Ministry of Defence of Ukraine

WHITE BOOK 2005

DEFENCE POLICY OF UKRAINE

KYIV • 2006

The White Book 2005: Defence Policy of Ukraine annual publication was prepared by a group of authors from the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Translation: Rozmai Media Center

Editors: Vadim KASTELLI, James GREENE, David JONES, Victor BALABIN, Oleksiy MELNIK, Mykola SUNGUROVSKIY, Oleg CHERNYSHOV

The White Book is published annually according to the Law of Ukraine "On Democratic Civilian Control over Military Organisation and Law Enforcement Agencies of the State", with the aim to regularly inform the society on activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine as well as the defence policy of the State, and its challenges and solutions.

This first publication of *The White Book 2005: Defence Policy of Ukraine* is dedicated to challenges in reform and development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The publication highlights current state of the Armed Forces and priority areas for further military development, stipulated in the new State Programme of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Development for 2006-2011.

The publication may be found useful for civilian and military experts in the fields of military development, defence and security policy, as well as for journalists, teachers and students of specialised educational institutions and to all interested in the state and development of the defence policy of Ukraine.

The White Book is published with financial support from the Embassies of Great Britain, USA and NATO's Centre of Information and Documentation.

ISBN 966-7272-75-3

© Zapovit Publishing house, 2006
© Layout & design: Alexandr MOSKALENKO, 2006

THE PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE, SUPREME COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE

PREFACE TO THE INTERNATIONAL EDITION OF THE UKRAINIAN WHITE BOOK ON DEFENCE POLICY

The Ukrainian Armed Forces have a long and proud tradition. The bravery and daring exploits of our Cossack fighters are world famous and our forebears considered it an honour to serve Ukraine through military service. They were also keenly aware that it was not just bravery and weapons that could win the bitterest battles – strategy and clear thinking were paramount.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces today also face many challenges. Some of these, like an Armed Forces bigger than the economy can sustain – despite years of continuous downsizing – and huge stockpiles of outdated and dangerous munitions, are a legacy inherited from Soviet times. Other challenges are more recent – the result of over a decade of financial and political neglect by the political leadership of independent Ukraine. As a result, the same Armed Forces that serve as a guarantee of national independence and sovereignty found themselves lacking training and equipment to meet the most basic missions, lacking clear political guidance as to priorities for their development, and suffering from ever-lower morale that undermined the Armed Forces' most precious resource – its people.

When I took the oath of the Presidency in January 2005, I committed myself to serving the citizens of the independent and democratic Ukrainian state. To me, that oath requires that I work to help Ukraine build a strong and modern Armed Forces that can defend Ukraine's sovereignty and promote our interests, both on their own and working together with the Armed Forces of our country's allies and partners.

It means that my administration has ensured that the Armed Forces have clear guidance on missions, tasks, and future development that truly match the needs of our young democracy. It means that we have provided a budget that allows the Armed Forces to dramatically increase its training and begin capital investment in needed equipment. It means that we have put people first, by giving those serving today the chance for real professional accomplishment and growth, and those who have completed their service the respect and compensation that they deserve. And finally, we have increased transparency and ensured civilian democratic leadership of the Ministry of Defence to ensure that the Ukrainian Parliament and public are informed and involved in efforts to rebuild the security of Ukraine and its people.

This White Book represents a part of that commitment to transparency. It is the first in an annual series of open reports by the Ministry of Defence that are intended to reach the widest possible audience: primarily the Ukrainian Parliament and people, but also our allies and partners in the international community. It outlines the vision of the government for the Armed Forces within the context of our national security and defence policy and provides honest explanations of the challenges that we face and assessments of the progress that we are making.

I will leave the detailed reporting to Minister Grytsenko and his civilian and military team at the Defence Ministry, who have done a superb job in putting together the contents of the White Book. But I would like to highlight a few achievements in which I have been personally involved.

Last year I said that the Minister of Defence of Ukraine would not be a serving general but a civilian. This promise has become reality, and because of this we can say that Ukraine now meets the standard of international democratic best practice.

In today's complex international security environment, Ukraine needs a clear and credible security and defence policy to play its part in the world community as a mature democratic

state. The National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine made a considerable step in that direction on December 9, 2005, with recommendations – which I have followed – to approve the State Programme for Development of the Armed Forces and the draft Law on the Marginal Strength of the Armed Forces. These documents provide clear strategic guidance for the development of the Armed Forces for the next six years – through 2011.

This is a first, and a real accomplishment, but I am convinced that Ukraine needs this kind of strategic clarity to spread beyond the Defence Ministry to other parts of the security sector. To that purpose I ordered the establishment of a State Commission for the Reform of the Armed Forces, Other Military Formations and the Defence Industry Complex of Ukraine.

My team is particularly concerned with the welfare of people in the Armed Forces. We cannot expect people to risk their lives and commit themselves to a professional career unless we demonstrate that they will be treated with fairness and respect. We have endeavoured to improve conditions of service wherever possible during the last year; let me provide a few examples:

- As early as February 2005, conscripts, cadets and pupils of military lyceums had a three-fold increase in their unfairly low pay levels.
- From April 2005, all officers have been receiving a pay incentive for special conditions of service. In addition they now receive a decent severance pay upon transfer to the Reserves.
- Throughout 2005, we worked to gradually equalise the difference in pensions for servicemen retired in different years; as a result by January 1, 2006, all disproportions in military pensions were eliminated, thereby remedying an injustice that had existed for many years.

A year ago I promised that the term of conscript service in our Armed Forces would be reduced to 12 months. This promise has now been delivered; in November 2005 the last soldier called up for military service the previous autumn returned home. I also promised Ukrainian citizens that by 2010 there would be a transition to fully professional Armed Forces, operating on a contract basis. By Presidential decision, three experimental brigades have been chosen as the first to be fully manned by contracted professional servicemen by the end of 2006. Work is progressing rapidly on re-shaping the rest of the Armed Forces to meet the 2010 target date.

I promised to withdraw the Ukrainian peacekeepers from Iraq and they celebrated the New Year amidst their families. We withdrew our contingent from Iraq in a responsible manner according to a careful plan that was agreed in advance with our allies in the Coalition Forces. As a result, our withdrawal was not detrimental to the coalition effort and we left with an enviable record of achievement in prepared a fully trained brigade of the new Iraqi armed forces. Ukraine can be rightfully proud of our soldiers – 28,000 since independence – who have performed abroad in NATO-led operations like Kosovo and in UN-led efforts in places like Liberia and Lebanon. In addition to their important peacekeeping missions, these servicemen served as unofficial ambassadors from Ukraine to the international community.

In addition to improving welfare and conditions of service I assigned the Minister of Defence the key objective of improving readiness, morale and professionalism. I am pleased to note that training levels have increased considerably across all the branches of the Armed Forces and that from 2006 all military units will be trained to perform clear and realistic missions. This new approach has been positively received by the military.

A key element of efforts to provide increased professional opportunities is our continuing close co-operation with NATO in the Partnership for Peace Programme and under the NATO-Ukraine Charter. I believe it is in Ukraine's national interest that this co-operation continues to deepen, even to the point of receiving the full protections, privileges, and responsibilities provided by membership. Of course, such a step would require majority support amongst Ukraine's people, and I expect the Defence Ministry will continue to play an important role in educating the public about the advantages to Ukraine's security and development that would result from NATO membership.

I wish to congratulate the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces on the rapid progress that they have made in transforming our defence sector into a modern democratic model. We still have some way to go but I am confident – as I am sure you will be after reading this White Book – that we are on the right path to meet our objectives.

President of Ukraine, Supreme Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Victor YUSCHENKO

OPENING ADDRESS OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF UKRAINE

The strategic national direction set for Ukraine by the President and the Cabinet of Ministers on the formation of the new government early in 2005 also provided clear direction for me as the new Minister of Defence. An important component in taking Ukraine forward in its national development will be the reform and modernisation of the security and defence sectors and my intention is to build on the good progress that has already been made on this task since independence. My duty as Minister of Defence is to meet the strategic defence targets set by the President as Supreme Commander-in-Chief and take forward the policy objectives for future development that have been agreed by the Cabinet of Ministers. The aim is to create modern Armed Forces capable of safeguarding our sovereignty and territorial integrity and able to protect our national interests both at home and abroad.

The publication of this White Book provides me with the opportunity to report openly and fully on the progress that we are making and set out the agenda for the future. It is intended to publish a White Book on an annual basis so as to provide a continuing narrative on the direction being taken by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Armed Forces. It is vital that we build the widest possible national consensus on defence policy at both the political level and in the minds of ordinary citizens. It is my intention that the White Book will play an important part in this process of building national consensus. This first volume will focus on explaining the provisions of the State Programme of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Development for 2006-2011. In the longer term the introduction of this annual publication will help establish a direct dialogue between society and the Armed Forces together with a mechanism to inform the international community about defence policy in Ukraine. This will help make it possible to fully meet society's expectations of the Armed Forces and introduce proper and timely adjustments to current and future plans. In addition the White Book contains information that could assist Ukrainian citizens who are considering joining the Armed Forces to make a career of serving their country. We need to attract the brightest and best of new generations to serve voluntarily in the new professionally manned Armed Forces.

Since Ukraine gained independence our Armed Forces have undergone a continuing process of complex reform and development. As a result I believe that the Armed Forces of Ukraine are now reaching a high level of ability and professionalism and because of this they are well respected by society when compared to many other state institutions. Armed Forces that are under effective civilian control are an important part of a modern democracy and in this respect the defence sector is leading the way in progressing the political commitment that has been made on the part of Ukraine towards seeking NATO accession. To make that ambition a reality requires a renewed and invigorated final level of defence reforms to ensure that we are fully aligned with internationally accepted standards. I believe that 2006 will mark a significant new stage in defence reform and the development of the Armed Forces. It will be the first year of the new State Programme of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Development covering the medium term period 2006-2011. We will be able to place defence reform within the context of an overall National Security Policy which is being prepared on the instruction of the President.

The changes in the Armed Forces within the next six years will be of a systemic nature and embrace a large spectrum of issues. In particular we need to eliminate the discrepancies between the objectives being set and the resources and capabilities available to meet them. To achieve this we will seek a balance between the requirements for operational capability and the conditions of service for people serving in the Armed Forces. To illustrate the progress we are making in achieving this

balance I would like to emphasise just a few of the key achievements of the past year and point out some important objectives for the future, you will be able to read about these in more detail in the text of the White Book:

- **Iraq.** As mentioned in the President's address we met the election pledge to withdraw our contingent from Iraq in a well planned manner. What was most important was the fact that the Ukrainian contingent of 1,600 peacekeepers trained a total of 2,700 Iraqi servicemen – that is a fully capable brigade of three battalions. Only the Ukrainian contingent has managed to train from scratch an entire brigade for the armed forces of Iraq and this brigade has now been transferred in a fully operational capacity to the zone of responsibility previously guarded by Ukrainian peacekeepers.
- **Volunteer/Professional Forces.** Three brigades – one from each service – were selected to be part of the thrust towards all volunteer professional manning. The target is to have these brigades fully manned by volunteers by the end of 2006. These brigades are receiving priority funding to ensure the success of the initiative and the lessons learnt will be extended across the Armed Forces to help with meeting the strategic target of all volunteer professional Armed Forces by 2010.
- **Training.** Professional training in the Armed Forces is essential for combat readiness and the maintenance of morale and I am pleased to report that levels of training have increased across all branches of the Armed Forces. To capitalise on this increased training command and staff exercises are now being conducted under realistic scenarios with clear achievable missions, this was not the case previously and this new approach has been well received by the military.
- **Equipment and Logistics.** We face considerable challenges in equipping our Armed Forces with the modern weapons platforms and equipment required to operate effectively particularly for overseas deployments where state of the art communications are necessary to ensure the integrity of command and control and provide real interoperability with partner nations. We are restructuring our logistics and support areas to meet the new challenges and we are rationalising the defence industrial complex to achieve balance and sustainability within our growing market economy. It will be important for us to make new partnerships across the international community in relation to the production of defence equipment and to broaden our traditional customer base. More details on this issue are contained in Chapter 6 of the White Book.
- **Defence Management.** It is essential in the modern environment to ensure that defence is managed efficiently on behalf of the state and we are continuing to develop capacity within the MOD and General Staff to deliver high quality management in areas such as strategic planning; financial management; policy development and personnel management. All of these functions have major projects running to achieve rapid progress in moving us to the forefront of international standards. Our benchmark in many respects will be NATO compatibility and we have a number of joint programmes running with NATO HQ and allied nations from which we are receiving technical assistance and advice. Of particular note is the new Civilian Professional Development Project which was launched at the High Level NATO/Ukraine Consultations held in Vilnius in October 2005. We also have projects aimed at key issues such as the creation of integrated planning and budgeting functions through capability based planning and resource accounting. Details of these and other major co-operation programmes are contained in the White Book and I would like to express my appreciation for the support and co-operation that we are receiving on all levels from our NATO Partners.

As we take forward the six-year State Programme of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Development for 2006-2011, I am confident that we are well placed for implementing all the key objectives that the government has set for us. We face many challenges but we also have great opportunities. My vision is to achieve fully professional Armed Forces that are well equipped and operating under civilian democratic control. They will then be able to play an increasingly important role within the world community on vital issues such as peacekeeping operations and maintaining regional and international stability.

Minister of Defence of Ukraine
Anatoliy GRYTSENKO



CHAPTER 1

GENERAL SUMMARY OF REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES 2001-2005

LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE OPERATION AND REFORM OF THE ARMED FORCES

IMPROVEMENT OF THE STRUCTURE AND CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES

ARMED FORCES DOWNSIZING

FORCE TRAINING

REDUCTION OF WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

MANNING THE ARMED FORCES

GENERAL SUMMARY OF THE 2001-2005 DEFENCE REFORM

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL SUMMARY OF REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES 2001-2005

The year 2005 saw the completion of the third stage of the Armed Forces development launched in July 2000 with the adoption of the **State Programme of Reform and Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine up to 2005** (hereinafter – *State Programme up to 2005*)*. Its main goal was to design a modern model for the Armed Forces based on the principle of defence sufficiency – optimal in strength, mobile, well armed, adequately supplied and trained forces capable of performing their mission, and at the same time not too burdensome for the state to maintain.

The Programme was intended, in particular, to improve the legislative framework for the operation of the Armed Forces and their structure and control, reduce troop strength as well as weapons and equipment, improve training of forces, and introduce the contractual principle of manning.

In December 2005 the implementation of the Programme was analysed at an enlarged session of the Ministry of Defence Board. The session showed that the main measures had, on the whole, been carried out, thereby creating sufficient foundation for the next stage of military reform.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE OPERATION AND REFORM OF THE ARMED FORCES

The measures under the *State Programme up to 2005* required adequate legal framework, and that was achieved by the process of developing a legal basis for the reforms.

In the period from 2001 to 2005 a total of 37 laws were adopted to launch the transition to a three-service structure of the Armed Forces, man units and elements with servicemen under contract, substantially reduce personnel strength, initiate a system of defence planning, and improve the welfare support for demobilised servicemen and members of their families (Figure 1.1; see also Annex 1).

In order to align the national system of defence planning with the standards of the world's leading nations and identify ways of further developing the Armed Forces, a defence review was carried out in 2003-2004. Its results were published in the **Strategic Defence Bulletin of Ukraine** for the period up to 2015. The review was made with the methodological and consultative assistance of the experts from NATO International Staff and Allied countries.

In June 2004, a Presidential Decree approved a new **Military Doctrine of Ukraine**, which was to serve as the basis for drafting and making military-political and military-strategic decisions as well as designing programmes and drawing up plans in the military area. However, the political situation during that pre-election period made it difficult to clearly define any doctrine for Ukraine's military-political orientation and thus considerably complicated the formulation of the missions of the Armed Forces and the general view of its future model.

* Stage I of the Armed Forces development is dated 1991-1996, when the groundwork for the Armed Forces of Ukraine was laid; during Stage II – 1997-2000 – the State Programme of Building and Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, initially designed for 1997-2005, was implemented. However, in view of the changes that occurred in Ukraine and the world at the end of the 20th century, the Programme was modified, and in July 2000 another State Programme of Reform and Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine up to 2005 was adopted. Its implementation became Stage III of development of the Armed Forces. See Annex 1 for details.

Figure 1.1. The main legislative documents passed in 2001-2005

2001

- Law of Ukraine "On Intelligence Agencies of Ukraine", March 22

2002

- Law of Ukraine "On Military Service of Law and Order of Armed Forces of Ukraine", March 7;
- Decree of the President of Ukraine "On State Programme for Transition of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to Personnel Manning on a Contract Basis", no.348, April 17

2003

- Law of Ukraine "On Principles of National Security of Ukraine", June 19;
- Law of Ukraine "On Democratic Civilian Control Over Military Organisation and Law Enforcement Agencies of the State", June 19

2004

- Law of Ukraine "On Amendment of Article 3 of the Law of Ukraine "On the Armed Forces of Ukraine", June 3 (transition of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from four-service to three-service structure);
- Law of Ukraine "On State Guarantees of Welfare Support for Servicemen who Retire because of Reform of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Members of their Families", June 15;
- Law of Ukraine "On Organisation of Defence Planning", November 18;
- Decree of the President of Ukraine "On Military Doctrine", no.648, June 15, 2004;
- Decree of the President of Ukraine "On Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine of July 6, 2004, "On Further Development of Relations with NATO Considering the Results of High Level Meeting of Ukraine-NATO Commission, June 29, 2004", no.800, July 15 (withdrawal of statements on Ukraine's accession to NATO from Military Doctrine);
- Decree of the President of Ukraine "On Adoption of the State Programme for Development of Weapons and Equipment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine up to 2015", November 2

2005

- Law of Ukraine "On Strength of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2005", March 17;
- Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine "On Universal Military Duty and Military Service", March 17;
- Law of Ukraine "On Approving the Decision of the President of Ukraine on Access of Units of Foreign Armed Forces to the Territory of Ukraine in 2005 for Participation in Multinational Military Exercises", June 2;
- Law of Ukraine "On Strength of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2006", December 22, which planned, as of December 30, 2006, to have 221,000 personnel in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, including 165,000 servicemen;
- Decree of the President of Ukraine "The Issues of Military Doctrine", no.702, April 21 (returning the statement on Ukraine's accession to NATO as the main goal of its Euroatlantic-integration course, to Military Doctrine);
- Decree of the President of Ukraine "On Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine of December 9, 2005 "On the State Programme of Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2006-2011", December 27;
- Decree of the President of Ukraine "On Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine of November 25, 2005, "On Urgent Measures for the Further Development of Relations with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)", no.1861, December 27

After the Presidential Elections in April 2005 a decree of the newly elected President introduced **new amendments to the military doctrine: the final goal of Ukraine's policy of Euro-Atlantic integration was identified: accession to NATO as the basis for a general European system of security.**

On the whole, a proper legal framework for the operation of the Armed Forces was set up during the past five years in Ukraine. Areas of further improvement will be determined by the state's political course, changes in the international environment, the pace of Ukraine's accession to the Euro-Atlantic security system and the provisions of the new State Programme of Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2006-2011.

IMPROVEMENT OF THE STRUCTURE AND CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES

During 2001-2005 the structure of the Armed Forces and the system of its control underwent substantial changes. In particular, during the reform a functional approach to the development and employment of the Armed Forces was taken. The Joint Rapid Reaction Forces, Main Defence Forces, and the Strategic Reserves will be the functional structures of the Armed Forces. Priority will be given to activating the **Joint Rapid Reaction Forces** (see Chapter 3 for details).

The disbandment of the 43 Missile Army in 2002 was an important step in restructuring the Armed Forces. By taking this action Ukraine demonstrated to the world community that it faithfully adhered to its international commitments as far as its non-nuclear status was concerned.

In 2004 in accordance with the amendments introduced to the Law of Ukraine *On the Armed Forces of Ukraine* the transition from a four-service to a three-service structure was launched by merging the Air Force and the Air Defence Forces into a **single Air Forces** comprised of three Air Commands ("West", "South" and "Centre") and the Task Force "Crimea" (Figure 1.2).

Figure 1.2. Three-service Structure of the Armed Forces



This enabled the Armed Forces to concentrate under a single command and control all the capabilities to conduct air missions, improve the structure, combat and numerical strength of the Armed Forces, bring their quantity of weapons and equipment in conformity with their requirements, and raise the efficiency of logistic support.

The Main Commands of the armed services were reformed into Armed Service Commands, while their structure and strengths were streamlined accordingly. Of the three Operational Commands two Commands remained (Western and Southern), while Northern Operational Command was reformed into Territorial Directorate "North". The numerical strength of the departments of the Western and Southern Operational Commands was cut down by 35%, while their status was reduced from operational-strategic to operational level.

To optimise the system of operational (combat) and logistic support the **Support Forces Command** was established to include over 50 units and elements of operational, technical and logistic support.

On the whole, about 16,000 restructuring activities were carried out in 2001-2005 (Table 1.1).

Table 1.1. Restructuring activities in the Armed Forces in 2001-2005

Armed services of Armed Forces	Reorganisation, *number of units*				Other organisational measures	TOTAL
	Disbanded	Formed	Restructured	Reformed		
Land Forces	587	46	748	370	5,092	6,843
Air Forces	306	63	180	127	2,687	3,363
Naval Forces	147	14	57	46	812	1,076
Other	262	65	324	152	3,826	4,629
TOTAL	**1,302**	**188**	**1,309**	**695**	**12,417**	**15,911**

The restructuring activities increased the efficiency of command and control of forces, released substantial human and material resources, created the necessary foundations for the next stage of the defence reform, and speeded up the introduction of a modern model for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

ARMED FORCES DOWNSIZING

During the past five years the overall authorised strength of the Armed Forces was reduced by almost 171,000 positions – from about 416,000 in early 2001 to 245,000 in late 2005 (Figure 1.3) – of which 138 were positions of generals, about 29,300 officers, 27,100 praporschyks (warrant officers), 69,100 sergeants (soldiers), 8,800 cadets and 36,500 civilian employees.

However, the downsizing of the Armed Forces (especially in 2003-2004) did not fully take into account the pace of restructuring of their components, the reduction in the stocks of weapons and equipment, as well as the disposal of missiles and ammunition. This created an imbalance in the ratio between combat units and combat service support units (Figure 1.4).

The situation was especially critical in early 2005 in the Land Forces where every combat unit had two or three service support units, while to every piece of combat materiel there were over two surplus pieces.

Experts of the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff believe that the process of the

Figure 1.3. Strength of the Armed Forces in 2001-2005, *by year's end, number of positions*



Figure 1.4. Correlation between combat units and service support units of the Armed Forces, *by year's end*



accelerated and large-scale reduction of the Armed Forces at the cost of their combat components has exhausted its possibilities. Further downsizing of the Armed Forces will continue primarily through the reduction of the strength of support units and bringing their structures into conformity with the assigned missions.

FORCE TRAINING

Despite the shortage of resources, a number of operational-tactical and staff exercises were carried out in the period between 2001 and 2005 (Figure 1.5; for details about the exercises in 2005 see Chapter 5 and Annex 2).

The force training activities of the past five years have not significantly increased the training level of the Armed Forces in general, however, they have fostered the improvement of personnel skills and enhanced combat potential and readiness levels of formations and units of the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces, the development of which has been identified as the priority area of defence reform.

Figure 1.5. Results of main exercises of the Armed Forces in 2001-2005

"Sky Thunder-2001"	A new step in the development of the art of warfare for the Armed Forces of Ukraine and a test of draft Fundamentals for Training and Employment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on preparation and conduct of air operations
"Clear Skies -2001"	Development of a single air defence system of the state and the Armed Forces. Practicing air defence command and control with live shooting exercise
"Sea Shield-2002", "Forpost-2002"	Development of theory and practice of Naval Forces and JRRF employment. Improvement of professional skills of formation command elements and coordination of command and control
"Force Projection-2003"	Introduction of new forms of planning force employment, identification of formations required, and financial and economic calculation of operational resource support
Bilateral Command Staff Exercise with Operational Commands West and South	Identification of the most effective methods of training for and conducting peacekeeping operations and armed conflict elimination or localisation
"Sea Frontier-2004"	Testing main provisions of Fundamentals for Training and Employment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
"Reaction-2005"	Command and control of combined operations of armed services as part of JRRF in various regions. Practicing new forms and ways of JRRF employment and evaluation of its effectiveness. Identification of areas for force training improvement.

REDUCTION OF WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

Within the scope of implementation of the *State Programme up to 2005,* the Armed Forces discarded over 2,000 pieces of obsolete and inoperable weapons and equipment, including over 870 tanks, about 380 armoured combat vehicles, over 289 artillery systems (calibre over 100 mm), 299 combat aircraft, 58 helicopters and 28 ships (Figure 1.6), since their repair or modernisation was decided to be economically unsustainable. Additionally, 56,300 pieces of surplus weapons and equipment as well as 97,800 tons of missiles and ammunition have been disposed of. However, these results are far from satisfactory as the existing stocks of materiel exceed the real requirements of the Armed Forces by anything between 20% and 120%, and even more in certain categories.

Figure 1.6. Total number of major conventional weapons in 2001-2005, *by year's end*



The introduction of a single military and technical policy required the development of the **State Programme of Development of Weapons and Equipment up to 2015**, approved with a Presidential Decree. However, it failed to reach a balance between the requirements in modernising the Armed Forces equipment and the real funding capacity of the state, for which reason the goals under the Programme proved to be unachievable.

In 2001-2005, substantial results were achieved in reducing surplus stocks of armaments, equipment, missiles and ammunition. The military units which determine the combat potential of the Armed Forces are mostly equipped with combat-effective weapons. At the same time, modernisation and procurement of new armaments remains a problematic issue.

MANNING THE ARMED FORCES

The period of 2001-2005 marked the onset of manning the Armed Forces with contracted servicemen. The decision was made for the Armed Forces to completely switch over to contractual military service from 2015. Compared with the changes in the overall force strength, the growth of contracted servicemen in 2001-2005 was, on the whole, positive (Figure 1.7).

Figure 1.7. Ratio on strength of the Armed Forces and number of contracted servicemen, *by year's end*



The changes in the system of manning the Armed Forces promoted the development and consolidation of the professional force component and positively influenced combat readiness of units and formations.

GENERAL SUMMARY OF THE 2001-2005 DEFENCE REFORM

The implementation of the State Programme of Reform and Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine up to 2005 has laid down a proper foundation for further development of the Armed Forces.

However, the **projected qualitative modernisation of the Armed Forces has not been fully achieved.** This was due to the fact that over a long period of time Ukraine lacked a clearly defined military-political policy from which the missions of the Armed Forces could be determined. In addition, there was no well-coordinated mechanism for the solution of development problems. The chronic shortage of financial resources added significantly to the problem.

Despite tremendous efforts and some positive results, the efficiency of the military reform carried out in 2001-2005 was lower than had been planned. In quite a few areas, the goals of the Programme were not fully achieved, which has hindered the pace of Armed Forces reform and will require radical changes in the future implementation of military reform plans in order to achieve full effectiveness.

CHAPTER 2

UPDATING THE POLICY OF ARMED FORCES REFORM

PRIORITY MEASURES
OF NEW POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

IDENTIFYING THE PROSPECTS
FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES

CHAPTER 2

UPDATING THE POLICY OF ARMED FORCES REFORM

A new and more decisive approach to defence problems was required on the part of the President, Parliament, Government and central executive bodies. This would enable the more efficient use of the previous stage of Armed Forces reform by removing its shortcomings and achieving a proper pace for military reforms.

PRIORITY MEASURES OF NEW POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

Such an approach was proposed and introduced in 2005, while the resulting decisions made it possible to define more clearly the place and role of the Armed Forces in the national security system.

Far-reaching amendments were introduced to the mechanisms of formulating strategic goals and priorities for the development of the Armed Forces and this enabled the drafting of policy documents with specific timeframes for mission performance and adequate resource support.

Priority objectives

(1) **The new political leadership clearly defined Ukraine's military-political orientation** and declared accession to NATO as the final goal of the country's Euro-Atlantic integration. One of the top priorities of both foreign and national policy was identified as the profound reform of national defence, based on European standards and taking into account real economic and social problems in Ukrainian society, and particularly, in the military environment.

(2) There has been a transition to appointing predominantly civilian employees to the main managerial offices of the Ministry of Defence in line with the principles of democratic civilian control over the military organisation of the state (see Information on Leadership of Ministry of Defence and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine). To date, civilian employees account for about 80% of the overall staff of the Ministry's Central Office.

(3) A number of key **initiatives** have been introduced **by the most senior military-political leadership** through the programmes of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the Ministry of Defence, and other structures involved in defence activities. The initiatives concerned, *first*, reduction of the period of active conscript service, and, *second*, complete transition of the Armed Forces to the contractual principle of manning. These initiatives also introduced realistic threat assessment, determination of missions (see Annex 3), resource potential and restrictions and identified priorities in the development of weapons and equipment.

(4) Within a short period of time a number of important decisions were made and implemented without unnecessary delay in co-ordination procedures and keeping cost to the minimum, namely:

- **a proper level of state budget appropriations for 2005 was ensured with the support of the President of Ukraine for welfare and financial support of servicemen;**
- **a more logical pace of reductions in the number of combat units of the Armed Forces was introduced.** According to expert assessment of the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff, the combat component of the Armed Forces has practically exhausted its reduction potential, so further reductions are only possible through the disbanding of arsenals, bases and depots. According to the Law of Ukraine *On the Strength of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2005*, only 40,000 personnel were to be released (from 285,000 to 245,000) instead of the planned reduction by 75,000-85,000 personnel as stipulated in the Strategic Defence Bulletin for the period till 2015;

Figure 2.1. Decree of the President of Ukraine

ON ACTIVITIES FOR TRANSITION
OF THE UNITS OF THE ARMED FORCES
OF UKRAINE TO CONTRACTUAL
MANNING

In order to improve combat readiness and professionalism of the personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine by means of transition to contractual manning and in accordance with p.1.17 of Article 106 of the Constitution of Ukraine,

1. To assign to the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine the responsibilities as follows:
1) for purposes of exploring the challenges that might emerge during the transition to professional military service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and determining the ways of meeting such challenges, to conduct a contractual manning experiment (hereinafter referred to as the Experiment) in
- 30 Separate Mechanised Brigade, of 8 Army Corps, Land Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine;
- 7 Bomber and Reconnaissance Aviation Brigade, of the Air Command "West", Air Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and
- 36 Coastal Guard Separate Brigade and Large Amphibious Ship "K.Olshansky", of 5 Surface Ship Brigade, the Naval Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine;

2) to analyse the results of the Experiment and, in accordance with the established procedure, to submit relevant proposals on amendments to the State Programme for Transition of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to Personnel Manning on Contract Base approved by Decree of the President of Ukraine no.348 of April 17, 2002, and to other legislation that regulates military service on contract basis and the transition to contractual military service by the end of 2010.

2. To assign the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine with the responsibility to take measures to allocate appropriate resources for the Experiment and to resolve other issues related to manning the above specified units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with contracted military personnel.

President of Ukraine V.Yushchenko
Kyiv, May 16, 2005

• in pursuance of the Presidential Programme *Ten Steps to Meet the People*, **the length of military conscript service was reduced**, as stipulated in the 2005 Law *On Introducing Amendments to the Law of Ukraine "On Universal Military Duty and Military Service"*. Now active service lasts only twelve months (18 months on ships, vessels and in the coastal combat support units of the Naval Forces), and nine months for University graduates. The transition to reduced active service did not have any negative effect on the level of combat readiness nor did it weaken the combat efficiency of the forces. **Within a short period of time the conscription system was changed, as well as the curricula at the training centres, and the organisation of daily routine.** Objective measurement of military efficiency has proved the decision to adopt contractual manning to be fully justified.

• **the deadline for a complete transition to contractual manning was moved from 2015 to late 2010.** By order of the President, three pilot projects were launched at three brigades, one for each armed service, and additionally, the Large Amphibious Ship *"K.Olshansky"*; by the end of 2006 these units will be fully manned by contracted servicemen. Adequate resources were allocated to support this initiative (Figure 2.1);

• **in order to make military service more attractive, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine decided to**

increase the pay for specific categories of servicemen (see Annex 4 for details). It will be raised threefold for sergeants, conscript service soldiers and sailors, cadets and pupils of military lyceums. As of April 2005 money incentives of UAH 100-300 were introduced for contracted sergeants, soldiers and sailors serving in positions that require higher combat readiness status, i.e., commanders of tanks and combat vehicles, signalmen, drivers, and others. This measure had a positive effect on the prestige of military service;

- **new regulations relating to the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff were developed** to identify their tasks and functions more clearly. In the new structure of the Ministry of Defence (Figure 2.2), the number of command levels was reduced, thereby simplifying decision-making and improving the interaction between the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff;

Figure 2.2. Structure of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, *by the end of 2005*



- **in order to ease the pressure on the State Budget, the Ministry of Defence has dramatically revised the procedure for providing the Armed Forces with mobilisation resources** – human, logistical, weapons and equipment. As a result, the number of officers required decreased and budget appropriations were cut for reserve officer training programmes covering approximately 6,000 students per year at military training departments of civilian educational institutions. Proposals were also put forward to review mobilization objectives which had been burdening the country's economy and had not been revised for many years.
- **combat training has been intensified.** The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine approved the decision to allocate for training an additional sum of UAH 100 million derived from the sale of surplus weapons and equipment. This decision coupled with the enhanced responsibility of commanders has significantly

improved the quality and increased the efficiency of force combat training (see Chapter 4);

• **service conditions for officers have been regulated.** Psychological pressures were created in many units by the unsatisfactory working conditions for officers caused by the constant long hours as a result of which officers were deprived of a normal family life and rest. The practice of engaging officers in constantly supervising the order and discipline in units was terminated, with exception of commanders and duty officers. Thousands of officers used to be regularly given such unnecessary tasks before. The practice of holding meetings outside duty hours except in emergencies was also forbidden.

• **a mechanism was developed and introduced to overcome corruption and other negative practices in the Armed Forces.** A sizable amount of orders and contractual documents on the transfer and sales of military property were suspended and amendments were introduced to the state procurement procedures in order to enhance the fight against corruption and control of the use of budgetary funds. The Deputy Minister of Defence and the Chief of the General Staff now head Bidding Committees.

On the whole, the high-priority decisions and efforts of the Ministry of Defence laid the groundwork for further large-scale changes in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. To translate them into reality, it is necessary to formulate a long-term strategy of development of the Armed Forces, secure a sufficient amount of resources and target their use. It is also necessary to sometimes make harsh unpopular political decisions.

IDENTIFYING THE PROSPECTS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES

The Ministry of Defence has abandoned the practice of developing one-year defence plans and adopted a programme-targeted method of strategic planning according to NATO standards. The basic documents that identify the strategic goals and objectives for building modern and combat capable Armed Forces have been adopted or are being drafted (The State Programme of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Development for 2006-2011, The State Programme for Development of Weapons and Equipment for the Armed Forces of Ukraine for the period till 2009, the Strategy of Military Security of Ukraine).

One such basic document is the **State Programme of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Development for 2006-2011** (hereinafter – the *State Programme for 2006-2011*). It was designed on the basis of President Yuschenko's Programme *Ten Steps to Meet the People*, the Action Programme of the Cabinet of Ministers, *Meeting the People,* and the *Strategic Defence Bulletin of Ukraine up to 2015* which identify the main targets for socio-economic development and the next stage of military reform in Ukraine.

The Programme has been designed by experts of the Verkhovna Rada, the Cabinet of Ministers, the Central Office of the National Security and Defence Council, the Ministry of Defence, and other central executive agencies, as well as the General Staff and individual services of the Armed Forces. Experts

Figure 2.3. Structure of the State Programme of Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2006-2011

1. Current state of the Armed Forces
2. Assumed allocations from the State Budget for defence and the Ministry of Defence share for the period up to 2011
3. Identification of the Armed Forces organisation
4. Solutions of the Armed Forces development problems
5. Expected results of Programme implementation
6. Programme funding
7. Activities and tasks to ensure development of the Armed Forces for 2006-2011

SUPPLEMENTS:

- Assumed allocations from the State Budget for the Armed Forces for 2006-2011
- Operation tasks and organisation of the Armed Forces formations
- Prospective system of Command and Control for the Armed Forces
- Functional Structure of the Armed Forces in late 2011
- Assumed strength of the Armed Forces for 2006-2011
- Prospective system of the military educations institutions
- Principle characteristics of the force training for 2006-2011
- Assumed quantity of modernized weapons and equipment in 2011
- Prospective logistic and medical support systems in the Armed Forces
- Allocations to the Armed Forces by funding lines and development areas for 2006-2011

from NATO member-nations and Defence Planning Division of NATO International Staff provided advice and expertise on a number of issues.

The *State Programme for 2006-2011* was the basis for elaborating main and target development programmes for the Armed Forces and this provided the detailed description of the Programme's basic provisions (Figures 2.3 and 2.4).

What makes the *State Programme for 2006-2011* so special is that, in the course of its development, the **Ministry of Defence, for the first time in the modern history of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, provided military command and control bodies with the output data for medium-term planning**. This included the priorities for the development of the Armed Forces, specified missions, quantitative

Figure 2.4. Main Programmes and Target Programmes of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Development for 2006-2011



indices for basic weapons and equipment, projected personnel strength, principles of organisation of the logistic support system, conscription, education, science, and, most importantly, the level of available resources.

The development of the paper was preceded by an evaluation of real and potential internal and external threats (Figure 2.5) and the scenarios for their possible

Figure 2.5. Real and potential military threats to Ukraine



development. On those grounds, with due regard to the availability of resources, the missions of the Armed Forces were substantiated and clearly identified. This meant that the Armed Forces were fully prepared to perform their stipulated role.

Previously only the general objectives of protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine had been identified as the primary task of the Armed Forces. Now a more detailed list of objectives has been drawn up relating to a whole range of scenarios, with clearly set timeframes for mission training and the required capabilities. The comparative analysis of objectives in the *State Programme up to 2005* and the new *State Programme for 2006-2011* can be found in Annex 3.

The underlying foundations for achieving the assigned objectives are the **principles of multi-functional force employment and specialisation of training.** Most of the formations, units and elements will be trained to perform several missions and they will be equipped with corresponding weapons and equipment. Certain units, mostly special-purpose ones, will be exclusively committed to special missions. Given such an allotment of efforts, every commander will know what mission his unit or element will be charged with and how to perform it in cases of conflicts, terrorist threats, emergencies, and the like.

Such an approach makes it possible to effectively plan the training of forces, provide them with corresponding weapons and resources, and check their readiness for designated missions.

On the whole, the introduction by the new Ministry of Defence of the programme and objective methods for strategic planning has resulted in the following:

- **first**, better alignment of the structure and combat strength of the Armed Forces based on studies of possible variants of conflict development and force engagement scenarios;
- **second**, improvements to the current system of combat and mobilisation training of the Armed Forces and their preparation for real force engagement conditions;

- **third**, significant reduction of mobilisation requirements, e.g., commissioned weapons and equipment have been reduced by three times, materiel by three to four times, human resources by four times, the number of draftees has been reduced by 2.5 to 3.0 times, over 1,500 categories of materiel have been removed from the defence commission list, and the state requirement to train reserve officers at the cost of the State Budget has been cancelled.

The main areas for development of the Armed Forces, as set out in the *State Programme for 2006-2011*, provide solutions for the systemic problems inherent in defence reform which could not be effectively resolved during the preceding years (Table 2.1).

The priority efforts of the Ministry of Defence laid down the necessary foundations for accelerating the pace of military reform and making it successful. The negative trends in military reform have been removed, and development programme for the Armed Forces has been intensified.

The new State Programme for Development of the Armed Forces for 2006-2011 is realistic from the viewpoint of the existing and potential threats, the missions of the Armed Forces, and resource capacities of the state. Its implementation should lead to a gradual build up of modern Armed Forces in Ukraine, well adapted to the new security challenges.

Described below are the main measures to improve the system of command and control, training, manning, logistics, supply of weapons and equipment for the forces, economic activities, development of the humanitarian sphere, as well as international activities and funding of the Armed Forces.

Table 2.1. Principal issues of the Armed Forces reform and their proposed solutions as defined in the State Programme of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Development for 2006-2011

Issues of the Armed Forces reform unresolved in past years	Proposed development for 2006-2011
Command and Control	
The number of operations command and control levels is excessive, and of low efficiency: General Staff – armed service – Operational Command – Army Corps (or Air Command) – military formation (military unit)	Implementation, **beginning in 2006, of the three levels of operational command and control system: General Staff (Joint Operational Command) – combined formation (Army Corps or Air Command) – military formation (military unit).** Operational Commands will be relieved of the functions of operation planning and combat and mobilization readiness ensuring; command and control of army corps will be directly subordinated to the Land Forces Command
The existing structure is tailored to command and control large forces (troops) for strategic operations in large scale warfare	
There is no command and control body for combined forces (troops)	
The system of material and technical support for the forces (troops) is not fully established	Establishment, **beginning in 2006**, of the Joint Support Forces, on the basis of the Support Forces Command
Low level of computerisation and information technologies at command and control bodies (the share of digital means of telecommunications is below 15%)	Completion of the Single Automated Command and Control System (SACCS) for the Armed Forces: • **2006-2009** – development and implementation of information technologies into the decision-making process, first and foremost in their command and control bodies of the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces; • **in longer term** – internal systemic integration and harmonisation of SACCS with NATO standards; implementation of a single telecom environment for command and control bodies, with capability to integrate into the all-national information space
Strength and Personnel Structure	
The existing division of the forces as per assigned functions (into Joint Rapid Reaction Forces, Main Defence Forces and Strategic Reserves) fails to conform with the adjusted scenarios of potential conflicts development and the new tasks of the Armed Forces	Establishment in the **Joint Rapid Reaction Forces and main Defence Forces**, beginning with 2006, of structural units that depending upon their defined tasks will differ in combat readiness terms, manning procedures and armaments. Reform of the Strategic Reserves
The actual manpower (245,000) exceeds the real needs of the Armed Forces	Downsizing (at a slower pace) of the Armed Forces strength: 2006 – down to 221,000; **2011** – down to 143,000 servicemen.
The ratio of combat units and service support units is 1.0 : 1.5, which considerably exceeds the needs in operational-tactical and tactical support forces (capabilities)	By the end of 2006, the ratio of combat units and support units is to become 1.2 : 1.0
Providing of Material and Technical Support, Weapons and Equipment	
The system of material and technical support is structurally disproportionate and functionally deficient	Transition to commercial procurements of resources and services for the Armed Forces; transition, by 2008, to the territorial principles of supply, centralisation of management, enlargement and specialisation of supply bodies
80% of weapons and equipment items have been in use for over 15 years; most key weapons are physically and morally obsolete	Dismissal, as of **2006**, of large scale weapons and equipment development projects, with concentration of resources and efforts on priority avenues of the technological upgrading of the Armed Forces
Maintenance of huge stockpiles of excessive weapons and munitions diverts considerable resources and generates risks of man-caused environmental disasters	Initiation of large scale long term projects for the disposal of excessive weapons, munitions, mines and rocket propellants, with attraction of substantial foreign financial and technical assistance
Military Infrastructure	
The balance sheet of the Ministry of Defence includes over 2,000 garrisons facilities, with nearly 44,000 buildings and enclosures, situated on 455,000 hectares of land, which exceeds the needs of the Armed Forces by 30% to 40%	Improvement of laws and regulations on transfer and realisation of garrisons facilities and relevant assets, with an increase in budget returns from their sale
Force Training	
The system of training fails to meet the present needs and does not secure the required level of the force's (troops') readiness to perform the set tasks (every year the combat training plans for the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces are, on the average, implemented only by 75%, while in the Main Defence Forces combat training is limited to commanders' trainings for officers and case by case trainings for non-commissioned officers and privates)	Full implementation of combat training plans at the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces and conduct of full scale training for the entire forces (troops). **Improvements in the ways and means of the forces' (troops') training, with proper use of state-of-the-art simulation and training equipment**
Personnel and Military Education	
The ratio of the number of positions for junior and senior officers constitutes 1.0 : 1.03, the needs being 1.5 : 1.0	The ratio of the number of positions for junior and senior officers will change from 1.06 : 1.0 in 2006 to 1.52 : 1.0 in **2011.**
The number of military educational institutions considerably exceeds the actual needs, while the number of their personnel makes up 11% of the Armed Forces total strength	By the end **of 2011 the number of educational institutions in the Armed Forces will go down to 12, and their personnel will constitute close to 7% of the total strength of the Armed Forces.**
Contractual manning is spreading at a slow pace	Accelerated pace of transition to contractual manning, with full transition to such manning in **2010** (instead of 2015, as planned earlier)
The system of human resources training for mobilization purposes is burdensome for the nation, not convenient for the population and fails to meet the present requirements as to quantitative and qualitative parameters of the mobilization resources	Adoption, in 2006, of the relevant laws and regulations, with initiation of voluntary service in the reserves



CHAPTER 3

ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE, PERSONNEL STRENGTH, COMMAND AND CONTROL

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE STRUCTURE AND PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES

ARMED SERVICES OF THE ARMED FORCES: STRUCTURE, COMBAT AND PERSONNEL STRENGTH

FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES

GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE

CHAPTER 3

ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE, PERSONNEL STRENGTH, COMMAND AND CONTROL

The organisational structure, personnel strength and command and control system of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are determined by the existing defence capabilities and experience of the state in relation to future defence policy. Additionally, they are determined by the missions assigned to the Armed Forces as well as requirements and standards set by the Euro-Atlantic security system with which Ukraine and its Armed Forces are seeking to co-operate.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE STRUCTURE AND PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES

The **organisational structure of the Armed Forces** is set forth in the *Law of Ukraine on Introduction of Amendments to Article 3 of the Law of Ukraine on the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 2004*. The organisational structure of the Armed Forces comprises the General Staff, three armed services – the Land Forces, the Air Forces, the Naval Forces, and formations, forces, units, military educational institutions, establishments and organisations that do not come under direct control of the Armed Forces (Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1. The structure of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, *by the end of 2005*



Functionally the Armed Forces consist of the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces, the Main Defence Forces and the Strategic Reserves (Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2. The functional structures of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, *by the end of 2005*



Figure 3.3. Weight of armed services in total strength of the Armed Forces, *by the end of 2005*



The **personnel strength of the Armed Forces** is determined by Ukrainian legislation. This legislation is passed by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine annually.

By the end of 2005 **the total personnel strength of the Armed Forces** comprised 245,000 personnel, including 180,000 military servicemen. In accordance with figures indicated in the *State Programme up to 2005*, by the end of 2005 the personnel strength was to comprise 375,000 and 295,000 respectively.

The **ratio of armed services' personnel** is mission-driven and determined by the scope of missions to be performed by the respective forces. The personnel ratio is as follows: Land Forces – up to 40%; Air Forces – up to 24%; Naval Forces – up to 8%; military command and control elements, formations, military educational institutions, establishments and organisations that do not belong to the armed services of the Armed Forces – up to 28%. Differences between the priorities set for other nations' armed services and Ukraine account for the variation in ratios between the figures of Ukraine and other countries (Figure 3.3).

The **ratio between the Armed Forces personnel strength and the general Ukrainian civilian population** is similar to the figures common amongst NATO nations (Figure 3.4).

Figure 3.4. Strength of the Armed Forces and its ratio in population (%)



By estimates of the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff, the high rate of personnel reduction undertaken recently is not feasible for the next stage of the Armed Forces transformation process. Therefore, the *State Programme for 2006-2011* makes provisions for reduction of approximately 102,000 authorized positions during the next six-year period (Figure 3.5).

This rate of downsizing of the Armed Forces is well-grounded and based upon the following:

- realistic estimates for reduction and upgrading of equipment, disposal of excessive stockpiles of weapons, missiles and ammunition;
- the necessity to comply with the requirements of Ukrainian legislation pertaining to state guarantees for the welfare support of servicemen, retired servicemen and their family members;

Figure 3.5. Personnel strength of the Armed Forces for 2006-2011, *by year's end*



• the need to relate the reduction of military educational institutions, including military training departments, training centres, junior specialist schools, and training ranges to the training timeline of cadets who were enrolled in the previous 4-5 years;

• economic capacity of the state;

• alignment with international and European standards.

Thus, the reduction in personnel strength of the Armed Forces will be more controlled and fully resourced in the future. Downsizing will be facilitated, in particular, by the transition of the Ministry of Defence to programme-based and target-driven planning methods. As a result the personnel strength of the Armed Forces will be identified for the full period of *the State Programme for 2006-2011*, **with possible annual adjustments.**

This approach will provide an opportunity to plan administrative activities in advance, develop detailed plans for officer transfer, allocate required resources for these processes, and introduce changes in a timely manner. The National Security and Defence Committee of the Verkhovna Rada, the Government, and the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine support the position of the Ministry of Defence in this policy.

ARMED SERVICES OF THE ARMED FORCES: STRUCTURE, COMBAT AND PERSONNEL STRENGTH

The **Land Forces** are the largest armed service within the Armed Forces. Due to the wide range of their assigned missions and scope of their functions they participate in the execution of the entire mission spectrum assigned to the Armed Forces.

The Land Forces consist of the mechanized infantry, armour, airborne, missile and artillery troops, army aviation and air defence troops of the Land Forces (Figure 3.6).

Figure 3.6. Branches of the Land Forces

Figure 3.7. Organisational structure and combat strength of the Land Forces, *by the end of 2005*



Figure 3.8. Projected organisational structure and combat strength of the Land Forces, *by the end of 2011*



By the end of 2005 the personnel strength of the Land Forces comprises approximately 97,000 personnel, including 78,000 servicemen. They are supplied with 100% of their major weapons and equipment requirements. The supply level of other major materiels (food, fuel etc.) is at 70-75%. The organisational structure and combat strength of the Land Forces are shown in Figure 3.7.

In 2006 the disbandment of two Operational Commands will begin. In the previous plans this disbandment was planned for after 2010. It is no longer necessary to maintain their role as operational strategic formations responsible for operational tasks, mobilisation missions, and territorial defence missions. The equipment, logistic, medical and other support they used to provide to the forces located on their territory is no longer required.

Overall, in 2006 one mechanised infantry brigade, four regiments and a significant number of arsenals, bases and depots of the Land Forces will be disbanded.

By the end of 2011 the Land Forces will comprise 16 brigades (Figure 3.8); the personnel strength will be approximately 60,000, including 52,000 servicemen.

The **Air Forces** are a new service within the Armed Forces. It was established as a result of the Air Force and Air Defence troops' merger accomplished in May 2005. It allowed the Armed Forces to transit to the modern three-service structure.

The Air Forces are the most mobile service within the Armed Forces. Its mission is to defend strategic state facilities and military formations against enemy air strikes and to strike enemy forces and facilities. It will also land airborne units, airlift troops or cargoes and perform special missions.

The Air Forces consist of the following branches: bomber aviation, fighter aviation, ground attack aviation, reconnaissance aviation, transport aviation, air defence and radar troops (Figure 3.9).

Figure 3.9. Branches of the Air Forces

At the end of 2005 the personnel strength of the Air Forces is approximately 59,000, including 50,000 servicemen. The Air Forces are equipped with all the major aviation weapons and equipment that they require. However the condition of some of the equipment is considered unsatisfactory due to inadequate rates of modernisation. The organisational structure of the Air Forces is shown in Figure 3.10.

Figure 3.10. Organisational structure and combat strength of the Air Forces, *by the end of 2005*



Beginning from 2006, it is planned to establish an Automated Command and Control System for aviation and air defence units within the Air Forces and to develop a Common Automated Radar Field within the automated command and control system, which will correspond to NATO standards.

As soon as the Automated Command and Control (C2) System is operational, an Air Operations Centre will be established along with C2 and Warning Centres. The ground attack, fighter, bomber and reconnaissance aircraft brigades will be reorganised into tactical aviation brigades. Additionally, the air defence units will also adopt a brigade structure.

By the end of 2011, it is planned to have 16 brigades within the Air Forces (Figure 3.11); the personnel strength will be approximately 35,000 personnel, including 32,000 servicemen.

Figure 3.11. Projected organisational structure and combat strength of the Air Forces, *by the end of 2011*



The **Naval Forces** ensure the integrity of Ukrainian maritime and littoral territories and enable Ukraine to maintain the status of a developed maritime state.

The Naval Forces consist of surface troops, naval aviation, coastal missile troops, coastal defence troops and the marines (Figure 3.12).

Figure 3.12. Branches of the Naval Forces

By the end of 2005 the personnel strength of the Naval Forces is approximately 20,000, including 15,000 servicemen. Combat strength amounts to 15 ships. The Naval Forces are fully provided with major weapon systems and equipment. However, only a quarter of the systems are currently of a modern type. The organisational structure of the Naval Forces is shown in Figure 3.13.

Figure 3.13. Organisational structure and combat strength of the Naval Forces, *by the end of 2005*



By the end of 2011, it is planned to have four brigades, two naval bases and four divisions within the Naval Forces (Figure 3.14). The personnel strength will be approximately 11,000 personnel, including 9,000 servicemen. The Naval Forces will have 15 combat ships.

Figure 3.14. Projected organisational structure and Combat Strength of the Naval Forces, *by the end of 2011*



The development of the Armed Forces is determined by the needs of support and maintenance, day-to-day overall support to training, and the required combat readiness of the forces. The armed services of the Armed Forces are the backbone for the development of combined formations which will be assigned to missions in response to scenarios resulting from potential conflicts.

FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES

The **Joint Rapid Reaction Forces** (JRRF) are a combined operational formation. Their mission is to provide immediate response to threats and armed conflicts in order to contain, neutralise and prevent the escalation of conflicts to wars. The JRRF comprise Land, Air and Naval components.

The JRRF units are manned at approximately 95% level (including 30% contracted servicemen on average). They are provided with weapons and equipment resulting in average resource levels of 95-100%. The level of aviation equipment readiness needs to be improved and some unit materiel support levels should be increased.

The **Main Defence Forces** are the most numerous functional component of the Armed Forces. Their mission is to reinforce the JRRF during the time they are

containing small-scale armed conflicts in threat areas as well as to deploy units within a determined timeline in case of a large-scale armed conflict. In peacetime the Main Defence Forces will maintain a lower level of combat readiness, when compared with the JRRF, and will require more time to deploy.

The Main Defence Forces consist of the military command and control elements, formations and units from the Land Forces, the Air Forces and the Naval Forces.

The mission of the **Strategic Reserves** is to reinforce the Main Defence Forces. They can be deployed prior to or during a major armed conflict.

This functional division in the Armed Forces does not yet fully correspond to the newly assigned missions and possible scenarios for force engagement (See Chapter 2, Figure 2.1). As a result the Ministry of Defence has initiated changes to the composition and personnel strength of the functional components. Within the JRRF and Main Defence Forces some components will be separated according to their assigned missions and their different manning methods, weapons and equipment, as well as different timelines required to generate an alert status of their forces. The Strategic Reserves will be generally excluded from the main functional components.

Beginning from 2006, the JRRF and Main Defence Forces will have two components each. The JRRF will have the *Immediate Reaction Forces* and *Rapid Reaction Forces*. The Main Defence Forces will have the *Augmentation Forces* and *Stabilisation Forces*. Their personnel strength and missions are described in Figure 3.15.

Figure 3.15. Functional structure of the Armed Forces, *by the end of 2011*



Special attention will be focused on accelerated development of the JRRF. In particular, during 2006-2011, it is planned to allocate for their needs UAH 23.3 billion with UAH 15.8 billion designated for the Main Defence Forces. The backbone of the JRRF will consist of the multifunctional air mobile and airborne units that are equipped with medium and light equipment. They will be primarily trained for participation in peacekeeping operations, and they will also be engaged in counter-terrorism operations, and natural and man-made emergency relief operations.

The development of the Armed Forces functional components will be determined by the need to increase the operational capabilities of the forces. Considering the changes to be introduced in 2006, their structure will correspond to missions and objectives (scenarios) of combined force engagement, and it will support Ukraine's aim to become a NATO member.

Generally, the *State Programme for 2006-2011* sets forth realistic tasks for optimising the quantitative and qualitative profiles of the Armed Forces and their structural reorganisation. The Programme aims at establishing Ukrainian Armed Forces that will be combat capable, mobile, small in number and economically sustainable.

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES

The President of Ukraine exercises military and political command and control of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. He is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, and the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine exercise military and political command and control of the Armed Forces of Ukraine within the established limits of their authority.

The Ministry of Defence of Ukraine exercises military and political command and control of the Armed Forces. On the strategic level authority is exercised jointly by the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Responsibilities for direct operational control of the Armed Forces rest with the Chief of the General Staff. He is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Command and Control System of the Armed Forces

As stated above, the command and control system of the Armed Forces has a five-level structure: the General Staff – armed service of the Armed Forces – Operational Command – Army Corps (Air Command) – formation or unit, as described in Figure 3.16.

This system of operational and administrative control basically ensures reliable command and control of the forces during routine activities, preparation for and control of military operations if required and tactical or special warfare operations.

However, one of its principal elements, i.e. operational command and control, is not fully ready to efficiently control combined formations (force groupings) and peacekeeping contingents. In this respect, *The State Programme for 2006-2011*

Diagram 3.16. C2 structure of the Armed Forces, *by the end of 2005*



outlines methods for accelerated improvement of the command and control system of the Armed Forces during 2006-2008. The first step is to change management philosophy by focusing on the control of the combined formations (force groupings) both in Ukraine and other regions of the world during combined operations conducted jointly with partner nation forces.

Structurally, this will require a phased transition from the current five-level operational control system to a three-level operational control system: the General Staff – Joint Operational Command – Combined Formation, Army Corps, and Air Command.

As a result, during 2006 a new element of operational command and control – a **Joint Operational Command** – will be established. It will have the C2 structure common to many of the military systems of NATO countries (Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, UK etc.). In November 2005, in accordance with a Directive issued by the Minister of Defence, the General Staff commenced establishing the Joint Operational Command. In 2006 the Joint Operational Command will assume the responsibility for planning, command and control of peacekeeping operations. The planning and decision-making procedures used by this control element will fully correspond to the procedures of NATO nations.

In 2006 the command and control elements of operational commands will be released from responsibilities for operational planning of force engagement. In order to accelerate this process the General Staff has planned to place the command and control elements of two army corps, along with their respective troops, under direct control of the Land Forces Command during 2006.

In 2008 the **Armed Service Commands** will be reorganised to **Directorates**. They will be mainly responsible for training their respective forces. The overall reduction of personnel strength in the Commands of the three armed services will total over 1,000 authorised positions.

It is also planned to reorganise the **Air Commands** into **C2 and Warning Centres of the Armed Forces.** They will be linked by the Single Automated Command and Control System and, possibly, in the future – to the Unified NATO Warning System.

After the implementation of the above mentioned package of measures, the operational control system will adopt the three-level structure (Figure 3.17).

Figure 3.17. Projected C2 Structure of the Armed Forces, *by the end of 2011*



Figure 3.18. Structure of Joint Support Forces, *by the end of 2006*



Beginning from 2008, the Joint Operational Command will provide operational planning; the territorial defence planning will be provided by the Territorial Directorates established on the basis of the Operational Commands.

After the implementation of the aforementioned decisions, the command and control elements of the operational commands will not be responsible for force combat and mobilisation readiness; they will instead focus their efforts on disbandment of formations and units, disposing of the infrastructure of disbanded military garrisons, management of disposal of excessive stocks of weapons, equipment, missiles or rockets, ammunitions, and other assets as specified by *the State Programme for 2006-2011*. Personnel strength of these command and control elements will be reduced by 300-350 officer positions (approximately 30-40% of the authorized strength), the number and personnel strength of support units responsible for supporting the departments of the operational commands will also be minimized.

The **Joint Support Forces** will be responsible for logistic system management within the Armed Forces. The Joint Support Forces will be established in 2006 on the basis of the Support Forces Command (Figure 3.18).

Changes in the Armed Forces command and control system have been carefully calculated, and they will be implemented in a well-planned and consistent manner. They will not affect negatively the force combat readiness and efficiency of command and control. The effectiveness of this approach was proved by the structural changes implemented in 2005. For example, the disbandment of the Northern Operational Command based in the city of Chernihiv took place simultaneously with the establishment of the Territorial Directorate ”North“ responsible for organisation of territorial defence, maintaining the records of mobilisation resources and mobilisation call-up. These processes were carried out according to a carefully planned schedule, so that they supplemented each other and did not decrease the level of operational control or command efficiency.

In order to increase operational efficiency of the command and control system, it is planned to introduce modern communication and information exchange equipment. In particular, beginning from 2006, the Command and Control Centre will exercise control of the peacekeeping contingents in conference call mode. Additionally, it is planned to establish in the near future direct information exchange channels with command and control elements of NATO member nations.

In general, the planned improvement of the Armed Forces command and control system will increase the speed of decision-making and efficiency of force command and control. It will also foster alignment of staff procedures to the standards used by NATO member nations.

GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE

In order to adjust the General Staff organisational structure to the assigned missions and to meet the requirement to bring the military command and control system in line with NATO standards, the General Staff will adopt the J structure, used by NATO countries (Figures 3.19, 3.20). This structure will help to eliminate excessive command and control levels, increase the share of direct executive officer positions and enhance their level of responsibility.

Figure 3.19. Structure of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, *by the end of 2005*



In order to accomplish this task, a detailed and well-structured plan of events has been developed. According to the plan, the following changes in the organisational structure are envisaged:

- the Main Directorate of Personnel (J-1) will in future include the organisational elements of the Main Department for Humanitarian Policy and Welfare Support of the Armed Forces;
- the Main Intelligence Directorate (J-2) will be established in the General Staff;
- the activities of the Main Operations Directorate (J-3) will be focused on military strategic analysis, development of proposals pertaining to strategic deployment of the Armed Forces and development of training policies;
- organisational structure and personnel strength of the Main Directorate of Defence Planning (J-5) will be improved through elimination of irrelevant functions related to support of the General Staff Bidding Committee.

Figure 3.20. Projected structure of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, *by the end of 2011*



As previously stated, Joint Support Forces will be established on the basis of the Support Forces Command (J-4).

Simultaneously with the changes in the General Staff organisational structure a fundamental change will take place in the decision-making procedure for force engagement. The procedure will be based on scenario assessments that take into account both the threat and the resources needed to meet the threat as opposed to generally identifying possible threats or only relying on the economic potential of the state (see Chapter 2, Annex 3). This approach has proved its effectiveness in NATO countries. With its introduction, the necessity to approve cumbersome plans for Armed Forces engagement by the President of Ukraine will be eliminated. Instead, a mechanism will be introduced to adjust plans to enable specific units to be engaged in missions under various scenarios.

The General Staff transition to the structure that is close to NATO standards will allow it to simplify the command and control decision-making mechanism, clearly identify the levels of responsibility and authority of various officials, eliminate unnecessary functions from the structural components and significantly cut down the amount of redundant paper communications between military command and control elements.

The organisational changes and modernisation of the command and control system of the Armed Forces will ensure reliable command and control of combined formations and interoperability with respective NATO command and control elements in combined peacekeeping operations.

CHAPTER 4

FORCE TRAINING

FORCE TRAINING SYSTEM,
ITS STATE IN EARLY 2005

ACTIONS TO IMPROVE
FORCE TRAINING IN 2005

WAYS TO IMPROVE
FORCE TRAINING

CHAPTER 4

FORCE TRAINING

Force training for assigned missions is an absolute priority for the Armed Forces. The level of force training is a clear indicator of the efficiency of military command and control.and provides sensible criteria for the rational implementation of the operational elements of military budgets. It is also a determining factor in raising the level of confidence that society has in the Armed Forces and it enhances Ukraine's prestige in the sphere of international security.

In the past the Armed Forces have not been able to effectively organise full-scale force training. In 2005 some positive changes occurred when the annual plans for combat training were fulfilled. The training indicators for the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces were improved and a new system of Armed Forces training was introduced.

FORCE TRAINING SYSTEM, ITS STATE IN EARLY 2005

Until recently the force training system had remained unchanged since the Soviet Army times and basically consisted of the multiple repetition of individual training cycles and was only co-ordinated at the local unit level. The large-scale use of combat equipment and other resources for training could not be sustained in the absence of proper funding and logistic support. As a result, the efficiency of the training system was low and negatively influenced the level of force training.

C2 elements were trained mostly at their permanent location without the experience of deployment to command posts. In addition, the training was only concentrated on theoretical issues. In consequence, staff officers of all levels were losing their skills in practical command and control of operations and of force formations.

The efficiency of professional and command training decreased. The content of its programmes did not take into account the evolution of modern methods of warfare or the changes that had occurred in the nature of armed conflicts in the world within the past few years.

Moreover, there had been no modernisation in the logistics of force training. As a result, there were no simulation instruments based on modern computer technologies, and the available equipment at the ranges and classes had actually exhausted their service life and could not meet all the requirements of training programmes.

Fundamental changes in the organisation of force training were introduced throughout 2005. It was one of the first items to be discussed at the session of the Ministry of Defence Board and declared to be a high-priority category.

ACTIONS TO IMPROVE FORCE TRAINING IN 2005

Despite restricted funding for force training programmes, the Ministry of Defence managed to redistribute the available material resources and commit them primarily to training the units of the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces (JRRF).

This has yielded positive results in the form of significant improvements in the combat training characteristics of the Armed Forces services:

- *in the Land Forces*: JRRF units and elements have completed fire shooting programmes and combat vehicle driving programmes, while the parachuting programme has exceeded planned targets by 15%; the average number of

flying hours per army aviation crew has increased by 2.5 times in the JRRF, from 40 hours in 2004 to over 90 hours in 2005, and by 1.3 times in the Main Defence Forces, from 17 hours to almost 24 hours respectively;

- *in the Air Forces*: the flight training plan has been completed at the level of 86%, while the figure for 2004 had been 56%; the average number of flying hours per crew has increased by 1.5 times in the JRRF, from 56.5 hours to almost 86 hours, and by 1.3 times in the Main Defence Forces, from 18.5 hours to 23 hours; pilot training programmes now include tactical manoeuvres and joint actions for air flights and squadrons that were missing in recent years;
- *in the Naval Forces*: combat training plans have been completed at the level of 100% for the land component and 90% for the ships, boats and JRRF units; the period of training at sea has gone up by 1.1 times for JRRF ships, from 23 days to 25 days, by 1.5 times for the Main Defence Forces, from eight to twelve days; the average number of flying hours per Naval aviation crew assigned to JRRF has increased by over 6.5 times, from about 10 hours to 67.5 hours; and special attention has been paid to achieving JRRF units and elements interoperability with NATO forces for participation in combined operations.

The main event in force training in 2005 was Reaction-2005, the integrated operational-tactical exercise with the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces, at which the President of Ukraine was present. The exercise involved 6,500 servicemen using 590 pieces of weapons and equipment, including over 100 tanks and armoured personnel carriers, 20 aircraft, 12 helicopters and 9 ships.

The missions of the exercise were performed simultaneously at different test grounds of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: a series of tactical and tactical flying missions was carried out at Zhytomyr all-services range; the Black Sea and the Opuk amphibious range was the site of tactical training in amphibious and air landing operations; a tactical flying exercise was conducted at Kyiv-Olexandrivka Air Forces range; while tactical exercises of airborne and paraborne elements were carried out at the Shyroky Lan all-services range (see insertion *Exircise "Reaction-2005"* for details).

The exercises made it possible to test new forms and methods of deploying the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces, evaluate their efficiency and identify the areas for improvements in force training.

WAYS TO IMPROVE FORCE TRAINING

Changes have been introduced into the training system that take account of the revised missions of the Armed Forces stemming directly from the operations in which they may be engaged, such as counter-terrorist actions and relief operations for natural or man-made emergencies. Other reasons for introducing the changes are the reduction of conscript service to twelve months and the transition to contractual manning arrangements.

Figure 4.1. New system of force training



Force training has already been reorganised to include one annual training cycle of 11 months (Figure 4.1).

From the beginning of the 2006 academic year, significant attention will be focused on individual professional training of soldiers and sergeants to help them adapt quickly to unit operations. Another focus will be the training of units, i.e. sections, platoons and companies.

Tactical exercises for these elements will be carried out once a year upon completion of the co-ordination stages.

The number of tactical exercises for all the types of elements will be reduced by 50%. Brigade tactical

Exercise “Reaction - 2005”

Complex of tactical and tactical flying missions carried out at Zhitomir all-services training range

Participants:
- reinforced mechanized battalion,
- aeromobile company,
- combined helicopter squadron
- ground attack flight

Performed exercises:
- state border cover,
- combating illegal armed formations and commando-reconnaissance groups

Tactical training in amphibious and air landing operations at Black Sea area and Opuk amphibious range

Participants:
- marines company,
- medium amphibious ship “Kirovohrad”,
- army aviation helicopter flight,
- two fighters

Performed exercises:
- landing tactical airborne troops by helicopters,
- amphibious operation,
- destroying camp of an illegal armed formation

Tactical flying exercise at Kyiv-Olexandrivka Air Forces range

Participants:
ground attack flight,
bomber flight

Performed exercises:
- aerial reconnaissance,
- destroying targets with air means

Table 4.1. Periodicity of tactical battalion and brigade exercises

Exercises level	Periodicity	Level of decision adoption
Tactical battalion exercises with live fire	1 per year	Number of battalions – by Commander of an armed service of the Armed Forces
Tactical battalion exercises without live fire	1 per year	
Tactical brigade exercises with live fire	1 per 3-5 year	Chief of the General Staff, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces

exercises with live fire will be conducted once every three to five years, while battalion exercises will be conducted once a year (Table 4.1).

The procedures for planning training activities as well as evaluating personnel readiness have been considerably revised for the new system of training. Commanders will gradually be granted broader rights in planning the training of their subordinates as well as choosing the subjects of training sessions and methods of conducting them. Higher staffs will only provide guidelines, general objectives and directions, as well as methodological support for unit training.

Commanders will also have the right to evaluate unit training throughout the year and introduce adjustments to training plans. Final examinations will be held not twice a year, as practiced earlier, but once at the end of the annual training cycle, in October. The

Table 4.2. The main indices of training in 2006-2011, JRRF/MDF (Main Defence Forces)

Indices of forces (troops) training		2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Battalions field training (day)	JRRF	80-90	90-100	100-120	120-140	140-160	160-180
	MDF	20-40	40-60	60-80	80-100	100-120	100-120
Ships training with sea campaign (day)	JRRF	60-80	80-100	100-120	120-140	140-160	160-180
	MDF	5-10	10-15	20-30	30-40	40-50	50-60
Training of the Air Forces aircraft crews (hours)	JRRF	80-100	100-120	120-140	140-160	160-180	180-200
	MDF	3-5	5-10	10-15	15-20	20-30	30-40
Training of Naval Forses aviation aircraft crews (hours)	JRRF	90	100	110	120	140	160
	MDF	4-8	8-12	20-30	30-40	40-60	40-60
Helicopter crews training (hours)	JRRF	80	90	100	110	120	140
	MDF	5-10	10-15	20-30	30-40	40-50	50-60

Figure 4.2. Personnel training for work at multinational staffs



promotion of command personnel will directly depend on the training levels of their subordinate elements.

The new system of combat training has already been tested at the units where 100% contractual manning experiment is under way and it has proved to be effective.

Concurrently with the introduction of the new force training system **an experiment was launched to appoint reservists to certain positions** and give them on-the-job training in their specialties at the military units, which is a widely applied practice in NATO countries. As an example, some reservists in Air Forces units are former pilots from the same units, and they require much less time to restore their flying skills. When necessary, this principle can be used to man peacekeeping units and transport aviation elements.

Changes are also to take place in the system of training higher command echelons. To this end long-term plans have been drawn up in accordance with the provisions of the *State Programme for 2006-2011*.

A **training system for the future Joint Operational Command** has been devised to enable it to control joint groups of forces and ensure compatibility with corresponding NATO command and control elements.

For this purpose **a course in staff procedures adopted in NATO countries** is to be introduced to the system of professional training command and control at all levels. Additionally, changes will be introduced to the curricula of higher military educational establishments and advanced training centres for officers.

It is also intended to introduce **new methods of training officers for work at multinational staffs** through participation in multinational exercises, training at multinational staff officer centres, courses in military NATO terminology and foreign language training (Figure 4.2).

Training methods based on computer technologies are to be gradually introduced to the force training programmes. They comprise computer-based command and staff training, or war games, and distance learning programmes for students of higher military educational establishments. Simulation and modelling centres will be established for computer training in all armed services of the Armed Forces. The training facilities in the units will also be equipped with modern simulators.

To save costs, the **system of the Armed Forces ranges** will be streamlined and procedures for their use will be improved.

Specialised training centres (Figure 4.3) will be established on the basis of the existing ranges to ease the workload on commanders by relieving them of the function of providing support to combat training, and also to exercise closed-cycle training programmes for the units up to battalion level.

In 2006 an experimental centre for closed-cycle training of units up to the company level will be established at the range near Zhytomyr.

Figure 4.3. Structure of the Specialised Training Centre



On the whole, implementation of the plans for improving force training will ensure a proper level of combat readiness, including improved performance of command and control elements, formations, units and other elements. There will be increased readiness to perform assigned missions, enhanced capability to operate within multinational peacekeeping forces and interoperability with the staffs, units and elements of the NATO Armed Forces.



CHAPTER 5

PERSONNEL POLICY AND MILITARY EDUCATION

MANNING
THE ARMED FORCES

DEVELOPING
THE OFFICER CORPS

MILITARY EDUCATION

CHAPTER 5

PERSONNEL POLICY AND MILITARY EDUCATION

Personnel policies in the Armed Forces are aimed at providing the forces with highly professional and motivated people capable of performing all the tasks assigned to them.

The main goals of Armed Forces personnel policies are the manning of the Armed Forces (including manning of the reserves) to the correct levels and the development of a high-quality officer cadre. This will require a high-quality system of military education.

MANNING THE ARMED FORCES

In manning the Armed Forces a mixed method of recruitment is currently used, including both fixed-date conscripted servicemen and those recruited on a contract basis. As mentioned above, the term of compulsory military service has been reduced to 12 months (18 months in the Naval Forces and 9 months for University graduates). By 2010, it is intended to fully revoke conscription in favour of manning the Armed Forces with contracted servicemen, which should improve the Armed Forces combat efficiency and considerably decrease the time required for preparation for assigned missions. The preparations for the transition are currently underway.

Figure 5.1. Predictable pace of the Armed Forces transition to contractual manning, *by year's end, personnel number*



In 2005, the Ministry of Defence abandoned the practice of gradually increasing the numbers of contracted personnel due to the lack of adequate resources and legislation. **According to the latest plans of the Ministry of Defence, within the next two years there will be a number of amendments to the laws that regulate financial and economic conditions, subsistence and other provisions for would-be contracted servicemen. This will ensure that improved standards of service are available to contracted servicemen. New training programmes for contracted servicemen will also be developed and experimentally tested. Following these improvements, from 2008 the next stage of increased contracted manning will begin** (Figure 5.1.)

At the same time, in 2005 the outflow of contracted personnel that previously amounted to approximately 6,000 persons per year was stopped. The number of servicemen willing to prolong their contracts for the second and third terms increased significantly (Figure 5.1.) The Chief of the General Staff, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, issued an order in October 2005, adopting regulations for the establishment of Sergeant Councils in the units

Figure 5.2. Manning on contract



of the Armed Forces. This measure should enhance the responsibility levels of servicemen, help improve morale within military groups and foster a culture that will not tolerate abuse or violation of military discipline.

In 2005, **the Centre for Contract Manning** was established together with 26 territorial centres. The Centre branches will be set up in districts and towns in 2006 (Figure 5.2.)

The activities of military units under new contract manning conditions are being thoroughly studied as part of a pilot project where each Service of the Armed Forces is represented by a brigade plus a large amphibious ship for the Naval Forces. The dynamics and the overall result of the pilot project are positive, i.e. combat efficiency has improved in the above mentioned formations where the numbers of contracted personnel have increased (Table 5.1.) For example, the tests and exercises that evaluated combat readiness of the 7 Bomber and Reconnaissance Aviation Brigade proved that the Brigade was at a high state of readiness for practical missions.

Beginning from 2006, the principle of contractual recruitment will also be applied to the **reserves**. Force manning with reservists will be achieved by civilians combining their professional jobs with their service duties in the Armed Forces Reserves in exchange for a financial reward and/or benefits, such as priority admission to educational institutions, free education, free health care, etc.

Table 5.1. Gradual increase of the contracted personnel strength at the experimental units in 2005

Military units	Authorized strength, *personnel (%), as of*	
	June1	December 1
30 Separate Mechanized Brigade	401 (29%)	751 (59%)
7 Bomber and Reconnaissance Aviation Brigade	414 (79%)	502 (96%)
36 Coastal Guard Separate Brigade	456 (17%)	1,079 (41%)
Large Amphibious Ship "*K.Olshanskiy*"	11 (14%)	40 (53%)

To provide a legislative framework for service in the Armed Forces Reserve, a number of principal legal documents have been developed, in particular, the draft law of Ukraine "On Reserves Service" and the draft Presidential decree "On the Structure of Military Reserves in the Human Resources". It is also planned to launch an experiment for manning certain positions with reservists and training the latter in specific military skills. Some 1,200 reservists are to be trained at military educational institutions and centres in 2006, with necessary costs being allocated in the Defence Budget.

The improvements in the system of manning of the Armed Forces and training of the stand-by reserves will have a positive effect on the development of a rational personnel management structure, increasing the prestige of military service and improving the combat efficiency of the Armed Forces.

DEVELOPING THE OFFICER CORPS

To date the Armed Forces of Ukraine have been unable to develop a fully integrated system for career development and support for professional military servicemen.

In 2005, the Ministry of Defence launched a project aimed at establishing a centralised system of personnel management which will comply with NATO standards.

A working group headed by the First Deputy Minister of Defence was set up to develop an appropriate legal framework and provide scientific, methodological, technical and financial support for the new personnel management system. The group is currently active.

In 2005, significant efforts were taken to bring the ratio between the main officer categories in line with the standards applied in the world's leading armed forces (Table 5.2.)

Reduction of the overall number of officers in the Armed Forces in 2006 and projected to the end of 2011 is shown in Figure 5.3.

Table 5.2. Correlation of main officer categories between the Armed Forces of Ukraine and leading world nations in 2005 (not including Generals)

Nation	Total number of officers	Senior officers			Junior officers	
		Colonels and their equal, %	Lieutenant Colonels and their equal, %	Majors and their equal, %	Captains and their equal, %	Lieutenants and their equal, %
Ukraine	**54,911**	**8.7**	**16.2**	**25.6**	**28.1**	**21.4**
Germany	37,150	3.7	8.7	20.7	31.4	35.5
Poland	35,838	7.0	13.6	26.2	26.2	26.6
Russia	185,422	7.5	16.8	27.6	28.4	19.7
USA	201,479	5.6	13.8	21.7	33.3	25.6
Turkey	441,023	5.0	3.5	11.2	17.0	62.3
Average		**5.8**	**11.3**	**21.5**	**27.3**	**34.0**

Figure 5.3. The numbers of officers by the end of 2005 and in prospect up to 2011



After introduction of the full list of officer positions and respective military ranks and levels of education in the Armed Forces of Ukraine on January 1, 2006, the number of senior officer positions will decrease by 1,131. The number of junior officer positions will increase proportionately. During the period 2006-2011, changes in the ratio between senior and junior officers will be determined by the overall reduction of officer numbers resulting from organisational restructuring measures.

Figure 5.4. Suggested terms for service in a military rank



Welfare support will be provided to the affected officers through a series of measures aimed at providing adequate financial support. For example, officers who have been downgraded or whose positions have been abolished as a result of organisational restructuring will retain their previous salaries.

In line with the legal maximum age of officers in military service, new minimum terms of service and maximum terms for holding a military rank are expected to be introduced in 2006 (Figure 5.4.).

The current and future changes in the structure of the officer corps will correspond to re-structuring and downsizing in the Armed Forces and the creation of new career and social incentives for officers will help to ensure a more efficient service.

MILITARY EDUCATION

Currently, servicemen are trained in over 60 military higher educational institutions and military educational departments of civilian higher educational institutions (Figure 5.5A). In the course of 2005, the number of personnel working in the military education system was reduced by 5,360 persons, including 3,810 servicemen and 1,550 civilian employees, allowing the Ministry of Defence to cut down its annual expenditure by UAH 20 million.

By the end of 2005, the number of personnel within the military education system was 31,000 persons, or 11% of the total Armed Forces strength, including over 3,000 teachers and instructors, of whom 164 are doctors of sciences and 1,209 are candidates of sciences.

Following the refinement of the main goals of the Armed Forces and the resulting downsizing and restructuring, there has been a corresponding decrease in the demand for military experts. There is also a need to review the training these experts receive and specializations they hold. This, in turn, will lead to significant changes in the system of military education.

In order to improve the system of military education and bring it up to the standards set by the new tasks and structure of the Armed Forces, the *State Programme for 2006-2011* suggests streamlining the network of military educational institutions and combining their capabilities with those of civilian educational institutions (Figure 5.5B)

Thus, it is planned that by the end of 2011 the Armed Forces will comprise 12 military educational establishments and departments (figure 5.5C) with the number of personnel amounting to approximately

Figure 5.5. The network of military educational establishments of the Armed Forces and main objectives for the development of the system of military education



10,000 persons, or 7% of the total Armed Forces strength, including some 7,000 servicemen and 3,000 civil employees.

From 2007, the Land Forces specialists will be trained for all specialties at a single specialised educational establishment to be set up at Lvivska Polytechnika National University, Lviv Military Institute.

This decision was made after careful consideration by the Ministry of Defence Board. Preparations are currently continuing for the establishment of this educational institution. Vacancies will be partially filled by the operational command officers whose positions will have been cut. This approach enables the Armed Forces to retain experienced officers. The National Defence Academy of Ukraine will start a special course to improve the level of their qualifications.

Along with streamlining of the network of military educational establishments, the state demand for trained military experts is being downsized overall. Approximately 1,200 cadets were admitted to military educational establishments in 2005, which is half the number of graduates from the same year. This figure will meet the requirements of the Armed Forces for officers in 2009-2010 and ensure the necessary rotation of officers for the period up to 2015.

The capabilities of civilian educational establishments are utilised to introduce the practice of training tactical level military specialists using the model ‘civilian student for four years, and military cadet for one year’. Some 1,230 persons are currently part of that educational programme. This has allowed the Ministry of Defence to reduce its expenditure for training junior officers by UAH 57.8 million.

Beginning from 2006, the period for training operational and tactical level specialists will be reduced from two years to one year, as is the practice in most NATO member nations. The standards of education for officers at the battalion, brigade, and corps levels will undergo significant adjustments. For example, for brigade commanders, the standards of education will be raised to the operational and strategic level, and for battalion commanders they will be raised to the operational and tactical level.

In order to improve the selection of the best candidates for military educational institutions, the Ministry of Defence Board made the decision to conduct an experiment in 2005. External evaluation and assessment of the education level and professional qualification for military service was made by the Main Selection Committee in the town of Yavoriv, Lviv Oblast. Following the results of the experiment, external assessment will be conducted on an ongoing basis for all specialties, except for pilots and the ”civilian student for four years, and military cadet for one year” model of training.

Beginning from 2006, the number of teachers and instructors at the National Defence Academy of Ukraine is to be reduced, and the released scientific and

Figure 5.6. The system of officers training



Note: *officers undergo training before appointment to superior positions and every 5 years when holding the same position*

pedagogical potential will be engaged in training officers of battalion and brigade levels at the Qualification Upgrading Centre of the National Defence Academy of Ukraine.

A new system of officer training at the Qualification Upgrading Centre will be introduced in 2006 to provide officers with an adequate level of theoretical knowledge and practical skills prior to promotion to higher ranks and/or when the officer in question has held a position for a long time (Figure 5.6).

Officers will be trained both at the National Defence Academy of Ukraine and higher educational establishments of the armed services. In addition, every officer will have to take a qualification upgrading course several times during his period of service. This is stipulated in the Directive of the Minister of Defence of Ukraine

"On Qualification Upgrading of Officer Corps and Civilian Employees within the Structure of the Armed Forces of Ukraine" issued on December 30, 2005, which clearly defines the terms and frequency of training and lists authorized institutions where qualification can be upgraded.

A rating system will be introduced to control the quality of training with the purpose of applying a unified objective method of measuring the individual level of qualification and relative rating of every serviceman.

Beginning from 2006, the obligatory rotation of teachers and instructors in military higher educational institutions will be introduced. Career promotion for officers who work solely as educational workers is being gradually abolished. Vacancies at the departments of tactical and technical profiles will be filled either by graduates of the

National Defence Academy of Ukraine or experienced army officers, while military educators will be appointed to various positions in units and headquarters.

In 2006, the number of officers receiving military education in higher educational establishments in NATO nations will be significantly increased. The quality of selection for enrolment of officers for these education opportunities will also be improved. Selection will be performed entirely on a competitive basis, with candidates to be approved by the High Evaluation Board of the Ministry of Defence.

Diplomas of certified foreign military higher educational institutions will be officially accepted in Ukraine, and persons who have graduated from these institutions will not be required to complete their education at the National Defence Academy in order to obtain their Master's degree. This is a step toward acknowledging, together with NATO countries, the single standards of education for the operational-tactical and operational-strategic levels provided by the above mentioned educational institutions.

The ultimate objective of military education reform is the development of a modern, economically viable and scientifically grounded system for training highly qualified military specialists for the Armed Forces and other military formations of Ukraine. The qualitative parameters of training will match NATO standards.

Upon completion of the reforms, personnel policy in the Armed Forces, development of high-quality officer corps and military education together will make up an integrated, efficient, economically viable, and scientifically grounded system for training highly qualified military specialists who will determine the professional level of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

CHAPTER 6

LOGISTIC SUPPORT, INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE ARMED FORCES, AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

LOGISTICS SYSTEM

ARMED FORCES INFRASTRUCTURE

ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

CHAPTER 6

LOGISTIC SUPPORT, INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE ARMED FORCES, AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

The combat capabilities of the Armed Forces and their mission effectiveness are largely dependant upon effective logistical support. This conclusion is justified by the experience from a wide range of conflicts including the most recent examples of multinational military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Inadequate logistic support and infrastructure in the Armed Forces of Ukraine will require swift and decisive actions on the part of the Ministry of Defence leadership to ensure more effective use of existing budget funds and the identification of additional resources. The latter can be generated, in particular, by revenue generating economic activities being undertaken by the Ministry of Defence.

The establishment of an efficient logistic support system is an integral part of the efforts being made to reach interoperability between Ukrainian military units and NATO forces during joint peacekeeping operations.

LOGISTICS SYSTEM

The existing support system for the Armed Forces (Figure 6.1) is founded upon military doctrine that dates from the middle of the the last century. It does not take into account the dramatic changes that have taken place in national political military policy is generally ineffective.

The stockpiling of materiel exceeds the real needs of the forces resulting in the maintenance of unnecessary storage facilities and an excessive number of vehicles for transportation purposes.

Attempts were made in 2004 to create a modern logistics system by redistributing functions as appropriate between the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff and establishing a Support Command by transferring over fifty arsenals, bases, and depots under its authority. Unfortunately it did not produce the desired results and efforts to create a unified troop support system based on the territorial principle have not been completed.

Private sector business potential has not been used effectively through the outsourcing of troop support as a result the important objective of achieving direct material supplies to the formations and units has not been implemented.

A number of key decisions were made in 2005 to address the urgent need to improve the logistics system for the Armed Forces, and a number of them have already been implemented.

At the initiative of the Ministry of Defence, the General Staff to radically review the situation and define new more realistic requirement levels for the Armed Forces

Figure 6.1. Armed Forces Logistics System, *by the end of 2005*



in terms of material support. As a result proposals have been developed to reduce material stocks by up to 75%. At the end of 2005 those proposals were submitted for the consideration of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

Beginning from 2006 after the Operational Commands have been disbanded, the logistic support system will gradually improve as a result of the reduction of command and control entities responsible for operational level logistic and technical support. This will significantly simplify planning and troop support. The roles and functions of the eliminated C2 organisations, as well as the subordinated arsenals, bases, and depots, will be gradually transferred to the **Support Forces Command**, and in the future to the **Joint Support Forces,** established on the basis of this Command. The facilities that are subject to downsizing will remain under the Operational Commands until the Commands themselves are completely disbanded.

As the Armed Services Commands undergo reorganisation into respective Staffs, they will retain the function of supplying the troops with the types of materiel that will be specific for their subordinated forces. For instance, the Naval Forces will maintain authority over supplying mines and torpedoes, and search and rescue equipment, while the Air Forces will supply navigation equipment, airfield ground support equipment, etc.

Thus, the future supply system, built around the **Joint Support Forces,** will be based upon the above-mentioned **Joint Supply Centres for Special Equipment, Weapons and Equipment, Missiles, Ammunition, and Materiel** (Figure 6.2).

In order to find ways to improve food supplies for the armed forces by making use of the market economy and to bring support systems closer to the western European models, an experiment has been conducted in the Armed Forces whereby private businesses have supplied foodstuffs to several military units (see Annex 5 for food supply standards). Based on the results of this experiment the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine resolved to source at least 10% of the total food supplies required for military personnel from competitive private sources, beginning January 1, 2006.

This decision has already been supported by practical steps. A tender has been held to select firms and companies with experience in food supply services and, capable of offering a good service at a competitive cost. An obligatory condition was

Figure 6.2. Projected Armed Forces Logistics System, *by the end of 2011*



to provide food supplies in field conditions as is the practice in most NATO countries. In the near future combat unit commanders will see none core functions, such as supply, taken away so that they can focus on their core activities such as personnel training and mission preparation.

In total, the Bidding Committee of the Ministry of Defence completed 460 competitive procedures for the procurement of goods and services in 2005. Of these 299 covered the area of logistic support and 161 were for technical support in total 929 contracts and 715 additional agreements were signed. The Committee enhanced quality control of contract obligations and implementation and as a result sanctions were imposed following 137 claims of non-compliance.

These new approaches are increasing the efficiency of logistic support. For example the delivery times for the supply of fuel to army units in 2005 has been improved by a factor of five as compared to 2004 – from 80-90 days down to 18-20 days.

For the first time in recent years, the Ministry of Defence paid all its outstanding debts to contractors (totalling UAH 26.8 million) at the beginning of the year. This consisted of UAH 1.2 million for food supplies and UAH 25.6 million for materiel procurement.

The aim of streamlining logistic support is to bring it as close as possible to modern market economy models. The gradual involvement of small and medium sized businesses in troop supply programmes will steadily increase the quality of food and other types of supplies, making it possible for commanders to focus on combat readiness and mobilisation training.

The introduction of the territorial model of troop support coupled with electronic accounting for goods and services will enable the Armed Forces to reduce personnel and technical equipment devoted to the logistics system.

ARMED FORCES INFRASTRUCTURE

Military infrastructure includes military and technical facilities, engineering facilities, buildings, communications, and land plots on which military units and agencies are located.

The infrastructure of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine currently comprises over 2,000 military bases, approximately 44,000 buildings, and 455,000 hectares of land.

During 2000-2005, 281 military bases with 7,700 buildings and facilities (Figure 6.3) were transferred from the Ministry of Defence to the central executive and municipal authorities.

Figure 6.3. Assets of the Armed Forces, *quantity by year's end*



Due to insufficient funding, the construction of over 570 planned military facilities has not been completed.

Military bases. During 2005, the Government developed and adopted, at the initiative of the Ministry of Defence, over 30 resolutions, instructions, and directives that were aimed at solving the numerous problems related to the transfer or sale of military installations and individual buildings and facilities. As a result the proceeds of the sales of redundant assets increased significantly throughout 2005. While some 100 separate contracts for the disposal of redundant assets were signed during the four years prior to 2005 with proceeds amounting to UAH 20 million in 2005 just five contracts were concluded but they resulted in greatly increased revenue receipts of UAH 200 million.

In the course of 2005, 55 military bases were sold, and over 4,000 hectares of land were transferred to the central executive authorities. This is almost 2.5 times more than in 2004.

The most attractive military installations are sold at open auctions, with the proceeds used to construct and buy housing for the military personnel.

Over the course of 2006, significant changes will be introduced into sales procedures for the disposal of surplus military infrastructure. The proceeds received by the planned sale of 420 military installations will be used to directly support the development of the Armed Forces and solve social issues related to military personnel. The new procedures will enhance control of the sales of surplus military installations and the Armed Forces will be relieved of redundant assets and non-core functions.

Almost 1,300 military bases are to be vacated by 2011 and over 21,000 buildings and facilities among which 13,500 will be released by the Ministry of Defence and transferred to the management of other executive authorities, while 7,500 facilities are to be sold.

Arsenals, bases and depots. In early 2005, the Armed Forces infrastructure included 159 arsenals, bases, and depots where missiles, ammunition, and other types of explosives were stored. Most of these facilities were overloaded by 130% and almost a third of them were in an unserviceable condition.

During 2005, measures were taken to improve the status of the arsenals, bases, and depots storing missiles, ammunitions, and other types of explosive and dangerous substances. In order to ensure their survivability, safety, and improve storage and maintenance conditions, over UAH 100 million were allocated in 2005. As a result, storage conditions improved at 30% of the facilities.

In addition, 2005 saw the initiation of the construction of 38 military technical and engineering facilities. A total of 10 facilities were placed into operation during the year these were all located in the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces garrisons.

Utility Services. In 2005 funding for the maintenance and operation of the Armed Forces utility services was increased by UAH 1.5 million (4.9%). Leased military property resulted in proceeds of approximately UAH 8.8 million, which was 2.9 million more than in 2004.

Beginning from 2006, a number of efforts will be taken to improve housing programmes for the Armed Forces. Thanks to the centralization of command and control and establishment of four territorial commands, the number of housing committees will be reduced by over a third.

The housing support system for the Armed Forces will be based on sound financial management principles including: conducting competitive tenders, concluding legally

binding agreements, improved quality control, and faster timeliness for services. Intermediate levels will be eliminated from some areas of housing operations and a new support system will be introduced. Utility services will be provided by commercial organisations and state-owned enterprises of the Ministry of Defence.

Implementation of these planned improvements will ensure that the infrastructure of the Armed Forces will correspond more closely to operational requirements and be managed in accordance with modern market economy methods.

ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

The economic activities of the Ministry of Defence are directed toward meeting the requirements of the Armed Forces by the production and sale of equipment and the supply of services through a number of subordinate enterprises and organisations. The other important area of this activity is the disposal of surplus military materiel owned by the Armed Forces. These commercial operations and sales are a funding source necessary to support the defence budget. There was a 39% increase in centralized funding volumes resulting from these economic activities during 2005.

Improvement to production capabilities. The Ministry of Defence possesses considerable technical, intellectual and production potential which allows it not only to help meet Ukrainian Armed Forces requirements but also to maintain a domestic civilian defence capability and be competitive with foreign defence suppliers. The Ministry of Defence manages 193 state-owned enterprises. Some of them are considered to be unique not only in Ukraine but world-wide because of their production capabilities and the quality and range of services they provide.

In 2005, the Ministry of Defence conducted a realistic assessment of the economic viability of continuing to maintain such a wide range of production capabilities. As a result of this assessment starting from 2006 the enterprises and organisations that do not have sustainable development prospects will be gradually closed down, while some 20 state-owned enterprises will be transferred to other executive authorities.

Five state-owned economic associations were established in 2005 based on functional alignments to enable the Ministry of Defence to more efficiently use its enterprise assets they are:

- *Military Construction Industry* Consortium — for the implementation of a comprehensive housing programme for military personnel;
- *Tekhnovoyenservis* Concern — vehicles, armour, and material repair services commissioned by the Government;
- *Aviavoyenremont* Concern — aviation equipment repair, and air transport services commissioned by the Government;
- *Voyenpromservis* Concern — repair of air defence, artillery, and communication equipment, ships refits, etc.;
- *Vijsktorhservis* Concern — operation and maintenance of military commercial enterprises, providing personal and rehabilitation services, military resorts and recreation facilities as well as hotel services.

The establishment of these associations had a positive impact on the economic indices for the Ministry of Defence in 2005. As compared to 2004, the state-owned economic enterprises of the Ministry of Defence increased the value of their production and services by UAH 71.7 million (8.4%) amounting to a total of UAH 924.2 million. For comparison, the production volumes of the national defence industrial complex as a whole increased by 3%.

At the same time, the sales volumes for products and services increased by UAH 159.7 million (15.1%) and totalled UAH 1,217.9 million. The net profit reached UAH 27.8 million, as compared to UAH 20.3 million in 2004.

Taxes and obligatory payments, including those made to the National Budget and the Pension Fund increased by UAH 41.9 million (22.1%), and the exports production level grew by UAH 74 million (19.3%), totalling UAH 456.8 million (Figure 6.4).

In 2005, the number of unprofitable enterprises decreased from 59 to 46 (by 22%), as compared to 2004. As at November 2005, there was a total of 34,2% enterprises within Ukrainian industry that were unprofitable.

Figure 6.4. Comparative characteristics of the Ministry of Defence enterprises, *by year's end, UAH m*



The future economic activities of the Ministry of Defence will be focused upon the preservation, efficient operation, and development of the most profitable enterprises, capable of meeting the requirements of the Armed Forces and working in the interests of the nation in general.

The economic activities of the Ministry of Defence will gradually adapt to the market economy environment. This will promote improvements in the technical status of the Armed Forces, foster modernization and provide additional revenues for force development and alleviating the welfare issues affecting military personnel as a result of defence reforms.

Sales of surplus military property. Surplus military property released by the Armed Forces is sold in accordance with the appropriate legislation and under clearly defined procedures. Proceeds from the sales go to the revenue part of the State Budget and are exclusively used for defence needs.

Proceeds from the sales of military equipment (Figure 6.5) has tended to decrease as a proportion of the national budget in the recent years.

Figure 6.5. Proceeds from the sales of surplus materiel, *by year's end, UAH m*



In 2005,the procedures for sales of military property changed considerably. A complete list of military assets is published on the web-site of the Ministry of Defence. A new procedure for selling surplus property at open auctions was introduced and such auctions have already taken place in many regions of Ukraine.

A total of 193 contracts were concluded in 2005 for the sale of MOD assets bringing proceeds of UAH 202.3 million, which exceeded the figure for the previous year by 4.9%.

An improved mechanism for the disposal and sale of surplus military property has been developed. The mechanism is simple and more transparent and it provides for the following:

- Centralised management by the Ministry of Defence of surplus, written-off, and obsolete property of the Armed Forces;
- Establishment of a single automated system for accounting and control of contracts at the Ministry of Defence and the enterprises and/or organisations authorized by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine; improvements to the database on available surplus military assets and their technical status; exchange and storage of information on the key characteristics of regional markets, potential purchasers, etc.;
- Use of a single standard contract form both for foreign and domestic markets, simplification of the mechanisms for co-ordinating the inventory of military property to be disposed of, as well as streamlining of the relevant paper work;
- Independent expert assessment of the value of surplus military property based on competitive principles, and the sale of military property that has any general economic value at fair and open auctions.

Surplus military property and stocks are a source of additional funding that is important for ensuring the full funding of operations and the continuing development of the Armed Forces. The introduction of new mechanisms for thedisposal and sales of military property will require further improvements in the economic structures within the Armed Forces and the associated legal base.

The efforts being made by the Ministry of Defence to establish a more effective logistics system, streamlined military infrastructure and improved economic activities are aimed at meeting the requirements of running the Armed Forces efficiently in a modern market environment and supporting defence reforms at every stage of their development. The aim is to meet corresponding NATO standards in these areas.



CHAPTER 7

MILITARY AND TECHNICAL POLICY AND MILITARY SCIENCE

EQUIPPING
THE ARMED FORCES

DISPOSAL OF SURPLUS WEAPONS,
EQUIPMENT, MISSILES AND MUNITIONS

MILITARY SCIENCE

CHAPTER 7

MILITARY AND TECHNICAL POLICY AND MILITARY SCIENCE

The military and technical policy of the Armed Forces is primarily aimed at ensuring the provision of state-of-the-art weapons and equipment and maintaining operational readiness in line with Armed Forces missions. Military science plays a crucial role in developing national economic and technological capabilities.

Military science not only meets the current requirements of the Armed Forces, but it also has to anticipate changes and new trends in defence matters in order to concentrate assets in a timely manner in the priority areas and search for most effective warfare methods and techniques.

The current stage in the development of military and technical policy and military science is significant as it will be necessary to overcome negative trends that have emerged in these areas during the previous phases in Armed Forces transformation. The problems include: deterioration of the technical state of weapons and equipment; accumulation of large amounts of excessive weapons, equipment and ammunitions to be disposed of and a disconnection between applied research and force requirements.

EQUIPPING THE ARMED FORCES

The Armed Forces are equipped at 100% levels with the major types of weapons and equipment required. The numbers are shown in Figure 7.1, and their characteristics – in Annex 6.

As at early 2005, over 60% of weapons and equipment had been in service for over 15 years, including 55% of the Air Forces combat aircraft and air defence missile launching systems, 97% of the Naval Forces combat ships, 84% of missiles and artillery systems, 11% of armoured vehicles and equipment and over 97% of wheeled vehicles. 53% of automated C2 systems and 45% of radio electronic equipment are in need of repair. 80% of the guided anti-aircraft missiles and medium-range launching systems do not meet operational requirements.

Figure 7.1. Number of main types of weapons and equipment in the Armed Forces, *by the end of 2005*



That was the situation in which the Ministry of Defence started its work in 2005. With the authority of the President of Ukraine, the next three years should see a comprehensive upgrade of the Armed Forces. To implement this large-scale project, the 2006 national budget has appropriated the necessary funds of UAH 491.5 million (in 2005 – UAH 167.6 million).

The Ministry of Defence now has exact status data on every single weapon and equipment piece, in particular regarding its operational service life and necessary repair timelines. This makes it possible to plan the future life cycle of every weapon type and allocate resources required to extend it.

Throughout 2005, the Ministry of Defence restored its contacts with leading national defence industrial complex enterprises and thoroughly examined their

potential (Figure 7.2). For the first time in five years, research and development projects were carried out in full with no outstanding debt owed by the Ministry of Defence to any researchers.

Figure 7.2. General characteristics of defence industry of Ukraine

The 2005 contracts with defence industries for procurement of weapons and equipment for the Armed Forces amounted to UAH 57.8 million. Seventeen *Bulat* T-64 tanks were modernised, 19 *Barsuk* reconnaissance stations were upgraded and over 550 units of automotive, engineering, navigation and computer equipment were repaired. The Ministry of Defence repair shops provided repair and regular maintenance services to some 1,700 equipment units of the Land Forces and over 1,000 of the Air Forces.

Negotiations are under way with *SAGEM*, France, for a Mi-24 helicopter modernisation project and *Iveko Fiat*, Italy, for the supply of engines for armoured vehicles.

During 2005, some difficult decisions have been made to suspend a number of research and development projects relating to weapons and equipment that were found to have no future requirement. Beginning from 2006 new more relevant projects will be launched, mainly for S-300 Surface-to-Air Missile Systems and MiG-29 and Su-25 combat aircraft upgrades. It is also planned to complete the development of a new guided air-to-air missile in 2006.

The development of a corvette type combat ship will be launched in 2006 in order to strengthen Naval Forces capabilities in the future.

A Joint Rapid Reaction Forces brigade will be equipped with modern digital communication equipment and new AN-70 transport aircraft will be fielded to the Air Forces in 2006.

Taking into consideration that Ukraine is not self-sufficient in terms of having a self-sustaining cycle of weapons production, the Ministry of Defence is going to focus on some key weapons and equipment development priorities.

The weapons and equipment development will comply with the following priorities:

- Development of new automated C3I systems and upgrading the existing ones; development of systems for intelligence gathering, electronic warfare, protection of facilities against high precision weapons; high precision weapons and artillery systems; weapons that are based on unconventional physical principles; aviation weapons and equipment; air defence weapons and equipment; frigate and corvette type ships;
- Upgrading other weapons and equipment in order to enhance their operational capabilities and to extend their service life;
- Development of new high precision aviation means of destruction, radar equipment and automated C2 systems, enhancing combat capabilities of the air defence missile launching systems, their survivability, mobility and intelligence resistance capabilities;
- Enhancing military technical co-operation with leading countries relating to weapons and equipment, defence research and technology development, maintaining a balanced level of exports and imports of military and dual use products.



Design of a new corvette-type ship

Displacement, *ton*	Speed, *knots*	Cruising range, *mile*	Sustainability, *day*	Period		Cost of building, *UAH m*
				Design	Building	
1,200	30	2,000	15	2006-2010	2010-2015	700

Within the Armed Forces, the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces and peacekeeping forces are considered to be the top priority for equipping with modern and upgraded weapons and equipment.

It is planned to develop a national operational-tactical surface-to-surface missile system (this measure will facilitate the revival of the Missile Forces of the Land Forces). It is also intended to equip the Naval Forces with modern missile weapons systems.

The current situation with procuring modern weapons and equipment for the Armed Forces of Ukraine is problematic. On the one hand, the Ministry of Defence has to carry out a huge amount of urgent equipment upgrades; on the other hand, there are stringent resource and time limitations. The Ministry of Defence believes that the best way forward lies in setting realistic military and technical policy priorities and improving management quality.

DISPOSAL OF SURPLUS WEAPONS, EQUIPMENT, MISSILES AND MUNITIONS

The Armed Forces arsenals, bases and depots store a great number of surplus weapons, equipment, missiles and munitions that are physically obsolete and some are unusable on moral grounds. From almost 7 million small arms and light weapons stored by the Armed Forces, 1.5 million pieces, or over 20% of the total stocks, are due for disposal. Almost 1.2 million tons, or 70% of the present 1.7 million tons of missiles and ammunitions, should be disposed of as a result of the expiry of their serviceable life and the deterioration of their technical status. A serious problem is caused by the need to dispose of 16.2 thousand tons of liquid propellant oxidant as there are no environmentally friendly technologies to achieve this.

Storage of such amounts of excessive weapons, equipment and ammunition requires extensive budget expenditure – over UAH 76 million per annum, significant human resources – more than 12 thousand personnel, and most importantly, it presents a risk to the population and creates social tension at storage locations.

Disposal of these stocks will meet the objectives of improving the Armed Forces and it is in line with Ukrainian commitments under international arms control and non-proliferation agreements.

In 2005, the existing legislation was amended and expanded and transparent and universal procedures for munitions disposal were established. Authorised by Government organisations, special state-owned enterprises, private companies, as well as military repair shops were involved in the disposal programmes. There are positive achievements to report in disposing of surplus, unserviceable or obsolete missiles and ammunition. In 2005, 23,100 tons of ammunition underwent disposal. This figure exceeds that of 2004 by almost 15,000 tons.

A draft national **Disposal Programme for Unserviceable Conventional Ammunition and Missiles for 2006-2015** has been developed to take care of such issues as improving the required technological capabilities, accelerating the disposal rate and securing adequate funding for the whole process. The total project funding will amount to approximately UAH 3.9 billion.

The Ministry of Defence has actively sought the assistance of NATO, EU, OSCE and other international organisations in order to attract additional technologies and funding for the disposal of weapons, equipment and liquid propellants.

Table 7.1. Investments of western countries and international organisations to the TRUST Fund

Country Organisation	Investment, € thousand
USA	1,700
EU	1,000
UK	582
Netherlands	300
Norway	240
Switzerland	200
Turkey	50
Austria	30
Luxemburg	30
Bulgaria	25
Slovakia	20
Lithuania	11.5
Total	**4,188.5**

On the basis of a NATO study of the present Ukrainian stocks of surplus weapons and ammunition, a €75.5 million twelve-year project has been proposed to dispose of 133,000 tons of ammunition and 1.5 million pieces of small arms and light weapons.

In November 2005, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and NAMSO (NATO Maintenance and Supply Organisation) signed an Implementation Agreement under which over €7.5 million of Western funding will be committed by a NATO TRUST Fund (*Together Reducing Unsafe Surplus Tools of War*) to implement the disposal programme.

The agreement provides funding for the first stage of the project to dispose of 15,000 tons of ammunition, 400,000 pieces of small arms and 1,000 portable anti-aircraft missile systems. The list of parties that have agreed to contribute to the project is presented in Table 7.1.

Additionally, a European Union project is being implemented in Ukraine to destroy 6.5 million anti-personnel mines, for which the European Commission intends to allocate some €7 million up to the end of 2008.

In July 2005, the Ministry of Defence initiated, jointly with OSCE, the first stage of a rocket fuel components disposal programme, for which the OSCE Co-ordinator in Ukraine has allocated €30,000.

Acceleration of the disposal programme for surplus weapons, equipment, and ammunition will contribute significantly to improving the security of the general population; it will help the Ministry of Defence to release and rehabilitate the areas of the military units subject to disbandment or reorganisation in the process of transformation of the Armed Forces; it will reduce the cost of maintaining excessive equipment, infrastructure and personnel costs; it will also increase the level of confidence in Ukraine's plans for disarmament, promote better partner relations and attract additional funding.

MILITARY SCIENCE

The main tasks of military science are to develop a theoretical basis for national military security and practical methods for its implementation, to formulate military doctrine and force deployment practice, to create solutions for military development problems and develop weapons and equipment.

The military research system is composed of command and control elements, consultation and advisory boards, and research institutions.

The Military Education and Science Department, and the **Weapons and Equipment Development and Procurement Department** of the Ministry of Defence are responsible for managing scientific and technical activities as well as conducting research and development commissioned by the State for national defence.

The Military Science Directorate of the General Staff is responsible for managing scientific and technical activities within the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

On all structural levels of military science and research consultative and advisory boards have been created and they work to validate and co-ordinate decisions made on the most important issues of military science development which affect current activities and the future development of the Armed Forces. The boards promote collective decision making and their proposals and recommendations provide the basis for scientific and technical activities.

Scientific and technical research in the Armed Forces is carried out in the following main areas:

I – Military security of Ukraine;

II – Armed Forces of Ukraine development;

III – Ways and methods of training and engaging the Armed Forces;

IV – Military technical policy, defence technologies, development of modern weapons and equipment, as well as equipping the Armed Forces.

Within these areas, the key scientific problems are identified and tasks are assigned to 16 research institutions and centres. They employ over 480 researchers, including 51 Doctors of Science. The leading scientific establishments of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are the Central Research Institute of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, National Research Centre of Defence Technologies and Military Security of Ukraine and the Central Research Institute of Weapons and Equipment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

In 2005, a total of 354 research and development projects were performed in the main scientific areas (Figure 7.3).

Figure 7.3. Main Areas of Research and Development Projects in 2005



Ukraine's military science institutes have actively contributed to the development of a number of strategically important papers for the Armed Forces. They include the Fundamentals of the Theory of Military Security of Ukraine, Fundamentals of the Armed Forces Training and Engagement, Basic Principles of Joint Rapid Reaction Forces Training and Engagement, Humanitarian Policy Concepts for the Armed Forces, methodologies for testing weapons and equipment, recommendations on adoption of the contractual principle of manning the Armed Forces, and many others.

However, a detailed analysis of the performance of the research institutions has shown that military science is not closely enough aligned with the real processes taking place in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and, therefore, does not provide sufficient direct scientific support to Armed Forces reform. Issues such as defence budget development, defining Armed Forces missions, establishment of a new troop logistic support system, force training and manning are currently beyond the focus of military scientific institutions.

Therefore, the Ministry of Defence is reforming the military research system. Its objectives were reviewed in 2005 and more relevant priorities were assigned.

Beginning from 2006, powerful military science centres will be established by accumulating scientific potential at the leading scientific institutions and at the same time their number and personnel strength will be decreased. A number of units that are not directly involved in scientific research will be closed down.

Following a review of all research projects, the unpromising ones were closed down and the ones that had a similar subject matter were merged. Over 80 research and design projects running in 2005 will be closed down in 2006. The terminated projects were researching methodologies that proved their effectiveness a long time ago, or were dealing with theories that could no longer be implemented by the Armed Forces. Some were working on the modernisation of obsolete weapons. Six studies were merged into a single project under the subject "Basic Principles of Training and Employment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine".

The research institutions will focus on the following priority subjects:

- Improving ways and methods of force deployment;
- Assessing combat capabilities of the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces;
- Development of an automated command and control system for the Air Forces;
- Development of operational and tactical level requirements for future reconnaissance and attack (fire) systems;
- Improving ways of employing the Naval Forces in modern military conflicts;
- Development of a methodology to assess the cost effectiveness of the Ministry of Defence budget programmes;
- Development of a methodology to optimise organisation, combat and authorised strength, and operational capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine relating to real and potential risks and threats to national security;
- Improvement of methods to evaluate performance of the Armed Forces of Ukraine units participating in international peacekeeping and anti-terrorist coalition activities.

Figure 7.4. Areas and Subjects of Research and Development



Applied research in the area of modernisation and development of new weapons and equipment has been identified as a top priority. In 2006, it is planned to conduct fundamental research in this area as part of over 70 design projects and six research projects (Figure 7.4).

Restructuring of the military research system will improve its efficiency and cost effectiveness and assist in finding solutions to the transformation problems of the Armed Forces.

In general, military scientific and military technical policy in the Armed Forces focuses on supporting cost efficiency of the Armed Forces operations in peace time and their effective deployment while performing operational missions.

Improvements in research and development will help create the necessary prerequisites for comprehensive military reform, including the key areas and timescales. It will also ensure the right balance between requirements and resources, in particular, when solving the urgent problem of upgrading weapons and equipment.



CHAPTER 8

WELFARE POLICIES

WELFARE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN THE ARMED FORCES

PROVISION OF SOCIAL GUARANTEES

HOUSING

CHAPTER 8

WELFARE POLICIES

Primarily welfare policies for the Armed Forces are aimed at safeguarding the constitutional rights and freedoms of servicemen and their families. In addition, they provide the framework for the training and development of people serving in the forces and help improve army discipline. They also assist with increasing recreational opportunities for personnel and so foster improved morale.

Welfare policies also have an external dimension, as they serve to promote a positive image of the Armed Forces and help present military service in the best light to civil society. They also ensure a level of military education for pre-conscripts and seek to maintain the credibility of the Armed Forces with the local community.

Safeguarding the constitutional rights of military personnel focuses primarily on providing appropriate social guarantees such as pensions, health care and housing. The level at which social guarantees are provided to the military contributes significantly to the image of the Armed Forces and the appeal of military service.

WELFARE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN THE ARMED FORCES

Welfare policies in the Armed Forces are implemented by the chain of command and the relevant units in concert with government authorities, citizens associations and religious organisations, other establishments and institutions for the advancement of culture and arts, and mass media (Figure 8.1). Civil-military co-operation does not only promote the objectives of well grounded personnel and welfare policies for servicemen, but also makes the Armed Forces more open and transparent for society.

Figure 8.1. Welfare policy system in the Armed Forces



In 2005, a process was initiated to introduce a proactive form of socio-political information and legal education for servicemen, which supported the key objectives of their training and development. The main objectives for welfare policies are supporting the morale of service personnel and helping to achieving higher levels of commitment from people the key elements are:

- raising the levels of morale amongst Armed Forces personnel, taking preventive measures against criminal activities and preventing, where possible, loss of life and injuries;
- promotion of a positive national image for the Armed Forces;
- explaining to all Armed Forces personnel the main thrust of government policy and the consequent effect on defence policy such as achieving the aim of the integration of Ukraine into the European Union and NATO;
- the improvement of the prestige of military service in the view of society
- seeking improvements in standards of military education
- providing for the wide use of the national language in all the areas of activities of the Armed Forces and developing a shared set of tolerant and inclusive cultural values
- promotion of a healthy life style by providing opportunities for the productive use of leisure time, promotion of physical education and sports among all personnel.

Information support for the Armed Forces is provided by the military media (Figure 8.2) and agencies responsible for liaison with civilian media. An important step towards openness and transparency was the introduction of the official Ministry of Defence web-site *www.mil.gov.ua* which is visited by over 20,000 persons every month.

Figure 8.2. Military media



The agenda of welfare training and development activities and of the military media are all aimed at making armed service personnel more aware of general legal issues relating to their service in the Armed Forces. In addition, specific information is provided on important policy issues such as Euro-Atlantic integration leading to the possibility of NATO membership.

An increase in the distribution of military publications is supporting the agenda of raising awareness to illustrate the improvement the number of copies of the magazine "Viysko Ukrainy" was increased from 750 to 4,500, the newspaper "Narodna Armia" increased from 3,500-4,000 to 10,000-12,000 copies. The circulation of regional newspapers also increased approximately two-fold.

Experimentally, a modernised mobile system designed to provide video/broadcasting/ full-colour printing services in field conditions was used to provide news and information support to "*Response-2005 Exercise*", a joint command and staff exercise with the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces. Another experiment has been launched to establish unit halls of fame in the living quarters.

In 2005, to maintain the right of servicemen to freedom of conscience and to provide adequate welfare support, chaplains were attached to the Ukrainian military contingent in Iraq.

In 2006, to promote substantial improvement in welfare activities, it is planned to:

- develop a **Concept Paper on Welfare and Support for Enlisted Personnel** (as from the date of contract to the date of retirement);
- establish a psychological support service within the personnel branch of the Armed Forces; draft new regulations for improved provision of military education.

In 2006, within the framework of a pilot project associated with the transition to manning the Armed Forces with contracted personnel, it is planned to stage an experiment in three brigades concerning the organisation of cultural, educational, social and recreational activities for enlisted personnel.

Essentially, welfare policies help promote greater efficiency within the Armed Forces through improved levels of morale and discipline. They also provide a focus for the education and development of servicemen.

With a view to **promoting a positive image of the Armed Forces and increasing the appeal of military service to young people,** traditional methods are used: e.g. guided tours of military units for pre-conscripts, particularly, when they are celebrating national military occasions; public ceremonies and military band performances; and *Best Marching Song* contests and *What Do You Know About the Army?* quizzes for students. Secondary schools are provided with assistance in furnishing their pre-conscription training rooms with visual aids and army promotional material and also information on military academies and contract service.

In 2005, for the first time in the history of the nation's Armed Forces, a central source was established to supply schools, executive authorities and military units with posters promoting activities of the Armed Forces (armed services). A kit of 24 posters was published to enhance the appeal of military service for young people.

A special pilot project has been launched to improve the **education of young people in military matters**. The project, implemented in conjunction with the municipality of Ukrainka, Kyiv Oblast, envisages that servicemen will teach classes on the history of the Armed Forces, drill training, learning marching songs at the city's schools and provide some basic information on types of weapons and defence technologies.

The national children's picture contest, *How I will Defend my Homeland*, organised jointly with the Ministry of Education and Sciences of Ukraine and the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, had a positive feedback from the general public. 32,000 children from all regions of Ukraine have participated in this contest.

An important part in educating civil society about military history is played by the museums operating under the auspices of the Armed Forces. In 2005 the Central Museum of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and its branches (the Balaklava Naval Memorial Site, Strategic Missile Troops Museum, Volyn Regional Museum of the Ukrainian Army and Defence Technologies) hosted over 58 thousand visitors and gave 2,250 guided tours.

Members of the public were especially keen on seeing the international exhibition *The Red Army Trophies*, as well as the exposition *Golden Treasures of Old Ukraine*, displayed at the Central Museum of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and the *Hiroshima-Nagasaki* exhibition shown at and created jointly with the Hiroshima Memorial Museum, Japan, and the Museum of the Strategic Missile Forces. In 2005 the Balaklava Naval Memorial launched its first topical exposition dedicated to the history and present day of the Ukrainian Naval Forces. During that same year, several photo exhibits were shown, *e.g., Combat Training 2005*, *We Serve Ukraine*, *Yalta Conference*, *For the Sake of Peace on Earth*, *War Children*, and *The Armed Forces of Ukraine: Past and Present*.

An important contribution to the cultural development of military personnel and to the promotion of the army's positive image is made by its cultural branches. For instance, the Armed Forces Song and Dance Ensemble gave a total of 125 concerts in 2005. The artists were applauded by audiences at many garrisons. The ensemble made a laudable presentation of Ukrainian national art at the opening ceremony of the 2005 *Eurovision* Song Contest. It also won awards at the international festival dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II that took place in the People's Republic of China.

Tina Karol, the Ensemble front girl, was the runner-up at the *New Wave* International Youth Song Festival in Jurmala, Latvia. She was also a great success as she performed for Ukrainian peacekeepers in Iraq and Kosovo.

Ekipazh Ensemble of Kharkiv Air Forces University won the Grand Prix at *Vivat, Victory!* Festival in Moscow, Russia, that commemorated the victory in the Great Patriotic War.

Significant attention is paid to the development of physical training and sports. The Armed Forces own 850 sports grounds, over 500 open-air physical training facilities, 210 gyms, 78 stadiums, 27 swimming pools and 15 shooting ranges. Every year competitions are held in Olympic sports and army-related sports, contests are conducted for best organisation of physical training and mass sports events in units and military educational institutions, and competitions for young people of pre-conscription age are carried out on the district, city, regional and national levels.

Co-operation is developing with the sports committees of the CIS countries. Ukrainian military athletes won two first awards, three second awards and a third award in six events at the 2005 Games in St.Petersburg.

The Armed Forces are a participant of the International Military Sports Organisation (International Council for Military Sports) that has over 110 member nations. The Council organises regional championships, World and European championships and the World Army Games.

Ukrainian military sportsmen won 97 gold, 127 silver and 100 bronze medals at the World and European championships in 2005.

Welfare policies are intended to promote a positive atmosphere inside the Armed Forces and a friendly external image to help the community to understand and support its military.

PROVISION OF SOCIAL GUARANTEES

The most important social guarantees in the Armed Forces as of today are health care and housing for all personnel.

Health care

Health systems in the Armed Forces are aimed at meeting the medical needs of military personnel, their families and military veterans. They also maintain the health status of personnel at the levels required for the effective discharge of their duties.

At present, the Armed Forces of Ukraine run 27 military hospitals, including the Main Clinical Military Hospital, 4 central military clinical hospitals, 9 basic military hospitals and 13 garrison hospitals. The health care system has a territorial structure.

In 2005 the health facilities of the Operational Commands of the Land Forces were reassigned to the Health Department of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine and the Western and Southern regional medical divisions were established, setting off the process of fashioning a **common health space** independent of any Service or operational subordination. A proposed structure for the health system is shown as Figure 8.3.

Figure 8.3 Medical support system in the Armed Forces, *by the end of 2011*



In the Armed Forces, health and recreation services are provided to over 2.3 million people (see Table 8.1). An average of 6,000-7,000 persons, including 3,000-4,500 servicemen, are provided daily with in-patient care at military hospitals.

Table 8.1. Contingent on medical provision, *by end of 2005*

Contingent	By form of provision *(thousand)*		Legislation
	treatment and prevention	sanatorium-and-spa treatment	
Servicemen	210.0	142.0	Law of Ukraine "On Welfare and Legal Support of Servicemen and Members of their Families", December 20, 1991
Pensioners of MoD	326.0	391.1	Law of Ukraine "On Status of Veterans of Military Service and Their Welfare", March 24, 1998
Members of servicemen and pensioners of MoD families	585.4	585.4	Laws of Ukraine "On the Armed Forces of Ukraine", December 6, 1991; "On Welfare and Legal Support of Servicemen and Members of their Families", December 20,1991
Civilian personnel of the Armed Forces, working in harmful environment	1.6	90.0	Agreement between MoD and Trade Union for 2003-2007, approved by regulation of MoD Board
TOTAL	**1,123.0**	**1,208.5**	

To meet the legislative requirements of Ukraine relating to the medical support of servicemen, veterans of the Ministry of Defence and their families and other individuals entitled to treatment in the Ministry's health institutions, the existing network of treatment institutions in the Armed Forces is undergoing improvement. As a result, military hospitals are being restructured rather than disbanded in order to comply with the objectives and standards of health services which should be provided to their customer base.

Day care centres have now been introduced as an efficient alternative to in-patient institutions, which ensures adequate standards of care at lower cost.

In view of current requirements, the Armed Forces have reorganised its system of treatment and health-improving facilities for personnel and the veterans of the Ministry of Defence. Currently, resort and spa treatment is provided by 10 military health centres (Figure 8.4).

Figure 8.4. Health Centres of the Armed Forces, *by the end of 2005*



In 2005, the Ministry's health centres provided services to over 75,000 persons, including 20,000 individuals who were entitled to preferential terms.

The medical service of the Armed Forces operates almost every type of resort/health centre: climatic, balneotherapeutic, mud cure, etc. This enables the specialisation of health centres, where treatment of all major types of diseases can be provided.

This improved system of medical provision to the Armed Forces promotes the goal of health protection and medical care for all serving personnel and military veterans, as well as other citizens legally entitled to medical services at the health institutions of the Ministry of Defence.

HOUSING

Provision of housing to the servicemen of the Armed Forces remains a priority of state social policy, as implemented in compliance with the Programme of Housing for Retired Servicemen and Reservists and the Integrated Programme of Housing for Servicemen and their Families.

In spite of these programmes, earlier attempts at solving the problem not only failed (Figure 8.5), but made the situation even worse because of deferred obligations and the growing number of dissatisfied personnel.

In 2000-2004, the waiting list of servicemen without housing was reduced by a mere 9,900 persons.

Figure 8.5. State of provision of housing to the servicemen of the Armed Forces and their family members



The total number of servicemen and veterans legally entitled to their own dwelling is over 60,000.

As of beginning of 2005, a total of 44,200 persons were on the Ministry's waiting list for housing. Of those 13,000 have been waiting for over 10 years. In addition, 17,200 persons discharged in 2004-2005 are entitled by law to receive housing within three years.

Another 17,000 families of persons discharged with honours are on the waiting lists managed by local councils, 3,800 of them being military veterans of 60 years of age and over. Housing issues of this category of citizens are in the competence of the State Department for Retired Servicemen and Reservists and Conversion of Military Bases. In 2005 the Department was subordinated to the Ministry of Defence.

During 2005, the Ministry of Defence took a number of effective measures in order to significantly improve the housing status of servicemen.

Firstly, the actual number of servicemen without their own apartments was identified for every oblast, district and community, and housing construction plans were adjusted accordingly (Figure 8.6).

Figure 8.6. Number of servicemen without housing (*as beginning of 2005*) and construction of apartments in regions of Ukraine (*by end of 2005*)



Note: the data in numerator is number of servicemen without housing; the data in denominator is number of apartments built in 2005

As a result of an inquiry into the legality of the waiting list for servicemen without housing, the list was reduced by 1,638 persons. Thus, an illegal channel of non-entitled use of defence budget funds reaching nearly UAH 160 million was eliminated.

A number of measures have been taken to institute rigorous supervision over allocation of housing to servicemen. Nowadays, the process of allocation is transparent and well managed. The list of servicemen without apartments and the names of those who are given housing is posted on the official web-site of the Ministry of Defence and published in the military media.

UAH 638.4 million were allocated to housing construction in 2005. The amounts invested into housing construction have almost tripled when compared to previous periods. A considerable number of dubious transactions concerning the allocation of land or reassignment of property were terminated, which helped save almost UAH 1 billion.

In 2005, a total of 6,537 apartments were built and purchased through the well-planned use of allocated resources, which was 2.3 times more than the figure for the previous year, i.e. 2,811 apartments.

Of the said number, 6,002 apartments were used to provide housing for the servicemen on the Ministry of Defence waiting list. In addition, 535 apartments were purchased by the State Department for Resettlement of Servicemen and Persons Transferred to Reserve or Retired, and Defence Conversion for the persons on the waiting lists with local governments.

The Ministry of Defence intends to solve the housing problem for the servicemen in Kyiv, Lviv, and Odessa in the course of the coming three years. Particular attention is being focused on setting up a service housing stock to provide dwellings to servicemen before they have reached 20 years of service. By the end of 2009 it is planned to provide additional service housing to nearly 7,000 servicemen.

In 2006, the Ministry of Defence will initiate the development and adoption of a state housing savings program. This will enable the accrual of funds in personalised accounts of servicemen (due to Ministry of Defence target subsidies and voluntary individual contributions of servicemen), so that by the end of 20 calendar years of service the serviceman will be able to acquire a standard home in any region of Ukraine. In case of the extension of service over 20 years, the funds in such accounts will continue to accrue, enabling the holders to buy a higher quality home.

The Ministry of Defence plans to solve the problem of housing in the Armed Forces in a 3-4 year period by setting up a large pool of service housing and providing housing to persons seeking retirement.

The Armed Forces will ensure the observance of the fundamental rights and freedoms of servicemen and their families. The Ministry of Defence will further intensify the welfare and social components of its work. Accountability will become a key requirement of military command and control – senior officers must respect the rights, freedoms and interests of their subordinates and they must protect and improve their conditions of service wherever possible. Troop morale is deemed to be of the highest importance. Compliance with that ethos is essential for the credibility and effectiveness of the Armed Forces.



CHAPTER 9

INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION, PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES AND ARMS CONTROL

INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES

ACTIVITIES IN ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION

CHAPTER 9

INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION, PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES AND ARMS CONTROL

International co-operation is an essential activity of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. During 2005 its external contacts have considerably intensified, in particular at the top level. More than 30 international events were held in the course of the year which the Minister of Defence of Ukraine attended signing seven international intergovernmental and interagency agreements. Over 15 working visits and meetings took place with the participation of the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine resulting in bilateral arrangements on military co-operation.

Major achievements are noticeable in the development of relations with NATO and the European Union. Ukrainian policy has become more transparent and understandable for our partners. The new format of relationship with NATO creates real prospects for Ukraine to acquire membership of the Alliance. Contacts with CIS member-states, as well as bilateral relations with other foreign countries, are also expanding.

The peacekeeping activities of the Armed Forces are a very important element of Ukraine's foreign and defence policy and Ukraine has received considerable international recognition for its positive role in peacekeeping. In addition Ukraine continues to meet a wide range of other international obligations and commitments in a responsible manner through international conventions on disarmament and non-proliferation. As a result, Ukraine's international prestige keeps growing and more partnerships within the framework of global and regional security are being established.

INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

The international co-operation policy of the Armed Forces aims at strengthening confidence among nations, reducing the threat of the use of military force, implementing a European and Euro-Atlantic integration policy and enhancing the capabilities of the Armed Forces through interoperability. The ultimate objective of these policies will hopefully be the accession of Ukraine to NATO.

The key areas of Armed Forces international co-operation are the following:

- development of relations with NATO and the EU within the context of Euro-Atlantic and European integration;
- co-operation with the CIS member-states in military and technical spheres;
- development of bilateral relations with other nations.

Development of relations with NATO. Co-operation with NATO is being developed through a number of activities such as reciprocal visits, consultations, meetings at the top military command level; implementation of the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan and Target Plan; Ukrainian participation in the Partnership for Peace Programme and in the Planning and Review Process.

During 2005, **the Minister of Defence of Ukraine** took part in meetings of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and NATO-Ukraine consultations at the Defence Ministers level. They resulted in bilateral arrangements on a number of important aspects of military policy and development and on agreement for the implementation mechanisms for the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan. The defence policy of Ukraine and the reform of its Armed Forces were also discussed in the context of attaining NATO membership.

NATO-Ukraine consultations at the Defence Ministers level were conducted in Vilnius on October 23-24. Following that, Ukraine and 13 NATO Allies signed a Letter of Intent confirming support for the NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on a Defence Reform Programme for Professional Development of Civilian Personnel Employed in Ukrainian Security Institutions.

In December 2005, the Minister of Defence of Ukraine was present at the Washington session of the South-eastern Europe Defence Ministerial Council

where it was declared that Ukraine was joining the organisation whose members are Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia, Turkey and the USA. The South-eastern Europe Defence Ministerial Council is a connecting link for the countries of the region with NATO. Through this initiative Ukraine has demonstrated its willingness to participate fully in regional security systems and taken another step towards membership of NATO.

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine intensified its international contacts in 2005. **The Chief of the General Staff** participated in more than 15 working meetings and visits to Belgium, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Spain and the USA, which resulted in bilateral agreements on military co-operation. In June and November 2005, the Chief of the General Staff took part in meetings of the NATO-Ukraine Military Committee and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Military Committee for Chiefs of Staff in Brussels, Belgium.

In 2005, official visits to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were made by NATO Military Committee Chairman, Commander of Joint US Forces in Europe, Commander of Joint US Navy in Europe; Chiefs of Staffs of Italy and Poland, as well as other military officials.

A significant step in development of relations between Ukraine and NATO was the adoption, in November 2002, of **the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan** and the annual NATO-Ukraine Target Plans. The plans were developed and implemented jointly by the National Security and Defence Council headed by the President of Ukraine and involving the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as other central state power agencies.

The main outcomes of the 2005 Target Plan implementation were the development of the State Programme for the Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2006-2011; restructuring of the Ministry of Defence Main Inspection; establishment of the Ministry of Defence Public Board; placement into force of the Regulations "On Adoption of Operational Procedures for the Air Defence Stand-by Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Peacetime", etc.

A new stage in the NATO-Ukraine relationship started in April 2005 when **Intensified Dialogue** was launched**.** It envisaged that Ukraine's membership issues would be put on the agenda of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council sessions, and Ukraine would participate in the sessions. Ukraine will also attend the periodic North Atlantic Council Ambassadorial sessions and hold meetings with the International Staff and other NATO organisations.

In June 2005, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine drafted and submitted to NATO the Initial Discussion Paper which was a mandatory condition and the first stage of Ukraine's engagement with NATO on Intensified Dialogue.

A working group has been set up at the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine to foster implementation of the Intensified Dialogue objectives. The Group is to work on defence issues within the context of Ukrainian Euro-Atlantic integration policy and participate in drafting the first Annual National Programme of Ukraine's Membership Action Plan.

Contacts with Bulgarian, Estonian, Lithuanian, UK and US experts as well as NATO Liaison Office in Ukraine were intensified in order to ensure effectiveness of the Working Group. The current plan is to invite in 2006 Czech, French, German, Lithuanian, Polish and Slovakian experts as advisors on development of the above-mentioned National Programme.

Ukraine pays significant attention to the participation of its Armed Forces in the **NATO Partnership for Peace Programme** (PfP). It includes, in particular, efforts to enhance the capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to ensure interoperability between partner forces, provide language training to the military and adapt retired servicemen to civilian life.

Approximately 40% of the 298 events planned for the Programme in 2005 dealt with the participation of Armed Forces units in multinational military exercises (Figure 9.1).

Figure 9.1. Major multilateral exercises with participation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 2005

A. In Ukraine or nearby its borders

Co-operative Best Effort
(Ukraine)
Battalion-level tactical exercise
Engaged:
540 personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Missions:
train NATO SOP in peacekeeping/counter-terrorism operations

Peace Shield 2005
(Ukraine)
Division-level computer-assisted command post exercise
Engaged:
4 ships, 4 helicopters and 4 Su-27 aircraft;
320 Ukrainian personnel
Missions:
train joint operations during planning and conduct of multinational peacekeeping operations;
train to achieve interoperability between the land and the naval components

Viking 2005
(Sweden, Ukraine)
Brigade-level command post computer-assisted exercise
Engaged:
52 Land Forces staff officers
Missions:
train staff officers to operate in multinational brigade staff environment

ASSISTEX - 2
(Ukraine)
Command post exercise with unit integration
Engaged:
17 vehicles from the Western Operational Command;
NBC Protection company;
unit of Military Service of Law and Order
Missions:
familiarize with planning, training and execution of NATO-standard counter sabotage and counter terrorism operations

BLACKSEAFOR Activation
(Black Sea waters)
Tactical Naval Forces exercise
Engaged:
Command and Control Ship "*Slavutych*", Rescue Tug Boat "*Kremenets*", 3 Naval Forces staff officers
Missions:
achieve interoperability between the BLACKSEAFOR units to execute assigned missions

B. Outside of Ukraine

Centrifugal Force
(Germany)
Signal units exercise
Engaged:
a communication unit (20 personnel with equipment on staff)
Missions:
train to achieve command, control and communications systems interoperability during peacekeeping operations

Cossack Steppe 2005
(Poland)
Battalion-level tactical exercise
Engaged:
IL-76 Air Forces aircraft;
110 personnel from the Western Operational Command
Missions:
train joint operations of combined arms units during peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations

Commonwealth 2005
(Poland)
Battalion-level command post exercise
Engaged:
13 staff officers from Ukrainian-Polish battalion
Missions:
train the battalion-level units and staff of the Western Operational Command, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, to execute the KFOR missions

Light Avalanche 2005
(Slovakia)
Command post exercise with integration of emergency response units
Engaged:
20 Ukrainian personnel of Tysa battalion
Missions:
train the Joint Ukrainian-Romanian-Hungarian-Slovak staff of Tysa engineer battalion to conduct natural disaster relief operations

Bold Monarch
(Italy)
Naval Forces tactical exercise
Engaged:
Tug Boat "*Kremenets*", Command and Control Ship "*Slavutych*" with rescue airborne team (7 personnel) from the Naval Forces aviation brigade; diver team (12 personnel), 4 staff officers
Missions:
train joint procedures and achieve interoperability during submarine search and rescue operations

Cooperative Key 2005
(Bulgaria)
Tactical exercise of Air and Land Forces units
Engaged:
IL-76 aircraft;
9 staff officers; combined airborne platoon from the Land Forces (33 personnel); air-drop support group (5 personnel)
Missions:
Improve interoperability between the units of NATO Member and Partner countries during air search and rescue operations, medical evacuation and air-drop operations to support the peacekeeping operations

Nearly 30% of PfP activities in 2005 were aimed at *achieving interoperability of command, control and communication systems, logistics, and adoption of NATO staff procedures and standards* which allows Ukraine to extend involvement of its Armed Forces in NATO combined operations and implement provisions of the Programme.

Another 30% of the activities were related to *training servicemen of the Armed Forces at professional centres and language schools at Allied and Ukrainian military educational institutions* with their subsequent internship in command and control elements.

Nearly 800 officers took language and professional courses abroad in 2005. A total of 24 representatives of the Armed Forces worked as interns at the structural departments of the National Defence Ministry of the Republic of Poland in September 2005 with the purpose of upgrading the professional level of Armed Forces servicemen, primarily those serving in the experimental brigades and studying the Polish Army's experience in the adoption of NATO standards.

Ten advanced English learning groups have been planned for 2006, with a 12-week course. The network of English language courses to be set up in the Armed Forces will allow the teaching of up to 1,170 servicemen annually.

NATO-Ukrainian co-operation programmes pay special attention to the problem of the *adaptation of former servicemen to civilian status*. Almost 440 reserve or retired servicemen took resettlement courses in 2005. The related NATO expenditure in this area increased by 30% in 2005 compared to the previous year.

Language courses and professional resettlement centres are currently functioning in Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv, Lviv, Odesa and Khmelnytskiy. Further courses and centres will be started in Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv and Kharkiv (Figure 9.2). Nearly 400 former servicemen have been provided with jobs as a result of these initiatives, including 75 persons finding work abroad.

Diagram 9.2. Resettlement centers for retired or discharged servicemen

City	Servicemen in resettlement courses
Kyiv	175
Odesa	97
Dnipropetrovsk	75
Lviv	49
Khmelnytskiy	44
In future	
Kharkiv	140
Kirovohrad	70
Mykolayiv	70

The Project on Disposal of Surplus Weapons and Munitions in Ukraine (see Chapter 7 for details) is a particular area of NATO-Ukraine PfP co-operation. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and US President George Bush declared at the NATO-Ukraine Commission meeting on February 22, 2005 that a PfP TRUST Fund project on disposal of munitions, small arms and man-portable air defence systems had been launched.

In November 2005, an Implementation Agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and NATO Maintenance and Supply Organisation (NAMSO) was concluded at the meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Armaments. According to the Agreement, eleven NATO member-states are providing funding to the project at present and the EU joined the project in December 2005.

Ukraine has been actively participating in the Planning and Review Process (PARP) since 1995. In all, 54 partnership goals were planned within the Process for 2004-2005, including 10 for the Land Forces, 10 for the Naval Forces and 7 for the Air Forces.

A meeting of the NATO Political-Military Steering Committee took place on November 21, 2005. At the meeting NATO experts expressed their appreciation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for their achievements in implementing PARP goals. Fifteen Ukrainian units are currently on the list of PARP-designated capabilities (Figure 9.3). Eleven of them have been assigned to the Joint Operational Capabilities Fund within the framework of the NATO Operational Capabilities Concept.

Figure 9.3. Capabilities of Ukrainian Armed Forces designated for NATO PARP

LAND FORCES

- Separate Airmobile Brigade
- Mechanized Battalion; Engineer and Sapper Battalion
- NBC Protection Company
- Special Separate Battalion
- Squadron of the Army Aviation Separate Regiment

AIR FORCES

- Four military transportation aircraft
- AN-26 medical aircraft

NAVAL FORCES

- U-130 Frigate with two helicopters Ka-27;
- U-402 Large Amphibious Ship
- U-200 Corvette
- U-760 Small Tanker
- U-705 Rescue Tug Boat with diver team (12 persons)
- Marine company
- Separate unit for countering sub-surface sabotage capabilities

Training of these units has been a priority for the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff since 2005. Thus, an airmobile company, a marine company and a warship of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were tested in 2005 and the results proved their readiness to accomplish tasks within NATO multinational formations.

Ukraine is a major contributor to **NATO-led peacekeeping operations.** It is currently enhancing its participation in the UKRPOLBAT multinational battalion in Kosovo, and the funding for the Ukrainian component has been provided since January 1, 2005, by the State Budget. An agreement on supporting the NATO "Active Endeavour" counterterrorist operation in the Mediterranean has been concluded. Ukraine has participated in NATO operations in Afghanistan, the Training Mission in Iraq and the NATO-African Union's peace-support operation in Sudan.

Ukrainian transport aircraft have provided airlift for cargo and peacekeepers of Canada, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, UK and the USA.

Relations with the European Union are developing within the framework of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan. A liaison officer for co-ordination with the EU Military Staff Group has represented the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine in the European Union since 2004.

Among the aspects Ukraine and the EU discussed within the framework of **EU-Ukraine Action Plan** in 2005 was participation of the Military Service of Law and Order units in the EU-led peacekeeping operations in the Balkans as a part of the International Military Police Battalion.

The Minister of Defence of Ukraine had a meeting with Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy during the Ninth EU-Ukraine Summit in Kyiv, in December 2005. The parties declared that the European Union would support Ukrainian involvement in the European collective security system and agreements on Ukrainian participation in the air traffic system and the global navigation satellite system were signed at the Summit.

In 2005 Ukraine and the European Union concluded agreements on security implementation procedures for classified information exchange as well as on the general plan of Ukrainian participation in EU-led crisis response operations.

Co-operation with the CIS Countries. Ukraine makes every effort to maintain a stable level of constructive co-operation with the CIS. In 2005 a Ministry of Defence delegation took part in two meetings of the Defence Ministers Council of the CIS Member-States (June, Dushanbe; November, Moscow). As the CIS is being transformed into a mechanism for negotiations and political consultations, Ukraine is concentrating its efforts on developing positive relations with the member-states. Thus, during the above-mentioned Moscow meeting, the Minister of Defence of Ukraine met Defence Ministers of Azerbaijan, Russian Federation, and Tajikistan, and signed bilateral co-operation plans. An agreement on co-operation in the area of National aircraft flight safety was concluded at the bilateral meeting with the Russian Federation Defence Minister. Plans for bilateral co-operation between Defence Ministries were also signed with Belarus and Kazakhstan.

Bilateral Relations with other Countries. As of late 2005, Ukraine has concluded international co-operation agreements with nearly 50 countries of the world.

The Ministry of Defence delegation visiting **the Republic of Iraq** in November 2005 signed a Letter of Intent on co-operation between the Ministries of Defence of Ukraine and the Republic of Iraq. The Ministry of Defence of Ukraine implemented the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to hand over to the Iraqi Security Forces surplus weapons, equipment and materiel owned by the Ukrainian Peacekeeping contingent of the Multinational Forces in Iraq.

In July 2005, the Minister of Defence of Ukraine paid an official visit to **the State of Israel** for the first time in recent Ukrainian history. As a result of the visit an Implementation Agreement on Co-operation in the Military Sphere was signed.

The implementation of a wide range of international military co-operation plans in 2005 contributed to Ukraine's national military policy in the context of European and Euro-Atlantic integration.

International military co-operation is one of the key factors in supporting an appropriate security policy for Ukraine and in restructuring its Armed Forces. In view of this, the Ministry of Defence makes every effort to intensify levels of co-operation. It intends, in particular, to turn to medium-term and long-term models for the planning of international military co-operation. The Armed Forces Military Co-operation Concept and the Regulations on International Co-operation Organisation in the Armed Forces of Ukraine are being drafted with due regard to national foreign policy priorities and the requirements of the State Programme for Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2006-2011.

PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES

Peacekeeping activities by the Armed Forces of Ukraine are very important and underpin the Government's policy regarding the further intensification of Ukraine's involvement in international security systems.

Participation by the Armed Forces of Ukraine in international operations and peace-support missions helps Ukraine gain prestige in the international community and maintain an adequate level of combat readiness for the Armed Forces. It is an essential factor for turning the Armed Forces into a professional army.

In 2005 Ukrainian military units and personnel took part in peace-support missions in nine countries (Figure 9.4). Detailed below is a description of the most important operations.

Figure 9.4. Peacekeeping activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine



International Forces in Kosovo. A national force formed on the basis of the 1 Separate Special Battalion of the Armed Forces of Ukraine started operating in Kosovo in 1999. At present the Ukrainian unit performs its duties as a component of the Ukrainian-Polish Peacekeeping Battalion within the Multinational Brigade East. Since early 2005, resource support for the Ukrainian unit has been coming from the budget appropriations of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine.

In 2005, the Battalion personnel escorted about 16,500 motor convoys carrying humanitarian goods and nearly 100,000 local residents. The Battalion carried out 27,000 patrol missions providing medical and humanitarian aid to about 30,000 residents of the settlements located within the area of responsibility of the Ukrainian unit. Ukrainian servicemen in Kosovo helped the local population fix 30 kilometres of power lines and repair ten schools, three hospitals and first-aid centres.

In June 2005, the Defence Ministers of Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania signed the Letter of Intent on the establishment of a joint Ukrainian-Polish-Lithuanian peacekeeping battalion that is to be a component of the Multinational Division of the Kosovo Peacekeeping Force (KFOR). In view of the coming restructuring of the International peace-support forces, the parties are studying the possibility of setting up a large multinational formation.

The UN Mission in Lebanon. The 3 Separate Engineer Battalion of the Armed Forces of Ukraine has been operating as a component of the UN Mission in Lebanon since 2000. It supervises the territory of some 850 sq. km to the South of the Al-Litany River with more than 60 settlements.

The personnel of the battalion has destroyed over 6,500 explosives including 3,400 anti-personnel mines, nearly 100 anti-tank mines, 330 shells and more than 1,000 hand grenades. They have checked almost 400 km of roads and about 540,000 sq. m of the territory for explosives, developed 14 helicopter landing sites and rendered medical assistance to nearly 10,000 local residents.

The UN Mission in Sierra Leone. The peacekeeping force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Sierra Leone participated in this mission from 2002 until February 2005. It comprised the 4 Separate Repair Battalion and the 20 Separate Helicopter Unit.

In the course of the UN peacekeeping operation, the Ukrainian units transported nearly 175,000 tons of goods, escorted about 120,000 local residents and repaired 4,000 pieces of equipment. It is notable that 100 servicemen from these units have received Ukrainian State awards, UN awards and Minister of Defence of Ukraine decorations for exemplary service.

The UN Mission in Liberia. The 56 Separate Helicopter Unit of the Armed Forces of Ukraine has been participating in peacekeeping operations as a component of the UN Mission in Liberia since 2004. The unit provides air escort for UN peacekeepers' movements, it transports cargoes and provides medical and humanitarian aid. In 2005, it made more than 12,000 flights transporting significant amounts of humanitarian equipment and more than 44,500 persons. Military pilots of the unit have flown for about 12 thousand hours.

Republic of Iraq. The mission of the Ukrainian peacekeeping force in the Republic of Iraq ended in 2005. The 7 Separate Mechanised Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine had served as part of the Multinational Division Centre-South from the beginning of the military operation in Iraq (2003) until May 2005. Later it was reorganised into a 81 Task Force. The Ukrainian contribution to peace and stability in Iraq was much appreciated by the coalition allies and the Iraqi Government. Ukrainian peacekeepers returned to their home country in December 2005, following the pre-election commitment made by the President of Ukraine, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

Ukraine transferred the area of responsibility of the 81 Task Force to the control of the 3 Brigade of the 8 Division of the Armed Forces of Iraq. The brigade, with a strength of 2,700 personnel, was trained by Ukrainian servicemen and certified, with the participation of American and Polish Command of the Multinational Forces in Iraq, as ready to perform designated missions. It is worth mentioning that the Ukrainian peacekeeping contingent in the Republic of Iraq is the only one to have managed the training of a fully capable formation at a brigade level for the Iraqi Armed Forces.

Ukraine will keep fifty representatives of its Armed Forces in Iraq during 2006 – to share expertise, co-ordinate training of the Iraqi Security Forces, carry out projects in reconstruction of the military and civilian infrastructure and render assistance in training Iraqi law enforcement agencies.

Units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are trained for peace-support operations in Yavoriv Training Centre where the International Centre for Peacekeeping and Security is currently being organised.

From 2006, specially trained regular units will be assigned to international peacekeeping operations after they are tested and certified by international experts. This will enable the officers of command and control elements to master NATO standard staff procedures and gain experience in co-ordination and co-operation with the host nation's civil authorities.

Ukraine's peacekeeping co-operation with international organisations is becoming ever more intensive and dynamic. Peace support activities of the Armed Forces are shaping a positive image of Ukraine as a welcome partner for international organisations and leading countries of the world. Ukraine's efforts offer an important contribution to global and regional security.

The Ministry of Defence of Ukraine will continue paying considerable attention to developing the functional potential of its peacekeeping units to promote peace and security.

ACTIVITIES IN ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION

Ukraine fully meets its obligations and commitments undertaken within the framework of international agreements on arms control and non-proliferation. Upon joining **the Australia Group** in April 2005 (export control of sensitive chemical and biological products), Ukraine became a participant in all the international export control instruments without exception.

Ukraine makes a significant contribution to ensuring international security through its participation in the **Open Skies Agreement,** which is effective within the territories of most European states as well as USA and Canada.

It should be emphasised that Ukraine continues to reduce its conventional armaments below the levels established by **the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty** (Figure 9.5). It has joined **the Initiative against Missile Development, Production, Testing and Deployment** with regard to medium-range

Figure 9.5. CFE ceilings and holdigs in Ukraine, ( ) – number of weapons in active units



TOTAL IN UKRAINE

	Total
Personnel	450,000
Tanks	4,080 (3,130)
Armoured combat vehicles	5,050 (4,350)
Artillery systems, calibre over 100mm	4,040 (3,240)
Helicopters	330
Aircraft	1,080

(1,000-5,500 km) and shorter-range (500-1,000 km) land-based missiles, both with nuclear warheads and non-nuclear charges, the launchers, as well as all the relevant auxiliary facilities and equipment.

Ukraine consistently supports co-operation projects in the areas of non-proliferation, disarmament, counter terrorism operations and nuclear security within the framework of the **Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.**

By the end of 2005, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are actively participating in the implementation of more than 30 international treaties and agreements in the security and arms control spheres. They support inspection activities of the member nations within Ukraine, undertake supervision activities abroad and participate in the exchange of relevant information as stipulated by the international agreements.

Ukraine's active participation in arms control and non-proliferation contributes to the establishment of its reputation as an open and reliable partner.

To sum up, one can be sure that Ukraine will continue to enhance the international co-operation and peacekeeping activities of the Armed Forces as well as maintain involvement in arms control and non-proliferation, thereby gaining more authority in the world as an influential participant in international security systems.

Active participation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the development of multilateral and bilateral military relations will help the country reach its objectives in military reform and development, ensure interoperability between Ukrainian units and those of NATO, strengthen relations among the soldiers of different nations and create a climate of confidence and co-operation.



CHAPTER 10

FUNDING OF THE ARMED FORCES

CHAPTER 10

FUNDING OF THE ARMED FORCES

The Law of Ukraine "On Defence of Ukraine" states that national defence needs are to be covered by the State Budget in the amount of not less than 3% of the planned gross domestic product (GDP).

Such a level of funding would provide for all necessary maintenance; restructuring of the Armed Forces; improvement of command and control and logistic support systems; procurement and upgrading of weapons and equipment and the welfare support of servicemen. However, the size of the annual defence budget has never fully complied with the provisions of the Law.

In the past five years the budget appropriations for the Ministry of Defence amounted to 1.37-1.76% of the GDP. As a result, the actual funding of the Armed Forces was much lower than the stipulated minimum requirements and did not reach the levels determined in the State Budget.

In 2005, for the first time, the defence budget was fully appropriated. Moreover, there was a 2% additional allocation (Figure 10.1).

Figure 10.1. Funding levels for the Armed Forces, *by year's end, UAH m*



The Armed Forces were funded at up to 50% during 2000-2002, and at 60-70% during 2003-2004

The surplus capacity of the Armed Forces resulted in spending more than 80% of the total budget on fixed overheads. The ability to increase the defence budget was severely limited by the relatively modest GDP of Ukraine: the World Bank estimates of purchasing power for Ukraine was nearly $5,000 per capita (compared to Germany and France – nearly $27,000; Poland – more than $10,000). Under such conditions only minimum funding was allocated for the development of the Armed Forces, while most of the defence budget was required to meet existing obligations.

Figure 10.2. Comparative assessments of cost sharing for needs of the Armed Forces in 2005



This resulted in an accumulation of unresolved financial problems and the continuation of a negative trend that was common to previous years.

Therefore, the defence budgets for 2000-2004 were not well balanced and left no headroom for development or investment as most of the money was committed to meeting the major fixed cost of personnel.

The experience of developed countries proves that a well balanced budget should allocate not more than half of overall appropriations to personnel costs (Figure 10.2). The critical limit is 75% for personnel support, anything beyond that can be considered to be unsustainable in the long term.

As a result of this unbalanced budget approach, the Ministry of Defence has been unable to provide adequate resources for key issues such as: weapons and equipment repair and modernisation; force training; welfare support; disposal of surplus weapons, equipment, missiles and munitions; restructuring the military education system. These problems have now built up to a critical level in the Armed Forces and require urgent resolution.

As amendments were introduced to the Law of Ukraine *On the State Budget of Ukraine for 2005*, the President, the Government and the Verkhovna Rada supported the move to increase appropriations for the Armed Forces from the previously approved level of UAH 5,294.1 million to UAH 5,925.7 million, or 1.37% of GDP.

These funds were distributed in the following way: 81.5% were assigned for personnel costs; 12% for training and reform of the Armed Forces; 6.5% for the development of weapons, equipment and infrastructure (Figure 10.2). This scheme of allocation was appropriate at that point because the overall budget limitations ruled out any immediate downsizing of the Armed Forces. Therefore, there was no possibility to redistribute funds to the priority areas of force training and modernisation of weapons and equipment.

However, by the imposition of strict fiscal controls and the elimination of inappropriate expenditure, a more effective use of budget resources was made possible. As a result, funding was reallocated to intensify force training and renew some types of weapons and equipment.

While drafting the State Programme for 2006-2011, the Ministry of Defence significantly revised the procedure for planning the Armed Forces financial requirements. The Ministry of Defence changed the method of strength-based proportional fund allocation among the armed forces and introduced programme and target-based models of defence budgeting focused on current and mid-term priorities.

The next step will be to delegate budgeting responsibility down to the level of individual units and force elements. This will mean that all responsible commanders will be engaged in the complete budgeting cycle (identification of requirements –

budget bidding – budget distribution – funds allocation – target spending – spending control). This will enable unit commanders to become active participants in defence planning. This practice will be progressively introduced from 2006.

In 2005, the Ministry of Defence started, jointly with the Ministry of Finance, to develop a modern method of budgeting to ensure transparency of budget drafting and spending. The intention is to utilise EU and NATO nations' experience in restructuring the defence budget to provide clarity for every target programme. Improved regulations and methods for budgeting will be drafted to provide guidance on budget execution and methods for assessing future expenditure efficiency. These principles formed the basis for drafting the military budget for 2006.

Measures have also been taken to ensure transparency and control of cash flows at the Ministry of Defence through the introduction of clear mechanisms of financial accounting and documents circulation.

2006 will be a significant year for the Armed Forces as the State Programme of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Development for 2006-2011 will be launched. This year will see the implementation of most of the objectives that are strategically crucial for the whole national defence sector. According to the adopted State Budget for 2006, the Ministry of Defence has received UAH 8,9542 million (1.74% of the GDP), of which UAH 2 billion are to come from the sales of surplus assets of the Armed Forces.

By estimates of the Ministry of Defence, the projected defence budget should support the effective implementation of all the objectives set forth for 2006, provided the efforts to improve efficiency in budget spending are successful. The sums have been calculated very thoroughly and allocated to the relevant programmes solely on the basis of priority.

From 2006, defence budgeting in Ukraine will gradually reach standards of the developed countries (Figure 10.3).

In future the Ministry of Defence intends to radically change the structure of the defence budget reducing the unsustainable level of expenditure on personnel costs and shifting the emphasis to increased spending on force training and weapons and equipment

Figure 10.3 Ministry of Defence budget structure in 2006



Figure 10.4 Projected Ministry of Defence budget structure in 2011



development. This transition to a more balanced defence budget is to be completed by 2011 (Figure 10.4).

Thus, the defence budget planned for 2006 will support the implementation of the State Programme objectives by concentrating financial resources on the priority areas to develop modern and combat capable Armed Forces. The process of defence budgeting in Ukraine is progressing towards NATO standards through increased transparency, streamlined structures and enhanced control of expenditure.

FINAL CHAPTER

In view of the scope of the missions to be performed by the Ministry of Defence, the General Staff and other command and control elements, the year 2006 is recognised as pivotal in creating preconditions for significant changes in the Armed Forces.

A number of amendments will be introduced to the legislation relating to the Armed Forces, fundamental adjustments will be made in the systems of command and control and logistics. The downsizing of the Armed Forces will continue and strict control over all defence economic activities will be exercised.

The Armed Forces are ready to perform the missions assigned to them and fully implement plans and objectives of the Ministry of Defence.

The priority areas for development in the Armed Forces in 2006 are:

- consistent build up of combat potential of the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces, increasing levels of readiness of the Main Defence Forces and introduction of new systems of combat and mobilisation readiness;
- enhancing the level of training of the Armed Forces, ensuring full-scale implementation of training curricula, driving and firing programmes and flight training of formations within the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces;
- renewal of weapons and equipment, primarily those of the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces, as the key condition for maintaining a high level of combat potential and personnel skills. Principal attention will be focused on the Air Forces, the Naval Forces, army aviation of the Land Forces, command and control and reconnaissance abilities of the Armed Forces;
- continuing the process of establishing a Common Automated Command and Control System for the Armed Forces in view of their restructuring, and introduction of standards and staff procedures adopted in NATO countries in relation to command and control systems;
- the implementation of Decree of the President of Ukraine no.1043 of May 16, 2005, *On Activities For Transition of the Units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to Contractual Manning* focusing on the proper selection of candidates and improvements in their conditions of service;
- strengthening military discipline, adherence to military laws, promotion of the health and safety of personnel and respect for serviceman's rights and freedoms;
- the introduction of harsh measures to prevent corruption and embezzlement, overcome professional incompetence of commanding officers and achieve exemplary discharge of military duty by officers.

The identified areas and measures for development of the Armed Forces have been supported by the President of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada, the Cabinet of Ministers, the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine and foreign partners of our State. This support should ensure the successful implementation of development plans for 2006.

INFORMATION ABOUT LEADING OFFICIALS OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF UKRAINE AND THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE

MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF UKRAINE

Anatoliy
GRYTSENKO

Born in 1957.

Education: 1979 – Kyiv Higher Military Aviation Engineering School; 1993 – Defence Language Institute, USA; 1994 – Air War College, Air Force University, USA; 1995 – Academy of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

During his military career, Anatoliy Grytsenko served as an officer in regular units, an instructor at a higher military educational establishment, staff officer at the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. In 1994-1997, he served as a Chief of the Military Security and Military Development Department of the Research Centre of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Later, in 1997-1999, he worked as a Chief of the Analytical Service of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine Staff. From 1999 to 2005, upon retirement, he was the President of the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies named after Olexander Razumkov.

From February 2000 to February 2005, Anatoliy Grytsenko was an invited adviser to the National Security and Defence Committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. From November 2000 to February 2005, he was also a member of the Civic Council of Experts on Internal and Political Issues under the President of Ukraine.

Anatoliy Grytsenko is the Air Force Colonel (retired). He holds a PhD in Technical Sciences degree, and is a Senior Scientific Researcher.

By Decree of the President of Ukraine, Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine no.154 of February 4, 2005, Anatoliy Grytsenko was appointed Minister of Defence of Ukraine.

FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF UKRAINE

Leonid
POLYAKOV

Born in 1960.

Education: 1979 – Kyiv College of Radio-Electronics; 1983 – Kyiv Higher Combined Arms Command School; 1993 – Combined Arms Faculty, Military Academy named after Mikhail Frunze, Russian Federation. 1994 – Defence Language Institute, USA; 1995 – Army War College, USA.

Leonid Polyakov served as an officer at command, staff positions and research positions. In 1985-1987, he took part in combat operations in Afghanistan. In 1993-1997, he served at the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In 1997-1999, he was a State Expert of the Analytical Service of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine Staff. From 1999 to 2005, upon retirement, he headed Military Programmes at the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies named after Olexander Razumkov.

From February 2000 to February 2005, Leonid Polyakov was an invited adviser to the National Security and Defence Committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

Leonid Polyakov is an Army Colonel (retired).

By Decree of the President of Ukraine, Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine no.288 of February 19, 2005, Leonid Polyakov was appointed First Deputy Minister of Defence of Ukraine.

DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF UKRAINE

Vyacheslav KREDISOV

Born in 1965.

Education: 1989 – Taras Shevchenko Kyiv National University; 1992 – post-graduate research at Taras Shevchenko Kyiv National University.

In 1992-2000, Vyacheslav Kredisov was Director and Chairman of the Board, 'Mezokred' Group. In 2000-2005, he was an economy Advisor, 'New Formation' Association of Entrepreneurs. In 2001-2002, he was invited advisor to the Prime Minister of Ukraine.

Vyacheslav Kredisov holds a Doctor of Sciences in Economics, and is Honoured Economist of Ukraine.

By Decree of the President of Ukraine, Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine no.287 of February 19, 2005, Vyacheslav Kredisov was appointed Deputy Minister of Defence of Ukraine.

DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF UKRAINE

Mykola NESCHADYM

Born in 1948.

Education: 1971 – Kyiv Higher Engineering School of Communications; 1997 – National Security of Ukraine course at Harvard University, USA.

Mykola Neschadym held a number of positions related to military education. From 1991 to 2004, he variously served as Deputy Head of the Department for Military Education of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, Head of the Main Department for Military Education of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, and Head of the Main Department for Personnel Policy of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine.

Mykola Neschadym is a Lieutenant General (retired). He holds a Doctor of Pedagogical Sciences and a PhD in Technical Sciences degree, as well as associate professorship. He is Honoured People's Educator of Ukraine.

By Decree of the President of Ukraine, Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine no.330 of February 25, 2005, Mykola Neschadym was appointed Deputy Minister of Defence of Ukraine.

DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF UKRAINE

Volodymyr PASKO

Born in 1946.

Education: 1971 – Military Medical Academy named after Serhey Kirov, Physicians Department.

Volodymyr Pasko served as an officer in regular units and higher military educational institutions. In 1982-1984, he took part in combat operations in Afghanistan. In 1984-1992, he was an instructor at the Military Medical Academy. In 1992-1996, he was Chief of Military Medical Division of Ukrainian State Medical University, Chief of the Organisation and Planning Division and Deputy Chief of the Main Military Medical Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In 1996, he served at the Ukrainian Peacekeeping Contingent in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1996-2003, he was the Chief of the Ukrainian Military Medical Academy.

Volodymyr Pasko is a Lieutenant-General (retired). He holds a Doctor of Medical Sciences degree and professorship. He is an Honoured Doctor of Ukraine.

By Decree of the President of Ukraine, Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine no.332 of February 25, 2005, Volodymyr Pasko was appointed Deputy Minister of Defence of Ukraine.

DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF UKRAINE

Volodymyr TERESCHENKO

Born in 1946.

Education: 1967 – Sumy Military Artillery School; 1976 – Military Artillery Academy.

Volodymyr Tereschenko served as an officer at command and staff positions. Between 1967 and 1992, he made a career from Platoon Leader to Deputy Chief of Missile Troops and Artillery of a Military District. In 1992-1996, he was Head of the Department for Missile Troops and Artillery of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In 1996-2000, he was Deputy Commander of the Land Forces of Ukraine–Commander of Missile Forces and Artillery of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. From 2000 to 2003, upon retirement, he headed the Main Department for Strategy of Military and Technical Policy of the State Commission for Defence-Industrial Complex. In 2003-2005, he was Head of the Sector in the Central Office of the National Centre for Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine.

Volodymyr Tereschenko is a Lieutenant General (retired). He holds a PhD in Military Sciences degree.

By Decree of the President of Ukraine, Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine no.331 of February 25, 2005, Volodymyr Tereschenko was appointed Deputy Minister of Defence of Ukraine.

CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF – COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE

Colonel General
Serhiy
KYRYCHENKO

Born in 1952.

Education: 1973 – Kharkiv Higher Guards Tank Command School; 1983 – Academy of Armour Troops named after the Hero of the Soviet Union Marshal Malinovskiy, Command Department; 2000 – National Defence Academy of Ukraine, Operational and Strategic Department.

Colonel General Kyrychenko began his officer career as a Tank Platoon Leader. In 1975-1992, he occupied positions of Tank Company Commander, Chief of Staff of Tank Battalion, Chief of Staff of Tank Regiment, Commander of Tank Regiment, Deputy Division Commander, Mechanised Division Commander, Army Corps Chief of Staff, and Army Corps Commander. In 2002-2003, he was Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. In 2003-2004, he was Chief of the Main Staff– First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces. From 2004 to 2005, he was Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

By Decree of the President of Ukraine, Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine no.961 of June 16, 2005. Colonel General Kyrychenko was appointed Chief of the General Staff, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

COMMANDER OF THE LAND FORCES OF THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE

Colonel General
Mykola
PETRUK

Born in 1950.

Education: 1971 – Baku Higher Combined Arms Command School; 1983 – Combined Arms Faculty, Military Academy named after Mikhail Frunze; 1993p. – Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russian Federation.

Colonel General Petruk began his officer career in 1971 as Mechanised Infantry Platoon Leader. In 1973-1991, he served as Deputy Commander of Mechanised Infantry Company, Commander of Mechanised Infantry Company, Chief of Staff of Mechanised Infantry Battalion, Deputy Commander of Mechanised Infantry Regiment, Commander of Mechanised Infantry Regiment, Chief of Staff of Mechanised Infantry Division, and Commander of Separate Mechanised Infantry Brigade. In 1993-2005, he was Commander of Mechanised Division, Commander of Army Corps, First Deputy Commander of Western Operational Command of the Land Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces, Commander of Western Operational Command of the Land Forces, and Commander of the Land Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

By Decree of the President of Ukraine, Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine no.962 of June 16, 2005, Colonel General Petruk was appointed Commander of the Land Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

COMMANDER OF THE AIR FORCES OF THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE

Colonel General
Anatoliy
TOROPCHYN

Born in 1951.

Education: 1973 – Stavropol Higher Military Aviation School for Air Defence Pilots and Navigators; 1986 – Military Command Air Defence Academy named after Marshal Zhukov.

Colonel General Toropchyn started his officer career in 1973 as Flight Senior Pilot. In 1974-1983, he served as Senior Pilot of Fighter Squadron, Flight Commander, Deputy Fighter Squadron Commander, Squadron Commander, and Regiment Chief of Air Fire and Tactical Training. From 1986 to 1992, he was Deputy Commander of Aviation Regiment, Regiment Commander, Chief of Aviation of Air Defence Corps, Chief of Aviation–Deputy Commander of Air Defence Corps, and Chief of Staff–Deputy Commander of Air Defence Separate Army. In 1992-2005, he served as Deputy Commander of Air Defence Corps, Commander of Southern Air Defence Region, Commander of Air Defence Corps, First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defence Troops of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Defence Troops of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and Commander of the Air Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

By Decree of the President of Ukraine, Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine no.959 of June 16, 2005, Colonel General Toropchyn was appointed Commander of the Air Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

COMMANDER OF THE NAVAL FORCES OF THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE

Vice Admiral
Ihor
KNYAZ

Born in 1955.

Education: 1977 – Black Sea Higher Naval Forces School; 1982 – 6th Higher Special Course for Naval Forces Commanders; 1989 – Naval Forces Academy; 1997 – National Defence Academy of Ukraine, Operational and Strategic Department.

Vice Admiral Knyaz started his officer career in 1977 as a Battery Commander of Missiles and Artillery Unit at a Large Anti-Submarine Vessel and served in this position to 1983. In 1983-2005, he served as Chief of Air Defence of Anti-Submarine Division, Chief of Air Defence of Amphibious Division, Senior Officer of Air Defence Section of the Naval Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Staff, Chief of Air Defence–Chief of air defence section of the Naval Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Staff, Chief of Operations Department–Deputy Chief of Staff of the Naval Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Naval Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Commander of Southern Naval Region of the Naval Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (which later became Southern Naval Base), and Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

By Decree of the President of Ukraine, Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine no. 1076 of July 11, 2005, Vice Admiral Knyaz was appointed Commander of the Naval Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

FIRST DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE

Lieutenant General
Mykola
TSYTSYURSKIY

Born in 1955.

Education: 1976 – Leningrad Higher Combined Arms Command School; 1986 – Military Academy named after Mikhail Frunze, Combined Arms Faculty; 1998 – National Defence Academy of Ukraine, Operational and Strategic Department.

Lieutenant General Mykola Tsytsyurskiy began his officer career as Mechanised Infantry Platoon Leader. In 1979-2003, he held positions of Mechanised Infantry Company Commander, Mechanised Infantry Battalion Chief of Staff, Deputy Commander of Mechanised Infantry Regiment, Chief of Staff of a Separate Centre for Junior Specialist Training, Mechanised Infantry Commander, Mechanised Division Commander, Army Corps Chief of Staff, and Army Corps Commander. From 2003 to 2005, he was Chief of Staff–First Deputy Commander of Southern Operational Command.

By Order of the Minister of Defence of Ukraine no.229 of May 4, 2005, Lieutenant General Tsytsyurskiy was appointed First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE

Lieutenant General
Hryhoriy
SAKOVSKIY

Born in 1953.

Education: 1975 – Kyiv Higher Combined Arms Command School; 1984 – Combined Arms Faculty, Military Academy named after Mikhail Frunze; 2000 – National Defence Academy of Ukraine, Operational and Strategic Department.

Lieutenant General Hryhoriy Sakovskiy began his officer career in the position of a Tank Platoon Leader. In 1975-2002, he held positions of Mechanised Infantry Company Commander, Mechanised Infantry Battalion Chief of Staff, Mechanised Infantry Regiment Chief of Staff, Mechanised Infantry Regiment Commander, Head of a Division of General Military Training of the Task Forces, Mechanised Division Chief of Staff, Mechanised Infantry Division Commander, Tank Division Commander, Army Corps Deputy Commander, Head of Department at the National Defence Academy of Ukraine, and Army Corps Commander. In 2003-2004, he was Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Naval Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine–Chief of Coastal Defence Troops of the Naval Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

By Order of the Minister of Defence of Ukraine no.996 of November 23, 2004, Lieutenant General Sakovskiy was appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE

Rear Admiral
Ihor
TENYUKH

Born in 1958.

Education: 1982 – Leningrad Higher Naval Forces School; 1994 – Defence Language Institute, USA; 1997 – Armed Forces Academy of Ukraine, Operational and Strategic Department.

Rear Admiral Ihor Tenyukh started his officer career in 1982 as a Combat Section Commander. In 1983-1991, he held positions of Raid Minesweeper Commander, Driving Crew Commander, Marine Minesweeper Senior Assistant Commander, and Marine Minesweeper Commander. In 1991, he worked for the Committee on Defence and State Security of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine drafting laws to establish the Armed Forces of Ukraine. From 1991 to 1995, he served as a Senior Officer at the Combat Support Division of Naval Forces Department at the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, Chief of Directions Division of Naval Forces Directorate at the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, and Chief of Directions Division of the Main Operations Directorate at the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In 1997-2005, he held positions of Surface Ships Brigade Commander, Head of Organisational Group for Establishment of Combined Fleet, and Commander of Combined Fleet of the Naval Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In 2002, he performed functions of BLACKSEAFOR Multinational Naval Formation Commander.

By Order of the Minister of Defence of Ukraine no.675 of November 15, 2005, Rear Admiral Tenyukh was appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE

Major General
Yuriy
SHAPOVAL

Born in 1954.

Education: 1976 – Kyiv Higher Combined Arms Command School; 1984 – Military Academy named after Mikhail Frunze, Combined Arms Faculty; 1997 – National Defence Academy of Ukraine, Operational and Strategic Department.

Major General Yuriy Shapoval began his officer career as Mechanised Infantry Platoon Leader. In 1976-2003, he held positions of Mechanised Infantry Company Commander, Mechanised Infantry Battalion Chief of Staff, Mechanised Infantry Regiment Deputy Commander, Mechanised Infantry Regiment Commander, Mechanised Infantry Division Deputy Commander, Mechanised Division Commander, Army Corps Chief of Staff, Chief of Military Service of Law and Order of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and Army Corps Commander.

By Order of the Minister of Defence of Ukraine no.996 of November 23, 2003, Major General Shapoval was appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1

LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR THE ACTIVITY OF THE ARMED FORCES AND TASKS OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE FOR 2006

From the very first days of its independence, Ukraine started creating its own military legislation. Its first legal act was the Resolution "On Military Formations in Ukraine" adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on August 24, 1991. It stated that all the military formations located in the territory of the country were subordinated to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. The Government was assigned the task of establishing the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine and start developing the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military formations. The said Resolution started off the **first stage of military development** that lasted till 1996.

The first stage of military development was characterised by: simultaneous development of legislative base for the activities of the Armed Forces and other military formations of Ukraine, reorganisation of their structures, establishment of the relevant systems of command and control, logistics, and other elements required for its functioning.

The following legal acts were adopted to form the structure of security and defence sector of Ukraine: Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted on October 11, 1992, that approved the Concept for Defence, and Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine; the laws of Ukraine "On National Guards of Ukraine" (November 1991), "On Border Guards of Ukraine" (November 1991), "On Defence of Ukraine" (December 1991), "On the Armed Forces of Ukraine" (December 1991), "On Alternative (non-military) Service" (December 1991), "On Security Service of Ukraine" (March 1992), "On Universal Military Duty and Military Service" (March 1992), "On Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine" (March 1992), "On Civil Defence of Ukraine" (February 1993), etc.

Thus, the legislative acts regulated the issues of military duty and military service, alternative, i.e., non-military duty, and adopted the statutes of the Armed Forces, which had a positive effect on the further reform of the Armed Forces.

The Constitution, adopted on June 28, 1996, defined the status of Ukraine as a sovereign, independent, democratic, and rule of law state, justified the need to have a well-grounded State Programme of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Development that would identify the directions and priorities for the development of the Armed Forces, and streamline their tasks, structure, and personnel strength to conform with real and potential threats and challenges to the national security of Ukraine in the military sphere, and economic potential of the nation.

In January 1997, the State Programme of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Development up to 2005 was approved by Decree of the President of Ukraine. Approval of the Programme marked the beginning of the **second stage of military reform** of Ukraine.

A characteristic feature of that stage was a detailed regulation of all aspects of security and defence sector. During 1997-2000, 25 laws were passed to regulate organisation of state defence, mobilisation and mobilisation training, legal regimes

of the state of war and state of emergency, procedures for access of foreign troops to the territory of Ukraine, conditions for their stay, as well as procedures for deployment of units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in other countries. Procedures for state defence commission were defined, as well as legal regime of property and economic activity in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

At the **third stage**, the President of Ukraine as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine took a decision to adjust the above-mentioned State Programme**,** taking into account the changes that had occurred in Ukraine and the world at the end of the twentieth century. By Decree of the President of Ukraine no.927 issued on July 28, 2000, the second State Programme of Reform and Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine up to 2005 was approved, to enter into force on January 1, 2001.

The third stage is characterised with further improvement of the legislation concerning the entire Military organisation of state. Functions and competence of military formations have been clarified and designated, and the functions of non-military and paramilitary formations were defined. The following Laws of Ukraine were adopted: "On Intelligence Agencies of Ukraine" (March 2001), "On Principles of National Security of Ukraine" (June 2003), "On Democratic Civilian Control over Military Organisation and Law Enforcement Agencies of the State" (June 2003), "On State Border Guard Service of Ukraine" (April 2003), "On National Special Service of Transportation" (February 2004), "On Legal Principles of Civil Defence" (June 2004), etc.

Issues of military development in Ukraine were regulated at that stage by the Strategic Defence Bulletin of Ukraine up to 2015 that was approved by Decree of the President of Ukraine no.670 on June 22, 2004. The Strategic Defence Bulletin contained results of a profound analysis of the current status of military formations in Ukraine and its relevance to the contemporary military and strategic situation. It also defined the ways for restructuring the Defence of the State in line with its strategic national interests. Special place in the Strategic Defence Bulletin was assigned to the reform of the Armed Forces of Ukraine up to 2015. The task was set to create the army of a new type on the basis of the existing capabilities.

According to the Strategic Defence Bulletin, it is envisaged that the main form of legal and regulatory support to the future development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be the clarification of the existing legal acts and development of the new national legislation to promote Ukraine's accession to NATO.

The following important laws and other regulatory and legal acts were passed in 2004 in the military sphere with the purpose of improving the legislative framework in the field of defence, and ensuring combat readiness of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:

- Law of Ukraine "On Amendment of Article 3 of the Law of Ukraine "On the Armed Forces of Ukraine" (June). Its entering into force marked the beginning of the practical stage of transition of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from a four-service to three-service structure;
- Law of Ukraine "On State Guarantees of Welfare Support for Servicemen who Retire because of Reform of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Members of their Families" (June), which established the legal grounds of welfare support for the servicemen who retire during the reform;
- Law of Ukraine "On Amendment of Article 12 of the Law of Ukraine "On Welfare and Legal Support of Servicemen and Members of their Families" (June), which regulated the procedure of providing housing to the servicemen;
- Law of Ukraine "On Amendment of Article 43 of the Law of Ukraine "On Pension Support for Servicemen, Commanders and Soldiers of the Interior Service Agencies and Some Other Persons" (June). Its provisions are aimed at elimination

of the disproportion in amounts of pensions depending on the time of retirement, and improvement of welfare support of the servicemen. For this purpose, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine issued Regulation no.895 on July 13, 2004, "On Improvement of the Level of Pension Support for Servicemen, Commanders and Soldiers of the Interior Service Agencies and Some Other Persons";

- Law of Ukraine "On Organisation of Defence Planning" (November), which defined tasks, principles, content and procedure for planning in the field of defence, and co-ordination of government activities in this sphere;
- Decree of the President of Ukraine no.648 of June 15, 2004, approving the Military Doctrine. It is the basis for development and approval of military-political and military-strategic decisions, and development of programmes in the military sphere. Provisions of the Military Doctrine are compulsory for fulfilment by all governmental agencies, authorities of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, as well as local administration bodies within the competence provided for by the Constitution and Laws of Ukraine.

To further develop the legislation and regulate relations within the Military Organisation of the State, the following key documents were drafted and adopted in 2005:

- Law of Ukraine "On Strength of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2005" (March), which planned to have 245,000 personnel in the Armed Forces of Ukraine by the end of 2005, including 180,000 servicemen;
- Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine "On Universal Military Duty and Military Service" (March) that brought down the length of the conscript military service;
- Law of Ukraine "On Approving the Decision of the President of Ukraine on Access of Units of Foreign Armed Forces to the Territory of Ukraine in 2005 for Participation in Multinational Military Exercises" (June);
- Law of Ukraine "On Strength of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2006" (December), which planned, as of December 30, 2006, to have 221,000 personnel in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, including 165,000 servicemen;
- Decree of the President of Ukraine "On Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine of December 19, 2005 "On the State Programme of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Development for 2006-2011" of December 27;
- Regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine "On Measures to Streamline the Network of High Military Educational Institutions and Military Educational Departments of High Educational Establishments" no.381 of May 26;
- Regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine "On Some Issues Concerning the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (on Maximum Strength of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine) no.586 of July 14;
- Regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine "On Adoption of the State Programme for Development of Weapons and Equipment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine up to 2009" no.932 of September 19.

The main areas for development of the legal base in the defence sector for 2006 are identified as improvement of command and control of the Armed Forces, legal regulation of military service and reserve service, improvement of welfare support instruments for the retired servicemen, and regulation of the issues related to downsizing of the Armed Forces. The following projects are being developed, drafted, assessed, and discussed:

- Law of Ukraine "On Introducing Amendments to Some Laws of Ukraine" regarding identification of the functions and tasks of the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in view of the separation of their powers;

- Law of Ukraine "On Reserve Service" regarding certain aspects of reserve service;
- Law of Ukraine "On Introducing Amendments to Article 6 of the Law "On the Status of Military Service Veterans and Veterans of Internal Affairs Agencies, and their Welfare Support" regarding some issues of welfare support of the military veterans over sixty years of age who have no housing;
- Law of Ukraine "On the State Programme for Disposal of Conventional Ammunitions that Can not Be Used or Stored" regarding disposal of surplus military equipment, weapons and munitions with involvement of companies of all forms of ownership and foreign companies;
- Law of Ukraine "On Conversion of Former Military Facilities" regarding removal of defence facilities from the property of the Armed Forces and other military formations, and their further use;
- Decree of the President of Ukraine "On the Military Administrative Division of Ukraine" regarding regulation of the activities of command and control elements of the Armed Forces and other military formations related to defence missions;
- Decree of the President of Ukraine "On Regulations of Military Service of Officers and Praporschyks (Petty Officers) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine" regarding service conditions for the said categories of servicemen in the course of transition of the Armed Forces to the contract principle of manning;
- Decree of the President of Ukraine "On Structure of Human Resource Reserves" regarding establishment of the necessary conditions for downsizing the force strength in peacetime.

PARTICIPATION OF THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE UNITS IN INTERNATIONAL EXERCISES IN 2005

Exercise	Dates	Place	Missions	Participants, weapons and equipment
CMX-2005 NATO strategic-level exercise	January 31 - February 9	Brussels, Belgium	Train crisis management procedures	From Ukraine 2 officers from the Mission of Ukraine to NATO. All NATO countries
BLACKSEAFOR Activation Tactical Naval Forces exercise (Phase II of Stage IV and Phase I of Stage V of establishing the Black Sea Naval Forces Co-operation Task Group)	Stage IV April 1-27 Stage V August 8-27	Black Sea (Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine)	Achieve interoperability between the BLACKSEAFOR units to execute assigned missions	From Ukraine – Ship "*Slavutych*", Rescue Tug Boat "*Kremenets*", 3 Naval Forces staff officers. Over 12 ships and boats from Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey
Black Sea Partnership 2005 Tactical Naval Forces exercise	April 7-9	Istanbul, Turkey	Train to achieve interoperability between the Naval Forces units of the Black Sea countries during peacekeeping operations	From Ukraine – 2 Naval Forces staff officers. 8 ships from Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey
Loyal Mariner NATO operational-level Naval Forces exercise (open for NATO Partner countries)	April 8-29	North Sea	Train joint operations and establish interoperability between the ships and tactical task forces of NATO Member and Partner countries during maritime counter-terrorism operations	From Ukraine – 3 Naval Forces staff officers. Representatives from 18 countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, UK, USA
Centrifugal Force Communication units exercise	May 3-26	Aulenbach, Germany	Train to achieve command, control and communications systems interoperability during peacekeeping operations Develop national state-of-the-art command, control and communications systems	From Ukraine – a communication unit (20 personnel with equipment). Representatives from 43 countries, including Austria, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Germany, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Macedonia, Moldova, Sweden, Switzerland, USA, Uzbekistan
Co-operative Merlin Naval Forces command post exercise for submarine search and rescue	May 23 - June 2	Sevastopol, Ukraine	Train interoperability and adapt general procedures to prevent submarine accidents	From Ukraine – 15 Naval Forces staff officers. Representatives from 9 countries: Canada, Germany, Greece, Italy, Jordan, The Netherlands, Poland, Turkey, USA and 17 representatives from NATO staffs

Exercise	Dates	Place	Missions	Participants, weapons and equipment
Steadfast Jackpot NATO Response Force command post exercise	Phase II May 25 - June 5 (Phase I took place at the beginning of 2005 without participation of Ukrainian representatives)	Valencia, Spain	Train to organise, deploy and train the NATO Response Force staff and transform it into a Multinational Combined Arms Task Force Staff	From Ukraine – 1 General Staff officer, 1 Land Forces staff officer, 1 Naval Forces staff officer. 525 representatives from NATO Member and Partner countries
Bold Monarch Naval Forces tactical exercise	June 17 - July 2	Taranto Bay, Italy	Train joint procedures and achieve interoperability during submarine search and rescue operations	From Ukraine – Tug Boat "*Kremenets*", Command and Control Ship "*Slavutych*" with rescue airborne team (7 personnel) from Naval Forces aviation brigade; diver team (12 personnel), 4 staff officers. Representatives from 16 countries: Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, UK, USA
Co-operative Best Effort Battalion-level tactical exercise	June 19-30	Yavoriv Training Range, Ukraine	Train NATO SOP in peacekeeping/ counter-terrorism operations	From Ukraine – 540 personnel. Representatives from 25 countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Egypt, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Qatar, Serbia and Montenegro, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, USA
Commonwealth 2005 Battalion-level command post exercise	June 20-24	Phase I – Nova Demba Training Range, Poland Phase II – Yavoriv Training Range, Ukraine	Train the battalion-level units and staff of the Western Operational Command, Armed Forces of Ukraine, to execute the KFOR missions	From Ukraine – 13 staff officers from Ukrainian-Polish Battalion. 13 officers from Polish component of Ukrainian-Polish Battalion
Peace Shield 2005 Division-level computer-assisted command post exercise with unit integration (battalion-level tactical exercise)	Phase I June 11-25	National Defence Academy of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine	Train joint operations during planning and conduct of multinational peacekeeping operations	Approximately 350 personnel, including 100 Ukrainian personnel.
	Phase II August 3-17	Starokrymskiy Training Range, Pischana Balka, Feodosiya, Southern Naval Forces Base of Naval Forces of Ukraine	Train to achieve interoperability between the Land Forces and the Naval Forces	Approximately 400 personnel with equipment on staff, including 220 Ukrainian personnel, 4 ships, 4 helicopters and 4 Su-27 aircraft
Breeze 2005 Tactical exercise of Bulgarian Navy	July 4-16	Western portion of the Black Sea, Burgas, Atiya Ports, Bulgaria	Train to achieve interoperability between the units of NATO Member and Partner countries during maritime phase of peacekeeping operations	From Ukraine – 1 Naval Forces officer. 45 representatives from the Black Sea countries
South 2005 Company-level tactical exercise	August 13-17	Beltsi, Moldova	Train mechanized units to participate in peacekeeping operations	From Ukraine – 30 personnel Approximately 50 personnel from the Armed Forces of Moldova
Cossack Steppe 2005 Battalion-level tactical exercise	August 21 - September 7	Vedgin Training Range, Poland	Train joint operations of combined arms units during peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations	From Ukraine – IL-76 Air Forces aircraft, 110 personnel from the Western Operational Command. Approximately 200 personnel from the Armed Forces of Poland

Exercise	Dates	Place	Missions	Participants, weapons and equipment
Co-operative Key 2005 Tactical exercise of Air and Land Forces units	August 24 - September 5	Plovdiv, Bulgaria	Improve interoperability between the units of NATO Member and Partner countries during air search and rescue operations, medical evacuation and air-drop operations to support the peacekeeping operations	From Ukraine – IL-76 aircraft, 9 staff officers; combined airborne platoon from the Land Forces (33 personnel), air-drop support group (5 personnel). Representatives from 29 countries: Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mauritania, Moldova, Morocco, The Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, USA
Rescuer – Medceur 2005 Crisis response and disaster relief exercise	September 9-23	Georgian territorial waters, Batumi Port, Georgia	Train crisis response and disaster relief operations	From Ukraine – 1 Naval Forces ship, Tug Boat "*Kremenets*", diver team (12 personnel). Representatives from Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, Romania USA
Light Avalanche 2005 Command post exercise with integration of emergency response units	September 19-23	Zemplinska Sirava, Slovakia	Train the Joint Ukrainian-Romanian-Hungarian-Slovak staff of *Tysa* Engineer Battalion to conduct natural disaster relief operations	*Tysa* Battalion officers, including 20 Ukrainian personnel
Bold Movie Naval Forces command post computer-assisted counter-mine warfare exercise	October 4-14	Ostende, Belgium	Train planning procedures of NATO-standard counter-mine warfare operations	From Ukraine – 2 Naval Forces staff officers Representatives from 11 countries: Canada, Finland, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Turkey, UK, USA,
ASSISTEX – 2 Command post exercise with unit integration	October 10-15	Yavoriv Training Range, Ukraine	Familiarize with planning, training and execution of NATO-standard counter-sabotage and counter-terrorism operations	From Ukraine – NBC Protection company, unit of Military Service of Law and Order, 17 vehicles from the Western Operational Command. Approximately 500 foreign servicemen with equipment on staff
Co-operative Associated (Cooperative Longbow) Land Forces command post computer-assisted exercise	November 14-26	Scopje, Macedonia	Improve interoperability between land and air components during crisis management operations planning	From Ukraine – 5 Land Forces staff officers. 230 representatives from 12 NATO Member and Partner countries
Viking 2005 Brigade-level command post computer-assisted exercise	December 5-16	Kunsengen, Sweden, Kyiv, Ukraine	Train staff officers to operate in multinational brigade staff environment	From Ukraine – 52 Land Forces staff officers. Approximately 50 officers from 16 NATO countries

ANNEX 3

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DEFENCE MISSIONS SET BY THE PREVIOUS AND NEW ARMED FORCES DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES

Armed Forces Missions	
State Programme of Reform and Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine up to 2005	**State Programme of Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2006 - 2011***
The Armed Forces are to be capable to effectively respond to non-military risks and threats which are: international terrorism; illegal arms trade; proliferation of missile technologies, nuclear armaments and other weapons of mass destruction; uncontrolled migration; religious and ethnical extremism. The forces engaged in the fight against terrorism shall be capable of conducting both antiterrorist (defensive) and counter-terrorist (preventive, offensive) operations and actions.	1. With emergence of threats of international terrorism and their expansion on the Ukrainian territory, the Armed Forces are to be capable, jointly with other national power institutions, to defend designated facilities of national importance against terrorist acts and to effectively resist any possible terrorist action in the air space and within the territorial waters of Ukraine. Besides, they shall be ready to participate, in line with the Ukrainian laws, in the antiterrorist operations overseas jointly with forces of other countries. Selected units and elements of the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces will be engaged in these missions with involvement of military command and control elements and stand-by air defence units.
The tasks within the framework of international peacekeeping operations are: • to prevent international or internal conflicts; • to settle them or enable their settlement by parties' consent or by compulsory measures following the decision of the UN Security Council; • to render humanitarian aid to the population suffering from conflicts; • to ensure security and respect of human rights; • to render assistance in conflict relief operations; • to avert threats against peace, breaches of peace, or acts of aggression.	2. To enhance stability in the regions surrounding Ukraine and prevent international and domestic conflicts, the Armed Forces are to be ready to participate in international peacekeeping operations, to render military assistance to other countries on the basis of international agreements and according to the procedure and terms stipulated by the Ukrainian legislation. To perform this task, the Armed Forces shall be ready **to generate and train peacekeeping forces within 60 days** on the basis of military units of the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces for participating jointly with coalition forces of other countries in **two or three international peacekeeping missions** either concurrently or in succession. The peacekeeping forces are to be capable to conduct special (combat) operations **for six months**, with the subsequent rotation. With account of the peacekeeping units rotation, up to three **task forces with the total strength up to 8,000 personnel and up to 400 combat armoured vehicles** shall be available for the mission.
The Armed Forces are to be ready to provide support to the relevant state authorities and contribute to natural or man-caused emergency relief	3. In case of a natural or man-caused emergencies on the national territory the Armed Forces are to be ready to render assistance to central and local executive authorities and local governments in search and rescue operations during disaster relief. To accomplish missions in the areas of natural or man-caused accidents, including the ones under the legal state of emergency, the Armed Forces may provide command and control elements as well as military units of the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces. Reserve capabilities can be engaged in case of large-scale emergencies.

* The Programme contains a determined list of specific formations and units as well as specific terms of their readiness and duration for execution of every specific mission. This information is classified, thus it can not cited in the White Book.

The tasks during a military conflict are: • to guarantee inviolability of the national border; • to eliminate the armed conflict and promote situation stabilization in line with the international law and national legislation of Ukraine.	4. In case of an emerging crisis in a neighbouring country that poses the threat of mass crossing of Ukraine's state border, the Armed Forces shall be capable of reinforcing protection of the state border and, when necessary, of the exclusive economic (maritime) area and Ukrainian continental shelf. To perform this mission, the Armed Forces are to be ready **to reinforce concurrently or successively protection of several national border sectors in the crisis areas with the regular personnel of the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces. The period of special operations** run by these forces under the legal state of emergency shall be **one month and longer**. 5. When crisis situations in the countries neighbouring Ukraine threaten to develop into a border armed conflict, the Armed Forces shall be capable of reinforcing and protecting the state border and the air space to prevent a possible armed attack against the Ukrainian territory. For this purpose the Armed Forces shall be ready to **protect several state border sectors in the crisis areas concurrently or in succession** with the personnel of the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces. When necessary, the latter may be augmented and reinforced at the expense of the Main Defence Forces. In this composition the Armed Forces shall be ready **to conduct special and combat operations for one month** under martial law conditions.
The tasks in a regional (local) war are: • to protect sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine; • to repel an armed aggression, and to create favourable conditions for conclusion of peace agreements.	6. When a crisis in the neighbouring countries develops into a border armed conflict, the Armed Forces shall be capable of eliminating (localising, neutralising) it at an early stage and creating conditions for situation stabilisation in the border regions of Ukraine. To perform the mission, the Armed Forces are to be ready to prevent spread of the armed conflicts to Ukrainian territory, **to contain and eliminate them in two crisis areas in succession or concurrently** engaging the strength of the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces reinforced by **the Main Defence Forces** that can, if necessary, be partially **mobilized for the period up to 30 days**. The Armed Forces shall be ready **to conduct combat and special operations for one month and longer** under martial law conditions. 7. In case of the armed conflict escalation in the countries neighbouring Ukraine that under certain conditions can develop into an international armed conflict, and its expansion can lead to involvement of Ukraine in it, the Armed Forces are to be capable of repelling a possible armed invasion or attack from the air, land, and sea to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Moreover, military assistance of other countries and international organisations shall not be excluded. To perform the mission, the Armed Forces are to be ready, upon mobilizing its full combat strength, to contain the armed conflict, repel the attack, and participate in defending designated areas of Ukraine. In view of this, they are **to possess mobilization capabilities to deploy extra troops and capabilities** required for reinforcing the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces and conducting territorial defence of Ukraine. After the Armed Forces are mobilised, deployed and prepared for combat, they shall be ready **to conduct military (combat) operations for two months and more**.

PAY OF SERVICEMEN OF THE ARMED FORCES

Table 1. Officers' pay for rank and position

Position, rank	Years of service	Pay for position *(UAH)*	Pay for rank *(UAH)*	Allowances					Total *(UAH)*
				Long service *(UAH)*	100 per cent, monthly *(UAH)*	Work with classified documents *(UAH)*	Unbroken service record *(UAH)*	Bonus *(UAH)*	
Regiment commander, Colonel	longer than 25	185	135	128.00	448.00	37.00	839.70	590.31	2,363.01
Chief of staff, Lieutenant-Colonel	20-25	180	130	108.50	418.50	27.00	604.80	489.11	1,957.91
Battalion commander, Major	15-20	165	125	87.00	377.00	24.75	700.88	492.72	1,972.34
Chief of service, Captain	10-15	160	120	70.00	350.00	16.00	214.80	309.96	1,240.76
Junior officer	5-10	140	115	51.00	306.00	14.00	62.60	229.30	917.90

Table 2. Contracted servicemen's pay for rank and position

Position	Rank	Pay for rank *(UAH)*	Pay for position *(UAH)*	Monthly allowance (for contracted servicemen and praporschyks), *(UAH)*	Total *(UAH)*
Warrant officer	Senior praporschyk	65	140	100	305
Scout	Praporschyk	60	125	100	285
Squad leader	Senior sergeant	50	110	250	410
Senior driver	Junior sergeant	40	105	250	395
Driver	Private	30	100	250	380

Table 3. Conscript's basic pay by pay grade

Pay grade	Basic pay amount *(UAH)*
1	51
2	57
3	63
4	69
5	75
6	81

ADDITIONAL TYPES OF ALLOWANCES

1. According to the Decree no.452 of April 6, 1998 of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, servicemen (except for conscripts and cadets) are paid a rated allowance for service length that is added to the monthly basic pay for rank and position (see Table 4):

Table 4. Allowance for service length

Length of service	Allowance amount
1-2 years	5%
2-5 years	10%
5-10 years	20%
10-15 years	25%
15-20 years	30%
20-25 years	35%
25 years and longer	40%

Table 5. Allowance for unbroken length continious service

Service length	Allowance amount
5 years and longer	up to 10%
10 years and longer	up to 30%
15 years and longer	up to 50%
20 years and longer	up to 70%
25 years and longer	up to 90%

2. A monthly additional allowance in the amount of 100% of the basic pay is paid following the Decree no.173 of February 23, 2002, of the President of Ukraine.

3. The additional allowance for work with classified documents that presupposes access to the State secrets is paid on a monthly basis, according to the Decree no.414 of June 15, 1994 of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, in the amount of 10-20% of the basic pay for the position held.

4. The Decree no.389 of May 5, 2003, of the President of Ukraine established the additional allowance depending on the service length for continuous service record rating from the basic pay of the servicemen who are good in service in the following amount presented in Table 5.

5. In line with the Decree no.829 of May 22, 2000, of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, servicemen get bonuses in the amount of 33.3% of the monthly basic pay.

6. In line with the Decree no.452 of April 6, 1998 of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the qualification pay is paid for high professional skills in a given specialty in the amount of 3-10% of the basic pay for the position held depending on the class.

7. In line with the Decree no.452 of April 6, 1998 of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine the conscripts permanently serving in disciplinary military units, tank crewmen, servicemen of airmobile troops, ship and aircraft crews are paid an additional alowance for special service conditions in the amount of 15-40% of the basic pay for the position held.

RATION OF SERVICEMEN OF THE ARMED FORCES

Table 1. The basic army Ration 1

Food-stuff	Quantity per person per day (grams)
Mixed bread of hulled rye flour and first grade wheat flour	350
Bread of first grade wheat flour	400
First grade wheat flour	50
Second grade wheat flour	15
Cereals	120
Pasta	40
Meat	200
Fish	150
Melted animal fat, margarine	15
Oil	25
Rennet cheese	15
Butter	30
Hen eggs (for a week)	2 (on days off and holidays)
Sugar	70
Salt, iodized salt	25
Tea	1.2
Bay leaf	0.2
Pepper	0.3
Mustard powder	0.3
Vinegar	1
Tomato puree	6
Baker's yeast (dry yeast or yeast cake)	0.5
Vegetables, total including:	900
potatoes	600
cabbages	130
beats	30
carrots	50
onions	50
cucumbers, tomatoes, roots, greens	40
dried fruits	20
or fruit-juice	100
Polyvitamins of "Geksavit" type, tablets (from March 15 till June 15)	1

According to the Resolution no.193 of February 18, 1998 of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, term active duty servicemen detailed for a guard duty are to be supplied with an extra ration supplementing the Ration 1 that is meant for cooking the fourth full value meal (supper).

The Resolution no.426 of March 29, 2002 of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine established the basic armed forces Ration 1. As of September 2005 the monetary equivalent of the Ration 1 made up UAH8 that according to the State Committee of Statistics of Ukraine was equal to an average sum spent for food for one person of an average Ukrainian family[1]. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine periodically specifies the sums of the ration 1 monetary equivalent.

This is the ration for:

- term duty servicemen;
- cadets of military higher educational institutions;
- convicted servicemen serving their sentences in disciplinary military units;
- term duty servicemen dismissed and transferred to the reserve while they are on the way to their places of residence;
- persons liable for conscription who are called up to be trained in annual camps, students drilled for military service according to the reserve officers training plan when they are in annual training camps, the above mentioned persons on the way to/back from the annual training camps;
- citizens conscripted for term active duty since the day they show up in a military registration and enlistment office (assembly place) to be sent to military units;
- contract servicemen detailed for a 24-hour duty or for a guard.

Table 2. The extra ration supplementing the Ration 1

Food-stuff	Quantity per person per day (grams)
Mixed bread of hulled rye flour and first grade wheat flour	50
Bread of first grade wheat flour	100
Cereals	70
Meat	50
Melted animal fat, margarine	5
Butter	15
Sugar	20
Tea	1
Vegetables, total	10
including: carrots	5
onions	5

1 See: Expenses and Resources of Ukrainian Households in 2004. On the Basis of a Sample Survey of Ukrainian Households Living Conditions – State Committee for Statistics of Ukraine, Kyiv, 2005, pp.146-147.

BASIC SPECIFICATIONS OF WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

1. LAND FORCES

Table 1.1. Tanks, Armoured Personnel Carriers, Armoured Reconnaissance Patrol Vehicles

Description		Combat weight, *ton*	Crew	Speed, *km/hour*			Weapon specifications
				off-road	road	swimming	
T-64B Tank		39	3	35-45	60.5	—	• 125-mm smoothbore cannon • 12.7-mm anti-aircraft machine gun • 7.62-mm coaxial machine gun • anti-tank missile system
T-64 BM "*Bulat*" Tank		45	3	60	60	—	• 125-mm smoothbore cannon • 12.7-mm anti-aircraft machine gun • 7.62-mm coaxial machine gun • anti-tank missile system
BTR-70 Armoured Personnel Carrier		11.5	2+8	20-40	80	9-10	• 14.5-mm large-calibre machine gun • 7.62-mm coaxial machine gun
BTR–80 Armoured Personnel Carrier		13.6	2+8	20-40	80	9-10	• 14.5-mm large-calibre machine gun • 7.62-mm coaxial machine gun
BRDM–2 Armoured Reconnaissance Patrol Vehicle		7	2+6	20-40	80	9-10	• 14.5-mm large-calibre machine gun • 7.62-mm coaxial machine gun
BMP-2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle		14	3+7	40-50	65	7	• 30-mm automatic gun • 7.62-mm coaxial machine gun

Table 1.2. Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), Ground Artillery

Description		Combat weight, *kg*	Calibre, *mm*	Fire range, *km*		Crew
				minimum	maximum	
BM-21 "*Grad*" (Hail) MLRS		13,700	122.4	1.6	20.4	6
9K57 "*Uragan*" (Hurricane) MLRS		20,000	220	8	35.8	4
9K58 "*Smerch*" MLRS		43,700	300	20	70	6

Table 1.3. Ground Artillery

Description		Combat weight, *kg*	Maximum fire range (high-explosive fragmentation shell), *m*	Practical rate of fire, *rpm*	Crew
"*Hvozdika*" (Carnation) 122-mm Self-Propelled Howitzer		15,700	15,200	4-6	4
"*Akatsiya*" (Acacia) 152-mm Self-Propelled Howitzer		27,500	17,300	3-5	4-6
MSTA-S 52-mm Self-Propelled Howitzer		42,000	24,000	7-8	4-6

Description		Combat weight, *kg*	Maximum fire range (high-explosive fragmentation shell), *m*	Practical rate of fire, *rpm*	Crew
D-20 152-mm Gun-Howitzer		5,650	17,410	5-6	8
D-30 122-mm Howitzer		3,200	15,300	6-8	6
"*Rapira*" (Rapier) Antitank Cannon		3,100	2,200	12	6

Table 1.4. Anti-Tank Missile Systems

Description		Fire range, *m*		Armour piercing performance, *mm*
		minimum	maximum	
"*Shturm-S*" Anti-Tank Missile System		400	5,000	up to 600
"*Konkurs*" Anti-Tank Missile System		70	4,000	—
"*Fagot*" Anti-Tank Missile System		70	2,000	up to 500

Table 1.5. Automobiles

Description		Wheel Drive	Gross weight, *kg*	Load capacity, *kg*	Maximum speed, *km/hour*	Engine power, *hp*
GAZ-66		4x4	4,100	2,000	85	115
Ural-4320		6x6	8,325	5,000	85	210
KaMAZ-4310		6x6	8,600	7,000	85	210
KrAZ		6x6	12,600	9,000	80	260

Table 1.6. Helicopters

Description		Maximum speed *km/hour*	Indicated altitude, *m*	Maximum flying range, *km*	Maximum take-off weight, *kg*	Weapon specifications
Mi-24		315	4,500	450	11,200	• FAB-100/250/500 bombs • 12.7-mm machine gun
Mi-8		250	4,500	475	12,000	• aircraft-launched rocket • 7.62-mm machine gun
Mi-26		200	6,500	490	56,000	—

Table 1.7. Air Defence Systems

Description		Maximum target kill altitude, *m*	Minimum target kill altitude, *m*	Head-on speed, *m/sec*	Target pursuit speed, *m/sec*
"*Osa-AK*" Surface-to-Air Missile System		5,000	15	500	300
"*Tunguska*" Surface-to-Air Missile and Gun System		3,500/3,000	15	500	500
"*Igla*" Man-Portable Air Defence Systems		3,000	10	360	320

2. AIR FORCES

Table 2.1. Bomber, Fighter, Attack and Reconnaissance Aircraft

Description		Maximum speed, *km/hour*	Operational ceiling, *m*	Flying range, *km*	Maximum take-off weight, *ton*	Weapon specifications
Su-24M		2,240	17,100	3,800	26	• R-60M, X-23, X-25, X-58 missiles • bombs, 8 tons • GSh-30 cannon
Su-24MR		1,800	11,500	1,300	39	• 6xR-60 • GSh-6-23 (500) cannon • reconnaissance equipment
MiG-29		2,450	18,000	1,430	18	• 2xR-27, 4xR-73 missiles • bombs, 2 tons • GSh-30/150 cannon

Description		Maximum speed, *km/hour*	Operational ceiling, *m*	Flying range, *km*	Maximum take-off weight, *ton*	Weapon specifications
Su-27		2,500	19,000	4,000	28	• 6xR-27, 6 R-73 missiles • bombs, 4-8 tons • GSh-30/150sn cannon
Su-25		1,000	7,000	480	17	• U-29, U-25, R-60 missiles • S-25, S-24, S-8, S-5 aircraft-launched rocket • FAB-100/250/500 bombs • 2xGSh-30 cannons

Table 2.2. Air Defence Systems

Description		Maximum altitude of intercept, *m*	Minimum altitude of intercept, *m*	Head-on speed, *m/sec*	Target pursuit speed, *m/sec*
S-300PT Surface-to-Air Missile System		25,000	25	4,200	1,200
S-300PS Surface-to-Air Missile System		30,000	30/100	1,400	420
S-200B Surface-to-Air Missile System		40,000	300	1,200	300
"*Buk-M1*" Surface-to-Air Missile System		22,000	15	830	380

3. NAVAL FORCES

Description		**Displacement,** *ton*	**Dimensions,** *length/width m*	**Speed at full,** *knots*	**Range,** *mile*	**Crew,** *totall/ officers*	**Weapon specifications**
"*K. Olshanskyi*" Large Amphibious Ship (amphibious lift capacity: tanks – 13 marines – 150 personnel)		3,900	112.5/15.0	18	3,500	87/8	*Missile systems:* MLRS: 2x20 122-mm BM-21 2x4 "*Strela-3*" Portable Air Defence Systems *Artillery systems:* 2x2 57-mm AK-725
"*Kirovohrad*" Medium Amphibious Ship		1,192	112.5/9.3	16	3,000	49/8	*Missile systems:* MLRS: 2x18 140-mm WM-18 2x4 "*Strela-3*" Portable Air Defence Systems *Artillery systems:* 2x2 30-mm AK-230
"*Slavutych*" Command and Control Ship		5,403	106/16.01	14.8	13,800	149/18	*Artillery systems:* 2x1 AK-306 2x1 2M7 Anti-Aircraft Machine gun
"*Kahovka*" Missile Boat		257	38.6/12.5	43	2,000	29/5	*Missile systems:* guided missile systems: 2 P-15M Anti-Ship Missile Launchers; 1x4 "*Strela-3M*" Portable Air Defence Systems *Artillery systems:* 1x1 76-mm AK-176 2x6 30-mm AK-630
"*Cherkasy*" Marine Sweeper		790	61.0/10.2	16.5	2,770	72/6	*Missile systems:* 2x4 "*Strela-3*" Portable Air Defence Systems *Artillery systems:* 2x2 30-mm AK-230 2x2 25-mm 2M-3M *Anti-mine equipment:* towed contact minesweeper TEM-3 Electromagnetic Minesweeper AT-3 Acoustic Minesweeper Linear charge 2 RBU-1200 Rocket Launchers

Description		**Displacement,** *ton*	**Dimensions,** *length/width m*	**Speed at full,** *knots*	**Range,** *mile*	**Crew,** *totall/ officers*	**Weapon specifications**
"*Hetman Sahaidachnyi*" Frigate		3,545	123.0/14.2	32	3,900	192/31	*Missile systems:* "*Osa-M*" Surface-to-Air missile System 2 RBU-6000 Anti-Submarine and Anti-Torpedo Systems *Artillery systems:* 1x1 100-mm AK-100 2x6 30-mm AK-630 Torpedo systems: 2x4 533-mm torpedo launchers
"*Prydniprovyia*" Corvette		790	56.1/10.2	41	1,600	40/5	*Missile systems:* guided missile systems: 4XP-15M 1x4 "*Strela-3*" Portable Air Defence Systems *Artillery systems:* 1x1 76-mm AK-176 1x6 30-mm AK-630
"*Kremenets*" Rescue Tug Boat		2,152	62.8/14.3	14.1	40	38	—

CONTENTS

The President of Ukraine, Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Preface to the International Edition of the Ukrainian White Book on Defence Policy 3

Opening Address of the Minister of Defence of Ukraine 5

Chapter 1
General Summary of Reform and Development of the Armed Forces 2001-2005 7

Chapter 2
Updating the Policy of Armed Forces Reform 15

Chapter 3
Armed Forces of Ukraine: Organisational Structure, Personnel Strength, Command and Control 25

Chapter 4
Force Training 41

Chapter 5
Personnel Policy and Military Education 49

Chapter 6
Logistic Support, Infrastructure of the Armed Forces, and Economic Activities of the Ministry of Defence 59

Chapter 7
Military and Technical Policy and Military Science 67

Chapter 8
Welfare Policies 75

Chapter 9
International Co-operation, Peacekeeping Activities and Arms Control 85

Chapter 10
Funding of the Armed Forces 97

Final Chapter 103

Information About Leading officials of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine 104

ANNEXES

Legislative Framework for the Activity of the Armed Forces and Tasks of the Ministry of Defence for 2006 113

Participation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Units in International Exercises in 2005 117

Comparative Analysis of Defence Missions Set by the Previous and New Armed Forces Development Programmes 120

Pay of Servicemen of the Armed Forces 122

Ration of Servicemen of the Armed Forces 124

Basic Specifications of Weapons and Equipment 125

WHITE BOOK
2005
DEFENCE POLICY OF UKRAINE

Publishing house “Zapovit”, 2006

Layout & design – Moskalenko Alexandr, 2006

Printing authorised 14.03.2006p.
Format 60x84/8. Offset printing.
Circulation: 1500 copies