Online Appendix: The Authoritarian Security Apparatus: Officer Careers and the Trade-offs in Command

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A.1 Descriptive statistics and results

This section offers summary statistics of our data sample and shows descriptive results.

1) **Summary statistics.** Table A.1.1 gives summary statistics on all variables of the statistical analyses.

2) **Selection of officers.** Figure A.1.1 shows the positive relationship between early career performance and the selection of officers for a subzone command. Officers with subzone commands had a significantly higher class rank, i.e. graduated closer at the top of their class at the military academy, than officers who did not receive such a post. Figure A.1.2 shows the positive relationship between mid-career performance and the selection of officers for a subzone command. Officers who successfully graduated from the army's war college were over-represented among those officers with a command post.

3) **Placement of officers.** Figure A.1.3 shows the positive relationship between the total time officers spent in the army after graduation and the geographic location of their subzone post. Those officers who had waited longer to be deployed in the field were more likely to be assigned to commands in the vicinity of their hometown.

Table A.1.1. Summary statistics

	Type	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
Subzone command	Binary	1024	0.083	0.276	0.000	1.000
Geographic proximity to home city[a]	Continous	63	3.201	1.760	0.000	8.566
Travel time to home city[a]	Continous	63	1.960	0.899	0.036	3.473
Class rank	Continous	1021	53.550	28.130	0.000	100.000
Advanced training	Binary	1021	0.490	0.500	0.000	1.000
Cadet age	Count	1021	223.090	18.608	179.000	308.000
Training length	Count	1021	39.328	7.286	21.000	83.000
Infantry officer	Binary	1021	0.402	0.490	0.000	1.000
Cavalry officer	Binary	1021	0.151	0.358	0.000	1.000
Artillery officer	Binary	1021	0.253	0.435	0.000	1.000
Engineering officer	Binary	1021	0.112	0.315	0.000	1.000
Born in Federal Capital	Binary	1021	0.336	0.473	0.000	1.000
Born in Province Buenos Aires	Binary	1021	0.213	0.409	0.000	1.000
Waiting time	Continous	82	29.990	1.933	22.750	34.583
Connections	Continous	82	-0.000	1.001	-3.043	2.066
Insurgent activity[a]	Count	85	0.949	1.289	0.000	4.025
Intelligence units	Count	85	2.024	0.913	0.000	4.000
Command under Directive 404/75	Binary	85	0.400	0.493	0.000	1.000
Previous subzone command	Binary	85	0.224	0.419	0.000	1.000

Note: [a] Variable logarithmized.

Figure A.1.1. Early career performance and deployment



Note: Graph shows the relationship between performance at the military academy and subsequent selection for subzone command. Dots give mean class ranks and vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A.1.2. Mid-career performance and deployment



Note: Graph shows the relationship between successful graduation from war college and subsequent selection for subzone command. Bars give percentages of subzone officers with and without staff college degrees.

Figure A.1.3. Waiting time and geographic placement



Note: Graph shows the positive relationship between each officer's waiting times and their placement on subzone commands in closer geographic proximity to their birth cities. Dots identify deployed officers.

A.2 Additional information on case selection

In the chapter, we illustrate how autocratic regimes use field deployments to generate loyalty among competent officers using Argentina's last dictatorship. This section provides more information on the case selection rationale. We are convinced that the empirical analyses of deployment patterns in Argentina's last dictatorship feature high levels of internal and external validity. Extensive historical accounts and detailed archival information provide a rare opportunity to examine an authoritarian regime's deployment strategy to maximize both competence and loyalty among commanding officers. At the same time, the strategic considerations and decisions by the military dictatorship in Argentina are likely representative of various other authoritarian regimes. Next, we detail these case features.

1) **External validity: Regime characteristics.** The Argentine regime bears many parallels with other authoritarian dictatorships in Latin America and beyond (Scharpf 2020; Scharpf and Gläßel 2020). In particular, due to Operation Condor, the Latin American authoritarian regimes involved, including the Argentine junta, influenced each other in terms of security policy and police/military operations (Dinges 2004; Lessa 2022; McSherry 2005). In addition, Scharpf and Gläßel (2020) show that the regime duration of the Argentine military dictatorship was close to the median of all military dictatorships and only slightly below that of all authoritarian regimes.

2) **External validity: Counterinsurgency characteristics.** In adopting the grid-based Quadrillage system, the Argentine junta followed the French counterinsurgency doctrine, as many other states in asymmetric conflicts do and have done to this day (Taillat 2010). This suggests that geographic placements of commanding officers may follow a similar co-optation logic in a number of autocracies involved in counterinsurgency wars.

3) **Internal validity.** The Argentine military dictatorship presents a prominent case that has received extensive scholarly attention (e.g., Brysk 1994; Fontana 1987; Norden 1996; Pion-Berlin 1989; Weyland 2019). Among other things, research has investigated the role of officers' ideology on local levels of repression (Scharpf 2018), the impact of the regime's public image concerns on patterns of human rights violations (Scharpf, Gläßel and Edwards 2022), the influence of business interests on military behavior (Gläßel, González and Scharpf 2020; Klor, Saiegh and Satyanath 2021), as well as the competence-loyalty trade-off (Scharpf and Gläßel 2020). Together with the extensive archival information, these insights offer a detailed understanding of the inner workings of the regime, its security apparatus, and the perceived threat of communist subversion. It is well established that military officers not only occupied key positions in Argentina's government but also handled all internal security matters, including operations against what the regime saw as a continent-wide campaign of subversion. This reinforces the plausibility of our theoretical mechanism that, for the leadership, having competent and loyal officers in command was essential.

4) **Data availability.** The case provides us with unprecedented, systematic data on the careers of military officers (Figueroa 2008). This allows us to study the entire officer corps from which individual commanders were selected. Likewise, we can draw on information on the army's grid-based system, which served as the operational backbone of the junta's war on subversion, and clearly demarcated the geographic areas of

responsibility for each commanding officer (D'Andrea Mohr 1999; Mittelbach and Mittelbach 2000). This allows us to test whether the regime used the geographic placement of officers and the respective distance to their hometown as a co-optation tool while controlling for various confounders and alternative explanations.

A.3 Additional information on data sources and control variables

This section offers additional information on the sources that we use to code our variables as well as a description of the control variables in the selection and placement models.

1) **Sources of information.** For our analyses of the two-step logic behind the selection and deployment of subzone officers we use various archival documents. First, we geocode the command headquarters of all subzones within the military grid system. For each subzone, we then compile a list of the names of the 64 commanding officers over time. For each commanding officer, we collect information about his rank and unit at the time, as well as the start and end date of his deployment as subzone commander based on military bulletins and notifications published by the Army to announce personnel changes (D'Andrea Mohr 1999; Mittelbach and Mittelbach 2000).[1] Second, we identify the birth city of each subzone commander using information from the officer's career record, which we retrieved from the General Archive of the Army in Buenos Aires.[2] Finally, we use first and last names as well as information on rank and graduation to link the list of subzone commanders with professional career data of all officers who had been serving in the Argentine army at the time. The original career data has been compiled from more than 20 army and government archives and comprises all serving 1,024 officers (Figueroa 2008).

2) **Control variables: Selection model.** In line with our theoretical two-step rationale for the deployment of subzone commands, we run two sets of statistical models. The first set of models investigates whether the regime selected commanders among the entire officer corps based on the candidates' competence. The dependent variable *Subzone command* is a binary indicator taking on the value of 1 if the respective officer was assigned a subzone command, and 0 otherwise. The main independent variables are *Class rank*, a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 100 that gives the individuals' relative performance at the military academy (where the cohort's top-performer receives a value of 100 and the cadet graduating bottom if his class gets the value of 0), and *Advanced training*, which indicates whether the officers completed the higher war college or not. To avoid biases due to potentially confounding omitted variables, we control for several pre-treatment variables. First, we include the variable *Cadet age*, which measures the officer's age at entering the military academy, and the variable *Training length*, which captures the total amount of time that it took an officer to complete training at the military academy. We also include binary variables that indicate each officer's army branch[3] as well as two variables that identify those officers born in the city of Buenos Aires and the surrounding province. While military branches in Argentina at the time serve as a proxy for an officers' ideological convictions and societal background (Scharpf 2018), the birthplace of Buenos Aires indicates the individuals' facilitated access to privileged social networks in the country's capital. Finally, we also use cohort fixed effects to control for structural differences across officer generations.

[1] Officers who held more than one subzone command appear more than once in the dataset.
[2] For 15 of the 64 subzone officers no record could be found at the Archive.
[3] Officers in the army's signals branch serve as the reference category.

3) **Control variables: Placement model.** The second set of statistical models tests whether the geographic placement of commanding officers indeed followed the suggested co-optation logic. Using the home city location and the location of each subzone command headquarter, we calculate the geographic proximity (logarithmized) as well as the travel time between both locations (logarithmized) for each commander. *Waiting time* serves as our main independent variable, measuring the time between an officer's graduation from the military academy and his selection for a command position. It proxies each officer's discontent with the regime, as officers who had to wait longer for a career-boosting assignment may bear grudges against the regime leadership. We expect that the variable *Waiting time* should be positively correlated with geographic proximity and negatively correlated with travel time, as the regime should have had an incentive to please the most disgruntled commanders in order to keep them loyal. We further include three controls that capture the local security situation. The variable *Insurgent activity* measures the logarithmized number of ERP and Montoneros attacks six months prior to each officer's command assumption. To code these events we draw on reports by both security forces and insurgent groups in order to alleviate problems with inaccurate or non-reporting of news-based accounts (Miranda 2014). The variable *Intelligence units* proxies for the regime's local capacity to uncover threats and the variable *Command under Directive 404/75* controls for potential differences in officer placements during the regime's most brutal phase around the 1976 coup. *Previous subzone command* captures idiosyncrasies of repeated deployments and military zone fixed effects hold constant structural differences between the grids in which subzone offices are located.

A.4 Main regression results

This section offers detailed information on our statistical regression results underlying the substantive effects plots shown in the chapter.

1) **Results: Selection model.** Table A.4.1 shows the results from six logistic regression models investigating the impact of individual officers' competence on the probability of being selected as subzone commanders. Models 1-3 estimate the influence of each officer's relative performance at the military academy, while Models 4-6 further include the variable *Advanced training* as an additional measure for professional qualification and competence. In line with our theoretical expectations, the coefficient estimates for *Class rank* and *Advanced training* are positive and statistically significant throughout. This suggests that the leadership of Argentina's military regime selected officers with a track record of early and mid-career performance on subzone commands, where they would then organize the regime's war on subversion.

2) **Results: Placement model.** Table A.4.2 shows the results from six linear regression models analyzing the strategic placement of subzone commanders. The dependent variable in Models 1-3 is *Geographic proximity to home city*, while *Travel time to home city* serves as the dependent variable in Models 4-6. As expected, the estimates for *Waiting time* are positive and statistically significant for geographic proximity. This suggests that the regime placed officers, who had waited longer for their stint, on commands close to the officers' home cities. This finding is corroborated by the results for travel time. The close proximity enabled officers to travel home to see family and friends in less time.

Table A.4.1. Selection of officers for subzone commands

	Military academy			War college		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Class rank	0.028***	0.025***	0.026***	0.020***	0.019***	0.017**
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Advanced training				3.219***	3.060***	3.324***
				(0.599)	(0.601)	(0.614)
Cadet age		−0.034***	−0.024**		−0.027***	−0.012
		(0.008)	(0.008)		(0.008)	(0.009)
Training length		−0.081***	−0.074		−0.073***	−0.047
		(0.020)	(0.046)		(0.020)	(0.043)
Infantry officer		0.838	0.765		0.297	0.513
		(0.568)	(0.584)		(0.575)	(0.644)
Cavalry officer		0.666	0.751		−0.028	0.370
		(0.603)	(0.631)		(0.617)	(0.697)
Artillery officer		0.099	0.111		−0.209	0.196
		(0.608)	(0.652)		(0.626)	(0.709)
Engineering officer		0.359	0.332		0.003	0.039
		(0.681)	(0.673)		(0.693)	(0.708)
Born in Federal Capital		−0.414	−0.400		−0.464	−0.428
		(0.299)	(0.305)		(0.305)	(0.330)
Born in Province Buenos Aires		−0.028	−0.076		−0.086	0.078
		(0.300)	(0.315)		(0.311)	(0.323)
Constant	−4.178***	6.161*	3.678	−6.193***	2.772	−1.908
	(0.336)	(2.466)	(3.234)	(0.631)	(2.436)	(3.362)
AIC	536.96	517.40	485.55	464.43	458.36	419.89
Observations	1021	1021	1021	1021	1021	1021
Cohort Fixed Effects	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.4.2. Placement of subzone commanders

	Geographic proximity to home city			Travel time to home city		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Waiting time	0.458***	0.609***	0.533**	−0.233***	−0.315***	−0.261***
	(0.125)	(0.150)	(0.161)	(0.059)	(0.073)	(0.074)
Insurgent activity		0.128	−0.205		−0.155	0.037
		(0.184)	(0.182)		(0.097)	(0.097)
Intelligence units		−0.076	0.067		0.137	−0.008
		(0.415)	(0.365)		(0.182)	(0.168)
Command under Directive 404/75		0.409	0.927†		−0.027	−0.314
		(0.642)	(0.527)		(0.322)	(0.256)
Previous subzone command		−0.679	−0.368		0.336	0.169
		(0.567)	(0.537)		(0.266)	(0.240)
Constant	−10.536**	−15.100**	−12.407*	8.957***	11.215***	9.497***
	(3.648)	(4.551)	(4.871)	(1.760)	(2.206)	(2.265)
AIC	234.47	238.91	233.23	151.25	153.04	142.54
Observations	62	62	62	62	62	62
Military Zone Fixed Effects	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

A.5 Robustness checks

This section shows the robustness of the main empirical results.

1) **Linear regressions.** Table A.5.1 replicates the results for officer selection using linear probability models. Coefficient estimates for early career performance (*Class rank*) and mid-career performance (*Advanced training*) are positive and statistically significant across all models. The selection of officers for subzone commands was based on merit.

2) **Heckman regressions.** Table A.5.2 replicates the analyses on the selection and subsequent placement of officers using Heckman regressions for sample selection. Results remain unchanged. On the selection stage, coefficient estimates for *Class rank* and *Advanced training* are positive and statistically significant across all models. On the placement stage, the estimates for *Waiting time* are also positive and statistically significant throughout. Moreover, estimates of the selectivity parameter λ show that selection and outcome equations are weakly correlated at best. This underlines the decision to analyze the selection and placement of officers in separate sets of models.

3) **Clustered standard errors.** Table A.5.3 replicates the results for officer selection using cohort-clustered standard errors, which allow for correlations among officers who attended military academy together. Results for *Class rank* and *Advanced training* remain unchanged. Table A.5.4 replicates the results for officer placements using standard errors clustered on birth provinces, which permit correlations between officers born in the same part of Argentina. Results for *Waiting time* remain again unchanged.

4) **Validating the co-optation measure.** This test probes the validity of the co-opation measure and assesses its independence from officer competence. To this end, we regress *Waiting time* on all variables of the analysis on selection, including the variables of early and mid-career performance. As shown in Table A.5.5 and Figure A.5.1, both performance variables and the variables on officer origin are not correlated with waiting time. The only exception is the variable *Artillery officer*, which indicates that officers of this army branch were more likely to be favored. Overall, the test underlines that waiting time captures the discrimination of officers, which is orthogonal to merit-based career prospects.

5) **Alternative measure of co-optation.** This test replicates the analysis of placements using an alternative measure of discrimination. The variable *Connections* measures the degree to which officers are discriminated (favored) within the military organization. We exploit the fact that career progression in the military, specifically at junior and mid-level ranks, is a function of seniority. Figure A.5.2 shows the positive relationship between an officer's age at assuming command and the officer's time spent in the army. The variable *Connections* measures deviations from this relationship. The idea is that well-connected officers (red dots), i.e., those with negative residuals (red lines), are placed on commands earlier than their seniority level would suggest. Conversely, poorly connected officers (blue dots), i.e., those with positive residuals (blue lines), are placed on commands later than their peers.

Results in Table A.5.6 show that our results for officer placements fully replicate using the alternate measure. The coefficient estimates of *Connections* in Models 1-3 suggest that officers with weak connections in the army (large positive residuals) are placed

on subzone commands in closer geographic proximity to their home cities. Estimates in Models 4-6 also show that this also reduces the required travel time to the officers' birth cities.

Table A.5.1. Linear regressions for selection of officers for subzone commands

	Military academy			War college		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Class rank	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Advanced training				0.134***	0.120***	0.130***
				(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Cadet age		−0.002***	−0.001**		−0.001***	−0.001
		(0.000)	(0.000)		(0.000)	(0.000)
Training length		−0.005***	−0.003†		−0.004***	−0.001
		(0.001)	(0.002)		(0.001)	(0.002)
Infantry officer		0.053†	0.052†		0.031	0.028
		(0.028)	(0.027)		(0.026)	(0.026)
Cavalry officer		0.045	0.055†		0.013	0.021
		(0.033)	(0.032)		(0.033)	(0.032)
Artillery officer		0.008	0.015		−0.006	0.002
		(0.028)	(0.028)		(0.027)	(0.027)
Engineering officer		0.016	0.017		0.005	0.003
		(0.033)	(0.031)		(0.031)	(0.030)
Born in Federal Capital		−0.027	−0.023		−0.030	−0.026
		(0.019)	(0.018)		(0.019)	(0.018)
Born in Province Buenos Aires		0.002	−0.001		0.002	−0.002
		(0.022)	(0.022)		(0.022)	(0.021)
Constant	−0.016	0.647***	0.432*	−0.043***	0.452***	0.187
	(0.012)	(0.144)	(0.189)	(0.012)	(0.136)	(0.181)
AIC	205.52	187.66	144.65	147.25	143.66	90.57
Observations	1021	1021	1021	1021	1021	1021
Cohort Fixed Effects	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.5.2. Regressions with Heckman sample selection

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Among army officers: Selection for subzone					
Class rank	0.010**	0.010**	0.010**	0.010**	0.009*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Advanced training	1.410***	1.341***	1.341***	1.341***	1.561***
	(0.347)	(0.359)	(0.359)	(0.359)	(0.464)
Cadet age		−0.012*	−0.012*	−0.012*	−0.003
		(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Training length		−0.031*	−0.031*	−0.031*	−0.012
		(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.025)
Infantry officer		0.151	0.151	0.151	0.307
		(0.377)	(0.377)	(0.377)	(0.458)
Cavalry officer		0.101	0.101	0.101	0.391
		(0.398)	(0.398)	(0.398)	(0.483)
Artillery officer		−0.127	−0.127	−0.127	0.204
		(0.416)	(0.416)	(0.416)	(0.503)
Engineering officer		0.152	0.152	0.152	0.166
		(0.427)	(0.427)	(0.427)	(0.490)
Born in Federal Capital		−0.213	−0.213	−0.213	−0.095
		(0.188)	(0.188)	(0.188)	(0.214)
Born in Province Buenos Aires		−0.057	−0.057	−0.057	−0.017
		(0.189)	(0.189)	(0.189)	(0.202)
Constant	−3.231***	0.599	0.599	0.599	−2.044
	(0.416)	(1.499)	(1.499)	(1.499)	(2.078)
Among subzone officers: Placement in proximity to home city					
Waiting time	0.462***	0.467***	0.628***	0.544**	0.608**
	(0.132)	(0.137)	(0.173)	(0.187)	(0.196)
Insurgent activity			0.129	−0.199	−0.168
			(0.201)	(0.205)	(0.202)
Intelligence units			−0.078	0.059	0.099
			(0.463)	(0.405)	(0.424)
Command under Directive 404/75			0.454	0.938	1.219†
			(0.704)	(0.586)	(0.706)
Previous subzone command			−0.670	−0.368	−0.299
			(0.621)	(0.608)	(0.603)
Constant	−11.484**	−11.170**	−16.184**	−12.967*	−15.530*
	(4.051)	(4.188)	(5.585)	(5.909)	(6.439)
Selectivity effect					
λ	0.507	0.231	0.327	0.139	0.462
	(0.487)	(0.387)	(0.468)	(0.507)	(0.465)
Number of observations	1001	1001	1001	1001	1001
Selected observations	62	62	62	62	62
Cohort Fixed Effects	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Military Zone Fixed Effects	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓

Note: Values are coefficients with jackknife standard errors in parentheses.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.5.3. Results for officer selection with standard errors clustered on academy cohorts

	Logistic regression			Linear regression		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Class rank	0.020**	0.019*	0.017*	0.001*	0.001*	0.001*
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Advanced training	3.219***	3.060***	3.324***	0.134*	0.120*	0.130*
	(0.679)	(0.683)	(0.756)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.044)
Cadet age		−0.027***	−0.012		−0.001*	−0.001
		(0.007)	(0.009)		(0.000)	(0.000)
Training length		−0.073*	−0.047		−0.004**	−0.001
		(0.031)	(0.061)		(0.001)	(0.002)
Infantry officer		0.297	0.513		0.031	0.028
		(0.411)	(0.488)		(0.024)	(0.022)
Cavalry officer		−0.028	0.370		0.013	0.021
		(0.456)	(0.626)		(0.026)	(0.031)
Artillery officer		−0.209	0.196		−0.006	0.002
		(0.479)	(0.545)		(0.022)	(0.021)
Engineering officer		0.003	0.039		0.005	0.003
		(0.821)	(0.890)		(0.040)	(0.040)
Born in Federal Capital		−0.464	−0.428		−0.030	−0.026
		(0.499)	(0.459)		(0.034)	(0.029)
Born in Province Buenos Aires		−0.086	0.078		0.002	−0.002
		(0.303)	(0.264)		(0.020)	(0.020)
Constant	−6.193***	2.772	−1.908	−0.043*	0.452***	0.187
	(0.564)	(2.248)	(4.158)	(0.018)	(0.100)	(0.150)
AIC	464.43	458.36	395.89	147.25	143.66	66.57
Observations	1021	1021	1021	1021	1021	1021
Clusters	12	12	12	12	12	12
Cohort Fixed Effects	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓

Note: Values are coefficients with clustered standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.5.4. Results for officer placement with standard errors clustered on birth provinces

	Geographic proximity to home city			Travel time to home city		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Waiting time	0.458*	0.609*	0.533*	−0.233**	−0.315**	−0.261**
	(0.159)	(0.195)	(0.200)	(0.053)	(0.078)	(0.079)
Insurgent activity		0.128	−0.205		−0.155†	0.037
		(0.135)	(0.123)		(0.072)	(0.064)
Intelligence units		−0.076	0.067		0.137	−0.008
		(0.554)	(0.379)		(0.260)	(0.178)
Command under Directive 404/75		0.409	0.927		−0.027	−0.314
		(0.729)	(0.595)		(0.362)	(0.264)
Previous subzone command		−0.679	−0.368		0.336†	0.169
		(0.382)	(0.396)		(0.163)	(0.163)
Constant	−10.536*	−15.100*	−12.407*	8.957***	11.215***	9.497**
	(4.565)	(5.183)	(5.360)	(1.495)	(1.966)	(2.130)
AIC	234.47	238.91	233.23	151.25	153.04	142.54
Observations	62	62	62	62	62	62
Clusters	11	11	11	11	11	11
Military Zone Fixed Effects	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓

Note: Values are coefficients with clustered standard errors in parentheses.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.5.5. Orthogonality test of waiting time measure

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Class rank	−0.008		−0.008	−0.007
	(0.008)		(0.008)	(0.009)
Advanced training		2.988	2.985	1.192
		(1.827)	(1.814)	(1.580)
Cadet age				−0.005
				(0.015)
Training length				−0.086**
				(0.032)
Infantry officer				0.047
				(0.719)
Cavalry officer				−0.277
				(0.907)
Artillery officer				−1.895*
				(0.824)
Engineering officer				1.281
				(1.168)
Born in Federal Capital				0.767†
				(0.408)
Born in Province Buenos Aires				−0.282
				(0.504)
Constant	30.560***	27.111***	27.678***	33.669***
	(0.589)	(1.816)	(1.754)	(3.989)
AIC	343.12	336.45	337.77	327.62
Observations	82	82	82	82

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Figure A.5.1. Orthogonality of the waiting time measure



Note: Graph shows that the waiting time measure is uncorrelated with the origins, performances, and most army branches of officers. Dots give coefficients estimates, and horizontal lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Calculations are based on Model 4, Table A.5.5.

Figure A.5.2. Measuring the connections of officers



Note: Graph shows the construction of the variable *Connections* based on the positive relationship between an officer's age at assuming command and the time spent in the army. Negative residuals (red lines) indicate well-connected officers (red dots), and positive residuals (blue lines) indicate weakly connected officers (blue dots).

Table A.5.6. Results for connection measure

	Geographic proximity to home city			Travel time to home city		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Connections	0.598***	0.581**	0.463*	−0.285**	−0.275**	−0.210*
	(0.166)	(0.178)	(0.196)	(0.086)	(0.091)	(0.092)
Insurgent activity		0.014	−0.363†		−0.095	0.117
		(0.202)	(0.208)		(0.106)	(0.105)
Intelligence units		0.040	0.132		0.078	−0.038
		(0.426)	(0.396)		(0.191)	(0.186)
Command under Directive 404/75		−0.228	0.480		0.308	−0.094
		(0.652)	(0.539)		(0.333)	(0.269)
Previous subzone command		0.092	0.317		−0.063	−0.169
		(0.562)	(0.530)		(0.265)	(0.231)
Constant	3.233***	3.214***	3.706***	1.946***	1.758***	1.591***
	(0.215)	(0.789)	(0.811)	(0.111)	(0.378)	(0.408)
AIC	241.05	248.75	242.52	158.98	164.91	153.16
Observations	62	62	62	62	62	62
Military Zone Fixed Effects	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

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