Pivotal States Codebook

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This codebook records the characteristics of 78 multilateral military operations. The dataset differs from existing datasets, most importantly from the *Third Party Interventions in Intrastate Disputes* (TPI) dataset and the *International Military Intervention* (IMI) dataset by the type of operation characteristics it provides.[1] As will be explained in detail below, this dataset identifies the *Pivotal State(s)* of individual operations (i.e. the nation(s), which have the greatest interest in the launch of a specific operation). The dataset also records the participants of the operation, the intensity of the operation, the specific objectives of the operation, the organizational structure of the operation and whether the operation was conducted under a UN mandate (incl. relevant UNSC resolutions).

Scope

Version 1.0 of the dataset is limited to the post-Cold War period covering only operations which have been initiated after January 1990 and no later than December 2005. In addition, this version of the dataset focuses solely on ground operations (i.e., naval and air operations have been excluded due to the difficulty of discerning individual country contributions). Any operations involving fewer than 100 military and/or police forces have been left out to avoid operations with a merely "political" objective (i.e. to show flag).

Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis of the dataset is potential participant/year/operation.

Identification of Cases

The sample of operations meeting the scope conditions described above was established using the following sources:

1) Réseau Francophone de Recherche sur les Opérations de Paix (ROP): http://www.operationspaix.net/
2) United Nations Peace Keeping Department (UNDPKO): http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/; http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/operationslist.pdf (last visited 08/26/2011)
3) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52060.htm (last visited 08/26/2011)
4) European Union (EU): http://consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations.aspx?lang=en (last visited 08/26/2011)
5) International Military Intervention Dataset (1989-2005) from Kisangani and Pickering: http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/21282
6) Third Party Interventions in Intrastate Disputes (TPI) Dataset (1945-2000) from Mullenbach and Dixon: http://cms.uca.edu:8080/politicalscience/documents/tpi_peacekeepingmissions.pdf

Note: Please refer to the code sheets attached for a list of the individual operations included in this version of the dataset.

[1] The TPI dataset lists conflicts in which a third-party got involved. The IMI dataset provides details of the type of intervention (incl. interventions aimed at territorial conquest), the type of military resources deployed (naval, air, ground), the amount of troops deployed and the number of battle casualties.

Purpose of Code Sheets

This codebook contains a code sheets per operation. The main purpose of these code sheets is to explain why a particular country was coded *Pivotal State* of a specific operation. There is one code sheet per operation included in the codebook.

Coding Technique of Pivotal States

Pivotal States are defined as those countries, which display the greatest preference intensity for the execution of a specific operation. To discern preference intensity two different coding criteria have been developed:

1. *How vocal is a state in international fora pushing for an operation?*

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) deliberates on the large majority of security situations, which are afterwards addressed by a UN or other peacekeeping operations. Any member of the United Nation – whether permanent, non-permanent or non-member of the UNSC at the time of deliberation -- can ask to address the UNSC during these sessions. This research project assumes that states having sharply defined and intense preferences with regards to a specific peacekeeping mission are particularly likely to request permission to address the UNSC. As a result, to discern preference intensities with regards to specific operations this research project counts the times a country advocates in the UNSC in favor of a particular mission. It uses the *UN Index to Speeches* (years 1988-2010) to do so.[2] I code a country a *Pivotal State* if its interventions rank three standard deviations (std. dev.) above the mean of all interventions per country in the UNSC on a specific security topic.[3] Note that I exclude any statements by the target state of the intervention and by states speaking on behalf of regional or other organizations. In addition, statements made by the country presiding the UNSC session are equally excluded as such statements are often administratively required and thus are not the result of state-specific preference intensities. Given that the UNSC discusses "security situations" and not specific operations, successive operations in one the same conflict theater often show the same speech patterns.

2. *How involved is a state in conflict resolution efforts (i.e. peace/cease-fire negotiations) prior to the launch of the operation?*

The UN Speech Record serves as a first cut at determining states' preference intensities. I am aware that talk may be cheap and thus not necessarily truthful in revealing preference intensities.[4] As a result, in addition to looking at UNSC statements, I examine the willingness of the key UNSC speakers to engage in costlier actions regarding the conflict situation in question. In fact, the deployment of most peacekeeping operations is preceded by (successful or failed) negotiations of peace/cease-fire agreements. Using the available secondary literature on the negotiations in question, I code whether a state served as initiator, mediator, observer, or principal financial sponsor of such negotiations. I thus assume that states having particularly strong preferences with regards to a specific operation are more likely to be involved in such negotiations than any other state.

Only states fulfilling both criteria, (1) UN statements, and (2) being diplomatically involved in peace negotiations, are coded *Pivotal States* of a specific operation. In case of a major discrepancy between

[2] See http://unbisnet.un.org/; to get the largest amount of observations I count all UNSC statements from 1988-2010.
[3] If no country's speech record is three standard deviations above the mean, I revert to two standard deviations above the mean.
[4] Schelling 1960, 117.

the speech record analysis and the negotiation analysis I put more weight on the involvement in negotiations.

Overall, a state can serve as sole pivotal state or in cooperation with a small group of countries that all show an equally strong preference intensity for the launch of a specific intervention. While certainly not perfect, these rather stringent criteria attempt to get as close at revealing individual countries' preference intensities as possible. Most importantly, by focusing on the diplomatic behavior of states, this coding strategy attempts to *not* overlook the interests of small states, which might be militarily unable to conduct an operation but still muster intense interests with regards to the conduct of such an operation.

1. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: UNAVEM II

Brief Description of Operation: Angola's independence is followed by a ferocious civil war compounded by superpower competition and South African colonial ambition in Namibia. The New York Accords (1988) specify Namibian independence under precondition of withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. The first UN operation (UNAVEM I) is deployed from 1988-1991. UNAVEM II is the larger follow-on mission implemented on the basis of the Bicesse Accords (1991). The operation is coupled to an arms and petroleum embargo against the rebel organization UNITA. UNAVEM II fails due to renewed violence over natural resources.

Start Date: 1991

End Date: 1995

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 696, 747, 804, 811, 834,952, 966

Intensity of Operations: Peacebuilding consultation

Max. Police Forces deployed: 126

Max. Military Forces deployed: 350

Target Nation: Angola

Participating Nations: Algeria, Colombia, Hungary, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Zimbabwe, Argentina, Egypt, India, Morocco, Netherlands, Slovakia, Brazil, Spain, Ireland, Nigeria, Czech Republic, Sweden, Canada, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan, Norway, Senegal, Yugoslavia, Russian Federation

Lead Nation(s): USA, USSR/Russian Federation, Portugal

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA, China, UK, France*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, China, UK, France, Russia, Brazil*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Bicesse Accords

Intensive involvement of the **United States, the Soviet Union and Portugal** as guarantor states of the Bicesse Accords. See for example McQueen (1998:399): "The slow, faltering movement of the process after Lusaka was overseen by two UN secretary-generals (Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and from January 1997 Kofi Annan), their special representatives and a peacekeeping force 7000 strong at its peak and costing USD one million a day. In the background were the three Observer States' actively involved in the search for a settlement in Angola since 1990, the **United States, Russia** and **Portugal**. These three states (as former superpowers and colonial power respectively) bore much historical responsibility for the protracted horror of the Angolan conflict which had been conducted with peaks and troughs of ferocity since the eve of decolonization in 1975." For a similar account on the role of the United States, Russia and Portugal see also Ciment (1999:279-280), Anstee (1996:13), Hare (1998:8), Cohen (2000:87-125).

References:

Anstee, M. J. (1996). Orphan of the cold war: the inside story of the collapse of the Angolan peace process, 1992-93. New York, St. Martin's Press.

Ciment, J., K. L. Hill, et al. (1999). Encyclopedia of Conflicts since World War II. Armonk, NY, Sharpe Reference.

Cohen, H. J. (2000). Intervening in Africa: superpower peacemaking in a troubled continent. New York, St. Martin's Press.

Franke, V. C. and A. Warnecke (2009). "Building Peace: An Inventory of UN Peace Missions since the End of the Cold War." International Peacekeeping **16**(3): 408-436.

Hare, P. J. (1998). Angola's last best chance for peace : an insider's account of the peace process. Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press.

MacQueen, N. (1998). "Peacekeeping by attrition: the United Nations in Angola." Journal of Modern African Studies **36**(3): 399-422.

Vines, A. (1999). Angola Unravels: the rise and fall of the Lusaka peace process, Human Rights Watch.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/UNAVEM-II (for participation data)
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml (for troop data)

2. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: UNAVEM III

Brief Description of Operation: Follow-on mission of UNAVEM II; Lusaka Protocol (1994) facilitates new attempts to resolve the conflict.

Start Date: 1995

End Date: 1997

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 967

Intensity of Operation: Multidimensional peacebuilding

Max. Police Forces deployed: 260

Max. Military Forces deployed: 7350

Target Nation: Angola

Participating Nations: Algeria, Bulgaria, Fiji, India, Mali, Norway, Poland, Russia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Argentina, DRC, France, Jordan, Morocco, New Zealand, Portugal, Senegal, Ukraine, Bangladesh, South Korea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Namibia, Pakistan, Romania, Slovakia, Uruguay, Brazil, Egypt, Hungary, Malaysia, Nigeria, Netherlands, UK, Sweden, Zambia

Lead Nation(s): USA, USSR/Russian Federation, Portugal

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA, China, UK, France*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, China, UK, France, Russia, Brazil*

Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Lusaka Protocol

The Lusaka Protocol created a joint commission, consisting of officials from the Angolan government, UNITA, and the UN with the governments of **Portugal, the United States, and Russia** as observer states, to oversee its implementation (see e.g. Vines 1999).

References:

Vines, A. (1999). Angola Unravels: the rise and fall of the Lusaka peace process, Human Rights Watch.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/UNAVEM-III (for participation data)
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml (for troop data)

3. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: MONUA

Brief Description of Operation: After the failures of UNAVEM II and III, this last attempt at facilitating transition to peace is terminated at the request of the Angolan government without peace having been achieved; MONUA is accompanied by sanctions against UNITA and a UN expert panel on resources and illegal arms flows (Franke and Warnecke 2009).

Start Date: 1997

End Date: 1999

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 1118, 1173

Intensity of Operation: Multidimensional peacebuilding

Max. Police Forces deployed: 403

Max. Military Forces deployed: 3315

Target Nation: Angola

Participating Nations: Argentina, Bulgaria, France, Hungary, Malaysia, Norway, Poland, Senegal, Ukraine, Bangladesh, DRC, Gambia, India, Mali, New Zealand, Portugal, Slovakia, Uruguay, Bolivia, Egypt, Ghana, Jordan, Namibia, Pakistan, Romania, Sweden, Zambia, Brazil, Spain, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Nigeria, Netherlands, Russia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe

Lead Nation(s): USA, USSR/Russian Federation, Portugal

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA, China, UK, France*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, China, UK, France, Russia, Brazil*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Lusaka Protocol

Same actors involved as in UNAVEM III (see above).

References:

Anstee, M. J. (1996). Orphan of the cold war: the inside story of the collapse of the Angolan peace process, 1992-93. New York, St. Martin's Press.

Ciment, J., K. L. Hill, et al. (1999). Encyclopedia of Conflicts since World War II. Armonk, NY, Sharpe Reference.

Franke, V. C. and A. Warnecke (2009). "Building Peace: An Inventory of UN Peace Missions since the End of the Cold War." International Peacekeeping **16**(3): 408-436.

Hare, P. J. (1998). Angola's last best chance for peace : an insider's account of the peace process. Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press.

MacQueen, N. (1998). "Peacekeeping by attrition: the United Nations in Angola." Journal of Modern African Studies **36**(3): 399-422.

Vines, A. (1999). Angola Unravels: the rise and fall of the Lusaka peace process, Human Rights Watch.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/MONUA (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

4. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: ISAF

Brief Description of Operation: ISAF is a NATO-led military operation following the US-led war that overthrew the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Its tasks are to create a secure environment and enable the political and economic rebuilding process.

Start Date: 2001

End Date: 2014

Organization: NATO

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 1386, 1510

Intensity of Operation: Multidimensional peacekeeping

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 132.457

Target Nation: Afghanistan

Participating Nations: Albania, Germany, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Colombia, Denmark, United Arab Emirates, Spain, Estonia, USA, Finland, France, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Norway, New Zealand, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Czech Republic, Romania, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine

Lead Nation(s): United States

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, Russia, France, China, UK, Japan, Pakistan*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Bonn Agreement

The Bonn Agreement initiated a series of agreements intended to recreate the State of Afghanistan following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The Bonn agreement was **US-driven** (Dobbins 2008) as was the deployment of ISAF. Kreps (2011: 105), for instance, writes: "After the fall of the Taliban, it became clear [to the United States] that the stabilization and reconstruction phases [of Afghanistan] would be lengthy and costly; the recognition that post-conflict operations would be a multibillion-dollar, multiyear process and that the United States could not win this phase 'cheaply' made allies more attractive" (see also Pierre 2002).

References:

Dobbins, J. (2008). After the Taliban: Nation-building in Afghanistan. Washington, D.C., Potomac Books.

Kreps, S. E. (2011). Coalitions of convenience: United States military interventions after the Cold War. New York, Oxford University Press.

Pierre, A. J. (2002). Coalitions: Building and Maintenance - Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan, War on Terrorism, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service Georgetown University.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)

http://www.iiss.org/members-login/?ReturnUrl=/publications/military-balance/members-access-military-balance/ (IISS Military Balance Archive 2001-2006) (for participation and troop data)

5. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: TMG (Bougainville Truce Monitoring Group)

Brief Description of Operation: Violent conflict in Bougainville began in 1988 and continued until the deployment of the TMG. It was initially a secessionist struggle between the government Papua New Guinea (PNG) and the Bougainville Revolutionary Army. The catalyst for the conflict was tensions among both mining area landowner groups and Bougainville mineworkers over distribution of mining-related revenue and of employment opportunities. TMG was established on December 6, 1997, to monitor compliance with the *Burnham Ceasefire Agreement* of October 10, 1997. The TMG had the mandate to promote and build confidence among the warring parties. It was replaced on May 1, 1998, by the PMG (see below) as stipulated in the Lincoln Peace Agreement of January 23, 1998.

Start Date: 1997

End Date: 1998

Organization: Ad hoc

UN Mandate: No

Intensity of Operation: Peacekeeping force

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 260

Target Nation: Papua New Guinea (PNG)

Participating Nations: New Zealand, Australia, Fiji, Vanuatu

Lead Nation(s): Australia, New Zealand

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *cannot be determined*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *cannot be determined*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Burnham Truce

The Burnham Truce was brokered by **Australia** and **New Zealand** (cf. Regan in Fry and Kabutaulaka 2008:188ff; Tapi 2002).

References:

Cotton, J. (2009). "Peacebuilding in the Pacific: the Australian military experience." Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development (14).

Fry, G. and T. T. Kabutaulaka (2008). Intervention and state-building in the Pacific : the legitimacy of 'cooperative intervention'. Manchester, UK ; New York, New York, Manchester University Press ;

Tapi, R. (2002). "From Burnham to Buin: sowing the seeds of peace in the land of the snow-capped mountains." Conciliation Resources; http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/png-bougainville/burnham-buin.php (last visited 06/19/2011)

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data); http://www.operationspaix.net/GST (for participation data)
Note: No data on troop deployments per country available

6. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: PMG (Bougainville Peace Monitoring Group)

Brief Description of Operation: The PMG was first deployed in May 1998 to Bougainville (Papua New Guinea) to ensure compliance with the *Lincoln Peace Agreement* signed on January 13, 1998, by the Government of Papua New Guinea, the Bougainville Interim Government, the Bougainville Revolutionary Army and other Bougainville leaders involved. PMG was the TMG follow-on operation. The operation ended on June 30, 2003, when it was replaced by the Bougainville Transition Team – an entirely civilian-led operation in charge of helping the establishment of an autonomous government in Bougainville following the *Bougainville Peace Agreement* signed in Arawa on August 30, 2001.

Start Date: 1998

End Date: 2003

Organization: Ad hoc

UN Mandate: No

Intensity of Operation: Peacekeeping operation

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 300

Target Nation: Papua New Guinea

Participating Nations: New Zealand, Australia, Fiji, Vanuatu

Lead Nation(s): Australia, New Zealand

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *cannot be determined*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *cannot be determined*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Lincoln Peace Agreement

The Lincoln Peace Agreement was brokered by **Australia and New Zealand** (cf. Regan in Fry and Kabutaulaka 2008:188ff; Wolfers 2006). Australia was initially hiding behind New Zealand because it was considered biased toward the PNG government (Regan in Fry and Kabutaulaka 2008:186). The process was then, however, largely funded by Australia, including a post-conflict transitional presence and assistance with the subsequent 2005 Bougainville elections (Cotton 2009; Regan in Fry and Kabutaulaka 2008:196).

References:

Cotton, J. (2009). "Peacebuilding in the Pacific: the Australian military experience." Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development (14).

Fry, G. and T. T. Kabutaulaka (2008). Intervention and state-building in the Pacific: the legitimacy of 'cooperative intervention'. Manchester, UK; New York, New York, Manchester University Press;

Tapi, R. (2002). "From Burnham to Buin: sowing the seeds of peace in the land of the snow-capped mountains." Conciliation Resources; http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/png-bougainville/burnham-buin.php (last visited 06/19/2011)

Wolfers, E. P. (2006). International Peace Missions in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, 1990-2005 - Host State Perspectives. http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan022601.pdf (last visited 06/19/2011)

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/GSP (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

7. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: AMIB (African Union Mission in Burundi)

Brief Description of Operation: Long-running tensions between the Hutu majority and dominating Tutsi minority lead to civil war in 1993. Various African-led conflict resolution efforts finally conclude in the Arusha Peace Agreement (2000). Due to the exclusion of two rebel factions, Burundi continues to experience violence. AMIB is created by the African Union on February 3, 2003, and ends on June 1, 2004, with the deployment of the UN follow-on operation ONUB (see below). It is deployed to oversee the implementation of the South Africa-brokered cease-fire agreements of October 7 and December 2, 2002.

Start Date: 2003

End Date: 2004

Organization: African Union

UN Mandate: No

Intensity of Operation: Multidimensional peacekeeping

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 3335

Target Nation: Burundi

Participating Nations: South Africa (1600), Benin, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia (858), Gabon, Mali, Mozambique (228), Tunisia

Lead Nation(s): South Africa

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *France, UK*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *France, UK, China, USA*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi

The Arusha process was a largely African-driven peace-process with Nelson Mandela (succeeding Julius Nyere) acting as protagonist (Franke 2009:116). AMIB deployed due to the failure of the 2000 Arusha Accord. Mandela used his good offices to convince **South Africa** to take the lead of the peacekeeping force (Accord 2007:25). In fact, as Svensson (2008:17) writes "AMIB could not have become a reality without the resources and funding capacity of South Africa since it was very difficult to find other troop contributing countries and the Au did not have the necessary resources." **South Africa** took the lead not only military but as well diplomatically through Jacob Zuma, South Africa's Deputy President at the time and the chief facilitator of the Arusha peace talks (Boshoff 2003, ICG 2002).

Financially, the peace process was supported by various Western states chiefly among them **France**, the **United States** and the **United Kingdom**. The US-based Carter Center helped start the peace process in late 1995 (Mthembu-Salter 2000) and Bill Clinton attended the signing of the Arusha Accord in August 2000 (Bentley and Southall 2005:71; Daley 2006:311). France hosted the Arusha Accord donor's conference (Bentley and Southall 2005:81; Accord 2007:18). The US and the UK agreed to finance the deployments of Ethiopian and Mozambican AMIB troops (Svensson 2008:13) while the EU donated € 9.5 million to the operation and the Belgian government US$5 million (Bentley and Southall 2005:85-6).

References:

Accord (2007). South Africa's peacekeeping Role in Burundi: Challenges and Opportunities for Future Peace Missions. Occasional Paper Series.2:2.

Agoagye, Festus (2004). The African Mission in Burundi: lessons learned from the first African Union Peacekeeping Operation. Conflict Trends. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=124031 (last visited 08/28/2011)

Bentley, K. A., R. Southall, et al. (2005). An African peace process : Mandela, South Africa and Burundi. Cape Town, South Africa, HSRC Press.

Boshoff, H. (2003). Burundi: The African Union's First Mission African Security Analysis Programme Situation Report.

Daley, P. (2006). "Challenges to Peace: conflict resolution in the Great Lakes region of Africa." Third World Quarterly **27**(2): 303-319.

Franke, B. (2009). Security cooperation in Africa: a reappraisal, FirstForumPress.

ICG (2002). The Burundi Rebellion and the Ceasefire Negotiations. Africa Briefing.

Mthembu-Salter, G. (2000). "Burundi's peace agreement without peace." Track Two **11**(5&6): 22-35.

Svensson, E. (2008). "The African Mission in Burundi." FOI - Swedish Defence Research Agency User Report: 24.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/MIAB (for participation data)

Agoagye (2004) (for participation/troop data)

8. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: ONUB (UN Operation in Burundi)

Brief Description of Operation: UN follow-on mission after the conclusion of AMIB (see above)

Start Date: 2004

End Date: 2006

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 1545

Intensity of Operation: Multidimensional peacebuilding and peace enforcement (Chapter VII)

Max. Police Forces deployed: 97

Max. Military Forces deployed: 5665

Target Nation: Burundi

Participating Nations: South Africa, Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, South Korea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Jordan, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Portugal, Russia, Senegal, Chad, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Yemen

Lead Nation(s): South Africa, France

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *France, UK*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *France, UK, China, USA*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi

Energetic **South African**-led diplomacy backed by French diplomatic support led to the deployment of a UN follow-on force (Jackson 2006; Accord 2007:29). According to Jackson, the UN deployment got, however, delayed due to larger Security Council politics i.e. "impaired relations between the US and France over Iraq with Burundi seen as **France**'s issue" (Jackson 2006).

References:

Accord (2007). South Africa's peacekeeping Role in Burundi: Challenges and Opportunities for Future Peace Missions. Occasional Paper Series. **2:2**.

Bentley, K. A., R. Southall, et al. (2005). An African peace process: Mandela, South Africa and Burundi. Cape Town, South Africa, HSRC Press.

Jackson, S. (2006). The United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) - Political and Strategic Lessons Learned. UNDPKO Best Practice. New York.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/ONUB (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

9. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: UNAMIC (UN Advance Mission in Cambodia)

Brief Description of Operation: After the Khmer Rouge are purged from power by Vietnam, civil war breaks out in Cambodia. The war is terminated with end of the cold war and a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict (the Paris Peace Accord of 1991). UNAMIC serves as preparatory force paving the way for the much larger follow-on force UNTAC (see below).

Start Date: 1992

End Date: 1992

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 717, 728

Intensity of Operation: Peacekeeping

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 1206

Target Nation: Cambodia

Participating Nations: Algeria, Germany, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, USA, France, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Poland, UK, Russia, Senegal, Thailand, Tunisia, Uruguay

Lead Nation(s): France, Japan, United States, Australia, Indonesia[5]

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *cannot be determined*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *cannot be determined*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Paris Peace Accord

The ASEAN countries, led by **Indonesia**, had laid the basis for the Cambodian peace settlement by hosting a series of pre-negotiation encounters – the Jakarta Informal Meetings (dubbed the JIM meetings) of 1988-89; in the spring of 1989 Indonesia joined forces with **France** to sponsor an international conference in Paris dedicated to achieving a comprehensive settlement of the Cambodia conflict (Whitfield 2007:27-28; Doyle et al. 1997: 9; Solomon in Crocket et al 1999:282). Prior to the Paris Conference a 'diplomatic marathon' had been run by **Australian** diplomat Michael Costello involving around 30 major meetings in 13 countries, to sell the Australian plan to the Paris Conference participants (Findlay 1995:7; Solarz 1990:100, 108). **Japan**, on the other hand, convened the Tokyo Conference on Cambodia on 4-5 June 1990 (Findlay 1995:7; Doyle et al. 1997:69).

Initially, the **United States** was not inclined to take the lead on Indochina and instead intended to follow France and ASEAN (Solomon in Crocker et al. 1999:287). Nevertheless, once the first Paris Peace Conference failed, the United States initiated and guided the UN-managed peace process (Findlay 1995:7; Solarz 1990:112; Solomon in Crocker et al. 1999). With success in building the UN framework agreement, the United States acquired a certain measure of paternity a vested interest in the peace negotiations (Solomon in Crocker et al. 1999: 300).

[5] Note that Indonesia is not among the key UNSC speakers. However, its involvement in the Cambodian peace process is so extensive that it is still counted among the Lead Nations of this operation.

References:

Crocker, C. A., F. O. Hampson, et al. (1999). Herding cats: multiparty mediation in a complex world. Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press.

Doyle, M. W. (1995). UN peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's civil mandate. Boulder, Colo. ; London, Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Doyle, M. W., I. Johnstone, et al. (1997). Keeping the peace: multidimensional UN operations in Cambodia and El Salvador. Cambridge , Cambridge University Press.

Findlay, T. (1995). Cambodia: the legacy and lessons of UNTAC. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Solarz, S. J. (1990). "Cambodia and the international community." Foreign Affairs **69**(2): 99-115.

Whitfield, T. (2007). Friends indeed?: the United Nations, groups of friends, and the resolution of conflict. Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/MIPRENUC (for participation data)

http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml (for troop data)

10. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: UNTAC (UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia)

Brief Description of Operation: The Supreme National Council of Cambodia delegates all powers to UNTAC to ensure implementation of the Paris Peace agreement.

Start Date: 1992

End Date: 1993

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 745

Intensity of Operation: International transitory government

Max. Police Forces deployed: 3500

Max. Military Forces deployed: 16440

Target Nation: Cambodia

Participating Nations: Algeria, Germany, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brunei, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Bile, China, Colombia, Egypt, USA, Fiji, France, Ghana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, New Zealand, Pakistan, Netherlands, Philippines, Poland, UK, Russia, Senegal, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, Uruguay

Lead Nation(s): France, United States, Australia, Indonesia

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *cannot be determined*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *cannot be determined*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Paris Peace Accord

Same actors involved as in UNAMIC (see above)

References: *see above*

http://www.operationspaix.net/APRONUC (for participation data)
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml (for troop data)

11. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: MISAB (Inter-African Force to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements)

Brief Description of Operation: MISAB was created on January 31, 1997, and deployed on February 8, 1997. It ended on April 15, 1998, when France withdrew its logistical and financial support. MISAB was immediately replaced by the UN operation MINURCA (see below). MISAB's mandate was to restore peace and security in the CAR and to monitor the implementation of the Bangui Agreements.

Start Date: 1997

End Date: 1998

Organization: Ad hoc

UN Mandate: No

Resolutions: -

Intensity of Operation: Peacekeeping

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 1100

Target Nation: Central African Republic

Participating Nations: Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Togo, Senegal, Mali

Lead Nation(s): France

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *cannot be determined*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, France, China, Chad*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Bangui Agreements

France almost single-handedly orchestrated the Bangui Agreements. In December 1996, **France** convenes the French-African summit in Ouagadougou. Here it is decided to launch the peace mediation efforts between the rebels and CAR President Ange-Felix Patassé, which conclude in the Bangui Agreements of January 27, 1997. At the request of **France**, six African countries (Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Senegal, Chad and Togo) agree to contribute military contingents to a regional peacekeeping force (MISAB). France covers the bulk of the cost of MISAB (the equivalent of €610,000per month) as well as the logistics on the ground (ICG 2007:11ff)

References:

ICG (2007). "Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State." ICG Africa Report N°136.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/MISAB (for participation data)

Note: No data on troop deployments per country available

12. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: MINURCA (UN Mission in the Central African Republic)

Brief Description of Operation: MISAB (see above) follow-on force

Start Date: 1998

End Date: 2000

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 1159, 1182, 1201, 1230, 1125

Intensity of Operation: Multidimensional peacebuilding (Chapter VII)

Max. Police Forces deployed: 24

Max. Military Forces deployed: 1350

Target Nation: Central African Republic

Participating Nations: Burkina Faso, Canada, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, France, Gabon, Mali, Senegal, Chad, Togo

Lead Nation(s): France

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *cannot be determined*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, France, China, Chad*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Bangui Agreement

On March 27, 1998, the UN Security Council decided to send 1350 blue helmets to the CAR. The US Congress was hostile because of the cost of the operation. However, their reluctance ended after patient lobbying by **France** and because the vote coincided with President Bill Clinton's trip to Africa (ICG 2007: 12).

References:

ICG (2007). "Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State." ICG Africa Report N°136.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/MINURCA (for participation data)
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml (for troop data)

11. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: CEN-SAD CAR

Brief Description of Operation: In December 2001, a CEN-SAD peacekeeping force of about 300 men (about 50 Djibouti soldiers, and 120 from each Libya and Sudan) was deployed in Bangui to make the CAR secure.

Start Date: 2001

End Date: 2001

Organization: Community of Sahel Saharan States

UN Mandate: No

Resolutions: -

Intensity of Operation: Multidimensional peacekeeping

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 300

Target Nation: Central African Republic

Participating Nations: Djibouti, Libya, Sudan

Lead Nation(s): Libya, Chad

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. **UN Speech Record Evaluation**

Note: Operation was not discussed at the UNSC

2. **Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation**

Peace Agreement: -

Former CAR President Kolingba launches a coup against Ange-Felix Patassé. Patassé calls for help and thus is deployed CEN-SAD CAR – a peacekeeping force led by **Libyan and Chadian** troops and Congolese rebels. In intervening to defend Patassé, **Chad** hopes to prevent destabilization from affecting its oil reserves, which lie near the CAR border (ICR 2007: 14; Security Council report).

References

Berman, E. G. (2003). "The Provision of Lethal Military Equipment: French, UK, and US Peacekeeping Policies Towards Africa." Security Dialogue **34**(2): 199.

ICG (2007). "Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State." ICG Africa Report N°136.

ICR 2007 (for troop data)

13. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: FOMUC (CEMAC Multinational Force in the Central African Republic)

Brief Description of Operation: The force technically replaces MINURCA (see above), whose term ended in 2000. FOMUC's original mandate is extended and adapted after the removal from power of President Patassé by General Francois Bozizé in March 2003.

Start Date: 2002

End Date: 2008

Organization: CEMAC

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 1159, 1182, 1201, 1230, 1125

Intensity of Operation: Multidimensional peacekeeping

Max. Police Forces deployed: 20

Max. Military Forces deployed: 500

Target Nation: Central African Republic

Participating Nations: Cameroon, DRC, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Chad

Lead Nation(s): France

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *cannot be determined*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, France, China, Chad*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: -

With pro-Bozize forces controlling one-third of the country, the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) decides to deploy a force to the Central African Republic in November to replace the CEN-SAD Force (see above). **France** again takes the lead on organizing financial and diplomatic support for the peacekeeping operation.

References:

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.2873037/k.D268/Central_African_Republicbr_Historical_Chronology.htm

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/FOMUC (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

14. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: ECOMICI (ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire)

Brief Description of Operation: At their meeting in Dakar on December 18, 2002, the ECOWAS leaders decide that a peacekeeping would be deployed on December 31, 2002, to bring stability back to Cote d'Ivoire and enable peace talks. At the invitation of France, a roundtable was organized with the participation of all Ivorian political forces in Linas-Marcoussis during January 15 to 23, 2003. The roundtable concluded with the signing of a peace agreement.

Start Date: 2003

End Date: 2004

Organization: ECOWAS

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 1464

Intensity of Operation: Peacekeeping

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 1300

Target Nation: Côte d'Ivoire

Participating Nations: Ghana, Benin, Niger, Senegal, Togo

Lead Nation(s): France

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *France*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *France*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Ceasefire Agreement of October 17, 2002

France serves as the key peace broker in the Ivorian conflict (ICG 2003:5). In October 2002, **France** is asked by the Ivorian President Outtara to supervise the ceasefire until troops from the ECOWAS could take over (ICG 2003:1). **France** subsequently deploys a 700-man strong force to Abijan ("Opération Licorne") (Chirot 2006:71). Following intense diplomatic activity by West African leaders and the French, first peace talks are organized in Lomé on October 28, under the leadership of President Gnassingbé Eyadéma of Togo. Facing failure at Lomé the French propose peace talks in **France** at Linas-Marcoussis, from January 15 to 23, 2003.

References:

Chirot, D. (2006). "The Debacle in Cote d'Ivoire." Journal of Democracy **17**(2): 63-77.

ICG (2003). "Côte d'Ivoire: "The war is not yet over"." ICG Africa Report N°72.

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.2876173/k.DD6D/C244te_dIvoirebr_Historical_Chronology.htm

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data); http://www.operationspaix.net/ECOFORCE (for participation data)
Note: No data on troop deployments per country available

15. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: UNOCI (UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire)

Brief Description of Operation: The implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement proved to be problematic. Thus, on May 13, 2003, the Security Council adopts Resolution 1479 creating UNOCI. UNOCI's mandate is to facilitate the implementation of the peace agreement in cooperation with the contingents from France and ECOWAS already there. UNOCI's deployment begins June 23, 2003. Prior to UNOCI, the UN was present in Cote d'Ivoire via its small observer mission MINUCI.

Start Date: 2004

End Date: Ongoing

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 1528, 1739

Intensity of Operation: Multidimensional peacebuilding and peace enforcement (Chapter VII)

Max. Police Forces deployed: 1137

Max. Military Forces deployed: 8059

Target Nation: Côte d'Ivoire

Participating Nations: Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, CAR, China, DRC, South Korea, Djibouti, Egypt, El Salvador, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Hungary, India, Ireland, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Moldova, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Uganda, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Chad, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Lead Nation(s): France

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *France*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *France*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Linas-Marcoussis Agreement

France brokered the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement (see above). It was signed on January 24, 2003, in Marcoussis (France) under French initiative (Security Council Report).

References:

Chirot, D. (2006). "The Debacle in Cote d'Ivoire." Journal of Democracy **17**(2): 63-77.

ICG (2003). "Côte d'Ivoire: "The war is not yet over"." ICG Africa Report N°72.

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.2876173/k.DD6D/C244te_dIvoirebr_Historical_Chronology.htm

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data); http://www.operationspaix.net/ONUCI-UNOCI (for participation data); http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml (for troop data)

16. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: MOMEP (Mission of Military Observers Ecuador-Peru)

Brief Description of Operation: The border dispute between Peru and Ecuador had persisted despite a 1942 treaty designed to end it and "guaranteed" by the United States, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. A renewal of fighting in 1995 prompted a new peace process that culminated in a comprehensive settlement signed in 1998.

Start Date: 1995

End Date: 1999

Organization: Ad hoc

UN Mandate: No

Resolutions: -

Intensity of Operation: Peacekeeping

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 100

Target Nation: Ecuador and Peru

Participating Nations: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, US

Lead Nation(s): Brazil

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Note: Operation was not discussed at the UNSC

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Rio Protocol/Declaration of Itamaraty

The guarantors of the Rio Protocol are Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the United States. When sustained combat between Ecuador and Peru broke out in January 1995, representatives of the guarantor countries meet in an emergency session in Brasilia. After an inconclusive first round Ecuador and Peru reached a peace agreement during the second round, the so-called 'Declaration of Peace of Itamaraty.' The declaration mandates setting up a peacekeeping operation (MOMEP) (Palmer 1997:122- 123). In the renewed guarantor effort after 1995, **Brazil** is from the start the undisputed coordinator (Einaudi in Crocker et al. 1999:417).

References:

Crocker, C. A., F. O. Hampson, et al. (1999). Herding cats: multiparty mediation in a complex world. Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press.

Palmer, D. S. (1997). "Peru Ecuador Border Conflict: Missed Opportunities, Misplaced Nationalism, and Multilateral Peacekeeping." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs **39**(3): 109-148.

IISS Military Balance (for participation/troop data)

17. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: ONUSAL (UN Observer Mission in El Salvador)

Brief Description of Operation: ONUSAL is created on May 20, 1991, by Resolution 693 of the UNSC. It results from UN-sponsored peace talks end a veracious civil war sparked by land inequality and characterized by grave human rights violations. ONUSAL is preceded by a UN Observer Group that monitors human rights. Its mandate is to verify the implementation of all agreements negotiated between the government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN).

Start Date: 1991

End Date: 1995

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 693, 729, 8321

Intensity of Operation: Peacebuilding consultation

Max. Police Forces deployed: 315

Max. Military Forces deployed: 368

Target Nation: El Salvador

Participating Nations: Germany, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Spain, India, Ireland, Sweden, Venezuela

Lead Nation(s): United States, Venezuela

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *cannot be determined*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, Spain, France, Venezuela*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Salvadorian Peace Agreement of January 16, 1992

The Salvadorian peace process was largely managed by the United Nations with help from the so-called "Friends of the Secretary-General for El Salvador," whose members were Mexico, Venezuela, Spain and the United States (Whitfield 2007:54). The most active member, according to the chief negotiator of the peace process, Alvaro de Soto, was **Venezuela** (de Soto in Crocker et al. 1999:366). The **United States –** although rather in secret **--** played another pivotal role in pushing the Salvadorian government to negotiate the peace agreement (de Soto in Crocker et al. 1999:371; Doyle 1997:251). In addition, by making the release of funds dependent on the Security Council's assessment of implementation, the US turned into a particularly effective engine behind implementation (Malone et al. 2004:430)

References:

Crocker, C. A., F. O. Hampson, et al. (1999). Herding cats : multiparty mediation in a complex world. Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press.

Doyle, M. W., I. Johnstone, et al. (1997). Keeping the peace : multidimensional UN operations in Cambodia and El Salvador. New York, Cambridge University Press.

Malone, D. (eds.) (2004). The UN Security Council : from the Cold War to the 21st century. Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner.

Whitfield, T. (2007). Friends indeed? : the United Nations, groups of friends, and the resolution of conflict. Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/ONUSAL (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

18. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: UNMEE

Brief Description of Operation: The War of Independence (1961–1991) leads to a referendum and peaceful separation (1993) of Ethiopia and Eritrea; a border conflict (1998–2000) is ended by the Algier Peace Agreement mediated by the AU; UNMEE deploys to supervise the peace agreement.

Start Date: 2000

End Date: 2008

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 1312, 1320, 1430

Intensity of Operation: Peacekeeping

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 4200

Target Nation: Ethiopia and Eritrea

Participating Nations: South Africa, Algeria, Germany, Austria, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Croatia, Spain, USA, Finland, France, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, India, Jordan, Kenya, Kirgizstan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Czech Republic, Romania, UK, Russia, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tanzania, Tunisia, Ukraine, Uruguay, Zambia

Lead Nation(s): United States

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *cannot be determined*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, Russia, China, UK*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Algier Peace Agreement

Although the AU formally mediated the Ethiopian-Eritrean peace process, the key player in the background was the **United States**. Prendergast (2001:2) notes that only "twice the **US** has made a commitment to lead a peace process in Africa and sustained that commitment over an extended period of time" - in Nambia led by Chester Crocker and in the Ethiopia-Eritrea led by Anthony Lake. When the conflict visibly erupted in May 1998, the leaders of both Ethiopia and Eritrea asked Susan Rice, then US assistant secretary of state, and Paul Kagame, then vice-president of Rwanda, to come to the region and try to defuse tensions. Also actively involved was President Clinton, who was in frequent contact with the leaders by phone, backing up and sealing US diplomatic efforts on the ground. Late in 1998 President Clinton and Secretary Albright appointed Anthony Lake as Special Envoy. He immediately launched a series of shuttle visits over the following six months. He also led a State-NSC-DOD team that worked closely with the OAU to help produce the Algiers Peace Agreement (Prendergast 2001). Once the peace agreement was negotiated, the US shifted focus to get a UN peacekeeping mission deployment process initiated quickly and competently (Prendergast 2001:5).

References:

Prendergast, J. (2001). U.S. Leadership in resolving African Conflict - the Case of Ethiopia-Eritrea. Special Reports, United States Institute of Peace.

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.2713925/k.F533/Ethiopia__Eritreabr_Historical_Chronology.htm

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/MINUEE (for participation data)

http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml (for troop data)

19. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: INTERFET (International Force for East Timor)

Brief Description of Operation: Following unilateral annexation of East Timor by Indonesia in the 1970s, independence efforts turn violent by late 1990s; the UN deploys a civilian operation (UNAMET) to conduct a referendum among East Timorese on special autonomy vs. independence. Following the referendum, violence breaks out and UNAMET is evacuated and replaced by INTERFET in an attempt to restore order.

Start Date: 1999

End Date: 2000

Organization: Ad hoc

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 1264

Intensity of Operation: Multidimensional peacekeeping (Chapter VII)

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 13.000

Target Nation: Indonesia

Participating Nations: Australia, Thailand, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Fiji, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mozambique, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, South Korea, Singapore, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States

Lead Nation(s): Australia, Portugal, USA

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. **UN Speech Record Evaluation** (truncated graph due to excessive number of entries)

Three standard deviations from the mean: *cannot be determined*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, UK, China, Australia, France, Russia, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal*

2. **Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation**

Peace Agreement: East Timor Independence Referendum (5 May 1999 Agreement)

The negotiations between Indonesia and Portugal leading up to Timorese Independence were led by the United Nations with important input from **Australia**, the **United States** and the **United Kingdom**.

Portugal had kept the issue of Timorese independence alive since Indonesian invasion of the island in 1975. During the UN-led negotiations, in which Portugal participated as a state-party to the conflict, Portugal specifically pressed for a referendum on Timorese sovereignty, while all other actors involved initially favored to solely convert East Timor into an autonomous region of Indonesia (e.g. Maker 2003; Martin 2001). **Australia**, although not a state-party to the negotiations, had great influence on the outcome of the negotiations and specifically on the Indonesian government's decision to allow the UN to organize a referendum (Martin 2001: 30; Marker 2001:128). The **United Kingdom** and the **United States** took the lead at the international level drafting UN resolutions and making use of various diplomatic levers to push for a successful outcome of the negotiation effort (Coleman 2007: 251, 267; Situmorang 2009:158; Marker 2001: 153). Dee (2001:18), for instance, reports how the United States threatened to withdraw IMF loans if Indonesia wouldn't comply with UN Security Council resolution on East Timor.

References:

Coleman, K. P. (2007). International Organizations and Peace Enforcement: The Politics of International Legitimacy. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Dee, M. (2001). "'Coalitions of the willing' and humanitarian intervention: Australia's involvement with INTERFET." International Peacekeeping **8**(3): 1-20.

Franke, V. C. and A. Warnecke (2009). "Building Peace: An Inventory of UN Peace Missions since the End of the Cold War." International Peacekeeping **16**(3): 408-436.

Marker, J. (2003). East Timor : a memoir of the negotiations for independence. Jefferson, N.C. ; London, McFarland.

Martin, I. (2001). Self-determination in East Timor : the United Nations, the ballot, and international intervention. Boulder, Colo. ; London, Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Ryan, A. (2002). "The Strong Lead-nation Model in an ad-hoc Coalition of the Willing: Operation Stabilize in East Timor." International Peacekeeping **9**(1): 23-44.

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.2815967/k.4D11/TimorLestebr_Historical_Chronology.htm

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/INTERFET (for participation data)

http://www.britains-smallwars.com/RRGP/EastTimor.html (for troop participation)

20. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: UNTAET (UN Transitional Administration in East Timor)

Brief Description of Operation: UNTAET replaces INTERFET and exercises all legislative and executive authority in East Timor, while preparing the country for independence.

Start Date: 1999

End Date: 2002

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 1272

Intensity of Operation: International transitory government

Max. Police Forces deployed: 1640

Max. Military Forces deployed: 9150

Target Nation: Indonesia

Participating Nations: Germany, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, South Korea, USA, Fiji, France, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Nepal, Norway, New Zealand, Philippines, UK, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand

Lead Nation(s): Australia, United States, United Kingdom, Portugal

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. **UN Speech Record Evaluation** (truncated graph due to excessive number of entries)

Three standard deviations from the mean: *cannot be determined*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, UK, China, Australia, France, Russia, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal*

2. **Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation**

Same actors involved as in INTERFET (see above)

References: *see above*

http://www.operationspaix.net/ATNUTO (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

21. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: UNMISET (UN Mission of Support in East Timor)

Brief Description of Operation: East Timor officially gains independence in 2002. The UN remains in the country to assist in reconstruction.

Start Date: 2002

End Date: 2005

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 1410, 1543

Intensity of Operation: Multidimensional peacebuilding

Max. Police Forces deployed: 771

Max. Military Forces deployed: 4776

Target Nation: Indonesia

Participating Nations: Australia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, BH, Brazil, China, Croatia, Denmark, Spain, USA, Fiji, Ghana, Jordan, Malaysia, Mozambique, Nepal, Norway, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Russia, Samoa, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Lead Nation(s): Australia, United States, United Kingdom, Portugal

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. **UN Speech Record Evaluation** (truncated graph due to excessive number of entries)

Three standard deviations from the mean: *cannot be determined*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, UK, China, Australia, France, Russia, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal*

2. **Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation**

Same actors involved as in UNTAET (see above)

References: see above

http://www.operationspaix.net/MANUTO (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

22. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: MINUGUA (UN Mission in Guatemala)

Brief Description of Operation: MINUGUA was created on January 20, 1997, by the UNSC. It ended on May 27, 1997. The objective of the operation was to strengthen the capacity of the UN human rights verification mission in Guatemala, which had been engaged in Guatemala since September 1994. MINUGUA's concrete mandate was to verify compliance with the provisions of the cease-fire agreement signed by the Government of Guatemala and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit (URNG) on December 4, 1996, which provided for the formal cessation of hostilities, separation of forces and demobilization of combatants.

Start Date: 1997

End Date: 1997

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 1094, A/RES/48/267

Intensity of Operation: Peacebuilding consultation

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 155

Target Nation: Guatemala

Participating Nations: Germany, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Spain, USA, Italy, Norway, Russia, Singapore, Sweden, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela

Lead Nation(s): Spain, United States, Norway, Mexico[6]

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *cannot be determined*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *cannot be determined*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Ceasefire of December 1997

The peace brokers in the Guatemalan case were the so-called "Friends of the Guatemalan Peace Process," consisting of Colombia, Mexico, Norway, Spain, United States and Venezuela. Not all "friends" were, however, equally involved. **Norway** stood out by financing the participation of the URNG throughout much of the negotiation process (Whitfield 2007: 84-86). Norwegian officials also took many initiatives to advance the resolution of the conflict, e.g. the National Dialogue (1989-1990), the 1990 Oslo agreement and the 1992 Nobel Price for Rigoberta Menchu. Olso was also the site of the June 1994 accords (Jonas 2000:63). **Mexico**, on the other hand, served as host of most of the talks leading up to the peace agreement in Mexico City and the "Group's convener" (Jonas 200:63; Whitfield 2007: 84-86). **Spain** served as the site of informal peace talks including the first encounter of the URNG and the Guatemalan government in 1987 (Jonas 2000:63). Finally, the **United States** lent their heavy diplomatic weight to pressure, in particular, the Guatemalan army to accept full civilian control and demilitarization and thus contributed significantly to the success of the peace talks (Jonas 2000:64).

[6] Note that Norway and Mexico are not among the key UNSC speakers. However, their involvement in the Guatemalan peace process is so extensive that they are still counted among the Lead Nations of this operation.

References:

Jonas, S. (2000). Of centaurs and doves : Guatemala's peace process. Boulder, Westview Press.

Whitfield, T. (2007). Friends indeed? : the United Nations, groups of friends, and the resolution of conflict. Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/MINUGUA (for participation data)

Note: No data on troop deployments per country available

23. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: UNMIH (UN Mission in Haiti)

Brief Description of Operation: After President Duvalier is ousted in 1986, Haiti has a series of short-lived governments. The UN *Observer Group for the Verification of Elections in Haiti* (ONUVEH) monitors the first democratic elections in 1990, which bring Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power. He is ousted in a coup in 1991. Joint UN–OAS International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) is deployed in 1993. Based upon the Governors Island Agreement, the embargo against Haiti is suspended, Aristide is to be restored to power and UNMIH is to assist in security sector reform. When agreement fails, all UN personnel is withdrawn and the suspended embargo is supplemented by a trade embargo. In 1994, a multinational force of 20,000 troops led by the US (Operation Uphold Democracy) reinstalls Aristide. In 1995, UNMIH takes over from the multinational US-led force.

Start Date: 1993

End Date: 1996

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 867, 940, 975

Intensity of Operation: Peacekeeping

Max. Police Forces deployed: 900

Max. Military Forces deployed: 6000

Target Nation: Haiti

Participating Nations: Algeria, Bangladesh, Canada, Djibouti, USA, France, Mali, Pakistan, Netherlands, Russia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago

Lead Nation(s): United States

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. **UN Speech Record Evaluation** (truncated graph due to excessive number of entries)

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA, France*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, France, China, Canada, Russia, Brazil, Argentina*

2. **Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation**

Peace Agreement: Governor's Island Agreement

The **United States** was the key player in solving the Haiti crisis. It not only hosted the peace talks concluding in the Governor's Island Agreement but also pulled the political and diplomatic strings behind the scenes (Malone 1998:86). Malone (1998:76, 117) suggests that "throughout the crisis, the **USA** was the single most important player, by a long shot, given its dominant role within the Hemisphere and the fact that nothing significant could be achieved at the OAS or in the UNSC without its leadership or at least its active concurrence (see also Kreps 2007:463, 466; Kreps 2011:74ff; Talentino 2005: 141).

References:

Franke, V. C. and A. Warnecke (2009). "Building Peace: An Inventory of UN Peace Missions since the End of the Cold War." International Peacekeeping **16**(3): 408-436.

Kreps, S. E. (2007). "The 1994 Haiti intervention: A unilateral operation in multilateral Clothes." Journal of Strategic Studies **30**(3): 449-474.

Kreps, S. E. (2011). Coalitions of convenience: United States military interventions after the Cold War. New York, Oxford University Press.

Malone, D. (1998). Decision-making in the UN Security Council: the case of Haiti, 1990-1997. Oxford New York, Clarendon Press

Talentino, A. K. (2005). Military intervention after the Cold War: the evolution of theory and practice, Ohio Univ Ctr for Intl Studies.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml (for participation and troop data)

24. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: Operation Uphold Democracy

Brief Description of Operation: Operation Uphold Democracy is deployed to reinforce UNMIH and enforce the implementation of the Governor's Island Agreement.

Start Date: 1994

End Date: 1995

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 940

Intensity of Operation: Peace enforcement

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 20.000

Target Nation: Haiti

Participating Nations: United States, Poland, Argentina

Lead Nation(s): United States

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. **UN Speech Record Evaluation** (truncated graph due to excessive number of entries)

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA, France*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, France, China, Canada, Russia, Brazil, Argentina*

2. **Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation**

Peace Agreement: Governor's Island Agreement

Same actors involved as in UNMIH (see above)

References:

Franke, V. C. and A. Warnecke (2009). "Building Peace: An Inventory of UN Peace Missions since the End of the Cold War." International Peacekeeping **16**(3): 408-436.

Kreps, S. E. (2007). "The 1994 Haiti intervention: A unilateral operation in multilateral Clothes." Journal of Strategic Studies **30**(3): 449-474.

Kreps, S. E. (2011). Coalitions of convenience: United States military interventions after the Cold War. New York, Oxford University Press.

Malone, D. (1998). Decision-making in the UN Security Council: the case of Haiti, 1990-1997. Oxford New York, Clarendon Press

Talentino, A. K. (2005). Military intervention after the Cold War: the evolution of theory and practice, Ohio Univ Ctr for Intl Studies.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
Note: No data on troop deployments per country available

25. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: UNSMIH (UN Support Mission in Haiti)

Brief Description of Operation: Mandated by the UNSC because of fears that stability and peace will collapse in Haiti; focus on restoring stability by rebuilding Haitian National Police.

Start Date: 1996

End Date: 1997

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 1063

Intensity of Operation: Multidimensional peacebuilding

Max. Police Forces deployed: 291

Max. Military Forces deployed: 1297

Target Nation: Haiti

Participating Nations: Algeria, Canada, USA, France, India, Mali, Pakistan, Togo

Lead Nation(s): United States

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. **UN Speech Record Evaluation** (truncated graph due to excessive number of entries)

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA, France*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, France, China, Canada, Russia, Brazil, Argentina*

2. **Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation**

Peace Agreement: Governor's Island Agreement

Same actors involved as in UNMIH (see above)

References:

Franke, V. C. and A. Warnecke (2009). "Building Peace: An Inventory of UN Peace Missions since the End of the Cold War." International Peacekeeping **16**(3): 408-436.

Kreps, S. E. (2007). "The 1994 Haiti intervention: A unilateral operation in multilateral Clothes." Journal of Strategic Studies **30**(3): 449-474.

Kreps, S. E. (2011). Coalitions of convenience: United States military interventions after the Cold War. New York, Oxford University Press.

Malone, D. (1998). Decision-making in the UN Security Council: the case of Haiti, 1990-1997. Oxford New York, Clarendon Press

Talentino, A. K. (2005). Military intervention after the Cold War: the evolution of theory and practice, Ohio Univ Ctr for Intl Studies.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data); http://www.operationspaix.net/MANUH (for participation data); IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

26. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: UNTMIH (UN Transition Mission in Haiti)

Brief Description of Operation: Continued fear that the peace process will collapse without further engagement leads to increased support or the Haitian National Police and for economic reconstruction.

Start Date: 1997

End Date: 1997

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 1123

Intensity of Operation: Peacebuilding consultation

Max. Police Forces deployed: 250

Max. Military Forces deployed: 50

Target Nation: Haiti

Participating Nations: Argentina, Benin, Canada, USA, France, India, Mali, Niger, Pakistan, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia

Lead Nation(s): United States

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. **UN Speech Record Evaluation** (truncated graph due to excessive number of entries)

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA, France*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, France, China, Canada, Russia, Brazil, Argentina*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Governor's Island Agreement

Same actors involved as in UNMIH (see above)

References:

Franke, V. C. and A. Warnecke (2009). "Building Peace: An Inventory of UN Peace Missions since the End of the Cold War." International Peacekeeping **16**(3): 408-436.

Kreps, S. E. (2007). "The 1994 Haiti intervention: A unilateral operation in multilateral Clothes." Journal of Strategic Studies **30**(3): 449-474.

Kreps, S. E. (2011). Coalitions of convenience: United States military interventions after the Cold War. New York, Oxford University Press.

Malone, D. (1998). Decision-making in the UN Security Council: the case of Haiti, 1990-1997. Oxford New York, Clarendon Press

Talentino, A. K. (2005). Military intervention after the Cold War: the evolution of theory and practice, Ohio Univ Ctr for Intl Studies.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data); http://www.operationspaix.net/MITNUH (for participation data); IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

27. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: MIPONUH (UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti)

Brief Description of Operation: Continued concerns regarding performance of Haitian National Police; MIPONUH is followed by joint UN–OAS International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH).

Start Date: 1997

End Date: 2000

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: -

Intensity of Operation: Specialized peacebuilding (police)

Max. Police Forces deployed: 300

Max. Military Forces deployed: -

Target Nation: Haiti

Participating Nations: Argentina, Benin, Canada, USA, France, India, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia

Lead Nation(s): United States

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. **UN Speech Record Evaluation** (truncated graph due to excessive number of entries)

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA, France*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, France, China, Canada, Russia, Brazil, Argentina*

2. **Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation**

Peace Agreement: Governor's Island Agreement

Same actors involved as in UNMIH (see above)

References:

Franke, V. C. and A. Warnecke (2009). "Building Peace: An Inventory of UN Peace Missions since the End of the Cold War." International Peacekeeping **16**(3): 408-436.

Kreps, S. E. (2007). "The 1994 Haiti intervention: A unilateral operation in multilateral Clothes." Journal of Strategic Studies **30**(3): 449-474.

Kreps, S. E. (2011). Coalitions of convenience: United States military interventions after the Cold War. New York, Oxford University Press.

Malone, D. (1998). Decision-making in the UN Security Council: the case of Haiti, 1990-1997. Oxford New York, Clarendon Press

Talentino, A. K. (2005). Military intervention after the Cold War: the evolution of theory and practice, Ohio Univ Ctr for Intl Studies.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data); http://www.operationspaix.net/MIPONUH (for participation data); IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

28. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: MIFH (Multinational Interim Force in Haiti)

Brief Description of Operation: Political violence breaks out after contested 2000 presidential and parliamentary elections. A US-led Multinational Interim Force (MIF) enforces peace under chapter VII of the UN Charter and is followed by MINUSTAH (see below).

Start Date: 2004

End Date: 2004

Organization: Ad hoc

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolution: 1542

Intensity of Operation: Peace enforcement (Chapter VII)

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 3000

Target Nation: Haiti

Participating Nations: US, Canada, France, Chile

Lead Nation(s): United States, France

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. **UN Speech Record Evaluation** (truncated graph due to excessive number of entries)

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA, France*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, France, China, Canada, Russia, Brazil, Argentina*

2. **Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation**

Peace Agreement: no agreement --> regime change

Whitfield (2007: 105ff; for a similar account see also Lehmann 2007; Podur 2004; Mayssan 2004) writes: "In February 2004 armed conflict broke out in the north of Haiti for the departure of Aristide – many of them former members of the army and paramilitary groups disbanded after Aristide's return to the country in 1994 – and Aristide's supporters. In a meeting of the SC held on February 26, representatives of CARICOM and Haiti appealed directly and unambiguously for immediate intervention by the UN to help restore peace and security to the country and save Aristide. But they were met with the UN equivalent of stony silence. Meanwhile, outside the Council, pressure on Aristide was mounting. On the day before the Council met, the Foreign Minister of **France** effectively called for Aristide to go. Aristide "bears heavy responsibility for the current situation," he said. "It is up to him to accept the consequences." **The United States** had not yet been so forthcoming, but was not at all displeased to see France out ahead on this issue, and soon began to make its own views felt. On February 29, Aristide resigned under controversial circumstance and was whisked out of Haiti on a US airplane to the Central African Republic. Supreme Court President Boniface Alexandre assumed the presidency. Hours later, the new authorities in Haiti asked the Security Council for help. **France and the United States** – working in lockstep to an extent that amazed colleagues who had grown used to the post-Iraq antipathy between them – sprung into action to push through a resolution later that day. This authorized the immediate deployment of a multinational force that would be replaced within three months by a UN peacekeeping operation."

References:

Lehmann, G. (2007). Haïti 2004 : radiographie d'un coup d'état. Paris, L'Harmattan.

Mayssan, T. (2004). "Coup d'Etat en Haiti." Réseau Voltaire.

Podur, J. (2004). "Kofi Annan's Haiti." New Left Review: 5.

Whitfield, T. (2007). Friends indeed? : the United Nations, groups of friends, and the resolution of conflict. Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
Note: No data on troop deployments per country available

29. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: MINUSTAH (UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti)

Brief Description of Operation: UN follow-on mission of MIFH (see above)

Start Date: 2004

End Date: 2017

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 1542

Intensity of Operation: Multidimensional peacebuilding and peace enforcement (Chapter VII)

Max. Police Forces deployed: 2066

Max. Military Forces deployed: 7051

Target Nation: Haiti

Participating Nations: Argentina, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, CAR, Chile, China, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Egypt, El Salvador, Ecuador, Spain, USA, France, Guatemala, Guinea, India, Jamaica, Jordan, Madagascar, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Chad, Togo, Turkey, Uruguay, Yemen

Lead Nation(s): United States, France

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation (truncated graph due to excessive number of entries)

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA, France*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, France, China, Canada, Russia, Brazil, Argentina*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: -

Same actors involved as in MIFH (see above)

References:

Lehmann, G. (2007). Haïti 2004 : radiographie d'un coup d'état. Paris, L'Harmattan.

Mayssan, T. (2004). "Coup d'Etat en Haiti." Réseau Voltaire.

Podur, J. (2004). "Kofi Annan's Haiti." New Left Review: 5.

Whitfield, T. (2007). Friends indeed?: the United Nations, groups of friends, and the resolution of conflict. Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/MINUSTAH (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

30. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: Operation Desert Storm

Brief Description of Operation: Operation Desert Storm was a US-led multinational combat operation to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

Start Date: 1990

End Date: 1990

Organization: Ad hoc

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 660, 678

Intensity of Operation: Combat Operation

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 959,600

Target Nation: Kuwait, Iraq

Participating Nations: United States, Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom, Egypt, France, Syria, Morocco, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, Canada, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bangladesh, Italy, Australia, Netherlands, Niger, Sweden, Argentina, Senegal, Spain, Bahrain, Belgium, Poland, South Korea, Czech Republic, Greece, Denmark, New Zealand, Hungary, Norway

Lead Nation(s): United States

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA, UK, France, USSR*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, UK, France, USSR, China*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: no agreement => response to Iraqi invasion of Kuwait

The **United States** is generally credited for having had the diplomatic as well as military lead on Operation Desert Storm (e.g. Bennett et al. 1994, 1997; Baker 1990; Kreps 2011:49ff; Bosco 2009:157).

References:

Baker, J. A. and T. M. Defrank (1995). The politics of diplomacy : revolution, war, and peace, 1989-1992. New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons.
Bennett, A., J. Lepgold, et al. (1994). "Burden-sharing in the Persian Gulf War." International Organization **48**(01): 39-75.
Bennett, A., J. Lepgold, et al. (1997). Friends in need : burden sharing in the Persian Gulf War. New York, St. Martin's Press.

Bosco, D. L. (2009). Five to rule them all: the UN Security Council and the making of the modern world. Oxford; New York, Oxford University Press.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data); http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/mil_gul_war_coa_for-military-gulf-war-coalition-forces (for participation/troop data)

31. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: UNIKOM (UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission)

Brief Description of Operation: UNIKOM was established April 9, 1991, by UNSC Resolution 687. It ended October 6, 2003. Its mandate was to monitor the demilitarized zone along the border between Iraq and Kuwait as well as the waterway Khor'Abdullah, prevent violations of the border and observe any other hostile act. In February 1993, following a series of incidents recorded over the new dividing line between Iraq and Kuwait, the Security Council decided to reinforce the strength of UNIKOM and to extend its mandate.

Start Date: 1991

End Date: 2003

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 687

Intensity of Operation: Peace enforcement (Chapter VII)

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 300

Target Nation: Kuwait, Iraq

Participating Nations: Germany, Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Canada, China, Denmark, USA, Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, UK, Russia, Senegal, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela

Lead Nation(s): United States

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA, UK, France, USSR*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, UK, France, USSR, China*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: -

Same actors involved as in Operation Desert Storm (see above)

References: *see above*

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/MONUIK (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

32. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: MNF-I (Multinational Force in Iraq)

Brief Description of Operation: The Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF–I) was a military command, led by the United States, which was responsible for Operation Iraqi Freedom. MNF-I replaced the previous force, Combined Joint Task Force 7, on May 15, 2004, and was later reorganized into its successor, United States Forces – Iraq.

Start Date: 2003

End Date: Approx. 2011

Organization: Ad hoc

UN Mandate: No

Intensity of Operation: Combat operation

Max. Police Forces deployed: 1051

Max. Military Forces deployed: 297.000

Target Nation: Iraq

Participating Nations: US, Australia, UK, Romania, El Salvador, Estonia, Bulgaria, Moldova, Albania, Ukraine, Denmark, Czech Republic, South Korea, Japan, Tonga, Azerbaijan, Singapore, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Latvia, Poland, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Mongolia, Georgia, Slovakia, Lithuania, Italy, Norway, Hungary, Netherlands, Portugal, New Zealand, Thailand, Philippines, Honduras, Dominican Republic, Spain, Nicaragua, Iceland

Lead Nation(s): United States

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. **UN Speech Record Evaluation** (truncated graph due to excessive number of entries)

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA, UK, Russia, France, China*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, UK, Russia, France, China*

2. **Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation**

Peace Agreement: no peace agreement => regime change

The **United States** led MNF-I (e.g. Baltrusaitis 2009; Kreps 2011:114ff).

References:

Baltrusaitis, D. F. (2009). Coalition Politics and the Iraq War, First Forum Press.

Kreps, S. E. (2011). Coalitions of convenience: United States military interventions after the Cold War. New York, Oxford University Press.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)

IISS Military Balance (for participation and troop data)

33. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: Operation Boleas

Brief Description of Operation: Operation Boleas was a military invasion launched by SADC and led by South Africa into Lesotho to quell a suspected coup d'état. In March 1998, parliamentary elections in Lesotho resulted in an overwhelming majority for the ruling Lesotho Congress for Democracy Party, which won 79 out of 80 seats. However allegations of vote fraud soon surfaced, and after a failed lawsuit by the opposition parties, widespread rioting broke out. Mandela authorized the deployment of 700 South African troops to Lesotho on September 22, 1998, to quell the rioting and maintain order.

Start Date: 1998

End Date: 1999

Organization: SADC

UN Mandate: No

Resolutions: -

Intensity of Operation: Combat operation

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 800

Target Nation: Lesotho

Participating Nations: South Africa, Botswana

Lead Nation(s): South Africa

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Note: Operation was not discussed at the UNSC

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace agreement: no peace agreement => prevention of regime change

South Africa is generally credited for having led Operation Boleas (e.g. Coleman 2007: 160ff).

References:

Coleman, K. P. (2007). International Organizations and Peace Enforcement: The Politics of International Legitimacy. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

http://www.operationspaix.net/Operation-Boleas (for participation data)

Note: No data on troop deployments per country available

34. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: ECOMOG-Liberia (ECOWAS Monitoring Group in Liberia)

Brief Description of Operation: In 1990, Liberia experiences a rebellion led by Charles Taylor to oust the sitting president Samuel Doe. As a response to the violence, ECOWAS deploys a military observer group (ECOMOG) to Liberia on August 24, 1990 and engages in multiple attempts to broker peace among the warring factions. In 1997, the Abuja Peace Accords put an end to hostilities in Liberia and provide for the disarmament of the armed movements, the establishment of political parties and democratic elections in July 1997, which sweep Charles Taylor into power. Following the 1997 agreement, ECOMOG is entrusted with the policing and disarmament of armed rebel groups and the formation of new security forces. ECOMOMG is gradually withdrawn until October 1999.

Start Date: 1990

End Date: 1999

Organization: ECOWAS

UN Mandate: No

Resolutions: -

Intensity of Operation: Peace enforcement

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 12.000

Target Nation: Liberia

Participating Nations: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Uganda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania

Lead Nation(s): Nigeria, United States

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. **UN Speech Record Evaluation** (truncated graph due to excessive number of entries)

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, China, France, Russia*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Standing Mediation Committee sponsoring the Banjul I, Bamako, Banjul II, Lomé Peace Accords and Yamoussoukro Peace Process,

Nigeria was the driving force behind the establishment of the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC), which brokered the *Banjul I, Bamako, Banjul II, Lomé Peace Accords* and also mandated the formation of ECOMOG (Mutwol 2009:55; Brown 1999). Nigeria was initially asked by Liberian President Doe to help him stay in power. Nigeria then took the issue to ECOWAS for consideration (Tuck 2000:4; Adeleke 1995:572) and provided the bulk of political, military and financial support for the operation (Adibe 1997:483; see also Adeleke 1995:577, Brown 1999).

By the summer of 1991 – roughly one year into the ECOMOMG operation -- the United States began to get involved in the Liberian peace process (Adibe 1907:472; Moran and Pitcher 2004:505; Cohen 2000:127-162). By 1994, the US provided $28.7 million to ECOMOG directly, $270 million for humanitarian assistance in the region and further $30.83 million to the Liberian Trust Fund (Adeleke 1995:589; Tuck 2000:9). In addition, it financed almost the entire Senegalese contribution to ECOMOG (Mortimer 1996; Mutwol 2009; Cohen 2000:158). After the violation of all the peace agreements brokered by the SMC, Jimmy Carter's International Negotiation Network (INN) sponsored the next round of negotiations – the so-called *Yamoussoukro Peace Process*. The US government donated $3.75 million to support the talks (Mutwol 2009:88-89).

References:

Adeleke, A. (1995). "The Politics and Diplomacy of Peacekeeping in West Africa: The ECOWAS Operation in Liberia." The Journal of Modern African Studies **33**(04): 569-593.

Adibe, C. E. (1997). "The Liberian conflict and the ECOWAS-UN partnership." Third World Quarterly **18**(3): 471-488.

Brown, N. (1999). "ECOWAS and the Liberia Experiences: peacekeeping and Self Preservation." Small Wars Journal.

Cohen, H. J. (2000). Intervening in Africa: superpower peacemaking in a troubled continent. New York, St. Martin's Press.

Moran, M. H. and M. A. Pitcher (2004). "The 'basket case' and the 'poster child': explaining the end of civil conflicts in Liberia and Mozambique." Third World Quarterly **25**(3): 501-519.

Mortimer, R. A. (1996). "Senegal's Role in Ecomog: The Francophone Dimension in the Liberian Crisis." The Journal of Modern African Studies **34**(02): 293-306.

Mutwol, J. (2009). Peace agreements and civil wars in Africa: insurgent motivations, state responses, and third-party peacemaking in Liberia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, Cambria Pr.

Tuck, C. (2000). "Every Car or Moving Object Gone: The ECOMOG intervention in Liberia." African Studies Quarterly **4**(1).

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.2892611/k.36B7/Liberia_brHistorical_Chronology.htm;

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

35. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: UNOMIL (UN Observer Mission in Liberia)

Brief Description of Operation: After ECOWAS brokers a peace agreement in Cotonou, Benin, in 1993, the UN Security Council establishes UNOMIL under UNSC Resolution 866. UNMIL deploys to reinforce ECOMOG (see above). It is mandated to implement the successive Liberian peace agreements: Cotonou Agreement (1993), Akosombo Agreement (1994), Accra Agreement (1994), Abuja Accord (1995).

Start Date: 1993

End Date: 1997

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 866, 1020

Intensity of Operation: Multidimensional peacebuilding

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 368

Target Nation: Liberia

Participating Nations: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Uganda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania

Lead Nation(s): Nigeria, Unites States

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, China, France, Russia*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace agreement: Cotonou Accord of July 25, 1993 (and successive peace agreements see above)

The Cotonou Accord (and all successive peace talks) resulted from combined efforts by ECOWAS, the OAU and the UN. Among the individual actors, **Nigeria** was clearly the most powerful broker, although its leadership was from time to time severely questioned by francophone ECOWAS members (Mutwol 2009; Mortimer 1996; Adebajo 2002).

At the UN level, the **United States** retained the lead in all diplomatic/financial questions regarding the Liberian conflict. In April 1996, for instance, the United States established the International Contact Group on Liberia (Mutwol 2009:157; Whitfield 2007:249). The United States also pledged $75 million for the implementation of the Abuja Peace Accords – by far the most generous contribution of all international actors (Mutwol 2009:144, 157).

References:

Adebajo, A. (2002). Liberia's civil war: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and regional security in West Africa. Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner.

Franke, V. C. and A. Warnecke (2009). "Building Peace: An Inventory of UN Peace Missions since the End of the Cold War." International Peacekeeping **16**(3): 408-436.

Mortimer, R. A. (1996). "Senegal's Role in Ecomog: The Francophone Dimension in the Liberian Crisis." The Journal of Modern African Studies **34**(02): 293-306.

Mutwol, J. (2009). Peace agreements and civil wars in Africa: insurgent motivations, state responses, and third-party peacemaking in Liberia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, Cambria Pr.

Whitfield, T. (2007). Friends indeed? : the United Nations, groups of friends, and the resolution of conflict. Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.2892611/k.36B7/Liberia_brHistorical_Chronology.htm

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/MONUL (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

36. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: ECOMIL (ECOWAS Monitoring Group in Liberia)

Brief Description of Operation: The *First Liberian Civil War* ended with the Liberian general election in 1997 in which Charles Taylor took power (see above). The *Second Liberian Civil War* began in April 1999, when Liberian dissidents under the banner of the Organization of Displaced Liberians, backed by the governments of neighboring Guinea and Sierra Leone, invade Liberia from the north and south. By 2003, the situation got so violent that ECOWAS deployed another peacekeeping operation following conclusion of the *Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement* on August 18, 2003.

Start Date: 2003

End Date: 2003

Organization: ECOWAS

UN Mandate: No

Resolutions: -

Intensity of Operation: Peace enforcement

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 3563

Target Nation: Liberia

Participating Nations: Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, The Gambia

Lead Nation(s): Unites States

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. **UN Speech Record Evaluation** (truncated graph due to excessive number of entries)

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, China, France, Russia*

2. **Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation**

Peace Agreement: Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement of August 18, 2003

Nigeria, which lost 1000 men in the ECOMOG intervention of 1990-1999 (see above), was initially unwilling to enter the Liberian conflict once again. It thus required substantial incentives from the **United States** to finally get involved (Moran and Pitcher 2004:506). The **United States** put immense pressure on Charles Taylor to resign on August 11, 2003 (Fake and Funk 2009:82; Hayner 2007). It also established *Joint Task Force Liberia*, built around a US Navy amphibious group with the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit aboard, positioned off the West African coast and was the driving political force behind the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which formed the negotiated end to the war.

References:

Funk, K. and S. Fake (2009). Scramble for Africa : Darfur-intervention and the USA. Montreal ; New York, Black Rose Books.

Hayner, P. (2007). Negotiaing peace in Liberia: Preserving the possibility for Justice. C. f. H. Dialogue.

Moran, M. H. and M. A. Pitcher (2004). "The 'basket case'and the 'poster child': explaining the end of civil conflicts in Liberia and Mozambique." Third World Quarterly **25**(3): 501-519.

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.2892611/k.36B7/Liberia_brHistorical_Chronology.htm

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
Note: No data on troop deployments per country available

37. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia)

Brief Description of Operation: ECOMIL (see above) was converted into UNMIL per UNSC Resolution 1509 on October 1, 2003.

Start Date: 2003

End Date: 2018

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 1509

Intensity of Operation: Multidimensional peacebuilding and peace enforcement

Max. Police Forces deployed: 1193

Max. Military Forces deployed: 14.125

Target Nation: Liberia

Participating Nations: Germany, Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, South Korea, Croatia, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, Ecuador, USA, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iceland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kirgizstan, Malaysia, Malawi, Mali, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Uganda, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Czech Republic, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Togo, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Lead Nation(s): Unites States

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, China, France, Russia*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement of August 18, 2003

Same actors involved as in ECOMIL (see above)

References:

Franke, V. C. and A. Warnecke (2009). "Building Peace: An Inventory of UN Peace Missions since the End of the Cold War." International Peacekeeping **16**(3): 408-436.

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.2892611/k.36B7/Liberia_brHistorical_Chronology.htm

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/MINUL (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

38. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: ONUMOZ (UN Operation in Mozambique)

Brief Description of Operation: Civil war broke out between governing socialist FRELIMO and opposing RENAMO shortly after Mozambique's independence, fostered by involvement of Zimbabwe and South Africa; Rome General Peace Accords (1992) initiate successful transition to peace.

Start Date: 1992

End Date: 1994

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Intensity of Operation: Multidimensional peacebuilding

Resolutions: -

Max. Police Forces deployed: 1144

Max. Military Forces deployed: 6979

Target Nation: Mozambique

Participating Nations: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Cap Verde, China, Egypt, Spain, USA, Finland, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, New Zealand, Pakistan, Netherlands, Portugal, Czech Republic, Russia, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Togo, Uruguay, Zambia

Lead Nation(s): Italy[7]

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *cannot be determined*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *Brazil*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Rome General Peace Accord of October 4, 1992

Mediation between FRELIMO and RENAMO conclude in the Rome General Peace Accord of October 1992. The negotiations were led by a nongovernmental organization, the Roman Catholic Community of Sant'Egidio, and Italy, supported, particularly in the latter stages of negotiations, by four observer countries – France, Portugal, the UK and the US (Whitfield 2007:28-29; Alden 1995:104; Hume 1994:101; Synge 1997:19; Cohen 2000:181-196).

Italy was the most important broker in the Mozambican peace negotiations. Italy hosted the talks and also provided travel money and political cover for the mediators (Francis in Utley (eds.) 2006:105; Hume 1994:33,74; Synge 1997:15). Ajello, for instance, writes "the greatest single contribution [to the Mozambican peace process] came from the Italian government, whose special responsibility was singled out in the General Peace Agreement, because of its role as mediator" (Ajello in Crocker et al. 1999:633).

[7] Note that Italy is *not* among the key UNSC speakers. However, its involvement in the Mozambican peace process is so extensive that it is still counted as the Lead Nations of this operation.

References:

Alden, C. (1995). "The UN and the Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique." The Journal of Modern African Studies **33**(01): 103-128.

Cohen, H. J. (2000). Intervening in Africa : superpower peacemaking in a troubled continent. New York, St. Martin's Press.

Crocker, C. A., F. O. Hampson, et al. (1999). Herding cats : multiparty mediation in a complex world. Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press.

Hume, C. R. (1994). Ending Mozambique's war : the role of mediation and good offices. Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press.

Synge, R. (1997). Mozambique : UN peacekeeping in action, 1992-94. Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press.

Utley, R. E., Ed. (2006). Major powers and peacekeeping : perspectives, priorities and the challenges of military intervention. Aldershot, England ; Burlington, VT, Ashgate.

Whitfield, T. (2007). Friends indeed? : the United Nations, groups of friends, and the resolution of conflict. Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/ONUMOZ (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

39. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: UNOMIG (UN Observer Mission in Georgia)

Brief Description of Operation: The UN's involvement in Georgia followed the outbreak of conflict in the former Soviet autonomous republic of Abkhazia in August 1992. From 1994 onward, the United Military Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) monitored a cease-fire between secessionist forces of the Abkhaz and the Georgian military.

Start Date: 1993

End Date: 2009

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 937

Intensity of Operation: Peacekeeping

Max. Police Forces deployed: 17

Max. Military Forces deployed: 130

Target Nation: Georgia

Participating Nations: Albania, Germany, Austria, Bangladesh, South Korea, Croatia, Denmark, Egypt, USA, France, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Jordan, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Czech Republic, Romania, UK, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Yemen

Lead Nation(s): Russian Federation

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *Russia*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *Russia, USA, UK, France*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Moscow Peace Agreement of May 14, 1994

Russia was in the lead with regards to the Moscow Agreement of May 1994 (Nalbanov 2009: 92). Russia was clearly also in the driving seat when it comes to UN mediation. Whitfield (2007:135) reports, for instance, that Russia conditioned its support for the UN 1994 intervention in Haiti with US support for UNOMIG (see also Albright 2003:158, Malone 1998:117).

References:

Albright, M. K. and B. Woodward (2003). Madam Secretary. New York, Miramax Books.

Malone, D. (1998). Decision-making in the UN Security Council : the case of Haiti, 1990-1997. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Nalbandov, R. (2009). Foreign interventions in ethnic conflicts, Ashgate Publishing.

Whitfield, T. (2007). Friends indeed?: the United Nations, groups of friends, and the resolution of conflict. Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data); http://www.operationspaix.net/MONUG (for participation data); IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

40. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: CIS Peacekeeping Forces in Georgia

Brief Description of Operation: The CIS operation follows UNIMOG (see above). In fact, in May 1994, the UN Secretary-General recommended that the UN should accept the CIS force, as the conditions for a UN operation had not been fulfilled.

Start Date: 1994

End Date: 2008

Organization: Commonwealth of Independent States

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: -

Intensity of Operation: Peacekeeping

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 2.325

Target Nation: Georgia

Participating Nations: Russian Federation, Georgia

Lead Nation(s): Russian Federation

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *Russia*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *Russia, USA, UK, France*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Moscow Peace Agreement of May 14, 1994

The CIS operation is deployed to reinforce UNOMIG. The deployment of the CIS force is largely the result of **Russian** statecraft (Facon in Utley (eds.) 2006:34). Lynch reports that on August 24, 1994, Yeltsin pledged personally to take steps to resolve the Georgian conflict. (Lynch 2000:133).

References:

Lynch, D. and Russia and Eurasia Programme (Royal Institute of International Affairs) (1998). The conflict in Abkhazia: dilemmas in Russian 'peacekeeping' policy. London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Russia and Eurasia Programme.

Lynch, D. and Royal Institute of International Affairs. (2000). Russian peacekeeping strategies in the CIS : the cases of Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan. Houndmills [England] New York, Macmillan Press ; St. Martin's Press.

Utley, R. E., Ed. (2006). Major powers and peacekeeping : perspectives, priorities and the challenges of military intervention. Aldershot, England ; Burlington, VT, Ashgate.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data); IISS Military Balance (for participation/troop data)

41. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: CSCE/OSCE Mission to Georgia

Brief Description of Operation: Established in December 1992, the OSCE Mission to Georgia was tasked to promote negotiations between the conflicting parties in Georgia as well as to monitor the joint peacekeeping forces established under the Sochi Agreement of June 24, 1992, in order to assess whether their activities are carried out in conformity with OSCE principles.

Start Date: 1992

End Date: 2009

Organization: OSCE

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: -

Intensity of Operation: Peacekeeping

Max. Police Forces deployed:

Max. Military Forces deployed: 175

Target Nation: Georgia

Participating Nations: Germany, Bulgaria, USA, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Norway, UK, Turkey, Belarus, Spain, France, Kazakhstan, Poland, Serbia, Ukraine, BiH, Estonia, Greece, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Sweden

Lead Nation(s): Russian Federation

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *Russian Federation*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *Russian Federation, USA, UK, France*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Sochi Agreement of June 24, 1992

Similar to the Moscow agreement (see above), the Sochi agreement is heavily influenced by Russia. Russia campaigned hard to obtain OSCE/CSCE approval for a Georgian peacekeeping operation. Moscow thereby hoped to take advantage of the fact that, in July 1992, the CSCE was proclaimed a regional agency as defined in chapter VII of the UN charter and was authorized to carry out peacekeeping operations (Allison 1994).

References:

Allison, R. (1994). Peacekeeping in the Soviet Successor States. Chaillot Paper 18. Paris, EUISS.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data); IISS Military Balance (for participation/troop data)

42. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force)

Brief Description of Operation: UNPROFOR was the first United Nations peacekeeping force in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Yugoslav wars. It existed between the beginning of UN involvement in February 1992, and its restructuring into other forces in March 1995. UNPROFOR was created by UN Security Council Resolution 743 on February 21, 1992.

Start Date: 1992

End Date: 1995

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 743, 1084

Intensity of Operation: Peacekeeping

Max. Police Forces deployed: 727

Max. Military Forces deployed: 38.810

Target Nation: Yugoslavia

Participating Nations: Argentina, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Ghana, Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Lithuania, Malaysia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela

Lead Nation(s): France, United Kingdom

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. **UN Speech Record Evaluation** (truncated graph due to excessive number of entries)

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA, Russian Federation, UK, France, China*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, Russian Federation, UK, France, China*

2. **Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation**

Peace agreement: Multiple cease-fire agreements (Carrington-Cutileiro Peace Plan (1992), Vance-Owen Peace Plan (1993), Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan (1993), Contact Group Plan (1994))

At the beginning of the Yugoslav Wars, the United States stood willingly on the sidelines while expecting its European allies to take the lead (Chollet 2005:3; Power 2002:252-3,67; Talentino 2005:178). Among them, **France** arguably exerted the greatest pressure to intervene in Yugoslavia (Lucarelli 2000: 176). Great Britain joined France only reluctantly in its desire to bring peace to Yugoslavia. During the first phase of the international response to the Yugoslav crisis (June-December 1991), **Britain** was very reluctant to become militarily involved in a 'far away' quarrel. Britain thus initially rejected the French idea of a *force d'interposition*, and declined to participate in UNPROFOR until August 1991. Finally in August 1992, Britain agreed to take part in the UN mission in Bosnia (Lucrelli 2000:195).

References:

Chollet, D. H. (2005). The road to the Dayton accords: a study of American statecraft. New York, Palgrave Macmillan.

Lucarelli, S. (2000). Europe and the breakup of Yugoslavia : a political failure in search of a scholarly explanation. The Hague; Boston, Kluwer Law International.

Power, S. (2002). A problem from hell : America and the age of genocide. New York, Basic Books.

Talentino, A. K. (2005). Military intervention after the Cold War: the evolution of theory and practice, Ohio Univ Ctr for Intl Studies.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/FORPRONU (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

43. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: UNMIBH (UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina)

Brief Description of Operation: The Dayton Accord ends the war in former Yugoslavia. UNMIBH replaces UNPROFOR. The mission is created on December 21, 1995, by UNSC resolution 1035 (1995). It comprises the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) and a United Nations civilian office. Following the successful conclusion of its mandate, UNMIBH is terminated on December 31, 2002, in accordance with UNSC resolution 1423 (2002) of July 12, 2002. The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) takes over from UNMIBH from January 1, 2003 onwards.

Start Date: 1995

End Date: 2002

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 1035, 1088, 1103, 1144, 1184, 1031

Intensity of Operation: Multidimensional peacebuilding

Max. Police Forces deployed: 2047

Max. Military Forces deployed: -

Target Nation: Bosnia-Herzegovina

Participating Nations: Germany, Bulgaria, Denmark, USA, Ghana, Indonesia, Jordan, Nepal, Netherlands, Romania, Sweden, Turkey, Argentina, Canada, Egypt, Fiji, Greece, Ireland, Kenya, Nigeria, Poland, UK, Switzerland, Ukraine, Austria, Chile, Spain, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, Lithuania, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Thailand, Vanuatu, Bangladesh, China, Estonia, France, India, Italy, Malaysia, Pakistan, Czech Republic, Senegal, Tunisia

Lead Nation(s): France, Great Britain, United States, Germany, Italy, Russian Federation

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. **UN Speech Record Evaluation** (truncated graph due to excessive number of entries)

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA, Russian Federation, UK, France, China*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, Russian Federation, UK, France, China*

2. **Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation**

Peace agreement: Dayton Accords

From 1994 onwards the *Contact Group on Former Yugoslavia* comprising **France, Italy, Germany, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States** took the lead in finding a solution to the Yugoslav wars. The United States assumed the leadership inside the group from mid-1995 onwards and especially at the Dayton Peace Talks concluding in the Dayton Accords of November 21, 1995. The peace conference was led by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and negotiator Richard Holbrooke with two Co-Chairmen in the form of EU Special Representative Carl Bildt and the First Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia Igor Ivanov (see for example Holbrooke 1998; Chollet 2005; Prantl 2006: 216; Whitfield 2007).

References:

Chollet, D. H. (2005). The road to the Dayton accords: a study of American statecraft. New York, Palgrave Macmillan.

Holbrooke, R. C. (1998). To end a war : from Sarajevo to Dayton and beyond. New York, Random House.

Prantl, J. (2006). The UN Security Council and informal groups of states: complementing or competing for governance? Oxford ; New York, Oxford University Press.

Whitfield, T. (2007). Friends indeed? : the United Nations, groups of friends, and the resolution of conflict. Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/MINUBH (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

44. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: UNPREDEP (UN Preventive Deployment Force)

Brief Description of Operation: UNPREDEP was established on March 31, 1995, to replace UNPROFOR in the Republic of Macedonia. The mandate of UNPREDEP remained essentially the same: to monitor and report any developments in the border areas which could undermine confidence and stability in the country and threaten its territory. The operation was shut down on February 28, 1999, when China vetoed its renewal following Macedonia's diplomatic recognition of Taiwan

Start Date: 1995

End Date: 1999

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 983, 1186

Intensity of Operation: Peacekeeping

Max. Police Forces deployed: 26

Max. Military Forces deployed: 1084

Target Nation: Yugoslavia (Macedonia)

Participating Nations: Argentina, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Spain, USA, Finland, France, Ghana, Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, New Zealand, Pakistan, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Czech Republic, UK, Russia, Senegal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine

Lead Nation(s): France, Great Britain, United States, Germany, Italy, Russian Federation

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. **UN Speech Record Evaluation** (truncated graph due to excessive number of entries)

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA, Russian Federation, UK, France, China*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, Russian Federation, UK, France, China*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace agreement: Dayton Accords

Same actors involved as in UNMIBH (see above)

References:

http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unpred_p.htm (last visited 06/13/2011)

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/FORDEPRENU (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

45. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: UNCRO (UN Confidence Restoration Operation)

Brief Description of Operation: UNCRO was established on March 31, 1995, by UNSC Resolution 981 and was deployed to the newly created Croatia. UNCRO replaced UNPROFOR in Croatia. UNCRO was established as an interim mission to create the conditions necessary to facilitating a negotiated settlement in accordance with Croatia's territorial integrity and protecting the security needs and rights of all resident communities; following Croatia's forceful annexation of Western Slavonia and Krajina, the mandate was partly changed.

Start Date: 1995

End Date: 1995

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 981

Intensity of Operation: Peacekeeping

Max. Police Forces deployed: 296

Max. Military Forces deployed: 6775

Target Nation: Croatia

Participating Nations: Germany, Argentina, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Spain, Estonia, USA, Finland, France, Ghana, Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Lithuania, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, New Zealand, Pakistan, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Czech Republic, UK, Russia, Senegal, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine

Lead Nation(s): France, Great Britain, United States, Germany, Italy, Russian Federation

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. **UN Speech Record Evaluation** (truncated graph due to excessive number of entries)

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA, Russian Federation, UK, France, China*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, Russian Federation, UK, France, China*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Dayton Accord

Same actors involved as in UNMIBH (see above)

References:

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/ONURC (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

46. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: UNTAES (UN Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium)

Brief Description of Operation: UNTAES replaces UNCRO in Eastern Slavonia to assist in the peaceful reintegration of that region into Croatia.

Start Date: 1996

End Date: 1998

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 1037

Intensity of Operation: International transitory government

Max. Police Forces deployed: 457

Max. Military Forces deployed: 5104

Target Nation: Yugoslavia (Croatia)

Participating Nations: Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, Egypt, USA, Fiji, Finland, Ghana, Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Lithuania, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, New Zealand, Pakistan, Netherlands, Poland, Czech Republic, UK, Russia, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Ukraine

Lead Nation(s): United States, France, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Russian Federation

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. **UN Speech Record Evaluation** (truncated graph due to excessive number of entries)

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA, Russian Federation, UK, France, China*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, Russian Federation, UK, France, China*

2. **Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation**

Peace Agreement: Dayton Accords

Same actors involved as in UNMIBH (see above)

References:
http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/ATNUSO (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

47. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: IFOR (NATO Implementation Force)

Brief Description of Operation: IFOR was deployed on December 20, 1995, six days after the conclusion of the Dayton Accords. IFOR took over from UNPROFOR and was authorized by UNSC Resolution 1031 adopted on December 15, 1995. Under the agreement, IFOR was authorized to use any means it deemed necessary to ensure that the parties respect their commitments to the Dayton Accords (particularly those relating to the withdrawal and redeployment of forces, the cantonment of heavy weapons and established zones of separation).

Start Date: 1995

End Date: 1996

Organization: NATO

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 1031

Intensity of Operation: Peace enforcement

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 60.000

Target Nation: Yugoslavia

Participating Nations: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, Austria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Ukraine, Malaysia, Latvia, Lithuania, New Zealand, Pakistan, Poland, Slovak Republic, Sweden, Russia

Lead Nation(s): France, Great Britain, United States, Germany, Italy, Russian Federation

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. **UN Speech Record Evaluation** (truncated graph due to excessive number of entries)

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA, Russian Federation, UK, France, China*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, Russian Federation, UK, France, China*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Dayton Accords

Same actors involved as in UNMIBH (see above)

References:

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/IFOR (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

48. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: SFOR (NATO Stabilization Force)

Brief Description of Operation: In December 1996, NATO members agree in Paris on a consolidation plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina that includes the organization of a stabilization force for peace (SFOR) to succeed IFOR.

Start Date: 1996

End Date: 2004

Organization: NATO

UN Mandate: Yes

Intensity of Operation: Peace enforcement

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 36.000

Target Nation: Yugoslavia

Participating Nations: Albania, Bulgaria, Spain, Hungary, Norway, Czech Republic, Sweden, Germany, Canada, USA, Ireland, Netherlands, Romania, Turkey, Argentina, Chile, France, Italy, Poland, UK, Austria, Denmark, Greece, Morocco, Portugal, Slovakia

Lead Nation(s): France, Great Britain, United States, Germany, Italy, Russian Federation

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. **UN Speech Record Evaluation** (truncated graph due to excessive number of entries)

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA, Russian Federation, UK, France, China*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, Russian Federation, UK, France, China*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Dayton Accord

Same actors involved as in UNPREDEP (see above)

References:

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/SFOR (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

49. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: EUFOR Althea (EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina)

Brief Description of Operation: EUFOR Althea is a military deployment in Bosnia and Herzegovina to oversee the military implementation of the Dayton Accords. It is the successor to NATO's SFOR and IFOR. The transition from SFOR to EUFOR was largely a change of name and commanders: 80% of the troops remained in place. It replaced SFOR on December 2, 2004.

Start Date: 2004

End Date: Ongoing

Organization: EU

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: -

Intensity of Operation: Peace enforcement

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 6656

Target Nation: Bosnia-Herzegovina

Participating Nations: Albania, Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, Chile, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Turkey

Lead Nation(s): France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. **UN Speech Record Evaluation** (truncated graph due to excessive number of entries)

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA, Russian Federation, UK, France, China*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, Russian Federation, UK, France, China*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Dayton Accord

The European members of the Contact Group (see above) took the lead in establishing EUFOR Althea.

References:

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/EUFOR-Althea (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

50. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: EUPM (EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina)

Brief Description of Operation: EUPM is the European Union's mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina that aids the local police organizations. EUPM was the successor to the United Nations' International Police Task Force in Bosnia (see above) whose term ended at the end of 2002.

Start Date: 2003

End Date: 2012

Organization: EU

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions:

Intensity of Operation: Police operation

Max. Police Forces deployed: 125

Max. Military Forces deployed: -

Target Nation: Bosnia and Herzegovina

Participating Nations: Germany, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Czech Republic, Romania, UK, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine

Lead Nation(s): France, Great Britain, Germany

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. **UN Speech Record Evaluation** (truncated graph due to excessive number of entries)

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA, Russian Federation, UK, France, China*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, Russian Federation, UK, France, China*

2. **Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation**

Peace Agreement: Dayton Accord

The European members of the Contact Group (see above) took the lead in establishing EUPM.

References:

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/MPUE (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

51. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: Operation Alba

Brief Description of Operation: In 1997 Albania is on the verge of civil war. Given the gravity of the situation, the Security Council accepts Italy's offer to lead a coalition of the willing, the Multinational Protection Force (Operation Alba), under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to stabilize the domestic situation, ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid and control Adriatic ports. Operation Alba begins in mid-April 1997 and ends August 12, 1997, after the victory of the socialist opposition in the parliamentary elections of June 1997 and the resignation of President Sali Berisha in July.

Start Date: 1997

End Date: 1997

Organization: Ad hoc

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: -

Intensity of Operation: Peace enforcement

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 7000

Target Nation: Albania

Participating Nations: Austria, France, Romania, Belgium, Greece, Slovenia, Denmark, Italy, Turkey, Spain, Portugal

Lead Nation(s): Italy

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *Italy, China*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *cannot be determined*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace agreement: no agreement --> regime change

Italy is generally credited with leading Operation Alba (e.g. Greco 1998; Marchio 2000).

References:

Greco, E. (1998). Delegated Peacekeeping: The Case of Operation Alba. I. A. Internazionali.

Marchio, R. (2000). "Operation Alba: A European Approach to the Peace Support Operations in the Balkans." USAWC Strategy Research Project: 27.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/FMP (for participation data)

Marchio 2000 (for troop data)

52. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: Operation Allied Harbor

Brief Description of Operation: Operation Allied Harbor was NATO's first humanitarian operation. By the end of March 1999 over 200,000 refugees had arrived in Albania from Kosovo. By June 25, 1999, there were 479,223 refugees in the country. The provision by NATO of medical, engineering, transport, security and staff support prevented Slobodan Milošević from destabilizing Albania and proved instrumental in sustaining the refugees and in their eventual return to Kosovo.

Start Date: 1999

End Date: 1999

Organization: NATO

UN Mandate: No

Intensity of Operation: Humanitarian operation

Max. Police Forces deployed:

Max. Military Forces deployed: 7300

Target Nation: Serbia

Participating Nations: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Hungary, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States

Lead Nation(s): United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. **UN Speech Record Evaluation** (truncated graph due to excessive number of entries)

Three standard deviations from the mean: *UK, USA, Russia, China*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *UK, USA, Russia, China, France*

2. **Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation**

Peace agreement: no agreement --> Rambouillet Peace Talks were ongoing

The key players in the Rambouillet Peace Talks were the **United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy** - the so-called International Contact Group or simply "the Quint" (e.g. Daadler and O'Hanlon 2000; Weymouth and Hening (eds.) 2001; Albright 2002).

References:

Albright, M. K. and B. Woodward (2003). Madam Secretary. New York, Miramax Books.

Daalder, I. H. and M. E. O'Hanlon (2000). Winning ugly : NATO's war to save Kosovo. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press.

Weymouth, T. and S. Henig (2001). The Kosovo crisis : the last American war in Europe? London, Reuters.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/sustain_hope.htm (for participation/troop data) (last visited 06/14/2011)

53. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: KFOR (NATO Kosovo Force)

Brief Description of Operation: The failure of the Rambouillet talks on the Kosovo conflict in March 1999 led to military intervention (air strikes) by NATO in Operation Allied Force. On June 9, 1999, NATO and the Serb government signed a technical agreement signaling the start of the withdrawal of Serbian troops from Kosovo. On June 10 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 endorsing the agreement and calling among other things for the deployment of an international security presence, including a substantial NATO participation. The soldiers of KFOR deployed to Kosovo on June 12, 1999, at the same time as the UN Mission Interim Administration Mission (UNMIK).

Start Date: 1999

End Date: Ongoing

Organization: NATO

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 1244

Intensity of Operation: Peace enforcement

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 17.174

Target Nation: Serbia

Participating Nations: Germany, Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, USA, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Morocco, Norway, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Czech Republic, UK, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine

Lead Nation(s): Germany, France, United Kingdom, United States, Italy

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. **UN Speech Record Evaluation** (truncated graph due to excessive number of entries)

Three standard deviations from the mean: *UK, USA, Russia, China*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *UK, USA, Russia, China, France*

2. **Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation**

Peace Agreement: Failure of Rambouillet Peace Talks --> Cease-Fire Agreement of June 9, 1999

The key players in the Rambouillet Peace Talks were the **United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy** - the so-called International Contact Group or simply "the Quint" (e.g. Daadler and O'Hanlon 2000; Weymouth and Hening (eds.) 2001; Albright 2002).

References:

Auerswald, D. P. (2004). "Explaining wars of choice: An integrated decision model of NATO policy in Kosovo." International Studies Quarterly **48**(3): 631-662.

Albright, M. K. and B. Woodward (2003). Madam Secretary. New York, Miramax Books.

Daalder, I. H. and M. E. O'Hanlon (2000). Winning ugly : NATO's war to save Kosovo. Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press.

Utley, R. E., Ed. (2006). Major powers and peacekeeping: perspectives, priorities and the challenges of military intervention. Aldershot, England ; Burlington, VT, Ashgate.

Weymouth, T. and S. Henig (2001). The Kosovo crisis : the last American war in Europe? London, Reuters.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/KFOR (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

54. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: Operation Essential Harvest

Brief Description of Operation: Operation Essential Harvest (or Task Force Harvest (TFH)) was a military operation that consisted of sending troops under the command of NATO following the 2001 conflict in Macedonia. It was officially launched August 22, 2001, but actually began on the August 27. The 3500 troops sent were to disarm the Albanian nationalist groups such as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and destroy their weapons. The mission lasted 30 days.

Start Date: 2001

End Date: 2001

Organization: NATO

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 1371

Intensity of Operation: Combat Operation

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 4800

Target Nation: Macedonia

Participating Nations: Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, UK, Hungary, Italy Norway, Portugal, US

Lead Nation(s): United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy,

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, Russian Federation*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Ohrid Framework Agreement of August 8, 2001

The Ohrid Framework agreement was brokered by the US envoy to Macedonia, James Pardew, and his EU counterpart, Francois Leotard. The negotiators got high-level support from NATO SG Robertson and the EU HR Javier Solana when necessary (Laity 2008:43; Dobbins 2008:50). The United Kingdom took the lead in setting up the NATO force. It also contributed the greatest number of troops to the operation. The US, while diplomatically pushing for an operation in Macedonia, took a back-seat in the operation (Laity 2008:51, 55; Eldgridge 2007:60).

References:

Dobbins, J. (2008). Europe's role in nation-building: from the Balkans to the Congo. Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation.

Laity, M. (2008). Preventing war in Macedonia : pre-emptive diplomacy for the 21st century. Whitehall, London, Royal United Services Institute.

Eldridge, J. L. C. (2002). "Playing at peace: Western politics, diplomacy and the stabilization of Macedonia." European Security **11**(3): 46-90.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data); http://www.nato.int/fyrom/tfh/home.htm (for participation/troop data)

55. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: Operation Amber Fox

Brief Description of Operation: Operation Amber Fox was the follow-on operation to Operation Essential Harvest (see above). The mission officially started on September 27, 2001 with an initial three-month mandate, which was subsequently extended until December 15, 2002.

Start Date: 2001

End Date: 2002

Organization: NATO

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 1371

Intensity of Operation: Peace enforcement

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 700

Target Nation: Macedonia

Participating Nations: Germany, Netherlands

Lead Nation(s): Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy**,** United States

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, Russian Federation*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Ohrid Framework Agreement of August 8, 2001

Same actors involved as in Operation Essential Harvest (see above)

References:

Laity, M. (2008). Preventing war in Macedonia : pre-emptive diplomacy for the 21st century. Whitehall, London, Royal United Services Institute.

Eldridge, J. L. C. (2002). "Playing at peace: Western politics, diplomacy and the stabilization of Macedonia." European Security **11**(3): 46-90.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.nato.int/fyrom/tff/home.htm (for participation/troop data) (last visited 06/14/2011)

56. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: EUPOL Proxima (EU Police Mission in Macedonia)

Brief Description of Operation: EUPOL Proxima was launched on December 15, 2003 and ended on December 14, 2005. EU police experts were monitoring, mentoring and advising the country's police, thus helping to fight organized crime as well as promoting European policing standards.

Start Date: 2003

End Date: 2005

Organization: EU

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 1371

Intensity of Operation: Police mission

Max. Police Forces deployed: 200

Max. Military Forces deployed: -

Target Nation: Macedonia

Participating Nations: Germany, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Czech Republic, Romania, UK, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine

Lead Nation(s): France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, Russian Federation*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Ohrid Framework Agreement of August 8, 2001

After NATO Operations *Essential Harvest* and *Amber Fox* (see above), the US pushed the EU to assume responsibility for Macedonia's security (Elridge 2002:69). The key EU powers thus took the lead in EUPOL Proxima.

References:

Eldridge, J. L. C. (2002). "Playing at peace: Western politics, diplomacy and the stabilization of Macedonia." European Security 11(3): 46-90.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showpage.aspx?id=584&lang=fr (for participation/troop data) (last visited 06/14/2011)

57. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: EUFOR Concordia

Brief Description of Operation: Operation Concordia is the first peacekeeping mission ever conducted by the European Union. The EU took over from NATO's operation Allied Harmony and deployed around 400 troops to provide security to EU and OSCE monitors overseeing the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement.

Start Date: 2003

End Date: 2003

Organization: EU

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 1371

Intensity of Operation: Peace enforcement

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 400

Target Nation: Macedonia

Participating Nations: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK, Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Turkey, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia

Lead Nation(s): France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, Russian Federation*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Ohrid Framework Agreement of August 8, 2001

Same actors involved as in EUPOL Proxima (see above)

References:

Eldridge, J. L. C. (2002). "Playing at peace: Western politics, diplomacy and the stabilization of Macedonia." European Security **11**(3): 46-90.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/Operation-Concordia,213 (for participation data)
IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

58. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: RAMSI (Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands)

Brief Description of Operation: RAMSI (also known as *Operation Helpem Fren)* was created in 2003 in response to a request for international aid by the Governor-General of the Solomon Islands.

Start Date: 2003

End Date: 2017

Organization: Ad hoc

UN Mandate: No

Resolutions: -

Intensity of Operation: Multidimensional peacekeeping

Max. Police Forces deployed: 300

Max. Military Forces deployed: 2225

Target Nation: Solomon Islands

Participating Nations: Australia, Fiji, Cook Islands, Marshall Islands, Kiribati, Micronesia, Nauru, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu

Lead Nation(s): Australia, New Zealand

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Note: Operation was not discussed at the UNSC

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace agreement: Failure of Townsville Peace Agreement of October 2000

Both **Australia** and **Zealand** sponsored the Solomon Island peace process. **Australia** is widely considered to have been in the logistical and diplomatic lead of RAMSI (see e.g. Kabutaulaka 2005:284, 291; Moore 2004: 738; Sharp 2001:3; Wallis 2006:81). However, the involvement of New Zealand cannot be ignored. The August 2, 2000, ceasefire agreement preceding the Townsville agreement was signed, for instance, aboard a Navy ship from **New Zealand**, the HMAS Tobruk (Kabutaulaka 2005:286).

References:

Fry, G. and T. T. Kabutaulaka (2008). Intervention and state-building in the Pacific: the legitimacy of 'cooperative intervention'. Manchester, UK; New York, New York, Manchester University Press ; Distributed in the USA by Palgrave.

Hurly, N. (2001). New Zealand and Solomon Islands Ethnic Conflict. S. W. Papers. Canberra.

Kabutaulaka, T. T. (2005). "Australian foreign policy and the RAMSI intervention in Solomon Islands." The Contemporary Pacific **17**(2): 283-308.

Moore, C. (2004). "Australia's Motivation and Timing for the 2003 Intervention in the Solomon Islands crisis." Royal Historical Society of Queensland Journal **19**(4).

Ponzio, R. (2005). "The Solomon Islands: the UN and intervention by coalitions of the willing." International Peacekeeping **12**(2): 173-188.

Sharp, M. (2001). Australian Policy on the 'Ethnic Tension' in Solomon islands 1999-2001. S. W. Papers. Canberra.

Wallis, J. (2006). "A 'helpem fren' in need ... Evaluating the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands." Security Challenges **2**(2).

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/RAMSI,237 (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

59. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: ECOMOG-Sierra Leone (ECOMWAS Monitoring Group-Sierra Leone)

Brief Description of Operation: The overthrow of the democratic government of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah triggered the ECOWAS intervention of 1997. The stated purpose of ECOMOG was to restore the weak but legitimate rule of Kabbah, by force if necessary. The OAU endorsed this position. While the UN did not officially sanction it, Secretary-General Kofi Annan, among others, admitted that force might be the only solution. ECOMOG troops were welcomed by the citizens and succeeded in toppling the junta in February 1998.

Start Date: 1997

End Date: 2000

Organization: ECOWAS

UN Mandate: No

Resolutions: -

Intensity of Operation: Peace enforcement

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 1400

Target Nation: Sierra Leone

Participating Nations: Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria

Lead Nation(s): Nigeria

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *UK, USA*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *UK, USA, Russian Federation, China, France*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace agreement: Conakry Peace Accord (1997)

In 1997, Sierra Leone's president Ahmed Tejan Kabbah appealed to **Nigeria** for help to reverse the coup. Nigeria then engaged the junta in intense bilateral negotiations to restore the civilian government. These negotiations, which later were broadened to include other ECOWAS countries, led to the signing of the Conakry Peace Accord (Mulow 2009:252; Talentino 2005:221; Dorman 2009:40).

References:

Dorman, A. M. (2009). Blair's successful war: British military intervention in Sierra Leone. Farnham, England; Burlington, VT, Ashgate.

Mutwol, J. (2009). Peace agreements and civil wars in Africa: insurgent motivations, state responses, and third-party peacemaking in Liberia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, Cambria Pr.

Talentino, A. K. (2005). Military intervention after the Cold War: the evolution of theory and practice, Ohio Univ Ctr for Intl Studies.

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.2857017/k.83CF/Sierra_Leonebr_Historical_Chronology.htm

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/ECOMOG-Sierra-Leone (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

60. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: UNOMSIL (UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone)

Brief Description of Operation: The Conakry Peace Plan (see above) did not ameliorate the situation in Sierra Leone. The ECOWAS intervention (ECOMOMG-SL) reinstalls the democratically elected president in 1998. On July 13, 1998, it is converted into UNOMSIL by UNSC 1181. As fighting continues, UNOMSIL is evacuated.

Start Date: 1998

End Date: 1999

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 1181, 1260

Intensity of Operation: Peacekeeping

Max. Police Forces deployed:

Max. Military Forces deployed: 245

Target Nation: Sierra Leone

Participating Nations: Bangladesh, Bolivia, China, Croatia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Gambia, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Kirgizstan, Malaysia, Namibia, Nepal, Norway, New Zealand, Pakistan, Czech Republic, UK, Russia, Slovakia, Sweden, Tanzania, Thailand, Uruguay, Zambia.

Lead Nation(s): United Kingdom, United States

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *UK, USA*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *UK, USA, Russian Federation, China, France*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace agreement: Lomé Peace Agreement

Following the failure if the Conakry Peace Agreement and the flagging performance of ECOWAS in Sierra Leone, various actors try to remedy the situation. **Great Britain** flies in a planeload of military vehicles and also directs its naval frigate HMS Norfolk, which arrives in Freetown on January 18, 1998, to provide backup support to ECOMOMG in terms of intelligence and reconnaissance capacity (Mutlow 2009:294-5). The United States provide $4 million to assist ECOMOG. However, ECOMOMG's performance suggests that there is no military solution to the war. Thus starts the Lomé Peace Process, which is largely funded by **Great Britain** (Mutlow 2009:296-7). **Great Britain** also suggest at the UN deploying a full-fledged peacekeeping operation (Talentino 2005:226).

References:

Cook, C. R., R. Fegley, et al. (2009). "A Question of Intervention: American Policymaking in Sierra Leone and the Power of Institutional Agenda Setting." African Studies Quarterly **10**(1).

Mutwol, J. (2009). Peace agreements and civil wars in Africa: insurgent motivations, state responses, and third-party peacemaking in Liberia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, Cambria Pr.

Talentino, A. K. (2005). Military intervention after the Cold War: the evolution of theory and practice, Ohio Univ Ctr for Intl Studies.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/MONUSIL (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

61. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: UNAMSIL (UN Mission in Sierra Leone)

Brief Description of Operation: Civil war is ended following the Lomé Peace Agreement (1999) and British unilateral military intervention (Operation Palliser). UNAMSIL follows in the footsteps of UNOMSIL (see above) with a more robust mandate and much larger deployment size.

Start Date: 1999

End Date: 2005

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 1270, 1289, 1346

Intensity of Operation: Multidimensional peacebuilding and peace enforcement

Max. Police Forces deployed: 87

Max. Military Forces deployed: 17.368

Target Nation: Sierra Leone

Participating Nations: Germany, Bangladesh, Bolivia, China, Croatia, Egypt, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mauritius, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Kirgizstan, Malaysia, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, UK, Russia, Slovakia, Sweden, Tanzania, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Lead Nation(s): United Kingdom, United States

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *UK, USA*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *UK, USA, Russian Federation, China, France*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Lomé Agreement (and Abuja I and II agreements)

Ongoing violence results in a unilateral British deployment on May 7, 1999 (Talentino 2005:228; Dorman 2009:87ff). Intense negotiations involving the cut of all EU aid to Liberia and sanctions targeting Charles Taylor, his family and close aides from entering the United States lead to a cease-fire agreement between the RUF and President Kabbah in May 2001 (Abuja I and II agreements). Great Britain contributes $120 million toward the reconstruction of Sierra Leonean security institutions and the justice system (Chege 2002: 155).

References:

Cook, C. R., R. Fegley, et al. (2009). "A Question of Intervention: American Policymaking in Sierra Leone and the Power of Institutional Agenda Setting." African Studies Quarterly **10**(1).

Dorman, A. M. (2009). Blair's successful War : British military intervention in Sierra Leone. Farnham, England; Burlington, VT, Ashgate.

Talentino, A. K. (2005). Military intervention after the Cold War: the evolution of theory and practice, Ohio Univ Ctr for Intl Studies.

Chege, M. (2002). "Sierra Leone: the state that came back from the dead." The Washington Quarterly **25**(3): 147-160.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data); http://www.operationspaix.net/MINUSIL (for participation data); IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

62. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: ECOMOG-Guinea Bissau (ECOWAS Monitoring Group-Guinea Bissau)

Brief Description of Operation: ECOMOG was deployed at the request of Guinean President João Bernardo Vieira, who faced a rebellion led by General Ansumane Mane. Despite ECOMOMG's support of the Viera's army, the fighting quickly turned in favor of the rebels. A peace agreement was signed on November 1, 1998, in Abuja (Nigeria) under the aegis of ECOWAS. The agreement provides for a cease-fire, withdrawal of foreign forces and the deployment of a peacekeeping force of ECOWAS. The ECOMOG forces withdraw from Guinea-Bissau in late June 1999, replaced by the UN Office for the Consolidation of Peace (UNOGBIS).

Start Date: 1998

End Date: 1999

Organization: ECOWAS

UN Mandate: No

Resolutions: -

Intensity of Operation: Peace enforcement

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 600

Target Nation: Guinea Bissau

Participating Nations: Benin, Gambia, Niger, Togo

Lead Nation(s): France, Portugal[8]

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *cannot be determined*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *France, USA, Russian Federation*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace agreement: Abuja Peace Agreement of November 1, 1998

France (through the francophone ECOWAS members) and Portugal (through the community of lusophone states) dominated the conflict resolution efforts. At times, the peace process was engulfed in a climate of fierce franco-portuguese competition (Masse in Furley and May (eds.) 2006:90; Francis in Utley (eds.) 2006:112). A final peace agreement was negotiated after an ECOWAS Foreign Minister summit in Abuja on November 1, 1998.

References:

Furley, O. and R. May Ed. (2006). Ending Africa's wars : progressing to peace. Aldershot, England ; Burlington, VT, Ashgate.

[8] Note that Portugal is not among the key UNSC speakers. However, its involvement in ECOMOG-Guinea Bissau is so extensive that it is still counted among the Lead Nations of this operation.

ICG (2007). "Guinea-Bissau: In Need of a State." ICG Africa Report N°142.

Utley, R. E., Ed. (2006). Major powers and peacekeeping : perspectives, priorities and the challenges of military intervention. Aldershot, England ; Burlington, VT, Ashgate.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/ECOMOG-Guinee-Bissau (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

63. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: MONUC (UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo)

Brief Description of Operation: Rwandan genocide (1994) leads to the downfall of dictator Mobutu and to looting by Rwanda and Uganda of the DRC's natural resources. The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (1999) and The Sun City Agreement (2002) inaugurate the transition process.

Start Date: 1999

End Date: 2010

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 1291, 1565, 1445, 1493, 1621, 1635, 1693, 1669, 1692, 1671

Intensity of Operation: Multidimensional peacebuilding and peace enforcement

Max. Police Forces deployed: 1085

Max. Military Forces deployed: 17.516

Target Nation: Democratic Republic of Congo

Participating Nations: South Africa, Algeria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, CAR, China, Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, Egypt, Spain, France, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Czech Republic, Romania, UK, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Chad, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia.

Lead Nation(s): United States, France, South Africa

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *France*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *France, UK*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 1999 and "Lusaka Plus" of 2000

The Lusaka Agreement of 1999 was a regional initiative led by **South Africa**. The United States and the European Union solely served as observer states to the Lusaka Process (Durch 2006:245).

The Lusaka Agreement foresaw the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force. In assembling the force (and thus implementing the Lusaka agreement), the **United States** took the lead. To solidify African commitment to the Lusaka process, Richard Holbrook, the newly appointed US ambassador to the UN, sought it necessary to make the conflict parties sign an accord quasi-identical to the initial Lusaka agreement called "Lusaka-plus" (Durch 2006:250). In early February 2000, the United States introduced UNSC Resolution 1291, which called for a peacekeeping mission to facilitate the implementation of Lusaka. Furthermore, the US Department of Defense worked very closely with UNDPKO to design MONUC (ICG 2000: 74; Durch 2006:251).

France laid one of the crucial foundations for the Lusaka agreement at the Francophone Summit in November 1998 in France attended by thirty-four African heads of State (Durch 2006:244).

References:

Durch, W. J., Ed. (2006). Twenty-first-century peace operations. Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace and the Henry L. Stimson Center.

ICG (2000). "Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War." ICG Africa Report N°26.

Reyntjens, F. (2009). The Great African War : Congo and regional geopolitics, 1996-2006. Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

Turner, T. (1997). "Kabila Returns, In a Cloud of Uncertainty." African Studies Quarterly **1**(3).

Willame, J.-C. (2002). L'accord de Lusaka : Chronique d'une négociation internationale. Paris Tervuren, Harmattan ; Institut africain-CEDAF = Afrika instituut-ASDOC.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/MONUC (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

64. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: Operation Sovereign Legitimacy

Brief Description of Operation: In August 1998, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia send troops into the Democratic Republic of Congo to counter an invasion from Rwanda and Uganda that threatened to topple DRC's President Laurent Desiré Kabila. Together with Congolese troops loyal to Kabila and 300 Namibian reinforcements, the SADC forces defeat the Western prong of the rebellion, relieve Kinshasa and preserve Kabila's government.

Start Date: 1998

End Date: 1998

Organization: SADC

UN Mandate: No

Resolutions: -

Intensity of Operation: Peace enforcement

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 20.000

Target Nation: Democratic Republic of Congo

Participating Nations: Namibia (2000), Angola (7000), Zimbabwe (11000)

Lead Nation(s): Zimbabwe

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Note: Operation was not discussed at the UNSC

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: no specific agreement

Operation Sovereign Legitimacy is generally considered a Zimbabwe-led operation. Coleman (2007:133ff), for instance, argues that "in August 1998, Mugabe deployed 3000 troops to save Kinshasa for Kabila, hoping, in return, to gain political influence and preferential commercial access to the DRC's vast resources," and Mugabe might also have hoped to secure an outstanding loan made to Kabila (see also Reyntjens 2009: 198).

References:

Coleman, K. P. (2007). International Organizations and Peace Enforcement: The Politics of International Legitimacy. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Reyntjens, F. (2009). The great African War : Congo and regional geopolitics, 1996-2006. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Coleman (2007) (for participation and troop data)

65. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: Operation Artemis

Brief Description of Operation: On June 5, 2003, the European Union launched Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, pursuant to UNSC resolution 1484 authorizing the establishment of an interim emergency multinational force in Bunia. The mission's mandate is to improve the security conditions and stabilize the humanitarian situation.

Start Date: 2003

End Date: 2003

Organization: EU

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 1484

Intensity of Operation: Peace enforcement

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 1800

Target Nation: Democratic Republic of Congo

Participating Nations: Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, South Africa, Sweden, United Kingdom, Croatia

Lead Nation(s): France

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *France*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *France, UK*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace agreement: no agreement --> humanitarian emergency

Operation Artemis is widely considered a French-led operation (see e.g. UNDPKO 2004:3/21, 4/21; Homan 2007:2).

References:

Homan, K. (2007). Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Netherlands Institute for International Relations 'Clingendael'**:** pp.151-155.

UNDPKO (2004). "Operation ARTEMIS: The lessons of the interim emergency multilateral force." Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit Military Division.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.peacekeeping-cost-is0805.eu/siteweb/images/ACTIVITIES/Publications/100331%20-%20+Article+Soder.pdf (for participation/troop data)

66. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: UNOSOM I (UN Operation in Somalia I)

Brief Description of Operation: After the downfall of the authoritarian ruler Siad Barre and severe drought, civil war breaks out in Somalia in 1991. UNOSOM I is established on April 24, 1992, by UNSC Resolution 751. Its mandate is to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu and to escort aid deliveries. In August 1992, the mandate and strength of UNOSOM I is expanded to enable it to protect humanitarian convoys and distribution centers throughout Somalia. In December 1992, following further deterioration of the situation in Somalia, the UNSC authorizes the creation of US-led UNITAF (see below).

Start Date: 1992

End Date: 1993

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 751, 775, 794

Intensity of Operation: Peacekeeping

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 4219

Target Nation: Somalia

Participating Nations: Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, Norway, New Zealand, Pakistan, Czech Republic, Zimbabwe

Lead Nation(s): United States

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. **UN Speech Record Evaluation** (Somalia 1992-1996)

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, France, Pakistan, China, Russian Federation, UK, Brazil*

2. **Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation**

Peace Agreement: no agreement

UNOSOM I was initiated by UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali. As African diplomat and expert on the Horn of Africa, he championed the Somali cause and made it a top priority of his beginning SG tenure (Cohen 2000:2006; Shalom 1993; Boutros-Ghali 1999). Initially, the United States sought to avoid taking the lead on Somalia. In addition to following the lead of Britain and Italy, US officials strongly endorsed the growing efforts of the SG to make the UN the cornerstone of future reconciliation efforts in Somalia (Schraeder 1992:586). Starting in July 1992, however, the **US interest** in Somalia increased steadily. On August 3, 1992, the US Senate passed a resolution urging the deployment of a UN force to Somalia. A similar resolution passed the House on August 10, 1992 (Mermin 1997:395). From then onwards, the United States was in the lead of all international conflict resolution efforts.

References:

Boutros-Ghali, B. (1999). Unvanquished - A U.S.-U.N. Saga. New York, Random House.

Clark, J. (1992). "Debacle in Somalia." Foreign Aff. **72**: 109.

Cohen, H. J. (2000). Intervening in Africa: superpower peacemaking in a troubled continent. New York, St. Martin's Press.

Menkhaus, K. J. and L. L. Ortmayer (1995). Key Decisions in the Somalia Intervention, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.

Schraeder, P. J. (1992). "The Horn of Africa: US foreign policy in an altered Cold War environment." Middle East Journal **46**(4): 571-593.

Shalom, S. R. (1993). "Gravy Train: feeding the pentagon by feeding Somalia." Zmag.

Western, J. (2002). "Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and Advocacy in the US Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia." International Security 26(4): 112-142.

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.2876199/k.3DCA/Somaliabr_Historical_Chronology.htm

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/ONUSOM-1 (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

67. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: UNITAF (Unified Task Force)

Brief Description of Operation: UNITAF operated in Somalia between December 5, 1992, and May 4, 1993. It was charged with creating a protected environment for conducting humanitarian operations in the southern half of Somalia.

Start Date: 1992

End Date: 1993

Organization: Ad hoc

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 794

Intensity of Operation: Peace enforcement (Chapter VII)

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 45.000

Target Nation: Somalia

Participating Nations: Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and Zimbabwe

Lead Nation(s): United States

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, France, Pakistan, China, Russian Federation, UK, Brazil*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace agreement: no peace agreement

UNITAF was a US-led operation (see e.g. Bowden 1999; Western 2002; Boutros-Ghali 1999:58; Baum 2004).

References:

Baum, M. A. (2004). "How public opinion constrains the use of force: The case of Operation Restore Hope." Presidential Studies Quarterly **34**(2): 187-226.

Bowden, M. (1999). Black hawk down: A story of modern war, Grove Press.

Boutros-Ghali, B. (1999). Unvanquished - A U.S.-U.N. Saga. New York, Random House.

Western, J. (2002). "Sources of humanitarian intervention: Beliefs, information, and advocacy in the US decisions on Somalia and Bosnia." International Security **26**(4): 112-142.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.unidir.org/pdf/ouvrages/pdf-1-92-9045-106-8-en.pdf (for participation/troop data)

68. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: UNOSOM II (UN Operation in Somalia II)

Brief Description of Operation: UNOSOM II is created March 26, 1993, by UNSC Resolution 814. It ends on March 2, 1995. Its mandate is to resume the activities of the UNITAF (see above) i.e., to take the appropriate measures, including coercive measures, to establish throughout Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations. In February 1994, after several violent incidents and attacks against UN peacekeepers, the Security Council revised the mandate of UNOSOM II to exclude the use of coercive methods.

Start Date: 1993

End Date: 1995

Organization: UN

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 814, 897

Intensity of Operation: Multidimensional peacebuilding and peace enforcement (Chapter VII)

Max. Police Forces deployed: 2800

Max. Military Forces deployed: 28.000

Target Nation: Somalia

Participating Nations: Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and Zimbabwe

Lead Nation(s): United States

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *USA*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, France, Pakistan, China, Russian Federation, UK, Brazil*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: no agreement

Same actors involved as in UNITAF (see above)

References:

Nalbandov, R. (2009). Foreign interventions in ethnic conflicts, Ashgate Publishing.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/ONUSOM-II (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

69. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: AMIS (African Union Mission in Sudan)

Brief Description of Operation: Since February 2003, a civil war rages in the Darfur region of Western Sudan, causing a grave humanitarian crisis. AMIS is deployed to monitor the implementation of the N'Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement of April 8, 2004, and the subsequent Addis Ababa Ceasefire Agreement of May 28, 2004. AMIS is replaced by a UN operation (UNAMID) on December 31, 2007.

Start Date: 2004

End Date: 2007

Organization: African Union

UN Mandate: No

Resolutions: -

Intensity of Operation: Peacekeeping

Max. Police Forces deployed: 1222

Max. Military Forces deployed: 5505

Target Nation: Sudan

Participating Nations: Nigeria, Rwanda, Egypt, South Africa, Senegal, Ghana, Gambia, Kenya, Mauritania, Niger, Mali, Burkina-Faso, Zambia, Lesotho, Uganda, Madagascar, Burundi, Cameroon, Mauritius

Lead Nation(s): United States

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations above the mean: *USA, UK*

Two standard deviations above the mean: *USA, UK, China, Russian Federation, France*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Comprehensive Peace Agreement (the so-called Naivasha Agreement)

The Sudanese peace process was set up under the umbrella of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), whose members are Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda. The process was accompanied by the so-called Troika states United States, Great Britain and Norway. The **United States** clearly bore the political and financial brunt of the Sudanese peace effort starting with the election of George W. Bush in 2000 (see e.g. Woodward in Furley and May 2006; Power 2004; Bosco 2009:245; Slim 2004:819,825; Whitfield 2007: 251-252). The United States, contributed, for instance around $220 million to the AMIS (De Coning 2007:3).

References:

Bosco, D. L. (2009). Five to rule them all : the UN Security Council and the making of the modern world. Oxford ; New York, Oxford University Press.

Furley, O. and R. May (2006). Ending Africa's wars : progressing to peace. Aldershot, England ; Burlington, VT, Ashgate.

Power, S. (2004). "Dying in Darfur: Can the ethnic cleansing in Sudan be stopped?" The New Yorker(August 30).

Slim, H. (2004). "Dithering over Darfur? A preliminary review of the international response." International Affairs **80**(5): 811-828.

Whitfield, T. (2007). Friends indeed? : the United Nations, groups of friends, and the resolution of conflict. Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/MUAS (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

70. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: UNMIS (UN Mission in the Sudan)

Brief Description of Operation: UNMIS is the UN follow-on mission of AMIS (see above). AMIS was considered inefficient and thus the UN was tasked to take over from the AU.

Start Date: 2005

End Date: 2011

Organization: African Union

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 1590, 1706

Intensity of Operation: Multidimensional peacebuilding and peace enforcement

Max. Police Forces deployed: 715

Max. Military Forces deployed: 10.000

Target Nation: Sudan

Participating Nations:

Lead Nation(s): United States

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations above the mean: *USA, UK*

Two standard deviations above the mean: *USA, UK, China, Russian Federation, France*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Comprehensive Peace Agreement (the so-called Naivasha Agreement)

Same actors involved as in AMIS (see above)

References:
http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/MINUS

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

71. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: CIS Collective Peacekeeping Force

Brief Description of Operation: The Tajik government asks for Russian intervention to crush its opposition the Tajik civil war (1992-1993). The Russian government is eager to gain international recognition for the CIS as a legitimate security institution and thus converts the operation into a CIS endeavor.

Start Date: 1993

End Date: 2000

Organization: CIS

UN Mandate: No

Resolutions: -

Intensity of Operation: Peacekeeping

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 32.000

Target Nation: Tajikistan

Participating Nations: Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan

Lead Nation(s): Russian Federation

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *Russian Federation*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *Russian Federation, USA*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace agreement: no agreement

Russian forces have been acting as mediators in Tajikistan even before the outbreak of the armed conflict in Tajikistan (Poujol in Djalili et al. 1998:100). On August 7, 1992, Boris Yeltsin holds a meeting in Moscow to discuss the Tajik crisis and on August 24, 1992, CIS Defense Ministers decide to intervene in Tajikistan via the CIS (Poujol in Djalili 1998:116; see also Lynch 200:161)

References:

Djalili, M. R., F. Grare, et al. (1998). Tajikistan : the trials of independence. Richmond, Surrey, Curzon.

Lynch, D. and Royal Institute of International Affairs. (2000). Russian peacekeeping strategies in the CIS: the cases of Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan. Houndmills [England] New York, Macmillan Press; St. Martin's Press.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)

Lynch (2000) (for participation/troop data)

72. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: UNMOT (UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan)

Brief Description of Operation: UNMOT is established on December 16, 1994, by UNSC Resolution 968. It ends on May 15, 2000. It is mandated to help established a Joint Commission, composed of representatives of the Government of Tajikistan and the Tajik opposition, to monitor the implementation of the cease-fire and the cessation of hostilities along the Tajik-Afghan as well as within the country.

Start Date: 1994

End Date: 2000

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 968, 1138

Intensity of Operation: Peacekeeping

Max. Police Forces deployed: 2

Max. Military Forces deployed: 120

Target Nation: Tajikistan

Participating Nations: Austria, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Denmark, Ghana, Hungary, Indonesia, Jordan, Nepal, Nigeria, Poland, Czech Republic, Switzerland, Ukraine, Uruguay

Lead Nation(s): Russian Federation

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *Russian Federation*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *Russian Federation, USA*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace agreement: Tehran Agreement (1994)

Same actors involved as in CIS Tajikistan operation (see above)

References:

Djalili, M. R., F. Grare, et al. (1998). Tajikistan: the trials of independence. Richmond, Surrey, Curzon.
http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/MONUT (for participation data)
IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

73. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: MINURSO (UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara)

Brief Description of Operation: After independence from Spain in the 1970s, the territory is annexed by Mauritania and Morocco. Mauritania withdraws but Morocco maintains its territorial claims against the POLISARIO front, in particular since the discovery of phosphate. Following an agreement between the Government of Morocco and the Polisario Front, MINURSO is deployed in September 1991 to monitor the cease-fire of September 6, 1991, and a referendum that would allow the people of Western Sahara entitled to vote to decide the future status of the territory. Despite multiple calls from the international community, the referendum has not taken place until today.

Start Date: 1991

End Date: Ongoing

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 690

Intensity of Operation: Multidimensional peacebuilding

Max. Police Forces deployed: 6

Max. Military Forces deployed: 225

Target Nation: Morocco

Participating Nations: Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, South Korea, Croatia, Djibouti, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Poland, Russia, Sri Lanka, Uruguay, Yemen

Lead Nation(s): United States, France

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations from the mean: *cannot be determined*

Two standard deviations from the mean: *USA, France*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Joint OAU/UN Settlement Plan (1988) and Ceasefire of September 6, 1991 --> subsequent talks to finally hold a referendum, most importantly, the "Manhasset Negotiations."

The **United States** is the key third-party interlocutor in the Western Sahara peace process. Distinctive former US Government officials have successively served as UN special envoys to MINURSO (e.g. Former Secretary of State James Baker (1997-2004) as well as Christopher Ross (2009-present)). The US also hosted the latest round of peace negotiations in Manhasset (NY) during June 18-19, 2007 (Souaré 2007:57). The United States also took the initiative in early 1993 to form the "Friends of Western Sahara"– a group to assist the UN SG in managing the Western Sahara issue (Whitfield 2007:171). The failure of the Perez de Cuellar Peace Plan is also largely attributed to US opposition (Jensen 2005:47).

France, on the other hand, maintains intensive political and military ties to the Moroccan government and thus is closely involved in the conflict on its behalf (Zunes and Mundy 2010: 412, 59).

References:

Durch, W. J. (1993). The Evolution of UN peacekeeping: case studies and comparative analysis. New York, NY, St. Martin's Press.

Jensen, E. (2005). Western Sahara : anatomy of a stalemate. Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Souaré, I. K. (2007). "Western Sahara: What can we expect from the Manhasset talks? ." African security review **16.4**.

Whitfield, T. (2007). Friends indeed? : the United Nations, groups of friends, and the resolution of conflict. Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press.

Zunes, S. and J. Mundy (2010). Western Sahara : war, nationalism, and conflict irresolution. Syracuse, N.Y., Syracuse University Press.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/MINURSO (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

74. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: CIS Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Force

Brief Description of Operation: After the accession of Moldova to independence from the USSR in August 1991, Transnistria proclaims its independence on September 2. Violence breaks out between separatists and the new Moldovan authorities in November of the same year. A CIS peacekeeping force is deployed on July 29, 1992.

Start Date: 1992

End Date: Ongoing

Organization: CIS

UN Mandate: No

Resolutions: -

Intensity of Operation: Peacekeeping

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 1120

Target Nation: Moldova

Participating Nations: Moldova, Russia, Ukraine

Lead Nation(s): Russian Federation

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Note: Operation was not discussed at the UNSC

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace agreement: Ceasefire Agreement of June 25, 1992, and Moscow Agreement of July 6, 1992

Russia hosted the peace talks and exercised pressure to deploy a CIS peacekeeping force instead of an OSCE force (Lynch 2000: 114-117).

References:

Lynch, D. and Royal Institute of International Affairs. (2000). Russian peacekeeping strategies in the CIS : the cases of Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan. Houndmills [England] New York, Macmillan Press; St. Martin's Press.

http://www.operationspaix.net/PKF,228 (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

75. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: NMOG II (OAU Neutral Military Observer Group II)

Brief Description of Operation: Following the conclusion of a ceasefire agreement between Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana and Rwanda Patriotic Front rebel group, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) decides to deploy a group of military observers (NMOG). The negotiated ceasefire is, however, quickly violated, and NMOG proves to be a failure. Its mission ends in October 1993. It is followed by UNAMIR (see above).

Start Date: 1992

End Date: 1993

Organization: OAU

UN Mandate: No

Resolution: -

Intensity of Operation: Peacekeeping

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 240

Target Nation: Rwanda

Participating Nations: Tunisia, Cameroon, Congo, Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, Zimbabwe

Lead Nation(s): Zaire

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Note: Operation was not discussed at the UNSC

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace agreement: N'sele and Gbabolite Ceasefire Agreements

In 1990, the neighboring countries to Rwanda react fast to the unfolding violence and convened summits at the regional level to put the conflict to a rest. The first ceasefire agreement is concluded in N'sele (Zaire) on March 29, 1991. The agreement is later amended in Gbadolite (Zaire) on September 16, 1991. At Gbadolite **Zairian** President Mobutu Sese Seko is appointed OAU mediator for the peace process (Jones 2001:54). The agreement mandates the deployment of NMOG II. At the same time, France and the United States engage in a series of talks which eventually lead to the initiate of the Arusha Process (see below) (Mutwol 2009:179-180).

References:

Jones, B. D. (2001). Peacemaking in Rwanda : the dynamics of failure. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Mutwol, J. (2009). Peace agreements and civil wars in Africa: insurgent motivations, state responses, and third-party peacemaking in Liberia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, Cambria Pr.

Jones (2001) (for participation data) *Note: no data on troop deployments per country available*

76. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: UNOMUR

Brief Description of Operation: UNOMUR is created on June 22, 1993, by UNSC Resolution 846. It ends on September 21, 1994. It is mandated to monitor the border between Uganda and Rwanda and verify that no military aid (lethal weapons, ammunition or other material that can be used for military purposes) reaches Rwanda.

Start Date: 1993

End Date: 1994

Organization: UN

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 846

Intensity of Operation: Peacekeeping

Max. Police Forces deployed:

Max. Military Forces deployed: 81

Target Nation: Rwanda

Participating Nations: Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Hungary, Netherlands, Senegal, Slovakia, Zimbabwe

Lead Nation(s): France

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations above the mean: *cannot be determined*

Two standard deviations above the mean: *France, USA, UK*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement. Arusha Accord (1993)

The peace talks leading to the Arusha Accords of August 1993 are organized by the United States, France and the Organization of African Unity (Jones 2001:75). The United States does not, however, play a major role during the negotiations (Cohen 2000:172; Stettenheim in Greenberg et al. 2002). Instead it is **France**, which takes the lead by setting up preliminary meetings in Paris leading up to the Arusha Accords. **France** also spearheads the implementation of Arusha. Jones (2001:109), for instance, argues that "France took the lead in backing the mission [UNOMUR]. The director for Africa at the Quai d'Orsay was considered by his colleagues to be a strong internationalist and a strong backer of the United Nations and his support for the UN mission was critical. Eventually, the French delegation in NY brokered a compromise: Georgia for Haiti for Rwanda (see also Whitfield 2010, Malone 1998)."

References:

Cohen, H. J. (2000). Intervening in Africa: superpower peacemaking in a troubled continent. New York, St. Martin's Press.

Jones, B. D. (2001). Peacemaking in Rwanda : the dynamics of failure. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Greenberg, M., J. H. Barton, et al. (2000). Words over war : mediation and arbitration to prevent deadly conflict. Lanham, Md., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Mutwol, J. (2009). Peace agreements and civil wars in Africa: insurgent motivations, state responses, and third-party peacemaking in Liberia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, Cambria Pr.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/MONUOR (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

77. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: UNAMIR (UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda)

Brief Description of Operation: UNAMIR is established on October 5, 1993, by UNSC Resolution 872. It ends on March 8, 1996. Its deployment follows from the 1993 Arusha Accord. It is mandated among others to help ensure the safety of the city of Kigali and to supervise the cease-fire and the overall security conditions during the final period of the mandate of the transitional government until elections.

Start Date: 1993

End Date: 1996

Organization: United Nations

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 872, 912, 965, 997, 1029, 918, 929

Intensity of Operation: Peacekeeping

Max. Police Forces deployed: 90

Max. Military Forces deployed: 5200

Target Nation: Rwanda

Participating Nations: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, DRC, Djibouti, Egypt, Spain, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, India, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, UK, Russia, Senegal, Slovakia, Switzerland, Chad, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uruguay, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Lead Nation(s): France

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations above the mean: *cannot be determined*

Two standard deviations above the mean: *France, USA, UK*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: Arusha Accords of August 1993

Same actors involved as in UNOMUR (see above)

References:
http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/MINUAR (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)

78. CODE SHEET

Name of Operation: Operation Turquoise

Brief Description of Operation: Operation Turquoise is a French-led operation under UNSC Resolution 929 to strengthen the approximately 270 men of UNAMIR (see above) who are incapable of stopping the ongoing genocide in Rwanda.

Start Date: 1994

End Date: 1994

Organization: Ad hoc

UN Mandate: Yes

Resolutions: 929

Intensity of Operation: Peace enforcement

Max. Police Forces deployed: -

Max. Military Forces deployed: 5500

Target Nation: Rwanda

Participating Nations: Egypt, France, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Chad

Lead Nation(s): France

Lead Nations Coding Notes:

1. UN Speech Record Evaluation

Three standard deviations above the mean: *cannot be determined*

Two standard deviations above the mean: *France, USA, UK*

2. Conflict Resolution Efforts Evaluation

Peace Agreement: no agreement --> humanitarian emergence

France led Operation Turquoise (see e.g. Nalbanov 2009:140ff, Prunier 1995:281; Jones 2001).

References:

Jones, B. D. (2001). Peacemaking in Rwanda : the dynamics of failure. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Nalbandov, R. (2009). Foreign interventions in ethnic conflicts, Ashgate Publishing.

Prunier, G. (1995). The Rwanda crisis : history of a genocide. New York, Columbia University Press.

http://unbisnet.un.org (for UNSC oral intervention data)
http://www.operationspaix.net/Operation-Turquoise (for participation data)

IISS Military Balance (for troop data)