Book Appendix

Making a Career in Dictatorship: The Secret Logic behind Repression and Coups

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A.4 Career Pressure and Excessive Loyalty

A.4.1 Summary statistics

1) **Summary statistics.** Table A.4.1 presents summary statistics for all variables used in the quantitative analyses of Chapter 4. Dependent variables are displayed in the upper part of Table A.4.1, while independent and control variables are listed in the lower part.

A.4.2 Zooming in on officers' detouring decisions

This section presents results from statistical tests that provide further evidence on the decisions of career-pressured army officers to detour through Battalion 601—Argentina's secret police unit between 1975 and 1983.

1) **Early performance and the risk of retirement.** This test shows the regression results that underlie **Figure 4.7** in the book. It demonstrates how early career performance affects the likelihood of staying in the army, the risk of retirement, and the probability of serving in Battalion 601. The tripartite dependent variable *Career outcomes* measures whether an officer served in any army unit other than Battalion 601 (value of 0), retired from the army (value of 1), or served in 601 (value of 2). Officers who died during their service are excluded from this analysis. Results are based on multinomial regression models. The reference category is "staying in the army" (value of 0). Results in Table A.4.2 show that *Graduation rank* is positively and statistically significantly correlated with both the risk of being retired from the army and the probability of serving in Battalion 601. The worse officers perform at the military academy, the more likely they are to join Battalion 601 or be forced out of the army.

2) **Rewards for secret police service.** These tests show the regression results underlying **Figures 4.8** and **4.9** in the book. They offer evidence on the positive effect of secret police work on future rewards. According to our data, 96% of Battalion 601 agents reentered the regular security apparatus after their secret police service. We use two variables to measure rewards: *Total service time* and *Rank at retirement*. Figure A.4.1a and Figure A.4.1b visualize the distribution of both variables. We expect that 601 officers remain in the military apparatus longer and retire at higher ranks than officers who did not serve in the secret police.

   We apply coarsened exact matching to isolate the statistical effects of service in Battalion 601 on both reward variables (Blackwell et al. 2009; Iacus, King and Porro 2012). To assess the results' robustness, we create two data samples. Sample 1 matches officers by graduation rank, while Sample 2 matches officers by graduation rank and cohort. The treatment variable is service in Battalion 601, measured through the variable *Battalion 601 member(ship)* (value of 1, 0 otherwise). Table A.4.3 shows pre- and post-matching balance statistics. The CEM matching procedure significantly reduces covariate imbalances in both samples. We include control variables in the models to account for remaining imbalances.

   Table A.4.4 shows results of OLS regression models. The estimated effect of *Battalion 601 membership* on service time in the army is positive and statistically significant across the matched samples. The substantive effects in **Figure 4.8** are based on Model 4. Table A.4.5 shows results of OLS regression models and Table A.4.6 results of

ordered logistic regression results for officers' rank at retirement. Again, across all models and samples, the estimated effect of *Battalion 601 membership* is positive and statistically significant. The findings demonstrate that Battalion 601 agents reap significant career benefits compared to peers without a secret police history. 601 agents could stay longer in the army and achieved also a higher rank.

To corroborate these findings, we scrutinize the differences in rewards between officers with and without service in Battalion 601 as well as differences among 601 agents, using the entire officer sample. We include the interaction between *Graduation rank* and *Battalion 601 membership* in ordered logistic and OLS regression models. The dependent variable is *Rank at retirement*. Table A.4.7 shows the results. The coefficient estimates of *Graduation rank * Battalion 601 membership* is positive and statistically significant in both models, while the estimates for *Graduation rank* are negative and statistically significant.

Figure A.4.2 visualizes the substantive effects of Model 1, in addition to the effects of Model 2 shown in **Figure 4.9** in the book. Overall the results demonstrate that service in 601 paid off for officers with weak performance (high values on graduation ranks). The visualization offers three insights. First, as the separate lines show, officers with poorer performance at the military academy who served as agents of the Battalion 601 have a significantly higher chance of achieving the corresponding rank than their counterparts with similarly poor performance but without service Battalion 601. Second, as can been seen by the relatively flat, solid line and its overlapping confidence intervals, service in the secret police offset the career problem of agents' weak performance at the academy. Third, this is very different for officers without secret police membership. For these individuals, as depict by steep, dotted line, early career performance still determines their chances of reaching higher ranks. Service in Battalion 601 particularly improves the career chances of underachieving officers.

3) **Internal placement of secret police agents.** These tests provide regression results related to **Figure 4.10** in the book. They demonstrate the selection and self-selection component of secret police service. To get as close as possible to the strategic placement of underachieving secret police agents by the regime, we focus exclusively on the years 1975 to 1980 when Jorge Videla served as chief of the army and head of the junta. The tests exploit the clandestine character of Battalion 601 and focus on the first positions held by incoming members within the Battalion. We argue in the book that officers are aware of the career opportunities that service in the Battalion offers but lack information about which department would be best suited to demonstrate their loyalty to the regime. In line with the statement of a former Battalion 601 member, we interpret the service of underachieving officers in Battalion's 601 most repressive department, Central Reunión, as evidence of the intentional selection by the regime.

We code a variable that indicates the first position for all incoming Battalion 601 members. The variable *Central Reunión member* is 1 for all officers that first served in Central Reunión and 0 otherwise. We assess the impact of graduation rank on the probability of serving in Central Reunión with two different regression methods. First, we analyze only Battalion 601 members using logistic and OLS regression models. Second, we replicate our result with the entire data sample using two-stage probit regression models with Heckman correction.

Table A.4.8 shows the results of logistic and OLS regression models. The coefficient estimate of *Graduation rank* is positive and statistically significant. Table A.4.9 shows the results of probit regression models with Heckman corrections. The model first accounts for the officers' service in Battalion 601 and then models the placement of Battalion members in Central Reunión. The results for *Graduation rank* on the first stage corroborate findings from our main analysis (see Selection Equation: Battalion 601 membership). Underachieving officers are more likely to serve in Battalion 601. Results of the second stage show a positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate for *Graduation rank* on service in Central Reunión (see Main Equation: Central Reunion Membership). The result of Model 3 underlie the substantive effects visualized in **Figure 4.10** in the book. Together, the results offer support for the superiors' strategic acceptance of underachieving officers in Battalion 601.

4) **Internal promotions.** This test offers additional evidence for the descriptive finding of **Figure 4.11** in the book. We analyze promotion patterns within Battalion 601. In the book, we argue that direct 601 superiors, concerned about their own careers, should favor underachieving subordinates, as these pose less competition and are unlikely to supersede them. If correct, the estimated coefficient of *Graduation rank* should not be significantly correlated with internal promotions. We code the binary variable *Promotion within Battalion 601*, which indicates whether a 601 agent was promoted during his secret police service.

   The regression results in Table A.4.10 show that, as expected, the coefficient estimate of *Graduation rank* is statistically insignificant and very close to zero. The results again underline how secret police service constitutes a unique opportunity for underachievers to compensate for weak past performances and alleviate their career pressure.

5) **Personal connections and secret police service.** This test provides regression results that underlie **Figure 4.12** in the book. It seeks to demonstrate that the decision of officers to join or stay away from Battalion 601 stems from their performance at the military academy, not from their personal connections. In other words, the test aims to provide additional evidence that the need to detour through the secret police unit arises from an officer's career pressures and not from the individual's personal connections—which could make a career possible without undertaking dirty secret police work.

   To capture officers' personnel connections, we draw on a comprehensive membership list in the prestigious Jockey Club—the exclusive Polo Club in Argentina's capital Buenos Aires and a meeting point of Argentina's social and military elite. By identifying those officers who were members, we code two variables: *Jockey Club member* is 1 for officers who are members of the Club, and 0 otherwise, and *Jockey Club member*$_{In\ cohort}$ is 1 for officers who were in a cohort with peer who was a member, and 0 otherwise.

   Table A.4.11 shows the results of logistic regression models. As also visualized in **Figure 4.12** in the book, the coefficient estimates for both Club membership variables are statistically indistinguishable from 0 across all models. In contrast, the coefficient estimates of *Graduation rank* remain unaffected. *Graduation rank* is robustly and positively correlated with service in Battalion 601. The results suggest that personal connections are not driving the original results, which again highlights the meritocratic

promotion system of the Argentine Army.

A.4.3 Additional robustness checks

This section presents results from statistical tests that demonstrate the robustness of the main findings presented in Chapter 4.

1) **Accounting for cohort differences.** This test checks whether career prospects systematically vary based on when officers joined the army and where they grew up. To ensure that such unobserved factors do not drive our results, we replicate the main analysis by including cohort and birth province fixed effects, respectively. Table A.4.12 and Table A.4.13 show the results of OLS regression models. The coefficient estimates of *Graduation rank* remain unchanged with the inclusion of cohort or birth province fixed effects.

2) **Excluding high ranks from the analysis.** This test focuses on potential differences between leaders and lower-level members of Battalion 601. The military regime may recruit underachieving officers as secret police personnel but places skilled officers in command positions of the Battalion. To assess whether such differences affect our results, we conducted our analyses excluding all commanders, all colonels, and ultimately all colonels and lieutenant colonels of Battalion 601. Results in Table A.4.14 remain robust. There are no substantive differences between Battalion commanders and subordinate officers.

3) **Testing for a potential change in the staffing pattern.** This test checks whether the composition of Battalion 601 changed during our observation period. The military leadership aimed to destroy communist subversion until the end of 1977, potentially altering the subsequent supply and demand for zealously committed secret police agents. Moreover, the regime experienced several leadership changes after 1981 and the Falklands War in 1982. We undertake two checks to ensure that the composition of Battalion 601 remained constant. First, we re-run the analyses excluding all officer entries from each year one at a time. The results, shown in Table A.4.15, remain unchanged. Second, we split our dataset in two parts and run our analysis on each data sample. The first sample includes only those officers who joined Battalion 601 between 1975 and 1977, and the second sample only those officers who joined the unit between 1978 and 1983. This constitutes a particularly rigorous test, as it excludes 49% and 51% of Battalion members, respectively. Table A.4.16 shows that the results remain again unchanged.

4) **Replicating the main analysis with matching.** This test replicates the main results using coarsened exact matching (Blackwell et al. 2009; Iacus, King and Porro 2012). The technique decreases model dependency and allows us to estimate the sample average treatment effect on the treated (SATT) of *Graduation rank* on service in Battalion 601. The matching procedure requires us to dichotomize our treatment variable. To avoid problems with arbitrary cutoffs, we build five dichotomous variables using values of 30, 40, 50, 60, and 70 as cutoffs for *Graduation rank*. That is, we build the treatment variables by moving from the bottom to the top of the performance scale. The higher the cutoff value, the more officers with relatively good performances are included in the treatment group, which should decrease the treatment effect. For example, the treatment variable with the cutoff 70 is 1 for all officers that graduated

at the bottom 70% of their cohort, and 0 otherwise. Balance statistics for both the raw and matched data are presented in Table A.4.17. Results in Table A.4.18 demonstrate that our main finding holds across all treatment variables. In line with the book's theoretical argument, the treatment effect becomes smaller and loses statistical significance as more officers with excellent graduation results are included in the treatment group.

Table A.4.1. Summary statistics

	Type	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
Battalion 601 member	Binary	4287	0.04	0.18	0.00	1.00
Member before 1977	Binary	4213	0.02	0.13	0.00	1.00
Member after 1977	Binary	4209	0.02	0.13	0.00	1.00
Career outcomes (w/o deaths)	Categorical (nominal)	4182	0.36	0.55	0.00	2.00
Advanced training	Binary	4287	0.51	0.50	0.00	1.00
Total service time	Count	4011	332.55	79.74	24.00	550.00
Rank at retirement	Categorical (ordered)	4266	6.26	1.29	1.00	10.00
Central Reunión member	Binary	152	0.27	0.45	0.00	1.00
Promotion within Battalion 601	Binary	152	0.36	0.48	0.00	1.00
Graduation rank	Continuous	4287	49.34	29.04	0.00	100.00
Cavalry officer	Binary	4287	0.15	0.36	0.00	1.00
Infantry officer	Binary	4287	0.35	0.48	0.00	1.00
Home literacy rate	Continuous	4216	0.84	0.12	0.46	0.97
Cadet age	Count	4286	218.19	21.39	141.00	382.00
Training under military gov.	Continuous	4286	62.03	42.75	0.00	100.00
Training length	Count	4286	44.44	10.36	21.00	93.00
Service time in Battalion 601	Count	152	2.84	1.65	1.00	9.00
Jockey Club member	Binary	4287	0.01	0.07	0.00	1.00
Jockey Club member$_{\text{In cohort}}$	Binary	4287	0.59	0.49	0.00	1.00

Table A.4.2. Multinomial logistic regression for army membership, Battalion 601 membership, and exit from army without deaths

	(1)		(2)	
	Leave army	601 member	Leave army	601 member
Graduation rank	0.005***	0.015***	0.009***	0.015***
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Cavalry officer			−0.187	−0.597†
			(0.130)	(0.316)
Infantry officer			0.192†	0.552**
			(0.110)	(0.169)
Home literacy rate			−1.077†	0.555
			(0.559)	(0.806)
Cadet age			0.008**	0.008
			(0.003)	(0.006)
Training under military gov.			−0.023***	−0.001
			(0.003)	(0.003)
Training length			−0.032*	0.001
			(0.013)	(0.009)
Constant	−1.139***	−3.760***	0.460	−6.169***
	(0.304)	(0.199)	(1.203)	(1.565)
AIC	6160.17		4976.46	
Wald χ^2	32.92***		493.89***	
Pseudo R^2	0.01		0.18	
Number of Observations	4182		4113	
Number of Clusters	30		30	

Note: Reference category: army membership. Values are coefficients with robust standard errors clustered on cohorts in parentheses. † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.4.3. Balance statistics for raw and matched data on Battalion 601 membership effects

	Sample 1		Sample 2	
	Diff. before	Diff. after	Diff. before	Diff. after
Graduation rank	11.348	0.002	11.348	−0.034
Cohorts			0.730	−0.068
Multivariate L1 distance	0.222	0.086	0.545	0.324
# Strata		13.000		169.000
# Matched strata		13.000		88.000

Note: Table shows differences between control and treatment group means in the unmatched and matched datasets for each covariate.

Table A.4.4. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for service time in army

	Matched sample 1		Matched sample 2	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Battalion 601 membership	14.058**	21.140***	13.789**	17.420**
	(5.101)	(5.146)	(5.312)	(5.334)
Constant	329.352***	522.486***	329.620***	507.353***
	(1.420)	(21.838)	(2.050)	(31.721)
AIC	46441.04	45348.20	25224.47	24630.32
F-Statistic	7.59**	49.90***	6.74**	29.83***
Adjusted R^2	0.00	0.08	0.00	0.07
Number of Observations	4011	3942	2191	2152
Control Variables	No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.4.5. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for rank at retirement

	Matched sample 1		Matched sample 2	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Battalion 601 membership	0.238***	0.372***	0.239***	0.303***
	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.072)	(0.071)
Constant	6.157***	9.364***	6.156***	9.042***
	(0.022)	(0.380)	(0.030)	(0.516)
AIC	14170.05	13606.03	7462.01	7130.38
F-Statistic	11.93***	51.46***	11.02***	39.16***
Adjusted R^2	0.00	0.09	0.00	0.09
Number of Observations	4266	4197	2323	2284
Control Variables	No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.4.6. Ordered logistic regressions for rank at retirement

	Matched sample 1		Matched sample 2	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Battalion 601 membership	0.213†	0.466***	0.281*	0.416**
	(0.126)	(0.125)	(0.134)	(0.136)
AIC	12520.36	11962.71	6712.38	6392.98
Wald χ^2	2.88†	354.32***	4.38*	237.18***
Pseudo R^2	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.04
Number of Observations	4266	4197	2323	2284
Control Variables	No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Cutoffs are not shown.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.4.7. Regression results for conditional effect of early career performance and service in Battalion 601 on rank at retirement

	Ordered Logistic	OLS
	(1)	(2)
Graduation rank*Battalion 601 membership	0.010*	0.005*
	(0.004)	(0.002)
Graduation rank	−0.017***	−0.008***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Battalion 601 membership	−0.164	0.072
	(0.301)	(0.165)
AIC	11961.86	13614.81
Wald χ^2	366.76***	
Pseudo R^2	0.05	
F-Statistic		61.62***
Adjusted R^2		0.11
Number of Observations	4197	4197
Number of Clusters	30	30
Control Variables	Yes	Yes

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors clustered on cohorts in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.4.8. Regression results for position in Central Reunión within Battalion 601

	Logistic		OLS	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Graduation rank	0.021*	0.024*	0.003*	0.003*
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Cavalry officer		1.528†		0.299†
		(0.804)		(0.171)
Infantry officer		0.021		0.011
		(0.532)		(0.077)
Home literacy rate		−5.592*		−0.786*
		(2.622)		(0.362)
Cadet age		−0.026		−0.003
		(0.023)		(0.002)
Training under military gov.		−0.003		−0.000
		(0.007)		(0.001)
Training length		−0.017		−0.003
		(0.032)		(0.004)
Constant	−2.672***	8.317	0.020	1.368*
	(0.688)	(6.486)	(0.075)	(0.617)
AIC	120.80	120.82	122.96	122.56
Wald χ^2	4.84*	16.24*		
Pseudo R^2	0.04	0.13		
F-Statistic			5.85*	2.58*
R^2			0.04	0.13
Number of Observations	117	116	117	116

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.4.9. Results of probit regressions with Heckman sample selection for position in Central Reunión

	Normal Std. Err.	Robust Std. Err.	Clustered Std. Err.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Selection Equation: Battalion 601 Membership			
Graduation rank	0.006***	0.006***	0.006**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Cavalry officer	−0.284*	−0.284*	−0.284*
	(0.116)	(0.115)	(0.113)
Infantry officer	0.169*	0.169*	0.169**
	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.059)
Home literacy rate	0.640†	0.640*	0.640†
	(0.336)	(0.321)	(0.350)
Cadet age	0.003	0.003	0.003*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Training under military gov.	0.002*	0.002*	0.002†
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Training length	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Constant	−3.678***	−3.678***	−3.678***
	(0.637)	(0.604)	(0.549)
Main Equation: Central Reunión Membership			
Graduation rank	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Constant	−3.294***	−3.294***	−3.294***
	(0.226)	(0.212)	(0.246)
Correlation Parameter			
atanh ρ	5.235	5.235	5.235†
	(39.925)	(3.536)	(2.988)
AIC	1152.75	1152.75	1152.75
Wald χ^2	16.73***	19.07***	12.76***
Number of Observations	4181	4181	4181
Number of Selected Observations	116	116	116
Number of Nonselected Observations	4065	4065	4065

Note: Values are coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.4.10. Regression results for promotions within Battalion 601

	Logistic		OLS	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Graduation rank	0.001	0.004	0.000	0.001
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Cavalry officer		1.150		0.193
		(0.715)		(0.137)
Infantry officer		−0.475		−0.061
		(0.461)		(0.070)
Home literacy rate		−0.063		−0.034
		(1.977)		(0.299)
Cadet age		−0.010		−0.001
		(0.008)		(0.001)
Training under military gov.		0.011		0.001
		(0.008)		(0.001)
Training length		0.001		0.001
		(0.021)		(0.003)
Service time in 601		1.122***		0.166***
		(0.236)		(0.019)
Constant	−0.628	−2.808	0.348**	0.004
	(0.463)	(3.201)	(0.106)	(0.470)
AIC	202.94	153.52	212.55	161.92
Wald χ^2	0.02	30.69***		
Pseudo R^2	0.00	0.32		
F-Statistic			0.02	16.59***
R^2			0.00	0.34
Number of Observations	152	151	152	151

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.4.11. Logistic regressions with controls for favoritism

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Graduation rank	0.014***	0.013**	0.014***	0.013**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Jockey Club member	0.167	0.237		
	(1.020)	(1.060)		
Jockey Club member$_{\text{In cohort}}$			0.129	−0.017
			(0.285)	(0.287)
Cavalry officer		−0.567†		−0.563†
		(0.314)		(0.311)
Infantry officer		0.506**		0.507**
		(0.172)		(0.173)
Home literacy rate		0.993		0.996
		(0.778)		(0.781)
Cadet age		0.006		0.006
		(0.005)		(0.005)
Training under military gov.		0.007*		0.007†
		(0.004)		(0.004)
Training length		0.008		0.008
		(0.010)		(0.010)
Constant	−4.059***	−7.180***	−4.136***	−7.164***
	(0.188)	(1.471)	(0.296)	(1.421)
AIC	1297.07	1265.29	1296.52	1265.33
Wald χ^2	15.54***	44.40***	15.94***	44.44***
Pseudo R^2	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.04
Number of Observations	4287	4216	4287	4216
Number of Clusters	30	30	30	30

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors clustered on cohorts in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.4.12. OLS regressions for Battalion 601 membership with cohort fixed effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Graduation rank	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Cavalry officer		−0.021***	−0.013*	−0.016*
		(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Infantry officer			0.020**	0.017*
			(0.007)	(0.007)
Home literacy rate			0.036	0.036
			(0.024)	(0.024)
Cadet age			0.000	0.000*
			(0.000)	(0.000)
Training under military gov.				0.000
				(0.001)
Training length				0.001*
				(0.000)
Constant	0.002	0.006	−0.064	−0.133*
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.045)	(0.060)
AIC	−2368.52	−2374.14	−2298.79	−2302.86
R^2	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04
F-Statistic	5.26***	5.05***	4.53***	4.25***
Number of Observations	4287	4287	4216	4216
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.4.13. OLS regressions for Battalion 601 membership with birth province fixed effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Graduation rank	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Cavalry officer		−0.021***	−0.012†	−0.013†
		(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Infantry officer			0.021**	0.020**
			(0.007)	(0.007)
Home literacy rate			0.088†	−0.004
			(0.052)	(0.056)
Cadet age			0.000	0.000
			(0.000)	(0.000)
Training under military gov.				0.000**
				(0.000)
Training length				0.000
				(0.000)
Constant	−0.021***	−0.016**	−0.107	−0.085
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.067)	(0.068)
AIC	−2294.69	−2299.60	−2225.82	−2234.88
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02
F-Statistic	5.98***	5.63***	4.64***	4.24***
Number of Observations	4287	4287	4216	4216
Birth Province Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

Tierra del Fuego and foreign birth country are reference category for fixed effects.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.4.14. Regression results for Battalion 601 membership with exclusion of commanders and high ranks

	w/o Bn. 601 Commander		w/o Bn. 601 Colonels		w/o Bn. 601 (Lieutenant) Colonels	
	(1) Logistic	(2) OLS	(3) Logistic	(4) OLS	(5) Logistic	(6) OLS
Graduation rank	0.014***	0.000***	0.015***	0.000***	0.019***	0.000***
	(0.004)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.000)	(0.005)	(0.000)
Cavalry officer	−0.481	−0.013*	−0.370	−0.011	−0.476	−0.009†
	(0.302)	(0.007)	(0.294)	(0.006)	(0.348)	(0.005)
Infantry officer	0.593***	0.020**	0.689***	0.022**	0.832***	0.021***
	(0.167)	(0.007)	(0.178)	(0.007)	(0.212)	(0.006)
Home literacy rate	1.032	0.034	1.332	0.040†	2.362†	0.039*
	(0.785)	(0.023)	(0.872)	(0.023)	(1.220)	(0.019)
Cadet age	0.007	0.000*	0.008	0.000*	0.001	0.000
	(0.005)	(0.000)	(0.005)	(0.000)	(0.006)	(0.000)
Training under military gov.	0.009*	0.000	0.013***	0.000	0.033***	0.000
	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.001)
Training length	0.008	0.001*	0.006	0.001*	−0.005	0.001
	(0.010)	(0.000)	(0.009)	(0.000)	(0.008)	(0.000)
Constant	−7.632***	−0.143*	−8.533***	−0.158**	−9.849***	−0.118*
	(1.509)	(0.060)	(1.566)	(0.059)	(2.149)	(0.049)
AIC	1220.00	−2442.79	1150.33	−2672.01	871.02	−3738.83
Wald χ^2	49.13***		56.47***		61.49***	
Pseudo R^2	0.05		0.07		0.13	
F-Statistic		4.10***		3.94***		3.15***
Adjusted R^2		0.03		0.03		0.04
Number of Observations	4211	4211	4203	4203	4171	4171
Number of Clusters	30		30		30	
Cohort Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: Values are coefficients with clustered (Logistic) or robust (OLS) standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.4.15. Regression results for Battalion 601 membership with exclusion of individual entry years

	Logistic								OLS							
	(1) w/o 1975	(2) w/o 1976	(3) w/o 1977	(4) w/o 1979	(5) w/o 1980	(6) w/o 1981	(7) w/o 1982	(8) w/o 1983	(9) w/o 1975	(10) w/o 1976	(11) w/o 1977	(12) w/o 1979	(13) w/o 1980	(14) w/o 1981	(15) w/o 1982	(16) w/o 1983
Graduation rank	0.014***	0.011**	0.014**	0.013**	0.012**	0.014***	0.012**	0.015***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Cavalry officer	−0.420	−0.738*	−0.527†	−0.623†	−0.595†	−0.621*	−0.550	−0.428	−0.010†	−0.016**	−0.014*	−0.015*	−0.015*	−0.017**	−0.015*	−0.012†
	(0.355)	(0.346)	(0.306)	(0.343)	(0.344)	(0.309)	(0.336)	(0.320)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Infantry officer	0.555**	0.460*	0.570**	0.514**	0.446*	0.471**	0.522**	0.533**	0.014*	0.014*	0.018**	0.016*	0.012†	0.015*	0.016*	0.016*
	(0.182)	(0.185)	(0.188)	(0.191)	(0.200)	(0.179)	(0.177)	(0.173)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Home literacy rate	1.294	1.025	1.464†	0.920	0.461	1.126	1.108	0.635	0.029	0.031	0.048*	0.029	0.017	0.038	0.039†	0.027
	(0.842)	(0.844)	(0.825)	(0.728)	(0.789)	(0.809)	(0.824)	(0.881)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Cadet age	0.003	0.007	0.009†	0.006	0.006	0.003	0.007	0.005	0.000	0.000†	0.000*	0.000†	0.000*	0.000†	0.000*	0.000†
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Training under military gov.	0.012**	0.006	0.007*	0.007†	0.007†	0.006†	0.006†	0.009*	−0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	−0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Training length	0.012	0.015	0.012	0.007	0.003	0.008	0.005	0.004	0.001*	0.001*	0.001**	0.001*	0.001*	0.001**	0.001*	0.001*
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	−7.846***	−7.596***	−8.512***	−7.107***	−6.515***	−6.771***	−7.335***	−6.840***	−0.084†	−0.110†	−0.154**	−0.109†	−0.115*	−0.111*	−0.139*	−0.119*
	(1.544)	(1.664)	(1.473)	(1.536)	(1.607)	(1.397)	(1.479)	(1.634)	(0.050)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.053)	(0.059)	(0.057)
AIC	974.94	1125.77	1165.63	1155.86	1129.66	1205.71	1192.39	1169.29	−3494.40	−2869.95	−2670.28	−2740.53	−2912.10	−2545.00	−2619.31	−2680.73
Wald χ^2	49.87***	55.14***	48.36***	42.01***	27.15***	34.47***	44.66***	40.94***								
Pseudo R^2	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04								
F Statistic									3.07***	3.64***	3.83***	3.76***	3.66***	4.00***	3.92***	3.92***
R^2									0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.04
Number of Observations	4175	4194	4202	4199	4194	4207	4204	4202	4175	4194	4202	4199	4194	4207	4204	4202
Number of Clusters	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30								
Cohort Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Values are coefficients with clustered (Logistic) or robust (OLS) standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.4.16. Regression results for Battalion 601 membership before and after 1977

	1975–1977		1978–1983	
	(1) Logistic	(2) OLS	(3) Logistic	(4) OLS
Graduation rank	0.014*	0.000**	0.012**	0.000***
	(0.006)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.000)
Cavalry officer	−0.547	−0.009†	−0.561	−0.007
	(0.495)	(0.005)	(0.445)	(0.005)
Infantry officer	0.431†	0.006	0.613**	0.012*
	(0.247)	(0.005)	(0.232)	(0.005)
Home literacy rate	−0.128	0.003	2.501*	0.035*
	(0.956)	(0.018)	(1.091)	(0.017)
Cadet age	0.002	0.000	0.009	0.000
	(0.006)	(0.000)	(0.006)	(0.000)
Training under military gov.	0.005	0.000	0.011*	−0.000
	(0.005)	(0.000)	(0.005)	(0.001)
Training length	−0.018	0.000	0.033***	0.001*
	(0.017)	(0.000)	(0.009)	(0.000)
Constant	−4.783*	−0.060	−11.350***	−0.081†
	(1.898)	(0.044)	(1.912)	(0.046)
AIC	760.78	−4908.94	707.00	−4996.66
Wald χ^2	13.91†		42.89***	
Pseudo R^2	0.03		0.07	
F Statistic		2.24***		2.09***
R^2		0.04		0.02
Number of Observations	4142	4142	4139	4139
Number of Clusters	30		30	
Cohort Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: Values are coefficients with clustered (Logistic) or robust (OLS) standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.4.17. Balance statistics for raw and matched data

	Cutoff: 30		Cutoff: 40		Cutoff: 50		Cutoff: 60		Cutoff: 70	
	Diff. before	Diff. after	Diff. before	Diff. after	Diff. before	Diff. after	Diff. before	Diff. after	Diff. before	Diff. after
Cavalry officer	0.004	0.000	−0.004	−0.000	−0.000	0.000	−0.000	−0.000	−0.002	−0.000
Infantry officer	0.027	0.000	0.024	0.000	0.016	−0.000	0.023	−0.000	0.013	−0.000
Home literacy rate	−0.009	0.000	−0.004	0.000	−0.004	−0.000	−0.005	−0.000	−0.008	−0.000
Cadet age	0.313	−0.025	−0.078	−0.057	0.122	−0.003	−0.007	0.155	0.149	0.450
Training under military gov.	0.880	0.032	0.768	0.026	0.614	0.008	1.749	0.020	1.111	0.012
Training length	2.111	0.044	2.089	0.034	1.848	0.038	1.808	0.045	2.007	0.055
Multivariate L1 distance	0.716	0.590	0.689	0.582	0.674	0.595	0.693	0.615	0.733	0.637
# Strata		1,325.000		1,325.000		1,325.000		1,325.000		1,325.000
# Matched strata		444.000		468.000		483.000		474.000		430.000

Note: Table shows differences between control and treatment group means in the unmatched and matched datasets for each covariate.

Table A.4.18. Logistic regressions for Battalion 601 membership with matched sample

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Cutoff: 30	Cutoff: 40	Cutoff: 50	Cutoff: 60	Cutoff: 70
Treatment	1.017**	0.989**	0.849**	0.712*	0.639*
	(0.364)	(0.303)	(0.288)	(0.284)	(0.302)
Constant	−4.060***	−3.912***	−3.765***	−3.577***	−3.481***
	(0.315)	(0.274)	(0.216)	(0.196)	(0.213)
AIC	911.43	981.27	985.62	1003.45	961.00
Wald χ^2	7.82**	10.63**	8.67**	6.30*	4.47*
Pseudo R^2	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01
Number of Observations	3024	3123	3180	3131	2987
Number of Clusters	30	30	30	30	30

Note: Treatment is dichotomized variable of graduation rank at respective cutoff.

Values are coefficients with robust standard errors clustered on cohorts in parentheses.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Figure A.4.1. Distribution of service time and rank at retirement

(a) Service time



(b) Rank at retirement



Figure A.4.2. Conditional effect of graduation rank and service in Battalion 601 on the probability of retiring as Brigadier General or Colonel



A.5 Career Pressure and Excessive Disloyalty

A.5.1 Summary statistics

This section presents summary statistics for all variables used in the quantitative analyses of Chapter 5. Dependent variables appear in the upper part of the tables, while independent and control variables are listed in the lower parts.

1) **Summary statistics for coup analysis.** Table A.5.1 and Table A.5.2 show summary statistics for the analysis of officers' participation in the coup attempts of June and September 1955.

2) **Summary statistics for out-of-sample forecast of forced exit risk.** Table A.5.3 and Table A.5.4 show summary statistics for the construction of the measure on officers' individual risk of forced exit. The variables are employed in the out-of-sample forecast (Table A.5.5).

A.5.2 Zooming in on officers' forcing decisions

This section presents results from statistical tests that provide further evidence on the decision by career-pressured army officers to force their way up in the army organization by participating in the two coups against Argentine President Juan D. Perón in 1955.

1) **Forecasting officers' individual risks of forced exit.** This analysis creates an officer-specific measure for the risk of retirement. The measure captures career pressure independent of rank and officers' position in the army hierarchy. It is employed in the test described below and underlies **Figure 5.10**. To this end, we conduct an out-of-sample forecast predicting the risk of retirement for each officer active at the time when the plotting for the 1955 coup attempts began, i.e. when officers had to decide whether to participate in the coup conspiracy or not. The individual-level measure is created in three steps: i) fit the survival model on the training dataset, ii) retrieve the estimated coefficients, iii) out-of-sample predict the risk of forced exit for each officer in the prediction sample.

   The modeling approach of the analysis follows the recommendation to employ parametric survival models when undertaking out-of-sample forecasting (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 86, 194). We estimate parametric survival models with shared cohort frailty. Based on model fit tests, we estimate Weibull and Gompertz survival models, producing two versions of *Risk of forced exit*. Both models are trained with data on officers who were served in the army after its professionalization in 1900 but had left the organization before the respective coups took place. As commonly done in out-of-sample forecasting, we adopt a y-centered approach. Tables A.5.3 and A.5.4 list the numerous independent variables included in the models, which capture cohort features as well as officers' biographic and professional characteristics. The variable that warrants further elaboration is *Cohort Survivors*$_{Cohort}$. It measures for each officer the relative size of his cohort, i.e. the share of officers that have survived the up-or-promotion system up to a given point. Table A.5.5 shows the results of the in-sample analysis.

   The success of this analysis and the validity of the resulting measure rests on how well it captures each officer's *Risk of forced exit*. To validate the measure, we undertake

two checks. First, we plot the measure against the ranks at which officers retired. Figures A.5.1 and A.5.2 reveal that the prediction works very well. Across most ranks of retirement, the predicted risk of force exit is above 0.5 and for most officers it clusters between 0.8 and 1. This suggests that *Risk of forced exit* actually depicts the likelihood of officers having their careers ended. Second, we plot *Risk of forced exit* against *Proximity to forced exit*—the measure of the main analysis. Figures A.5.3 and A.5.4 reveal that both measures are not fully co-linear. This increases our confidence that the out-of-sample measure captures a more individualized aspect of career pressure, which we employ as an independent variable in the next analysis.

2) **Individual risk of forced exit.** This test provides the regression results that underlie **Figure 5.10** in the book. It employs the out-of-sample predicted, individual-level measure *Risk of forced exit* as the independent variable. The test demonstrates that coup participation is independent of officers position in the military hierarchy, thereby predicting coup participation across all ranks and independent of their coup capacity. Table A.5.6 and Table A.5.7 show results of logistic regression models with *Risk of forced exit* as the key independent variable (based on the predictions of the models in Table A.5.5). Across both versions of the independent variable, *Risk of forced exit* is positively and statistically significantly correlated with officers' participation in the 1955 coups. **Figure 5.10**, shown in the book, depicts the substantive effects of the Weibull-based *Risk of forced exit* while Figure A.5.5 depicts the effects of the Gompertz-based *Risk of forced exit* on the likelihood of coup participation. Across both measurements and models the main result remains unchanged. Officers threatened by forced retirement are more likely to join coup conspiracies in the hope of saving their career.

3) **Rewards for coup participation.** These tests check whether the participation in a successful coup provides officers with career rewards. In the book, we provide two types of tests. The first test looks at rewards within the military apparatus. It provides the regression results that underlie **Figure 5.7** in the book. The test leverages that the fact that the June Coup failed but the September Coup was successful. The regression analysis is based on a matched sample of coup plotters and officers with the same seniority. Table A.5.8 shows pre- and post-matching balance statistics. Table A.5.9 shows regression results. The coefficient estimate of *Coup participation* is positively and statistically significantly correlated with rank at retirement in the case of the successful coup in September. In contrast, the estimate is statistically insignificant for the unsuccessful coup in June, which serves as a placebo case. The results show that those officers who participate in a successful coup are indeed more likely to reach the general ranks.

The second test looks at rewards outside of the the military apparatus. It provides the regression results that underlie **Figure 5.8** in the book. The test leverages historical information to build an additional measure of career opportunities. The information identifies officers who served as managers, directors, or board members of Argentine companies after the September Coup in 1955. We use this information to code two versions of the dependent variable: *Company post*$_{Count}$ gives the number company posts held by each officer, and *Company post*$_{Binary}$ is dichotomous identifying whether officers had obtained at least one company posts (value of 1) or not (value of 0). Regression results in Table A.5.10 are again based on a matched sample of coup plotters and officers with the same seniority (see Table A.5.8). The coefficient

estimates of *Coup participation* are positively and statistically significantly correlated with both the count and dichotomous measure of company posts. The results show that officers who participated in the September coup were more likely to obtain at least one lucrative position in the private sector than their peers who did not participate.

4) **Connections, favoritism, and coup participation.** This test provides the regression results that underlie **Figure 5.9** in the book. It demonstrates that regime co-optation and favoritism is not confounding the results of the main analysis. Put differently, the test aims at providing additional evidence that officers' willingness to force their way up is first and foremost driven by career pressure.

   To capture the regime's co-optation effort, we draw on a comprehensive list of all officers that received a foreign car as part of car distribution scheme initiated by the Perón government. By being able to identify those officers who received such a car, we code two variables: *Car bribe* is 1 for officers who received a car, and 0 otherwise, while *Car bribe*$_{In\ cohort}$ is 1 for officers who were in a cohort with peer who received a car, and 0 otherwise.

   Table A.5.11 and Table A.5.12 show the results of logistic regression models. The coefficient estimates for the *Car bribe* variable are statistically indistinguishable from 0 across all models. Moreover, the coefficient estimates of *Proximity to forced exit* remain unaffected. The results suggest that regime co-optation and favoritism are not undermining the original results, which again highlights the strength of career pressure in the Argentine Army. Turning, to the second measure, the coefficient estimates for the *Car bribe*$_{In\ cohort}$ variable are positive and statistically significant in the models for the September coup. As we describe in the book, this result is compatible with our career pressure logic, as officers outside of the regime's nepotistic networks came under career pressure.

A.5.3 Additional robustness checks

This section presents results from statistical tests that demonstrate the robustness of the main findings presented in Chapter 5.

1) **Accounting for cohort differences.** These tests check whether career prospects systematically vary based on when officers joined the army and where they grew up. To ensure that such factors do not drive our results, we replicate the main analysis and the analysis with the individual-level measure of exit pressure. In the first test, we re-run the main analysis, including birth province fixed effects. In the second text, we employ a reduced sample consisting only of coup plotters and their cohort peers. We do not run cohort fixed effects models due to the collinearity of *Proximity to forced exit* and *Risk of forced exit* with cohort numbers (i.e. the start year of each cohort). Table A.5.13 and Table A.5.14 show the results of the first test. Across all regression models, the coefficient estimate of *Proximity to forced exit* remains substantively unchanged. Table A.5.15 shows the results of the second test. Across all random effects models, the coefficient estimates of *Risk of forced exit* remain unchanged as well.

2) **Using functional form flexibility.** This test checks whether the main finding persists even under functional form flexibility of the regression model. We introduce a nuanced version of *Proximity to forced exit*, extending it beyond the cutoff of 0 for those officers who managed to survive beyond the median service time at which Lieutenant

Colonels are retired. We then include this measure, *Proximity to forced exit*$_{Extended}$, and its squared version in the regression model. Results in Table A.5.16 show that the coefficient estimates for the simple term are positive and statistically significant whereas the estimates for the squared term are negative and significant. Substantive effects shown in Figure A.5.6 depict the relationship. While the likelihood of officers participating in coup attempts increases as they approach forced exit, the likelihood plateaus (June Coup) or even decreases (September Coup) once officers manage to professionally survive beyond the career danger zone. The finding lends further credibility to the argument that coup participation is not just a function of seniority or rank, but of the fear of losing one's career.

3) **Controlling for previous coup participation.** This test checks whether the main finding is driven by previous coup participation. The goal is to demonstrate that coup participation is not merely the result of individual officers who–for whatever reason–have an extraordinarily high willingness to commit treason. We include the binary variables *Coup participation*$_{Sep.\ 28,\ 1951}$ and *Coup participation*$_{Jun.\ 16,\ 1955}$, which identify members of previous coup attempts in the respective repression models. Table A.5.17 shows the regression results. While the coefficient estimates of variables are positive and statistically significant, the estimates of *Proximity to forced exit* remain substantively unchanged. Career pressure motivates officers to participate in coups, independent of past coup involvement.

4) **Employing different regression methods.** This test checks whether the main finding is robust to the use of different regression methods. We re-run the main analysis using OLS and rare events logistic regression models, respectively. Table A.5.18 and Table A.5.19 show the results of both analyses. Independent of the regression method used and across both coups, the coefficient estimates of *Proximity to forced exit* are positively and statistically significantly correlated with coup participation. These results underline the overall robustness of the empirical findings.

Table A.5.1. Summary statistics for coup on June 16, 1955

	Type	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
Coup participation	Binary	4496	0.005	0.071	0.000	1.000
Proximity to forced exit	Continuous	4496	-13.968	8.062	-25.734	0.000
Proximity to forced exit$_{\text{Extended}}$	Continuous	4496	-12.921	10.389	-25.734	39.336
Risk of forced exit$_{\text{Weibull}}$	Continuous	4495	0.759	0.285	0.001	1.000
Risk of forced exit$_{\text{Gompertz}}$	Continuous	4495	0.765	0.272	0.010	1.000
Training length	Continuous	4496	3.544	0.753	0.802	9.889
Graduation rank	Continuous	4496	49.147	28.937	0.000	100.000
Artillery branch	Binary	4496	0.242	0.428	0.000	1.000
Infantry branch	Binary	4496	0.421	0.494	0.000	1.000
Engineering branch	Binary	4496	0.110	0.313	0.000	1.000
Advanced degree	Binary	4496	0.466	0.499	0.000	1.000
Coup participation$_{\text{Sep. 28, 1951}}$	Binary	3781	0.020	0.139	0.000	1.000
Car bribe	Binary	4496	0.078	0.268	0.000	1.000
Car bribe$_{\text{In cohort}}$	Binary	4496	0.641	0.480	0.000	1.000

Table A.5.2. Summary statistics for coup on September 16, 1955

	Type	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
Coup participation	Binary	4473	0.027	0.161	0.000	1.000
Proximity to forced exit	Continuous	4473	-13.697	7.956	-25.359	0.000
Proximity to forced exit$_{\text{Extended}}$	Continuous	4473	-12.608	10.370	-25.359	39.711
Risk of forced exit$_{\text{Weibull}}$	Continuous	4472	0.773	0.279	0.002	1.000
Risk of forced exit$_{\text{Gompertz}}$	Continuous	4472	0.777	0.266	0.017	1.000
Training length	Continuous	4473	3.544	0.751	0.802	9.889
Graduation rank	Continuous	4473	49.157	28.914	0.000	100.000
Artillery branch	Binary	4473	0.242	0.429	0.000	1.000
Infantry branch	Binary	4473	0.420	0.494	0.000	1.000
Engineering branch	Binary	4473	0.110	0.313	0.000	1.000
Advanced degree	Binary	4473	0.468	0.499	0.000	1.000
Coup participation$_{\text{Jun. 16, 1955}}$	Binary	4465	0.003	0.058	0.000	1.000
Car bribe	Binary	4473	0.078	0.268	0.000	1.000
Car bribe$_{\text{In cohort}}$	Binary	4473	0.640	0.480	0.000	1.000

Table A.5.3. Summary statistics for out-of-sample forecast (June 1955 Coup)

	Type	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
Retirement	Binary	390955	0.005	0.068	0.000	1.000
$\text{Seniority}_{\text{Months}}$	Count	390955	148.026	106.871	1.000	618.000
$\text{Cohort survivors}_{\text{Share}}$	Continuous	390955	84.311	16.904	3.846	100.000
Cohort size	Continuous	390955	90.447	39.480	11.000	296.000
Cadet age	Continuous	390950	17.779	1.600	13.651	31.088
Graduation rank	Continuous	390955	53.137	28.529	0.000	100.000
Infantry officer	Binary	390955	0.444	0.497	0.000	1.000
Artillery officer	Binary	390955	0.234	0.423	0.000	1.000
Cavalry officer	Binary	390955	0.200	0.400	0.000	1.000
Engineering officer	Binary	390955	0.100	0.301	0.000	1.000
Advanced degree	Binary	390955	0.157	0.364	0.000	1.000
Training length	Continuous	390955	3.406	0.957	0.849	10.179
Born in Province Buenoes Aires	Binary	389696	0.201	0.401	0.000	1.000
Born in Federal Capital	Binary	389696	0.400	0.490	0.000	1.000

Table A.5.4. Summary statistics for out-of-sample forecast (September 1955 Coup)

	Type	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
Retirement	Binary	397344	0.005	0.068	0.000	1.000
$\text{Seniority}_{\text{Months}}$	Count	397344	148.151	106.855	1.000	618.000
$\text{Cohort survivors}_{\text{Share}}$	Continuous	397344	84.300	16.883	3.846	100.000
Cohort size	Continuous	397344	90.631	39.495	11.000	296.000
Cadet age	Continuous	397339	17.777	1.601	13.651	31.088
Graduation rank	Continuous	397344	53.074	28.573	0.000	100.000
Infantry officer	Binary	397344	0.449	0.497	0.000	1.000
Artillery officer	Binary	397344	0.233	0.423	0.000	1.000
Cavalry officer	Binary	397344	0.197	0.398	0.000	1.000
Engineering officer	Binary	397344	0.100	0.300	0.000	1.000
Advanced degree	Binary	397344	0.158	0.365	0.000	1.000
Training length	Continuous	397344	3.412	0.962	0.849	10.179
Born in Province Buenoes Aires	Binary	396085	0.204	0.403	0.000	1.000
Born in Federal Capital	Binary	396085	0.398	0.489	0.000	1.000

Table A.5.5. Parametric survival models for officer retirement with shared cohort frailty

	Jun. 16, 1955		Sep. 16, 1955	
	(1) Weibull	(2) Gompertz	(3) Weibull	(4) Gompertz
Cohort survivors$_{\text{Share}}$	−0.022***	0.020***	−0.022***	0.019***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Cohort size	0.022***	0.022***	0.022***	0.022***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Cadet age	−0.028	−0.029†	−0.030†	−0.029†
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Graduation rank	−0.003**	−0.002*	−0.002*	−0.001†
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Infantry officer	−2.094***	−1.150***	−2.042***	−1.109***
	(0.127)	(0.129)	(0.126)	(0.127)
Artillery officer	−2.250***	−1.298***	−2.168***	−1.242***
	(0.134)	(0.135)	(0.133)	(0.134)
Cavalry officer	−2.181***	−1.206***	−2.109***	−1.144***
	(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.133)	(0.134)
Engineering officer	−2.181***	−1.242***	−2.103***	−1.176***
	(0.141)	(0.144)	(0.140)	(0.143)
Advanced degree	−0.641***	−0.581***	−0.632***	−0.578***
	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.084)
Training length	−0.069†	−0.070†	−0.066†	−0.072†
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Born in Province Buenoes Aires	0.050	0.074	0.017	0.045
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Born in Federal Capital	−0.063	−0.016	−0.074	−0.023
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.054)
Constant	−7.719***	−8.777***	−7.682***	−8.766***
	(0.520)	(0.479)	(0.523)	(0.483)
$\ln(p)$	0.695***		0.687***	
	(0.020)		(0.020)	
γ		0.013***		0.013***
		(0.000)		(0.000)
$\ln(\theta)$	−0.733***	−0.517**	−0.632**	−0.459*
	(0.200)	(0.196)	(0.198)	(0.194)
AIC	2713.99	2722.08	2756.22	2761.32
LR χ^2	594.66***	294.76***	582.91***	285.07***
Number of Observations	389691	389691	396080	396080

Note: Values are coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.5.6. Logistic regressions for individual coup participation with officer-specific measures of exit pressure (Weibull hazards)

	Jun. 16, 1955		Sep. 16, 1955	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Risk of forced exit	7.511*	9.503**	1.310*	1.742**
	(3.004)	(3.284)	(0.632)	(0.607)
Training length		0.471†		0.116
		(0.256)		(0.170)
Graduation rank		−0.007		0.002
		(0.010)		(0.004)
Artillery branch		−0.282		0.504
		(0.608)		(0.319)
Infantry branch		−0.302		−0.091
		(0.464)		(0.267)
Engineering branch		0.127		−0.418
		(0.662)		(0.444)
Advanced degree		0.476		0.439*
		(0.467)		(0.217)
Constant	−11.974***	−15.172***	−4.666***	−5.814***
	(2.780)	(3.229)	(0.549)	(0.823)
AIC	273.52	280.11	1091.19	1088.09
Wald χ^2	6.25*	23.52**	4.30*	37.23***
Pseudo R^2	0.07	0.08	0.01	0.02
Number of Observations	4495	4495	4472	4472
Number of Clusters	63	63	63	63

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors clustered on cohorts in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.5.7. Logistic regressions for individual coup participation with officer-specific measures of exit pressure (Gompertz hazards)

	Jun. 16, 1955		Sep. 16, 1955	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Risk of forced exit	6.003*	7.232*	1.102	1.507*
	(2.840)	(3.121)	(0.705)	(0.686)
Training length		0.499*		0.148
		(0.233)		(0.167)
Graduation rank		−0.008		0.002
		(0.009)		(0.004)
Artillery branch		−0.433		0.470
		(0.609)		(0.319)
Infantry branch		−0.350		−0.105
		(0.464)		(0.266)
Engineering branch		0.073		−0.423
		(0.662)		(0.442)
Advanced degree		0.247		0.408†
		(0.500)		(0.213)
Constant	−10.578***	−12.983***	−4.492***	−5.689***
	(2.633)	(3.119)	(0.610)	(0.885)
AIC	276.13	282.46	1094.22	1091.94
Wald χ^2	4.47*	19.70**	2.44	33.59***
Pseudo R^2	0.06	0.08	0.01	0.02
Number of Observations	4495	4495	4472	4472
Number of Clusters	63	63	63	63

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors clustered on cohorts in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.5.8. Balance statistics for raw and matched data on coup participation effects

	Jun. 16, 1955		Sep. 16, 1955	
	Diff. before	Diff. after	Diff. before	Diff. after
Seniority	12.967	0.406	2.222	0.228
Multivariate L1 distance	0.564	0.261	0.269	0.171
# Strata		13.000		13.000
# Matched strata		8.000		9.000

Note: Table shows differences between control and treatment group means in the unmatched and matched datasets for the covariate.

Table A.5.9. Regression results for rank at exit (matched sample)

	Jun. 16, 1955		Sep. 16, 1955	
	(1) OLS	(2) Ord. Logit	(3) OLS	(4) Ord. Logit
Coup participation	$-1.060^{\dagger}$	-1.024	0.425^{**}	0.974^{***}
	(0.589)	(1.399)	(0.148)	(0.249)
Seniority	0.024^{***}	0.043^{***}	0.038^{***}	0.071^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.006)
Training length	-0.030	-0.049	-0.027	-0.047
	(0.040)	(0.074)	(0.028)	(0.053)
Graduation rank	-0.003^{*}	-0.007^{**}	-0.004^{***}	-0.008^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Artillery branch	-0.227^{**}	-0.430^{**}	-0.222^{***}	-0.432^{***}
	(0.074)	(0.142)	(0.041)	(0.095)
Infantry branch	-0.073	-0.138	-0.115^{**}	-0.231^{**}
	(0.074)	(0.134)	(0.041)	(0.089)
Engineering branch	-0.083	-0.175	-0.125^{*}	-0.261^{*}
	(0.089)	(0.175)	(0.057)	(0.124)
Advanced degree	1.089^{***}	2.240^{***}	0.972^{***}	1.975^{***}
	(0.089)	(0.171)	(0.073)	(0.137)
Constant	6.246^{***}		5.984^{***}	
	(0.169)		(0.130)	
AIC	6252.67	6035.35	12363.24	11604.90
F-Statistic	38.38^{***}		61.07^{***}	
Adjusted R^2	0.32		0.31	
Wald χ^2		343.25^{***}		672.56^{***}
Pseudo R^2		0.13		0.13
Number of Observations	2262	2262	4398	4398
Number of Clusters	45	45	50	50

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors clustered on cohorts in parentheses.
Estimated cutpoints of ordered logit regressions not shown.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.5.10. Regression results for private sector posts after September 16, 1955 coup (matched sample)

	Company post (count)				Company post (dummy)			
	(1) Neg. Bin.	(2) Neg. Bin.	(3) OLS	(4) OLS	(5) Logit	(6) Logit	(7) OLS	(8) OLS
Coup participation	0.911**	1.103*	0.037†	0.034†	1.076**	0.960**	0.048*	0.046†
	(0.353)	(0.452)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.344)	(0.371)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Seniority		0.074***		0.001***		0.050***		0.001***
		(0.012)		(0.000)		(0.011)		(0.000)
Training length		0.420***		0.006*		0.406***		0.009**
		(0.098)		(0.002)		(0.106)		(0.003)
Graduation rank		−0.010*		−0.000†		−0.013†		−0.000*
		(0.005)		(0.000)		(0.006)		(0.000)
Artillery branch		0.106		0.006		0.047		0.005
		(0.281)		(0.008)		(0.293)		(0.009)
Infantry branch		−0.568*		−0.011†		−0.711*		−0.015†
		(0.256)		(0.006)		(0.326)		(0.008)
Engineering branch		0.024		0.005		−0.039		0.001
		(0.468)		(0.013)		(0.485)		(0.015)
Advanced degree		1.698***		0.027**		1.362***		0.029**
		(0.368)		(0.008)		(0.366)		(0.009)
Constant	−3.292***	−6.806***	0.022***	−0.020†	−3.579***	−6.092***	0.027***	−0.020†
	(0.184)	(0.683)	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.180)	(0.616)	(0.005)	(0.011)
Ln(Alpha)	2.932***	2.100***						
	(0.238)	(0.199)						
AIC	1337.37	1211.21	−4624.24	−4738.03	1134.67	1023.00	−3306.24	−3415.11
F-Statistic			3.58†	10.37***			4.14*	10.63***
Adjusted R^2			0.00	0.03			0.00	0.03
Wald χ^2	6.67**	119.15***			9.76**	96.81***		
Pseudo R^2	0.00	0.11			0.01	0.12		
Number of Observations	4398	4398	4398	4398	4398	4398	4398	4398
Number of Clusters	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors clustered on cohorts in parentheses.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.5.11. Logistic regressions with control for regime co-optation

	Jun. 16, 1955		Sep. 16, 1955	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Proximity to forced exit	0.150***	0.151***	0.036**	0.039**
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Car bribe	0.369	0.407	−0.369	−0.359
	(0.525)	(0.522)	(0.347)	(0.353)
Training length		−0.063		−0.075
		(0.239)		(0.178)
Graduation rank		−0.006		0.002
		(0.009)		(0.004)
Artillery branch		−0.757		0.407
		(0.620)		(0.317)
Infantry branch		−0.660		−0.168
		(0.475)		(0.261)
Engineering branch		−0.288		−0.515
		(0.705)		(0.440)
Advanced degree		−0.330		0.239
		(0.534)		(0.223)
Constant	−3.979***	−2.872**	−3.114***	−3.046***
	(0.251)	(1.059)	(0.185)	(0.690)
AIC	263.74	272.90	1093.72	1094.10
Wald χ^2	21.74***	58.38***	7.23*	23.85**
Pseudo R^2	0.11	0.12	0.01	0.02
Number of Observations	4496	4496	4473	4473
Number of Clusters	63	63	63	63

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors clustered on cohorts in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.5.12. Logistic regressions with control for favoritism in cohort

	Jun. 16, 1955		Sep. 16, 1955	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Proximity to forced exit	0.151***	0.152***	0.021	0.024†
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Car $\text{bribe}_{\text{In cohort}}$	0.066	0.060	0.730**	0.719**
	(0.481)	(0.482)	(0.259)	(0.244)
Training length		−0.051		−0.063
		(0.241)		(0.170)
Graduation rank		−0.006		0.002
		(0.010)		(0.004)
Artillery branch		−0.758		0.430
		(0.621)		(0.318)
Infantry branch		−0.659		−0.140
		(0.470)		(0.263)
Engineering branch		−0.307		−0.517
		(0.700)		(0.441)
Advanced degree		−0.299		0.212
		(0.536)		(0.221)
Constant	−3.970***	−2.899**	−3.868***	−3.811***
	(0.466)	(1.047)	(0.318)	(0.721)
AIC	264.13	273.37	1085.12	1085.75
Wald χ^2	19.37***	43.64***	15.17***	33.93***
Pseudo R^2	0.11	0.12	0.02	0.03
Number of Observations	4496	4496	4473	4473
Number of Clusters	63	63	63	63

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors clustered on cohorts in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.5.13. Linear regressions for individual coup participation with birth province fixed effects

	Jun. 16, 1955		Sep. 16, 1955	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Proximity to forced exit	0.001***	0.001***	0.001*	0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Training length		−0.001		−0.002
		(0.002)		(0.005)
Graduation rank		−0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Artillery branch		−0.004		0.013
		(0.003)		(0.009)
Infantry branch		−0.003		−0.002
		(0.003)		(0.006)
Engineering branch		−0.002		−0.008
		(0.004)		(0.008)
Advanced degree		−0.002		0.006
		(0.003)		(0.006)
Constant	0.052	0.062	0.056	0.054
	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.050)
AIC	−10978.96	−10970.35	−3626.75	−3624.74
F-Statistic	1.10	1.27	6.49***	7.70***
Adjusted R^2	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00
Number of Observations	4495	4495	4472	4472
Birth Province Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.5.14. Logistic regressions for individual coup participation using sample of officers in same cohort

	Jun. 16, 1955		Sep. 16, 1955	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Proximity to forced exit	0.089**	0.086*	0.043***	0.046***
	(0.030)	(0.037)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Training length		−0.161		−0.037
		(0.187)		(0.168)
Graduation rank		−0.010		0.001
		(0.011)		(0.004)
Artillery branch		−0.682		0.429
		(0.674)		(0.317)
Infantry branch		−0.591		−0.124
		(0.476)		(0.262)
Engineering branch		−0.365		−0.541
		(0.727)		(0.446)
Advanced degree		−0.465		0.197
		(0.575)		(0.227)
Constant	−3.292***	−1.600†	−2.894***	−2.921***
	(0.161)	(0.833)	(0.173)	(0.684)
AIC	220.76	228.82	1052.71	1053.78
Wald χ^2	9.01**	15.28*	10.87***	28.25***
Pseudo R^2	0.03	0.04	0.01	0.02
Number of Observations	1085	1085	3842	3842
Number of Clusters	18	18	38	38

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors clustered on cohorts in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.5.15. Linear regressions for individual coup participation with cohort random effects

	Jun. 16, 1955		Sep. 16, 1955	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Risk of forced exit	0.021**	0.020**	0.026**	0.031***
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Training length		−0.000		0.002
		(0.002)		(0.005)
Graduation rank		−0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Artillery branch		−0.002		0.014
		(0.003)		(0.009)
Infantry branch		−0.003		−0.002
		(0.003)		(0.006)
Engineering branch		−0.001		−0.008
		(0.004)		(0.009)
Advanced degree		0.000		0.010†
		(0.003)		(0.006)
Constant	−0.007	−0.002	0.007	−0.014
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.018)
Wald χ^2	7.80**	12.07†	7.81**	44.23***
Number of Observations	4495	4495	4472	4472
Cohort Random Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.5.16. Logistic regressions for individual coup participation with extended measure of proximity to forced exit

	Jun. 16, 1955		Sep. 16, 1955	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Proximity to forced $\text{exit}_{\text{Extended}}$	0.238***	0.241***	0.131***	0.157***
	(0.065)	(0.070)	(0.039)	(0.042)
Proximity to forced $\text{exit}^2_{\text{Extended}}$	−0.003*	−0.003*	−0.003**	−0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Training length		−0.018		−0.232
		(0.214)		(0.201)
Graduation rank		−0.005		0.002
		(0.009)		(0.004)
Artillery branch		−0.763		0.453
		(0.636)		(0.313)
Infantry branch		−0.649		−0.136
		(0.483)		(0.261)
Engineering branch		−0.274		−0.504
		(0.692)		(0.441)
Advanced degree		−0.286		0.157
		(0.550)		(0.226)
Constant	−8.333***	−7.458***	−4.580***	−4.151***
	(0.907)	(1.145)	(0.305)	(0.732)
AIC	262.72	272.06	1084.50	1082.52
Wald χ^2	23.47***	43.56***	13.39**	35.46***
Pseudo R^2	0.11	0.12	0.02	0.03
Number of Observations	4496	4496	4473	4473
Number of Clusters	63	63	63	63

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors clustered on cohorts in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.5.17. Logistic regressions with controls for previous coup participation

	Jun. 16, 1955		Sep. 16, 1955	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Proximity to forced exit	0.214***	0.213***	0.026†	0.029*
	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Coup participation$_{\text{Sep. 28, 1951}}$	2.106**	2.022*		
	(0.801)	(0.980)		
Coup participation$_{\text{Jun. 16, 1955}}$			3.333***	3.442***
			(0.556)	(0.593)
Training length		−0.149		−0.105
		(0.361)		(0.198)
Graduation rank		0.001		0.003
		(0.013)		(0.004)
Artillery branch		−1.244		0.501
		(1.293)		(0.322)
Infantry branch		0.020		−0.052
		(0.851)		(0.260)
Engineering branch		0.632		−0.435
		(1.065)		(0.438)
Advanced degree		0.913		0.296
		(0.691)		(0.221)
Constant	−4.328***	−4.330*	−3.395***	−3.378***
	(0.310)	(1.945)	(0.208)	(0.788)
AIC	161.92	167.86	1008.93	1009.19
Wald χ^2	16.67***	22.49**	50.47***	57.06***
Pseudo R^2	0.16	0.19	0.04	0.05
Number of Observations	3781	3781	4465	4465
Number of Clusters	59	59	63	63

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors clustered on cohorts in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.5.18. Linear regressions for individual coup participation

	Jun. 16, 1955		Sep. 16, 1955	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Proximity to forced exit	0.001***	0.001***	0.001*	0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Training length		−0.001		−0.002
		(0.002)		(0.005)
Graduation rank		−0.000		0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Artillery branch		−0.003		0.013
		(0.003)		(0.009)
Infantry branch		−0.003		−0.004
		(0.003)		(0.006)
Engineering branch		−0.001		−0.010
		(0.004)		(0.009)
Advanced degree		−0.002		0.006
		(0.003)		(0.006)
Constant	0.015***	0.024**	0.039***	0.043*
	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.019)
AIC	−11010.06	−11001.27	−3654.50	−3654.43
F-Statistic	19.49***	3.49**	6.77*	3.12**
Adjusted R^2	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00
Number of Observations	4496	4496	4473	4473
Number of Clusters	63	63	63	63

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors clustered on cohorts in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table A.5.19. Rare events logistic regressions for individual coup participation

	Jun. 16, 1955		Sep. 16, 1955	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Proximity to forced exit	0.146***	0.148***	0.034**	0.037**
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Training length		−0.043		−0.083
		(0.241)		(0.177)
Graduation rank		−0.006		0.002
		(0.009)		(0.004)
Artillery branch		−0.705		0.403
		(0.619)		(0.317)
Infantry branch		−0.675		−0.174
		(0.475)		(0.261)
Engineering branch		−0.210		−0.463
		(0.705)		(0.439)
Advanced degree		−0.297		0.233
		(0.537)		(0.222)
Constant	−3.896***	−2.760**	−3.158***	−3.035***
	(0.226)	(1.048)	(0.179)	(0.696)
Number of Observations	4496	4496	4473	4473

Note: Values are coefficients with robust standard errors clustered on cohorts in parentheses.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Figure A.5.1. Validating measure on risk of forced exit (prediction sample, Weibull regression)



Figure A.5.2. Validating measure on risk of forced exit (prediction sample, Gompertz regression)



Figure A.5.3. Comparing measures of exit pressure (risk [Weibull] vs. proximity)



Figure A.5.4. Comparing measures of exit pressure (risk [Gompertz] vs. proximity)



Figure A.5.5. Substantive effects for predicted risk of forced exit (Gompertz hazards)



Figure A.5.6. Substantive effects for extended measure of proximity to forced exit



A.7 The Relationship between Repression and Coups

A.7.1 Summary statistics

1) **Summary statistics.** Table A.7.1 displays summary statistics for all variables used in the quantitative analyses of Chapter 7. Dependent variables are presented in the upper part of the table, while independent variables are listed in the lower part.

A.7.2 Empirical analysis

This section presents results from statistical analyses that examine the book's macro-implications outlined in Chapter 7.

1) **The repression-coup nexus.** This analysis provides results underlying **Figures 7.6** and **7.7** in the book. It tests the key macro-level implication of the book's theory. We draw on repression data by Fariss, Kenwick and Reuning (2020) and coup data by Chin, Carter and Wright (2021) and Powell and Thyne (2011). Based on the coup data, we code four versions of the binary dependent variable: *Military Coups*, *Regime Change Coups*, *Reshuffling Coups* that leave the regime intact but oust the regime leader, and *All Coups*, which includes both military officers and civilian officials as coup plotters. The analysis includes all autocracies between 1946 to 2019. The key independent variable is $_{\Delta}$*Repression*, which captures changes in violence against civilians perpetrated by state forces. To model the hypothesized U-shaped relationship, we follow the recommendation of Carter and Signorino (2010) and incorporate cubic polynomials of the independent variable, thereby granting the regression models full functional form flexibility. We also incorporate country and year fixed effects to control for unobserved geographic and time-specific factors. We fit linear probability models (OLS).

   Table A.7.2 shows the regression results. Note that although the coefficient estimates are statistically significant across all types of coup attempts (i.e., models), the flexibility in functional form complicates the direct interpretation of the cubic polynomials. The substantive effects, as detailed in the book, demonstrate that the regression results robustly support the hypothesized U-shaped relationship between changes in repression and coup attempts.

Table A.7.1. Summary statistics

	Type	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
Military coup	Binary	8067	0.05	0.23	0.00	1.00
Regime change coups	Binary	8067	0.04	0.20	0.00	1.00
Reshuffling coups	Binary	8067	0.02	0.13	0.00	1.00
All coups	Binary	6336	0.06	0.24	0.00	1.00
$_{\Delta}$Repression	Continuous	6352	0.00	0.03	-0.28	0.35
$_{\Delta}$Repression^2	Continuous	6352	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.12
$_{\Delta}$Repression^3	Continuous	6352	0.00	0.00	-0.02	0.04

Table A.7.2. Two-way linear fixed effects regressions for coup risk

	Military coups		Regime change coups		Reshuffling coups		All coups	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$_{\Delta}$Repression	1.418***	1.382***	1.117***	1.096***	0.385**	0.365*	1.211***	1.165***
	(0.226)	(0.223)	(0.215)	(0.212)	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.224)	(0.219)
$_{\Delta}$Repression^2	4.919***	5.260***	3.828***	4.091***	1.304†	1.407†	5.112***	5.477***
	(1.048)	(1.034)	(0.963)	(0.939)	(0.763)	(0.781)	(1.158)	(1.120)
$_{\Delta}$Repression^3	−16.550*	−16.085*	−9.851†	−9.562†	−8.591*	−8.372*	−14.302*	−13.772*
	(6.635)	(6.535)	(5.072)	(5.024)	(3.603)	(3.583)	(6.790)	(6.491)
Constant	0.027***	0.039	0.027***	0.072†	−0.000	−0.021	0.028***	0.002
	(0.000)	(0.041)	(0.000)	(0.040)	(0.000)	(0.022)	(0.000)	(0.022)
AIC	−333.27	−274.42	−2049.81	−2021.81	−6949.38	−6885.97	−692.37	−658.07
Observations	6352	6352	6352	6352	6352	6352	6168	6168
Clusters	149	149	149	149	149	149	147	147
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: Coefficients with robust standard errors clustered on countries.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

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