Supplementary Appendix

This Supplementary Appendix contains results tables that provide additional details on some of the additional analyses that were reported as figures in the main Appendix.

Table S.1: RD Estimates for Higher-Order Polynomial Specifications

Model	Estimate	95% CI	p	h	n
Female Candidates, Linear	-0.790	[-1.31, -0.27]	0.003	0.18	2361
Male Candidates, Linear	-0.133	[-0.71, 0.45]	0.655	0.13	1928
Female Candidates, Quadratic	-1.097	[-1.91, -0.28]	0.008	0.18	2349
Male Candidates, Quadratic	-0.012	[-0.7, 0.68]	0.973	0.19	2475
Female Candidates, Cubic	-1.124	[-1.97, -0.28]	0.009	0.27	2875
Male Candidates, Cubic	0.202	[-0.64, 1.05]	0.638	0.21	2589
Female Candidates, Quartic	-1.116	[-2.12, -0.11]	0.029	0.28	2930
Male Candidates, Quartic	0.193	[-0.7, 1.08]	0.672	0.28	2938

Table S.2: Effects by Candidate Type

Model	Estimate	95% CI	p	h	n
Dynastic Candidate	-0.755	[-1.64, 0.13]	0.096	0.23	847
Not Dynastic Candidate	-0.676	[-1.39, 0.04]	0.065	0.16	1334
Incumbent	-0.502	[-1.68, 0.68]	0.405	0.13	367
Not Incumbent	-0.837	[-1.46, -0.21]	0.009	0.17	1900
Held Prior Office	-1.975	[-3.86, -0.09]	0.040	0.14	343
Not Prior Office	-0.901	[-1.69, -0.11]	0.025	0.14	1151
Party Insider	-0.966	[-1.8, -0.14]	0.023	0.12	602
Not Party Insider	-1.686	[-2.96, -0.41]	0.009	0.15	558

Table S.3: Effects by Municipality Type

Model	Estimate	95% CI	p	h	n
High Development	-1.113	[-2.17, -0.06]	0.038	0.14	962
Low Development	-0.661	[-1.37, 0.05]	0.067	0.12	945
High Female Labor Force Participation	-1.079	[-2.01, -0.15]	0.022	0.18	1126
Low Female Labor Force Participation	-0.604	[-1.25, 0.04]	0.065	0.15	1103
Large Electorate	-0.340	[-0.81, 0.13]	0.154	0.15	997
Small Electorate	-1.339	[-2.31, -0.37]	0.007	0.15	1089

Table S.4: Effects by Party Type

Model	Estimate	95% CI	p	h	n
Leftist Party	-0.957	[-2.11, 0.19]	0.103	0.15	270
Centrist or Right-wing Party	-0.840	[-1.47, -0.21]	0.009	0.16	1936
Policy-Seeking Party	-1.165	[-2.13, -0.2]	0.018	0.12	503
Not Policy-Seeking Party	-0.900	[-1.72, -0.08]	0.031	0.13	1398
Centralized Party	-1.220	[-2.15, -0.29]	0.010	0.13	660
Decentralized Party	-0.527	[-1.33, 0.28]	0.201	0.15	1099
High Women in Party Leadership	-0.378	[-1.53, 0.77]	0.519	0.18	364
Low Women in Party Leadership	-0.980	[-1.63, -0.33]	0.003	0.15	1796

Table S.5: Party-Switching of Female Party Members

Model	Estimate	95% CI	p	h	n
PT, Female Mayors	0.015	[-0.1, 0.13]	0.808	0.23	182
PT, Male Mayors	0.050	[-0.1, 0.2]	0.509	0.14	140
PSDB, Female Mayors	0.020	[-0.01, 0.04]	0.119	0.15	249
PSDB, Male Mayors	0.061	[-0.02, 0.14]	0.156	0.13	219
MDB, Female Mayors	-0.066	[-0.18, 0.05]	0.269	0.13	344
MDB, Male Mayors	-0.038	[-0.12, 0.05]	0.383	0.14	375
DEM, Female Mayors	-0.050	[-0.3, 0.2]	0.700	0.13	153
DEM, Male Mayors	-0.074	[-0.3, 0.15]	0.521	0.14	139

Table S.6: Party-Switching of Male Party Members

Model	Estimate	95% CI	p	h	n
PT, Female Mayors	-0.035	[-0.17, 0.1]	0.608	0.16	152
PT, Male Mayors	0.046	[-0.12, 0.21]	0.576	0.14	154
PSDB, Female Mayors	-0.036	[-0.07, 0]	0.048	0.20	313
PSDB, Male Mayors	0.016	[-0.06, 0.09]	0.676	0.15	259
MDB, Female Mayors	-0.158	[-0.28, -0.03]	0.014	0.12	345
MDB, Male Mayors	-0.063	[-0.15, 0.02]	0.154	0.16	419
DEM, Female Mayors	-0.042	[-0.24, 0.16]	0.687	0.17	181
DEM, Male Mayors	-0.085	[-0.29, 0.12]	0.411	0.13	136

Table S.7: Effect of Incumbency by Year

Model	Estimate	95% CI	p	h	n
Year 1, Female Mayors	0.009	[-0.17, 0.18]	0.923	0.18	2421
Year 1, Male Mayors	-0.034	[-0.16, 0.09]	0.590	0.14	1997
Year 2, Female Mayors	-0.055	[-0.18, 0.07]	0.371	0.15	2164
Year 2, Male Mayors	0.070	[-0.09, 0.23]	0.404	0.18	2342
Year 3, Female Mayors	-0.579	[-1.08, -0.07]	0.025	0.16	2225
Year 3, Male Mayors	-0.022	[-0.44, 0.4]	0.916	0.15	2088
Year 4, Female Mayors	-0.213	[-0.46, 0.03]	0.087	0.14	1968
Year 4, Male Mayors	-0.247	[-0.55, 0.06]	0.112	0.17	2266