Supplementary Analyses

Historical memory and radical right voting:

VOX and the legacy of Francoism

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1 Recruitment strategy via Facebook and Instagram advertisement

We recruited more than 4,000 study participants by using Facebook and Instagram advertisements between February 19 and March 8, 2022. Here we are using a similar recruitment strategy as applied by Elçi (2022) and as tested by Neundorf and Öztürk (2023). When participants clicked on the ad of our study, they were redirected to our consent form, information sheet, and survey programmed using the platform Qualtrics. Figure A.1 shows the four specific advertisement images used, and Table A.12 confirms that our results remain unchanged regardless of how participants accessed our study.

We used Facebook Business Manager, which allowed us to manage the ads and track progress in recruitment. We used the targeting tool on Facebook Business Manager to attract potential VOX supporters and to restrict our data collection to Spanish regions with electoral constituencies where VOX received above its national average vote share (15%) in the last 2019 parliamentary election.[1] This regional restriction is used to maximize the reach of VOX supporters and not to waste resources in regions with few VOX voters. Our sample does not attempt to be representative of the Spanish population but aims to over-represent a population of interest that would be difficult to capture with a random probability sample (i.e. potential VOX voters). The focus of our research question and design is on internal validity, and thus our interest is in observing the effects of our randomized treatments on VOX supporters. Research shows that, on average, large convenience samples offer statistically indistinguishable estimates of the average treatment effect from representative samples (Coppock, 2019).

After completing our pre-treatment questionnaire, respondents were classified as potential VOX supporters (responding 6-10 in the subjective probability to ever vote for VOX) or as non-potential VOX supporters (responding 1-5 on the same scale). Each respondent was then randomly assigned to one of our six experimental conditions, ensuring that each of them had enough numbers of potential and non-potential VOX supporters.

Table A.1 further reports the proportion of non-VOX and VOX voters per advertisement image. Different images and incentive strategies (see Figure A.1) were used for another methodological project on recruitment strategies of research participants on social media, not reported here. As the table shows, we were most successful in attracting VOX voters using a nationalist image, showing Spanish flags.

In total, we spent £1,483 (1,930 USD) (excluding sales tax) on recruiting 4,691 respondents of which 1,134 were classified as VOX supporters.

[1] Ceuta, Región de Murcia, Andalucía, Castilla la Mancha, Comunidad Valenciana, Castilla y León, Melilla, Comunidad de Madrid, Aragón, Extremadura, Islas Baleares, and Principado de Asturias.

Figure A.1: Advertisement images from Facebook/Instagram







Table A.1: Number of respondents recruited by each ad, by VOX support

	VOX supporter		
Ads	No	Yes	Total
Base (microphones)	285	49	334
	8.0	4.3	7.1
Political image	2,802	939	3,741
	78.9	82.8	79.8
Incentives: low	199	60	259
	5.6	5.3	5.5
Incentives: high	271	86	357
	7.6	7.6	7.6
Total	3,557	1,134	4,691
	100	100	100

1.1 Ethical considerations of participant recruitment and data collection

Participant compensations: 616 participants were recruited to our study via an incentive strategy, whereby we promised those that completed the survey to be entered into a lottery to either win one of 10 Euros Amazon vouchers with a probability of 1 in 14 to win, or to win a larger voucher of 175 Euros with a probability of 1 in 250. Social media users self-selected into these conditions, whereby the majority of our respondents were not promised any financial compensation for their time to complete the survey. Those that were recruited via the lottery ads, were included in a random draw and vouchers were distributed via email or text message, as collected via additional consent from the participants.

Conflict of interest: We are not aware of any potential conflict of interest. None of the authors has any formal connection to any of the organizations mentioned in the experimental design nor to Meta or Qualtrics, the platforms used for participant recruitment and data collection.

Financial support: The research was funded by a European Research Council Consolidator Grant (grant number: 865305).

Risks to participants: We do not see any significant ethical risks for the participants of this study. The questionnaire includes questions on political attitudes, which might be considered sensitive. However, all questions included have been verified by existing, peer-reviewed research and are commonly used in political science. We therefore do not believe that these questions lead to any undue psychological harm. If anything the design of our questions is aimed to avoid directly asking sensitive questions, e.g. "are you nostalgic for the previous (Franco) dictatorship", but instead probe this in an indirect way by asking them whether they approve of public funds for organizations like the Francisco Franco Foundation. For this, we use the innovative approach of endorsement and list experiments.

Deception: None of the examples used in our survey experiments use deception. We carefully checked that all organizations mentioned receive public funds and engage in the activities listed in the control group (del Prado, 2023), Franco Foundation treatment (Independiente, 2018; Publico, 2021; Franco, 2023a,b), Catalan secessionist treatment (LaVanguardia, 2012), immigration treatment (Hacienda, 2023), feminist treatment (BOE, 2015), and trade union treatment (Independiente, 2021).

Ethical approval: Our design was considered low risk based on an anonymous peer-reviewed ethical approval process by the University of Glasgow. Our experiment is fully compliant with APSA's Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research (APSA, 2020).

2 Power calculations

According to our power calculations, we needed a sample size of at least 1,908. Assuming a one-tailed 95% level of statistical significance and 80% power, the parameters used for this calculation are a difference in outcome means of 6.048 (based on observational data by Neundorf and Öztürk (2023)), a standard deviation of the outcome of 13.580, and a standardized difference (difference in means / standard deviation) of 0.45. According to these parameters, we need a sample size of at least 159 individuals per treatment group (`https://egap.shinyapps.io/Power_Calculator/`). Since we have 12 groups (6 experimental treatments X potential/non-potential VOX supporters), the minimum sample size needed will be 1,908. Each experimental group needs 318 respondents, of which about 160 are potential VOX supporters and 160 are non-potential VOX supporters.

Table A.2 below shows the number of observations by treatment. The number of potential VOX supporters is well within our power requirements. The number of actual VOX voters, which is naturally smaller in the population and not part of our power calculations, is below that threshold. Our results are equally statistically significant and even stronger in magnitude when using vote choice, suggesting that an underpowered design is not a concern in this case.

2.1 Number of observations by treatment

Table A.2: Finished at least 90% of survey, which includes all relevant questions

	VOX voter			VOX supporter		
Treatment:	No	Yes	Total	No	Yes	Total
Prado	632	97	729	560	169	729
Franco	586	88	674	496	179	675
Catalan	607	93	700	526	169	695
Immigration	598	110	708	527	178	705
Feminism	614	104	718	536	178	714
Unions	608	74	682	535	143	678
Total	3,645	566	4,211	3,180	1,016	4,196

3 Descriptives

Table A.3: Summary descriptives of all variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Vox vote	4,704	0.14	0.34	0	1
Vox support	4,745	0.24	0.43	0	1
Vote vote vs right	1,402	0.46	0.50	0	1
PTV: PSOE	4,723	4.19	3.09	1	10
PTV: PP	4,745	2.93	2.77	1	10
PTV: Vox	4,745	3.11	3.35	1	10
PTV: Cs	4,741	2.18	2.03	1	10
PTV: Podemos	4,734	4.65	3.60	1	10
Outcome: support	4,454	3.17	1.99	1	6
Outcome: donate	3,937	0.21	0.41	0	1
Democracy unimportant	4,369	0.08	0.21	0	1
Democracy not best	4,269	0.11	0.31	0	1
Age	4,861	48.07	15.72	18	77
Female	4,781	0.40	0.49	0	1
Education:					
No/primary	4,974	0.07	0.25	0	1
Secondary	4,974	0.21	0.41	0	1
Vocational	4,974	0.21	0.41	0	1
Degree	4,974	0.49	0.50	0	1
Other	4,974	0.02	0.13	0	1
Political interest	4,675	3.24	0.75	1	4
Income	3,930	6.47	1.99	1	11
Domicile					
Big city	4,963	0.31	0.46	0	1
Suburb	4,963	0.12	0.33	0	1
Small city	4,963	0.39	0.49	0	1
Rural	4,963	0.17	0.38	0	1

Figure A.2: Support for public funds by VOX-support by treatment



Note: All variables range from 0 - no support to 6 - complete support. Vertical lines represent mean support for VOX (black) and non-VOX supporters (grey line).

Figure A.3: Distribution of Vote Intention for VOX



4 Balance Tests

While assignment into treatment groups is generally not predicted by any covariate, we observed marginally significant effects of political interest predicting assignment to the Franco treatment (vs. control) for the full sample, and of education and gender predicting the assignment to the trade union treatment for VOX voters and VOX supporters respectively. We therefore control for these covariates in the relevant models below. However, Appendix 6 shows that our substantive results remain identical with regional fixed effects, regardless of pre-treatment controls being all excluded or included.

4.1 Full sample

Table A.4: Balance test: Full sample

Treatment (ref: control)	Franco	Catalan	Immigration	Feminism	Unions
Age	0.000	0.001	-0.003	-0.001	0.001
	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.004]
Female	-0.014	-0.089	0.025	-0.057	-0.154
	[0.117]	[0.118]	[0.117]	[0.117]	[0.119]
Education (ref: no/primary)					
Secondary	0.161	-0.209	-0.343	-0.267	-0.11
	[0.278]	[0.257]	[0.248]	[0.248]	[0.261]
Vocational	0.307	-0.102	-0.128	-0.239	-0.062
	[0.279]	[0.258]	[0.248]	[0.251]	[0.263]
Degree	0.324	-0.076	-0.291	-0.263	0.088
	[0.269]	[0.248]	[0.239]	[0.240]	[0.251]
Other	0.074	0.147	-0.661	-0.338	0.311
	[0.562]	[0.503]	[0.570]	[0.532]	[0.497]
Pol. interest	0.161**	0.004	0.111	0.036	0.074
	[0.081]	[0.080]	[0.080]	[0.079]	[0.080]
income	-0.007	0.015	-0.046	0.025	-0.032
	[0.031]	[0.031]	[0.031]	[0.031]	[0.031]
Domicile (ref: rural)					
Big city	0.134	0.032	-0.02	0.005	0.106
	[0.168]	[0.173]	[0.174]	[0.170]	[0.173]
Suburbs	0.005	0.063	0.191	0.047	-0.059
	[0.210]	[0.212]	[0.209]	[0.209]	[0.218]
Small city	-0.076	0.139	0.238	0.146	0.192
	[0.165]	[0.165]	[0.163]	[0.162]	[0.165]
Constant	-0.805*	-0.129	0.144	-0.02	-0.195
	[0.434]	[0.418]	[0.412]	[0.410]	[0.422]
Observations	3,696	3,696	3,696	3,696	3,696

Significance levels: ** p< 0.01, * p< 0.05. Results are based on a multi-nominal regression with the control group as the baseline category.

4.2 Sample: VOX voters

Table A.5: Balance test: VOX voters

Treatment (ref: control)	Franco	Catalan	Immigration	Feminism	Unions
Age	0.01	-0.006	-0.006	-0.004	0.006
	[0.011]	[0.011]	[0.010]	[0.010]	[0.012]
Female	0.095	-0.106	0.233	0.029	-0.351
	[0.340]	[0.338]	[0.317]	[0.323]	[0.380]
Education (ref: no/primary)					
Secondary	0.086	-0.833	-0.815	-1.021	-1.688*
	[0.727]	[0.665]	[0.611]	[0.596]	[0.659]
Vocational	0.4	0.057	-0.243	-0.552	-0.962
	[0.729]	[0.639]	[0.603]	[0.591]	[0.625]
Degree	0.441	0.132	-0.334	-0.607	-0.705
	[0.713]	[0.626]	[0.591]	[0.577]	[0.595]
Other	0.34	-0.612	-15.265	-1.44	-15.686
	[1.210]	[1.360]	[1,105.698]	[1.336]	[1,365.513]
Pol. Interest	-0.047	-0.121	0.128	0.071	0.208
	[0.228]	[0.222]	[0.216]	[0.217]	[0.250]
Income	0.026	-0.116	-0.06	0.002	-0.038
	[0.085]	[0.080]	[0.078]	[0.079]	[0.088]
Domicile (ref: rural)					
Big city	-0.925	0.067	-0.461	-0.489	-0.161
	[0.487]	[0.507]	[0.465]	[0.470]	[0.530]
Suburbs	-0.398	-0.033	-0.095	-0.062	-0.327
	[0.601]	[0.651]	[0.580]	[0.581]	[0.692]
Small city	-0.744	0.101	-0.467	-0.393	-0.204
	[0.448]	[0.481]	[0.438]	[0.439]	[0.503]
Constant	-0.398	1.38	1.036	0.962	0.151
	[1.205]	[1.148]	[1.094]	[1.093]	[1.232]
Observations	511	511	511	511	511

Significance levels: ** p< 0.01, * p< 0.05. Results are based on a multi-nominal regression with the control group as the baseline category.

4.3 Sample: VOX supporters

Table A.6: Balance test: VOX supporters

Treatment (ref: control)	Franco	Catalan	Immigration	Feminism	Unions
Age	-0.003	-0.008	-0.002	-0.001	0.004
	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.008]
Female	-0.013	-0.355	0.076	-0.162	-0.582*
	[0.241]	[0.251]	[0.242]	[0.245]	[0.273]
Education (ref: no/primary)					
Secondary	-0.025	-0.641	-0.734	-0.963*	-1.058
	[0.585]	[0.587]	[0.548]	[0.516]	[0.543]
Vocational	-0.075	0.08	-0.318	-0.948	-0.64
	[0.589]	[0.569]	[0.540]	[0.517]	[0.532]
Degree	0.068	0.074	-0.349	-0.776	-0.744
	[0.575]	[0.561]	[0.529]	[0.501]	[0.522]
Other	0.007	0.016	-13.766	-0.111	-1.258
	[1.140]	[1.134]	[542.093]	[0.983]	[1.318]
Pol. Interest	0.099	-0.202	0.237	-0.066	0.125
	[0.163]	[0.161]	[0.165]	[0.162]	[0.175]
Income	0.004	-0.055	-0.066	0.013	-0.085
	[0.060]	[0.061]	[0.060]	[0.061]	[0.065]
Domicile (ref: rural)					
Big city	-0.19	0.329	-0.147	-0.19	-0.112
	[0.353]	[0.386]	[0.354]	[0.370]	[0.384]
Suburbs	-0.516	0.348	-0.326	-0.041	-0.249
	[0.445]	[0.452]	[0.436]	[0.439]	[0.474]
Small city	-0.306	0.159	-0.425	0.015	-0.148
	[0.341]	[0.377]	[0.346]	[0.351]	[0.368]
Constant	0.099	1.301	0.443	1.127	0.773
	[0.907]	[0.902]	[0.884]	[0.868]	[0.921]
Observations	900	900	900	900	900

Significance levels: ** p< 0.01, * p< 0.05. Results are based on a multi-nominal regression with the control group as the baseline category.

4.4 Sample: Non-VOX voters

Table A.7: Balance test: Non-VOX voters

Treatment (ref: control)	Franco	Catalan	Immigration	Feminism	Unions
age	0.001	0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001
	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.004]
female	0.023	0.01	0.014	-0.012	-0.061
	[0.136]	[0.136]	[0.136]	[0.134]	[0.134]
Education (ref: no/primary)					
Secondary	0.12	-0.154	-0.287	-0.009	0.142
	[0.321]	[0.290]	[0.283]	[0.293]	[0.306]
Vocational	0.377	-0.264	-0.103	0	0.099
	[0.321]	[0.296]	[0.284]	[0.297]	[0.311]
Degree	0.346	-0.179	-0.33	-0.078	0.286
	[0.308]	[0.280]	[0.273]	[0.284]	[0.295]
Other	0.039	0.078	-0.385	-0.546	0.658
	[0.651]	[0.576]	[0.609]	[0.678]	[0.554]
Pol. Interest	0.195**	0.094	0.102	0.076	0.079
	[0.095]	[0.094]	[0.093]	[0.092]	[0.092]
income	-0.009	0.04	-0.027	0.033	-0.017
	[0.037]	[0.037]	[0.037]	[0.036]	[0.036]
Domicile (ref: rural)					
Big city	0.24	-0.051	-0.016	0.093	0.152
	[0.193]	[0.196]	[0.203]	[0.194]	[0.195]
Suburbs	0.179	-0	0.339	0.108	-0.039
	[0.241]	[0.244]	[0.241]	[0.240]	[0.249]
Small city	0	0.153	0.431*	0.2	0.282
	[0.190]	[0.185]	[0.187]	[0.185]	[0.186]
Constant	-1.121*	-0.635	-0.086	-0.481	-0.489
	[0.504]	[0.484]	[0.475]	[0.480]	[0.486]
Observations	2,764	2,764	2,764	2,764	2,764

Significance levels: ** p< 0.01, * p< 0.05. Results are based on a multi-nominal regression with the control group as the baseline category.

4.5 Sample: VOX vs right-wing voters

Table A.8: Balance test: VOX vs right-wing voters

Treatment (ref: control)	Franco	Catalan	Immigration	Feminism	Unions
age	0.01	-0.004	-0.002	-0.002	0.007
	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.008]
female	-0.138	-0.304	0.046	-0.03	-0.342
	[0.216]	[0.222]	[0.216]	[0.214]	[0.233]
Education (ref: no/primary)	-0.032	-0.916*	-0.662	-0.676	-0.718
Secondary					
	[0.557]	[0.496]	[0.496]	[0.480]	[0.497]
Vocational	0.223	-0.232	-0.176	-0.353	-0.368
	[0.562]	[0.488]	[0.494]	[0.483]	[0.499]
Degree	0.384	-0.353	-0.424	-0.546	-0.605
	[0.540]	[0.471]	[0.478]	[0.465]	[0.481]
Other	-0.168	-0.323	-1.431	-0.47	-1.456
	[1.047]	[0.928]	[1.240]	[0.924]	[1.238]
Pol. Interest	0.034	-0.077	0.245*	0.03	0.066
	[0.145]	[0.144]	[0.146]	[0.142]	[0.152]
income	0.008	-0.086	-0.06	-0.02	-0.04
	[0.056]	[0.056]	[0.056]	[0.055]	[0.059]
Domicile (ref: rural)					
Big city	-0.11	0.12	-0.19	-0.201	-0.064
	[0.328]	[0.348]	[0.330]	[0.337]	[0.355]
Suburbs	-0.364	-0.154	-0.152	-0.131	-0.142
	[0.391]	[0.414]	[0.381]	[0.388]	[0.416]
Small city	-0.283	0.234	-0.28	0.081	0.01
	[0.319]	[0.332]	[0.317]	[0.317]	[0.338]
Constant	-0.712	1.299*	0.21	0.687	0.163
	[0.817]	[0.768]	[0.774]	[0.757]	[0.806]
Observations	1,086	1,086	1,086	1,086	1,086

Significance levels: ** p< 0.01, * p< 0.05. Results are based on a multi-nominal regression with the control group as the baseline category.

5 Coefficients Figure 1

Table A.9: Full results for Figure 1 (coefficients and standard errors)

Sample:	VOX-voters		VOX-supporters		Non-VOX-voters	
Outcome:	Att support	Donation	Att support	Donation	Att support	Donation
Treatment (ref: Control)						
Franco	0.634**	0.130**	-0.162	0.019	-0.222**	-2.514**
	[0.181]	[0.042]	[0.145]	[0.031]	[0.023]	[0.095]
Catalan	-1.786**	-0.108**	-1.887**	-0.143**	-0.126**	-1.139**
	[0.176]	[0.041]	[0.146]	[0.031]	[0.023]	[0.095]
Immigration	-1.232**	-0.043	-1.008**	-0.054	0.280**	0.649**
	[0.171]	[0.040]	[0.144]	[0.031]	[0.024]	[0.093]
Feminism	-1.739**	-0.112**	-1.672**	-0.127**	0.097**	0.084
	[0.172]	[0.040]	[0.143]	[0.030]	[0.024]	[0.094]
Unions	-1.920**	-0.144**	-1.637**	-0.125**	-0.053*	-0.465**
	[0.188]	[0.043]	[0.152]	[0.032]	[0.023]	[0.094]
Female	0.083	0.015	0.094	-0.008		
	[0.112]	[0.026]	[0.090]	[0.019]		
Education (ref: no/primary)						
Secondary	0.02	-0.079	0.302	-0.014		
	[0.205]	[0.046]	[0.186]	[0.038]		
Vocational	-0.369	-0.101*	-0.005	-0.038		
	[0.199]	[0.044]	[0.185]	[0.038]		
Degree	-0.05	-0.072	0.207	-0.017		
	[0.186]	[0.041]	[0.175]	[0.036]		
Other	0.011	-0.032	0.605	0.078		
	[0.431]	[0.092]	[0.376]	[0.075]		
Political interest					0.048**	0.422**
					[0.009]	[0.037]
Constant	3.073**	0.208**	2.874**	0.180**	0.085*	2.514**
	[0.210]	[0.047]	[0.192]	[0.040]	[0.033]	[0.137]
Observations	586	561	1,036	980	3,320	3,808
R^2	0.388	0.104	0.244	0.055	0.149	0.284

Significance levels: ** p< 0.01, * p< 0.05. Results are based on a linear regression.

6 Replicating Table 1, using VOX (PTV) support and donations instead of VOX vote

This table is only replicating the results of Table 1 using the full sample. It is not possible to replicate the results for right-wing supporters, as the PTV - used to create party support - considerably overlaps between VOX, PP, and Cs.

Table A.10: Main results: Vox support and treatments (FULL SAMPLE)

Outcome:	Attitudinal support		Donation	
	Coef	s.e.	Coef	s.e.
Treatment (ref: Control)				
Franco	-2.742**	[0.094]	-0.237**	[0.023]
Catalan	-0.982**	[0.094]	-0.110**	[0.024]
Immigration	0.825**	[0.092]	0.334**	[0.024]
Feminism	0.337**	[0.092]	0.151**	[0.024]
Unions	-0.343**	[0.092]	-0.039	[0.023]
Vox support	-0.855**	[0.134]	-0.074*	[0.034]
Interactions: Vox vote x				
Franco	2.581**	[0.189]	0.249**	[0.047]
Catalan	-0.862**	[0.189]	-0.031	[0.047]
Immigration	-1.852**	[0.187]	-0.402**	[0.048]
Feminism	-2.008**	[0.186]	-0.284**	[0.046]
Unions	-1.385**	[0.195]	-0.102*	[0.048]
Political interest	0.307**	[0.032]	0.041**	[0.008]
Constant	2.978**	[0.122]	0.112**	[0.031]
Obs.	4,389		3,872	
R^2	0.398		0.190	

Significance levels: ** p< 0.01, * p< 0.05. Results are based on a linear regression.

Table A.11: Using PTV instead of binary support variables

	PTV: VOX		PTV: PSOE		PTV: PP		PTV: CS		PTV: Podemos	
Outcome:	Support	Donate	Support	Donate	Support	Donate	Support	Donate	Support	Donate
Treatment (ref: Control)										
Franco	-3.265**	-0.277**	-0.964**	-0.084*	-2.711**	-0.194**	-2.220**	-0.155**	-0.617**	-0.059
	[0.107]	[0.027]	[0.147]	[0.034]	[0.127]	[0.030]	[0.135]	[0.030]	[0.127]	[0.033]
Catalan	-0.843**	-0.100**	-1.331**	-0.098**	-0.624**	-0.082**	-0.844**	-0.081**	-1.838**	-0.138**
	[0.107]	[0.028]	[0.146]	[0.034]	[0.127]	[0.031]	[0.137]	[0.031]	[0.126]	[0.032]
Immigration	1.232**	0.418**	-0.452**	0.013	1.080**	0.357**	0.702**	0.294**	-0.745**	-0.03
	[0.105]	[0.029]	[0.143]	[0.035]	[0.124]	[0.031]	[0.133]	[0.032]	[0.123]	[0.033]
Feminism	0.764**	0.217**	-1.182**	-0.093**	0.853**	0.202**	0.452**	0.156**	-1.579**	-0.141**
	[0.105]	[0.028]	[0.146]	[0.035]	[0.125]	[0.031]	[0.133]	[0.031]	[0.123]	[0.032]
Unions	-0.041	-0.006	-1.311**	-0.140**	0.096	0.015	-0.226	-0.008	-1.511**	-0.161**
	[0.105]	[0.028]	[0.147]	[0.035]	[0.125]	[0.031]	[0.135]	[0.031]	[0.127]	[0.033]
PTV: VOX	-0.113**	-0.008								
	[0.016]	[0.004]								
PTV: PSOE			0.096**	0.006						
			[0.020]	[0.005]						
PTV: PP					-0.031	0.000				
					[0.022]	[0.005]				
PTV: Ciudadanos							0.007	0.007		
							[0.031]	[0.007]		
PTV: Podemos									0.120**	0.009*
									[0.015]	[0.004]
Interaction: PTV x treatment										
Franco	0.372**	0.033**	-0.269**	-0.022**	0.204**	0.007	0.06	-0.009	-0.306**	-0.024**
	[0.023]	[0.006]	[0.028]	[0.007]	[0.031]	[0.007]	[0.045]	[0.010]	[0.021]	[0.005]
Catalan	-0.118**	-0.006	0.023	-0.005	-0.212**	-0.013	-0.182**	-0.018	0.132**	0.003
	[0.023]	[0.006]	[0.028]	[0.007]	[0.032]	[0.008]	[0.047]	[0.011]	[0.022]	[0.006]
Immigration	-0.272**	-0.057**	0.206**	0.053**	-0.249**	-0.048**	-0.156**	-0.034**	0.231**	0.054**
	[0.023]	[0.006]	[0.028]	[0.007]	[0.031]	[0.008]	[0.044]	[0.010]	[0.021]	[0.006]
Feminism	-0.294**	-0.042**	0.224**	0.039**	-0.349**	-0.043**	-0.287**	-0.040**	0.304**	0.049**
	[0.023]	[0.006]	[0.028]	[0.007]	[0.031]	[0.007]	[0.044]	[0.010]	[0.021]	[0.006]
Unions	-0.211**	-0.018**	0.157**	0.018**	-0.257**	-0.026**	-0.182**	-0.024*	0.184**	0.022**
	[0.024]	[0.006]	[0.028]	[0.007]	[0.032]	[0.008]	[0.045]	[0.010]	[0.021]	[0.006]
Political interest	0.302**	0.041**	0.347**	0.042**	0.289**	0.037**	0.341**	0.044**	0.159**	0.023**
	[0.031]	[0.008]	[0.034]	[0.008]	[0.034]	[0.008]	[0.037]	[0.008]	[0.031]	[0.008]
Constant	3.144**	0.119**	2.229**	0.066	2.919**	0.106**	2.648**	0.067	2.703**	0.111**
	[0.125]	[0.032]	[0.150]	[0.036]	[0.144]	[0.035]	[0.153]	[0.035]	[0.128]	[0.033]
Obs.	4,389	3,872	4,385	3,873	4,401	3,883	4,394	3,875	4,390	3,871
R^2	0.447	0.204	0.312	0.163	0.313	0.144	0.214	0.114	0.457	0.212

Significance levels: ** p< 0.01, * p< 0.05. Results are based on a linear regression.

7 Robustness tests: Additional model specifications

Table A.12: Additional specifications. Outcome: Attitudinal support

	M1.1 coef./s.e.	M2.1 coef./s.e.	M3.1 coef./s.e.	M4.1 coef./s.e.	M5.1 coef./s.e.	M6.1 coef./s.e.	M7.1 coef./s.e.	M8.1 coef./s.e.
Treatment (ref: Control)								
Franco	-2.476**	-2.585**	-2.522**	-2.497**	-2.715**	-2.835**	-2.744**	-2.739**
	[0.093]	[0.101]	[0.092]	[0.093]	[0.095]	[0.102]	[0.094]	[0.094]
Catalan	-1.138**	-1.204**	-1.148**	-1.109**	-0.975**	-1.047**	-0.997**	-0.973**
	[0.094]	[0.102]	[0.093]	[0.093]	[0.095]	[0.104]	[0.094]	[0.095]
Immigration	0.644**	0.649**	0.654**	0.666**	0.822**	0.843**	0.821**	0.831**
	[0.092]	[0.102]	[0.091]	[0.091]	[0.092]	[0.102]	[0.092]	[0.092]
Feminism	0.086	0.039	0.099	0.095	0.346**	0.271**	0.354**	0.333**
	[0.092]	[0.101]	[0.091]	[0.092]	[0.093]	[0.101]	[0.092]	[0.093]
Unions	-0.445**	-0.496**	-0.472**	-0.441**	-0.328**	-0.385**	-0.349**	-0.328**
	[0.092]	[0.101]	[0.092]	[0.092]	[0.093]	[0.101]	[0.092]	[0.093]
VOX vote	-0.885**	-0.696**	-0.852**	-0.771**				
	[0.177]	[0.190]	[0.175]	[0.178]				
VOX support					-0.882**	-0.786**	-0.860**	-0.832**
					[0.135]	[0.147]	[0.134]	[0.135]
Interaction: VOX vote/support x								
Franco	3.146**	3.104**	3.200**	3.068**	2.563**	2.551**	2.569**	2.538**
	[0.257]	[0.279]	[0.254]	[0.257]	[0.191]	[0.206]	[0.189]	[0.191]
Catalan	-0.649**	-0.744**	-0.644**	-0.730**	-0.891**	-0.937**	-0.843**	-0.876**
	[0.250]	[0.271]	[0.248]	[0.249]	[0.191]	[0.207]	[0.189]	[0.191]
Immigration	-1.829**	-2.084**	-1.879**	-1.921**	-1.833**	-2.014**	-1.840**	-1.866**
	[0.244]	[0.264]	[0.242]	[0.244]	[0.189]	[0.207]	[0.187]	[0.188]
Feminism	-1.836**	-1.966**	-1.871**	-1.928**	-2.021**	-2.024**	-2.031**	-2.019**
	[0.245]	[0.261]	[0.242]	[0.245]	[0.188]	[0.204]	[0.186]	[0.188]
Unions	-1.481**	-1.630**	-1.489**	-1.551**	-1.370**	-1.430**	-1.384**	-1.405**
	[0.264]	[0.287]	[0.261]	[0.265]	[0.197]	[0.214]	[0.195]	[0.197]
Pol. Interest		0.370**	0.358**	0.385**		0.303**	0.305**	0.333**
		[0.039]	[0.034]	[0.036]		[0.037]	[0.032]	[0.034]
Pre-treatment controls		Y				Y		
Regional FE			Y				Y	
Ads FE				Y				Y
Constant	3.885**	2.843**	2.719**	4.107**	3.979**	3.072**	2.985**	3.050**
	[0.065]	[0.213]	[0.135]	[0.111]	[0.066]	[0.204]	[0.131]	[0.154]
Obs.	4,431	3,575	4,384	4,379	4,410	3,560	4,363	4,358
R^2	0.31	0.344	0.334	0.31	0.384	0.413	0.404	0.384

Significance levels: ** p< 0.01, * p< 0.05. Results are based on a linear regression.

Table A.13: Additional specifications. Outcome: Donation

	M1.2 coef./s.e.	M2.2 coef./s.e.	M3.2 coef./s.e.	M4.2 coef./s.e.	M5.2 coef./s.e.	M6.2 coef./s.e.	M7.2 coef./s.e.	M8.2 coef./s.e.
Treatment (ref: Control)								
Franco	-0.216**	-0.217**	-0.225**	-0.225**	-0.232**	-0.241**	-0.238**	-0.242**
	[0.022]	[0.024]	[0.022]	[0.022]	[0.023]	[0.025]	[0.023]	[0.023]
Catalan	-0.124**	-0.112**	-0.125**	-0.125**	-0.107**	-0.105**	-0.109**	-0.112**
	[0.023]	[0.025]	[0.023]	[0.023]	[0.024]	[0.026]	[0.024]	[0.024]
Immigration	0.283**	0.289**	0.280**	0.277**	0.338**	0.335**	0.334**	0.331**
	[0.023]	[0.026]	[0.023]	[0.023]	[0.024]	[0.027]	[0.024]	[0.024]
Feminism	0.095**	0.112**	0.099**	0.099**	0.151**	0.154**	0.154**	0.153**
	[0.023]	[0.025]	[0.023]	[0.023]	[0.024]	[0.026]	[0.024]	[0.024]
Unions	-0.049*	-0.048	-0.054*	-0.053*	-0.036	-0.047	-0.041	-0.040
	[0.022]	[0.025]	[0.023]	[0.022]	[0.023]	[0.026]	[0.024]	[0.024]
VOX vote	-0.106*	-0.068	-0.103*	-0.094*				
	[0.043]	[0.046]	[0.043]	[0.043]				
VOX support					-0.077*	-0.085*	-0.074*	-0.071*
					[0.034]	[0.037]	[0.034]	[0.034]
Interaction: VOX vote/support x								
Franco	0.346**	0.319**	0.357**	0.332**	0.246**	0.253**	0.244**	0.240**
	[0.061]	[0.067]	[0.061]	[0.061]	[0.047]	[0.051]	[0.047]	[0.047]
Catalan	0.029	-0.007	0.035	0.024	-0.037	-0.021	-0.028	-0.032
	[0.059]	[0.064]	[0.059]	[0.059]	[0.047]	[0.051]	[0.047]	[0.047]
Immigration	-0.323**	-0.371**	-0.323**	-0.328**	-0.403**	-0.396**	-0.400**	-0.402**
	[0.059]	[0.064]	[0.059]	[0.059]	[0.048]	[0.053]	[0.048]	[0.048]
Feminism	-0.203**	-0.241**	-0.204**	-0.220**	-0.285**	-0.268**	-0.287**	-0.293**
	[0.058]	[0.063]	[0.058]	[0.059]	[0.047]	[0.051]	[0.047]	[0.047]
Unions	-0.086	-0.115	-0.082	-0.09	-0.097*	-0.074	-0.100*	-0.102*
	[0.062]	[0.068]	[0.062]	[0.062]	[0.048]	[0.053]	[0.048]	[0.049]
Pol. Interest		0.051**	0.046**	0.056**		0.043**	0.040**	0.051**
		[0.009]	[0.008]	[0.009]		[0.009]	[0.008]	[0.008]
Pre-treatment controls		Y				Y		
Regional FE			Y				Y	
Ads FE				Y				Y
Constant	0.241**	0.123*	0.068*	0.044	0.244**	0.154**	0.086**	0.055
	[0.016]	[0.051]	[0.033]	[0.039]	[0.017]	[0.051]	[0.033]	[0.038]
Obs.	3,917	3,192	3,870	3,845	3,896	3,175	3,849	3824
R^2	0.15	0.167	0.162	0.161	0.185	0.198	0.195	0.195

Significance levels: ** p< 0.01, * p< 0.05. Results are based on a linear regression.

8 Cohort results: Coefficients and additional results

Table A.14: Full results for Figure 3 (coefficients and standard errors)

Outcome:	Att. Support	
	coef.	s.e.
Treatment (ref: Control)		
Franco	3.783	[11.684]
Catalan	-13.947	[12.064]
Immigration	27.047*	[11.511]
Feminism	17.261	[11.748]
Unions	12.749	[11.673]
VOX vote	59.570*	[24.625]
Interactions: VOX-vote x		
Franco	-51.343	[35.948]
Catalan	-57.923	[33.371]
Immigration	-105.743**	[33.304]
Feminism	-78.905*	[34.187]
Unions	-60.068	[34.723]
Birth year	0.007	[0.004]
Interactions: Birth x		
Franco	-0.003	[0.006]
Catalan	0.006	[0.006]
Immigration	-0.013*	[0.006]
Feminism	-0.009	[0.006]
Unions	-0.007	[0.006]
VOX vote x birth	-0.031*	[0.012]
Interactions: VOX vote x birth x		
Franco	0.028	[0.018]
Catalan	0.029	[0.017]
Immigration	0.053**	[0.017]
Feminism	0.039*	[0.017]
Unions	0.03	[0.018]
Political interest	0.361**	[0.034]
Constant	-10.203	[8.330]
Observations	4,307	
R^2	0.335	

Significance levels: ** p< 0.01, * p< 0.05. Results are based on a linear regression.

Figure A.4: Franco treatment effects by cohorts



Note: Predicted values based on linear regression. Franco cohort: born 1944-1955 (N of VOX voters in Franco treatment = 21); Transition cohort: born 1956-1969 (N=67); Democratic cohort: born 1970+ (N=117). The dashed line represents the mid-point of the scale.

Figure A.5: Franco treatment effects by birth cohorts for VOX and PP voters



Note: Predicted values based on linear regression.

9 Main effects of treatments

Table A.15: Main effects of treatments

Outcome:	Support M1	Donation M2
Treatment (ref: Control)		
Franco	-2.102**	-0.175**
	[0.097]	[0.022]
Catalan	-1.254**	-0.122**
	[0.097]	[0.022]
Immigration	0.336**	0.217**
	[0.095]	[0.022]
Feminism	-0.203*	0.065**
	[0.095]	[0.022]
Unions	-0.598**	-0.052*
	[0.097]	[0.022]
Female	0.160**	0.046**
	[0.057]	[0.013]
Education (ref: no/primary)		
Secondary	0.120	-0.001
	[0.125]	[0.028]
Vocational	-0.046	-0.031
	[0.125]	[0.028]
Degree	0.234*	-0.004
	[0.116]	[0.027]
Other	0.35	0.048
	[0.250]	[0.058]
Constant	3.581**	0.217**
	[0.127]	[0.029]
Observations	4,283	3,792
R^2	0.174	0.102

Significance levels: ** p< 0.01, * p< 0.05. Results are based on a linear regression.

10 VOX support and overt support for democracy

The questionnaire included two variables that measured respondents' attitudes toward democracy. First, we asked whether respondents agree that democracy is the best form of government. From this, we created a dummy for those who disagreed or were indifferent to 1 and all those agreeing with the statement to 0. Second, we asked how important it is for respondents to live in a democracy, which we recorded so that 0 indicates it is "very important" and 1 indicates it is "not important at all". Here we present additional results, exploring the relationship between overtly stated support for democracy, VOX vote, and our treatments.

Table A.16: Percentage agreeing with democracy statements

	VOX voters	Non-VOX voters
Democracy not best	28.2%	8.4%
Not important to live in democ.	14.1%	6.6%

Table A.17: Regression results of overt democracy support variables

Outcome:	Democracy best		Important to live in democ.	
	coef/se	beta	coef/se	beta
VOX-vote	0.195***	0.216	0.072***	0.123
	[0.014]		[0.009]	
Age	-0.004***	-0.179	-0.002***	-0.189
	[0.000]		[0.000]	
Female	-0.040***	-0.063	-0.034***	-0.082
	[0.010]		[0.007]	
Education (ref: no/primary)				
Secondary	0.045**	0.058	0.045***	0.090
	[0.023]		[0.015]	
Vocational	0.014	0.018	0.014	0.029
	[0.023]		[0.015]	
Degree	0.004	0.007	0.015	0.037
	[0.022]		[0.014]	
Other	0.055	0.021	0.057*	0.034
	[0.046]		[0.030]	
Income	-0.012***	-0.074	-0.005***	-0.048
	[0.003]		[0.002]	
Domicile (ref: rural)				
Big city	0.032**	0.047	0.012	0.028
	[0.015]		[0.010]	
Suburbs	0.025	0.026	0.002	0.004
	[0.019]		[0.012]	
Small city	0.016	0.026	0.008	0.019
	[0.014]		[0.009]	
Political interest	-0.014**	-0.032	-0.020***	-0.071
	[0.007]		[0.005]	
Constant	0.359***		0.263***	
	[0.038]		[0.024]	
Observations	3,592		3,655	
R^2	0.101		0.075	

Significance levels: ** p< 0.01, * p< 0.05. Results are based on a linear regression.

Table A.18: Treatment effects x VOX vote for different samples of democracy support. Outcome: Attitudinal Support for organization

Sample:	Democracy best		Important to live in democ.	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Treatment (ref: Control)				
Franco	-2.672**	-1.170**	-2.612**	-1.742**
	[0.099]	[0.312]	[0.098]	[0.280]
Catalan	-1.194**	-1.297**	-1.200**	-0.647*
	[0.099]	[0.332]	[0.098]	[0.293]
Immigration	0.691**	-0.09	0.660**	0.620*
	[0.099]	[0.303]	[0.097]	[0.264]
Feminism	0.07	-0.397	0.066	0.225
	[0.098]	[0.323]	[0.096]	[0.280]
Unions	-0.485**	-0.61	-0.499**	-0.197
	[0.098]	[0.321]	[0.097]	[0.281]
VOX vote	-0.897**	0.078	-0.891**	-0.544
	[0.210]	[0.382]	[0.190]	[0.460]
Interactions: VOX-vote x				
Franco	3.099**	2.092**	3.224**	2.584**
	[0.315]	[0.536]	[0.280]	[0.627]
Catalan	-0.712*	-0.667	-0.639*	-0.998
	[0.300]	[0.560]	[0.272]	[0.623]
Immigration	-1.755**	-1.863**	-1.840**	-2.011**
	[0.284]	[0.559]	[0.262]	[0.626]
Feminism	-1.894**	-1.637**	-1.880**	-1.811**
	[0.289]	[0.548]	[0.263]	[0.633]
Unions	-1.479**	-1.626**	-1.399**	-1.903**
	[0.318]	[0.557]	[0.289]	[0.639]
Political interest	0.373**	0.072	0.377**	0.297**
	[0.038]	[0.085]	[0.037]	[0.083]
Constant	2.743**	3.039**	2.695**	2.659**
	[0.144]	[0.330]	[0.138]	[0.318]
Observations	3,628	451	3,843	566
R^2	0.345	0.230	0.340	0.266

Significance levels: ** p< 0.01, * p< 0.05. Results are based on a linear regression.

Table A.19: Average attitudinal support for Franco (treated group)

	Democracy best	
	Yes	No
VOX voters	3.44	4.27
Non-VOX voters	1.33	2.10

11 Representative data on VOX voters and support for Franco

Here we are presenting results using the representative Center for Sociological Research (CIS) data,[2] which was collected in December 2019, after the general election when VOX entered the national parliament. The survey included a question that read: "Did the exhumation of Franco's remnants influence your vote?" Of those that said yes to this question, the voters split as follows: VOX = 18%; PP = 10.4%; PSOE = 5%; Ciudadanos = 3.66%; and Podemos = 3.43%.

For those who said yes, respondents were then asked "in which way did it influence it?" Among VOX voters 65.38% reaffirmed voting for VOX; 7.69% changed their mind about the party; 3.85% were mobilized to participate in the election; and 24% abstained.

In the next step, we regress VOX vote (vs everyone else) on "did exhumation have an influence". Table A.20 presents regression without (M1) and with additional controls for gender, age, income, and education (M2). The results confirm that the Franco item is significantly associated with Vox vote, increasing the probability of voting for VOX by 17 percentage points. This confirms the intuition of this paper that Franco has an important weight in the probability of voting for VOX (at least compared to other parties), and that the effect was mostly to reaffirm the vote for this party. This implies that voters did not change their minds. They already had these views and saw VOX as the right owner of the issue. These results are very endogenous and vulnerable to social desirability and it is difficult to compare how Franco performs vis-à-vis other ideological traits, hence our experiment.

[2] `https://www.cis.es/detalle-ficha-estudio?origen=estudio&idEstudio=14479`, last accessed on 03/21/2024

Table A.20: Linear regression predicting VOX vote in the 2019 Spanish election

	M1	M2
Franco influence	0.172**	0.169**
	[0.016]	[0.021]
Education (ref: no education)		
Primary		0.001
		[0.024]
Secondary – lower		0.062*
		[0.024]
Secondary – higher		0.004
		[0.027]
Vocational training		0.019
		[0.026]
University		-0.044
		[0.026]
Age		-0.001**
		[0.000]
Female		-0.037**
		[0.010]
HH income		0.013**
		[0.003]
Constant	0.065**	0.073*
	[0.004]	[0.037]
Observations	4,783	2,840
R^2	0.023	0.061

Significance levels: ** p< 0.01, * p< 0.05. Results are based on a linear regression.

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