based on ideas shown in the National Defense Program Guidelines, see Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2.
7) The Mid-Term Defense Program stipulates that the Government of Japan will improve the research and education function of the National Institute for Defense, a think tank-like institute of the Japanese Defense Ministry, regarding security policy.
8) Major equipment of the MSDF (Aegis-equipped destroyers: four vessels) and major units of the ASDF (Air-warning control units: seven warning groups and four warning squadrons; surface-to-air guided missile units: three groups). For development of the BMD system, see Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2.
9) Total costs of defense equipment that becomes necessary throughout the full lifecycle of brainstorming sessions, the development process, mass production, operations (including maintenance and repair costs) and equipment scrapping.
10) Based on this statement, it was decided on December 24, 2005 by the Security Council and the Cabinet that the joint Japan-U.S. technical research on a sea-based midcourse system of the BMD would be succeeded by joint Japan-U.S. development in FY 2006. In a statement issued by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on the same day, it was stated that "weapons required by the United States for the purpose of joint Japan-U.S. development shall be provided under strict control and also upon coordination with the United States regarding a framework for provision of weapons." Following this statement, the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies was concluded by the Japanese and U.S. Governments in June of 2006. The exchange provides a framework for enabling the transfer of weapons and weapons technologies designed for the joint Japan-U.S. BMD development, as well as weapon technologies that were subject to transfer under the previous Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-1 and Part III, Chapter 2, Section 3-5)
11) In June 2006, Japan decided to provide patrol vessels, which fall under the category of weapons and others under the Three Principles on Arms Export, to Indonesia as grant aid meant to support the country in its efforts to control and prevent terrorism and piracy. A statement issued at that time by the Chief Cabinet Secretary stated that the transfer of the patrol vessels was exempted from the Three Principles on Arms Export on the condition that an international agreement is concluded with the recipient country to ensure that the vessels are not used for purposes other than controlling and preventing terrorism and piracy and that the country does not transfer the vessels to a third party without Japan's prior consent.
12) As a part of their efforts to restore sound fiscal standing, the Government and ruling coalition parties conducted discussions and studies on the proposed unified reform of the nation's spending and revenue

structures. As a result, specific measures to reform defense-related expenditures were laid out in the Basic Policies for Economic and Fiscal Management and Structural Reform (Cabinet endorsement on July 7, 2006).

13) In the budget for FY 2008, a change in recording method was enacted from the viewpoint of clarifying the overall debt burden and payment amount for first-time expenses (expenditures for production facilities that must be prepared for creation of necessary equipment, etc.), so that first-time expenses related to equipment of which procurements start from FY 2008 and equipment of which procurements have started in FY 2007 and earlier are conducted in FY 2008 are bracketed together and recorded as act of bearing liabilities with national treasury funds.

14) Procurement of some main front-line defense equipment, such as vessels and aircraft, and construction of accommodations for SDF personnel, take several years. Budgeting for such activities is made to allow execution of contracts basically within five years. Based on such budgeting, MOD and contractors conclude a contract which allows MOD to pay contractors at a specified time in the future. The total budget amount for the contract will then be split into several portions over the years, and expenses for payment will be budgeted in each year. Expenses budgeted in the fiscal year when their payment to the contractor becomes necessary several years after the conclusion of the contract are called "obligatory outlay expenses," while expenses for which the payment period has yet to come are termed "expenses carried over to following fiscal years."

15) A typical cost under this category is expenses for installation of a sound-proof system in residences located near U.S. bases.

16) A gauge that measures each country's ability to purchase assets or services by taking into account their respective price levels.

17) The table excludes Russia and China, for which no OECD data on purchasing power parity exist. For changes in defense-related expenditures for each country in its local currency, see Part I, Chapter 2 and Reference 21.

Part III

Measures for Defense of Japan

Chapter 1

Operations of Self-Defense Forces for Defense of Japan and Responses to Diverse Situations

Section 1. Frameworks for Responses to Armed Attack Situations
Section 2. Effective Responses to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies
Section 3. Preparation against Full-Scale Aggression

Section 1. Frameworks for Responses to Armed Attack Situations

It is of utmost importance for the national government to establish a basis for SDF activities such as a legislative structure and SDF operational structure, to deal with serious situations which threaten the peace and security of the country and its people, such as armed attacks against Japan. This establishment enables an effective response to armed attack situations and anticipated situations (both to armed attack situations[1] and to situations where armed attacks are anticipated[2]; the same applies hereinafter) and contributes to the deterrence of an armed attack, and is also vital from the perspective of achieving civilian control in an armed attack situation.

This section outlines the key aspects of Japan's response framework in the event of an armed attack situation, and the SDF operational structure that is based on this framework.

1. The Basic Framework for Responses to Armed Attack Situations

1. The Background to Laws for Responses to Armed Attack Situations

The 1954 enactment of the Defense Agency Establishment Law and the Self-Defense Forces Law established a fundamental legislative framework for Japan's response to armed attack situations. However, many areas that required additional legislation remained.

In 1977, with the approval of then Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda and following instructions from Asao Mihara, then Director General of the Defense Agency, the Defense Agency at that time launched studies on so-called "emergency legislation," with the goal of addressing issues not covered by the existing legislation. These studies continued for almost a quarter of a century.

In February 2002, then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi made it clear in his policy statement that specific legislative reforms were to be made "towards a strong country in times of emergencies." Following this policy statement, the Diet enacted three laws related to responses to armed attacks starting with the emergency legislation to deal with an armed attack situation in Japan, the "legislation for responses to situations." The following year in 2004, the Diet enacted an additional seven laws related to legislation for responses to emergency situations, including the Law Concerning Measures for Protection of the Civilian Population in Armed Attack Situations[3] (the Civil Protection Law) and with the additional ratification of three international treaties, the foundation for emergency legislation was established[4]. (See Fig. III-1-1-1)

2. Responses to Armed Attack Situations

The Armed Attack Situation Response Law[5] determines the fundamental nature of Japan's response to armed attack situations and defines basic principles, basic policies (the Basic Response Plan) and the responsibilities of national and local governments in the event of an armed attack situation. Based on this legislation and on other emergency legislation, such as the Civil Protection Law, the relevant organizations (designated government institutions, local governments and designated public institutions[6]) mutually cooperate to implement coordinated response measures. The establishment of this legislative framework enables the country as a whole to implement a thorough response to armed attack situations. (See Fig. III-1-1-2)

Fig. III-1-1-1 Relationship between Three Laws related to Emergency Legislation and Seven Laws Related to Emergency Legislation, and Related Treaties



(1) Systems and Procedures for Responding to Armed Attack Situations

In armed attack situations, the government must respond following the procedure outlined in Fig. III 1-1-3. (See Reference 22)

(2) Response Measures

When responding to armed attack situations, the designated government institutions, local governments, and designated public institutions will implement the following countermeasures based on legal provisions between the period of formulation and termination of the Basic Response Plan.

Fig. III-1-1-2 Basic Principles for Responding to Armed Attack Situations

Situations etc.	Basic Principles
General	❍ National and local government and specified public institutions must mutually cooperate to take thorough measures, while obtaining cooperation of citizens ❍ Citizens' freedoms and rights guaranteed by the Japan Constitution must be respected, and even if these are restricted, such restrictions are limited to the minimum required to respond to the armed attack situations, and must be executed through fair and proper procedures* ❍ Citizens must be informed in a timely and proper manner of the armed attack situations and the situation concerning responses ❍ While closely cooperating with the U.S. based on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, must work to obtain understanding and cooperative action of the U.N. and the international community
Expected Armed Attack Situations	Must work to avoid occurrence of a military attack
Armed Attack Situations	Prepare for the military attack. If the military attack occurs, must work to bring it to an end while repelling the attack. However, if the military attack occurs, when repelling the attack, military force must be used within limits judged reasonably necessary corresponding to the contingency.

*In this situation, the Japan Constitution, Articles 14, 18, 19, 21, and other provisions concerning basic human rights must receive the maximum compliance.

Fig. III-1-1-3 Procedures for Responding to Armed Attack Situations



Notes: 1. The Task Force will be established in the Cabinet for general advancement of measures to respond to armed attack situations and anticipated situations.
2. For the Prime Minister to issue a defense operations order requires the process of a separate Cabinet decision and Diet approval, in addition to that concerning the basic response plan.
In emergency circumstances and if there is no time to obtain advance Diet approval, SDF mobilization shall be approved after the order.
(See Reference 22)

a. Measures to Bring Armed Attack Situations to an End Depending on the Progress of the Situation

1) The use of military force, unit deployment and other activities conducted by the SDF;
2) Provision of materials, facilities and services and other measures to facilitate the smooth and efficient implementation of the SDF and U.S. forces' operations;
3) Diplomatic measures other than those described in paragraphs 1) and 2) above.

b. Measures to Protect Lives, Bodies and Properties of the People, and to Minimize the Effects on People's Lives and Economy

1) Warnings, evacuation instructions, rescue of disaster victims, emergency restoration of facilities and installations, and other measures; and
2) Price stabilization, distribution of necessities of daily life, and other necessary measures.

At the point when the Prime Minister deems the response measures as no longer necessary or the Diet resolves that these measures should be concluded, the Prime Minister must then obtain the approval of the Cabinet to abolish the Basic Response Plan.

(3) Responsibilities of the National and Local Governments

a. Responsibilities of the National Government

Regarding the implementation of response measures, the national government, in accordance with the basic principles, will respond to armed attack situations and take every measure by using all organizations and functions.

b. Responsibilities of Local Governments

The local governments, which have responsibilities of protecting the lives, bodies, and properties of the residents in its region will implement necessary measures in mutual cooperation with the national government, other local governments and other institutions.

c. Responsibilities of Designated Public Institutions

The designated public institutions will implement necessary measures in the scope of their works in mutual cooperation with the national government, local governments and other institutions.

d. Cooperation of the People

In light of the importance of securing the safety of the nation and its citizens, the people of Japan will strive to provide necessary cooperation for implementation of these measures.

(4) Authority of the Prime Minister for Response Measures

Following the stipulation of the Basic Response Plan, the Task Force for Armed Attack Situations etc. (the Task Force) will be established within the Cabinet with the Prime Minister as leader for overall promotion of response measures. Appropriate Ministers of State will be appointed as Deputy Chief and other members of the Task Force.

If the Prime Minister recognizes that there are obstacles to protecting the lives, bodies, and properties of the people, and to eliminating an armed attack, when necessary response measures under comprehensive coordination are not implemented, he may instruct the head of the local government concerned and other relevant persons to implement the necessary measures.

In circumstances where necessary response measures are not implemented or if there is an obstacle to protecting the lives, bodies, and properties of the people, in emergency response situations, the Prime Minister or the Minister of State responsible for operations relating to the relevant countermeasure may take responsibility

for and implement the response measures that the local governments or designated public institutions have failed to implement, after notifying the relevant head of local governments or other relevant individual.

(5) Report to the U.N. Security Council

In accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, the government will immediately report measures it has implemented to terminate armed attacks on Japan to the U.N. Security Council.

3. Responses to Emergency Response Situations other than Armed Attack Situations[7]

The Armed Attack Situation Response Law provides for appropriate and rapid response measures to be implemented in emergency response situations other than armed attacks, in order for the government to ensure the peace and independence of the country, and to maintain the security of the country and its people.

In addition, based on changes in various situations surrounding Japan, such as the appearance of unidentified vessels or mass terrorism incidents, measures shall be promptly taken including the following:

1) Development of the systems for assembling information, analysis, and situational evaluations;
2) Preparation for formulating response measures in accordance with various situations;
3) Rapid implementation of measures to strengthen levels of coordination between the SDF, the police, the Japan Coast Guard and other relevant organizations.

(1) Emergency Response Situation Response Plan

In an emergency response situation, the Cabinet must decide the following items for those policies concerning emergency response situations (emergency response situation response plan) and must obtain the approval of the plan by the Diet. Also, on the approval of the emergency response situation response plan, the Headquarters for the Emergency Response Situation will be temporarily established within the Cabinet to deal with the relevant situation.

1) Certification of an emergency response situation and the facts supporting the certification;
2) General plan for responses; and
3) Important matters relating to emergency response measures.

(2) Emergency Response Measures

The designated government institutions, local governments, and designated public institutions will implement the following emergency response measures based on legal provisions, during the period between the formulation and termination of an Emergency Response Situation Response Plan:

1) Measures most appropriate to end the emergency response situation and measures to prevent or suppress attacks during emergency response situations.
2) In order to protect the lives, bodies, and properties of the people from attacks or to minimize the impact on their daily lives and economic conditions in emergency response situations, the following measures will also be implemented according to current developments in the emergency response situation: the issuance of warnings, evacuation instructions, the rescue of disaster victims, the emergency restoration of facilities and equipment, etc.

2. Measures Based on the Armed Attack Situation Response Law and other Relevant Laws

Based on the provisions of the Armed Attack Situation Response Law[8] enacted in June 2003, an additional seven emergency legislation related laws and three related treaties were established and approved during June 2004. Additionally, in 2007, Japan concluded three treaties for the protection of cultural properties in the event of an armed conflict and agreed on regulations for the International Criminal Court. As a result, a legislative framework has been established enabling Japan to implement measures necessary for responses to armed attack situations. The outline of this framework is as follows. (See Fig. III-1-1-4)

1. Measures to Protect the Lives etc. of the People and to Minimize the Effects on the Daily Lives of the People

Japan established the Civil Protection Law[9], which prescribes measures for necessary items[10] to protect the lives etc. of the people in armed attack situations. In addition, the Law provides for the same measures to be implemented in emergency response situations.

Fig. III-1-1-4 Overview of Legislation for Responses to Armed Attack Situations and Other Situations



2. Measures to Terminate Armed Attack Situations

(1) Facilitation of SDF Operations

Japan enacted the Maritime Transportation Restriction Law[11], which enables the implementation of measures to restrict the maritime transportation of foreign military supplies (weapons etc.) in Japanese territorial waters or in international waters surrounding Japan.

Furthermore, Japan revised one part of the SDF Law which centered on the need to establish legislation for so-called section one classification laws and regulations (those within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense) and section two classification laws and regulations (those outside the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense) referred to in the "emergency legislation study." The necessary special provisions were newly established for the appropriate application of relevant laws, such as measures for the construction of defense facilities prior to issuance of a defense operations order, provisions related to emergency traffic on issuance of a defense operations order, or relating to the Road Law.

(2) Facilitation of U.S. Forces Operations

a. Japan established the Law Related to Measures Conducted by the Government in Line with U.S. Military Actions in Armed Attack Situations[12], etc. (U.S. Military Actions Related Measures Law). In accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, it prescribes measures to be implemented so that U.S. forces may smoothly and effectively take the necessary actions to terminate armed attacks against Japan.

b. The Diet approved partial amendment of the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America (ACSA - Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement)[13]. The scope of application for this Agreement has been widened so that it now additionally applies to responses to armed attack situations, the efforts of the international community to contribute to global peace and security, and for disaster response measures. Also, the revision of one part of the SDF Law has enabled the SDF to provide logistic support, supplies, and services to U.S. forces implementing these actions. (See Chapter 2, Section 3)

(3) Others (Coordination of the Use of Facilities of Ports and Airfields, Roads and Others)

Japan established the Law Regarding the Use of Specific Public Facilities[14], ensuring that the SDF and U.S. forces' actions and measures to protect the people of Japan can be implemented appropriately and promptly. The Law enables the comprehensive coordination of specific public facilities etc. (ports, airfields, roads, territorial waters and airspace, and radio frequencies) that may be required in armed attack situations.

3. Guarantee of Appropriate Implementation of International Humanitarian Laws

(1) Japan established the Law Concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War and other Detainees in Armed Attack Situations (Prisoners of War Law)[15]. The Law was created to ensure that prisoners are always treated humanely in armed attack situations and to ensure that prisoners' lives, bodies, health, and dignity are always respected and protected from any violations or threats.

(2) Japan established the Law Concerning Punishment of Grave Breaches of the International Humanitarian Law[16] prescribing appropriate punishment for "grave breaches" of international humanitarian laws applicable to international armed conflicts.

(3) Japan has established legislation to protect cultural properties during armed conflict establishing a system to provide international protection for those cultural properties that can be considered valuable cultural assets for the entire human race.

(4) Japan established legislation to cooperate with the International Criminal Court which ensures the appropriate implementation of International Criminal Court regulations.
(5) To coordinate the implementation of the necessary domestic measures that are provided by the above described specific legislation for responses to situations, in 2004, Japan approved the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)[17] and the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949[18], and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II)[19]. Also, three treaties relating to the protection of cultural properties and the regulations of the International Criminal Court were concluded in 2007.

4. High Readiness for Armed Attack Situations

With the passing of the legislation for responses to situations, Japan has established a legal foundation but still needs to confirm the legislation's effectiveness and also ceaselessly strive to maintain the effectiveness of the required operational infrastructure to ensure an appropriate response in an ever-changing security environment.

As part of these efforts, during peacetime, the Special Advisory Committee for Contingency Planning, under the jurisdiction of the Security Council, will study responses to emergency situations, such as armed attacks, terrorist attacks, or the appearance of unidentified vessels. In addition, it will formulate plans for the specific response measures to be implemented by designated government institutions, local governments, and designated public institutions in armed attack situations. The Council will also take steps to formulate role-related plans and ensure that these plans are reflected into policies and operations.

The government also works in peacetime to utilize a range of opportunities to educate the public on all of the important measures that it will implement to protect the lives, bodies, and properties of the people in armed attack situations. Also, it verifies the effectiveness of its operational structure through methods such as training.

3. Measures for Civil Protection

1. Measures for Civil Protection in Armed Attack Situations (Civil Protection Measures)

All organizations and functions of the government will implement their civil protection measures based on the Basic Response Plan provided for in the Armed Attack Situation Response Law and the basic guidelines for civil protection in armed attack situations. Also, the country as a whole will give its unfailing support for all civil protection measures implemented by local governments and designated public institutions.

Local governments will implement their respective civil protection measures based on the national government policies, and will be responsible for the overall coordination of the civil protection measures to be implemented in their jurisdiction. (See Fig. III-1-1-5)

2. The Basic Guidelines for Civil Protection

In March 2005, the government established the Basic Guidelines for Civil Protection (hereinafter the "Basic Guidelines")[20], based on Article 32 of the Civil Protection Law. The Basic Guidelines classify armed attacks into four types: amphibious landing attacks; guerrilla or special operations forces attacks; ballistic missile attacks; and air attacks. The Basic Guidelines also identify elements for consideration when implementing civil protection measures in response to each type of attack. In addition, the Basic Guidelines define the possible scope for civil protection measures that may be implemented by the national government, prefectures, municipalities, and designated public institutions in such areas as evacuation, relief and disaster response and also provides for the allocation of roles.

Designated government institutions and prefectural governments, etc. will establish the plan concerning civil protection (the Civil Protection Plan) based on the Civil Protection Law and the Basic Guidelines. (See Reference 30-31)

Fig. III-1-1-5 Mechanism for Civil Protection in Armed Attack Situations



3. Roles of the SDF in Civil Protection

In October 2005, the then Defense Agency and Defense Facilities Administration Agency, both designated government institutions, established the Civil Protection Plan[21], based on Article 33, Paragraph 1 of the Civil Protection Law and the Basic Guidelines. The Plan included measures to be implemented in full force by the SDF to terminate armed attacks, a primary mission of the SDF. In addition, the Plan described civil protection measures to be implemented within feasible range, relating to evacuation, relief support, and responses to armed attack disasters.

(1) Civil Protection Dispatch

An outline of the provisions relating to dispatches for civil protection etc. is as follows.

a. Dispatch Procedure

For situations where it is recognized that a dispatch is required, the Minister of Defense may issue a civilian protection dispatch order to dispatch relevant units to implement civil protection measures following a request by a prefectural governor or the Task Force Chief[22]. (See Fig. III-1-1-6)

Also, when a defense operations order has been issued in an armed attack situation, or on the issuance of a public security operations order for measures to deal with an emergency response situation, the Minister of Defense may implement civil protection measures or emergency response protection measures without issuing a civil protection dispatch order if they constitute a part of the consistent defense or public security operations strategy.

Fig. III-1-1-6 Mechanism of Civil Protection Dispatches

(Applicable to both Armed Attack Situation and Emergency Response Situation)



Notes: 1. Cases where no request is made by the prefectural governor.
2. See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hogohousei/hourei/hogo_s.html>.
3. Implement as required.

b. Authorities

Only in cases when police officers, etc. are not at the scene, the SDF personnel ordered for a civil protection dispatch operation are authorized to execute the following measures: evacuation and other measures as prescribed by the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials; crime prevention and deterrence; entering premises; and the use of firearms.

In addition, only in cases when the municipal mayors, etc. are not at the scene, the SDF personnel ordered for a civil protection dispatch operation are authorized to execute the following: evacuation instructions, government business, specifying hazard areas, requests to local residents for cooperation, etc.

c. Temporary Organization of Units

For civil protection dispatch operations, special units may temporarily be organized based on necessity and SDF ready and reserve personnel may be called to duty.

d. Emergency Response Protection Measures

The same provisions as measures in armed attack situations, based on the Civil Protection Law and the Basic Guidelines etc., shall apply for measures in emergency response situations.

(2) SDF Measures

a. Evacuation of Residents

The SDF will collect and distribute essential information, coordinate with relevant organizations, and provide guidance and transport services for the evacuation of residents.

b. Relief of Evacuated Residents

Centered on measures for the relief of human life (search and rescue, providing emergency medical treatment etc.) and following a request from the Task Force Chief or other authorized persons, the SDF will provide the following supports: medical treatment, (transportation of the sick and injured), measures to support the lives of the people when necessary (distributing hot meals, supplying water, transportation of relief supplies etc.), and collecting safety and security-related information.

c. Responses to Armed Attack Disasters

The SDF will carry out the following response measures: confirming the extent of damage, providing monitoring support, implementing measures for relief of human lives (search and rescue, provision of emergency medical treatment etc.) preventing damage expansion (support for the evacuation of nearby residents, firefighting etc.), and removing dangerous substances dispersed by nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) attacks.

Otherwise, under the authority of the Prime Minister, the SDF will implement other important measures to ensure the security of facilities such as those related to daily life (guidance and advice, dispatching units etc.).

d. Emergency Recovery

While implementing emergency recovery measures for SDF facilities and equipment based on a request from a prefectural governor etc., support operations will be conducted including the removal of dangerous wreckage and emergency repairs for roads and runways.

4. Activities by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF to Facilitate the Civil Protection Measures

(1) Participation in Training for Civil Protection

In order to appropriately and promptly implement civil protection measures in armed attack situations, it is essential that all government ministries and agencies, local governments, and other relevant organizations cooperate for the coordinated implementation of these civil protection measures.

In this respect, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have actively participated and cooperated in civil protection training implemented by relevant organizations or local governments, such as the Cabinet Office and prefectural governments. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF intend to continue such efforts to strengthen coordination and response capabilities. (See Fig. III-1-1-7)

(2) Coordination with Local Governments in Peacetime

During peacetime, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF closely coordinate with local governments etc. The Provincial Liaison & Coordination Division was established within the GSDF Army Headquarters to achieve effective implementation for civil protection measures through close coordination. To strengthen functions relating to coordination and cooperation with local governments etc., a Civil Protection and Disaster Countermeasures Liaison Coordination Officer post was established in each SDF Provincial Cooperation Office.

Fig. III-1-1-7 Participation in Civil Protection-Related Joint Exercises by the National Government and the Local Public Entity (FY 2007)

Field exercise	Shimane prefecture	[Nov. 2, 2007 (Fri.)]
	Ehime prefecture	[Nov. 10, 2007 (Sat.)]
	Chiba prefecture	[Nov. 21, 2007 (Wed.)]
	Ibaraki prefecture	[Nov. 28, 2007 (Wed.)]
	Shizuoka prefecture	[Feb. 8, 2008 (Fri.)]
Simulation exercise	Yamaguchi prefecture	[Oct. 23, 2007 (Tue.)]
	Kyoto prefecture	[Oct. 25, 2007 (Thur.)]
	Miyagi prefecture	[Nov. 13, 2007 (Tue.)]
	Nagano prefecture	[Jan. 18, 2008 (Fri.)]
	Wakayama prefecture	[Jan. 25, 2008 (Fri.)]
	Hiroshima prefecture	[Jan. 28, 2008 (Mon.)]
	Kagoshima prefecture	[Feb. 5, 2008 (Tue.)]
	Kumamoto prefecture	[Feb. 6, 2008 (Wed.)]
	Aichi prefecture	[Feb. 15, 2008 (Fri.)]
	Gifu prefecture	[Feb. 21, 2008 (Thur.)]

Note: Implemented in 5 prefectures in FY 2005.
Implemented in 10 prefectures in FY 2006.
(Including prefectures where exercises are implemented multiple times)

In addition, GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF members have been appointed as members of the civil protection consultative committees of prefectures and municipalities, which were established to actively solicit opinions from a wide range of citizens.

Moreover, a staff of each Regional Defense Bureau, which is a designated local administrative organization, is appointed as a member of the Committee. (See Chapter 4, Section 1)

GSDF conducting decontamination training in a commercial facility

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Joint Training for Civil Protection

Based on the Law Concerning Measures for Civil Protection in Armed Attack Situations (Law No. 112 of 2004), the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces carried out joint training programs in connection with measures to protect the people, which were participated in by the central government and local municipalities. The programs were aimed at strengthening coordination among related organizations and thereby enhancing capabilities for emergency response situations. In implementing the training programs, emphasis was put on the following: the enhancement of SDF response capabilities; establishment of the initial operation postures; strengthening of the coordination/cooperation postures among local municipalities, etc.; confirmation of the implementation processes, etc. of the civil protection measures; and evaluation of the training results.

The key training programs included simulation exercises performed in Kyoto Prefecture on October 25, 2007; field training in Chiba Prefecture on November 21, 2007; and simulation exercises performed in Kagoshima Prefecture on February 5, 2008. These programs were participated in by: the Eastern, Middle, Western Armies, etc. of the Ground Self-Defense Force; Maizuru, Yokosuka, Sasebo Districts, etc. from the Maritime Self-Defense Force; and the Air Defense Command etc. of the Air Self-Defense Force.

GSDF personnel conducting rescue training

GSDF personnel conducting decontamination training

4. The Operations of the Self-Defense Forces

On March 27, 2006, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF shifted to a joint operational structure, in which the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff solely assists the Minister of Defense on SDF operations from a military expert's perspective. This has established the basis for unified SDF operations among the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), and the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) in peacetime, and is enabling the SDF to fulfill its diversified roles in an effective and prompt manner.

1. Outline of Joint Operational Structure

(1) Basic Concept

a. The Chief of Staff, Joint Staff develops a joint operations concept for the operations including the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, and solely supports the Minister of Defense on operations from a military expert's perspective.

b. The Minister of Defense commands SDF operations through the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, and the Chief of

Staff, Joint Staff executes SDF operational orders.

(2) Establishment of Central Organization Required for Joint Operations

As a result of the shift to a joint operational structure the system for assisting the Minister of Defense by the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF is as follows:

a. Sole Assistance by Chief of Staff, Joint Staff to the Minister of Defense on SDF Operations from a Military Expert's Perspective, and the Responsibility of Chiefs of Staff of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF for Building-up their Respective Units

The Joint Staff undertakes the functions relating to those SDF operations that were transferred and consolidated from the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF Staff. The GSDF, MSDF and ASDF Staff Offices continue to undertake functions for unit maintenance, such as personnel, building-up defense capability, and education and training.

In addition, from the perspective of facilitating the smooth SDF joint operations through appropriate unit operations, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff creates medium- to long-term defense concepts and strategies, and annual planning policies to clarify the requirements of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF functions. Each of the Chiefs of Staff of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF will implement all measures in accordance with these plans. (See Fig. III-1-1-8)

The information necessary for the SDF to carry out its operations is provided by the Defense Intelligence Headquarters to the Joint Staff and the relevant units.

Fig. III-1-1-8 Roles of Chief of Staff, Joint Staff and Chiefs of Staff of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF



Notes: 1. The Chief of Staff, Joint Staff is responsible for joint training.
2. With respect to forces affairs other than operations in regards to the Joint Task Force, command responsibilities of the Defense Minister.

b. Execution of the Minister's Orders for SDF Operations by the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff

The Chief of Staff, Joint Staff shall execute all ministerial orders relating to GSDF, MSDF and ASDF operations. The Minister's commands are executed by the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff when joint task forces[23] are organized and even in situations where a single SDF unit is mobilized (for example, only a GSDF unit is mobilized) to respond to the situation. (See Fig. III-1-1-9)

Fig. III-1-1-9 The Operation System of the SDF



2. Establishment of Infrastructure to Enhance the Joint Operational Structure

Within the joint operational structure it is essential that the Joint Staff and each SDF unit maintain systems to communicate commands accurately and to share information promptly. With this in mind, in March 2008, the SDF Command and Communication Squadron was established to strengthen communication functions directly linked to unit operations. Also, a wide-ranging and mobile information communications structure has been created employing information and communication technologies available at home, overseas.

Furthermore, at the unit level, commanders[24] of major units who may be required to take command of a joint task force will create plans for such force's operations during peacetime. Also, they need to maintain a posture capable of executing duties through training and other methods. For this purpose, staff from other SDF branches are to be stationed at major command headquarters during peacetime to strengthen coordination between the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, and if necessary, another Joint Staff personnel will be dispatched to enable a flexible joint operational response to a range of situations.

As the third year approaches since the shift to a joint operational structure, deliberation continues aiming for a more effective one and necessary measures to be taken, while bearing in mind past accomplishments. This deliberation includes topics such as the improvement of education and training, the SDF headquarter structure, development of human resources to fit joint operations, and the necessity of common equipment for joint operations.

3. Placing the Defense Intelligence Headquarters under the Direct Command of the Minister of Defense

In March 2006, accompanying the shift to a joint operations posture, the Defense Intelligence Headquarters, which had been under the control of the Joint Staff Council (at that time), became a special institution under the direct control of the Minister of Defense. Its position and role was clarified as the central intelligence service for the Ministry of Defense.

This change has enabled the intelligence organizations of the Ministry of Defense to strengthen the following functions: to collect extensive intelligence from a more holistic perspective, high quality analysis based on the needs of each government ministry and agency, and more prompt, accurate, and direct reporting to the Minister of Defense.

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of an SDF Officer Working as the Defense Attaché in India

Masakatsu Tamaru
Colonel
11th Defense Attaché posted in India, GSDF

I am working as a Defense Attaché at the Embassy of Japan in New Delhi, the capital of India.

Are you familiar with the work of Defense Attachés? In fact, our assignments are more diverse and extensive than most believe due to the increasing complexity of our world today which is full of active mutual exchanges.

Colonel Tamaru and security staff of a survey team visiting Jammu and Kashmir

Here in India in particular, my tasks as a Defense Attaché include: (1) participation in about 30 formal events a year in my capacity as a representative of Japan, held by the Government of India, its Department of Defense and military organizations of its ground, naval and air forces, etc. This is a very important task as it represents Japan's diplomatic stance vis-à-vis India, as Japan's Defense Attaché in uniform, together with his wife, joins other military officers and their spouses from about 50 countries including the United States, China, Russia, and the United Kingdom. Attendance at such events is imperative as a failure to participate in any such official event could negatively impact Japan's reputation, which enjoys friendly relations with India. At the same time, more than 120 countries maintain embassies in New Delhi, and many invite Japan's Defense Attaché to events held in commemoration of national holidays and military-related anniversaries. Again, absence from any such occasion would raise questions such as "Is Japan not interested in participating in our country's events?"

Colonel Tamaru (center) invites military officers from other countries to dinner

(2) Secondly, the Defense Attaché is tasked with accurately informing Japan of the situation in India and the surrounding region, in relation to the security of Japan and of the international community. To pursue this task appropriately, various actions must be taken as necessary: visiting relevant sites; seeking communication through interactions with groups of military officers posted from various countries and through personal interactions with such officers (at dinners, etc.); and attending opportunities of opinion exchanges. Furthermore as a Defense Attaché, I try to be alert to events that happen from day to day and am available 24 hours a day, in cooperation with other embassy personnel and my family.

Additional tasks of the Defense Attaché include: (3) services related to Japan-India bilateral relations; (4) services related to Japan-India defense cooperation (bilateral security dialogue; discussions between the defense authorities; joint training, etc.); (5) services related to international peacekeeping operations etc. carried out by Japan's Ministry of Defense (advancing procedures and arrangements inside India); and (6) securing the safety of Japanese nationals in India. Being stationed in India allows me to stay abreast of the "movements of the new world," which would be more difficult if I were in Japan. Combining the population of India (the world's second most-populated country) and China (the world's most populated) makes about 2.3 billion people (compared to the world population of about 6 billion). This means that every third person in the world is either from India or China. While the two countries have yet to solve their border dispute (since the Indo-China border conflict of 1962), they are rising on the global stage not only economically but also militarily as if the two countries were competing in harmony. Against this background, I was assigned to the current post in 2006. As a representative of the Ministry of Defense and of Japan, I am determined to fulfill my duties not only in the security and other relevant fields, but also for the sake of Japan's national interest (diplomacy). My family (wife and three children) support me in fulfilling my profession.

Section 2. Effective Responses to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies

The primary role of the National Defense Program Guidelines is to provide an effective defense response to new threats and diverse contingencies.

This section explains the ideal role of the SDF in response to new threats and diverse contingencies under the joint operations posture as well as issues on which the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have been working on to date. (See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 2)

1. Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

While various efforts have been made by the international community in recent years for the non-proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, proliferation still continues. Further, in July 2006, North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles reconfirming that the threat from ballistic missiles is a reality.

Against this background, Japan began developing a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in FY 2004 in order to improve readiness in response to ballistic missile attacks. Necessary amendments were subsequently made to the SDF Law in 2005. In December of the same year, the Security Council and Cabinet decided to begin Japan-U.S. joint development of advanced BMD interceptor missiles.

Furthermore, on December 18, 2007 (Japan time) a test was conducted in the sea off Hawaii's Kauai Island where a standard missile (SM-3) was fired by the *Kongo*, an Aegis destroyer[25]. The fired imitated ballistic missile target was successfully intercepted outside the atmosphere.

With assignment of ballistic missile capability to the *Kongo* class Aegis destroyers, in addition to the already deployed PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability-3)[26], although limited, Japan built its own multi-tier defense system against ballistic missile attacks. (See Fig. III-1-2-1)

Fig. III-1-2-1 The History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan

1995	Commenced a comprehensive study on the posture of the air defense system of Japan and a Japan-U.S. joint study on ballistic missile defense
1998	North Korea launched a ballistic missile over Japanese territory
1999	Started the joint Japan-U.S. technical research on four major components for advanced interceptor missiles
2000	The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2001- FY 2005) with a decision to continue the joint Japan-U.S. technical research on a sea-based upper-tier system and to take necessary measures after the review of its technical feasibility
2002	Decision by the United States on the initial deployment of BMD
2003	The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the introduction of BMD system and other measures, and the deployment of BMD in Japan started
2004	The Security Council and the Cabinet approved the National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid-Term Defense Build-up Program, with a decision to take necessary measures after examining possible transition of the joint technical research to a development stage, together with continued efforts of build-up to establish a necessary defense posture including development of the BMD system
2005	The Security Council and the Cabinet approved a Japan-U.S. Cooperative Development on advanced interceptor missiles for BMD
2006	North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles toward the Sea of Japan
2007	Started the deployment of Patriot PAC-3 units

1. Japan's Ballistic Missile Defense

(1) General Situation of BMD System Development

a. Basic Concept

The BMD system has been developed by Japan following the Cabinet decision of December 2003 and serves to improve the capability of the Aegis destroyers and Patriot systems currently maintained by the SDF. Furthermore, with incorporation of BMD functions to the automatic warning and control system JADGE (Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment), the basic concept is efficient execution of a multi-tier defense system with upper-tier interception by Aegis destroyers in coordination with lower-tier interception by Patriot PAC-3 missiles.

b. Configuration of the BMD System

Japan's BMD system employs a multi-tier weapon system to intercept incoming ballistic missiles at either the mid-course phase or terminal phase using Aegis destroyers or Patriot PAC-3 missiles respectively. The entire system consists of the multi-tier weapon system, the sensors which detect and track ballistic missiles flying toward Japan, and the command, control, battle management and communications systems to systematically counter ballistic missiles by effectively coordinating weapons and sensors. (See Fig. III-1-2-2)

Fig. III-1-2-2 Concept of BMD Deployment and Operation (Image diagram)



c. Policy for Introducing the BMD System

In developing the BMD system, existing equipment will be utilized from the perspective of developing an effective and efficient system while reducing acquisition and maintenance costs. Beginning with capability improvements of the aforementioned Aegis destroyers and Patriot system, an improved model of the current ground radar system will also be employed in the area of sensors. In addition, the newly developed warning and control radar (FPS-5)[27], able to deal with both conventional airborne threats (aircraft and others) and ballistic missiles, has been introduced to be used concurrently with the improved ground radar. The same also applies in regards to JADGE as a command, control, battle management and communications system.

d. Development Status of the BMD System

By the end of FY 2007, Patriot PAC-3 missiles were deployed to four fire units of the 1st Air Missile Defense Group situated in the Tokyo area (Iruma, Narashino, Takeyama and Kasumigaura) and at the end of December 2007, the *Kongo*, an Aegis destroyer was equipped with SM-3. By way of continuing the development of the BMD system, the Ministry of Defense and SDF have the present objective of constructing a system by 2011 to link the various types of command, control, battle management and communications systems, starting with JADGE, four Aegis destroyers (with added BMD capability), 16 Patriot PAC-3 FUs[28] (fire units), four FPS-5 radars and seven FPS-3 upgraded radars (improved model).

In this fiscal year's budget, a total of approximately 93 billion yen (contract basis amount, excluding initial expenses) has been appropriated for BMD outlays for 1) enhancement and strengthening of the operational basis by developing radar and establishing a system for radar maintenance, etc., 2) continued development of intercept systems such as modifications to Aegis destroyers and acquisition of PAC-3 missiles.

(2) Future Capability Improvement

The proliferation of ballistic missile technology continues and the possibility remains that in the future, ballistic missiles possessed by various countries will be furnished with measures to avoid interception, such as the use of decoys to deceive intercepting warheads.

Furthermore, expansion of the defense coverage provided by a single system and improvement of interception probability are also required in response to conventional ballistic missiles. Thus, it is essential to improve the kinetic performance of interceptor missiles and undertake initiatives to advance the efficiency and reliability of the BMD system.

From this perspective, with regards to the state of capability improvements for Aegis destroyers and the Patriot system, from this fiscal year (after establishment of the structure provided for the schedule of the NDPG), the Mid-Term Defense Program states that necessary measures will be undertaken following consideration on the state of development in the United States. In addition, a Japan-U.S. joint development project concerning an advanced interceptor missile commenced from 2006 based on results obtained from Japan-U.S. joint technical research carried out since 1999. Moreover, efforts to improve future capabilities are being made including Japan-U.S. joint research to improve the capabilities of radar and combat command systems. (See Fig. III-1-2-3-4)

PAC-3 system and ASDF personnel

Fig. III-1-2-3 Future Measures to Avoid Intercepting Ballistic Missiles



Fig. III-1-2-4 Images of Expanding Protected Areas through Future Improvement in Capabilities of BMD Missiles (Image Diagram)



2. Improvement in Legislation and Operations

(1) Legal Measures regarding Responses to Ballistic Missiles

In response to the event that ballistic missiles or other objects[29] are launched toward Japan as armed attacks, defense operation orders for armed attack situations will be ordered and the missiles will be intercepted.

On the other hand, in the event ballistic missiles are launched towards Japan and an armed attack situation is not acknowledged, and no defense operation orders are given, the SDF may take the following measures giving adequate consideration 1) to provide a prompt and appropriate response and 2) to ensure civilian control.

a. When the Minister of Defense determines, based on pre-indications, there is a possibility that ballistic missiles or other objects will come flying toward Japan, the Minister of Defense may order SDF units to take measures to destroy the ballistic missiles upon approval of the Prime Minister[30].

b. Furthermore, in addition to the above, there may be cases where the situation changes suddenly, such as when almost no information is available concerning missile launches or when missiles are launched mistakenly or accidentally and there is no time for the Minister of Defense to obtain Prime Ministerial approval. In preparation for such events, the Minister of Defense may prepare emergency response procedures approved by the Prime Minister during peacetime. Then, in accordance with these emergency response procedures, the Minister of Defense may issue advance orders for SDF units, within a specified period of time, to destroy ballistic missiles with Aegis destroyers etc. when they actually do fly toward Japan in order to protect lives and properties in Japanese territory. (See Fig. III-1-2-5)

Fig. III-1-2-5 Flow of Response to Ballistic Missiles



(2) Concept of Ensuring Civilian Control of Military

Responses against ballistic missiles require a response not only by the SDF but also action by the government as a whole, including alerting and evacuating the people for their protection, undertaking diplomatic activities, information gathering by the departments concerned and reinforcing readiness for emergencies. Furthermore, in the event ballistic missiles are actually flying toward Japan, destruction of these missiles by using interceptor missiles is necessary. The Japanese government must assess the possibility concerning missiles flying toward Japan by comprehensively analyzing and evaluating the specific situation and international circumstances.

In view of the gravity of such incidents and the necessity of action by the Japanese government as a whole, Prime Ministerial approval (Cabinet decision) and individual orders by the Minister of Defense are required so that the Cabinet and Minister of Defense may sufficiently fulfill their responsibilities. Furthermore, the participation of the Diet is also defined with a specification in the law on ex post facto reporting to the Diet.

Moreover, the Defense Minister drafted the aforementioned emergency response procedures when Japan's initial Patriot PAC-3 was deployed in March 2007 and consequently amended the procedures when the Aegis destroyer *Kongo* was equipped with BMD capabilities[31] in December of the same year, and Prime Ministerial consent was received for both. With this approval, Japan now has its own system necessary for conducting prompt and appropriate responses, including in the event of an emergency. (See Reference 27)

The SM-3 launch (MSDF Aegis destroyer *Kongo*)

(3) Operational Efforts

a. Responses to Ballistic Missiles through Joint Operations

The destruction of incoming ballistic missiles will be conducted by a full combination of MSDF Aegis destroyers, ASDF radar, the Patriot system as well as various command, control, battle management and communications systems such as JADGE. With regards to operation of the BMD system, effective responses are being considered, for example including the role of unified operations led by the Commander of the Air Defense Command, together with preparation for various contingencies. Furthermore, the GSDF will play a leading role in dealing with damage caused by the impact of ballistic missiles.

b. Japan-U.S. Cooperation in Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

Further cooperation with U.S. forces in Japan as well as with the U.S. government is required for efficient and effective operation of the BMD system. Related measures were agreed upon at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2) meetings in October 2005, May 2006 and May 2007 which indicated the direction for Japan-U.S. security cooperation.

Also, at the Japan-U.S. defense ministers meeting in November 2007, with progress in development of the BMD system, both Japan and the U.S. agreed to advance cooperation with a focus on operational aspects. (See Part II, Chapter 2, Chapter 3)

3. Missile Defense of the United States and Japan-U.S. BMD Cooperation

(1) Missile Defense of the United States

The United States aims to develop a multi-tier missile defense system in which interception systems suited for each of the 1) boost phase, 2) mid-course phase and 3) terminal phase of the ballistic missile flight path are combined for complementary missile defense. These systems are being deployed as they become available[32]. (See Fig. III-1-2-6)

Japan and the U.S. have formed a close coordination concerning ballistic missile defense, and the missile defense capabilities of the U.S. are being deployed into our nation step by step.

To begin with, in June 2006, the USFJ deployed a transportable radar for BMD at the ASDF Shariki sub base (Aomori Prefecture) and in October 2006, Patriot PAC-3 missiles were deployed[33] at Kadena Air Base in Okinawa Prefecture. Furthermore, BMD capability equipped Aegis destroyers have been forward deployed to Japan and surrounding areas since August 2006.

The development of the U.S. missile defense capabilities into our country will serve to secure the safety of the people of Japan.

Fig. III-1-2-6 Example of U.S. Multi-Tier Defense Against Ballistic Missiles



ABL : Airborne Laser: Airborne deployed system for the interception of ballistic missiles at the boost phase
GMD : Ground-based Mid-course Defense System: An interception system for long range ballistic missiles at the mid-course phase from a fixed silo on the ground
SMD : Sea-based Mid-course Defense System: An interception system for intermediate range ballistic missiles from a sea-based Aegis-equipped destroyer
THAAD : Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System: An interception system for short- to medium-range ballistic missiles from a movable launcher at the terminal phase
MEADS : Medium Extended Air Defense System: A missile system under development by the U.S., Germany and Italy with the Patriot PAC-3 as its platform

(2) Japan-U.S. Joint Development of Improved Missiles

In 1998, the government received approval from the Security Council of Japan and decided to commence Japan-U.S. joint technical research on a sea-based upper-tier system (the current sea-based mid-course defense system) from FY 1999.

This joint technical research carries out design, prototype and necessary testing of interceptor missiles with higher capabilities than the sea-based mid-course defense system currently being deployed by Japan. So far, the design, prototypes and necessary testing of four major components[34] have been conducted.

The Japan-U.S. joint technical research has completed verification of elementary technology and acquired prospects for solving technical issues. In December 2005 the Security Council and Cabinet decided to shift to joint development and to utilize the joint technical research results as the technological foundation for development of interceptor missiles with improved capabilities. In June 2006, the Japanese and U.S. governments reached official agreement on this matter. In the budget for this fiscal year, approximately 20.2 billion yen was appropriated for the joint development of the future BMD system. (See Fig. III-1-2-7) (See Reference 26)

Fig. III-1-2-7 Outline of the Japan-U.S. Joint Development of Advanced Interceptor Missiles for BMD



(3) Relationship to the Three Principles on Arms Exports

Japan's BMD program consists of capability improvements to the Aegis destroyers and Patriot system possessed by Japan, and does not conflict with the Three Principles on Arms Exports.

On the other hand, with regard to the Japan-U.S. joint technical development, which is aimed for improved BMD capability for the future, it will be necessary to export arms concerned with BMD from Japan to the U.S., as part of development. In accordance with the Chief Cabinet Secretary's statement made in December 2004, it was determined, when the transition to joint development was decided in December 2005, that the Three Principles on Arms Exports would not apply under the condition that strict controls are maintained and a framework for the

provision that arms required to be exported to the U.S. would be developed through coordination with the U.S.

In June 2006, letters concerning the provision of arms and arms-related technology to the U.S. were exchanged which established a framework to provide arms and arms-related technology under tight controls—for example, prohibiting use for other purposes and prohibiting the transfer to third countries without Japan's agreement in advance. (See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 2)

(4) Strengthening Japan-U.S. Cooperation on BMD

Since the decision was made to introduce BMD systems to Japan, efforts have been continuously made to strengthen Japan-U.S. BMD cooperation.

As a policy for strengthening the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, the Mid-Term Defense Program states the Government of Japan will strengthen Japan-U.S. bilateral efforts to enhance ballistic missile defense capabilities and promote cooperation with the U.S. in the areas of defense policy, operations, and equipment and technology. Furthermore, the Cabinet decided to exchange letters concerning BMD cooperation between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Ambassador to Japan. Following the Cabinet decision, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on BMD cooperation was signed between the (then) Japan Defense Agency and the U.S. Department of Defense in 2004.

Furthermore, in June 2006, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Ambassador to Japan exchanged a letter concerning BMD cooperation which included cooperation on Japan-U.S. joint development.

2. Response to Attacks by Guerillas and Special Operations Forces

Since Japan is highly urbanized, relatively small-scale infiltrations and attacks can pose a serious threat to the peace and security of the country. Such attacks may take various forms including illegal actions by armed agents[35], which will be handled primarily by the police, and armed attacks such as destructive actions by guerillas and special operations forces which constitute a form of aggression on the territory of Japan.

GSDF personnel in the urban area combat training

1. Responses to Attacks by Guerillas and Special Operations Forces

(1) Basic Concept

In the event of an armed attack on Japan by guerillas or special operations forces, Japan will respond by means of defense operations. Forms of armed attacks on Japan include 1) destruction of facilities and attacks on people by irregular forces such as guerillas and 2) subversive activities, assassination of important figures and raids on operation centers by regular forces such as special operations forces.

(2) Operations to Respond to Attacks by Guerillas and Special Operations Forces

In operations to respond to attacks by guerillas or special operations forces, an intelligence gathering posture is established to detect guerillas or special operations forces at the earliest possible time to be captured or destroyed. It is important at this time to quickly gain control of the situation to minimize damage from assault.

a. Search and Discovery of Guerillas and Special Operations Forces

Efforts will be made to detect transport modes of guerillas and special operations forces, including all types of vessels and submarines, at an early stage and interdict them at sea by means including submarines and destroyers and ASDF aircraft. When the possibility of infiltration into Japanese territory by guerillas and special operations forces is suspected, GSDF patrol units will engage in warning and surveillance activities in coastal areas. In the event of an infiltration, patrol and air units will search and detect the guerillas or special operations forces. Furthermore, as required, a guarding posture will be established for the prompt deployment of guarding units to secure key facilities.

GSDF personnel in checkpoint training

b. Capture and Defeat of Guerillas and Special Operations Forces

In the event that guerillas or special operations forces are detected, combat forces will be promptly assembled in the area to besiege them, upon which they will be captured or destroyed. (See Fig. III-1-2-8)

Fig. III-1-2-8 Example of Operations for Coping with Guerillas and Special Forces



2. Response to Armed Agents

(1) Basic Concept

While the police assume primary responsibility for responding to illegal activities of armed agents, the SDF will respond in principle as shown in Fig. III-1-2-9, in accordance with situational developments.

Fig. III-1-2-9 Basic Concept for Responding to Armed Agents



(2) Amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Law to Deal with Armed Agents

In 2001, the SDF Law was amended for the purpose of rapid and effective responses to armed agents with 1) new provisions established for intelligence gathering prior to orders for public security dispatches as well as the use of weapons in such cases, and 2) amendment of provisions for the use of weapons during public security operations. (See Reference 28-29)

(3) Measures for Strengthening Cooperation with the Police

a. Establishing the Framework for Strengthening Cooperation

For the SDF to deal with armed agents it is important to cooperate with the police agency. Accordingly, in 2000, the Basic Agreement concluded in 1954 between the (then) JDA and National Public Safety Commission, to

provide cooperation procedures in case of public security operations to suppress mass violence was revised, enabling its application to illegal activities by armed agents[36]. In addition, local agreements were concluded in 2002 regarding public security operations between GSDF divisions/brigades and prefectural police forces.

Furthermore, guidelines were jointly formulated with the National Police Agency in 2004 for dealing jointly with public security dispatches in the event of armed agent concerns.

b. Joint Exercises with the Police

By July 2005, the GSDF divisions/brigades and each prefectural police force, which are parties to the local agreements, had conducted joint map maneuver exercises to strengthen mutual cooperation at the local level in preparation for dealing with armed agents. Based on the results of these table-top exercises, in October 2005, the Northern Army and Hokkaido prefectural police conducted joint field exercises for the first time. Subsequently, joint field exercises were held in FY 2007 between the 12th Brigade and the prefectural police of Tochigi and Shiga Prefectures; the 10th Brigade and the prefectural police of Aichi, Gifu and Mie; the 14th Brigade and the prefectural police of Ehime and Kochi; the 1st Division and the prefectural police of Shizuoka, Kanagawa and Yamanashi; the 13th Brigade and the prefectural police of Hiroshima, Shimane, Okayama, Yamaguchi and Tottori; the 4th Division and the prefectural police of Nagasaki, Saga and Oita; the 8th Division and the prefectural police of Kumamoto, Kagoshima and Miyazaki; and the 7th Division and Hokkaido prefectural police. These exercises served to confirm cooperation guidelines in the event of a public security operation. (See Reference 70)

Emergency transport training jointly conducted with the police

3. Response to Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Weapons

In recent years, there has been strong recognition of the danger of NBC weapon proliferation and the means for transporting such weapons, as well as related equipment and materials, to terrorists and rogue states. In the event that such weapons of mass destruction are used, it is likely there will be indiscriminate mass casualties and contamination of an extensive area. The sarin gas attack[37] on the Tokyo subway in 1995 and the incidents of mail in the United States containing anthrax[38] in 2001 are evidence of the fact that these weapons have already been used.

(1) Basic Concept

In the event of a so-called NBC terrorist attack in Japan which corresponds to an external armed attack, the SDF will conduct defense operations and take all necessary action to defend the country and rescue victims. Furthermore, in the event of an NBC terrorist attack which does not correspond to an external armed attack but against which the general police alone cannot maintain public security, the SDF will conduct public security operations to suppress the terrorists and assist victims in cooperation with related agencies. Furthermore, when the incident does not fall under the category of defense operations or public security operations, the SDF will conduct disaster relief dispatches and civilian protection dispatches to rescue victims and prevent damage from spreading; support related agencies to conduct intelligence gathering concerning the extent of the damage; decontamination activities; transport of the sick and injured; and medical activities led by the chemical protection units of the GSDF and medical units of the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF.

(2) Initiatives of the Ministry of Defense and SDF in Response to NBC Weapons

The Mid-Term Defense Program provides that the Ministry of Defense and SDF shall improve the capability for responding to NBC weapon attacks. Specifically, the GSDF, which will play a central role in various settings, has newly formed the Central NBC Weapon Defense Unit, under the Central Readiness Force able to operate nationwide. Also, there has been an increase of chemical protection unit personnel, and improvement of all types of protection equipment including chemical protection vehicles, decontamination vehicles, personnel protection equipment and chemical protection clothes. It also conducts research and development on subjects including NBC reconnaissance vehicles, portable automatic sensors for chemical agents as well as decontamination sets. Furthermore, the GSDF has designated personnel to take initial action in the event of special-type disasters in order to allow operations to begin within approximately one hour. The MSDF and ASDF have also acquired protective equipment and materials to be used on vessels and at bases. (See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 3)

(3) Response to Substances[39] Related to Nuclear and Radiation Weapons

Substances related to nuclear weapons have various effects on the health of those exposed to them, even in the event they do not directly damage the body. Thus, appropriate protection and exposure control is required taking into consideration the characteristics of such substances.

To a certain degree, internal exposure[40] from inhalation of radioactive substances can be prevented through the use of protective masks and clothing while external exposure[41] from radiation can be prevented through the use of chemical protection vehicles. For this reason, although limited, activities by chemical protection units possessing such equipment are possible. In this event, the SDF will conduct operations in cooperation with related organizations including measurement of the contamination situation and transportation of the sick and injured.

(4) Response to Biological Weapons

a. Disaster Relief Dispatches in the Event of Biological Terrorism

Biological agents have certain incubation periods so it is difficult to determine whether a disease is caused by biological agents based on the initial symptoms alone. For this reason, in the event that biological agents are dispersed secretly, anthropogenic causes may be suspected only after damage has occurred and spread. Thus, it is anticipated that detecting biological terrorism before damage is caused will be extremely difficult.

In the event of an outbreak of such damage, medical institutions will assume primary responsibility for responding to the situation and the SDF will be responsible mainly for decontamination, transportation of patients and medical activities. (See Fig. III-1-2-10)

b. Initiatives for Biological Weapons Countermeasures

The Ministry of Defense and SDF are involved in all types of initiatives, including holding seminars for dealing with biological weapons, with the objective of improving response capability through operations research.

Furthermore, in March 2008, the Nuclear Biological Chemical Countermeasure Medical Unit was newly established in order to minimize damage caused by biological weapons. The unit is directly under the command of the Minister of Defense and makes decisions on early diagnosis and treatment policy by utilizing the biological agent medical laboratory units, and quarantining and accommodating patients suspected of infection.

Fig. III-1-2-10 Image of Future Response to Biological Weapons



(5) Response to Chemical Weapons

Unlike biological agents, the outbreak of injury with chemical agents is generally fast so a rapid initial response at the time of injury is exceedingly important.

With respect to chemical agents, the chemical protection units of the GSDF are equipped to respond to chemical agents through the use of their chemical protection clothes and vehicles. The chemical protection units and medical units of the GSDF dispatched for disaster relief dispatches will detect the chemical agents using detective devices, transport and treat victims, and conduct decontamination and medical activities in contaminated areas. Even when the situation does not require SDF dispatch, as required, the SDF will lend chemical protection clothes and dispatch chemical protection unit personnel as liaison officials to the relevant agencies.

GSDF personnel conducting decontamination training

3. Response to Aggression on Japan's Offshore Islands

According to the NDPG, the geographical features of Japan are considered vulnerable from a security perspective, due to narrow lands, long coastlines and many islands. In particular, invasion of these islands can be anticipated as one form of armed attack against Japan.

Operations to Respond to Aggression on Islands

In order to respond to aggression on islands, it is important to detect signs at an early stage through activities routinely conducted by the SDF including patrols and military information gathering. Response to this aggression has many points in common with the form of operations to deal with full-scale land invasions. However, if signs of aggressions are detected in advance, operations will be conducted to prevent invasion of the enemy forces. When no signs of aggression are detected in advance and the islands in question are occupied, operations will be conducted to defeat the enemy.

In carrying out these operations, the mobile transportation and deployment of forces through joint operations is essential. The ASDF, GSDF and MSDF will cooperate to swiftly concentrate troops to prevent and destroy enemy forces.

GSDF personnel conducting island training in the U.S.

4. Warning and Surveillance of the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan and Response to Violation of Airspace and Armed Special Operations Vessels

In order for the SDF to respond swiftly to not only a full-scale invasion situation but also new threats and diverse contingencies, it is extremely important to routinely conduct warning and surveillance activities in Japan's territorial waters and airspace as well as gather and process information required for defense. For this purpose, the SDF is engaged in various activities directly linked to ensuring the peace and security of Japan.

1. Warning and Surveillance in Sea Areas Surrounding Japan

The MSDF patrols the sea areas surrounding Hokkaido, the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea about once a day, using P-3C patrol aircraft. Furthermore, warning and surveillance activities are conducted with the flexible use of destroyers and aircraft as required, such as a surveillance to a possible missile launch. Thus, a state of readiness is maintained for situations in areas surrounding Japan.

As an additional measure, GSDF coastal surveillance units and MSDF security posts conduct 24-hour warning and surveillance activities in the major sea straits.

Flight monitoring of the MSDF P-3C patrol aircraft

2. Warnings and Emergency Takeoffs (Scrambles) in Preparation against Violation of Territorial Airspace

The ASDF conducts daily 24-hour surveillance of Japan's territorial and adjacent airspace using nationwide radar, E-2C early warning aircraft and E-767 early warning and control aircraft. Furthermore, some fighters are always kept on standby for immediate takeoff (scramble). When any aircraft suspected of violating Japan's territorial airspace are detected, scrambled fighters will approach them to assess the situation and monitor the aircraft as necessary. In the event that an airspace violation does occur, an evacuation warning will be issued. In FY 2007, there were 307 scrambles by the ASDF with an increasing tendency[42].

On February 9, 2008, a Russian Air Force Tu-95 violated Japanese airspace in the vicinity of Sofugan in the southern Izu Islands and ASDF fighters were scrambled in response. (See Fig. III-1-2-11)

Fig. III-1-2-11 Number of Scrambles in the Last Decade and its Breakout



3. Response to Submarines Submerged in Japan's Territorial Waters[43]

(1) Basic Concept

With respect to foreign national submarines navigating underwater in Japan's territorial waters, an order for maritime security operations[44] will be issued according to the Cabinet decision[45] of 1996, and the SDF will request the submarine to navigate on the surface of the water and show its flag. In the event that a submarine does not comply with the request, it will be requested by the SDF to leave territorial waters.

(2) Measures in Relation to the Submerged Chinese Nuclear Submarine Operating in Japan's Territorial Waters

In November 2004, a Chinese submarine navigating underwater in Japan's territorial waters surrounding the Sakishima Islands was discovered. In response to this, an order for maritime security operations was issued according to procedures determined by Article 82 of the SDF Law and the Cabinet decision of 1996 to deal with the situation. However, it took a considerable amount of time for the Japanese government to issue an order for maritime security operations after receiving

ASDF personnel boarding the F-15 fighter for an emergency takeoff

information on the submarine entering territorial waters. Therefore, based on the lessons learned from this event, the government established the following response plan.

a. Response Plan

(a) With respect to submarines submerged in territorial waters, as a general rule, measures will be executed according to maritime security operations including requests to appear on the surface and requests to leave territorial waters.

(b) When an incident occurs, the Minister of Defense shall promptly issue an order for maritime security operations following the required procedures.

❍ For this purpose, when information is obtained on submarines approaching the territorial waters of Japan, it will be shared within the government in the early stages.

❍ In the event a submarine does enter the territorial waters of Japan, unless there is any particular reason, an order for maritime security operations shall be issued immediately.

(c) Even after the submarine leaves the territorial waters of Japan, maritime security operations shall be continued for actions such as ascertaining the possibility of reentry and identifying the nationality of the submarine.

(d) Contact shall be made with concerned nations while necessary measures are undertaken.

(e) While taking security aspects into account, the status of the submarine navigating underwater in territorial waters and actions taken by the government shall be explained to the public in an appropriate and timely manner, including the announcement of issuing an order for maritime security operations.

(f) Necessary manuals (response procedures) will be shared by relevant ministries and agencies to ensure implementation of the plan above.

b. Enhancement and Improvement of Equipment for Responding to Submarines Navigating Underwater in Territorial Waters

The MSDF is enhancing and improving capabilities for detecting, identifying and tracking foreign submarines navigating underwater in the territorial waters of Japan, as well as making Japanese government intentions clear to submarines. It is also maintaining and improving capabilities for responding to submarines in shallow water areas.

4. Response to Armed Special Operations Vessels

(1) Basic Concept

The Japan Coast Guard, as a police organization, is primarily responsible for responding to unidentified vessels. However, in the event that it is deemed extremely difficult or impossible for the Japan Coast Guard to respond to a situation, an order for maritime security operations will be issued in a timely manner and the SDF will respond in cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard.

Taking into consideration lessons learned and reflecting on the unidentified vessel incident off the Noto Peninsula in 1999[46] and the unidentified vessel incident in southwest Kyushu in 2001[47], the government has taken all necessary precautionary measures in order for effective and safe measures to be taken against unidentified vessels, while the Ministry of Defense and SDF have strengthened cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies.

(2) Amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Law to Respond to Unidentified Vessels

The Self-Defense Forces Law was amended in 2001 to add provisions concerning the use of weapons in maritime security operations following a review including legislative aspect, which focused on the state of weapon usage authorization to stop unidentified vessels. (See Reference 28)

(3) Enhancement of Equipment for Responding to Unidentified Vessels

The MSDF took the following steps: 1) improved the speed of the new-type missile boats[48]; 2) established a "special patrol unit"[49]; 3) equipped destroyers with machine guns; 4) furnished forcible maritime interdiction equipment (flat-nose shells)[50]; and 5) improved the sufficiency ratio of essential military vessel personnel.

(4) Measures for Strengthening Cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard

a. Development of a Framework for Strengthening Cooperation

In 1999, the (then) Defense Agency and the Japan Coast Guard jointly developed the Manual on Joint Strategies concerning Unidentified Vessels which made stipulations concerning information liaison systems, initial response outlines and division of roles (joint response guidelines) before and after the announcement of maritime security operations in the event an unidentified vessel is discovered.

b. Joint Exercises with the Japan Coast Guard

The Ministry of Defense and the Japan Coast Guard conduct periodic mutual training, information exchanges and joint exercises. Also, cooperation is strengthened through joint exercises between the MSDF and the Japan Coast Guard, based on the manual, in relation to pursuit and capture guidelines for unidentified vessels and communication between the MSDF and the Japan Coast Guard.

A joint training exercise was conducted on March 12, 2007, on the open sea off Sasebo. (See Chapter 4, Section 1)

5. Response to Large-Scale and Unconventional Disasters

The SDF conducts a variety of disaster relief activities when such disasters occur including search and rescue for disaster victims and ships or aircraft in distress, flood control, medical treatment, prevention of epidemics, water supply and transportation of personnel and goods. Recently, the SDF has played a major role in responding not only to natural disasters but also to various other disasters.

Rescue operations by GSDF personnel for victims of the flood caused by heavy rain in Misato-cho, Kumamoto

1. Mechanism of Disaster Relief Dispatches

(1) Types of Disaster Relief Dispatches

a. Dispatches upon Request (General Form of Disaster Relief Dispatch)

In principle, the SDF dispatches units for disaster relief upon the request of prefectural governors and other officials in accordance with Article 83 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. This is because prefectural governors and other officials assume primary responsibility for disaster control measures and are in a position to grasp the overall condition of the disaster. Therefore, it is considered most appropriate for dispatches to be made upon their request. Furthermore, in the event that a disaster has occurred or anticipated to occur in the near future, and it is

deemed necessary to take emergency measures, municipal mayors may ask governors to request a disaster relief dispatch by the SDF according to Article 68-2 of the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act; Countermeasures Headquarters (the Prime Minister). Furthermore, in the event that mayors are unable to make such a request to the prefectural governor, they can inform disaster conditions to the Minister of Defense, or those designated by the Minister. After receiving such requests from governors, the Minister of Defense can immediately dispatch units as necessary.

In exceptional circumstances when the situation is particularly urgent and a request must be made immediately, the Minister of Defense or those designated by the Minister may authorize a discretionary dispatch. In order to render discretionary dispatches even more effective, the (then) Defense Agency Disaster Prevention Plan[51] was amended in 1995 to establish the basis[52] for SDF unit commanders and other officials to order discretionary dispatches.

b. Earthquake Disaster Prevention Dispatch

When an alert is issued based on the Law Concerning Special Measures for Large-Scale Earthquakes Countermeasures[53], the Minister of Defense is authorized to order an earthquake disaster prevention dispatch based on the request of the Director of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters (the Prime Minister), even prior to the occurrence of an earthquake.

Fig. III-1-2-12 Flow of Events from the Point of Request to Dispatch and Withdrawal



Notes: 1. SDF ready reserve personnel and SDF reserve personnel will be summoned by urgency.
2. Units are all withdrawn together.
3. Disbandment of SDF ready reserve personnel and SDF reserve personnel.

c. Nuclear Disaster Dispatch

When a nuclear emergency alert is issued based on the Special Law on Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures, the Minister of Defense is authorized to order a nuclear disaster dispatch upon request of the Director of the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters (the Prime Minister).

(2) Flow of the Request for the Withdrawal of a Disaster Dispatch

The flow of SDF disaster relief operations is shown in Fig. III-1-2-12.

(3) Authority of SDF Officers in Disaster Relief Dispatches

Under the Self-Defense Forces Law and other legislation, officers of units requested for disaster relief dispatches, earthquake disaster prevention dispatches or nuclear disaster dispatches have the authority established in Fig. III-1-2-13 in order to efficiently conduct disaster relief activities.

Fig. III-1-2-13 Authority of Self-Defense Forces Officers in Disaster Relief Dispatches

1. In cases in which no police officers are present, SDF officers may issue necessary warnings to people in the vicinity, and in extremely imminent situations, may by themselves, or ask people concerned to take measures that are deemed generally necessary to hold or to evacuate people who may be in danger at the site in order to avoid harm.

2. In cases in which no police officers are present, SDF officers may trespass into private land or buildings, if they deem it reasonably necessary under the circumstances, in order to protect people's lives, bodies, or property from harm, prevent greater damage and to rescue victims.

3. In cases in which no police officers are present, SDF officers may remove unattended vehicles from streets in order to secure passage of emergency SDF vehicles in areas to which access of vehicles other than emergency vehicles are prohibited or limited (excluding earthquake disaster prevention dispatches).

4. In cases in which neither the mayor of the city, town or village involved, nor police officers nor Japan Coast Guard officials authorized under the mayor's proxy are on the scene, SDF officers may take the following additional actions (excluding earthquake disaster prevention dispatches):
   (1) Set up warning zones where there is a high risk of building collapses, landslides, or such occurrences, and issuing orders to restrict or prohibit entry to evacuate people.
   (2) Use land and buildings to secure bases for relief operations and communication relay stations required for airlifting emergency patients.
   (3) Move or clear away buildings or other structures obstructing efforts in cases such as rescuing people trapped in collapsing houses.
   (4) Recruiting residents or people present to engage in lifesaving rescue efforts, flood prevention and other activities, when there are insufficient SDF personnel on the scene.
   (See Article 94, 94-3, and 94-4 of the Self-Defense Forces Law as well as the Basic Law for Disaster Countermeasures.)

2. Initial Operations Posture and Implementation Status of Disaster Relief Dispatches

(1) Initial Response to the Disaster

Based on lessons learned from the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake disaster, the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF have designated units able to provide an initial response to ensure disaster relief operations are conducted promptly. As of May 2008, the GSDF has designated approximately 2,700 personnel, 410 vehicles and 30 helicopters nationwide to be able to respond immediately to disaster relief operations. The MSDF has vessels designated for emergency dispatch at each base in addition to aircraft on standby alert and the ASDF is prepared with aircraft on standby alert.

Furthermore, in the event that information is received of the occurrence of a strong earthquake greater than level-5 on the Japanese seismic scale, the SDF will independently dispatch aircraft to gather site information and is in the position to transmit this information to the Prime Minister's Office. Furthermore, depending on the circumstances, liaison officers will be dispatched to the concerned local public authorities for information gathering purposes.

Life-saving activities can also be conducted employing various ASDF, GSDF and MSDF equipment. In October 2006, the ASDF established a new aeromedical evacuation squadron in the process of developing a system

for promptly transporting patients in critical condition to distant locations in order to provide adequate treatment in the event of a large-scale disaster.

(2) Implementation Status of Disaster Dispatches

a. Transportation of Emergency Patients

The SDF has traditionally used its aircraft to transport emergency patients from isolated islands and remote areas with insufficient medical facilities. In FY 2007, out of a total of 679 cases of disaster relief operations, 467 cases were for transporting emergency patients with the large number of 435 cases being dispatches to such isolated islands as Nansei Islands (Okinawa and Kagoshima Prefectures) and the Goto Islands (Nagasaki Prefecture).

The breakdown of these cases indicates that elderly emergency patients were the most common, while there were also cases of emergency transportation related to childbirth and accidents. Furthermore, in the event that aircraft of other organizations are unable to respond, due to reasons including a short endurance distance, emergency patient transport will be provided to vessels navigating areas of ocean far from the mainland.

b. Firefighting Support

In FY 2007, there were 120 dispatches of firefighting support, the second largest number of dispatches after transportation of emergency patients.

Within this category, dispatches for neighborhood firefighting were the highest in number, with 108 cases in FY 2007. The SDF units deployed throughout the country are actively involved in neighborhood firefighting in order to contribute to maintaining the security of local residents' lives.

Furthermore, upon the request of prefectural governors for disaster relief dispatches, the SDF also conducted aerial firefighting activities in locations where firefighting conditions were difficult, such as Japan's offshore islands and mountain areas. (See Fig. III-1-2-14-15)

GSDF UH-1 helicopter conducting firefighting activities for forest fire

Fig. III-1-2-14 Record of Disaster Relief Dispatches (Past Five Years)



Fig. III-1-2-15 Record of Disaster Relief Dispatches (FY 2007)

	Description	Number of dispatches	Personnel	Vehicles	Aircraft	Vessels
Record of FY 2007	Responses to storm, flood and earthquake disasters	9	94,807	35,801	1,233	94
	Transporting emergency patients	467	2,347	6	508	1
	Search and rescue	40	3,378	461	65	6
	Assisting firefighting	120	3,225	431	124	-
	Other	43	1,623	281	42	16
	Total	679	105,380	36,980	1,972	117

c. Response to Natural Disasters

On July 16, 2007, the Chuetsu Offshore Earthquake (magnitude 6.8) ("Heisei 19 (2007) Chuetsu Offshore Earthquake") struck in the Niigata region resulting in damage which included a fire of an electric transformer at Unit 3 of the Kashiwazakikariwa Nuclear Power Station, collapsed buildings, landslides and water outages. The GSDF 12th Brigade accepted the Niigata prefectural governor's request issued on July 16, 2007 and in the period until August 29, 2007 carried out activities such as lifesaving, nursing casualties, water and food supply and bathing support. As of July 13, 2008, the scale of the dispatch was approximately 92,400 personnel, approximately 35,100 vehicles, 94 vessels and 1,184 aircraft.

Furthermore, the (then) Tokyo Defense Facilities Administration Agency provided technical support to U.S. forces in installing air conditioners gifted by the U.S. government to the area struck by the disaster.

On June 14, 2008, an earthquake occurred with the hypo center in the southern inland region of Iwate Prefecture, causing soil avalanche, blocked river channels, and water outage (estimated magnitude of 7.2) ("2008 Iwate Earthquake"). During the same day, the JGSDF 9th Artillery Regiment commander received a request from the Iwate prefectural governor, the JGSDF 6th division commander received a request from the Miyagi prefectural governor, and conducted the following activities: search for missing people, rescue of isolated people by helicopter, water supply, food service, bathing support, and others. As of July 13, 2008, the total numbers of personnel, vehicles and aircraft are approximately 23,990, 7,150 and 542, respectively.

GSDF water supply vehicle receiving water supply from MSDF destroyer during the 2007 Niigata Prefecture Chuetsu Earthquake

GSDF personnel and residents conducting food service during the 2007 Niigata Prefecture Chuetsu Earthquake

ASDF personnel and firefighters airlifting victims of the 2007 Niigata Prefecture Chuetsu Earthquake using the ASDF V-107 Rescue Helicopter

MSDF vessels providing bathing support during the 2007 Niigata Prefecture Chuetsu Earthquake

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of SDF Personnel Working at the Joint Staff

Lieutenant Commander Hiroki Matsuoka
Operational Section, Joint Staff

The Niigata Chuetsu Offshore Earthquake broke out on July 16, 2007, two weeks after I was posted to the disaster dispatch team of the Joint Staff. I was at home on that day, for it fell on a national holiday (Marine Day), but my long duty began when my daughter, looking at a TV subtitle, said to me, "Daddy, they say there was a big earthquake."



Lieutenant Commander Matsuoka on duty (right)

Immediately after the disaster, SDF units voluntarily dispatched members to the affected areas. The Joint Staff was tasked with the coordination of these activities as an efficient set of the SDF's disaster dispatch operations. To this end, the Joint Staff urgently summoned the required personnel and strengthened its operational capabilities. I, too, rushed to the office and began work at the Joint Staff Operations Room. Amongst the exchanges of loud voices, each member of the Staff pursued duties which transcended the boundaries of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces. Our operations proceeded to grasp the state of the disaster on the ground and the outline of the troops' activities, as well as to coordinate each unit of the SDF troops in response to the needs of the affected areas, to ensure cooperation with other ministries and to report to the Minister of Defense and the Prime Minister's Office.

Various units of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces were dispatched during these disaster relief activities. Although I was an MSDF official, I was naturally required to seek cooperation with other forces. Only two weeks after being posted to the Joint Staff, I was unable to immediately identify the names of troops other than those of the MSDF, their locations and names of their equipment. In addition there were abbreviations I had never heard of, such as "kin-san team" (kinkyu-sanshu team: emergent assembly team), "kuronoro" (chronology: outline of the development) and "conference" (conference communication system of the Air Self-Defense Force). Before coordinating troops, I exhausted a huge amount of energy to

understand these terms. This hardship, however, paved a firm road ahead for fulfilling my future duties.

During the disaster relief dispatches, the three Self-Defense Forces joined hands to respond to the situations, which allowed more than 4,000 SDF personnel to be working on site by the fifth day after the outbreak of the quake, responding to the needs of the local municipalities. I am convinced that the joint operations enabled the effective and swift deployment of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Force capacities. Therefore, it is my desire to continue the cross-border coordination of the three forces to better respond to the needs of our people.

3. Efforts Made in Peacetime in Preparation for Disaster Relief

(1) Cooperation with Local Governments

It is important for the SDF to strengthen cooperation with local governments in peacetime in order to conduct disaster relief operations promptly and precisely. Examples which can be given include enhancing information liaison systems, integration of the respective disaster control plans and proactive participation in the disaster prevention practices of local governments.

Further, the post of Liaison and Coordination Officer for Citizen Protection and Disaster Relief Operation Countermeasures was created at the SDF Regional Cooperation Headquarters to work at ensuring cooperation with local governments in peacetime. (See Chapter 4, Section 1)

It is important to strengthen cooperation with local governments to enable human cooperation which utilizes SDF experience and knowledge in disaster prevention operations. As such, upon the request of local governments, the SDF recommends retired SDF personnel to share their experience and knowledge in this field. As of March 31, 2008, the number of SDF personnel working at sections of local governments related to disaster prevention is 139 people in 44 prefectures and 77 municipalities across the country. In addition, current SDF personnel temporarily serve as staff in the Disaster Prevention Bureau of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. Additionally, in April 2008 a mutual exchange of administrative officials was conducted from the Central GSDF Headquarters to Hyogo Prefecture's Disaster Prevention Planning Office, and from Hyogo Prefecture to the Central GSDF Headquarters Regional Communication Coordination Division. (See Reference 32)

While collaboration with the SDF at the time of a disaster is described in regional disaster prevention plans prepared by prefectural governments, the following actions to be taken by local governments are important for the Ministry of Defense and SDF to conduct disaster relief activities more effectively.

a. Securing Assembly Areas[54] and Heliports[55]

Disaster relief operations units require an assembly area at the site as a base for activities to secure a command post, lodging, parking and to accumulate necessary materials. Furthermore, due to the fact that activities using vehicles may be restricted at the time of a disaster, it is necessary to establish heliports at and nearby the disaster site to enable transportation of emergency patients, transportation of materials and firefighting using helicopters. At this time, in order to ensure smooth take-off and arrival of helicopters, it is necessary to clearly designate evacuation centers and heliports as well as making these locations commonly known to the public in peacetime. In addition, as a project to subsidize welfare facilities[56], parks have been improved in case they are deemed necessary to facilitate evacuation and firefighting activities. For example, in the Regional Plan for Disaster Prevention for Joetsu City in Niigata Prefecture, parks which are scheduled to be improved are planned to be used as emergency heliports and assembly points for disaster relief units at the time of a disaster.

b. Marking Building Numbers

In order for aircraft to efficiently gather information and transport people and materials, it is useful to mark numbers on the rooftops of facilities to identify buildings important for disaster prevention, such as prefectural

offices and schools, so that buildings can be easily confirmed from the air, enabling faster disaster relief operations by aircraft.

c. Securing Facilities for Coordination and Communication

It is also essential for facilities to be established within prefectures for liaison and coordination with the SDF[57]. Further, it is important to develop a disaster prevention map for common use by all disaster prevention organizations which indicate the location of evacuation areas and heliports, etc. Furthermore, it is necessary to make coordination on a daily basis to secure water sources such as reservoirs, while maintaining firefighting equipment for aerial firefighting by helicopter.

(2) Development of a Response Manual for Various Disasters

In order to respond more promptly and appropriately to disasters which occur in various forms, it is valid to clarify basic responses in advance and consolidate the recognition of parties concerned. For this purpose, in November 2000, the (then) Defense Agency and SDF developed a response manual[58] for various types of disasters which compiled issues to be noted for each type of disaster. Copies of this manual were distributed to relevant organizations and local public bodies.

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of SDF Personnel who Participated in Relief Efforts for the Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake (GSDF)

Sergeant Hiroyuki Fujita
2nd Infantry Regiment, GSDF

On July 16, 2007, the advance platoon rushed to a site in Kashiwazaki city, Niigata Prefecture, to assist in the rescue of an 84-year-old woman who had been trapped in a collapsed house in the area. When we arrived, we saw a completely demolished warehouse: three-stories, with a tiled roof, built right next to a family house. We cut a hole with a chain saw designed to be used as lifesaving equipment and other tools to clear a path out of the rubble. However, there was no response to our calls and 30 minutes had passed since the operation started. When our hopes of finding any signs of life began to fade, we heard someone yell, “A voice!” The atmosphere of the site completely changed and we confirmed the exact position. Rescuers reached the trapped woman and shouted words of encouragement: “You can do it!” They gave her an oxygen mask and used a hydraulic lifter to remove a slab lying on her chest. At 15:30, we managed to rescue her safely. What was even more touching was the sight of her family, weeping with relief and happiness, as she was carried away on a stretcher. I fully realized the importance of human lives.

(3) Response to Nuclear Disasters

The Special Law on Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures was enacted based on lessons learned from the critical accident which occurred at the uranium processing plant in Tokaimura, Ibaraki Prefecture in 1999. In accordance with this, the Self-Defense Forces Law was partially revised[59].

Following the critical nuclear accident at Tokaimura, the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF have provided transport support, assistance for evacuating residents and monitoring of airborne and seaborne radiation levels in comprehensive nuclear disaster prevention exercises conducted primarily by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry since 2000. This serves to improve effectiveness including a review of cooperation guidelines between government agencies and local bodies at the time of a nuclear disaster.

Further, the Mid-Term Defense Program states that in addition to nuclear disasters, capabilities for responding to NBC will be strengthened in order to deal with other special disasters[60].

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of SDF Personnel who Participated in Relief Efforts for the Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake (MSDF)

Chief Petty Officer, Katsuo Kaneko
Destroyer *Mineyuki*, MSDF

The Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake occurred on July 16, 2007, when the destroyer *Mineyuki* was at Kanazawa Port for public tours of the vessel as part of public relations activities. We immediately set out for Kashiwazaki, the affected area, together with our consort vessels. Immediately after our arrival in the early morning of July 17, we began our supports for food and water supply and bathing service. All our crew members worked as one, with ingenuity to conduct the disaster relief activities, such as constructing temporary bathing facilities with lifesaving rafts. Under the sweltering midsummer heat, we quickly responded to the needs on the sites and made efforts to ensure a more sanitary environment for devastated Kashiwazaki residents and to reduce their mental stress. I had hardship, but got energy from the delighted faces of the residents which at the same time made us feel pride and a sense of mission. I truly believe that the delight of the citizens was the very source of energy for all team members.

Temporary bathing facilities constructed with lifesaving rafts

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of SDF Personnel who Participated in Relief Efforts for the Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake (ASDF)

Major Naoki Nishimura
Air Rescue Wing Flight Group Niigata Rescue Team, ASDF

On July 16, 2007, a holiday of Marine Day, I was relaxing at home, when strong tremors shook the ground. I knew immediately that the quake was large. As a TV bulletin reported that a quake measuring 6-plus had hit my local area of Niigata, I rushed to my base.

Major Nishimura in the cockpit of UH-60J

There I received an order to gather information such as the extent of damage from the sky. I operated a search and rescue helicopter (UH-60J) to the affected area from Niigata Airport. Near Kashiwazaki City, I confirmed areas with serious damage, roads and railways blocked by mudslides, and collapsed houses. In addition to rescue activities for the affected people, the Niigata Rescue Team also maintained its readiness for the potential for a massive aftershock.

When the Governor of Niigata visited the affected sites, I was ordered to provide air transportation for him, since no conventional means of transport were available due to bad weather. I managed to complete the airlift mission amidst heavy rain, and thick low-hanging clouds, which hampered a route over land and forced us to fly along the coast in order to stay clear of the rain clouds.

Natural disasters are virtually impossible to predict. Therefore, it is crucial for rescue teams to maintain readiness and mobility to swiftly respond to any given situation. I was convinced that these factors are key to minimize the damage and provide prompt assistance to the affected people.

Through my experiences in the aftermath of the quake, I was able to renew my recognition of the noble mission to “protect our people” and was filled with a sense of fulfillment on account of the significant responsibilities associated with the mission. Going forward, I am determined to continue to develop myself on a daily basis.

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Letters of Appreciation from Local People for Disaster Relief Efforts



MON CHOUCHOU

自衛隊のみなさんへ

暑い中 いつも 私達のために 炊き出しや お風呂の開設など、ありがとうございます。
今 お水や ガスは 通っていない中での保育をしている状態ですが 子ども達は 少しずつ 笑顔をとり戻し、毎日 元気に 遊んだり 活動したりできるように なりました。 その中で、子ども達の口から 自衛隊の みなさんのことが 毎日 話題になっています。『ボク 大きくなったら 自衛隊の人になる!!』と 言っている子も いるんですよ♡
子ども達から 感謝の気持ちを込めて 絵と メッセージを 贈らせて頂きたいと思います。
お忙しいと思いますが、見て頂けたら 嬉しいです。
これからも 復旧に向けて 私達も がんばっていきたいと思いますので 困ったことが ありましたら また よろしく お願いします。

2007 7 31
相馬市 はらまち保育園一同より



じえたいの人へありがとうの手紙
ぼくは、毎日、毎日なごみそうの前のおふろにはいりにいっています。
毎日のおふろはきもちいいです。
おんせんに色いろなこなを入れてくれるのでうれしいです。おんせんも、あったかくてきもちがいいです。
また、かんわざきに来てください
相又健太より

おんせんの絵です。

2007 7 31

Children of Haramachi Nursery School

GSDF personnel providing bathing support

6. Response to Other Events

1. Improvement in Guard Postures for SDF Facilities

While police agencies have primary responsibility in dealing with incidents of terrorism, the Self-Defense Forces Law was amended to allow SDF units to be called upon to guard facilities and areas of the SDF and USFJ, and to use weapons as necessary in regular guarding assignments of SDF facilities in order to ensure readiness for large-scale terrorist attacks such as those which occurred on September 11, 2001.

(1) Operations for Guarding SDF Facilities (Guarding Operations)

When there is a danger of a large-scale terrorist attack on facilities and areas of the SDF and USFJ within Japan and in the event it is deemed particularly necessary to prevent damage, the Prime Minister may order SDF units to conduct operations to guard facilities and areas. Part of the authority given to police officials under the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials are applied correspondingly to SDF personnel dispatched for guarding operations[61]. Further, the amended Self-Defense Forces Law provides that SDF personnel have authority to use weapons beyond the limitations of Article 7 of this law. (See Fig. III-1-2-16)

GSDF personnel conducting guarding operation training at USFJ facilities

The Ministry of Defense and SDF exchange opinions concerning guarding operations with the police and Japan Coast Guard in order to ensure the effectiveness of such operations which are new duties for the SDF. In addition, exercises for guarding operations have been conducted at USFJ facilities and areas throughout Japan since 2003.

(2) Use of Weapons to Guard SDF Facilities in Normal Circumstances

The authority for use of weapons in the course of guarding SDF faclities[62] within Japan has been stipulated[63].

Fig. III-1-2-16 Outline of Guarding Operations

Situation	Requirements for actions	Primary Powers
In cases where special measures are approved for preventing damage due to danger of destructive actions being carried out at the facilities of SDF and U.S. Forces in Japan	1) Authorized to order Prime Minister 2) Procedure The Prime Minister determines the facilities to be guarded as well as the duration after listening to the opinions of prefectural governors and having the Minister of Defense confer with the National Public Safety Commission 3) Withdrawal The Prime Minister must order the withdrawal of units without delay when it has been confirmed that operations of the units are no longer necessary, even when it is still within the designated period	1) Powers granted under the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials, mutatis mutandis, in questioning, *evacuation, *ingress, *the prevention and control of crimes, and the use of weapons 2) In addition to the above-mentioned use of weapons, the use of weapons is permitted in the event a facility being guarded in line with the SDF's duty suffering large-scale destruction or the danger of infringement where there exists no other appropriate means to overcome it except with the use of weapons, within the scope of necessity reasonably judged from the situation. Consequently, even when a person is injured, even when it results in harm to people, the actions would be legally regarded as a lawful act

* Limited to cases where no police officers are present

2. Maintaining Posture to Transport Japanese Nationals Overseas

(1) Amendment of Self-Defense Forces Law

In addition to the currently utilized government aircraft and ASDF transport aircraft, in 1999, SDF ships and the helicopters onboard were added as a means of transport for transporting Japanese nationals overseas in the event of disasters, riots or other states of emergency in foreign countries. Further, SDF personnel became authorized to use the minimum necessary weapons in order to protect the lives and bodies of themselves and Japanese nationals and thus transportation conditions were reinforced. Furthermore, the transportation of Japanese nationals overseas became a primary SDF mission in January 2007 with stipulation in Article 84-3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. (See Part II, Chapter 1, Section 4)

(2) Postures of the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF

In order to transfer Japanese nationals overseas from diplomatic establishments and transport them safely to local airports and harbors, the GSDF designates dispatch personnel for helicopter guidance units[64], the MSDF designates transport ships and air units, and the ASDF designates airlift units and personnel for the dispatch, in order to maintain posture for readiness.

Furthermore, missions to transport Japanese nationals overseas are conducted in close cooperation between the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF therefore integrated coordination is required. To meet this need, capability has been improved to fulfill such missions through joint exercises using transport aircraft and ships.

(3) Achievements in Transporting Japanese Nationals Overseas

On April 15, 2004, 10 Japanese journalists on assignment in Samawah, Iraq, to report on activities of the GSDF dispatched under the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq were transported from Talil Airport in Iraq to Mubarak Air Force Base in Kuwait by ASDF transport aircraft (C-130H). This was the first transport of Japanese nationals overseas based on Article 84-3 (then Article 100-8) of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

MSDF personnel conducting training to transport Japanese nationals overseas

3. Response to Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

In the event of situations in areas surrounding Japan, the Ministry of Defense and SDF will provide materials and services as rear area support and conduct rear area search and rescue activities or ship inspection activities as stipulated in the Law to Ensure Security for Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and the Ship Inspections Operations Law.

Furthermore, rear area support was entrenched as a primary mission of the SDF as stipulated in Article 84-4 of the Self-Defense Forces Law in January 2007. (See Part II, Chapter 1, Section 4)

4. Military Intelligence Gathering

In order for effective operation of defense capabilities to initially deal with new threats and diverse situations, it is further required to detect signs of various situations in advance and gather, analyze and share information promptly and appropriately with the objective of responding sufficiently to such situations. From the perspective

of Japanese national security, broader scope and comprehensive intelligence capability are essential.

For this reason, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF comprehensively analyze and assess a variety of information and have diversified the means of gathering intelligence. Specific intelligence gathering activities include: 1) collecting, processing and analyzing radio waves in relation to military communications and radio waves emitted from electronic weapons bound for Japan from overseas; 2) collecting and analyzing high-resolution commercial satellite imagery data; 3) warning and surveillance of ships and aircraft; 4) collecting and organizing a variety of published information; 5) information exchanges with defense authorities of other nations; and 6) intelligence activities[65] such as those conducted by defense attachés and other officials[66].

In order to enhance the capability of gathering a variety of intelligence and comprehensively analyzing and assessing information based on the security environment and technical trends, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF will improve human resource cultivation, equipment, and devices for intelligence gathering as well as enhance the organization of intelligence units which support such capability, starting with the Defense Intelligence Headquarters.

Further, the Principles for Strengthening Intelligence Functions (of the Prime Minister's Office) was adopted at an Intelligence Capability Enhancement Review Committee of the Prime Minister's Office in February 2008. In order to strengthen the Prime Minister's Office control tower function in relation to national security, given the recognition of the extreme importance of strengthening intelligence functions in the Prime Minister's Office, the Ministry of Defense will cooperate to implement these policy measures such as linking with indicated policy areas, intelligence gathering, summary and analysis, and information conservation. Moreover, it will continue to provide timely and relevant information to the Prime Minister's Office which is essential for national security.

Section 3. Preparation against Full-Scale Aggression

In the region surrounding Japan, even today, unpredictable and uncertain factors remain. Considering the devastating loss of lives and property of the people that armed aggression could cause, readiness for full-scale invasions is essential.

In the event of full-scale aggression against Japan, the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF will respond promptly and effectively by means of a joint operational structure to act in a coordinated and integrated manner. Operations to be employed in response to full-scale aggression are classified as follows according to function: 1) operations for air defense, 2) operations for guarding the waters surrounding Japan, 3) operations for guarding the territories of Japan, and 4) operations for securing the safety of maritime traffic. In implementing these operations, U.S. forces will support operations employed by the SDF and conduct operations to supplement the capabilities of the SDF, including operations which employ strike capabilities in accordance with the "Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation."

This section explains the outline of typical operations which may be conducted by the SDF to defend the nation in the event that full-scale aggression occurs. (See Chapter 2, Section 3)

1. Air Defense Operations

In the event of an armed attack on Japan, such attacks are likely to begin with surprise air attacks using aircraft and missiles, which may be repeated because of Japan's geographical characteristics of being surrounded by waters and because of modern warfare trends[67].

ASDF F-15 fighter in-flight

Air defense operations are characterized by the invading party having the advantage in choosing the time, location and mode of attack and by adequacy of the initial response having a significant effect on the overall operation. Therefore, it is necessary to maintain a prompt response posture in peacetime, continuously collect relevant information, and exhibit combat strength promptly and comprehensively from the initial stage of operations.

Operations for air defense can be divided into overall operations led by the ASDF, and local air defense operations conducted by the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF to defend their respective bases and units.

In terms of overall air defense, efforts will be made promptly in response to enemy air strikes to intercept enemy aircraft as far from Japanese territory as possible to prevent the enemy from acquiring air superiority[68], to prevent damage to the Japanese people and territory, to inflict heavy damage on the enemy and to deter serial air assaults. (See Fig. III-1-3-1)

Fig. III-1-3-1 Example of Air Defense Operations



Notes: 1. Aircraft with alternative control capabilities for defense ground environments, with early warning and control functions in distant sea from national land.
2. Keeping armed fighters on stand-by in order to immediately respond to approaches by enemy aircraft.

(1) Detecting Intruding Enemy Aircraft

The entire airspace surrounding Japan is under constant surveillance by means of air warning and control unit radar and early warning and control aircraft so as to detect intruding enemy aircraft as early as possible.

(2) Identifying the Detected Aircraft

Detected aircraft are identified as enemy or friend according to the Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE)[69] system.

(3) Interception and Destruction of the Enemy's Aircraft

In the event an aircraft is judged to be an enemy aircraft, the air warning and control unit organization assigns destruction targets to aircraft standing-by on the ground or in the air, as well as to surface-to-air guided missile units of the GSDF or ASDF. The enemy aircraft is then destroyed by guided and controlled fighter aircraft or surface-to-air guided missiles.

2. Operations for the Defense of Surrounding Sea Areas

Armed attacks on Japan can be made by vessels as well as by aircraft due to the island geography of Japan.

Operations for defending sea areas surrounding Japan will be led by the MSDF in cooperation with the GSDF and the ASDF to execute various combined strategies including anti-surface ships, anti-submarines and air defense warfare (local) operations. The cumulative result of these operations provides protection to surrounding sea areas by obstructing enemy advances and exhausting the enemy's military strength. (See Fig. III-1-3-2)

Fig. III-1-3-2 Strategy for Defense in Sea Areas Surrounding Japan



(1) Defense on the Sea

The MSDF patrols[70] vast sea areas using patrol aircraft and patrols navigation sea areas with destroyers. In the event that an enemy surface ship or submarine attempting to attack Japanese ships is detected, it will be destroyed by using MSDF destroyers, submarines and patrol aircraft (anti-surface ship and anti-submarine operations). Additional support will be provided by fighters and others as the situation requires.

(2) Defense in Coastal Areas

The MSDF patrols the vicinity of major ports and harbors using destroyers, patrol aircraft and minesweepers for the early detection of enemy offensives and to ensure the safety of ships and coastal areas.

In the event of an attack by enemy surface ships and submarines, these will be destroyed by using MSDF destroyers, submarines and patrol aircraft (anti-surface ship and anti-submarine operations). In this case, depending on the situation, support will be provided by fighter aircraft and GSDF surface-to-ship guided missile units. Further, the MSDF will remove mines laid by the enemy using minesweepers (anti-mine operations).

(3) Defense in Main Straits

As the situation requires, mines will be laid in main sea areas using minesweeping mother ships, submarines, and aircraft of the MSDF and ASDF (mine-laying operations). In the event that enemy surface ships or submarines attempt to pass the sea areas, they will be destroyed by using MSDF destroyers, submarines and patrol aircraft (anti-surface ship and anti-submarine operations).

MSDF P-3C patrol aircraft releasing mines for training

(4) Air Defense in Surrounding Waters

Air defense for ships in surrounding waters will be performed by destroyers and will receive support from fighters as necessary.

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of SDF Personnel on Dispatch at Other Ministries and Agencies

Commander Hayato Shinzato
(Deputy Counsellor), Secretariat, Headquarters for Ocean Policy

In April 2007, the Basic Law of the Sea was enacted, and following its entry into force on July 20, 2007, the Headquarters for Ocean Policy was newly organized within the Cabinet Secretariat, which began work on the formulation of the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, which is the first ever basic plan on policy relating to the ocean created in Japan. The Headquarters for Ocean Policy comprises 38 persons (including part-time members), from eight ministries and agencies, including two personnel dispatched from the Ministry of Defense, one regular SDF member and an administrative official. Together, the group worked towards the realization of Japan as a maritime nation.

Commander Shinzato and colleagues from other government agencies (second from left)

The Basic Plan on Ocean Policy has been formulated with the aim of comprehensively promoting measures concerning the ocean that will achieve balance and synergy among the concepts of "knowing the ocean," "protecting the ocean," and "using the ocean." The plan sets forth six basic policies and 12 measures that the government should construct in a comprehensive and systematic manner and it was approved by the Cabinet on March 18, 2008. The six basic policies are: (1) harmonization of the development and use of the oceans with conservation of the marine environment; (2) ensuring safety and security of the oceans; (3) improvement of scientific knowledge of the oceans; (4) sound development of ocean industries; (5) comprehensive governance of the oceans; and (6) international partnership with regard to the oceans.

In the compilation of the plan, for example with regard to "ensuring safety and security of the oceans," based on a number of themes, such as how to approach safety and security issues in waters surrounding Japan

and in sea lanes, the Secretariat used the opinions of experts, various organizations, and ordinary citizens as reference and engaged in coordination and consultation with each ministry and agency. However, given the differing views on ocean policy among government bodies the compilation process took approximately eight months. Policy on oceans covers a wide range of areas, including development of resources, etc., environmental conservation and leisure, and one area among these is the fact that the ocean is the way by which critical resources are transported to Japan. Accordingly, in my work as a member of the Secretariat I very often found that my various experiences to date working in the field as an MSDF pilot of a P-3C patrol aircraft and a YS-11 transportation aircraft and my work in the Joint Staff and Maritime Staff Office proved to be an extremely beneficial asset.

The intergovernmental work to create a structure for the promotion of measures based on the Basic Plan has only just begun, and there are many challenges and issues that Japan must address. In advancing ocean policy, the Ministry of Defense and SDF play an important role in ensuring the peace and safety of the seas as stipulated in the Basic Law of the Sea, and in the future I will continue to work in cooperation with other ministries and agencies, as I believe it is my duty to work to promote the Basic Plan.

3. Operations for Defending Japan's Territory (Response to Landing of Invading Forces)

In the event of an attempt to occupy the island nation of Japan, the invading country will acquire air and sea superiority on the invading fronts and then land ground troops, etc., on Japanese territory by ship or aircraft.

However, it will be difficult for invading ground troops to demonstrate a systematic fighting force during movements by ship and aircraft, and before and after landing. Operations in response to land invasions must take advantage of this weakness to destroy enemy forces as early as possible by countering them between the sea and coastal areas, as well as at landing sites, etc. (See Fig. III-1-3-3)

(1) Defense in the Nearshore Waters

The ASDF, GSDF and MSDF will endeavor, as much as possible, to destroy enemy ships transporting ground troops and such, whilst at sea using destroyers, submarines, patrol aircraft, fighters and surface-to-ship guided missiles to force the enemy to abandon its intention of landing or to reduce its strength.

Further, the ASDF and GSDF will endeavor to destroy enemy aircraft transporting ground troops in the air using fighters and surface-to-air guided missiles.

(2) Defense in Coastal Areas

The MSDF will use minesweeping mother ships to lay sea mines and the GSDF will use amphibious mine-laying equipment to lay coastal mines to obstruct and counter the mobilization of landing enemy forces.

The GSDF will play the primary role in response to enemy forces planning a landing by concentrating the use of tanks, anti-tanks and special artillery of the units[71], etc. deployed close to the coast. In the event that an enemy lands, the enemy invasion will be obstructed and destroyed through mobile striking ability provided predominantly by special artillery of the units, anti-tank guided missiles and tanks. The ASDF will support the GSDF with fighters during these operations.

Enemy airborne assaults[72] and helicopter borne assaults[73] conducted at this time in coordination with the landing of ground troops will be destroyed in the early stages mainly through special artillery of the units and mobile striking ability.

Further, the GSDF will conduct air defense (local) including units using anti-aircraft firepower starting with surface-to-air guided missiles.

Fig. III-1-3-3 Example of Operations for Coping with the Landing of Invading Forces



(3) Inland Defense

In the event that the SDF is not able to destroy enemy ground troops immediately after their landing, an enemy advance will be prevented by pre-deployed units in inland areas with the support of fighters (holding operations). In the meantime, to the utmost extent, units will be assembled from other areas to launch counterattacks to eliminate advancing enemy ground troops.

(4) Countermeasures to be Implemented throughout the Stages of Operations

Throughout each of these stages, efforts will be made by the MSDF using destroyers, submarines, and patrol aircraft, and by the ASDF using fighters to obstruct ocean transport ships providing reinforcements to enemy ground troops and to cut off maritime logistical support lines.

Furthermore, throughout operations, to counter the landing of invading forces, the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF will carry out air defense, reconnaissance, and transport of units and supplies, etc., required for the execution of operations.

Shooting by Type-90 tank

4. Operations for Ensuring the Safety of Maritime Traffic

Maritime traffic is the lifeline of Japan and operations to ensure maritime traffic safety are important not only to sustain the country's fighting ability and foundation for survival, but also for enabling the support of U.S. forces to the SDF.

The MSDF ensures the safety of maritime traffic by patrolling, escorting ships and making defensive preparations for straits and harbors through a combination of various operations including anti-surface ship and anti-submarine operations, air defense (local) and minesweeping operations. These operations are conducted in waters several hundred nautical miles around Japan and also generally around 1,000 nautical miles in the event of establishing sea lanes[74].

Operations conducted in waters surrounding Japan will be almost the same as those for defending the waters surrounding Japan as described previously.

In the event of operations following the establishment of sea lanes, the sea lane will be patrolled continuously to quickly detect and respond to disturbances from enemy surface ships or submarines, etc. In addition, Japanese ships will be escorted as necessary.

Air defense of Japanese ships traveling in maritime traffic routes will be conducted by destroyers. In this case, depending on the circumstances, support will be provided by fighters within a feasible range.

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Basic Plan on Ocean Policy

Japan enforced the Basic Law on Ocean Policy in July 2007, as an oceanic nation facing the need to address maritime-related issues through cooperation of related ministries and agencies, against the backdrop of various issues associated with the ocean, particularly waters surrounding Japan. The Basic Law is aimed at the sound development of Japan's economy and stable enhancement of the life of its people, as well as the pursuit of contribution to the coexistence of the ocean and mankind.

Pursuant to the Basic Law, the Cabinet approved the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy on March 18, 2008, as the foundation for ocean-related measures, in order to promote maritime measures accordingly and jointly. The Basic Plan incorporated measures that are highly important to Japan's security, such as the safety of the seas and maintenance of maritime transportation.

The Ministry of Defense, on its part, actively engaged in activities for the maritime policy of the entire Government, which is headed by the Headquarters for Ocean Policy. For example, it has established a section for maritime policy in its Bureau of Defense Policy. The Ministry of Defense further plans to strategically examine the maintenance of maritime order, preservation of safe sea transportation lines from the Middle East via the Straits of Malacca and Singapore to the waters surrounding Japan, and measures for non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Notes:

1) A situation in which an external armed attack on Japan emerges, or an imminent danger is clearly acknowledged.
2) A situation where an armed attack has yet to emerge, but circumstances are growing increasingly strained and an armed attack is expected.
3) The Law concerning Measures for Protecting Civilians in Armed Attack Situations.
   See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hogohousei/hourei/hogo.html>
4) Emergency legislation is not a clearly defined concept and has been used in different ways in the past. For example, "emergency legislation research" refers to research conducted for legislation to mobilize the SDF via a defense operations order, as provided for by Article 76 of the SDF Law. However, the term "emergency legislation" as used in this white paper, refers to legislation for responses to emergency situations established from 2003 and onwards.
5) The Law for Ensuring Peace and Independence of Japan and Security of State and the People in Armed Attack Situations etc.
   See <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/hourei/houritu/jitai_h.html>
6) Independent administrative agencies, the Bank of Japan, the Japanese Red Cross Society, the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK), other public institutions, and corporations engaged in public service operations, including the provision of electricity, gas, transportation, communications, and other services.
7) An emergency response situation. (A situation arising due to actions that may kill or injure many people which uses methods equivalent to those used in an armed attack situation, or a situation where it is recognized that the relevant actions represent a clear and present threat that necessitate an emergency response by the state.) Alternatively, a contingency situation other than an armed attack situation that may have a significant impact on the security of the nation and its people.
8) Based on the framework provided by this Law, the Armed Attack Situation Response Law establishes the specific emergency legislation for measures to protect the lives etc. of the people and to minimize the impact on their daily lives and economic conditions. It achieves this by enabling those measures implemented by the SDF and the U.S. to repel and terminate armed attack situations to proceed smoothly and effectively, and by ensuring the accurate implementation of the International Humanitarian Laws relating to specific emergency legislation.
9) Law concerning Measures for Protection of the Civilian Population in Armed Attack Situations.
   See <http://kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hogohousei/hourei/hogo.html>
10) Measures such as those relating to the responsibilities of the national and local governments to minimize the impact on the lives of the people, to the cooperation by the people of Japan, to the evacuation of residents, to assistance operations for the evacuation of residents, and to responses to an armed attack situation, etc.
11) The Law concerning the Restriction of Maritime Transportation of Foreign Military Supplies, etc. in Armed Attack Situations.
   See <http://mod.go.jp/j/library/law/yuji/houritu/002.htm>
12) The Law Related to Measures Conducted by the Government in Line with U.S. Military Actions in Armed Attack Situations, etc.
   See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hogohousei/hourei/beigun.html>
13) The Agreement to Amend the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning the Reciprocal Provision of Logistics Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America (ACSA).
   See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/acsa/acsa_gaiyo.html>

14) The Law Related to the Use of Specific Public Facilities, etc.
See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hogohousei/hourei/koukyou.html>
15) The Law concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War and other Detainees in Armed Attack Situations.
See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hogohousei/houan/youkou/040224_4.pdf>
16) The Law concerning Punishment of Grave Breaches of the International Humanitarian Law.
See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hogohousei/houan/youkou/040224_5.pdf>
17) There are four Geneva Conventions:
    1) The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949 (Convention I);
    2) The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949 (Convention II);
    3) The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Convention III);
    4) The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Convention IV).
18) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I).
See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/treaty/pdfs/treaty159_11a.pdf>
19) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II).
See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/k_jindo/pdfs/giteisho_02.pdf>
20) See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hogohousei/hourei/050325shishin.pdf>
21) The Civil Protection Plan of the Ministry of Defense.
See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/archives/keikaku/kokumin_hogo.pdf>
22) The Prime Minister will assume the position of the Director of the Countermeasures Headquarters, although these positions will be legally prescribed as separate entities.
23) Based on Article 22, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the SDF Law, a special unit shall be organized to carry out a specific duty, or the required troops will be placed under the authority of a commander outside of their usual command structure. This unit shall be made up of members of the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF, or a combination of two or more of the branches of the SDF.
24) GSDF Commanding General of Army and Central Response Readiness Force Headquarters; MSDF Commander of the Self-Defense Fleet and Commandant Regional District; ASDF Commander of Air Defense Command, Commander of Air Support Command and Commander of Air Defense Force, ASDF and so on.
25) Vessels equipped with Aegis air defense systems which automatically process a series of activities including target search, detection, identification/classification and attack using high performance computers.
26) Patriot PAC-3 missiles are one of the air defense systems for countering airborne threats. Unlike the conventional type anti-aircraft PAC-2 missiles, which mainly target the interception of aircraft, the PAC-3 missile system is designed primarily to intercept ballistic missiles.
27) Developed since FY 1999, radar which enables the detection and tracking of ballistic missiles (formerly referred to as FPS-XX).
28) Fire unit (the minimum fire unit of surface-to-air fire units).
29) These refer to objects other than aircraft which are recognized to cause grave damage to human life and property when they fall to earth such as ballistic missiles.
30) A specific example of SDF activity is deployment, upon receipt of the appropriate directive from the Minister of Defense, of Patriot PAC-3 missiles by the ASDF and Aegis system-equipped destroyers by the MSDF in

order to respond to ballistic missiles and prepare for ballistic missiles launched toward Japan. In the event missiles are launched toward Japan, based on the aforementioned directive, these can be destroyed.

31) The amendment was made in view of the successful test firing of the sea-based SM-3 missile onboard the Aegis system-equipped destroyer (*Kongo* class) in the sea off Hawaii.
Items amended were 1) addition of the standard SM-3 missile as a method of destroying ballistic missiles, 2) area of activity for SDF units is not restricted to the area around Tokyo, 3) the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry was added to the Cabinet Secretariat; National Police Agency; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Fisheries Agency; Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and Japan Coast Guard as a cooperating relevant administrative authority.

32) The U.S. is steadily enhancing its missile defense systems with research and development while deploying systems as they become technically feasible in what is referred to as the evolutionary spiral development method.

33) The radar was later on moved to the U.S. Forces Shariki Communication Site.

34) The four components are the nose cone, second-stage rocket motor, kinetic warhead, and infrared seeker.

35) Refers to persons engaging in illegal acts such as subversive activities in Japan while possessing weapons with significant killing power, those cooperating with such persons, etc.

36) The official name is the Agreement on the Maintenance of Public Order in the Event of Public Security Operations which was concluded between the (then) Defense Agency and the National Public Safety Commission.

37) An incident in which members of Aum Shinrikyo spread extremely poisonous sarin gas in subway trains crowded with commuters, claiming the lives of 12 people. The SDF conducted decontamination operations of the trains and stations.

38) Since September 2001, postal mail containing anthrax has been delivered to individuals including members of the U.S. Senate and those related to the mass media.

39) During a critical accident that occurred at the JCO uranium-processing plant in Tokaimura, Ibaraki Prefecture in 1999, some employees were exposed to radioactive emissions caused by the nuclear accident and died. The GSDF chemical unit was dispatched to the plant at this time for disaster relief operations.

40) Radiation sickness caused by inhaling radioactive substances into the body.

41) Radiation injury caused by direct exposure to external radioactive substances.

42) Ratio by country of emergency scramble subject aircraft: Russia, approximately 82%; China, approximately 14%; Taiwan, 1% and others, 3%.

43) Including territorial waters and inland waters.

44) Maritime security operations (Article 82 of the SDF Law) refer to actions taken at sea by the SDF with the particular need to protect lives or property or keep peace and order. Prime Ministerial approval is required.

45) Regarding Response to Foreign Submarines Navigating Underwater in Territorial and Inland Waters of Japan, decided at the Security Council and Cabinet meeting in December 1996.

46) An SDF patrol aircraft (P-3C) discovered two unidentified vessels in a surveillance operation in Japanese territorial waters east of the Noto Peninsula and west of Sadogashima Island. These were suspected to be North Korean spy ships disguised as Japanese fishing vessels. The two vessels were pursued around the clock by patrol vessels, destroyers and aircraft but fled to outside the air defense identification zones (ADIZ). They are presumed to have reached a port in the northern part of North Korea.

47) An SDF patrol aircraft (P-3C) discovered an unidentified vessel in a surveillance operation and monitored it with patrol vessels and aircraft. The vessel did not stop despite repeated orders by the Japan Coast Guard. As a result, the JCG fired warning shots after alerting the vessel, however, the vessel continued to make

its getaway and made an armed attack on the patrol ship which fired shots in self-defense. The vessel subsequently exploded from possible self-destruction and sunk. Based on facts revealed in the investigation process the vessel was identified as a North Korean spy ship. Further, in 2002 a patrol aircraft (P-3C) discovered an unidentified vessel in waters approximately 400km north-northwest off the Noto Peninsula (beyond the exclusive economic zone of Japan) in a surveillance operation. The vessel was tracked and observed by patrol vessels of the Japan Coast Guard, destroyers and aircraft.

48) Six vessels have been commissioned since March 2004 with the following main improvements:
1) Speed improved from 40 knots to 44 knots, 2) fitted with 12.7mm machine guns, 3) bullet-proof measures were implemented on the bridge and 4) night vision devices were fitted.

49) A special unit of the MSDF newly established in March 2001 to deter expected resistance, and disarm and immobilize unidentified vessels in the event of on-board inspections under maritime security operations.

50) A non-bursting shell launched from 76mm artillery fitted on destroyers whereby the flat front edge of the shell prevents scattering.

51) The Ministry of Defense Disaster Prevention Plan.
See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/archives/keikaku/bousai/index.html>

52) Unit commanders may make a dispatch in the event that 1) intelligence gathering is necessary in order to provide information to relevant organizations and bodies, 2) it is deemed impossible for the prefectural governor to make a dispatch request and immediate rescue measures are required, 3) life saving rescue operations occur or a fire or disaster occurs in the vicinity of Ministry of Defense facilities.

53) The Prime Minister issues an earthquake alert with endorsement of the Cabinet in the event that an earthquake has been predicted and when it is deemed necessary to urgently implement emergency earthquake disaster prevention measures.

54) Parks and playgrounds close to the disaster site are suitable for assembly areas. For example, for lodging and the activities of forces on the scale of one GSDF regiment, approximately 15,000m^2 is required (an area approximately one-third the size of the Tokyo Dome) and a division requires in excess of approximately 140,000m^2 (an area approximately three times the size of the Tokyo Dome).

55) While heliport sizes differ according to the type of helicopter and the nature of activities, as a rough estimate, each helicopter requires a circle area with a radius of 50 to 100m.

56) Subsidized projects based on Article 8 of the Law Relating to Improvement, etc. of the Living Environment in the Vicinities of Air Defense Facilities.

57) Examples may include temporary communication sites, waiting rooms for liaison officers or vehicle parking spaces for liaison and coordination duties.

58) Manual for Responses to Disasters in Urban Areas, Hilly and Mountainous Areas, Islands and Special Disasters.
See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/archives/keikaku/bousai/index.html>

59) 1) SDF units can be dispatched to provide assistance upon a request of the Director of the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters, 2) SDF personnel dispatched for nuclear disaster relief may exercise necessary authority, 3) special units may be temporarily formed when necessary for nuclear disaster relief dispatches, and 4) SDF Ready Reserve Personnel may be called up for service in the event of nuclear disaster relief dispatches.

60) Special-type disasters may be caused by terrorist or armed attacks using weapons of mass destruction.

61) Limited to the case where there are no police officials at the scene, SDF personnel on duty are authorized to make enquiries, undertake evacuation measures and enter property in addition to their authorized duties of preventing and controlling crimes and usage of weapons.

62) Facilities and equipment for the storage, accommodation or maintenance of SDF weapons, ammunition,

explosives, ships, aircraft, vehicles, wired telecommunications equipment, wireless telecommunications equipment or liquid fuels, barracks, harbors and airports.

63) SDF personnel may use weapons to the extent deemed to be reasonably necessary in situations within applicable facilities in the event it is considered the use of such weapons is required to execute duties or to protect themselves or others. Weapons must not be used to cause harm to other people except in cases of self-defense or acts of emergency evacuation.

64) Units temporarily organized to be dispatched along with transport units (SDF aircraft and ships) to guide and protect Japanese nationals overseas on site.

65) As of the end of May 2007, 48 defense attachés (SDF personnel temporarily transferred from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) were dispatched to diplomatic establishments overseas in 37 locations. Utilizing their experience as SDF personnel, these attachés are engaged in information gathering through exchange with defense-related personnel of the country to which they have been dispatched, as well as military attachés from other nations.

66) In order to enhance Japan's capability for gathering image data, the third and fourth intelligence gathering satellites were launched respectively on September 11, 2006 and February 24 last year.

67) In modern warfare, air operations play a vital role in determining the success or failure of an operation. Therefore, it is essential to secure air superiority ahead of, or concurrently with, land and sea operations.

68) A state in which various strategies can be executed without incurring damage from the enemy due to the security of air superiority.

69) An automated air warning and control unit organization which serves as a nationwide command and communications system to deliver and process commands, and track information.

70) The systematic patrol of particular regions with the objective of preventing surprise attacks, reconnaissance, etc.

71) Long-range and large-caliber howitzers and rockets will be used to destroy or intercept infantry, light-armored vehicles and facilities.

72) Assault units which parachute to the ground from transport aircraft in the vicinity of important terrain to conduct offensives. These units are specially formed, equipped and trained to be able to move quickly by air over long distances.

73) Assault units which are delivered to the vicinity of important terrain by transport helicopters to conduct offensives. Compared to airborne offensives, the attack criterion are simply and easily executed.

74) Relatively safe sea areas established to enable maritime traffic. The area and width of sea lanes vary according to the threat aspect.

Part III

Measures for Defense of Japan

Chapter 2

Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

Section 1. The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements
Section 2. Japan-U.S. Security Consultation on the Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and other Matters
Section 3. Policies and Measures for Enhancing Credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Talks Joint Press Release (at the Ministry of Defense, November 2007)

Section 1. The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

Based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty[1], the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements constitute a central pillar of Japan's national defense. The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements also serve as the foundation of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and are indispensable not only to maintaining the peace and security of Japan, but also the entire Asia-Pacific region. In addition, the close cooperative relationship between Japan and the U.S. resulting from their alliance is proving to be extremely significant for effective responses to the diverse security challenges occurring throughout the world.

Furthermore, the Japan-U.S. alliance is playing an increasingly important role by advancing the shared fundamental values in the international community such as respect for human rights, freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. The significance of the Japan-U.S. alliance continues to grow, and Japan will resolutely strive to maintain and strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. (See Fig. III-2-1-1)

This section explains the significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements for Japan's security today.

Fig. III-2-1-1 Major Milestones in Security Cooperation between Japan and the U.S.

1951		The former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is signed
1952	The era of the former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty	The treaty enters into force
1958		Fujiyama-Dulles Talks (agreement on the revision of the treaty)
1960	Revision of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty	The new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is signed, and enters into force
1968		Ogasawara Islands are returned to Japan
1969		Sato-Nixon Talks (agreement on the renewal of the new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the return of Okinawa to Japan)
1972		Return of Okinawa to Japan
1976		Agreement on the establishment of Sub-Committee for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation
1978	Establishment of the former guidelines and enhancing Japan-U.S. Security Treaty	Establishment of the Former Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (the Former Guidelines)
1991		Collapse of the former USSR and end of the Cold War
1993		North Korea withdraws from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT)
1996	End of the Cold War and establishment of the new guidelines	Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (Hashimoto-Clinton Talks)
		SACO Final Report
1997		Establishment of the New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (the New Guidelines)
2001		Terrorist attacks in the United States
2003	Japan-U.S. relations since terrorist attacks in the United States	Japan-U.S. Global Alliance (Koizumi-Bush Talks)
2006		Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century (Koizumi-Bush Talks)
		North Korea declared implementation of nuclear test
2006		Japan-U.S. Alliance for the World and Asia (Abe-Bush Talks)
2007		Irreplaceable Japan-U.S. Alliance (Abe-Bush Talks)

1. The Significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

1. Maintenance of Japan's Security

In today's international community, any country seeking to secure its peace and independence must construct a watertight defense system capable of responding to every contingency, ranging from all types of armed attacks – including by nuclear weapons – to military threats or intimidation. In today's globalized international community, it is impossible even for a superpower like the U.S. to guarantee its security by acting alone. Therefore, it would be practically impossible for Japan to ensure its national security by solely independent efforts given its population, land and economy. Moreover, such a strategy would not be politically appropriate and would not necessarily contribute to the regional stability.

Consequently, Japan maintains an alliance with the world's dominant military superpower, the U.S., with whom it shares basic values such as respect for freedom, human rights and democracy, and the desire to maintain peace and security. In addition, the U.S. has strong economic ties with Japan and is also widely accepted by countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Further, the overwhelming military strength of the U.S. functions as an effective deterrent against threats to Japan's security. When combined with Japan's own considerable defense capabilities, it creates an absolute defense structure fully capable of maintaining the security of our nation.

Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty designates that Japan and the U.S. will take bilateral action in the event of an armed attack against Japan. The U.S. obligation to defend Japan in the event of an armed attack means that an attacker must be prepared to confront not only the military power of the SDF, but also the overwhelming military strength of the U.S. This serves as an effective deterrence to potential attacks.

2. Maintenance of Peace and Stability in the Region Surrounding Japan

Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty provides for the use of facilities and regions by the U.S. forces within Japan for the purpose of maintaining the security of Japan, and also for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East. This provision is based on the recognition that the security of Japan is closely tied to the peace and security of the Far East region to which Japan belongs.

The close bonds of cooperation based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, as seen in the presence of U.S. forces in Japan, also constitutes the essential foundation for the maintenance of peace and security in the region. These arrangements are complemented by the alliances[2] and friendly relations the U.S. has built with other countries in the region, and continue to play an important role in preserving the peace and security of the Far East region in the post-Cold War security environment.

3. Improvement of International Security Environment

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are the foundation for a comprehensive and friendly cooperative relationship between the U.S. and Japan, not only in the defense area but also in a wide range of areas, including political, economic and social aspects. The friendly relationship between Japan and the U.S., founded on their security arrangements, also forms the basis for Japan's foreign policy. It contributes to Japan's ability to implement positive measures to maintain the peace and security of the international community, including promoting dialogue and cooperation on multinational security and cooperating with the United Nations in all areas of its operations.

Verifying the embarkation of the GSDF CH-47 transport helicopter to the U.S. Air Force C-17 transport aircraft at Yokota Air Base (February 2008) [U.S.A.F]

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the international community has been increasingly concerned about new kinds of threats and diverse contingencies, such as international terrorist attacks and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In this international environment, the strong bonds forged between Japan and the U.S. are playing an important role in achieving effective cooperative measures that can improve the security of the international community.

In particular, under the auspices of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, the SDF and U.S. forces are working together in peacetime in a variety of areas to improve the levels of coordination. This kind of close coordination forms the foundation for every kind of international collaboration undertaken by the SDF and U.S. forces, and is resulting in their heightened operational effectiveness.

Peace and prosperity of the international community is closely linked to the peace and prosperity of Japan. Accordingly, by cooperating with the U.S., which possesses preeminent international operational capabilities, Japan is able to advance its measures to improve the international security environment. This in turn is enhancing the security and prosperity of Japan.

2. Presence of U.S. Forces in Japan

1. Significance of Presence of U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ)

Based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the United Sates stations its armed forces in Japan. Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty obliges the United States to defend Japan, while Article 6 grants the United States the use of facilities and areas in Japan. Taken as a whole, the obligations of both countries form a balance. This differs from the North Atlantic Treaty, which provides only for shared defense by the contracting states.

In accordance with Article 5 of the Security Treaty, the U.S. forces in Japan (USFJ) have stable access to facilities and areas in Japan. This access plays a key role in enabling a swift bilateral response by the SDF and U.S. forces in the event of an armed attack against Japan, and constitutes a crucial element of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

In addition, as previously stated, an attacking force will confront not only the SDF, but also the USFJ. Therefore, USFJ function as an effective deterrent against an armed attack. Moreover, the actions of USFJ in the defense of Japan will be assisted by the timely reinforcement of other U.S. forces. The USFJ also functions as the foundation for the reinforcement actions of U.S. forces.

These USFJ functions play a vital role in maintaining the security of Japan. In addition, the U.S. military presence in Japan constitutes the basis for the actions of U.S. forces in the region, and is a vital factor in maintaining peace and security in the region. (See Fig. III-2-1-2)

The U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk leaving Yokosuka port to be replaced with the U.S. aircraft carrier George Washington (May 2008) [U.S. Navy]

Fig. III-2-1-2 USFJ



2. USFJ Facilities and Areas and Local Communities which Host such Facilities and Areas

The cooperation and understanding of the people in the regions which host facilities and areas used by U.S. forces is vital for the USFJ to function to its full capabilities. However, in the past several decades since the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the social environments surrounding facilities and areas used by the U.S. forces have undergone considerable changes, such as urbanization.

In this context, it is necessary to minimize to the utmost extent the impact the facilities and areas have on their surrounding environments, so that these facilities and areas may fully function, and that the USFJ can be truly accepted and supported by the Japanese people.

As Japan is a relatively narrow country with a small range of plain areas, it is inevitable that many of the facilities and areas used by U.S. forces are found close to residential and commercial zones. Facilities and areas used by U.S. forces have a considerable effect on the living environment and development in these regions, due to such factors as the location of the bases or the take-off and landing of aircraft. It is essential that measures appropriate to each region are taken to minimize these effects. (See Chapter 4, Section 2-3)

3. USFJ in Okinawa

In comparison to the U.S. mainland and Hawaii, Okinawa is located much closer to countries in East Asia. Consequently, U.S. forces stationed in Okinawa are able to respond rapidly to needs for urgent deployment within the region. Further, Okinawa's certain distance from the countries surrounding Japan serves as an additional geographical advantage. It is primarily for these reasons that U.S. Marines and other U.S. forces that will constitute the main response force in the event of an emergency situation in the region are stationed in Okinawa.

The facilities and areas used by U.S. forces in Okinawa have been provided by Japan for use by U.S. forces since May 1972, when the U.S. returned Okinawa to Japan in accordance with the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). At present, many facilities and areas are located within Okinawa Prefecture, including airfields, maneuver areas and logistics support facilities. As of January 2008, 74% of the land used by the USFJ for facilities and areas (for their exclusive use) was located in Okinawa. As a result, special consideration must be paid to minimize the burdens on Okinawa.

Section 2. Japan-U.S. Security Consultation on the Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and other Matters

The maintenance of peace and security requires the appropriate development of its means depending on changes in the security environment. To make effective the cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States as Japan's ally based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, the Governments and people of both countries must make constant efforts in developing the alliance depending on changes in the security environment from time to time.

In consideration of the items described in Fig. III-2-2-1, Japan and the United States have been engaged in consultations on the future Japan-U.S. alliance, including force posture realignment, in recent years. As a result, the two countries have reached various epoch-making agreements for further enhancing the future. Japan and the U.S. are engaged in all types of efforts in close coordination based on the Japan-U.S. alliance, including the May 2006 agreement on force posture realignment.

This section explains details of consultations, including the outline and background of Japan-U.S. consultations on the future Japan-U.S. alliance and the realignment of USFJ.

Fig. III-2-2-1 Background of Japan-U.S. Consultations



1. Outline of Recent Japan-U.S. Consultations

1. Post-Cold War Developments Concerning the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

During the Cold War era, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements contributed to the maintenance of security of Japan as a member of the Free World and the maintenance of peace and security of the region surrounding Japan. Since the end of the Cold War era, Japan and the United States have held various types of dialogues depending on changes in the international security environment. The two countries announced the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, which clarifies the direction of bilateral cooperation for the 21st century, at the Japan-U.S. summit meeting held in Tokyo in April 1996. (See Reference 33)

The Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security reaffirmed that the bilateral security relationship would remain the cornerstone for maintaining stability and prosperity in the region, and indicated those cooperative measures in specific areas that would serve as important pillars to enhance the credibility of the Japan-U.S. alliance.

Based on the Declaration, in September 1997, the two countries established new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (hereafter referred to as the "Guidelines"), and implemented various measures. Through these measures, Japan-U.S. defense cooperation has become more effective, and the credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements has further strengthened. (See Section 3-2, Reference 40)

2. Activities since the September 11th Terrorist Attacks

(1) Background of Japan-U.S. Consultations

Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 Japan and the U.S. have pursued new postures to deal with the changing security environment including emerging threats such as international terrorist activities and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as shown in Figure III-2-2-1.

Based on the understanding that it is important for Japan and the United States to maintain close exchanges in reviewing respective defense and security policies in the new security environment, the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee[3] (hereafter referred to as the "2+2 meeting") held in December 2002 confirmed that the bilateral security consultations should be intensified. Since then, working-level consultations have been held.

Those Japan-U.S. consultations have been conducted as part of bilateral strategic dialogues from a viewpoint of how to make the capabilities of the Japan-U.S. alliance more effective in meeting changes of the times. Japan has proactively addressed these consultations for the maintenance of its own security, based on the basic policy to maintain deterrence and capabilities and to reduce burdens on local communities.

Japan's basic policy reflects the perception that amid the changing security environment, in order to remain strong, the Japan-U.S. alliance requires both the enhancement of reliability and effectiveness of U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan and the maintenance of peace and security of the Asia-Pacific region and broad and firm support of the people of the two countries.

Based on this basic policy, Japan-U.S. consultations have confirmed strategic objectives common to both countries at first, examined Japan-U.S. roles, missions and capabilities in order to achieve common strategic objectives, and then examined force posture realignment (realignment of USFJ) based on those roles, missions and capabilities, and have established the direction of Japan-U.S. alliance gradually and comprehensively.

❍ Confirmation of Common Strategic Objectives (the First Stage)

The two countries identified the strategic objectives concerning defense and security that should be achieved by them in the region and the world, and confirmed them in the joint statement at the 2+2 meeting held in February 2005. At this meeting, the two countries agreed that they should intensify consultations on the sharing of the roles, missions and capabilities as examined at the second stage and on force posture realignment as studied at the third stage. (See 2 of this section, Reference 34)

❍ Examination of Roles, Missions and Capabilities of Japan and the United States (the Second Stage)

The two countries examined the roles, missions and capabilities of the SDF and U.S. forces that would be needed for achieving the strategic objectives identified at the first stage, taking into consideration the developments and achievements of security and defense policies of the two countries in recent years.

This examination was made to clarify how Japan and the United States should cooperate with each other while the SDF and U.S. forces coordinate adequately before the Unites States would begin force posture realignment.

Pursuant to these consultations, the two-plus-two meeting held in October 2005 prepared a joint document titled the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future (hereafter referred to as the "SCC document"). The SCC document indicates the concrete direction of the roles, missions and capabilities shared by Japan and the United States, and other matters. (See 2 of this section, Reference 35)

❍ Force Posture Realignment (Realignment of USFJ) (the Third Stage)

The two countries studied the postures of USFJ and the related SDF that would be necessary for performing or demonstrating such roles, missions and capabilities that were examined at the second stage.

The study on the realignment of USFJ was conducted based on the basic policy of maintaining deterrence and capabilities and reducing burdens on local communities.

The SCC document issued in October 2005 indicated the guiding precepts (see Fig. III-2-2-2) and a specific direction of the realignment of postures of USFJ and related units of the SDF for this study. At the two-plus-two meeting held in May 2006, Japan and the United States finalized the realignment in a document titled the Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (hereafter referred to as the "Roadmap"), which indicated the details for implementing concrete initiatives. (See 2 of this section, Reference 36-37)

The overview of Japan-U.S. consultations is shown in Fig. III-2-2-3. A joint document was produced at the two-plus-two meeting held at each stage. Thus, the transparency of consultations was ensured and their contents were made known in Japan and abroad.

(2) Japan-U.S. Alliance for the World and Asia

At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held in 2003, the two countries agreed to enhance the Japan-U.S. alliance in the global context, by cooperating and strengthening the relationship with the international community in addressing global problems, as part of efforts to deal with a new security environment. Then, at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held in November 2006, they confirmed that they would work on various challenges of the international community based on the policy of Japan-U.S. Alliance for the World and Asia, while further strengthening the Japan-U.S. relationship.

3. Recent Developments

The two countries confirmed the progress made to date with the Roadmap initiatives at the two-plus-two meeting held in May 2007, and reaffirmed the importance of steady implementation of the initiatives.

At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held on November 16, 2007 Prime Minister Fukuda and President Bush agreed to steady implementation of the Roadmap initiatives for the realignment of USFJ to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities. They also confirmed their

Prime Minister Fukuda at a summit with President Bush (October 2007) [Cabinet Public Relations Office]

shared recognitions that the Japan-U.S. Alliance is the key to the development of Japan-U.S. diplomacy in Asia, that the alliance plays an essential role in Japan and the U.S. dealing with global issues, and that it is important to further strengthen deterrence and capabilities, which result from the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, the basis for the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

Fig. III-2-2-2 Summary of Guiding Precepts

1) The U.S. military in the Asia-Pacific region is a core capability that is indispensable to regional peace and security presence is critical for the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.
2) Capabilities will be strengthened through realignment as well as adjustment of roles, missions and capabilities.
3) Coordination or interoperability between headquarters will be enhanced or improved for the purpose of flexible and responsive command and control.
4) Regular training and exercises, as well as availability of facilities and areas for these purposes, are essential. Dispersal of training can provide greater diversity of training opportunities and can have the ancillary benefit of reducing burdens on local communities.
5) Shared military use can promote effectiveness of bilateral cooperation.
6) Capacity of the U.S. facilities and areas can provide a critical capability toward meeting local emergency needs such as in disaster relief situations.
7) Particular attention is paid to possible realignment of force structure in densely populated areas.
8) The civilian-military dual use will be studied, where appropriate, so that it is compatible with operational requirements.

Fig. III-2-2-3 Overview of Japan-U.S. Consultations



2. Results Achieved by the Japan-U.S. Consultations

1. Common Strategic Objectives (the First Stage)

The common strategic objectives to be pursued by both Japan and the U.S. were confirmed in the joint statement at the two-plus-two meeting held in February 2005 and its overview is described below.

- ❍ Region: maintenance of security in Japan, strengthening peace and stability in the region, peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula, peaceful resolution of issues related to North Korea, welcoming China's responsible and constructive roles and development of a cooperative relationship with China, peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait, improvement of transparency of China's military affairs, constructive involvement by Russia, assistance to peaceful, stable and vibrant South East Asia.
- ❍ World: promotion of fundamental values such as democracy in the international community, engagement in international peace cooperation activities, reduction and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means to transport these weapons, prevention and eradication of terrorism, and improvement in effectiveness of the U.N. Security Council.

At the two-plus-two meeting held in May 2007, the two countries reconfirmed their commitments to these common strategic objectives, and highlighted the following strategic objectives (outline) that advance the interests of both countries:

- ❍ Achieving denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through the Six-Party Talks;
- ❍ Further encouraging China to conduct itself as a responsible international stakeholder, improve transparency in its military affairs, and maintain consistency between its stated policies and actions;
- ❍ Increasing cooperation to strengthen the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum as the pre-eminent regional economic forum;
- ❍ Supporting efforts made by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to promote democratic values, good governance, the rule of law, human rights, fundamental freedoms, and a unified market economy in Southeast Asia;
- ❍ Further strengthening trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United States and Australia in the region and around the world, including in the areas of security and defense;
- ❍ Continuing to build upon partnerships with India;
- ❍ Ensuring Afghanistan's successful economic reconstruction and political stabilization;
- ❍ Contributing to the reconstruction of a unified and democratic Iraq;
- ❍ Achieving swift, full implementation of UNSCR 1737 and 1747, aimed at bringing Iran into full compliance with its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements; and
- ❍ Achieving broader Japan-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) cooperation.

2. Roles, Missions and Capabilities of Japan and the United States (the Second Stage)

(1) Basic Concepts of Roles, Missions and Capabilities

The basic concepts on such primary areas indicated in the SCC document as "defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan, including responses to new threats and diverse contingencies" and "efforts to improve the international security environment" are shown in Figs. III-2-2-4 and III-2-2-5. In due consideration of the increasing importance of these two areas, Japan and the United States will develop their respective defense capabilities and maximize the benefits of innovations in technology.

Fig. III-2-2-4 Japan-U.S. Cooperation in Japan's Defense and Response to Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (SIASJ) Including Response to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies



Fig. III-2-2-5 Japan-U.S. Cooperation for Improving the International Security Environment



(2) Examples of Operations in Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation to be Improved

The SCC document reconfirmed the necessity to strengthen the entire spectrum of bilateral cooperation. The document pointed out specific examples of key areas for further enhancement in the current security environment, as described in Fig. III-2-2-6.

But the list of key areas is not intended to be an exhaustive list of possible areas of cooperation, and other areas of operation not explicitly listed above remain important.

(3) Indispensable Steps to Strengthen Posture for Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation

It is important for Japan and the United States to intensify their postures of security and defense cooperation so that the two countries may respond to diverse contingencies in a new security environment. For this purpose, the two countries must implement necessary steps in peacetime. Some examples of the essential steps specified in the SCC document are listed in Fig. III-2-2-7.

Fig. III-2-2-6 Examples of Activities to be Improved in Japan-U.S. Security and Defense Cooperation

	Example of Area
1	Air defense
2	Ballistic missile defense
3	Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and other proliferation prevention activities
4	Anti-terrorism measures
5	Minesweeping, maritime interdiction, and other operations to maintain the security of maritime traffic
6	Search and rescue activities
7	Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) activities and improvement of capabilities and effectiveness of the activities by using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and patrol aircraft
8	Humanitarian relief operations
9	Reconstruction assistance activities
10	Peacekeeping activities and capacity building for other nation's peacekeeping efforts
11	Guarding operations for important infrastructure including USFJ facilities and areas
12	Disposal and decontamination of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other measures against WMD attack
13	Mutual logistic support activities such as supply, maintenance and transportation. Supply cooperation includes mutual provision of aerial maritime refueling. Transportation cooperation includes enhanced or combined efforts of air and maritime transportation (including transportation by high speed vessels (HSVs))
14	Transportation, use of facilities, medical support and other activities for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs)
15	Use of ports, airports, roads, sea, airspace and frequency bands

Fig. III-2-2-7 Essential Measures for Enforcing Bilateral Security and Defense Posture

Category	Item	Content
Measures to be Addressed by Governments as a Whole	Close and continuous policy and/or operational coordination	• Close and continuous policy and operational coordination conducted at multiple levels of the Governments of Japan and the United States, ranging from tactics of unit level to strategic consultations, is essential for responding to diverse security issues[1] • Improvement of effectiveness of comprehensive and bilateral coordination mechanisms by clarifying functions based on the "Guidelines"
	Developing bilateral contingency planning	• Continuance of bilateral planning for armed attack situations in Japan and mutual cooperation planning for situations in areas surrounding Japan, conducted under the "Guidelines" taking the changing security environment into account • Reflection of Japan's legislation dealing with contingency (providing a strengthened basis for contingency use of facilities, including airports and seaports by the SDF and the U.S. Forces in the plannings mentioned above) • Close coordination with relevant ministries agencies and local authorities, and conducting detailed surveys of airports and seaports
	Enhancing information sharing and/or intelligence cooperation	• Enhancement of information and intelligence sharing and cooperation, at national strategy through unit-level tactics • Additional measures to protect secret information among relevant ministries and agencies
Measures to be Addressed by the SDF and U.S. Forces	Improving interoperability[2] between the SDF and U.S. Forces	• Maintenance of regular consultations to maintain and enhance interoperability • Enhancement of connectivity between SDF and U.S. Forces headquarters
	Expansion of training opportunities in Japan and the United States	• Expansion of bilateral training and exercise opportunities (including the expansion of shared use of training facilities in Japan of the SDF and U.S. Forces) • Expansion of trainings by the SDF in Guam, Alaska, Hawaii and the U.S. mainland
	Shared use of facilities by SDF and U.S. Forces	(To be specified when force posture is realigned)
	Ballistic missile defense (BMD)	• Constant information gathering and sharing, and maintenance of readiness and interoperability • If appropriate, U.S. Forces will additionally deploy supplemental capabilities to Japan and SIASJ and adjust their operations

Notes: 1. Close policy consultations on security are conducted between officials of the Governments of Japan and the United States through Security Consultative Committee (SCC) of ministerial level (so-called "2 + 2" meeting), Japan-U.S. defense ministerial meeting the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) and others. As for operations, there exist a comprehensive mechanism and a bilateral coordination mechanism under the Guidelines. (See Section 3 of this chapter)

2. The term "interoperability" refers to the commonness and duality of tactics, equipment, logistics support a bilateral the implementation guidelines for various operations.

(4) Enhancement and Expansion of Japan-U.S. Security and Defense Cooperation

Japan and the U.S. agreed to enhance and improve the effectiveness of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation indicated in the Guidelines and cooperation in other fields, if necessary, that are not specified in the Guidelines. (See Section 3-2)

Japan and the United States emphasized at the two-plus-two meeting held in May 2006 that the effectiveness of bilateral security and defense cooperation should be strengthened or improved, and the two countries emphasized the importance of examining security and defense cooperation so that the two countries may solidify the alliance relationship and improve the alliance capabilities.

Furthermore, in the joint statement made at the two-plus-two meeting held in May 2007, the two countries reviewed progress in updating roles, missions, and capabilities in line with the alliance transformation vision indicated in the October 2005 SCC document, and highlighted as follows:

❍ The redefinition of the SDF's primary mission to include international peacekeeping operations, international disaster relief operations, and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan;

❍ Sustained progress in developing more specific planning to reflect the evolving security environment and to better posture the forces of the two countries to operate together in a regional crisis;

❍ Substantive agreement between the two governments concerning security measures for the protection of classified military information, also known as a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA)[4];

- ❍ Establishment of a bilateral Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense Working Group;
- ❍ Establishment of a flexible, bilateral interagency coordination mechanism to coordinate policy, operational, intelligence, and public affairs positions before and during crisis situations; and
- ❍ Execution of joint, bilateral training exercises to strengthen interoperability and advance alliance roles, missions, and capabilities.

3. Force Posture Realignment, Including USFJ (the Third Stage)

(1) Overview

The force posture realignment of USFJ is necessary to maintain the stable presence of USFJ, which serves as deterrence and capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region, to adapt the Japan-U.S. alliance based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements to a new security environment, and thereby to reinforce the peace of Japan and the peace and security of the Asia-Pacific region.

The implementation of these realignment initiatives will lead to a new phase in alliance cooperation and strengthened alliance capabilities in the region. The measures to be implemented demonstrate the resolve of both parties to strengthen their commitments under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and, at the same time, to reduce burdens on local communities, including those on Okinawa.

The construction and other costs for facility development in the implementation of these initiatives will be borne by the Government of Japan unless otherwise specified in the Roadmap. The U.S. Government will bear the operational costs that arise from the implementation of these initiatives. Since the realignment of USFJ is an important task to reduce burdens on local communities, including Okinawa, while maintaining deterrence and capabilities of USFJ, it is decided that proper budgetary measures will be taken after having examined the particulars of costs to be borne by Japan.

The realignment is described in Fig. III-2-2-8 and Fig. III-2-2-9, and the current status of specific measures is explained below.

(2) Force Posture Realignment in Okinawa

At present, many of USFJ facilities and areas are located in Okinawa.

In particular, U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa with high mobility and readiness play multiple roles in defending Japan, and in maintaining the peace and security of the region, including responses to the earthquake that took place in Java, Indonesia in May 2006.

As part of its global military posture realignment effort, the U.S. is conducting some reviews to strengthen its force structures in the Pacific. Among these reviews are strengthening Marine Corps crisis response capabilities and redistributing those capabilities to provide greater flexibility to respond with appropriate capabilities according to the nature and location of particular situations. These reviews will also enable increased security cooperation with countries in the region, thereby improving the overall security environment.

In connection with this realignment, a set of integrated measures that will also substantially reduce burdens on Okinawa are identified as follows.

a. Futenma Replacement Facility and Other Matters

The U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma) fulfills the following functions:

1) To transport ground units of Marine Corps by helicopters and other means;

2) To operate tanker aircraft;

3) To accommodate aircraft in case of emergency.

Fig. III-2-2-8 The Force Structure Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and the SDF



Note: Lines of Guam are also added from Camp Zukeran



Note: Portions of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at Iwakuni Air Station.

Fig. III-2-2-9 Major Realignment Schedule shown in the Roadmap

Time	Implementation Plans for Realignment
By Summer 2006	**For deployment of a U.S. X-Band Radar system to JASDF Shariki Base, necessary arrangements and facility modifications will be made**
By October 2006	**Return portions of Yokota airspace will be identified**
From 2006	**Shared use of Camp Hansen that requires no facility improvements will become possible**
By March 2007	Consolidation plan for facilities and areas in Okinawa will be developed
From FY 2007	**Development of annual plans for training relocation**
By U.S. FY 2008 (October 2007 – September 2008)	U.S. Army command and control structure at Camp Zama will be transformed
By September 2008	Portions of Yokota airspace will be returned to Japanese control
July 2009 (or the earliest possible date thereafter)	Permanent site for field-carrier landing practice facility will be selected
FY 2009 (April 2009 -)	Comprehensive study, including conditions required for the possible return of the entire Yokota airspace, will be complemented
FY 2010 (April 2010 -)	JASDF Air Defense Command and relevant units will relocate to Yokota
By FY 2012 (April 2012 -)	The headquarters of the JGSDF Central Readiness Force will arrive at Camp Zama
By FY 2014	Futenma Replacement Facility will be completed Part of U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa (III Marine Expeditionary Force personnel and their dependents) will relocate to Guam Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi to Iwakuni

* Items written in boldface show the implementation of actual measures.

In the meantime, local residents have strongly demanded the early return of MCAS Futenma for their concerns over local safety, noise and traffic of the region as it is located in the middle of the residential area.

Therefore, the following initiatives will be implemented on the functions of MCAS Futenma, and then the air station will be returned.

(a) Function to Transport Ground Units of Marine Corps by Helicopters and Other Means

a Status of Basic Plan Based on the SACO Final Report

In the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report prepared in December 1996, the two countries agreed to totally return MCAS Futenma after an adequate replacement facility is completed within five to seven years. (See 4 of this section)

A sequence of events related to the replacement facility for MCAS Futenma (hereafter referred to as the "Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF)") after the issuance of the Final Report are shown in Fig. III-2-2-10. In 2002, the Basic Plan of the FRF was finalized. After that, although an environmental impact assessment procedure started in 2004, and the technical site survey, a necessary procedure for commencement of construction begun in 2003, the process did not go smoothly, and as the construction of the FRF was expected to take nine and a half years, it is now expected that it will take another ten years or so to relocate and return MCAS Futenma.

In addition, a U.S. military helicopter accident took place in Ginowan City in August 2004. It became evident that the existence of MCAS Futenma in the middle of the residential area has a potential risk, and therefore it was strongly recognized that the early relocation and return of MCAS Futenma is essential.

In order to drive away a general feeling of unrest among local residents, the two Governments conducted a study again on how to realize early relocation and return of MCAS Futenma during the course of Japan-U.S. consultations on the realignment of USFJ.

b Basic Concept of Review of Futenma Relocation

The U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa consist of air, ground, logistics and command elements, and the interaction of those elements in actual operations is necessary. Therefore, both sides conducted a study based on the recognition that the FRF needs to be located within Okinawa Prefecture so that rotary wing aircraft currently stationed at MCAS Futenma will be located near the other elements with which they train or operate on a regular basis.

In the study, both sides considered several factors, including safety of neighboring communities and military personnel, noise impacts on local communities, impacts on the natural environment including seaweed beds, and operational requirements in peacetime and in contingencies.

Fig. III-2-2-10 Background for the Construction of the Futenma Air Station Replacement Facility

Month & Year	Background	Remarks
April 1996	Prime Minister Hashimoto and U.S. Ambassador Mondale held a meeting and the total return of Futenma Air Station was expressed	Up to local government's acceptance of the FRF and the Cabinet decision (three years and eight months)
December	SACO Interim Report SACO Final Report Construction of a sea-based facility off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa	
November 1999	Governor of Okinawa Prefecture Inamine expressed that the coastal area of Henoko in Nago City was designated as the relocation site	
December	Mayor of Nago City Kishimoto expressed that the city would accept the FRF "Government Policy on Relocation of Futenma Air Station" (Cabinet decision) Construction in the "Coastal Area of Henoko, Nago City in Camp Schwab Water Area"	From the Cabinet decision to the development of the Basic Plan (two years and seven months)
July 2002	Development of the "Basic Plan of the Futenma Replacement Facility"	
April 2004	The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedure started (Abolished in 2007)	From the development of the Basic Plan to the beginning of the environmental impact assessment (one year and nine months)
August	A helicopter of U.S. Forces crashed into a university campus in Ginowan City, Okinawa	
September	Offshore operation of the boring survey started	
October 2005	A new plan was agreed on in the SCC document The FRF will be constructed in an "L"-shaped configuration that combines the southern shoreline areas of Camp Schwab and adjacent water areas of Oura Bay	
April 2006	A basic agreement was concluded with Nago City and Ginoza Village The plan to construct two runways aligned in a "V"-shape was agreed on, regarding the construction of the FRF	
May	The FRF plan was finalized in the U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation Memorandum of Basic Understanding was concluded between the Defense Agency and Okinawa Prefecture "GOJ Efforts for USFJ Force Structure Realignment and Others"(Cabinet decision) Abolition of 1999 GOJ Policy	
August	Establishment of the Council on Measures for Relocation of Futenma Air Station	
June 2007	Survey of existing conditions started	
August	The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedure started	
March 2008	Survey based on the Environmental Impact Assessment scoping document started	

c Overview of Futenma Relocation

Based on the aforementioned concept, both sides conducted the study intensively. As a result, in the SCC document prepared in October 2005, the initiative to "locate the FRF in an 'L'-shaped configuration that combines the shoreline areas of Camp Schwab and adjacent water areas of Oura Bay" was approved.

Thereafter, as a result of consultation with local municipalities, including Nago City, agreements on the FRF were made with Nago City and Ginoza Village in April 2006 stating that, based on the initiative approved in the SCC document, two runways would be constructed to avoid an air route above the surrounding area pursuant

to the request from the local communities, and that the runways should be constructed by paying due attention to the following points: 1) safety of lives of local residents; 2) conservation of the natural environment; and 3) the feasibility of the project. Then, it was decided that the Ministry of Defense, Okinawa Prefecture, Nago City, Ginoza Village and related local municipalities would continue to have consultations on the plan of construction of the FRF in good faith on a continuous basis to reach a conclusion.

Based on the above-mentioned agreement, both countries agreed in the Roadmap, to locate the FRF in a configuration that combines the Henoko-saki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays. This facility includes two runways aligned in a "V"-shape, each runway having a length of 1,600meters plus two 100-meter overruns. The length of each runway portion of the facility is 1,800meters, exclusive of seawalls.

The facility ensures agreed operational capabilities while addressing issues of safety, noise, and environmental impacts.

As indicated in the SACO Final Report, the FRF will have capabilities to support operations of helicopters now stationed in MCAS Futenma and short take-off and landing aircraft operations. There's no plan to operate fighter aircraft from this facility.

Furthermore, it is indicated that, in order to locate the FRF in the Camp Schwab area, necessary adjustments will be made, such as reconfiguration of Camp Schwab facilities and adjacent water surface areas.

In principle, the construction method for the FRF will be landfill. The construction work is targeted for completion by 2014. It is indicated that relocation to the FRF will occur when the facility is fully operationally capable. (See Fig. III-2-2-11)

In the case of the newly agreed FRF, construction will be made mainly on land and therefore construction work may be started earlier and conducted more steadily as compared with the old plan. Thus, earlier relocation becomes possible. In addition, the portion to be constructed in the offshore area will be made as small as possible. Thus, full consideration is given to environmental impacts. Concerning the construction of the FRF, the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture and the then Minister of State for Defense signed, in May 2006, a Memorandum of Basic Understanding in which both parties agreed to cope with the issue based on the Government plan and paying due attention to: 1) removal of danger of MCAS Futenma; 2) safety of lives of local residents; 3) conservation of the natural environment; and 4) feasibility of the project.

d Status of Coordination with Local Communities

The Government made a Cabinet decision on May 30, 2006 to proceed with the construction based on the plan approved at the two-plus-two meeting held on May 1, 2006 and by taking into consideration the positions of the Government, Okinawa Prefecture and the related local municipalities and background of the relocation of MCAS Futenma, aimed to develop a construction plan immediately. It was also decided that the specific construction plan, safety/environmental measures and local development measures should be addressed through consultations made at a consultative organ, which is established jointly with Okinawa Prefecture and related local municipalities[5].

Since August 2006, the Council Meetings on Measures for Relocation of MCAS Futenma[6] have been held as follows.

Council Meetings held to date:

❍ First Council Meeting (on August 29, 2006)
❍ Second Council Meeting (on December 25, 2006)
❍ Third Council Meeting (on January 19, 2007)
❍ Fourth Council Meeting (on November 7, 2007)
❍ Fifth Council Meeting (on December 12, 2007)
❍ Sixth Council Meeting (on February 7, 2008)
❍ Seventh Council Meeting (on April 9, 2008)

Fig. III-2-2-11 Diagram of the Futenma Replacement Facility



e Status of Implementation of the Environmental Impact Assessment

The Environmental Impact Assessment Scoping Document (hereafter referred to as the "Scoping Document") was sent to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture and others on August 7, 2007. It was announced and presented to the public and summaries of the opinions pertaining to the Scoping Document from residents and others were sent to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture and others on October 22, 2007. Then, the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture's opinion on the Scoping Document was submitted on December 21, 2007 and January 21, 2008. Based on that opinion and other factors, additions and corrections to the Scoping Document were submitted to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture on February 5, 2008. On March 14, 2008, the revised edition of this was sent to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture and others, and a survey in accordance with the Scoping Document was begun on March 15.

(b) Function to Operate Tanker Aircraft

Air refueling aircraft KC-130 (12 in total) are to be relocated from Futenma Air Station to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni under the Roadmap as well as the SACO Final Report. They will be regularly deployed on a rotational basis to Kanoya Base and Guam for training and operations. Consultations are being held between Japan and the U.S. pertaining to training and operations at Kanoya Base.

(c) Base Function to Accommodate Aircraft in Contingencies

Strengthened contingency use of Nyutabaru Air Base (in Miyazaki Prefecture) and Tsuiki Air Base (in Fukuoka Prefecture) of ASDF will be provided for U.S. forces. When site surveys are completed, facility improvements for the strengthened use will be made as necessary before MCAS Futenma is returned. These improved facilities, when completed, will also support the bilateral training activities, which should be expanded according to the recommendations on roles, missions and capabilities.

Because operations using long runways cannot be replicated at the FRF, improved contingency use of civilian facilities will be examined in the context of bilateral contingency planning, and appropriate arrangements will be made in order to realize the return of MCAS Futenma.

(d) Efforts to Eliminate Danger at MCAS Futenma

On August 10, 2007 the Ministry of Defense announced various measures as part of efforts to eliminate dangers at MCAS Futenma: 1) improving approach and takeoff routes including actively avoiding areas of high residential density, 2) expanding clear zones and other measures for safe return from the area around the airfield when there is engine trouble, 3) improving equipment to make the runways more easily visible at night, and 4) developing automatic flight control systems rather than relying on eyesight. The Ministry of Defense is steadily implementing these measures.

The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on February 19, 2008 that of these measures the Government of Japan would improve facilities to make runways more easily visible at night and to expand clear zones.

b. Force Reductions and Relocation to Guam

In conjunction with the realignment of U.S. Marine Corps capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region, the personnel of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) will be relocated to Guam and the remaining Marine units in Okinawa will be realigned. Due to this realignment in Okinawa, it is planned that approximately 8,000 III MEF personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014 in a manner that maintains unit integrity[7]. U.S. Marine Corps forces remaining in Okinawa will consist of Marine Air Ground Task Force elements, such as command, ground, aviation, and combat service support, as well as a base support capability.

As for costs of relocating U.S. forces to Guam, the Governments of both Japan and the United States held consultations on how both sides should share such costs. At the Japan-U.S. defense summit meeting held in April 2006, both sides agreed on the sharing of costs for providing facilities and infrastructure involved in the relocation of U.S. forces to Guam, as described in Fig. III-2-2-14. (See 3 of this section)

c. Land Returns and Shared Use of Facilities

(a) Return of Significant Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base

The facilities and areas of USFJ are located in densely populated areas south of Kadena Air Base (approximately 1,500ha in total). Following the relocation and return of MCAS Futenma, and the transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam described before, the remaining facilities and areas in Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base.

In the Roadmap prepared in May 2006, Japan and the United States agreed to develop a detailed consolidation plan for the six candidate facilities (Camp Kuwae, Camp Zukeran, MCAS Futenma, Makiminato Service Area, Naha Port, and Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1). At present, the plan is under deliberation between both countries. (See Fig. III-2-2-8)

(b) Steady Implementation of the SACO Final Report

The steady implementation of the SACO Final Report prepared in 1996 is important because it aims to properly maintain the capabilities and readiness of USFJ and to reduce impacts of operations of U.S. forces on local residents of Okinawa. In the Roadmap, Japan and the United States agreed to the possibility that the SACO relocation and return initiatives may need to be re-evaluated.

(c) Shared Use of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Okinawa

The SDF has only a limited number of facilities in Okinawa, including Naha Air Base, and most of them are located in urbanized areas with some operational restriction. Therefore, the shared use of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa will greatly improve the training environment for SDF units in Okinawa, and facilitate bilateral training and interoperability between the SDF and U.S. forces. Some of the shared use will improve readiness and contribute to maintaining the safety of local residents at a time of disaster.

Based on such concepts, it was decided that Camp Hansen would be used for GSDF training, and training commenced in March 2008. ASDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. forces while taking into account noise impacts on local communities.

d. Relationships among Realignment Initiatives

Within the overall realignment package in the Roadmap, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected. Specifically, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena Air Base depend on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam. The III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: 1) tangible progress toward completion of the FRF; and 2) Japan's financial contribution to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam.

(3) Improvement of U.S. Army Japan Command and Control Capacity

The headquarters of U.S. Army Japan (USARJ) at Camp Zama (in Kanagawa Prefecture) was activated as the headquarters of the I Corps (Forward)/USARJ on December 19, 2007[8]. This transformation is based on the global realignment of USARJ as part of the overall transformation of U.S. forces. The transformed USARJ headquarters in Japan will continue to hold the same core mission of defending Japan and maintaining the peace and security of the Far East.

To enable rapid responses to various contingencies, the GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters that centrally controls mobile operation units and specialized units will relocate to Camp Zama by Japan Fiscal Year 2012 so that it may strengthen coordination with the transformed USARJ headquarters.

Along with the transformation of USARJ headquarters, a battle command training center and other support facilities will be constructed within U.S. Forces Sagami General Depot (SGD) (in Kanagawa Prefecture) using U.S. funding. In addition, measures will be implemented for more efficient and effective use of Camp Zama and SGD, including partial releases of facilities and areas.

(4) Yokota Air Base and Airspace

a. Establishment of the Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC)[9]

Enhancement of coordination between headquarters, combined with the transition to a joint operations structure, is quite important from the perspective of ensuring flexible and rapid responses of the SDF and U.S. forces. The headquarters of USFJ located at Yokota Air Base (in Tokyo) plays an important role in the various mechanisms[10] under the Guidelines. Therefore, along with the relocation of ASDF Air Defense Command as mentioned below, the Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC) is to be established and it is planned to complete construction/installation of facilities and infrastructure and to commence operations at the BJOCC by Japan Fiscal Year 2010.

ASDF controllers together with U.S. Air Force controllers at the Yokota RAPCON facility

b. Relocation of ASDF Air Defense Command

ASDF Air Defense Command located in Fuchu City, Tokyo has an air defense mission, and will function as a headquarters for BMD operations in the future. In the case of air defense and BMD, response time is very short. Therefore, it is quite important for the SDF and U.S. forces to immediately share necessary information. Thus, in Japan Fiscal Year 2010, ASDF Air Defense Command and its relevant units will relocate to Yokota

Air Base where the headquarters of U.S. 5th Air Force is located[11]. This arrangement and the establishment of the above-mentioned BJOCC will enhance coordination between headquarters of the SDF and U.S. forces, including the sharing of information concerning air defense and BMD.

c. Yokota Airspace

At Yokota Air Base, U.S. forces conduct radar approach control for the Yokota airspace spreading from the western part of the Tokyo Metropolitan area to Niigata Prefecture. To facilitate the operation of those civilian airplanes that have been forced to deviate from the airspace, however, the following measures are pursued.

(a) Establish a program in Japan Fiscal Year 2006 to inform commercial aviation entities of the existing procedure needed for transiting Yokota airspace.

(b) Develop a procedure in Japan Fiscal Year 2006 for temporary transfer of air traffic control responsibility to Japanese authorities for portions of Yokota airspace, when not required by military purposes.

(c) Return portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese authorities by September 2008 after having identified the returned portions by October 2006.

(d) Complete a study[12] of the conditions required for the possible return of the entire Yokota airspace by Japan Fiscal Year 2009.

In response, the procedure mentioned in (b) as above started in September 2006. The themes of 1) identification of the airspace portions to be returned by September 2008 and 2) collocation of U.S. forces and SDF controllers at the Yokota Radar Approach Control (Yokota RAPCON) facility have been examined by the Civil Aeronautics Subcommittee established under the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee, approved by the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee, and mutually agreed by the Governments of both countries, in October 2006. Once the airspace portions mentioned in above item 1) are returned to Japan, the airspace portion of the Yokota airspace adjoining the western part of Haneda International Airport will be reduced by approximately 40%. Further in connection with item 2), Japanese ASDF traffic controllers have been collocated at Yokota Air Base since May 2007.

The lessons learned from experiences with the collocation will be taken into account in the study of the conditions required for the possible return of the entire Yokota airspace. (See Fig. III-2-2-12)

d. Civilian-Military Dual Use of Yokota Air Base

At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held in May 2003, it was agreed that the feasibility of a civilian-military dual use of Yokota Air Base would be bilaterally studied by both governments. A Liaison Conference was then established as a working panel attended by ministries and agencies (the Cabinet Secretariat, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, the Defense Agency (now reorganized in the Ministry of Defense)), the Defense Facilities Administration Agency (at the time)) and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. Since then, discussions have been made.

The Governments of Japan and the United States have conducted a study, starting in October 2006, of the specific conditions and modalities in the study group, with the understanding that the dual use will not compromise military operations and safety[13] of Yokota Air Base, and based on further coordination and the outcome of the study, both governments will consult and then make appropriate decisions.

(5) Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni

a. Significance of Deployment of U.S. Aircraft Carriers

The presence of the U.S. Pacific Fleet plays an important role in maintaining the regional peace and stability, including the safety of its maritime traffic in the Asia-Pacific region. U.S. aircraft carriers are the core capability in the Fleet. To date, the U.S. aircraft carrier, Kitty Hawk, has been deployed to this region and has been visiting Yokosuka (in Kanagawa Prefecture). A homeport for the U.S. aircraft carrier needs to be provided in Japan to maintain the forward-deployed capabilities of the carrier and its aircraft for a long time.

Fig. III-2-2-12 Yokota Airspace



Japan and the United States agreed in June 2006 that the Government of Japan would carry out dredging work in the restricted water area of Yokosuka Naval Base in order to ensure safe operations of the nuclear aircraft carrier, George Washington, in preparation for the planned replacement of the U.S. aircraft carrier, Kitty Hawk, in Japan Fiscal Year 2008, and that dredging work was conducted.

b. Base for Carrier-Based Aircraft

When the U.S. aircraft carrier is deployed in Yokosuka, Atsugi Air Facility (in Kanagawa Prefecture) is currently used as a base for carrier-based aircraft. Since Atsugi Air Facility is located in the center of an urban district, noise of carrier jets taking off and landing particularly had been problems for a long time.

These problems should be resolved as soon as possible in order to stably maintain the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and the operations of carriers under the arrangements from now into the future.

After the completion of the runway relocation project at MCAS Iwakuni, the safe operations of aircraft will be possible in a less intrusive manner.

In consideration of these matters, Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons will be relocated from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni. This relocation, consisting of F/A-18, EA-6B, E-2C and C-2 aircraft (59 aircraft in total), will be completed by 2014, subsequent to the following: (1) completion of necessary facilities, and (2) adjustment of training airspace and the Iwakuni RAPCON airspace.

The relocations will be conducted after the runway is moved offshore to mitigate impacts of the increased operations at MCAS Iwakuni due to this relocation. Related measures will also be taken, including the relocation of JMSDF's EP-3 and other aircraft from MCAS Iwakuni to Atsugi Air Facility, the regular rotational deployment of KC-130 aircraft (which are to be relocated from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni) to JMSDF Kanoya Base and Guam, and the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters from MCAS Iwakuni to Guam.

It is expected that the area requiring residential noise-abatement work (so-called first category area) will decrease from approximately 1,600ha of present area to 500ha. Thus, the noise around MCAS Iwakuni will be alleviated. Furthermore, safety will be improved as the runway will be relocated offshore and approach and takeoff routes will be established above the water. (See Fig. III-2-2-8)

As for field-carrier landing practice (FCLP), a bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent field-carrier landing practice facility is to be established with the goal of selecting a permanent site by July 2009 or the earliest possible date thereafter. In addition, the SCC document confirmed that U.S. forces will continue to conduct field-carrier landing practice at Iwo Jima in accordance with the existing temporary arrangements until a permanent field-carrier landing practice training facility is identified.

c. Commercial Airport at MCAS Iwakuni

Considering that the local governments, including Yamaguchi Prefecture and Iwakuni City, have been working as one to request the reopening of a commercial airport, the Governments of Japan and the United States have been discussing within the framework of the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee to identify such issues as the relations between commercial aviation resumption and the operations of U.S. forces and to study its feasibility. As a result, in October 2005, it was agreed at the committee that commercial aviation operations of four round trips per day would be allowed as long as such operations do not compromise U.S. military operational requirements.

This issue was then dealt with during the discussions on the realignment of USFJ. Since it was agreed in the Roadmap that portions of the future civilian air facility would be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni, with coordination between Japan and the U.S., the locations of the civilian air facilities were indicated on the Master Plan of airfield facility developments which had been developed by the U.S., and the Ministry of Defense explained that to the local public governments in May 2007.

(6) Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

As confirmed in the examination on roles, missions and capabilities, Japan and the United States will continue close coordination on BMD as the two countries improve their respective BMD capabilities.

In June 2006 the new U.S. Forward Based X-Band Transportable (FBX-T) Radar System (AN/TPY-2; hereafter referred to as the "X-Band Radar System") with the sophisticated capability to search and track ballistic missiles was deployed to ASDF Shariki Air Station (in Aomori Prefecture) and operations commenced[14]. The data obtained by the X-Band Radar System will be shared by the two countries. Thereby, the capabilities to intercept missiles directed at Japan and capabilities for Japan's civil protection and consequence management will improve.

Also in October 2006 U.S. Army Patriot PAC-3 capabilities were deployed to Kadena Air Base and Kadena Ammunition Storage Area, and in addition Aegis-equipped cruisers, which are forward-deployed in the Western Pacific region, have been installed with BMD capabilities in turn since August 2006.

This deployment of U.S. forces' BMD capabilities to Japan contributes to the improvement of our country's defense against missile attacks, the maintenance of deterrence of USFJ and the safety of Japanese citizens.

(7) Training Relocation

Initially, aircraft from three U.S. facilities, Kadena Air Base, Misawa Air Base (in Aomori Prefecture) and MCAS Iwakuni will participate in relocated training conducted at the following SDF facilities: Chitose (in Hokkaido), Misawa, Hyakuri (in Ibaraki Prefecture), Komatsu (in Ishikawa Prefecture), Tsuiki and Nyutabaru.

Since March 2007, U.S. forces have conducted training relocation from Misawa Air Base, MCAS Iwakuni and Kadena Air Base to ASDF Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki, and Nyutabara Air Bases.

The Government of Japan is improving infrastructure for training relocation at SDF facilities as necessary after conducting site surveys.

U.S. Air Force F-16 fighter planes during training relocation to ASDF Hyakuri Air Base

Furthermore, the Regional Defense Bureaus are working to implement smooth training and have established local communications headquarters in cooperation with the ASDF and to support the U.S. military in the conduct of relocated training, by communicating with related local government organizations and responding to nearby citizens concerned about their peace and safety during training.

3. Initiatives for Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of USFJ

The previously mentioned Roadmap intends to enhance the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, maintain deterrence and capabilities, and contribute to the long-awaited reduction of burdens on local communities where USFJ facilities and areas are located.

In this connection, it is important to ensure the implementation of the efforts by the Government of Japan regarding realignment of U.S. forces structure in Japan and others approved by the Cabinet in May 2006. (See Reference 38)

The Law Concerning Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and Related SDF Forces (hereafter referred to as the "USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law") was passed in May 2007 and enacted on August 29, 2007. Following is a general description of that law.

1. Overview of the USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law

(1) Institutionalization of Provision of New Grants to Local Municipalities (Realignment Grant)

The realignment grant is a measure to be implemented by the Government for those local municipalities that accept increased burdens to implement the realignment of USFJ, in appreciation of their contribution to the maintenance of peace and security of Japan, and is needed for facilitating the smooth implementation of the realignment of USFJ.

The realignment grant is awarded for different purposes than expenses for measures around bases[15], which have been paid before, and will be used to improve the convenience of lives of residents in the local communities[16] where the realignment is implemented and to contribute to the promotion of local industries[17], during the period—10 years in principle—including time before and after the realignment.

The grant is awarded to related communities depending on the progress of USFJ realignment measures, after the Ministry of Defense has specified defense facilities and nearby communities. This mechanism is appropriate for the policy objective for the smooth implementation of the realignment of USFJ.

(2) Establishment of Exception to the Grant Rate for Public Works Projects, or Other Treatment

While burdens on local municipalities are increasing due to realignment, there are some whose burdens are extremely heavy, for example, due to the relocation of units with many aircraft. These municipalities will be required to carry out public works such as roads and ports promptly and special grant-rate measures targeted for such municipalities will contribute to a smooth implementation of the realignment. However, the public works as mentioned above will often be implemented by the national government or prefectures and, in some cases, will be limited to certain municipalities. It is feared that the public works may be infeasible with the realignment grant. Therefore, the USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law provides measures to promote industrial development for the region consisting of municipalities with heavy burdens and surrounding municipalities[18] (Special Area for Development concerning Realignment). (See Fig. III-2-2-13)

Fig. III-2-2-13 Exceptions to the Grant Rate for Public Works (examples)

Project Name[1]	Ordinary Grant Rate	Exceptions to the Grant Rate	
		Mainland	Okinawa
Roads	1/2	5.5/10	Rate prescribed by the Special Measures Law for Okinawa Development (9.5/10 and others)
Harbors	1/2 (4/10)[2]	5.5/10 (4.5/10)[2]	
Fishing ports	1/2	5.5/10	

Notes: 1. In addition, waterworks, sewage, land improvement and facilities for compulsory education are treated as exceptions.
2. The figures in parentheses show the examples of grant rates for the construction and improvement of small-scale water facilities, outlying facilities, and berthing facilities specified by the ordinance of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism as provided for in Article 42.1 of the Port and Harbor Law.

The provisions to promote regional development are as follows:

- ❍ A council chaired by Minister of Defense and consisted of relevant Ministers (Council for Local Development concerning Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and Related SDF Forces[19]) will be established under the Ministry of Defense.
- ❍ The Governor of a prefecture will apply to Minister of Defense for the designation of Special Area for Development concerning Realignment, and submit a development plan (Development Plan for Special Area for Development concerning Realignment-draft), including public works projects for roads, ports and others.
- ❍ Upon receipt of an application from the Governor of a prefecture, the Council will deliberate on the designation of Special Area for Development concerning Realignment and on the decision of a development plan for the area[20].

(3) Special Operations of Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and Other Measures

a. Reasons Why Japan Shares Expenses of Relocating U.S. Forces to Guam

The relocation of U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa out of the prefecture has been strongly desired by the residents of Okinawa Prefecture. It is important to realize the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam as soon as possible, which enables the reduction of burdens on Okinawa while maintaining the deterrence and capabilities of the USFJ.

Therefore, the Government of Japan has actively approached the United States to negotiate the relocation. As a result, the two countries agreed on the sharing of costs of the relocation. If the United States alone undertakes

the development of necessary facilities and infrastructure in Guam, the task is expected to take a very long time, despite the need to realize the relocation at an early date. Therefore, the Government of Japan decided to support the United States in its development of necessary facilities, including Marine headquarters buildings, barracks and family housing, and infrastructure. Japan will bear the cost for the relocation on the basis of actual requirement of facilities and infrastructure. In other words, Japan will not bear the cost based on a certain percentage of the total costs necessary for the relocation, which the United States requested in the negotiation.

Also, the development of family housing and infrastructure for Marine personnel will be funded by private finance initiatives by means of equity investment and loans so that the Government of Japan's financial burden may be reduced as much as possible. The funds for projects that are raised by private finance initiatives will be recovered by rents and service charges paid by the U.S. side in the future.

The agreed amounts of the costs of relocation to Guam to be shared by Japan and the United States are based on the estimation prepared by the U.S. side at the stage of study, and therefore such amounts are only rough estimate. To reduce and rationalize the amount of cost to be borne by Japan, it will be important for the Government of Japan to carefully examine concrete project schemes and the detailed estimate for spending.

Therefore, GOJ will take budgetary measures only after thorough examinations have been made in cooperation with JBIC and all efforts have been made to reduce the amount of costs required. (See Fig. III-2-2-14)

Fig. III-2-2-14 Breakdown of Cost of Relocating U.S. Forces to Guam

	Project	Sources	Amount	
Cost borne by Japan	Marine headquarters buildings, instruction buildings, barracks and QOL facilities including schools	(Direct) fiscal spending	$2.8 billion (upper limit)	
	Family housing	Equity investment	$1.5 billion	$2.55 billion
		Loans, etc.	$0.63 billion	
		Cost reduction by improved efficiency	$0.42 billion	
	Infrastructure (electricity, potable water and sewage, and waste disposal)	Loans, etc.	$0.74 billion	
	Total		$6.09 billion	
Cost borne by the United States	Helidromes, communication facilities, training support facilities, maintenance and refilling facilities, fuel and ammunition warehouses and other basic facilities	(Direct) fiscal spending	$3.18 billion	
	Roads (high-standard roads)	Loans or (direct) fiscal spending	$1 billion	
	Total		$4.18 billion	
Aggregate amount			$10.27 billion	

Notes: 1. The amounts and schemes are subject to change.
2. Japan is committed to sharing cost not according to the ratio to the total amount but based on the amount required for each of the facilities and infrastructures.
The cost will be further examined and thus upper limits are shown for (direct) fiscal spending.
3. As for family housing, the cost was reduced by $0.42 billion (by improved efficiency) from $2.55 billion to $2.13 billion.
4. As for equity investment and loans, the amount spent will be recovered through rents and fees paid by the United States.
5. The cost of moving the Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam and the cost for the Corps' activities in Guam are not included in the aggregate amount of $10.27 billion.

b. Outline of Special Financial Operations of JBIC

To properly and stably implement overseas projects for which private finance initiative is utilized for a long period, it will be necessary to employ the capability of JBIC which has expertise and experience in this field.

Therefore, it was decided to authorize JBIC to conduct financial services for facilitating the USFJ realignment as exceptional measures under the USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law, so that JBIC may make capital investments, loans and other operations that will be needed for projects to facilitate the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam, and to authorize the Government of Japan to take special financial measures for such operations. (See Fig. III-2-2-15)

Fig. III-2-2-15 Image of Project Scheme for Which Private Finance Initiative is Utilized



Notes: 1. SPE: Special Purpose Entity.
2. $1 in the U.S. housing privatization project.

(4) Measures for USFJ Local Employees

The employment of USFJ local employees may be adversely affected, because defense facilities will be returned, U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa will relocate to Guam, and other measures will be taken as a result of the realignment of USFJ.

Therefore, the Government of Japan decided to take measures to maintain the employment of USFJ local employees, including education and skill training.

(5) Validity of the Law

❍ The law shall be valid for 10 years.

❍ Despite the validity of the law, measures including special operations of JBIC shall remain effective for a considerable length of time.

2. Measures based on the USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law

Based on the USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law, 14 defense facilities and 33 municipalities were identified as realignment defense facilities and realignment municipalities qualified for realignment grants in October 2007, and in November 2007 three municipalities related to Camp Hansen were additionally identified, and Iwakuni City, Nago City and Ginoza Village were additionally identified in March 2008.

4. Various Measures Concerning USFJ Facilities and Areas

Ensuring the stable use of the USFJ facilities and areas is essential for the achievement of the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The Government of Japan has long been implementing measures to harmonize the stable use of these facilities and areas with requests of the surrounding local communities.

1. USFJ Facilities and Areas Located in Japan, Excluding Okinawa

(1) Iwakuni Runway Relocation Project

In response to requests of Iwakuni City and other local governments, the Government of Japan has decided to proceed with the project to relocate the runway approximately 1,000 meters to the east (offshore) in order to solve problems related to operations, safety and noise and to ensure the stable use of MCAS Iwakuni. (See 2 of this section)

Iwakuni Air Base runway relocation construction in progress

(2) Realignment of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture

Considering that local governments concerned and other organizations have strongly requested the return of USFJ facilities and areas in Kanagawa Prefecture, the Governments of Japan and the United States held consultations on the ideal state of these facilities and areas. As a result of consultations, the two countries reached a common understanding regarding a basic stance on the release of the six facilities and areas in Yokohama City, including Kamiseya Communication Station, and the construction of approximately 700 units of U.S. family housing in the Yokohama City portion of Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex. The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed upon the result of the consultation in October 2004.

The construction of U.S. family housing will: 1) pave the way for the extensive return of six USFJ facilities and areas (approximately 419ha in total) in Kanagawa Prefecture; and 2) solve the current housing shortage problem of U.S. Navy in Japan. In addition, it is essential to achieve the objectives of the Japan- U.S. Security Treaty. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense is making utmost efforts to realize the abovementioned housing construction through coordination with the United States and local governments concerned through such procedures as design and environmental impact assessment. (See Fig. III-2-2-16)

Of these six facilities and areas, the whole land area of Koshiba POL Depot was returned to Japan in December 2005. As for the remaining five facilities and areas, the Ministry of Defense will be attentive to the requests of related local governments concerning the use of land, and will ask the United States to return them as soon as possible.

2. USFJ Facilities and Areas in Okinawa

As of January 2008, approximately 74% of the area of USFJ facilities and area (for exclusive use) are concentrated in Okinawa Prefecture, and they take up approximately 10% of the area of the prefecture, and approximately 18% of the area of the main island of Okinawa. Therefore, the Cabinet and the Government as a whole are addressing the issues related to Okinawa as one of the most important tasks. The Ministry of Defense, for its own part, has so far been strongly committed to implementing a number of measures to resolve these issues, while at the same time, harmonizing the achievement of objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty with the requests of local communities.

Fig. III-2-2-16 Facilities and Areas Related to the Realignment of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture



Of these measures, the Ministry of Defense believes that the steady implementation of the proposals set out in the Final Report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), which was completed by the Governments of Japan and the United States, would be the most reliable way to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense is making efforts to realize the proper and rapid implementation of such proposals. (See 2 of this section)

(1) Efforts for Realignment, Consolidation and Reduction before the Establishment of SACO

When Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972, the Government of Japan provided 83 facilities and areas covering approximately 278km^2 for exclusive use by USFJ under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. However, their concentration in Okinawa has led to strong calls for their realignment and reduction on the grounds that regional promotion and development projects are restricted and the lives of residents are seriously affected.

In view of these circumstances, both countries have continued their efforts to realign, consolidate and reduce USFJ facilities and areas, focusing on issues that are strongly voiced by local communities. In light of the items identified by the joint statement issued by then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato of Japan and then President

Richard Nixon of the United States in 1972, a plan for the realignment and consolidation of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa was endorsed by the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held in 1973, 1974 and 1976. It was agreed at the meeting of the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee of 1990 that both sides would proceed with the necessary adjustments and procedures for the release of land, known as the 23 Issues.

Meanwhile, under the agreement reached at the Japan-U.S. Summit of 1995 regarding the so-called Three Okinawa Issues (the release of Naha Port, the return of Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, and the relocation of artillery live-fire training over Highway 104) strongly demanded by the residents of the prefecture, it was agreed that efforts would be made to resolve the issues. (See Reference 42)

(2) Circumstances Surrounding the Establishment of SACO and Other Matters

Public interest in Okinawa-related issues heightened across the country in response to an unfortunate incident that occurred in 1995 as well as the refusal of the then Governor of Okinawa to sign land lease renewal documents under the Special Measures Law for USFJ Land.

In the belief that the burden on the people of Okinawa should be reduced as much as possible and shared by the whole nation, the Government has, for the sake of future development of Okinawa, decided to put even greater efforts into bringing about steady progress in the realignment, consolidation and relocation of USFJ facilities and areas, and to do its utmost to take measures for industrial development in Okinawa. In order to hold consultations on issues related to USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa, the Government established the Okinawa Action Council between the central government and Okinawa Prefecture, and SACO between Japan and the United States in 1995.

Since then, the issues on Okinawa were intensely discussed for about one year, and the so-called SACO Final Report was compiled in 1996.

(3) Overview of the SACO Final Report and Progress

The SACO Final Report stipulates the return of land (the total return of six facilities, including MCAS Futenma, and the partial return of five others, such as the Northern Training Area), the adjustment of training and operational procedures (the termination of artillery live-fire training over Highway 104 and the dispersed implementation of similar live-fire training in maneuver areas on mainland Japan), the implementation of noise-reduction initiatives, and the improvement of operational procedures under the Status of Forces Agreement. The land to be returned based on the SACO Final Report represents approximately 21% (about 50km^2) of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa, exceeding the roughly 43km^2 of land returned during the period between the reversion of Okinawa and the implementation of the SACO Final Report.

The facilities and areas relating to the SACO Final Report and the major progress status are described in Fig. III-2-2-17 and Fig. III-2-2-18.

The changes in the numbers and area of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) as a result of the efforts described above are described in Fig. III-2-2-19.

The Ministry of Defense will continue to make its maximum efforts aiming at realizing the SACO Final Report with the understanding and support of local communities.

(4) Efforts for the Use of Returned Land Used for USFJ Facilities and Areas

On release of the land used for USFJ facilities and areas, the Ministry of Defense has taken measures to restore vacated land to its original state by removing buildings and structures, and to provide benefits for the owner of the land in accordance with the Special Measures Law for USFJ Land Release. Under the Special Measures Law for Okinawa Development (enforced in 2002), benefits are provided for the owner of large-scale vacated land or designated vacated land.

Fig. III-2-2-17 State of Progress of the SACO Final Report

[Return of Land]

1. Already Returned

Name of Facility (Project)	State of Progress
Aha Training Area (Return of total area)	❍ Totally returned in December 1998 (Cancellation of joint use)
Sobe Communication Site (Return of total area)	❍ April 1999: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on land return after the relocation of communication systems including communication facilities such as antennas and others to Camp Hansen ❍ March 2006: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on the release of land to which the Special Measures Law for USFJ Land was applied ❍ June 2006: Land to which the Special Measures Law for USFJ Land was applied (approx. 236m²) was returned ❍ December 2006: Remaining portion (approximately 53ha) returned (Sobe Communication Site totally returned [approximately 53ha])
Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (Return of total area)	❍ October 2002: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on land return after the relocation of the Sobe Communication Site ❍ May 2006: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on partial land return ❍ July 2006: Partially returned (approximately 138ha) ❍ December 2006: Remaining portion (approximately 53ha) returned (Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield totally returned [approximately 191ha])
Senaha Communication Station (Return of most area)	❍ March 2002: The Japan-U.S. Committee agreed on the return of most land after the relocation of communication systems including antennas and others to Torii Communication Station ❍ September 2006: Partially returned (approximately 61ha excluding the microwave tower portion) ❍ October 2006: The microwave tower portion consolidated into Torii Communication Station

2. Process for Return in Progress

Name of Facility (Project)	State of Progress
Northern Training Area (Return of more than half the area)	❍ April 1999: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on land return following the relocation of seven helicopter landing zones and others ❍ December 1998-March 2000: environmental survey (past year survey) ❍ November 2002-March 2004: environmental survey (continuous environmental survey) ❍ February 2006: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on the change of the agreement in April 1999 (Helicopter Landing Zones (HLZ): from 7 HLZs to 6 HLZs, reduction of the scale of the site preparation from 75m to 45m in diameter) ❍ February-August 2006: Environmental impact assessment document (draft) was released and examined, and the Governor of Okinawa expressed his opinion about the draft ❍ December 2006-March 2007: the Governor of Okinawa expressed his opinion on the final environment impact assessment document and the document was released and examined ❍ March 2007: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on the construction of the HLZs (three out of six) ❍ July 2007: Phase I of the construction of Helicopter Landing Zones started (three out of six) ❍ January 2008: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on conducting the construction of the Helicopter Landing Zones (Phase II: the remaining three zones)
Gimbaru Training Area (Return of total area)	❍ June 2007: The mayor of Kin announced the acceptance of the relocation of the Helicopter Landing Zones to Kin Blue Beach Training Area ❍ January 2008: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on land return after the HLZ was relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area, and the other facilities were relocated to Camp Hansen

3. Specific Measures Stated in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation

Name of Facility (Project)	State of Progress
Futenma Air Station (Return of total area → return of total area)	See Fig. III-2-2-10 "Background for the Construction of the Replacement Facility for Futenma Air Station" * May 2006: Completion of the replacement facility for Futenma Air Station (having two runways laid out in a "V"-shape) by 2014 aimed at in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation
Camp Kuwae (Return of most areas →return of total area)	❍ July 2002: Youth center was furnished ❍ March 2003: Part of northern side returned (approximately 38ha) ❍ January 2005: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on the relocation and construction of the Naval Hospital and others related facilities ❍ December 2006: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on the construction of the Naval Hospital *May 2006: Return of total area aimed at in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation ❍ February 2008: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on implementation of the construction of a switching station and a helicopter landing zone (Support facility to the Naval Hospital)

Makiminato Service Area (Return of partial area → return of total area)	*May 2006: Return of total area aimed at in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation
Naha Port Facility (Return of total area → return of total area)	❍ November 2001: Three Councils, such as the Consultative on the Relocation of Naha Port were established ❍ January 2003: Fourth meeting of the Consultative Body for the Relocation of Naha Port confirmed the site and configuration of the replacement facility ❍ July 2003: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee revised and agreed the site and configuration of the replacement facility that were agreed by the Committee in 1995 ❍ December 2007: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee revised and agreed the site and configuration of the replacement facility of Naha Port including additional staging area ❍ At present, consultation is being made at organizations including the Consultative Body for the Relocation of Naha Port *May 2006: Return of total area aimed at in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation
Housing Consolidation Camp Zukeran (Return of partial area → return of partial area)	(Phase I: Golf Range Area) (Camp Zukeran) ❍ April 1999: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on the relocation and construction of housing and other facilities ❍ July 2002: Two highrises were furnished ❍ July 2006: An underpass was furnished (Phase II: Sada Area) (Camp Zukeran) ❍ February 2002: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on the relocation and construction of housing and other facilities ❍ September 2005: Two highrises and 38 townhouses were furnished (Phase III: Eastern Chatan Area) (Camp Zukeran) ❍ March 2004: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on the relocation and construction of the housing units and others ❍ June 2008: 35 townhouses were furnished (Phase IV: Futenma and Upper Plaza Area)(Camp Zukeran) ❍ March 2005: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on the relocation and construction of the housing units and others ❍ At present, partial construction is being done *May 2006: Return of partial area aimed at in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation

[Adjustment of Training and Operation Methods]

Item	State of Progress
Relocation of Artillery Live-fire Training over Highway 104	❍ Relocated to five maneuver areas in mainland Japan in FY 1997
Parachute Drop Training	❍ Relocation training conducted at Iejima Auxiliary Airfield since July 2000

[Implementation of Noise Reduction Initiatives]

1. Already Implemented

Item	State of Progress
Installation of Noise Reduction Baffles at Kadena Air Base	❍ Furnished in July 2000

2. Implementation Underway

Item	State of Progress
Relocation of the U.S. Naval Ramp at Kadena Air Base	❍ June 2005: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on the relocation and improvement of the aircraft rinse facility ❍ January 2007: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on the construction of the aircraft rinse facility ❍ At present, basic study and other activities are being conducted concerning the construction of the facilities at the relocation sites of the Navy Ramp

3. Specific Measures Stated in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation

Item	State of Progress
Transfer of KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base	May 2006: United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation stated that the KC-130 squadron would be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities, and that the squadron would regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam

Fig. III-2-2-18 Facilities and Areas Relating to the SACO Final Report



Fig. III-2-2-19 Changes in Number and Area of USFJ Facilities and Areas (exclusive use) in Okinawa



Pursuant to the Policy toward Tasks in Each Field Related to Promotion and Facilitation of Utilizing Returned Land Used for MCAS Futenma, formulated in December 2001, related municipalities have been making efforts to establish returned land use plans. In February 2006, Okinawa Prefecture and Ginowan City established a basic policy for the use of returned land used for MCAS Futenma.

The Ministry of Defense will continue efforts to promote and facilitate the utilization of vacated land in coordination and cooperation with related ministries and prefectural and municipal governments.

Section 3. Policies and Measures for Enhancing Credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

It is necessary to make incessant efforts to ensure the continued effectiveness and enhance the credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. The following section explains the relevant measures other than those mentioned in the preceding section.

1. Japan-U.S. Policy Consultations

1. Major Forums for Japan-U.S. Consultations on Security

Close policy consultations on security are conducted through diplomatic channels as well as between officials in charge of defense and foreign affairs at multiple levels of the Governments of Japan and the United States through the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (so-called two-plus-two meeting), the Security Subcommittee (SSC) and the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC). The framework of these consultations is shown in Fig. III-2-3-1.

Fig. III-2-3-1 Major Fora for Japan-U.S. Security Consultations

Consultative Forum	Participants		Purpose	Legal Basis
	Japanese Side	U.S. Side		
Security Consultative Committee (SCC) ("2 + 2" Meeting)	Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense	U.S. Secretary of State, U.S. Secretary of Defense[1]	Study of matters which would promote understanding between the Japanese and U.S. Governments and contribute to the strengthening of cooperative relations in the areas of security, which form the basis of security and are related to security	Established on the basis of letters exchanged between the Prime Minister of Japan and the U.S. Secretary of State on January 19, 1960 in accordance with Article IV of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
Security Subcommittee (SSC)	Participants are not specified[2]	Participants are not specified[2]	Exchange of views on security issues of mutual concern to Japan and the United States	Article IV of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and others
Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC)[3]	Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Director-General of Bureau of Defense Policy, Director-General of Bureau of Operational Policy, Ministry of Defense, Representative from Joint Staff[4]	Assistant Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Representative from: U.S. Embassy in Japan, USFJ, Joint Staff, PACOM	Study and consideration of consultative measures to Japan and the United States including guidelines to ensure consistent joint responses covering the activities of the SDF and USFJ in emergencies	Established on July 8, 1976 as a sub-entry under the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee in its 16th meeting Reconstituted on June 28, 1996 in Japan-U.S. vice-ministerial consultation
Japan-U.S. Joint Committee (once every two weeks in principle)	Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Director-General of Bureau of Local Cooperation, Ministry of Defense and others	Vice Commander of USFJ, Minister and Counselor at the U.S. Embassy and others	Consultation concerning implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement	Article XXV of the Status of Forces Agreement

Notes: 1. The U.S. side was headed by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan and the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command before December 26, 1990.
2. Meetings are held from time to time between working-level officials of the two Governments, such as officials corresponding in rank to vice minister or assistant secretary.
3. A Council of Deputies consisting of Deputy-Director General and Deputy Assistant Secretaries was established when the SDC was recognized on June 28, 1996.
4. Then Director-General of the Bureau of Defense Operations was added on September 23, 1997.

In addition, the Ministry of Defense organizes Japan-U.S. defense ministerial meetings between the Minister of Defense of Japan and the U.S. Secretary of Defense as necessary where discussions are made with a focus on defense policies of the respective governments and defense cooperation.

Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense has held working-level meetings when necessary to exchange information with the U.S. Department of Defense and others under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. The importance of these opportunities has further increased as Japan-U.S. defense cooperation has been enhanced in recent years.

The sharing of information and views at every opportunity and level between Japan and the United States is undoubtedly conducive to increased credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, through further enhancement of close collaboration between the two countries. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense is proactively involved in these activities.

2. Recent Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States

The Japan-U.S. policy consultations (ministerial level) conducted since 2005 are shown in Fig. III-2-3-2. Defense Ministerial Meetings were conducted between then Defense Minister Koike and Secretary of Defense Gates on August 8, 2007 and between former Defense Minister Ishiba and Secretary of Defense Gates on November 8, 2007. Furthermore, utilizing the opportunity created by the 7th International Institute for Strategic Studies Asian Security Summit, former Defense Minister Ishiba and Secretary of Defense Gates held a Defense Ministerial Meeting in Singapore on May 31 of this year.

The two countries conduct consultations not only at a ministerial level but also at working levels.

(1) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (August 8, 2007)

The outline of the meeting held between then Defense Minister Koike and Secretary of Defense Gates is as follows.

a. Intelligence Security

Minister Koike expressed her recognition that intelligence security was the largest challenge for her term of office, and her commitment not only to the Defense Ministry's utmost efforts but also to government-wide efforts including those in areas of counter-intelligence. The two sides exchanged views on the importance for Japan and the U.S. to work together to strengthen intelligence security.

b. Realignment of USFJ

The two sides agreed on the early materialization of the realignment in accordance with the Roadmap.

The Japanese side stated after the submission of the Environmental Impact Assessment Scoping Document to Okinawa Prefecture, the Futenma Replacement Facility plan should proceed. Regarding areas south of Kadena, the Japanese side requested the early return of the maximum scale of land from Camp Zukeran upon which the U.S. side replied, saying they would work towards the return but many other considerations were necessary. The Japanese side also stated that the early relocation to Guam would be beneficial for both Japan and the U.S., bearing in mind financial efficiency. Both sides agreed on the continuous cooperation of the study group work for the joint use of Yokota Air Base.

c. Replacement of Fighters (F-X)

In response to a statement by the Japanese side of its wishes for future examinations on capabilities required for defense of Japan in the changing East Asian environment, the U.S. side commented that the F-X program was also an important issue to the U.S and suggested bilateral examinations on what capabilities were necessary for the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

Fig. III-2-3-2 Japan-U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (In and After 2005)

Date	Type of Consultation/Place	Participants	Outline and Results
February 19, 2005	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2" Meeting) /Washington, D.C.	Minister of State for Defense Ohno Foreign Minister Machimura Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld Secretary of State Rice	❍ Shared recognition on the situation of North Korea, and confirmed basic policies towards the peaceful solution to nuclear issues ❍ Agreed on deeper cooperation such as in information towards effective system management for missile defense ❍ Recognized the importance of deepening cooperation between Japan and the U.S. as part of measures taken by the international community ❍ Agreed on the acceleration of consultations for the review of the USFJ's force structure
June 4, 2005	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting /Singapore	Minister of State for Defense Ohno Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld	❍ Exchanged opinions on the roles, missions, and capabilities of the SDF and the U.S. Forces as well as on future consultations on the USFJ's force structure ❍ Appreciation expressed by the U.S. for SDF activities in Iraq and the Indian Ocean ❍ Exchanged opinions on the transparency of China's defense budget
October 29, 2005	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2" Meeting) /Washington, D.C.	Minister of State for Defense Ohno Foreign Minister Machimura Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld Secretary of State Rice	❍ Exchanged opinions on global security cooperation regarding Iraq and the fight against terrorism, and on the regional situations such as in China and North Korea ❍ Creation of the document titled "U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future" as a result of past bilateral talks about future alliance
January 17, 2006	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting /Washington, D.C.	Minister of State for Defense Nukaga Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld	❍ Agreed on the significance and importance of the U.S.-Japan Security Arrangements and on the acceleration of activities for successful alignment of U.S. Forces ❍ Minister of State for Defense Nukaga announced expectations of deliberation on the new U.S.-Japan Alliance ❍ Exchanged opinions on humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq and crimes committed by U.S. military personnel in Japan
April 23, 2006	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting /Washington, D.C.	Minister of State for Defense Nukaga Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld	❍ Discussed the cost of transferring the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam
May 1, 2006	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2" Meeting) /Washington, D.C.	Minister of State for Defense Nukaga Foreign Minister Aso Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld Secretary of State Rice	❍ Confirmed the importance of the U.S.-Japan Alliance and the importance of international cooperation regarding the fight against terrorism, and the recovery and democracy of Iraq ❍ Appreciation expressed by the U.S. for Japan's support including the dispatch of SDF personnel ❍ Exchanged opinions on Iran's nuclear issue and the situations in North Korea and China ❍ Final agreement on the realignment of forces, and an announcement of the document titled "United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation"
May 3, 2006	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting /Washington, D.C.	Minister of State for Defense Nukaga Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld	❍ Exchanged opinions on the specific measures to implement the finalized realignment plan
June 4, 2006	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting /Singapore	Minister of State for Defense Nukaga Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld	❍ Confirmed the significance of the final agreement on the U.S. Forces realignment
April 30, 2007	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting /Washington, D.C.	Minister of Defense Kyuma Secretary of Defense Gates	❍ Agreed on steadily implementing the respective realignment initiatives, securing information, enhancing operational cooperation in areas such as information sharing in BMD, and continuing to deliberate on the roles, missions, and capabilities

Date	Type of Consultation/Place	Participants	Outline and Results
May 1, 2007	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2" Meeting) /Washington, D.C.	Minister of Defense Kyuma Foreign Minister Aso Secretary of Defense Gates Secretary of State Rice	❍ Confirmed the steady implementation of the U.S. Forces realignment according to the Roadmap of May 2006 ❍ Confirmed the enhancement of BMD cooperation and operational cooperation, especially regarding intelligence cooperation ❍ Reconfirmed that the commitment of the United States to Japan's defense through various U.S. military capacities remains unchanged ❍ Disclosed the document titled "Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation"
August 8, 2007	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting /Washington, D.C.	Minister of Defense Koike Secretary of Defense Gates	❍ Agreed on the early realization of the U.S. Forces Realignment following the Roadmap of May 2006 which was created through U.S.-Japan consent ❍ Exchanged opinions on the enhancement of information security and the fight against terrorism
November 8, 2007	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting /Ministry of Defense	Minister of Defense Ishiba Secretary of Defense Gates	❍ Discussed the transformation of the Japan-U.S. Alliance adapting to the future along with specific topics such as replenishment-related activities in the Indian Ocean and the U.S. Forces Realignment ❍ Concerning the BMD, both countries confirmed their continuous cooperation, the deliberation of their roles, missions, and capabilities, and the importance of enhancing the effectiveness of their bilateral cooperation
May 31, 2008	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting /Singapore	Minister of Defense Ishiba Secretary of Defense Gates	❍ Agreed on continuous closely knit cooperation for the peace and stability of the international community such as resuming replenishment support in the Indian Ocean ❍ Reconfirmed the steady implementation following the Roadmap of May 2006 and exchanged opinions on future plans

d. War on Terror

The Japanese side stated that Japan must continue to play a crucial role in the war on terror, and explained the Government of Japan was deliberating on extending the valid term of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law due to the expiration in November 2007, and that this extension was essential for Japan to play its expected role in the international community. The U.S. side expressed its appraisal of Japan's contribution to the war on terror and stated that the U.S. was impressed with the dramatic development of the Japan-U.S. Alliance over the decade.

(2) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (November 8, 2007)

The outline for the meeting between former Defense Minister Ishiba and Secretary of Defense Gates is as follows.

a. International Security Environment

Regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, the Japanese side stated that the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, including not only nuclear facilities but also nuclear weapons, was vital for Japan's security. Both sides agreed on the importance of close cooperation between Japan and the U.S on the North Korean nuclear issue.

b. The Transformation of Alliance

The two sides agreed that in proceeding with deployment of the BMD system, effective operation would become essential, and that the security of intelligence the two countries share would be critically important for further enhancing Japan-U.S. defense cooperation, including BMD.

c. Refueling Mission in the Indian Ocean

The two sides reconfirmed the importance of the war on terror in the international society. Former Defense Minister Ishiba stated that the early resumption of the SDF's refueling mission in the Indian Ocean was important for the sake of Japan itself and in terms of contribution to the international society as well as the enhancement of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and expressed his desire to establish the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law at all costs. The U.S. side indicated its appraisal for Japan's contribution to the war on terror as well as its appreciation for the Japanese government's efforts for the early resumption of the SDF's activities.

Former Defense Minister Ishiba also mentioned that some support the idea of establishing so-called "the general legal framework," and commented he would like to raise "the general legal framework" as an important agenda, taking into consideration deepened discussions among both opposing political parties and the general public.

d. Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ

The two sides confirmed that the cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ was an important element for the smooth and effective operation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. Regarding the Special Measures Agreement, both sides agreed to aim for an early agreement.

e. U.S. Forces Realignment

The two sides confirmed that they would implement measures for the U.S. Forces realignment as a whole, including the relocation/return of MCAS Futenma, in accordance with the Japan-U.S. agreement, while the Japanese side requested the maximum return of Camp Zukeran regarding the return of land south of Kadena.

Also, both sides shared the view on the need for discussions from the aspect of maintenance of deterrence and capabilities, referring to the basic concept of the USFJ realignment, "maintenance of deterrence and capabilities and reduction of burden."

f. Roles, Missions and Capabilities

The two sides confirmed the importance of continuing the examinations on roles, missions and capabilities and enhancing bilateral cooperation effectiveness, and agreed to make continuous efforts of information sharing between Japan and the U.S.

(3) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (May 31, 2008)

The U.S. side expressed its high appreciation for the resumption of the SDF's refueling activities in the Indian Ocean at the meeting between Minister Ishiba and Secretary of Defense Gates. Both sides also agreed to work closely together for international peace and stability. Regarding the U.S. Forces realignment, both sides confirmed the importance of steady implementation in accordance with the Roadmap. Minister Ishiba mentioned two objectives of the U.S. Forces realignment, maintaining deterrence and capabilities, and reducing the burdens on local communities. He also stated that Japan and the U.S. needed to share necessary information and fulfill their accountability in order to implement the initiatives.



Former Defense Minister Ishiba and Defense Secretary Gates at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Talks (November 2007)

2. Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation and Policies to Ensure their Effectiveness

1. The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

In 1996, the reexamination of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation[21] was announced through the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security. With the announcement, Japan and the U.S. both reviewed the previous guidelines in order to enhance credibility towards Japan-U.S. security, and a new version of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (hereafter referred to as the "Guidelines") was acknowledged at the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (so-called the two-plus-two meeting) in September 1997. The outline is as follows. (See Reference 40)

(1) Objectives of the Guidelines

The Guidelines aim to create a solid basis for more effective and reliable Japan-U.S. cooperation under normal circumstances, in case of an armed attack against Japan and situations in areas surrounding Japan.

(2) Matters for Cooperation Prescribed in the Guidelines

a. Cooperation under Normal Circumstances

Both governments will maintain close cooperation for the defense of Japan and for the creation of a more stable international security environment, and will promote cooperation in various fields under normal circumstances. Such cooperation includes information sharing and policy consultations; security dialogues and defense exchanges; U.N. Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) and international humanitarian operations; bilateral defense planning, and mutual cooperation planning; enhancing bilateral exercises and training; and establishing a bilateral coordination mechanism.

b. Actions in Response to Armed Attack against Japan

Bilateral actions in response to an armed attack against Japan remain a core aspect of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation. As can be seen in Fig. III-2-3-3, the SDF will take initiative in defense operations[22] while the U.S. forces conduct operations to supplement and support the SDF's operations based on respective concepts of operations in a coordinated manner.

Fig. III-2-3-3 Concept of Operations When an Armed Attack against Japan Takes Place

<table>
<tr><th colspan="2">Operations</th><th>Operations of Self-Defense Forces</th><th>Operations of U.S. Forces</th></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Operations to counter air attack against Japan</td><td>❍ Will have primary responsibilities for conducting operations for air defense</td><td>❍ Will support SDF operations
❍ Will conduct operations, including those which may involve the use of strike power, to supplement SDF capabilities</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Operations to defend surrounding waters and to protect sea lines of communication</td><td>❍ Will have primary responsibilities for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan, for the protection of ships in surrounding waters and for other operations</td><td>❍ Will support SDF operations
❍ Will conduct operations, including those which may provide additional mobility and strike power, to supplement SDF capabilities</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Operations to counter airborne and seaborne invasions of Japan</td><td>❍ Will have primary responsibilities for conducting operations to check and repel such invasions</td><td>❍ Will primarily conduct operations to supplement SDF capabilities
〔The U.S. will introduce reinforcements at the earliest possible stage, according to the scale, type and other factors of invasion and will support SDF operations〕</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">Responses to other threats</td><td>Guerrilla-commando type attacks or any other unconventional attacks involving military infiltration of Japanese territory</td><td>❍ Will have primary responsibilities to check and repel such attacks at the earliest possible stage. In its operations, the SDF will cooperate and coordinate closely with relevant agencies</td><td>❍ Will support the SDF in appropriate ways depending on the situation</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Ballistic missile attacks</td><td colspan="2">❍ Will cooperate and coordinate closely to respond to such attacks</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">❍ Will provide Japan with necessary intelligence
❍ Will consider, as necessary, use of forces providing additional strike power</td></tr>
</table>

c. Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

The Governments of both Japan and the United States will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent situations in areas surrounding Japan[23] from occurring. Functions and fields of cooperation and examples of items of cooperation in such situations are shown in Fig. III-2-3-4.

Fig. III-2-3-4 Function and Fields and Examples of Items for Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

Functions and Fields			Examples of Items for Cooperation
Cooperation in activities initiated by either Government	Relief activities and measures to deal with refugees		❍ Transportation of personnel and supplies to the affected area ❍ Medical services, communications and transportation in the affected area ❍ Relief and transfer operations for refugees and provision of emergency materials to refugees
	Search and rescue		❍ Search and rescue operations in Japanese territory and at sea around Japan and information sharing related to such operations
	Noncombatant evacuation operations		❍ Information sharing and communication with, and assembly and transportation of noncombatants ❍ Use of SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports by U.S. aircraft and vessels for transportation of noncombatants ❍ Customs, immigration and quarantine of noncombatants upon entry into Japan ❍ Assistance to noncombatants in such matters as temporary accommodations, transportation and medical services in Japan
	Activities for ensuring effectiveness of economic sanctions for maintenance of international peace and stability		❍ Inspection of ships based on U.N. Security Council resolutions for ensuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions and activities related to such inspections ❍ Intelligence sharing
Japan's support for activities by U.S. Forces	Use of facilities		❍ Use of SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports for supplies and other purposes by U.S. aircraft and vessels ❍ Reservation of spaces for loading/unloading of personnel and materials by the U.S. and of storage areas at SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports ❍ Extension of operating hours for SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports for use by U.S. aircraft and vessels ❍ Use of SDF facilities by U.S. aircraft ❍ Provision of training and exercise areas ❍ Construction of offices, accommodations, etc. inside U.S. facilities and areas
	Rear area support	Supplies	❍ Provision of materials (except weapons and ammunition) and POL (petroleum, oil and lubricants) to U.S. aircraft and vessels at SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports ❍ Provision of materials (except weapons and ammunition) and POL (petroleum, oil and lubricants) to U.S. facilities and areas
		Transportation	❍ Land, sea and air transportation of personnel, materials and POL inside Japan ❍ Sea transportation of personnel, materials and POL to U.S. vessels on the high seas ❍ Use of vehicles and cranes for transportation of personnel, materials and POL
		Maintenance	❍ Repair and maintenance of U.S. aircraft, vessels and vehicles ❍ Provision of repair parts ❍ Temporary provision of tools and materials for maintenance
		Medical services	❍ Medical treatment of casualties inside Japan ❍ Transportation of casualties inside Japan ❍ Provision of medical supply
		Security	❍ Security of U.S. facilities and areas ❍ Maritime surveillance around U.S. facilities and civilian airports and ports ❍ Security of transportation routes inside Japan ❍ Intelligence sharing
		Communications	❍ Provision of frequencies (including those for satellite communications) and equipment for communications among relevant Japanese and U.S. agencies
		Others	❍ Support for port entry/exit by U.S. vessels ❍ Loading/unloading of materials at SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports ❍ Sewage disposal, water supply and electricity inside U.S. facilities and areas ❍ Temporary increase of workers at U.S. facilities and areas
Japan-U.S. operational cooperation	Surveillance		❍ Intelligence sharing
	Minesweeping		❍ Minesweeping operations in Japanese territory and on the high seas around Japan, and intelligence sharing on mines
	Sea and airspace management		❍ Maritime traffic coordination in and around Japan in response to increased sea traffic ❍ Air traffic control and airspace management in and around Japan

(3) Bilateral Programs under the Guidelines

In order to promote Japan-U.S. cooperation under the Guidelines in an effective manner and to achieve positive results without fail, the two countries need to hold consultative dialogues throughout the spectrum of security conditions mentioned above. In addition, both sides must be well informed at various levels and undertake appropriate coordination to attain such objectives. To that end, the two governments will strengthen their information and intelligence-sharing and policy consultations by taking advantage of all available opportunities, and will establish the following two mechanisms for facilitation of consultations, policy coordination, and coordination of operations and activity areas.

a. Comprehensive Mechanism

The Comprehensive Mechanism has been created so that not only the SDF and U.S. forces but also the relevant agencies of the respective governments conduct bilateral works based on the Guidelines under normal circumstances. In the comprehensive mechanism, bilateral work such as bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning will be conducted to respond smoothly and effectively to armed attacks against Japan and to situations in areas surrounding Japan. (See Fig. III-2-3-5)

b. Coordination Mechanism

The coordination mechanism, established in 2000, is being set up in normal circumstances so that the two countries may coordinate their respective activities in the event of an armed attack against Japan and in situations in areas surrounding Japan. (See Fig. III-2-3-6)

2. Various Policies for Ensuring the Effectiveness of the Guidelines

(1) Measures for Ensuring the Effectiveness of the Guidelines

In order to secure effectiveness of the Guidelines, it is important to properly take necessary measures, including legal ones, regarding Japan-U.S. cooperation in case of armed attack situations and situations in areas surrounding Japan. From this perspective, it is necessary for the Government of Japan as a whole to collaborate in advancing bilateral work between Japan and the United States, including examination of bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning of the Guidelines in peacetime.

Laws such as the Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and the Ship Inspection Operations Law are being established in light of Japan-U.S. cooperation in areas surrounding Japan.

Also, measures are being taken to facilitate U.S. force operations as a part of strengthening of security-cooperation legislation for situations such as armed attacks.

(2) Outline of the Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and the Ship Inspection Operations Law

The Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan establishes the measures that Japan will implement in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan and the actual implementation procedures. The Ship Inspection Operations Law provides for the types, measures and other matters of ship inspection operations implemented by Japan in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan. Its outline is as follows.

The Prime Minister, facing a situation in areas surrounding Japan and deeming it necessary to adopt measures including such SDF activities as rear area support[24], rear area search and rescue operations, and ship inspection operations, must request a Cabinet decision on such measures and on a draft basic plan of response measures.

Fig. III-2-3-5 Structure of the Comprehensive Mechanism



The Prime Minister must obtain prior approval, or ex post facto approval in case of emergency, from the Diet in order for the SDF to conduct response measures.

In accordance with the basic plan, the Minister of Defense will draw up an implementation guideline (including designation of implementation areas), obtain approval for the guideline from the Prime Minister, and give the SDF orders to conduct rear area support, rear area search and rescue activities, and ship inspection operations.

Heads of relevant administrative organizations will implement response measures and may request the heads of local governments to provide the necessary cooperation for the organizations to exercise their authorities in accordance with relevant laws and regulations and the basic plan. In addition, the heads of relevant administrative organizations may ask persons other than those from the national government to cooperate as necessary in accordance with relevant laws and regulations and the basic plan[25].

Fig. III-2-3-6 Framework of Coordination Mechanism



The Prime Minister reports to the Diet without delay when the Cabinet has made a decision or approved its revision, or when the response measures have been completed.

(3) Rear Area Support

Rear area support means support measures, including the provision of goods, services and conveniences, given by Japan in rear areas to U.S. Forces conducting activities that contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in situations in areas surrounding Japan. (Article 3, Paragraph 1, Item 1 of the Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan)

As rear area support, the SDF provides goods and services, including supplies, transportation, repair, maintenance, medical services, communications, airport and seaport activities and base activities.

(4) Rear Area Search and Rescue Operations

Rear area search and rescue operations mean operations conducted by Japan in situations in areas surrounding Japan to search and rescue those who engage in combat and are shot down in rear areas (including transporting

those rescued). (Article 3, Paragraph 1, Item 2 of the Law concerning the Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan).

If one does not engage but still faces a mishap he/she will be also rescued. In addition, if there is anyone in the territorial waters of a foreign country adjacent to the implementation area in which the SDF is conducting activities, the SDF will also rescue that person, after having obtained approval from that foreign country. However, this is limited to cases in which no combat operations are conducted at that time and are expected to be conducted in the waters throughout the period during which the SDF conducts rescue activities.

(5) Ship Inspection Operations

Ship inspection operations mean operations conducted by Japan in situations in areas surrounding Japan to inspect and confirm the cargo and destination of ships (excluding warships and others[26]) and to request, if necessary a change of sea route, or destination port or place, for the purpose of strictly enforcing the regulatory measures concerning trade or other economic activities to which Japan is a party. These activities are conducted based on the U.N. Security Council Resolution or the consent of the flag state[27] in the territorial waters of Japan or in the surrounding high seas (including the EEZ[28]) (Article 2 of the Ship Inspection Operations Law).

3. Japan-U.S. Bilateral Training and Exercises

Bilateral training and exercises conducted by the SDF and U.S. Forces are useful for enhancing their respective tactical skills[29]. Bilateral training and exercises are also indispensable as a means of facilitating mutual understanding and close communication under normal circumstances, thereby improving interoperability and ensuring the smooth conduct of Japan-U.S. bilateral actions. In addition, it is important for the SDF to conduct necessary trainings for collaboration and coordination between the SDF and U.S. Forces in normal circumstances so that the SDF may carry out the missions conferred by the Law concerning the Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, and other laws. Such efforts serve to maintain and enhance the credibility and deterrent effect of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

Therefore, the SDF has conducted a variety of bilateral training and exercises with U.S. Forces, and maintains a policy to enhance these training and exercises in the future. For example, Joint Staff Office and units from the GSDF, MSDF, ASDF and U.S. Forces participated in the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint Training Exercise last November, which was the first field exercise after transferring to a joint operations posture. Bilateral joint operations capabilities were maintained and enhanced through actual training on the coordination procedures among the three SDF forces as well as between SDF and U.S. Forces in cases of armed attack situations in Japan and the surrounding areas. (See Reference 41)

GSDF and U.S. Army personnel conducting command post exercise

ASDF E-2C early warning and control aircraft and F-2 fighter make a flight formation with U.S. Air Force F-16 fighter during the exercise “Cope North” in Guam

4. The Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between Japan and the United States (ACSA)

The basic principle of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between Japan and the United States (ACSA)[30] is that if either side requests the provision of goods or services, the other side should provide these goods or services[31]. The Agreement is designed to positively contribute to the smooth and effective operation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and to efforts for international peace made under the leadership of the United Nations. Its scope of application includes various occasions such as bilateral training and exercises in peacetime, U.N. PKOs, situations in areas surrounding Japan, and armed attack situations. (See Fig. III-2-3-7)

Fig. III-2-3-7 Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)



5. Mutual Exchanges of Equipment and Technology

There is need for both Japan and the U.S. to aggressively promote cooperation in areas of equipment and technology while bearing in mind the maintenance of Japan's technology and production base and the mutual cooperation principle based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America.

In view of the progress in technological cooperation between Japan and the United States, the improvement of technological level, and other factors, Japan decided to transfer its military technology to the United States despite the provisions of the Three Principles on Armed Exports and other regulations. And, in 1983, Japan concluded the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America[32]. In June 2006, the Governments of Japan and the United States concluded the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America[33] to replace the foregoing Exchange of Notes. (See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 2)

Under these frameworks, the Government of Japan has decided to provide the United States with 17 items of arms and military technology, including portable surface-to-air missile (PSAM) technology and weapon technologies related to joint technological research on BMD.

Japan and the United States consult with each other at forums such as the Systems and Technology Forum (S&TF), which provides opportunities for exchanging opinions about military equipment and technology, and

Former Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Eto holds a press conference after the SM-3 test launch (Hawaii, July 2007)

conduct cooperative research and development regarding the specific projects agreed upon at the forums. Since 1992, the two countries have concluded the joint project agreement, and conducted 17 joint projects, 11 of which have been completed. Japan-U.S. cooperation in military equipment and technology is significant for improving interoperability and reducing R&D costs and risks, and the two countries have been examining the possibility of expanding joint research projects in the future. (See Fig. III-2-3-8)

Fig. III-2-3-8 Japan-U.S. Joint Research Projects

Item	Summary	Time of Conclusion, Agreed upon by the Japanese and U.S. Governments, on the Implementation of Japan-U.S. Joint Research Projects	Time of Completion
Ducted Rocket Engine	Research into basic technology for the secondary combustion of solid liquid fuel through the injection of air from an external source	September 1992	January 1999
Advanced Steel Technology	Research into basic technology for the welding of extra-high-strength steel used in the pressure hulls of submarines and others	October 1995	January 2002
Fighting Vehicle Propulsion Technology Using Ceramic Materials	Research into basic technology related to diesel engine using ceramic materials	October 1995	October 2002
Eye-Safe Laser Radar	Research into basic technology related to LIDAR systems using eye-safe frequencies	September 1996	September 2001
Ejection Seat	Modification work to supplement combat aircraft ejector seats with pilot-restraint devices and seat-stabilizing equipment	March 1998	March 2003
Advanced Hybrid Propulsion Technology	Research into basic technology related to thrust-controllable propulsion devices made up of solid fuel and liquid oxidizers	May 1998	May 2005
Shallow Water Acoustic Technology	Research related to the analysis of characteristics of transmittance of sound waves in shallow sea regions, and the reflection of sound waves on the seabed	June 1999	February 2003
Ballistic Missile Defense Technology	Research related to the Navy's Theater Wide Defense System's (Current Sea-Based Midcourse Defense System) four principal missile components (infrared seeker, kinetic warhead, second stage rocket motor and nose cone)	August 1999	March 2008
Low-Vulnerability Gun Propellant for Field Artillery	Research related to the development of gunpowder that avoids unintentional secondary explosions of the gunpowder at the time of bombing	March 2000	January 2004
Avionics Aboard the Follow-on Aircraft to the P-3C	Research into onboard avionics of the MSDF's next P-3C fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft (P-X) and the U.S. Navy's future Multi-purpose Maritime Aircraft (MMA) for better interoperability	March 2002	September 2006
Software Radio	Research into basic technologies of software radio, which enables primary radio functions through software	March 2002	March 2007
Advanced Hull Material/Structural Technology	Research into hull system of vessels improved in its stealth feature and survivability by utilizing advanced materials/structural technology	April 2005	Ongoing
Sea-Based Radar System	Research on the Phased Array Radar technology for ships that applies high-power semiconductor device	April 2006	Ongoing
Combat System for Ship	Research on improving the information processing ability by applying the open architecture technology to the combat system for ship	April 2006	Ongoing
New Guided Missiles for Ballistic Missile Defense	Development of new ship-based guided missiles for ballistic missile defense to improve the existing capability to counter threats caused by ballistic missiles and to deal with diversification of ballistic missiles with higher performance	June 2006	Ongoing
Effect on People by Aircraft Fuel and/or Engine Emission	Research on the aircraft fuel (JP-4 and/or JP-8) and/or engine emission effects on people	March 2007	Ongoing
Palm-sized automated chemical agent detector	Research on palm-sized automated chemical agent detector of simplified control and treating methods with quick and accurate detection, and its test and evaluation technique	March 2008	Ongoing

6. Measures to Ensure the Smooth Stationing of USFJ

The stationing of USFJ forms the core of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and also demonstrates the U.S.'s deep commitment to Japan and the Asia-Pacific region. The USFJ has been contributing to the peace and stability of the region in various ways. In particular, their presence itself is considered to function as a visible deterrent. Thus, the Government of Japan has already taken various measures to ensure the smooth stationing of USFJ and enhance the credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

1. Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ

(1) Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ

The cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ is important to ensure the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. From this point of view, the Government of Japan has made efforts as much as possible within the scope of the Status of Forces Agreement or based on the Special Measures Agreement[34], with due consideration for its financial situation and other factors. At present, the Ministry of Defense bears cost for the stationing of USFJ. (See Fig. III-2-3-9)

Fig. III-2-3-9 Outline of Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ

Item	Outline	Ground
Costs for Facilities Improvement Program (FIP)[1]	❍ Barracks, family housing, environmental facilities, etc. have been constructed in the USFJ facilities and areas by the Japanese side since JFY 1979 and furnished to USFJ	Within the framework of the Status of Forces Agreement
Labor costs	❍ Welfare costs, etc. since JFY 1978 and pay that exceeds the one equal to the pay conditions of national public employees since JFY 1979 have been borne by the Japanese side	Within the framework of the Status of Forces Agreement
	❍ Eight kinds of allowances such as Adjustment Allowance have been borne by the Japanese side since JFY 1987	Special Measures Agreement (JFY 1987)
	❍ Basic pay, etc. have been borne by the Japanese side since JFY 1991 (By gradually increasing the costs borne by the Japanese side, the total amount has been borne within the scope of the upper limit of the number of workers since JFY 1995)	Special Measures Agreement (JFY 1991)
Utilities costs	❍ Fee or charge for electricity, gas, water supply, sewerage and fuels (for heating, cooking or hot water supply) have been borne by the GOJ since JFY 1991 (By gradually increasing the costs borne by the GOJ, the total amount has been borne within the scope of the upper limit of the procured quantity since JFY 1995)	Special Measures Agreement (JFY 1991)
	❍ The upper limit of the procured quantity provided in the Special Measures Agreement (JFY 1996) has been cut by 10% after subtracting the quantity of the off-base U.S. residential housing since JFY 2001	Special Measures Agreement (JFY 2001)
	❍ The GOJ will bear the costs for fuels etc. equivalent to the JFY 2007 budget of 25.3 billion yen for JFY 2008, and those equivalent to 24.9 billion yen, a reduction of 1.5% from the JFY 2007 budget for JFY 2009 and 2010	Special Measures Agreement (JFY 2008)
Training relocation costs	❍ Additionally required costs incident to the relocation of the training requested by the GOJ have been borne by the GOJ since JFY 1996	Special Measures Agreement (JFY 1996)

Note: Concerning the costs for FIP, the Government of Japan formulated "Criteria for adopting the FIP projects" to make an effort for efficiency in implementation of FIP as follows: 1) Concerning facilities contributing to the improvement of foundation for the stationing of USFJ (bachelor housing, family housing and others), the Government of Japan improves those facilities steadily by considering necessity, urgency and other factors; and 2) Concerning welfare facilities such as recreational facilities and entertainment-oriented facilities, the Government of Japan especially scrutinizes the necessity and refrains from newly adopting the facilities regarded as entertainment-oriented and profitable (shopping malls and others).

Under the new SMA put into effect this May, the sharing of labor costs and training relocation costs will be maintained within a framework of the previous SMA; while utilities costs will be reduced at a fixed rate. The new agreement also states that the U.S. Government will make further efforts to economize its expenditures. Furthermore, an agreement was made between the U.S. and Japanese Governments for a comprehensive review of cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ in order to enhance its efficiency and effectiveness.

(2) Review of USFJ Local Employee Wages (Abolishment of USFJ Differential, etc.)

Taking into consideration a working environment with a different language and customs, Japan had borne USFJ differential and language allowance. However, it was decided that these allowances, which are not authorized for National Public Service personnel, would be abolished in JFY 2008 from a viewpoint of rationality of the wage system due to the drastic changes in social circumstances since around the early 1950s when they were first introduced, while the uniqueness of working at a USFJ facility under the control of U.S. military personnel is still recognized.

Additionally, it was decided to reduce the retirement allowance to a level for national public employees from JFY 2008 following the reform of the retirement allowance system for national public employees in 2005.

Taking into consideration the length of implementation of these systems, which have become a part of cost-of-living pay, Japan guarantees the present wage levels for incumbent employees and enforces measures to minimize drastic change for five years, which will be reviewed in five years. (See Column (USFJ Local Employees))

Fig. III-2-3-10 Outline of Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ (JFY 2008 Budget)



Note: Numbers in ( ) represent the relative composition within the whole.

(3) Measures taken in Addition to Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ

In addition to the cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ, the Government of Japan bears the necessary costs for USFJ facilities and areas (rental fees for facilities and others), takes measures to improve the living environment in the surrounding areas of these facilities and areas, and devises relief measures for the unemployment of USFJ local employees. A base subsidy[35] and others are provided to the municipalities as a substitute for property tax. (See Fig. III-2-3-10)

2. Ensuring the Stable Use of USFJ Facilities and Areas

The Government has concluded lease contracts with owners of private and public land on which these facilities and areas exist in order to ensure the stable use of necessary U.S. facilities and areas. However, should the Government be unable to obtain the approval of land owners, it will acquire a title[37] under the Special Measures Law for USFJ Land[36].

In addition, the Government has promoted measures related to USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) in order to balance between accomplishing objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and meeting requests of the surrounding communities. (See Section 2-4)

Moreover, in the vicinities of U.S. facilities and areas, the incidents and accidents caused by U.S. military personnel, etc.,[38] such as the assault incident by U.S. Marine Corps personnel in February 2008 in Okinawa, have affected local residents.

The Government of Japan has requested USFJ to take effective measures for the prevention of recurrence, such as educating personnel and enforcing strict discipline among them, and is cooperating in preventive measures. The Government of Japan has also taken measures for prompt and appropriate compensation for the damage caused by such incidents and accidents.

3. Efforts to Preserve the Environment Surrounding USFJ Facilities and Areas

Concerning environmental issues surrounding USFJ facilities and areas, at the two-plus-two meeting held in September 2000, the Governments of Japan and the United States, in recognition of the importance of environmental protection associated with USFJ facilities and areas, agreed to make it a common purpose to ensure the health and safety of U.S. Forces personnel and their dependents, and announced the Joint Statement of Environmental Principles[39]. In order to follow up on this statement, Japan-U.S. consultations have been more frequently held. Specifically, related ministries and agencies have been engaged in discussions regarding strengthened cooperation at the time of periodic reviews of the Japan Environmental Governing Standards (JEGS)[40], exchange of environmental information, and response to environmental contamination in collaboration with each other. In addition, at the two-plus-two meeting held in May 2006, the two countries confirmed the importance of improved implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), including proper attention to the environment.

Since September 2006, Japanese and U.S. officials have held working-level meetings on disaster prevention and safety measures for nuclear aircraft carriers keeping the replacements of the carriers in mind, and the Japan-U.S. joint exercise was conducted last November with the participation of governmental organizations, the city of Yokosuka and the U.S. Navy.

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

USFJ Local Employees

Paragraph 4, Article XII of the Status of Forces Agreement states that the local labor requirement shall be satisfied with the assistance of Japanese authorities. Under this provision, the Government of Japan hires USFJ local employees[1] to work at USFJ facilities as office clerks, technicians, drivers, security guards, mariners who perform non-combat duties aboard U.S. ships, the home ports of which are in Japan, waiters and sales staff in cafeterias, shops, etc. within the Headquarters and units, etc. of USFJ, and other roles required by the USFJ.

Throughout Japan, there are 25,260 people working at USFJ bases as USFJ employees (as of March 31, 2008). These employees play an extremely important role by helping to ensure the smooth and effective operation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, which are a pillar of Japan's defense.



U.S. Fleet Activities, Yokosuka (Kanagawa)

1) Besides the USFJ, the USFJ local employees are also hired in various organizations established with the U.S. Government's non-appropriated funds, such as the PX, cafeterias, etc. for the welfare of military personnel, civilian personnel and their families.

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of SDF Personnel who Completed a Flight Training Course with the U.S. Air Force

Lieutenant Junior Grade Nobutake Kimura
Navigation Student
Flight Training Squadron 23, ASDF

When I heard them say "You're a foreigner, what can you do?" I was frustrated by the reality of my helplessness, and felt extremely disgraced. The remarks were not blatant discrimination; I was told this after I had made mistakes during training and been slow to understand the instructor's directions.

The fact that it was the United States was not the particular reason for my difficulties, but emotionally these were very tough times for me.

However, not everything was bad.

My flight training course with the United States Air Force allowed me to see the world.

I was given an inside look at the most powerful Air Force in the world from which I was able to watch conflicts and troop movements all over the world. Conflicts are steeped in complex relationships that involve a wide-range of factors such as politics and economics, religion, and history, and from my training in this course, I was able to grasp things from an even broader range of perspectives.

Lieutenant Junior Grade Kimura boarding the cockpit of the U.S. Air Force AT-38 training aircraft

Moreover, I forged relationships with people from around the world who also took part in the U.S. training which I will treasure for the rest of my life.

At the end of the training, I received an award for excellence. I was very proud to have my efforts recognized in this way. But even after receiving the award, I felt my existence would be meaningless if I were to fail a mission, therefore, I plan to spare no effort in achieving my next goal.

I returned to Japan from the United States, and my goal now is to graduate from the F-15 flight training course and become a full-fledged pilot within my squadron.

As an additional option for the future, I have been considering applying to the test pilot school in the United States. I would be able to make use of research at graduate school (School of General Policy Studies, Department of Policy/Media Research) and my flight training experience in the United States, which could lead to my potential involvement in the development of future fighter aircraft.

The U.S. flight training course allows you to master flying techniques, while at the same time, to master English at a high level. The improved English ability of one individual ultimately contributes to overall organizational strength. I strongly believe that personnel who have the opportunity should take this course—the things you gain are of extremely great value.

Notes:

1) The official title is the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America.
2) In addition to Japan, the U.S. has formed security alliances based on treaties with the Republic of Korea and the Philippines in the East Asia region.
3) One of the occasions for policy talks between Japan and the United States of America which is attended by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of State for Defense from Japan, and the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense from the United States. (See Section 3, Fig. III-2-3-1)
4) Signed and concluded on August 10, 2007.
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/hosho/kyotei_0708.html>
5) Accordingly, the previous Cabinet decision designating the "coastal area of Henoko in Nago City in the Camp Schwab Water Area" as the construction site was abolished. (See Reference 38)
6) The members of this Council Meeting are the Chief Cabinet Secretary; the Minister of State in Charge of Okinawa and Affairs Related to the Northern Territories; the Minister of Defense; the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications; the Minister for Foreign Affairs; the Minister of Finance; the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology; the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare; the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry; the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport; the Minister of the Environment; the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture; the Mayor of Nago City; the Mayor of Ginoza Village; the Mayor of Kin Town; and the Mayor of Higashi Village.
7) Units to relocate include: III MEF Command Element, 3rd Marine Division Headquarters, 3rd Marine Logistics Group (formerly known as Force Service Support Group) Headquarters, 1st Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine Regiment Headquarters. The affected units will relocate from such facilities as Camp Courtney, Camp Hansen, Futenma Air Station, Camp Zukeran, and Makiminato Service Area.
8) According to the U.S. there will be 90 personnel there by the end of September 2008, and they are examining personnel plans and other matters beyond that time.
9) Concerning air defense and BMD, the BJOCC will fulfill functions to facilitate bilateral actions for the defense of Japan by making close coordination between headquarters and share information of SDF and U.S. Forces thereby improving interoperability.
10) See Section 3-2.
11) The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed in July 2007 on the joint use of land for the headquarters building, etc.
12) This study will be conducted as part of a comprehensive study of options for related airspace reconfigurations and changes in air traffic control procedures that would satisfy future patterns of civilian and military demand for use of Japanese airspace.
13) According to the Roadmap, the study will be completed by the Study Group within 12 months of the time it is begun.
14) The radar was thereafter transferred to the neighboring U.S. Shariki Communication Site.
15) Measures have been implemented to prevent and reduce burdens under the Law on Improvement Around Defense Facilities.
16) Under the Special Measures Law for the Realignment of USFJ and SDF, the changes of composition of units of those naval vessels that conduct operations in synchronization with USFJ air wings subject to realignment (replacement of the aircraft carrier at Yokosuka Naval Base with a nuclear aircraft carrier) will be treated as the same as the realignment of USFJ.
17) The scope of specific projects includes 14 projects identified by Article 2 of the enforcement ordinance of

the USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law including educational, sports and cultural projects.

18) Surrounding municipalities are limited to those for which it is considered necessary to implement promotional measures in conjunction with municipalities with heavy burdens in consideration of natural, economic and social conditions.

19) Chairman: Minister of Defense; Relevant Ministers; Chief Cabinet Secretary; Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications; Minister for Foreign Affairs; Minister of Finance; Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology; Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare; Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry; Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport; Minister of the Environment; and Ministers of State specifically designated by the Prime Minister.

20) As for public works projects under the Development Plan for Special Area for Development concerning Realignment that have been deliberated and approved at the Council, the percentage of costs borne by the Government, or grant rate, will apply to the seven projects concerning road, ports, fishing ports, water supply, sewage system, land reform, and facilities for compulsory education that should be immediately implemented in consideration of the particulars and degree of adverse influences caused by the realignment of USFJ on local communities will be higher than those for ordinary cases.

21) The Former Guidelines created in 1978. These guidelines stipulate the cooperation between Japan and the United States to effectively achieve the goals stated in the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

22) Operations conducted to interdict an enemy's offensive and to prevent their purpose from being achieved.

23) Situations that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security, including situations that could develop into a direct armed attack against Japan if left unaddressed. (Article 1 of the Law concerning the Measures for Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan)

24) The term "Rear Area" refers to Japan's territorial waters and international waters surrounding Japan (including the exclusive economic zone up to 200 nautical miles (or approximately 370km) from the baseline of the territorial waters) in which no combat operations are conducted at that time and no combat operations are expected to be conducted throughout the period when the rear activities are carried out, and the space over these international waters.

25) If any person other than the central government who had been requested to cooperate has suffered a loss as a result of such cooperation, the Government shall take necessary fiscal measures for the loss.

26) Warships, and such vessels that are possessed or operated by foreign governments and are exclusively used for non-commercial purposes.

27) The state that has the right to fly its flag as prescribed in Article 91 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

28) Article 1 of the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf.
See <http://law.e-gov.go.jp/H08/H08H0074.html>

29) The capabilities required to operate a unit of a certain size in addition to the use of individual items of equipment.

30) The official title is the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America.

31) The categories of supplies and services as provided under the Agreement include: food; water; billeting; transportation (including airlift); petroleum, oil and lubricant; clothing; communications; medical services; base support; storage; use of facilities; training services; spare parts and components; repair and maintenance; airport and seaport services; and ammunition (only in armed attack situations and anticipated situations) (weapons are not included).

32) The official title is the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United

States of America under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America.

33) The official title is the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America.

34) The official title is the Agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning New Special Measures relating to Article XXIV of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan.

35) Provided by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.

36) The official title is the Law for Special Measures Regarding the Use and Expropriation of Land, etc., Incidental to the Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan.

37) The term “title” means a legal cause that justifies a certain act.

38) The total number of these incidents and accidents stood at 1,512 in JFY 2007, of which about 90% are traffic accidents. These incidents and accidents have been on the decrease since JFY 2003.

39) Consists of 1) environmental governing standards; 2) information exchange and access; 3) responses to environmental pollution; and 4) consultation on the environment.

40) The Japan Environmental Governing Standards (JEGS) is an environmental governing standard prepared by USFJ to guarantee that USFJ activities and facilities can protect the health of the people and the natural environment. The JEGS provides the methods to handle and store environmental pollutants.

Part III

Measures for Defense of Japan

Chapter 3

Improvement of the International Security Environment

Section 1. Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities
Section 2. Promotion of Security Dialogue and Defense Exchanges
Section 3. Efforts for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

Section 1. Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities

At present, the international community faces a range of global-scale problems, such as international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, complex and various conflicts and international crimes. Globalization has raised concerns that the occurrence of events even in regions far from Japan will pose a threat to the country or have an impact on the country.

In light of the difficulty for a single country to respond to and solve these global threats and the need to take an approach to addressing these threats not only on the military front but also on various other fronts, it is widely recognized that the international community should join hands in coping with these threats.

On the basis of the efforts made by the international community, Japan's defense and security goals set forth in the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) are to improve the international security environment to reduce the potential threats to Japan. As a result, the NDPG also states that Japan will promote diplomatic efforts including the use of Official Development Assistance (ODA), and, proactively and on its own initiative, Japan will work on activities that nations of the world cooperatively undertake to enhance the international security environment (hereinafter referred to as "international peace cooperation activities").

Upon the transition from the Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense in January 2007, missions of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) were reviewed and the international peace cooperation activities were stipulated as a primary mission. (See Part II, Chapter 1, Section 4-2)

This chapter will explain Japan's efforts at international peace cooperation activities undertaken by the Defense Ministry and the SDF on such activities on the basis of the NDPG, and also their details. (See Fig. III-3-1-1)

Fig. III-3-1-1 International Peace Cooperation Activities Conducted by the Self-Defense Forces



1. Proactive Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities on Japan's Own Initiative

1. History of Japan's Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities

The Persian Gulf War became a major turning point for prompting Japan to recognize the need to promote international cooperation on the military front. The SDF dispatched a minesweeping unit of the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) to the Persian Gulf in 1991 to ensure the safe passage of Japanese vessels. For Japan, this dispatch meant, an international contribution on the human front with the purpose of peaceful and humanitarian support for the reconstruction of devastated, and war-affected countries. In 1992, the International Peace Cooperation Law[1] was enacted and Japan subsequently dispatched Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) personnel to Cambodia in September of the same year as the country's first participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations. Since then, the Defense Ministry and the SDF have proactively and on its own initiative participated in various international peace cooperation activities in an effort to improve the international security environment.

The September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States led to the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law[2], and the succeeding law, the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law[3], was enacted in January 2008. The MSDF has been conducting refueling operations in the Indian Ocean on the basis of these laws. Moreover, in 2003, Japan enacted the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq[4]. As a result, the GSDF provided medical care, water supply and assistance for the recovery and improvement of public infrastructure such as schools and roads. At present, the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) transports supplies for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance from its base in Kuwait. (See Fig. III-3-1-2)

2. Systems to Effectively Undertake International Peace Cooperation Activities

In order to undertake international peace cooperation activities proactively and on its own initiative, the SDF must continue establishing various systems. In March 2008, the GSDF established the Central Readiness Force Regiment under the Central Readiness Force, so that Japan can quickly and appropriately dispatch the Central Readiness Regiment for international peace cooperation activities as an advance unit to carry out operations smoothly on the ground. In addition, the SDF designates regional armies whose personnel are to be dispatched on a rotational basis, and will continue to improve defense equipment and transport capacity so as to bolster the system for quick and appropriate responses in international peace cooperation activities. Moreover, the so-called "general law" for international peace cooperation, which is currently the subject of active debate, is thought to become a very important issue hereafter. (See Part II, Chapter 1, Section 4-3)

Former Parliamentary Secretary for Defense Akimoto gives instructions for the dispatch of the MSDF vessel *Oumi*

3. Welfare and Mental Health Care of Dispatched SDF Personnel

It is extremely important to make preparations so that the dispatched SDF personnel, who are expected to fulfill their assigned duty under severe working conditions while being far away from their home country and their families, can effectively fulfill such duty while maintaining both their physical and mental health.

The Defense Ministry and the SDF have taken various measures to ease away deep anxiety of SDF members being dispatched overseas for participation in international peace cooperation activities and of their families in

Fig. III-3-1-2 Comprehensive Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities

Item	International Peace Cooperation Law	The Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq	Replenishment Support Special Measures Law
Purpose	❍ Active contribution to U.N.-centered efforts toward international peace	❍ Active and proactive contribution to the effort by the international community to support and encourage the independent efforts by the Iraqi people toward the prompt reconstruction of the State of Iraq ❍ Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community including Japan through the reconstruction of Iraq	❍ Active and proactive contribution to the efforts of the international community to prevent and eradicate international terrorism ❍ Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community including Japan
Provisions in the SDF Law	❍ Provision under Article 84-4 (Chapter 6) of the SDF Law	❍ Provisions under the Supplementary provisions of the SDF Law	❍ Provisions under the Supplementary provisions of the SDF Law
Major Activities	❍ International peacekeeping activities ❍ Humanitarian international relief activities ❍ International election monitoring activities ❍ Supplies cooperation for the above-mentioned activities	❍ Humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities ❍ Support activities for ensuring security	❍ Replenishment Support Activities
Activity Areas	❍ Areas excluding Japan (including the high seas) (A ceasefire agreement between the parties of the dispute and an agreement of the receiving country are required.)	❍ Territories of Japan ❍ Territories of foreign countries (An agreement of the agency in charge of administration is required in the relevant countries and in Iraq)[1] ❍ High seas and the airspace above[1]	❍ Territories of Japan ❍ Territories of foreign countries (limited to the Indian Ocean State etc.) (An agreement of the relevant countries is required)[1] ❍ High seas (limited to the Indian Ocean etc.) and the airspace above[1]
Diet Approval	❍ To be discussed in the Diet in advance, as a general rule, about the implementation by the SDF of the peacekeeping operation of the peacekeeping force[2]	❍ To be discussed in the Diet within 20 days from the day the measures start about the response measures by the SDF[2]	[3]
Diet Report	❍ Report about the details of the implementation plan and others without delay	❍ Report about the details of the basic plan and others without delay	❍ Report about the details of the implementation plan and others without delay

Notes: 1. Limited to areas where combat is not taking place or not expected to take place while Japan's activities are being implemented.
2. In cases such as when the Diet is closed, an approval shall be promptly requested in the Diet being first summoned thereafter.
3. As prescribed by Law, (1) The category and nature of operations shall be limited to supply only. (2) The range of the area where operations can be implemented, including the overseas destinations of dispatched forces, shall be regulated by Law so when these actions are implemented, it shall not be necessary to once again obtain the approval of the Diet, and therefore there are no provisions relating to the acquisition of Diet approval.

Japan so that the members can devote themselves to undertaking assigned duties without worry.

For example, welfare services are provided for the dispatched SDF members to help them maintain close bonds with their families in Japan. Specifically, direct communication between the dispatched SDF members and their families in Japan is ensured via international phone calls, TV telephones, e-mail and other services, and the SDF members and their families can exchange video correspondence. Moreover, briefing sessions for families of the dispatched members have been held to provide them with necessary information, and family support centers and family counseling rooms have been established to respond to various questions raised by the families.

The SDF also offers mental healthcare services such as a course on stress reduction methods for SDF members scheduled to be dispatched overseas. Moreover, engaging in overseas missions, dispatched SDF members can consult other SDF members who have been designated as counselors after undergoing specialized training. Such counselors provide the dispatched members with sufficient mental care. In addition, medical officers accompany the SDF units engaged in overseas missions. The Defense Ministry is prepared to send qualified psychiatrists from Japan or return sickened personnel for full treatment if necessary.

2. Cooperation in Global Efforts to Reconstruct Iraq

1. Details and Significance of Japan's Efforts to Support Iraqi Reconstruction

Major combat operations have ended in Iraq, and the international community is redoubling its efforts to help rebuild the country, following the adoption of the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483[5] and subsequent resolutions since May 2003. The reconstruction of Iraq is extremely important for ensuring peace and security in the international community including Japan, as well as for attaining peace and security for the Iraqi people and the Middle East. Japan began dispatching SDF units to the Middle East in December 2003 based on the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, approved in the Diet

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of SDF Personnel who Participated in Replenishment Activities in the Indian Ocean

Petty Officer First Class Takahide Kai
Destroyer *Murasame*, MSDF
(Currently 21st Air Squadron)

I was stationed on board the destroyer *Murasame* as an SH-60K patrol helicopter pilot and engaged in replenishment activities in the Indian Ocean.

The main missions of helicopters engaging in replenishment activities were reconnaissance of oilers' courses and surveillance of ships. This was a flight in actual operation where we prepared for contingencies by loading ourselves with unusual equipment, carrying live rounds, wearing bullet-proof vests, and installing bullet-proof seats, etc. Under the scorching sun, the temperature inside the aircraft rose to well over 40ºC, and we had to periodically hydrate ourselves to prevent heat stroke. An unthinkable precaution in Japan had been necessary. Furthermore, I was extremely sensitive due to the adverse effects on the aircraft's devices as a result of sandstorms, high temperatures and humidity, which occurred every two or three days.

It was my first deployment to the Indian Ocean, therefore I encountered various hardships because of the unfamiliar surroundings. However, during the first support activities when we supplied fuel to the Pakistani Marines' vessel, they were very pleased at the resumption of MSDF support activities, displaying the national flag of Japan and playing the national anthem of Japan "Kimi ga yo" in the background. This appreciation humbled me and made me truly aware of the contribution of our activities to international peace cooperation efforts. At the moment, I also realized that working as a member of the international community along with other cooperating countries is also for Japan's own benefit.

Petty Officer First Class Kai standing on the destroyer *Murasame* (Indian Ocean)

Replenishment at sea from supply vessel *Oumi* to Pakistani Marines' vessel (February 21, 2008)

in July of the same year. The dispatched SDF units have conducted operations for humanitarian assistance in cooperation with support provided by Official Development Assistance.

The SDF units have also been assisting troops of foreign countries in their efforts to restore security and stability in Iraq to the degree that would not hamper the units' humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities.

Japan's cooperation activities play a vital role in preventing Iraq from becoming a hotbed of terrorism and helping the country to rebuild itself so that it can become a peaceful, democratic and responsible country, paving the foundation for Japan and Iraq to establish favorable relations in the future. They are not only instrumental in stabilizing the overall Middle East but also are extremely important for Japan because the situation in the Middle East region directly affects the prosperity and stability of Japan, which relies on the region for nearly 90% of its petroleum.

Personnel see out aircraft leaving for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq

Japan's humanitarian contribution to the activities along with the U.S. for the reconstruction of Iraq has further cemented the relationship of mutual confidence between Japan and the U.S., helping to strengthen their bilateral security alliance.

Japan's support to help rebuild Iraq has garnered acclaim both from the international community and the Iraqi people. It plays a significant role in not only achieving closer and more effective security cooperation between Japan and the U.S., but also enhancing trust in Japan by the international community.

2. Outline of the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq and the Basic Plan

(1) Outline of the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq

Japan believes that it is important to ensure that the results of its reconstruction assistance are firmly rooted and to work toward building a broad, long-term partnership with Iraq. The Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, or the Iraq Special Measures Law, is intended to allow Japan to implement activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance and support activities for ensuring security in line with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483 and others. It is also designed for Japan to proactively and voluntarily contribute to global efforts for the reconstruction of Iraq in order to promote the peace and security of the international community, including Japan.

In light of the continued assistance to Iraq offered by the U.N. and the multinational force, such as the adoption in November 2006 of the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1723 extending the authority of the multinational force for one year at the request of the Iraqi Government, Japan decided in June 2007 to extend the effective term of the Iraq Special Measures Law by two years to July 31, 2009. (See Fig. III-3-1-3)

(2) Outline of the Basic Plan

The Basic Plan stipulated basic policies, the range of aid activities, their contents, the scope of areas where such activities are undertaken, and other matters regarding response measures Japan is to take in line with the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq. The Government deemed it necessary for Japan to conduct activities commensurate to its international status in order to fulfill

its responsibility in the international community, and the Cabinet approved the Basic Plan in December 2003. Initially, the Basic Plan stipulated the dispatch of SDF troops to Iraq for up to one year, but acting on an independent assessment based on the Iraqi situation, Japan revised the Basic Plan a total of 10 times in order to extend the duration of the SDF's humanitarian assistance activities in Iraq, to withdraw GSDF units from the country and to enable the ASDF to engage in missions in support of U.N. operations. (See Reference 44) (See Fig. III-3-1-4)

Fig. III-3-1-3 Contents of Activities Based on the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq

Classification	Content of Activity
Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance Activities	❍ Medical services ❍ Assistance in helping return of victims of the Iraq war as well as provision of food, clothing, medicines and other daily necessities, and construction of accommodation facilities of the victims ❍ Restoration and upgrading of facilities needed to help improve the welfare of victims of the Iraq war and to help reconstruct Iraq, and improvement of natural environments ❍ Advice and instruction on clerical administrative work ❍ Transport, construction and goods supply to support humanitarian relief activities for victims of the Iraq war, to relieve the damage of the war and to help reconstruct Iraq
Support Activities for Ensuring Security	❍ Medical service, transport works, goods supply and other activities provided by Japan in support of efforts by U.N. member countries to help ensure security and safety in Iraq

Notes: 1. The activities that are to be (were) implemented by the SDF are underlined.
2. The water supply activity conducted by the GSDF dispatched troops in Iraq is included in the "goods supply" of the humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities listed above.

Fig. III-3-1-4 Outline of Basic Plan Regarding Response Measures Based on Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq

Implementation Items		Implementation Outline
Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance Activities	Types and description	Transport of goods and materials used for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance
	Geographical areas	Airstrip facilities in Kuwait and Iraq (aircraft)
	Scales, composition of SDF troops and their equipment	❍ Up to eight transport and other aircraft, and personnel for operating such aircraft ❍ Necessary amount of pistols, rifles and machine guns for securing safety
	Duration of dispatch	Through July 31, 2009
Support Activities for Ensuring Security		Medical services, transportation, storage, telecommunications, construction, repair, maintenance, supply and sanitation can be conducted as support activities for ensuring security within a scope that does not affect humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities

3. SDF Operations

Since December 2003, the SDF, based on the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, has provided humanitarian and reconstruction support to the country such as medical care, water supply, restoration and improvement of public infrastructure such as schools and roads, and transportation of personnel and aid materials for the local people facing hardship. In June 2006, the Government of Japan concluded that Iraq was capable of carrying out reconstruction independently by its own people, and thus ended the GSDF operations, which had lasted for about two and a half years in Al-Muthanna Province. (See Reference 46-47)

Meanwhile, an ASDF squadron continues to assist in the reconstruction and stabilization of Iraq, providing airlift support to the U.N. as requested by the U.N. Secretary-General as well as to the multinational force. As of July 2, 2008, the number of airlifting operations by the ASDF for the Iraqi mission totaled 729 times, which transported 603.6 tons of goods and materials. The SDF personnel contribution and the Government's Official Development Assistance (ODA) under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been carried out in tandem, and such efforts to support Iraq, having produced visible results, have garnered high acclaim from the international community, including Iraq.

In addition, the SDF has dispatched liaison and other officers[6] to the U.S. Central Command in the state of Florida and to the multinational force headquarters in Baghdad to gather information necessary for SDF operations being undertaken based on the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq and to make various coordination with the U.S. Central Command and the multinational force.

4. Evaluation of Japan's Efforts by Other Countries

Japan's activities for the reconstruction of Iraq have garnered acclaim and gratitude from Iraq and other countries, as mentioned below. A public opinion poll conducted by the Samawah local newspaper Uruku and the Asahi Shimbun of Japan showed that about 70% of respondents supported the Japanese operations. (As of August 2006)

(1) Evaluation in Iraq

In his letter addressed to then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on March 12, 2007, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki said airlifting activities by Japan's ASDF for the U.N. and the multinational force have been playing a major and vital role in Iraq's efforts to promote reconstruction and nation rebuilding. In the letter, the Iraqi Prime Minister also requested Japan to consider renewing its support activities in Iraq. During his visit to Japan in April 2007, Prime Minister al-Maliki commended the ASDF's airlifting activities as what encourages the Iraqi people and expressed gratitude for Japan's contribution to rebuilding Iraq.

(2) Evaluation by the United Nations

In a letter delivered to then Prime Minister Abe in March 2007, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon expressed gratitude for Japan's airlifting operations, saying that the airlift service has been of particular importance in supporting UNAMI's Area Office in Erbil.

In March 2007, Ashraf Qazi, the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Iraq, expressed appreciation for the ASDF's airlift operations and asked for Japan's continued engagement in a letter to the Japanese Acting Ambassador to Iraq.

(3) Evaluation by Other Countries

U.S. President George W. Bush thanked then Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi during their summit meeting in June 2006 for Japan's humanitarian reconstruction assistance efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and for

Japan's support to the multinational force operations in the Indian Ocean.

Prior to that, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Japan in July 2004 and highly commended Japan for its contribution to rebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan. Rice also stated that Japan's assistance in Iraq has greatly helped the Iraqi people.

Furthermore, during the Japan-U.S. Defense Chiefs' Meeting in January 2006 between then U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and then Japanese Minister of State for Defense Fukushiro Nukaga, Rumsfeld highly appreciated Japan's past efforts in Iraq. Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz, who also serves as Inspector General and Minister of Defense and Aviation, meeting with then Prime Minister Koizumi in April 2006, expressed his high evaluation of Japan's efforts to reconstruct and stabilize Iraq and his gratitude for its contribution in the country.

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of SDF Personnel working in the Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, Airlift Wing

Lieutenant Colonel Hitoshi Sakauchi
Medical Squadron, Air Base Group, 1st Air Wing, JASDF
(Then Medical Squadron Leader, Iraq Reconstruction Support Airlift Wing)

The proud and fulfilled faces of SDF members who returned to Japan from overseas missions impressed me, and I thought "I want to do something, too," so I applied for it.



Lieutenant Colonel Sakauchi conducting a dental examination

As Medical Squadron Leader, I was in charge of the health management, including medical treatment of Squadron members. In addition to the treatment (medical and dental), the Medical Squadron was responsible for medical exams and Squadron member training, such as lifesaving methods and mental healthcare. We also maintained readiness to respond to emergency situations and critical patients. Nevertheless, we were busy every day, and I think this four-month tour was physically and mentally hard particularly for the sole medical officer (Medical Squadron Assistant Leader) in charge of medical treatment.

In Iraq, we were able to actively participate in rescue drills with U.S. military medical corps. It was valuable experience to be involved in training to deal with unexpected situations with other countries that we are rarely able to do in Japan. Although there were some communication barriers with the U.S. Air Force medical team, thanks to the face-to-face training, I think we were able to build a strong relationship. As a result, when a critical patient arose, we received prompt cooperation for examination and transportation.

I feel proud to have served in such international peace cooperation activities. What's more, I am very grateful to my subordinates who assisted with administrative duties during my absence, and for the support of my wife and relatives who promptly responded when I resolved to volunteer for such overseas duty.

Technical Sergeant Masahiro Nomura
Headquarters, Maintenance Supply Group,
1st Tactical Airlift Wing, JASDF
(Then Maintenance Squadron, Iraq Reconstruction Support Airlift Wing)

Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait, where I am stationed, is surrounded by desert as far as I can see. This was a totally different world from anything I had experienced: a wasteland where sandstorms dance, a dry climate and strong sunlight, and a wide range of temperature that can vary about 40ºC between midday and night.

Technical Sergeant Nomura coordinating airframe maintenance operations

I was posted here voluntarily of course. My reason for volunteering is that I wanted to fulfill my duty to contribute to the reconstruction of Iraq and stability in the Middle East as a member of the international community.

As maintenance coordination personnel for the C-130H transport plane, in order to conduct efficient maintenance, I make maintenance plans, allocate work to each maintenance technician, and maintain and manage the operational state of each plane.

I am greatly satisfied when the blue-gray C-130H planes that other colleagues and I maintain safely finish their flight assignment, and in the moment when they return to the base, I am filled with relief as I say to the plane, "You flew well again today!"

After the plane lands, I immediately tackle the maintenance for the next day's assignment and it is a daily occurrence that the darkness of night creeps up on me without notice. Maintenance operations in Kuwait lack sufficient tools and maintenance equipment, but maintenance staffs make up for the inadequacies of the situation by overcoming problems with "guts" and "ingenuity" to send off our beloved planes daily into the skies over Iraq. I want to further refine my skills as maintenance personnel and fulfill our duties involving international peace cooperation activities with complete preparedness.

3. Activities Responding to International Terrorism

1. Efforts of International Community

Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the international community has been fighting terrorism not only on the military front but also on diplomatic, police, judicial, intelligence and economic fronts. However, the threat of terrorist attacks prevails in the international community in light of the outbreak of a series of suspected terrorist acts[7] in various parts of the world by international terrorist organizations including Al Qaeda. Due to these circumstances, it is imperative that the international community continues the long-term effort in a consolidated manner in order to fully eradicate terrorism.

Strongholds of terrorist groups like Al Qaeda are believed to exist along the national border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. As Afghanistan continues to serve as a production center for narcotics, a source of major funding for terrorist activities, the U.S. military and others have been conducting mopping-up operations against forces of Al Qaeda and the Taliban in the region under Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). (See Fig. III-3-1-5)

A number of countries have dispatched troops to Afghanistan (as of May 2008) to take part in the U.S.-led operation in an attempt to stamp out terrorists in the region. But some groups with suspected links to terrorist organizations who are believed to be involved in narcotics and weapons trafficking may have escaped from the region via mountainous

Fig. III-3-1-5 Dispersion of Terrorists and Outline of OEF (conceptual image)



areas and moved to the sea. These groups are believed to have already moved by sea to wider areas like the Middle East, Africa, Europe or Southeast Asia and may be engaging in terrorist activities in those regions.

The international community has been engaged in maritime interdiction operations in the Indian Ocean in order to block and deter the movement of terrorists, weapons, ammunition and narcotics – a major funding source for terrorism. At present, U.S., European, Pakistani, and other countries' warships are operating in this area. These activities such as making radio inquiries and conducting on-the-spot inspections of suspicious boats have already achieved accomplishments such as detecting and confiscating a large amount of narcotics, firearms, and portable anti-tank rockets.

In addition, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been trying to maintain security in Afghanistan and rebuild[8] the country, reflecting the determination by the international community to prevent it from reverting to a hotbed of terrorism.

2. Japan's Efforts in the Fight Against Terrorism

At a time when the international community stands united in the fight against terrorism, it is necessary for Japan to reinforce its efforts to combat terrorism in collaboration with other countries as well. Based on this concept, Japan is making anti-terrorism efforts[9] on various fronts.

For example, the replenishment activities conducted by the MSDF in the Indian Ocean have become an important basis for vessels of other countries to conduct MIOs in these waters, and have earned high acclaim from the international community. In addition to the U.S., U.K., France and Germany, Pakistan, which is an Islamic country, is participating in the MIOs. In the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1776 adopted in September 2007, praise for Operation Enduring Freedom including MIOs was expressed as contributions to many countries.

Since December 2001, Japan has conducted replenishment activities such as refueling and water supplying to vessels of various nations. Due to these replenishment activities, it has become possible for vessels of all

MIO-participating countries to continue activities in the open waters without returning to the port for refueling. In addition, replenishment activities at sea are less likely to be targeted by terrorists than those at ports. Furthermore, replenishment activities at sea require the refueling vessel to position itself parallel to the vessel being refueled, which requires a high level of skill and capability. Only few other countries besides Japan can stably conduct such replenishment activities at sea for a long time. Thus, such activities by the MSDF can be regarded as a highly appropriate contribution by Japan. Moreover, these activities by the MSDF contribute to the peace and security of the area, and serve Japan's national interest as a country that depends on the Middle East for many resources.

Pakistani vessel receiving refueling support from MSDF vessel in the Indian Ocean

The replenishment activities that have been conducted for six years by the MSDF based on the former Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, have earned high appraisals from various countries. Although the continuation of these replenishment activities had been desired, it was suspended due to the expiration of the Law mentioned above in November 2007. However, from the aforementioned perspective, after the establishment of the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law by the Diet in January 2008, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have promptly dispatched the MSDF vessels to the Indian Ocean, and resumed replenishment activities from February.

3. Outline of the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law and Implementation Plan

(1) Purpose

The Law aims to contribute to securing the peace and security in the international community including Japan, through Japan's continued contribution to assist efforts by the international community proactively and on its own initiative in order to prevent and eradicate international terrorism, through replenishment support activities[10] for the multinational forces participating in the Operation Enduring Freedom–Maritime Interdiction Operation (OEF-MIO)[11].

1) The U.N. Security Council Resolution 1776[12] expresses its appreciation for contributions by the international community to prevent and eradicate international terrorism which Japan has also contributed through replenishment and other support operations by the Maritime Self-Defense Force to the foreign naval vessels taking part in OEF-MIO under the former Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law;
2) Due to the current situation where the continued threats of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks still exist, the Security Council resolutions such as 1368 and 1373 request all U.N. member nations to take appropriate measures to prevent and eradicate international terrorist acts. In response to this request, the international community has continued its efforts to prevent and eradicate international terrorism, which includes efforts by the armed forces and other entities to eliminate terrorist threats to help achieve the goals of the U.N. Charter;
3) Given the fact that the Security Council Resolution 1776 emphasizes the necessity for continuous implementation of such operations, this Law aims to contribute to securing the peace and security in the international community including Japan, through Japan's continued contribution to assist efforts by the international community proactively and on its own initiative in order to prevent and eradicate international terrorism, through replenishment support activities for the multinational forces participating in the Operation Enduring Freedom-Maritime Interdiction Operation (OEF-MIO).

(2) Basic Principles

a. The Government will proactively contribute to efforts by the international community to prevent and eradicate international terrorism by conducting replenishment support activities appropriately and promptly, and thereby work to secure the peace and security of the international community, including Japan.

b. Replenishment support activities shall not be conducted with threat of military force or exertion of military force.

c. Replenishment support activities will be conducted in the following areas:

(i) The territory of Japan

(ii) Areas specified below where it is recognized that acts of war[13] are not currently being conducted and that acts of war will not be conducted for the duration in which these activities are performed:

[A] International waters (limited to the Indian Ocean [including the Persian Gulf, the same to apply hereinafter] and waters traversed in passage between the territory of Japan and the Indian Ocean) and their airspace

[B] The territories of foreign countries (limited to the Indian Ocean, countries along its coast, and countries with ports-of-call made by ships during passage between the territory of Japan and countries along the coast of the Indian Ocean) (only with consent of these foreign countries)

d. The Prime Minister, representing the Cabinet, will direct administrative departments in accordance with the implementation plan when conducting replenishment support activities.

e. The heads of relevant administrative agencies will cooperate with the Defense Minister concerning the implementation of replenishment support activities.

(3) Implementation Plan

a. The Prime Minister must request the Cabinet in advance to approve the proposal of the implementation plan on replenishment support activities (hereinafter referred to as "implementation plan").

b. The matters to be stipulated by the implementation plan are as follows.

(i) The basic plan concerning implementation of replenishment support activities

(ii) Matters concerning the designation of areas for implementation of replenishment support activities

(iii) The size of SDF units to implement replenishment support activities in the territory of a foreign country, their composition, equipment and duration of dispatch

(iv) Important matters concerning the procurement of goods by the SDF to the armed forces of foreign countries other than those to be provided or those which have been provided for use in said activities

(v) Matters concerning communication and coordination with relevant administrative agencies for implementation of replenishment support activities

(vi) Other important matters concerning implementation of replenishment support activities

(4) Relations to the Diet

a. Diet reports

The Prime Minister must report the following matters to the Diet without delay.

(i) Details concerning decision or change of the implementation plan

(ii) Results following the conclusion of replenishment support activities

b. Diet approval

The Replenishment Support Special Measures Law: 1) limits the type and manner of operations to the replenishment only, and 2) stipulates the implementation area including the range of foreign nations of dispatch, consequently, the law does not establish the provisions concerning Diet approval, which is based on the idea that if the law passes through Diet deliberations, the repeated requests for the Diet approval for the implementation of the activities can be regarded as unnecessary.

(5) Use of Weapons

a. A Self-Defense Force member of SDF units who has been commanded to implement replenishment support activities may use weapons in a situation where there is sufficient reason to believe that the use of force is unavoidable in order to protect the life or safety of the member, or that of other SDF members present along with the member at the site of operations, or that of persons under the member's supervision when such operations are carried out, to the extent determined reasonably as being necessary to respond to the situation.

b. If a senior officer is present at the site of operations, the use of weapons must be authorized by order of the senior officer. This shall not apply, however, in situations where a violation or threat against life or safety is imminent and there is insufficient time to obtain such order.

c. A senior officer at the said site shall issue a necessary order so as to prevent threat to life or safety or to prevent confusion caused by the unregulated use of weapons in order to ensure that the use of such weapons is conducted within the scope of the purpose of use in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph and paragraph d., below.

d. The use of weapons shall not cause injury to people except in cases of justifiable self-defense or emergency evacuation.

(6) Term of Law

This law will expire one year from the date of enforcement. However, the term may be extended by a period not to exceed one year. (See Fig.III-3-1-6) (See Reference 48)

Fig. III-3-1-6 Comparison between the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law

Outline of Basic Plan for Activities based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law

Action	Implementation Outline
Cooperation and Support Activities	(1) Replenishment (supply of fuel to vessels and helicopters on board vessels) (2) Transport (transport of fuel by transport vessels and transport of personnel and goods by aircraft) (3) Others (repair and maintenance, medical services and domestic port administration)
Search and Rescue Activities	SDF troops are supposed to engage in search and rescue activities within areas in the Indian Ocean and its airspace designated for cooperation and support activities and for assistance to affected people, if they spot refugees or are requested to rescue them by U.S. troops and others
Assistance to Affected People	Daily necessities are supplied to UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) in response to request by the organization

Outline of the Basic Plan for the Replenishment Activities based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law

Action	Implementation Outline
Replenishment Activities	Refueling and provision of water for vessels or fixed-wing aircraft for vessels

4. Replenishment Support Activities by the Maritime Self-Defense Force

In accordance with the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law, the MSDF dispatched the destroyer *Murasame* from Yokosuka Naval Base on January 24, 2008 and the replenishment ship *Oumi* from Sasebo Naval Base on January 25 and resumed replenishment activities in the Indian Ocean on February 21. The MSDF replenishment activities supplied fuel for vessels and helicopters on board vessels, and water to naval vessels of nations participating in anti-terrorism maritime interdiction activities, and as of June 30, 2008, has supplied vessels with fuel 32 times, helicopters on board vessels with fuel 7 times, and water 11 times.

Additionally, the MSDF conducted replenishment activities under the former Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Laws a total of 794 times. (See Fig. III-3-1-7)

Furthermore, regarding replenishment activities, the following measures are taken to ensure that the fuel supplied by Japan is appropriately used in line with the major principles of the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law.

Fig. III-3-1-7 Vessels on Missions (July 2007 – June 2008)



(1) Conclusion of Exchange of Notes

Japan has decided to conclude a new exchange of notes under the new law, following the former practice under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law[14].

By clearly rewriting the purpose of the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law on the exchange of notes, it further clarifies that the replenishment such as refueling by the MSDF shall be conducted under the purpose of the law. Moreover, it stipulates consultations between the Japanese government and the governments involved for the effective implementation of the Law.

In addition, the conditions for replenishment were repeatedly explained to each country before signing the exchange of notes, and were concluded with all countries accepting these conditions.

(2) Confirmation work by Liaison Officers in Bahrain

MSDF liaison officers dispatched to the Bahraini Coalition Headquarters must confirm each time of supply, whether the aforementioned vessels are following operations based on the counterterrorism Maritime Interdiction Operation written on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law, while comprehending the plans of vessels to be supplied.

Additionally, in such events, the officers must make an entry of the following check points in a stylized format: the date and time of replenishment, name and attached unit of vessels subject to supply, replenishment amount, and future plans (documentation of follow-up procedures that have been conducted).

Also regarding the adequacy of replenishment implementation, the Minister of Defense will make the final decision when it is difficult for the local unit to come to a decision.

5. Evaluation of Japan's Activities

At a meeting with a member of the House of Representatives Special Committee on Anti-Terrorism Measures and Iraq, in evaluating Japan's activities to counter international terrorism President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan said that he believed that the operations of the MSDF fulfilled an essential role for the MIO activities as a whole and that the replenishment activities performed by Japan were for the benefit of Japan, the international community, and Afghanistan. In August 2007, then President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan, in a meeting with then Defense Minister Koike, said that Japan's replenishment activities were essential for sustaining anti-terrorism operations. In addition, in a telephone conversation with then Minister for Foreign Affairs Machimura in August 2007, the U.N. Secretary-General stressed the importance of continuing the fight against terrorism together with the international community. The U.N. Secretary-General also praised the resumption of Japan's replenishment activities, saying that along with peacekeeping forces in Afghanistan, the replenishment activities significantly help the Government of Afghanistan bring safety and development to its people.

4. Efforts to Support U.N. Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs), etc.

As a way to prevent recurrence of regional conflicts following a cease-fire agreement, the U.N. sponsors peacekeeping operations such as cease-fire monitoring, election monitoring, and reconstruction assistance. As of the end of May, 2008, U.N. peacekeeping operations are underway in 17 locations around the world. (See Fig. I-2-9-1)

In addition, international organizations such as the UNHCR and individual countries engage in relief and reconstruction activities for the victims of conflicts and large-scale disasters from a humanitarian perspective or from the viewpoint of stabilizing the domestic situations of affected countries.

Japan, in a bid to fulfill a role commensurate to its international status, has been cooperating both in terms of funding and personnel, with global efforts being led by the U.N. to build a peaceful and stable international community.

In order to help improve the international security environment, the Defense Ministry and the SDF have actively engaged in international peace cooperation activities by dispatching troops and through other efforts.

Commander of the Golan Heights transport unit receives the unit flag from the Central Readiness Force Commander (then) with the presence of former Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Eto

1. Outline of International Peace Cooperation Law, etc.

The International Peace Cooperation Law, enacted in June 1992, is designed to contribute further to global efforts being led by the U.N. to achieve peace in the international community by upgrading Japan's framework for cooperating appropriately and quickly in 1) U.N. peacekeeping activities[15], 2) humanitarian support for international relief and rescue opeations[16] and 3) international election monitoring activities.

The law stipulates a set of basic guidelines (the so-called five principles for participation) for Japan's participation in a U.N. peacekeeping force (PKF).

Japan had suspended the SDF's participation in PKF's so-called core operations[17]. Meanwhile, Japan provided logistical support to PKF missions, and steadily accumulated achievements and experience in the area. Due to expectations both at home and abroad for further participation in international peace cooperation activities, Japan amended the International Peace Cooperation Law in December 2001. The amendment lifted the ban on the SDF's participation in core PKF operations. (See Fig. III-3-1-8, 9)

Fig. III-3-1-8 Basic Policy on Japan's Participation in U.N. Peacekeeping Forces (Five Principles)

1. Warring parties must reach a ceasefire accord
2. Warring parties, including those from the countries in which the U.N. peacekeeping force are to operate, must consent to the U.N. force's operations and Japan's participation in the operations of the U.N. force
3. The U.N. peacekeeping force must take a neutral stance; they should not side with any particular warring party
4. Japan must ensure that the SDF can withdraw from operations of the U.N. peacekeeping force if either one of the three principles stated above is not met
5. The use of weapons by SDF members participating in operations of the U.N. peacekeeping force should be limited as much as possible to situations that are conceivably necessary to protect the members' lives

Fig. III-3-1-9 International Peace Cooperation Activities by SDF

Duration	International Peace Cooperation Activities (Type of activities)	Region
Sept. 1992 – Sept. 1993	Cambodia (U.N. peacekeeping activities)	Southeast Asia
May 1993 – Jan. 1995	Mozambique (U.N. peacekeeping activities)	Africa
Sept. 1994 – Dec. 1994	Rwanda (Humanitarian support for international relief and rescue operations)	Africa
Feb. 1996 –	The Golan Heights (U.N. peacekeeping activities)	Middle East
Nov. 1999 – Feb. 2000	East Timor (Humanitarian support for international relief and rescue operations)	Southeast Asia
Oct. 2001	Afghanistan (Humanitarian support for international relief and rescue operations)	Central Asia
Feb. 2002 – June 2004	East Timor (U.N. peacekeeping activities)	Southeast Asia
March 2003 – April 2003	Iraq (Humanitarian support for international relief and rescue operations)	Middle East
July 2003 – Aug. 2003	Iraq (Humanitarian support for international relief and rescue operations)	Middle East
March 2007 –	Nepal (U.N. peacekeeping activities)	South Asia

Bold frame: International peacekeeping activities are currently underway

2. United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)

(1) Background of Japan's Decision to Send Personnel to UNMIN

Despite the ongoing civil war between the Nepalese Government and the Maoists (Communist Party of Nepal) in a bid to capture power, an accord aimed at achieving permanent peace was signed in November 2006 thanks to repeated peace negotiations under the new government established in May 2006. Subsequently, a comprehensive peace agreement was reached, marking the end of conflict.

In response to a request from the Nepalese Government and a recommendation by the Secretary-General of United Nations, UNMIN was established[18] on January 24, 2007 through U.N. Security Council Resolution 1740. UNMIN activities were then extended until January 23, 2009, in response to the Nepalese constituent assembly election in April 2008 and the request by the Nepalese Government in July 2008.

Situated between China and India, Nepal occupies an important strategic position, and its stability is crucial to the security of the surrounding region as a whole. With the noble efforts being made toward the peace and stability of Nepal, it is important for Japan, as a member of Asia, to make personnel contribution to the mission. On March 27, 2007, Japan's Cabinet, in response to a request by the U.N. for the dispatch of military-monitoring personnel to UNMIN operations, decided to dispatch personnel to the mission, and since March 30, 2007, six GSDF officers have been posted at UNMIN. In addition, the Defense Ministry and the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters of the Cabinet Office respectively dispatched two liaison personnel for the purpose of communication, coordination and information collection with local agencies concerned. Furthermore, in March 2008, the second dispatch of a military-monitoring team consisting of six members replaced the first dispatch of personnel to continue military-monitoring duties. (See Fig. III-3-1-10)

Fig. III-3-1-10 Location of Military Monitoring Officers Placed under the U.N. Mission in Nepal



✻ Dispatched in rotation to Maoist camps etc. from UNMIN Headquarters Katmandu

(2) Activities of GSDF Officers at UNMIN

GSDF officers are being dispatched to seven Maoist camps and barracks of the Nepalese military for the management of arms and soldiers.

The GSDF officers dispatched to UNMIN do not carry weapons in line with the provisions of the U.N. The officers, dispatched on an individual basis, have been working as military-monitoring personnel and command personnel, which is different from the past personnel dispatch by Japan for the support of U.N. peacekeeping operations where SDF officers were dispatched both as military-monitoring personnel and personnel posted for the assignment at peacekeeping headquarters. Through their activities, GSDF officers have earned high acclaim from UNMIN military-monitoring personnel of the U.N. and participating nations for their discipline, professionalism, leadership and sincere approach to their work.

GSDF personnel checking the management of weapons at UNMIN

GSDF personnel heading towards the areas of action at UNMIN

3. International Peace Cooperation Activities in the Golan Heights

(1) Background to Japan's Decision to Send Troops to UNDOF

The U.N. Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has been undertaking peacekeeping operations in a zone called the Area of Separation (AOS), set up between the opposing troops of Syria and Israel based on a ceasefire agreement. UNDOF's mission is to monitor the ceasefire between the two countries and the implementation of measures stipulated under an agreement between the countries over the separation of their opposing troops. The SDF has been providing logistical support for UNDOF operations. (See Fig. III-3-1-11,12)

Japan's participation in the UNDOF operations is significant because it marks Japan's personnel contribution to the international efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East. The participation is also significant for Japan because it cultivates human resources with skills relevant to international peace cooperation activities.

The Government of Japan decided in December 1995 to dispatch SDF units and other personnel to the UNDOF. In February 1996, the first transport unit of 43 personnel was sent to the Golan Heights and replaced a Canadian transport unit. Since then, an SDF unit has been dispatched approximately every six months on a rotating basis. However, the system has changed to involve only the rotation of personnel while maintaining troops and the Golan Heights Transport Unit was newly organized in February 2008. As of the end of May 2008, the 25th dispatch of personnel was sent to the Golan Heights.

Fig. III-3-1-11 Map of the Golan Heights and Its Vicinity



Note: —Denotes main transport routes.

Fig. III-3-1-12 Organizational Structure of UNDOF



[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of SDF Personnel Working for the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)

Colonel Katsunobu Ishibashi
Leader of Nepal International Peace Cooperation Team (Primary Staff Member)
Assigned to Central Readiness Force HQ (Currently assigned to the Ground Staff College)

From March 31, 2007, six SDF personnel selected from all parts of Japan took part in the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) for one year as military-monitoring personnel, joining other military-monitoring personnel from 80 countries and Nepalese colleagues in engaging in monitoring of arms and military personnel management.

Colonel Ishibashi making adjustments with UNMIN staff from different countries (second from left)

The major activities that we took part in were to visit the Maoist army camps and the Nepalese Army barracks for the purpose of monitoring the storage of arms and their activities on both sides. On the occasion of monitoring of the Maoist army, we stayed in the Maoist camp with three to five military-monitoring personnel from other countries together with a Nepalese interpreter. At the start of our activities we did not have proper accommodation or working facilities. We often worked in temperatures exceeding 40˚C, and were plagued by mosquitoes in our tents. Gradually prefabricated facilities were constructed, and although it was not ideal, an environment was improved so that we could bear to remain there and work for one or two weeks. However, the most difficult aspect of the assignment was living together with colleagues who had been brought up in a different environment and who had different religions and values from ours. For example, personnel from the region on the equator and those from near the North Pole had completely different reactions to the heat, and some personnel could not share the same meals for religious reasons. Regarding work procedures, some people work systemically according to a plan; others do not have a plan and respond to the situation on the scene. The military-monitoring personnel work sensibly as representatives of their respective countries as well as the U.N., but at times we have some misunderstandings and I was under a lot of stress because of such various interpersonal relationships in addition to the severe living conditions. However, the Japanese characteristics of modesty and harmony contributed to creating a good atmosphere in the team. In addition, given our sense of duty in our mission, our adherence to time and the work performance skills we have acquired in the SDF, our activities were highly praised within UNMIN, and we played a leading role in operations on the scene.

I believe that our activities were significant in the sense that Japan should fulfill its obligations to the international community in the field. In addition, I think that we were able to make a contribution to demonstrating the excellence of Japanese people to Nepal and to the world.

Note: “Maoist” is the common term used to refer to the Maoist group of the Nepalese Communist Party.

(2) SDF Operations

The dispatched SDF transport unit is in charge of transporting daily goods and materials needed for UNDOF operations from the harbors, airports and commodities markets of Israel, Syria and Lebanon to the UNDOF camps. The unit also provides logistical support, including repairs of roads which have become slippery due to rain and snowfall, and removal of snow from streets in plateau areas with an altitude of more than 2,800 meters. The transport unit stayed at the same camp as Indian forces, which replaced Canadian forces in March 2006. Members of the SDF and Indian forces jointly provide meals and other services to troops.

The ASDF flies a C-130H transport plane and a U-4 multipurpose assistance plane to the Golan Heights every six months to transport goods and materials for the transport unit.

Two SDF officers being sent to the UNDOF headquarters overseas are in charge of planning and coordination of transport and other UNDOF logistic support operations, and are also responsible for publicity and budget-related works. SDF officers are assigned to the UNDOF headquarters for about one year, and are replaced by other SDF personnel after completing their assignment. SDF personnel working at the UNDOF headquarters as of the end of May 2008 are in the 13th dispatch.

Japan had initially intended to complete its participation in UNDOF operations within two years. However, participation has continued until now after taking into consideration various factors, such as strong requests from the U.N., high evaluation of past Japanese operations by the U.N. and relevant countries, and the importance of Japan's personnel contribution to peace in the Middle East. Japan's contribution to UNDOF has been deepened with the SDF dispatch of the Golan Heights Transport Unit totaling up to 25 times, with approximately 1,100 personnel.

The experience the SDF has accumulated through the mission has contributed to creating a foundation for participation in other U.N. peacekeeping operations and activities to support the reconstruction of Iraq.

4. The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)

In Sudan, the Sudanese Government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005. Based upon this agreement, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was formed to support the execution of the CPA and to perform ceasefire surveillance etc. In addition to the military section that performs ceasefire surveillance etc., the UNMIS has the civilian section in charge of election support and humanitarian assistance coordination. UNMIS is a multi-functional, large-scale U.N. peacekeeping operation that involves approximately 10,000 people.

During the joint press conference after the meeting with U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon in June 2008, Prime Minister Fukuda announced the dispatch of SDF personnel to UNMIS headquarters personnel. Preparation for the dispatch are being arranged within the government.

5. Dispatch of SDF officers to the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations

In 2000, the U.N. established the Panel on U.N. Peace Operations[20] to review all issues associated with peace operations including U.N. peacekeeping operations. The U.N. expanded the number of officials in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (PKO Department) in response to recommendations by the panel, as a means of reinforcing the peacekeeping function of the U.N. headquarters.

In November 2001, the Law on Working Conditions of Defense Agency Officials Dispatched to International Organizations (then) (1995 Law No. 122; hereinafter referred to as the "Dispatched Defense Agency Personnel Working Conditions Law") was revised to enable the (then) Defense Agency to send its personnel to the PKO Department. The revision was based on the judgment that the agency's dispatch of personnel to the U.N. department would contribute to supporting the U.N. in its efforts toward achieving world peace. Under the revised law, one GSDF officer was dispatched in December 2002 to the Military Planning Section of the Military

Division in the PKO Department of the United Nations, which is located in the U.S. The dispatched GSDF officer has been participating in various PKO works including development of policies and plans.

5. International Disaster Relief Operations

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF are determined to step up international disaster relief operations from the viewpoint of humanitarian contributions and improvement of the international security environment.

In addition, the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF maintain their readiness to take any necessary action based on prepared disaster relief operation plans, whenever a situation in which their operations are deemed necessary arises. The SDF has dispatched its units overseas for international disaster relief operations while closely examining specific relief requests filed by governments of affected countries and disaster situations in these countries. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF have been proactively conducting international disaster relief operations fully utilizing the capabilities of the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF. (See Fig. III-3-1-13) (See Reference 49)

Fig. III-3-1-13 International Disaster Relief Operations and Others by the SDF

Duration	International Disaster Relief Operations and Others	Region
Nov. 1998-Dec. 1998	International disaster relief operations in response to a hurricane that hit Honduras	Latin America
Sep. 1999-Nov. 1999	Transportation of necessary resources for international disaster relief operations in quake-hit northwestern Turkey	Middle East
Feb. 2001	International disaster relief operations in response to a major earthquake in India	South Asia
Dec. 2003-Jan. 2004	Transportation of necessary resources for international disaster relief operations in quake-hit southeastern Iran	Middle East
Dec. 2004-Mar. 2005	International disaster relief operations after a large-scale earthquake off Indonesia's Sumatra Island and consequent tsunami in the Indian Ocean	Southeast Asia
Aug. 2005	International disaster relief operations for a Russian mini-submarine accident off Kamchatka Peninsula in Russia	North Pacific
Oct. 2005-Dec. 2005	International disaster relief operations in response to a major earthquake in Pakistan and other countries	South Asia
Jun. 2006	International disaster relief operations in response to a major earthquake in central Java Island in Indonesia	Southeast Asia

1. Outline of the Law Concerning the Dispatch of International Disaster Relief Teams

Since the Law Concerning the Dispatch of International Disaster Relief Teams (1987 Law No. 93; hereinafter referred to as "the International Disaster Relief Law") was enacted in 1987, Japan has engaged in international disaster relief activities in response to requests from the governments of affected countries and international organizations.

In 1992, the International Disaster Relief Law was amended to enable the SDF to participate in international disaster relief operations and to transport its personnel and equipment. Since then, the SDF has maintained its readiness for international disaster relief operations with self-sufficient capabilities, including relief operations

and medical treatment, and with the use of its own equipment, organizations and the benefits of regular training, even when local support is not available for transport, accommodation, food and water supplies, communication, sanitation and so forth.

2. International Disaster Relief Operations by the SDF and the SDF's Posture

International disaster relief operations conducted by the SDF may take different forms according to factors such as the scale of the disaster, the degree of damage, and the requests of the governments of affected countries or international organizations. In the major earthquake that struck the central region of Java, Indonesia in May 2006, the SDF, acting on a request from the Indonesian Government, provided medical assistance in the affected area, examining a total of about 3,800 persons while vaccinating about 1,700 persons and controlling infections diseases over an area of 4,300m^2. Judging from the past experience of SDF dispatched to various disaster sites in Japan, the SDF's capabilities in international disaster relief operations encompass 1) medical services, such as first-aid medical treatment and epidemic prevention, 2) transport of goods, patients, and disaster relief personnel by helicopter, and 3) ensuring water supplies using water-purifying devices. Also, the SDF uses transport planes and transport ships to carry disaster relief personnel and equipment to the affected area.

Central Readiness Force and regional units of the GSDF are assigned duties on a six-month rotational basis to ensure that they can provide medical, transport and water-supply services in an independent manner anytime the need for disaster relief arises.

In addition, the MSDF and the ASDF maintains its readiness to dispatch fleet and air-support units, respectively, to transport supplies to units participating in international disaster relief operations, including their own, as the need for disaster relief arises.

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of SDF Personnel who Participated in Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks (MLST)

Lieutenant Colonel Yasuhiro Hamamatsu
Department of Logistics, Ground Staff Office
(Currently assigned to the Comptroller Department)

From December 3-7, 2007, the Department of Logistics, Ground Staff Office hosted the Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks (MLST) at Ichigaya Base and other sites. The MLST was the largest such event yet held, with 10 logistics staff from nine countries in the Asia-Pacific region (representatives from the U.S. Army and Marines attended), including first-time participants India and Indonesia, and representatives from the GSDF (Central Readiness Force, Ground Research and Development Command, Ground Material Control Command, Staff College, and Kodaira School) as well as from the Joint Staff. This was the 11th of its kind held, and given the frequent incidence of large-scale natural disasters in the Asia-Pacific region in recent years, the discussion was based on the theme "Military Logistics Cooperation for International Disaster Relief Operations." Each participating country exchanged information and opinions on their respective military

Lieutenant Colonel Hamamatsu explaining the overview during a meeting

logistics support systems for disaster relief activities, with the aim of promoting mutual understanding and building confidence and trust among members.

Briefing by participants

Following an explanation by each participating country on their own experiences in international disaster relief activities, group discussions took place on military logistics cooperation. The group sessions succeeded in sharing information about the cooperative frameworks with militaries of other countries, methods for effective information sharing, and securing strategic transportation capabilities. Future challenges were also discussed. Participants visited the Eastern Army where the GSDF logistic support posture was confirmed and views were exchanged.

I have been involved in the MLST for three years since 2005 and there have been times when in preparation for the meeting prior coordinating telephone calls and e-mail contact with participants have not gone according to plan, due to differences in culture or customs, etc. As such, with the cooperation of the SDF personnel member dispatched to the Japanese embassy in each country, I have coordinated everything from the meeting content to other management items. It is a wonderful experience to exchange opinions and interact with colleagues in a friendly atmosphere after their arrival in Japan and even though our countries are different we share many common views as military logistics practitioners, and the meeting provides an opportunity for us to get together, and deepen our relations of trust. When the approximately one-week meeting comes to an end and it is time to send off the participants at Narita airport, my feelings of accomplishment at having successfully concluded the meeting are coupled with regret at having to say farewell to good friends, and as the organizer of this meeting I truly feel that it has been a valuable experience to be involved in this process.

The MLST discusses themes that are important for the military logistics personnel in each country, and by meeting together in Tokyo, and constructing an Asia-Pacific human network, it is an effective means of promoting mutual understanding that will be truly useful in future international peace cooperation activities, and enable logistics cooperation. The enthusiasm on the part of the participants from each country continues to grow each year. I hope that in the future too the MLST will achieve further advancements and will continue to play an important role in defense exchange.

* Participants in 2007: Australia, India, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States

Section 2. Promotion of Security Dialogue and Defense Exchanges

In the new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), making proactive efforts on its own initiative to help improve the international security environment is positioned as a major role of defense. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) proactively promote security dialogue and defense exchanges, including bilateral and multilateral training, while also taking part in international peace cooperation activities.

This section will describe the security dialogue and defense exchanges that the Ministry of Defense and the SDF currently engage in.

1. Significance of Security Dialogue and Defense Exchanges

After the end of the Cold War, awareness has grown regarding the importance of preventing meaningless arms races, and contingencies and the escalation of such events through means such as increasing the transparency of military capabilities and defense policies, and enhancing mutual relationships of trust through dialogue and exchanges between defense officials and various joint exercises between military units.

Mutual cooperation and dependence between nations continues to grow within the international community, and it has become widely recognized that the international community must work together in responding to new threats and diverse contingencies.

In accordance with these changes in international circumstances, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF place emphasis on efforts including bilateral exchanges with related nations, multilateral security dialogue such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and multilateral joint exercises. In recent years, in particular, a change has been seen in the role of defense exchanges, and the defense exchanges tend to deepen in terms of quality and expand in terms of quantity with the aim of proactively promoting exchanges to improve the security environment. Specifically, this includes: 1) in addition to confidence-building, the increasing significance of establishing and strengthening cooperative relations with the international community, 2) a global expansion of exchanges that extends beyond Japan's neighboring countries, and 3) the increasing importance of promoting not only goodwill exchanges but also practical exchanges, and action-oriented exchanges in addition to dialogue.

For this reason, the Ministry of Defense formulated a "Basic Policy for Defense Exchanges[21]" in April 2007 in order for the ministry to implement defense exchanges in a harmonized and strategic manner.

The "Basic Policy" emphasizes defense exchanges[22] aimed at contributing directly to enhancing international cooperation in addition to promoting traditional defense exchanges. The "Basic Policy" also aims to build relations of trust and cooperation with other countries by effectively utilizing a variety of defense exchange measures[23] not limited to bilateral dialogue and consultation. (See Fig. III-3-2-1)

2. Bilateral Defense Exchanges

Bilateral defense exchanges are those between defense officials from various countries and with the objective of promoting relations of trust and cooperation. Characteristically, these exchanges allow a tailor made response in light of particular relations with an individual nation, and it is possible that the bilateral relationships of trust and cooperation constructed via these exchanges can lay the foundation for effectively promoting other initiatives such as multilateral security dialogue.

1. Japan-Republic of Korea Defense Exchanges

The Republic of Korea (ROK) is an important country for Japan's security from a geopolitical perspective. It is also a friend of Japan as both countries share the fundamental values of freedom and democracy. The ROK has formed an alliance with the United States and, just as Japan, does allow the U.S. to station its forces in the country from a security perspective. Therefore, it is extremely important for Japan and the ROK to proactively utilize

Fig. III-3-2-1 Security Dialogue and Defense Exchanges

Classification	Type	Significance	Outline
Bilateral	High-level exchange of defense officials	Improving and reinforcing mutual trust and cooperation relations through frank exchanges of views on regional situations and national defense policies that are of important concerns to both countries, and subsequently spur exchanges of the countries	• Dialogue and mutual visits between Japan's Defense Minister and defense ministers from other countries • Dialogue and mutual visits between Japan's Senior Vice-Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Secretary for Defense, Vice-Minister of Defense, Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, GSDF, MSDF, ASDF Chiefs, and their counterparts in foreign countries
	Regular consultation between defense officials	Paving the basis for high-level dialogue and exchanges through continuous and direct exchanges of views between policy-makers of national defense of both countries, and contributing to improvement and enhancement of relations of mutual trust and cooperation between the countries	• Consultation between Director-General-level officials, Deputy Director-General-level officials, and their counterparts in foreign countries • Dialogue between Japan's Joint Staff Office, GSDF, MSDF, ASDF, and their counterparts in foreign countries
	Exchange between units	Contributing to improvement and enhancement of relations of mutual trust and cooperation between the countries through joint defense exercises and events for exchanges	• Personnel exchanges • Mutual visits of MSDF Training Squadrons, aircraft, and joint exercises for search and rescue operations
	Exchange of students	Increasing understanding toward other country's defense policy and the situation of its defense units, and building relations of mutual trust through promotion of personnel exchanges involving relatively long stays in other countries in addition to human exchanges for educational purposes, and establishing human networks between both countries	• Mutual acceptance of students • Dispatch of students to overseas military-related organizations
	Research exchanges	Deepening mutual understanding between researchers of both countries through frank opinion exchanges for the maintenance and promotion of defense exchanges	Research exchanges between Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies and military-related research organizations in foreign countries
Multilateral	Security dialogue	Deepening mutual understanding on recognition of situations and security perceptions among concerned countries and discussing multilateral issues efficiently and effectively	• ARF dialogue • Multilateral dialogue sponsored by the Defense Ministry • Multilateral dialogue sponsored by the Japanese Government • Multilateral dialogue sponsored by Japan's private sector
	Joint exercises and seminars	Improving defense skills and contributing to improvement and enhancement of mutual trust and cooperation relations through joint exercises and seminars	• Personnel exchanges • Joint exercises, and seminars related to minesweeping and submarine rescue operations

defense exchanges to promote mutual understanding and relations of trust, establish a basis for cooperation, and to effectively coordinate and cooperate in policy-making for the peace and stability of the entire East Asia region.

(1) Exchanges of High-Level Defense Officials Including Top Officials

Almost every year since 1994 (excluding 2001, 2004 and 2006), the defense ministers of Japan and the ROK have made reciprocal visits and held discussions. In February 2007, then ROK Minister of National Defense Kim Jang-Soo visited Japan and exchanged views with then Japan's Minister of Defense Fumio Kyuma on matters such as the situation in Northeast Asia and their respective national defense policies. Also, at the 7th IISS Asia Security Summit (commonly referred to as the Shangri-La Dialogue)[24], which was held in May 2008 by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) of the United Kingdom, ROK Minister of National Defense Lee Sang-Hee and former Japanese Minister of Defense Shigeru Ishiba held dialogue and exchanged views on Japan-ROK defense exchanges. Furthermore, views were openly exchanged on various occasions including in

March 2007 when Chief of Staff Saito visited the ROK to meet with then Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Kim Guan-Jin, in June 2007 when then ROK Chief of Naval Staff Song Yong-Moo visited Japan to meet with then MSDF Chief of Staff Eiji Yoshikawa, in January 2008 when then ROK Chief of Army Staff Park Honyoru visited Japan to meet with Japanese GSDF Chief of Staff Ryoichi Oriki, in April 2008 when ROK Chief of Air Force Staff Kim Ung-Ki visited Japan to meet with Japanese ASDF Chief of Staff Toshio Tamogami, and in April 2008 when ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Kim Tae-Young visited Japan to meet with Japanese Chief of Staff Saito.

Chief of Staff, the Republic of Korea Army Park and GSDF Chief of Staff Oriki

(2) Regular Consultations between Defense Officials

In addition to holding military-to-military consultations (bilateral consultations at the Director-General/Councilor-level) every year since 1994, Japan and the ROK have held security dialogue since 1998 that has included diplomatic authorities from both countries.

In July 2007, Japan and the ROK held the 15th military-to-military consultation whereupon views were exchanged on Japan and the ROK's defense policies and Japan-ROK defense exchanges. In addition, in December 2007, the first Japan-ROK military-to-military working group was held between Director-level officials.

Furthermore, in October 2007, Japan and the ROK held the seventh bilateral security dialogue where views were exchanged on matters including the security environment surrounding the two countries and their respective security policies.

Active dialogue has also been held between Japan's Joint Staff and the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as between Japan's GSDF, MSDF and the ASDF, and the ROK's Army, Navy and Air Force respectively. In addition, Japan and the ROK have been promoting mutual exchange of students and research exchanges.

(3) Exchanges between Units

Japan's GSDF and the ROK Army have held defense exchanges since 2001, including mutual visits by unit commanders of the GSDF's Western Army and the ROK's Second Army[25]. In June 2007, the Commander of the ROK Second Army visited Japan, and in October 2007, the Commanding General of the Japanese GSDF Western Army visited the ROK.

Exchanges between Japan's MSDF and the ROK Navy, including mutual visits by naval vessels, have been carried out since 1994. In September 2007, a MSDF training squadron visited the ROK, and in December 2007 an ROK Navy cruise training squadron visited Japan. Also, in June 2007, the two navies conducted their fifth search and rescue exercise.

Japan's ASDF and the ROK Air Force have continued exchanges through mutual visits by aircraft since 2000. In June 2007, the commander of the Japanese ASDF Western Air Defense Force visited the ROK, and in May 2008 the ROK Southern Air Force Combat Commander visited Japan. In regards to military band exchanges, the ROK Air Force Band participated in the November 2007 JSDF Marching Festival.

2. Japan-Russia Defense Exchanges

Russia has a great influence on the security of Europe, Central Asia, and the Asia-Pacific region and is a neighboring country of Japan. It is therefore extremely important for Japan to deepen defense exchanges with this country and promote relations of trust and cooperation.

With Japan-Russia relations continuing to develop in wider areas following the 1997 summit in Krasnoyarsk, the Ministry of Defense has been steadily promoting defense exchanges with Russia at various levels in accordance with the memorandum on Japan-Russia defense exchanges signed in 1999.

(1) Exchanges of High-Level Defense Officials Including Top Officials

High-level exchanges have advanced between Japan and Russia since 1996, when then Minister of State for Defense Hideo Usui visited Russia, becoming the first Japanese defense chief to visit the country since the Soviet era.

Chief of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff Baluyevsky and Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Saito

When then Japanese Minister of State for Defense Fukushiro Nukaga visited Russia in January 2006, Japan and Russia revised the 1999 memorandum on defense exchanges between the two countries. Then Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov told that the Japan-Russia Action Plan was a strong foundation for deepening cooperation between their respective defense officials. Minister Ivanov also said defense exchanges had significantly deepened between the MSDF and Russia's Navy but added that he also wanted to promote exchanges between the GSDF and Russia's Ground Force and the ASDF and Russia's Air Force. Minister Nukaga and Minister Ivanov shared the view that observers would be mutually dispatched to exercises conducted by the GSDF and Russia's Ground Force. They also shared the view that representatives and aircraft of the ASDF and Russia's Air Force would make mutual visits. Furthermore, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Force Aleksei Maslov visited Japan in March 2008 and exchanged views with Japanese GSDF Chief of Staff Oriki, and in April 2008, Chief of Joint Staff Saito visited Russia to exchange views with then Chief of General Staff Yuri Baluyevsky.

(2) Regular Consultations between Defense Officials

The Ministry of Defense has continued to hold discussion with Russia, such as Japan-Russia Bilateral Working Group meetings and annual meetings based on the Japan-Russia Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas, to discuss how to promote overall defense exchanges in addition to holding regular discussion between Director-General-level and Councilor-level defense officials.

The GSDF and ASDF have actively held dialogue with their respective Russian counterparts, the Russian Ground and Air Forces, including Staff Talks between Japan's Joint Staff and the General Staff Office of the Russian Armed Forces. In addition, Japan-Russia defense research exchanges and other activities are continually held between the National Institute for Defense Studies and a research institute affiliated with the Russian Defense Ministry.

(3) Exchanges between Units

The GSDF and the Russian Ground Force have promoted mutual exchanges since 2003, including a mutual visit between the Russian Commander of Far Eastern Military District and the Commanding General of the

GSDF's Northern Army. In October 2006, the Commanding General of the GSDF's Northern Army visited the Far Eastern Military District of Russia.

The MSDF and the Russian Navy have conducted mutual visits by vessels every year since the MSDF's first port visit to Vladivostok in 1996. Both have also conducted bilateral joint search and rescue exercises since 1998. In August 2007, the MSDF and the Russian Navy conducted their ninth joint search and rescue exercise when an MSDF vessel was in port at Vladivostok Port.

In December 2007, the Commander of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army visited Japan and exchanged views with the commander of the ASDF Northern Air Defense Force conducting the first inter-unit exchange between the ASDF and the Russian Air Force.

3. Japan-China Defense Exchanges

China has great influence on the Asia-Pacific region and its outstanding economic development and the modernization of its military capabilities in recent years have drawn much attention from other countries around the world. Deepening mutual understanding on the defense front and promoting relations of trust with China is not only beneficial for the security of the two countries, but also for ensuring peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

In December 2007, Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda paid an official visit to China where the two sides shared the view on positioning the "promotion of exchanges and mutual trust" as one of the three pillars as a materialization of the "Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests[26]." The two sides also shared the view on enhancing exchanges in the security sector, specifically including dispatching an MSDF vessel and reciprocal visits by company-officer-level officers of the SDF and People's Liberation Army.

In addition, upon the May 2008 visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao, agreement was made on matters such as enhancing high-level exchanges between officials including defense ministers, visit by an MSDF vessel to China, and promptly establishing a communication mechanism between defense officials. In the Joint Statement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China on Comprehensive Promotion of a "Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests," it was also noted that reciprocal visits by high-level officials in the security sector would be enhanced and that various dialogues and exchanges would be promoted, thereby further strengthening mutual understanding and trust.

(1) Exchanges of High-Level Defense Officials Including Top Officials

In September 2003, former Minister of Defense Shigeru Ishiba visited China and met with then Chinese Minister of National Defense Cao Gangchuan. At their meeting, Minister Ishiba and Minister Cao shared the recognition that Japan and China would proactively promote defense exchanges, including those at the working-level defense officials.

In August 2007, then Chinese Minister of National Defense Cao Gangchuan visited Japan and held a discussion with then Minister of Defense Masahiko Koumura regarding the international and regional situation, defense policy of Japan and China, and Japan-China defense exchanges. During their meeting they shared the view on the importance of further developing Japan-China defense exchanges, including promoting high-level exchanges between officials such as defense ministers and chiefs of staff, reciprocal port

Commander of the South Sea Fleet of China Xiao and MSDF Chief of Staff Yoshikawa (then)

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of Staff Member in Charge of Japan-China Defense Exchanges

Commander Keizo Kitagawa
Defense Division, Maritime Staff Office

There is a saying in the Chinese classic "Zhuangzi" that states, "Friends agree best at a distance (Exchanges between wise men remain silent like water.)" In other words, the relationship between admirable people is an exchange that flows quietly like water; it never grows tired, so it continues for a long time. I think this precept is something that defense exchanges should aim for.

I am in charge of external policy at the Defense Section, Defense Division, Maritime Staff Office, and every day I think of how the Maritime Self-Defense Force can best contribute to defense exchanges for Japan. My work is highly rewarding, considering the breadth of naval exchanges with countries spanning the entire globe.

Part of the job involves coordinating staff conferences with the navy of each country, but I feel that defense exchanges have transformed from an age of simply engaging in "dialogue," to an age where substance is demanded, accompanied by action and cooperation.

For instance, what role should the Maritime Self-Defense Force fulfill regarding Japan-China defense exchanges? The maritime defense capability of one country involves the internationality of naval vessels visiting foreign countries, which since ancient times, accorded significance as a means of foreign diplomacy. When you consider that Japan and China have used ships to cross the sea from ancient times, it is easy to see how their relationship built by the Maritime Self-Defense Force can serve to deepen Japan-China defense exchanges.

Developments in Japan-China defense exchanges since FY 2007 have been remarkable. The Maritime Self-Defense Force sent Japan's first exchange student to the officer training course at the Chinese People's Liberation Army National Defense University from September 2007, and from the end of November last year to the beginning of December, the Chinese destroyer *Shenzhen* visited Japan for the first time, a particularly noteworthy event that I feel merits attention. In particular, the visit to Japan of the *Shenzhen* provided a valuable opportunity to exchange views with China's naval personnel.

Furthermore, agreement was reached on Maritime Self-Defense Force ships visiting China, and promoting high-level exchanges between Japan's Maritime Chief of Staff and the Chinese People's Liberation Army Naval Commanders. Compared to diplomatic relations between both countries, it can be said that Japan-China defense exchanges are in an early stage, but at the same time, I am conscious that the relationship holds a future full of expectations that it will only deepen going forward. Accordingly, in order to establish a relationship with China like in the teaching mentioned at the start, I want to incorporate "Think Globally, Act Locally" as my personal motto in future defense exchanges with China.

calls by naval vessels, and expanding exchanges in various military branches and sectors. Thereupon, Japan released the Japan-China Defense Authorities Joint Press Release between Japan-China Defense Authorities the first joint document released between Japanese and Chinese defense authorities. In addition, Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Saito visited China in February 2008 and held dialogue with Chief of General Staff of the People's Liberation Army Chen Bingde. Vice-Defense Minister Kohei Masuda visited China in March 2008 and held a discussion with Deputy Chief of General Staff Ma Xiaotian and made proposals regarding the intention of the increase of China's military spending. He also paid a courtesy call to Minister of National Defense Liang Guanglie where they shared the view that visits by high-level officials would be continued in the future as well.

(2) Regular Consultations between Defense Officials

In July 2006, Japan and China held bilateral security dialogue between diplomatic and defense officials from both nations. The two countries have also promoted research and educational exchanges, mainly by accepting Chinese defense officials in regular courses at Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies and sending Japanese students to the PLA National Defense University, in addition to continued mutual visits by defense officials from Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies, the JSDF Joint Staff College, and China's PLA National Defense University.

(3) Exchanges between Units

In a meeting between then Minister of National Defense Cao Gangchuan and then Minister of Defense Masahiko Koumura, the two ministers shared the view on conducting reciprocal port calls by naval vessels in commemoration of the 35th anniversary of the normalization of Japan-China diplomatic relations, and thus from November to December 2007 the Chinese destroyer *Shenzhen* of South China Sea Fleet ported in Tokyo for the first time. Following this visit, and based on agreement between Japanese and Chinese leaders, an MSDF destroyer *Sazanami* visited Zhanjiang in China's Guandong Province as an MSDF vessel for the first time in June 2008. Furthermore, exchanges are also being promoted, including GSDF personnel being dispatched for the first time as observers in September 2007 to Chinese military exercise "Warrior 2007" upon invitation from China and visit to Japan by the delegation of leaders of the Chinese PLA Air Force.

4. Japan-Australia Defense Exchanges

Australia is an important partner for Japan in the Asia-Pacific region that shares the fundamental values of respect for freedom and human rights, and democracy. Regarding security, both Australia and Japan are allies of the United States and thus share the strategic interest, and there are many interests in common in the area of defense. From this perspective, it is important for peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region to promote defense exchanges with Australia to establish a foundation for a cooperative relationship, and to promote collaboration and cooperation more effectively. Moreover, cooperation between Japan and Australia in the trilateral framework with the United States and in the multilateral frameworks is important.

In recent years, in particular, defense exchanges between Japan and Australia have deepened and expanded and bilateral cooperation[27] in the field of security has been advancing steadily, including cooperation in Iraq and humanitarian support for disasters.

Based on these circumstances, then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and then Australian counterpart John Howard released the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation[28] on March 13, 2007 in order for the two countries to further strengthen bilateral security cooperation under a comprehensive framework.

Based on this joint declaration, then Japanese Minister of Defense Fumio Kyuma and then Australian counterpart Brendan Nelson held talks in Tokyo in June 2007. During Nelson's stay in Tokyo, Japan and Australia also held Joint Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations ("two-plus-two") for the first time. During the

Kyuma-Nelson meeting, Japan and Australia highly evaluated the advancement of defense exchanges between the two countries and their continued cooperation in international peace cooperation activities since Japan's participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations in Cambodia. During their meeting, both ministers also decided to expand bilateral defense exchanges including promoting unit exchanges through mutual visits of aircraft and ships and enhancing personnel exchanges and to contribute via bilateral cooperation to trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United States and Australia, and to multilateral cooperation. They also decided to begin work on updating the Memorandum on Defense Exchanges, which was agreed between two Defense Ministers in 2003, as the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation action plan in the field of defense. During their "two-plus-two" meeting, the Defense and Foreign Ministers of Japan and Australia evaluated and welcomed the decision between Kyuma and Nelson, and released a Joint Statement[29] to that effect. Furthermore, in September 2007, an action plan to implement the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation was drawn up that, with regard to the field of defense, included such matters as a direction for updating the Memorandum on Defense Exchanges.

In light of these developments, Japan and Australia are currently holding discussion in order to expand their defense exchanges.

(1) Exchanges of High-Level Defense Officials Including Top Officials

Then Australian Defense Minister Robert Hill visited Japan in September 2003 and met with then Japanese Minister of Defense Shigeru Ishiba. During their meeting, Hill and Ishiba signed the Memorandum on Defense Exchanges between Japan and Australia.

In March 2007, then Defense Minister Fumio Kyuma met with then Australian Prime Minister John Howard during his visit to Japan and they confirmed the need for the two countries to advance bilateral defense exchanges in the future. In addition, in June 2007, then Defense Minister Kyuma met with then Australian Defense Minister Brendan Nelson during his visit to Japan to conduct the Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting. Furthermore, in May 2008 at the 7th IISS Asia Security Summit, former Defense Minister Ishiba met with Australian Defense Minister Joel Fitzgibbon and the two concurred on continuing and developing cooperation in the field of security.

In April 2008, Chief of the Royal Australian Navy Russ Shalders visited Japan and exchanged views with MSDF Chief of Staff Akaboshi, and ASDF Chief of Staff Toshio Tamogami exchanged views with Chief of the Royal Australian Air Force Geoff Shepherd on his visit to Australia in May 2008.

(2) Regular Consultations between Defense Officials

Japan and Australia have held military-to-military consultations at the Director-General-level and Councilor-level as well as security dialogue including diplomatic officials almost every year since 1996. The Joint Staff, the GSDF, the MSDF, and the ASDF have also held consultations with their respective counterparts in the Australian Defence Force on a regular basis. Both countries also exchange students of their defense-related educational institutions and hold research exchanges.

(3) Exchanges between Units

GSDF units dispatched to international peace cooperation activities in areas such as East Timor and Iraq conducted exchanges with units of the Australian Army there. Also, the MSDF and the Royal Australian Navy and Air Force conduct mutual goodwill visits by ships and aircraft. In October 2007, the ASDF dispatched a multi-purpose assistance aircraft (U-4) to Australia for the first time. (See Column)

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of a Participant in Defense Exchanges with the Royal Australian Air Force, Transportation Unit

Then Colonel Yasuji Kitamura
402 Squadron Commander
2nd Tactical Airlift Group, ASDF

Last year, the ASDF conducted its first overseas flight with the objective of enhancing defense exchanges and unit visits – a flight between Japan and Australia by air carrier. In previous overseas flights, the C-130H transport aircraft was mainly used and unit exchanges were limited to an additional part of mission flight, but this time, a U-4 multi-purpose assistance aircraft was used for the first time, and a goodwill visit was made for the main purpose of defense exchanges at the airlift unit level between Japan and Australia.

Australia is pro-Japanese, and in an alliance relationship with the United States like Japan, but the environment was not conducive for concrete defense exchanges between the two air forces. However, last year, a high-level agreement between the Foreign and Defense Ministers of Japan and Australia included promotion of unit exchanges and was considered to be the first step toward concrete exchange.

Royal Australian Air Force transport aircraft (B-737) and participating personnel in the Japan-Australian defense exchange (left, on the highest rung is Colonel Kitamura)

Through our visit to the Royal Australian Air Force Headquarters and their Air Lift Group, we could achieve mutual understanding at the unit level. In particular, in our mutual field as units operating transport aircraft, we developed awareness of our similarities and differences with regard to operations, and it was a good opportunity to exchange opinions about future challenges.

My impression of the Royal Australian Air Force is as follows:

- ❍ They have the spirit to incorporate positive aspects of other military forces and develop them into their own unique style.
- ❍ While cheerful, delightful and friendly toward SDF personnel, there are many military personnel with pride as military personnel and love for their country.
- ❍ Their equipment is modern and they introduce state-of-the-art systems.

In this unit exchange, an extensive variety of local exchange events were prepared, and we discussed the future bilateral cooperation and learned about protocols to conduct a reception through planning the ASDF-hosted reception. I think that such defense exchanges that are not limited to unit operations became a large building block for the future international activities.

(4) Cooperation among Japan, the United States and Australia

In June 2007, upon attending the 6th IISS Asia Security Summit, then Minister of Defense Kyuma held the first Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting with U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and then Australian

Minister of Defense Brendan Nelson. In addition, in April 2008, and continuing on talks conducted in April 2007, Director-General-level meetings were conducted among Japan, the United States and Australia where discussion was held on matters including trilateral defense cooperation.

Further, in May 2007 and February 2008, defense officials from Japan, the United States and Australia participated in holding the Pacific Global Air Mobility Seminar. At the seminar views were exchanged on future trilateral air mobility cooperation. In the February 2008 seminar, the loading exercise of a GSDF CH-47J onto a U.S. Air Force's C-17 was conducted. Moreover, in October 2007, trilateral exercise using MSDF patrol aircraft (P-3C) was conducted for the first time among the MSDF, U.S. Navy, and Royal Australian Air Force.

5. Japan-U.K. Defense Exchanges

Being a major power that influences the European region as well as the rest of the world, the U.K. has maintained close relations with Japan. On the security front, Japan has shared the same strategic interests with the U.K., as both countries are important allies of the United States. Given this relationship, it is important for both Japan and the U.K. to promote defense exchanges, build a basis of cooperation, and promote more effective cooperation and coordination.

In January 2004, former Japanese Minister of Defense Shigeru Ishiba and then U.K. Secretary of State for Defense Geoff Hoon signed a memorandum on bilateral defense cooperation in order to develop bilateral defense exchanges in various sectors, thereby confirming the two countries' resolve to promote defense exchanges at all levels and in various fields.

(1) Exchanges of High-Level Defense Officials Including Top Officials

In January 2006, then Japanese Minister of State for Defense Fukushiro Nukaga visited the U.K. and met with then U.K. Secretary of State for Defense John Reid. During their meeting, Minister Nukaga and Secretary Reid confirmed that high-level and working-level defense exchanges advanced between Japan and the U.K. They also discussed the progress on development of Iraqi Security Forces and the process of transferring security authorities to Iraq.

Furthermore, at the 7th IISS Asia Security Conference in May this year, U.K. Secretary of State for Defense Des Browne met with former Minister of Defense Ishiba. During their meeting, Minister Ishiba expressed gratitude to Secretary Browne for the cooperation being extended by U.K. forces to SDF troops operating in Iraq. They also shared the view on the importance of replenishment activities in the Indian Ocean.

(2) Regular Consultations between Defense Officials

Japan and the U.K. frequently hold dialogue between Director-General-level and Councilor-level officials. In June 2007, Japan and the U.K. held DG-level meetings of Foreign Affairs and Defense authorities as well as between defense authorities, and exchanged views on matters such as defense policy and Iraqi issues. Moreover, the chiefs of Japan's Joint Staff, the GSDF, the MSDF, and the ASDF have also held consultations with their respective U.K. Ministry of Defence counterparts. Both countries also exchange students of their educational institutions and promote research exchanges.



Sir Glenn Torpy, Chief of the Air Staff of the U.K. Royal Air Force meets Vice-Minister of Defense Masuda

(3) Exchanges between Units

After the deployment of U.K. Forces in Muthanna Province in Iraq, the GSDF[30] troops which had been deployed since January 2006 in the same area, held active exchanges with the U.K. forces in Samawah, Iraq.

6. Japan-India Defense Exchanges

India has traditionally maintained friendly relations with Japan, and shares the same recognition on democracy, and a free and market-oriented economy.

Moreover, India has a vast territory with a population that exceeds one billion, and possesses great influence on the security in the South Asian region. This region is important for the safety of sea lanes that connect Japan to the Middle East as well as activities that Japan conducts in the Indian Ocean and other areas. Against this background, it is meaningful for Japan and India to hold consultations to exchange views over matters including defense policy and the regional situation, to deepen mutual understanding, and to promote relations of mutual trust and cooperation.

In December 2006, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Japan and signed a joint statement between Japan and India after meeting with then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. In the joint statement, the two countries shared the view on upgrading Japan-India relations to "Strategic and Global Partnership[31]" and specified measures to be taken in the political and security sectors toward building such a partnership. In addition, in August 2007, then Prime Minister Abe visited India where he and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed the Joint Statement on the Roadmap for New Dimensions to the Strategic and Global Partnership between Japan and India, and thereupon agreed to study the future course of cooperation in the security field between the two countries and also enhance defense exchanges.

(1) Exchanges of High-Level Defense Officials Including Top Officials

In August 2007, then Minister of Defense Yuriko Koike and then Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Takahide Kimura visited India and held dialogue with Indian Minister of Defense A.K. Antony and Minister of State for Defense Pallam Raju. During the defense ministerial meeting, views were exchanged on matters including the fight against terrorism, regional situation, and Japan-India relations, and the view was shared to further develop defense exchanges.

In April 2007, then Indian Defense Secretary Shekhar Dutt visited Japan and held a Japan-India Defense Policy Dialogue with then Japanese Vice-Minister of Defense Takemasa Moriya which was expanded from the Vice Defense Minister-level meeting. Moriya and Dutt exchanged views on how to deepen defense exchanges between the two countries in the future and the regional situation.

Moreover, in January 2007, then Indian Air Force Chief of Staff S. P. Tyagi visited Japan and exchanged views with then ASDF Chief of Staff Yoshida. In April 2007, then Indian Army Chief of Staff J. J. Singh visited Japan and exchanged views with GSDF Chief of Staff Ryoichi Oriki.

(2) Regular Consultations between Defense Officials

In February 2008, Japan and India held Director-General-level and Councilor-level talks between defense officials and exchanged views about Japan-India defense exchanges and the regional situation. In March 2008, working-level discussion was also held between the GSDF and Indian Army. Furthermore, Japan and India actively promote research exchanges, including sending and accepting defense officials as students and mutually dispatching defense researchers.

(3) Exchanges between Units

The MSDF and the Indian Navy have frequently made reciprocal visits in the past. Unit exchanges are active as, during these reciprocal visits, MSDF Training Squadron and Indian Navy units conduct activities such as goodwill

exercises. In April 2007, three vessels of the Indian Navy paid a port call in Japan, marking the 15th visit to Japan by Indian Navy vessels. During the Indian vessels' visit, Japan, the United States, and India conducted their first trilateral joint maritime exercise. Furthermore, in September 2007, the MSDF participated in a multilateral joint marine exercise ("Malabar 07-2[32]") in the waters near the Bay of Bengal for the first time.

7. Defense Exchanges with Southeast Asian Countries

Southeast Asian countries are situated in areas deemed as strategically important for maritime traffic, and they also have close economic relations with Japan. Therefore, promoting dialogue between Japan and these countries on various security issues and deepening relations of mutual trust and cooperation are of great importance for both sides.

In November 2007, former Minister of Defense Ishiba had a meeting with Singaporean Defense Minister Teo Chee Hean who visited Japan, and enhanced mutual understanding on the regional situation and defense policies of both countries. Both ministers held another meeting at the 7th IISS Asia Security Summit held in May 2008. Also, in March 2008, former Defense Minister Ishiba had a meeting with Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Tea Banh, and exchanged opinions on the following issues: defense exchange between the two countries, the regional security situation, and defense policies of both countries.

The recent high-level exchanges between Japan and Southeast Asian countries are shown in Fig. III-3-2-2, indicating how defense relations between Japan and these countries have steadily progressed.

In addition to exchanges by high-level officials, Japanese defense officials have held consultations at the working-level on a regular basis to build relations of mutual understanding and confidence through exchange of views in the security and defense field and Japan and Southeast Asian countries have also steadily promoted staff talks among various services, exchanges of researchers and students as well as units including port calls. Through these defense relations, Japan and Southeast Asian countries lay the foundation for building a multilateral defense network, which could play an important role for realizing peace and stability in the region. (See Fig. III-3-2-2)

Former Defense Minister Ishiba with Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Tea Banh

Pakistani vessel enters Harumifuto (Tokyo)

Chief of the Republic of Singapore Air Force Ng and ASDF Chief of Staff Tamogami

Fig. III-3-2-2 High-level Exchanges with Southeast Asian Countries (since last year)

Visits

Date	Visitors	Visited Countries
Jan. 2007	Then Minister of State for Defense Kyuma	Thailand
Feb. 2007	Then MSDF Chief of Staff Yoshikawa	Indonesia
Mar. 2007	Then GSDF Chief of Staff Mori	Viet Nam
Jun. 2007	Then Defense Minister Kyuma, Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Saito	Singapore
Aug. 2007	Then Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Kimura	Cambodia
Jan. 2008	Vice-Minister of Defense Masuda	Malaysia
May 2008	ASDF Chief of Staff Tamogami	Philippines
	Parliamentary Secretary for Defense Terada	Thailand
	Former Defense Minister Ishiba, Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Saito	Singapore

Visits to Japan

Date	Visitors
Mar. 2007	Malaysian Defense Minister
Nov. 2007	Singaporean Defense Minister
Dec. 2007	Chief of the Republic of Singapore Air Force
Feb. 2008	Chief of Staff of Indonesian Navy
Mar. 2008	Cambodian Vice-Minister/Defense Minister
Apr. 2008	Singaporean Permanent Secretary (Defense)
Jun. 2008	Supreme Commander of Royal Thai Armed Forces

8. Defense Exchanges with Other Countries

In addition to neighboring countries previously described, Japan has promoted defense exchanges with many other countries. The Ministry of Defense has held high-level exchanges, working-level consultations and student exchanges with many other countries around the world. Among them are Pakistan, which has played an important role in the global fight against terrorism; Canada, with which Japan had undertaken the U.N. peacekeeping operations in the Golan Heights; Mongolia, an Asia-Pacific country; countries related to the SDF's mission in Iraq such as Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE); European countries, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Regarding unit-to-unit exchanges, mutual visits by vessels have been frequent along with mutual exchanges with countries where international peace cooperation activities are underway.

The recent high-level exchanges are as shown in Fig. III-3-2-3.

In August 2007, then Minister of Defense Koike visited Pakistan for the first time as Defense Minister, and exchanged views on the fight against terrorism with President Musharraf and then Defense Minister Iqbal and officials during their meetings. Defense Minister of Luxembourg Schiltz visited Japan for the first time and met with former Minister of Defense Ishiba in October 2007. Like this, the Ministry of Defense intends to establish a close and cooperative relationship with many countries. Especially in relations with NATO, policy dialogues and cooperation have progressed as partners in endeavors for the stability and prosperity of the international community. In January 2007, then Prime Minister Abe participated in the North Atlantic Council for the first time as the Japanese Prime Minister, and delivered a speech. In May 2007, then Minister of Defense Kyuma visited NATO. In December the

Fig. III-3-2-3 High-level Exchanges with Other Countries (since last year)

Visits

Date	Visitors	Visited Countries
Feb. 2007	Then MSDF Chief of Staff Yoshikawa	New Zealand
May 2007	Then Parliamentary Secretary for Defense Kitagawa	Portugal, Spain
	Then Defense Minister Kyuma	Italy, Belgium, NATO
Aug. 2007	Then Defense Minister Koike	Pakistan
May 2008	Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Eto	Poland

Visits to Japan

Date	Visitors
Jan. 2007	Chief of Mongolian Armed Forces
Mar. 2007	French Defense Minister
Apr. 2007	German Defense Minister
May 2007	State Secretary, Ministry of Defense, Latvia
Sep. 2007	Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Navy
Oct. 2007	Luxembourg Defense Minister, Italian Naval Chief of Defence
Dec. 2007	NATO Secretary General
Jan. 2008	Chairman of the NATO Military Committee
Mar. 2008	Chief of New Zealand Defence Force
Apr. 2008	Chief, Brazilian Air Force
May 2008	New Zealand Defence Minister
Jun. 2008	Chief of Staff, French Air Force

same year, former Minister of Defense Ishiba conducted a meeting with NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer and while exchanging opinions on the fight against terrorism and regional situation, shared the view to deepen their cooperation as partners sharing common values and to enhance Japan-NATO relations both in political and practical aspects. In January 2008, General Henault, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, visited Japan and met with Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Saito, while paying a courtesy call on former Minister of Defense Ishiba. Also, a Japan-NATO High-level consultation was held in March 2008. At the 7th IISS Asia Security Summit, former Minister of Defense Ishiba had meetings with French Defense Minister Morin and Canadian Defense Minister MacKay. Furthermore, in May 2008, Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Eto visited Poland for the first time as a high-level official of the Ministry of Defense and exchanged opinions with senior officials from the Polish Defense Ministry. From the perspective of carrying out a wide range of security dialogues and of smooth implementation of international peace cooperation



Commander of Pacific Fleet of the French Navy Maurice and MSDF Chief of Staff Akahoshi

activities, it is beneficial to develop defense exchanges with various countries, including East European countries.

In this way, through defense exchanges, Japan is playing an important role for the peace and stability of Asia and the world. (See Fig. III-3-2-4)

Fig. III-3-2-4 Japan's Defense Exchanges (latest five years)

Exchanges of High-Level Defense Officials

2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
International conferences and others / Visits / Acceptance of visits			Japan U.S.A. Australia	
			The Philippines	
			New Zealand	
			India	
			ROK	
	Singapore		Singapore	
	ROK		NATO	
	Mongolia		Belgium	
	The Philippines	The Philippines	Italy	
	Australia	New Zealand	Thailand	
	U.K.	Mongolia	Pakistan	
	Australia	Indonesia	India	
	Singapore	Australia	Australia	
	Malaysia	Singapore	Germany	Canada
The Netherlands	Indonesia	Mongolia	France	ROK
France	The Philippines	Indonesia	ROK	France
U.K.	ROK	Russia	Malaysia	Singapore
U.K.	Singapore	U.K.	China	U.K.
Finland	New Zealand	India	Luxembourg	Australia
The Netherlands	Switzer-land	Canada	Singapore	Cambodia
Kuwait	NATO	New Zealand	NATO	New Zealand

Notes: In addition to a meeting of defense chiefs between Japan and Australia, "2+2" security talks were held between the Defense and Foreign Ministers of Japan and Australia.

Exchanges of Working-Level Officials

Country	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
ROK	●	●	●	◎◎●	
China	◎▲▲	▲	▲◎		▲
Russia	●	●	●	●	◎●
Australia		●	◎●●	●	◎
New Zealand		●	●	●	
Singapore	●	●		●	
Thailand			◎●	◎●	
Viet Nam		◎●		◎●	
The Philippines		◎●	◎●	◎●	
Indonesia				●	
Malaysia		●			
India	◎	◎●	◎●	△	◎●
Pakistan	◎●		◎●	●	
U.K.	●		◎●	◎●	
France	◎●	◎●	◎●	◎●	◎●
Germany	◎	◎●	◎●		
Canada		◎●	●		
NATO			◎	◎	◎

◎ Working-level meetings of officials of foreign affairs authorities and defense authorities

● Working-level meetings of officials of defense authorities

▲ Vice-Minister-level meetings of defense officials from Japan and China

△ Defense policy dialogue between vice defense ministers of Japan and India

3. Multilateral Security Dialogue

1. Significance of Multilateral Security Dialogue

Multilateral security dialogue is extremely significant because participating countries can increase their mutual understanding and relations of mutual trust by exchanging views on security issues of mutual concern. Such security dialogue can also effectively contribute to bringing about regional peace and stability through cooperation and coordination among countries concerned on regional issues affecting several countries.

2. ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

At the ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting and ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference in 1993, the foreign ministers from 17 countries and from the European Community (EC), now the European Union (EU), agreed to create the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as a political and security forum in the Asia-Pacific region. Since its first ministerial meeting in 1994, the ARF has held its regular ministerial meeting annually. The number of ARF members has gradually increased annually to currently 26 countries and one organization[33].

At present, the ARF is not a security organization typically seen in Europe, such as NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), but the ARF is of significance because it provides opportunities for both foreign and defense officials to attend various inter-governmental meetings.

The Ministry of Defense believes that it is necessary for defense officials among ARF member countries to enhance mutual confidence along with the evolution of the ARF process so that the ARF can become a forum to generate a sense of community among Asia-Pacific countries, and thereby stabilize the region's security environment. To this end, the Ministry of Defense has been continuing its efforts to deepen mutual understanding within the ARF through continuous participation in the ARF, by encouraging ARF members to increase the transparency of their defense policies while explaining Japan's policies and efforts, and by promoting frank discussion among defense officials.

In recent years, ARF member countries have been actively exchanging their views on common regional security issues including international disaster relief activities, maritime security, peacekeeping activities, and counter-terrorism. The Ministry of Defense has been actively participating in such discussions at the ARF.

Furthermore, in the aforementioned fields, the ARF has begun to look for more practical cooperation. For example, in the area of international disaster relief, following the drafting of a "general guideline" that should be considered for international cooperation, the drafting of the "Standard Operation Procedure," now renewed as "Strategic Guidance," which describes more concrete cooperation procedures is underway, while a desktop exercise took place in Indonesia in May with the participation of the Ministry of Defense.

Every year, ARF holds such meetings as the Senior Officials Meeting (SOM), the Inter-Sessional Support Group (ISG) Meeting on Confidence-Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (CBM[34]/PD) and the ARF Security Policy Conference in addition to the Foreign Ministerial Meeting. Apart from the so-called plenary meeting, which is composed of foreign and defense ministry officials, defense officials have convened their own Defense Officials Dialogue prior to the plenary meeting since the 2002 Ministerial Meeting. The Ministry of Defense has steadily increased its involvement in the ARF, by actively participating in these meetings, and frankly exchanging views with defense officials from other ARF member countries.

3. Multilateral Security Dialogue Sponsored or Participated in by the Japan Defense Ministry and the SDF

The Ministry of Defense believes that it is important for Japan to take the initiative in multilateral security dialogue in order to promote relations of mutual confidence and cooperation among defense officials of Japan and other countries through exchanges of information and opinions. The Ministry of Defense also believes that by

doing so, Japan can contribute to the stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Based on this recognition, the Ministry of Defense/the Self-Defense Forces have taken the initiative for multilateral security dialogue by sponsoring various international seminars while it has also actively participated in such forums sponsored by other countries and other organizations. (See Reference 52-53)

In particular, the Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum) has been sponsored by the Ministry of Defense every year since 1996. The Forum is designed to contribute to the stability of the Asia-Pacific region by deepening mutual understanding among participating countries on each other's defense policy and increasing the transparency of their defense policies. In the forum, defense officials of participating countries have exchanged views on defense policies of each country, and confidence-building measures in the field of defense.

At the 12th forum in September 2007, opinions were exchanged on "National and International Efforts for Peace-Building in Peacetime," with the participation of 25 countries, the EU, OCHA, ASEAN Secretariat, and the ICRC. In February 2008, the 7th Sub-committee meeting was held with the participation of 25 countries, the EU, OCHA, ASEAN Secretariat, and the ICRC which debated "Regional Cooperation and its Import on Surrounding States," while deliberating on the content of the "Best Practice Reference Paper for Peace-Building" including capacity building and elements to be noted for promoting international cooperation with respect to peace-building. The IISS Asia Security Conference (Shangri-La Dialogue), an international conference held annually in Singapore under the sponsorship of a private institute, is the only conference where a large number of defense ministers in the Asia-Pacific region participate. From Japan, former Minister of Defense Ishiba participated at the 7th conference in May 2008, and delivered a speech on important security issues of the same region, under the theme "East Asian Security and Future." During the conference, former Minister of Defense Ishiba paid a courtesy call on Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong while having individual meetings with Defense Ministers of the U.S., Canada, the ROK, France, Singapore, the U.K., and Australia.

In addition, the Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS) was organized for the first time in Japan in September 2007 and co-hosted with the U.S. Army Pacific Headquarters, with 91 participants from 28 countries and 2 organizations.

Former Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Eto gives a speech at the 12th Tokyo Defense Forum

4. Multilateral Exercises

1. Significance of Multilateral Exercises in the Asia-Pacific Region

The Defense Ministry and the SDF consider participating in and hosting multilateral exercises will contribute not only to improving their maneuvering skills but also to helping establish the foundation for building cooperative relationship among participating countries through the coordination process and exchange of views.

Since 2000, multilateral exercises involving various elements such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and non-combatant evacuation operations, have been conducted in the Asia-Pacific region, in addition to conventional combat exercises.

Specific exercises thus far conducted on a multilateral basis include refugee rescue training held as part of the Rim of the Pacific Exercise in 2000; the "Cobra Gold" Exercise conducted by the United States, Thailand and other countries focusing on U.N. PKO activities and disaster relief operations; the exercise for submarine

rescue drills in the West Pacific, which was hosted by Singapore in 2000, Japan in 2002, the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 2004 and Australia in 2007; and the Maritime Multilateral Exercise Malabar 07-2 hosted by the U.S. and India in 2007.

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF will continue to participate in these multilateral exercises proactively and on their own initiative.

2. Efforts on Multilateral Exercises in the Asia-Pacific Region

(1) Hosting Multilateral Exercises

The MSDF hosted "Pacific Reach 2002" in April 2002, a multilateral exercise for submarine rescue drills in the West Pacific[35]. This was the first time Japan hosted a multilateral exercise. In October 2002, the MSDF hosted the Multilateral Search and Rescue Exercise[36].

The SDF has sent its officers to the annual Cobra Gold exercise since 2005. In May 2008 at Cobra Gold 2008, they engaged in training for non-combatant evacuation operations and transportation of Japanese nationals overseas, in addition to practices for U.N. PKO command post exercise and medical divisions of humanitarian and civic assistance activities which they had previously taken part in.

Multilateral exercises in which the SDF has recently participated are as shown in Fig. III-3-2-5.

Fig. III-3-2-5 Participation in Multilateral Exercises (Since Last Year)

Date	Exercises	Hosts	Participating Nations	Participation by Defense Ministry and SDF
Aug. 2007	Khaan Quest 2007	U.S. and Mongolian militaries	About 22 countries, including U.S., Mongolia, Bangladesh, Fiji, India, Thailand and Tonga	Two GSDF participating as observers
Sep. 2007	Maritime Multilateral Exercises, Malabar 07-2	U.S. Navy, Indian Navy	India, Australia, Singapore, U.S., Japan	Two destroyers, two P-3C patrol aircraft, approximately 400 participants
Nov.-Dec. 2007	Western Pacific Rescue Submarine Exercises (Pacific Reach 07)	Australian Navy	Australia, U.S., Singapore, the ROK, the United Kingdom, Canada, China, Japan and others	The Response of Ministry of Defense and SDF. One rescue submarine and a crew etc. of approximately 130 personnel
May 2008	Cobra Gold 2008	U.S. and Thai militaries	21 countries, including Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, U.S., and Japan	69 SDF officers

(2) Inviting Observers to Multilateral Exercises

The SDF invited observers from eight countries in the Asia-Pacific region to Japan in September 2001 to the 4th Japan-Russia Search and Rescue Exercise. Since then, the SDF has been making efforts to invite observers from foreign countries to multilateral exercises being sponsored by the SDF.

The GSDF has invited working-level officers from countries mainly in the Asia-Pacific region to Japan to participate in the Multinational Cooperation Program in the Asia-Pacific (MCAP), which it has hosted annually since 2002 as part of its multilateral cooperation. (See Fig. III-3-2-6)

GSDF personnel participate in MCAP 2007 (at the research group)

Fig. III-3-2-6 Dispatch of Observers to Multilateral Joint Exercises (since 2007)

Date	Exercise	Overview
Aug. 2007-Sep. 2007	Sixth Multilateral Cooperation Program in the Asia Pacific (MCAP 2007)	This program was hosted by the GSDF with working-level personnel from 17 countries, mainly from the Asia-Pacific region, being invited. Under the theme, "military cooperation at international peace cooperation activities" participants held a training session and exchanged views in order to enhance response ability under diverse contingencies in the Asia-Pacific region, and promote mutual understanding and confidence-building among participating countries.

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of MSDF Personnel Who Participated in the Maritime Multilateral Exercise Malabar

Lieutenant Junior Grade Daiki Sakazaki
Flight Squadron 6, MSDF

I am a pilot of a fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-3C). In September last year, our P-3C squadron landed in India for the first time to participate in the maritime multilateral exercise, Malabar 07-2.

Lieutenant Junior Grade Sakazaki piloting the P-3C

It was the P-3C squadron's first visit to India and we experienced some difficulties concerning participation in training in a land with a different climate and customs. Initially, it was necessary to spend a lot of time gathering information from the Air Self-Defense Force concerning flight experience toward the Middle East on how to best avoid the air zone where extensive cumulonimbus clouds are generated (intertropical convergence zone) with the performance of the P-3C aircraft, and what airports to use in case of emergency landings due to aircraft trouble, in order to select the safest flight paths to India. Furthermore, compared to our own bases in Japan, the air bases in India were not equipped with the same range of support necessary for flying, such as aircraft maintenance, so we had to envision all possible contingencies. Then, within the weight limitations of the aircraft, we carefully selected aircraft parts and specialized maintenance equipment to take with us.

P-3C on the runway at Chennai International Airport in India

Due to sanitation concerns, we were careful not to drink untreated water. Nonetheless, after working in the heat all day and adapting to differences in the regional cuisine, some squadron members became ill. Healthcare is still an issue while participating in exercises in foreign countries, and these challenges will need to be addressed.

The multilateral exercise was conducted in the Bay of Bengal – about a three-hour flight from Indian air bases in a P-3C. In contrast to operations within Japan, it was difficult to confirm the operation details and exchange information with participating squadrons which is normally conducted before flying. However, once the exercise started, we were able to get communication with foreign ships and aircraft, even though English with the regional accents of each country was spoken during the exercise.

Through this multilateral exercise in India, a relationship of trust was established with the participating naval squadrons from India, Singapore and Australia, as well as the U.S. and we believe we also sufficiently showed the Japanese presence in East Asia. For me personally, it was a valuable experience, and the next time international activities are ordered, I am confident that I can respond promptly and flexibly.

Section 3. Efforts for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

In recent years, the international community has firmly recognized the new threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the missiles which serve as their means of delivery, and related equipment and materials falling into the hands of terrorists and countries of concern. For this reason, efforts toward non-proliferation which regulate and strictly control their export have become pressing tasks for the peace and stability of today's international community.

From a humanitarian point of view, international public opinion demanding regulation of certain conventional weapons has also been rising. Responding to the issue of regulating certain conventional weapons, while continuing to consider the balance between such humanitarian demands and defense necessity, has become an important challenge for all countries.

As an effort to address these challenges, a system concerned with arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation is being developed with the cooperation of all nations worldwide. (See Fig. III-3-3-1)

Based on the above, Japan will play an active role in efforts creating a world free of nuclear weapons by taking realistic step-by-step measures for disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as in international efforts related to the disarmament and non-proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction and the missiles which serve as their means of delivery, and furthermore in those related to the issue of regulating certain conventional weapons.

This section will explain the measures of the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces toward efforts concerning arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation carried out by international organizations including the United Nations.

Fig. III-3-3-1 Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Regarding Conventional Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Missiles and Related Materials

<table>
<tr><th rowspan="2">Item</th><th colspan="4">Weapons of Mass Destruction and Others</th><th rowspan="2">Conventional Weapons</th></tr>
<tr><th>Nuclear Weapons</th><th>Chemical Weapons</th><th>Biological Weapons</th><th>Delivery Means (Missiles)</th></tr>
<tr><td>Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation -Related Treaties</td><td>Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)</td><td>Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)</td><td>Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)</td><td>Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)</td><td>Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)

Convention on the Prohibition of Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Convention)

Restriction on Illegal Transactions of Small Arms and Light Weapons

System of the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms</td></tr>
<tr><td>Export Control System for Non-Proliferation</td><td>Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)</td><td colspan="2">Australia Group (AG)</td><td>Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)</td><td>Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)</td></tr>
<tr><td>New International Efforts for Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction</td><td colspan="4">Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540</td><td></td></tr>
</table>

1. Efforts on Treaties related to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

1. Nuclear Weapons

(1) Related Treaties

Treaties and export control systems for the purpose of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, are shown in Reference 54.

(2) Japan's Efforts

From the perspective of reinforcing systems for disarmament and non-proliferation, Japan has been proactively participating in discussions for better implementation of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as well as discussions in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), in addition to continuing its work aimed at the early enforcement of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and efforts for the strengthening of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

2. Chemical Weapons/Biological Weapons

(1) Relevant Treaties

Treaties and export control systems for the purpose of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, are shown in Reference 55.

(2) Japan's Efforts

a. Since 1980, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have dispatched chemical protection specialists from the GSDF to the negotiations of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) when required. As members of the Japanese delegation they assisted to draft the convention. Since 1997, when the convention came into effect, GSDF experts on protection from chemical weapons have been dispatched to the Hague, the Netherlands, to implement verification measures stipulated in the convention. (See Reference 56)

At the GSDF Chemical School (Saitama City), small quantities of chemical substances, which are the target of regulation in the convention, are synthesized for the purpose of protection research. Therefore, in accordance with the stipulations of the convention, inspections have been implemented a total of six times since the initial establishment of the organization.

In addition, the government as a whole is working on projects to dispose of chemical weapons that were abandoned in China, based on the CWC. Based on results of investigations so far, it is estimated that even now up to approximately 300,000 to 400,000 chemical weapons of the former (Imperial) Japanese Army remain buried in Haerbaling District, Dunhua City, Jilin Province, China. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF have relocated five personnel, including GSDF officers to the Cabinet Office, which is responsible for the disposal of abandoned chemical weapons. In addition, collaboration is being given in areas such as the dispatch of GSDF officials who are specialists in chemistry and ammunition disposal, to excavation and recovery operations for abandoned chemical weapons, carried out in China.

Since 2000, GSDF officers have been dispatched to the location for excavation and recovery projects a total of seven times. From August through September last year, eight SDF officers participated in excavation and recovery projects in Lianhuapao, Dunhua City, Jilin Province, China conducted by the Cabinet Office, and carried out measures such as the identification and emergency disarmament of shells.

b. With regard to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), cooperation is being given to efforts to strengthen

it. This is in areas such as the dispatch of SDF officers who are pharmaceutical and medical specialists, to relevant meetings such as multinational negotiations related to the introduction of BWC verification measures.
c. Personnel have been dispatched to the Australia Group (AG) Meeting every year since 1994, and they are collaborating to help make the group's regulations and agreements effective.

3. Delivery Means (Missiles)

(1) Relevant Agreements

International political agreements and export control systems for the purpose of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of means of delivery (missiles) are shown in Reference 57.

(2) Japan's Efforts

The Ministry of Defense has been dispatching personnel to the assembly of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) every year since 1992, and they are collaborating to help make the MTCR's regulations and agreements effective.

2. Efforts on Arms Control-Related Treaties on Certain Conventional Weapons

1. Related Treaties

Treaties and export control systems for the purpose of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of certain conventional weapons recognized as being inhumane, are shown in Reference 58.

2. Japan's Efforts

(1) The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)

In recent years, negotiations and reviews have been conducted to reduce the humanitarian risks that may be brought about by Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) such as unexploded ordnance.

In the 2003 Conference of the State Parties, Protocol V, related to post-conflict remedial measures of a generic nature in order to minimize the danger of post-conflict ERW was adopted (coming into effect in November 2006).

However, discussion regarding ERW continued, due to the necessity of responding to the problems brought about in particular by unexploded cluster munitions (munitions that have multiple sub-munitions in themselves), and at the Conference of the State Parties in November last year, it was decided to carry out negotiations at meetings of State governmental experts this year, for the purpose of responding promptly to the humanitarian concern of cluster munitions.

Regarding the issue of cluster munitions regulation, Japan contributes actively to these issues from the perspective of striking a balance between the humanitarian concern and its security necessity, as well as gaining the participation of major producers and possessors of them. Japan engages in active discussions with relevant countries by dispatching a delegation, including personnel from the Ministry of Defense, to the conferences of the State Parties and group of governmental experts, where discussion and negotiations are taking place for the purpose of the addition of protocol.

(2) The Oslo Process[37]

Regarding the cluster munitions issue, momentum was gained for the restriction of cluster munitions out of

the CCW, and the international conference was held in Oslo in February 2007 where the Oslo Declaration was adopted, claiming to conclude an international agreement by 2008 to ban cluster munitions which cause unacceptable harm to civilians. As a result of negotiations in the series of international conferences that followed, the Convention on Cluster Munitions was adopted by 111 countries, including Japan, at the Dublin Conference in May 2008.

As for the convention of the Oslo Process, Japan is seriously considering concrete steps to follow the signing of the Convention, while studying necessary security measure. The Defense Ministry is also appropriately debating while following its own policies.

(3) The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF began disposing of anti-personnel mines in January 2000. In February 2003, the destruction of all anti-personnel mines was completed excluding the minimum necessary amount retained as an exception, recognized in the convention for the purpose of developing technology and training in landmine detection and clearance.

Meanwhile, in order to maintain the security of Japan, as an alternative that poses no danger of causing harm to civilians and does not correspond to the anti-personnel landmines banned in the convention, the acquisition of an anti-personnel obstacle system, which includes directional fragmentation charges[38], is proceeding.

As of November last year, 156 nations have concluded this convention, but only 12 out of 26 ARF participating nations have done so. For this reason, until now the Ministry of Defense has encouraged ARF participating nations who have not yet concluded this convention to do so.

What is more, the Ministry of Defense has been submitting annual reports to the United Nations on data such as exceptional possession, while also actively cooperating in the international efforts on the issue of anti-personnel mines, by dispatching its staff from time to time to relevant international conferences[39].

(4) U.N. Register of Conventional Arms

Every year, the Ministry of Defense registers data on import amount of defense equipment with the United Nations, while also voluntarily providing information related to its possession, domestic procurement and the transfer of small weapons. It also dispatches its staff from time to time to expert meetings and so on, for the purpose of reviews, which are carried out to improve and strengthen this system.

3. International Efforts for Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Others

1. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

(1) Background Behind Adoption of the PSI

The Bush administration was deeply concerned that countries of proliferation concern such as North Korea and Iran are engaged in the development of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. In December 2002 it announced the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, and advocated the comprehensive three-pillared approach of “non-proliferation,” “counter-proliferation,” and “responding to the effects of WMD use.”

As a part of this President Bush announced the Proliferation Security Initiative[40] (PSI) in June 2003, and as a result of his request for the participation of nations in the effort, as of May this year, it has developed into an international approach with the support of over 90 countries, including Japan.

(2) Past Achievements of PSI and Japan's Efforts

Participating nations have agreed to the Statement of Interdiction Principles[41] which declared the objectives of PSI up until now and principles for the purpose of interdiction. Interdiction training is carried out in all fields of ground, maritime and air transportation etc., in order to increase WMD proliferation interdiction capabilities. As of March of this year, various kinds of PSI interdiction training (only field training exercises) have been carried out a total of 31 times.

In addition to this training, meetings have been held by the PSI participating nations, and discussions are being held to tackle the policy and legislative challenges faced.

As a result of such activities, there have been some success stories in actual operations, such as the BBC China Incident[42] which validated the effectiveness of PSI.

The objective of PSI is to contribute to the improvement of the national security environment, and as such Japan has been continuing to play an important role since the start of PSI in June 2003.

(3) Efforts by the Defense Ministry and SDF

It has been thought necessary for the Ministry of Defense and the SDF to continue to make maximum use of the SDF's capabilities in these kinds of Japanese efforts, to cooperate with relevant organizations and countries and to proactively contribute to PSI. After the third Paris Plenary Meeting, in addition to dispatching Ministry of Defense personnel including SDF personnel to a variety of meetings, Japan dispatched observers to PSI interdiction exercises conducted overseas, and gathered related information.

In October last year, along with relevant organizations such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Finance and the Japan Coast Guard, Japan hosted the second PSI Maritime Interdiction Exercise (Pacific Shield 07)[43], following the previous exercise in 2004. The SDF has conducted a joint exercise and played a proactive role on its own initiative in a number of joint exercises. This exercise included carrying out exhibition training related to search, identification and tracking at sea by the MSDF and ASDF, boarding and on-the-spot inspections by the MSDF, and decontamination of suspicious substances in ports by the GSDF.

Through these proactive efforts, for example in the case of PSI maritime interdiction activities, the relevant information obtained through information gathering activities (such as surveillance by ships of the MSDF and by aircraft of the MSDF and ASDF) is provided to relevant organizations and countries. Furthermore, it is thought that the MSDF will be able to carry out effective boarding and on-the-spot inspections of suspicious ships, with the cooperation of the Japan Coast Guard in the event that maritime security operations are ordered. When cargo inspection is carried out in harbors and so on, it is believed that the decontamination capabilities of the GSDF will be able to effectively assist in PSI activities, if by some chance harmful substances such as chemical agents are spilt.

Also, as a part of the proactive approach (outreach activities) for the purpose of strengthening comprehensive non-proliferation systems including PSI, Japan has been actively providing information and knowledge gained through past training to the national defense authorities of other Asian countries, and has been taking advantage of opportunities such as defense exchanges to work on promoting understanding toward PSI. (See Fig. III-3-3-2)

Boarding inspection training by MSDF personnel

Fig. III-3-3-2 Defense Ministry Participation in PSI Interdiction Exercises (Since last year)

Date		Exercises	Exercise Place	Participation by Defense Ministry and SDF
2007	April	Air interdiction exercises hosted by Lithuania	Vilnius (Lithuania)	Participated as observer
	May	Maritime interdiction exercises hosted by Slovenia	Koper (Slovenia)	Participated as observer
	June	Maritime interdiction exercises hosted by the United States (PSI games)	Newport (United States)	Dispatched for command post training
	October	Maritime interdiction exercises hosted by Japan	Tokyo Bay area (Japan)	Dispatched for field training
	October	Maritime interdiction exercises hosted by Ukraine	Black Sea (Ukraine)	Participated as observer
2008	March	Maritime interdiction exercises co-hosted by France and Djibouti	Republic of Djibouti	Participated as observer

(4) Future Efforts

Bearing in mind examples of proliferation in the area around Japan, grasping PSI as a security issue that widely includes factors such as defense, diplomacy, law enforcement and export management, is necessary to concentrate the combined efforts of Japan, and to ensure that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is prevented, through constant voluntary and proactive efforts.

For this reason, Japan will positively contribute to PSI in the future as well, and give consideration toward the systems within the government, while continuing to closely cooperate with relevant organizations and so on.

Also, from the perspective of increasing the capability of the SDF, Japan has been considering participating in and hosting interdiction exercises.

2. Security Council Resolution 1540 Concerning the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

In April 2004, the United Nations Security Council unanimously voted for the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1540 on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, which aims to take appropriate and effective action toward the threat that proliferation of NBC (Nuclear, Chemical, Biological) weapons, and their means of delivery poses to the peace and security of the international community. Under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, its details include: 1) to refrain from providing support of any kind to non-state actors attempting to develop weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, 2) to adopt and execute appropriate and effective legislation to prohibit the manufacture etc., of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by terrorists in particular, and 3) to establish border controls and export control measures for the purpose of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

Based on the danger imposed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on the peace and stability of the international community, which includes Japan, the prevention of proliferation of these weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors such as terrorists, is an urgent task for the international community. Based on the recognition of this fact, Japan supports the adoption of this resolution, and hopes that all United Nations members will observe the resolution.

Notes:

1) The formal name is the "Law concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations." (Law 79 of 1992)
   See <http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_J/related/bill/index.html>
2) The formal name is the "Special Measures Law Concerning Measures Being Implemented by Japan in Response to Activities by Foreign Countries to Achieve Goals Envisaged under the U.N. Charter Following Terrorist Attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, and concerning Humanitarian Measures Being Implemented on the Basis of Relevant United Nations Resolutions." (Law 113 of 2001)
   See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/singi/anpo/houan/tero/index.html>
3) The formal name is the "Law concerning the Special Measures on the Implementation of Replenishment Support Activities for Counter-Terrorism Maritime Interdiction Activities." (Law 1 of 2008)
   See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anpo/kakugi/080116keikaku.html>
4) The formal name is the "Law concerning the Special Measures on the Implementation of Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance Activities and Support Activities for Ensuring Security in Iraq." (Law 137 of 2003)
   See <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/hourei/houritu/iraq_h.html>
5) The resolution recognizes the specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of the United States and Britain as occupying powers under unified command (the Authority). The Authority is requested to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through effective administration of Iraqi territory until an internationally recognized representative government is established by the people of Iraq. The resolution also calls upon U.N. member countries to provide humanitarian relief to the Iraqi people, help reconstruct Iraq, and contribute to the stability and security of Iraq.
6) Liaison officers etc. are dispatched to carry out communications and coordination operations such as collecting information on site conditions in the area of operations, accepting personnel and materials, and procuring and transporting materials, and thereby contribute to the smooth and efficient operation of units at the site. At present, the Joint Staff Council has dispatched liaison officers to the U.S. Central Command and the ASDF has dispatched a liaison team to the Multinational Command in Baghdad.
7) Bali (October 2005); Amman, Jordan (November 2005); Algiers (December 2007).
8) As of February 2008, 40 countries were participating in the ISAD, which is designed to support the Afghanistan Government by maintaining its public security, so as to prevent Afghanistan from reverting into a hotbed of terrorism.
9) Japan is pursuing various anti-terrorism measures with a central focus on such fields as immigration controls, collection and analysis of counterintelligence, countermeasures to prevent hijackings and similar acts, measures for NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical weapons), security of important domestic facilities, and countermeasures against terrorist funding. Furthermore, the Government of Japan formulated an "Action Plan for Preventing Terrorist Attacks" containing 16 items of specific measures in December 2004, and has been addressing such issues as an international exchange of the information concerning lost or stolen passports, strengthening of immigration controls, introduction of the sky marshal program, strengthening of identity verification of foreign hotel guests, strengthening of controls of materials feared to be used for terrorism, and enhancement of information gathering capabilities.
10) The Security Council reached a resolution focusing mainly on the extension of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), adapted on September 19, 2007, to October 13, 2008. In this resolution, evaluation of each country's contribution to the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was expressed.
11) Counter-terrorism maritime interdiction activities are the conduct of inspections, verification, and other necessary measures to ships navigating the Indian Ocean in order to interdict and deter transportation of

terrorist, weapons, through international cooperation, which is one of the activities contributing to the achievement of U.N. Charter objectives, by making effort in the elimination of threat by terrorist attacks by foreign militaries.

12) Activities related to the supply of goods and services of the SDF to foreign marine vessels that are engaged in SDF counter-terrorism maritime interdiction activities (Limited to water supply and fuel for marine vessels or rotary wing aircraft mounted on marine vessels), in order to contribute to the smooth and effective operation of counter-terrorism maritime interdiction activities.

13) An act of combat points to any actions taken as a part of international armed conflicts to kill and injure people or destroy properties.

14) E/N was signed with five countries (U.S., U.K., Pakistan, France and Germany) in February 2008. Another was signed with Canada in March, and an additional is planned with New Zealand in April.

15) Activities conducted in line with a U.N. resolution and under the jurisdiction of the U.N. for the maintenance of peace and security in the international community to deal with the outbreak of conflicts, including ensuring the observance of an agreement concerning prevention of renewed military conflicts between the warring parties.

16) Activities being conducted by the U.N., other international organizations or countries based on a humanitarian spirit for the relief of victims of military conflicts, and reconstruction activities in connection with war-related damage. Such activities are initiated in accordance with a U.N. Security Council Resolution or requests from international organizations such as the UNHCR.

17) Japan defines core operations of the PKF as: 1) monitoring activities in connection with the observance of a ceasefire agreement, relocation of military forces, withdrawal and disarmament of forces; 2) stationing and patrolling in buffer zones; 3) inspection and check of weapons entering or exiting the site; 4) recovery, storage and disposal of discarded weapons; 5) assistance in the establishment of a ceasefire line between conflicting parties; and 6) assistance in the exchange of prisoners of war between conflicting parties.

18) The principal mission of UNMIN includes the following:
   (1) Monitoring the management of weapons and soldiers in accordance with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
   (2) Support concerning the performance of the agreement concerning the management of weapons and soldiers through the Joint Monitoring Coordinating Committee
   (3) Support concerning the monitoring of ceasefire agreements
   (4) Provision of technical support for planning, preparation and implementation of constituent assembly elections
   (5) Study of all technical viewpoints involved in the election process and provision of a small election-monitoring team for evaluation of election behavior.

19) The period of UNMIN operations as established in Security Council Resolution 1740 was extended to July 23, 2008 in accordance with a request from the Nepalese Government and a recommendation of the Secretary-General.

20) This refers to a study panel established in response to a request from then U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2000 for recommendations concerning measures for strengthening the capabilities of the U.N. concerning peace activities.

21) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/defense/exchange/01.html.>

22) Including dialogue directly tied to sharing awareness on issues and policy coordination, joint exercises that are directly linked to facilitating the SDF's international peace cooperation activities, etc.

23) Including reciprocal unit inspections and dispatch of observers to exercises, various types of forums, symposiums, and seminars, information sharing, equipment and technology exchanges, providing SDF

expertise in the disaster sector, etc.

24) This is a multilateral meeting that gathers defense minister class officials from the Asia-Pacific region and is held with the objective of discussing defense issues and regional defense cooperation. It began under the sponsorship of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a private research facility in the United Kingdom.
See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/defense/dialogue/iiss.html>

25) The Second Army was reorganized into the Second Operations Command on November 1, 2007.

26) See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/china/visit/0704_gai.html>

27) Specific examples following PKOs in Cambodia include cooperation in Samawah, Iraq and humanitarian assistance in response to disasters caused by the Indian Ocean tsunami.

28) See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/australia/visit/0703_ks.html>

29) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/news/youjin/2007/06/06d.html>

30) The GSDF concluded its withdrawal from Iraq in September 2006.

31) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/defense/exchange/pdf/india01.pdf>

32) In addition to Japan, participation was also seen by the United States, India, Australia, and Singapore.

33) 26 countries including 10 member countries of ASEAN (Indonesia, Cambodia (from 1995), Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Beirut, Viet Nam, Malaysia, Myanmar, Laos), North Korea (from 2000), ROK, China, the United States, Japan, India (from 1996), Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Pakistan (from 2004), Papua New Guinea, East Timor (from 2005), Mongolia (since 1998), Russia, Bangladesh (from 2006), Sri Lanka (from 2007) and the EU.

34) CBM: Confidence Building Measure: Efforts for military intelligence exposure, fixed military activity regulations, and promoting military exchange from a perspective of strengthening trust among nations, while preventing accidental military clashes. (Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs World Index)

35) The MSDF dispatched two vessels to the first western Pacific submarine rescue training hosted by the Republic of Singapore Navy in 2000.
Also, at the second training in 2002, 10 vessels from 5 countries including three MSDF vessels conducted an exhibition of submarine rescue technology in the Western Kyushu waters.

36) Nine countries of Japan, India, Australia, ROK, Singapore, Thailand, New Zealand, France, and Russia, in the Southern Kanto Waters, practiced the common process and steps in search and rescue with participants countries vessels while simulating MSDF vessels as distressed merchant ships.

37) Participating countries include Norway and other sponsors (Peru, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland etc.) and many developing countries such as Latin America and Africa which were included in the NGO-centered process. The major producing and possessing countries, including the U.S., China, and Russia, did not participate.

38) Explosives for use in anti-infantry combat, which obstruct the approach of enemy soldiers. In order that civilians do not get indiscriminately hurt, personnel will be made to operate them with their objective in sight. Detonation in the presence, approach or contact of civilians is not planned.

39) The Ministry of Defense referred retired SDF members to the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) between 1999 and December 2006, to provide support to anti-personnel landmine removal activities in Cambodia. These retired SDF members were dispatched as maintenance and transport advisors for the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) under the JICA framework of long-term dispatched specialists.

40) PSI is an initiative which continues to work in accordance with existing international and domestic laws to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their related materials, and consider steps which participating nations are able to take together. At the same time, it attempts to work toward the strengthening of related domestic laws within the range possible for each country.

41) The Statement of Interdiction Principles refers to the fact that the PSI participating countries will share the effort aimed at halting the flow of weapons of mass destruction to countries of proliferation concern or non-state actors, and from countries of proliferation concern or non-state actors. At the same time, it refers to all interested countries which are concerned about proliferation, supporting PSI and working together with current PSI participant countries to take steps that are possible and intended to be implemented. With the statement, each country is taking concrete action for the purpose of preventing the proliferation of the freight of weapons of mass destruction, within the allowable range of international and domestic law.

42) In September 2003, the German Foreign Office obtained information that the Antigua and Barbuda (an island nation in the Caribbean Sea) ship BBC China was transporting nuclear-related items and materials to Libya. The German government dispatched intelligence experts to Italy, and carried out inspections with the cooperation of Italy and the U.S. Navy. They discovered counterfeiting of container numbers, brought the ship to Taranto, Italy and seized the nuclear-related items and materials (aluminum tubes which could be used in a centrifuge). As a result of this incident, the nuclear development of Libya was tied to the exposure of the Khan Network, and the effectiveness of PSI was demonstrated.

43) Under the sponsorship of Japan, the PSI Maritime Interdiction Training was held in Izu-Oshima Eastern Sea, Yokosuka New Port and Yokohama Port, with the main objectives of showing the strong intention of the international community aimed at strengthening non-proliferation systems, increasing the skill of participating nations and relevant organizations, strengthening mutual cooperation, and promoting PSI understanding among non-PSI participating countries. Ships, aircraft, units and so on from the SDF took part. Ships, aircraft, customs officials etc., from Australia, France, New Zealand, Singapore, the U.S., and the United Kingdom participated in the training, and observers from 40 nations including these countries were dispatched to the event.

Part III

Measures for Defense of Japan

Chapter 4

Citizens of Japan, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF

Section 1. Sustaining Defense Capabilities
Section 2. Interaction between the Ministry of Defense & the SDF, and the Local Community & Japanese Citizens

Defense capabilities are the ultimate guarantee of a country's security and no other means can replace this function. For the core of the SDF's defense capabilities, it is not enough to simply create the necessary organization, but it is also indispensable for the SDF to earn the understanding and support of the Japanese people in order to execute its missions. It is also important to establish human resources[1] and a foundation of equipments and facilities.

With the above background, this chapter explains the following four aspects:

- ❍ The organization of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF.
- ❍ The process from recruitment and employment, through education and training, to retirement and outplacement of personnel.
- ❍ Details on information and communication systems, which is the foundation for all equipment and related matters. (These are examined in Section 1.)
- ❍ Activities by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF together with local communities, to gain the support of the Japanese people. (Section 2)

Section 1. Sustaining Defense Capabilities

Defense capabilities depend on organization and human resources. The operational efficiency of organizations depends on the capabilities of their personnel, not only equipment and systems. Under the security environment of recent years, missions have become more diverse and international in character, and equipment within the Ministry of Defense and the SDF[2] has been improved. Human resources must therefore be improved too, which means securing and training high-quality personnel.

This section explains the development of the organization and of human resources in the Ministry of Defense and the SDF, measures for the enhancement of information and communications capabilities, and the enhancement of technical research and development.

1. Organization of the MOD/SDF

The Self-Defense Forces (SDF), the core of Japan's defense capability, is a specialist organization that plays the most essential role in the continued existence of the country, that is, national defense. The SDF consists of a full range of units and services that provide the functions required to fulfill that responsibility.

1. Organization of the MOD/SDF

The MOD/SDF consist of a number of organs that center on the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), to fulfill their mission of defending Japan as armed organizations, and a number of other organs including the National Defense Academy, National Defense Medical College, National Institute for Defense Studies, Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH), Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI), Equipment Procurement and Construction Office, and the Inspector General's Office of Legal Compliance. (See Figs. III-4-1-1, III-4-1-2)

2. System to Support the Minister of Defense

The Minister of Defense, in accordance with the provisions of the SDF Law, is in charge of the SDF, and is supported by the Senior Vice-Minister of Defense and two Parliamentary Secretaries for Defense. The Minister of Defense is supported by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense in supervising administrative work, and the Defense Counselors in setting up basic policies, respectively.

Moreover, the Internal Bureau, Joint Staff and Ground Staff Office, Maritime Staff Office, and Air Staff Office support the Minister of Defense. The Internal Bureau is responsible for basic policies relating to the work of the SDF. The Director-General of the Secretariat and Directors-General of the Bureaus, as part of their own

responsibilities, support the Minister of Defense when the Minister of Defense gives instructions and authorization to the Chief of Joint Staff (Chief of Staff, Joint Staff), and Chief of Ground Staff (GSDF Chief of Staff), Chief of Maritime Staff (MSDF Chief of Staff), and Chief of Air Staff (ASDF Chief of Staff). The Joint Staff is a staff organization for the Minister of Defense concerning SDF operations. The Chief of Joint Staff supports the Minister of Defense by providing unified military expert advice on SDF operations. The Ground Staff, Maritime Staff, and Air Staff are the staff organizations for the Minister of Defense concerning their respective services (excluding operations, with the Chiefs of Staff for the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF acting as the top-ranking expert advisors to the Minister of Defense.

Fig. III-4-1-1 Organizational Chart of the Ministry of Defense



Fig. III-4-1-2 Outline of the Ministry of Defense

Organization	Outline
GSDF (see Location of Principal SDF Units at the end of the book)	❍ Regional Armies • Composed of multiple divisions, brigades and other directly controlled units (such as engineer brigades and anti-aircraft artillery groups) • There are five regional armies, each mainly in charge of the defense of their respective regions ❍ Divisions and Brigades • Compared to the combat troops, composed of logistics support units which support combat units and others
MSDF (see above)	❍ Self-Defense Fleet • Consists of key units such as the Fleet Escort Force, the Fleet Air Force (consisting of fixed-wing patrol aircraft units and such), and the Submarine Force • Responsible for the defense of the sea areas around Japan primarily through mobile operations ❍ Regional Units • The five regional units mainly guard their posts and support the Self-Defense fleet
ASDF (see above)	❍ Air Defense Command • Composed of three air defense forces and the Southwestern Composite Air Division • Primarily responsible for general air defense duties ❍ Air Defense Force • Composed of key units such as air wings (including fighter aircraft and others), the Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (including aircraft warning and control units), and Air Defense Missile Groups (including surface-to-air guided missile units)
National Defense Academy of Japan (Yokosuka, Kanagawa)	❍ An institution for the cultivation of future SDF officers Conducts training and education for future SDF officers (including education that complies to university establishment standards which are the same as other universities) ❍ Offers a science and engineering postgraduate course equivalent to a master's or doctoral degree from a university (undergraduate and postgraduate courses) and a comprehensive security postgraduate course equivalent to a master's degree. Conducts education and training in order to impart a high ability of knowledge and research capability
National Defense Medical College (Tokorozawa, Saitama)	❍ An institution for the cultivation of future SDF medical officers Conducts education and training for future SDF officers who will serve as medical doctors (including education which complies to the School Education Act that universities with medical education also comply to) ❍ Offers a medical course that complies with university establishment standards for PhD programs for schools of medicine. Conducts education and training in order to impart a high ability of knowledge of advanced theoretics, application, and related-research capabilities
National Institute for Defense Studies (Meguro-ward, Tokyo)	❍ Organization that functions as a "think tank" of the Ministry of Defense • Conducts basic research and studies related to the administration and operation of the SDF* • Conducts research and compiles data on military history • Educates SDF officers and other senior officials • Manages books and documents of historical value located in the connected library
Defense Intelligence Headquarters (Shinjuku-ward, Tokyo)	❍ Central intelligence organization of the Ministry of Defense, which collects and analyzes military data • Collects various military intelligence, including signal intelligence, image information and information acquired by warning and surveillance activities; comprehensively analyzes and assesses the information; and provides information to related organizations within the ministry • Consists of six communication sites and its headquarters
Technical Research and Development Institute (Shinjuku-ward, Tokyo)	❍ Central organization that conducts equipment-related research and development • Conducts R&D in response to the operational needs of each service of the SDF • Conducts R&D in a wide range of fields, from firearms, vehicles, ships and aircraft used by each service of the SDF to equipment for responses to NBC weapons and clothing
Equipment Procurement and Construction Office (Shinjuku-ward, Tokyo)	❍ Central organization for affairs related to equipment procurement required by the SDF to accomplish its duties • Necessary equipment include firearms, explosives, fuel, guided weapons, ships, aircraft, and vehicles • Within the construction work related affairs, the drafting of technical standards and evaluation of plans are conducted
Inspector General's Office of Legal Compliance (Shinjuku-ward, Tokyo)	❍ Institution which checks the general operations of the Ministry of Defense and SDF from an independent perspective • Checks the accounting procedures, bidding procedures and other operational procedures from an independent viewpoint to ensure they are conducted fairly and in accordance with the law
Regional Defense Bureau (eight existing in the country)	❍ Local branch office that provides defense administration in the regions • Conducts administrative work related to obtaining the cooperation of local public organizations and the local people, local equipment procurement, and administration related to facilities • Existing in the following eight regions: Hokkaido, Touhoku, North-Kanto, South-Kanto, Central Kinki, Kyushu and Okinawa

3. Restructuring of the Ministry of Defense

Following various examinations, taking into account such issues as the case of bid-rigging at the Defense Facilities Administration Agency, the following large-scale restructuring activities were carried out in September 2007:

- ❍ Abolition of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency and its incorporation into the Ministry of Defense.
- ❍ Restructuring of the Internal Bureau in order to strengthen policy-planning functions.
- ❍ Establishment of the Inspector General's Office of Legal Compliance.
- ❍ Establishment of the Regional Defense Bureau as the local base of the Ministry of Defense.

Inspector General's Office of Legal Compliance Inauguration Ceremony

In addition, the organizational reform for strengthening the command functions of the Ministry of Defense was shown in the report by the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense released in July 2008. (See Part IV, Section 1)

2. Recruitment and Employment of Personnel in the Ministry of Defense and the SDF

1. Recruitment

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF need highly-qualified personnel in order to fulfill their missions. SDF Regular Personnel and other personnel of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF are recruited and employed under various systems[3]. (See Reference 59)

SDF Provincial Cooperation Offices, which are located in 50 locations throughout the nation (four in Hokkaido, and one in each prefecture), conduct recruitment with the help of prefectural and municipal governments, schools, private recruitment counselors and others. Local public organizations are also required to carry out administrative recruitment activities[4], and the Ministry of Defense defrays the costs incurred by local public organizations.

Recruitment by local cooperation headquarters

Since recruitment of the SDF personnel is likely to become increasingly difficult with the declining birth rate in Japan, it is necessary to seek the assistance of local public organizations, related organizations and other community organizations. (See Fig. III-4-1-3) (See Reference 60)

Fig. III-4-1-3 Changes in Male Population at the Ages Eligible for Recruitment of Males to the Short-Term Service



Sources: The data of up to and including 2004, and data of 2006; "Population Estimates of Japan 1920-2000" and "Annual Report on Current Population Estimates" by the Statistics Bureau of Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.
Data of 2005; National Institute of Population and Social Security Research made calculations based on the "Population Census," by the Statistics Bureau of Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, and made corrections by proportionally distributing the population with unknown age.
Data of 2007 and after; "Future Estimate of Japan's Population" by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (based on average estimate as of December 2006).

2. Employment[5]

(1) SDF Regular Personnel

SDF Regular Personnel enlist of their own free will on a volunteer basis and are employed as General Officer Candidates; General Candidates for Enlisted (Upper[6]), Privates (GSDF), Seaman Apprentices (MSDF), Airmen Third Class (ASDF), and others[7]. Because of the special nature of the work they do, personnel management performed for SDF Regular Personnel is distinct from that of general civilian government employees[8].

Personnel management of the SDF Regular Personnel differs significantly from that of general civilian government employees because the former adopts an early retirement system and a short-term service system to keep the forces strong. Under the early retirement system, the SDF Regular personnel retire at a younger age than general civilian government employees. Meanwhile, under the short-term service system, employment may be completed in two or three years. Upon employment, the SDF Regular personnel who enlist in each SDF service complete the basic education and training in a training unit or at a school of each SDF service, and are then assigned to units and positions nationwide.

Freshman wears uniform for the first time

The preferences and aptitude of each personnel are taken into consideration when assigning them to occupational areas and positions, which are determined before they complete their basic education. (See Reference 61-63)

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of a Staff Involved in the Disbandment of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency and Compilation of its History

Akira Takahashi
South Kanto Defense Bureau
(Previously working at the Defense Facilities Administration Agency)

The Defense Facilities Administration Agency was disbanded and integrated into the Ministry of Defense in September last year. The decision, which followed the incident of the agency officials' involvement in the bid-rigging in January 2006, was a great shock to the staff who must have felt an immense sense of loss. I think many of those who have once worked at the agency had the same feeling.

General team that took part in the editing of the history of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency (General Manager Takahashi, center)

Under such situation, then Director-General of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency Iwao Kitahara proposed to compile the History of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency before its disbandment. That was how the all-agency project was launched. Five persons from the General Affairs Division, including myself, were involved as a "Wrap-up Team." We worked until midnight everyday: collecting data, drafting, adjusting layout, and doing all other tasks which were completely new to us.

The History of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency is the history of the issues related to the military bases in Japan. Originally started as the Special Procurement Agency, the agency has always been at the forefront of military base issues as Japan went through the Allied Occupation, development and expansion of the Self-Defense Forces, the reversion of Okinawa, and so on. We decided to compile a comprehensive history recording the outline of the base issues and its transformation, including the movement of local communities. However, we only had limited time and the process was not straightforward.

On the other hand, I was excited to hear directly from the former agency staff and the local people involved in the base issues. We felt like making a trip back in time to witness some of the well-known incidents.

Compiling the History, we once again realized how challenging the agency's task was to acquire facilities and ensure their stable operation. At the same time, I felt great respect for those who have diligently fulfilled their task in spite of the difficulty. It was their effort, I believe, that founded the cornerstone of Japan's national security.

The History was completed right before the final day of the agency. I will never forget how the book felt and weighed when we first handled it. Although it is up to the readers to judge the content, I do think that our original intentions were mostly fulfilled.

Reading it again, I renew my conviction that the articles contributed to the History, including those from the local residents, convey a message to us that further efforts are being expected to resolve the base issues that remain even after the disbandment of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency. About a year has passed since the agency was reorganized into the Defense Ministry. I think we need to keep up our efforts to live up to the people's expectations and to make the best out of this reorganization.

See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/info/choushi/>

(2) SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, SDF Reserve Personnel, and Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel[9]

a. Purpose for Establishing the Reserve Personnel System

Normally, the number of SDF Regular Personnel is kept to the minimum needed to respond to situations: SDF Regular Personnel need to be available immediately in an emergency as the need arises. To meet such needs promptly and systematically, there are three systems: the SDF Ready Reserve Personnel System, the SDF Reserve Personnel System, and the System for Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel[10].

In particular, the System for Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel, which is mainly for personnel without experience, was established to develop and expand the defense basis, secure the stability of SDF Reserve Personnel, and effectively use civilian expertise in fields such as medical practice and language skills.

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of a Newcomer (a General Officer Candidate, GSDF)

Second Lieutenant Aki Tsuchiyagaito
1st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Company, GSDF

What does it mean to shine at work?

I am working at the 1st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Company in Hokkaido, which forms a part of the ground/air defense.

I joined the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) about one year ago, attracted by the catchphrase that I happened to see, “There are people I want to protect.” Although there are many other ways to help people, the mission of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) appealed to me in particular. I pictured myself protecting Japan’s peace and independence and safeguarding the people.

I enrolled in the Officer Candidate School filled with dreams and hopes.

Initially I had difficulty adjusting to the new life. I sometimes felt like giving up, frustrated at my immaturity and the disparity between ideal and reality. But I hardly had time to contemplate this. Basic training of the GSDF awaited us, such as a general drill involving a 100-kilometer march. As I overcame one difficulty after another, I realized myself improving step by step. I owe my progress to the wonderful colleagues and attentive instructors who were always there to support me.

I graduated from the Officer Candidate School in December last year. Although it only lasted for three months, I learned much from the regimental training for the infantry which forms the core of the GSDF. At the 27th Infantry Regiment in Kushiro, Hokkaido, we joined the regular infantry members for combat training, target practices, street fighting training, ski marching, wintertime inspection, and so on to experience the real life at a unit and the fighting spirit. The “fighting spirit” which I acquired at the 27th Infantry Regiment will stay with me for the rest of my career.

I was appointed Second Lieutenant in March this year, and started working at the Anti-Aircraft Artillery Company which I had strongly desired to be assigned to. From now on, I will be expected to lead the unit as an officer, in addition to fulfilling the duties of a combatant. The GSDF treasures the heart-to-heart interaction of people. During my everyday interactions with people, I find that they are more often motivated by emotion than plain logic. I wonder what is needed for me to be a leader without having much experience. Whenever in doubt, I always try recalling the motto “passion and sincerity,” which my instructor at the Officer Candidate School constantly reminded us. Strategic, tactical thinking is required for an officer, but at the same time, I believe it is this “passion and sincerity” that brings the unit together. I will keep that in mind as I realize my mission and take care of every single member of the unit.

Since there are a small number of female service members in the SDF, becoming an officer may prove to be a difficult path. But that does not preclude the possibility. There have been a number of active female service members so far and many paths will be available for female members in the future. For the time being, I think my task is to keep shining in the unit, believing that would foster a strong team by bringing the members closer together.

Second Lieutenant Tsuchiyagaito during the ski march training

Second Lieutenant Tsuchiyagaito conducting an Armed Obstacle Race

There are two employment categories in the SDF Reserve Personnel system: general and technical. Personnel hired in the technical category are healthcare professionals and qualified technical personnel in such fields as languages and information processing.

Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel are appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel following completion of the education and training necessary to work as SDF personnel. In recent years, SDF Reserve Personnel employed with qualifications as healthcare professionals have participated in general disaster prevention drills as medical officers once being appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel, and those employed through their language qualifications have been active as interpreters, participating in Japan-U.S. joint armies of the GSDF post exercises and activities in other fields, following their appointment as SDF Reserve Personnel. (See Reference 64-65)

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of a Newcomer (Student Pilot, MSDF)

Petty Officer Second Class Tomoharu Inoue
Student Pilot, MSDF

I am currently in training as a student pilot at Ozuki Air Station, Shimonoseki, Yamaguchi Prefecture. I have loved airplanes since I was a child, and becoming a pilot had been my long-time dream. However, things were not that easy. I failed the entrance exam for the student pilot course twice because of my poor vision. But I did not give up and tried again for a third time. This time, the vision requirement was greatly reduced and I finally gained long-awaited entry to the course.

"Dreams can be realized as long as you don't give up." That is the lesson I learned from this experience.

Student pilots spend their first two years or so at Ozuki Air Station, where they learn basic academic skills in mathematics, English and physics, and cultivate the physical and mental strength required for MSDF staff.

After these two years, we begin learning piloting techniques at the 201st Air Training Unit. That is where I am right now, which is the first crucial step for realizing my dream to become a pilot. I must first become

acquainted with the airplane, and then be able to take off and land on my own.

Within no more than 20 hours after first handling the control stick, we took a solo flight without the guidance of an instructor. I was excited at the idea of being on my own in the open sky, but the pressure was immense as I assumed all the responsibilities of the flight. Nevertheless, having the entire sky right in front of me for myself was a truly rewarding experience. The thrill I felt during my first solo flight is still fresh in my memory.

Petty Officer Second Class Inoue in the cockpit

After that, we learn acrobatic flight, instrument flight, navigation and formation flight. At the recent navigation training, I happened to fly over my hometown. I was greatly moved as I had never imagined myself as a pilot, flying over my old home and town.

I owe my accomplishments to the attentive guidance of my instructors. They could be demanding at times because even a single error can be fatal.

I was assigned to a fixed-wing aircraft as I desired. I will keep up with the training to become a regular P-3C pilot at the earliest possible date, so that I can work at the forefront of Japan's maritime defense.

b. Cooperation from Corporations Employing Personnel

In addition to carrying out their normal duties, SDF Reserve Personnel and other personnel are also expected to undergo training to maintain the required skills. To attend such training, they take leave or vacation, or adjust their work schedules accordingly. To function smoothly, such systems require the understanding and cooperation of the employers of the personnel. SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, in particular, attend training for 30 days a year, so employers need to allow Ready Reserve Personnel to take this leave and prepare for their absence.

To assist, the Ministry of Defense provides a special subsidy to companies and other organizations to cover for their Ready Reserve Personnel when attending training sessions and the like. This reduces the burden on such employers.

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of a Newly Enlisted SDF Personnel (ASDF General Candidate for Enlisted (Upper))

Airman Second Class Hiroki Takahashi
Air Basic Training Wing 1st Basic Training Group
General Candidate for Enlisted (Upper), ASDF

What kind of dreams do you want to realize?

My dream is to have a job that contributes to the society. As I was thinking about how to make this dream a reality, my father's friend coincidentally introduced me to a provincial cooperation officer, which gave me the opportunity to realize my dream in the ASDF.

After considering the challenges of the "Student Candidate for Enlisted (Upper) System," a course to train future ASDF personnel to become key personnel, I joined the SDF.

Prior to joining the SDF I did not have much understanding of what kind of jobs the SDF was involved in. However, as I learned more and more about the SDF's role after my enrollment, I started to believe that it was a necessary job for the safety of Japan and the peace of the international community.

Airman Second Class Takahashi in highball training (right)

Presently, as a first term General Candidate for Enlisted (upper), I am receiving basic training as an SDF member in the ASDF training unit. Although this period will lay the groundwork for ASDF members and includes subjects that are mentally and physically challenging, I am steadily learning and improving, and my fellow comrades and I encourage each other. I will continue to work hard everyday to graduate from this course, until the day that I am promoted to 4th class, at the earliest time, and become a reliable member of the ASDF. At that time, I hope to contribute to international peacekeeping operations and disaster relief dispatches as a representative of Japan. Among the many units in the ASDF, I would like to serve in the rescue unit.

In addition, if possible, I hope to become a pilot within the ASDF and to continue to challenge myself. This is because becoming a pilot is my other dream.

Lastly, I hope to never forget my present aspirations and to strive toward the achievement of my dreams, without regret.

(3) Administrative Officials, Technical and Engineering Officials, Instructors, and Other Civilian Personnel

There are approximately 23,000 civilian officials – Administrative Officials, Technical and Engineering Officials, or Instructors, and others – in addition to SDF Regular Personnel at the Ministry of Defense and the SDF. These civilians are mainly employed through the Class I Examination for National Public Workers, or the Class I, II, or III Examination for Ministry of Defense Civilian Officials. After participation in the same training course, Class I and II personnel undertake a wide range of work.

Administrative officials are engaged in planning defense policies and management, and the basic operation of the SDF at the Internal Bureau; intelligence works of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH); and administrative works (general affairs, measures to ensure harmony between defense facilities and surrounding communities, and others) and provide logistic support (maintenance, supply, and others) to SDF units throughout Japan.

Technical and Engineering Officials work at the Technical Research & Development Institute (TRDI) and other organizations, where they conduct R&D to maintain and improve the level of technology of the nation's defense capabilities. Instructors' duties include basic investigation and research on the management and operation of the SDF at the National Institute for Defense Studies, and cultivation of highly qualified personnel at organizations such as the National Defense Academy and the National Defense Medical College.

As of the end of March 2008, there were 602 Technical and Engineering Officials and Instructors with doctoral degrees.

Moreover, in the various organizations where these civilian officials work, SDF Regular Personnel of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF work together with the civilians, mainly in fields where the special knowledge of SDF Regular Personnel is required.

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of a Crew Member of the Icebreaker *Shirase*

Chief Petty Officer Yoshihiko Matsumoto
Icebreaker *Shirase*, MSDF

I have been involved in three missions so far to support Antarctic expeditions. One such on board mission happened to be the maiden voyage of the current *Shirase*, which took place in 1981 (25th Antarctic expedition), five years after I joined the MSDF in 1976. At first, everything I saw was new to me, so the months-long mission was spent in complete wonder.

However, things were different when I boarded *Shirase* two years ago after a 23-year interval. As I arrived at Showa Base in Antarctica, I was shocked to see how dramatically things had changed. There was an abundance of high-tech equipment so that we could get almost the same information as in Japan. During my initial visit, we only had satellite telephones and telegraphs, so I completely lost touch with current affairs and trends after being there for five months.

The primary mission of *Shirase* is to supply Showa Base with food and other necessities. It also provides support for base building at Showa Base and assists in field and maritime observations. Because these tasks must be completed within a specific timeframe, weather becomes our biggest concern every day. Even during the summer season, we need to dress appropriately for the cold as the temperature can drop well below -10˚C. We also need to protect ourselves against ultraviolet rays when working outside. Without sunglasses and sunscreen, a tan from the snow or injury to the eyes could occur within a few hours. These are just some of the challenges crew members face during their everyday duties.

The successor to *Shirase* is scheduled to be commissioned this April. The new ship will offer increased efficiency in transportation capabilities, such as containerizing goods and supplies, loading large onboard helicopters and others. It also has an expanded capacity to accommodate 80 expedition team members, compared to the previous 60, which will enable additional research observation and base building at the site.

It is imperative that our operational support for Antarctic expeditions continue to live up to the public expectations. I am confident that the 40-year long tradition founded by our predecessors on *Fuji* and *Shirase* will be inherited and nurtured by future generations.

3. Daily Education and Training[11]

In order to accomplish its missions such as the defense of the country, the SDF needs commanding officers and other members who possess excellent knowledge and skills and to be highly qualified, and it also needs each unit to maintain a high level of proficiency. Personnel are always required to be prepared to demonstrate their capabilities in any situation, so that the SDF can immediately and appropriately deal with various situations and deter any country threatening to invade Japan.

Education and training are crucial for the SDF to develop its human resources and strengthen its capabilities, as described above. While working under various constraints and making great effort to prevent accidents and address other safety concerns, the SDF is committed to educating its personnel and training its units to make them strong, and to maintaining and improving its readiness to respond to any situation.

GSDF personnel conducting shooting training in the snow

MSDF personnel in cutter training

ASDF personnel in low-pressure training

1. Education of SDF Regular Personnel

(1) Present Status of Education

Enhancing the ability of each SDF Regular Personnel is essential to the SDF to perform their duties at units. At its schools and training units, the SDF provides a systematic phased education, starting from basic education immediately after joining the SDF, to life-long learning to nurture the qualities necessary for positions and duties, in order to cultivate quality, knowledge and skills of personnel.

When it is judged that personnel need to improve their professional knowledge and skills, or if it is difficult for them to acquire such knowledge and skills within the SDF, they may study abroad, at external educational institutions[12], domestic companies, research institutes, and similar organizations. Education is entrusted to such organizations, and so a wide range of external educational organizations is used to help personnel continuously improve their qualifications, knowledge and skills. (See Reference 66)

(2) Joint Educational Programs

The joint operations posture was started in March 2006. Knowledge and skills regarding joint operations are essential in order to develop the system, which is done primarily through joint educational programs. Therefore, the SDF has enhanced education on joint operations at the Staff College[13] of each force, and at other educational facilities. Additionally, a joint educational program system, centered on the Joint Staff College[14], has been set up. High-ranking SDF officers who will become Senior Unit Commanders and Senior Staff receive joint educational programs at this College.

(3) Educational Programs Meeting the Needs of the Times

The SDF has increasing opportunities to take part in international activities, and is developing more active relationships with other countries, and so has added language programs for English, Russian, Chinese, Korean, Arabic, and other languages to its curricula. The SDF also accepts students from abroad to increase understanding of other countries. Furthermore, education on the implementation of international peace cooperation activities is being carried out in the GSDF International Activities Training Unit and other groups in order to conduct international peace cooperation activities in an expeditious and continuous manner. (See Chapter 3, Section 1) (See Reference 67-68)

2. SDF Training

(1) Training by Each Self-Defense Force

There are two main types of training within units in the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF: training for individual SDF personnel to improve their proficiency in respective fields, and training for units to conduct systematic operations.

Training for individuals is conducted one-on-one in stages based on occupational classification and individual ability. Training for units is conducted by size of unit, from small to large, and large-scale comprehensive training is also carried out to ensure that overall abilities can be exercised. (See Reference 69)

In addition to such training for national defense, training is given on the diverse roles required for the SDF in recent years. (See Reference 70)

(2) Joint Exercise

In order to exert defense capabilities most effectively in the event of an armed attack on Japan, the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF must conduct joint exercise during peacetime. Therefore, the SDF has been conducting joint exercise involving two or more forces. Such joint exercise has been strengthened with the transition to a joint operations posture in March 2006[15]. (See Reference 69)

(3) Restrictions on Education and Training, and Responses

Various facilities and equipment[16] are available for SDF training under the nearest possible environment to that of real fighting, yet many restrictions are imposed on their usage.

Particularly, restrictions[17] in maneuver areas, waters and airspace, and firing ranges where training is carried out are becoming tighter along with the modernization of equipment and other changes. Such areas are not sufficient in size, are unevenly dispersed across the nation, and have time limitations.

Furthermore, training under an electronic warfare[18] environment – conducted as practical training – is limited by the need to avoid radio wave interference.

To deal with these restrictions, each SDF makes maximum use of its limited domestic maneuvering areas. They also strive to carry out more practical training by conducing live-firing training and Japan-U.S. joint exercises in the United States and waters off the United States where there are training conditions not available in Japan. (See Reference 71)

(4) Safety Management

Because the primary mission of the SDF is to defend Japan, SDF training and activities are inevitably accompanied by risk. However, accidents that cause injury or loss of property to the public or the loss of life of SDF personnel must be avoided at all costs.

Continuous safety reviews and improvements are vital, and must be jointly handled by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF take great care to ensure the safety of military vessel and aircraft traffic, and firing training at ordinary times, and prepare aeronautical safety radio facilities and equipment for prevention and rescue in the event of marine accidents.

(5) The Collision between the Destroyer *Atago* and the Fishing Vessel *Seitoku Maru*

The MSDF destroyer was one party in the collision on 19 February 2008 between the destroyer *Atago* and the fishing vessel *Seitoku Maru*, causing the capsizing of the *Seitoku Maru* with its crew of two. It is extremely regrettable that the SDF, which is responsible for defending the lives and property of the Japanese people, caused such an accident and the SDF maintains an awareness of the extreme importance of this issue.

An "MSDF Accident Investigation Commission" was established immediately following the incident to investigate its causes. On 21 March 2008 the findings of the investigation until that point were made public to the extent that such disclosure would not hinder the investigation. The following evaluations were provided of the total response extended by the *Atago*[19]:

1) The watch conditions for the ship as a whole were not performed adequately. This includes the placement of watch personnel and the CIC person on duty.
2) The fact that the *Seitoku Maru* was observed at starboard means that it is highly likely the *Seitoku Maru* approached the starboard side of the *Atago*. If this is the case, the *Atago* had an obligation to give-way but failed to implement appropriate give-way maneuvers. Furthermore, it is highly possible that the measures implemented by the *Atago* immediately preceding the collision were inadequate avoidance maneuvers.

The MOD and SDF will continue to perform investigations, make efforts to create more detailed responses, and work to prevent the recurrence of such accidents.

Safety in maritime navigation is of utmost importance, whether for SDF ships or general vessels. The general rules for maritime traffic safety outlined in the Law for the Prevention of Collision at Sea and in the Maritime Traffic Safety Law for designated waters apply to SDF ships in exactly the same way as they apply to general maritime vessels. Education and training on this matter are currently being provided.

The conditions of the *Atago* at the time of the accident and the accident cause will be made clear by a Japan Coast Guard investigation and by accident investigations by a marine accident inquiry and by MOD Marine Vessel Accident Investigation Committee. Emergency measures implemented due to this accident include the following:

1) On the day of the accident the Minister of Defense issued instructions ("The Safe Navigation of Military Vessels") to the head of the unit operating military vessels to reconfirm and educate personnel on (a) compliance and adherence with laws and regulations on the securing of safety in maritime traffic and (b) the operational system for safe navigation.
2) Based on these Ministerial instructions, on 28 and 29 February the MSDF ceased all training and operations, excluding critical unit operations on actual duty, and implemented a "General Review on Operational Safety" for aircraft as well as military vessels that included a safety review of operational preparedness with such elements as a review of duty readiness and watch-related conditions.
3) Regarding the use of the autopilot until immediately before the accident, instructions have been issued for an investigation to establish internal autopilot regulations and to make as clear as possible for all situations upon whose authority the decision for autopilot use is made. Furthermore, from 25 February, with the exception of multi-purpose assistance vessels with restrictions on staffing for operations, the use of autopilot functions by

individual vessels of the SDF fleet during regular operations was prohibited until said internal regulations are established.

Further developments include the following:

1) A decision was made to establish universal operating standards for autopilot equipment in the MSDF in order to achieve a standardized autopilot operation.
2) Audio recordings from voice recorders and the navigational record of ships as detected by radar are valuable for the investigation and analysis following accidents such as this one. As such, a decision was made to proceed with investigations into installing equipment and/or functions capable of continuously recording such information, and to equip automatic audio and radar course recording functions.
3) Following the *Nadashio* Submarine incident, improvements were made to the content of year-round basic training implemented annually to improve basic skills for operational safety.

The accident was first reported to the Minister of Defense at 5:40 a.m., more than one-and-one-half hours after the accident, and first reported to the Prime Minister at approximately 6:00 a.m., nearly two hours after the accident. It must be noted that reporting was delayed.

The fact that an extended period of time passed between the accident and the accident being reported to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense indicates an incredibly serious weakness of the crisis management response.

As a result of these conditions, the instruction for reporting incidents and accidents was immediately revised to make it clear that notification for important incidents and/or accidents is to be provided by individual Chiefs of Staff to their direct Ministers and Senior Vice-Ministers within one hour. Furthermore, in March the existing instructions were radically revised and new instructions were issued for the prompt reporting of emergency situations in order to improve reporting to 1) the Minister of Defense and others, 2) the Prime Minister's Office, and 3) to prefectures and municipalities. In addition, revisions such as the following were made: 1) conditions that require prompt reporting are not only SDF incidents and/or accidents, but are expanded to include all emergency situations, and "emergency situation" is to be indicated in detail; 2) a report to the Prime Minister's Office is to be made without fail and the point of contact is to be made clear; and 3) a description will be provided of new reports to be made to concerned prefectures and municipalities.

4. Working Conditions of Personnel, Measures on Personnel Matters, and Other Related Issues

The duties of the SDF make no distinction between night and day. The work assigned to SDF Regular Personnel can be extremely demanding, involving various operations onboard aircraft, long-term service on ships or submarines, or parachuting. To instill SDF personnel with pride and allow them to concentrate on their duties without anxiety, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF strive to provide salaries and allowances, medical care, health and welfare, and benefits that reflect the special nature of their duties. (See Fig. III-4-1-4)

1. The Panel to Examine Comprehensive Reform in the Personnel Field of the Defense Force

The Ministry of Defense has acknowledged the significance of maintaining high-quality human resources, and has implemented various measures for the new era[20]. Given the rapidly declining birth rate in recent years and changes in lifecycles of SDF personnel, a wide range of reforms, which focus on the personnel field of the Defense Force, has become a pressing issue, in order to secure sufficient human resources and create a comfortable working environment where personnel can concentrate on their duties without anxiety. In September 2006, the Panel to Examine Comprehensive Reforms in the Personnel Field of the Defense Force was established. The panel is headed by the Minister of State for Defense (at the time), and includes top officials of the Defense Agency (at the time) and outside experts. Under their authority the panel has implemented various types of

Fig. III-4-1-4 Main Measures on Personnel Matters

Items	Measures by the Ministry of Defense and SDF	Related governmental activities
Discussions on Reform of the Public Servant System	❍ A new personnel evaluation system was introduced on a trial basis in January 2006. ❍ Laws have been organized and prepared with public servants in other Ministries and Agencies: to set up a system which obliges personnel who leave their position soon after returning from overseas to reimburse overseas training expenses; to improve the system for personnel exchanges between the public and private sectors; and to introduce a system for leaves of absences for self-development. ❍ In response to the establishment of the Diet bill to partially revise the National Civil Service Law and related regulations, study is underway on laws that will be applied to SDF personnel, considering the specific features of special services.	Reform of the Public Servant System (Approved in the Cabinet meeting on April 24, 2007)
Efforts for Gender Equality	❍ The Defense Agency Headquarters for the Promotion of Gender Equality was established in 2001, with the Senior Vice-Minister of Defense as the head of the organization. It has implemented various measures. ❍ In 2006, the headquarters drew up the Basic Plan for Gender Equality in the Defense Agency and made other decisions to promote: the expansion in the recruitment and employment of female personnel, support for female personnel to balance work and family life, the improvement of facilities and accommodation on ships and other work areas to fit situations where more and more female personnel are being placed.	Gender-Equal Society Law (1999)[1]
Promotion of Measures to Support the Development of the Next Generation	❍ The Defense Agency Committee for the Promotion of Measures to Support the Development of the Next Generation was established. ❍ The Defense Agency drew up the Action Plan of the Defense Agency as a specific business proprietor. (In particular, encouraging male personnel to take child-care leave and special leave, and establishing day care centers on the premises of the Ministry of Defense and SDF).	Law for Measures to Support the Development of the Next Generation (2003)[2]
Approaches to Mental Health	❍ After its establishment in 2003, the Defense Agency Headquarters for the Prevention of Suicide has discussed measures to prevent suicide and distributed referential materials on suicide prevention to garrisons and bases. ❍ Efforts to enhance awareness among SDF personnel have been made through improvement in the counseling system, and the production and dissemination of educational videos. ❍ In relation to mental health, measures on Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Critical Incident Stress have been deliberated.	
Active Utilization of Warrant Officers and Enlisted Personnel	❍ The GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF have assigned Warrant Officers and senior enlisted personnel new roles, including giving instruction on service discipline to enlisted personnel. For example, the MSDF introduced the Command Master Chief System in April 2003, while the GSDF introduced the Master Sergeant Major System from 2006, and the ASDF introduced the Command Master System on a trial basis since April of this year.	
The Comprehensive Reform in the Personnel Field	❍ The Panel to Examine Comprehensive Reform in the Personnel Field of the Defense Force was established in September 2006 with the Defense Agency Chief then as the chairman. They created reports on recruitment, items during one's tenure, measures taken for backup and after one's retirement, and on other items. ❍ In addition, the Panel to Implement Measures for the Comprehensive Reform in the Personnel Field of the Defense Force was established last August with the Senior Vice-Minister of Defense as the chairman. They have steadily implemented the content of their report.	

Notes: 1. See http://www.gender.go.jp/9906kihonhou.html
2. See http://mhlw.go.jp/general/seido/koyou/jisedai/suisin.html
Remark: As for the reference to the measures taken before the transition to the Ministry of Defense, the former name, "the Defense Agency," is used.

research projects and studies.

In June 2007, the panel produced a report[21] of its findings compiled in the following categories: "Recruitment Items," "Service Period Items," "Items on Measures for Aid and Post-Retirement," and "Other Items."

Furthermore, on 7 August 2007, the "Panel to Implement Measures for the Comprehensive Reform in the Personnel Field of the Defense Force[22]," headed by the Senior Vice-Minister of Defense was established, and this panel is working for the steady implementation of these reforms.

2. Efforts to Prevent Suicide among SDF Personnel

In 1998, the annual number of suicides in Japan exceeded 30,000 and has since maintained a high level. This is a serious social problem in Japan. The same is true for the SDF, with a record-setting 94 SDF personnel suicides in FY 2004, 93 suicides in FY 2005 and FY 2006, and 83 suicides in FY 2007.

The suicide of any SDF personnel is truly a great tragedy for both the suicides themselves and their bereaved families, and it is also a great loss for the SDF to lose capable personnel. The Ministry of Defense established, in July 2003, the Defense Agency Headquarters for the Prevention of Suicides (at the time), headed by the Parliamentary Secretary for Defense (at the time), and took the following measures to prevent suicide. Much effort will be continued to be made for the prevention of suicide.

1) Expanding the counseling system (inside counselors, outside counselors, mental health care officers, and a 24-hour telephone hotline for counseling).
2) Promoting education, to ensure that commanders feel signs of mental problems among subordinates, and that general personnel are aware of their own mental health.
3) Setting a campaign period for the good mental health in spring and summer, which is when personnel are transferred, to enhance awareness of mental health, which includes: having commanders closely monitor the mental condition of subordinates whose environment has been changed due to personnel transfer, providing various reference materials and providing lectures.

3. Commemorating Personnel Killed in the Line of Duty

Since the establishment of the National Police Reserve in 1950, which has evolved through the National Safety Force and the Coastal Safety Force into the SDF today, SDF personnel have been striving to accomplish the noble mission of protecting the peace and independence of Japan. They have accomplished this by devoting themselves unstintingly to training, day and night, to live up to the expectations and trust of the Japanese citizens, regardless of danger, and with a strong sense of responsibility. During this time, however, more than 1,700 personnel have lost their lives in the line of duty.

In the Ministry of Defense and the SDF, funeral ceremonies are carried out by each SDF unit, to which the personnel killed in the line of duty belonged, in order to express condolences to them. Moreover, in order to eternally recognize the achievements of the SDF personnel killed in the line of duty, and to express deep honor and condolences, memorial ceremonies are carried out in various forms, and support is provided to the families of the deceased[23].

Prime Minister Fukuda delivers memorial addresses at the memorial service for SDF personnel killed in action

5. Retirement and Outplacement of Personnel, and Related Issues

1. Retirement and Outplacement of Personnel

There is an early retirement system and a short-term service system for SDF Regular Personnel, to keep the forces strong. Unlike general civilian government employees, many SDF Regular Personnel retire by their mid-50s (personnel serving under the early retirement system) and their 20s (most uniformed personnel serving under the short-term service system).

To resolve concerns that SDF Regular Personnel may have about their future, it is essential to ensure that

they can lead a stable life after retirement, and thus can work diligently with peace of mind while in service. Such treatment also boosts morale and makes it easier to attract high-quality human resources.

For these reasons, the Ministry of Defense places great importance on outplacement measures for retiring SDF Regular Personnel in personnel matters, and assists outplacement, such as by providing occupational training to teach useful skills, and by effectively using employment information[24].

Various local organizations help retiring SDF personnel find new jobs. On the other hand, since the Ministry of Defense is not authorized to conduct employment placement services itself, the SDF Assistance Foundation – with the permission of the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare, and the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport – offers free employment placement services. As the job market is expected to remain tight, assistance from local governments and other organizations is also becoming increasingly necessary.

Retired Regular Personnel of the SDF work in various sectors, including the manufacturing and service industries, and are now increasingly being employed as risk management staff, including disaster prevention, by local public organizations. Retired SDF personnel are highly evaluated by their employers because they generally have an excellent sense of responsibility, diligence, physical strength, spirit, discipline and other qualities. In particular, those retired or reaching mandatory retirement age have great leadership skills cultivated through many years of service. (See Fig. III-4-1-5)

Fig. III-4-1-5 Main Measures for Reemployment Support

Item	Description
Occupational aptitude testing	❍ Testing aimed to provide guidance on the basis of individual aptitudes
Technical training	❍ Provide transferable technical skills for use after retirement (e.g. heavy-duty/special-purpose vehicle operation, information processing skills, crane operation, vehicle maintenance, boiler operation, handling dangerous materials)
Driver training	❍ Grant heavy-duty vehicle license
Disaster prevention and risk control training	❍ Provide technical knowledge on disaster prevention administration and the Civil Protection Plan
Correspondence courses	❍ Provide capabilities to obtain official certification (e.g. social insurance officer, health manager, real estate business manager) to SDF Regular Personnel that will take mandatory retirement
Business management training	❍ Enlighten SDF Regular Personnel that will take mandatory retirement so that they foster social adaptability. Also provide know-how to lead a stable life after retirement or reemployment
Career guidance	❍ Prepare near-retiree SDF Regular Personnel to find new employment and provide them with know-how to choose new occupation

2. Regulations on Outplacement of Personnel after Retirement

There are restrictions on the outplacement of SDF Regular Personnel to ensure impartiality in public duties. For example, within the first two years after a person leaves the SDF, if the prospective employer is a private company that had a contract with the Ministry of Defense within five years before said person leaves the SDF, then the approval[25] of the Minister of Defense or other regulated personnel is required. In 2007, the Minister of Defense approved 99 individual cases (99 persons) of reemployment of SDF Regular Personnel at private companies.

3. Reappointment System

The reappointment system allows the reemployment of personnel who have the desire and capabilities to continue working as SDF personnel after they reach the retirement age. The system makes the best possible use of experienced and valuable human resources, and secures the linkage between employment and pension. Under this system, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have reappointed 236 personnel as of the end of March 2008. Furthermore, from the standpoint of building an environment for SDF Regular Personnel, who reach retirement earlier than general civilian government employees to focus on their duties with a sense of security, there are plans to revise the Reappoint System from the existing appointment within one year to make appointments possible within three years when under 60 years of age. (See Fig. III-4-1-6)

Fig. III-4-1-6 Overview of Reappointment System

Item	Administrative officials and others	SDF regular personnel
Basic approach	❍ Present mandatory retirement age to remain in place; personnel in their early 60s who have the ability and desire to work in the public service to be reappointed	❍ While maintaining present mandatory retirement age, personnel with the desire and ability to work as SDF regular personnel beyond the mandatory retirement age remains to be appointed to a position determined by the Minister of Defense
Job conditions	❍ Full-time ❍ Shorter-time service	❍ Limited to full-time service
Period of reappointment	❍ One year, with renewal allowed	❍ Renewal is allowed within one year (term for personnel under 60 is intended to be within three years). Extension is allowed ❍ Extension is allowed for a certain period of time (between six months to a year) in the case of mobilization
Maximum age for reappointment	❍ 65 (Maximum age was 61 between FY 2001 to FY 2003. Subsequently, the age has been increased incrementally by one year, every three years)	
Salary and allowance	❍ Fixed monthly salary is provided based on job level and rank. Allowances, such as a commuting allowance, are provided	

6. Enhancing Information and Communications Capabilities

Information and communication are the basis for command and control, extending from the central command to respective headquarters, and to the lower units. It is like the central nervous system of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF recognize the importance of enhancing information and communication capabilities in related fields that are directly related to the capabilities of the SDF to execute missions.

1. Response to the Information Technology (IT) Revolution

In response to the IT revolution of recent years, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF are pursuing information superiority[26], and are systematically establishing the infrastructure to integrate their defense capabilities in order to enable efficient operations. The following three core measures have been taken: 1) Developing sophisticated networks, including the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) or Common Operating Environment (COE); 2) Enhancing information and communications functions, such as the Central Command System (CCS) and the

command system of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF[27]; and 3) Assuring information security, such as responding to cyber attacks against the Ministry of Defense and the SDF.

2. Future Policy for Information and Communications (Action Plan)

In order to meet the new operational needs expected of the SDF in the future, it is necessary to develop more varied and flexible information and communications systems. Our policy targets for strengthening command and communications capabilities and related capabilities have already been set[28].

As a result, DII has been proceeding with construction of an enhanced information and communications

Fig. III-4-1-7 Enhancement of System to Cope with Cyber Attacks and Evaluation Function



posture in response to state-of-the-art information and communications technologies at home and overseas. In addition, the enhancement of capabilities for responses to cyber and other attacks is being sought by the introduction of protective equipment and the development of response readiness. (See Fig. III-4-1-7) (See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 4)

7. Enhancement of Technical Research & Development

1. Research & Development of the Technical Research & Development Institute (TRDI)

In the Ministry of Defense, strict financial circumstances make it necessary to select and concentrate research programs (e.g. by sharing works with the private sector, focusing on fields of our country's superiority, etc.). TRDI implemented a medium-to-long-term technology outlook which determined the vision on priority technology areas and clarified future directions for each technology area[29].

In addition, it has become necessary to introduce emerging technologies into R&D, and to conduct deeper analysis on operational needs. For these purposes, a number of new R&D methods are being adopted[30].

In order to optimize the performance, schedule and cost throughout the lifecycle of equipment or materials, it is effective to thoroughly conduct trade-off analyses on a number of proposals regarding performance and cost at the point of concept creation or R&D. Additionally, it is effective to follow-up for improvements and other necessary measures, after deployment of equipment and materials. Continuous study is underway as part of efforts to enhance the R&D system. (See Reference 72-73)

2. Strengthening Relations with the Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS) Technology Field

In regard to R&D at the Ministry of Defense, the National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid-Term Defense Program state that efforts should be made "by proactively introducing advanced technology of industrial, governmental, and academic sectors."

TRDI aims to investigate and introduce superior technologies in the private sector. As part of this effort, basic (element) technology research themes have been selected, and investigation and research projects that invite public participation by not only private corporations, but also various research organizations, were newly introduced from FY 2007. Implementation of such projects is intended to push forward introduction of superior technology from a wide range of organizations, including research organizations and corporations without direct past contact with the Ministry of Defense.

It is also important to spread the outcome of R&D at the Ministry of Defense into the private sectors. The Ministry of Defense is cooperating to promote the conversion of aircraft that have been developed as SDF aircraft for civil use, since this may lead to a reduction in the procurement costs of such aircraft. The Ministry of Defense is cooperating with other related ministries and agencies through the Council of Ministries and Agencies Related to Promotion of Development of Civil Aircrafts[31].

Experiment preparations by personnel

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of an Engineering Official Involved in Developing a New Tank

Dr. Akihiko Shimura
Combat Vehicle System Research Director
Technical Research & Development Institute (TRDI)

I am working as a director of the research office responsible for upgrading and evaluating the combat vehicle systems.

Right now, we are involved in the technical tests for the new tank. Technical tests are conducted to verify that the prototype has all the necessary functions. After passing that test, the prototype undergoes a service trial at the camp, based on which its adoption or rejection will be decided.

Dr. Shimura conducting technical training

The tank is powerful equipment that combines three functions – firepower, mobility and protection – in a highly systemized manner. Accordingly, there are many aspects that need to be evaluated. This new tank will have an enhanced information and telecommunication function in addition to the three functions mentioned above. As a cutting-edge IT tank equipped with the latest features, it requires very precise testing.

A new tank in the research and development stage

Tests are conducted by a test team, which consists mainly of research officials and is supported by some GSDF personnel. Since the performance must be tested from all technical perspectives, we also consult technical staff from other research offices internally or externally, as necessary. Because the tests must be conducted within the GSDF camps or TRDI test centers, we have to make an official tour for days. Preparation and data collection before and after the tour are as important as the actual test, since no accurate evaluation can be expected without thorough preparation and arrangement of data. Therefore, I would like to concentrate on one test. Nevertheless, I always have difficulty finding enough personnel to accomplish the mission since multiple tests are going on at all times.

As a director tasked with management, I am no longer involved in as many tests as I used to be when I was a researcher. Nevertheless, in FY 2007 I directed two tests as the head of a test team. One of them, which was conducted at Kamifurano Camp, involved hitting a moving object while driving the vehicle. This is one of the highest technical tests, and the severe cold and heavy snow at the camp made the task all the more difficult. When we saw bullet marks near the center of the target, we were amazed at the capability of the new tank. At the same time, we felt rewarded and proud that our test was successful.

The tests for the new tank will continue until FY 2009. Although busy days are expected to continue, we as a team would like to make efforts to ensure that the new tank adopted by the GSDF will perform flawlessly as a critical part of the future ground defense systems.

Section 2. Interaction between the Ministry of Defense & the SDF, and the Local Community & Japanese Citizens

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the various activities of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF cannot be carried out by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF alone. They are only possible with the understanding and cooperation of each and every citizen, local governments and other organizations.

In addition to the details explained in Section 1 of this chapter, the SDF is executing its duties with support and cooperation from the local communities and the Japanese people in a variety of forms. Likewise, the SDF has been making various cooperation activities to support the people's lives. Such activities are further deepening the mutual trust between the local community and the people, and the SDF, not only contributing to the enhancement and strengthening of the foundation of defense bases, but also instilling a sense of pride and self-confidence in SDF personnel.

To ensure full function of defense facilities[32], it is necessary to maintain a state of stable use by securing harmony with the local communities, and gaining the understanding and cooperation of local residents surrounding defense facilities. For this reason, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF strive to minimize the impact of the presence and operation of defense facilities on the daily lives of local residents through various measures.

This section explains the daily interaction between the Defense Ministry and the SDF and the local communities, and activities undertaken to gain public understanding and cooperation.

1. Cooperation from Local Public Organizations and Other Related Organizations for the SDF

1. Cooperation in Recruitment of SDF Regular Personnel and Support for Outplacement

As stated in the previous section, under the severe recruitment environment and employment situation, the cooperation of local public organizations and relevant organizations is vital to secure highly qualified personnel and to assist the outplacement of SDF Regular Personnel who retire at a relatively young age. (See Section 1-2)

2. Support for SDF Activities

SDF camps and bases are located in all prefectures, and maintain close relations with the local communities. Various forms of cooperation and support from the local communities are indispensable for the SDF to conduct diverse activities. The SDF has also received words of encouragement from the people including local residents and relevant organizations.

In addition to this kind of support and cooperation from the local communities, many letters of encouragement are sent by the people to personnel engaging in international peace cooperation activities which raise the morale of personnel and reinforce their awareness of serving the people of Japan.

2. Activities in Civic Life and Contributions to Society

The SDF is carrying out support activities for residents in a number of fields linked with the people, based on requests from local governments and relevant organizations, in addition to its role set forth in the National Defense Program Guidelines. For example, the SDF worked with relevant organizations to provide transport support for VIPs, surveillance and guarding at SDF camps at the G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit from 7-9

GSDF special transport helicopter EC-225LP transports Prime Minister Fukuda to the 2008 G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit (July 2008)

July this year. These activities have deepened the mutual trust between the SDF and the people and contributed to expanding and strengthening the foundation of national defense. They also give SDF personnel a sense of pride and confidence in their constant contribution to the lives of the people. (See Reference 74-75)

3. Harmony between Defense Facilities and the Local Community, and Environmental Conservation

1. Scale and Features of Defense Facilities

The uses of defense facilities can be extended in various ways such as maneuver areas, airfields, ports and barracks[33]. Many defense facilities, including airfields and maneuver areas, require large areas of land. Due to Japan's geographical characteristics, there are some cities and industrial facilities that must compete with defense facilities on narrow plains. In particular, problems related to restricted presence and operations of defense facilities have emerged due to the urbanization of areas around many defense facilities as a result of economic development. Also, noise related to frequent takeoffs and landings by aircraft, firing, bombing, gunshots from artillery, tank operations and so on, raise concern in the affected residential communities. (See Figs. III-4-2-1, III-4-2-2)

Fig. III-4-2-1 Situation of SDF Facilities (land plots)



Note: These numbers have been rounded off, thus might not exactly equal the total.

Fig. III-4-2-2 Situation of Facilities of U.S. Forces in Japan (exclusively used facilities)



2. Defense Facility Issues and Various Measures

Defense facilities, as bases which support the defense capabilities of Japan and the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, are indispensable to the country's security, and maintaining continuous and stable use of them is necessary. For that reason, the Ministry of Defense has been securing harmony between the defense facilities and surrounding areas, and working to obtain the understanding and cooperation of the local residents by taking the measures shown in Fig. III-4-2-3.

In order to publicize one of these measures, the North Kanto Defense Bureau invited elementary school children residing in the area surrounding the ASDF Hyakuri Base to create pictures titled "Friends and family playing in schools and parks improved by subsidies related to soundproof construction and public welfare facilities." Such pictures were exhibited in April this year. (See Reference 76)

The Ministry of Defense has put priority on improving the living environment around airfields, including providing subsidies for residential sound insulation. However, some residents have filed lawsuits concerning noise damage and others[34].

Under such situation, the Ministry of Defense established the Council for the Improvement of the Living Environment around Airfields comprised of external experts in 2001, to discuss future measures. The council subsequently compiled a report the following year[35].

With regard to measures for improving the living environment such as subsidies for residential sound insulation, the Ministry of Defense is making efforts to grasp the status of the noise in areas surrounding defense facilities, appropriately review target areas for sound insulation in consideration of the actual status and expand new measures based on the proposals incorporated in the report by the council. (See Figs. III-4-2- 3, 4, 5) (See Reference 77)

Improvements to Hamura city road route 201 were conducted as part of measures to reduce the burden of residents around the base

Fig. III-4-2-3 Measures to Ensure Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Communities

Purpose	Measures	Description of Measures
Prevention of Noise Problems	Subsidies to finance sound insulation work	❍ Educational facilities such as elementary schools, junior high schools and kindergartens; medical facilities like hospitals and clinics; and welfare facilities such as nursery centers, day-service centers for the elderly and special nursing homes for the elderly ❍ Housing
	Compensation for relocations	❍ Compensation for relocating buildings ❍ Land procurement ❍ Improvement of public facilities such as roads, water-supply systems and sewage facilities in land where housing is to be relocated
	Improvement of green zones	❍ Tree planting, upgrading of grass fields
Prevention of Problems Other Than Noise	Subsidies to finance trouble-prevention work	❍ River improvement projects, improvement of irrigation and drainage canals, dams, reservoirs, pumping stations, roads, sewage facilities and facilities for jointly receiving TV broadcasting services
Reduction of Troubles Related to Life and Business	Subsidies to build facilities meant to stabilize people's lives	❍ Educational facilities ❍ Garbage and human waste treatment plants, firefighting facilities, parks, roads, green zones, community halls, libraries, welfare centers for the elderly and nursing homes for the elderly ❍ Agricultural facilities ❍ Fishery facilities
Reduction of Effects on Surrounding Areas	Provision of grant aimed at improving areas surrounded by designated defense facilities	❍ Improvement of public facilities like traffic facilities, recreation centers and welfare facilities

Fig. III-4-2-4 FY 2008 Costs of Finance Countermeasures in Areas near Bases (Based on Expenditures)



Fig. III-4-2-5 FY 2008 SACO-related Spending (Measures to Expedite Implementation of SACO Projects) (Based on Expenditures)



Note: Other projects are those meant to improve green zones.

Art exhibition for elementary school students: Prizewinning pictures

Oba Erika

Narushima Ai

Ohata Mako

Fujioka Yuma

Ishikawa Ayumi

Yamamoto Tamaki

3. Environmental Conservation

As a part of the government, the Ministry of Defense has been developing implementation plans based on a variety of government plans to proactively promote various efforts for environmental conservation[36].

In 2001 the Ministry of Defense Environment Month and Week were established, during which camps throughout the country carried out events for the purpose of environmental conservation, such as prevention of global warming, and enhancing a sense of environmental awareness by SDF personnel.

In maintaining its facilities and equipment, the SDF is promoting diverse efforts[37] to ensure environmental conservation and decrease the environmental burden.

4. Base of Defense Administration in Regional Areas

The relationship between the Ministry of Defense and local communities is increasing its importance. Consequently, the local branch offices of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency (the Defense Facilities Administration Bureaus) and the regional organizations of the Equipment Procurement Office were unified at the time of the disbandment and integration of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency, and the Regional Defense Bureaus were established as the local branch offices of the Ministry of Defense to create a base for comprehensive defense administration in regional areas, including coordination and consultation with local governments and municipalities related to defense policies.

While succeeding the roles that the Defense Facilities Administration Bureau and the Equipment Procurement Office local branches had played, the Regional Defense Bureaus are making explanations to the local communities of the policies of the Ministry of Defense and the reorganization of the U.S. Forces (as work to ensure local cooperation to obtain the understanding and cooperation of local governments and residents), and implementing various policies such as local coordination in line with the improvement of defense facilities in order to smoothly and effectively implement the overall administrative works of the Ministry of Defense.

4. Public Relations Activities, Information Disclosure, and Related Activities

The activities of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF to protect the peace and security of Japan can not be carried out without the understanding and support of the people of Japan toward the Ministry of Defense and the SDF. For this reason, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF, have been making efforts to provide them with information through active public relations activities, etc. from the perspective of increasing the public attention to national defense and accountability to the public.

See <http://www.mod.go.jp/menu/kohokatudo.html>

1. Various Public Relations Activities

As the scope of SDF activities has expanded both domestically and internationally, including international peace cooperation activities such as the replenishment support activities in the Indian Ocean and disaster relief dispatches, the public attention[39] to the SDF and defense issues has been increasing.

With the recognition that it is necessary to proactively promote publicity on defense policies and SDF activities on a regular basis, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF employ a variety of PR activities to ensure better understanding about the current status of the SDF in consideration of the changing public awareness and needs as well as for increasing overseas attention to the Ministry of Defense and the SDF.

(1) Website (http://www.mod.go.jp), Pamphlets and Others

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF conduct PR activities using a wide variety of media, including providing information and gathering public opinions and supplying PR videos via the internet, and displaying commercial films for each SDF service on large outdoor screens.

The Ministry of Defense has been making efforts to provide accurate information on the SDF and the national defense more extensively to the public, in the form of creation and distribution of various pamphlets which explain the policies of the Ministry of Defense and the activities of the SDF, cooperation for media coverage, and assistance in editing the PR magazine “MAMOR.” Furthermore, as the SDF activities overseas have increased, oversea attention to the Ministry of Defense and the SDF has been enhanced. In order to address such situation, the Ministry of Defense is making efforts including publishing the English language quarterly newsletter “Japan Defense Focus”, promoting participation of foreign media in regular press conferences, expanding the English section of the Ministry of Defense website, creation of defense white papers, various policy pamphlets and PR videos in English.

In addition to these efforts, regarding measures such as the replenishment support activities and so on of the Maritime Self-Defense Force in the Indian Ocean, etc. which has particularly attracted public attention, intensive publicity has been carried out through channels such as the Ministry of Defense website, special features in the PR magazine, videos, pamphlets, and the seminars on defense issues organized by Regional Defense Bureaus.

(2) Events, PR Facilities, etc.[40]

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF conduct activities to extensively inform the people of the current status of the SDF. These activities include the annual GSDF Comprehensive Fire Power Exercise conducted at the base of Mt. Fuji; cruises for experience by vessels of the MSDF in each region; and demonstration flights and boarding experience on aircraft at open base festivals held at ASDF bases. In addition, at camps and bases throughout the country, events including equipment exhibitions, unit tours and SDF band concerts are held on the anniversary of a unit's foundation, etc. Furthermore, in commemoration of the anniversary of the foundation of the SDF, events such as a SDF Marching Festival, a troop review, a fleet review, and an air review are held.

Former Parliamentary Secretary for Defense Terada presents a bouquet to the 200,000th Ichigayadai Tour participant

Last year's SDF Marching Festival was held at the Nippon Budokan attracting a total audience of approximately 40,000. Concerning annual reviews by the SDF, the troop review, fleet review and air review are hosted in rotation by the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF at which the SDF equipment and exercises are exhibited to the public. Last year, the GSDF held a troop review, which was attended by approximately 42,000 people, including rehearsals. This year, an air review by the ASDF is planned.

In addition to such events, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF actively promote tours at PR facilities. For example, some facilities in the Defense Ministry at Ichigaya are open to visitors on two guided tours each weekday; one each in the morning and afternoon. Since the tours were launched in June 2000, more than 200,000 people have visited the facilities so far. Each SDF service also has established PR facilities which people can visit free of charge, and camps and bases across Japan have PR stations and history museums open to the public. (See Reference at the end of the book)

(3) Enlistment Experience Programs[41]

The SDF offers enlistment experience programs for employees at the request of private companies to provide opportunities to experience the daily life and training of the SDF member by staying at an SDF camp or base for two to three days. In the last fiscal year, the SDF held approximately 1,100 programs which were participated by approximately 21,100 people. Tours of enlistment experiences for the youth, college students and women are also conducted[42].

Training in an enlistment experience program for female college students

Observation of the special honor guard training during a tour at Ichigaya

2. Appropriate Operation of the Information Disclosure System[43] and Personal Data Protection System[44]

An information disclosure system was established in the Ministry of Defense, in line with the enactment of the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs in 2001. Based on this legislation, the Ministry of Defense discloses administrative documents under its jurisdiction upon request. A personal information protection system (in MOD) was also established in line with the Law for the Protection of Personal Information Held by Administrative Organs of 2005. Along with measures to ensure the security of the personal information under its jurisdiction, the Defense Ministry also discloses such information based on this law in response to requests for disclosure, revision and termination of use.

For this reason, the receipt and implementation of disclosure applications will be instigated at the Ministry of Defense offices (Shinjuku Ward, Tokyo) and each Regional Defense Bureau and branch.

See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/info/joho/johokokai06.pdf> (See Reference 79)

3. Appropriate Operation of the Whistle-Blower Protection System[45]

In recent years, workers within corporations have contributed to revealing various corporate scandals, which have threatened the peace of mind and security of the peoples' daily life. In order to develop a safeguard system to protect workers who disclose information, the Whistle-Blower Protection Act entered into effect in April 2006.

In accordance with this act, the Defense Ministry set up a system to handle public interest-related information disclosures by MOD employees and outside workers on issues where the Defense Ministry has the legal authority to punish or issue recommendations. Moreover, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have established an internal contact desk for information disclosure in the public interest by MOD employees, and an external contact desk for related disclosure by outside workers. Through the contact desks, the Defense Ministry deals with information disclosure that is in the public interest and whistle-blower protection.

4. Engagement in Policy Evaluation[46]

In 2001, a system to evaluate government policies was introduced with the aim of improving the efficiency and quality of administration in the public's best interest, while the Government Policy Evaluations Act (GPEA) entered into effect in 2002.

Based on these plans, the Ministry of Defense is evaluating various policies designated to achieve the objectives of the Defense Ministry and the SDF: to ensure the peace and independence of Japan and the security of the state. These evaluations involve analysis from diverse perspectives, such as domestic and overseas circumstances and technological innovation trends using a comprehensive evaluation system.

In FY 2007, 49 policy evaluations were performed beginning with the "ideal format of the Ministry of Defense's audiovisual publicity."

Notes:

1) The importance of human resources is also pointed out in the National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid-Term Defense Program. Also see Chapter 2 of Part I for details on the National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid-Term Defense Program
2) The "Ministry of Defense" and the "Self-Defense Forces (SDF)" are the same governmental organization for defense. The "Ministry of Defense" is used to refer to the governmental organization responsible for the administration and operations of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, whereas the "SDF" is used to refer to the armed organization operating in units that is responsible for the defense of Japan.
3) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/jieikanbosyu/> for details on the recruitment of SDF Regular Personnel.
4) Notification of the recruitment period, checking of qualifications for application, processing of application forms, issuance of examination admission tickets, notification of examination dates and locations, provision of locations and facilities necessary for examinations, public relations and related works.
5) For details on employment information, see <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/saiyou/>
6) Until FY 2006, there were two systems applied to employment of SDF Regular Personnel who are 18 years old or over and under 27 years of age (under 24 years of age for Student Candidates for Enlisted (Upper) System) as candidates for "enlisted (upper)": the "Student Candidate for Enlisted (Upper) System" and the "Enlisted (Upper) Candidate System." In recruitment from FY 2007, the two systems were reorganized and unified into a new appointment system. It adopts some elements of the "Enlisted (Upper) System," which aims to raise awareness of candidates for the Enlisted (Upper), and the "Candidates for the Enlisted (Upper) System," which emphasizes individual capabilities in personnel management. Those qualified for SDF Regular Personnel are recruited as "General Candidates for Enlisted (Upper)" from FY 2007.
7) For SDF Youth Cadets employed as Recruits in the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, FY 2007 was the final year for employment of MSDF and ASDF Youth Cadets and no further recruitment and employment will be performed. Nevertheless, from FY 2009 GSDF Youth Cadets is scheduled to be revised so that their status is not SDF Regular Personnel but the new, non-combatant students of GSDF.
8) SDF personnel must perform duties such as defense operations as specified in the Self-Defense Forces Law. They are, therefore, designated as special national government employees under Article 2 of the National Civil Service Law, and personnel management of SDF personnel is conducted independently of that of general civilian government employees.
9) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/defense/yobiji/index.html>
10) Many countries other than Japan also have reserve personnel systems.
11) Details on education and training can be found on the website of each SDF group: GSDF at <http://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/>; MSDF at <http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/>; and ASDF at <http://www.mod.go.jp/asdf/>
12) Such external educational institutions in FY 2008 include the Tokyo Institute of Technology and Waseda University in Japan, and the National Defense University (U.S.) and Harvard University (U.S.) overseas.
13) Institutes of each SDF where high-ranking SDF officers of each SDF and others receive training on security, defense strategy and other subjects.
14) The Joint Staff College is part of the Joint Staff and educates high-ranking SDF officers on joint operations.
15) Training includes SDF Joint Exercises, Japan-U.S. Combined Joint Exercises, and Ballistic Missile Response Exercises to deter threats to Japan, training such as International Peace Cooperation Exercises and Joint International Humanitarian Operation Training in preparation for international peace cooperation, and related activities.
16) For example, the GSDF has a Command Post Exercise Center for carrying out command and staff activities at the division/regiment level, and the Fuji Training Center and urban warfare training facilities for

company-level training.

17) For example, some firing and launch training involving tanks, anti-tank helicopters, missiles, long-range artillery, surface-to-air guided missiles (improved Hawk and Patriot System), surface-to-surface missiles, torpedoes, and other weapons cannot be carried out at some firing ranges in Japan, or are prohibited in Japan as ranges exceed domestic limits. There are also various restrictions on exercises by large-scale units that require larger areas, minesweeping training, and submarine rescue drills that are carried out in relatively shallow sea areas, and early-morning and night-time flight training.

18) Activities to detect, exploit, and reduce or annul the effects of enemies' electromagnetic waves, while securing the use of electromagnetic waves by friendly forces.

19) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/news/atago/pdf/siryou_080321.pdf>

20) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/news/2006/07/12.html> for details on gender equality; and <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/info/koudou/index.html> for details on the Laws for Measures to Support the Development of the Next Generation.

21) See the following for the Report on Measures for the Comprehensive Reform in Personnel Field of the Defense Force:
<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/archives/manpower/report1_5.pdf>
<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/archives/manpower/report2_5.pdf>
<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/archives/manpower/report3_5.pdf>
<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/archives/manpower/report4_5.pdf>
<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/archives/manpower/report5_5.pdf>

22) In the panel, in addition to an Executive Secretary Committee headed by the Vice-Minister of Defense, the following five panel groups were created: 1) Panel Administration; 2) Personnel Planning Related Policy, etc.; 3) Appointment System and Rank-based-pay, etc.; 4) Recruitment and Aid, etc.; 5) Post-Retirement Policy, etc.

23) The Memorial Stone of SDF Members who Died on Duty was established in 1962, and reinforced in 1980, due to aging through weathering. Afterwards, when the headquarters of the then Defense Agency was moved to Ichigaya in 1998, the Memorial Zone in its current form was located on the east side of the memorial area with the Memorial Stone of SDF Members who Died on Duty and Other Monuments. A Memorial Ceremony for SDF Members who Died on Duty is held annually at the Memorial Zone. This ceremony is attended by surviving family members of the honored dead, and also attended by high-ranking staff of the Ministry of Defense and SDF under the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, former Directors-General of the Defense Agency, and others. At the Memorial Stone of SDF Members who Died on Duty in the Memorial Zone there is an iron plate containing the names and other information of personnel killed in the line of duty. When foreign dignitaries such as Defense Ministers visit the Ministry of Defense, they make offerings of flowers, expressing their respect and condolences to personnel killed in the line of duty. Memorial ceremonies are also held at individual SDF posts and bases.

24) Specific measures include: provision of education and training to acquire useful knowledge and skills for outplacement; promotion of employment of retiring SDF Regular Personnel in the public sector; networking of employment information at each SDF; and improvement of job-seekers' skills by enhancing the job training curricula.

25) "Seclusion from private companies" is stipulated in Article 62 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

26) Superiority in prompt and accurate recognition, gathering, processing and dissemination of information.

27) For details on the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII: Standardized network for the MOD/SDF), the Common Operating Environment (COE: Basic group of software commonly used by computer systems maintained by each service of the SDF), and the Central Command System (CCS: central command system

that conducts data aggregation processing and other data processing by online-connecting the command system of each SDF service), see: <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/archives/it/youkou/>

28) The five policy targets are "Enhancement in Gathering/Communicating Information in the Chain of Command (Vertical Direction)"; "Promotion of Intelligence Sharing Among Units (Horizontal Direction)"; "Establishment of System to Cope with Cyber Attacks"; "Promotion of Intelligence Sharing with External Organizations"; and "Enhancement of Various Telecommunication Infrastructures."

29) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/trdi/>

30) 1) "Operational Demonstration Research" is introduced. In this type of research, the SDF service (the future operator) will evaluate the prototypes of the equipment. The evaluation will be reflected onto the later R&D, procurement, and related operations. 2) "Evolutionary Development" is introduced. At the start of the development phase, the performance requirements to be achieved are left undecided. Even after the start of the development phase, the precision of required performance can be upgraded, and up-to-date military science technology can be newly introduced.

31) This council was established in September 2003 by the former Defense Agency; the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology; the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport. It was established to promote development of civil aircraft and engines based on initiative taken by our nation as a whole. This is important in the sophistication of our country's industrial infrastructure, as well as the development and dissemination of industrial technology.

32) The generic term for the facilities used by the Self-Defense Force and the U.S. forces in Japan based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. It refers to training areas, airfields, ports, communication stations, barracks, warehouses, ammunition depots, oil bunkers and so on.

33) The land area of defense facilities, as of 1 January this year is approximately 1,397km^2 (the sum of the land area of SDF facilities (approximately 1,084km^2), the land area of the facilities and areas (for exclusive use) of the U.S. forces in Japan (approximately 309km^2) and the land area of facilities other than SDF facilities which the U.S. forces in Japan are jointly using under the Status of Forces Agreement (approximately 4km^2)), which accounts for approximately 0.37% of the country's land. Of this, approximately 42% of the land area of SDF facilities is situated in Hokkaido. Divided by use, approximately 75% of this is maneuver areas. Meanwhile, 38km^2 of the land area of the facilities and areas of the U.S. forces in Japan (for exclusive use) which is jointly used by the SDF under the Status of Forces Agreement.

34) 1) The filing of lawsuits which include requests from the local residents of five airports including Komatsu Airport (Ishikawa prefecture) for the ban of night-time takeoff and landing, the compensation for noise damage, and the acknowledgement of "the compensation for past damage" in the definitive judgments, 2) due to the sense of inequality on the part of residents affected by the noise who have not filed claims, there is a trend in demanding financial compensation corresponding to the past damage compensation (the claim for which was recognized in the noise judgment) and the institutionalization of this kind of compensation (trends demanding so-called fairness compensation), 3) demands for the expansion of all kinds of policies by local government and residents of the areas around defense facilities.

35) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/delibe/kondankai/hokoku.pdf>

36) The Ministry of Defense's implementation plan established in October 2007 after receipt of the "Plan for the government to establish measures that should be enacted for the purpose of suppression of greenhouse gases etc., related to their business and projects" (approved by the Cabinet in the same year), the "Defense Agency environmental consideration policy" established in 2003 based on the government's "Basic Environment Plan" and a review of the corresponding plans carried out in January 2005. See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/info/hairyo/index.html> for the environmental consideration plans of the Ministry of Defense.

37) Specifically, improvement of policies for air and water quality conservation, recycling and waste disposal,

improvement to environmental protection facilities, and environmental assessments, etc.

38) From the viewpoint of security, etc., there is some information which is not suitable for release to the public (such as 1) information that may hinder the operation of units, 2) information that may impair the relationship of mutual trust with the nation concerned and 3) information related to individuals). However, the Ministry of Defense will continue to retain its policy to make efforts to release information as much as possible in order to enhance the public's understanding.

39) In the "Opinion Poll on the Self-Defense Forces and Defense Issues" conducted in February 2006, approximately 67% of respondents indicated their interest in the SDF and defense issues. Regarding their impression of the SDF, roughly 85% responded "good."* See Reference 78 for further details. In the "Special Opinion Poll on the Self-Defense Force's Iraq Humanitarian Reconstruction Assistance Activities" conducted in September of the same year, approximately 72% of respondents who gained information regarding the activities via the media (approximately 91%) regarded them as "valuable."

40) For details on events, etc., see the Ministry of Defense website <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/events/index.html>

41) Tours to experience the lifestyle of the Ground, Maritime or Air Self-Defense Force (For tour information, refer to the abovementioned address for event information).

42) On March 2005, in addition to the various tours until then, the "One Day Visit to Self-Defense Forces for Women" was launched so that women of a broad range of ages could easily participate.

43) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/info/joho/index.html>

44) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/info/hogo/index.html>

45) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/koueki_tuho/index.htm>

46) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/info/hyouka/index.html>

Part IV

Reform of the Ministry of Defense

Section 1. Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense
Section 2. Fundamental Efforts to Ensure Thorough Civilian Control
Section 3. Efforts to Prevent the Leakage of Information
Section 4. Efforts for Effective, Efficient, Open, and Transparent Procurement
Section 5. Other Measures

Defense capabilities are the last resort to ensure the nation's security and cannot be substituted by other means. Nevertheless, a defense force that lacks the public support cannot function effectively. Thus, SDF personnel strive on a daily basis to live up to the public trust and expectations.

However, recently, the following issues have become apparent: problems related to the thoroughness of civilian control regarding mistakes in reporting the amount of refueling and accidental disposal of logbooks, problems related to the establishment of a rigorous information security system in light of the information leakage via the Internet and the Special Defense Secret leakage on the Aegis system, and problems related to the transparency of defense procurement such as excessive demand. In addition, the former Vice-Minister of Defense was arrested on bribery charges in November 2007 and on February 19, 2008, a collision occurred between the destroyer *Atago* and the fishing vessel *Seitoku Maru*. (See Part III, Chapter 4, Section 1)

In response to these various issues and in order to restore the public confidence in the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces, and ensure that they function according to their mandate, it is necessary to implement a thorough examination of the working practices and customs that have been implemented to date and construct fundamental measures to improve the situation.

The Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces are committed to advancing fundamental reforms that will revitalize the organizations that are responsible for ensuring the peace and independence of the nation.

From the abovementioned perspectives, this chapter explains the reform measures being taken by the Ministry of Defense in the following sections:

Section 1 covers the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense; Section 2 covers fundamental efforts to ensure thorough civilian control; Section 3 covers efforts to prevent the leakage of information; Section 4 covers efforts for effective, efficient, open, and transparent procurement; and Section 5 covers other measures.

The 2nd meeting of the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense with the presence of Prime Minister Fukuda [Cabinet Public Relations Office]

Section 1. Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense

It was announced in the autumn of 2007 that "Through the deliberation for the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law, various points had been raised concerning the execution of the work by the Ministry of Defense, which is responsible for the defense and security of Japan. Given this situation, the "Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense" will be held to engage in a fundamental review of the issues related to the Ministry from the viewpoint of the public, with gaining the participation of various experts."[1] This "Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense" (hereafter referred to as the "Reform Council") was established at the Prime Minister's Office, and has held 11 meetings from December 2007 to July 2008, and has engaged in various discussions. (See Fig. IV-1-1)

Fig. IV-1-1 Meetings of the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense

	Date of Meeting	Topic of Discussion
1st	December 3, 2007	General exchange of opinions on issues concerning the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces
2nd	December 17	Ensuring civilian control
3rd	January 9, 2008	Establishing a rigorous information security system
4th	February 1	Ensuring transparency in defense procurement
5th	February 13	Ensuring civilian control
6th	March 3	1) Issues related to the system of communicating information following the incident involving the Aegis-equipped destroyer *Atago* 2) Points of previous discussions
7th	April 7	In the Project Team for Promoting Comprehensive Acquisition Reform Report (Defense Ministry Report)
8th	May 8	Points of previous discussions
9th	May 21	Studying the ideal structure and organization of the Ministry of Defense
10th	June 19	General rearrangement of the points of previous discussions
11th	July 15	Finalizing of the "Report"

1. Considerations within the Ministry of Defense

In conjunction with the Reform Council, a panel has also been established within the Ministry of Defense to engage in working-level discussions, and these two bodies accumulated discussions in close cooperation with each other.

Based on the various efforts[2] in the Reform Council on the agenda items "Fundamental Measures to Ensure Civilian Control," "Establishment of a Stringent System for Protection of Information," and "Transparency in Defense Procurement," and on discussions on other subjects, a "Ministry of Defense Reform Promotion Team" was launched within the Defense Ministry in February 2008 for the purpose of considering the ideal form that the structure and organization of the Ministry should take. Subsequently, at the ninth meeting in May, the Ministry of Defense explained the series of recent incidents as well as the status of considerations concerning the ideal structure and organization in the future.

At the ninth meeting of the Council, former Minister of Defense Ishiba presented the "Keywords for the Reform of the Ministry of Defense" as follows: 1) "Safety from the SDF (military)" as well as "Safety through the SDF (military)," 2) From partial optimization to total optimization, 3) Minimization of the distance and time between the units on the scene and the central organization, 4) Optimization of human resource distribution and personnel improvement of units on the scene and in the field of education/training as a result of this optimization, and 5) Elimination of responsibility shifting between civilian personnel and uniformed SDF personnel, and the development of human resources.

(See Column: Keywords for the Reform of the Ministry of Defense)

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Keywords for the Reform of the Ministry of Defense

Keywords for the Reform of the Ministry of Defense (abstract) presented by former Minister of Defense Ishiba in May 2008 are as follows:

1. "Safety through the SDF (military)" as well as "Safety from the SDF (military)"

In the past, "civilian control" was a core concept as "passive civilian control" by preventing threats to the democratic system from armed organizations. However, nowadays, there is an additional need for "aggressive civilian control" on "how to utilize the SDF to secure the safety of the country and citizens, and how to realize national interests."

Since the main body of democratic civilian control is politicians, who have responsibility to the people, it is strongly sought to establish the best support structure.

2. From partial to total optimization

At present, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF consist of four Staff Offices and the Internal Bureau. However, the interests for each organization, and the individual optimization within each organization are prioritized, resulting in a system that makes it difficult for the Ministry of Defense and the SDF to realize total optimization. Therefore, there is recognition of the necessity to reform the organizational structure which may hinder the total optimization through realization of the individual optimization of each organization.

Thus, it is necessary to establish a structure which enables us to serve the state and the people through the utmost unification of the present organizations, and enhancing support for the Minister of Defense in full consideration of the characteristics of the civilian personnel and the uniformed SDF personnel, and ensuring total optimization of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF as a whole.

3. Minimize the distance and time between the units on the scene and the central organization

Under the present organization, due to many connection points and long distance from the units on the scene to the central organization, the following problems can be seen: time delays, inaccurate information (facts) concerning the condition of the units and the situation resulting from alternations made at each connection point and distance, and inaccurate transmission of the executives' intentions, including that of the Minister.

In order to dissolve such problems, it is necessary to eliminate the intervention of the intermediate organization as much as possible and to reorganize the organizational structure into a simple one.

In addition, with the current increase in SDF field operations, it is sought for the SDF to appropriately execute their duties strictly in line with laws and regulations, comprehend these operations and activities at the central organization, and achieve accountability by properly and appropriately reporting them to the Diet and the people.

Guaranteed accuracy and speed of such administrative works is vitally important and, in order to ensure it, we must simplify the organizational structure as much as possible.

4. Optimization of human resource distribution and personnel improvement of units on the scene and in the field of education/training

Due to a multi-layered organizational structure with many connecting points, an ineffective distribution of human resources has taken place.

The practice of drafting a budget for each fiscal year is a good example. It has a two-step process involving the collection of requests from the units on the scene by each Staff Office and their compilation into a hypothetical budget frame, followed by an assessment of the Internal Bureau in consideration of the overall balance. This process causes a considerable number of sections and personnel in the Staff Offices to engage in "budget drafting all year long." Such situation is not considered to be ideal and effective as the central organization.

On the other hand, a situation which has been characterized by under-enrollment and a chronic shortage of personnel has been seen in some units.

Even if high-level SDF personnel are placed into the units on the scene, this would not directly resolve the shortage of personnel. However, by doing it we can expect an improvement in the poorly-staffed units.

Moreover, we will be able to allocate good human resources to posts of instructors at various educational institutions, and contribute to the future development of human resources.

5. Elimination of responsibility shifting between civilian personnel and uniformed SDF personnel and the development of human resources

It is not possible for the civilian personnel in the Internal Bureau to conduct adequate defense administration without sufficient knowledge and awareness concerning the operations of the units on the scene, and the conditions of SDF personnel on the frontline.

Even SDF officers at the Staff Offices, a central organization, do not play a role as desired for the central organization, such as coordination with external organization, responding to the Diet and fulfilling the accountability to the public, while concentrating their energy on operation, training and improvement of units.

Since they have not been exposed directly to severe criticism from the outside, they tend to have peculiar cultures. The split structure of the "Internal Bureau that is solely in charge of external adjustment and Diet responses" and "Staff Offices solely in charge of units on the scene" are considered to be one of the fundamental reasons behind various misconducts and failures.

Civilian personnel learning about the difficulties of units on the scene and uniformed personnel learning about the difficulties of external coordination and responses to the Diet are expected to deepen mutual understanding, eliminate the responsibility shifting between them, and enable them to be defense professionals with a balance of characteristics and knowledge. From such perspective of human resources development, the organizational structure unifying civilian and uniformed personnel for executing works is extremely critical.

2. Report of the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense

As a result of the abovementioned discussion process, the Reform Council compiled and published a report.

The following is an explanation of the overview of the report.

1. Introduction

Last year the Reform Council was established at the Prime Minister's Office in response to the frequent incidents of misconduct at the Ministry of Defense and within the Self-Defense Forces.

Since then the individual incidents and organizational problems that caused them to occur have been identified, and consideration has been given to demonstrate measures to prevent recurrence and a direction for reform. It is necessary to reconstruct the organization and decision-making systems of the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces to ensure that the principles of reform can function and that the organizations can engage effectively and efficiently in their activities, in line with their duties.

The Self-Defense Forces are entering an era in which they must act in a multi-functional, flexible and effective manner. In addition to further enhancing "safety from the military organization" as emphasized during the post-war period, it is also necessary to incorporate the perspective of "safety through the military organization."

It is proposed to construct the system which will ensure effective functions of the principles of reform while ensuring civilian control.

2. Incidents of Misconduct - Identifying the Issues

In recent years incidents of misconduct have repeatedly occurred at the Ministry of Defense (formerly the Defense Agency) and in the Self-Defense Forces. Incidents that have had a considerable impact on society include the following: mistakes in reporting the amount of refueling[3], leakage of information via the Internet[4], leakage of Special Defense Secrets related to the Aegis system[5], the collision between the destroyer *Atago* and the fishing vessel *Seitoku Maru*[6], and the misconduct of a former Vice-Minister. (See Fig. IV-1-2)

In order to prevent future incidents of misconduct, it is essential that continuous organization-wide efforts be made to identify goals and nurture a sense of duty, while making every effort to minimize mistakes.

3. Reform Proposal (1): Reform of the Consciousness of Personnel and Organizational Culture

(1) Principles of Reform

The Reform Council, based on consideration and analysis of the incidents of misconduct proposes the following principles for reform: (1) Thorough adherence to rules and regulations, (2) Establishment of professionalism (professional awareness), and (3) Establishment of a management of works that prioritizes execution of duties, with the aim of total optimization.

(2) Thorough Adherence to Rules and Regulations

It is necessary to ensure that awareness of adherence to the rules and regulations prevails in an organizational climate. In addition, it is necessary to organize these rules in a manner that clarifies what needs to be observed.

(3) Establishment of Professionalism (Professional Awareness)

Senior personnel with thorough professionalism should take leadership to instill a high degree of ethics and a sense of mission throughout the entire organization.

Fig. IV-1-2 Major Incidents included in the Report

Incidents	Outline of Incidents Highlighted in the Report
Mistakes in reporting the amount of refueling (Negligence of duty to report)	Concerning the amount of fuel provided to U.S. naval vessels, incorrect figures were reported by the Head of Defense Plans and Program Division of the MSDF Maritime Staff Office, and were subsequently reflected at the press conference held by then Chief of Joint Staff, and in statements made by then Director-General of Defense Agency and Chief Cabinet Secretary. His negligence to correct the mistake even after its recognition indicates a lack of professionalism and a denial of civilian control. The responsibility to correct mistakes is ambiguous and this organizational problem must be corrected.
Information leakage via the Internet (Information and communication modernization and information security)	Several incidents concerning information leakage occurred in sequence until 2006, including one such incident where administrative data containing classified information was leaked through file-sharing software on a personal computer. These incidents occurred due to the failure of the SDF to stay abreast of the rapid modernization of information and communication technology, and due to the inadequacy of the security awareness of classified information.
Leakage of special defense secret related to the Aegis System (Education on advanced technology and information security)	Information on Aegis categorized as special defense secret was used as teaching materials and was distributed within an MSDF unit without appropriate procedures. This incident occurred due to both a desire to learn about the latest technology and a lack of awareness of information security.
The collision of the destroyer *Atago* and the fishing boat *Seitoku Maru* (Negligence of basic action)	The MSDF destroyer *Atago* collided with a fisherman's boat. This incident demonstrates how the loosening of basic discipline, the prevalence of disregard of organizational rules, and the lack of navigation capability, can lead to disastrous results. Problems with communications information between the Staff Office and the Internal Bureau in emergency also became apparent with this incident.
Breach of faith by the former Vice-Minister of Defense	This was an incident in which the former Vice-Minister of Defense received monetary gifts, and used influence on the procurement of defense equipments and materials. In the procurement of equipments and materials, actions motivated by personal gains are unacceptable and are far from the professionalism of which the Internal Bureau is proud. This is a breach of faith. Furthermore, there were organizational problems to allow a grave deviation by a high-ranking ministry official.

(4) Establishment of a Management of Works that Prioritizes Execution of Duties, with the Aim of Total Optimization

In addition to reform of the consciousness of individual personnel and units, it is necessary to create an organizational culture that aims at total optimization of the organization, focusing on the execution of duties. (See Fig. IV-1-3)

4. Reform Proposal (2): Organizational Reforms for Modern Civilian Control

(1) Necessity of Organizational Reform

In order that the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces can implement the above-mentioned three principles of reform steadily and effectively, organizational reform is required.

(2) Strategic Level: Strengthening Command Functions of the Prime Minister's Office

The Reform Council proposes that the Prime Minister's Office should utilize the Security Council and other ministerial councils to strengthen the command functions by actively and comprehensively discussing the critical items for security. The specific measures are shown in Figure IV-1-4.

Fig. IV-1-3 Specific Details of Reform Proposal (1)

Items	Details
Thorough adherence to rules and regulations	1) Senior personnel understand the necessity of rules and regulations and take the initiative in obeying them 2) Workplace training for staff members on regulations focused more on necessity than formality 3) Thorough enforcement of rules and regulations related to preservation of classified information and strict disciplinary action for violation 4) Clarification of responsibilities for securing transparency in defense procurement, as well as preparing and releasing records of meetings 5) Strengthening inspection and observation including inspections without notice 6) Revision and examination of necessities of rules and regulations
Establishment of professionalism	1) Review of educational programs and administrative experience in order to foster staff members with broad views 2) Expanding basic workplace education, while reviewing the balance of workload and workforce within each section of the SDF, as well as reducing excessive workload in the workplace 3) Development of professionalism involving information communication and security, which is significant to the present security
Establishment of a management of works that prioritizes execution of duties, with the aim of total optimization	1) Establishment of cooperation structure based on a sense of unity between civilian and uniformed staff, and between the ASDF, GSDF, and MSDF 2) Establishment of voluntary PDCA (Plan – Do – Check – Act) cycle 3) While taking into account the "Best Practices" of the private sector, common efforts for improvement should be made by subordinates and commanders who lead an SDF unit, the basic unit to the Ministry of Defense 4) Mobile response to issues related to the policy plan by the Integrated Project Team (IPT[1]) method 5) Full-scale introduction of IPT method in defense procurement 6) Further promotion of joint operations posture centered on the Joint Staff 7) In order to maintain the trust of the Japanese people, implementation of various press conferences and integrated public relations activities by units and central organizations

Note: 1. Integrated Project Team. See IV-4.

Fig. IV-1-4 Measures to Strengthen the Command Functions of the Prime Minister's Office

Measures	Outline
Development of the Security Strategies	Presenting the National Security Strategy that is to be the premise of defense policy
Use of Three Ministers Meetings (such as Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Defense)	Improve the assembly with daily/active discussions on important issues related to security, by efforts of Cabinet officials, such as the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Defense
System for the Government Policy Plan on SDF's defense capability build-up	Make utilization of the Security Council to discuss important items for defense capability build-up. Establish a Cabinet-related assembly to discuss issues such as governmental policy on SDF's defense capability build-up and also establish a permanent system to support this assembly
Reinforcement of the support system for the Prime Minister	Reinforcement of Cabinet staff members in order to strengthen and expand the support system for the Prime Minister related to the issue of security

(3) Organizational Reform to Strengthen Command Functions at the Ministry of Defense

The Reform Council proposes that while maintaining the current organization of the Ministry of Defense basically through drastic reforms and restructuring of the various functions and responsibilities, a structure should be created so as to prevent recurrence of incidents of misconduct, enable civilian control to function, and enable the implementation of more effective defense policies. The specific measures are shown in Figure IV-1-5.

Fig. IV-1-5 Structural Reform within the Ministry of Defense

Measures	Outline
Expansion of Policy Decision-Making System which centers on the Minister of Defense	1) Abolish the Support System by Civilian Defense Counselors and appoint Aides to the Minister of Defense 2) Explicitly establish the Defense Council by law, and advise the Minister of Defense on policy decision-making and responses to emergency situations through deliberation by politicians such as the Senior Vice-Minister and Parliamentary Secretary for Defense, and civilian officials such as the Vice-Minister of Defense, and uniformed officials such as the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff 3) Establish a center which engages in information gathering and disaster management at the ministry
Functional reinforcement of the Bureau of Defense Policy	Attempt to improve the system of planning, drafting and implementing defense policies. Also, plan functional reinforcement that takes the actual situation into account in terms of operation by appointing SDF personnel. In particular, work to improve intelligence-analysis capabilities, and drafting projects such as international peace cooperation activities
Functional reinforcement of Joint Staff Office (JSO)	Abolish Bureau of Operational Policy and ensure the execution of operations under the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, who receives orders from the Minister. Concerning important matters such as unit mobilization and operational planning, submit the matter for approval to the Minister of Defense, after obtaining suggestions from the Defense Council through the Bureau of Defense Policy
Unification of defense capability build-up sections	1) In order to ensure optimization of defense capability build-up, arrange and realign the defense capabilities build-up sections of the Internal Bureau and the three Staff Offices of the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF. Then establish a defense capability build-up department that unitarily engages in build-up projects, and study how the department should specifically be. Maintain a posture able to conduct procurement by using the IPT method 2) Concerning important matters, the defense capability build-up department of the Ministry of Defense will prepare options, gain approval by the Minister of Defense via the Internal Bureau through discussion at the Defense Conference, and seek deliberation and resolution at the Cabinet level, based on the defense build-up plan of the Cabinet Office 3) Review local procurement to transfer it as much as possible to central procurement. Moreover, strengthen the frameworks for highly independent third-party verification
Other important measures	1) Concerning the management sections, actively appoint SDF personnel familiar with the actual conditions of the unit while aiming at utmost integration 2) The ASDF, GSDF and MSDF Staff Offices will bear responsibility for issues related to personnel, education and training of the SDF. However, the Internal Bureau will assist the Minister of Defense in terms of system and policies

5. Conclusion

The Ministry of Defense should promptly compile an implementation plan for the reforms contained in these proposals and move to implement such reforms. In addition, when implementing organizational reform, multi-faceted simulations should be implemented in advance.

The Reform Council proposed issues to be considered in the future, such as how the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces, police forces, and the Japan Coast Guard should cooperate more closely to fulfill the function of the government as a whole.

The Council expects that the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces will be revitalized as professional organizations that have their pride.

3. Future Efforts

Given the series of incidents of misconduct since last year at the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces that resulted in a significant loss of public confidence, the reform council was established at the Prime Minister's Office and the contents of the report issued by the Council have been taken with the utmost seriousness by the Ministry of Defense.

This report sets out a fundamental direction for the rebirth of the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces, and in order to follow the basic direction laid out in the report and to realize reform of the Ministry, the Ministry of Defense Reform Head Office headed by the Defense Minister was established in July. Furthermore, in order to thoroughly disseminate the reform to all personnel, and to secure engagement by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF as a whole, the Ministry of Defense Nationwide Staff Meeting was held with the attendance of senior personnel of the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces.

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Statement by the Prime Minister at the 11th Meeting of the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense

Prime Minister Fukuda attended the 11th meeting of the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense held on July 15, 2008 and stated the following after receiving a report from Chairman Nobuya Minami.

"The recent incidents of misconduct as well as the collision involving the Aegis-equipped destroyer "Atago" this February have shaken and damaged the long-established trust of the people toward the Ministry of Defense and the SDF. Based on the detailed analysis of these problems and issues, the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense has presented three reform principles and proposed to reform the organizations of the Ministry of Defense and SDF, and to strengthen the command functions of the Prime Minister's Office. The Government will swiftly advance the reform in the direction based on the Council's proposals. Together with the Minister of Defense, I will make the utmost efforts to restore the people's trust as soon as possible, by constructing a strong and flexible Ministry of Defense and SDF consisting of personnel with pride and a sense of mission."

Prime Minister Fukuda receiving a report from Chairman Minami (Cabinet Public Relations Office)

Section 2. Fundamental Efforts to Ensure Thorough Civilian Control

In a democratic nation, politics must be given priority over the military. However, recently, public confidence in the processes of administrative works at the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces has been lost, and very serious issues concerning civilian control have emerged.

Given this situation, this section explains the specific content of the incidents that have occurred and sets out the points at issue and specific efforts based on them. (See Part II, Chapter 1, Section 3)

1. Recent Incidents

1. Incident of Mistakes in Reporting the Amount of Refueling[7]

In 2003, the MSDF replenishment ship *Tokiwa* refueled U.S. vessels based on the former Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. Although a division head of the Maritime Staff Office noticed inaccurate information on the amount of refueling, he failed to report this mistake to senior personnel nor to the Internal Bureau. Subsequently, based on the inaccurate information, then Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda and then Director-General of the Defense Agency Shigeru Ishiba made responses in press conferences and at the Diet.

This incident resulted in a loss of confidence in the work-process at the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces. This is a very significant problem in terms of thorough civilian control that should be seriously taken, as detailed below:

1) Work-processing mistakes within the Ministry of Defense, including a report with inaccurate figures and the failure to correct the report, demonstrated that the Ministry of Defense failed to appropriately assist the Minister of Defense, who is a core of civilian control.
2) Responses based on the inaccurate figures were made at the Diet, which demonstrates that the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces will not be appropriately controlled by the Diet, which is responsible for final civilian control.
3) At the same time, the fact that inaccurate information was given directly to the people through press conferences is a grave situation that may cause damage to the basis of the issue of civilian control.

2. Mistaken Destruction of Ship Deck Log[8]

The ship deck log is a document that is prepared on MSDF vessels to record the activities and movements of that vessel. Regulations require that the log be kept on board for one year after the day the log is recorded, and, after that, should be stored for three years at the Regional Staff Office. However, on the replenishment ship *Towada*, which had been dispatched to the Indian Ocean under the former Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, a part of the ship deck log was mistakenly destroyed after the ship returned to Japan within the period of preservation of the document.

This work processing raises the following significant problems:

1) The supervision and instructions by a supervisor on document management on a daily basis were insufficient.
2) The appropriate procedures for document management were not taken.
3) The preservation of the ship deck log was not appropriately implemented according to regulations.

3. Collision between the Destroyer *Atago* and the Fishing Vessel *Seitoku Maru*

It was a serious problem in terms of the crisis management that considerable time was taken to report to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, who are responsible for civilian control, after the occurrence of the collision between the destroyer *Atago* and the fishing vessel *Seitoku Maru* at 04:07 on February 19, 2008. The fact also

shows that appropriate assistance has not been conducted to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense.

2. Efforts at the Ministry of Defense

Given the occurrence of the incident of mistakes in reporting the amount of refueling, and the mistaken destruction of a ship deck log, from the perspective of ensuring thorough civilian control, in October 2007, the Ministry of Defense established the Committee on Drastic Measures to Ensure Civilian Control and has engaged in discussions on what drastic steps should be taken, including thorough prevention of recurrence.

In the incident of the collision between the destroyer *Atago* and the fishing vessel *Seitoku Maru*, an instruction concerning reports on incidents and accidents was revised on the day of the incident, and in March 2008, the existing system was completely revised and a new instruction concerning rapid reports related to emergency situations was issued. (See Part III, Chapter 4, Section 1)

Based on the above, in April 2008, in order to prevent recurrence of an incident like the series of incidents of misconduct and accidents, the Committee on Drastic Measures to Ensure Civilian Control was abolished and the Council on Drastic Measures to Prevent Recurrence of and Responses to Incidents and Accidents was established, considering that in addition to stop-gap measures, the background and fundamental causes of the incident should also be considered candidly to make any improvements, and that based on the harsh criticism of Ministry of Defense explanations following such incidents, it is necessary to fundamentally discuss how the accountability of the Ministry should be improved as required.

In addition, in the report by the Reform Council released in July 2008, a direction was laid out for the reform at the Prime Minister's Office and at the Ministry of Defense that will serve as "organizational reforms to ensure modern civilian control." Of them, measures for organizational reforms to strengthen command and control functions at the Ministry of Defense are as follows: (1) strengthening of policy-making structures that are centered on the Defense Minister; (2) strengthening of the functions of the Bureau of Defense Policy; (3) strengthening of the functions of the Joint Staff Office; (4) unification of sections responsible for defense capabilities build-up; and (5) measures in other important areas.

The Ministry of Defense will make every effort to advance these measures to realize the reform in the future.

Section 3. Efforts to Prevent the Leakage of Information

Leakage of some information handled by the Ministry of Defense could have serious impact on the defense of Japan. Protection of such classified information is the essential foundation to fulfill defense of our country and maintain security of our country. Accordingly, the Ministry of Defense defines three types of classified information and stipulates procedures for designation and handling, such as communication, storage and disposal for each information, in order to prevent unauthorized personnel from inappropriately accessing the information in an effort to protect it. The three types of classified information are: "Special Defense Secret," which is information concerning materials, equipment, etc. provided by the United States based on the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America; "Defense Secret," which is designated by the Minister of Defense as information concerning SDF operations, build-up of defense capabilities, etc. that must be kept secret for national defense; and the so-called "Ministry of Defense Secret," which is classified information, other than those listed above, related to administrative work of the Ministry of Defense.

The following incidents where classified information was leaked have taken place at the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces, as explained below.

This section explains the points of issue arising from these incidents and measures taken based on them.

1. Recent Incidents

1. Incident of Information Leakage via the Internet

A series of information leakage via the Internet occurred at the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces. In February 2006, an incident of leakage of classified information on the destroyer *Asayuki* from a privately-owned personal computer through file-sharing software came to light.

The fact that the Ministry of Defense's information security systems and awareness of personnel have not kept abreast of recent rapid IT innovation is in the background of this incident.

2. Incident of Leakage of Special Defense Secret Concerning the Aegis System

In January 2007 it was discovered that a crew member of the destroyer *Shirane* had saved information that was thought to be classified on an external hard disk at the crew member's home, and as a result of investigations, in December 2007, an MSDF officer was arrested on suspicion of leaking Special Defense Secrets concerning the Aegis system, and four other MSDF officers were sent to the prosecutor.

The following problems are considered to have contributed to this incident: (1) lack of awareness concerning information security, including violation of rules and the fact that they easily copied the classified documents; (2) an incomplete system for protecting classified information, including the implementation of education involving classified information without approval; (3) incomplete management of personal computers (this incident emerged prior to the implementation of drastic measures to prevent a recurrence of a leakage of information via the Internet, as described above); and (4) insufficient monitoring and surveillance by managers and persons responsible for the protection of classified information.

As a result of investigations into this incident, although it was not confirmed that Special Defense Secrets had been leaked outside the SDF, there is a possibility that external leakage could have occurred in consideration of the fact that confidential information about the Aegis system was leaked to numerous SDF personnel. This was a very serious problem involving information security. This incident could have resulted in significant distrust among the public concerning the information security of the MSDF and indeed the SDF as a whole, and has also impacted the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and relations with other countries. Furthermore, it has had a severe impact on the morale of SDF personnel.

The Ministry of Defense has examined and investigated the facts of this incident and in March 2008, the result was reported to the public[9].

2. Efforts at the Ministry of Defense

In February 2006, in response to the incident of information leakage via the Internet, the Ministry of Defense took a number of emergency measures, including removal of file-sharing software installed on privately-owned personal computers which had been used for work; removal of classified information and unnecessary data relating to work; and total prohibition of the use of privately-owned personal computers to handle classified information.

In addition to these emergency measures, in February 2006, the Commission on Drastic Measures to Prevent Recurrence of Computer Related Classified Information Leakages, headed by the then Parliamentary Secretary for Defense, was established. The Commission discussed specific drastic measures to prevent recurrence and released them in April 2006. After that, in April 2006, the Committee to Implement Measures for the Prevention of the Recurrence of Computer Related Classified Information Leakages, headed by the then Parliamentary Secretary for Defense was established, and it has endeavored to take specific measures.

Under the circumstances, the incident of the leakage of Special Defense Secrets concerning the Aegis system came to light. In response to it, the Committee to Implement Measures for the Prevention of the Recurrence of Computer Related Classified Information Leakages was abolished, and the Council for Prevention of Information Leakage, headed by the Minister of Defense, was newly established in April 2007. This Council is engaged in consideration and implementation of measures, based on an awareness that the importance of information management and drastic measures to prevent leakages have not sufficiently permeated through the terminal members of the Defense Ministry and the SDF.

The major measures implemented to date by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF concerning prevention of information leakage are shown in Fig. IV-3-1.

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF would like to continue such efforts based on the report by the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense in July 2008.

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

New Establishment of the "Self-Defense Forces Intelligence Security Unit" (Provisional Name)

The Intelligence Security Unit is a unit established within the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces to collect and sort out information necessary for implementing information security works at units.

It has become extremely important to strengthen the posture for information security in the Ministry of Defense in response to a series of incidents of information leakage. Based on the recognition that it has become increasingly necessary for the Ministry of Defense to protect sensitive information gained by the Self-Defense Forces from intelligence activities by foreign countries, in the budget for FY 2008, the intelligence security units placed in the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces are to be integrated into a newly established unit called the SDF Intelligence Security Unit (provisional name), and a necessary increase in the staff is being planned.



* Planned to be established during FY 2008 aiming at developing operation policies and others of the SDF Intelligence Security Unit (provisional name) and the gathering and sharing of counter-intelligence-related information.

Through this reorganization, it will be possible to conduct efficient gathering, collection, analysis and sharing of information on intelligence activities against the SDF, thereby strengthening the information security posture for counter-intelligence.

Fig. IV-3-1 Principal Measures for the Prevention of Information Leakage

• Measures involving people

Necessary measures for security of classified information	Measures taken by the Ministry of Defense
❍ Limitation of those with access to classified information	❍ The manager will designate "suitable persons" as persons who handle classified information (Decision made based on consideration of personal history and specific individual details such as daily work attitude) ❍ Minimize appointments under the "principles of need to know"*
❍ Recognition of the importance of information management	◎ Submit "contracts" in order to raise awareness of the significant responsibility associated with the protection of classified information ◎ Clarify the responsibility of managers and others handling classified information ❑ Implementation of private training for all unit members involved in Information Leakage Prevention ❑ Dispatch to the unit a special activity team headed by an internal bureau executive personnel
❍ Familiarization of those handling classified information with specific rules	❍ Periodically implement education on information protection to all staff according to grades and information ◎ Prepare and distribute a compilation of examples, and confirm the degree of comprehension, as well as establish monthly information security ◎ Organize and unify dispersed regulations for protection of classified information, and establish a coherent structure
❍ Reinforcement of deterrent against leakage of classified information	◎ After thorough scrutiny of information concerning "MOD Secret (classified • top secret)," shift them to "Defense Secret" guaranteed by strict penalty (Strengthening of disciplinary action by establishment of Classified Information of Defense System by revision to the Self-Defense Forces Law in 2001 and implemented in 2002) ◎ Define the disciplinary action standards in regards to information leakage ❑ Utilization of the Whistleblowing Act ❑ Inspection by the Inspector General's Office of Legal Compliance
❍ Counter-intelligence	❍ Collect and organize, etc. necessary information for security by the SDF Intelligence Security Unit ❍ Concerning contacts with residing military attaché of each country, consent is to be obtained from those in charge of security, etc., and such contact status are to be reported
❍ Recognition and elimination of personal weakness	◎ Report any suspicious activities to those in charge of security, etc. ❍ Execute guidance concerning personal issues related to family or financial problems

* : Principle of "sharing information only with those who require it, and not sharing information with those who do not require it."

◎ : Measures following the establishment of "Fundamental Measures for the Prevention of the Recurrence of Computer Related Classified Information Leakages" in April 2006.

❑ : Implemented since April 2007 following the incident in which MSDF unit informally removed classified information.

• Measures involving Classified Documents

Necessary measures for security of classified information	Measures taken by the Ministry of Defense
❍ Prohibition of the removal of classified documents	❍ The person in charge in each division will unitarily conduct the storage of classified documents ❍ Classified documents will be logged in a book, and then kept in a safe deposit, etc. with a three-level dial lock ❍ Installation of a security and alarm system at some entrances of government office buildings that detect and warn against taking out of classified documents
❍ Leakage prevention when mailing to external sources	❍ In order to send or lend classified documents to external persons, manager approval is necessary and those actions must be recorded in the register ❍ Use of telephones and faxes that conceal contents by encryption for transmission of classified information
❍ Restricted access to facilities handling classified information	❍ Prohibit access to most facilities handling classified information. Access to such places, managed by IC card, password or verification
❍ Reduction of classified documents	◎ Prevent an excess of classification designations as well as reduce classified documents by taking measures to make stricter designations of classified information

◎ : Measures following the establishment of "Fundamental Measures for the Prevention of the Recurrence of Computer Related Classified Information Leakages" in April 2006.

• Measures involving electronic data

Necessary measures for security of classified information	Measures taken by the Ministry of Defense
❍ Prohibition of the removal of administrative data outside of the workplace without consent	◎ Removal of private computers from the workplace • Emergency supply of computers owned by the ministry (around 56,000 computers, around ¥4 billion) • Prohibit use of personal computers inside workplace ◎ Prohibit use of privately-owned portable memory devices on official computers ◎ Prevent the unauthorized taking out of data • Execute inspections without notice of personal belongings during work hours and upon arriving/departing work • Prevent the removal of work-related data by installing file encryption software ◎ Clearly mark and strictly manage official portable memory devices ◎ Verification of adherence to the measures concerning information guarantee, such as inspections of the official portable memory devices management book (Periodic investigation once a year, special investigation once a year, dispatch of the special investigation team if a third person is secured.)
❍ Prohibition of work-related data handling on computers at home, etc.	◇ Erase all unnecessary classified data as well as file-sharing software from personal computers once used for work purposes ◎ Educate relevant persons on the dangers of information leakage by file-sharing software and promote removal of such software ◎ Following the submission of a written oath that states the handling of no administrative data on personal computers and such, obtain consent from the individual to check whether or not private computers at home contain administrative work-related data ❑ In regards to the "check" as mentioned above, make one round of all staff members by the end of July 2007, and toughen penalty thereafter
❍ Reinforcement of information management system	◎ Regarding the manager assistant, appointment is made by considering knowledge of the treatment of computers, etc., and not just simply appointment

◇ : Emergency measures enforced in February 2006.
◎ : Measures following the establishment of "Fundamental Measures to the Prevention of the Recurrence of Computer Related Classified Information Leakages" in April 2006.
❑ : Implemented since April 2007 following the incident in which MSDF unit informally removed classified information.

Section 4. Efforts for Effective, Efficient, Open, and Transparent Procurement

Appropriate and efficient procurement of defense equipment and materials is one of the most important elements for Japan's defense. It is also imperative to maintain indispensable production and technological infrastructure for defense equipment in Japan even in peacetime. Moreover, since last year, taking into account several incidents of excessive billing by import firms that came to light, there is a need to build a transparent and fair system that is better able to fulfill its accountability to the public, including with regard to the importation of equipment.

This section will explain in detail the various efforts that the Ministry of Defense has taken thus far, as well as new initiatives that will be taken in light of the incidents of excessive billing for procurement of imports.

1. The Ministry of Defense's Efforts to Date

1. Comprehensive Acquisition Reform

The Ministry of Defense has been promoting comprehensive acquisition reform. The major goals are: more efficient and streamlined procurement, supply and lifecycle cost management of defense equipment and materials; enhancement of open and transparent procurement processes; as well as preservation and upgrading of the necessary defense production and technological infrastructure.

Once procured, major defense equipment is used over a long period of time, ranging from 10 to 20 years and beyond. Therefore, acquisition reform towards more efficient and streamlined management of equipment—from concept-refining, development, procurement, operation (including maintenance and repairs) to disposal—is of increasing importance. In light of this fact, the Ministry of Defense established the Equipment Procurement Office (then) in July 2006 with the aim of achieving more efficient equipment procurement[10].

The Ministry of Defense is pursuing a variety of efforts for efficient procurement of equipment and materials. These include the bulk purchase of equipment in a single fiscal year rather than over multiple fiscal years; lump-sum purchase of equipment and materials instead of respective purchase by the three SDF services; commoditization of certain specifications at the development stage; introduction of commercial off-the-shelf products; private consignment; and review of equipment maintenance costs.

While the Japanese government is making efforts to assure appropriate public purchasing in all fields, the Ministry of Defense has also been reviewing private contract procedures to enhance the transparency and fairness of the procurement process. Private contract procedures are being reformed by expanding the scope of the comprehensive evaluation bidding system[11], increasing the number of contracts for bulk purchase of equipment over multiple fiscal years, and introducing efficient bidding procedures. A vice-chief in charge of auditing was appointed at the Equipment Procurement Office in July 2006, while a councilor in charge of auditing and Audit Division were set up in the Internal Bureau in the Ministry of Defense in August 2006. (See Part IV, Sections 2 and 3)

(See Columns: "What is the procedure for equipment selection?" and "What are the concrete measures for cost reduction?")

2. Enhancement and Strengthening of the Defense Production & Technological Infrastructure

Regarding equipment, it is necessary to pursue effective and efficient acquisition of equipment that adequately responds to the development of joint operations and meets the needs of troops, taking into account the latest trends in military science and technology. Therefore, for the acquisition of equipment the SDF selects the most appropriate method of procurement—domestic manufacture, import, or licensed domestic manufacture—on the basis of deliberations that take into consideration not only performance and price, but also maintenance, supply, ease of education and training, and the necessity of Japan's own reforms.

In doing so, securing a domestic production and technology infrastructure that possesses the production capacity and technological capability to supply outstanding domestically-produced equipment plays an important role. In other words, regarding key types of equipment such as aircraft, ships, tanks and guided missiles, production volumes are low as a whole, initial investment is high and a high level of technological capability is required. The number of companies able to develop and produce these types of equipment is therefore limited to one or a handful of companies. For this reason, there is a possibility that withdrawal from the market of a single firm involved in the manufacture of equipment could immediately interfere with the stable acquisition and maintenance of equipment. When procuring equipment from outside of Japan, maintaining this domestic production and technology infrastructure makes it possible to secure negotiating power with the partner country and acquire equipment under conditions as favorable as possible to Japan.

For this reason, the Ministry of Defense, taking severe financial circumstances into account, believes that it should clarify the areas of defense production and technological infrastructure that should be prioritized, fostered and maintained, centered around the core technology areas indispensable to the safety and security of Japan, and that it should make efforts toward the establishment of truly essential domestic production and technology infrastructure.

(See Reference 80)

2. Recent Incidents

1. Excessive Billing by Yamada Corporation

On November 22, 2007, it was determined that Yamada Corporation had engaged in excessive billing for two pieces of imported equipment that had been delivered to the Ministry of Defense.

In light of this discovery, the Ministry both halted business transactions with Yamada Corporation and implemented a survey of all contracts concluded with this company from 2002 and onward to verify the authenticity of estimates through direct contact with the overseas manufacturers. As a result of this inquiry, an additional 16 incidents of excessive billing were revealed, and disclosed to the public on February 28.

In addition, regarding a procurement contract for chaff/flare launchers in 2000, although there were suspicions that the company had engaged in excessive billing by falsifying the estimate provided by U.S. manufacturer BAE Systems, Inc., it was ultimately decided that only an initial reduction of the contract had been made. An investigation into the contract through documents from the time, interviews with employees and information provided by BAE is ongoing, along with an investigation of excessive billing by Yamada Corporation. Currently the Ministry is conducting a random survey of other import firms to confirm the authenticity of estimates directly with overseas manufacturers.

Through this random survey, it has been discovered that estimates had been falsified in six contracts for submarine communications antennas procured by Kyokuto Boeki Kaisha, Ltd. (KBK), and that excessive billing had occurred in five of these contracts. This finding was announced on January 7, 2008.

In light of this discovery, the Ministry of Defense both halted business transactions with KBK and implemented a survey of all contracts conducted with this company from 2002 and onward to verify the authenticity of estimates through direct contact with the overseas manufacturers. As a result of this inquiry, an additional 12 incidents of excessive billing were revealed and disclosed to the public on June 20.

2. Selection and Procurement of C-X Engines and Other Equipment

There were several accusations made regarding the involvement of a former Vice-Minister of Defense in the selection and procurement of the engines for the ASDF's next-generation cargo aircraft (C-X), the engines installed in biological reconnaissance vehicles and minesweeper/cargo helicopters (MCH-101), and the engines installed in 19DD destroyers. As a result, there have been calls for even further transparency in the decision-making processes of the Ministry of Defense.

3. New Initiatives at the Ministry of Defense

1. Recent Actions

Recently, there have been changes in the situation surrounding acquisition of equipment. First, amid budget constraints, rising unit prices of equipment due to the increasing sophistication of equipment has led to a decrease in the volume of units procured. This in turn gives rise to a vicious cycle in which unit prices consequently increase still further. Therefore, promotion of various cost control measures are an urgent issue.

Second, there has long been an increasing demand for greater transparency and openness in the process. Although in the past the Ministry of Defense has endeavored to disclose information related to the acquisition of equipment – even amid such restraints as the limited number of firms capable of manufacturing defense equipment and the need for preservation of confidentiality – there has been demand for increased accountability, including with regard to procurement procedures.

In light of such changes to the situation, in October 2007, the Ministry received the Ministerial Directive for the Acceleration of Acquisition Transformation, and the Project Team for the Promotion of Acquisition Transformation was established, led by Parliamentary Secretary for Defense Terada. Immediately following its establishment, this team uncovered incidents of excessive billing for import procurement, and has since held a total of 10 meetings on of the issue of import procurement. In March 2008, it released a report on the topic[12].

Project Team for the Promotion of Comprehensive Acquisition Reform headed by former Parliamentary Secretary for Defense Terada

2. Efforts for Comprehensive Acquisition Reform

(1) Actions for Import Issues

In November 2007, several incidents related to import procurement came to light, including the determination that excessive billing had taken place in two contracts for equipment delivered to the Ministry of Defense by Yamada Corporation.

The Ministry of Defense is making the following efforts to address this issue:

1) In order to uncover and prevent excessive billing, the Ministry is consulting directly with overseas manufacturers to obtain estimates.
2) The number of import liaisons in the Equipment Procurement and Construction Office has been increased from 3 to 10 people to enhance the price survey function in the United States. (FY 2008)
3) In order to facilitate the participation of overseas manufacturers in the contract, the Ministry is continuously improving the environment and promoting direct contracts (including through the use of bid guidance materials written in English and by conducting English-language information sessions).
4) The Ministry will request a FY 2009 budget for the department of import in the Equipment Procurement and Construction Office.
5) The Ministry will make use of chartered accountants and personnel from outside who have worked in trading companies.
6) The Ministry will strengthen punitive measures against incidents of excessive billing (the Ministry currently demands the refund of the amount paid in excess and charges a penalty equal to the amount paid in excess. This penalty will be doubled). (FY 2008)

7) In addition to comparing the records in the trading company's accounting system with the estimate submitted to the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry will introduce an import procurement survey that investigates the company's internal fraud prevention measures and legal compliance structures. (FY 2008)

(2) Enhancing Management of Equipment Lifecycle Costs

Generally, the equipment is designed, developed, and manufactured over a significant period of time and at considerable cost, and the equipment is used for a long period of time. The Ministry has estimated the lifecycle costs (LCC) for certain individual pieces of equipment over the entire lifecycle of the equipment, from concept-refining to development, procurement, operation (including maintenance and repairs) and disposal.

In order to promote LCC management on a Ministry-wide basis, in March 2008, the Ministry set up LCC management procedures and calculation procedures and applied LCC management to key equipment on a trial basis. Going forward, the Ministry will also pursue new initiatives, including establishment of cross-organizational liaison and coordination meetings based on the IPT[13] methods in use in various other countries, and establishment of uniform calculation methods for LCC.

(3) Establishment of Performance Targets for Cost Control

For the first time, the Ministry of Defense has established a comprehensive cost reduction goal of a 15% reduction in costs within five years (by FY 2011) and a 9% reduction in costs by FY 2009 in comparison with the costs in FY 2006 through efficiency-boosting measures such as ongoing review of methods of acquisition, utilization of commercial products and technologies and integrated procurement.

(4) Expansion of Incentive Contracts[14]

The Ministry of Defense has made use of only two incentive contracts since the concept was introduced in 1999. The Ministry has introduced a new system that improves the evaluation procedure for corporate proposals which promotes corporate cost reduction activities by reviewing the overall system to enhance the effect of incentive contracts.

(5) Expansion of Outsourcing to the Private Sector

In order to respond to the increasing sophistication of equipment and diversity of missions, there are limits to the conventional model of task-by-task basis outsourcing to the private sector. Therefore, from the perspective of acquisition transformation, the Ministry of Defense continues to implement analysis of cost effectiveness, including ascertaining total costs, and promote the utilization of new methods (such as PFIs[15]) to further expand outsourcing to the private sector.

(6) Further Improvement of Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

FMS is the supply of equipment to eligible arms-exporting countries based on United States Government laws on arms export control. Currently, however, there are several issues, including insufficient disclosure of cost breakdowns. Going forward, the Ministry of Defense will make efforts for further improvement, including expansion of cost breakdowns.

MSDF Kure Museum, part of the PFI project

(7) Acquisition of Equipment from the Perspective of Joint Operations

In the past as well, 1) unification of equipment specifications, 2) standardization of equipment, 3) integration of the command and operations systems of the SDF services, and 4) research and development concerning 1) to 3) above have been conducted on the premise of joint operations. Going forward, while continuing to promote consideration of suitable equipment to contribute to joint operations in the fields of rescue, health, transportation, and warning and surveillance, the Ministry of Defense will conduct efforts toward such goals as materializing a framework of deliberation and coordination, and establishing the system for sharing information on stock and specifications among the SDF services.

(8) Strengthening Evaluation of Technological Research and Development, etc.

From the perspective of acquisition improvement, current evaluation of research and development is by no means sufficient. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense has established a Technology Evaluation Committee headed by the Parliamentary Minister for Defense and has instituted a new and effective structure for evaluation of technology.

In addition, with the aim of promoting international cooperation that contributes to effective and efficient research and development, while vitalizing technological exchange with various countries, the Ministry of Defense must further deepen its discussions on the background, benefits, and problems related to joint international research and development.

(9) Review of Central and Regional Procurement

In order to conduct third-party oversight of contracts at regional departments and bureaus, the Ministry of Defense reviews the bid oversight committees of regional defense bureaus and conducts oversight of contracts related to equipment and materials.

In addition, in order to further improve transparency, the approval of the Minister of Defense, which currently applies to only high-level negotiated contracts in central procurement, is conducted at the regional level as well, taking into account operational efficiency (as with central procurement, this applies to contracts for major equipment over 150 million yen).

(10) Division of Duties for Various Stages of Planning and Procurement in Equipment Selection

For next-generation rescue helicopters and other equipment, based on the outcome of detailed deliberation on more transparent and efficient equipment selection procedures, the Ministry of Defense will implement a test-run of the system in which the Bureau of Defense Policy is in charge of selecting functions and performance, while the Bureau of Finance and Equipment is in charge of model types and acquisition method. (In April 2008, the Ministry of Defense formed a cross-organizational work team to deliberate on selection procedures and other matters.)

In addition, the Ministry of Defense is aiming to review procedures for selection of aircraft model types, and looking into application and expansion of a more competitive bidding system.

3. Steady Implementation of Measures

In advancing measures for reform, it is extremely important to continually propose new measures while making clear the road for steady implementation of those measures.

Going forward, taking into account the schedule for implementation of acquisition improvement, the Ministry of Defense will conduct a necessary review of the progress of measures at each important point. Through such measures, the Ministry of Defense will endeavor to advance acquisition improvement without backtracking or unproductive delays.

Moreover, based on the contents of the July report of the “Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense,” these efforts will be continued.

[COLUMN]

Q&A

What is the procedure for equipment selection?

The equipment selection process depends on the type of equipment. The basic flow is as follows:

1) First, the necessary functions and performance for defense of Japan are evaluated.

2) Next, factors such as cost, introduction method such as whether it is acquisition of a newly-developed equipment item or existing one, the type of equipment, type of model, and quantity are determined.

For example, in the case of an aircraft, after the process whereby the Internal Bureau of the Ministry of Defense performs adjustment and evaluation of the model selection plan and performance requirement[1] made by the Ground, Maritime or Air Self-Defense Force, the proposal of model selection is drafted as the Ministry of Defense Proposal. After the model selection of the aircraft with items that should be kept secret is submitted to and evaluated by the Aircraft Model Selection Conference in the Ministry of Defense for consultation and approval, a decision is made by the Minister of Defense. Furthermore, regarding model selection of combat aircraft, the Security Council is consulted in accordance with the year end budget compilation as an important issue for the maintenance of defense forces for each fiscal year.

For aircraft with no items requiring secrecy, such as training aircraft, a competitive bidding system that adopts the comprehensive evaluation bidding method may be used.

1) Required performance items in order to satisfy required items such as operation objective, operation structure, and expected main performance.

[COLUMN]

Q&A

What are the concrete measures for cost reduction?

The measures for cost reduction and the amount of expenditure retrenchment raised by the cost reduction effort in recent years are as follows.

❍ Active use of commercial goods and technology

The Ministry of Defense makes effort in the use of commercial goods and technology, such as the use of commercial goods for components of the ASDF's JADGE system (expenditure retrenchment of approx. ¥600 million), pursuing the adoption of specification of the commercial vessels as much as possible in regards to the marine observation vessels and examines the observation equipment (expenditure retrenchment of approx. ¥16 billion).

❍ Lump-sum procurement

The Ministry of Defense has introduced lump-sum procurement for the equipment as follows:

1) GSDF's Type-89 rifles (approx. 20,000 rifles: expenditure retrenchment of approx. ¥300 million), 2) MSDF's next-generation patrol aircraft (P-1: expenditure retrenchment of approx. ¥10.6 billion) (four aircraft in two years), 3) MSDF's minesweeping and transport helicopters (MCH-101: expenditure retrenchment of approx. ¥300 million) (three aircraft in two years), 4) modernization of ASDF's combat aircraft (F-15) (20 aircraft in two years: expenditure retrenchment of approx. ¥16.8 billion).

❍ Revision of maintenance measures

The Ministry of Defense has reviewed maintenance regulations to extend the period of periodic repairs of ASDF short-range SAM (expenditure retrenchment of approx. ¥1.1 billion).

❍ Revision of specifications

As a result of technology advancement, crashworthiness has been given to fiber-reinforced plastic (FRP). Thus, the body of minesweepers (MSC) is switched from wood to fiber-reinforced plastic (FRP), which has made it possible to expand the minesweepers' service life to approximately 30 years. This figure is double that of the wood-body MSC (an expenditure retrenchment of approx. ¥600 million).

Note: The amount of expenditure retrenchment is an estimation made at the time of budget compilation, which is expected to change according to the situations of future procurements.

Section 5. Other Measures

1. Efforts in Response to the Fire on the Destroyer *Shirane*

In December 2007, a crew member of the destroyer *Shirane*, which was berthed in the Yokosuka area, spotted smoke coming out of the ship's Combat Information Center (CIC) and a fire was detected. The damage included complete loss of the equipment in the CIC, while some of the equipment in the rooms adjacent to the CIC was also rendered unusable. A portion of the ship body itself was also damaged due to the heat of the fire.

Regarding the cause of the fire, the possibility that it was started by an unextinguished cigarette or by arson were determined to be extremely low. The fact that the fastest-burning area was around a cooling box that was placed on top of a refrigerator raised questions, but the refrigerator and the cooling box were severely damaged, and it was not possible from the remains to identify which portion had initially caught fire. Therefore, it could not be determined whether the refrigerator and the cooling box were the cause of the fire.

Accordingly, the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces have compiled recurrence preventive measures including: 1) tightened restrictions on the use of home electronic appliances in combat areas; 2) investigation for improving firefighting equipment, etc.; 3) establishment of a rapid and reliable internal and external reporting system; and 4) strict check of the locking status of secure areas through on-vessel inspection in order to ensure reliable locking of secured areas such as the CIC. These were announced in March 2008 along with the results of the investigation into the fire[16].

2. Efforts to Uphold the Self-Defense Forces Personnel Ethics Code and Act

In August 1999, the Self-Defense Forces Personnel Ethics Act was established along with the National Public Service Ethics Act, and came into effect the following April. The purpose of this Act is to take necessary measures that contribute to the maintenance of ethics pertaining to the duties of Self-Defense Forces personnel in order to ensure the trust of the public that duties are being carried out in an open manner. In addition, the establishment of a Self-Defense Forces Personnel Ethics Code (Ethics Code) was decreed by Cabinet Order on the basis of this Act.

In 2007, it became clear that a former Vice-Minister of Defense had violated this Ethics Code, and at the order of the Minister of Defense, starting in October 2007 the Inspector General's Office of Legal Compliance conducted a special defense inspection[17] regarding the compliance of senior personnel[18] with the Ethics Code.

To date, a total of three senior personnel have been found in violation of the Ethics Code following the implementation of the Code by inspection, involving such incidents as golf outings, wining and dining with those who have interests in the duties of Self-Defense Forces personnel[19], and receiving gifts from those who have interests in the duties of Self-Defense Forces personnel. In addition, on February 1, 2008 the Ministry of Defense announced[20] the status of the inspection, indicating the need to pay sufficient attention to the following two points:

1) Because some SDF personnel have numerous opportunities to interact with outside parties, including those who have interests in the duties of Self-Defense Forces personnel, in addition to complying with the Ethics Code at all times, it is important to consider the intent and purpose of institutions such as the Code to prevent suspicion and mistrust from the public.
2) In particular, high-level officials should keep in mind the influence of their positions being that they superintend their subordinates' behavior in their dealings with outside parties.

3. Measures against Drug Abuse

The Ministry of Defense and SDF deeply regret the series of drug abuse incidents which occurred in 2005, and established the Committee on Measures for Drug Issues in October 2005. This Committee issued a final report in February 2006 describing the problems, measures for their future prevention, and other related issues[21].

Despite these efforts, there have been additional incidents of SDF members being arrested on allegations of violating drug-related laws. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF will continue to take strict measures to prevent a recurrence.

Notes:

1) See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/bouei/index.html>
2) See Part IV Section 2 to 4.
3) See Part IV Section 2.
4) See Part IV Section 3.
5) See Part IV Section 3.
6) See Part III Chapter 4 Section 4 and Part IV Section 2.
7) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/sankou/report/2007/1029a.html>
8) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/sankou/report/2007/1029b.html>
9) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/sankou/report/2008/pdf/080321a.pdf>
10) In September 2007, the Equipment Procurement Office was reorganized as the Equipment and Facilities Headquarters.
11) Regarding the extremely important matter of evaluation of technical factors, this differs from an automatic bidding procedure which determines the vendor solely on the basis of price, instead of on a comprehensive evaluation of additional factors as well as price.
12) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/info/sougousyutoku/index.html>
13) IPT: Integrated Project Team. A cross-organizational team formed to coordinate information and opinion-sharing among related divisions and stakeholders in order to efficiently resolve a specific issue. IPTs are used in defense equipment acquisition processes in Europe and the United States, as well as in plant construction by private companies and information system development.
14) A system which seeks to reduce procurement costs by incentivizing private companies to reduce costs. When a cost reduction on a project is achieved due to the efforts of the private company that has been commissioned for the work, a portion of the cost savings is awarded to the company.
15) Use of private-sector funds, management capability, or technological capability for public facilities or equipment.
16) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/sankou/report/2008/pdf/shirane_080321.pdf>
17) Refers to administrative officials at or above the level of section chief or the equivalent, and SDF personnel of the rank of major general or above.
18) The Inspector General's Office of Legal Compliance would conduct an inspection particularly of the items mandated by the Minister of Defense.
19) Business persons among those who fall under the administration of SDF personnel who are concluding contracts with the Ministry of Defense, and others.
20) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/sankou/report/2008/pdf/0201.pdf>
21) The "final report" recommended immediate, comprehensive implementation of the following and other measures to prevent recurrence: a) thorough disciplinary guidance and education; b) introduction of drug testing (urine analysis) (SDF members are tested for drugs upon enlistment).

Reference

Table of Contents

Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Reference 1. Major Nuclear Forces 391
Reference 2. Performance of Major Ballistic and Cruise Missiles 392
Reference 3. Outline of Major Countries and Regional Military Power (Approximate Numbers) 393
Reference 4. Outline of Regular and Reserve Forces of Major Countries and Regions (Approximate Numbers) 393
Reference 5. Outline of Changes in Military Power in Countries and Regions Surrounding Japan 394

Part II The Basics of Japan's Defense Policy and Build-up of Defense Capability

Chapter 1 The Basic Concepts on Japan's Defense Policy

Reference 6. Basic Policy for National Defense 395
Reference 7. "Project Team of the ruling parties for the General Law of International Peace Cooperation" Interim Report 395

Chapter 2 The National Defense Program Guidelines and Build-up of Defense Capability

Reference 8. National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005- 396
Reference 9. Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2005-2009) 403
Reference 10. Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary 409
Reference 11. The Three Principles on Arms Control, etc. 411
Reference 12. Cost of Major Programs in FY 2008 413
Reference 13. Major Equipment to be Procured in FY 2008 415
Reference 14. Number of Tanks and Major Artillery Owned, Performance Specifications 416
Reference 15. Number of Major Aircraft and Performance Specifications 417
Reference 16. Number of Major Ships Commissioned into Service, with Performance Specifications and Data 418
Reference 17. Guided Missile Specifications 419
Reference 18. Pattern of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis) 420
Reference 19. Changes in Major Areas of Expenditures on General Account Budget (Original Budget Basis) 421

Part III Measures for Defense of Japan

Chapter 1 Operations of Self-Defense Forces for Defense of Japan and Response to Diverse Situations

Reference 20. Changes in Composition of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis) 422
Reference 21. Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries 424
Reference 22. Examples of Items Provided by Basic Response Plan 424
Reference 23. Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on the Joint Japan-U.S. Technical Research on the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) 425
Reference 24. Preparation of Ballistic Missile Defense System, etc. 425
Reference 25. Statement of the Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan on the Cabinet Decision, "On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures" 428
Reference 26. Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary "Japan-U.S. Cooperative Development of Advanced SM-3 Missile for Ballistic Missile Defense" (tentative translation) 429
Reference 27. Emergency-Response Procedures Concerning Measures to Destroy Ballistic Missiles or Other Objects as Stipulated under Article 82-2, Paragraph 3 of SDF Law 430
Reference 28. Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces 433

Reference 29. Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel 437
Reference 30. Basic Guidelines for the Protection of Civilians (Outline) 440
Reference 31. Highlights of the Civil Protection Plan of the Ministry of Defense 448
Reference 32. Retired SDF Personnel Working at Disaster Prevention-Related Departments of Local Governments (As of June 30, 2008) 450

Chapter 2 Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

Reference 33. Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century 452
Reference 34. Joint Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee 455
Reference 35. U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future 457
Reference 36. United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee Document Joint Statement 466
Reference 37. United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation 467
Reference 38. Efforts by the Government of Japan regarding Realignment of U.S. Force Structure in Japan and Others 471
Reference 39. Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee U.S. Department of State 472
Reference 40. Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation 477
Reference 41. Record of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY 2007 484
Reference 42. Outline of 23 Issues 487
Reference 43. The SACO Final Report 488

Chapter 3 Improvement of the International Security Environment

Reference 44. Basic Plan regarding Response Measures based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq 494
Reference 45. Humanitarian and Reconstruction Activities etc. by the Self-Defense Forces after the Restoration of Sovereignty of Iraq 499
Reference 46. Details of Humanitarian and Reconstruction Support Activities by GSDF Units in Iraq 501
Reference 47. GSDF Activities Based on Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, and Their Results 502
Reference 48. Basic Plan Concerning the Replenishment Support Activities based on the Special Measures Law on Implementation of Replenishment Support Activities towards the Anti-Terrorism Maritime Interdiction Operation 503
Reference 49. The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities 505
Reference 50. Record of Main Bilateral Defense Exchange (Last Five Years) 508
Reference 51. Record of Major Multilateral Security Dialogues (Asia-Pacific Region, Last Five Years) 510
Reference 52. Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the Ministry of Defense 511
Reference 53. Other Multilateral Security Dialogue 513
Reference 54. Treaties Related to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Weapons (nuclear weapons) 514
Reference 55. Treaties Related to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Weapons (biological and chemical weapons) 515
Reference 56. Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations (Last Five Years) 515
Reference 57. Treaties Related to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Weapons (delivery means including missiles) 516

Reference 58. Treaties Related to Arms Control for Certain Conventional Weapons 516

Chapter 4 Citizens of Japan, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF

Reference 59. Personnel of the Ministry of Defense (Breakdown) 517
Reference 60. Authorized and Actual Strength of Self-Defense Personnel 517
Reference 61. Overview of Appointment System for SDF Regular Personnel 518
Reference 62. SDF Personnel: Applications and Recruitment (FY 2007) 519
Reference 63. Rank and Retirement Age of SDF Regular Personnel 520
Reference 64. Overview of Systems Related to SDF Reserve Personnel 521
Reference 65. SDF Personnel: Applications and Recruitment (FY 2007) 522
Reference 66. The Ethos of SDF Personnel 522
Reference 67. Outline of the SDF Educational System 524
Reference 68. Exchange Student Acceptance Record (FY 2007) 526
Reference 69. Record of the Main Exercises of Each of the Self-Defense Forces (FY 2007) 527
Reference 70. Results of Joint Exercises with the Police and the Japan Coast Guard (FY 2007) 529
Reference 71. Results of Fire Training and Related Training by Dispatch of Each of the Self-Defense Forces to the United States (FY 2007) 529
Reference 72. Cutting-Edge Technologies Underway at TRDI 530
Reference 73. Major Systems and Equipment Currently under Development at the Ministry of Defense 531
Reference 74. Activities in Civic Life 532
Reference 75. Activities Contributing to Society 533
Reference 76. Outline of Measures to Improve the Living Environment in the Areas Surrounding Defense Facilities 534
Reference 77. New Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Communities 535
Reference 78. Public Opinion Survey on the SDF and Defense Issues (The Government Public Information Office, Cabinet Secretariat, Cabinet Office: This survey was conducted in February 2006) 536
Reference 79. Record of Information Disclosure by the Defense Agency (FY 2007) 540

Part IV Reform of the Ministry of Defense

Reference 80. Change in Equipment Volumes Procured, by Procurement Method 540

Defense Chronology 541

Organizational Diagram of the Self-Defense Forces (As of March 31, 2008)

Location of Principal SDF Units (As of March 31, 2008)

Reference 1. Major Nuclear Forces

		U.S.	Russia	U.K.	France	China
Missiles	Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)	550 Minuteman III: 500 Peacekeeper: 50	508 SS-18: 80 SS-19: 126 SS-25: 254 SS-27: 48	—	—	46 DF-5 (CSS-4): 20 DF-31 (CSS-9): 6 DF-4 (CSS-3): 20
	IRBMs MRBMs	—	—	—	—	35 DF-3 (CSS-2): 2 DF-21 (CSS-5): 33
	SRBMs	—	—	—	—	725
	Submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)	432 Trident C-4: 120 Trident D-5: 312 (SSBN [Nuclear-powered submarines with ballistic missile payloads]: 14)	252 SS-N-18: 96 SS-N-19: 60 SS-N-23: 96 (SSBN [Nuclear-powered submarines with ballistic missile payloads]: 15)	48 Trident D-5: 48 (SSBN [Nuclear-powered submarines with ballistic missile payloads]: 4)	64 M-45: 64 (SSBN [Nuclear-powered submarines with ballistic missile payloads]: 4)	12 JL-1 (CSS-N-3): 12 (SSBN [Nuclear-powered submarines with ballistic missile payloads]: 1)
Long-distance (strategic) bombers		114 B-2: 19 B-52: 94	79 Tu-95 (Bear): 64 Tu-160 (Blackjack): 15	—	—	—

Note: Sources: Military Balance 2008, etc.

Reference 2. Performance of Major Ballistic and Cruise Missiles

Item	Country	Name	Maximum range	Warhead (yield)	Guidance System	Remarks
ICBM	U.S.	Minuteman III	13,000	MIRV (170 KT, 335-350 KT or 300-475 KT × 3)	Inertial	Three-stage solid
		Peacekeeper	9,600	MIRV (300–475 KT × 10)	Inertial	Three-stage solid
	Russia	SS-18	10,500-16,000	MIRV (1.3 MT × 8, 500 -550 KT × 10 or 500-750KT × 10) or Single (24MT)	Inertial	Two-stage liquid
		SS-19	9,000-10,000	MIRV (550 KT × 6 or 500-750 KT × 6)	Inertial	Two-stage liquid
		SS-25	10,500	Single (550 KT)	Inertial + Computer control	Three-stage solid
		SS-27	10,500	Single (550 KT)	Inertial + GLONASS	Three-stage solid
	China	DF-5 (CSS-4)	12,000-13,000	Single (4 MT) or MIRV (150-350 KT × 4-6)	Inertial	Two-stage liquid
		DF-31 (CSS-9)	8,000-14,000	Single (1 MT) or MIRV (20–150 KT × 3–5)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Three-stage solid
SLBM	U.S.	Trident C-4	7,400	MIRV (100 KT × 8)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Three-stage solid
		Trident D-5	12,000	MIRV (100 KT or 475 KT × 8)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Three-stage solid
	Russia	SS-N-18	6,500-8,000	Single (450 KT) or MIRV (500 KT × 3 or 100 KT × 7)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Two-stage liquid
		SS-N-20	8,300	MIRV (200 KT × 10)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Three-stage solid
		SS-N-23	8,300	MIRV (100 KT × 4)	Inertial + Stellar reference + Computer Controlled PBV	Three-stage liquid
	U.K.	Trident D-5	12,000	MIRV (100-120 KT × 8)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Three-stage solid
	France	M-45	5,300	MRV (100 KT × 6)	Inertial + computer control	Three-stage solid
	China	JL-1 (CSS-N-3)	2,150 – 2,500	Single (20–500 KT)	Inertial + GPS + radar	Two-stage solid
IRBM MRBM	China	DF-3 (CSS-2)	2,400 – 2,800	Single (3 MT)	Inertial	One-stage liquid
		DF-4 (CSS-3)	4,750	Single (3 MT)	Inertial	Two-stage liquid
		DF-21 (CSS-5)	2,150 – 2,500	Single (20–500 KT) HE, chemical, EMP, sub munition	Inertial + GPS + radar	Two-stage solid
SRBM	China	DF-11 (CSS-7)	280 – 530	Single (2–20 KT)	Inertial + GPS + Terminal guidance	One-stage solid
		DF-15 (CSS-6)	600	Single (90 KT)	Inertial + Terminal guidance	One-stage solid
Cruise missile (long-range)	U.S.	Tomahawk (TLAM-N)	2,500	Single (200 KT)	Inertial + Terrain contour matching	Sea surface and underwater launched
		AGM-86B	2,500	Single (200 KT)	Inertial + Terrain contour matching	Air launched
Cruise missile (long-range)	Russia	SS-N-21	2,400	Single (200 KT)	Inertial + Terrain contour matching	Underwater launched
		AS-15	2,500 – 3,500	Single (200–250 KT)	Inertial + Terrain contour matching	Air launched

Note: Sources: Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems, etc.

Reference 3. Outline of Major Countries and Regional Military Power (Approximate Numbers)

Ground Forces		Naval Forces			Air Forces	
Country or region	Ground forces (10,000 persons)	Country or region	Tonnage (10,000 tons)	Number of vessels	Country or region	Number of combat aircraft
China	160	United States	556.2	950	United States	3,940
India	110	Russia	201.9	1,030	China	2,820
North Korea	100	China	117.1	860	Russia	2,170
Pakistan	55	United Kingdom	89.6	240	Republic of Korea	620
Republic of Korea	54	France	42.5	260	North Korea	590
United States	52	India	35.5	150	Syria	580
Viet Nam	41	Indonesia	23.4	180	India	570
Turkey	40	Turkey	21.9	200	Egypt	550
Russia	40	Taiwan	20.7	330	Taiwan	530
Myanmar	38	Germany	20.3	130	Turkey	500
Iran	35	Spain	19.1	100	France	500
Egypt	34	Italy	17.4	170	Israel	400
Brazil	24	Australia	15.6	80	Pakistan	380
Indonesia	23	Brazil	15.6	90	Libya	380
Colombia	22	Republic of Korea	15.3	180	United Kingdom	370
Japan	13.8	Japan	43.7	150	Japan	440

Notes: 1. Data on ground forces and air forces is taken from Military Balance 2008 and other sources, and data on naval forces is taken from Jane's Fighting Ships 2007–2008 and other sources.
2. Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Self-Defense Forces as of the end of FY 2007, and combat aircraft include ASDF combat aircraft (excluding transports) and MSDF combat aircraft (only those with fixed wings).
3. Arrangement is in order of the scale of armed strength.

Reference 4. Outline of Regular and Reserve Forces of Major Countries and Regions (Approximate Numbers)

Country or Region	Military Service System	Regulars (10,000 persons)	Reserves (10,000 persons)
United States	Volunteer	150	108
Russia	Conscription	103	2,000
United Kingdom	Volunteer	18	20
France	Conscription	25	3
Germany	Conscription	25	16
Italy	Volunteer	19	4
India	Volunteer	129	116
China	Conscription	211	80
North Korea	Conscription	110	65
Republic of Korea	Conscription	69	450
Egypt	Conscription	47	48
Israel	Conscription	18	57

Japan	Volunteer	Army	13.8	3.2 (0.6)
		Navy	4.4	0.09
		Air Force	4.5	0.08

Notes: 1. Data taken from Military Balance 2008 and other sources.
2. Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Ground Self-Defense Force, the Maritime Self-Defense Force, and the Air Self-Defense Force as of the end of FY 2007. The figure in brackets shows the number of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, and is not included in the total figure.
3. Russia has made the shift from a conscription to voluntary system a top priority issue.

Reference 5. Outline of Changes in Military Power in Countries and Regions Surrounding Japan







Note: Data taken from Military Balance, etc., of the respective years (Figures for Japan represent actual strength as of the end of the respective fiscal years.)

Reference 6. Basic Policy for National Defense

(Adopted by the National Defense Council and approved by the Cabinet on May 20, 1957)

The aim of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression and to repel any such aggression with the aim of protecting Japan's independence and peace, which are founded on democracy.

In order to achieve this, the Basic Policy states as follows:

(1) To support the U.N. activities and promote international cooperation to achieve world peace.
(2) To stabilize the livelihood of the people, promote their patriotism, and establish the foundations required for national security.
(3) Within the limits required for self-defense, to progressively establish efficient defense capabilities in accordance with the nation's strength and situation.
(4) To deal with external act of aggression based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, until the United Nations can provide sufficient functions to effectively prevent such acts in the future.

Reference 7. "Project Team of the ruling parties for the General Law of International Peace Cooperation" Interim Report

The first meeting of this project team was held on May 23, 2008, and reached a basic agreement as shown in the annex. Since then, enthusiastic debate has taken place concerning the four items listed below over nine occasions. The results of the meetings are as reported below, however, discussions concerning these items will be held continuously within this project team, by agreement at the meeting of policy officers of the ruling parties.

I. Conditions With and Without the U.N. Resolution

1. Concerning a) PKOs and b) international peace cooperation activities with U.N. Resolution, discussions will be held for Japan to participate in these activities within the scope that is suitable for the nation.
2. Continuous examinations will be held for c) international peace cooperation activities with no related U.N. Resolution.

II. Activities to be Conducted by Japan

1. Continuous discussions will be held for the implementation of ceasefire monitoring and logistics support tasks.
2. Discussions on expanding the content of humanitarian and reconstruction assistance tasks will be held.
3. Continuous discussions on whether to newly invest in security tasks, in addition to its relations with the use of weapons rights, will be held.
4. The tasks of civilians will be expanded and discussions will be held on ensuring the safety of dispatches.
5. Continuous examinations will be held for ship inspection, and other activities.

III. Relations with Article 9 of the Constitution

1. Based on the assumption of the existing interpretation of the Constitution.
2. Maintain the five principles for PKO participation. However, discussions will be held depending on the current status of PKO development.
3. Japan's activities will be limited to the so-called "non-combat area," with exceptions of the conditions described in III-2 above.

IV. Involvement of the Diet

In principle, advance approval is necessary for each individual case concerning the dispatch of SDF forces.

(Annex)

"Scope of discussion for the General Law of International Peace Cooperation" (by Representatives Yamazaki and Yamaguchi)

1. Discussions concerning legislations will be limited within the bounds of the existing Constitution.
   a) The Fukuda Cabinet has no plans to reinterpret the Constitution.
   b) Therefore, interpretation will not be changed for the right of collective defense that has been established in successive cabinets.
2. Civilian control such as Diet approval will be secured.
3. The bill will be recognized as a cabinet bill for submission of bills to the Diet.

Reference 8. National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005-

(Approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004)

I. Purpose
II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan
III. Basic Principles of Japan's Security Policy
IV. Future Defense Forces
V. Additional Elements for Consideration

I. Purpose

In order to ensure the peace and safety of Japan and peace and stability of the international community, given the current security environment surrounding our country, the Security Council and Cabinet of the Government of Japan approved the "National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005-." The Guidelines build on the December 19, 2003 Security Council and Cabinet decision, "On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures."

II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan

1. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States demonstrated that, in addition to such traditional problems as inter-state military confrontations, non-state actors such as international terrorist organizations have emerged as a dire threat in today's security environment.

   Against a backdrop of increased interdependence and growing globalization, the international community is facing urgent new threats and diverse situations to peace and security, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, as well as international terrorist activities (hereinafter "new threats and diverse situations"). We need to bear in mind that conventional forms of deterrence may no longer work effectively against international terrorist organizations, which have neither states nor citizens to protect.

   Ten years have passed since the end of the Cold War. Mutual cooperation and interdependence among major countries have deepened, as exemplified by the growing trust between the United States and the Russian Federation. Since a stable international environment serves the interests of all nations, greater efforts at international coordination and cooperation on security issues have taken root in the international community, including those within the framework of international organizations such as the United Nations.

In this context, the United States, as the sole superpower, continues to contribute significantly to international peace and stability by taking active measures to combat terrorism and to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In the meantime, the use of military force now plays a broader role in the international community than simply deterring or responding to armed conflict: Military force is also used for a variety of purposes, including the prevention of conflict and the reconstruction assistance.

2. As a result of the further expansion and deepening of interdependence among the nations in recent years, greater efforts are also being made to promote and strengthen bilateral and multilateral coordination and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. However, although Russia has drastically reduced its armed forces in the Far East since the end of the Cold War, massive military might, including nuclear arsenals, continue to exist in the region, and a number of countries are pouring in efforts to modernize their military forces. The situation on the Korean Peninsula is unpredictable and cross-Taiwan Strait relations remain uncertain.

   North Korea is engaged in the development, deployment and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and it maintains a large number of special operations forces. Such military activities by North Korea constitute a major destabilizing factor to regional and international security, and are a serious challenge to international non-proliferation efforts.

   China, which has a major impact on regional security, continues to modernize its nuclear forces and missile capabilities as well as its naval and air forces. China is also expanding its area of operation at sea. We will have to remain attentive to its future actions.

   The close and cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, continues to play an important role for the security of Japan as well as for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

3. In light of the security environment surrounding our country, as outlined above, even though a full-scale invasion against Japan is increasingly unlikely, Japan must now deal with new threats and diverse situations in addition to regional security issues.

4. In considering Japan's security, we have to take into account vulnerabilities resulting from: limited strategic depth; long coast lines and numerous small islands; a high population density; the concentration of population and industry in urban areas; and a large number of important facilities in coastal areas, in addition to frequent natural disasters due to Japan's geological and climatic conditions, and the security of sea lines of communication which are indispensable to the country's prosperity and growth.

III. Basic Principles of Japan's Security Policy

1. Basic Principles

   The first objective of Japan's security policy is to prevent any threat from reaching Japan and, in the event that it does, repel it and minimize any damage. The second objective is to improve the international security environment so as to reduce the chances that any threat will reach Japan in the first place. Japan will achieve these objectives by both its own efforts as well as cooperative efforts with the United States, Japan's alliance partner, and with the international community.

   To this end, Japan will: support United Nations activities for international peace and security; make diplomatic efforts to promote cooperative relationships with other countries; further develop its close cooperative relationship with the United States, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements; establish a basis for national security by preserving domestic political stability; and, develop efficient defense forces.

   Based on the Constitution of Japan, and the ideas of maintaining the exclusively defense-oriented policy by not becoming a military power that might pose a threat to other countries, Japan will continue to uphold the fundamental principles of developing modest defense forces of its own under civilian control and will

continue to adhere to the three non-nuclear principles.

To protect its territory and people against the threat of nuclear weapons, Japan will continue to rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent. At the same time, Japan will play an active role in creating a world free of nuclear weapons by taking realistic step-by-step measures for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Japan also will play an active role in international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts regarding other types of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, such as missiles.

2. Japan's Own Efforts

(1) Basic Ideas

Based on the premise that any country's security depends first and foremost on its own efforts, Japan will utilize all appropriate means to prevent any threat from reaching the country. In addition, based on the principle of acting closely with the international community and its alliance partner—the United States—Japan will engage in diplomatic and other activities to improve the international security environment so as to prevent the emergence of any new threats.

(2) Japan's Integrated Response

In the event that these efforts fail to prevent a threat from reaching Japan, the Government of Japan will take an integrated response by swiftly making appropriate decisions through mechanisms such as the Security Council, and bringing together all relevant organizations. To this end, the Government will improve its ability to collect and analyze information which serves as the basis of the Government's decision-making. The Self-Defense Forces, police, Japan Coast Guard and other relevant organizations will improve their close cooperation through increased intelligence sharing, joint exercises, and other activities, while appropriately sharing their roles, and improve their overall performances. In addition, the Government will establish national protection systems including those for responding to different types of disasters, by quickly issuing warning signals and promoting mutual cooperation between the central and local governments.

(3) Japan's Defense Forces

Japan's defense forces are the ultimate guarantee of its national security, representing Japan's will and ability to repel any threat that might reach its shores.

Japan has developed its defense forces in accordance with the "National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005-" (Security Council and Cabinet decision on November 28, 1995) which incorporated the key elements of the Basic Defense Force Concept. The Basic Defense Force Concept espouses the idea that, rather than preparing to directly counter a military threat, Japan, as an independent state, should maintain the minimum necessary basic defense forces lest it becomes a destabilizing factor in the region by creating a power vacuum. Combined with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, this concept has been successful in preventing an armed invasion from occurring.

Given the new security environment, however, future defense forces should be capable of effectively responding to new threats and diverse situations while maintaining those elements of the Basic Defense Force Concept that remain valid. Because the peace and stability of Japan is inextricably linked to that of the international community, Japan should voluntarily and actively participate in activities that nations of the world cooperatively undertake to enhance the international security environment (hereinafter "international peace cooperation activities").

In developing Japan's defense forces, we have to take into account the fact that while the roles that our defense forces have to play are multiplying, the number of young people in Japan is declining as a result of the low birth rate, and fiscal conditions continue to deteriorate.

From this standpoint, Japan will develop multi-functional, flexible, and effective defense forces that are highly ready, mobile, adaptable and multi-purpose, and are equipped with state-of-the-art

technologies and intelligence capabilities measuring up to the military-technological level of other major countries. In building such a defense force, without expanding its size, the Government of Japan will rationalize and streamline personnel, equipment, and operations so as to attain greater results with the limited resources that are available.

3. Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable in ensuring Japan's security. In addition, the U.S. military presence is critically important to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, where unpredictability and uncertainty continue to persist.

Close cooperative relations between Japan and the United States, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, play an important role in facilitating international efforts to prevent or to respond to new threats and diverse situations, such as terrorism and ballistic missiles attacks.

Japan will proactively engage in strategic dialogue with the United States on wide-ranging security issues such as role-sharing between the two countries and U.S. military posture, including the structure of U.S. forces in Japan, while working to harmonize our perceptions of the new security environment and appropriate strategic objectives.

In doing so, the Government of Japan will bear in mind the need to reduce the excessive burden that the existence of U.S. military bases and facilities places on local communities, while maintaining the deterrent that the U.S. military presence in Japan provides.

In addition, Japan will continue to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements by actively promoting such measures as: intelligence exchange; operational cooperation, including in "situations in areas surrounding Japan"; cooperation on ballistic missile defense; equipment and technology exchange; and, efforts to make the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan smoother and more efficient.

4. Cooperation with the International Community

In order to improve the international security environment and help maintain security and prosperity of Japan, the Government of Japan will actively engage in diplomatic efforts, including the strategic use of Official Development Assistance (ODA).

Based on the recognition that the destabilization of the international community by events such as regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorist attacks would directly affect its own peace and security, Japan will, on its own initiative, actively participate in international peace cooperation activities as an integral part of its diplomatic efforts.

In particular, stability in the region spreading from the Middle East to East Asia is critical to Japan.

Japan traditionally has close economic ties with this region, its sea lines of communication run through the region, and Japan depends almost entirely on energy and natural resources from overseas. In this context, Japan will strive to stabilize the region by promoting various cooperative efforts in conjunction with other countries sharing common security challenges.

In order to enable the international community to effectively address the range of new issues in the twenty-first century, measures must be taken to reform the world's only global and comprehensive international organization—the United Nations—to make it more effective and reliable. Japan will actively pursue this goal.

In the Asia-Pacific region, multilateral frameworks for regional security, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), as well as multilateral efforts to deal with common agendas such as counter-terrorism and counter-piracy are taking root. By continuing to support these positive developments, Japan will continue to play an appropriate role, together with the cooperation with the United States, to promote a stable security environment in the region.

IV. Future Defense Forces

1. Role of the Defense Forces

Based on the recognition described above, Japan will develop and maintain, in an efficient manner, the necessary Self-Defense Forces posture to effectively carry out missions in the following areas:

(1) Effective Response to the New Threats and Diverse Situations

Japan will deal effectively with the new threats and diverse situations by developing highly responsive and mobile defense force units capable of responding properly to various different situations and by deploying them appropriately in accordance with Japan's geographical characteristics. Should such a situation emerge, the defense forces will respond quickly and appropriately in smooth and close collaboration with the police and other relevant organizations, thereby providing a seamless response to the situation in accordance with circumstances and designated roles. Japan's Self-Defense Forces posture to address the key elements of the new threats and diverse situations will be as follows:

a. Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

We will respond to ballistic missile attacks by establishing necessary defense force structure, including the introduction of ballistic missile defense systems, to deal effectively with ballistic missile attacks. We will adequately respond to the threat of nuclear weapons by doing so, in addition to relying on U.S. nuclear deterrence.

b. Response to Guerrillas and Special Operations Forces Attacks

We will maintain necessary defense force structure to respond effectively to attacks carried out by guerrillas and special operations forces. We will also enhance readiness and mobility of the defense force units, and deal with such attacks in a flexible manner.

c. Response to the Invasion of Japan's Offshore Islands

We will maintain necessary defense force structure to respond effectively to the invasion of Japan's offshore islands, improve and strengthen capabilities to transport and deploy forces, and deal with the invasion in a flexible manner.

d. Patrol and Surveillance in the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan, and Response to the Violation of Japan's Airspace and the Intrusion of Armed Special-Purpose Ships and Other Similar Vessels

We will maintain necessary defense force structure, including ships, aircraft and other assets, to carry out around-the-clock patrol and surveillance in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan. We will also maintain fighter aircraft units to respond instantly to the violation of our territorial airspace, as well as combatant ships and other assets in order to respond to armed special-purpose ships operating in waters surrounding Japan, submerged foreign submarines operating in Japan's territorial waters, and other similar vessels.

e. Response to Large-Scale and/or Special-Type (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Radiological) Disasters

To deal effectively with large-scale and/or special-type (nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological) disasters, where protection of life and property is desperately needed, we will maintain an adequate force structure with defense force units, as well as specialized capabilities and expertise to conduct disaster relief operations in any part of Japan.

(2) Preparations to Deal with Full-Scale Invasion

Since in our judgment, the likelihood of full-scale invasion of Japan has declined and is expected to remain modest in the foreseeable future, we will modify our current defense force building concept that emphasized Cold War-type anti-tank warfare, anti-submarine warfare and anti-air warfare, and will significantly reduce the personnel and equipment earmarked for a full-scale invasion. However, because the original role of our defense forces is to cope with full-scale invasion and reconstructing

these forces cannot be accomplished in a short period of time, Japan will continue to maintain the most basic capabilities of its defense forces, while also taking into account developments in neighboring countries and making use of technological progress.

(3) Proactive Efforts to Improve the International Security Environment

In order to engage actively in international peace cooperation activities, we will take the following measures: develop education and training systems, highly responsive force posture for relevant units, and transport and other required capabilities; establish necessary infrastructure to quickly dispatch defense force units overseas and to carry out missions continuously; and, make necessary arrangements to include the promotion of international peace cooperation activities in the Self-Defense Forces mission priorities.

We will strongly promote activities for international peace and stability, including security dialogue and defense exchanges, bilateral and multilateral training and exercises, and arms control and disarmament efforts carried out by international organizations such as the United Nations.

2. Critical Elements of Our Defense Capabilities

Following are the critical elements for developing defense forces capable of carrying out the missions described above.

(1) Enhancing Joint Operation Capabilities

In order to have the three services of the Self-Defense Forces work integrally and to enable them to execute their missions swiftly and effectively, we will employ them jointly whenever possible. We will create a central organization to facilitate joint operations, and establish infrastructure for training and education as well as intelligence and communications. In doing so, we will reexamine existing organizations so as to enhance their efficiency.

(2) Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities

In order to employ our defense forces successfully to respond effectively to the new threats and diverse situations, it is imperative for the Government to be able to identify events at the earliest possible time and to collect, analyze, and share intelligence promptly and accurately. For this purpose, we will strengthen our diversified intelligence collection capability and enhance our comprehensive analysis and assessment capability, keeping in mind the changes in the security environment and technological trends. We will also strengthen the Self-Defense Forces' intelligence structure, including the Defense Intelligence Headquarters that supports our capabilities. In this way, we will build a sophisticated intelligence capability.

(3) Incorporating the Progress in Science and Technology into Our Defense Forces

We will incorporate the outcome of science and technological progress, in such areas as information and communications technologies, into our defense forces. In particular, we will develop the command and control systems and agile intelligence sharing systems that are indispensable for joint operations, in tune with information and communication technologies available at home and overseas.

In addition, we will create advanced systems for command and communications and a network for information and communications, with sufficient protection against possible cyber attacks, to enhance operational and organizational efficiency.

(4) Utilizing Human Resources More Efficiently

We will take various measures to maintain high morale and firm discipline within the Self-Defense Forces. We will recruit, cultivate, train and educate high-quality personnel to meet the challenge of the diversification and internationalization of Self-Defense Forces missions, and the need to properly operate rapidly advancing high-tech equipment. In addition, we will promote activities related to research and education on security issues, and develop human resources.

The defense force level required to fulfill missions described above is indicated in the attached table.

V. Additional Elements for Consideration

1. In developing, maintaining, and operating the defense forces as described in section IV, the following elements will be taken into consideration.
   (1) Mindful of increasingly severe fiscal conditions, we will restrict defense expenditures by further rationalizing and streamlining defense forces. We will also work to make our defense forces successful in carrying out their missions by harmonizing their operations with other measures taken by the Government.
   (2) We will make procurement and research and development (R&D) more effective and efficient by taking the following measures: curbing lifecycle costs, including purchase price of defense equipment; actively using cutting-edge technologies developed by private enterprises, universities, and governmental organizations in carrying out R&D as well as by allocating R&D resources in a more focused manner; and, appropriately and timely reviewing various R&D projects. At the same time, we will work to establish defense production and technological bases, especially in core technological areas indispensable for our national security.
   (3) In order to efficiently develop and maintain defense-related facilities, the Government of Japan will, in close cooperation with relevant local authorities, take various measures to make those facilities coexist more harmoniously with local communities.
2. The National Defense Program Guidelines provide the vision for our defense forces for the next decade. However, five years from now or in case there is a significant change in the international situation, we will review and, if necessary, revise the Guidelines in light of the security environment, technological progress, and other relevant factors at the time.

(Attached Table)

The following posture will be established in order to make Japan's new defense forces multi-functional, flexible and effective, and able to undertake diverse roles as discussed above (IV).

Ground Self-Defense Force	Personnel Regular Reserve (Ready Reserve Personnel)		155,000 148,000 7,000
	Major Units	Regionally Deployed Units	8 divisions 6 brigades
		Mobile Operation Units	1 armed division Central Readiness Force
		Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups
	Major Equipment	Tanks Main Artillery	Approx. 600 Approx. 600
Maritime Self-Defense Force	Major Units	Destroyer Units (for mobile operations) Destroyer Units (regional district units) Submarine Units Minesweeper Unit Patrol Aircraft Units	4 flotillas (8 divisions) 5 divisions 4 divisions 1 flotilla 9 squadrons
	Major Equipment	Destroyers Submarines Combat Aircraft	47 16 Approx. 150
Air Self-Defense Force	Major Units	Air Warning and Control Units Fighter Aircraft Units Air Reconnaissance Unit Air Transport Units Aerial Refueling/Transport Unit Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 airborne early-warning group (2 squadrons) 12 squadrons 1 squadron 3 squadrons 1 squadron 6 groups
	Major Equipment	Combat aircraft Fighters	Approx. 350 Approx. 260
Major Equipment and Major Units that can be used for Ballistic Missile Defense		Aegis-equipped Destroyers	4
		Air Warning and Control Units Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	7 warning groups 4 warning squadrons 3 groups

Note: The numbers of units and equipment are already included in the Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces sections above.

Reference 9. Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2005-2009)

(Approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004)

I. Policies for the Program

From FY 2005 to FY 2009, the Government of Japan (GOJ) will build-up Japan's defense forces based on the following plan, in accordance with the "National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005-" (adopted by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004. Hereinafter the new NDPG).

1. In order to effectively respond to new threats and diverse situations as well as to voluntarily and proactively participate in activities that nations of the world cooperatively undertake to enhance the international security environment (hereinafter "international peace cooperation activities"), the GOJ will efficiently establish multi-functional, flexible and effective defense forces that are highly ready, mobile, adaptable and multi-purpose, and are equipped with state-of-the-art technologies and intelligence capabilities, while maintaining the most basic capabilities to cope with large-scale invasion.
2. Under the new security environment, the GOJ will review current organs of defense administration, and

transfer the major units and main equipment of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to the new defense forces prescribed in the new NDPG while reducing equipment and personnel earmarked for large-scale invasion.

3. In order to realize defense forces that are multi-functional, flexible and effective, the GOJ will advance the critical elements of defense capabilities; strengthening joint operation capabilities and intelligence capabilities while incorporating the progress in science and technology, and making effective use of human resources as well.
4. In building, maintaining and operating defense forces, the GOJ will promote measures that support the defense forces such as: procuring defense equipment more effectively and efficiently; and improving cooperative ties with related administrative institutions and local communities.
5. The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable in ensuring Japan's security. In addition, the U.S. military presence is critically important to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, the close cooperative relationship between Japan and the U.S. based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements plays an important role in facilitating international efforts in security fields. The GOJ will promote measures to further strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and the close relations with the U.S. based on the Arrangements.
6. Mindful of seriously deteriorating fiscal conditions, and with due consideration paid to other national measures, the GOJ will restrict defense expenditures by further rationalizing and streamlining defense forces.

II. Review of the Organizations of Defense Agency and SDF

1. The GOJ will review organization of defense administration including the Internal Bureau of Defense Agency, and take necessary measures.
2. The GOJ will establish a new joint staff organization and transform each service Staff Office in order to strengthen the joint operations. The GOJ will continue to study on whether or not further organizational change is necessary for effective joint operations, and take necessary measures.

   The GOJ will place the Defense Intelligence Headquarters under direct control of the Minister of State for Defense.
3. Concerning the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the GOJ will: transform five Divisions, one Brigade and two combined Brigades, among which a Division and two Combined Brigades are converted into three Brigades, in order to improve readiness and mobility, while reducing number of tanks and artillery; and establish the Central Readiness Force that administrates and operates units for nation-wide mobile operations and special tasks. The authorized number of GSDF personnel will be around 161,000 persons (152,000 persons for regular personnel and 8,000 persons for reservists) at the end of FY 2009. The actual number of GSDF regular personnel will be approximately 146,000 at the end of FY 2009.
4. Concerning the Maritime Self-Defense Force, the GOJ will consolidate the number of the Escort divisions of the Destroyer unit for mobile operations into eight, each of which is deployed four destroyers; and abolish one of the Escort divisions for regional deployment. The GOJ also consolidate the number of divisions of the Submarine unit into five, Flight Squadrons of Fixed-wings Patrol Aircraft unit into four and Patrol Helicopter unit into five.
5. Concerning the Air Self-Defense Force, the GOJ will transform the Early Warning Group into that composed with two squadrons. The GOJ will establish the first Aerial Refueling Transport Unit.

III. Major Plans Related to SDF Capabilities

1. Effective Response to the New Threats and Diverse Situations

(1) Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

The GOJ will improve the capabilities of the Aegis destroyers and Patriot surface-to-air missiles to enable them to respond to ballistic missile attacks. The GOJ will study the course of capability improvement for FY 2008 and after, taking into consideration the status of BMD technology development in the U.S., and take necessary measures.

The GOJ will also improve the Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE), and start to build-up a new warning and control radar which can detect and track ballistic missiles.

The GOJ will promote the joint Japan-U.S. technical research targeting the sea-based upper-tier system, consider the possibility of transition to the development stage, and take necessary measures.

(2) Response to Attacks by Guerillas or Special Operations Units

In order to effectively respond to attacks by guerillas or special operations units, the GOJ will improve the readiness and mobility of ground units, and strengthen the capability of infantries, and procure: light armored vehicles; multi-purpose helicopters (UH-60JA, UH-1J); and combat helicopters (AH-64D). The GOJ will also improve the capability to deal with nuclear, biological and/or chemical attacks.

(3) Response to Invasions of Japan's Offshore Islands

In order to effectively respond to invasion of Japan's offshore islands by improving transportation, deployment and other capabilities, the GOJ will procure transport helicopters (CH-47JA/J), tanker transport aircraft (KC-767), fighters (F-2) and new transport aircraft that will replace C-1s. The GOJ will, based on actual operations and other matters, reconsider the total number of tanker-transport aircraft, and will take necessary measures.

The GOJ will also improve rescuing capability by attaching transport aircraft (C-130H) the in-flight refueling function for rescue helicopters (UH-60J).

(4) Patrol and Surveillance in the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan, and Response to Violation of Japan's Airspace or the Intrusion of Armed Special-Purpose Vessels

In order to patrol and survey in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan constantly and continuously, and to deal properly with armed special-purpose ships or submerged foreign submarines navigating under Japanese territorial sea, the GOJ will: procure destroyers (DDH and DD), patrol helicopters (SH-60K) and minesweeper-transport helicopters (MCH-101); modernize early warning aircraft (E-2C) and the air control and warning systems of the BADGE; procure new patrol aircraft that will replace P-3Cs: and initiate the project to modernize early warning and control aircraft (E-767).

The GOJ will also promote the modernization of fighters (F-15), and procure new fighters that will replace F-4s while restricting the total number of the procurement under the new NDPG.

(5) Response to Large-Scale and/or Special-Type Disasters

In order to effectively respond to large-scale and/or special-type disasters and other situations that demand protection of human lives and properties in cooperation with related institutions, the GOJ will take measures to help the SDF units improve necessary capabilities.

2. Preparations to Deal with Large-Scale Invasion of Japan

Since the likelihood of large-scale invasion of Japan is expected to remain modest in the foreseeable future, the GOJ will modify the current defense force building concept that emphasized anti-tank warfare, anti-submarine warfare, and anti-air warfare, and will downsize equipment and personnel earmarked for a large-scale invasion. At the same time, because reconstructing defense forces cannot be accomplished in a short period of time, while taking into accounts developments in neighboring countries and making use of technological progress, the GOJ will continue to procure tanks, artillery, mid-range surface-to-air missiles,

destroyers, submarines, minesweepers, patrol aircraft, fighters, and so on.

3. Voluntary and Proactive Efforts to Improve the International Security Environment

(1) Appropriate Effort for International Peace Cooperation Activities

In order to send units quickly to international peace cooperation activities and sustain the operation, the GOJ will: establish a unit for education and research for international peace cooperation activities; expand and improve the current rotating standby posture; and procure equipment for international peace cooperation activities.

(2) Enhancement of Security Dialogue, Defense Exchanges and Co-Training/Exercises with Other Countries

The GOJ will promote measures for bilateral or multilateral security dialogue and defense exchanges by positively promoting defense exchanges of each level and participating in international peace cooperation activities such as Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and joint exercises for rescue and other objectives. The GOJ will also take part in efforts in the areas of arms control and disarmament led by international organizations including the United Nations (U.N.).

4. Critical Elements of Defense Capabilities

(1) Strengthening Joint Operation Capabilities

In addition to creating a new joint staff organization and reorganizing service Staff Office as mentioned in section II above, the GOJ will reorganize the Joint Staff College, conduct joint exercises, establish common information and communication infrastructure, and take other measures to build foundations for the joint operations.

(2) Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities

The GOJ will strengthen the capability of intelligence sections such as the Defense Intelligence Headquarters by securing and training able personnel and enhancing measures for gathering and analyzing various intelligence including signal and geospatial intelligence. The GOJ will modernize Electronic Intelligence Aircraft (EP-3), and start tentative modification for converting some of the F-15 fighters to reconnaissance aircraft.

In addition, the GOJ will take necessary measures, upon consideration, with regard to unmanned aerial vehicles of high altitude and endurance.

(3) Incorporation of the Progress in Science and Technology into Defense Forces

a. Strengthening Command and Control Capability, etc.

In order to have credible command and control and swift information sharing that are indispensable for joint operations and smooth implementation of international peace cooperation activities with enhanced operational and organizational efficiency, the GOJ will establish advanced command and communication systems and information and communication network in tune with information and communication technologies available at home and overseas, thereby concentrating and circulating information through chains of command, sharing intelligence at the unit level, strengthening capability to respond cyber attacks and enhancing information sharing with relevant organizations and other entities.

b. Promoting Research and Development

The GOJ will promote development of next generation aircraft that will replace P-3Cs and C-1s, and next generation tank. The GOJ will promote, taking into account trends of science and technology, research and development (R&D) of various command and control systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, and other equipments, with focused distribution of resources. In the meantime, the GOJ will make efforts for effective and efficient implementation of R&D by proactively introducing advanced technology of industrial, governmental and academic sectors, using modeling and

simulation methods, using the same parts or components for different equipment, and promoting cooperation with the U.S. and other nations.

Furthermore, the GOJ will review methods for focused investment in R&D, and the organization of the Technical Research and Development Institute, and take necessary measures.

(4) Effective Utilization of Human Resources

a. Enhancement of Measures for Personnel, Education and Training

The GOJ will take various measures for maintaining high morale and strict discipline of personnel. The GOJ will secure and raise SDF personnel of high quality through increasing young officers endowed with flexible judgment and other means, and also enhancing education and training so that the SDF can better respond to diversified and internationalized missions, advanced defense equipment and joint operations.

The GOJ will also consider effective way of utilization of retired personnel in the society, and take necessary measures.

b. Promotion of Research and Education Regarding Security Issues

The GOJ will improve the research and education function of the National Institute for Defense Studies regarding security policy. The GOJ will enhance human basis by personnel exchanges in security area.

5. Measures to Support Defense Capability

(1) Streamlined and Efficient Acquisition of Equipment

The GOJ will strengthen efforts to curb lifecycle cost of equipments including cost of procurement, with a concrete target to achieve. The GOJ will promote general procurement reform and take necessary measures, such as establishing an efficient procurement and replenishment posture which can cope with diverse situations and establishing the truly necessary defense industrial and technological basis, the center of which constitutes core technological areas indispensable for national security.

(2) Promotion of Cooperation with Relevant Administrative Organizations and Local Communities

The GOJ will improve coordination with the relevant organizations such as police, fire department, and the Coast Guard, and promote cooperation with local governments and local communities with the Civil Protection Law as its basis.

In addition, the GOJ will efficiently maintain and develop defense-related facilities. In order to make those facilities coexist more harmoniously with local communities, the GOJ will continue to promote measures for local communities surrounding those facilities under close cooperation with local governments.

IV. Measures to Strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

1. Exchanges of Intelligence and Policy Consultations

The GOJ will promote exchanges of intelligence and views regarding international situations, and maintain strategic dialogue with the U.S. on wide-ranging security issues such as role-sharing between the two countries and the military posture that includes force structure of the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ), bearing in mind the need to reduce the excessive burden that U.S. military bases and facilities place on local communities, while maintaining the deterrent that the U.S. military presence in Japan provides.

2. Operational Cooperation and Bilateral Exercise/Training

Based on the outcome of the strategic dialogue, the GOJ will make efforts to build an effective posture for operational cooperation, and expand bilateral exercise/training.

3. Promotion of Cooperation based on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

The GOJ will strengthen Japan-U.S. bilateral efforts to enhance ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities,

and promote cooperation with the U.S. in the fields of defense policy, operations, and equipment and technology.

4. Equipment and Technology Exchanges
   The GOJ will make efforts to enhance broad mutual exchanges including joint R&D projects with the U.S. in the area of equipment and technology.
5. Promotion of Efforts to Make the Stationing of the USFJ Smooth and Effective
   The GOJ will take measures to make the stationing of the USFJ smooth and efficient, such as support to the stationing of the USFJ and realignment, consolidation, and reduction of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa, while engaging in strategic dialogue with the U.S. regarding force structure of the USFJ on its own initiative and continuously maintaining the deterrent that the U.S. military presence in Japan provides.
6. Enhancement of Japan-U.S. Cooperation concerning International Measures for Regional or Global Security
   The GOJ will take measures to closely cooperate with the U.S. and proactively participate in international activities to prevent or to tackle new threats and diverse situations such as the fight against terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

V. Size of Procurement

Regarding the size of equipment procurement as described in the preceding section III (Major Plans related to SDF Capabilities), specific numbers of main equipment procurement are shown in the attached table.

VI. Expenses Required

1. The limit of the total amount of defense-related expenditures needed for this program is approximately 24.24 trillion yen at the prices of FY 2005.
2. In the annual budget formulation process, the GOJ will decide it within the framework of the expenditures required by this Program, while achieving harmony with other Government measures by seeking further efficiency and rationalization. In case of needs to respond to an unforeseeable situation in the future, extra budget, besides the defense-related expenditures shown in I, might be provided within the limit of 100 billion yen on the condition that the Security Council of Japan would approve.

   The GOJ will continue to respect the spirit of seeking a moderate defense build-up as stated in the "Program for the Future Build-up of Defense Capability" (adopted by the Security Council and the Cabinet on January 24, 1987).
3. Within the limit of the total amount of expenditures to this program, the program will be reviewed if necessary in three years from now, considering various factors in and outside Japan including international situations prevailing at that time, global trends in technology such as information and communication technology and Japan's fiscal condition.

(Attached Table)

Classification	Type	Size of Procurement
Ground Self-Defense Force	Tanks	49 vehicles
	Artillery (excluding mortar)	38 vehicles
	Armored vehicles	104 vehicles
	Combat helicopters (AH-64D)	7 craft
	Transport helicopters (CH-47JA)	11 craft
	Medium-range surface-to-air guided missiles	8 batteries
Maritime Self-Defense Force	Improve capability of Aegis system equipped	3 ships
	Destroyers	5 ships
	Submarines	4 ships
	Others	11 ships
	Total number of self-defense ships to be built (Tonnage)	20 ships (Approx. 59,000 tons)
	New fixed-wing patrol aircraft	4 craft
	Patrol helicopters (SH-60K)	23 craft
	Minesweeping and transport helicopters (MCH-101)	3 craft
Air Self-Defense Force	Improve capability of surface-to-air guided Patriot missiles	2 groups & for education, etc.
	Modernization of fighters (F-15)	26 craft
	Fighters (F-2)	22 craft
	New fighters	7 craft
	New transport aircraft	8 craft
	Transport helicopters (CH-47J)	4 craft
	Air tanker-transport aircraft (KC-767)	1 craft

VII. Others

1. The GOJ will review the modality of defense forces stated in the new NDPG to make necessary changes, in five years or when serious situational changes emerge, taking into account the security environment and technological trends at the time.
2. The GOJ will steadily implement projects related to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO). The costs required for their implementation will be separately identified.

Reference 10. Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary

(December 10, 2004)

1. The Government of Japan approved the "National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005-" (the new NDPG) and the "Mid-Term Defense Program, FY 2005-FY 2009" at the Security Council and the Cabinet Meeting today.
2. In light of the new threats and diverse situations presented by today's security environment, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, international terrorism, and other various situations that affect peace and security, the Government has developed the new NDPG in recognition of the need to set new guidelines for shaping Japan's future security and defense.
3. The new NDPG spell out both Japan's vision for future defense forces as well as the basic principles of its security policy which underlie that vision. Japan has two basic security policy objectives: (a) to prevent any threat from reaching Japan and, in the event that it does, to repel it; and (b) to improve the international security environment in order to prevent any threat from reaching Japan in the first place.

   The new NDPG make it clear that, in particular, improving the international security environment is one of the major pillars of the security policy of Japan, whose prosperity and growth depend heavily on the security of sea lines of communication.

   The new NDPG point out that it is necessary to achieve these goals by both its own efforts as well

as cooperative efforts with the United States, Japan's alliance partner, as well as with the international community. At the same time, we will continue to firmly uphold the basic principles of our defense policy that we have ascribed to in accordance with the Constitution of Japan.

4. In implementing this policy, the Government of Japan will employ all available means to prevent any threat from reaching the country. Should a threat reach Japan, the Government will take an integrated response, swiftly making appropriate decisions, bringing together all relevant organizations, and having them cooperate fully. The new NDPG have clearly stated that relevant organizations such as the Self-Defense Forces, the police, and the Japan Coast Guard will utilize all available means and work closely together to protect Japan and its people. In addition, as a part of its own effort, Japan will engage in diplomatic and other activities to improve the international security environment so as to prevent the emergence of any threats. Japan's defense forces—the ultimate guarantee of its national security—should be capable of effectively responding to any new threats and diverse situations, while inheriting the elements of the Basic Defense Force Concept that still remain valid. Japan's defense forces should also be capable of actively participating in international peace cooperation activities in order to improve the international security environment. While roles that the defense forces have to play are multiplying and fiscal conditions continue to deteriorate, Japan's future defense forces should be multi-functional, flexible, and effective while, at the same time, more rationalized and streamlined.

   The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable to the security of Japan as well as the peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Based on the Arrangements, close cooperative relations between Japan and its alliance partner, the United States, play an important role in facilitating international efforts to effectively address new threats and diverse situations. Japan will proactively engage in strategic dialogue with the United States on wide-ranging security issues such as role-sharing between the two countries and U.S. military posture, including the U.S. force structure in Japan, while working to harmonize our perceptions of the new security environment and appropriate strategic objectives in it.

   Regarding its cooperation with the international community, Japan will utilize its Official Development Assistance (ODA) strategically and actively participate in international peace cooperation activities. The new NDPG have clearly defined these activities as part of our effort to improve the international security environment.

5. Regarding the future defense force, Japan will develop highly responsive and mobile defense forces capable of dealing effectively with new threats and diverse situations, and deploy them appropriately in accordance with Japan's geographical characteristics. Japan's future defense forces should be capable of coping with ballistic missile attacks, attacks carried out by guerrillas and special operations forces, and invasion of offshore islands. They should also be able to execute patrol and surveillance in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan, and respond to the violation of airspace, the intrusion of armed special purpose ships and other similar vessels, and large-scale and/or special-type (nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological) disasters. Should such a situation emerge, the defense forces will respond in smooth and close collaboration with the police and other relevant organizations, thereby providing a seamless response to the situation in accordance with circumstances and designated roles. In our judgment, the likelihood of a full-scale invasion of Japan has declined and will remain modest for the foreseeable future. Thus, based on a fundamental review, we have decided to reduce the personnel and equipment earmarked for coping with such a contingency. However, because the original role of our defense forces is to cope with full-scale invasion and reconstructing these forces cannot be accomplished in a short period of time, Japan will continue to maintain the most basic capabilities of its defense forces, while also taking into account developments in neighboring countries and making use of technological progress. In our effort to improve the international security environment, we will establish infrastructure and make necessary arrangements

to engage in international peace cooperation activities. Japan will continue to strongly promote activities conducive to international peace and stability, such as security dialogue and defense exchanges.

6. We will continue to firmly maintain our policy of dealing with arms exports control carefully, in light of Japan's basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation on which the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines are based.

   If Japan decides that it will engage in joint development and production of ballistic missile defense systems with the United States, however, the Three Principles will not be applied, under the condition that strict control is maintained, because such systems and related activities will contribute to the effective operation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and are conducive to the security of Japan.

   In addition, through the process by which the NDPG were developed, questions were raised regarding how to handle cases of joint development and production with the United States (other than those related to the ballistic missile defense system) as well as those related to support of counter-terrorism and counter-piracy.

   Decisions will be made on the basis of individual examination of each case, in light of Japan's basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation that aims at avoiding the escalation of international conflicts.
7. Based on the new NDPG, the Government will devise Japan's vision for international peace cooperation activities, and take legal and other necessary measures concerning Japan's security and defense policy, including placement of international peace cooperation activities in Self-Defense Forces' mission priorities, and operational issues pertaining to the ballistic missile defense systems.
8. To clearly indicate the target period in which the planned defense force level will be achieved, the new NDPG provide the vision for our defense forces for the next decade. In addition, in order to better adjust our defense policy to the changing security environment, we will review and, if necessary, revise the NDPG in five years.
9. The "Mid-Term Defense Program, FY 2005-FY 2009" was formulated to achieve the defense forces level that Japan should possess as provided for in the new NDPG. We expect the total defense-related budget for the new Mid-Term Defense Program to be approximately ¥24,240 billion measured in constant FY 2004 yen.
10. The Government of Japan will report today's decision to the Diet. I would sincerely hope that the people of Japan will understand and give their support to the decision.

Reference 11. The Three Principles on Arms Export, etc.

❍ The export of "arms" needs a license from the Minster of Economy, Trade and Industry pursuant to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (Law 228, 1949) (Note) and the Export Trade Control Order (Ordinance No. 378, 1949).

Note: Now known as the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law.

1. The Three Principles on Arms Export

On April 21, 1967, then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato declared the Three Principles at the House of Representatives' Audit Committee meeting.

(Summary)

The Principles provide that arms export to the following countries shall not be permitted:

(1) Communist Bloc countries;

(2) Countries to which arms export is prohibited under the U.N. resolutions; or

(3) Countries which are actually involved or likely to become involved in international conflicts.

2. The Government's Unified View on Arms Export

On February 27, 1976, then Prime Minister Takeo Miki announced the Government's view at the House of Representatives' Budget Committee meeting.

(Full text)

(1) The Government's Policy

With regard to the export of "arms," the Government, from the standpoint of Japan as a pacifist country, has always been dealing with the problems of arms export in a cautious manner to avoid the escalation of international conflict. The Government will continue to deal with such matters pursuant to the following policy and will not promote arms export.

(i) The export of "arms" to the areas subject to the Three Principles shall not be permitted.

(ii) The export of "arms" to areas other than the areas subject to the Three Principles shall be restrained in line with the spirit of the Constitution and the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law.

(iii) Equipment related to arms production (Export Trade Control Order, Separate Table 1, Section No. 109, etc.) shall be treated in the same category as "arms."

(2) Definition of Arms

The term "arms" is used in different laws and regulations or in terms of application, and its definition should be interpreted in accordance with the purpose of that law or regulation.

(i) Arms referred to in the Three Principles on Arms Export are "those that are used by the military forces and directly employed in combat." Specifically "arms" are those that are listed in Items from No. 197 to No. 205 in the Annexed List 1 of the Export Trade Control Order and are consistent with the above definition.

(ii) "Arms" under the Self-Defense Forces Law are interpreted as "firearms, explosives, swords and other machines, equipment and devices aimed at killing and injuring people or destroying things as means of armed struggle." Such equipment as destroyers, fighters and tanks that move, intrinsically carrying firearms, etc. for purposes of directly killing and injuring people or destroying things as a means of armed struggle, are considered "arms."

Note: Due to partial revision of the Export Trade Control Order in November 1991, "the item No. 109" in (3) of 1) and "the items from No. 197 to No. 205" in (1) of 2) have been changed to "the Item No. 1."

Reference 12. Cost of Major Programs in FY 2008

1. Contents of Major Programs

(Unit: million yen)

Classification	Budget for FY 2007	Budget for FY 2008	Notes
1. Effective response to new threats and diverse contingencies			
(1) Response to ballistic missile attacks	182,599	113,191	Maintenance of new warning control and surveillance radars (FPS-5), Japan-U.S. joint development of interceptive missiles with improved capabilities for Aegis destroyer, etc.
(2) Counterattacks against guerrillas and special operations units	88,903	85,009	Maintenance of mobile surveillance radars, equipment of Type-89 rifles on all basic operation units, improvements in smallpox vaccines, chemical agent monitoring system, and chemical protection vehicles, etc.
(3) Upskilling of maritime security	33,318	105,715	Maintenance of next helicopter trainer (P-1), minesweeping/transport helicopters (MCH-101), Special Boats (SB), etc.
(4) Response to large-scale and particular disasters	94,890	86,968	Improvement of the rescue system, rescue helicopter (UH-60J), transport helicopter (CH-47JA), etc.
2. Efforts for a peaceful and stable international community including Japan	12,001	21,719	Improvements of equipment for international peace cooperation activities and the maintenance of the education/logistic structures, promotion of mutual defense, etc.
3. Establishment of a more advanced information communication network	176,977	179,231	Replacement of the Central Command System (CCS), strengthen and improve the information gathering/analysis structure
4. Response to progress of military technology applications	134,005	117,996	Research on the system integration of aircraft technologies for high maneuverability and stealth, development of mobile combat vehicles, etc.
5. Hygiene (including enhancement of measures regarding medical officers)	743,583	617,450	Modernized upgrade for battle tanks (9 units), artilleries (8 units), destroyers (DD: 1 unit), fighters (F-15), etc.

Notes: 1. Amounts are pursuant to contracts (the same applies to the table below).
2. The budgets for FY 2008 exclude the initial costs for production of equipment etc. There is some overlap of mutually related operations.

2. Enhancement of Equipment

Category	Quantity	Total Cost	FY 2008 Budget	Future Obligation
Ground Equipment				
Type-90 tank	9	7,140		7,140
Type-96 wheeled armored vehicle	20	2,862		2,862
Type-99 155mm self-propelled howitzer	8	7,433		7,433
Type-87 reconnaissance and control vehicle	2	484		484
Chemical protection vehicle	3	561		561
Light armored mobile vehicle	201	6,312	9	6,303
Other		10,074	26	10,048
Total		34,866	35	34,831
Guided Missiles				
Equipment and material for improvement of surface-to-air missile (Hawk)	—	2,267		2,267
Surface-to-air missile (Patriot)	—	4,503	116	4,387
Improving capabilities for surface-to-air missile (Patriot) (including the acquisition of PAC-3 missile)	Fixed repair reserve (1 set)	24,163	19	24,145
Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile	1 company	21,485		21,485
Equipment for improvement of Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile	1 set	4,410		4,410
Type-93 short-range surface-to-air missile	2 sets	2,055		2,055
Man-portable surface-to-air missile (modified version)	13 sets	1,029		1,029
Type-88 surface-to-ship missile	—	2,218		2,218
Type-96 multi-purpose missile	1 set	2,528		2,528
Type-01 light anti-tank guided missile	49 sets	3,488		3,488
Other		142		142
Total		68,288	135	684,154

Category	Quantity	Total Cost	FY 2008 Budget	Future Obligation
Aircraft				
GSDF				
Observation helicopter (OH-1)	2	4,965		4,965
Multi-purpose helicopter (UH-60JA)	1	5,881	1	5,880
Transport helicopter (CH-47JA)	2	9,869	1	9,868
Liaison and reconnaissance aircraft (LR-2)	1	2,399		2,399
Subtotal	6	23,103	2	23,101
MSDF				
Next fixed patrol aircraft (P-1)	4	64,585	14	64,571
Minesweeping/transport helicopters (MCH-101)	3	21,444	2	21,442
Primary trainer (T-5)	4	978		978
Instrument flight trainer (TC-90)	4	4,023		4,023
Next helicopter trainer (TH-X)	2	1,802		1,805
Subtotal	17	92,835	16	92,819
ASDF				
Combat aircraft (F-15) modernized upgrade	(20)	60,943		60,943
Transport helicopter (CH-47J)	1	3,477	2	3,475
Search and rescue aircraft (U-125A)	1	6,746	536	6,210
Rescue helicopter (UH-60J)	1	5,183	17	5,165
Improvements of early warning and control aircraft (E-2C)	(2)	838		838
Subtotal	3	77,187	556	76,631
Total	26	193,125	574	192,551
Vessels				
Destroyer (DD)	1	68,987	253	68,734
Submarine (SS)	1	51,026	82	50,944
Minesweeper (MSC)	1	15,863	49	15,814
Replacement of short-range SAM system on Murasame-destroyer		73	73	
Functional improvements of Aegis-equipped destroyer (including the acquisition of SM-3 missile)	(1)	8,052	135	7,917
Total	3	144,001	592	143,409

Notes: 1. Monetary amounts in this table are rounded off and therefore totals are not exact.
2. The figures for the equipment and material for improvement of the improved missile (Hawk) are the expenses needed for the improvement of the guided missile.
3. The figures for the Type-88 surface-to-ship missile are the expenses needed for the improvement of the training missile.
4. The figures for replacement of short-range SAM system on Murasame-class destroyer and functional improvements of Aegis-equipped destroyer are not included in the total number of aircraft for FY 2005 since these are a part of the work to improve aircraft currently in use.
5. Excludes the initial costs for production of equipment etc.

Reference 13. Major Equipment to be Procured in FY 2008

Item		Counting Unit	Number Procured	
			FY 2007	FY 2008
Ground Self-Defense Force	Type-89 rifle	Gun	6,424	20,005
	5.56-mm machine gun MINIMI	Gun	416	356
	12.7-mm heavy machine gun	Gun	80	80
	Type-87 anti-tank missile launcher	Set	–	–
	81-mm mortar L16	Mortar	9	23
	120-mm mortar RT	Mortar	4	4
	Type-99 155-mm self-propelled new howitzer	Vehicle	8	8
	Type-90 tank	Vehicle	9	9
	Light armored mobile vehicle	Vehicle	173	180
	Type-96 wheeled armored vehicle	Vehicle	17	20
	Type-87 reconnaissance and patrol vehicle	Vehicle	1	2
	Type-99 ammunition supply vehicle	Vehicle	1	1
	Type-90 tank recovery vehicle	Vehicle	1	2
	Type-91 tank bridge	Vehicle	1	1
	Type-78 snowmobile	Vehicle	12	12
	Chemical protection vehicle	Vehicle	1	3
	Anti-personnel sniper rifle	Gun	133	111
	Observation helicopter (OH-1)	Aircraft	2	2
	Multi-purpose helicopter (UH-60JA)	Aircraft	–	1
	Multi-purpose helicopter (UH-1J)	Aircraft	16	–
	Transport helicopter (CH-47JA)	Aircraft	1	2
	Combat helicopter (AH-64D)	Aircraft	1	–
	Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile	Company	1	1
	Improvement of Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile	Set	1	1
	Type-93 short-range surface-to-air missile	Set	2	2
	Man-portable surface-to-air missile (modified version)	Set	23	13
	Type-96 multi-purpose missile system	Set	1	1
	Type-01 light anti-tank guided missile	Set	36	49
Maritime Self-Defense Force	5,000-ton destroyer	Vessel	1	1
	2,900-ton submarine	Vessel	1	1
	570-ton minesweeper	Vessel	–	1
	3,200-ton oceanographic research ship	Vessel	1	–
	Patrol helicopter (SH-60K)	Aircraft	5	–
	Rescue amphibian (US-2)	Aircraft	1	–
	Next Helicopter Trainer (P-1)	Aircraft	–	4
	Minesweeping/transport helicopter (MCH-101)	Aircraft	–	3
	Primary trainer (T-5)	Aircraft	4	4
	Instrument flight trainer (TC-90)	Aircraft	2	4
	Next helicopter trainer (TH-X)	Aircraft	1	2
	Exchange of short-range SAM systems on Murasame-class destroyers	Vessel	1	–
	Repair of destroyers equipped with the Aegis system	Vessel	1	–

Item		Counting Unit	Number Procured	
			FY 2007	FY 2008
Air Self-Defense Force	Modernization and repair of combat aircraft (F-15)	Aircraft	–	20
	Combat aircraft (F-2)	Aircraft	8	–
	Transport helicopter (CH-47J)	Aircraft	1	1
	Search and rescue aircraft (U-125A)	Aircraft	1	1
	Rescue helicopter (UH-60J)	Aircraft	2	1
	Primary trainer (T-7)	Aircraft	–	–
	Improvement of the early warning aircraft (E-2C)	Aircraft	1.5	2
	Improvements in radar function of early warning and control aircraft (E-767)	Aircraft	4	–
	Improvements in reconnaissance function of reconnaissance aircraft (RF-4E)	Aircraft	1	–
	Capacity improvement of the surface-to-air guided missile, Patriot	Group of items	1	–
	Light armored mobile vehicles	Vehicle	8	21

Reference 14. Number of Tanks and Major Artillery Owned, Performance Specifications

Number Owned

(As of March 31, 2008)

Type	Recoilless guns	Mortars	Field artillery	Rocket launchers, etc	Anti-aircraft machine guns	Tanks	Armored vehicles
Approximate Number Owned	3,110	2,020	630	1,670	110	880	960

Performance Specifications and Data

Type	Item	Artillery	Total Weight (ton)	Maximum Speed (km/h)	Capacity/No. of Operators (people)
Tanks	Type-90 tank	120-mm anti-tank gun	Approx. 50	70	2
Armed vehicles	Type-96 wheeled armored vehicle	12.7-mm heavy machine gun or automatic grenade launcher	Approx. 15	100	10
	Type-89 armored combat vehicle	35-mm machine gun	Approx. 27	70	10
	Type-82 command and communication vehicle	12.7-mm heavy machine gun	Approx. 14	100	8
	Type-87 reconnaissance and warning vehicle	25-mm machine gun	Approx. 15	100	5
Field artillery	155-mm howitzer FH70	155-mm howitzer	Approx. 9.6	16	9
	Type-99 155-mm self-propelled howitzer	155-mm howitzer	Approx. 40	49	4
	203-mm self-propelled howitzer	203-mm howitzer	Approx. 28	54	5
Anti-aircraft machine guns	Type-87 self-propelled anti-aircraft machine gun	35-mm anti-aircraft machine gun	Approx. 38	53	3

Note: The weight of the 155-mm howitzer FH70 includes that of the supplementary power unit. The maximum speed indicated above is the maximum speed of the howitzer with the supplementary power unit activated.

Reference 15. Number of Major Aircraft and Performance Specifications

(As of March 31, 2008)

Service	Model Type	Model	Use	Number Owned	Maximum Speed (knots)	Crew (number)	Full Length (m)	Full Width (m)	Engine
GSDF	Fixed-wing	LR-1	Liaison and Reconnaissance	6	290	2 (5)	10	12	Turboprop, twin-engines
		LR-2	Liaison and Reconnaissance	6	300	2 (5)	14	18	Turboprop, twin-engines
	Rotary-wing	AH-1S	Anti-tank	78	120	2	14	3	Turboshaft
		OH-6D	Observation	118	140	1 (3)	7	2	Turboshaft
		OH-1	Observation	26	140	2	12	3	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		UH-1H/J	Utility	148	120	2 (11)	12/13	3	Turboshaft
		CH-47J/JA	Transport	54	150/140	3 (55)	16	4/5	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		UH-60JA	Utility	28	150	2 (12)	16	3	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		AH-64D	Combat	6	150	2	18	6	Turboshaft, twin-engines
MSDF	Fixed-wing	P-3C	Patrol	95	400	11	36	30	Turboprop, four-engines
	Rotary-wing	SH-60J	Patrol	73	150	3	15	3	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		SH-60K	Patrol	22	140	4	16	3	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		MH-53E	Minesweeping and transport	10	150	7	22	6	Turboshaft, triple engines
ASDF	Fixed-wing	F-15J/DJ	Combat	203	2.5 mach	1/2	19	13	Turbofan, twin-engines
		F-4EJ	Combat	90	2.2 mach	2	19	12	Turbojet, twin-engines
		F-2A/B	Combat	76	2 mach	1/2	16	11	Turbofan, one-engine
		RF-4E/EJ	Reconnaissance	17	2.2 mach/ 1.8 mach	2	19	12	Turbojet, twin-engines
		C-1	Transport	26	440	5 (60)	29	31	Turbofan, twin-engine
		C-130H	Transport	16	340	5 (92)	30	40	Turboprop, four-engines
		E-2C	Early warning	13	330	5	18	25	Turboprop, twin-engines
		E-767	Early warning and control	4	450	20	49	48	Turbofan, twin-engines
	Rotary-wing	CH-47J	Transport	16	150	3 (55)	16	4	Turboshaft, twin-engines

Notes: 1. The number of aircraft possessed indicates numbers registered in the national property ledger as of March 31, 2008.
2. Parenthetical figures in the item "Crew" represents the number of people transported.
3. F-4EJs include 83 improved versions of the F-4EJ.

Reference 16. Number of Major Ships Commissioned into Service, with Performance Specifications and Data

Number of Ships

(As of March 31, 2008)

Class	Number (vessels)	Standard Displacement (1,000 tons)
Destroyer	52	211
Submarine	16	43
Mine warfare ship	31	27
Patrol combatant craft	9	1
Amphibious ship	13	29
Auxiliary ship	31	126
Total	152	437

Note: Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally.

Performance Specifications and Data

Class	Type	Standard Displacement (tons)	Maximum Speed (knots)	Principal Weaponry		
Destroyer	Kongo	7,250	30	127-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2	Aegis system × 1 set Vertical launching system × 1 set	SSM system × 1 set Triple torpedo tube × 2
	Atago	7,750	30	5-inch gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2	Aegis system × 1 set Vertical launching system × 1 set	SSM system × 1 set Triple torpedo tube × 2
	Shirane	5,200	32 (31)	5-inch gun × 2 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2	Short-range SAM system × 1 ASROC system × 1	Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 3
	Hatakaze	4,600 (4,650)	30	5-inch gun × 2 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2	Tartar system × 1 SSM system × 1 set	ASROC system × 1 Triple torpedo tube × 2
	Takanami	4,650	30	127-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapons system [20 mm] × 2	Vertical launching system × 1 set SSM system × 1 set	Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 1
	Murasame	4,550	30	76-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2	Vertical launching system × 1 set SSM system × 1 set	Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 1
	Asagiri	3,500 (3,550)	30	76-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2 Short-range SAM system × 1 set	SSM system × 1 set ASROC system × 1 set	Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 1
	Hatsuyuki	2,950 (3,050)	30	76-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2 Short-range SAM system × 1 set	SSM system × 1 set ASROC system × 1 set	Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 1
	Abukuma	2,000	27	76-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 1	SSM system × 1 set ASROC system × 1 set	Triple torpedo tube × 2
Submarine	Oyashio	2,750	20	Underwater launching tube × 1 set		
Minesweeper (Ocean)	Yaeyama	1,000	14	20-mm machine gun × 1	Deep-sea minesweeping equipment × 1 set	
Minesweeper (Coastal)	Sugashima	510	14	20-mm machine gun × 1	Minesweeping equipment × 1 set	
Missile ship	Hayabusa	200	44	76-mm gun × 1	SSM system × 1 set	
Amphibious ship	Osumi	8,900	22	Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2	Landing craft air cushion [LCAC] × 2	

Note: Parentheses indicate that some ships have these standard displacements.

Reference 17. Guided Missile Specifications

(As of March 31, 2008)

Use	Name	Service	Weight (kg)	Full Length (m)	Diameter (cm)	Guidance System
Anti-ballistic	Patriot (PAC-3)	ASDF	Approx. 300	Approx. 5.2	Approx. 26	Program + command + radar homing
	SM-3	MSDF	Approx. 1,500	Approx. 6.6	Approx. 35	Inertial guidance + Image + IR homing
Anti-aircraft	Patriot (PAC-2)	ASDF	Approx. 1,000	Approx. 5.0	Approx. 41	Pre-program + command + TVM
	Improved Hawk	GSDF	Approx. 640	Approx. 5.0	Approx. 36	Radar homing
	Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile (Middle-range SAM)		Approx. 930	Approx. 5.1	Approx. 33	—
	Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile (improved) (SAM-1C)		Approx. 100	Approx. 2.7/2.9	Approx. 16	Image + IR homing Radar homing
	Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM-1)	GSDF/ ASDF	Approx. 100	Approx. 2.7	Approx. 16	IR homing
	Portable SAM (Stinger)		Approx. 10	Approx. 1.5	Approx. 7	IR homing
	Type-91 portable surface-to-air missile (SAM-2)		Approx. 12	Approx. 1.4	Approx. 8	Image + IR homing
	Type-93 short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM-3)	GSDF	Approx. 12	Approx. 1.4	Approx. 8	Image + IR homing
	Standard (SM-1)	MSDF	Approx. 630	Approx. 4.5	Approx. 34	Radar homing
	Standard (SM-2)		Approx. 710	Approx. 4.7	Approx. 34	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Sea Sparrow (RIM-7F/M)		Approx. 230	Approx. 3.7	Approx. 20	Radar homing
	Sea Sparrow (RIM-162)		Approx. 300	Approx. 3.8	Approx. 25	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Sparrow (AIM-7E/F/M)	ASDF	Approx. 230	Approx. 3.7	Approx. 20	Radar homing
	Sidewinder (AIM-9L)		Approx. 89	Approx. 2.9	Approx. 13	IR homing
	Type-90 air-to-air missile (AAM-3)		Approx. 91	Approx. 3.0	Approx. 13	IR homing
	Type-99 air-to-air missile (AAM-4)		Approx. 220	Approx. 3.7	Approx. 20	Radar homing
	Type-04 air-to-air missile (AAM-5)		Approx. 95	Approx. 3.1	Approx. 13	IR homing
Anti-ship	Type-88 surface-to-ship missile (SSM-1)	GSDF	Approx. 660	Approx. 5.1	Approx. 35	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Harpoon (SSM)	MSDF	Approx. 680	Approx. 4.6	Approx. 34	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Harpoon (USM)		Approx. 680	Approx. 4.6	Approx. 34	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Harpoon (ASM)		Approx. 520	Approx. 3.9	Approx. 34	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Type-90 ship-to-ship missile (SSM-1B)		Approx. 660	Approx. 5.1	Approx. 35	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Type-91 air-to-ship missile (ASM-1C)		Approx. 510	Approx. 4.0	Approx. 35	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Type-80 air-to-ship missile (ASM-1)	ASDF	Approx. 600	Approx. 4.0	Approx. 35	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Type-93 air-to-ship missile (ASM-2)		Approx. 530	Approx. 4.0	Approx. 35	Inertial guidance + IR image homing
Anti-tank	Type-64 anti-tank missile	GSDF	Approx. 16	Approx. 1.0	Approx. 12	Wire guidance
	Type-87 anti-tank missile		Approx. 12	Approx. 1.1	Approx. 11	Laser homing
	Type-01 light anti-tank missile		Approx. 11	Approx. 0.9	Approx. 12	IR image homing
	TOW		Approx. 18	Approx. 1.2	Approx. 15	IR semi-automatic wire guidance
Anti-landing craft and anti-tank	Type-79 anti-landing craft and anti-tank missile	GSDF	Approx. 33	Approx. 1.6	Approx. 15	IR semi-automatic wire guidance
	Type-96 multipurpose guided missile system (MPMS)		Approx. 59	Approx. 2.0	Approx. 16	Inertial guidance + IR image Optic fiber TVM
	Hellfire	MSDF	Approx. 48	Approx. 1.6	Approx. 18	Laser homing

Reference 18. Pattern of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)

(Unit: 100 million yen, %)

Item / Fiscal Year	GNP/GDP (Original Estimates) (A)	Annual Expenditures on General Account (B)	Growth Rate from Previous Year	General Annual Expenditures (C)	Growth Rate from Previous Year	Defense-Related Expenditures (D)	Growth Rate from Previous Year	Ratio of Defense-Related Expenditures to GNP/GDP (D/A)	Ratio of Defense-Related Expenditures to Annual Expenditures on General Account (D/B)	Ratio of Defense-related Expenditures to General Annual Expenditures (D/C)
1955	75,590	9,915	- 0.8	8,107	- 2.8	1,349	- 3.3	1.78	13.61	16.6
1965	281,600	36,581	12.4	29,198	12.8	3,014	9.6	1.07	8.24	10.3
1975	1,585,000	212,888	24.5	158,408	23.2	13,273	21.4	0.84	6.23	8.4
1985	3,146,000	524,996	3.7	325,854	- 0.0	31,371	6.9	0.997	5.98	9.6
1995	4,928,000	709,871	- 2.9	421,417	3.1	47,236	0.86	0.959	6.65	11.2
1996	4,960,000	751,049	5.8	431,409	2.4	48,455	2.58	0.977	6.45	11.2
1997	5,158,000	773,900	3.0	438,067	1.5	49,414 49,475	1.98 2.1	0.958 0.959	6.39 6.39	11.3 11.3
1998	5,197,000	776,692	0.4	445,362	1.7	49,290 49,397	- 0.3 - 0.2	0.948 0.950	6.35 6.36	11.1 11.1
1999	4,963,000	818,601	5.4	468,878	5.3	49,201 49,322	- 0.2 - 0.2	0.991 0.994	6.01 6.03	10.5 10.5
2000	4,989,000	849,871	3.8	480,914	2.6	49,218 49,358	0.0 0.1	0.987 0.989	5.79 5.81	10.2 10.3
2001	5,186,000	826,524	- 2.7	486,589	1.2	49,388 49,553	0.3 0.4	0.952 0.956	5.98 6.00	10.1 10.2
2002	4,962,000	812,300	- 1.7	475,472	- 2.3	49,395 49,560	0.0 0.0	0.995 0.999	6.08 6.10	10.4 10.4
2003	4,986,000	817,891	0.7	475,922	0.1	49,265 49,530	- 0.3 - 0.1	0.988 0.993	6.02 6.06	10.4 10.4
2004	5,006,000	821,109	0.4	476,320	0.1	48,764 49,030	- 1.0 - 1.0	0.974 0.979	5.94 5.97	10.2 10.3
2005	5,115,000	821,829	0.1	472,829	- 0.7	48,301 48,564	- 1.0 - 1.0	0.944 0.949	5.88 5.91	10.2 10.3
2006	5,139,000	796,860	- 3.0	463,660	- 1.9	47,906 48,139	- 0.8 - 0.9	0.932 0.937	6.01 6.04	10.3 10.4
2007	5,219,000	829,088	4.0	469,784	1.3	47,818 48,016	- 0.2 - 0.3	0.916 0.916	5.77 5.79	10.2 10.2
2008	5,269,000	830,613	0.2	472,845	0.7	47,426 47,796	- 0.8 - 0.5	0.900 0.907	5.71 5.75	10.0 10.1

Notes: 1. The figures provided show GNP in and before FY 1985, and GDP from FY 1995, in each case based on original estimates.

2. The upper figures for defense-related expenditures for FY 1997 and thereafter exclude the cost for SACO-related projects (6.1 billion yen in FY 1997, 10.7 billion yen in FY 1998, 12.1 billion yen in FY 1999, 14 billion yen in FY 2000, 16.5 billion yen in FY 2001, 16.5 billion yen in FY 2002, 26.5 billion yen in FY 2003, 26.6 billion yen in FY 2004, 26.3 billion yen in FY 2005, 23.3 billion yen in FY 2006, 12.6 billion yen in FY 2007, and 18 billion yen in FY 2008) as well as U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (reduction of burden on local communities) (7.2 billion yen in FY 2007 and 19.1 billion yen in FY 2008), while the lower figures include them.

3. The expenditures on the Security Council are not included in the Defense-related expenditures since they are requested for rearrangement as other expenses from FY 2008.

Reference 19. Changes in Major Areas of Expenditures on General Account Budget (Original Budget Basis)

(Unit: 100 million yen, %)

Item / Fiscal Year	Annual Expenditures on General Account	National Defense	Composition Ratio	Social Security	Composition Ratio	Education and Science	Composition Ratio	Public Works	Composition Ratio
1955	9,915	1,349	13.6	1,043	10.5	1,308	13.2	1,635	16.5
1965	36,581	3,014	8.2	5,183	14.2	4,751	13.0	7,333	20.0
1975	212,888	13,273	6.2	39,282	18.5	25,921	12.2	29,120	13.7
1985	524,996	31,371	5.98	95,740	18.2	48,409	9.2	63,689	12.1
1995	709,871	47,236	6.7	139,368	19.6	60,765	8.6	92,413	13.0
1996	751,049	48,455	6.5	143,014	19.0	62,270	8.3	96,210	12.8
1997	773,900	49,414 49,475	6.4 6.4	145,650	18.8	63,436	8.2	97,490	12.6
1998	776,692	49,290 49,397	6.3 6.4	148,598	19.1	63,457	8.2	89,891	11.6
1999	818,601	49,201 49,322	6.0 6.0	161,123	19.7	64,632	7.9	94,338	11.5
2000	849,871	49,218 49,358	5.8 5.8	167,666	19.7	65,285	7.7	94,340	11.1
2001	826,524	49,388 49,553	6.0 6.0	176,156	21.7	66,472	8.0	94,335	11.6
2002	812,300	49,395 49,560	6.1 6.1	182,795	22.5	66,998	8.2	84,239	10.4
2003	817,891	49,265 49,530	6.0 6.1	189,907	23.2	64,712	7.9	80,971	9.9
2004	821,109	48,764 49,030	5.9 6.0	197,970	24.1	61,330	7.5	78,159	9.5
2005	821,829	48,301 48,564	5.9 5.9	203,808	24.8	57,235	7.0	75,310	9.2
2006	796,860	47,906 48,139	6.0 6.0	205,739	25.8	52,671	6.6	72,015	9.0
2007	829,088	47,818 48,016	5.8 5.8	211,409	25.5	52,743	6.4	69,473	8.4
2008	830,613	47,426 47,796	5.7 5.8	217,824	26.2	53,122	6.4	67,352	8.1

Notes: 1. In this table, figures related to FY 1995 and thereafter were rearranged on the FY 2001 budget basis for the convenience of comparison. However, figures related to FY 2001 have been rearranged on the FY 2002 budget basis for the convenience of comparison with FY 2002.
2. Public works expenses for FY 1995 and thereafter include the amount of money from revenues other than the sale of relevant stocks for loan financed public construction projects implemented by FY 1991 under the "Special Measures Law for Improving Social Overhead Capital," and also the amount of money to be paid or subsidized by the Government at the time of repayment of loans for public construction projects under the "Special Measures Law for Improving Social Overhead Capital."
3. The upper figures for defense-related expenditures for FY 1997 and thereafter exclude the cost for SACO-related projects (6.1 billion yen in FY 1997, 10.7 billion yen in FY 1998, 12.1 billion yen in FY 1999, 14 billion yen in FY 2000, 16.5 billion yen in FY 2001, 16.5 billion yen in FY 2002, 26.5 billion yen in FY 2003, 26.6 billion yen in FY 2004, 26.3 billion yen in FY 2005, 23.3 billion yen in FY 2006, 12.6 billion yen in FY 2007, and 18 billion yen in FY 2008) as well as U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (reduction of burden on local communities) (7.2 billion yen in FY 2007 and 19.1 billion yen in FY 2008), while the lower figures include them.
4. The expenditures on the Security Council are not included in the Defense-related expenditures since they are requested for rearrangement as other expenses from FY 2008.

Reference 20. Changes in Composition of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)

Item \ Fiscal Year	1999		2000		2001		2002		2003	
	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio
Personnel and provisions	21,674 43.9	44.1 43.9	22,034 44.6	44.8 44.6	22,269 44.9	45.1 44.9	22,273 44.9	45.1 44.9	22,188 44.8	45.0 44.8
Materials	27,527 27,648	55.9 56.1	27,183 27,324	55.2 55.4	27,119 27,284	54.9 55.1	27,122 27,287	54.9 55.1	27,077 27,342	55.0 55.2
Equipment acquisition	9,629 19.5	19.6 19.5	9,141 18.5	18.6 18.5	9,178 18.5	18.6 18.5	9,206 18.6	18.6 18.6	9,028 18.2	18.3 18.2
R&D	1,307 2.6	2.7 2.6	1,205 2.4	2.4 2.4	1,353 2.7	2.7 2.7	1,277 2.6	2.6 2.6	1,470 3.0	3.0 3.0
Facility improvement	1,822 3.7	3.7 3.7	1,687 3.4	3.4 3.4	1,598 3.2	3.2 3.2	1,570 3.2	3.2 3.2	1,528 3.1	3.1 3.1
Maintenance	8,601 17.4	17.5 17.4	8,906 18.0	18.1 18.0	8,865 17.9	18.0 17.9	9,065 18.3	18.4 18.3	9,075 18.3	18.4 18.3
Base countermeasures	5,402 11.0	11.0 11.0	5,447 11.0	11.1 11.0	5,326 10.7	10.8 10.7	5,189 10.5	10.5 10.5	5,151 10.4	10.5 10.4
The cost for SACO-related projects	121 0.2	0 0.2	140 0.3	0 0.3	165 0.3	0 0.3	165 0.3	0 0.3	265 0.5	0 0.5
U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (reduction of burden on local communities)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Others	765 1.6	1.6 1.6	797 1.6	1.6 1.6	798 1.6	1.6 1.6	815 1.6	1.6 1.6	825 1.7	1.7 1.7
Total	49,201 49,322	100.0	49,218 49,358	100.0	49,388 49,553	100.0	49,395 49,560	100.0	49,265 49,530	100.0

Notes: 1. Personnel and provisions expenditures include personnel wage and food expenditures.
2. Equipment acquisition expenditures include the purchase of arms, vehicles and aircraft, and the construction of ships.
3. R&D expenditures include R&D expenditures of equipment.
4. Facility improvement expenditures include airfields and barracks expenditures.
5. Maintenance expenditures include those for housing, clothing and training.
6. Base countermeasures expenditures include those for areas surrounding base countermeasures and burden by USFJ.
7. Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally.
8. The upper figures for Budgets and Composition Ratios for FY 1997 and thereafter exclude the cost for SACO-related projects (6.1 billion yen in FY 1997, 10.7 billion yen in FY 1998, 12.1 billion yen in FY 1999, 14 billion yen in FY 2000, 16.5 billion yen in FY 2001, 16.5 billion yen in FY 2002, 26.5 billion yen in FY 2003, 26.6 billion yen in FY 2004, 26.3 billion yen in FY 2005, 23.3 billion yen in FY 2006, and 12.6 billion yen in FY 2007, 18.0 billion yen in FY 2008) as well as U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (reduction of burden on local communities) (7.2 billion yen in FY 2007, 19.1 billion yen in FY 2008), while the lower figures include them.
9. The expenditures on the Security Council are not included in the Defense-related expenditures since they are requested for rearrangement as other expenses from FY 2008.

Item \ Fiscal Year	2004		2005		2006		2007		2008	
	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio
Personnel and provisions	21,654	44.4 44.2	21,562	44.6 44.4	21,337	44.6 44.3	21,018	44.0 43.8	20,940	44.2 43.8
Materials	27,110 27,376	55.6 55.8	26,739 27,002	55.4 55.6	26,570 26,803	55.5 55.7	26,801 26,999	56.0 56.2	26,486 26,856	55.8 56.2
Equipment acquisition	8,806	18.1 18.0	9,000	18.6 18.5	8,594	17.9 17.9	8,663	18.1 18.0	8,125	17.1 17.0
R&D	1,707	3.5 3.5	1,316	2.7 2.7	1,714	3.6 3.6	1,445	3.0 3.0	1,728	3.6 3.6
Facility improvement	1,442	3.0 2.9	1,386	2.9 2.9	1,150	2.4 2.4	1,099	2.3 2.3	933	2.0 2.0
Maintenance	9,175	18.8 18.7	9,177	19.0 18.9	9,405	19.6 19.5	10,222	21.4 21.3	10,382	21.9 21.7
Base countermeasures	5,094	10.4 10.4	4,973	10.3 10.2	4,879	10.2 10.1	4,618	9.7 9.6	4,535	9.6 9.5
The cost for SACO-related projects	266	0 0.5	263	0 0.5	233	0 0.5	126	0 0.3	180	0 0.4
U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (reduction of burden on local communities)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Others	885	1.8 1.8	887	1.8 1.8	827	1.7 1.7	754	1.6 1.6	783	1.7 1.6
Total	48,764 49,030	100.0	48,301 48,564	100.0	47,906 48,139	100.0	47,818 48,016	100.0	47,426 47,796	100.0

Notes: 1. Personnel and provisions expenditures include personnel wage and food expenditures.
2. Equipment acquisition expenditures include the purchase of arms, vehicles and aircraft, and the construction of ships.
3. R&D expenditures include R&D expenditures of equipment.
4. Facility improvement expenditures include airfields and barracks expenditures.
5. Maintenance expenditures include those for housing, clothing and training.
6. Base countermeasures expenditures include those for areas surrounding base countermeasures and burden by USFJ.
7. Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally.
8. The upper figures for Budgets and Composition Ratios for FY 1997 and thereafter exclude the cost for SACO-related projects (6.1 billion yen in FY 1997, 10.7 billion yen in FY 1998, 12.1 billion yen in FY 1999, 14 billion yen in FY 2000, 16.5 billion yen in FY 2001, 16.5 billion yen in FY 2002, 26.5 billion yen in FY 2003, 26.6 billion yen in FY 2004, 26.3 billion yen in FY 2005, 23.3 billion yen in FY 2006, and 12.6 billion yen in FY 2007, 18.0 billion yen in FY 2008) as well as U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (reduction of burden on local communities) (7.2 billion yen in FY 2007, 19.1 billion yen in FY 2008), while the lower figures include them.
9. The expenditures on the Security Council are not included in the Defense-related expenditures since they are requested for rearrangement as other expenses from FY 2008.

Reference 21. Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries

Country \ Fiscal Year	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Japan (100 million yen)	48,764 49,030 -1.0% -1.0%	48,301 48,564 -1.0% -1.0%	47,906 48,139 -0.8% -0.9%	47,818 48,016 -0.2% -0.3%	47,426 47,796 -0.8% -0.5%
U.S. (US$1 million)	436,453 12.7%	474,089 8.6%	499,310 5.3%	529,845 6.1%	583,054 10.0%
U.K. (GBP 1 million)	29,524 0.6%	30,603 3.7%	31,454 2.8%	33,400 6.19%	— —
Germany (€1 million)	24,250 -0.5%	24,040 -0.9%	27,870 15.9%	28,400 1.9%	29,450 3.6%
France (€1 million)	32,402 4.3%	32,920 1.6%	36,061 9.5%	36,285 0.6%	36,780 1.3%
Russia (RR 100 million)	4,187.183 16.2%	5,311.392 26.8%	6,660.266 25.4%	8,220.360 23.4%	9,596.000 16.7%
China (100 million yuan)	2,100 13.3%	2,447 16.5%	2,807 14.7%	3,472 23.7%	4,099 18.0%

Notes: 1. Data sources are national budget books, defense white papers and others.
2. % represents a rate of growth over the previous year.
3. U.S. defense expenditures represent the expense narrowly defined by the historical table FY 2008.
4. The figures for the United Kingdom up to FY 2006 are based on U.K. Defense Statistics published by Ministry of Defense. The figure in FY 2007 is the expected amount announced in the budget message.
5. The German defense expenditures rose sharply in FY 2006 because the data began to include pension expenditures. The defense expenditures actually decreased by 0.7% in comparison with FY 2005 when the pension expenditures are excluded.
6. Data for China is based on the Finance Minister's Budget Report to the National People's Congress. For the National Defense Budget 2004, China's fiscal report stated national defense expenditures would increase, "11.6% by 21.83 billion yuan." The total expenditures, however, have not been revealed. As there is a discrepancy in the calculation made on the figures in the said report based on the FY 2003 defense budget, calculations are made based on the assumed actual expenditure amounts in 2001 and 2003 (unpublished).
7. According to tables and analyses in part two of Military Balance 2008 outlining an international comparison of defense expenditures and military manpower defense expenditures for FY 2006 were: U.S. $535,943 million, U.K. $55,444 million, Germany $37,775 million, France $54,003 million, Russia $70,000 million, China $121,872 million and Japan $41,144 million.
8. As for Japan, the upper figures exclude the cost for SACO-related projects (26.6 billion yen in FY 2004, 26.3 billion yen in FY 2005, 23.3 billion yen in FY 2006, 12.6 billion yen in FY 2007, 18.0 billion yen in FY 2008) as well as U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (reduction of burden on local communities) (7.2 billion yen in FY 2007, 19.1 billion yen in FY 2008), while the lower figures include them.

Reference 22. Examples of Items Provided by Basic Response Plan

Basic Response Plan			
Armed attack situation	Situation where an armed attack is anticipated	Recognition of armed attack situation or situation where an armed attack is anticipated, and the facts that constituted the base of the recognition	
		Overall plan for the response to the armed attack situation	
		Important items regarding response measures	Approval for the Minister of Defense to dispatch a defense call-up order for SDF reserve personnel and ready reserve personnel for defense operations
			Approval for the Minister of Defense to dispatch a defense operation alert order
			Approval for the Minister of Defense to order defense facility construction
			Approval for the Minister of Defense to order the offer of service as action related measures provided in the U.S. Military Actions Related Measures Law
			Approval for the Minister of Defense to order detention inspections and cruising as provided in the Maritime Transportation Restriction Law
			Request for Diet approval on issuing a defense operations order
			Ordering defense operations (When there is no time to receive advance Diet approval due to the urgency)

* The contents of the examples of the Basic Response Plan indicated above are subject to change in accordance with the conditions of the concerned armed attack situation.

Reference 23. Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on the Joint Japan-U.S. Technical Research on the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

(December 25, 1998)

1. Today, on the approval by the Security Council of Japan, the Government of Japan decided to launch joint technical research with the United States of America on the Navy's Theater Wide Defense (NTWD) System starting in FY 1999.
2. Given the trend of proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles after the end of the Cold War, the government considers that the issue of the ballistic missile defense (BMD) is a crucial one for Japan's defense policies that rely exclusively on a defense-oriented defense policy and that Japan should actively lead the issue of BMD. Thus, we have been making necessary studies and discussions on the issue.
3. The Government of Japan considers that launching joint Japan-U.S. technical research on NTWD is the most effective as well as most productive measure the government should take in the future and that such cooperation between Japan and the United States will contribute to the improvement of reliability of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.
4. While there is no doubt that the official interpretation of the Diet resolutions should be carried out by the Diet itself, the Government of Japan takes the position on the relevance of this matter with the Diet resolution on development and use of the outer space as follows. Considering the recent situation where ballistic missiles are on the trend of proliferation, and the fact that BMD system is an inherently defensive as well as unsubstitutable and only measure to protect the lives and properties of the people of Japan, the Government of Japan determines that active involvement of Japan in the BMD system agrees with the purport of the Diet resolution concerned and the basic policy of Japan as a peaceful nation, which the purport of the resolution relies on. Thereby the Government also determines that the people will understand and support our decision.

   It should be noted that the Diet resolution of September this year by the lower house regarding the ballistic missile launch by North Korea states: "The Government will take every measure to ensure the safety of the people of the nation."

   It should also be noted that technical transfer of weapons related to BMD will be carried out within the framework of the agreements on the technical transfer of the weapons to the United States.
5. This resolution refers only to the technical research and not to the transition of the government action to the stages of development and/or deployment of such weapons, which should be determined separately. Such determination will be made upon thorough review of technical feasibility of the BMD and the visions of the Japan's defense policies in the future.

Reference 24. Preparation of Ballistic Missile Defense System, etc.

(Adopted by the Security Council of Japan and approved by the Cabinet on December 19, 2003)

(Preparation of Ballistic Missile Defense System)

1. On the issue of the ballistic missile defense (BMD), under the recognition that Japan should take active measures on the issue given the advancement of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2001 to FY 2005) (hereinafter "MTDP"), which was adopted by

the Security Council of Japan and approved by the Cabinet on December 15, 2003, stipulates that "necessary measures will be taken upon the review of its technical feasibility." As recent tests of various kinds have confirmed the high technical feasibility of the BMD, development of the BMD system has become feasible upon the improvement of capacities and joint operation of the existing Aegis system-equipped destroyers and the surface-to-air Patriot guided missile system. Thus, considering that the BMD system is inherently defensive as well as unsubstitutable and is the only measure to protect the lives and properties of the people of Japan against ballistic missile attacks, the system agrees with Japan's exclusively defense-oriented policy. Consequently, the Government of Japan is determined to equip the nation with the same system.

(Review of Japan's Defense Capabilities)

2. Regarding the security environment surrounding Japan, while large-scale invasion by a third country into Japan has become less likely, measures against the increasing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, activities of international terrorist groups and other types of new forms of threats as well as diverse contingencies that are likely to have a negative impact on the peace and security of the nation (hereinafter "the new threats, etc.") has been urgently needed for the international community. For the peace and stability of the nation and the international community, Japan also needs to take all possible measures against such new threats, etc. through comprehensive and prompt responses under the organic coordination of diplomatic effort promotion, effective operation of defense forces and other measures, while firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. When such new security environment and the introduction of the BMD system are considered, we come to a conclusion that the whole defense capacities of Japan need to be reviewed.

   To this end, we will make effectual measures against the new threats, etc. according to the specific features of each of them while maintaining close cooperation with concerned agencies and local communities, further developing cooperative relationship with the United States based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, and promoting cooperation with neighboring nations and other nations and international organizations concerned. At the same time, the Government of Japan will review the whole defensive capacities of Japan in order to prepare for proactive and affirmative actions that are to be taken to protect the peace and stability of the international community to which Japan belongs. In so doing, preparation of necessary schemes that can effectually deal with the new threats, etc., including terrorist attacks and ballistic missile attacks, will be prepared, and at the same time the current defense build-up concept and equipment system will be fundamentally reviewed and appropriate down-sizing will be made, while taking events of large-scale invasion into consideration. These actions are to build defense forces that are capable of effectively responding to the new security environment.

   Based on the views described above, when renewing the current system of the Self-Defense Forces into a new system, we will pursue the improvement of readiness, mobility, flexibility and multipurpose functions of the system as well as highly advanced technical capabilities and intelligence capabilities, and at the same time we will carry out a fundamental review of the existing organizations, equipment and other items concerned in order to improve their efficiencies. In so doing, the following items will be focused in order to establish an effectual system.

   (1) The current organizations and alike will be reviewed, and new organizations, including an advisory organization to the Defense Minister, necessary for the operation of the Self-Defense Forces that centers on joint operation, will be formed.

   (2) As for the major units of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces, new schemes, including a new organization, will be constructed in order that effectual measures may be taken in the event of new threats, etc.

(3) Necessary functions, organizations and equipments will be prepared in order to readily take actions that effectively contribute to the peace and security of the international community.

(4) In order to prepare for the unexpected change of the security situations in the future, while securely retaining the fundamental components to respond to events of large-scale invasion and concerning the security situations of the surrounding area of Japan, the following measures will be taken.

a. Regarding the Ground Self-Defense Force, a defense build-up concept focused on anti-tank warfare will be developed, and a system that can promptly respond to the new threats, etc. will be prepared through improvement of mobility and other capabilities, while the current situation of tanks, artilleries and other weapons will be reviewed and appropriate downsizing will be made.

b. Regarding the Maritime Self-Defense Force, the defense build-up concept will be altered to one that is focused on anti-submarine warfare, and preparation of a responding system to ballistic missiles and other new threats, etc. will be attempted, while the current situation of destroyers, fixed-wing patrol aircraft and other equipment will be reviewed and appropriate downsizing will be made.

c. Regarding the Air Self-Defense Force, the current defense force build-up concept focused on the anti-combat aircraft warfare will be modified to better prepare for ballistic missile and other new threats, etc. At the same time, the current situation of combat aircraft and other equipment will be reviewed and appropriate downsizing and other measures will be taken.

(Defense-related Expenditures)

3. When carrying out such a large-scale program as the BMD system preparation, the Government of Japan will carry out a fundamental review of the existing organizations and equipment of the Self-Defense Forces based on the items described above (see 2) in order to improve the efficiency, and, at the same time, make efforts to reduce defense-related expenditures to take the harsh economic and fiscal conditions of Japan into consideration. Based on such views, the government will lay down a new Mid-Term Defense Program that will replace the current program by the end of 2004 and determine the limit of the total amount needed for the same program.

(Formulation of New Defense Program Guidelines)

4. As a precursor to the formulation of a new Mid-Term Defense Program, the Government of Japan will formulate new National Defense Program Guidelines that will replace the National Defense Program Guidelines from FY 1996 (adopted by the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet on November 28, 1995). The new Guidelines will be formulated to adopt the system to the new security environment and follow the concepts described above (see 1 and 2). We also aim to stipulate our visions for Japan's defense forces, including the position of Japan's Self-Defense Forces in activities to maintain the peace and stability of the international community.

Reference 25. Statement of the Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan on the Cabinet Decision, "On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures"

(December 19, 2003)

1. The Government of Japan decided "On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures" at the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet today. This decision shows the thinking behind the introduction of BMD system, and at the same time, indicates the direction of Japan's defense force review taking into account the introduction of BMD system and the new security environment. Based on this decision, the Government of Japan will formulate a new National Defense Program Outline and a new Mid-Term Defense Program by the end of the year 2004.
2. The Government of Japan, recognizing that rapid progress on the relevant technologies of BMD has recently been made and that technological feasibility of BMD system is high, and noting that BMD system is suitable for our exclusively defense-oriented policy, decided to introduce the multi-tier defense system based on the Aegis BMD system and Patriot PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability-3).
3. The technical feasibility of the BMD system has been confirmed with the results from interception tests and other capability tests carried out by the United States as well as with the Japan's original simulation experiments. Therefore, we concluded that technical reliability of these systems is considerably high and the technology has reached a sufficiently high level for practical use as we can see from the decision by the United States on the primary deployment.
4. BMD system is the only purely defensive measure, without alternatives, to protect life and property of the citizens of Japan against ballistic missile attacks, and meets the principle of exclusively defense-oriented policy. Therefore, it is considered that this presents no threat to neighboring countries, and does not affect the regional stability.
5. As for the issue of the right of collective self-defense, the BMD system that the Government of Japan is introducing aims at the defense of Japan. It will be operated based on Japan's independent judgment, and will not be used for the purpose of defending third countries. Therefore, it does not raise any problems with regard to the issue of the right of collective self-defense. The BMD system requires interception of missiles by Japan's own independent judgment based on the information on the target acquired by Japan's own sensors.
6. In legal terms on the operation of the BMD system, interception of ballistic missile attack is basically conducted as a defense operation that is undertaken in situations regarded as an armed attack against Japan. In addition, due to the nature of ballistic missiles and the characteristics of BMD, the Government will conduct specific studies on necessary measures including legal ones, which enable appropriate responses to each situation.
7. The joint Japan-U.S. technical research currently underway is not for the system being introduced this time, but it aims to improve the capability of future interceptor. It remains important to carry on the research in order to take all possible measures to ensure national defense. The future transition to the development and deployment stage will be decided separately, taking international situations of the time and other factors into consideration.
8. Japan will take all possible measures to ensure national defense and prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, by ensuring transparency and encouraging international understanding on BMD, and by promoting further cooperation with the United States on technology and operation.

Reference 26. Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary "Japan-U.S. Cooperative Development of Advanced SM-3 Missile for Ballistic Missile Defense" (tentative translation)

(December 24, 2005)

1. The Government of Japan, through today's meetings of the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet, decided to initiate Japan-U.S. joint development of advanced SM-3 missile for Ballistic Missile Defense.
2. The Government of Japan has started and promoted Japan-U.S. joint technical research on a sea-based upper-tier system since 1999 with the understanding that BMD system is the only and purely defensive measure, without alternatives, to protect the lives and properties of Japanese citizens against ballistic missile attacks and meets the principles of exclusively defense-oriented policy, in an environment marked by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. This research does not aim at the BMD system which Japan started to introduce since FY 2004, but aims to improve the future capabilities of interceptors in order to expand all possible means to ensure Japan's national defense.
3. The "Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2005-2009)" states "the Government of Japan will consider the possibility of transition to the development stage, and take necessary measures." Based on the results of Japan-U.S. joint technical research to date, the Government of Japan has sufficient prospect for solving the initial technical challenges. In the current international situation, taking into consideration the continuing fiscal constraint, we consider it appropriate to promote Japan-U.S. joint development of advanced SM-3 missiles efficiently in order to acquire the capability against future ballistic missile threats. Future transition to the deployment stage of the advanced missile will be decided based on the results of the joint development.
4. Regarding the relation with the Three Principles on Arms Export, "Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary" for National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005- (approved by the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004), states "if Japan decides that it will engage in joint development and production of ballistic missile defense systems with the United States, however, the Three Principles on Arms Exports will not be applied, under the condition that strict control is maintained, because such systems and related activities will contribute to the effective operation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and are conductive to the security of Japan." We will continue to firmly maintain our policy of dealing with arms exports control carefully, in light of Japan's basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation on which the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines are based.

   Based on these, arms that need to be provided to the United States for the Japan-U.S. joint development will be provided under strict control after coordinating with the United States in the future on the framework for arms transfer.
5. Japan will continue to ensure the transparency and increase international understanding of its BMD system while further promoting cooperation in the areas of policy, operation and equipment/technology with the United States. Through these efforts, Japan will strive to take all possible measures in ensuring its national defense and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.

Reference 27. Emergency-Response Procedures Concerning Measures to Destroy Ballistic Missiles or Other Objects as Stipulated under Article 82-2, Paragraph 3 of SDF Law

(Cabinet Decision on March 23, 2007)

In line with Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the SDF Law (No. 165 of 1954 law and hereinafter called the Law) and Article 104-2 of the Ordinance to Execute the SDF Law (No. 179 of 1954 ordinance and hereinafter called the Ordinance), emergency-response procedures concerning measures to destroy ballistic missiles and others (as stipulated under Paragraph 1 of Article 82-2 of the Law) are stipulated as follows.

These procedures are stipulated based on the current defense capability Japan has against ballistic missiles, arising from the deployment of a PAC-3 Patriot missile at the 1st Air Defense Missile Group of the Central Air Defense Force of the Air Defense Command of the ASDF (hereinafter called the 1st Air Defense Missile Group). The procedures will be revised in the future if a revision is deemed necessary due to reasons including the enhancement of Japan's ballistic missile defense capability.

1. Conditions for the Defense Minister to issue an order based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law and conditions which are required in order to certify the situation as a state of "emergency" as stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law (related to Article 104-2-1 of the Ordinance)

(1) Conditions for the Defense Minister to issue an order based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2

If either of conditions shown below is met, the Defense Minister will issue an order based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2.

a. When a ballistic missile is suspected of having been launched in a foreign country or is feared to be launched in a foreign country but it cannot be recognized at that time that the missile is feared to fly toward Japan due to an uncertainty over the purpose of a possible launch of the missile and its capability and other factors

b. When a satellite launch rocket launched in a foreign country or other objects except aircraft whose possible fall may result in causing serious damage to human life and property are feared to fall due to an accident and other reasons but it cannot be recognized at that time that the rocket or other objects are feared to fly toward Japan due to an uncertainty over the location of the accident and the situation of the accident and other factors

(2) Conditions which are required in order to certify the situation as a state of "emergency"

It can be certified that the situation is a state of "emergency" if Japan's Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system recognizes that a ballistic missile or other objects are flying toward Japan.

2. Scope of ballistic missiles and other objects which become subject to measures stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law and means to destroy the missiles or others (related to Article 104-2-2 of the Ordinance)

(1) Scope of ballistic missiles and other objects

Either of objects listed below that is recognized to be flying toward Japan using its BMD system

a. Ballistic missile

b. Satellite launch rocket

c. Artificial satellite
d. Other objects except aircraft whose possible fall may result in causing serious damage to human life and property

(2) Means to destroy ballistic missiles or other objects

Based on provisions stipulated under Article 93-2 of the Law, a PAC-3 Patriot missile deployed at the 1st Air Defense Missile Group will be launched with the aim of destroying an incoming ballistic missile or other objects over Japanese territory or over international waters in the vicinity of Japan (including an exclusive economic zone stipulated under the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea).

3. Areas where SDF units undertake activities to implement measures based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law (related to Article 104-2-3 of the Ordinance)

Areas where SDF units undertake activities following the issuance of an order by the Defense Ministry to implement measures based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law are in Japanese territory, international waters in the vicinity of Japan and over such waters.

Areas where SDF personnel belonging to the 1st Air Defense Missile Group undertake activities are limited to places where their activities are deemed necessary to prevent a possible fall of a ballistic missile or other objects from causing damage in the Tokyo metropolitan area. Such areas will be designated under an order to be issued by the Defense Minister based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law.

4. Matters concerning command of SDF units which implement measures based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law (related to Article 104-2-4 of the Ordinance)

SDF units which implement these measures are the 1st Air Defense Missile Group, the Aircraft Control and Warning Wing and other units whose activities are judged by the Defense Minister to be necessary under certain situations. SDF units in charge of implementing the measures will be placed under the Commander of the Air Defense Command.

The command of the Defense Minister with regard to operations of SDF units in charge of implementing the measures will be conducted via the Chief of Staff at the Joint Staff Office. A Defense Minister's order regarding this matter will be executed by the Chief of Staff at the Joint Staff Office.

5. Matters concerning cooperation with relevant government organizations (related to Article 104-2-5 of the Ordinance)

When the Defense Ministry recognizes the flight of a ballistic missile or other objects toward Japan using its BMD system, it will immediately inform relevant government organizations (the Cabinet Secretariat, the National Police Agency, the Fire and Disaster Management Agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Fisheries Agency, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, the Japan Coast Guard and other administrative organizations whose activities are judged by the Defense Minister to be necessary under certain situations) of the detection of the missile or the objects, areas where they are forecast to fall and an estimated arrival time.

When SDF units in charge of implementing measures to destroy the missile or other objects have taken such measures, the Defense Ministry will immediately inform the relevant government organizations of the situation regarding the destruction.

In addition, the Defense Ministry will conduct necessary cooperation with the relevant government organizations in response to their requests.

6. Matters concerning measures to be taken when it is recognized that a ballistic missile or other objects stipulated under Paragraph 1 of Article 82-2 of the Law are feared to fly toward Japan while an order issued based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law is in place (related to Article 104-2-6)

When it is recognized that a ballistic missile or other objects stipulated under Paragraph 1 of Article 82-2 of the Law are feared to fly toward Japan while an order based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law is in place, the Defense Minister, based on Paragraph 1 of Article 82-2 of the Law, will order SDF units to take the measures to destroy the missile or the objects after receiving an approval from the Prime Minister. The Defense Minister will then withdraw the order which has been in place based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law.

Reference 28. Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Type of Authorized Actions Authority is Provided
Defense operation (Article 76, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When necessary to defend Japan against an armed attack or when an armed attack is clearly imminent	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: required (prior consent required in principle)	❍ Use of force (only if the case fulfils 3 conditions for exercising the right of self-defense) ❍ Maintenance of public order (same as for public security operation) ❍ Others (including control over the Japan Coast Guard, emergency passage, appropriation of supplies, marine transportation restriction, treatment of prisoners, etc.)
Establishment of defense facilities (Article 77-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When there are areas in which the deployment of SDF units under the order for defense operations is expected and the reinforcement of defensive preparations is deemed necessary (intended deployment area) before the deployment of SDF units for possible operation in cases where the situation has intensified and the order for defense operations is likely	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan) (see Note 1) (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister	❍ Establishment of positions and defense-purpose facilities in the intended deployment area ❍ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty
Measures to be taken before a defense operation order (Article 77-3, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When a defense operation order is expected under a tense situation	(1) Authorized by: supplies—Minister of Defense or someone else delegated authority by the Minister; services—Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: supplies—not required; services—required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan) (see Note 1)	❍ Provision of supplies to the U.S. military forces as a measure related to the actions based on the U.S. Military Actions Related Measures Law ❍ Provision of services as an action measure ❍ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty
Civil Protection Dispatch (Article 77-4, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When deemed unavoidable upon request by prefectural governors in accordance with the Civil Protection Law, or when requested by the Armed Attack Situation, etc. Task Force Chief or the Emergency Response Situation Task Force Chief in accordance with the Law	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister	❍ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (see Note 2) (evacuation, crime prevention and control, entry, use of weapons) (all only when police officers are not present) ❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (request for cooperation from nearby people and ships)
Public security operation by order (Article 78, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When it is deemed that the public security cannot be maintained by the civilian police force in the event of indirect aggression or other such emergency	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: required (to be referred to the Diet within 20 days of the order's issuance)	❍ Application of the Police Duties Law (interrogation, evacuation, crime prevention and control, use of weapons, etc.) ❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, use of weapons, etc.) ❍ Use of weapons for guarding operations and suppression of disturbances ❍ Control over the Japan Coast Guard
Information gathering before public security operation order (Article 79-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When situations have intensified and a public security operation order and illicit activity by those armed with rifles, machine guns or other weapons are expected; and there is a special need to gather information	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister after consulting with the National Public Safety Commission	❍ Use of weapons to protect one's own life and body or other personnel on duty

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Type of Authorized Actions Authority is Provided
Public security operation by request (Article 81, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When deemed unavoidable if public peace is to be maintained in serious situations by the prefectural governors and by the Prime Minister	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: prefectural governor makes a request to the Prime Minister after consulting with the prefectural Public Safety Commission	❍ Application of the Police Duties Law (interrogation, evacuation, crime prevention and control, use of weapons, etc.) ❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, use of weapons, etc.) ❍ Use of weapons for guard operations and suppression of disturbances
Guarding operation (Article 81-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When special measures are deemed necessary to prevent damage due to likely large-scale terrorist attacks on SDF or U.S. forces facilities and areas in Japan	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: Minister of Defense consults with the National Public Safety Commission after hearing opinions from the relevant prefectural governor	❍ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (interrogation; measures such as evacuation, etc.; entry (all only when police officers are not present); crime prevention and control; use of weapons) ❍ Use of weapons is permitted for the prevention of large scale destruction of guarding facilities
Maritime security operations (Article 82, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When there is a particular need in order to protect lives and property or maintain order at sea	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister	❍ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (use of weapons) ❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, use of weapons, etc.)
Destruction measures against ballistic missiles, etc. (Article 82-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When it is anticipated that missiles are flying toward Japan and the measure is deemed necessary to protect lives and properties in Japan's territory from the damage caused by missiles	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (after-the-fact report required) (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister (for an urgent case, the order can be made in advance according to the emergency response procedures approved by the Prime Minister)	❍ Use of weapons to destroy ballistic missiles, etc.
Disaster relief dispatch (Article 83, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When judged necessary in order to protect lives and property or maintain order at sea in the event of natural calamities or other disasters (see Note 3)	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense or those designated by the Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: at the request of prefectural governors or other parties designated by Government ordinance (excluding particularly urgent situations when it is deemed there is no time to wait for a request to be made)	❍ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (evacuation, crime prevention and control, entry, use of weapons) (all only when police officers are not present) ❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (request for cooperation) ❍ Authority provided for under the Disaster Measures Basic Law (designation of alert zones, guarantee of passage for emergency vehicles, etc.; restricted to cases when no municipal mayor or police officer is present)
Earthquake disaster relief dispatch (Article 83-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When the Director-General of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters deems the support of the SDF to be necessary for the swift and appropriate implementation of emergency measures to deal with earthquakes and other disasters (Article 13-2 of the Special Law Concerning Countermeasures for Large-Scale Earthquakes)	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: request of the Director-General of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters (Prime Minister)	❍ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch) ❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch)

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Type of Authorized Actions Authority is Provided
Nuclear disaster relief dispatch (Article 83-3, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When the Director-General of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters deems the support of the SDF to be necessary for the swift and appropriate implementation of measures to deal with emergency situations (Article 20-4 of the Special Law Concerning Countermeasures for Nuclear Disasters)	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: request of the Director-General of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters (Prime Minister)	❍ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch) ❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch) ❍ Authority provided for under the Disaster Measures Basic Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch)
Action against violation of territorial airspace (Article 84, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When a foreign aircraft enters Japan's territorial airspace in violation of international law and/or the provisions of the Aviation Law or other relevant laws and regulations	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required	The action necessary to make invading aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan (guiding intruders away, issuing radio transmission warnings, use of weapons, etc.) (see Note 4)
Elimination of mines and other dangerous objects (Article 84-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)		(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required	❍ Elimination and disposition of mines and other dangerous explosive objects found on the sea
Evacuation of Japanese nationals residing abroad (Article 84-3, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When a disaster, commotion, or other emergency situation occurs in a foreign country	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to evacuate Japanese nationals and protect their life and body	❍ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty
Rear area support (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-4, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, Ship Inspection Operations Law)	When a situation that may seriously affect the peace and security of Japan occurs in an area surrounding Japan	(1) Authorized by: supplies—Minister of Defense or someone else delegated authority by the Minister; services/rear area search and rescue activities/ship inspection operations-Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: required (prior to taking any response measure, in principle) (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister (according to the basic plan and the established implementation guideline)	❍ Provision of supplies and services for rear area support; rear area search and rescue activities; and ship inspection operations ❍ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty
International disaster relief activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-4, International Disaster Relief Law)		(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: request of the government of the disaster-stricken country to dispatch international disaster relief teams, and consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs	❍ International disaster relief activities by units and the like or personnel of the SDF, and transportation of personnel and goods necessary for the activities
International peace cooperation activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-4, International Peace Cooperation Law)	When a request is made from the United Nations to take part in international peace cooperation activities compatible with the International Peace Cooperation Law	(1) Authorized by: Chief of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (Prime Minister) (2) Consent of the Diet: required if units or other groups of the SDF implement peacekeeping operations of the peacekeeping force (3) Additional requirements: Cabinet decision for operations other than peacekeeping operations	❍ International peace cooperation activities by units and the like of the SDF, and transportation operations entrusted to Japan ❍ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Type of Authorized Actions Authority is Provided
Activities based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law (supplementary provision of the Self-Defense Forces Law Paragraph 8 Item 1, Replenish Support Special Measures Law Article 5)		(1) Authorized by: supplies-Minister of Defense or someone else delegated authority by the Minister; services-Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: required	❍ Provision of supplies and services by units and the like of the SDF as replenishment support activities ❍ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty
Activities based on the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (supplementary provision of the Self-Defense Forces Law Paragraph 8 Item 2, Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq Article 8)		(1) Authorized by: supplies-Minister of Defense or someone else delegated authority by the Minister; services-Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: required	❍ Provision of supplies and services by units and the like of the SDF as response measures ❍ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty

(All authority referred to in the above table is prescribed by applicable law)

Notes: 1. If the Prime Minister gives approval to services in connection with defense facility construction, as well as U.S. military actions before a defense operations order is issued, such approval is specified in the Basic Response Plan and presented to the Diet for consent (Article 9, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure National Independence and Security in a Situation of Armed Attack).

2. Full title: Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials.

3. Moreover, SDF unit commanders are authorized to dispatch units, should a fire or other disaster occur in or near the Defense Ministry's facilities.

4. The use of weapons is not specifically defined, but is generally covered under "necessary action."

Reference 29. Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel

Type of Operation	Provision	Content
Action against violation of territorial airspace	Article 84, Self-Defense Forces Law	It is considered that the use of force that falls under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code is allowed as part of making aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan.
Public security operation	Article 89 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security operations.
	Article 90 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel who are ordered into public security operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials, use weapons under certain cases, such as when they reasonably consider that persons to be guarded in the line of duty and others may suffer violence or infringement or are apparently exposed to such danger and no appropriate means of overcoming it exist other than the use of weapons.
	Article 91 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows shooting with risk of injury to stop boats that meet certain conditions, applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security operations.
Guarding operation	Article 91-2 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under guarding operations.
	Article 91-2 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel who are ordered into guarding operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials, use weapons in execution of their duties to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when a clear danger of devastating destruction to the installation being guarded exists and there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons.
Defense operation	Article 88, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel and units under defense operations may take necessary military action to defend Japan.
	Article 92 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials, Article 90 (1) of the Self-Defense Forces Law and Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law apply mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties to maintain public order by SDF personnel under defense operations.
Civil protection dispatch	Article 92-3 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to SDF personnel ordered to civil protection dispatches only when police officers, Japan Coast Guard Officers, including petty officers, are not present.
Establishment of defense facilities	Article 92-4, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in construction of defense facilities may use weapons to the extent that is considered proper and necessary in light of a situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons to protect the lives and bodies of themselves and other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Information-gathering duties before public security operation order	Article 92-5, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in information-gathering duties before public security operation order may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of themselves or other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Maritime security operation	Article 93 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security operations.
	Article 93 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows shooting with risk of injury to stop boats that meet certain conditions, applied mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security operations.
Destruction of ballistic missiles	Article 93-2, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF units ordered to destroy ballistic missiles which are headed toward Japan may use weapons as required.

Type of Operation	Provision	Content
Evacuation of Japanese nationals residing abroad	Article 94-5, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in evacuation of Japanese nationals and others overseas may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect the lives and bodies of themselves, other SDF personnel engaged in the evacuation, or Japanese and foreign nationals to be evacuated. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Guarding weapons, etc.	Article 95, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in duties of guarding weapons, etc. of the SDF may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in the light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect the weapons, etc. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Guarding facilities	Article 95-2, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel that meet certain conditions, engaged in duties of guarding facilities of the SDF in Japan may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to execute their duties or to protect themselves or others. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Maintenance of internal order	Article 96 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel exclusively engaged in maintaining order within the SDF.

Provision	Content
Article 12, Related Measures Law U.S. Military Actions	SDF personnel and others ordered to provide services in accordance with measures related to U.S. military actions may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect lives or bodies of themselves, other Self-Defense personnel who are with them, or those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 37, Marine Transportation Restriction Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to MSDF personnel ordered to execute the measures in line with the Marine Transportation Restriction Law. If the crew of the vessel does not obey repeated orders to halt, persistently resists or tries to escape and when there is a considerable reason to believe that there are no other means to halt the vessel, the said personnel may use their weapons within the extent that is judged to be reasonably necessary, following the orders of the Captain etc.
Article 152, Prisoners of War Law	SDF personnel ordered into defense operations and engaged in imprisonment and SDF personnel engaged in guarding prisoners may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 24, International Peace Cooperation Law International peace cooperation assignments	SDF personnel engaged in international peace cooperation assignments may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in the light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of themselves, other SDF personnel, and international peace cooperation personnel who are with them on the scene or those who have come under their control while conducting their duties. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 11, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan Rear area support activities	SDF personnel ordered to provide services, etc. as rear area support or to implement rear area search and rescue activities may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of themselves and others engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 6, Ship Inspection Operations Law Ship inspection operations	SDF personnel and others ordered to execute ship inspection operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of themselves and others engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code. SDF personnel and others engaged
Article 8, Special Measures Law concerning Replenishment Support Activities	SDF personnel and others ordered to execute Replenishment Support Activities may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of themselves and others engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 17, Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq Humanitarian and reconstruction assistance	SDF personnel and others ordered to provide humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, etc., may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, other Self-Defense personnel who are with them, staff members of humanitarian or reconstruction assistance organizations in Iraq, or those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of Self-Defense officials. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.

Reference 30. Basic Guidelines for the Protection of Civilians (Outline)

Introduction

The Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan was enacted in June 2003. The law stipulates basic response measures in the event of armed attacks against Japan from foreign countries. Enacted in June 2004 following the enactment of the situation law was the Civil Protection Law, which stipulates necessary measures to be taken to protect civilian lives, their bodies and their assets from armed attacks in situations including one in which Japan comes under armed attack. Meanwhile, the Cabinet approved the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) in December 2004. The national security goal set under the NDPO is to prevent any threat from reaching Japan and, in the event that it does, repel it and minimize any damage and to improve the international security environment so as to reduce the chances that any threat will reach Japan in the first place. Under this background, basic guidelines are to be set based on Article 32 of the Civil Protection Law.

Chapter 1 Basic Policy Concerning Implementation of Measures for Protecting Civilians

The state, local governments, designated state-run public institutions and designated local public institutions do their utmost in order to implement measures for protecting civilians appropriately and expeditiously in line with the Civil Protection Law, other laws, basic guidelines, civil protection plan undertaken by designated administrative institutions and prefectures, and the civil protection plan undertaken by designated public institutions while taking the following points into consideration.

1) Respecting fundamental human rights, limiting the scope of restrictions on citizens' freedom and rights to minimum necessary levels, and implementing measures under fair and adequate procedures
2) Ensuring procedures and adequately managing documents to enable relief measures to be taken in an expeditious manner for protection of citizens' rights and profits
3) Providing citizens with accurate information on situations about armed attacks at an appropriate timing and in an appropriate manner
4) Ensuring the establishment of relations of mutual cooperation among the state, local governments and designated state-run public institutions, and ensuring the promotion of cooperation among local governments, the Defense Ministry and the SDF when taking measures including requesting SDF units to be dispatched to engage in civil protection activities
5) Implementing educational and enlightenment measures, improving activities by firefighting groups and voluntarily formed disaster-prevention organizations, and seeking citizens' support and cooperation in activities by volunteering groups
6) Respecting the independence of the Red Cross Society of Japan, giving special consideration to freedom of expression in speech and others by broadcasting business operators, and respecting the independence of designated state-run public institutions and designated local public institutions
7) When issuing warnings, guiding people for evacuation and engaging in rescue operations, special considerations are to be given to people needing special protection measures, such as aged people and handicapped people. When information is collected on the safety of foreign nationals, adequate measures are to be taken based on international laws concerning humanitarian protection
8) Safety measures are to be implemented sufficiently for parties in charge of implementing civil protection steps, transportation services operators, people providing medical services, parties managing livelihood-related facilities and running livelihood-related facilities, and parties providing cooperation in implementation of civil protection measures
9) Measures to revise initial instructions issued by the Prime Minister when governors of concerned prefectures

deem it impossible to implement measures being introduced based on the Prime Minister's instructions such as an instruction for evacuation

Chapter 2 Items Concerning Assumed Situations in which Japan Comes under Armed Attacks

Assumed situations in which Japan comes under armed attacks cannot be defined in a uniformed manner. But such situations can be roughly categorized into four types. These situations are likely to occur in a compound manner. Characteristics of each type of situation are explained below.

1) Invasion via landing
   - Prior preparations against the invasion are possible. Advanced evacuation from expected battle areas is necessary.
   - Generally speaking, areas where civil protection measures are to be implemented are assumed to be wide.
2) Armed attacks by guerrillas and special forces
   - Activities by these forces cannot be forecast or detected in advance. Damage from attacks by these forces is assumed to occur in an instantaneous manner.
   - Citizens are to be temporarily evacuated to indoor areas as an immediate step against the attack. Full-fledged evacuation is to follow with safety measures being taken by concerned institutions.
3) Attacks by ballistic missiles
   - Determining the missile's target area when it was fired is extremely difficult. A missile is to reach its target quickly after it was fired.
   - It is important to try to localize the missile's damage area by providing information on the launch in a speedy manner. Evacuation is to be mainly in indoor areas.
4) Attacks via air
   - Bombing by airplanes makes it difficult for authorities to determine specific targets of the attack, which underlines the need for authorities to issue instructions for outdoor evacuation in wide areas.

Chapter 3 Establishment of Implementation Posture

(1) The state, local governments and designated state-run public institutions are to establish a posture to implement civil protection measures in an appropriate and expeditious manner, including allocating clerical works to be assigned to divisions and bureaus of these parties and posting of employees of these parties for specific works under civil protection plans. The state and local governments are to take measures to foster human resources, including improving educational and training courses.

Local governments are to improve the system to implement civil protection measures while utilizing existing systems for disaster prevention. Prefectural governments, in particular, should strive to establish a posture in which their employees stand by around the clock so that they can respond the moment after the outbreak of an emergency situation, as well as establishing a disaster-prevention system. Municipalities should strive to strengthen an employee stand-by system in cooperation with local firefighters' groups formed on a permanent basis.

(2) A special task force of the state and task forces of local governments are to promote cooperation in order to implement civil protection measures in a perfect manner.

The Prime Minister is to set up a special task force in the area concerned, when taking response measures in the local area is deemed necessary. The local task force is to fully take charge of liaison and coordination with a special task force created at a concerned prefectural government.

Chapter 4 Items Concerning Measures for Protecting of Civilians

1. Measures Concerning Evacuation of Residents

(1) A warning relating to the situation of armed attacks, a forecast on armed attacks and areas expected to come under imminent armed attacks is to be issued in a document written as easily as possible and as compactly as possible. Such warning is to be notified to residents via public communications networks such as comprehensive administrative networks and regional satellite communications networks as well as disaster-prevention wireless radio networks operated by local municipalities. Sirens are to be used in principle so as to ensure that the warning can reach areas where armed attacks are deemed to be imminent or armed attacks are deemed as having occurred.

Municipalities are to ensure that the warning has reached all households covered by the municipalities in cooperation with voluntarily formed disaster-prevention organizations and neighborhood associations. Special consideration is to be given so that aged people and handicapped people can be informed of the warning.

As broadcasting operators, designated public institutions are to broadcast the warning so as to convey the warning's content to households.

(2) The task force chief is to instruct the governor of a concerned prefecture to take evacuation measures when evacuation of residents from specified areas is deemed necessary after situations surrounding the emergency are examined in a comprehensive manner.

When the instruction of evacuation measures becomes necessary beyond a certain prefecture, the task force chief is to instruct the state to take evacuation measures as the state's policy after hearing views and opinions from affected prefectures.

(3) Following are points to be considered in the event of evacuation.

- In view of the fact that having a large number of residents in big cities evacuate to remote areas quickly during a short period of time is extremely difficult, governors of prefectures should strive to get information about available evacuation facilities and designate facilities that can sufficiently accommodate such residents while the task force chief should basically instruct affected residents to immediately evacuate to indoor facilities in their neighborhood, before issuing other instructions in response to new developments later.
- On the evacuation of people living in isolated islands, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport is to provide necessary support by examining the availability of airplanes to be used in the event of an emergency, so as to smoothly airlift affected people in response to requests by concerned local governments.
- On the evacuation of people living in the neighborhood of nuclear power plants, the task force chief is to instruct adequate evacuation measures in response to developments in the situation.
- On the evacuation of people living in the neighborhood of SDF facilities and U.S. military facilities, the state and local governments are to keep close cooperation even during peacetime in order to ensure the use of evacuation facilities, evacuation routes and means to transport evacuees. The state is also to implement necessary coordination with local governments so that the governments can take measures to evacuate local residents in the event of armed attacks.
- On the evacuation of people living on peninsulas, mountainous areas and in the neighborhood of nuclear power plants, governors of concerned prefectures, when issuing evacuation instructions, can recommend the use of self-owned vehicles as transportation means for evacuation after taking into consideration traffic situations of the regions.
- In cooperation with local governments, the state is to clarify points to be taken into account by civilians in the event of evacuation and to disseminate these points to the people, depending upon types of armed

attacks including those by ballistic missiles.

- It is necessary to avoid guiding people to evacuate leeward in the event of armed attacks by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and it is important to have them put on hats and masks in evacuation to help reduce the skin's exposure to the contaminated air as much as possible. When human bodies are seen to be contaminated by radioactive iodine in the wake of nuclear weapons attacks, affected people are to be instructed to take agents to neutralize such iodine. When attacks by biological and chemical weapons are launched, affected people are to be instructed to leave the attacked areas or the sites immediately and evacuate to indoor rooms that are highly shielded against the air outside.

(4) Governors of prefectures who have received evacuation instructions are to instruct affected people to evacuate immediately via mayors of municipalities. The governors are then to show major evacuation routes such as national roads and local roads, and cite available transportation means for evacuation such as railways and buses, after examining geographical features of each region. Local governments are to keep close contact with designated public transportation operators to ensure means to transport evacuees.

Mayors of municipalities are to have residents informed of the evacuation instruction, using disaster prevention wireless radio networks operated by the municipalities and public relations vehicles.

As broadcasting operators, designated public institutions are to broadcast information on the evacuation instruction in a prompt, accurate and compact manner.

(5) When an instruction of evacuation is issued, mayors of municipalities are to devise evacuation implementation measures in line with the civil protection plan and evacuation guidelines prepared in advance, and to guide people to safe places.

In order to adequately evacuate aged people and handicapped people, the mayors are to request those who run facilities that house such people to implement measures for their smooth evacuation in line with measures that would be taken in the case of fires and earthquakes.

If response measures by employees of the municipalities and local firefighting agencies alone are deemed to be insufficient, police officers, Japan Coast Guard officers or SDF officers are to be mobilized to smoothly evacuate affected people.

2. Measures Concerning Relief of Evacuees

(1) Following the receipt of an instruction by the task force chief to give relief to evacuated people, governors of prefectures are to conduct relief operations that are deemed necessary, including provision of accommodation facilities, supplies of food stuffs and provision of money to buy daily necessities. The governors are to conduct these relief operations without receiving a relief instruction by the task force chief, if such operations are deemed to be necessary immediately. Special considerations are to be given in order to provide adequate relief to aged people and handicapped people.

(2) Prefectural governments are to establish shelters and manage these facilities in an adequate manner by ensuring the evacuees' health in a sound condition and maintain their privacy in the shelters.

Prefectural governments are, even during peacetime, to establish methods to supply and procure food, water and sleeping gear to be used in the event of armed attacks in line with methods that would be employed in the case of natural disasters.

The state is to supply pharmaceuticals, food stuffs, daily necessities and fuel, when necessary or in line with support requests from governors of concerned prefectures. The state is also to ensure ways to supply such goods in cooperation with concerned industrial organizations. The state is to give special consideration to ensuring ways to supply food stuffs and daily necessities to people in isolated islands.

If necessary, concerned prefectures are to open emergency medical facilities in cases where a large number of citizens have sustained injuries as a result of large-scale armed attacks against Japan. The

prefectures are also to set up medical squads and dispatch qualified people to the squads. The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare and other ministries are to secure medical doctors and form their own medial teams, if necessary. The Ministry of Defense is to dispatch hygiene units to affected areas in response to requests from governors of concerned prefectures or the head of a special task force.

(3) When a disaster stemming from an armed attack occurs, the state and prefectures will utilize medical supplies and medical equipment that have been stockpiled so that they could be used in the event of armed attacks by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

(4) On medical activities in the event of armed attacks by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, the Prime Minister is to instruct concerned Cabinet ministers to take necessary measures, including dispatch of emergency medical teams, and provision of medical supplies and medical equipment, in cooperation with concerned prefectural governments. In the event of attacks by biological weapons, medical services operators are to take necessary protection measures, including vaccination, to provide medical treatment to the victims and prevent the spread of the biological agents used in the attacks to other areas. In the event of attacks by chemical weapons, medical services operators are to take necessary measures, including neutralizing the contamination of the chemical agents used in the attacks as fast as possible.

(5) On activities to collect information on the safety of citizens and provision of such information to other parties, consideration is to be given to the protection of personal information and freedom of press.

Heads of local governments are to collect and sort out information on the safety of citizens, including evacuees and people who have been admitted to the hospital. Other administrative organizations are to help heads of local governments in collecting information on the safety of citizens.

Upon receiving inquiries on the safety of citizens, the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications or heads of local governments are to provide information on such safety unless the inquiries are deemed as being done for unduly purposes.

Designated administrative agencies, designated public institutions and other relevant organizations are to try to cooperate with heads of local governments in collecting information on the safety of citizens.

The Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications and heads of local governments are to cooperate with the Red Cross Society of Japan in collecting and sorting out information on the safety of foreign nationals.

3. Response Measures Concerning Disasters Caused by Armed Attacks

(1) On response measures concerning disasters caused by the armed attacks against Japan, the state is to take necessary measures on its own while the head of a special task force is, if necessary, to immediately instruct governors of prefectures to implement these measures after explaining an implementation policy to the governors.

Governors of prefectures are to request the head of a special task force to take necessary measures, including dispatches of firefighters, police officers, Maritime Safety Agency officers and SDF units, if preventing disasters from armed attacks and reducing the damage from such attacks by relevant prefectures alone are deemed difficult.

(2) If emergency measures to prevent danger of citizens are deemed necessary, governments of concerned prefectures are to swiftly issue an emergency notice and, if necessary, take measures, including an issuance of an evacuation instruction and designation of dangerous areas.

As broadcasting operators, designated public institutions are to broadcast information on the emergency notice swiftly.

(3) Government ministries and agencies having jurisdiction over certain livelihood-related facilities and relevant prefectures should ensure the obtainment of information on these facilities during peacetime.

Government ministries and agencies having jurisdiction over certain livelihood-related facilities should maintain contact with the Fire and Disaster Management Agency, the National Police Agency and the Maritime Safety Agency, and take note of special points to be considered to ensure the safety of each facility according to the characteristics and features of each.

When taking measures to ensure the safety of certain livelihood-related facilities and their surrounding areas is deemed necessary, the Prime Minister is to instruct relevant Cabinet ministers to strengthen security and take other measures including evacuation of citizens living in the areas, based on the government's basic response plan.

In the event of armed attacks being launched against Japan, governors of prefectures are to request public safety commissions of the prefectures to swiftly designate livelihood-related facilities where people are barred from entry. To be designated off-limit are facilities whose security, if not ensured, would cause significant damage to the surrounding areas, such as dams, nuclear power plants and stations handling a large amount of dangerous objects.

(4) Following points need to be considered as ways to ensure the security of nuclear power plants in addition to taking measures which are usually meant to ensure the safety of a livelihood-related facility.

- When the leakage of radioactive substances is reported or the leakage of such substances is warned, the Prime Minister is to immediately set up a special local task force while ensuring safety in the affected area. In principle, such a special task force is to be headquartered in an off-site area. The task force is to organize a joint council with the concerned local government to work out measures against disasters stemming from armed attacks on nuclear power plants. The joint council is to be led by the head of the local task force.
- In the event of armed attacks, nuclear power plant operators are to immediately take necessary measures to halt the operation of nuclear power reactors. The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry is to immediately order nuclear power plant operators to stop the operation of nuclear reactors located in areas covered by the warning. If a warning is issued without designating specific areas, the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry is to order suspension of operation for nuclear reactors whose suspension is deemed necessary after the degree of danger and its specific content are examined. Nuclear power plant operators are to stop the operation of their reactors on their own decision if the situation is emergent. After relevant nuclear power reactors stop operating, the state and nuclear power plant operators are to take necessary measures to ensure power supply.

(5) When disasters arise following armed attacks by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, the Prime Minister is, based on the basic response plan, to instruct relevant Cabinet ministers to swiftly collect information, launch operations to rescue victims, promptly identify objects that have caused the disaster, determine the contaminated area, and implement necessary measures to decontaminate the area and prevent the spread of the contamination. If the situation is emergent, the Prime Minister is to ask for cooperation from heads of concerned prefectures.

In response to these instructions by the Prime Minister and his request for cooperation from heads of concerned prefectures, firefighting agencies, prefectural police authorities, the Maritime Safety Agency and the SDF are to implement necessary response measures. These response measures are to be implemented after necessary safety measures are taken, including the use of protection gear by those who are to engage in actual rescue and other operations. In the event of attacks by biological agents, response measures are to be taken after protection measures are implemented, including vaccination against the agents.

Information on the disaster is to be disseminated to citizens in order to prevent the citizens from panicking. In the event of attacks by biological agents, information on vaccination is to be disseminated to citizens while the Minster of Health, Labour and Welfare is to instruct governors of relevant prefectures to have citizens vaccinated against the agents, if necessary.

The Governor of a concerned prefecture is to make coordination with governors of other prefectures and police authorities of concerned prefectures before introducing measures including barring citizens from entering certain buildings and imposing traffic restrictions.

When water used by citizens is contaminated as a result of attacks by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare or governors of prefectural governments are, if necessary, to order water-supply parties to take measures, including limiting the water supply.

(6) If firefighting, rescue and fast-aid activities are deemed necessary in response to disasters stemming from armed attacks against Japan, the Commissioner of the Fire and Disaster Management Agency is to instruct governors of concerned prefectures or mayors of concerned municipalities to ensure that these activities can be conducted in an appropriate and expeditious manner.

If citizens are infected with biological agents used as weapons in armed attacks against Japan or they are feared to be infected with such agents, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare is to designate the infection from the chemical agent as a designated infection and, if necessary, take measures under the Infectious Disease Law.

When a large amount of waste, such as rubble and debris, arises as a result of large-scale armed attacks against Japan, the Ministry of the Environment is to promptly dispose of such waste under exceptional rules set to govern waste disposal.

When protection of important cultural assets from possible damage following armed attacks is deemed particularly necessary, the Commissioner of the Cultural Affairs Agency is to order or recommend owners of the assets to take measures to change the assets' storage places, and to provide necessary support to the owners if they ask for such support.

4. Points to be Considered Concerning Measures in General to Protect Civilians

(1) Telecommunications carriers are to preferentially cater to important telecommunications needs by the state, local governments and designated public institutions to implement measures for civil protection in the wake of armed attacks against Japan.

(2) In consultation with designated public institutions that serve as transportation operators, the state and local governments are to strive to ensure transportation of evacuees and emergency relief goods while taking into consideration safety issues involved.

(3) In the event of armed attacks, police authorities of prefectural governments are to implement traffic restriction measures on general vehicles, including their being barred from using certain roads, in order to secure traffic routes for transporting evacuees and emergency relief goods.

(4) Concerned local governments, in cooperation with relevant organizations, are to try to improve systems to receive emergency relief goods from the general public and businesses, and to distribute these goods to people needing them.

(5) The state is to set standards and procedures for issuing Red Cross and other special badges to be used in emergency. Based on these standards and procedures, heads of designated administrative agencies and others are to devise necessary guidelines for specifically issuing such badges.

5. Measures to Stabilize Civil Life

(1) In order to stabilize civil life, the state and local governments are to take necessary measures, including helping stabilize prices of daily necessities, imposing moratorium on debt repayments, stabilizing the currency and monetary system, ensuring to offer school education and maintaining employment.

(2) Local governments are to take necessary measures to ensure that water can be supplied in a stable and appropriate manner. Designated public institutions are to implement necessary measures to ensure that

electricity and gas can be supplied in a stable and appropriate manner, ensure that civil passengers and cargo can be transported in an appropriate manner, ensure that telecommunications lines can be kept through such measures as installing emergency circuit lines and to ensure that mail and correspondence services can be maintained.

(3) The state, local governments and designated public institutions are to begin quick restoration work for damaged facilities and equipment under their jurisdiction after ensuring appropriate safety measures involved in the work.

6. Measures Concerning Reconstruction after Disasters from Armed Attacks

The state is to implement necessary measures for prompt restoration of facilities and services while examining their damage from armed attacks. The Government is to promptly take necessary steps to establish a legal framework to finance measures being implemented in the restoration work following armed attacks.

7. Exercise and Stockpiling

(1) The state and local governments should conduct practical training against armed attacks from foreign countries and evaluate results of the training. Designated public institutions should independently engage in training for civil protection while such institutions should encourage citizens to participate in training courses sponsored by the state or local governments. Training mentioned above is to be conducted in combination with disaster-prevention drills.

(2) The state, local governments and designated public institutions should ensure to get accurate information about the amount of goods and materials being stockpiled against natural disasters, their specific kinds and where these goods are to be supplied in disasters so that these goods and materials can also be used for civil protection in the event of armed attacks against Japan.

The state should try to secure goods and materials that would become necessary in the event of armed attacks by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, such as protective garments to be worn against chemical weapons, and special medicines to neutralize chemical agents, and also should try to improve the system to procure these goods and materials.

Local governments should establish a system to enable stockpiled anti-disaster goods and materials to be utilized in the event of armed attacks against Japan, and also should strive to establish a system to procure and stockpile goods and materials that would become particularly necessary in the event of such armed attacks.

Chapter 5 Responses to Emergency Response Situations

(1) Measures almost equal to civil protection measures that would be taken in the case of armed attacks against Japan are to be implemented in the event of terrorist attacks against the country, which are seen as roughly equal to armed attacks. Therefore, the state of being attacked by terrorists is categorized as a situation that requires emergency response action, leading the Government to take emergency response protection measures. Following are situations that require emergency response action by the Government.

1) A situation in which an attack is launched against facilities containing inherently dangerous substances (destruction of nuclear power plants and explosion of petrochemical complex facilities)
2) A situation in which an attack is launched against facilities accommodating a large number of people and against public transportation systems (explosion of terminal stations and railways)
3) A situation in which an attack is launched using substances that are capable of injuring and killing a large number of people (indiscriminate dispersion of anthrax and sarin)
4) A situation in which an attack is launched using transportation systems as a way to destroy targets

(suicidal terrorist attacks using civil airplanes)

(2) When a special headquarters is set up to deal with situations requiring emergency response action, the state, led by the headquarters, is to do its utmost to implement emergency response protection measures in cooperation with local governments and designated public institutions.

The Prime Minister is to establish a special task force in a certain local area if setting up such a task force there is deemed necessary. The local task force is to fully take charge of liaison and coordination with a prefectural task force.

(3) Emergency response protection measures are to be taken basically in line with basic policies and civil protection steps stipulated under Chapter 1 to Chapter 4 of the basic guidelines.

The notification of warning and the scope of areas subject to such notification in the case of situations requiring emergency response measures are to be determined by the task force chief after the degree of the damage by the attack and the scope of geographical areas impacted by the attack are examined.

Chapter 6 Procedures for Planning Concerning Civil Protection

The Civil Protection Plan undertaken by designated administrative institutions and prefectures, and the Civil Protection Plan undertaken by designated public institutions are to be devised or revised after views and opinions from wider quarters of society are heard. Designated public institutions are to ensure opportunities for hearing opinions from those who are engaging in work to devise civil protection plans.

Reference 31. Highlights of the Civil Protection Plan of the Ministry of Defense

Civil Protection Plans are prepared by all designated administrative agencies based on provisions including Article 33, Paragraph 1 of the Civil Protection Law.

1. Basic Concept

The SDF shall take measures to protect civilians such as evacuation, relief of residents, and responses to armed attack situations, to the extent possible without affecting its main duty to repel an armed attack with full force in an armed attack situation.

2. Implementation Framework

a. An intra-ministry coordination system and emergency call posture of personnel shall be developed in peacetime.

b. In armed attack situations and anticipated situations, the Defense Minister shall instruct necessary responses with the advice of the Defense Council, to be held as necessary. To that end, the system assisting the Defense Minister shall be established through augmentation of personnel and others. In addition, units shall be put on readiness in anticipation of implementing civil protection measures (enhanced service capabilities of personnel, inspection and maintenance of equipment and supplies, etc.).

3. Implementation Procedures for Civil Protection Measures

a. If the Defense Minster is requested by a prefectural governor and recognizes it is unavoidable, or is requested by the Task Force Chief, the Minister of State for Defense, with the approval of the Prime Minister, orders a civilian protection dispatch to implement civil protection measures.

b. If the Minster of State for Defense is requested for support by a prefectural governor and recognizes it is required, the Defense Minister orders defense operations/public security operations to all or part of the forces to implement civil protection measures.

4. Contents of Civil Protection Measures Executed by the SDF

a. Evacuation of residents

The SDF, in coordination with related organizations, implements guidance and transportation of evacuated residents, as well as collection and provision of necessary information. In addition, it coordinates and manages procedures associated with traffic inside the SDF's posts and bases or on the premises of U.S. military installations in Japan, for the purpose of evacuation.

b. Relief of evacuated residents

The SDF implements lifesaving measures (such as search and rescue, and provision of first aid), and as appropriate, measures for livelihood support (such as preparation of hot meals, water supply, and transportation of aid supplies). In addition, it gives permission to use facilities of the Ministry of Defense for the purpose of relief.

c. Responses to armed attack situations

The SDF checks on the damage situation (including monitoring support), saves lives (including search and rescue, and provision of first aid), prevents the spread of damage (including evacuation support of surrounding residents, and firefighting), and removes hazardous substances caused by attacks using NBC weapons, etc. In addition, it implements support for securing safety of life-related facilities (including instruction/advice, and personnel dispatch).

5. Responses to Emergency Response Situations

The SDF implements protection measures for emergency responses pursuant to the measures for civil protection in implementation procedures and content.

Reference 32. Retired SDF Personnel Working at Disaster Prevention-Related Departments of Local Governments (As of June 2008)

Area		Prefectural Government	Municipal Government
Hokkaido	Hokkaido	Hokkaido Prefectural Government	Obihiro City Government
			Chitose City Government (two persons)
			Bibai City Government
			Sapporo City Government (two persons)
			Hakodate City Government
			Shikiabe Town Government
			Bihoro Town Government
			Hokuto City Government
			Asahikawa City Government
			Iwamizawa City Government
			Eniwa City Government
			Engaru Town Government
			Tomakomai City Government
			Kushiro City Government
			Kushiro Town Government
Tohoku	Aomori	Aomori Prefectural Government	Aomori City Government
			Hirosaki City Government
			Hachinohe City Government
	Iwate	Iwate Prefectural Government	Shiwa Town Government
			Takizawa Village Office
	Miyagi	Miyagi Prefectural Government	Sendai City Government (two persons)
			Ishinomaki City Government
	Akita	Akita Prefectural Government	
	Yamagata	Yamagata Prefectural Government	Higashine City Government
	Fukushima	Fukushima Prefectural Government	
Kanto	Ibaraki	Ibaraki Prefectural Government	
	Tochigi	Tochigi Prefectural Government (two persons)	Utsunomiya City Government
	Gunma	Gunma Prefectural Government	
	Saitama	Saitama Prefectural Government	Soka City Government
			Saitama City Government
	Chiba	Chiba Prefectural Government	Urayasu City Government
			Ichikawa City Government
	Tokyo	Tokyo Metropolitan Government (three persons)	Shinagawa Ward Office
			Itabashi Ward Office
			Arakawa Ward Office
			Adachi Ward Office
	Kanagawa	Kanagawa Prefectural Government	Yokohama City Government (four persons)
			Kawasaki City Government
Chubu	Niigata	Niigata Prefectural Government	Joetsu City Government
	Toyama	Toyama Prefectural Government	Toyama City Government
	Ishikawa		Wajima City Government
			Komatsu City Government
	Fukui		Fukui City Government
	Yamanashi	Yamanashi Prefectural Government	Kofu City Government
	Nagano	Nagano Prefectural Government (two persons)	Ina City Government
	Gifu	Gifu Prefectural Government	
	Shizuoka	Shizuoka Prefectural Government (two persons)	Ito City Government
	Aichi	Aichi Prefectural Government	Miyoshi Town Government
			Seto City Government

Area		Prefectural Government	Municipal Government
Kinki	Mie	Mie Prefectural Government	Ise City Government
			Kameyama City Government
	Shiga	Shiga Prefectural Government	Kusatsu City Government
			Takashima City Government
	Kyoto	Kyoto Prefectural Government	
	Osaka	Osaka Prefectural Government	Sakai City Government
			Ikeda City Government
			Osaka City Government
			Kawachinagano City Government
			Izumi City Government
			Shijonawate City Government
	Hyogo		Akashi City Government
			Toyooka City Government
	Nara	Nara Prefectural Government	Kashihara City Government
	Wakayama	Wakayama Prefectural Government	Wakayama City Government
Chugoku	Tottori	Tottori Prefectural Government	Tottori City Government
	Shimane	Shimane Prefectural Government	Matsue City Government
	Okayama	Okayama Prefectural Government (five persons)	Kurashiki City Government
	Hiroshima	Hiroshima Prefectural Government (five persons)	
	Yamaguchi	Yamaguchi Prefectural Government	Iwakuni City Government
			Shimonoseki City Government
Shikoku	Tokushima	Tokushima Prefectural Government (two persons)	Komatsushima City Government
			Anan City Government
			Yoshinogawa City Government
	Kagawa	Kagawa Prefectural Government	Marugame City Government
	Ehime	Ehime Prefectural Government (two persons)	
	Kochi	Kochi Prefectural Government	
Kyushu	Fukuoka	Fukuoka Prefectural Government	Iizuka City Government
			Tagawa City Government
			Nogata City Government
	Saga	Saga Prefectural Government (two persons)	Karatsu City Government
	Nagasaki	Nagasaki Prefectural Government (four persons)	Sasebo City Government (two persons)
			Omura City Government
	Kumamoto	Kumamoto Prefectural Government	Kumamoto City Government
			Uki City Government
	Oita	Oita Prefectural Government	Oita City Government
	Miyazaki	Miyazaki Prefectural Government (two persons)	Miyakonojo City Government
			Nobeoka City Government
			Saito City Government
	Kagoshima	Kagoshima Prefectural Government (two persons)	Satsuma-Sendai City Government
			Kirishima City Government
			Tarumizu City Governmen
	Okinawa		

* Part-time personnel included

Reference 33. Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century

(Tokyo, April 17, 1996)

1. Today, the Prime Minister and the President celebrated one of the most successful bilateral relationships in history. The leaders took pride in the profound and positive contribution this relationship has made to world peace and regional stability and prosperity. The strong Alliance between Japan and the U.S. helped ensure peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region during the Cold War. Our Alliance continues to underlie the dynamic economic growth in this region. The two leaders agreed that the future security and prosperity of both Japan and the U.S. are tied inextricably to the future of the Asia-Pacific region.

   The benefits of peace and prosperity that spring from the Alliance are due not only to the commitments of the two Governments, but also to the contributions of the Japanese and American people who have shared the burden of securing freedom and democracy. The Prime Minister and the President expressed their profound gratitude to those who sustain the Alliance, especially those Japanese communities that host U.S. forces, and those Americans who, far from home, devote themselves to the defense of peace and freedom.
2. For more than a year, the two Governments conducted an intensive review of the evolving political and security environment of the Asia-Pacific region and of various aspects of the Japan-U.S. security relationship. On the basis of this review, the Prime Minister and the President reaffirmed their commitment to the profound common values that guide our national policies: the maintenance of freedom, the pursuit of democracy and respect for human rights. They agreed that the foundations for our cooperation remain firm, and that this partnership will remain vital in the twenty-first century.

The Regional Outlook

3. Since the end of the Cold War, the possibility of global armed conflict has receded. The last few years have seen expanded political and security dialogue among countries of the region. Respect for democratic principles is growing. Prosperity is more widespread than at any other time in history, and we are witnessing the emergence of an Asia-Pacific community. The Asia-Pacific region has become the most dynamic area of the globe.

   At the same time, instability and uncertainty persist in the region. Tensions continue on the Korean Peninsula. There are still heavy concentrations of military force, including nuclear arsenals. Unresolved territorial disputes, potential regional conflicts, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery all constitute sources of instability.

The Japan-U.S. Alliance and the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security

4. The Prime Minister and the President underscored the importance of promoting stability in this region and dealing with the security challenges facing both countries.

   In this regard, the Prime Minister and the President reiterated the significant value of the Alliance between Japan and the U.S. They reaffirmed that the Japan-U.S. security relationship, based on the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, remains the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives, and for maintaining a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia-Pacific region as we enter the twenty-first century.

   (a) The Prime Minister confirmed Japan's fundamental defense policy as articulated in its new National Defense Program Outline adopted in November 1995, which underscored that the Japanese defense capabilities should play appropriate roles in the security environment after the Cold War. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that the most effective framework for the defense of Japan is

close defense cooperation between the two countries. This cooperation is based on a combination of appropriate defense capabilities for the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) of Japan and the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. The leaders again confirmed that U.S. deterrence under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security remains the guarantee for Japan's security.

(b) The Prime Minister and the President agreed that continued U.S. military presence is also essential for preserving peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The leaders shared the common recognition that the Japan-U.S. security relationship forms an essential pillar which supports the positive regional engagement of the U.S.

The President emphasized the U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan as well as to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. He noted that there has been some adjustment of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region since the end of the Cold War. On the basis of a thorough assessment, the U.S. reaffirmed that meeting its commitments in the prevailing security environment requires the maintenance of its current force structure of about 100,000 forward deployed military personnel in the region, including about the current level in Japan.

(c) The Prime Minister welcomed the U.S. determination to remain a stable and steadfast presence in the region. He reconfirmed that Japan would continue appropriate contributions for the maintenance of U.S. Forces Japan, such as through the provision of facilities and areas in accordance with the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and Host Nation Support. The President expressed U.S. appreciation for Japan's contributions, and welcomed the conclusion of the new Special Measures Agreement which provides financial support for U.S. forces stationed in Japan.

Bilateral Cooperation under the Japan-U.S. Security Relationship

5. The Prime Minister and the President, with the objective of enhancing the credibility of this vital security relationship, agreed to undertake efforts to advance cooperation in the following areas.

(a) Recognizing that close bilateral defense cooperation is a central element of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, both Governments agreed that continued close consultation is essential. Both Governments will further enhance the exchange of information and views on the international situation, in particular the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, in response to the changes which may arise in the international security environment, both Governments will continue to consult closely on defense policies and military postures, including the U.S. force structure in Japan, which will best meet their requirements.

(b) The Prime Minister and the President agreed to initiate a review of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation to build upon the close working relationship already established between Japan and the U.S.

The two leaders agreed on the necessity to promote bilateral policy coordination, including studies on bilateral cooperation in dealing with situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence on the peace and security of Japan.

(c) The Prime Minister and the President welcomed the April 15, 1996 signature of the Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services Between the SDF of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America, and expressed their hope that this Agreement will further promote the bilateral cooperative relationship.

(d) Noting the importance of interoperability in all facets of cooperation between the SDF of Japan and the U.S. forces, the two Governments will enhance mutual exchange in the areas of technology and equipment, including bilateral cooperative research and development of equipment such as the fighter support (F-2).

(e) The two Governments recognized that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery has important implications for their common security. They will work together to prevent proliferation and will continue to cooperate in the ongoing study on ballistic missile defense.

6. The Prime Minister and the President recognized that the broad support and understanding of the Japanese people are indispensable for the smooth stationing of U.S. Forces Japan, which is the core element of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. The two leaders agreed that both governments will make every effort to deal with various issues related to the presence and status of U.S. forces. They also agreed to make further efforts to enhance mutual understanding between U.S. forces and local Japanese communities.

In particular, with respect to Okinawa, where U.S. facilities and areas are highly concentrated, the Prime Minister and the President reconfirmed their determination to carry out steps to consolidate, realign, and reduce U.S. facilities and areas consistent with the objectives of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. In this respect, the two leaders took satisfaction in the significant progress which has been made so far through the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), and welcomed the far-reaching measures outlined in the SACO Interim Report of April 15, 1996. They expressed their firm commitment to achieve a successful conclusion of the SACO process by November 1996.

Regional Cooperation

7. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that the two Governments will jointly and individually strive to achieve a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. In this regard, the two leaders recognized that the engagement of the U.S. in the region, supported by the Japan-U.S. security relationship, constitutes the foundation for such efforts.

The two leaders stressed the importance of peaceful resolution of problems in the region. They emphasized that it is extremely important for the stability and prosperity of the region that China play a positive and constructive role, and, in this context, stressed the interest of both countries in furthering cooperation with China. Russia's ongoing process of reform contributes to regional and global stability, and merits continued encouragement and cooperation. The leaders also stated that full normalization of Japan-Russia relations based on the Tokyo Declaration is important to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. They noted also that stability on the Korean Peninsula is vitally important to Japan and the U.S. and reaffirmed that both countries will continue to make every effort in this regard, in close cooperation with the Republic of Korea.

The Prime Minister and the President reaffirmed that the two Governments will continue working jointly and with other countries in the region to further develop multilateral regional security dialogues and cooperation mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and eventually, security dialogues regarding Northeast Asia.

Global Cooperation

8. The Prime Minister and the President recognized that the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security is the core of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and underlies the mutual confidence that constitutes the foundation for bilateral cooperation on global issues.

The Prime Minister and the President agreed that the two governments will strengthen their cooperation in support of the U.N. and other international organizations through activities such as peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations.

Both Governments will coordinate their policies and cooperate on issues such as arms control and disarmament, including acceleration of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations and the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The two leaders

agreed that cooperation in the U.N. and APEC, and on issues such as the North Korean nuclear problem, the Middle East peace process, and the peace implementation process in the former Yugoslavia, helps to build the kind of world that promotes our shared interests and values.

Conclusion

9. In concluding, the Prime Minister and the President agreed that the three pillars of the Japan-U.S. relationship—security, political, and economic—are based on shared values and interests and rest on the mutual confidence embodied in the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The Prime Minister and the President reaffirmed their strong determination, on the eve of the twenty-first century, to build on the successful history of security cooperation and to work hand-in-hand to secure peace and prosperity for future generations.

Reference 34. Joint Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee

(Washington, DC, February 19, 2005)

1. United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld hosted Japan's Minister for Foreign Affairs Nobutaka Machimura and Minister of State for Defense and Director-General of the Defense Agency Yoshinori Ohno in a meeting of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) in Washington, DC, on February 19, 2005. They addressed security and alliance issues facing the United States and Japan, as well as other aspects of the relationship.

Working Together on Challenges Facing the World Today

2. The Ministers noted the excellent state of cooperative relations between the United States and Japan on a broad array of security, political, and economic issues. They looked to expand that cooperation, recognizing that the U.S.-Japan Alliance, with the U.S.-Japan Security Arrangements at its core, continues to play a vital role in ensuring the security and prosperity of both the United States and Japan, as well as in enhancing regional and global peace and stability.
3. The Ministers underscored the importance of U.S. and Japanese leadership in providing international assistance to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the broader Middle East—efforts that are already producing results. The Ministers lauded the successful cooperation between the United States and Japan with other countries in extending wide-ranging assistance to those who suffered from the earthquake and the subsequent tsunami disaster in the Indian Ocean.
4. The Ministers recognized that cooperation and consultation between the United States and Japan have been pivotal in promoting non-proliferation, particularly through the Proliferation Security Initiative. They welcomed the success of multinational interdiction exercises hosted by the United States and Japan and by others.
5. The Ministers expressed their confidence that ballistic missile defense (BMD) enhances our ability to defend against and deter ballistic missile attacks and dissuade other parties from investing in ballistic missiles. Taking note of achievements in missile defense cooperation, such as Japan's decision to introduce ballistic missile defense systems and its recent announcement on its Three Principles on Arms Export, the Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to close cooperation on policy and operational matters and to advancing U.S.-Japan cooperative research in BMD systems, with a view to possible cooperative development.

Common Strategic Objectives

6. The Ministers discussed the new security environment in which new and emerging threats, such as international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, have surfaced as common challenges. They recognized that deepening interdependence among nations in a global community means that such threats can affect the security of nations worldwide, including the United States and Japan.
7. While noting that these threats are also emerging in the Asia-Pacific region, the Ministers also emphasized that persistent challenges continue to create unpredictability and uncertainty. Moreover, they noted that modernization of military capabilities in the region also requires attention.
8. The Ministers strongly urged North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks expeditiously and without preconditions, and to commit itself to complete dismantlement of all its nuclear programs in a transparent manner subject to verification.
9. Based on this understanding of the international security environment, the Ministers concurred that both Governments need to work closely together to pursue common strategic objectives through their respective efforts, implementation of the U.S.-Japan Security Arrangements, and other joint efforts based on the Alliance. Both sides decided to hold regular consultations to coordinate policies in accordance with these common strategic objectives and to update these objectives as the security environment requires.
10. In the region, common strategic objectives include:
    - Ensure the security of Japan, strengthen peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, and maintain the capability to address contingencies affecting the United States and Japan.
    - Support peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula.
    - Seek peaceful resolution of issues related to North Korea, including its nuclear programs, ballistic missile activities, illicit activities, and humanitarian issues such as the abduction of Japanese nationals by North Korea.
    - Develop a cooperative relationship with China, welcoming the country to play a responsible and constructive role regionally as well as globally.
    - Encourage the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue.
    - Encourage China to improve transparency of its military affairs.
    - Encourage Russia's constructive engagement in the Asia-Pacific region.
    - Fully normalize Japan-Russia relations through the resolution of the Northern Territories issue.
    - Promote a peaceful, stable, and vibrant Southeast Asia.
    - Welcome the development of various forms of regional cooperation, while stressing the importance of open, inclusive, and transparent regional mechanisms.
    - Discourage destabilizing sales and transfers of arms and military technology.
    - Maintain the security of maritime traffic.
11. Global common strategic objectives include:
    - Promote fundamental values such as basic human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in the international community.
    - Further consolidate U.S.-Japan partnership in international peace cooperation activities and development assistance to promote peace, stability, and prosperity worldwide.
    - Promote the reduction and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, including through improved reliability and effectiveness of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and other regimes, and initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative.
    - Prevent and eradicate terrorism.

- Coordinate efforts to improve the effectiveness of the United Nations Security Council by making the best use of the current momentum to realize Japan's aspiration to become a permanent member.
- Maintain and enhance the stability of the global energy supply.

Strengthening of U.S.-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation

12. The Ministers expressed their support and appreciation for each other's efforts to develop their respective security and defense policies. Japan's new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) emphasize Japan's capability to respond effectively to new threats and diverse contingencies, Japan's active engagement to improve the international security environment, and the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. As a central component of its broad defense transformation effort, the United States is reorienting and strengthening its global defense posture to provide it with appropriate, strategy-driven capabilities in an uncertain security environment. The Ministers confirmed that these efforts will ensure and strengthen effective security and defense cooperation as both countries pursue common strategic objectives.
13. In this context, the Ministers underscored the need to continue examining the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan's Self-Defense Forces and the U.S. Armed Forces required to respond effectively to diverse challenges in a well-coordinated manner. This examination will take into account recent achievements and developments such as Japan's NDPG and new legislation to deal with contingencies, as well as the expanded agreement on mutual logistical support and progress in BMD cooperation. The Ministers also emphasized the importance of enhancing interoperability between U.S. and Japanese forces.
14. The Ministers concurred that this examination should contribute to these consultations on realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan. They decided to intensify these consultations in a comprehensive effort to strengthen the Alliance as the bedrock of Japan's security and the anchor of regional stability. In this context, both sides confirmed their commitment to maintaining deterrence and capabilities of U.S. forces in Japan while reducing the burden on local communities, including those in Okinawa. The Ministers directed their staffs to report expeditiously on the results of these consultations.
15. The Ministers also stressed the importance of continued efforts to enhance positive relations between local communities and U.S. forces. They emphasized that improved implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), including due attention to the environment, and steady implementation of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report are important to the stable presence of U.S. forces in Japan.
16. The Ministers, noting that the current Special Measures Agreement (SMA) will expire in March 2006, decided to start consultations on future arrangements to provide appropriate levels of host nation support, bearing in mind the significant role of the SMA in supporting the presence of U.S. forces in Japan.

Reference 35. U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future

(Washington, DC, October 29, 2005)

I. Overview

The U.S.-Japan Alliance, with the U.S.-Japan Security Arrangements at its core, is the indispensable foundation of Japan's security and of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. A close, cooperative relationship based on the Alliance also plays an important role in effectively dealing with global challenges, and must evolve to reflect the changing security environment. Therefore, following the December 2002 meeting of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC), the U.S. and Japan intensified consultations on respective U.S. and Japanese

security and defense policies in order to examine the direction of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and to develop options to adapt the Alliance to the changing regional and global security environment.

At the February 19, 2005 meeting of the SCC, the Ministers reached an understanding on common strategic objectives, and underscored the need to continue examinations of the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and the U.S. Armed Forces in pursuing those objectives. They also decided to intensify their consultations on realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan and directed their staffs to report expeditiously on the results.

Today, the SCC members reaffirmed their shared view of the security environment, in which new and emerging threats have surfaced as common challenges that can affect the security of nations worldwide, including the U.S. and Japan. They also reemphasized the persistent challenges in the Asia-Pacific region that create unpredictability and uncertainty and underscored the need to pay attention to modernization of military capabilities in the region. In this context, both sides reiterated their commitment to work closely together to pursue the regional and global common strategic objectives identified in their February 19, 2005 Joint Statement.

The SCC members approved findings and recommendations on roles, missions, and capabilities. They also approved recommendations for realignment, as reflected in this report. These measures are designed to enhance the Alliance's capability to meet new threats and diverse contingencies and, as a whole, will reduce burdens on local communities, thereby strengthening security and ensuring the Alliance remains the anchor of regional stability.

II. Roles, Missions, and Capabilities

Both sides recognized recent achievements and developments in security and defense policies related to the roles, missions, and capabilities of the U.S. and Japan, to include: bilateral cooperation in international activities such as the fight against terrorism, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), assistance to Iraq, and disaster relief following the tsunami in the Indian Ocean and the earthquake in South Asia; Japan's December 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines; progress in ballistic missile defense (BMD) cooperation; Japan's legislation to deal with contingencies; the SDF's planned transition to a new joint operations posture; and the transformation and global posture realignment of U.S. forces.

1. Primary Areas

In this context, the U.S. and Japan examined bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities, particularly those of the U.S. forces and the SDF, for responding to diverse challenges in the contemporary security environment, placing primary emphasis on the following two areas:

— Defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan, including responses to new threats and diverse contingencies;

— Efforts to improve the international security environment, such as participation in international peace cooperation activities.

2. Basic Concepts of Roles, Missions, and Capabilities

Both sides confirmed several basic concepts relevant to bilateral defense cooperation. Related to defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan, these concepts include:

- Bilateral defense cooperation remains vital to the security of Japan as well as to peace and stability of the region.
- Japan will defend itself and respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan, including addressing new threats and diverse contingencies such as ballistic missile attacks, attacks by guerilla and special forces, and invasion of remote islands. For these purposes, Japan's defense posture will be strengthened in accordance with the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines.
- The U.S. will maintain forward-deployed forces, and augment them as needed, for the defense of Japan as

well as to deter and respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan. The U.S. will provide all necessary support for the defense of Japan.

- U.S. and Japanese operations in the defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan must be consistent so that appropriate responses will be ensured when a situation in areas surrounding Japan threatens to develop into an armed attack against Japan or when such a situation and an armed attack against Japan occur simultaneously.
- Japan will continue to provide host nation support including facilities and areas for U.S. forces (hereafter referred to as "U.S. facilities and areas"). Japan will also take appropriate measures to provide seamless support to U.S. operations as the situation evolves, including support based on Japan's legislation to deal with contingencies. Both sides will work with local communities to ensure stable support for the presence and operations of U.S. forces in Japan.
- U.S. strike capabilities and the nuclear deterrence provided by the U.S. remain an essential complement to Japan's defense capabilities in ensuring the defense of Japan and contribute to peace and security in the region. Both sides also confirmed several basic concepts relevant to roles, missions, and capabilities in the area of improving the international security environment, to include:
- Bilateral cooperation in improving the international security environment to achieve regional and global common strategic objectives has become an important element of the alliance. To this end, the U.S. and Japan contribute as appropriate based on their respective capabilities, and take necessary measures to establish effective posture.
- Rapid and effective response requires flexible capabilities and can benefit from close U.S.-Japan bilateral cooperation and policy coordination. Regular exercises, including those with third countries, can improve these capabilities.
- The U.S. forces and the SDF will strengthen cooperation with other partners to contribute to international activities to improve the international security environment. In addition, both sides emphasized that the increasing importance of addressing new threats and diverse contingencies and improving the international security environment compels both sides to develop their respective defense capabilities, and to maximize the benefits of innovations in technology.

3. Examples of Operations in Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation to be Improved

Both sides reconfirmed that the entire spectrum of bilateral cooperation must be strengthened, consistent with relevant national security policies and laws, and with agreements between the U.S. and Japan. Through their examination of roles, missions, and capabilities, they emphasized the importance of improving several specific areas of cooperation:

- Air defense.
- Ballistic missile defense.
- Counter-proliferation operations, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
- Counter-terrorism.
- Minesweeping, maritime interdiction, and other operations to maintain the security of maritime traffic.
- Search and rescue operations.
- Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations, including increasing capabilities and effectiveness of operations by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and maritime patrol aircraft.
- Humanitarian relief operations.
- Reconstruction assistance operations.
- Peacekeeping operations and capacity building for other nations' peacekeeping efforts.
- Protection of critical infrastructure, including U.S. facilities and areas in Japan.
- Response to attacks by weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including disposal and decontamination of

WMD.

- Mutual logistics support activities such as supply, maintenance, and transportation. Supply cooperation includes mutual provision of aerial and maritime refueling. Transportation cooperation includes expanding and sharing airlift and sealift, including the capability provided by high speed vessels (HSV).
- Transportation, use of facilities, medical support, and other related activities for non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO).
- Use of seaport and airport facilities, road, water space and airspace, and frequency bands.

Both sides emphasized that other areas of operations not explicitly listed above remain important to alliance capabilities; this list highlights key areas for further enhancement but is not intended to be an exhaustive list of possible areas of cooperation.

4. Essential Steps to Strengthen Posture for Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation

Based on the examination of roles, missions, and capabilities described above, both sides further identified the following essential steps that can be taken in peacetime to strengthen the posture of bilateral security and defense cooperation to deal with diverse challenges in the new security environment. Both sides also emphasized the importance of continuing examinations of roles, missions, and capabilities, based on the progress made thus far, to ensure effective bilateral cooperation.

- Close and Continuous Policy and Operational Coordination.

Both sides recognized that regular policy and operational coordination will improve the alliance's timely and effective response to future changes in the strategic environment and to contingencies. Close and continuous policy and operational coordination at every level of government, from unit tactical level through strategic consultations, is essential to dissuade destabilizing military build-ups, to deter aggression, and to respond to diverse security challenges. Development of a common operational picture shared between U.S. forces and the SDF will strengthen operational coordination and should be pursued where possible. Closer cooperation between defense and other pertinent authorities is also increasingly necessary. In this context, both sides reaffirmed the need to improve the effectiveness of the comprehensive mechanism and bilateral coordination mechanism under the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation by streamlining their functions.

- Advancing Bilateral Contingency Planning.

Recalling that the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation provide a basis for bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning, both sides affirmed the continual requirement for such planning while taking full account of the changing security environment. This planning will reflect Japan's legislation to deal with contingencies, which provides a strengthened basis for contingency use by U.S. forces and the SDF of facilities, including airports and seaports, in Japan. Both sides will expand their planning by adding specificity, coordinating closely with relevant government agencies and local authorities, enhancing bilateral mechanisms and planning methods, conducting detailed surveys of civilian and SDF air and seaports, and validating their planning work through strengthened bilateral exercise programs.

- Enhancing Information Sharing and Intelligence Cooperation.

Recognizing that common situational awareness is a key to well coordinated cooperation, both sides will enhance information sharing and intelligence cooperation in the whole range from unit tactical level through national strategic level. To facilitate this interaction, both sides will take additional necessary measures to protect shared classified information so that broader information sharing is promoted among pertinent authorities.

- Improving Interoperability.

To ensure smooth cooperation as the SDF transitions to a joint operations posture, U.S. forces and the SDF will maintain regular consultations to maintain and strengthen interoperability. Continued cooperation in planning for bilateral operations and exercises will strengthen connectivity between the headquarters of U.S.

forces and the SDF and will benefit from improved secure communications capabilities.

- Expanding Training Opportunities in Japan and the United States.
  Both sides will expand opportunities for bilateral training and exercises to improve interoperability, improve capabilities, enhance readiness, more equitably distribute training impacts among local communities, and advance the effectiveness of bilateral operations. These measures will include increasing mutual use of U.S. and SDF training facilities and areas throughout Japan. The training of SDF personnel and units in Guam, Alaska, Hawaii, and the U.S. mainland will also be expanded.
  - ❍ In particular, the U.S. plans to expand its training infrastructure in Guam will provide increased training opportunities for the SDF in Guam.
  - ❍ Additionally, both sides recognized that U.S. forces and SDF participation in multinational training and exercises will enhance their contribution to a better international security environment.
- Shared Use of Facilities by U.S. Forces and the SDF.
  Both sides recognized that shared-use of facilities between U.S. forces and the SDF contributes to closer bilateral operational coordination and improved interoperability. Specific opportunities for shared use of facilities are described in the force posture realignment recommendations (see section below).
- Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD).
  Emphasizing that BMD plays a critical role in deterring and defending against ballistic missile attacks, and can dissuade other parties from development and proliferation of ballistic missiles, both sides stressed the value of closely coordinating improvements in their respective BMD capabilities. To support these BMD systems, they emphasized the critical importance of constant information gathering and sharing, as well as maintaining high readiness and interoperability in light of the minimal time available to respond to a ballistic missile threat. The U.S. will deploy additional complementary capabilities in and around Japan when appropriate, coordinating their operations to support Japan's missile defense operations. Close coordination between respective BMD command and control systems will be critical to effective missile defense operations.
  Both sides committed to strengthen and improve the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation under the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation and, as appropriate, in additional areas not currently addressed by the Guidelines.

III. Force Posture Realignment

Both sides reviewed the posture of U.S. forces in Japan and related SDF forces, in light of their shared commitment to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities, including those in Okinawa. Both sides recognized the importance of enhancing Japanese and U.S. public support for the security alliance, which contributes to sustainable presence of U.S. forces at facilities and areas in Japan.

1. Guiding Precepts

In their review, taking full account of the examination of bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities, both sides established several precepts to guide force posture realignments in Japan.

- The U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region is a core capability that is indispensable to regional peace and security and critical to both the U.S. and Japan. Japan contributes capabilities that are additional and complementary to those provided by the U.S. forces, while taking the leading role of providing for its own defense. The presence of U.S. forces and the SDF must evolve as the regional and global security environment changes and as both sides assess alliance roles and missions.
- Capabilities will be strengthened through realignment as well as adjustment of roles, missions, and capabilities; these capabilities underpin the credibility of U.S. commitments to the defense of Japan and peace and security of the region.

- Enhanced coordination and improved interoperability between headquarters for flexible and responsive command and control is a core capability of critical importance to the U.S. and Japan. In that context, both sides recognized the continued importance of Headquarters, U.S. Forces Japan for strengthened bilateral coordination.
- Regular training and exercises, as well as availability of facilities and areas for these purposes, are essential to ensure readiness, employability, and interoperability of forces. When consistent with military missions and operational requirements, dispersal of training can provide greater diversity of training opportunities and can have the ancillary benefit of reducing burdens of training on local communities.
- Shared military use of both U.S. and SDF facilities and areas is valuable in promoting effectiveness of bilateral cooperation and increasing efficiencies.
- Adequate capacity of U.S. facilities and areas is necessary, and the capacity above typical daily peacetime usage levels also plays a critical and strategic role in meeting contingency requirements. This capacity can provide an indispensable and critical capability toward meeting local emergency needs such as in disaster relief and consequence management situations.
- Particular attention will be paid to possible realignment of force structure in such regions where U.S. facilities and areas are concentrated in densely populated areas.
- Opportunities to introduce civil-military dual-use of U.S. facilities and areas will be studied, where appropriate. Implementation of such dual-use must be compatible with military missions and operational requirements.

2. Recommendations for Realignment

Based upon intensive consultations conducted thus far and in keeping with these basic precepts, domestic and bilateral coordination should be conducted for the following initiatives in a timely manner, consistent with the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and its related arrangements. The Ministers committed themselves to completing local coordination, and directed their staffs to finalize these specific and interrelated initiatives and develop plans, including concrete implementation schedules no later than March 2006. These initiatives represent elements of a coherent package, which will begin to be implemented upon agreement on the overall package. Both sides emphasized the importance of taking necessary measures required for the prompt implementation of these initiatives.

- Strengthening Bilateral and Joint Operational Coordination.
  Recognizing the Government of Japan's intention to transform the SDF into a joint operations posture, the Headquarters, U.S. Forces Japan will establish a bilateral and joint operations coordination center at Yokota Air Base. The shared use of this center will ensure constant connectivity, coordination, and interoperability among U.S. forces in Japan and the SDF.
- Improvement of U.S. Army Command and Control Capability.
  The capabilities of the U.S. Army Japan's command structure in Camp Zama will be modernized to a deployable, joint task force-capable operational headquarters element. The transformed command structure will provide an additional capability to respond rapidly for the defense of Japan and other contingencies. Adjustments to U.S. facilities and areas will be made to accommodate the new Army command structure and integral capabilities. The establishment of the headquarters of a GSDF Central Readiness Force Command, which will operate units for nationwide mobile operations and special tasks, will be pursued at Camp Zama, thereby strengthening the coordination between the headquarters. In relation to this realignment, possibilities of more effective and efficient use of Camp Zama and Sagami General Depot will be explored.
- Collocation of Air Command and Control.
  Japan's Air Defense Command and relevant units, currently located at Fuchu, will be collocated with the headquarters of the U.S. 5th Air Force at Yokota Air Base, strengthening the coordination between air and missile defense command and control elements, and sharing relevant sensor data through the bilateral and

joint operations coordination center described above.

- Yokota Air Base and Airspace.

  Measures to facilitate movement of civilian aircraft through Yokota airspace will be explored, bearing in mind the planned expansion of nearby Haneda Airport in 2009. Possible options to study will include reducing the airspace under U.S. control and collocation of Japanese air traffic controllers at Yokota Air Base. In addition, both sides will take into account development of the process of transferring the Kadena radar approach control. The specific conditions and modalities for possible civil-military dual-use will be studied, while noting that dual-use must not compromise the military operational capabilities of Yokota Air Base.

- Missile Defense.

  The optimum site for deployment in Japan of a new U.S. X-Band radar system will be examined. Through timely information sharing, this radar will support capabilities to intercept missiles directed at Japan and capabilities for Japan's civil defense and consequence management. In addition, as appropriate, the U.S. will deploy active defenses, such as Patriot PAC-3 and Standard Missile (SM-3) to support U.S. treaty commitments.

- Regional Realignment of U.S. Marine Forces for Flexible Crisis Response.

  As part of its global posture realignment effort, the U.S. is making several changes to strengthen its force structure in the Pacific. Among these changes are a strengthening of Marine Corps crisis response capabilities and a redistribution of those capabilities among Hawaii, Guam and Okinawa that will provide greater flexibility to respond with appropriate capabilities according to the nature and location of particular situations. These changes will also enable increased theater security cooperation with countries of the region, thereby improving the overall security environment. In connection with this realignment, both sides identified an integrated set of interrelated measures that will also substantially reduce burdens in Okinawa.

  ❍ Acceleration of Futenma Relocation: Both sides, bearing in mind the strong request from residents of Okinawa for early return of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma, as well as the preference that any Futenma replacement facility (FRF) be located outside of Okinawa Prefecture, considered options to satisfy these requests while maintaining the deterrence capabilities that will remain necessary in the future. They determined that the rapid crisis response capabilities provided by the presence of Marine Corps forces constitute a critical alliance capability that both sides desire to maintain in the region. Moreover, they recognized that sustaining those capabilities, which consist of air, ground, logistics and command elements, remains dependent upon the interaction of those elements in regular training, exercises and operations. For this reason, both sides concluded that the FRF must be located within Okinawa Prefecture where rotary wing aircraft currently stationed at Futenma Air Station will be near the other elements with which they operate on a regular basis.

  ❍ Both sides, recognizing the extensive delays in Futenma relocation resulting from the many problems related to the 1996 Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) plan for relocation of Futenma Air Station to a civil-military facility located on a coral reef in deep waters, examined numerous other possible options for relocation within Okinawa Prefecture that could accelerate return of Futenma Air Station while maintaining operational capabilities. Both sides considered several factors in this work, including:

  - Safety of neighboring communities and military personnel.
  - Noise impacts on local communities, taking into account future housing and commercial development patterns that might occur in the vicinity of the FRF.
  - Minimization of adverse environmental impacts.
  - Ability of the FRF to support operational and mission requirements in peacetime and in contingencies.
  - Inclusion of necessary operational support, billeting and related facilities in the FRF, to avoid creation of traffic congestion and related irritants that might otherwise detract from the quality of life of local

residents.

❍ Bearing such factors in mind, both sides will locate the FRF in an "L"-shaped configuration that combines the shoreline areas of Camp Schwab and adjacent water areas of Oura Bay. The runway portion of the facility will cross Henoko-saki, extending from Oura Bay into the water areas along the south shore of Camp Schwab. The lower section of the facility, oriented in a northeast-southwest direction will include a runway and overruns, with a total length of 1,800 meters exclusive of seawalls. Hangars, maintenance, fuel supply pier and related infrastructure, and other aviation support activities required for the operation of the new facility will be located on the areas of the FRF to be constructed within Oura Bay. Furthermore, facilities in the Camp Schwab area will be reconfigured as necessary to accommodate the relocation of Futenma-related activities. (Reference: Initialed concept plan dated 26 October 2005.)

❍ Both sides concurred that other capabilities now present at Futenma Air Station would be relocated and maintained as provided for in the SACO Final Report, with the following adjustments:

- With regards to the KC-130s, which are to be relocated from Futenma Air Station to Iwakuni Air Station under the SACO Final Report, alternative facilities will be considered with priority consideration given to MSDF Kanoya Base. The final basing configuration will be determined by both sides based on ongoing operational and engineering studies.
- Strengthened contingency use of the ASDF bases at Nyutabaru and Tsuiki will be provided for U.S. forces. Improvements to operational facilities at these bases will be made to support this contingency use. These improved facilities, when completed, will also support the expanded bilateral training activities described in the Roles, Missions and Capabilities section of this report.
- Improved contingency use of civilian facilities for long runway operations that cannot be replicated at the FRF will also be provided for U.S. forces.

❍ Both sides recognized that early realization of the foregoing measures, in addition to enabling the long-desired return of Futenma Air Station, is an essential component of the realignment of the Marine Corps presence in Okinawa.

❍ Force Reductions: In conjunction with the realignment of U.S. Marine Corps capabilities in the Pacific region outlined above, the headquarters of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) will be relocated to Guam and other locations and the remaining Marine units in Okinawa will be realigned and reduced into a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). This realignment in Okinawa will include the transfer of approximately 7,000 Marine officers and enlisted personnel, plus dependents out of Okinawa. These transferred personnel will come from units in each of the elements of Marine capability (air, ground, logistics and command), including portions of the Marine Air Wing, the Force Service Support Group, and the 3rd Marine Division.

❍ The Government of Japan, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocations be realized rapidly, will work with the U.S. Government to examine and identify appropriate financial and other measures to enable the realization of these relocations to Guam.

❍ Land Returns and Shared-Use of Facilities: Recognizing that successful relocation of Futenma Air Station and the force reductions described above will make further consolidation of forces and return of land possible, both sides discussed the concept of consolidation of those Marine Corps units that remain in Okinawa into a smaller total land area. This would enable the return of significant land in the densely populated areas south of Kadena Air Base. The U.S. stressed its willingness to develop and implement a concrete program for this concept in cooperation with the Government of Japan.

❍ Furthermore, recognizing the limited access that the SDF have to facilities in Okinawa, most of which are located in urbanized areas, the U.S. also underscored its willingness to implement shared-use of Kadena Air Base, Camp Hansen, and other U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa in cooperation with the Government

of Japan. Both sides consider that such shared use could facilitate bilateral training and interoperability between their forces, as described in the Roles, Missions and Capabilities section of this report, and thereby strengthen overall alliance capabilities.

- ❍ Steady Implementation of SACO Final Report: Both sides validated the importance of steady implementation of the recommendations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report unless otherwise changed by the recommendations in this document.

● Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Iwakuni Air Station.

To ensure the viability of a long-term forward-deployment of the U.S. aircraft carrier and its air wing, the carrier jet and E-2C squadrons will be relocated from Atsugi Air Facility to Iwakuni Air Station, which will have the necessary facilities and training airspace for safe and effective operation of the aircraft in a less intrusive manner after the current construction of the replacement runway is completed. To alleviate the impact of the increased operations at Iwakuni Air Station, the following related measures will be taken.

- ❍ Relocation of MSDF E/O/UP-3 squadrons and other aircraft from Iwakuni Air Station to Atsugi Air Facility.
- ❍ Adjustment of training airspace for all U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps aircraft to ensure adequate readiness levels are maintained.
- ❍ Identification of a permanent field-carrier landing practice (FCLP) facility. In the interim, the U.S. will continue to conduct FCLPs at Iwo Jima in accordance with existing temporary arrangements. The Government of Japan reiterates its commitment to provide an acceptable permanent FCLP facility for U.S. naval aviation forces.
- ❍ Development of necessary facilities at the MSDF Kanoya Base to accommodate KC-130 aircraft. These facilities will also be available to support rotations of additional SDF or U.S. C-130 or P-3 aircraft from elsewhere in Japan to increase Alliance capabilities and flexibility.
- ❍ Development of necessary additional facilities, infrastructure, and training areas required to support U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps units based at Iwakuni Air Station, as well as civil aviation operations.

● Training Relocation.

Consistent with the necessity of improving bilateral interoperability discussed in this report, and with reference to the goal of reducing the impact of training activity, renewed attention will be given to expanding the distribution of training from U.S. air facilities such as Kadena Air Base as well as Misawa Air Base and Iwakuni Air Station to other military facilities.

● Efficient Use of Capacity at U.S. Facilities in Japan.

Opportunities to strengthen U.S. cooperation with the Government of Japan and local communities regarding efficient use of capacity at U.S. facilities in Japan will be pursued when consistent with operational requirements and safety. For example, both sides will explore possibilities for utilizing the capacity of Sagami General Depot for meeting local emergency needs such as in disaster relief and civilian consequence management.

Future changes in U.S. facilities and areas and force structure not addressed elsewhere in this report will be addressed in accordance with existing practices under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and its related arrangements.

Reference 36. United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee Document Joint Statement

(Washington, DC, May 1, 2006)

The U.S.-Japan Alliance, with the U.S.-Japan security relationship at its core, is the indispensable foundation of Japan's security and of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the linchpin of American security policy in the region. This strong partnership is increasingly vital in meeting global challenges, and in promoting fundamental values shared by both nations, including basic human rights, freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. The alliance has successfully adapted itself to changes in the regional and global security environment, and it must continue to evolve in depth and scope in order to address future challenges. To remain strong, this partnership must be reinforced by continued firm public support in both countries.

At today's meeting, the Ministers, sharing the view that new and emerging threats pose a common challenge that affects the security of nations worldwide, noted the increasingly close cooperation between their two countries on a broad array of issues. The Ministers confirmed their desire to expand that cooperation to ensure the U.S.-Japan Alliance continues to play a vital role in enhancing regional and global peace and security. The Ministers noted the importance of U.S. and Japanese efforts to strengthen democracy in and reconstruct Iraq and Afghanistan, and to support reform efforts in the broader Middle East. They committed to work closely on efforts to convince Iran to suspend all enrichment-related activities and cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency's investigation, and agreed on the need for concerted United Nations Security Council action.

As elsewhere in the world, the Asia-Pacific region faces persistent challenges that give rise to unpredictability and uncertainty. The Ministers reconfirmed a shared commitment to the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, and urged North Korea to return expeditiously to the talks without preconditions, to dismantle its nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and to cease all illicit and proliferation activities. They reaffirmed the importance of resolving regional disputes through diplomatic efforts, and called for greater transparency on the modernization of military capabilities in the region.

In this security environment, the Ministers affirmed their commitment to close cooperation in realizing the common strategic objectives the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) identified in February 2005. The Ministers stressed the imperative of strengthening and improving the effectiveness of bilateral security and defense cooperation in such areas as ballistic missile defense, bilateral contingency planning, information sharing and intelligence cooperation, and international peace cooperation activities, as well as the importance of improving interoperability of Japan's Self-Defense Forces and U.S. forces, as outlined in the recommendations on bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities described in the October 2005 SCC document. In this context, the Ministers emphasized the importance of examining the scope of security and defense cooperation to ensure a robust alliance relationship, and to enhance the alliance's capability to respond to diverse challenges in the evolving regional and global security environment.

At the SCC meeting held today, the Ministers approved implementation details for the October 2005 realignment initiatives, which are described in today's SCC document, "United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation." The Ministers recognized that the implementation of these realignment initiatives will lead to a new phase in alliance cooperation and strengthened alliance capabilities in the region. The measures to be implemented demonstrate the resolve of both parties to strengthen their commitments under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and, at the same time, to reduce the burden on local communities, including those on Okinawa, thereby providing the basis for enhanced public support for the security alliance. Recognizing the Government of Japan's coordination with local communities, the Ministers confirmed the feasibility of the realignment initiatives. Recognizing also that completion of these realignment initiatives is essential to strengthen the foundation of

alliance transformation, the Ministers committed themselves to the timely and thorough implementation of the plan, consistent with the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and its related arrangements.

Reference 37. United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation

(Washington, DC, May 1, 2006)

Overview

On October 29, 2005, the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) members approved recommendations for realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and related Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in their document, "U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future." In that document, the SCC members directed their respective staffs "to finalize these specific and interrelated initiatives and develop plans, including concrete implementation schedules no later than March 2006." This work has been completed and is reflected in this document.

Finalization of Realignment Initiatives

The individual realignment initiatives form a coherent package. When implemented, these realignments will ensure a life-of-the-alliance presence for U.S. forces in Japan.

The construction and other costs for facility development in the implementation of these initiatives will be borne by the Government of Japan (GOJ) unless otherwise specified. The U.S. Government (USG) will bear the operational costs that arise from implementation of these initiatives. The two Governments will finance their realignment-associated costs consistent with their commitments in the October 29, 2005 SCC document to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities.

Key Implementation Details

1. Realignment on Okinawa
   (a) Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF)
   - The United States and Japan will locate the FRF in a configuration that combines the Henoko-saki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays, including two runways aligned in a "V"-shape, each runway having a length of 1,600 meters plus two 100-meter overruns. The length of each runway portion of the facility is 1,800 meters, exclusive of seawalls (see attached concept plan dated April 28, 2006). This facility ensures agreed operational capabilities while addressing issues of safety, noise, and environmental impacts.
   - In order to locate the FRF, inclusive of agreed support facilities, in the Camp Schwab area, necessary adjustments will be made, such as reconfiguration of Camp Schwab facilities and adjacent water surface areas.
   - Construction of the FRF is targeted for completion by 2014.
   - Relocation to the FRF will occur when the facility is fully operationally capable.
   - Facility improvements for contingency use at ASDF bases at Nyutabaru and Tsuiki related to replacement of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma capabilities will be made, as necessary, after conducting site surveys and before MCAS Futenma is returned.
   - Requirements for improved contingency use of civilian facilities will be examined in the context of bilateral contingency planning, and appropriate arrangements will be made in order to realize the return of MCAS Futenma.

- In principle, the construction method for the FRF will be landfill.
- The USG does not intend to operate fighter aircraft from this facility.

(b) Force Reductions and Relocation to Guam

- Approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, in a manner that maintains unit integrity. Units to relocate will include: III MEF Command Element, 3rd Marine Division Headquarters, 3rd Marine Logistics Group (formerly known as Force Service Support Group) Headquarters, 1st Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine Regiment Headquarters.
- The affected units will relocate from such facilities as Camp Courtney, Camp Hansen, MCAS Futenma, Camp Zukeran, and Makiminato Service Area.
- The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) forces remaining on Okinawa will consist of Marine Air-Ground Task Force elements, such as command, ground, aviation, and combat service support, as well as a base support capability.
- Of the estimated $10.27 billion cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan will provide $6.09 billion (in U.S. FY 2008 dollars), including $2.8 billion in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be realized rapidly. The United States will fund the remainder of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the relocation to Guam estimated in U.S. FY 2008 dollars at $3.18 billion in fiscal spending plus approximately $1 billion for a road.

(c) Land Returns and Shared Use of Facilities

- Following the relocation to the FRF, the return of MCAS Futenma, and the transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, the remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base.
- Both sides will develop a detailed consolidation plan by March 2007. In this plan, total or partial return of the following six candidate facilities will be examined:
  - ❍ Camp Kuwae: Total return.
  - ❍ Camp Zukeran: Partial return and consolidation of remaining facilities and infrastructure to the extent possible.
  - ❍ MCAS Futenma: Total return (see FRF section above).
  - ❍ Makiminato Service Area: Total return.
  - ❍ Naha Port: Total return (relocated to the new facilities, including additional staging constructed at Urasoe).
- Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1: Total return.
- All functions and capabilities that are resident in facilities designated for return, and that are required by forces remaining in Okinawa, will be relocated within Okinawa. These relocations will occur before the return of designated facilities.
- While emphasizing the importance of steady implementation of the recommendations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report, the SACO relocation and return initiatives may need to be re-evaluated.
- Camp Hansen will be used for GSDF training. Shared use that requires no facility improvements will be possible from 2006.
- ASDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. forces, taking into account noise impacts on local communities.

(d) Relationships among Initiatives

- Within the overall package, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected.
- Specifically, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depend on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam.
- The III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: (1) tangible progress toward completion of the FRF, and (2) Japan's financial contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam.

2. Improvement of U.S. Army Command and Control Capability
   - U.S. Army command and control structure at Camp Zama will be transformed by U.S. FY 2008. The headquarters of the GSDF Central Readiness Force subsequently will arrive at Camp Zama by Japan FY 2012; SDF helicopters will have access to Kastner Heliport on Camp Zama.
   - Along with the transformation of Army headquarters in Japan, a battle command training center and other support facilities will be constructed within Sagami General Depot (SGD) using U.S. funding.
   - In relation to this transformation, the following measures for efficient and effective use of Camp Zama and SGD will be implemented.
     - ❍ Some portions of land at SGD will be returned for local redevelopment (approximately 15 hectares (ha)) and for road and underground rail (approximately 2ha). Affected housing units will be relocated to Sagamihara Housing Area.
     - ❍ A specified area of open space in the northwest section of SGD (approximately 35ha) will be provided for local use when not required for contingency or training purposes.
     - ❍ Portions of the Chapel Hill housing area of Camp Zama (1.1ha) will be returned to the GOJ following relocation of affected housing units within Camp Zama. Further discussions on possible additional land returns at Chapel Hill will occur as appropriate.
3. Yokota Air Base and Airspace
   - ASDF Air Defense Command (ADC) and relevant units will relocate to Yokota Air Base in Japan FY 2010. A bilateral master plan for base use will be developed to accommodate facility and infrastructure requirements.
   - A bilateral, joint operations coordination center (BJOCC), established at Yokota Air Base, will include a collocated air and missile defense coordination function. The USG and GOJ will fund their own required equipment and systems, respectively, while both sides will coordinate appropriate funding of shared-use equipment and systems.
   - The following measures will be pursued to facilitate movement of civilian aircraft through Yokota airspace while satisfying military operational requirements.
     - ❍ Establish a program in Japan FY 2006 to inform commercial aviation entities of existing procedures to transit Yokota airspace.
     - ❍ Return portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese control by September 2008; specific portions will be identified by October 2006.
     - ❍ Develop procedures in Japan FY 2006 for temporary transfers of air traffic control responsibility to Japanese authorities for portions of Yokota airspace, when not required for military purposes.
     - ❍ Study the conditions required for the possible return of the entire Yokota airspace as part of a comprehensive study of options for related airspace reconfigurations and changes in air traffic control procedures that would satisfy future patterns of civilian and military (U.S. and Japanese) demand for use of Japanese airspace. The study will take into account both the lessons learned from the Kadena radar approach control (RAPCON) transfer experience and the lessons learned from experiences with collocation of U.S. forces and Japanese controllers in Japan. This study will be completed in Japan FY 2009.

- The USG and GOJ will conduct a study of the specific conditions and modalities for possible civilian-military dual-use of Yokota Air Base, to be completed within 12 months from commencement.
  - ❍ The study will be conducted on the shared understanding that dual-use must not compromise military operations and safety or the military operational capabilities of Yokota Air Base.
  - ❍ Based upon the outcome of this study, the two governments will consult and then make appropriate decisions on civilian-military dual-use.

4. Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni
   - The relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni, consisting of F/A-18, EA-6B, E-2C, and C-2 aircraft, will be completed by 2014, subsequent to the following: (1) completion of necessary facilities, and (2) adjustment of training airspace and the Iwakuni RAPCON airspace.
   - Necessary facilities will be developed at Atsugi Air Facility to accommodate MSDF E/O/UP-3 squadrons and other aircraft from Iwakuni, taking into account the continued requirement for U.S. operations from Atsugi.
   - The KC-130 squadron will be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities. The aircraft will regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam. To support the deployment of KC-l30 aircraft, necessary facilities will be developed at Kanoya.
   - U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters will be relocated from MCAS Iwakuni to Guam when the III MEF personnel relocate from Okinawa to Guam.
   - Training airspace and Iwakuni RAPCON airspace will be adjusted to fulfill safely the training and operational requirements of U.S. forces, Japan SDF, and commercial aircraft (including those in neighboring airspace) through coordination by the Joint Committee.
   - A bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent field-carrier landing practice facility will be established, with the goal of selecting a permanent site by July 2009 or the earliest possible date thereafter.
   - Portions of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni.
5. Missile Defense
   - As both sides deploy additional capabilities and improve their respective ballistic missile defense capabilities, close coordination will continue.
   - The optimum site for deployment of a new U.S. X-Band radar system has been designated as ASDF Shariki Base. Necessary arrangements and facility modifications, funded by the USG, will be made before the radar becomes operational in summer 2006.
   - The USG will share X-Band radar data with the GOJ.
   - U.S. Patriot PAC-3 capabilities will be deployed to Japan within existing U.S. facilities and areas, becoming operational at the earliest possible time.
6. Training Relocation
   - Both sides will develop annual bilateral training plans beginning in Japan FY 2007. As necessary, a supplemental plan for Japan FY 2006 can be developed.
   - Initially, aircraft from three U.S. facilities—Kadena, Misawa, and Iwakuni—will participate in relocated training conducted from the following SDF facilities: Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki, and Nyutabaru. Both sides will work toward expanding use of SDF facilities for bilateral training and exercises in the future.
   - The GOJ will improve infrastructure for training relocation at SDF facilities as necessary after conducting site surveys.

- Relocated training will not diminish the quality of training that is currently available to U.S. forces in Japan, taking into account facilities and training requirements.
- In general, bilateral training will commence with participation of 1-5 aircraft for the duration of 1-7 days, and develop over time to participation of 6-12 aircraft for 8-14 days at a time.
- At those SDF facilities at which terms of joint use are stipulated by Joint Committee agreements, limitations on the number of joint training events will be removed. Limitations on the total days and period per training event for joint use of each SDF facility will be maintained.
- The USG and GOJ will share costs for bilateral training as appropriate, bearing in mind the priority of maintaining readiness.

Reference 38. Efforts by the Government of Japan regarding Realignment of U.S. Force Structure in Japan and Others

(May 30, 2006 Cabinet Decision)

1. The Governments of Japan and the U.S. had a series of consultations regarding examinations of the roles, missions and capabilities of Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and the U.S. Armed Forces, and of realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan. And at the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) Meeting of October 29, 2005, recommendations on those issues were approved. The governments of the two countries continued consultations and at the SCC Meeting of May 1, 2006 the final report including specific initiatives for realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan and other issues (hereinafter "realignment related measures") was approved.
2. In the new security environment, it is important to maintain and develop the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements to ensure the security of Japan and maintain the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region in a continuous manner. Stationing of the U.S. forces in Japan is at the core of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, and stable use of facilities and areas of the U.S. forces needs to be secured.

   Facilities and areas used by the U.S. forces concentrate on Okinawa, and areas around facilities and areas on the mainland are increasingly urbanized, hence these facilities and areas have great impact on the living environment of residents and regional development. In light of such conditions, it is important to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities, in order to secure stable use of facilities and areas by gaining broader public understanding and cooperation as well as to maintain and develop the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.
3. The final report includes the following specific initiatives: relocation of approximately 8,000 Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa where facilities and areas used by the U.S. forces concentrate; relocation of Futenma Air Station to Camp Schwab; return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base which are densely populated (including total returns of Futenma Air Station, Makiminato Service Area, Naha port facilities and other facilities); collocation of ASDF Air Defense Command and relevant units at Yokota Air Base to enhance coordination between the headquarters; transformation of the U.S. Army command and control structure at Camp Zama; deployment of a new U.S. X-Band radar system for BMD at ASDF Shariki Base; relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Iwakuni Air Station; return of some portions of Camp Zama and Sagami General Depot; and relocation of trainings.

   These realignment related measures shall be steadily implemented based on the timeframe for implementation presented in the final report.
4. Ensuring security arrangements for maintenance of the peace and security of Japan is one of the most

significant policies of the Japanese government, therefore, it is necessary for the government to address the issue with responsibility. Based on such recognition, in implementing realignment related measures that entail new burdens on the part of local authorities, the government will take requests from the local authorities that shoulder such burdens into consideration, and take measures for regional development and other in return for their contributions to the peace and security of Japan.

In addition, the Government of Japan will continue to be totally committed to taking measures in promotion of the use of returned land and securing employment stability of workers at USFJ facilities and areas.

5. Relocation of Marine units in Okinawa to Guam is critical in reducing burdens on Okinawa where U.S. facilities and areas concentrate, thus it shall be rapidly implemented with required costs shared by Japan.
6. Based on such recognition, the Government of Japan shall properly and promptly implement realignment related measures including legal and budgetary aspects. Meanwhile, under the strained state of public finance, the Government of Japan shall make efforts in more drastic rationalization and streamlining of defense-related expenses to implement an efficient defense program, in line with the efforts of the government as a whole in cost-cutting and rationalization. The "Mid-Term Defense Program (for FY 2005 to FY 2009)" (approved by the Cabinet on December 10, 2004) shall be reviewed once estimates for the entire costs of realignment related measures become clear based on concrete contents of realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan and others.
7. As to relocation of Futenma Air Station, it shall be implemented based on the plan approved at the SCC Meeting on May 1, 2006, with due consideration on the positions of the national government, the local government of Okinawa and relevant local authorities, as well as the course of discussions so far regarding the issues such as facilities related with relocation of Futenma Air Station, the basing agreement and regional development and others, through paying enough attention to removal of danger of Futenma Air Station, safety of lives of residents in the vicinity, preservation of natural environment and feasibility of the program. Also a construction plan for the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) shall be formulated in a prompt manner.

   The government shall establish a consultative body together with the Government of Okinawa and relevant local governments to have consultations about and address the issues of a concrete construction plan of the FRF, safety and environmental measures and regional development.

   In accordance with this, the Government Policy Concerning Relocation of Futenma Air Station (approved by the Cabinet on December 28, 1999) shall be abolished.

   However, in FY 2006, the projects based on the "II Regional Development" stipulated in the abovementioned government policy shall be implemented.

Reference 39. Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee U.S. Department of State

(Washington, DC, May 1, 2007)

Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation

I. Overview

The U.S.-Japan security relationship is the bedrock of Japan's defense and the keystone of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. The members of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) welcomed recent advances in bilateral security and defense cooperation, consistent with the vision laid out in SCC meetings and statements

over the past two years. The North Korean provocations, including missile launches in July and a nuclear test in October 2006, serve as stark reminders of the importance of transforming the U.S.-Japan Alliance to ensure its continued effectiveness in an ever-changing security environment.

The SCC members recognized that, just as today's expanding U.S.-Japan cooperation was enabled by previous efforts to update and consolidate the alliance that began years ago, so too will investments that the two countries make in the alliance today enable and ensure effective alliance responses to future challenges to peace and security.

Additionally, the SCC members stressed the importance of the traditional role of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which has enabled a life-of-the-alliance presence for U.S. forces in Japan while providing U.S. security assurances to the Government of Japan. U.S. extended deterrence underpins the defense of Japan and regional security. The U.S. reaffirmed that the full range of U.S. military capabilities—both nuclear and non-nuclear strike forces and defensive capabilities—form the core of extended deterrence and support U.S. commitments to the defense of Japan.

In this context, the SCC members emphasized the need to expand and deepen bilateral intelligence cooperation and information sharing in order to respond more effectively to emerging security challenges. They also decided to strengthen mechanisms to protect classified materials.

President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe met on November 18, 2006 and called for a review of U.S.-Japan bilateral security cooperation, especially in the area of ballistic missile defense (BMD), reiterating its importance during their April 27, 2007 summit meeting. The SCC members focused on this agenda today in the context of common strategic objectives and alliance transformation.

The SCC members also welcomed the elevation of Japan's defense organization from agency to ministry status and the redefinition of the Self-Defense Forces' (SDF) international peace cooperation activities as part of their primary missions.

II. Common Strategic Objectives

The U.S. and Japan are committed to promoting fundamental values such as basic human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in the international community. On February 19, 2005, the SCC members identified common strategic objectives that provide a broad basis for advancing bilateral cooperation.

At today's meeting, the SCC members reconfirmed their commitment to these common strategic objectives, taking the current international security environment into account. In this context, they welcomed the "Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement" adopted at the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks on February 13, 2007, and urged North Korea to expeditiously meet its commitments described in the statement.

During their discussions, the SCC members highlighted the following strategic objectives that advance the interests of both countries:

- Achieving denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through the Six-Party Talks and fully implementing the Joint Statement of September 19, 2005, which envisions progress in other areas, including: the normalization of relations between North Korea and the United States and Japan, respectively; resolution of humanitarian issues, such as the matter of abductions; and commitment by all Six Parties to join efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia.
- Achieving swift and full implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718, noting that all United Nations Member States remain obligated to comply with the provisions of that Chapter VII resolution.
- Recognizing the importance of China's contributions to regional and global security, further encouraging China to conduct itself as a responsible international stakeholder, improve transparency in its military affairs, and maintain consistency between its stated policies and actions.

- Increasing cooperation to strengthen the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum as the preeminent regional economic forum, recognizing its crucial role in promoting stability, security, and prosperity in the region.
- Supporting efforts made by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to promote democratic values, good governance, the rule of law, human rights, fundamental freedoms, and a unified market economy in Southeast Asia, and building regional capacity and cooperation on critical non-traditional and transnational security issues bilaterally and through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).
- Further strengthening trilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan, and Australia in the region and around the world, including in the areas of security and defense, based on shared democratic values and interests.
- Continuing to build upon partnerships with India to advance areas of common interests and increase cooperation, recognizing that India's continued growth is inextricably tied to the prosperity, freedom, and security of the region.
- Ensuring Afghanistan's successful economic reconstruction and political stabilization, which is essential to securing broader regional security and to defeating terrorism. To that end, the United States and Japan are both committed to supporting Afghanistan's transition, which requires reconstruction, development, and security.
- Contributing to building a united, democratic Iraq capable of governing, defending, and sustaining itself, while remaining an ally in the War on Terror.
- Achieving swift, full implementation of UNSCR 1737 and 1747, aimed at bringing Iran into full compliance with its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements. Noting the international community's continuing concerns regarding Iran's activities in the Middle East, both countries share the view that Iran must play a more positive role in the international community by demonstrating responsible behavior on the issue of terrorism.
- Achieving broader Japan-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) cooperation, recognizing that NATO's global contributions to peace and security and the common strategic objectives of the U.S.-Japan Alliance are consistent and complementary.

III. Roles, Missions, and Capabilities

On October 29, 2005, the SCC approved the document, "U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future," which outlined initiatives on roles, missions, and capabilities of U.S. and Japanese forces. Following through on the security agenda laid out in that SCC document is imperative to the alliance's ability to respond to diverse challenges in the contemporary security environment.

The SCC members reviewed progress in updating roles, missions, and capabilities in line with this alliance transformation vision and highlighted:

- The redefinition of the SDF's primary mission to include international peacekeeping operations, international disaster relief operations, and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan, which reflects growing attention to the importance of Japan's contributions to improving the international security environment. In this context, the SCC members discussed the SDF's assistance for Iraq's reconstruction efforts as well as its support to coalition forces operating in the Indian Ocean.
- Sustained progress in developing more specific planning to reflect the evolving security environment and to better posture our two forces to operate together in a regional crisis. Because such planning requires further coordination in a wide range of functions and fields, active participation of relevant ministries and agencies in the bilateral planning process will remain vital.
- Substantive agreement between the two governments concerning security measures for the protection of classified military information, also known as a General Security of Military Information Agreement

(GSOMIA). The GSOMIA will facilitate information exchange and establish a common basis of information security contributing to sharing of intelligence and defense program and operational information.

- Establishment of a bilateral Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense Working Group to make steady progress in improving readiness and interoperability of U.S. and Japanese forces against CBRN weapons, ensuring sustained operational capability in the event of an attack by weapons of mass destruction.
- Establishment of a flexible, bilateral interagency coordination mechanism to coordinate policy, operational, intelligence, and public affairs positions before and during crisis situations.
- Execution of joint, bilateral training exercises to strengthen interoperability and advance alliance roles, missions, and capabilities.

The SCC members, recognizing the growing importance of the U.S. force presence to Japanese and regional security, stressed the requirement for appropriate resources to ensure the success of the alliance transformation agenda. Both allies will also make best efforts to secure resources to improve alliance capabilities and to sustain the presence of U.S. forces in Japan.

IV. Implementation of the Realignment Roadmap

The SCC members reaffirmed their resolve to steadily implement the realignment initiatives described in the May 2006 SCC document, "United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation." These initiatives, when implemented, will enhance U.S. and Japanese public support for the security alliance.

The SCC members reviewed and appreciated the progress made thus far with the initiatives described in the "Roadmap" including:

- The creation of a bilateral coordination mechanism in June 2006 providing implementation oversight for the realignment initiatives;
- Japanese Diet action on legislation and funding required to facilitate early implementation of realignment initiatives;
- Elaboration of the engineering and technical design for the Futenma Replacement Facility and the initiation of surveys in the water areas offshore of Camp Schwab;
- Significant cooperation toward relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel and their dependents from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, including:
  - ❍ The U.S. creation and funding of a Joint Guam Program Office to oversee planning and development of the facilities in Guam;
  - ❍ The launch of the U.S. environmental impact assessment process, including Notice of Intent to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement, for the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps forces from Okinawa to Guam; and
  - ❍ Submission of the above-mentioned legislation to the Japanese Diet authorizing the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) to take appropriate measures under the direction of the Japanese government to fulfill a portion of Japan's financial commitments related to the relocation of III MEF personnel and their dependents from Okinawa to Guam.
- Commencement of the aircraft training relocation program in March 2007;
- Implementation of flexible-use of Yokota airspace measures in September 2006, and agreement in October 2006 for return of portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese control by September 2008, and for collocation of SDF controllers at the Yokota Radar Approach Control (RAPCON). These measures will help facilitate the movement of civilian aircraft through Yokota airspace while satisfying military operational requirements; and
- October 2006 launching of the Study Group on the specific conditions and modalities for possible civil-military dual-use of Yokota Air Base, as specified in the "Roadmap."

The SCC members reaffirmed that completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility, in accordance with the

"Roadmap" by the target date of 2014, is the key to successful and timely implementation of the overall realignment plan for Okinawa, including the III MEF relocation to Guam and subsequent consolidation of remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa. The SCC members acknowledged the significant progress on a detailed consolidation plan and directed their staffs to continue close consultations toward its completion.

The SCC members also appreciated continued progress in implementation of commitments under the 1996 Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) final report, including return of the Senaha Communications Facility in September 2006, and the Sobe Communications Facility and the Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield in December 2006, totaling more than 300 hectares/750 acres.

V. Strengthening BMD and Operational Cooperation

Alliance BMD capabilities, which contribute to the alliance's overall deterrence posture, are strengthened to the extent that U.S. and Japanese systems can operate together effectively. The SCC members confirmed that, as both countries develop and deploy capabilities, every effort must be made to ensure tactical, operational, and strategic coordination. In that light, the United States and Japan will take appropriate measures, in close coordination, in response to ballistic missile threats against alliance interests.

In this context, the SCC members highlighted the following areas of operational cooperation:

- To strengthen operational cooperation, bilateral planning efforts must take into account missile defense capabilities, today and in the foreseeable future. To that end, the two sides' forces will clarify concepts, roles, and missions for each side in the conduct of missile defense and related operations in response to ballistic missile threats. At the same time, a policy-level forum will ensure that policy guidance for BMD operations is unambiguous and current.
- On October 29, 2005, the SCC directed the creation of a bilateral joint operations coordination center (BJOCC). During the North Korean missile provocations of June-July 2006, the United States and Japan exchanged information in a timely manner, including through an interim coordination facility at Yokota Air Base with SDF liaisons. The success of this facility in ensuring that both sides had a common awareness of the evolving situation validated the importance of continuous enhancement of bilateral policy/operational coordination including through establishment of the BJOCC at Yokota Air Base.
- Recognizing the importance of improving the situational awareness of U.S. forces and the SDF, the two sides are committed to the routine sharing of BMD and related operational information directly with each other on a real-time, continuous basis. The two sides will also develop a bilateral common operational picture (COP).
- The two sides will establish a comprehensive information-sharing roadmap to identify broader operational information and data to be shared in support of alliance roles, missions, and capabilities.

VI. Enhancing BMD System Capabilities

The SCC members noted with satisfaction that past alliance decisions about missile defense, coupled with recent accelerated cooperation, have strengthened BMD capabilities in the region.

They highlighted key advances, including:

- The operational deployment of a U.S. X-Band radar system to ASDF Shariki Base, Japan, with associated U.S. delivery of radar data to Japanese forces.
- The operational deployment of a U.S. PAC-3 battalion to Kadena Air Base, Japan.
- The recent and continuing addition of Standard Missile (SM-3) defense capabilities to the forward-deployed naval forces of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.
- Japan's decision to accelerate modification of its Aegis ships with SM-3 capabilities. Japan will complete modification of DDG *Kongo* by the end of 2007, and will expedite modification of DDGs *Chokai*, *Myoko*, and *Kirishima*.

- Japan's decision to expedite the deployment of PAC-3, which resulted in deployment of the first PAC-3 fire unit in March 2007 and its goal to deploy 16 PAC-3 capable fire units by early 2010.
- Priority focus on U.S.-Japan cooperative development of the next generation SM-3 interceptor. The basic agreement on a framework for technology transfer reached by the two sides will facilitate progress on this project as well as in future U.S.-Japan technology cooperation projects.

The SCC members confirmed that advancing the alliance transformation agenda for security and defense cooperation will contribute to regional and global peace and security.

Reference 40. Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

(New York, September 23, 1997)

I. The Aim of the Guidelines

The aim of these Guidelines is to create a solid basis for more effective and credible Japan-U.S. cooperation under normal circumstances, in case of an armed attack against Japan, and in situations in areas surrounding Japan. The Guidelines also provide a general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and ways of cooperation and coordination, both under normal circumstances and during contingencies.

II. Basic Premises and Principles

The Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines are consistent with the following basic premises and principles.

1. The rights and obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan (the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty) and its related arrangements, as well as the fundamental framework of the Japan-U.S. alliance, will remain unchanged.
2. Japan will conduct all its actions within the limitations of its Constitution and in accordance with such basic positions as the maintenance of its exclusively defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles.
3. All actions taken by Japan and the U.S. will be consistent with basic principles of international law, including the peaceful settlement of disputes and sovereign equality, and relevant international agreements such as the U.N. Charter.
4. The Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines will not obligate either Government to take legislative, budgetary or administrative measures. However, since the objective of the Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines is to establish an effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two Governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, based on their own judgments, in their specific policies and measures. All actions taken by Japan will be consistent with its laws and regulations then in effect.

III. Cooperation under Normal Circumstances

Both Governments will firmly maintain existing Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. Each Government will make efforts to maintain required defense postures. Japan will possess defense capability within the scope necessary for self-defense on the basis of the "National Defense Program Outline." In order to meet its commitments, the United States will maintain its nuclear deterrent capability, its forward-deployed forces in the Asia-Pacific region, and other forces capable of reinforcing those forward-deployed forces.

Both Governments, based on their respective policies, under normal circumstances will maintain close cooperation for the defense of Japan as well as for the creation of a more stable international security

environment.

Both Governments will under normal circumstances enhance cooperation in a variety of areas. Examples include mutual support activities under the Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America; the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States of America and Japan; and their related arrangements.

1. Information Sharing and Policy Consultations

   Recognizing that accurate information and sound analysis are at the foundation of security, the two Governments will increase information and intelligence sharing, and the exchange of views on international situations of mutual interest, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. They will also continue close consultations on defense policies and military postures.

   Such information sharing and policy consultations will be conducted at as many levels as possible and on the broadest range of subjects. This will be accomplished by taking advantage of all available opportunities, such as the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) and Security Sub-Committee (SSC) meetings.

2. Various Types of Security Cooperation

   Bilateral cooperation to promote regional and global activities in the field of security contributes to the creation of a more stable international security environment.

   Recognizing the importance and significance of security dialogues and defense exchange in the region, as well as international arms control and disarmament, the two Governments will promote such activities and cooperate as necessary.

   When either or both Governments participate in U.N. PKOs or international humanitarian relief operations, the two sides will cooperate closely for mutual support as necessary. They will prepare procedures for cooperation in such areas as transportation, medical services, information sharing, and education and training.

   When either or both Governments conduct emergency relief operations in response to requests from governments concerned or international organizations in the wake of large-scale disasters, they will cooperate closely with each other as necessary.

3. Bilateral Programs

   Both Governments will conduct bilateral work, including bilateral defense planning in case of an armed attack against Japan, and mutual cooperation planning in situations in areas surrounding Japan. Such efforts will be made in a comprehensive mechanism involving relevant agencies of the respective Governments, and establish the foundation for bilateral cooperation.

   Bilateral exercises and training will be enhanced in order not only to validate such bilateral work but also to enable smooth and effective responses by public and private entities of both countries, starting with the SDF and U.S. forces. The two Governments will under normal circumstances establish a bilateral coordination mechanism involving relevant agencies to be operated during contingencies.

IV. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan

Bilateral actions in response to an armed attack against Japan remain a core aspect of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation.

When an armed attack against Japan is imminent, the two Governments will take steps to prevent further deterioration of the situation and make preparations necessary for the defense of Japan. When an armed attack against Japan takes place, the two Governments will conduct appropriate bilateral actions to repel it at the earliest possible stage.

1. When an Armed Attack against Japan is Imminent

The two Governments will intensify information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations, and initiate at an early stage the operation of a bilateral coordination mechanism. Cooperating as appropriate, they will make preparations necessary for ensuring coordinated responses according to the readiness stage selected by mutual agreement. Japan will establish and maintain the basis for U.S. reinforcements. As circumstances change, the two Governments will also increase intelligence gathering and surveillance, and will prepare to respond to activities, which could develop into an armed attack against Japan.

The two Governments will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent further deterioration of the situation.

Recognizing that a situation in areas surrounding Japan may develop into an armed attack against Japan, the two Governments will be mindful of the close interrelationship of the two requirements: preparations for the defense of Japan and responses to or preparations for situations in areas surrounding Japan.

2. When an Armed Attack against Japan Takes Place

(1) Principles for Coordinated Bilateral Actions

(a) Japan will have primary responsibility immediately to take action and to repel an armed attack against Japan as soon as possible. The U.S. will provide appropriate support to Japan. Such bilateral cooperation may vary according to the scale, type, phase, and other factors of the armed attack. This cooperation may include preparations for and execution of coordinated bilateral operations, steps to prevent further deterioration of the situation, surveillance, and intelligence sharing.

(b) In conducting bilateral operations, the SDF and U.S. forces will employ their respective defense capabilities in a coordinated, timely, and effective manner. In doing this, they will conduct effective joint operations of their respective forces' ground, maritime and air services. The SDF will primarily conduct defensive operations in Japanese territory and its surrounding waters and airspace, while U.S. forces support SDF operations. U.S. forces will also conduct operations to supplement the capabilities of the SDF.

(c) The U.S. will introduce reinforcements in a timely manner, and Japan will establish and maintain the basis to facilitate these deployments.

(2) Concept of Operations

(a) Operations to Counter Air Attack against Japan

The SDF and U.S. forces will bilaterally conduct operations to counter air attacks against Japan. The SDF will have primary responsibility for conducting operations for air defense.

U.S. forces will support SDF operations and conduct operations, including those, which may involve the use of strike power, to supplement the capabilities of the SDF.

(b) Operations to Defend Surrounding Waters and to Protect Sea Lines of Communication

The SDF and U.S. forces will bilaterally conduct operations for the defense of surrounding waters and for the protection of sea lines of communication.

The SDF will have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan, for the protection of ships in surrounding waters, and for other operations.

U.S. forces will support SDF operations and conduct operations, including those, which may provide additional mobility and strike power, to supplement the capabilities of the SDF.

(c) Operations to Counter Airborne and Seaborne Invasions of Japan

The SDF and U.S. forces will bilaterally conduct operations to counter airborne and seaborne invasions of Japan.

The SDF will have primary responsibility for conducting operations to check and repel such invasions.

U.S. forces will primarily conduct operations to supplement the capabilities of the SDF. The

U.S. will introduce reinforcements at the earliest possible stage, according to the scale, type, and other factors of the invasion, and will support SDF operations.

(d) Responses to Other Threats

(i) The SDF will have primary responsibility to check and repel guerrilla-commando type attacks or any other unconventional attacks involving military infiltration in Japanese territory at the earliest possible stage. They will cooperate and coordinate closely with relevant agencies, and will be supported in appropriate ways by U.S. forces depending on the situation.

(ii) The SDF and U.S. forces will cooperate and coordinate closely to respond to a ballistic missile attack. U.S. forces will provide Japan with necessary intelligence, and consider, as necessary, the use of forces providing additional strike power.

(3) Activities and Requirements for Operations

(a) Command and Coordination

The SDF and U.S. forces, in close cooperation, will take action through their respective command-and-control channels. To conduct effective bilateral operations, the two Forces will establish, in advance, procedures which include those to determine the division of roles and missions and to synchronize their operations.

(b) Bilateral Coordination Mechanism

Necessary coordination among the relevant agencies of the two countries will be conducted through a bilateral coordination mechanism. In order to conduct effective bilateral operations, the SDF and U.S. forces will closely coordinate operations, intelligence activities, and logistics support through this coordination mechanism including use of a bilateral coordination center.

(c) Communication and Electronics

The two Governments will provide mutual support to ensure effective use of communications and electronics capabilities.

(d) Intelligence Activities

The two Governments will cooperate in intelligence activities in order to ensure effective bilateral operations. This will include coordination of requirements, collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence products. Each Government will be responsible for the security of shared intelligence.

(e) Logistics Support Activities

The SDF and U.S. forces will conduct logistics support activities efficiently and properly in accordance with appropriate bilateral arrangements.

To improve the effectiveness of logistics and to alleviate functional shortfalls, the two Governments will undertake mutual support activities, making appropriate use of authorities and assets of the central Government and local governments, as well as private sector assets.

Particular attention will be paid to the following points in conducting such activities:

(i) Supply

The U.S. will support the acquisition of supplies for systems of U.S. origin while Japan will support the acquisition of supplies in Japan.

(ii) Transportation

The two Governments will closely cooperate in transportation operations, including airlift and sealift of supplies from the U.S. to Japan.

(iii) Maintenance

Japan will support the maintenance of U.S. forces' equipment in Japan. The U.S. will support the maintenance of items of U.S. origin which are beyond Japanese maintenance capabilities.

Maintenance support will include the technical training of maintenance personnel as required. Japan will also support U.S. forces' requirement for salvage and recovery.

(iv) Facilities

Japan will, in case of need, provide additional facilities and areas in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. If necessary for effective and efficient operations, the SDF and U.S. forces will make joint use of SDF facilities and U.S. facilities and areas in accordance with the Treaty and its related arrangements.

(v) Medical Services

The two Governments will support each other in the area of medical services such as medical treatment and transportation of casualties.

V. Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan that will Have Important Influence on Japan's Peace and Security (Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan)

Situations in areas surrounding Japan will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security. The concept, situations in area surrounding Japan, is not geographic but situational. The two Governments will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent such situations from occurring. When the two Governments reach a common assessment of the state of each situation, they will effectively coordinate their activities. In responding to such situations, measures taken may differ depending on circumstances.

1. When a Situation in Areas Surrounding Japan is Anticipated

When a situation in areas surrounding Japan is anticipated, the two Governments will intensify information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations, including efforts to reach a common assessment of the situation.

At the same time, they will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent further deterioration of the situation, while initiating at an early stage the operation of a bilateral coordination mechanism, including use of a bilateral coordination center. Cooperating as appropriate, they will make preparations necessary for ensuring coordinated responses according to the readiness stage selected by mutual agreement. As circumstances change, they will also increase intelligence gathering and surveillance, and enhance their readiness to respond to the circumstances.

2. Responses to Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

The two Governments will take appropriate measures, to include preventing further deterioration of situations, in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan. This will be done in accordance with the basic premises and principles listed in Section II above and based on their respective decisions. They will support each other as necessary in accordance with appropriate arrangements.

Functions and fields of cooperation and examples of items of cooperation are outlined below, and listed in the Annex.

(1) Cooperation in Activities Initiated by Either Government

Although either Government may conduct the following activities at its own discretion, bilateral cooperation will enhance their effectiveness.

(a) Relief Activities and Measures to Deal with Refugees

Each Government will conduct relief activities with the consent and cooperation of the authorities in the affected area. The two Governments will cooperate as necessary, taking into account their respective capabilities.

The two Governments will cooperate in dealing with refugees as necessary. When there is a flow of refugees into Japanese territory, Japan will decide how to respond and will have primary responsibility for dealing with the flow; the U.S. will provide appropriate support.

(b) Search and Rescue

The two Governments will cooperate in search and rescue operations. Japan will conduct search and rescue operations in Japanese territory; and at sea around Japan, as distinguished from areas where combat operations are being conducted. When U.S. forces are conducting operations, the United States will conduct search and rescue operations in and near the operational areas.

(c) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

When the need arises for Japanese and U.S. noncombatants to be evacuated from a third country to a safe haven, each Government is responsible for evacuating its own nationals as well as for dealing with the authorities of the affected area. When both Governments deem it appropriate, they will coordinate in planning and cooperate in carrying out such evacuations, including matters that affect the securing of means of transportation and the use of transportation and facilities, using their respective capabilities in a mutually supplementary manner. Should a similar need arise with regard to noncombatants other than of Japanese or U.S. nationality, the respective countries may consider extending, on their respective terms, evacuation assistance to third country nationals.

(d) Activities for Ensuring the Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions for the Maintenance of International Peace and Stability

Each Government will contribute to activities for ensuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions for the maintenance of international peace and stability. Such contributions will be made in accordance with each Government's own criteria.

Additionally, the two Governments will cooperate with each other as appropriate, taking into account their respective capabilities. Such cooperation includes information sharing, and cooperation in inspection of ships based on U.N. Security Council resolutions.

(2) Japan's Support for U.S. Forces Activities

(a) Use of Facilities

Based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements, Japan will, in case of need, provide additional facilities and areas in a timely and appropriate manner, and ensure the temporary use by U.S. forces of SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports.

(b) Rear Area Support

Japan will provide rear area support to those U.S. forces that are conducting operations for the purpose of achieving the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The primary aim of this rear area support is to enable U.S. forces to use facilities and conduct operations in an effective manner. By its very nature, Japan's rear area support will be provided primarily in Japanese territory. It may also be provided on the high seas and international airspace around Japan which are distinguished from areas where combat operations are being conducted.

In providing rear area support, Japan will make appropriate use of the authority and capacity of the central Government and local governments, as well as private sector capacity. The SDF, as appropriate, will provide such support consistent with their mission for the defense of Japan and the maintenance of public order.

(3) Japan-U.S. Operational Cooperation

As situations in areas surrounding Japan have an important influence on Japan's peace and security, the SDF will conduct such activities as intelligence gathering, surveillance and minesweeping, to protect lives and property and to ensure navigational safety. U.S. forces will conduct operations to restore the peace and security affected by situations in areas surrounding Japan.

With the involvement of relevant agencies, cooperation and coordination will significantly enhance the effectiveness of both Forces' activities.

VI. Bilateral Programs for Effective Defense Cooperation under the Guidelines

Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require Japan and the U.S. to conduct consultative dialogue throughout the spectrum of security conditions: normal circumstances, an armed attack against Japan, and situations in areas surrounding Japan. Both sides must be well informed and coordinate at multiple levels to ensure successful bilateral defense cooperation. To accomplish this, the two Governments will strengthen their information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations by taking advantage of all available opportunities, including, SCC and SSC meetings, and they will establish the following two mechanisms to facilitate consultations, coordinate policies, and coordinate operational functions.

First, the two Governments will develop a comprehensive mechanism for bilateral planning and the establishment of common standards and procedures, involving not only the SDF and U.S. forces but also other relevant agencies of their respective Governments.

The two Governments will, as necessary, improve this comprehensive mechanism. The SCC will continue to play an important role in presenting policy direction for the work to be conducted by this mechanism. The SCC will be responsible for presenting policy, validating the progress of work, and issuing directives as necessary. The SDC will assist the SCC in bilateral work.

Second, the two Governments will also establish, under normal circumstances, a bilateral coordination mechanism that will include relevant agencies of the two countries for coordinating respective activities during contingencies.

1. Bilateral Work for Planning and the Establishment of Common Standards and Procedures

   Bilateral work listed below will be conducted under a comprehensive mechanism, involving relevant agencies of the respective Governments in a deliberate and efficient manner. Progress and results of such work will be reported at significant intervals to the SCC and the SDC.

   (1) Bilateral Defense Planning and Mutual Cooperation Planning

   The SDF and U.S. forces will conduct bilateral defense planning under normal circumstances to take coordinated actions smoothly and effectively in case of an armed attack against Japan. The two Governments will conduct mutual cooperation planning under normal circumstances to be able to respond smoothly and effectively to situations in areas surrounding Japan.

   Bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning will assume various possible situations, with the expectation that the results of this planning work will be appropriately reflected in the plans of the two Governments. The two Governments will coordinate and adjust their plans in light of actual circumstances. The two Governments will be mindful that bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning must be consistent so that appropriate responses will be ensured when a situation in areas surrounding Japan threatens to develop into an armed attack against Japan or when such a situation and an armed attack against Japan occur simultaneously.

   (2) Establishment of Common Standards for Preparations

   The two Governments will establish under normal circumstances common standards for preparations for the defense of Japan. These standards will address such matters as intelligence activities, unit activities, movements and logistics support in each readiness stage. When an armed attack against Japan is imminent, both Governments will agree to select a common readiness stage that will be reflected in the level of preparations for the defense of Japan by U.S. forces, the SDF and other relevant agencies.

   The two Governments will similarly establish common standards for preparations of cooperative measures in situations in areas surrounding Japan so that they may select a common readiness stage by mutual agreement.

   (3) Establishment of Common Procedures

   The two Governments will prepare in advance common procedures to ensure smooth and effective

execution of coordinated U.S. forces and SDF operations for the defense of Japan. These will include procedures for communications, transmission of target information, intelligence activities and logistics support, and prevention of fratricide. Common procedures will also include criteria for properly controlling respective unit operations. The two Forces will take into account the importance of communications and electronics interoperability, and will determine in advance their mutual requirements.

2. Bilateral Coordination Mechanism

The two Governments will establish under normal circumstances a bilateral coordination mechanism involving relevant agencies of the two countries to coordinate respective activities in case of an armed attack against Japan and in situations in areas surrounding Japan.

Procedures for coordination will vary depending upon items to be coordinated and agencies to be involved. They may include coordination committee meetings, mutual dispatch of liaison officers, and designation of points of contact. As part of such a bilateral coordination mechanism, the SDF and U.S. forces will prepare under normal circumstances a bilateral coordination center with the necessary hardware and software in order to coordinate their respective activities.

VII. Timely and Appropriate Review of the Guidelines

The two Governments will review the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner when changes in situations relevant to the Japan-U.S. security relationship occur and if deemed necessary in view of the circumstances at that time.

(The schedule omitted: See Fig. III-2-3-4)

Reference 41. Record of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY 2007

Joint Exercise

Exercise Designation	Date	Location	Scale		Reference
			Japan	U.S.	
Japan-U.S. joint exercises (Actual experience)	November 5 – November 6, 2007	Facilities of SDF/U.S. Forces, sea area and airspace surrounding Japan	Joint Staff Office, GSDF, MSDF, ASDF, Regional Armies, Central Readiness Force, MSDF Fleet, District Units, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, etc. Approx. 22,500 personnel Fleet: Approx. 90 Aircraft: Approx. 400	USFJ Command, USFJ Armed Forces, etc. Approx. 8,500 personnel	Training in joint operations

GSDF

Exercise Designation	Date	Location	Scale		Reference
			Japan	U.S.	
Combined command post exercise	July 6 – July 14, 2007	Fort Shafter in Hawaii, United States	Ground Staff Office, etc. Approx. 125 personnel	U.S. Army Japan, 1st Corps, etc. Approx. 100 personnel	Training in coordinated operations
Field training in the United States (U.S. Army)	October 27 – November 22, 2007	Fort Hunter Liggett in California, United States	5th Brigade Approx. 222 personnel	40th Infantry Brigade (Separate) 1st - 184th units Approx. 200 personnel	Training for street warfare
Field training	November 11 – November 23, 2007	Nihonbara Maneuver Area, etc.	14th Brigade Approx. 350 personnel	U.S. III Marine Expeditionary Force, 1 Company Major Unit Approx. 150 personnel	Training in joint operations
Combined command post exercise	December 8 – December 17, 2007	Sendai Garrison	Northeastern Army, etc. Approx. 3,500 personnel	USFJ 1st Corps Approx. 1,500 personnel	Training in coordinated operations
Field training in the United States (U.S. Marine Corps)	January 17 – February 20, 2008	Camp Pendleton in California, etc., United States	Western Army Approx. 180 personnel	U.S. 1st Marine Expeditionary Force Approx. 100 personnel	Training and exercises for tactical and combat skills for diverse contingencies
Field training	January 28 – February 8, 2008	Sekiyama Maneuver Area, etc.	12th Brigade Approx. 220 personnel	256th Infantry Brigade Infantry Battalion Major Unit (Louisiana National Guard) Approx. 250 personnel	Training in joint operations
Field training	February 29 – March 13, 2008	Yausubetsu Maneuver Area	5th Brigade Approx. 300 personnel	U.S. III Marine Expeditionary Force Approx. 150 personnel	Training in joint operations
Field training	March 3 – March 16, 2008	Iwateyama Maneuver Area, etc.	9th Division Approx. 400 personnel	207th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade Reconnaissance Brigade Major Unit (Alaska National Guard) Approx. 170 personnel	Training in joint operations

MSDF

Exercise Designation	Date	Location	Scale		Reference
			Japan	U.S.	
Special minesweeping training	July 17 – July 29, 2007	Mutsu Bay	Vessels: 27 Aircraft: 15	One Aircraft 9 minesweeping personnel	Minesweeping training
Anti-submarine special training	October 10 – October 14, 2007	Sea area surrounding Okinawa	Vessels: 4 Aircraft: a few	One vessel Aircraft: a few	Anti-submarine training, etc.
Special training for base security	November 13 – November 15, 2007	Within Yokosuka Bay, etc.	Yokosuka MSDF's Headquarters, etc. Approx. 170 personnel	U.S. Navy Yokosuka Base Security Police, etc.	Training in joint operations for guarding the base
Special medical training	November 17, 2007	Yokosuka Naval Base	Yokosuka District Unit Approx. 50 personnel	U.S. Navy Hospital, Yokosuka Approx. 150 personnel	Medical training
Anti-submarine special training	December 1 – December 4, 2007	Sea area surrounding Okinawa	Vessels: 2 Aircraft: a few	Vessels: 7 Aircraft: a few	Anti-submarine training
Special minesweeping training	February 15 – February 27, 2008	Suounada	Vessels: 22 Aircraft: 11	One vessel Aircraft: 3 Underwater explosive ordnance disposal personnel: 16 personnel	Minesweeping training
Anti-submarine special training	February 19 – February 22, 2008	Airspace surrounding Okinawa	Vessels: 5 Aircraft: a few	Vessels: 10 Aircraft: a few	Anti-submarine training
Special transportation training	February 28 – March 1, 2008	Sasebo and Kyushu western waters	One vessel	One vessel	Transportation training
Command post experience	March 10 – March 21, 2008	U.S. Navy College	ASDF Staff, etc. Approx. 30 personnel	U.S. Army Japan, U.S. 7th Fleet Approx. 40 personnel	Training in coordinated operations

ASDF

Exercise Designation	Date	Location	Scale		Reference
			Japan	U.S.	
Fighter training	April 26 – April 27, 2007	Airspace surrounding Okinawa and temporary airspace for training	Aircraft: 9	Aircraft: 9	Training in joint operations Enhancing tactical skills
Rescue training	May 15 – May 18, 2007	Ukibarujima Training Area and surrounding sea areas	Aircraft: 4	Aircraft: 3	Training in joint operations Enhancing tactical skills
Fighter training	May 16 – May 23, 2007	Off Komatsu airspace	Aircraft: 10	Aircraft: 5	Training in joint operations Enhancing tactical skills
Fighter training Air defense combat training Air-to-ground firing and bombing training	May 29 – July 4, 2007	Andersen Air Force Base in Guam and Farallon De Medinila Air-to-Ground Firing Site as well as their surrounding airspace	Aircraft: 10	Aircraft: 18	Training in joint operations Enhancing tactical skills
Fighter training	June 18 – June 22, 2007	Airspace north and west of Kyushu and off Shikoku airspace and temporary airspace for training	Aircraft: 12	Aircraft: 5	Training in joint operations Enhancing tactical skills
Air defense combat training Air defense training for guarding bases	July 4 – August 2, 2007	Eielson Air Force Base and Elemendorf Air Force Base in Alaska and their surrounding airspace	Aircraft: 7	Aircraft: -	Training in joint operations Enhancing tactical skills
Fighter training	July 16 – July 21, 2007	Airspace west of Akita Airspace east of Misawa and temporary airspace for training	Aircraft: 13	Aircraft: 5	Training in joint operations Enhancing tactical skills
Fighter training	September 3 – September 4, 2007	Airspace west of Kyushu and off Shikoku airspace and temporary airspace for training	Aircraft: 2	Aircraft: 2	Training in joint operations Enhancing tactical skills
Fighter training	October 15 – October 19, 2007	Off Hyakuri airspace	Aircraft: 4	Aircraft: 5	Training in joint operations Enhancing tactical skills

Reference 42. Outline of 23 Issues

(As of March 31, 2008)

Facility	Scope	Area (ha)	Classification				Remarks
			SCC	Gun-Ten-Kyo	Gover-nor	U.S. Forces	
<Already returned>							
Army POL Depots	1. Pipeline between Urasoe and Ginowan City	4			◎		Returned on December 31, 1990
Camp Zukeran	2. Manhole, etc. for underground communication system (Noborikawa)	0.1		◎			Returned on September 30, 1991
Northern Training Area	3. Kunigami-son (Mt. Ibu) district, Higashi-son (Takae) District	480		◎			Returned on March 31, 1993
	4. A part of southern area of the prefectural highway Nago-Kunigami line	(256)	◎				
Camp Schwab	5. A part of area along National Highway 329 (Henoko)	1	◎				Returned on March 31, 1993
Makiminato Service Area Annex	6. In whole	0.1				◎	Returned on March 31, 1993
Naha Cold Storage	7. In whole	Building	◎				Returned on March 31, 1993
Sunabe Warehouse	8. In whole	0.3				◎	Returned on June 30, 1993
Yaedake Communication Site	9. Southern part (Nago City) and northern part (Mo tobu-cho)	19	◎				Returned on September 30, 1994
Camp Kuwae	(19. Southern side of eastern part)	2	○	○			Returned on December 31, 1994
Onna Communication Site	10. In whole	62			◎		Returned on November 30, 1995
	11. Eastern part	(26)	◎				
Kadena Air Base	12. A part of southern area (Tobaru)	2		◎			Returned on January 31, 1996
Chibana Site	13. In whole	0.1				◎	Returned on December 31, 1996
Camp Hansen	14. A part of Kin-cho (Kin)	3		◎			Returned on December 31, 1996
Kadena Ammunition Storage Area	(21. Eastern Side of National Highway 58 (Kino-Hija), Southwestern corner (Yamanaka Area))	74	○				Returned on March 25, 1999
	15. Kadena bypass (west side of Route 58)	3	○	◎			Returned on March 25, 1999
	(21. Waste incineration facility site (Kurahama))	9	○				Returned on March 31, 2005
	(21. Area that GSDF is currently using)	58	○				Returned on October 31, 2006
Torii Communication Station	16. Kadena bypass	4		◎			Returned on March 31, 1999
Deputy Division Engineer Office	17. In whole	4	◎				Returned on September 30, 2002
Camp Kuwae	18. Northern part (Ihei)	38		◎			Returned on March 31, 2003
	(19. Along Route 58)	(5)	○				
	16 facilities, 18 issues	765	6	7	2	3	
<Not yet returned after release agreement was concluded>							
Camp Kuwae	19. Northern side of eastern part (Kuwae)	0.5	◎				Release agreed on December 21, 1995; amendment agreed on April 22, 1999 and December 21, 2001 (to be returned upon formulation of the land utilization plan or reversion of southern part, whichever comes first)
Camp Zukeran	20. Awase golf course	47			◎		Release agreed on March 28, 1996 (to be returned after relocation of golf course into Kadena Ammunition Storage Area; Construction work is underway on the relocation area.
Kadena Ammunition Storage Area	21. Former Higashionna ammunition storage area	43	◎				Release agreed on March 28, 1996 (the remaining portion to be returned after relocation of ammunition storage and completion of relocation arrangement of Awase Golf Course)
Futenma Air Station	22. A strip of land along the east side (Nakahara - Ginowan)	4		◎			Release agreed on March 28, 1996 (to be returned after relocation of the perimeter patrol road, etc.)
Camp Hansen	23. A part of East China Sea side slope (Nago City)	162	◎				Release agreed on December 21, 1995; amendments agreed on April 22, 1999 and February 12, 2004 (another 5 year postponement requested from the local municipality due to formulation of the land utilization plan (2nd postponement: 10 years in total); Release due by the end of 2008)
	5 facilities, 5 issues	256	3	1	1	0	
Total	17 facilities, 23 issues	1,021	9	8	3	3	

Notes: 1. For the Area column, the value within parentheses is a portion of the value indicated immediately above.
2. A single circle mark in the Classification column expediently indicates that a scope of the case overlaps that of another issue.
3. The numbers in the Scope column were assigned only for classification purpose of 23 issues.
4. "SCC" in the Classification column indicates issues in which release was not achieved by June 1990 with respect to realignment, consolidation, and reduction plans of facilities and areas in Okinawa which were approved by the 15th and 16th Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee meetings. "Gun-Ten-Kyo" indicates issues in which release was requested by the Council for promotion of dezoning and utilization of military land and consultation of problems accompanying bases in Okinawa Prefecture chaired by Okinawa's governor. "Governor" indicates issues in which release of facilities and areas was requested to the U.S. government by then Governor Nishime of Okinawa. "U.S. Forces" indicates issues in which the U.S. side declared to be returnable with respect to facilities and areas in Okinawa.

Reference 43. The SACO Final Report

(December 2, 1996)

The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was established in November 1995 by the Governments of Japan and the United States. The two Governments launched the SACO process to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance.

The mandate and guidelines for the SACO process were set forth by the Governments of Japan and the United States at the outset of the joint endeavor. Both sides decided that the SACO would develop recommendations for the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) on ways to realign, consolidate and reduce U.S. facilities and areas, and adjust operational procedures of U.S. forces in Okinawa consistent with their respective obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and other related agreements. The work of the SACO was scheduled to conclude after one year.

The SCC which was held on April 15, 1996, approved the SACO Interim Report which included several significant initiatives, and instructed the SACO to complete and recommend plans with concrete implementation schedules by November 1996.

The SACO, together with the Joint Committee, has conducted a series of intensive and detailed discussions and developed concrete plans and measures to implement the recommendations set forth in the Interim Report.

Today, at the SCC, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry and Ambassador Mondale approved this SACO Final Report. The plans and measures included in this Final Report, when implemented, will reduce the impact of the activities of U.S. forces on communities in Okinawa. At the same time, these measures will fully maintain the capabilities and readiness of U.S. forces in Japan while addressing security and force protection requirements. Approximately 21 percent of the total acreage of the U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa excluding joint use facilities and areas (approx. 5,002ha/12,361 acres) will be returned.

Upon approving the Final Report, the members of the SCC welcomed the successful conclusion of the year-long SACO process and underscored their strong resolve to continue joint efforts to ensure steady and prompt implementation of the plans and measures of the SACO Final Report. With this understanding, the SCC designated the Joint Committee as the primary forum for bilateral coordination in the implementation phase, where specific conditions for the completion of each item will be addressed. Coordination with local communities will take place as necessary.

The SCC also reaffirmed the commitment of the two governments to make every endeavor to deal with various issues related to the presence and status of U.S. forces, and to enhance mutual understanding between U.S. forces and local Japanese communities. In this respect, the SCC agreed that efforts to these ends should continue, primarily through coordination at the Joint Committee.

The members of the SCC agreed that the SCC itself and the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) would monitor such coordination at the Joint Committee described above and provide guidance as appropriate. The SCC also instructed the SSC to seriously address the Okinawa-related issues as one of the most important subjects and regularly report back to the SCC on this subject.

In accordance with the April 1996 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, the SCC emphasized the importance of close consultation on the international situation, defense policies and military postures, bilateral policy coordination and efforts towards a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. The SCC instructed the SSC to pursue these goals and to address the Okinawa-related issues at the same time.

Return Land:

— Futenma Air Station—See attached.

— Northern Training Area

Return major portion of the Northern Training Area (approx. 3,987ha/9,852 acres) and release U.S. joint use of certain reservoirs (approx. 159ha/393 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2003 under the following conditions:

• Provide land area (approx. 38ha/93 acres) and water area (approx. 121ha/298 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 in order to ensure access from the remaining Northern Training Area to the ocean.

• Relocate helicopter landing zones from the areas to be returned to the remaining Northern Training Area.

— Aha Training Area

Release U.S. joint use of Aha Training Area (approx. 480ha/1,185 acres) and release U.S. joint use of the water area (approx. 7,895ha/19,509 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after land and water access areas from the Northern Training Area to the ocean are provided.

— Gimbaru Training Area

Return Gimbaru Training Area (approx. 60ha/149 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after the helicopter landing zone is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area, and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.

— Sobe Communication Site

Return Sobe Communication Site (approx. 53ha/132 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.

— Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield

Return Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (approx. 191ha/471 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the parachute drop training is relocated to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield and Sobe Communication Site is relocated.

— Camp Kuwae

Return most of Camp Kuwae (approx. 99ha/245 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 after the Naval Hospital is relocated to Camp Zukeran and remaining facilities there are relocated to Camp Zukeran or other U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa.

— Senaha Communication Station

Return Senaha Communication Station (approx. 61ha/151 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Torii Communication Station. However, the microwave tower portion (approx. 0.1ha/0.3 acres) will be retained.

— Makiminato Service Area

Return land adjacent to Route 58 (approx. 3ha/8 acres) in order to widen the Route, after the facilities which will be affected by the return are relocated within the remaining Makiminato Service Area.

— Naha Port

Jointly continue best efforts to accelerate the return of Naha Port (approx. 57ha/140 acres) in connection to its relocation to the Urasoe Pier area (approx. 35ha/87 acres).

— Housing consolidation (Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran)

Consolidate U.S. housing areas in Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran and return portions of land in housing areas there with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 (approx. 83ha/206 acres at Camp Zukeran; in addition, approx. 35ha/85 acres at Camp Kuwae will be returned through housing consolidation. That land amount is included in the above entry on Camp Kuwae.).

Adjust Training and Operational Procedures:

— Artillery live-fire training over Highway 104

Terminate artillery live-fire training over Highway 104, with the exception of artillery firing required in the event of a crisis, after the training is relocated to maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan within Japanese FY 1997.

— Parachute drop training

Relocate parachute drop training to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield.

— Conditioning hikes on public roads

Conditioning hikes on public roads have been terminated.

Implement Noise Reduction Initiatives:

— Aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station Agreements on aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station announced by the Joint Committee in March 1996 have been implemented.

— Transfer of KC-130 Hercules aircraft and AV-8 Harrier aircraft

Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft currently based at Futenma Air Station to Iwakuni Air Base after adequate facilities are provided. Transfer of 14 AV-8 aircraft from Iwakuni Air Base to the United States has been completed.

— Relocation of Navy aircraft and MC-130 operations at Kadena Air Base

Relocate Navy aircraft operations and supporting facilities at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the other side of the major runways. The implementation schedules for these measures will be decided along with the implementation schedules for the development of additional facilities at Kadena Air Base necessary for the return of Futenma Air Station. Move the MC-130s at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the northwest corner of the major runways by the end of December 1996.

— Noise reduction baffles at Kadena Air Base

Build new noise reduction baffles at the north side of Kadena Air Base with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998.

— Limitation of night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station

Limit night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station to the maximum extent possible, consistent with the operational readiness of U.S. forces.

Improve Status of Forces Agreement Procedures:

— Accident reports

Implement new Joint Committee agreement on procedures to provide investigation reports on U.S. military aircraft accidents announced on December 2, 1996.

In addition, as part of the U.S. forces' good neighbor policy, every effort will be made to insure timely notification of appropriate local officials, as well as the Government of Japan, of all major accidents involving U.S. forces' assets or facilities.

— Public exposure of Joint Committee agreements

Seek greater public exposure of Joint Committee agreements.

— Visits to U.S. facilities and areas

Implement the new procedures for authorizing visits to U.S. facilities and areas announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.

— Markings on U.S. forces official vehicles

Implement the agreement on measures concerning markings on U.S. forces official vehicles. Numbered

plates will be attached to all non-tactical U.S. forces vehicles by January 1997, and to all other U.S. forces vehicles by October 1997.

— Supplemental automobile insurance

Education programs for automobile insurance have been expanded. Additionally, on its own initiative, the U.S. has further elected to have all personnel under the SOFA obtain supplemental auto insurance beginning in January 1997.

— Payment for claims

Make joint efforts to improve payment procedures concerning claims under paragraph 6, Article XVIII of the SOFA in the following manner:

Requests for advance payments will be expeditiously processed and evaluated by both Governments utilizing their respective procedures. Whenever warranted under U.S. laws and regulatory guidance, advance payment will be accomplished as rapidly as possible.

A new system will be introduced by the end of March 1998, by which Japanese authorities will make available to claimants no-interest loans, as appropriate, in advance of the final adjudication of claims by U.S. authorities.

In the past there have been only a very few cases where payment by the U.S. Government did not satisfy the full amount awarded by a final court judgment. Should such a case occur in the future, the Government of Japan will endeavor to make payment to the claimant, as appropriate, in order to address the difference in amount.

— Quarantine procedures

Implement the updated agreement on quarantine procedures announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.

— Removal of unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen

Continue to use USMC procedures for removing unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen, which are equivalent to those applied to ranges of the U.S. forces in the United States.

— Continue efforts to improve the SOFA procedures in the Joint Committee

The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station (an integral part of the SACO Final Report)

(Tokyo, Japan, December 2, 1996)

1. Introduction
   a. At the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held on December 2, 1996, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry, and Ambassador Mondale reaffirmed their commitment to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Interim Report of April 15, 1996 and the Status Report of September 19, 1996. Based on the SACO Interim Report, both Governments have been working to determine a suitable option for the return of Futenma Air Station and the relocation of its assets to other facilities and areas in Okinawa, while maintaining the airfield's critical military functions and capabilities. The Status Report called for the Special Working Group on Futenma to examine three specific alternatives: 1) incorporate the heliport into Kadena Air Base; 2) construct a heliport at Camp Schwab; and 3) develop and construct a sea-based facility (SBF).
   b. On December 2, 1996, the SCC approved the SACO recommendation to pursue the SBF option. Compared to the other two options, the SBF is judged to be the best option in terms of enhanced safety and quality of life for the Okinawan people while maintaining operational capabilities of U.S. forces. In addition, the SBF can function as a fixed facility during its use as a military base and can also be removed when no longer necessary.

c. The SCC will establish a bilateral U.S.-Japan working group under the supervision of the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) entitled the Futenma Implementation Group (FIG), to be supported by a team of technical experts. The FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will develop a plan for implementation no later than December 1997. Upon SCC approval of this plan, the FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will oversee design, construction, testing, and transfer of assets. Throughout this process, the FIG will periodically report to the SSC on the status of its work.

2. Decisions of the SCC

a. Pursue construction of an SBF to absorb most of the helicopter operational functions of Futenma Air Station. This facility will be approximately 1,500 meters long, and will support the majority of Futenma Air Station's flying operations, including an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)—capable runway (approximately 1,300 meters long), direct air operations support, and indirect support infrastructure such as headquarters, maintenance, logistics, quality-of-life functions, and base operating support. The SBF will be designed to support basing of helicopter assets, and will also be able to support short-field aircraft operations.

b. Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base. Construct facilities at this base to ensure that associated infrastructure is available to support these aircraft and their missions.

c. Develop additional facilities at Kadena Air Base to support aircraft, maintenance, and logistics operations which are currently available at Futenma Air Station but are not relocated to the SBF or Iwakuni Air Base.

d. Study the emergency and contingency use of alternate facilities which may be needed in the event of a crisis. This is necessary because the transfer of functions from Futenma Air Station to the SBF will reduce operational flexibility currently available.

e. Return Futenma Air Station within the next five to seven years, after adequate replacement facilities are completed and operational.

3. Guiding Principles

a. Futenma Air Station's critical military functions and capabilities will be maintained and will continue to operate at current readiness levels throughout the transfer of personnel and equipment and the relocation of facilities.

b. To the greatest extent possible, Futenma Air Station's operations and activities will be transferred to the SBF. Operational capabilities and contingency planning flexibility which cannot be supported by the shorter runway of the SBF (such as strategic airlift, logistics, emergency alternate divert, and contingency throughput) must be fully supported elsewhere. Those facilities unable to be located on the SBF, due to operational cost, or quality-of-life considerations, will be located on existing U.S. facilities and areas.

c. The SBF will be located off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa, and is expected to be connected to land by a pier or causeway. Selection of the location will take into account operational requirements, airspace and sea-lane deconfliction, fishing access, environmental compatibility, economic effects, noise abatement, survivability, security, and convenient, acceptable personnel access to other U.S. military facilities and housing.

d. The design of the SBF will incorporate adequate measures to ensure platform, aircraft, equipment, and personnel survivability against severe weather and ocean conditions; corrosion control treatment and prevention for the SBF and all equipment located on the SBF; safety; and platform security. Support will include reliable and secure fuel supply, electrical power, fresh water, and other utilities and consumables.

Additionally, the facility will be fully self-supporting for short-period contingency/emergency operations.

e. The Government of Japan will provide the SBF and other relocation facilities for the use of U.S. forces, in accordance with the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the Status of Forces Agreement. The two Governments will further consider all aspects of life-cycle costs as part of the design/acquisition decision.

f. The Government of Japan will continue to keep the people of Okinawa informed of the progress of this plan, including concept, location, and schedules of implementation.

4. Possible Sea-Based Facility Construction Methods

Studies have been conducted by a "Technical Support Group" comprised of Government engineers under the guidance of a "Technical Advisory Group" comprised of university professors and other experts outside the Government. These studies suggested that all three construction methods mentioned below are technically feasible.

a. Pile Supported Pier Type (using floating modules)—supported by a number of steel columns fixed to the sea bed.

b. Pontoon Type—platform consisting of steel pontoon type units, installed in a calm sea protected by a breakwater.

c. Semi-Submersible Type—platform at a wave free height, supported by buoyancy of the lower structure submerged under the sea.

5. The Next Steps

a. The FIG will recommend a candidate SBF area to the SCC as soon as possible and formulate a detailed implementation plan no later than December 1997. This plan will include completion of the following items: concept development and definitions of operational requirements, technology performance specifications and construction method, site survey, environmental analysis, and final concept and site selection.

b. The FIG will establish phases and schedules to achieve operational capabilities at each location, including facility design, construction, installation of required components, validation tests and suitability demonstrations, and transfer of operations to the new facility.

c. The FIG will conduct periodic reviews and make decisions at significant milestones concerning SBF program feasibility.

Reference 44. Basic Plan regarding Response Measures based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq

(Approved by the Cabinet on December 9, 2005)
(Partially revised on December 12, 2006)

1. Basic Principles

On March 20, 2003, the United States and other countries began to use force against Iraq as the last resort to remove the threat posed by Iraq against the peace and security of the international community. Major combat operations in Iraq have ended, and the international community has been actively engaged in reconstruction assistance to Iraq.

That Iraq be rebuilt as a peaceful and democratic state while maintaining its sovereignty and territorial unity is of utmost importance not only for the people of Iraq and to the peace and stability of the Middle East, but also to securing peace and stability in the international community including Japan which depends on the Middle East for nearly 90% of its oil imports.

Japan's aid to Iraq has consisted of two major pillars—humanitarian and reconstruction assistance being provided by the SDF and official development assistance being extended by the Foreign Ministry. Based on the idea, Japan has extended as much assistance as possible, on its own initiative and proactively, to Iraq, taking into account the will of the international community expressed in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1483 and 1511, so that Iraq will be reconstructed as early as possible by the people of Iraq themselves. Based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (Law No.137 of 2003, hereinafter called the "Iraq Special Measures Law"), Japan dispatched SDF units to Muthanna Province and other places in Iraq. At a time when Iraq restored its sovereignty and moved toward full-fledged restoration, which is mentioned in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546, Japan further supported the efforts of Iraqi people and the international community, and enhanced its assistance so that rehabilitation of Iraq will progress steadily. Thanks to international backing as mentioned above, an election for the National Assembly was held in Iraq based on the newly adopted Constitution, leading to the formation of a new Government and concluding the political process specified in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546. In addition, the Iraqi security force has taken root and the process of transferring security authority from the U.N. multilateral force has advanced, marking the first step forward toward full-scale reconstruction led by the people of Iraq on their own initiative under democratic government. In the future, Japan will strive to make fruitful results of its reconstruction assistance take root in Iraq and will try to establish relations of broad and long-term partnership with the country. In light of the continued support of Iraq by the United Nations and the multilateral force, including the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1723 that extends the authority of the multinational force for one year upon request of the Iraqi transitional government, Japan will carry out activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance and other response measures based on the Iraq Special Measures Law.

2. Matters Regarding Implementation of Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance

(1) Basic Matters Regarding Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance

Iraq, in the first place, was ravaged by a quarter century of oppressive rule, and development of its social infrastructure was delayed. Its government collapsed following the use of force by the United States and other countries in March 2003. Thus, its people were thrown into a difficult situation, making the need for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance extremely important. In particular, in the area of medical services, there were shortfalls regarding operation, maintenance and management of hospitals including

insufficiency in medical equipment. Besides the supply of electricity and water, supply networks at the national level were not functioning sufficiently, becoming major issues in certain regions.

Therefore, expeditious assistance in these areas was necessary. Furthermore, in addition to assistance to meet such short-term needs, assistance that would lead to a more full-fledged development of social infrastructure was also necessary.

In view of such a situation, Japan conducted activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, dispatching GSDF units to Muthanna Province in Iraq in line with the Iraq Special Measures Law and having ASDF units undertake airlifting of goods and materials used in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities. Aid activities by the GSDF units in the Iraqi province continued for about two years and a half in wide-ranging areas, from medical services and water supply to reconstruction of public facilities such as schools and roads. These assistance measures along with the provision of ODA produced visible results in the province, such as the establishment of livelihood-related infrastructure and creation of new jobs, basically ending the stage of assistance for meeting short-term needs. Reconstruction efforts in Iraq have now moved to the stage in which the people of Iraq should play a leading role on their own initiative. Under such circumstances, on June 20, 2006, Japan decided to terminate the aid mission by GSDF units of implementing response measures to meet domestic needs in Iraq. GSDF units in charge of providing humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq returned home on July 25, 2006 and GSDF units in charge of undertaking supplementary work accompanied by the ending of response measures arrived in Japan on September 9 in the same year.

Meanwhile, ASDF units, acting on a request from the United Nations, will continue to undertake activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance.

In order to smoothly conduct these activities, and to contribute to the stability and improvement of the livelihood of the people of Iraq, amongst others, personnel of SDF units in charge and Japanese Government officials tasked with undertaking reconstruction assistance in Iraq will communicate closely with each other as well as with the overseas establishments concerned, and will collaborate on reconstruction assistance in Iraq.

(2) Categories and Contents of Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance

A. Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance to be conducted by SDF Units

SDF units will engage in transport of goods and materials used for activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance (activities stipulated under Article 3, Paragraph 2, Sub-Paragraph 5). These activities will be conducted carefully and in a flexible manner, with safety measures to be taken in view of the nature and form of the activities to be conducted.

B. Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance to be conducted by Officials in Charge of Iraqi Reconstruction

Categories and contents of activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to be conducted by Japanese officials in charge of Iraqi reconstruction shall be as follows. These activities will be conducted carefully and in a flexible manner, with safety measures to be taken after full assessment of the security situation in Iraq in view of the nature and form of the activities to be conducted, and under the premise that the security of officials conducting the activity will be ensured.

(a) Medical Services (activities stipulated under Article 3, Paragraph 2, Sub-Paragraph 1 of the Iraq Special Measures Law)

To provide advice and guidance to Iraqi doctors and others on operation, maintenance and management of hospitals with the aim of rebuilding the function of Iraqi hospitals and thus improving conditions for domestic medical services.

(b) Improvement in Irrigation (activities stipulated under Article 3, Paragraph 2, Sub-Paragraph 5 of

the Iraq Special Measures Law)

To conduct construction activities such as setting up water purification and supply equipment that can be maintained by the local residents themselves. These activities will be carried out after conducting a survey on the current situation of supply and sources of water.

(3) Matters Regarding the Range of Areas in which Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction are to be Implemented and the Designation of the Areas

A. Matters Regarding the Range of Areas in which Units of SDF Conduct Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance and the Designation of the Areas

(a) Activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to be conducted by the units of SDF shall be implemented in areas where combat is not taking place and is not expected to take place throughout the period during which the activities are to be conducted there. Security of the units of the SDF must be ensured when implementing these activities.

Toward this end, when designating the areas in which the units of the SDF conduct activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance within the range of (b), the Defense Minister shall fully consider the contents of the activities, overall situation of the activities conducted by other countries and relevant organizations including measures for ensuring security, as well as the security situation on the ground. In doing so, activities to be carried out in areas with severe security situations shall be implemented after evaluating the development of the situation with special care.

(b) The range of areas in which the units of the SDF conduct activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance shall be places of transit which lie in the area between the territory of Japan and airport facilities in Kuwait and Iraq (Basra Airport, Baghdad Airport, Balad Airport, Mosul Airport, Al Talil Airport and Erbil Airport, etc.); places where personnel are boarded and disembarked; places where goods are loaded and unloaded or procured; areas where training concerning the activities of the troops is conducted; places where equipment is repaired; and areas of transit when moving between these places and areas.

In addition to the aforementioned, the members of SDF who conduct, as supplementary activities of the troops, intelligence gathering, communication and coordination activities, which are necessary for the safe and proper implementation of the activities of the troops, shall be able to perform their activities in the facilities of the coalition forces headquarters in Baghdad, the neighboring countries of Iraq and coastal states of the Persian Gulf, as well as the places and areas of transit when moving and communicating between the aforementioned places or areas, as well as between the aforementioned places or areas and the airport facilities stipulated in the preceding paragraph.

B. Matters Regarding the Range of Areas in which Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq Conduct Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance and the Designation of the Said Areas

(a) Activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to be conducted by Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq shall be implemented in areas where combat* is not taking place and is not expected to take place throughout the period during which the activities are to be conducted there. Security of Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq must be ensured when implementing the said activities.

Toward this end, when designating the areas in which Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq conduct activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance within the range of (b), the Prime Minister shall fully consider the contents of the activities, overall situation

of the activities conducted by other countries and relevant organizations including measures for ensuring security, as well as the security situation on the ground. In doing so, activities to be carried out in areas with severe security situations shall be implemented after evaluating the development of the situation with special care.

(b) The range of areas in which Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq conduct activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance shall be the places and areas listed below as well as the following areas: places of transit which lie in the area between the territory of Japan and the places and areas listed below as well as the areas of transit when moving between these places or areas.

a) Medical Services

Hospitals and medical facilities in Iraq

b) Improvement in Irrigation

Southeastern part of Iraq, centering around the Governorate of Al Muthanna

(4) Size, Composition, Equipment, and Duration of Dispatch of Units of SDF That Conduct Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Territories of Foreign Countries

A. Size, Composition, and Equipment

ASDF units that engage in airlifting of goods and materials listed in (2) A, used for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, shall consist of no greater than eight transport aircraft and other aircraft suitable for transportation and the number of personnel shall be limited within the range necessary for the operation of these aircraft.

The ASDF units shall be equipped with as many pistols, rifles, machine guns as necessary for ensuring security, and other equipment required for implementing their activities depending on the size of the units. When replacing the equipment, additional number of equipment may be added as necessary for the said replacement.

B. Duration of Dispatch

The duration of dispatch shall be from December 15, 2003 to July 31, 2007.

During the above-mentioned period, the Government will properly review the activities of the dispatched SDF units in consideration of various factors, such as the progress of the political process by the new Iraqi government toward establishing valid sovereignty, security conditions, activities of the United Nations and its multinational force, and changes in the composition of the force. The Government, after evaluating the progress of rehabilitation in Iraq, will take response action appropriately.

(5) Important Matters Regarding the Procurement of Goods Other Than Those Goods which are or Have been Utilized by the Relevant Administrative Agencies for Their Work or Operations with a View to Transferring Them to the United Nations and Others

The government shall procure the electric generators necessary for their installation to public facilities as well as water purification and supply facilities necessary for the improvement of irrigation that are to be conducted by Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq.

(6) Other Important Matters Regarding the Implementation of the Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance

A. Including in designating the areas in which activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance are to be conducted, and in order to ensure adequate implementation of the said activities, Japan shall sufficiently consult and closely communicate with the United Nations, international organizations related to humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, relevant countries as well as organizations responsible for administration in Iraq and others.

B. Activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to be conducted by Support Personnel for

Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq as stipulated in (2) B shall be implemented carefully and in a flexible manner during the necessary period that falls between December 15, 2003 and July 31, 2007 while assessing the security situation and paying due regard to ensuring security, including the form of implementation, location for accommodation of personnel, security arrangements, and equipment to be carried, and provided that security is ensured.

C. The government shall conduct necessary surveys concerning the development of Iraq's social infrastructure such as key industrial facilities and facilities related to daily life such as electricity power plants and cement plants, provided that security is ensured, and based on their results, endeavor to achieve rehabilitation and maintenance of these facilities through the activities of Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq.

D. With respect to the implementation of the activities for humanitarian and reconstruction by SDF troops, etc., which are mentioned in above item (2) A, the government will take proper measures to maintain security, if necessary, during the period of dispatch, while watching local security conditions, activities of the multinational forces, etc.

3. Implementation of Support Activities for Ensuring Security

(1) Basic Matters Regarding the Implementation of Support Activities for Ensuring Security, Categories and Contents of the Activities, Matters Regarding the Range of Areas in which the Activities are to be Implemented, and the Designation of the Said Areas, as well as Size, Composition, Equipment and Duration of Dispatch of Troops of SDF That Conduct the Activities in Territories of Foreign Countries

A. Japan shall implement its response measures focusing on activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. On the other hand, in order to support the U.N. Member States' activities to restore security and stability in Iraq, the SDF troops that conduct the activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance as stipulated in 2 (4) A, may conduct medical services, transportation, storage of goods/ stockpiling, communications, construction, repair/maintenance, supply and decontamination activities as stipulated in Article 3, paragraph 3 of the Iraq Special Measures Law, insofar as it does not affect the accomplishment of their assigned activities.

B. The range of the areas in which support activities for ensuring security by SDF troops shall be the same as that stipulated in 2 (3) A designated as the areas in which activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to be conducted by SDF troops as stipulated in 2 (4) A.

The SDF units' support activities for ensuring security shall be implemented in the areas where combat* is not taking place and is not expected to take place throughout the period during which the activities are to be conducted there. Security of the SDF troops must be ensured when implementing the said activities.

Toward this end, when designating the areas in which SDF troops conduct support activities for ensuring security within the range stated above, the Defense Minister shall fully consider the contents of the activities, the overall situation of the activities conducted by other countries and relevant organizations including measures for ensuring security, as well as the security situation on the ground. In doing so, activities to be carried out in areas with severe security situations shall be implemented after evaluating the development of the situations with special care.

(2) Other Important Matters Regarding Support Activities for Ensuring Security

A. Japan shall sufficiently consult and closely communicate with the United Nations, international organizations related to humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, relevant countries, as well as organizations responsible for administration in Iraq and others in order to ensure adequate implementation of the said activities, including the designation of the areas in which support activities for ensuring

security are to be conducted.

B. With respect to the implementation of support activities for ensuring security by SDF troops, etc., which are mentioned in above item (1) A, the government will take proper measures to maintain security, if necessary, during the period of dispatch, while watching local security conditions, activities of the multinational forces, etc.

4. Matters Regarding Coordination and Cooperation among the Relevant Administrative Agencies for the Implementation of Response Measures

To promote the response measures based on the Iraq Special Measures Law in a comprehensive and effective manner, and to ensure the safety of SDF troops and Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq dispatched under the said law, relevant administrative agencies, including the Defense Ministry/SDF, the Cabinet Office, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, shall maintain close coordination and conduct necessary cooperation centering around the Cabinet Secretariat, including the matters listed below.

(1) SDF troops and Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq dispatched, and relevant overseas establishments will liaise closely with each other, including exchange of information necessary for carrying out the activities and ensuring security, and cooperate in working to deliver reconstruction assistance to Iraq.

(2) The relevant administrative agencies shall closely communicate with each other concerning the overall situation of activities by other countries in the areas in which SDF troops or Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq conduct the activities based on the Iraq Special Measures Law and their vicinities, information on the security situation on the ground, and other necessary information for conducting the activities based on the said law and for ensuring safety, obtained through the execution of their activities in their respective areas of competence.

(3) The Heads of relevant administrative agencies shall cooperate to the extent that it does not affect the execution of their activities in their respective areas of competence when he (or she) is requested by the Prime Minister or the Defense Minister to dispatch officials that have the skills and ability, among others, that are necessary to conduct the activities based on the Iraq Special Measures Law, to transfer the control over the goods under his (or her) control and to cooperate by other means.

(4) The Prime Minister shall endeavor to enlist a wide range of human resources in recruiting Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, with the cooperation of relevant administrative agencies, local governments or private organizations. The Heads of relevant administrative agencies shall provide necessary cooperation in this regard.

(5) The Heads of overseas establishments designated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs shall provide necessary cooperation for conducting the activities based on the Iraq Special Measures Law and of ensuring safety upon instructions by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Reference 45. Humanitarian and Reconstruction Activities etc. by the Self-Defense Forces after the Restoration of Sovereignty of Iraq

(Approved by Cabinet on June 18, 2004)

On June 8, 2004, Resolution 1546 was unanimously adopted by the United Nations Security Council. As provided in the Resolution, the occupation of Iraq will be terminated and its sovereignty will be fully restored on June 30.

Japan welcomes the full restoration of sovereignty of Iraq and the entering into a new phase toward full-

fledged reconstruction.

Up until now, the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) of Japan has been carrying out activities centering on humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities for the people of Iraq, based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq and its Basic Plan in accordance with the Constitution of Japan. Its activities are highly appreciated in Iraq, and there is a strong expectation for the continuation of their activities after the restoration of Iraq.

In line with the unanimously adopted UNSC Resolution, which is based on the request of the Iraq Interim Government to the international community for assistance including the continued presence of the Multinational Force (MNF), and with the understanding that the reconstruction and stability of Iraq is important for the security and prosperity of Japan, the SDF will continue to carry out the above mentioned activities after the restoration of sovereignty.

In this respect, taking into account that the new Resolution clearly defines that humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities, as have been carried out by the SDF, are included in the tasks of the MNF, and upon sufficient deliberation within the Government on this matter, the Government has decided that the SDF will continue its activities henceforth within the MNF.

Beyond June 30, the SDF will be in the MNF and under the unified command of the MNF, and it will maintain communication and coordination between the command of the MNF. However, it will not be subject to the command of the MNF. The SDF will continue to carry out humanitarian and reconstruction activities etc., based on Japan's own judgment and under the Japanese national command on the basis of the Iraq Special Measures Law and its Basic Plan, and in a manner welcomed by the Iraq Interim Government. An understanding was reached on this point, between the Government of Japan and the Governments of the U.S. and the U.K., which jointly proposed the draft Resolution, and which are core members of the MNF and its unified command.

The SDF will not be engaged in any activities that may be deemed as the use of force which is prohibited by the Constitution. It will continue its activities in so-called "non-combat areas" in accordance with the Special Measures Law, and its activities will not become an integral part of the use of force by other States.

As explained above, the SDF's activities within the MNF will not alter the Government position regarding participation in so-called multinational forces in a manner considered to be impermissible in regard to the Constitution.

(Reference) Humanitarian and Reconstruction Activities etc. by the Self-Defense Forces after the Restoration of Sovereignty of Iraq

(Cabinet Approval on June 28, 2004)

The sovereignty was fully restored to Iraq on June 28, 2004. Therefore, the date, "June 30" being cited as the day to restore sovereignty to Iraq in the "Humanitarian and Reconstruction Activities etc. by the Self-Defense Forces after the Restoration of Sovereignty of Iraq" (Cabinet Understanding of June 18, 2004) should be understood as "June 28."

Reference 46. Details of Humanitarian and Reconstruction Support Activities by GSDF Units in Iraq



Reference 47. GSDF Activities Based on Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, and Their Results

Activities	Description	Action	Results
Medical Activities Since February 2004	❍ Activities by GSDF medical personnel at four hospitals including Samawah General Hospital • Training and advice to local medical doctors regarding diagnosis methods and treatment policy • Training and advice on use of medical equipment supplied by Japan ❍ Technical training of ambulance personnel in Al-Muthanna Province ❍ Medical support including technical training for management of pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical warehouses	Medical technique support provided a total of 277 times	★ Newborn infant mortality rates in Samawah reduced to one-third with development of basic medical infrastructure ★ Improved ability of emergency medical services
Water Supply Activities Since March 2004	❍ Water purification and supply to water supply vehicles in Samawah camp Water supply activities by GSDF completed with start-up of water purification facility installed close to the camp under ODA program on February 4, 2005	About 53,500 tons of water supplied to a total of about 11.89 million people	★ Stable access to clean water made possible
Public Facility Restoration and Construction Since March 2004	❍ Repair of walls, floors, electric circuits and others of schools in Al-Muthanna Province	Completion of 36 facilities	★ Improvement of facilities at about one-third of schools in Al-Muthanna Province, resulting in improvement of educational environment
	❍ Groundwork and pavement of roads to be used by local citizens	Completion of groundwork at 31 locations	★ Greater convenience with construction of major roads important for daily life
	❍ Repair works for other facilities • Medical clinic (Primary Health Center) • Nursing facilities and low-income residential housing in Samawah • Water purification facilities in Warka and Rumeitha • Uruk ruins, Olympic Stadium and other cultural facilities	Completion of 66 facilities	★ Improvement of quality of life and culture for citizens of Al-Muthanna Province
Local Employment	❍ Local businesses mobilized for restoration and development of public facilities ❍ Local citizens recruited for interpreting and garbage collection at the base camp	Up to some 1,100 jobs created per day for total of 490,000 people	

Reference 48. Basic Plan Concerning the Replenishment Support Activities based on the Special Measures Law on Implementation of Replenishment Support Activities towards the Anti-Terrorism Maritime Interdiction Operation

(January 16, 2008)

1. Basic Policy

The terrorist attacks that took place in the United States on September 11, 2001 were despicable and unforgivable acts that were committed not only against the United States but also against humankind as a whole. The threat of terrorist attacks has not been eliminated and the war on terror still continues to exist in the international community. The Fight Against Terrorism is one of the most important issues that the whole world including Japan should tackle.

For six years up to November 1, 2007, Japan had undertaken response measures in line with the Special Measures Law Concerning Measures Being Implemented by Japan in Response to Activities by Foreign Countries to Achieve Goals Envisaged under the U.N. Charter Following Terrorist Attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, and Concerning Humanitarian Measures Being Implemented on the Basis of Relevant United Nations Resolutions (Law No. 113 of 2001). The Fight Against Terrorism requires continuous international efforts. With the recognition that it is Japan's own problem, it is important that Japan will continuously make an active contribution on its own initiative for the prevention and eradication of international terrorism.

Given such a recognition, Japan will undertake replenishment support activities for foreign military forces conducting counter-terrorist maritime interdiction activities in line with the Law Concerning the Special Measures on the Implementation of Replenishment Support Activities for Counter-Terrorism Maritime Interdiction Activities (Law of 1 of 2008) as follows.

2. Matters concerning Designation of Area Where Replenishment Support Activities are to be Implemented

When designating the area where replenishment support activities are to be implemented as high seas (including the exclusive economic zone stipulated in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, limited to the Indian Ocean (including the Persian Gulf, same as below) and waters they pass in operating between the Indian Ocean and Japan's territorial waters) and in the air above the high seas, and territory of foreign countries (countries located in the Indian Ocean or on its seashores, or Japan's territory, and countries where seaports are located for calling in among those countries), the Defense Minister shall fully consider the overall situation of the activities conducted by other countries as well as the security situation on the ground to ensure that the activities are to be conducted in areas where no combat operations are conducted and no combat operations are expected to be conducted throughout the period during which the activities are to be conducted there and safety is to be ensured while activities are underway.

3. Size and Composition of SDF Units Engaging in Replenishment Support Activities in Overseas Territories, Their Equipment and Dispatch Period

A. (A) Size and Composition

MSDF units implementing replenishment support activities by supply vessels and escort vessels (up to 500 personnel. If unit replacement is involved, the number will be up to 1,000 personnel)

B. (B) Equipment

a. (a) Vessels

1 supply vessel and 1 escort vessel (up to 2 supply vessels and up to 2 escort vessels if unit

replacement is involved)

b. (b) Others

Equipment necessary for ensuring health and safety of SDF personnel and for replenishment support activities (except those listed in (a))

C. (C) Dispatch Period

The period between January 16, 2008 and June 30, 2008.

4. Important Matters Concerning Procurement and Transfer to Foreign Militaries of Goods Other Than Those Being Used or Having Been Used by SDF in Clerical Work and Business Projects

In order to replenish fuel and water to vessels and rotary wing aircraft carried on vessels as replenishment support activities, the Government of Japan procures the relevant fuel, and transfers it to other foreign military forces on the basis of the purport of the Law.

5. Matters Concerning Coordination and Liaison between Relevant Government Organizations for Implementation of Replenishment Support Activities

The Cabinet Secretariat takes the initiative in promoting coordination and liaison between relevant government organizations.

6. Other Important Matters Concerning Replenishment Support Activities

A. (A)

Relevant government organizations closely communicate with each other to share information obtained through execution of administrative duty which is deemed necessary for implementation of replenishment support activities by the SDF, including overall situations of activities by foreign military forces in areas where SDF units are to engage in such activities and their vicinity, and local security conditions.

B. (B)

Heads of relevant government organizations cooperate with the SDF when the Defense Minister files a request with such organizations for dispatching to SDF units which are to engage in replenishment support activities their employees with technological expertise and ability, etc. which are deemed necessary for implementation of the activities and for providing goods and equipment belonging to the government organizations, as long as such cooperation does not hamper execution of their administrative duty.

C. (C)

Heads of Japan's foreign establishments designated by the Foreign Minister provide necessary cooperation for the implementation of replenishment support activities acting on an order by the Foreign Minister.

Reference 49. The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities

(1) Activities based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq

	Place of Dispatch	Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
GSDF	Southeast Iraq etc.	January 2004–July 2006	About 600	• Medical treatment, water supply, reconstruction and maintenance of public facilities
	Kuwait etc.	June–September 2006	About 100	• Operations required for evacuation of vehicles, equipments and others
MSDF	Persian Gulf etc.	February 20–April 8, 2004	About 330	• Maritime transport of vehicles and other equipment required for the GSDF's activities
ASDF	Kuwait etc.	December 2003–	About 210	• Transportation of materials for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance

(2) Cooperative activities based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law

	Place of Dispatch	Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
MSDF	Northern Indian Ocean etc.	November 2001–November 2007	About 320	• Material supplies for U.S., U.K. and other forces
ASDF	U.S. Forces in Japan etc.		–	• Transportation of materials

(3) Replenishment activities based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law

	Place of Dispatch	Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
MSDF	Indian Ocean	January 2008–	About 340	• Material supplies for U.S., U.K. and other forces

(4) International Peace Cooperation Activities

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)	Ceasefire monitors	September 1992–September 1993	8	16	• Monitor custody of weapons collected and observance of ceasefire • Monitor observance of ceasefire at the border
	Engineering unit	September 1992–September 1993	600	1,200	• Repair roads, bridges and other infrastructure • Supply fuel and water to UNTAC components and other groups • Supply food and accommodation, provide facilities needed for work and medical care to UNTAC component personnel
United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	Headquarters staff	May 1993–January 1995	5	10	• Draft mid-and long-term plans, plan and coordinate transport operations at ONUMOZ Headquarters
	Transport coordination unit	May 1993–January 1995	48	144	• Support customs clearance work and provide other transport-related technical coordination in the allocation of transport
Humanitarian Relief Operations for Rwandan Refugees	Rwandan refugee relief unit	September–December 1994	260		• Medical care, prevention of epidemics, water supplies
	Air transport unit	September–December 1994	118		• Airlift members of Rwandan refugee relief units and additional supplies between Nairobi (Kenya) and Goma (former Republic of Zaire and present Democratic Republic of Congo) • Make use of spare capacity to airlift personnel and supplies of humanitarian international organizations engaged in refugee relief operations
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	Headquarters staff	February 1996–	2	26	• Create PR and budgets for UNDOF operations, plan and coordinate transport, maintenance and other operations at UNDOF Headquarters
	Transport unit	February 1996–	43	1,075	• Transport food and other supplies • Store goods at supply warehouses, repair roads and other infrastructure, maintain heavy machinery, conduct firefighting and snow clearance

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
Humanitarian Relief Operations to East Timor	Air transport unit	November 1999–February 2000	113		• Air transport of aid materials for UNHCR • Make use of spare capacity for the air transportation of UNHCR-related personnel
Humanitarian Relief Operations for Afghanistan Refugees	Air transport unit	October 2001–	138		• Air transport of aid materials for UNHCR
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNMISET) from May 20, 2002	Headquarters staff	February 2002–June 2005	7 (10 for the first Headquarters staff)	17	• Plan and coordinate engineering and logistics operations at military headquarters
	Engineering unit	March 2002–June 2005	405 (680 each for the first and second units, 522 for the third unit)	2,287	• Maintain and repair roads and bridges that are necessary for PKO unit activities • Maintain reservoirs used by units of other nations and local inhabitants that are in Dili and other locations • Civic assistance
Humanitarian Relief Operations for Iraqi Refugees	Air transport unit	March–April 2003	50		• Air transport of aid materials for UNHCR
Humanitarian Relief Operations for Iraqi Victims	Air transport unit	July–August 2003	98		• Air transport of materials for the relief of Iraqi victims
United Nations Political Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)	Military monitors	March 2007–	6	12	• Monitor weapons and soldiers of Maoists and the Nepali government force

Notes: 1. Other operations have included support activities in the areas of transport and supply carried out by units of the MSDF (in Cambodia and East Timor) and the ASDF (in Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, East Timor, and Afghanistan).
2. An advance unit of 23 people was additionally sent as part of the Rwandan refugee relief effort.

(5) International Disaster Relief Activities by the SDF

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
International Disaster Relief Activities in Honduras (hurricane)	Medical unit	November 13–December 9, 1998	80		• Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics in the Republic of Honduras
	Air transport unit		105		• Transportation of equipment for medical units, etc. between Japan and Honduras • Air transport of equipment and other materials between the United States and Honduras
Transportation of Materials for International Disaster Relief Activities in Turkey (earthquake)	Maritime transport unit	September 23–November 22, 1999	426		• Marine transportation of materials necessary for international disaster relief activities in the Republic of Turkey (e.g. temporary dwellings)
International Disaster Relief Activities in India (earthquake)	Material support unit	February 5–11, 2001	16		• Delivery of aid materials and technical instruction on aid materials
	Air transport unit		78		• Transport of aid materials and support units, etc.
International Disaster Relief Activities in Iran (earthquake)	Air transport unit	December 30, 2003–January 6, 2004	31		• Air transport of aid materials
International Disaster Relief Activities in Thailand (earthquake, tsunami)	Dispatched maritime unit	December 28, 2004–January 1, 2005	590		• Search and rescue activities for the disaster struck victims around Thailand and its sea

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia (earthquake, tsunami)	Joint liaison office	January 6–March 23, 2005	22		• Joint arrangements for the international disaster relief activities • Communication and coordination with relevant organizations and foreign forces involved in the international disaster relief activities
	Medical/Air support unit		228		• Air transport of aid materials • Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics
	Maritime transport unit		593		• Marine transportation of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams • Support for the activities of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams • Transport of aid materials
	Air transport unit		82		• Air transport of aid materials
International Disaster Relief Activities off Kamchatka Peninsula, Russia	Maritime transport unit	August 5–10, 2005	346		• Rescue of a Russian submarine
International Disaster Relief Activities in Pakistan (earthquake)	Air support unit	October 12–December 2, 2005	147		• Air transport in connection with relief activities
	Air transport unit		114		• Air transport of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams
International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia	Medical support unit	June 1–22, 2006	149		• Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics
	Air transport unit		85		• Air transport of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams

Notes: 1. For international disaster relief activities in Iran, fixing team was sent to Singapore separately because of a mechanical problem with transport aircraft on the way to Iran.
2. 11 officers dispatched by GSDF, MSDF and ASDF are included in the number of personnel of the liaison office in Indonesia for the international disaster relief activities.

Reference 50. Record of Main Bilateral Defense Exchanges (Last Five Years)

(April 1, 2003–June 30, 2008)

Country	Exchanges of High-Level Defense Officials		Regular consultations between defense officials
	Goers	Comers	
ROK	Minister of Defense (Jan. 05) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff (May 04, Mar. 07) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Aug. 03, Jul. 05) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Feb. 04) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Jun. 04)	Minister of National Defense (Nov. 03, Feb. 07) Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman (Feb. 05, Apr. 08) Chief of Army Staff (Jan. 08) Chief of Naval Staff (Jan. 05, Jun. 07) Chief of Air Staff (May 03, Apr. 08)	Japan-ROK security dialogue (Nov. 03, May 07, Oct. 07) Japan-ROK military-military consultation (Jun. 03, Nov. 03, Aug. 04, Aug. 05, Dec. 06, Jul. 07) Japan-ROK military-military working group (Dec. 07)
Russia	Minister of Defense (Jan. 06) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff (May 05, Apr. 08) Chief of Staff, GSDF (May 06) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Jun. 07)	Minister of Defense (Apr. 03) Chief of General Staff (Oct. 06) Ground Forces Commander-in-Chief (Mar. 08)	Japan-Russia defense official consultation (Oct. 03, Nov. 04, Oct. 05, Apr. 06, Dec. 07, May 08) Japan-Russia security talks (Apr. 08) Japan-Russia annual meeting based on the Japan-Russia Agreement on Prevention of Maritime Accidents (Mar. 04, Mar. 05, May 06, Apr. 07, Apr. 08) Japan-Russia working group meeting (Sep. 03, Mar. 04, Nov. 04, Apr. 05, Oct. 05, Apr. 06, Dec. 06, May 07, Dec. 07, May 08)
China	Minister of Defense (Sep. 03) Vice-Minister (Jan. 04, Mar. 05, Mar. 08) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff (Feb. 08) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Apr. 04)	National Defense Minister (Aug. 07) Deputy Chief of General Staff for the PLA (Oct. 04)	Japan-China security dialogue (Feb. 04, Jul. 06)
Southeast Asian Nations	• Cambodia Senior Vice-Minister of Defense (Aug. 07)	Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense (Mar. 08) Defense Force Chief Commander (Oct. 04)	
	• Indonesia Minister of Defense (Jan. 05, Aug. 06) Senior Vice-Minister of Defense (Feb. 05) Parliamentary Secretary for Defense (Aug. 04) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff (Feb. 05) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Feb. 07)	Vice Minister of Defense (Nov. 06) Military Commander (Aug. 06, Nov. 06) Chief of Naval Staff (Feb. 08)	Japan-Indonesia military-military consultation (Mar. 07)
	• Malaysia Minister of Defense (Jan. 05) Parliamentary Secretary for Defense (Aug. 04) Vice-Minister of Defense (Jan. 08) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff (Nov. 06)	Minister of Defense (Mar. 07)	Japan-Malaysia military-military consultation (Feb. 05)
	• Philippines Minister of Defense (May 05) Vice-Minister of Defense (Nov. 05) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Nov. 03, May 08)	Chief of General Staff (Oct. 04) Air Force Commander (Mar. 04)	Japan-Philippines politico-military consultation and military-military consultation (Feb. 05, Apr. 06, Dec. 07)
	• Singapore Minister of Defense (May 03, Jan. 05, Jun. 05, Jun. 06, Jun. 07, May 08) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff (Jun. 07, May 08) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Nov. 04) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Feb. 04)	Minister for Defense (Feb. 05, Nov. 07) Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Prime Minister's Office for Coordination in Public Security and Defense (Jun. 04) Permanent Secretary (Defense) (Apr. 08) Chief of Defense Force (May 04, Oct. 04) Chief of Navy (Aug. 05) Chief of Air Force (Dec. 07)	Japan-Singapore military-military consultation (Nov. 03, Jul. 04, Aug. 05, Mar. 07)
	• Thailand Minister of Defense (Jan. 07) Senior Vice-Minister of Defense (Feb. 05) Parliamentary Secretary for Defense (May 08) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff (Jul. 03, Feb. 05) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Aug. 05) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Feb. 05)	Supreme Commander (Oct. 04, Jul. 05, Jun. 08) Air Force Commander (Jul. 05)	Japan-Thailand politico-military consultation and military-military consultation (Dec. 03, Mar. 06, Oct. 07)
	• Viet Nam Chief of Staff, Joint Staff (Jul. 03) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Mar. 07)		Japan-Viet Nam politico-military consultation and military-military consultation (Feb. 05, Dec. 07)

Country	Exchanges of High-Level Defense Officials		Regular consultations between defense officials
	Goers	Comers	
India	Minister of Defense (May 03, Aug. 07) Senior Vice-Minister of Defense (May 05, Aug. 07) Vice-Minister of Defense (May 04) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff (Sep. 05) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Mar. 06) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Feb. 06) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Apr. 06)	Minister of Defense (May 06) Vice Minister of Defense (Apr. 07) Chief of General Staff, Army (Apr. 07) Chief of General Staff, Navy (Oct. 05) Chief of Staff, Air Force (Jul. 04, Jan. 07)	Japan-India politico-military consultation (Jan. 04, Mar. 05, Feb. 06, Feb. 08) Japan-India military-military consultation (Mar. 05, Feb. 06, Feb. 08)
Pakistan	Minister of Defense (Aug. 07) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff (Sep. 05) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Mar. 06) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Apr. 06)	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (Jun. 06) Chief of Staff, Air Force (Sep. 04)	Japan-Pakistan politico-military consultation (Jan. 04, Sep. 06) Japan-Pakistan military-military consultation (Jan. 04, Sep. 06, Aug. 07)
Australia	Minister of Defense (May 05) Vice-Minister of Defense (Sep. 04) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Aug. 07) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Feb. 07) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Nov. 03, Nov. 05, May 08)	Minister for Defense (Sep. 03, Jun. 07) Secretary for Defense (Sep. 03) Chief of Defense Force (Oct. 04, Jun. 07) Chief of Army (Mar. 07) Chief of Navy (May 05, Apr. 08) Chief of Air Force (Sep. 06)	Japan-Australia politico-military consultation (Dec. 03, Aug. 06, Feb. 08) Japan-Australia military-military consultation (Dec. 03, Sep. 05, May 06, Aug. 06, May 07)
New Zealand	Chief of Staff, MSDF (Feb. 07) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Nov. 05)	Minister of Defense (Aug. 03, Jun. 05, Oct. 06, May 08) Secretary of Defense (May 03) Chief of Defense Force (Oct. 04, Mar. 08) Chief of Air Staff (Sep. 04)	Japan-New Zealand military-military consultation (Dec. 05, May 06, Oct. 07)
Canada	Chief of Staff, ASDF (Nov. 06)	Minister of Defence (Sep. 06) Chief of Defense Staff (Jul. 03) Chief of Naval Staff (May 04) Chief of Air Staff (Mar. 06)	Japan-Canada politico-military consultation (Mar. 05) Japan-Canada military-military consultation (Mar. 05, Nov. 06)
United Kingdom	Minister of Defense (Jan. 04, Jan. 06) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Mar. 05) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Sep. 03, Jun. 05) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Apr. 07)	Secretary of State (Sep. 04) Chief of Army Staff (Sep. 05) Chief of Naval Staff (Jan. 07) Chief of Air Staff (Sep. 04, Oct. 05, Mar. 08)	Japan-U.K. politico-military consultation (Aug. 06, Jun. 07) Japan-U.K. military-military consultations (Feb. 04, Feb. 06, Jun. 07)
France	Minister of Defense (Jan. 04) Vice-Minister of Defense (Sep. 06) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Oct. 03) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Jun. 05) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Jul. 05)	Minister for Defense (Mar. 07) Secretary General of National Defence (Nov. 06) Chief of Army Staff (Jan. 05) Chief of Staff, Navy Force (Jan. 04) Chief of Air Staff (Sep. 04, Jun. 08)	Japan-France politico-military consultation and military-military consultation (Feb. 04, Jan. 05, Feb. 06, Feb. 07, Apr. 08)
Germany	Vice-Minister of Defense (Jan. 05) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Oct. 03)	Minister for Defense (Apr. 07) Naval Inspector-General (Dec. 05)	Japan-Germany politico-military consultation (Mar. 04, Jan. 05, Jun. 06) Japan-Germany military-military consultation (Jan. 05, Jun. 06)

Note: Politico-military consultation: Security talks among diplomatic and defense officials of Director-General-level and Councilor-level
Military-military consultation: Talks among defense officials of Director-General-level and Councilor-level. "Minister of Defense" and "Senior Vice-Minister of Defense" on the Japanese side were called "Minister of State for Defense" and "Senior Vice Minister of Defense," respectively, until January 9, 2007. Likewise, "Chief of Staff, Joint Staff" was called "Chairman of Joint Staff Council" until March 27, 2006.

Reference 51. Record of Major Multinational Security Dialogues (Asia-Pacific Region, Last Five Years)

(April 1, 2003- June 30, 2008)

	Dialogue		Date
Participation in Security Dialogues in the Asia-Pacific Region	Intergovernmental	❍ ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) • Ministerial Meeting • Senior Officials' Meeting (ARF-SOM) • Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (ARF-ISG)	(Jun. 03, Jul. 04, Jul. 05, Jul. 06, Aug. 07) (Apr. 03, May 04, May 05, May 06, May 07, May 08) (Nov. 03, Apr. 04, Oct. 04, Feb. 05, Oct. 05, Mar. 06, Nov. 06, Mar. 07, Nov. 07, Apr. 08)
	Hosted by the private sector	• IISS Asia Security Conference	(May 03, Jun. 04, Jun. 05, Jun. 06, Jun. 07, May 08)
Security Dialogue hosted by the Ministry of Defense	❍ Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum) ❍ Subcommittee Meeting on Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum subcommittee) ❍ Asia-Pacific Security Seminar ❍ International Seminar for Military Science ❍ International Conference of Cadets		(Oct. 03, Oct. 04, Jun. 05, Oct. 06, Sep. 07) (Jan. 04, Jan. 05, Jan. 06, Jan. 07, Feb. 08) (Nov. 03, Nov. 04, Nov. 05, Nov. 06, Nov. 07) (Jul. 04, Jul. 05, Jul. 06, Jul. 07) (Mar. 04, Mar. 05, Mar. 06, Mar. 07, Mar. 08)

Reference 52. Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the Ministry of Defense

Security Dialogue			Outline	Recent Situations
Hosted by Ministry of Defense	Internal Bureau and others	Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum)	Hosted by the Ministry of Defense, this forum has been held annually since 1996 with Director-General-level officials in charge of defense policy and defense exchange, all from the Asia-Pacific region, participating. The forum is designed to provide defense officials with opportunities to exchange views on ways to promote confidence-building in defense areas with major attention paid to each country's national defense.	The 12th Tokyo Defense Forum in September 2007 was participated in by 25 countries of the ARF (including Japan) and the European Union, as well as the ASEAN Secretariat, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The participants exchanged views under the agenda of "Efforts for Peace-Building in Peacetime." Participants discussed national and international efforts for peace-building in peacetime and agreed that such efforts should be further pursued in the ARF framework.
		Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Subcommittee of the Tokyo Defense Forum)	Hosted by the Ministry of Defense, this forum has been held annually since 2002 with Director (colonel)-level working officials in charge of defense policy and defense exchange from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The forum is designed to provide defense officials with opportunities to exchange views on defense issues including diversified military roles.	The 7th Subcommittee of the Tokyo Defense Forum in February 2008 was participated in by 25 countries of the ARF (including Japan) and the European Union, as well as the ASEAN Secretariat, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The participants exchanged views under the agenda of the "Best Practice Reference Paper for Peace-Building" and "Regional Cooperation and its Impact on Surrounding States." Participants shared the view that efforts for regional capacity building and international cooperation in peace-building should be further pursued in various international fora including the ARF. Participants also shared the view that recent defense exchanges play an essential role in promoting practical cooperation for common security challenges.
	GSDF	Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks (MLST)	Hosted by the GSDF, these talks have been held annually since 1997, inviting government officials in charge of logistics support from major countries in the Asia-Pacific region and Europe to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on logistic systems.	The 11th MLST meeting was held in December last year with working-level officials in charge of logistic support, sent from armies of Australia, the ROK, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, India, Indonesia and the United States, and with participation by the U.S. Marines. Participants exchanged views on logistic support to be extended in international humanitarian assistance activities and disaster relief operations.
		Army Command and General Staff College Seminar	Hosted by the GSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2001 with students of army academies from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on training of military units.	The seventh seminar was held in August last year with students of army colleges from nine Asia-Pacific countries participating. Participants exchanged views on the roles of an army in the fight against terrorism and how army training should be.
	MSDF	Seminar of Naval Colleges in the Asia-Pacific Region	Hosted by the MSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 1998 with instructors of naval colleges from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on roles of naval capabilities.	The 11th seminar was held in February this year with officials related to naval colleges from 16 Asia-Pacific countries being invited. Participants exchanged views on the "Development, Challenges and Visions of the Multi-National Force" and the "Introduction of the Research Results of Various Naval War Colleges."
		Navy Command and Staff Course Student Exchange Program (Western Pacific Naval Symposium Seminar for Officers of the Next Generation (WPNS SONG))	Hosted by the MSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2003 with students of naval colleges participating. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on regional security and naval leadership.	The fifth seminar was held in November last year mainly with students of naval colleges from 23 Asia-Pacific countries participating. Participants discussed naval leadership and how to evaluate such leadership, and each country's recognition of situations regarding maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region. Since the third seminar, this meeting has been named Seminar for Officers of Next Generation under the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS).

Security Dialogue			Outline	Recent Situations
Hosted by Ministry of Defense	ASDF	International Air Force Education Seminar	Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 1996 with officials related to air force academies from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on officer's education.	The 12th seminar was held in November last year with six countries being invited. Participants mainly exchanged views on how officer's education should be at the air force of each country.
		Air Command and Staff Course Student Exchange Program	Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2001 with students of air force academies from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on security issues and the roles of each country.	The 7th seminar was held in October last year with students of air force academies from seven Asia-Pacific countries participating. Participants exchanged views on security in the Asia-Pacific region and efforts by each country to ensure such security.
	National Defense Academy	International Seminar on Defense Science	Hosted by the National Defense Academy, this seminar has been held annually since 1996 with instructors of military academies from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on cadet education.	The 12th seminar was held in July last year with 12 countries being invited. Participants exchanged views on "Education on Military Science Technology Required in Changing Environments."
		International Cadets' Conference	Hosted by the National Defense Academy, this conference has been held annually since 1998 with cadets from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The conference is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on militaries in the 21st century.	The 11th seminar was held in March this year with 13 countries being invited. Participants exchanged views on "Non-Conventional Threats and Issues of the 21st Century."
	National Institute for Defense Studies	Asia-Pacific Security Seminar	Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this seminar has been held annually since 1994 with military officers from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on security order in the region.	The 14th seminar was held in November last year with 20 countries participating. Under the main theme of "Visions towards Regional Security Building: The Framework for Confidence-Building Measures" participants exchanged views about the unstable elements related to regional peace and security, and how each country should cooperate in response to these issues from a long-term perspective.
		International Security Symposium	Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this symposium has been held annually since 1999 with researchers and experts participating. The symposium is designed to provide opportunities to hold public debates and release reports on security for the purpose of promoting public understanding of current security issues.	The 10th symposium was held in December 2007. Eminent scholars were invited from the U.S., ROK, China, and Russia, and views were exchanged on "North Korea's Nuclear Issue: Towards Building Peace."
		International Security Colloquium	Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this seminar has been held annually since 1999 with officials at home and abroad knowledgeable about defense being invited. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to hear advanced and professional reports and discussions on security issues.	The 10th symposium was held in December 2007 to discuss "North Korea's Nuclear Issue: Towards Peace and Security in Northeast Asia." Scholars and experts from the U.S., the ROK, China and Russia, as well as Japan were invited to present papers. Lively discussions were held among panelists and the floor.
		International Forum on War History	Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this forum has been held annually since 2002 with participation by military historians. The forum is designed to deepen the mutual understanding of its participants by making comparative studies of military history.	This forum was held in September 2007 and featured domestic scholars as well as scholars from the U.S. The participants exchanged views on "New Perspectives on the War in the Pacific: Grand Strategies, Military Governments and POWs."

Reference 53. Other Multilateral Security Dialogue

Other Multilateral Security Dialogue			Overview
Hosted by the Government	Internal Bureaus and others	Asia-Pacific Military Operations Research Symposium (ARMORS)	ARMORS is a forum held by Asia-Pacific countries on a rotational basis to exchange views on defense operations and research technology. Japan has participated in the forum since the second meeting in 1993.
	Joint Staff	Chief of Defense Conference (CHOD)	CHOD is an annual conference hosted either by the United States or jointly with other participating countries on a rotational basis. Senior defense officials and others of Asia-Pacific countries meet to exchange views on security issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1998.
		Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS)	PASOLS is a seminar hosted by an Asia-Pacific country on a rotational basis mainly to exchange information on logistic-support activities. Japan's participation in the seminar as an official member started in 1995 when the 24th session was held. The 36th Seminar will be held in Japan with participation of nearly 30 countries.
	GSDF	Pacific Armies Management Seminars (PAMS)	PAMS is a forum held jointly by the U.S. and the participating countries in rotation. It provides opportunities for exchanging information about efficient and economical management techniques so that armies in the Asia-Pacific region can develop their ground troops. The GSDF has been participating in PAMS since the 17th meeting in 1993.
		Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference (PACC)	PACC is a conference hosted jointly by the United States and a member country on a rotational basis every other year when PAMS is held. Army chiefs of Asia-Pacific countries and others meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1999. The 6th meeting will be held in Japan in 2009.
	MSDF	International Sea Power Symposium (ISS)	ISS is a symposium hosted by the United States every other year. Navy chiefs of member countries and others meet to exchange views on common issues for their navies. Japan has participated in the symposium since the first meeting in 1969.
		Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS)	WPNS is a symposium hosted by a member country on a rotational basis every other year when ISS is not held. Senior navy officials and others of Western Pacific countries meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the symposium since the second meeting in 1990.
		International MCM Seminar	This seminar is hosted by a WPNS member country on a rotational basis to exchange views on minesweeping in a year when minesweeping exercises are not conducted in the Western Pacific. Japan has participated in the seminar since the first meeting in 2000. Japan's MSDF hosted this seminar in Yokosuka in October 2006.
		Asia-Pacific Submarine Conference	Hosted either by the United States or jointly with other participating countries in the Asia-Pacific region on a rotational basis to exchange views on issues centering around submarine rescue. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 2001. The JMSDF hosted the conference in October 2006.
	ASDF	Pacific Air Chiefs Conference (PACC)	PACC is a conference hosted jointly by the United States every other year with senior air force officials and others of member countries exchanging views on common issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1989.
		PACRIM Airpower Symposium	This seminar is hosted jointly by the United States and a member country on a rotational basis every year (held twice in 1996 and 1997). Air force strategy-formulation chiefs from Pacific Rim countries meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the seminar since the first meeting in 1995.
Hosted by the Private Sector	Asia Security Conference		Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the U.K., this conference has been held since 2002 with defense ministers and others of the Asia-Pacific region and other areas participating to exchange views on issues centering around submarine rescue. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 2001.
	The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)		Organized mainly by the Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) of the University of California in San Diego and private-sector research institutes in the United States, Russia, China, the ROK and Japan (among them the Japan Institute of International Affairs), this dialogue is designed for participants—private-sector researchers and government officials from member countries—to freely exchange their views on security situations and confidence-building measures in Northeast Asia. Japan has participated in the dialogue since the first meeting in 1993.

Reference 54. Treaties Related to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Weapons (nuclear weapons)

Classification	Treaties	Outline (Purpose and Others)
Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation Related Treaties	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)[1]	• Nuclear non-proliferation The NPT recognizes five countries—the United States, Russia, the U.K., France and China—as nuclear weapon states. It prohibits acquisition of nuclear arms by non-nuclear weapon states. • Nuclear disarmament The NPT obliges nuclear weapon states to pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament in good faith. • Peaceful use of nuclear energy The NPT recognizes the "inalienable" right of signatory states to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. (Article 4-1) The NPT obliges non-nuclear weapon states to accept safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)[2] to verify that they are not diverting nuclear energy for peaceful use to military technologies. (Article 3) • The NPT entered into force in 1970. • There are 190 signatory countries to the NPT.
	Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)[3]	• The CTBT prohibits any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion by signatory states at any place in the world, including outer space, the atmosphere, underwater and underground. • The CTBT has been signed by 178 states and ratified by 144 states. (Of 44 designated countries whose ratification is necessary for the treaty's enforcement, 35 countries have ratified it) • All of the 44 states need to ratify the treaty so that it can enter into force. But some states which have yet to ratify the treaty are uncertain if they will ratify it. As a result, the treaty has yet to enter into force.
Export Control System for Non-Proliferation	Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)[4]	• The NSG is a group of nuclear supplier countries which seeks to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons by controlling exports of materials, equipment and technologies that could be used for development of nuclear arms. • The NSG was formed in 1978 following a nuclear test by India in 1974. • The group consists of 45 countries.

Notes: 1. See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku/npt/index.html>
2. See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/atom/iaea/index.html>
3. See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku/ctbt/index.html>
4. See<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku/nsg/index.html>

Reference 55. Treaties Related to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Weapons (biological and chemical weapons)

Classification	Treaties	Outline (Purpose and Others)
Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation Related Treaties	Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)[1]	• The CWC pursues to abolish chemical weapons by prohibiting signatory states from developing, producing, acquiring, stockpiling, retaining, transferring or using such weapons and obliging them to destroy the weapons if they own them. A strict verification system has been established to make the implementation of the convention effective. • The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was established in The Hague, the Netherlands in 1997 in order to implement verification measures stipulated under the CWC following its enforcement. • The CWC entered into force in 1997. • CWC signatory states: 184 countries.
	Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)[2]	• The BWC is designed to destroy biological weapons already in possession of some countries as well as prohibit development, production and stockpiling of such weapons. • The BWC entered into force in 1975. • State parties: 162 countries.
Export Control System for Non-Proliferation	Australia Group (AG)[3]	• The AG has been trying to prevent proliferation of biological and chemical weapons by controlling exports of materials, manufacturing facilities and related technologies that could be used for making such weapons. • The first meeting took place in 1985. • Participating states: 40 countries.

Notes: 1. See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bwc/cwc/index.html>
2. See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bwc/bwc/index.html>
3. See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bwc/ag/index.html>

Reference 56. Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations (Last Five Years)

Period of Dispatch	Position in the Dispatched Organization	Dispatched Personnel
June 9, 1997–June 30, 2002, August 1, 2004–August 1, 2007	Inspectorate Division Director, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Major General) *
October 1, 2002–June 30, 2007	Head, Operations and Planning Branch, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)
December 2, 2002–June 1, 2005	Planning and Control Team, Military Division, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
February 9, 2001–July 31, 2003	Analyst, Division of Analysis and Assessment, United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) Headquarters (New York)	1 MSDF personnel (Commander)
March 10, 2003–March 9, 2005	Analyst, Division of Analysis and Assessment, United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) Headquarters (New York)	1 ASDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
July 11, 2005–	Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Major)
November 28, 2005–	Planning and Control Team, Military Division, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)

* OPCW Inspectorate Division Director is still in office after his retirement from the SDF on August 1, 2007.

Reference 57. Treaties Related to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Weapons (delivery means including missiles)

Classification	Treaties	Outline
Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation Related Treaties	Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)[1]	• The HCOC is a political agreement that mainly stipulates principles such as prevention of proliferation of ballistic missiles and restraint on tests, development and deployment of such missiles, and confidence-building measures among member states. • The HCOC was adopted in 2002. • Participating states: 130 countries.
Export Control System for Non-Proliferation	Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)[2]	• The MTCR is designed to control exports of missiles, which can serve as means of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and general-purpose equipment and technologies that are capable of contributing to missile development. • The MTCR was established in 1987. • Participating states: 34 countries.

Notes: 1. See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mtcr/index.html>
2. See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mtcr/mtcr.html>

Reference 58. Treaties Related to Arms Control for Certain Conventional Weapons

Classification	Treaties	Outline
Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation Related Treaties	Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects (CCW)[1]	• Protocol I: Protocol for the use of non-detectable fragments; 103 signatory countries Protocol II: Protocol for the ban and limited use of mines, booby traps and other similar devices; 90 signatory countries Protocol II (Revised): Protocol for the ban and limited use of mines, booby traps and other similar devices; 89 signatory countries Protocol III: Protocol for the ban and limited use of incendiary weapons; 98 signatory countries Protocol IV: Protocol on blinding laser weapons; 89 signatory countries Protocol V: Protocol on explosive remnants of war; 43 signatory countries Japan has signed Protocols I-IV (Signatory countries are as of June 9, 2008) • The CCW entered into force in 1983. • State parties: 105 countries.
	Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines (Ottawa Convention)[2]	• The convention categorically prohibits the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines while obligating signatory states to destruct stockpiled mines within four years and remove laid mines within 10 years. It also stipulates international cooperation regarding the removal of anti-personnel mines and assistance for mine victims. • The convention entered into force in 1999. • State parties: 156 countries.
	Restriction on Illegal Transactions of Small Arms and Light Weapons	The United Nations is currently studying ways to restrict illegal transactions of small arms and light weapons and to reduce excessive accumulation of such arms.
	System of the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms	This register system has been in operation from 1992 to help increase the transparency of armaments, following a proposal made by Japan along with countries of the European Community (then). Under the system, each country is required to register to the United Nations the quantity of its annual exports and imports of defense equipment in seven categories[3] and the countries to which such equipment is imported or exported.
Export Control System for Non-Proliferation	Wassenaar Arrangement[4]	• This arrangement is an international export control regime aimed at achieving the following objectives. (1) To contribute to regional and international security and stability, by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfer of conventional arms and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilizing accumulations (2) To prevent the acquisition of conventional arms and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies by terrorist groups and organizations as part of global efforts in the fight against terrorism • The arrangement was established in 1996. • Participating states: 40 countries.

Notes: 1. See <http://www.mofa.go/jp/mofaj/gaiko/arms/ccw/ccw.html>
2. See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/arms/mine/index.html>
3. The seven are 1) battle tanks, 2) armored vehicles, 3) large-caliber artillery systems, 4) combat aircraft, 5) attack helicopters, 6) warships and 7) missiles and missile launchers. As a result of an institutional review in 2003, MANPADS was newly registered as equipment under a subcategory of the "missile and missile launcher" category.
4. See <http://mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/arms/wa/index.html>

Reference 59. Personnel of the Ministry of Defense (Breakdown)

(As of March 31, 2008)

Personnel of the Ministry of Defense	Special Service	Minister of Defense			
		Senior Vice-Minister of Defense			
		Parliamentary Secretary for Defense (2)			
		Authorized Strength	Private Secretary (Special Assistant to the Minister)		
			Strength SDF Personnel	Vice-Minister of Defense	
				Director General, and others	532
				Administrative Officials, and Others	22,404
				SDF Regular Personnel	248,647
		Non-Authorized Strength		Ready Reserve Personnel	8,425
				Reserve Personnel	47,900
				Candidate Reserve Personnel	2,875
				National Defense Academy students	
				National Defense Medical College students	
				Part-Time Officials	
	Regular Service	Authorized Strength		Administrative Officials, and Others	30
		Non-Authorized Strength		Part-Time Officials	

Reference 60. Authorized and Actual Strength of Self-Defense Personnel

(As of March 31, 2008)

Category	GSDF	MSDF	ASDF	Joint Staff, etc.	Total
Authorized	153,220	45,716	47,313	2,398	248,647
Actual	138,422	44,088	45,594	2,187	230,291
Staffing Rate (%)	90.3	96.4	96.4	91.2	92.6

Category	Non-Fixed-Term Personnel				Fixed-Term Personnel
	Officer	Warrant Officer	Enlisted (upper)	Enlisted (lower)	Enlisted (lower)
Authorized	45,046	5,056	138,436	60,109	
Actual	41,453 (1,671)	4,846 (8)	136,429 (5,494)	18,344 (1,226)	29,219 (2,841)
Staffing Rate (%)	92.0	95.8	98.6	79.1	

Note: Figures in parentheses denote the number of females included in the preceding value.

Reference 61. Overview of Appointment System for SDF Regular Personnel



Notes: 1. Ranks of officials are General (GSDF, ASDF), Admiral (MSDF); Major General (GSDF, ASDF), Rear Admiral (MSDF); Colonel (GSDF, ASDF), Captain (MSDF); Lieutenant Colonel (GSDF, ASDF), Commander (MSDF); Major (GSDF, ASDF), Lieutenant Commander (MSDF); Captain (GSDF, ASDF), Lieutenant (MSDF); First Lieutenant (GSDF, ASDF), Lieutenant Junior Grade (MSDF); and Second Lieutenant (GSDF, ASDF), Ensign (MSDF).

2. Medical doctor and dentist Officer Candidates are promoted to First Lieutenant (GSDF, ASDF)/Lieutenant Junior Grade (MSDF) upon passing the relevant national vocational examinations and completing the prescribed training courses.

3. For SDF Youth Cadets employed as Recruits in the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, FY 2007 was the final year for employment of MSDF and ASDF Youth Cadets and no further recruitment and employment will be performed. Nevertheless, from FY 2009 GSDF Youth Cadets is scheduled to be revised so that their status is not SDF Regular Personnel but as the new noncombatant students of GSDF.

4. The "Student Candidate for Enlisted (Upper)" System and the "Enlisted (Upper) Candidate" System are reorganized and unified into a single system, under which those qualified are recruited as "General Candidates for Enlisted (Upper)" as from the recruitment of 2007.

5. They are promoted to Sergeant First Class (GSDF) upon passing of the national nursing examination.

6. ➡: Enrollment examination ⇨: Examination or non-examination screening

Reference 62. SDF Personnel: Applications and Recruitment (FY 2007)

Applicant Group			Number of Applicants	Number Recruited	Rate of Competition
General and technical Officer Candidates		GSDF	3,160 (463)	165 (13)	19.2 (35.6)
		MSDF	1,092 (138)	94 (9)	11.6 (15.3)
		ASDF	1,402 (176)	47 (8)	29.8 (22.0)
		Total	5,654 (777)	306 (30)	18.5 (25.9)
Enlisted (upper)	Technical petty officers	MSDF	201 (49)	32 (11)	6.3 (4.5)
	Nursing petty officers	GSDF	13 (8)	3 (2)	4.3 (4.0)
Student candidates for enlisted (upper)		GSDF	15,150 (2,127)	4,620 (184)	3.3 (11.5)
		MSDF	4,377 (624)	1,200 (82)	3.6 (7.6)
		ASDF	7,127 (911)	1,174 (116)	6.1 (7.9)
		Total	26,654 (3,662)	6,994 (382)	3.8 (9.6)
SDF youth cadets		GSDF	4,156	244	17.0
		MSDF			
		ASDF			
		Total	4,156	244	17.0
Student airmen		MSDF	652 (52)	70 (5)	9.3 (10.4)
		ASDF	1,811 (94)	65	27.9
		Total	2,463 (146)	135 (5)	18.2 (29.2)
Student nurses		GSDF	2,960 (2,293)	66 (57)	44.8 (40.2)
Private, Seaman Apprentice, Airman 3rd Class		GSDF	17,860 (2,057)	5,107 (500)	3.5 (4.1)
		MSDF	4,555 (635)	1,512 (152)	3.0 (4.2)
		ASDF	5,284 (644)	1,738 (162)	3.0 (4.0)
		Total	27,699 (3,336)	8,357 (814)	3.3 (4.1)
National Defense Academy students	Admitted by recommendation	Humanities	131 (30)	28 (5)	4.7 (6.0)
		Science/Engineering	216 (22)	96 (5)	2.3 (4.4)
		Total	347 (52)	124 (10)	2.8 (5.2)
	Admitted by examination	Humanities	5,320 (1,897)	59 (6)	90.2 (316.2)
		Science/Engineering	8,358 (1,379)	271 (27)	30.8 (51.1)
		Total	13,678 (3,276)	330 (33)	41.4 (99.3)
National Defense Medical College students			5,306 (1,497)	79 (15)	67.2 (99.8)

Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses denote the number of females included in the preceding value.
2. Figures represent the recruitment of SDF personnel in FY 2007.

Reference 63. Rank and Retirement Age of SDF Regular Personnel

Rank	Designation	Mandatory Retirement Age
General (GSDF), Admiral (MSDF), General (ASDF)	Sho	60
Major General (GSDF), Rear Admiral (MSDF), Major General (ASDF)	Shoho	
Colonel (GSDF), Captain (MSDF), Colonel (ASDF)	Issa	56
Lieutenant Colonel (GSDF), Commander (MSDF), Major (ASDF)	Nisa	55
Major (GSDF), Lieutenant Commander (MSDF), Major (ASDF)	Sansa	
Captain (GSDF), Lieutenant (MSDF), Captain (ASDF)	Ichii	54
First Lieutenant (GSDF), Lieutenant Junior Grade (MSDF), First Lieutenant (ASDF)	Nii	
Second Lieutenant (GSDF), Ensign (MSDF), Second Lieutenant (ASDF)	Sani	
Warrant Officer (GSDF), Warrant Officer (MSDF), Warrant Officer (ASDF)	Juni	
Sergeant Major (GSDF), Chief Petty Officer (MSDF), Senior Master Sergeant (ASDF)	Socho	
Master Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer First Class (MSDF), Master Sergeant (ASDF)	Isso	
Sergeant First Class (GSDF), Petty Officer Second Class (MSDF), Technical Sergeant (ASDF)	Niso	53
Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer Third Class (MSDF), Staff Sergeant (ASDF)	Sanso	
Leading Private (GSDF), Leading Seaman (MSDF), Airman First Class (ASDF)	Shicho	—
Private First Class (GSDF), Seaman (MSDF), Airman Second Class (ASDF)	Isshi	
Private (GSDF), Seaman Apprentice (MSDF), Airman Third Class (ASDF)	Nishi	
Recruit (GSDF), Seaman Recruit (MSDF), Airman Basic (ASDF)	Sanshi	

Notes: 1. The mandatory age of retirement for SDF Regular Personnel who hold the rank of General (GSDF and ASDF) or Admiral (MSDF), and serve as Chief of Staff of Joint Staff, GSDF Chief of Staff, MSDF Chief of Staff, or ADSF Chief of Staff is 62.
2. The mandatory age of retirement for SDF Regular Personnel who are doctors, dentists, pharmacists and other personnel such as members of musical bands is 60.

Reference 64. Overview of Systems Related to SDF Reserve Personnel

	SDF Ready Reserve Personnel	SDF Reserve Personnel	Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel
Basic concept	❍ When defense call-up is received, or under similar conditions, they will serve as SDF Regular Personnel in a predesignated GSDF unit, as part of the basic framework of defense capability	❍ When defense call-up or disaster call-up is received, they will serve as SDF Regular Personnel	❍ Appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel upon completion of education and training
Candidate	❍ Former Regular Personnel, former Reserve Personnel	❍ Former Regular Personnel, former Reserve Personnel, former SDF Ready Reserve Personnel	(Same for General and Technical) ❍ Inexperienced SDF Personnel (includes those with less than a year of SDF experience)
Age	❍ Enlisted (Lower): 18-31 years old ❍ Officer, Warrant Officer, Enlisted (Upper): Under three years younger than each retirement age	❍ Enlisted (Lower): 18-36 years old ❍ Officer, Warrant Officer, Enlisted (Upper): Under two years older than retirement age	❍ General: 18-33 years old Technical: From 18 years old to 53-54 years old, depending on technical qualifications
Employment	❍ Employment on screening, based on application	❍ Employment on screening, based on application ❍ Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel is appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel upon completion of education and training	❍ General: Employment on examination, based on application ❍ Technical: Employment on screening, based on application
Rank	❍ Former Regular Personnel: As a rule, rank at the point of retirement ❍ Former Reserve Personnel: As a rule, designated rank at the point of retirement	❍ Former Regular Personnel: As a rule, rank at the point of retirement ❍ Former Reserve Personnel: Rank at the point of retirement ❍ SDF Ready Reserve Personnel: Currently specified rank ❍ Candidate for Reserve Personnel • General: 2 Enlisted Personnel • Technical: Assignment based on skills	❍ Rank is not designated
Term of service	❍ Three years/One term	❍ Three years/One term	❍ General: A maximum of three years ❍ Technical: A maximum of two years
Education/ Training	❍ 30 days per year	❍ Although the law designates a maximum of 20 days per year, actual implementation is five days per year	❍ General: 50 days within a maximum of three years (an equivalent to new recruitment education course (first term)) ❍ Technical: 10 days within a maximum of two years (training to serve as an SDF Regular Personnel by utilizing each skill)
Promotion	❍ Promotion is determined by screening the service record of personnel who has fulfilled the service term (actual serving days)	❍ Promotion is determined by screening the service record of personnel who has fulfilled the service term (actual serving days)	❍ Since there is no designated rank, there is no promotion
Benefits, allowances, and other terms	❍ Education and Training Call-up Allowance: ¥10,400-14,200/day ❍ SDF Ready Reserve Allowance: ¥16,000/month ❍ Continuous Service Incentive Allowance: ¥120,000/one term ❍ Special subsidy for corporations employing Ready Reserve Personnel: ¥42,500/month	❍ Training Call-up Allowance: ¥8,100/day ❍ SDF Ready Reserve Allowance: ¥4,000/month	❍ Education and Training Call-up Allowance: ¥7,900/day ❍ Allowance as Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel is not paid because defense call-up duty is not imposed on them
Call-up duty, and other duties	❍ Defense call-up, civil protection call-up, security call-up, disaster call-up, training call-up	❍ Defense call-up, civil protection call-up, disaster call-up, training call-up	❍ Education and training call-up

Reference 65. SDF Personnel: Applications and Recruitment (FY 2007)

		Number of Examinees	Number of Successful Examiners	Number of Recruits
General		1,995	1,359	1,107
Technical	Medical (Ko)	28	20	20
	Medical (Otsu)	111	74	67
	Linguistic	59	39	37
	Maintenance	40	32	25
	Information Processing	30	17	13
	Telecommunications	12	9	8
	Electricity	10	6	5
	Construction	53	35	30
	Subtotal	343	232	205
Total		2,338	1,591	1,312

Notes: 1. The numbers of recruits represent those of persons recruited in FY 2007.
2. Medical (Ko): Medical doctor, dentist and pharmacist.
3. Medical (Otsu): Physical therapist, occupational therapist, medical radiology technician, clinical technologist, nurse, paramedic (with the qualification of practical nurse), nutritionist, practical nurse, and dental technician.
4. Linguistic: English–Graduate of junior or higher-level foreign language college, or person who has passed STEP (Society for Testing English Proficiency) pre-1st or 1st grade, or person who has a linguistic ability that is equal to, or higher than, the ability of the preceding person. Russian, Chinese and Korean–Graduate of junior or higher-level foreign language college, or person who has a linguistic ability that is equal to, or higher than, the ability of the preceding person.
5. Maintenance: 1st grade large or small vehicle mechanic, 1st or 2nd grade motorcycle mechanic, 2nd grade petrol-powered vehicle mechanic, or 2nd grade diesel-powered vehicle mechanic.
6. Information processing: Systems auditor exam, system analyst exam, project manger exam, application engineer exam, production engineer exam, 1st grade information processing specialist exam, software development engineer exam, network specialist exam, database specialist exam, systems operation management engineer exam, technical engineer (network) exam, technical engineer (system management) exam, technical engineer (information security) exam, technical engineer (embedded system) exam, senior systems administrator exam, information systems security administrator exam, 2nd grade information processing specialist exam, fundamental information technology engineer exam.
7. Telecommunications: 1st, 2nd or 3rd Class Radio Operator for General Services, 1st or 2nd Technical Radio Operator for On-the-Ground Services, AI TYPE I Installation Technician, Analog TYPE I Installation Technician, DD TYPE I Installation Technician, Digital TYPE I Installation Technician, AI and DD Installation Technician, Analog and Digital Installation Technician
8. Electricity: Type I, II or III electrical licensed engineer.
9. Construction: First- or second-grade registered architect, land surveyor, assistant land surveyor, first- or second-grade construction machinery specialist.

Reference 66. The Ethos of SDF Personnel

(Adopted on June 28, 1961)

Ours is a country with a long history and splendid tradition that has emerged from the many trials it has faced, and is now in the process of developing as a nation based on the principles of democracy.

Its ideals are to cherish freedom and peace, encourage social welfare and contribute to a global peace that is founded on justice and order. In order to bring about these ideals, it is essential that we ensure the continued existence and security of a Japan that stands on the premise of democracy by protecting its peace and its independence.

In observing the realities of the world, we find that countries are making ever greater efforts to prevent war through international cooperation. At the same time, the development of weapons of mass destruction means that the outbreak of large-scale war would be disastrous, and thus efforts to keep such weapons under control are growing stronger. International disputes, however, continue unabated, with countries seeking to protect their own peace and independence by putting in place the defense arrangements they need to serve their continued existence and security.

While retaining the sincere hope that the wisdom of mankind and the cooperation of people of all countries will

lead to a lasting world peace, the Japanese people have created the present-day SDF to protect their own country. The mission of the SDF is to protect the peace and independence of the country and preserve its security.

The principal task of the SDF is to prevent the occurrence of direct and indirect aggression against Japan, and to repel any such aggression should it take place.

The SDF exist as part of the nation. In accordance with the principles of democratic government, the Commander-in-Chief of the SDF is, as such, the Prime Minister, who represents the Cabinet, and the basic administration of the SDF is subject to control by the National Diet.

Whether in peacetime or in the event of an emergency, SDF personnel must, at all times, be prepared to identify themselves with the people and take pride in serving the public without regard to themselves.

The spirit of SDF personnel is founded on the healthy spirit of the nation itself. Cultivation of the self, love of others and concern for the motherland and its people —these particular attributes provide the SDF with the proper sense of patriotism and identification with their own people that lie at their spiritual heart.

We must remember the true nature of our role as members of the SDF, and refrain from taking part in political activities, reflect deeply on the distinguished mission bestowed on us as members of the SDF and take great pride in our work. By the same token, we must devote ourselves unstintingly to training and self-discipline and, in the face of events, be prepared to discharge our duties at risk to ourselves, acting on the basis of the criteria below.

1. Awareness of Mission

(1) We will protect from external aggression the nation of Japan, its land and people, which we have inherited from our forefathers and which we will bequeath to the next generation enriched and developed.

(2) We will safeguard the peace and order of our national life, which is founded on freedom and responsibility.

2. Individual Development

(1) We will strive to make ourselves into positive and upstanding members of society who are free from prejudice, and cultivate sound judgment.

(2) We will develop into well-balanced individuals with regard to qualities such as intellect, initiative, trustworthiness and physical fitness.

3. Fulfillment of Responsibility

(1) We will go about our duties with courage and perseverance at the risk of our lives as dictated by our responsibilities.

(2) We will be bound to our comrades by love and protect our posts steadfastly in the spirit of public service.

4. Strict Observance of Discipline

(1) We will be true and impartial in our observance of the law and submission to orders, in the belief that discipline is the lifeblood of a unit.

(2) We will make sure that the orders we give are appropriate, and cultivate the habit of positive, considered obedience.

5. Strengthening of Solidarity

(1) Outstanding leadership and warm comradeship will allow us to develop the confidence to endure hardship and suffering collectively.

(2) We, the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces, will do all we can to respond to the responsibilities with which we are entrusted by devoting ourselves as one to ensuring the continued existence of our country and its people.

Reference 67. Outline of the SDF Educational System

1. SDF Officers and Officer Candidates



2. Enlisted SDF Personnel



Reference 68. Exchange Student Acceptance Record (FY 2007)

(Unit: persons)

Country Name / Institution Name	United States	Thailand	Republic of Korea	France	Indonesia	China	Singapore	Viet Nam	Cambodia	India	Pakistan	Mongolia	Sub total
National Institute for Defense Studies	3	1				1				1			6
National Defense Academy	3	5	7	2	3			4	3			2	29
Ground Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)	3	1	3								4		11
Maritime Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)		1	1							1			3
Air Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)		4	4				1						9
Joint Staff College		1	1										2
Total	9	13	16	2	3	1	1	4	3	2	4	2	60

Reference 69. Record of the Main Exercises of Each of the Self-Defense Forces (FY 2007)

Exercise				Period	Location	Main Participating Forces, etc.		Remarks
						Ministry of Defense/SDF	Outside Related Institutions	
GSDF	Cooperative Long-Distance Mobility Exercise	Northern region		June 20, 2007-Aug. 4	West Army District-East Army District (Yausubetsu Maneuver Area)	8th Division, Major Unit Personnel: Approx. 3,250 Vehicles: Approx. 1,000		Exercise to improve distance mobility using various transportation methods including ground, sea and air, and also improve joint operation capability for divisions and under, by implementing cooperative training with MSDF and ASDF
		Southern region	First	July 2, 2007-July 14	Northeast Army District-East Army District (Higashi-Fuji Maneuver Area)	6th Division, Major Unit Personnel: Approx. 1,000 Vehicles: Approx. 250		
			Second	July 11, 2007-July 24	North Army District-East Army District (Higashi-Fuji Maneuver Area, etc.)	5th Brigade 27th Infantry Regiment, Major Unit Personnel: Approx. 300 Vehicles: Approx. 90		
			Third	Dec. 3, 2007-Dec. 16		1st Artillery Brigade 4th Artillery Group, Major Unit Personnel: Approx. 350 Vehicles: Approx. 75		
MSDF	MSDF Exercise	Map Exercise		Sept. 18, 2007-Sept. 22	Location of MSDF Staff College and other participating forces	Self-Defense Fleet and Regional District Units Personnel: Approx. 400		Top Commander's situation-based judgement and integrating the force operations
ASDF	Air Defense Command Comprehensive Exercise	Command Post Training		Feb. 25, 2008-Feb. 26	Air Defense Command (ADC) (Fuchu), etc.	Air Defense Commands, etc.		Integration of the series of command and staff activities starting from the possibility of armed attacks until the actual attack
Joint	SDF joint exercise (command post exercise)			Feb. 4, 2008-Feb. 7	Ichigaya Post, etc.	Joint Staff Office (JSO); Defense Intelligence Headquarters; Staff of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF; Regional Armies; Central Readiness Force; Self-Defense Fleet; Regional District Units; Air Defense Command; Air Support Command; etc. Personnel: Approx. 330		Exercise to sustain and improve joint operation capability of the SDF by exercising integrated SDF operation in case of armed attacks, and similar situations
	Japan-U.S. combined joint exercises (actual exercise)			Nov. 5, 2007-Nov. 16	Bases of Japan's SDF and U.S. Forces, as well as marine and air space surrounding Japan	Joint Staff Office (JSO); Defense Intelligence Headquarters; Internal Bureau of the Ministry of Defense; Staff of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF; Regional Armies; Central Readiness Force; Military Police Force; Self-Defense Fleet; Regional District Units; Educational Air Command; MSDF Replenishment Headquarters etc.; Air Defense Command; Air Support Command; Air System Communications Force; etc. Personnel: Approx. 22,500 Vessels: Approx. 90 Aircraft: Approx. 400	Headquarters of USFJ, Headquarters of U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Army in Japan, U.S. 7th Fleet, U.S. 5th Air Force, USARJ III Marine Expeditionary Force Peronnel: Approx. 8,500 Vessels: Approx. 10 Aircraft: Approx. 50	Exercise to sustain and improve combined joint operation capability by exercising U.S.-Japan cooperation and SDF responses to various situations in areas surrounding Japan, and U.S.-Japan joint responses for the defense of Japan

Exercise		Period	Location	Main Participating Units, and Others		Remarks
				Japan Side	Outside Related Institutions	
Joint	SDF joint disaster prevention exercise (actual exercise)	Aug. 29, 2007- Sept. 1	Location for forces conducting exercises, etc., the Shizuoka Prefectural Comprehensive Disaster Prevention Training Venue, and the air and marine area around Shizuoka	Joint Staff Office (JSO); Defense Intelligence Headquarters; Staff of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF; Regional Armies; Central Readiness Force; Communications Units; Military Police Force; Information Security Force; Fuji School; Aviation School; Engineer School; Signal School; Self-Defense Fleet; MSDF Yokosuka District; Educational Air Command; System Communications Force; Air Defense Command; Air Support Command; Aviation Education Command; Air System Communications Force; etc. Personnel: Approx. 3,000 Vehicles: Approx. 600 Aircraft: Approx. 70 Naval Vessels: Approx. 5	Cabinet Office, National Police Agency, Fire Department, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Japan Coast Guard, etc.	Actual exercise over the SDF's joint operation in dealing with earthquakes in the Tokai region with related organizations, and support for the verification of the SDF Tokai Earthquake Action Plan as well as the maintenance and improvement of the joint response capability for disaster prevention
	SDF joint disaster prevention exercise (command post exercise)	Sep. 26, 2007- Sep. 28	Location for forces conducting exercises, etc., and the Shizuoka Prefectural Government	Joint Staff Office (JSO); Defense Intelligence Headquarters; Staff of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF; Regional Armies; Central Readiness Force; Communications Units; Military Police Force; Information Security Force; Central Air Traffic Control & Weather Services; Fuji School; Aviation School; Engineer School; Signal School; Material Control Command Headquarters; Self-Defense Fleet; MSDF Yokosuka District; Educational Air Command; System Communications Force; Second Service School; SDF Yokosuka Hospital; Material Command Headquarters; Air Defense Command; Air Support Command; Aviation Education Command; Air System Communications Force; Air Material Command Headquarters; etc. Personnel: Approx. 1,000	Shizuoka Prefectural Government Personnel: Approx. 130	Exercise over the command activities during the joint operation of the SDF to support the verification of the SDF Tokai Earthquake Action Plan as well as the maintenance and improvement of the joint response capability for disaster prevention
	International Peace Cooperation Exercise	Feb. 25, 2008- Feb. 27	Ichigaya Post	Joint Staff Office (JSO); Defense Intelligence Headquarters; Staff of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF; Western Army; Central Readiness Force; Self-Defense Fleet; Air Support Command Personnel: Approx. 16	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), International Organization for Migration (IOM), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Japanese Red Cross Society, Humanitarian Medical Assistance HuMA (NGO), MOFA International Cooperation Bureau, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Japan Platform (NGO), Australian Embassy Personnel: 16	Concerning SDF's International Disaster Relief activities, aim to improve the joint operation capability of the SDF through exercises such as the Staff activities by the Staff Office etc., and the coalition of each organization

Reference 70. Results of Joint Exercises with the Police and the Japan Coast Guard (FY 2007)

Date	Location	Participating Units and Others	
		GSDF Side	Police Side
Jun. 8, 2007	Soumagahara	12th Brigade (Gunma Pref., Shinto village)	Tochigi Prefectural Police Gunma Prefectural Police
Nov. 22, 2007	Moriyama	10th Division (Aichi Pref., Nagoya city)	Gifu Prefectural Police Aichi Prefectural Police Mie Prefectural Police
Dec. 14, 2007	Matsuyama	14th Brigade (Kagawa Pref., Zentuji city)	Ehime Prefectural Police Kochi Prefectural Police
Jan. 29, 2008	Komakado	1st Division (Tokyo Pref., Nerima ward)	Kanagawa Prefectural Police Shizuoka Prefectural Police Yamanashi Prefectural Police
Jan. 31, 2008	Kaitaichi	13th Brigade (Hiroshima Pref., Kaita town)	Hiroshima Prefectural Police Shimane Prefectural Police Okayama Prefectural Police Yamaguchi Prefectural Police Tottori Prefectural Police
Feb. 13, 2008	Omura	4th Division (Fukuoka Pref., Kasuga city)	Saga Prefectural Police Oita Prefectural Police Nagasaki Prefectural Police
Feb. 19, 2008	Kita-Kumamoto	8th Division (Kumamoto Pref., Kumamoto city)	Kumamoto Prefectural Police Miyazaki Prefectural Police Kagoshima Prefectural Police
Mar. 17, 2008	Higashi-Chitose	7th Division (Hokkaido Pref., Chitose city)	Hokkaido Prefectural Police

Reference 71. Results of Fire Training and Related Training by Dispatch of Each of the Self-Defense Forces to the United States (FY 2007)

	Name of Training	Date	Location	Dispatched Unit
GSDF	HAWK/Medium-range SAM unit level live-fire training	Aug. 25-Nov. 22, 2007	McGregor Range in New Mexico (U.S.)	Seventeen anti-aircraft companies
GSDF	Fire training in the U.S.	Sep. 6-Sep. 15, 2007	Yakima Training Center in Washington (U.S.)	Infantry unit and 155 howitzer force of 8th Division, major tank unit of 7th Division, and anti-tank helicopter unit of the Western Army District
GSDF	Surface-to-surface missile unit level live-fire training	Sep. 16-Nov. 19, 2007	Point Mugu Range in California (U.S.)	Six surface-to-surface missile regiments, training artillery
MSDF	Training in the U.S. by dispatch of destroyer, and others	May 16-Aug. 1, 2007	Mid-Pacific area surrounding Hawaii, and areas around the U.S. western coast	Three destroyers
MSDF	Training in the U.S. by dispatch of fixed-wing patrol aircraft	June 18-Jul. 25, 2007	Mid-Pacific area surrounding Hawaii, etc.	Five P-3Cs
MSDF	Training in the area near Guam by dispatch of mine-laying ship *Muroto*	Sep. 4-Oct. 29, 2007	Area near Guam	One mine-laying ship
MSDF	Training in the U.S. by dispatch of submarine	Aug. 23-Nov. 29, 2007	Mid-Pacific area surrounding Hawaii, and other locations	One submarine
ASDF	Annual practice by anti-aircraft units	Aug. 13-Dec. 1, 2007	McGregor Range and White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico (U.S.)	Twelve anti-aircraft/anti-aircraft training units, eight base air defense units
ASDF	Tactical Airlift Training	Oct. 22-Nov. 9, 2007	Missouri Rosecrans Air National Guard Base, Arizona Libby Army Air Field and airspace surrounding the area (U.S.)	1st Tactical Airlift Wing

Reference 72. Cutting-Edge Technologies Underway at TRDI

Category	Item	Features	Started (FY)	To be Completed (FY)
Aircraft	Outline of the system integration of aircraft technologies for high maneuverability and stealth	Detailed design technology concerning system integration which integrates the results of advanced built-up aircraft technology including stealth technology, engine technology, flight control technology, and composite technology etc.	2008	2010
Guided missile	Advanced SAM component technology	Technology to achieve a missile system that can intercept small supersonic targets cruising at very low or flying at high altitudes using a multi-layered structure for long to short ranges	2005	2012
	Future network type multi-purpose missile	Technology concerning the multi-purpose missile that allows transmission of automatically searched and identified target information with the use of network	2008	2012
Naval vessel and submersible equipment	Torpedo guidance and control device	Technology to guide and control torpedoes in image-homing with superior target identification capability, so as to cope with improvement in torpedo defense capability and stealth vessels	2002	2009
	Submarine structure with walk-back prevention and impact-resistant features	Walk-back prevention technology that reduces noises caused by submarines, and submarine structure related technology to improve impact-resistant features	2007	2014
Electronic devices	Infrared countermeasure system	Technology for infrared countermeasure system to be applied to airborne environment in order to effectively protect aircraft itself against the threat of a man portable surface-to-air missile with infrared guidance towards helicopters and large aircraft, such as carriers	2004	2009
	Two wave-length infrared sensor technology	Two wave-length infrared sensor technology that is superior in high temperature operation and mass-productivity, and with potential to have superior characteristics in extracting the target item and identification	2005	2014
Others	Advanced personal equipment system technology	Technology concerning the personal equipment system for the purpose of effective protection of personnel and to improve the ability to handle each situation	2003	2009
	Countermeasure technology against biological weapons	Technology concerning the detection and identification of biological agents, and individual protective equipment against multiple threats of biological agents	2004	2010

Reference 73. Major Systems and Equipment Currently under Development at the Ministry of Defense

Item		Start of Development (FY)	Features
Aircraft	Next fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft and air carrier	2001	Next fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft and air carrier planned to be operable from 2011 in order to replace P-3C and C-1. Low cost development will be achieved by commonality of applied technology.
	Unmanned aircraft research system	2004	System for operation of unmanned aircraft (fixed wing) that automatically gathers and transmits images and other data by autonomous flights, and returns. The system is achieved by establishing technologies for automatic running and landing, and image processing by unmanned aircraft.
Guided missile	Type-99 air-to-air guided missile (remodeled)	2002	Intermediate-range air-to-air missile with improved functions and performance compared to the original Type-99 air-to-air guided missiles in survivability, shooting coverage, and jamming features.
	Intermediate-range multipurpose missile	2004	Multipurpose missile used in infantry units and others to destroy enemy units in diverse situations.
	Short-range SAM (Rev. II)	2005	Surface-to-air missile to provide overall air defense coverage in the operation area as a replacement of Type-81 short-range surface-to-air guided missiles. It will also be used as major air defense means at bases.
	New guided missiles for ballistic missile defense	2006	Advanced ship-board guided missiles for ballistic missile defense that will be jointly developed by Japan and the U.S. It will have improved capability to respond to the threats of existing ballistic missiles, and potential to respond to advanced and diversified ballistic missiles.
Artillery and vehicle	New tank	2002	Tanks that will be used in tank units to replace the present tanks to destroy enemy units in diverse situations.
	NBC detection vehicle	2005	Vehicle used by Chemical Protection Units (platoons) to promptly reconnoiter (e.g. detect, identify) a wide area contaminated by harmful chemical or biological agents, or radioactivity.
	Mobile Combat Vehicle	2008	Armored transport vehicle to be equipped with combat troops, and to be spread promptly with distinguished air transportation and street mobility etc., to vanquish enemy armored combat vehicle etc.
Naval vessel and submersible equipment	New anti-submarine short torpedo	2005	Short torpedo for attacking advanced submarines that run in all sea areas from shallow to deep.
Electronic devices	IRST system for fighters	2003	Mobile Combat Vehicle
	Anti-aircraft combat command and control system	2004	System used by anti-aircraft artillery units to collect, process and transmit necessary information for anti-aircraft combat; and to implement prompt and accurate command and control needed in anti-aircraft combat unit.
	Firing combat command and control system	2006	System used by field artillery units and others to collect, process and transmit target information; and to implement prompt and accurate command and control needed in firing combat.
	New outdoor telecommunications system	2007	System for Regional Armies, Divisions, and other levels to assure continuous telecommunications for command, control, and communication.
Others	Air-to-air small sized target	2006	Small sized, lightweight, low cost targets that will be used in place of some multifunction and expensive targets that are presently used. It will be loaded on target mother planes (F-15) for various air-to-air missile fire training.

Note: In the case that these are equipped, the assumption for development is that the number of vehicles, including tanks, will not exceed the number of combat vehicles (in the current National Defense Program Outlines, the number is approximately 600).

Reference 74. Activities in Civic Life

Items	Details of Activities and Their Past Records
Disposal of Unexploded Bombs[1]	❍ The GSDF disposes of such bombs at the request of municipal governments and others. ❍ Disposal operations in last fiscal year: a total of 1,310 disposal operations (average of 25 operations per week), weighing about 36.1 tons; in particular, the amount of unexploded bombs that were disposed of in Okinawa Prefecture totaled about 23.2 tons, (accounting for 64.3% of such bombs removed across the nation). (If unexploded bombs are chemical bombs, their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the SDF. However, the SDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible for disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)
Removal of Mines[2]	❍ The MSDF undertakes in minesweeping operations in waters designated as dangerous areas because underwater mines had been laid there during World War II. ❍ Minesweeping has been almost completed in the dangerous areas. At present, the MSDF has been removing or disposing of explosives at the request of municipal governments. ❍ Disposal operations in last fiscal year: a total of 1,526 units were disposed of, including 3 underwater mines (average of 29 units per week), weighing about 9.9 tons. (If unexploded bombs are chemical bombs, their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the SDF. However, the SDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible for disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)
Medical Activities[3]	❍ Medical services are provided to general citizens at National Defense Medical College in Tokorozawa, Saitama Prefecture, and some hospitals affiliated with the SDF (five out of 16 such hospitals, including SDF Central Hospital in Setagaya Ward, Tokyo). ❍ National Defense Medical College runs an emergency medical center, which is in charge of providing emergency medical services to seriously injured patients and patients in critical condition. The center is designated as a medical facility providing tertiary emergency services. ❍ In the wake of a disaster, medical units belonging to major SDF units, acting on a request from municipal governments, provide emergency medical services and work for the prevention of epidemics. ❍ GSDF Medical School (Setagaya Ward, Tokyo), MSDF Underwater Medical Center (Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture) and ASDF Aviation Medicine Laboratory (Tachikawa City, Tokyo and Sayama City, Saitama Prefecture) undertake study on outdoor sanitation, underwater medicine and aviation medicine, respectively. ❍ National Defense Medical College Research Institute (Tokorozawa City, Saitama Prefecture) undertakes study on emergency medicine.
Cooperation for Supporting Athletic Meetings[4]	❍ In response to support requests from concerned organizations, the SDF helps operations of athletic competitions such as Olympic games and Asian games being held in Japan and national sports meetings in the fields of ceremonies, communications, transportation, music performance, medical services and emergency medical services. ❍ The SDF provides transportation and communication support to marathon events and ekiden road relays.
Exchanges with Local Communities	❍ Sports facilities such as grounds, gyms and swimming pools at many of the SDF garrisons and bases are open to general citizens in response to requests from local communities. ❍ SDF personnel promote exchanges with people of local communities by participating in various events sponsored by general citizens and municipal governments or by acting as sports referees and instructors on an individual basis.

Notes: 1. Supplementary provisions of Self-Defense Forces Law.
2. Article 84-2 of Self-Defense Forces Law.
3. Article 27 of Self-Defense Forces Law, Article 4-10 of Defense Ministry Establishment Law, and others.
4. Article 100-3 of Self-Defense Forces Law.

Reference 75. Activities Contributing to Society

Items	Details of Activities and Their Past Records
Offering of Education and Training on Consignment from Other Parties[1]	❍ The SDF, acting on requests from third parties, provides education and training to people other than SDF personnel. ❍ Basic ranger training, underwater search and rescue training, education on how to respond to chemical disasters, and aircraft-manoeuvring training are provided to police officers and personnel of the Japan Coast Guard. The National Institute for Defense Studies and the graduate school of the National Defense Academy offer education to employees at private-sector companies and personnel of other government ministries on a consignment basis.
Transportation Work[2]	❍ ASDF helicopters and government planes transport state guests and the Prime Minister. ❍ Acting on requests from Ministries such as the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the SDF provides transportation support for events such as recovery of remains of dead Japanese soldiers, the Joint Japan-U.S. Commemorative Ceremony of the Battle of Iwoto, and pilgrimages to Iwoto in memory of the war dead. ❍ SDF units operate government planes which are used when the Emperor and other imperial members make overseas visits or the Prime Minister makes overseas trips to attend international conferences. (Partial revision in July 2005 of ordinances of the Self-Defense Forces Law has enabled the use of an SDF plane for transport of state ministers if doing so is deemed necessary for the execution of important duties.)
Ceremonial Work at National Events[3]	❍ The SDF provides support for state-sponsored ceremonial events involving the Emperor, other imperial members and state guests, with its personnel serving as honor guard[4], forming a line for guests[5] and firing a gun salute for them[6]. ❍ Guard of honor and firing of gun salute are offered at welcoming ceremonies for state guests.
Cooperation in Antarctic Exploration[7]	❍ The SDF has provided operational support for icebreakers being dispatched to the South Pole for Antarctic expedition since the seventh Antarctic expedition team was dispatched in 1965, contributing greatly to Japan's Antarctic exploration project that recently marked its 50th anniversary. ❍ Most recently, the SDF provided support to the 49th Antarctic expedition team, which was dispatched to the Antarctic Ocean from November last year to April this year, by helping the icebreaker *Shirase* transport members of the expedition team and 870 tons of goods and supplies, and by assisting maritime observation, fixed-point observation and research observation being planned by the expedition team. (Icebreaker *Shirase* is set to retire from active service in 2008 following the completion of voyages because the ship is outmoded in its various parts with the passage of 25 years since its maiden voyage. Construction of *Shirase*'s successor ship began in FY 2005. It is planned to be put into active service in FY 2009.)
Other Cooperation	❍ Acting on requests from the Japan Meteorological Agency, the SDF supports it in various meteorological observations, such as volcanic observation using aircraft and marine-ice observation in Hokkaido coastal regions. ❍ Acting on requests from a liaison council formulating anti-radiation measures, the SDF collects high-altitude floating dusts and makes radiation analysis of them. The SDF, also acting on requests from the Geographical Survey Institute, supports it in aerial measurement aimed at making maps. ❍ Entrusted by the state and municipal governments, the SDF undertakes civil engineering work. (Such support is provided only if doing so is deemed as serving training purposes)[8] ❍ Other support activities by the SDF include sea ice observation, support of flights of private chartered aircraft, and transportation of music bands to Iwoto.

Notes: 1. Article 100-2 of Self-Defense Forces Law.
2. Article 100-5 of Self-Defense Forces Law and others.
3. Article 6 of Self-Defense Forces Law and Article 13 of rules aimed at implementing Self-Defense Forces Law and others.
4. Guard of honor: officers of Honor Guard, as a mark of state respect for guests, give a salute to them while carrying a gun.
5. Formation of line: SDF officers form a line on the road to show respect to guests and salute them.
6. Firing of gun salute: SDF officers fire a blank canon salute to show respect to guests.
7. Article 100-4 of Self-Defense Forces Law.
8. Article 100 of Self-Defense Forces Law.

Reference 76. Outline of Measures to Improve the Living Environment in the Areas Surrounding Defense Facilities



Note 1: (1) Class 1 Area, Class 2 Area, Class 3 Area
Areas around bases are classified according to the degree of disturbance caused by aircraft noise, as follows:
Class 1 Area: WECPNL is 75 or more
Class 2 Area: Area within Class 1 Areas in which WECPNL is 90 or more
Class 3 Area: Area within Class 2 Areas in which WECPNL is 95 or more
(2) WECPNL (Weighted Equivalent Continuous Perceived Noise Level) represents the unit by which the impact of aircraft noise on human life is evaluated, taking into account various factors including intensity, as well as frequency of occurrence and duration, with particular emphasis on nighttime noise levels.



Note 2: Compensation for loss or damage resulting from the actions of the USFJ and others is made under the Law Concerning Compensation for Special Damages Incurred by Acts of United States Forces Stationed in Japan (promulgated in 1953).

Reference 77. New Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Communities

New Measures	Description of Projects
Initiative to Integrate Various Projects Undertaken in Areas Surrounded by Defense Facilities	Various livelihood-improvement projects being planned separately by municipalities in designated areas where serious problems are caused due to installation and operations of defense facilities will be integrated with certain discretion given to concerned municipalities for project implementation.
Subsidies for Installation of Solar Power Systems	Monitoring will be conducted to study whether it is advisable to provide subsidies to households which have installed a solar power system as part of sound-insulation work so as to reduce their financial burden of electricity charges for air-conditioning equipment which has been also installed for sound insulation.
Promotion of Housing-Exterior Work for Sound Insulation	In order to improve the livelihood of affected households, sound-insulation work covering the entire part of their houses will be promoted instead of room-based work as being applied previously.
Community-Building Support Projects	Subsidies and other support will be provided for an initiative by municipalities to promote community-building using surrounding assets (nearby airfields). Such support is meant to significantly contribute to the development of local communities as well as reducing negative effects of defense facilities to minimal levels.
Renovation of Existing Public Facilities	When public halls and other public facilities become unable to meet needs of local people because such facilities have become outmoded with the passage of time or the aging of the population, these facilities will be renovated using subsidies so that they are made barrier-free with their safety being enhanced.
Active Use of Assets Near Airfields	The state will promote the use by the general public of surrounding assets it has established and managed, such as green zones, by installing benches and rest facilities and permitting municipalities to use them. The state will also permit municipalities to use farm areas so that they are open to citizens.

Reference 78. Public Opinion Survey on the SDF and Defense Issues (The Government Public Information Office, Cabinet Secretariat, Cabinet Office: This survey was conducted in February 2006)

(http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h17/h17-bouei/index.html)

Summary of the Survey

Survey conducted between February 16-26, 2006

Surveyed population: 3,000 people of age 20 and older throughout Japan

Valid number of respondents (%): 1,657 people (55.2%)

Survey method: Individual interview by survey personnel

Survey conducted by the Government Public Information Office, Cabinet Secretariat, Cabinet Office

Note: As the figures in (%) are rounded up, total may be more or less than 100.

1. Interest in the SDF and defense issues



2. Impression about the SDF



3. Awareness of the role and activities of the SDF

(1) Reasons that the SDF exists (Multiple answers)



(2) Impression about SDF's disaster relief activities



(3) Future Efforts of International Peace Cooperation Activities



(4) Outcomes of SDF activities concerning the reconstruction of Iraq



(5) Opinions about relief activities in disaster-stricken foreign countries



(6) Opinions about the establishment of the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) System



4. Awareness of defense

(1) Attitude regarding intrusion by foreign countries



(2) Necessity of education about national defense



5. Awareness of national defense

(1) Measures to maintain the security of Japan



(2) Risk that Japan would be involved in a war



(3) Which international affairs are you interested in as regarding the peace and security of Japan



Reference 79. Record of Information Disclosure by the Defense Agency (FY 2007)

	Ministry of Defense	Defense Facilities Administration Agency
1. Number of disclosure requests Number of received disclosure requests	1,431	285
2. Number of decisions regarding disclosure Number of decisions regarding disclosure	1,330	266
Requests accepted	625	175
Requests partially accepted	466	59
Requests declined	239	32
3. Administrative protests Number of administrative protests	209	2
4. Number of lawsuits Number of lawsuits	0	0

Reference 80. Change in Equipment Volumes Procured, by Procurement Method

(Unit: 100 million yen)

Procurement Type / Fiscal Year	Domestic Procurement (A)	Imports			Total (E=A+D)	Domestic Procurement Ratio (%) (A/E)
		Commercial Imports (B)	Foreign Military Sales (C)	Subtotal (D=B+C)		
1993	16,408	1,356	1,574	2,930	19,338	84.8
1994	17,349	1,195	1,056	2,251	19,600	88.5
1995	18,131	914	598	1,512	19,642	92.3
1996	18,725	938	541	1,478	20,204	92.7
1997	18,479	1,173	376	1,548	20,027	92.3
1998	17,344	1,127	348	1,474	18,818	92.2
1999	17,704	1,185	390	1,575	19,280	91.8
2000	17,685	1,249	439	1,687	19,372	91.3
2001	17,971	1,156	489	1,646	19,617	91.6
2002	17,218	1,326	1,101	2,427	19,645	87.6
2003	17,598	1,292	1,006	2,298	19,896	88.4
2004	18,233	1,334	979	2,313	20,546	88.7
2005	18,917	1,525	937	2,462	21,379	88.5
2006	18,818	1,158	1,047	2,205	21,022	89.1

Notes: 1. Figures for "Domestic Procurement," "Commercial Imports" and "Foreign Military Sales" are based on the results of the Survey of Equipment Procurement Contract Amounts for the year in question.
2. "Foreign Military Sales" refers to the amount of equipment procured from the U.S. Government under the Japan-U.S. Mutual Defense Agreement.
3. Figures are rounded up or down, and may not tally precisely.

Defense Chronology

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1945			Aug. 15	World War II ends	Oct. 24	United Nations established
			Aug. 17	Higashikuni Cabinet formed		
			Sep. 2	GHQ established		
			Oct. 9	Shidehara Cabinet formed		
			Oct. 15	General Staff Office and Military Command abolished		
			Nov. 30	Army and Navy Ministries abolished		
1946			Jan. 27	GHQ orders the suspension of Japanese administrative right over Ryukyu and Ogasawara Islands	Jan. 10	First session of U.N. General Assembly (London, through February 14)
			Feb. 26	Far East Commission formed	Mar. 5	Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech
			Apr. 5	First meeting of Allied Council on Japan	Oct. 1	International War Crimes Tribunal in Nuremberg delivers verdicts
			Apr. 24	Civil administration of Okinawa established	Dec. 19	First Indochina War starts
			May 3	International Military Tribunal for the Far East opened		
			May 22	Yoshida Cabinet formed		
			Nov. 3	Constitution of Japan promulgated		
1947			May 3	Constitution of Japan takes effect	Mar. 12	Truman Doctrine announced
			Jun. 1	Katayama Cabinet formed	Jun. 5	The Marshall Plan announced
			Dec. 17	Police Law promulgated (National Rural Police and municipal police forces established)	Oct. 5	Comintern established
1948			Mar. 10	Ashida Cabinet formed	Apr. 1	USSR imposes Berlin blockade (through May 12, 1949)
			Apr. 27	Japan Coast Guard Law promulgated	May 14	First Middle East War starts (through February 24, 1949)
			Oct. 15	Yoshida Cabinet formed	Jun. 26	Berlin airlift starts
			Nov. 12	International Military Tribunal for the Far East delivers verdicts	Aug. 15	Republic of Korea (ROK) established
					Sep. 9	Democratic People's Republic of Korea established
1949			Jul. 5	Shimoyama incident	Jan. 25	COMECON established
			Jul. 15	Mitaka incident	Apr. 4	North Atlantic Treaty signed by 12 nations (becomes effective August 24)
			Aug. 17	Matsukawa incident	Apr. 21	Nationalist-Communist talks break up; Chinese Communist Army launches general offensive
					May 6	Federal Republic of Germany established (West Germany)
					Sep. 24	USSR declared possession of atomic bomb
					Oct. 1	People's Republic of China established
					Oct. 7	German Democratic Republic established (East Germany)
					Dec. 7	Chinese Nationalist Party takes refuge in Taiwan

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1950	Jul. 8	General MacArthur authorizes the establishment of the National Police Reserve, consisting of 75,000 men, and the expansion of the Japan Coast Guard by 8,000 men	Jun. 21	John Foster Dulles, adviser to the U.S. Department of State, visits Japan	Jan. 27	U.S. signs MSA agreement with NATO countries
			Nov. 24	U.S. announces the seven principles for concluding a peace treaty with Japan	Feb. 14	China-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed
	Aug. 10	National Police Reserve Ordinance promulgated and put into effect			Jun. 25	Korean War (ends July 27, 1953)
	Aug. 13	Ordinary personnel recruitment for the National Police Reserve begins			Jul. 7	United Nations Force formed for dispatch to Korea
	Aug. 14	Masuhara appointed first Director-General of the National Police Reserve			Sep. 15	U.N. troops land at Inchon
					Oct. 25	Chinese Communist volunteers join Korean War
	Sep. 7	National Police Reserve headquarters moves from the National Police Agency headquarters to Etchujima			Dec. 18	NATO Defense Commission agrees to establishment of NATO Forces
1951	Jan. 23	Minister of State Ohashi takes charge of the National Police Reserve	Jan. 29	First Yoshida-Dulles talks (peace treaty negotiations)	Aug. 30	U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty signed
			Sep. 8	49 countries sign Peace Treaty with Japan	Sep. 1	Australia-New Zealand-U.S. sign ANZUS Treaty
	Mar. 1	Special recruitment of Military and Naval Academy graduates to serve as police officers 1st and 2nd class begins		Japan-U.S. Security Treaty concluded		Republic established (East Germany)
			Oct. 26	House of Representatives approves Peace Treaty and Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (House of Councillors approval given November 18)		
	Oct. 20	Ozuki unit dispatched for the first time on a rescue relief operation to Kita Kawachi Village, Yamaguchi Prefecture, in the wake of Typhoon Ruth				
1952	Feb. 28	Japan-U.S. Administrative Agreement signed	Apr. 28	Japan-Taiwan Peace Treaty concluded	Jan. 18	ROK proclaims sovereignty over neighboring ocean areas (Rhee Line)
	Apr. 26	Maritime Guard established within the Japan Coast Guard		Japan-U.S. Peace Treaty and Japan-U.S. Security Treaty enter into force	May 26	U.S.-U.K.-France sign peace agreement with Germany
	Jul. 26	Japan-U.S. Facilities and Areas Agreement signed		Far East Commission, Allied Council, and GHQ abolished	May 27	European Defense Community (EDC) Treaty signed
	Jul. 31	National Safety Agency Law promulgated	May 1	May Day riot at Imperial Palace Plaza	Oct. 3	U.K. carries out its first atomic bomb test
	Aug. 1	National Safety Agency established	Jul. 21	Subversive Activities Prevention Law promulgated and enters into force	Nov. 1	U.S. carries out its first hydrogen bomb test
		Prime Minister Yoshida concurrently appointed Director-General of the National Safety Agency				
		Coastal Safety Force inaugurated				
	Oct. 15	National Safety Force inaugurated				
	Oct. 30	Kimura appointed Director-General of the National Safety Agency				
1953	Jan. 1	Security Advisory Group in Japan inaugurated	Aug. 1	Weapons Production Law promulgated	Mar. 5	USSR General Secretary Stalin dies
	Apr. 1	National Safety Academy (predecessor of National Defense Academy) established	Dec. 25	Japanese administrative rule over Amami Islands restored	Jul. 27	Truce signed in Korean War
					Aug. 12	USSR carries out its first hydrogen bomb test

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1953	Oct. 30	Ikeda-Robertson talks; joint statement issued on gradual increase in self-defense strength			Oct. 1	U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty signed
1954	Mar. 8	Mutual Defense Assistance (MDA) agreement signed	Mar. 1	Daigo Fukuryu maru (Lucky Dragon V) incident	Mar. 1	U.S. carries out hydrogen bomb test at Bikini Atoll
	May 14	Japan-U.S. sign Land Lease Agreement on naval vessels	Dec. 10	Hatoyama Cabinet formed	Jul. 21	Geneva Agreement on armistice in Indochina signed
	Jun. 2	House of Councillors passes resolution prohibiting dispatch of troops overseas			Sep. 3	Chinese People's Liberation Army shells Quemoy and Matsu for the first time
	Jun. 9	Promulgation of Defense Agency Establishment Law, Self-Defense Forces Law and Protection of National Secrecy Law pertaining to the MDA			Sep. 8	South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) formed by signing of collective defense pact
	Jul. 1	Defense Agency established; Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces inaugurated			Dec. 2	U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty signed
	Dec. 10	Omura appointed Minister of State for Defense				
1955	Mar. 19	Sugihara appointed Minister of State for Defense	May 8	Protests begin at Sunagawa Base	Apr. 18	Africa-Asia conference held at Bandung
	May 6	Live shell fire by U.S. forces at Kita Fuji Maneuver Area; opposition to firing intensifies	Aug. 6	First World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs held at Hiroshima	May 5	West Germany formally admitted to NATO
	Jul. 31	Sunada appointed Minister of State for Defense	Aug. 31	Shigemitsu-Dulles meeting; joint statement issued on revision of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty	May 14	Signing of Warsaw Pact
	Nov. 22	Funada appointed Minister of State for Defense	Nov. 14	Japan-U.S. Atomic Energy Agreement signed		
			Dec. 19	Atomic Energy Basic Law promulgated		
1956	Jan. 30	Japan-U.S. joint statement on reduction of Japan's share of defense spending	Feb. 9	House of Representatives passes resolution to ban atomic and hydrogen bomb tests (House of Councillors, February 10)	Feb. 14	Stalin criticized at the 20th Congress of Soviet Communist Party in Moscow; Khruschev proclaims policy of peaceful co-existence with the West
	Mar. 22	Japan-U.S. Technical Agreement relating to sharing of knowledge on patents and technology signed in accordance with MDA	Oct. 19	Joint declaration on restoration of Japanese-Soviet relations	Apr. 17	USSR announces dissolution of Comintern
	Mar. 23	Defense Agency moved to Kasumiga-seki	Dec. 18	Japan joins the U.N.	Jul. 26	Egyptian President Nasser nationalizes the Suez Canal
	Jul. 2	National Defense Council Composition Law promulgated	Dec. 23	Ishibashi Cabinet formed	Oct. 23	Hungarian Revolution
	Sep. 20	First domestically-produced F-86F fighter delivered			Oct. 29	Second Middle East War (Suez War) (through November 6)
	Dec. 23	Prime Minister Ishibashi concurrently becomes Minister of State for Defense				
1957	Jan. 31	Acting Prime Minister Kishi concurrently becomes, ad interim, Minister of State for Defense	Feb. 25	Kishi Cabinet formed	May 15	U.K. conducts its first hydrogen bomb test
			Mar. 15	House of Councillors passes resolution to ban atomic and hydrogen bombs	Aug. 26	USSR announces successful ICBM test
	Feb. 2	Kotaki appointed Minister of State for Defense	Aug. 6	Japan-U.S. Security Council inaugurated		

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1957	May 20	Basic Guidelines for National Defense adopted by the National Defense Council and the Cabinet			Oct. 4	USSR launches the world's first man-made satellite, Sputnik 1
	Jun. 14	First Defense Build-up Plan adopted by the National Defense Council and approved by the Cabinet			Nov. 23	World Congress of Communist Parties issues the Moscow Declaration
	Jun. 21	Kishi-Eisenhower talks; joint statement on the early withdrawal of the USFJ issued				
	Jul. 10	Tsushima appointed Minister of State for Defense				
1958	Jan. 14	First ocean training exercises (Hawaii, through February 28)	Apr. 18	House of Representatives passes resolution to ban atomic and hydrogen bombs	Oct. 23	Dulles talks with Chiang Kaishek; joint statement issued denying counteroffensive against mainland China
	Feb. 17	ASDF begins measures to counter invasions of territorial airspace	Sep. 11	Fujiyama-Dulles talks (Washington); agreement on revision of the Japan- U.S. Security Treaty	Dec. 17	U.S. test-launches Atlas ICBM
	Jun. 12	Sato appointed Minister of State for Defense concurrently becomes Minister of State for Defense	Oct. 4	Commencement of Japan-U.S. talks on the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty		
1959	Jan. 12	Ino appointed Minister of State for Defense	Mar. 30	Tokyo District Court ruled the stationing of U.S. forces to be unconstitutional in the Sunagawa case	Mar. 31	14th Dalai Lama is exiled to India
	Jun. 18	Akagi appointed Minister of State for Defense	Dec. 16	Original ruling in the Sunagawa case was reversed by the Supreme Court	Aug. 25	China-India border dispute
					Sep. 18	Soviet Premier Khrushchev proposes total and complete disarmament at U.N.
					Sep. 27	U.S.-Soviet summit; joint statement issued at Camp David
					Dec. 1	Antarctica Treaty signed
1960	Jan. 11	Defense Agency moves to Hinoki-cho	Jan. 19	New Japan-U.S. Security Treaty signed (enters into force June 23)	Feb. 13	France conducts its first nuclear test
	Jul. 19	Esaki appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jul. 19	Ikeda Cabinet formed	May 1	U-2 reconnaissance plane belonging to U.S. shot down in Soviet airspace
	Dec. 8	Nishimura appointed Minister of State for Defense			Jul. 20	U.S. conducts successful underwater launch of Polaris SLBM
					Dec. 20	Formation of the South Viet Nam National Liberation Front
1961	Jan. 13	National Defense Council decides to reorganize GSDF units (into 13 divisions); presented to Cabinet January 20			May 16	Military junta seizes power in coup d'état in ROK
					Jul. 6	Soviet-North Korea Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed
	Jul. 18	Fujieda appointed Minister of State for Defense			Jul. 11	China-North Korea Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed
		Second Defense Build-up Plan adopted by National Defense Council and Cabinet			Aug. 13	Construction of Berlin Wall
1962	Jul. 18	Shiga appointed Minister of State for Defense			Oct. 20	China-India border dispute (through November 22)

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1962	Nov. 1	Defense Facilities Administration Agency established			Oct. 24	U.S. Navy imposes sea blockade of Cuba (through November 20)
	Nov. 9	Shiga visits U.S. for first time as Minister of State for Defense (through November 26)			Oct. 28	USSR General Secretary Khrushchev declares dismantling of missile bases in Cuba
1963	Jul. 18	Fukuda appointed Minister of State for Defense	Aug. 14	Japan joins Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty	Jun. 20	Agreement signed for U.S.- Soviet hotline
					Aug. 14	Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty signed by U.S.-USSR-U.K. (enters into force on Oct. 10)
1964	Jul. 18	Koizumi appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jun. 15	Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty enters into force for Japan	Aug. 2	Gulf of Tonkin incident
			Nov. 9	Sato Cabinet formed	Oct. 16	China successfully carries out its first nuclear test
			Nov. 12	U.S. nuclear submarine (Sea Dragon) enters a Japanese port (Sasebo) for the first time		
1965	Feb. 10	Diet debate on Mitsuya study	Jun. 22	Japan-ROK Basic Treaty signed	Feb. 7	U.S. starts bombing Viet Nam
	Jun. 3	Matsuno appointed Minister of State for Defense			Sep. 1	Second India-Pakistan conflict (through September 22)
	Nov. 20	Icebreaker *Fuji* leaves on first mission to assist Antarctic observation (through April 8, 1966)				
1966	Aug. 1	Kambayashiyama appointed Minister of State for Defense			May 16	Cultural Revolution starts in China
	Nov. 29	Outline of Third Defense Build-up Plan adopted by National Defense Council and Cabinet			Jul. 1	France withdraws from the NATO command
					Oct. 27	China carries out its first successful nuclear missile test
	Dec. 3	Masuda appointed Minister of State for Defense				
1967	Mar. 13	Key matters for inclusion in Third Defense Build-up Plan agreed by National Defense Council; adopted by Cabinet on March 14	Mar. 29	Sapporo District Court rules in Eniwa Case	Jun. 5	Third Middle East War (through June 9)
					Jun. 17	China carries out its first successful hydrogen bomb test
					Jul. 1	Formation of European Community (EC)
					Aug. 8	Formation of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
1968	Nov. 30	Arita appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jan. 19	U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (*Enterprise*) enters a Japanese port (Sasebo) for the first time	Jan. 23	Seizure of U.S. Navy intelligence vessel *Pueblo* by North Korea
			Jun. 26	Ogasawara Islands revert to Japan	May 13	First formal Vietnamese peace talks held in Paris
					Jul. 1	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signed
					Aug. 20	Soviet and Eastern European troops invade Czechoslovakia
					Aug. 24	France carries out its first hydrogen bomb test in the South Pacific

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1969	Jan. 10	National Defense Council decision to produce 104 F-4E aircraft domestically, approved by Cabinet	Nov. 21	Sato-Nixon joint statement (extension of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, return of Okinawa to Japan by 1972)	Mar. 2	Armed clashes between Chinese and Soviet forces on Chenpao Island (Damansky Island)
					Jun. 10	South Viet Nam announces establishment of Provisional Revolutionary Government
					Jul. 2	Nixon Doctrine announced
1970	Jan. 14	Nakasone appointed Minister of State for Defense	Feb. 3	Japan signs Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty	Jan. 24	Formation of integrated Warsaw Pact forces (involving seven countries)
	Oct. 20	Publication of "The Defense of Japan," the first white paper on defense	Feb. 11	First domestically produced artificial satellite successfully launched	Mar. 5	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty comes into force
			Mar. 31	Yodo hijacking	Aug. 12	West Germany-USSR sign non-aggression pact
			Jun. 23	Automatic extension of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty		
			Nov. 25	Yukio Mishima commits suicide by ritual disembowelment at the GSDF Eastern Army Headquarters in Ichigaya		
1971	Jun. 29	Okinawa Defense Agreement (Kubo-Curtis Agreement) signed	Jun. 17	Agreement on the Return of Okinawa signed	Feb. 11	Signing of treaty forbidding the use of the seabed for military purposes
	Jul. 5	Masuhara appointed Minister of State for Defense	Nov. 24	House of Representatives resolution on non-nuclear weapons	Sep. 30	U.S.-USSR sign agreement on measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war
	Jul. 30	All Nippon Airways plane collides with SDF aircraft (Shizukuishi)			Oct. 25	U.N. General Assembly adopts resolution to admit China and expel Taiwan
	Aug. 2	Nishimura appointed Minister of State for Defense			Dec. 3	Third India-Pakistan conflict (through December 17)
	Dec. 3	Ezaki appointed Minister of State for Defense				
1972	Feb. 7	National Defense Council adopts Outline of 4th Five-Year Defense Build-up Plan, approved by Cabinet on February 8	Jan. 7	Sato-Nixon joint statement on the agreement of the return of Okinawa and the reduction of bases	Feb. 28	President Nixon visits China; China-U.S. Joint Communiqué
	Apr. 17	National Defense Council decision on SDF deployment in Okinawa, presented to Cabinet on April 18	Apr. 10	Japan signs Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)	Apr. 10	Signing of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction
			May 15	Return of Okinawa		
			Jul. 7	Tanaka Cabinet formed		
	Jul. 7	Masuhara appointed Minister of State for Defense	Sep. 29	Prime Minister Tanaka visits China; normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China	May 26	SALT-I and agreement to limit ABM signed on the visit of President Nixon to USSR
	Oct. 9	National Defense Council determines key matters for inclusion in Fourth Defense Build-up Plan and measures to enhance civilian control, adopted by Cabinet			Jul. 3	India-Pakistan truce signed
					Dec. 21	East-West Germany Basic Treaty signed
1973	Jan. 23	14th Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee meeting agrees on consolidation of U.S. bases in Japan (Kanto Program)	Sep. 7	Sapporo District Court rules SDF unconstitutional (Naganuma Judgment)	Jan. 27	Viet Nam peace agreement signed (ceasefire takes effect on January 28)
			Sep. 21	Japan-North Viet Nam establish diplomatic relations	Mar. 29	U.S. forces complete their withdrawal from Viet Nam
	Feb. 1	Defense Agency publishes Peacetime Defense Strength	Oct. 8	Japan-Soviet summit (Moscow)	Jun. 22	General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev of the Soviet Union visits U.S., convention on the prevention of nuclear war signed
	May 30	Yamanaka appointed Minister of State for Defense				

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1973	Jul. 1	Commencement of SDF air defense mission on Okinawa			Oct. 6 Oct. 17	Fourth Middle East War (ends October 25) Ten OPEC countries decide to reduce crude oil supplies
1974	Apr. 25 Nov. 12 Dec. 9	National Defense Medical College opens Uno appointed Minister of State for Defense Sakata appointed Minister of State for Defense	Dec. 9	Miki Cabinet formed	May 18 Jul. 3	India carries out its first underground nuclear test President Nixon visits USSR, Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (Threshold Test Ban Treaty) signed
1975	Aug. 29	Japan-U.S. defense summit meeting (Sakata-Schlesinger, Tokyo)			Mar. 26 Apr. 30 Aug. 1 Nov. 15	Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) enters into force Fall of Saigon, South Vietnamese Government surrenders unconditionally Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) adopts the Helsinki Declaration (Helsinki) First summit meeting of most industrialized nations (Rambouillet, through November 17), since held annually
1976	Jun. 4 Jul. 8 Sep. 6 Oct. 29 Nov. 5 Dec. 24	Publication of second white paper on defense, "The Defense of Japan" (henceforth published annually) Sub-Committee for Defense Cooperation MiG-25 forced to land at Hakodate Airport National Defense Council and Cabinet adopt National Defense Program Outline National Defense Council and Cabinet adopt Immediate-term Defense Build-up Program Mihara appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jun. 8 Dec. 24	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty comes into force for Japan Fukuda Cabinet formed	Jul. 2 Aug. 18 Sep. 9	Socialist Republic of Viet Nam (unified Viet Nam) proclaimed U.S. military officers slain at Panmunjom Death of Chairman of Chinese Communist Party Mao Zedong
1977	Apr. 15 Aug. 10 Nov. 28 Dec. 28 Dec. 28	Establishment of systematic defense programs Defense Agency starts Emergency Legislation Study Kanemaru appointed Minister of State for Defense National Defense Council decides on introduction of "F-15s and P-3Cs," approved by Cabinet on December 29	Jul. 1	Implementation of two maritime laws, proclaiming a 200-mile fishing zone and 12-mile territorial waters	Jun. 30 Aug. 1	South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) dissolved (Treaty remains effective) North Korea establishes military demarcation lines in Sea of Japan and Yellow Sea
1978	Sep. 21	Defense Agency announces modality and purpose of emergency legislation study	Aug. 12 Dec. 7	Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China signed in Beijing Ohira Cabinet formed	Sep. 7 Dec. 16 Dec. 25	Camp David Agreement U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty annulled Vietnamese troops invade Cambodia

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1978	Nov. 27	(ASDF) First Japan-U.S. joint training exercises (east of Misawa and west of Akita, through December 1) Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee approves Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Cooperation, presented to and approved by Cabinet following deliberation by the National Defense Council on November 28				
	Dec. 7	Yamashita appointed Minister of State for Defense				
1979	Jan. 11	Introduction of E-2C approved by National Defense Council and Cabinet	Nov. 9	Second Ohira Cabinet formed	Jan. 1	U.S. and China normalize diplomatic relations
	Jul. 17	Announcement of Mid-Term Defense Estimate (FY 1980–FY 1984)			Jan. 7	Fall of Phnom Penh, establishment of Heng Samrin regime announced
	Jul. 25	Minister of State for Defense Yamashita makes first visit to ROK as an incumbent Minister (through July 26)			Feb. 1	Islamic Revolution takes place in Iran
					Feb. 17	China-Viet Nam conflict (through March 5)
	Nov. 9	Kubota appointed Minister of State for Defense			Mar. 26	Egypt-Israel peace treaty signed
					Jun. 18	SALT-II signed
					Oct. 26	Assassination of ROK President Park Chung Hee
					Dec. 27	Soviet Union invades Afghanistan
1980	Feb. 4	Hosoda appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jul. 17	Suzuki Cabinet formed	Apr. 11	China-Soviet Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance lapses
	Feb. 26	Maritime Self-Defense Force takes part in RIMPAC for the first time (through March 18)	Dec. 1	Ministerial council on comprehensive national security established	May 18	China tests an ICBM in the direction of the South Pacific for the first time
	Jul. 17	Omura appointed Minister of State for Defense			Sep. 22	Iran and Iraq enter into full-fledged war
1981	Apr. 22	Defense Agency announces classification of the laws and regulations subject to the Studies on Emergency Legislation	Nov. 30	Reshuffled Suzuki Cabinet formed	Dec. 13	Poland declares martial law, and establishes the Army Council of National Salvation
	Oct. 1	(GSDF) First Japan-U.S. joint exercises (in communications) staged at Higashi Fuji Maneuver Area (through October 3)				
	Nov. 30	Ito appointed Minister of State for Defense				
1982	Feb. 15	(GSDF) First Japan-U.S. combined command post exercise staged (Takigahara, through February 19)	Jun. 8	BWC enters into force in Japan	Apr. 2	Falklands dispute (ends June 14)
			Jun. 9	Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), Protocols I, II and III concluded	Jun. 6	Israeli forces invade Lebanon
	May 15	Use of some sections of land within installations and areas located in Okinawa starts under the Special Land Lease Law	Sep. 9	Supreme Court ruled on Naganuma Nike Missile Base Case	Jun. 29	Commencement of Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START-I) U.S.-Soviet Union (Geneva)
			Nov. 27	Nakasone Cabinet formed	Oct. 16	Successful underwater launch of an SLBM by China

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1982	Jul. 23	1981 Mid-Term Defense Estimate (for FY 1983– FY 1987) presented to and approved by National Defense Council				
	Nov. 27	Tanigawa appointed Minister of State for Defense				
1983	Jan. 14	Government decides to pave the way for the transfer of military technologies to the U.S.	Dec. 2	CCW Protocols I, II and III enter into force in Japan	Mar. 23	U.S. President Reagan announces Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
	Dec. 12	(ASDF) First Japan-U.S. combined command post exercise staged (Fuchu, through December 15)	Dec. 27	Second Nakasone Cabinet formed	Sep. 1	KAL passenger liner shot down by Soviet fighters over Sakhalin
	Dec. 27	Kurihara appointed Minister of State for Defense			Oct. 9	19 ROK government officials, including cabinet ministers, killed in Burma by North Korean terrorist explosion
					Oct. 25	U.S. and six Caribbean nations send troops to Grenada
1984	Jun. 11	(MSDF) First Japan-U.S. combined command post exercise staged (Yokosuka, through June 15)	Nov. 1	Reshuffled second Nakasone Cabinet formed		
	Oct. 16	Defense Agency announces procedures etc. of future Studies on Emergency Legislation in "Studies on Legislation to Deal with Emergencies"				
	Nov. 1	Kato appointed Minister of State for Defense				
1985	Sep. 18	Mid-Term Defense Program approved by National Defense Council and Cabinet	Aug. 12	Japan Airlines aircraft crashes	Feb. 1	New Zealand refuses to allow U.S. destroyer *Buchanan* to enter port
	Dec. 27	Detailed arrangements for the supply of military technologies to the U.S. concluded	Dec. 28	Reshuffled second Nakasone Cabinet formed	Mar. 11	Mikhail Gorbachev installed as General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party
					Mar. 12	U.S.-Soviet Union arms control talks begin
					Jun. 4	China announces cut of one million personnel from the People's Liberation Army
1986	Feb. 24	First Japan-U.S. integrated command post exercise (through February 28)	Jul. 22	Third Nakasone Cabinet formed	Apr. 26	Accident at Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Soviet Union
	Jul. 1	Security Council Establishment Law enacted			Aug. 10	U.S. announces termination of its obligations to New Zealand under the ANZUS Treaty
	Jul. 22	Kurihara appointed Minister of State for Defense				
	Sep. 5	Government approves the first transfer of military technology to the U.S.			Sep. 22	Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) adopts final documents (Stockholm)
	Oct. 27	First Japan-U.S. integrated field exercises staged (through October 31)			Oct. 11	U.S.-Soviet Union summit talks (Reykjavik, through October 12)

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1986	Dec. 30	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet approve plans for dealing with the Immediate-term Defense Build-up Program authorized by the Cabinet on November 5, 1976 and included in the FY 1987 budget				
1987	Jan. 24	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet agree on a program for the future build-up of defense capacity	May 27	Metropolitan Police Department arrests two employees of Toshiba Machine Co., Ltd., in connection with unfair exports that breach the rules of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls (COCOM) to Communist areas	Nov. 29	KAL airliner blown up by North Korean terrorists while flying over the Bay of Bengal
	Jan. 30	Special Measures Agreement concerning the cost sharing of the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan signed (effective June 1)			Dec. 8	INF Treaty signed
	Nov. 6	Kawara appointed Minister of State for Defense	Aug. 26	Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams enacted		
	Dec. 18	Security Council of Japan approves a study on the state of air defense on the high seas	Oct. 6	First Japan-U.S. Meeting on COCOM held (Tokyo, through October 7)		
			Nov. 6	Takeshita Cabinet formed		
1988	Mar. 2	Revised protocol of the Special Measures Agreement concerning the cost sharing of the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan signed (effective June 1)	Mar. 13	Aomori-Hakodate Undersea Tunnel opens	Mar. 14	Armed clashes between China and Viet Nam in the waters around the Spratly Islands
			Jun. 1	Supreme Court rules on an appeal against the enshrining of an SDF officer killed in an accident	May 29	U.S.-Soviet Union summit talks (Moscow, through June 1, instruments of ratification of INF Treaty exchanged)
	Apr. 12	Signing of official documents for the transfer of military technologies in certain areas of defense from the U.S. to Japan under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the two countries	Dec. 27	Second Takeshita Cabinet formed	Aug. 17	First joint verification of an underground nuclear test carried out by U.S. and Soviet Union (Nevada)
					Aug. 20	Ceasefire agreement reached in Iran-Iraq War
	Jul. 23	Submarine and civilian fishing boat in collision (off Yokosuka)			Dec. 7	General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev delivers speech to the U.N. on the decommissioning of 500,000 Soviet troops
	Aug. 24	Tazawa appointed Minister of State for Defense				
	Nov. 29	Japanese and U.S. Governments sign memorandum and detailed arrangements relating to FS-X joint development				
1989	Jan. 27	Establishment of a commission for the study of defense capability	Jan. 7	Emperor Showa dies	Feb. 15	Soviet Union completes the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan
			Feb. 24	Emperor Showa's funeral		
	Jun. 3	Yamazaki appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jun. 3	Uno Cabinet formed	May 17	China-Soviet summit (Beijing): state-to-state and government-to-government relations normalized
			Aug. 10	Kaifu Cabinet formed		
	Aug. 10	Matsumoto appointed Minister of State for Defense				Gorbachev announces the reduction of the Soviet Far East forces by 120,000 (Beijing)
					Jun. 4	Tiananmen Square incident

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1989					Nov. 9	GDR permits free departures to the West (virtual demolition of the Berlin Wall)
					Dec. 2	U.S.-Soviet summit talks (Malta, through December 3)
1990	Feb. 28	Ishikawa appointed Minister of State for Defense	Feb. 28	Second Kaifu Cabinet formed	Aug. 2	Iraq invades Kuwait
			Aug. 30	Government decides to donate U.S.$1 billion to efforts to restore peace in the Gulf region	Sep. 30	Soviet Union-ROK establish diplomatic relations
	Jun. 19	Japan-U.S. Joint Committee confirms that the two countries will push ahead with procedures to coordinate the return of facilities by U.S. forces (23 items) in Okinawa	Sep. 14	Government pledges an additional U.S.$1 billion of economic aid toward efforts to restore peace in the Gulf region plus U.S.$2 billion to countries adjacent to the conflict	Oct. 3	German unification
					Nov. 19	CFE Treaty and 22-Nation Joint Declaration, signing of Paris Charter Signing of CSBM Vienna document
	Jun. 21	Japan and the U.S. reach agreement in principle on the establishment of a ministerial conference on security	Oct. 16	Bill on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations submitted to Diet		
	Dec. 20	Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 1991–FY 1995) approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet	Nov. 10	Bill on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations annulled		
	Dec. 29	Ikeda appointed Minister of State for Defense	Nov. 12	Coronation of Emperor		
1991	Jan. 14	New Special Measures Agreement concerning the cost sharing of the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan signed (effective April 17)	Jan. 17	Cabinet approves the establishment of the Gulf Crisis Countermeasures Headquarters	Jan. 17	Coalition forces launch air attacks against Kuwait and Iraq, Operation Desert Storm
			Jan. 24	Government pledges an additional U.S.$9 billion to efforts to restore peace in the Gulf region	Feb. 24	Coalition forces ground troops advance on Kuwait and Iraq
	Jan. 25	Cabinet approves ordinance on interim measures for the airlifting of Gulf Crisis refugees (promulgated and enacted on January 29)	Nov. 5	Miyazawa Cabinet formed	Feb. 28	Coalition forces cease combat action against Iraq
					Mar. 31	Warsaw Pact structures dismantled
	Apr. 26	Total of six MSDF vessels, including minesweepers, depart for the Persian Gulf			Jun. 25	Croatian and Slovenian Republics secede from Yugoslavia
					Jul. 10	Russian President Yeltsin takes office
	Jun. 3	Disaster relief dispatch with the eruption of Fugendake on Mount Unzen (through December 16, 1995)			Jul. 31	U.S.-Soviet leaders sign START-I in Moscow
					Sep. 6	Soviet State Council approves independence of three Baltic states
	Oct. 9	SDF personnel join U.N. teams carrying out inspections on Iraq chemical weapons for the first time			Sep. 17	ROK and North Korea simultaneously admitted to the U.N.
	Nov. 5	Miyashita appointed Minister of State for Defense			Dec. 8	CIS agreement signed by leaders of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine at summit
1992	Apr. 1	Custody of Government aircraft (B-747) transferred to the Defense Agency	Jun. 29	Law Revising Part of the Law Concerning the Dispatch of International Disaster Relief Teams comes into force	Feb. 7	EC countries sign the European Union Treaty (Maastricht Treaty)
	Sep. 17	SDF units dispatched to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) (through September 26, 1993)	Aug. 10	International Peace Cooperation Law comes into force	Feb. 25	China promulgates and enacts Territorial Waters Act, designating the Senkaku Islands as an integral part of China
			Oct. 23	Emperor and Empress visit China (through October 28)		
	Dec. 11	Nakayama appointed Minister of State for Defense			May 25	IAEA officials make the first designated inspection of North Korea's nuclear facilities (through June 5)

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1992	Dec. 18	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet authorize modification of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 1991–FY 1995)			Jun. 16	Massive cuts in strategic arms agreed at U.S.-Russia summit in Washington (through June 17)
					Jul. 2	U.S. President Bush announces completion of the withdrawal to the U.S. of ground- or sea-based tactical nuclear weapons deployed overseas
					Aug. 24	China-ROK establish diplomatic relations
					Nov. 9	CFE Treaty becomes formally effective
					Nov. 24	U.S. completes withdrawal of its Armed Forces from the Philippines
1993	May 11	SDF units dispatched to the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) (through January 8, 1995)	Jan. 13	Japan signs CWC	Jan. 3	U.S.-Russia summit (Moscow); START-II signed
			Jun. 9	Wedding ceremony of His Imperial Highness the Crown Prince	Jan. 13	Signing of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction
	Jul. 12	Disaster relief teams dispatched to Hokkaido in response to the earthquake off southwestern Hokkaido (through August 12)	Aug. 9	Hosokawa Cabinet formed	Mar. 12	North Korea announces secession from NPT
	Aug. 9	Nakanishi appointed Minister of State for Defense			May 29	North Korea conducts ballistic missile test over the central Sea of Japan
	Oct. 13	Japan-Russia agreement on prevention of marine accidents signed			Jun. 11	North Korea reserves the right to withdraw from the NPT in a joint statement issued during first round of U.S.-North Korea consultations
	Dec. 2	Aichi appointed Minister of State for Defense			Sep. 1	U.S. Defense Department announces the Bottom Up Review
					Sep. 13	Israel and PLO sign a declaration of the principles of provisional autonomy
					Oct. 3	Armed clashes between UNOSOM II and armed Somali factions result in the deaths of 18 U.S. soldiers and a number of casualties
					Nov. 1	European Union established
1994	Mar. 1	First Japan-China security dialogue (Beijing)	Apr. 28	Hata Cabinet formed	Jan. 11	NATO summit adopts the Partnership for Peace (PfP)
	Apr. 28	Kanda appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jun. 30	Murayama Cabinet formed	Mar. 3	IAEA nuclear inspection team starts inspections of seven nuclear facilities declared by North Korea (through March 14)
	Jun. 30	Tamazawa appointed Minister of State for Defense				
	Sep. 17	SDF units dispatched to Zaire to assist Rwandan refugees (through December 28)			Mar. 25	U.S. forces dispatched to Somalia complete their withdrawal
	Nov. 9	First Japan-ROK working-level defense policy dialogue (Seoul)				

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1994	Dec. 1	First Asia-Pacific Security Seminar (under the auspices of the National Institute for Defense Studies, through December 17)			Mar. 31	U.N. Security Council adopts a chairman's statement to urge North Korea to complete nuclear inspections (North Korea refuses April 4) COCOM dissolved
					Mar. 31	North Korea notifies U.S., which holds presidency of the IAEA Charter, of its withdrawal from the IAEA
					Jun. 14	Former U.S. President Carter visits North Korea and holds talks with North Korean President Kim Il Sung
					Jun. 17	North Korean President Kim Il Sung dies
					Jul. 25	First ASEAN Regional Forum (Bangkok)
					Aug. 31	Russian troops complete withdrawal from the former GDR and three Baltic countries
					Oct. 21	U.S.-North Korea Framework Agreement signed
					Dec. 1	Commander of U.S.-ROK Combined Forces devolves operational control in peacetime to ROK forces
					Dec. 5	START-I comes into force
					Dec. 18	Russia starts military operations against Chechnya
1995	Jan. 17	Disaster relief teams dispatched after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (through April 27)	Sep. 4	Japanese schoolgirl assaulted by three U.S. soldiers based in Okinawa	Jan. 1	CSCE changes its name to OSCE
			Nov. 17	Cabinet approves the establishment of a consultation forum to discuss issues relating to U.S. bases in Okinawa	Feb. 27	U.S. Department of Defense publishes the EASR
	Mar. 20	SDF personnel dispatched teams to carry out rescue operations in the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system (through March 23)			Mar. 9	Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) established
					May 11	NPT extended indefinitely
			Nov. 19	Prime Minister Murayama and U.S. Vice President Gore agree on the establishment of the Special Action Committee on Facilities and Areas in Okinawa (SACO)	Jun. 7	Taiwan President Lee Tenghui visits U.S.
	Jun. 5	Japan and ROK defense authorities exchange correspondence on measures to prevent accidents between SDF and ROK military aircraft			Jul. 11	U.S. President Clinton announces the normalization of U.S.-Viet Nam relations
					Dec. 14	Formal signing of the Bosnian Peace Agreement in Paris
	Jun. 9	Security Council of Japan meets for the first time to discuss the state of future defense capabilities (total of 13 meetings through December 14)			Dec. 15	10 Southeast Asian nations sign the South East Asia Non-Nuclear Zone Treaty at ASEAN summit meeting
					Dec. 20	IFOR, consisting mainly of NATO troops, replaces UNPROFOR and formally commences operations in Bosnia
	Aug. 8	Eto appointed Minister of State for Defense				
	Sep. 27	New Special Measures Agreement concerning the cost sharing of the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan signed (effective April 1, 1996)				

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1995	Sep. 29	Governor of Okinawa Prefecture refuses to implement part of the procedure for the acquisition of useable land under the Special Land Lease Law				
	Nov. 28	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet adopt National Defense Program Outline for the period from FY 1996				
	Dec. 14	Security Council of Japan adopts the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 1996–FY 2000) (Cabinet Decision of December 15)				
1996	Jan. 11	Usui appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jan. 11	Hashimoto Cabinet formed	Jan. 26	START-II ratified by U.S. Senate
			Apr. 12	Prime Minister Hashimoto meets U.S. Ambassador Mondale (agreement reached on the total return of Futenma Air Station, Okinawa, within five to seven years after conditions are satisfied)	Jan. 27	France carries out nuclear tests (completion of which announced January 29)
	Jan. 31	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)			Mar. 8	China carries out missile firing exercises, naval and air force live-fire drills and integrated ground, naval and air force exercises in the waters close to Taiwan on a total of three occasions March 8–25
	Mar. 29	Application for a court order for the Prime Minister to authorize the use of land for U.S. bases as part of the procedure for the acquisition of useable land under the Special Land Lease Law	Apr. 15	SACO Interim Report approved by Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee		
	Apr. 1	Lease expires on part of land being used for Sobe Communication Site	Apr. 16	Cabinet approves the promotion of solutions to issues relating to facilities and areas of U.S. forces in Okinawa Prefecture	Mar. 23	Taiwan holds its first direct presidential elections Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui re-elected
	Apr. 15	Signing of Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement and its procedural arrangements	Jul. 20	U.N. Treaty on the Law of the Seas goes into effect in Japan	Jul. 29	China conducts underground nuclear test (its forty-fifty), then announces moratorium on nuclear testing
	Apr. 17	Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security issued	Aug. 28	Supreme Court ruled on suit ordering the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture to execute his duty to sign by proxy under the Special Land Lease law for use by the stationing forces	Sep. 10	U.N. General Assembly adopts the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
	Jul. 26	First visit to Russia by MSDF ships (Vladivostok, through July 30)			Sep. 18	North Korean minisubmarine runs aground on the east coast of ROK, its crew intruding into ROK territory
	Sep. 2	First visit by MSDF ships to ROK (Pusan, through September 6)	Sep. 8	Plebiscite held in Okinawa Prefecture	Sep. 27	Taliban gains control of the Afghan capital, Kabul, and declares the establishment of a provisional government
	Sep. 18	Governor of Okinawa carries out notification and inspection procedures in accordance with the Special Land Lease Law (through October 2)	Sep. 17	Cabinet approves the establishment of the Okinawa Policy Council		
			Nov. 7	Second Hashimoto Cabinet formed	Oct. 3	Russia-Chechnya ceasefire agreed
	Oct. 29	First Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (through October 31, Tokyo)	Dec. 2	SACO final report approved by Japan-U.S. Joint Security Council	Nov. 5	Clinton reelected U.S. President
					Nov. 18	Basic NATO agreement to keep a multinational stabilization force (SFOR) to succeed IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina
	Nov. 7	Kyuma appointed Minister of State of Defense				
	Dec. 24	Security Council and Cabinet approve responses to foreign submarines traveling underwater in Japanese territorial waters				

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1997	Jan. 20	Establishment of Defense Intelligence Headquarters	Apr. 29	CWC enters into force in Japan	Mar. 14	China enacts National Defense Law
	Apr. 23	Partial amendment to the Special Land Lease Law promulgated and enters into force	Jul. 3	First artillery live-fire training by U.S. Marines stationed in Okinawa carried out on the mainland of Japan (at Kita Fuji) (through July 9)	Apr. 29	CWC enters into force
					May 12	Russia-Chechnya peace treaty signed
					Jul. 1	Hong Kong reverts to China
	Apr. 25	Provisional use of part of Sobe Communication Station land starts	Sep. 11	Second Hashimoto Cabinet inaugurated	Jul. 16	North Korean soldiers cross the military demarcation line (MDL) and exchange fire with ROK troops
	May 15	Provisional use of part of the land belonging to 12 facilities including Kadena Air Base starts	Nov. 5	Plans for the construction of a sea-based heliport presented to the local authority and residents	Jul. 18	NATO and Russia establish a permanent joint council
					Jul. 23	Agreement reached on modification of the framework of the CFE Treaty
	Jun. 9	Self-Defense Official (Director General of the Inspection Bureau) is dispatched to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)	Dec. 3	Japan signs Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty		
			Dec. 21	Nago City holds a plebiscite on the planned construction of a U.S. heliport	Aug. 19	KEDO holds a ceremony to mark the start of work on the light-water reactors to be provided to North Korea
			Dec. 25	Nago City mayor formally announces the acceptance of the sea-based heliport	Oct. 8	North Korean Labor Party Secretary Kim Jong Il assumes the post of General Secretary
		C-130H aircraft transferred to Utahpao, Thailand for action against armed fighting in Cambodia (through July 16)				
	Sep. 23	New Japan-U.S. defense cooperation Security Consultative Committee (SCC)			Nov. 10	China-Russia summit talks: China-Russian joint statement signed (Beijing), and demarcation of the China-Russian eastern border declared
	Dec. 19	Review of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 1996–FY 2000) approved by the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet			Dec. 3	Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty signed
1998	Mar. 26	Establishment of Defense Intelligence Headquarters	Feb. 6	Governor of Okinawa refuses to accept the seabased heliport	Feb. 23	U.N. and Iraq sign a memorandum of understanding on the agreement by Iraq to allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to inspectors
		Introduction of a system of SDF ready reserve personnel	Jul. 30	Obuchi Cabinet formed		
	Apr. 28	The signing of an agreement to revise the Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement	Aug. 31	Government refuses to sign Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) resolution on cost sharing after North Korean missile launch	Apr. 6	U.K. and France ratify CTBT
	May 18	C-130H aircraft transferred to Payareva, Singapore in the case of riots in Indonesia (through May 27)	Sep. 1	Temporary freezing of Japan-North Korea normalization talks	May 11	India carries out underground nuclear tests (repeated May 13)
					May 14	Large-scale riots in the Indonesian capital Jakarta
	Jun. 12	Revision of the International Peace Cooperation Law promulgated and comes into force (the section concerning use of force enters into force July 12)	Sep. 2	Additional sanctions on North Korea (suspension of charter flights) implemented	May 28	Pakistan carries out underground nuclear tests (repeated May 30)
			Oct. 21	Japan lifts freeze on cooperation with North Korea and signs KEDO	Jun. 11	Government of Pakistan announces unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests
	Jul. 29	Combined search and rescue operation exercise between MSDF/ASDF and Russian Navy—the first large-scale combined exercise between Japan and Russia	Dec. 3	CCW revised Protocol II enters into force in Japan	Jun. 22	North Korean submarine trespasses in waters off east coast of ROK and arrested by ROK military forces
			Dec. 22	Cabinet decision on the introduction of information-gathering satellite		
	Jul. 30	Nukaga appointed Minister of State for Defense		Aha Training Area returned (the first resolved issue of SACO)	Jul. 12	Bodies of armed North Korean special forces found in waters off ROK east coast
	Aug. 31	North Korea launches missile over and beyond Japanese airspace			Jul. 27	China publishes its first comprehensive defense white paper, “Defense of China”

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1998	Sep. 3	Former Director-General of Central Procurement Office arrested on suspicion of breach of trust; compulsory investigation to Defense Agency			Aug. 20	U.S. military attacks terrorist facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan
		Based on Okinawa Prefectural Land Expropriation Committee decision of use on May 19, usage of most land of 12 facilities, including Kadena Air Base, begins			Sep. 5	Kim Jong Il assumes posts of General Secretary of the Worker's Party and Chief of the National Defense Commission of North Korea
					Oct. 23	Israel and the Palestinian Authority sign the Wye River Memorandum
	Nov. 14	SDF units dispatched to Honduras with Japan Disaster Relief Team (through December 9)			Dec. 17	U.S. and U.K. forces initiate Operation Desert Fox against Iraq as a punishment for refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM inspections (through December 20)
	Nov. 15	First joint exercise involving all three branches (a total of 2,400 personnel from the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF) (Iwo Jima)			Dec. 18	North Korean semisubmersible infiltrates ROK southern coastal waters and is attacked and sunk by ROK Navy
	Nov. 19	Announcement of the Basic Policy of Defense Procurement Reform				
	Nov. 20	Norota appointed Minister of State for Defense				
	Dec. 25	Security Council approves On Japan-U.S. Cooperative Research on Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies				
1999	Mar. 23	Discovery of a spy ship off the Noto Peninsula (Maritime security operations ordered on March 24)	Mar. 1	Entry into force by Japan of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty	Mar. 1	Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty enters into force
					Mar. 24	NATO starts air campaign in Yugoslavia (through June 10)
	Apr. 2	Announcement of Concrete Measures of Procurement Reform	Sep. 30	Critical accident at a private uranium processing facility in Tokaimura, Ibaraki Prefecture	May 7	NATO forces mistakenly bomb Embassy of China in Yugoslavia
	May 28	Bill Partially Amending the Self-Defense Forces Law (transportation of Japanese citizens and others in foreign countries) promulgated and comes into force	Oct. 5	Second Obuchi Cabinet inaugurated	May 20	U.S. inspection team enters North Korean nuclear facility at Kumchang-ni
			Oct. 12	Suspect Morodomi and 12 others found guilty of malpractice, etc. (Tokyo District Court)	Jun. 4	Government of the Yugoslav Federation accepts Kosovo conflict peace plan submitted by U.S., EU and Russia
			Nov. 22	Governor of Okinawa Prefecture declares the site proposed for the relocation of Futenma Air Station	Jun. 10	U.N. Security Council adopts peace resolution which includes deployment of an international security force (KFOR), including operations in Kosovo
	Aug. 5	First Joint Exercise of Search and Rescue Operations between MSDF and ROK Navy (Kyushu western waters)	Dec. 1	Former Prime Minister Murayama and his Mission leave for North Korea. This Mission and the Workers' Party of North Korea sign a joint announcement (through December 3)	Jul. 9	Taiwan "President" Lee Teng-hui describes China-Taiwan relations as a "special state-to-state relationship"
	Aug. 16	Exchange of official documents and the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments of Japan and the U.S. on Japan-U.S. Cooperative Research on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)	Dec. 27	Mayor of Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture announces the acceptance of alternative facilities for Futenma Air Station	Sep. 29	Russian military unit advances into the Republic of Chechnya
					Oct. 12	Coup in Pakistan; Prime Minister Sharif overthrown
					Oct. 13	U.S. Senate rejects ratification of CTBT

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1999	Aug. 25	The Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan comes into force	Dec. 28	Cabinet decision on Government Policy for the Relocation of Futenma Air Station	Oct. 25	U.N. Security Council adopts a resolution for the establishment of the U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)
	Sep. 23	SDF personnel dispatched to implement the transportation of necessary resources for international disaster relief operations in the Republic of Turkey (through November 22)			Dec. 17	U.N. Security Council establishes UNMOVIC
					Dec. 20	Rule over Macao transferred from Portugal to China
	Sep. 25	Agreement to amend the Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between Japan and the United States enters into force			Dec. 31	Russian President Yeltsin resigns
	Oct. 5	Tsutomu Kawara appointed Minister of State for Defense				
	Nov. 22	SDF personnel dispatched to Indonesia for East Timor Refugees Support (through February 8, 2000)				
	Dec. 17	The Security Council approves the Investigation of Functions Related to In-flight Refueling				
2000	Mar. 29	Disaster relief dispatch for the eruption of Mount Usu begins (through July 24)	Jan. 17	Disposal of anti-personnel mines by civilians begins	Jan. 4	Italy establishes diplomatic relations with North Korea (first of the G7 to do so)
	May 8	Defense Agency moves to the Ichigaya building	Feb. 16	First assembly of the Research Commissions on the Constitution in the Upper House (Lower House on February 17)	Feb. 6	Acting Russian President Putin declares the conclusion of operations to capture cities in the Chechen Republic
	Jun. 16	The Special Law for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (Establishment of nuclear disaster relief dispatch) comes into force	Apr. 5	Mori Cabinet formed	Mar. 18	"Presidential" elections conducted in Taiwan; Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party elected
			Jul. 4	Second Mori Cabinet inaugurated		
	Jun. 27	Disaster relief dispatch conducted in response to the eruption of Mount Miyake (through October 3, 2001)	Jul. 21	Kyushu-Okinawa Summit (through July 23)	Apr. 14	Russian Duma ratifies the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START-II)
			Aug. 25	Replacement Facilities Council on the Relocation of Futenma Air Station established		
	Jul. 4	Kazuo Torashima appointed Minister of State for Defense			May 7	Russian Acting President Putin officially assumes duties as President
	Sep. 8	Active MSDF official arrested for leaking secret documents to military attaché of Embassy of Russia	Nov. 20	The 22nd Japanese Communist Party Convention decides to accept the SDF	Jun. 13	North-South Korean Summit (through June 15, Pyongyang)
			Dec. 5	Second Mori Cabinet reshuffled		
	Sep. 11	New Special Measures Agreement concerning the cost sharing of the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan signed (effective April 1, 2001)			Jul. 21	U.S.-Russia summit meeting held, Cooperation on Strategic Stability announced
					Aug. 12	Russian nuclear-powered submarine *Kursk* sinks
	Sep. 13	SDF personnel dispatched to dispose of Abandoned Chemical Weapons (ACW) in Beian, China			Aug. 23	Secretary-General of the U.N. publishes a report on U.N. peace operations
					Sep. 25	ROK and North Korea hold Defense Ministers' Talks (through September 26)
	Oct. 27	Defense Agency finishes report on Review and Reinforcement of Classified Security System				

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2000	Dec. 5	Toshitsugu Saito appointed Minister of State for Defense			Oct. 12	U.S. and North Korea announce U.S.-North Korea Joint Communiqué
	Dec. 15	Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet adopts the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2001–FY 2005)				In Yemen, a small boat explodes, causing great damage to U.S. Navy destroyer *USS Cole*
					Oct. 23	Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visits North Korea (through October 25)
2001	Jan. 6	Bureau of Finance and Equipment and Central Contract Office established	Jan. 6	Reorganization of Government ministries and agencies into Cabinet Office and 12 ministries and agencies	Jan. 15	North Korean General Secretary Kim Jong Il makes unofficial visit to China (through January 20)
	Feb. 5	SDF units dispatched to India for International Disaster Relief Operation (through February 11)	Feb. 10	The *Ehime Maru*, a training boat from Ehime Prefecture Uwajima Fisheries High School sinks off Hawaii after collision with U.S. submarine	Jan. 20	George W. Bush becomes president of the U.S.
	Feb. 9	Personnel dispatched to UNMOVIC (through March, 2005)				Gloria Macapagal Arroyo becomes president of the Philippines
	Mar. 1	The Ship Inspection Operations Law comes into effect	Mar. 7	Former Maritime Self-Defense Official is given a jail sentence for providing confidential documents to officer of the Russian Embassy	Mar. 7	Sharon administration is inaugurated in Israel
					Apr. 1	Collision between U.S. and Chinese military planes
	Apr. 26	Gen Nakatani appointed Minister of State for Defense			Jun. 15	Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) established
	Sep. 21	First Meeting of the Committee to Consider the Modality of National Defense	Apr. 1	Information Disclosure Act (IDA) comes into force	Jul. 15	Pakistani President Musharraf visits India and holds meeting with Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee
	Oct. 6	International peace cooperation for the relief of Afghan refugees (through October 12)	Apr. 26	Koizumi Cabinet formed		
			May 3	Suspected North Koreans detained (on suspicion of illegal entry on a falsified passport)	Sep. 3	President and CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin visits North Korea (through September 5)
	Nov. 2	Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and Law to Amend the Self-Defense Forces Law (guarding operations, strengthening penalties to ensure secrecy (defense secrets)) are promulgated and enforced (strengthening penalties to ensure secrecy is separately enforced on November 1, 2002)	Jun. 28	Defense Ministry Bill presented to the House of Representatives by Diet members	Sep. 11	Terrorist attacks in the U.S. occur (two airplanes crash into the World Trade Center and one into the Pentagon, killing thousands)
			Aug. 13	Prime Minister Koizumi visits Yasukuni Shrine		
			Sep. 19	Prime Minister Koizumi announces immediate measures in response to the September 11th terrorist attacks in the U.S.	Sep. 12	U.N. Security Council passes resolution condemning the terrorist attacks
					Sep. 14	Australia decides to invoke the right of collective self-defense under the ANZUS Treaty
	Nov. 9	SDF warship dispatched to the Indian Ocean for information-gathering	Oct. 8	Government of Japan establishes the Emergency Anti-Terrorism Headquarters and decides upon Emergency Response Measures at the First Meeting	Oct. 1	U.S. announces Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
	Nov. 25	Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, an MSDF supply vessel, minesweeper tender, and destroyers depart for cooperation and support activities			Oct. 2	In response to the September 11th terrorist attacks in the U.S., NATO invokes Article 5 (on collective self-defense) of the North Atlantic Treaty
			Oct. 29	Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and other measures passed in the House of Councillors plenary session		
	Nov. 29	Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, ASDF begins aerial transportation between USFJ bases			Oct. 7	U.S. and U.K. forces begin attacks in Afghanistan
			Nov. 16	A Cabinet decision is made for a basic plan based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law	Nov. 13	U.S.-Russia Summit held, President George W. Bush announces policy to cut strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 over the next 10 years

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2001	Dec. 2	Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, MSDF supply vessels begin refueling U.S. ships in the Indian Ocean	Dec. 1	Her Imperial Highness Princess Aiko is born to Their Imperial Highnesses The Crown Prince and Crown Princess	Dec. 1	Taiwan's ruling Democratic Progress Party, led by "President" Chen Shui-bian, wins majority in legislative election
		Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, ASDF begins international airlift	Dec. 22	Suspicious boat incident in waters southwest of Kyushu	Dec. 3	U.S. is successful in missile defense testing
	Dec. 14	A bill is introduced to partially amend the Law Concerning Cooperation for U.N. PKOs and Other Operations (the absolution of the freeze on Peacekeeping Force headquarter activities, etc.)			Dec. 5	U.S. and Russia complete implementation of START-I
					Dec. 7	Anti-Taliban force in Afghanistan takes over Kandahar
					Dec. 13	Assault on the Indian Parliament
					Dec. 20	U.N. Security Council adopts a resolution establishing an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
		Security Council approves the Selection of In-flight Refueling Transportation Aircraft Type			Dec. 22	Afghanistan Interim Authority formed, with Mr. Hamid Karzai serving as Chairman
					Dec. 29	Russia withdraws troops from its base in Cuba
2002	Jan. 29	Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, MSDF supply vessels begin refueling U.K. warships in the Indian Ocean	Feb. 15	Cabinet decision on international cooperation execution plan for East Timor	Jan. 8	U.S. Department of Defense submits the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to Congress
			Apr. 12	Supreme Court rejected an appeal for the New Yokota Air Base Suit	Jan. 21	International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan (through January 22, Tokyo)
	Mar. 2	680 SDF personnel dispatched on the First Dispatch Engineering Group to East Timor (through June 25, 2004)	Apr. 16	Cabinet decision on the bill to amend the Law on the Establishment of the Security Council of Japan, the bill to respond to Armed Attacks and the bill to amend the Self-Defense Forces Law	Jan. 29	U.S. President Bush depicts "Axis of Evil" in the State of the Union Address
	Mar. 27	Implementation of law to partially amend the Defense Agency Establishment Law and Self-Defense Forces Law (the Introduction of Candidates for Reserve Personnel introduction of Candidates for Reserve Personnel, etc.)			May 4	Russian Army returns Cam Ranh Naval Base to Viet Nam
					May 20	Independence of East Timor The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) switches to the United Nations Mission Support in East Timor (UNMISET)
			May 31	FIFA World Cup 2002 Korea/Japan is held		
			Jun. 11	Investigation Report of Defense Agency Incident Related to List of People Requesting Information Disclosure is released		
	Apr. 1	Establishment of the Labor Management Organization for USFJ Employees, Incorporated Administrative Agency	Jul. 29	9th Meeting (i.e. final meeting) of the Consultative Body on Futenma Replacement Facility (CFR) is held	May 24	U.S.-Russia Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions signed
					May 28	NATO-Russia Summit reaches formal agreement to establish NATO-Russia Council
	Apr. 22	2nd Western Pacific Submarine Rescue Exercise held (the first multilateral exercise organized by Japan, through May 2)		Basic Plan of the Futenma Replacement Facility agreed	Jun. 13	U.S. officially withdraws from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
			Sep. 11	Suspicious ship raised from the sea floor (offshore Amami Oshima Island)		
	Apr. 29	Prime Minister Koizumi visits PKO unit in East Timor	Sep. 17	Japan-North Korea Summit held Kim Jong-Il, the North Korean President, admits and apologizes for abductions	Jun. 29	Exchanges of fire between ROK patrol boats and North Korean patrol boats which crossed the NLL
	Sep. 30	Ishiba appointed Minister of State for Defense				
	Oct. 1	One personnel dispatched to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (as an Operation and Planning Director)			Sep. 12	U.S. President Bush makes a statement about Iraq at the U.N. meeting
			Sep. 30	Cabinet reshuffle	Sep. 20	U.S. Government announces the National Security Strategy

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2002	Oct. 15	Multilateral search and rescue exercise (Southern Kanto waters and Sagami Bay)	Oct. 13	First International Fleet Review in Japan (Tokyo Bay)	Oct. 3	Assistant Secretary of State Kelly visits North Korea (through October 5)
	Nov. 1	Law to Amend the Self-Defense Forces Law, which strengthens penalties to ensure secrecy, is enforced	Oct. 15	Five of those abducted return to Japan	Oct. 12	Terrorist bombing breaks out in Bali
	Nov. 18	SDF and police authority hold joint command post exercise in Hokkaido	Oct. 23	APEC Summit held	Oct. 16	U.S. Government announces that North Korea admitted the fact that they had a uranium enrichment plan for nuclear weapons when Assistant Secretary of State Kelly visited North Korea
	Dec. 2	One person dispatched to Planning and Control Team, Military Division, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)			Oct. 23	Chechen guerillas seize the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow
	Dec. 16	*Kirishima*, vessel equipped with Aegis air defense systems, departs the port of Yokosuka, according to revision (Dec. 6) in the Implementation Plan based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law			Nov. 14	KEDO Executive Board decides to freeze provision of heavy oil to North Korea from December
					Nov. 21	NATO Summit decides new membership for seven countries in Central and Eastern Europe, announces the Prague Declaration, and agrees to establish its high-readiness unit
	Dec. 19	Joint Staff Council (JSC) reports on Study of Joint Operations to Minister of State for Defense			Nov. 27	U.N. Inspection Team visits Baghdad to resume inspections after four years
					Nov. 29	IAEA Board of Governors decides to request North Korea to accept nuclear inspection
					Dec. 7	Iraq submits a report to the U.N. on its plan for development of weapons of mass destruction
					Dec. 12	North Korea announces it will resume operation and establishment of nuclear-related facilities
					Dec. 13	EU Summit decides new membership for 10 countries in Eastern Europe
					Dec. 17	U.S. announces deployment of a missile defense system
2003	Feb. 8	Antipersonnel landmines possessed by the SDF are all disposed of (with some exceptions)	Jan. 28	Establishment of Consultative Body on Construction of Futenma Replacement Facility concerning Futenma Air Station Replacement	Jan. 10	North Korea announces it is leaving the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
	Mar. 30	International peace cooperation activities are conducted for relief of Iraqi refugees (Airborne unit for Iraqi refugee relief returns to Japan on April 2)	May 30	Personal Information Protection Law partially takes effect	Jan. 24	U.S. Department of Homeland Security established
					Feb. 25	Roh Moo-hyun is elected as 16th President of Republic of Korea
			Jun. 6	Three Armed Attack Situation Response related laws are passed at the Upper House plenary session and enacted	Mar. 7	UNMOVIC and IAEA present an additional report on inspections in Iraq
	Apr. 21	ASDF in-flight refueling training Meeting (through May 1)				

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2003	Jul. 17	International peace cooperation activities are conducted for relief of affected people in Iraq (Airborne unit for relief of affected people in Iraq returns to Japan August 18)	Jul. 26	Law concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq passed the House of Councillors plenary session	Mar. 7	At the U.N. Security Council meeting for foreign affairs officials, the U.S., U.K., and Spain submit a revised resolution draft to request Iraq to disarm itself of weapons of mass destruction
	Sep. 11	Ceremony to celebrate the completion of the Memorial Zone	Sep. 14	Government survey mission dispatched to Middle East countries, including Iraq	Mar. 15	China's National People's Congress elects Hu Jintao as its President, while Ziang Zemin remains as chairman of the Central Military Commission
	Oct. 10	Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law remains in force for another two years	Sep. 30	Cabinet decides to newly establish, in its decoration system, an award for people engaged in dangerous activities	Mar. 17	U.S. and U.K. give up adopting the revised resolution draft on Iraq at U.N. Security Council
	Nov. 3	Former SDF officials decorated for their engagement in dangerous activities	Oct. 7	Joint communiqué signed for the first time at Japan-China-ROK Summit meeting	Mar. 20	U.S. and U.K. forces begin military operations in Iraq
	Nov. 15	SDF special research group dispatched to Iraq	Oct. 10	"The Defense Ministry Establishment Bill" was scrapped concurrently with the dissolution of the House of Representatives	Apr. 30	U.S., Russia, U.N., and EU present Roadmap to Israeli-Palestinian peace, as a new peace process for Palestine
	Dec. 19	Government decides to introduce ballistic missile defense system (Security Council of Japan and Cabinet meeting)	Oct. 24	Foreign Minister Kawaguchi announces US$5 billion worth of assistance at the International Donors' Conference for the Reconstruction of Iraq in Spain	May 1	U.S. President Bush declares termination of major military operations in Iraq
	Dec. 19	Order issued to GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF concerning implementation of response measures based on the Law concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq	Nov. 19	Second Koizumi Cabinet		U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld declares termination of major military operations in Afghanistan
			Nov. 27	Supreme Court rules on suit related to dispossession of Sobe Communication Site land	May 22	U.N. Security Council Resolution adopted by a large majority to allow member states to give assistance for reconstruction of Iraq
	Dec. 26	ASDF advance team leaves for Kuwait	Nov. 29	Ambassador Oku and First Secretary Inoue shot to death in the central region of Iraq	May 31	Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) proposed by U.S. President for the first time
	Dec. 30	Relief materials transported by air in response to great earthquake in Iran under the Law concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams (Iran on January 1 and 2)	Dec. 9	Cabinet decision made on basic plan for Law concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq	Jun. 1	U.S.-Russia Summit meeting held and the strategic offensive reductions treaty between U.S. and Russia ratified
					Jul. 13	Iraq's Governing Council inaugurated
					Aug. 5	Suicide bombing against U.S. affiliated-hotel in Jakarta
					Aug. 6	Shanghai Cooperation Organization holds joint antiterrorism military maneuvers (through August 12)
					Aug. 19	Suicide bombing on U.N. headquarters in Baghdad
					Aug. 27	First Six-Party Talks held (through August 29)
					Sep. 12	First joint naval exercise held in the Coral Sea off the northeastern coast of Australia under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) (through September 14)

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2003					Oct. 2	North Korean Foreign Ministry announces it has finished reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods
					Oct. 15	China becomes the third country to successfully launch a manned spacecraft into orbit, following the United States and the former Soviet Union
					Oct. 23	International Donors' Conference for the Reconstruction of Iraq (Madrid) (through October 24)
						Russia establishes air force base in Kyrgyz
					Nov. 6	Russia-EU Summit held (Rome)
					Nov. 24	U.S. President Bush makes a statement about emphasis on consultation with allies in connection with global posture review of U.S. forces
					Nov. 26	Kashmir ceasefire agreement comes into force
					Dec. 4	Australia decides to participate in missile defense program
					Dec. 5	First meeting of advisory committee on comprehensive U.N. reform held
					Dec. 13	U.S. forces capture former President Hussein in Iraq
					Dec. 18	Iran signs IAEA agreement
					Dec. 19	Libya announces abandonment of weapons of mass destruction program
					Dec. 26	Massive earthquake strikes Iran
2004	Jan. 9	Dispatch order issued to GSDF advance team and ADSF main detached airborne unit	Feb. 9	Implementation of Iraq-related response measures approved in Diet	Feb. 4	Pakistani government admits Dr. Khan's involvement in suspected nuclear technology proliferation issues
	Jan. 16	GSDF advance team leaves for Iraq	Apr. 20	Council for security and defense capabilities established (first meeting held on April 27)	Feb. 25	Second Six-Party Talks held (Beijing) (through February 29)
	Jan. 22	ASDF main contingent leaves for Kuwait	May 22	Japan-North Korea Summit held (Pyongyang)	Mar. 11	Terrorist bombings on commuter train system in Madrid, Spain
	Feb. 3	Departure of first SDF contingent for Iraqi humanitarian and reconstruction support activities	Jun. 14	Five abductees return to Japan	Mar. 22	EU General Affairs Council agrees upon development of the structure and organization of the rapid response capabilities of the EU
	Feb. 9	MSDF unit for marine transport leaves for Kuwait (return on April 8)		Seven bills on legislation concerning contingency response measures passed in Upper House plenary session and conclusion of three treaties approved	Apr. 28	UNSC unanimously adopts Resolution 1540 calling for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
	Feb. 17	Attempt to fire metal bullets to Defense Agency		Special Measures Law for the Embargo on Specific Ships passed		
	Aug. 1	Dispatch of SDF personnel to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as Director of Inspection Bureau				

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2004	Sep. 8	Defense Agency/SDF 50th anniversary (commemorative) ceremony	Jun. 18	Cabinet agreement for SDF's activities in Iraq for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance after reestablishment of Iraq sovereignty (joining multinational forces)	Jun. 1	Interim Iraqi Government inaugurated, and Iraqi Governing Council dissolved
	Sep. 27	Minister of Defense Yoshinori Ono assumes office				UNSC unanimously adopts Resolution 1546 on reconstruction of Iraq
	Oct. 23	Disaster relief dispatch for Niigata-Chuetsu Earthquake (through December 21)	Aug. 13	U.S. helicopter crash at the university campus in Ginowan City, Okinawa	Jun. 23	The Third Six-Party Talks (Beijing) (through June 26)
	Oct. 25	PSI exercise for maritime interdiction operation hosted by Japan (in the offing of Sagami Bay and in Yokosuka Harbor, through October 27)	Sep. 27	2nd Koizumi reshuffled Cabinet formed	Jun. 28	Transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government
			Oct. 4	Final report of Council on Security and Defense Capabilities	Aug. 16	President Bush delivers a speech on the military posture review
	Nov. 7	Defense Agency/SDF 50th anniversary commemorative troop review			Sep. 1	Chechen's armed pro-independence rebels seize a school in Beslan of the Russian Republic of North Ossetia
	Nov. 10	Intrusion of submerged Chinese nuclear powered submarine into Japan's territorial waters–Maritime security operations order issued (through November 12)			Sep. 18	The IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution calling for a halt to Iran's uranium enrichment-related activities
	Dec. 10	"National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005-" adopted by the Security Council and the Cabinet "Mid-Term Defense Program for FY 2005–FY 2009" adopted by the Security Council and the Cabinet			Sep. 19	President Hu Jintao assumes the position of Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party
					Oct. 6	The U.S. and ROK announce a plan of three-stage reduction of 12,500 U.S. forces stationed in the ROK by 2008
	Dec. 28	MSDF ships dispatched to the offing of Thailand's Phuket Island to engage in the international disaster relief activities for Indonesia's Sumatra earthquake and Indian Ocean tsunami disaster (through January 1, 2005)			Oct. 29	EU leaders sign the EU Constitution
					Nov. 16	Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs expresses regret over its nuclear submarine's intrusion into Japan's territorial waters
					Dec. 7	Karzai sworn in as Afghan president
					Dec. 26	Sumatra earthquake and Indian Ocean tsunami disaster
2005	Jan. 4	SDF units dispatched to Indonesia to engage in the international emergency assistance in response to the major earthquake off the coast of Sumatra and tsunami in the Indian Ocean (All units returned home by March 23)	Jan. 19	The Japanese Government newly formulates measures to cope with intrusion of the submerged Chinese nuclear submarines in Japan's territorial waters	Jan. 15	China and Taiwan agree on special direct flights
						Abbas sworn in as Palestinian Authority President
					Jan. 30	Iraqi National Assembly elections
			Mar. 14	A Japanese boat attacked in the Straits of Malacca, and three crew abducted (Released on March 20)	Feb. 10	North Korean Foreign Ministry claims that the country has already manufactured nukes
	Feb. 19	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2 + 2"/Washington)–The common strategic objectives confirmed	Mar. 25	Cabinet decision made on Basic Guidelines for the Protection of Civilians		
	Mar. 7	U.K. forces take over security mission in Al Muthanna Province of Iraq from the Netherlands				

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2005	Apr. 14	Crash of an MU-2 search and rescue plane (ASDF/ Mountainous area of Agamachi, Niigata Prefecture)	Oct. 31	The third Koizumi reshuffled Cabinet is inaugurated. Partial amendment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law comes into force (validity is extended for one year)	Mar. 5	China holds the 3rd session of the 10th National People's Congress (through March 14)/The Anti-Secession Law adopted on the last day
	May 2	SDF officially takes part for the first time in the multilateral joint exercise "Cobra Gold 05" conducted in Chiang Mai Thailand (through May 13)	Nov. 3	Japan-North Korea intergovernmental conference resumes after the interval of about one year		Syrian President Assad expresses a policy of withdrawing the troops stationed in Lebanon
	Aug. 5	Dispatch of an MSDF vessel to conduct international disaster relief activity in connection with the accident of a small submarine of the Russian Navy off Kamchatka (through August 10)	Nov. 11	The Cabinet approves "the government's actions to be taken for the time being in connection with the matters approved at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultation Committee held on October 29, 2005"	Apr. 9	Massive anti-Japan demonstrations in Beijing
					Apr. 16	Massive anti-Japan demonstrations in Shanghai
					Apr. 28	The Iraqi Transitional Government sworn in
					May 11	North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman announces that the country has completed unloading of 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods from its nuclear reactor in Yongbyon
	Oct. 12	Dispatch of SDF units to Pakistan to conduct international disaster relief activity for damages from the great earthquake in Pakistan etc. (All units returned home by Dec. 2)	Nov. 16	At the Japan-U.S. summit talks, the two countries agree to enhance Japan-U.S. alliance	Jun. 24	Conservative Ahmadinejad elected as Iran's new president
			Nov. 27	Field training under the Civil Protection Law takes place for the first time in Fukui Prefecture	Jul. 7	Terrorist explosions take place in London
	Oct. 20	GSDF and Hokkaido Prefectural Police conduct joint field training against terrorist attack for the first time	Dec. 8	The Cabinet approves the one-year extension of period of dispatch of SDF units to Iraq	Jul. 20	The United States and India announce a joint statement concerning the formation of "global partnership" and the enhancement of U.S. cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy by India
	Oct. 29	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2"/Washington) announces "U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future"			Jul. 26	The first phase of the Fourth Six-Party Talks held (through August 7)
	Oct. 31	Minister of State for Defense Nukaga assumes office			Aug. 18	First-Ever China-Russia Joint Military Exercises, dubbed "Peace Mission 2005," are conducted (through August 25)
	Dec. 24	The Security Council and the Cabinet approve "Japan-U.S. Joint Development of Interceptor Missiles Having Improved Capability of Ballistic Missile Defense"			Sep. 1	The Chinese State Council publicizes a white paper titled "China's Arms Control, Arms Reduction and Efforts for Non-Proliferation"
					Sep. 8	Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore agree to establish a system to jointly monitor vessels navigating through the Malacca Straits. The three countries agree to implement first-ever joint air patrol.
					Sep. 9	MSDF's P-3C patrol aircraft identifies that five destroyers of the Chinese Navy, including Sovremenny Class, are navigating in the sea area surrounding "Kashi" gas field near the median line between Japan and China in the East China Sea

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2005					Sep. 13	The Fourth Six-Party Talks resumes (the second phase) (through September 19)
					Oct. 12	China succeeds in launching a spaceship named "Shen Zhou-6"
					Oct. 15	Iraq conducts a national referendum for the draft constitution
					Nov. 9	The first phase of Fifth Six-Party Talks held (through November 11)
					Dec. 14	The first East Asia Summit is held
					Dec. 15	Iraq conducts an election of the National Assembly under the permanent constitution
2006	Jan. 23	The "New Special Measures Agreement on Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ" is signed (Effective on April 1, 2006)	Feb. 4	Japan-North Korea negotiations concerning abduction issue, normalization of diplomatic relations and nuclear/missile issues are held (through February 6)	Jan. 18	Iran begins uranium enrichment experiments
	Jan. 30	Senior officials of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency were arrested on charges of interruption of bidding procedures	Mar. 6	At the Japan-China intergovernmental conference, China makes a proposal of joint development of gas field in East China Sea (through March 7)	Feb. 3	The United States issues the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
	Jan. 31	A compulsory search is made of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency	Mar. 11	Iwakuni City holds a local referendum concerning the relocation of U.S. carrier-based aircraft in connection with the force posture realignment of USFJ	Mar. 16	The United States announces the National Security Strategy
	Feb. 28	MSDF and Japan Coast Guard conduct joint training in responding to a suspicious vessel (off Maizuru)	Mar. 31	The Cabinet approves the Prefectural Civil Protection Plans prepared by 24 prefectures. 47 prefectures establish their own Prefectural Civil Protection Plans	Mar. 31	The new Hamas cabinet is formed in the Palestinian Authority
	Mar. 8	Japan and the United States successfully conduct a joint performance test of the next-generation sea-based interceptor missile (SM-3) off Hawaii	Apr. 7	The Mayor of Nago City agrees to the proposed relocation of U.S. Marine Corps Futenma Air Station to the site off Henoko	May 20	New Iraqi government is formed
	Mar. 27	Partial amendment (measures for destructing ballistic missiles etc., establishment of Joint Staff Office, etc.) of the Defense Agency Establishment Law is enacted. With the creation of the Joint Staff Office, the SDF establishes a joint operations posture.	May 11	The Governor of Okinawa Prefecture Inamine and Minister of State for Defense Nukaga sign a basic agreement on the realignment of USFJ	May 27	Large-scale earthquake takes place in the middle part of Java, Indonesia
	Apr. 1	Partial amendment (reform of pay structure) of the Law concerning Allowances, etc. of Defense Agency Personnel is enacted	May 30	The Cabinet approves the "Government's Actions to Be Taken in Connection with the Force Posture Realignment of USFJ, etc."	Jun. 8	The Iraqi government announces that Zarqawi was killed
					Jun. 16	The Nepal government and Maoists sign peace accord
					Jun. 27	The Israeli army attacks Gaza to recover its soldiers abducted by Palestinian armed groups (ceasefire takes effect on November 26)
					Jul. 5	North Korea launches seven ballistic missiles
					Jul. 12	The Israeli army attacks southern Lebanon to recover its soldiers abducted by Hezbollah (ceasefire takes effect on August 14)
					Jul. 13	The authority to maintain public order in Al Muthanna Province is transferred from the multilateral forces to Iraq
					Jul. 15	U.N. Security Council unanimously passes Resolution 1695 condemning North Korea

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2006	Apr. 23	Japan-U.S. defense ministers' meeting (Minister of State for Defense Nukaga and U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, in Washington)/ Japan and the United States agree to the sharing of expenses of relocation of U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam as part of realignment of USFJ	Jun. 20	The Government makes a decision to discontinue the activities of the GSDF contingent dispatched to Iraq. ASDF units continue to support the United Nations and the multinational forces	Jul. 31	U.N. Security Council passes Resolution 1696 to call on Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment activities
	May 1	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2"/Washington) announces the "United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation"	Jul. 5	Security Council meeting held to decide on the response to North Korea	Aug. 16	The Russian Coast Guard fires on and seizes a Japanese fishing boat in the Northern Territories waters
	Jun. 1	Dispatch of SDF units to Indonesia to conduct international disaster relief activity for damages from the earthquake that occurred in central Java (All units returned home by June 22)	Jul. 19	Decision made to transfer weapons and their technologies to the U.S. to jointly develop a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system, and the memorandum concluded with the U.S.	Oct. 9	North Korea announces that it "successfully conducted an underground nuclear test under secure conditions"
	Jul. 5	North Korea launches seven ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan	Aug. 16	A Russian patrol boat fires on a Japanese fishing boat, killing one of its crew members. The Government files a strong protest to Russia	Oct. 13	Temporary cabinet formed by Prime Minister Surayud (former army commander) in Thailand
	Jul. 25	The 10th SDF contingent for Iraqi humanitarian and reconstruction support activities returns to Japan	Aug. 29	U.S. Navy deploys *Shiloh*, an Aegis cruiser with SM-3 missiles, to Yokosuka base	Oct. 14	U.N. General Assembly appoints Ban Ki-Moon, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea, as the 8th Secretary-General
	Jul. 31	A part of the partial amendment (strengthening of facilities administration function of the internal organizations, establishment of the Equipment headquarters, reorganization of the Prefecture Liaison Offices into the Provincial Cooperation Offices, and so on) of the Defense Agency Establishment Law enforced	Sep. 19	The Government decides to implement another financial sanction against North Korea	Dec. 18	U.N. Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1718 to impose sanctions on North Korea
	Sep. 9	GSDF Kuwait Evacuation Unit returns to Japan	Sep. 26	Abe Cabinet formed	Dec. 23	U.S.-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act enacted
	Sep. 26	Kyuma appointed Minister of State for Defense	Oct. 13	Sanctions implemented against North Korea, which announced that it had conducted a nuclear weapon test	Dec. 30	The second phase of Fifth Six-Party Talks held (through November 22)
	Oct. 9	North Korea announces that it conducted an underground nuclear weapon test	Nov. 1	Partial amendment (extension of the term for one year) of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law enforced		Mr. Gates appointed as U.S. Secretary of Defense
		Minister of State for Defense issues urgent instructions on the response to North Korea's nuclear weapon test				U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1737 to impose economic sanctions on Iran
						Former Iraqi President Hussein executed

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2006	Dec. 15	Partial amendment (transition of the Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense, upgrading of international peace cooperation activities to a primary mission, and so on) of the Defense Agency Establishment Law passed at the plenary session of the House of Councillors with support from the ruling parties, the Democratic Party of Japan, the People's New Party and others (enforced on January 9, 2007)				
2007	Jan. 4	Japan-Thailand defense summit talks (Minister of State for Defense Kyuma and Minister of Defense Boonrawd, in Bangkok)	Jan. 9	Prime Minister Abe visits four European countries (U.K., Germany, Belgium, France) (through January 13)	Jan. 10	U.S. President Bush announces the new Iraq policy
	Jan. 9	The transition of the Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense Ceremony held with Prime Minister Abe	Jan. 12	Prime Minister Abe makes a speech at the NATO North Atlantic Council	Jan. 12	China conducts an anti-satellite test
	Feb. 18	The 23rd air transport unit dispatched to Golan Heights takes over from the 22nd unit	Feb. 17	F-22, the latest U.S. fighter, temporarily deployed at the Kadena Air Base (returned on May 10)	Jan. 14	ASEAN Summit begins
	Feb. 25	Japan-Republic of Korea defense ministers' meeting (Minister of Defense Kyuma and Minister of National Defense Kim, in Tokyo)	Feb. 24	The fourth information gathering satellite launched	Jan. 17	Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists start disarmament under the supervision of the United Nations
	Mar. 6	Japan-Malaysia defense ministers' meeting (Minister of Defense Kyuma and Minister of Defense Najib, in Tokyo)	Feb. 26	Japan-Mongolia summit talks	Jan. 23	U.N. Security Council decides to set up the U.N. Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) to oversee disarmament in Nepal
	Mar. 13	Minister of Defense Kyuma pays a courtesy visit to and meets with Australian Prime Minister	Feb. 27	The Council on the Strengthening of the Function of the Prime Minister's Office Regarding National Security submits a report		Taiwanese Ministry of Defense announces that China deployed 60 new J-10 fighters
	Mar. 15	Japan-France defense ministers' meeting (Minister of Defense Kyuma and Minister of Defense Alliot-Marie, in Tokyo)	Mar. 5	An aircraft training relocated from Okinawa to Tsuiki for the first time as part of the U.S. Forces realignment (through March 8)	Feb. 8	The third phase of Fifth Six-Party Talks held (through February 13)
	Mar. 23	Emergency response procedures to destroy ballistic missiles prepared	Mar. 13	Australian Prime Minister Howard visits Japan, and the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation signed	Feb. 9	Mecca Agreement (Hamas and Fatah agree to establish the Palestine unity government)
	Mar. 25	Disaster relief dispatch for the Noto Peninsula Earthquake (through April 8)	Apr. 6	Cabinet decision made on a bill to partially amend the Security Council Establishment Law, and the bill submitted to the Diet	Feb. 13	North Korea agrees to disable all its nuclear facilities during the Six-Party Talks
	Mar. 28	A part of the partial amendment (establishment of the Central Readiness Force, and so on) of the Defense Agency Establishment Law enforced	Apr. 9	Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki visits Japan and meets with Prime Minister Abe	Feb. 14	Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki announces that the government started new security measures in Baghdad
			Apr. 11	Wen Jiabao, premier of the Chinese State Council, visits Japan and meets with Prime Minister Abe	Feb. 27	The 20th North Korea-South Korea ministerial-level meetings
			Apr. 24	Cabinet decision made to change the Basic Plan regarding Response Measures Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law	Mar. 4	The Chinese government announces its 2007 defense budget
					Mar. 17	The Palestine unity government established
					Mar. 19	The first phase of sixth Six-Party Talks held (through March 22)

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2007	Mar. 30	A Patriot PAC-3 system is deployed at the ASDF Iruma Base	Apr. 25	Chief Cabinet Secretary announces that the Council on Reconstruction of a	Mar. 23	Iran seizes 15 British sailors and marines in the Persian Gulf (released 13 days later)
		SDF personnel dispatched for the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) as military observers		Legal Basis for Security was formed under Prime Minister (the first meeting held on May 18)	Mar. 24	U.N. Security Council decides to impose additional sanctions on Iran
		A CH-47 JA helicopter crashes while transporting emergency patients during a disaster relief operation (GSDF, Tokunoshima Town, Kagoshima Prefecture)	Apr. 27	Prime Minister Abe visits the U.S. and meets with President Bush	Apr. 9	Presidential election in Timor-Leste
			Apr. 30	Prime Minister Abe visits five Middle Eastern countries (through May 2)		Iran announces that it began to produce nuclear fuel on an industrial scale
	Apr. 1	Partial amendment (wide area transfer allowance and so on) of the Law concerning Allowances, etc. of Defense Agency Personnel enforced	May 23	The Special Measures Law concerning Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan passed at the plenary session of the House of Councillors, and enacted	Apr. 10	The U.S. Treasury Department announces that it agrees to unfreeze North Korean accounts in a Macau bank
	Apr. 11	Japan-India vice-ministerial level talks on defense policy			Apr. 15	Russia launches its new nuclear submarine *Yuri Dolgoruky*
	Apr. 16	Japan-U.S.-India naval drill conducted for the first time	Jun. 7	Joint exercises in line with Civil Protection Law in 17 prefectures	May 3	Iraq Compact, an agreement between Iraq and the international community, adopted
	Apr. 19	Japan-Germany defense ministers' meeting (Minister of Defense Kyuma and Minister of Defense Jung, in Tokyo)		Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting Japan-France Summit Meeting	May 16	Mr. Sarkozy inaugurated as French President
			Jun. 20	Bill to amend the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, passed by the House of Councillors (two-year extension)	May 17	A test run of the railway connecting South and North Korea conducted
	Apr. 29	Prime Minister Abe inspects the MSDF units operating on the Indian Ocean under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law			May 20	Mr. Horta inaugurated as Timor-Leste President
	Apr. 30	Japan-U.S. defense ministers' meeting (Minister of Defense Kyuma and U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates, in Washington)	Jul. 10	Cabinet decision on the extension of the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq		The Lebanese government force and Fatah Islam, a Sunni Islamist group, clash
					May 28	U.S and Iran begin official talks for the first time in 27 years (ambassador-level)
	May 1	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2"/Washington) announces the joint statement "Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation"			May 29	Russia announces that it succeeded in launching a new intercontinental ballistic missile
			Jul. 16	M6.8 Niigata-Chuetsu Earthquake occurs		
			Jul. 29	Election of the House of Councillors	Jun. 6	G8 Heiligendamm Summit (through June 8)
			Aug. 7	Minister for Foreign Affairs Aso and U.S. Ambassador Schieffer sign the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA)	Jun. 7	U.S.-Germany Summit Meeting (Heiligendamm)
		Prime Minister Abe inspects the ASDF units based in Kuwait				At the U.S.-Russia Summit Meeting (Heiligendamm), Russian President Putin proposes joint use of the radar base in Azerbaijan to the United States
	May 3	Japan-Italy Defense Ministers' Meeting (Minister of Defense Kyuma and Minister of Defense Parisi, in Rome)	Aug. 10	Conclusion of the General Security of Military Information Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States (GSOMIA)	Jun. 10	U.S.-Albania Summit Meeting (Tirana)
	May 4	Japan-Belgium Defense Ministers' Meeting (Minister of Defense Kyuma and Minister of Defense Flahaut, in Brussels)			Jun. 12	The Government of Sudan agrees to accept the U.S./ African Union Joint PKO Unit into the Darfur region
			Aug. 19	Prime Minister Abe visits Indonesia, India and Malaysia (through August 25)	Jun. 14	Hamas in virtual control of the Gaza Strip
		Minister of Defense Kyuma meets with NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer	Aug. 20	China Air Boeing 737 explodes after catching fire at Naha International Airport	Jun. 17	Fayad emergency cabinet formed in the Palestinian Territories
	May 18	ASDF controllers positioned at the Yokota RAPCON facility	Aug. 27	Abe Cabinet is formed		

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2007	Jun. 1	Partial amendment (abolition of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency and its consolidation into the Ministry of Defense, establishment of the Inspector General's Office of Legal Compliance and the Local Defense Bureaus, joint units of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, and so on) of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law and the Self-Defense Forces Law enacted	Aug. 29	Japan-Germany Summit Meeting Enactment of Special Measures Law for Realignment of USFJ	Jun. 21	U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Hill visits North Korea (through June 22)
					Jun. 27	Brown appointed prime minister of the United Kingdom
			Sep. 8	At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting, Abe promises "utmost efforts" to continue the replenishment activities of the MSDF in the Indian Ocean	Jun. 28	Russia succeeds in the experimental launch of new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), Bulava.
					Jun. 29	Explosives discovered in a vehicle in London, terrorist incident occurs in vehicle at Glasgow Airport, U.K. (through June 30)
			Sep. 9	At the Japan-Australia Summit Meeting, both countries agree to promote practical cooperation in line with the Action Plan already agreed upon	Jul. 2	Chinese National Defense Minister visits North Korea (through July 4)
	Jun. 2	Minister of Defense Kyuma attends the 6th Asia Security Conference (organized by IISS, in Singapore)	Sep. 12	Prime Minister Abe announces his intention of resigning	Jul. 3	Madrassa (religious school) students barricade themselves in the Rar Masjit (Red Mosque) in the capital of Islamabad, Pakistan (through July 10)
		Japan-U.S.-Australia defense ministers' meeting held for the first time (Minister of Defense Kyuma, U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates, and Minister of Defense Nelson, in Singapore)	Sep. 14	Successful launch of Kaguya lunar probe		
			Sep. 26	Fukuda Cabinet is formed		
			Sep. 27	Japanese journalist covering anti-government demonstrations in Myanmar shot to death by Myanmar law and order troops	Jul. 12	U.S. President Bush announced the interim report concerning progress of the Government of Iraq (benchmarks)
	Jun. 5	Japan-Australia defense ministers' meeting (Minister of Defense Kyuma and Minister of Defense Nelson, in Tokyo)	Oct. 1	Privatization of postal services	Jul. 14	Russian President Putin signs presidential order on the termination of the execution of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)
	Jun. 6	Japan-Australia Joint Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations held for the first time ("2+2"/Tokyo)	Oct. 9	Cabinet decision to extend the Government's sanctions against North Korea by half a year		
	Jun. 13	Implementation order issued for ASDF Golan Heights International Peace Cooperation Activities	Oct. 17	Cabinet decision on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law (draft) for the Maritime Interdiction Operation against terrorism	Jul. 18	6th Ministerial Meeting (through July 20)
					Jul. 26	Pakistan implements experimental launch of its cruise missile Hatf-7 (Babur), for the fourth time
	Jun. 22	GSDF Colonel arrested on bribery charges				
	Jul. 4	Koike appointed Minister of State for Defense	Nov. 1	Expiry of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law	Jul. 27	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
	Jul. 8	Japan-U.S. joint exercises for BMD in sea areas surrounding Japan	Nov. 8	Tokyo Prosecutors Office's arrest of former executive Motonobu Miyazaki of Yamada Corporation, a defense trading company, on charges of embezzlement of corporate funds	Jul. 30	U.S. announced military aid to the Gulf States, Israel and Egypt
					Jul. 31	The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1769 on the dispatch of the UN/AU Joint PKO Unit (UNMID) to the Darfur region in Sudan
	Jul. 17	Dispatch of disaster relief unit in the wake of Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake (through July 29)				
	Aug. 1	Governor of Saitama Prefecture designates National Defense Medical College as disaster base hospital	Nov. 16	Prime Minister Fukuda visits the United States. Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting	Aug. 4	NASA launches unmanned Mars Lander, Phoenix
			Nov. 20	At the Japan-China-ROK Summit Meeting, China and ROK commit to cooperation to normalize Japan-North Korea relations	Aug. 6	U.S.-Afghanistan Summit Meeting (Washington)
					Aug. 9	Afghanistan and Pakistan host Joint Peace Jirga (through August 12)
	Aug. 8	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers' Meeting (Kyuma, Gates, Washington)				Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) conducts Mission of Peace 2007, anti-terrorism joint military exercises
	Aug. 19	Order to exchange the 23rd Golan Heights transport unit with the 24th Golan Heights transport unit		Prime Minister Fukuda meets with Chinese Premier Wen in Singapore and both agree to enhance mutual military relationship		

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2007	Aug. 22	Japan-Pakistan Defense Ministers' Meeting (Koike, Iqbal, Islamabad)	Nov. 28	Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office arrests former Vice Defense Minister Moriya and his wife for allegedly accepting a bribe in the procurement of defense equipment	Aug. 15	M8.0 earthquake occurs off the central coast of Peru
	Aug. 24	Japan-India Defense Ministers' Meeting (Koike, Antony, New Delhi)			Aug. 17	Russian President Putin announces the resumption of long-distance flights (patrol) of Russia's strategic bombers
		Japan-Russia joint exercises for search and rescue off Vladivostok (MSDF and the Russian Navy)	Dec. 3	Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense meets for the first time at the Prime Minister's Office	Aug. 19	New constitution draft approved by national ballot in Thailand
	Aug. 27	Koumura appointed Minister of State for Defense	Dec. 12	The governments of Japan and the U.S. agree and sign agreement concerning the Japanese burden of the costs of USFJ (budget allocation for sympathy) (reduction of total of ¥0.8 billion for electricity and water)	Aug. 20	U.S.-ROK joint exercises, Osshi Focus Lens (through August 31)
	Aug. 30	Japan-China Defense Ministers' Meeting (Koumura, Cao, Tokyo)			Aug. 28	Pakistan implements experimental launch of its aerial cruise missile Hatf-8, (Ra'ad) for the first time
	Sep. 1	Local Cooperation Bureau, Equipment and Facilities Headquarters, Inspector General's Office of Legal Compliance, and Local Defense Bureau created	Dec. 13	Russia seizes four Japanese fishing vessels off Kunashiri Island	Sep. 2	China announces return to U.N. military registration system and participation in U.N. military expenditure report system
	Sep. 19	12th Tokyo Defense Forum (through September 21)	Dec. 19	Front headquarters of 1st Corps headquarters of U.S. forces formed at USFJ Camp Zama in line with the USFJ realignment	Sep. 3	U.S. President George Bush visits Iraq
	Sep. 23	First participation as an observer in China military exercises (Warrior-07)			Sep. 4	Malabar 07-2 (Bay of Bengal) (through September 9)
	Sep. 26	Ishiba appointed Minister of State for Defense	Dec. 24	Cabinet decisions on "Improvement of next fixed-wing aircraft," "Important issues among contents of Defense Capability Build-up in FY 2008," "Changes of emergent response measures on destruction measures by ballistic missiles"		Chinese Armed Police and the Russian Ministry of the Interior conducted anti-terrorism joint training exercises "Collaboration 2007" (Russia) (through September 6)
	Oct. 1	First visit of ASDF U-4 to Australia (through October 7)				
	Oct. 13	Japan hosts PSI Maritime Interdiction Operation exercises (through October 15) (Izu-Oshima East Coast, Yokosuka, port of Yokohama)			Sep. 5	The U.S. House of Representatives passes resolution to express gratitude for Japanese support in the U.S. forces' "War on Terror"
	Oct. 17	Japan-U.S.-Australia joint exercises (MSDF, U.S. Navy, the Royal Australian Air Force)	Dec. 27	Prime Minister Fukuda visits China (through December 30)	Sep. 6	U.S.-China Summit Meeting (Sydney)
	Oct. 18	Ministerial order on acceleration of acquisition reform. Acquisition reform promotion project team created with Parliamentary Vice Minister for Defense Terada as head				Syria criticizes Israeli air forces' attack on Syrian domestic facilities
					Sep. 7	U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting (Sydney)
					Sep. 8	APEC Summit Meeting (Sydney) (through September 9)
					Sep. 11	Russian announced successful drop experiment of air explosion bombs
	Oct. 19	Japan-Luxembourg Defense Ministers' Meeting (Ishiba, Schiltz, Tokyo)				Russia conducts Russia-India joint exercises, "Indra 2007 (ground exercises)" (within Russia) (through September 20)
	Oct. 22	Panel to Examine Drastic Measures to Enhance Civilian Control created				
	Oct. 28	Central inspection ceremony (Asaka)			Sep. 13	U.S. President Bush announces that the United States will start the withdrawal of dispatched units from Iraq
	Oct. 31	Fire on F-2 aircraft at Komaki airport in Aichi Prefecture				
	Nov. 1	Order issued on termination of response measures based on Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law			Sep. 14	U.S. President Bush announces final report on progress of the Government of Iraq (benchmark)
	Nov. 5	Japan-U.S. joint exercises (through November 16)				

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2007	Nov. 8	Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers' Meeting (Ishiba, Gates, Tokyo)			Sep. 25	The United Nations Security Council adopts Resolution 1778 to deploy PKO forces (MINURCAT) and EU forces to Chad and the Central African Republic
	Nov. 28	Chinese naval vessel visits Japan for the first time (through December 1)			Sep. 26	The Government of Myanmar suppresses demonstrations by monks and the general public against the surge in fuel prices by force
	Nov. 29	Japan-Singapore Defense Ministers' Meeting (Ishiba, Teo, Tokyo)			Sep. 27	Sixth Six-Party Talks, second round (Beijing) (through September 30)
		Deployment of Patriot PAC-3 in Narashino base			Sep. 30	General elections in Ukraine The pro-Western party wins (October 15, Central Election Commission report)
	Dec. 13	Defense Minister Ishiba meets with NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer			Oct. 1	The United States starts the temporary operation of a new regionally integrated United States Africa Command
		MSDF major arrested for violating the Law Concerning the Protection of Secrets Incidental in line with the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America			Oct. 2	Inter-Korean Summit is held (Pyongyang) (through October 4)
	Dec. 14	Fire on escort vessel *Shirane*				The navies of China, Australia, and New Zealand partake in a joint maritime search and rescue exercise (offshore Australia) (through October 3)
	Dec. 18	Review of USFJ Local Employee Wages (Abolishment of USFJ Differential, etc.)			Oct. 3	The Six-Party Talks Joint Statement, the "Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement," is announced
		Aegis vessel MSDF *Kongo* conducts a successful test on counter-missile by ballistic missile			Oct. 5	The Nepalese interim government announces the postponement of the Nepalese Constituent Assembly
					Oct. 6	Pakistan presidential election is held and President Musharraf wins by the largest number of votes
					Oct. 9	The seventh plenary session of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (through October 12)
					Oct. 10	A military parade is held during the Republic of Taiwan's national day "Double Tenth Day"
					Oct. 11	The United Nations Security Council unanimously adopts a chairman's statement "strongly deploring" the use of violence against anti-government demonstrations in Myanmar
					Oct. 15	The 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China is held (through October 21)

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
					Oct. 17	The Turkish parliament approves the Turkish military's cross-border attack on Iraq
					Oct. 19	Suicide bomb incident occurs aimed at former Prime Minister Bhutto in Karachi, Pakistan
					Oct. 24	China succeeds in the launching of its lunar orbiter "Chang'e 1"
					Oct. 25	The United States announces financial sanctions against the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and others
					Oct. 28	The Russian army conducts "Vostok2007," a strategic command and staff corps exercise (through November 3)
					Nov. 3	Pakistani President Musharraf declares a state of emergency across the country (lifted December 5)
					Nov. 4	United States Defense Secretary Gates visits China (through November 6)
					Nov. 7	President Saakashvili of Georgia declares a nation-wide state of emergency
					Nov. 9	United States-Germany Summit Meeting (Crawford) (through November 10)
					Nov. 14	Inter-Korean Summit is held (Seoul) (through November 16)
					Nov. 20	The ASEAN Charter is signed at the 13th ASEAN Summit (Singapore) (through November 22)
					Nov. 21	The USS *Kitty Hawk* is denied docking in Hong Kong and returns to Yokosuka via the Taiwan Strait (through November 25)
					Nov. 24	The Australian Labour Party came into power winning a majority in the House of Representatives election, leading to the first change in administration in 11 years
					Nov. 27	The Annapolis Middle East Peace Conference is held Meeting of the defense chiefs of North Korea and ROK (Pyongyang) (through November 29)
					Dec. 2	The governing party led by President Putin wins a landslide victory in the Russian House of Representatives elections
					Dec. 5	The Russian navy resumes its position as a world-class presence by deploying Russian navy vessels to the Atlantic and the Mediterranean Sea

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2007					Dec. 6	India conducts ballistic missile interception experiments (Bay of Bengal)
					Dec. 11	Pakistan conducts its fifth test fire of cruise missile Hatf-7 (Babur)
					Dec. 12	Russia suspends implementation of the CFE treaty
					Dec. 17	British forces transfer control of security efforts in Basra province to the Iraqi authorities
						Russia announces its intent to provide nuclear fuel for the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant
					Dec. 18	The United Nations Security Council adopts a resolution to extend by one year the deployment of multinational forces in Iraq
					Dec. 19	Lee Myung-Bak of the Grand National Party is elected president at the ROK presidential elections
						The United Nations Security Council holds final status discussions on Kosovo
						The United States and the European Union declared a termination of the negotiations on the grounds that a resolution by the U.N. Security Council did not seem possible
						A humanitarian proposal towards North Korea demanding the resolution of the abduction issue and immediate return of the abductees was adopted at the United Nations General Assembly
					Dec. 20	The first joint army exercises between China and India (China) (through December 27)
					Dec. 21	Chinese and Indian forces launch their first joint anti-terrorism exercises "Join Hands 2007"(through December 27)
					Dec. 23	The first lower house general elections under the new constitution are conducted in Thailand
						The party led by former Prime Minister Thaksin becomes the leading party
					Dec. 25	Russia announces the ICBM "RS-24" launch experiments as well as the SLBM "RSM-54" launch exercises
					Dec. 27	Former Prime Minister Bhutto of Pakistan is assassinated

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2008	Jan. 14	Research involving the review of where to operate Patriot PAC-3 missiles (Shinjuku Gyoen)	Jan. 11	Replenishment Support Special Measures Law is voted down in the House of Councillors, and passed and enacted in the House of Councillors	Jan. 6	President Saakashvili selected in Georgian presidential election
	Jan. 17	Order issued to implement replenishment support activities based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law	Jan. 16	Replenishment Support Special Measures Law put into force	Jan. 13	Indian Prime Minister Singh visits China (through January 15)
	Jan. 24	The recommencement of replenishment support activities in the Indian Ocean based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (departure of units from port)	Feb. 23	Marine Corps member arrested in Yokohama	Jan. 16	NATO and Russia conduct theater missile defense exercises jointly against short-range missiles in Germany
				Japan launches super-high-speed internet communications experimental satellite (H2A rocket 14)		Ceasefire agreement expires in Sri Lanka
	Jan. 25	New Special Measures Agreement concerning the Cost Sharing on the Stationing of U.S. forces in Japan signed	Feb. 24	Prime Minister Fukuda visits ROK	Jan. 18	Israeli forces blockade the Palestinian authority
				Attends appointment ceremony of new President Lee (through February 25)	Jan. 25	Pakistan implements a training launch of its mid-range ballistic missile, Hatf-4 (Shaheen1)
	Jan. 30	Deployment of Patriot PAC-3 missiles at the Takeyama sub base of the ASDF	Feb. 25	Japan-ROK Summit Meeting	Feb. 1	Pakistan implements a training launch of its mid-range ballistic missile, Hatf-5 (Ghauri)
			Feb. 27	Japan-Israel Summit Meeting		
	Feb. 5	Outline of proposals of revisions to the Defense Ministry Establishment Law (Changes in the number of members of SDF personnel and SDF reserves due to organizational change, clarification of the positioning of research conducted at the National Defense Academy and the National Defense Medical College, the abolishment of the private recruit rank and the creation of student rank due to the GSDF students no longer being active SDF personnel, and a review of extending the service period of SDF personnel and reappointment system)	Apr. 3	U.S. Marine Corps captain arrested for the murder of a taxi driver in Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture	Feb. 11	The U.N. Security Council issues a chairman's statement saying that it "condemns in the strongest possible terms" the attack on East Timorese President Horta and others
				Cabinet decision to extend by six months the Government of Japan's sanctions against North Korea	Feb. 17	The province of Kosovo in the south of Serbia declares its independence from Serbia
			Apr. 11	Japan-France Summit Meeting		
			Apr. 16	Japan-Sweden Summit Meeting	Feb. 19	President Fidel Castro resigns (Cuba)
			Apr. 21	Japan-ROK Summit Meeting	Feb. 20	The U.S. vessel Aegis succeeds in launching an NTWD SM-3 interceptor missile at an uncontrollable satellite thus intercepting it in outer space
			Apr. 25	Prime Minister Fukuda visits Russia, holds Japan-Russia Summit Meeting		
			May 7	Japan-China Summit Meeting Joint Statement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China on Comprehensive Promotion of a "Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests" was signed	Feb. 24	President Raoul Castro appointed (Cuba)
					Feb. 25	ROK President Lee appointed
					Mar. 3	U.N. Security Council adopts resolution on additional sanctions against Iran for the third time, for continuing its uranium enrichment activities
	Feb. 17	Force rotation of the air transport unit dispatched to the Golan Heights				
	Feb. 19	The collision of MSDF destroyer *Atago* with fishing boat *Seitoku Maru*	May 14	Japan-New Zealand Summit Meeting		Ecuador suspends diplomatic relations with Colombia
			May 21	Basic Space Law passed and enacted by the House of Councillors	Mar. 5	China announces that its 2008 national defense budget is approximately 6 trillion 74.4 billion yen, a 17.6% increase on the previous year
	Mar. 5	Dispatch of SDF personnel to the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) as the second deployment of military observers	Jun. 1	Prime Minister Fukuda visits three EU countries (Germany, U.K. and Italy) (through June 5)	Mar. 14	Demonstration by Buddhist monks in the regional capital of Lhasa in the Tibet Autonomous Region, China
		Japan-Cambodia Defense Ministers' Meeting (Ishiba, Tea Banh, Tokyo)	Jun. 12	Japan-Australia Summit Meeting		
			Jun. 14	M7.2 (estimate) earthquake occurred inland in Iwate and Miyagi Prefectures		

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2008	Mar. 26	Partial revision of the Defense Ministry Establishment Law Implementation of the re-organization of the Self-Defense Forces Command and Communication Unit	Jun. 18	Agreement reached between the Government of Japan and Government of China on the joint development of natural gas in the East China Sea	Mar. 16	President Hu Jintao re-selected at the National People's Congress of China
	Mar. 28	Announcement of the project team report for the Comprehensive Reform of Defense Equipment Procurement	Jun. 24	Report on Information Meeting on the Re-establishment of a Legal Basis for Security	Mar. 29	Arab League Summit (Syria) (through March 30)
	Mar. 29	Deployment of Patriot PAC-3 missiles at the Kasumigaura sub base of the ASDF	Jul. 6	Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting	Apr. 3	At the NATO Summit, Croatia's and Albania's entries are accepted
	Mar. 31	Japan-China talks between high-level defense officials		Japan-Canada Summit Meeting	Apr. 6	U.S.-Russia Summit Meeting (Sochi)
	May 14	Deployment of Patriot PAC-3 missiles at the JASDF Hamamatsu Airbase	Jul. 7	G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit (through July 9)	Apr. 17	U.S.-U.K. Summit Meeting (Washington)
	May 16	Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministers' Meeting (Ishiba, Goff, Tokyo)		Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting	Apr. 19	U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting (Washington)
	May 31	Minister of Defense Ishiba participates in the 7th Asia Security Conference (hosted by IISS, in Singapore)		Japan-Germany Summit Meeting	Apr. 24	Announcement by the Government of the United States that North Korea assisted with the construction by Syria of nuclear facilities destroyed in an air attack
	Jun. 14	Disaster relief dispatch for the 2008 Iwate-Miyagi Inland Earthquake	Jul. 8	Japan-Russia Summit Meeting	May 2	Damage in Myanmar caused by a major cyclone
	Jun. 24	First visit of SDF vessel to China (through June 28)		Japan-Italy Summit Meeting	May 12	M7.8 earthquake occurs in Sichuan Province, China
	Jul. 1	Six-month extension of replenishment support activities in the Indian Ocean	Jul. 15	The Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense at the Prime Minister's Office announces its report	May 14	U.S. President Bush visits Israel
	Jul. 15	MOD Reform Head Office established	Aug. 1	Prime Minister Fukuda's Cabinet formed	May 20	Taiwanese President Ma appointed
	Jul. 22	Meeting of members involved in the MOD reform is held			May 30	The Convention on Cluster Munitions is adopted at an international conference in Dublin
	Aug. 2	Minister of Defense Hayashi appointed			Jun. 17	France announces Defense White Paper
					Jun. 26	North Korea submits its nuclear program
					Jul. 10	Heads of Delegation Meeting of the Six-Party Talks
					Jul. 12	Heads of Delegation Meeting of the Six-Party Talks announce press communiqué
					Jul. 13	Mediterranean Federation Meeting (Paris)

* Listed in detail for two most recent years (2007-2008) as targeted in this white paper.

Organizational Diagram of the Self-Defense Forces

(As of March 31, 2008)

- **Minister of Defense**
  - **Chief of Staff, Joint Staff**
  - **Chief of Staff, GSDF / Ground Staff Office**
    - **Northern Army**
      - 2nd Division (Asahikawa)
      - 5th Brigade (Obihiro)
      - 7th Division (Higashi Chitose)
      - 11th Division (Makomanai)
      - 1st Tank Group (Kita Eniwa)
      - 1st Artillery Brigade (Kita Chitose)
      - 1st Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade (Higashi Chitose)
      - 3rd Engineer Brigade (Minami Eniwa)
      - Others
    - **Northeastern Army**
      - 6th Division (Jinmachi)
      - 9th Division (Aomori)
      - Northeastern Combined Brigade (Sendai)
      - 2nd Artillery Group (Sendai)
      - 5th Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Hachinohe)
      - 2nd Engineer Brigade (Funaoka)
      - Others
    - **Eastern Army**
      - 1st Division (Nerima)
      - 12th Brigade (Somagahara)
      - 2nd Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Matsudo)
      - 1st Engineer Brigade (Koga)
      - 1st Training Brigade (Tateyama)
      - Others
    - **Middle Army**
      - 3rd Division (Senzo)
      - 10th Division (Moriyama)
      - 13th Brigade (Kaitaichi)
      - 14th Brigade (Zentsuji)
      - 8th Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Aonogahara)
      - 4th Engineer Brigade (Okubo)
      - 2nd Training Brigade (Otsu)
      - Others
    - **Western Army**
      - 4th Division (Fukuoka)
      - 8th Division (Kita Kumamoto)
      - 1st Combined Brigade (Naha)
      - Western Artillery Unit (Yufuin)
      - 2nd Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade (Iizuka)
      - 5th Engineer Brigade (Ogori)
      - 3rd Training Brigade (Ainoura)
      - Others
    - **Central Readiness Force**
      - 1st Airborne Brigade (Narashino)
      - 1st Helicopter Brigade (Kisarazu)
      - Central Readiness Force (Utsunomiya)
      - Central NBC Weapon Defense Unit (Utsunomiya)
      - Special Operation Group (Narashino)
      - Others
    - Signal Brigade (Ichigaya)
    - Ground Research & Development Command (Asaka)
    - Ground Material Control Command (Jujo)
    - Other units and organizations
  - **Chief of Staff, MSDF / Maritime Staff Office**
    - **Self-Defense Fleet**
      - **Fleet Escort Force**
        - 1st Escort Flotilla (Yokosuka)
        - 2nd Escort Flotilla (Sasebo)
        - 3rd Escort Flotilla (Maizuru)
        - 4th Escort Flotilla (Kure)
        - Others
      - **Fleet Air Force**
        - 1st Fleet Air Wing (Kanoya)
        - 2nd Fleet Air Wing (Hachinohe)
        - 4th Fleet Air Wing (Atsugi)
        - 5th Fleet Air Wing (Naha)
        - 21st Fleet Air Wing (Tateyama)
        - 22nd Fleet Air Wing (Omura)
        - 31st Fleet Air Wing (Iwakuni)
        - Others
      - **Fleet Submarine Force**
        - 1st Submarine Flotilla (Kure)
        - 2nd Submarine Flotilla (Yokosuka)
        - Others
      - Mine Warfare Force (Yokosuka)
      - Fleet Research Development Command (Yokosuka)
      - Oceanographic Command (Yokosuka)
      - Fleet Intelligence Command (Yokosuka)
      - Others
    - **Yokosuka District**
    - **Kure District**
    - **Sasebo District**
    - **Maizuru District**
    - **Ominato District**
    - Air Training Command (Shimofusa)
    - Training Squadron (Kure)
    - Communications Command (Ichigaya)
    - MSDF Maritime Material Command (Jujo)
    - Other units and organizations
  - **Chief of Staff, ASDF / Air Staff Office**
    - **Air Defense Command**
      - **Northern Air Defense Force**
        - 2nd Air Wing (Chitose)
        - 3rd Air Wing (Misawa)
        - Northern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (Misawa)
        - 3rd Air Defense Missile Group (Chitose)
        - 6th Air Defense Missile Group (Misawa)
        - Others
      - **Central Air Defense Force**
        - 6th Air Wing (Komatsu)
        - 7th Air Wing (Hyakuri)
        - Central Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (Iruma)
        - 1st Air Defense Missile Group (Iruma)
        - 4th Air Defense Missile Group (Gifu)
        - Others
      - **Western Air Defense Force**
        - 5th Air Wing (Nyutabaru)
        - 8th Air Wing (Tsuiki)
        - Western Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (Kasuga)
        - 2nd Air Defense Missile Group (Kasuga)
        - Others
      - **Southwestern Composite Air Division**
        - 83rd Air Wing (Naha)
        - Southwestern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (Naha)
        - 5th Air Defense Missile Group (Naha)
        - Others
      - Others
    - **Air Support Command**
      - Air Rescue Wing (Iruma)
      - 1st Tactical Airlift Group (Komaki)
      - 2nd Tactical Airlift Group (Iruma)
      - 3rd Tactical Airlift Group (Miho)
      - Air Traffic Control Service Group (Iruma)
      - Air Weather Service Group (Fuchu)
      - Others
    - **Air Training Command**
      - 1st Air Wing (Hamamatsu)
      - 4th Air Wing (Matsushima)
      - 11th Flying Training Wing (Shizuhama)
      - 12th Flying Training Wing (Hofu-kita)
      - 13th Flying Training Wing (Ashiya)
      - Air Basic Training Wing (Hofu-minami)
      - Others
    - **Air Development and Test Command**
      - Air Development and Test Wing (Gifu)
      - Electronics Development and Test Group (Iruma)
      - Aeromedical Laboratory (Tachikawa)
    - Air Communications and System Wing (Ichigaya)
    - Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron (Komaki)
    - Air Material Command (Jujo)
    - Other units and organizations

Location of Principal SDF Units (As of March 31, 2008)