Global Dominant Party Systems Dataset (GDPS):

Data on Executive Dominance From 1900 Until 2024

Codebook

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Contents

Introductory remarks 3

What constitutes a minimum for identifying a case of a dominant party system? 6

Essential data for every case of the dominant party system 8

Establishment and maintenance phase. Political system, electoral system, regime characteristics, and socio-economic variables. 12

Crisis phase 23

Post-crisis phase: turnover elections 30

Post-crisis phase: first elections since the turnover elections (t+1) 37

Post-crisis phase: second elections since the turnover elections (t+2) 43

Post-crisis phase: third elections since the turnover elections (t+3) 49

Party system change 54

Country codes for connecting the GDPS Dataset with other datasets 58

List of references 60

Introductory remarks

For the purpose of easier orientation while using the Global Dominant Party Systems Dataset, it is worth knowing the structure of the dataset. The dataset is composed of variables which can be grouped in five groups that will be shortly introduced below.

Essential data for every case of the dominant party system. These variables appear first when the dataset is browsed from left to right. They identify the basic data for every case of executive dominance such as: unique numerical identifier of the case, name of the case, country in which the case appears, region to which the country belongs, unique text and numerical ID of the dominant party according to the PartyFacts database (Döring & Regel, 2019), time period covered by the rule of the dominant party (that is, start and end year, if there is an end year), and the duration of the executive dominance in months (if the party is still in power at the time of creating the dataset, then just the start date and year are indicated).

Establishment and maintenance phases: political system, electoral system, regime characteristics, and socio-economic variables. The next group of variables provide useful data that describe what can be termed following Pempel (1990) and Giliomee and Simkins (1999) the establishment and maintenance phases in the evolution of the dominant party system. These variables indicate the years when the dominant party secured its first three electoral victories (i.e. took highest executive office after the elections), variant of executive dominance (single-party, coalition, or a mix of the two), the type of the

political and electoral system at the time when executive dominance was established, and the characteristics of the regime under which executive dominance was established and then maintained. They can help users distinguish between different variants of one-party dominance identified by Abedi and Schneider (2010) as single-party, coalitional, long-term and short-term and identify whether the case was a dominant party authoritarian or dominant party democratic system according to different criteria found in the literature such as: a) that all three victories were secured in the context of at least electoral democracy (Nwokora & Pelizzo, 2014), b) that only first victory or the last victory was in a multi-party setting (Templeman, 2010), or c) that there was simply de jure protection of political rights even if the elections in practice were not competitive at all (Lindberg & Jones, 2010). In addition, users can rely on the provided regime scores for the first elections to include or exclude certain cases.

Crisis phase. These variables contain data which might be useful in identifying potential sources of crisis in the system, such as large electoral decline of the ruling party/coalition, increase in mass mobilization (e.g. protests) or decline in party cohesion.

Post-crisis phase: turnover election. These variables come after the first three groups and contain the data in cases where the crisis culminated in the defeat of a dominant party/coaliton. Variables belonging to this group indicate the year of the turnover elections, voter turnout, political system and electoral system type at the time of

turnover elections, regime characteristics in the year before the turnover elections, numerical and textual ID for the executive party after the turnover elections, as well as socio-economic data at the time of turnover elections (population size and annual percentage GDP growth).

Post-crisis phase: first, second, and third elections since the turnover elections. These variables contain data important for studying the government formation process and the regime characteristics after the turnover elections. They indicate the numerical and text ID of the executive party after first, second, and third elections since turnover elections, regime characteristics in the year prior to the given elections, political and electoral system type, as well as socio-economic characteristics at the time of election (population size and annual percentage GDP growth).

Party system change. Related to previously mentioned variables are varaibles that indicate what was the outcome of the party system change, if the crisis phase culminated in turnover elections and if enough data is available for elections after the turnover elections. In cases where government formula is known for the three (and in some cases already two) electoral cycles since the turnover elections, the outcome of party system change can be determined.

Country codes linking the GDPS dataset with other datasets. Finally, readers can find a set of useful variables at the end of the dataset that enable linking between the GDPS dataset and relevant useful datasets such as: V-Dem (Coppedge et al., 2023), V-Party (Düpont

et al., 2022a), PartyFacts (Döring & Regel, 2019), Dataset of Political Institutions (Cruz et al., 2021), the Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (Skaaning et al., 2015a) and the Historical Index of Ethnic Fractionalization (Drazanova, 2020). These variables contain country (and party) codes which can be used in statistical software to merge datasets based on common values.

What constitutes a minimum for identifying a case of a dominant party system?

The same party or unchanged coalition of parties are holding the highest executive position in the independent country, according to the Constitution, for at least three times in a row after elections for which is required that at least one of those elections was held in a multi-party, contested setting. The idea behind this combination of requirements is to make sure to select only those cases where the dominant party/coalition secured prolonged term in office after elections, not via coup or revolution unless this kind of assumption of power was later also confirmed in contested elections as suggested by Templeman (2010). What was the highest executive office at the time of dominant party's first three electoral victories was determined based on the rules set by experts who created the Database of Political Institutions (Cruz et al., 2021) and data was updated for each case not originally found in the DPI dataset. Whether elections were multi-party contested elections or not was determined based

on the Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy database (Skaaning et al., 2015a), with the minimum requirement being that at least one election was held under L3 category which means multiparty elections for both legislature and executive and opposition parties are legally allowed to contest elections. This category corresponds to Levitsky and Way's (2010) competitive authoritarian regime, as suggested by Skaaning et al. (2015a, p. 18). LIED database was chosen due to its conceptual rigor and spatial and time coverage which allow data to be collected for every case included in the GDPS dataset. Users of the dataset can also chose alternative sources of data on electoral democracy such as V-DEM (Coppedge et al., 2023) for which country codes are provided.

The cases of coalitional dominance that are allowed in the GDPS dataset are: 1) when the same party is persistently holding the highest executive office, but is unable to control majority of legislative seats alone, that is it is supported in parliament by votes of coalition partners which might be the same or change from election to election; and 2) several parties rotate in the highest executive office in accordance with the pre-election agreement or established alliance, with the composition of the coalition or alliance remaining largely unchanged for at least three consecutive electoral cycles. A good example for the second scenario is Chile's *Coalition of Parties for Democracy* whose members rotated in the highest executive office (that of the President) after every election between 1990 and 2010. The case of Chile's peculiar coalitional executive

dominance in the context of the presidential political system is also recognized in comparative works by Nwokora and Pelizzo (2014) and Templeman (2010).

Taking all argumentation into account, the GDPS dataset includes all scenarios of one-party dominance identified by Abedi and Schneider (2010, pp. 79-83): 1) *dictatorial*[1] (i.e. single-party) and *non-dictatorial* (i.e. coalitional); and 2) *long-term* (more than 18 years in power) and *short-term* (less than 18 years in power). Scholars who disagree with the minimal definition adopted by the GDPS can easily build upon this definition and impose additional requirements based on the variables in the dataset so to exclude cases based on preferred temporal, regime or other criteria.

For detailed explanations of how each case was identified and how complex cases were handled, readers are advised to consult the separate document dealing extensively with this topic: "Case Selection Notes" (gdps_case_selection.pdf).

Essential data for every case of the dominant party system

ID – unique numerical identifier for each case

case – unique textual ID for each case

country – name of the country in which the case of executive dominance was identified

[1] Not to be confused with the regime type. The concept is taken from game theory.

region_UN – region to which the country in which the case of executive dominance was identified belongs. Regions are coded according to the list of Geographic Regions developed by the UN Statistics Division (United Nations Statistics Division, n.d.). For each case the same level, that of sub-region, is used, unlike some other possible variants such as that used by V-DEM (Coppedge et al., 2023) in which some sub-regions are merged into a larger region (for example, Oceania which includes Australia and the Pacific). Scholars who would prefer to go a level higher on the list of regions, can still use V-DEM country codes and apply their geographic region coding which is a modified version of the UN Statistics Division methodology.

dominantparty_partyfacts – full name of the dominant party according to the Party Facts database (Döring & Regel, 2019).

dominantparty_partyfacts_abb – short name of the dominant party according to the Party Facts database (Döring & Regel, 2019).

dominantparty_partyfacts_id – unique numerical identifier for the dominant party according to the Party Facts database (Döring & Regel, 2019). This number is also shared by the V-Party database (Düpont et al., 2022b).

dominance_period – the period of uninterrupted rule for the given dominant party shown in the format YYYY-YYYY (start year - end year). If the ruling party was not defeated at the time of data collection, only the start year appears.

start – the date when the first government was formed after the first out of three consecutive elections. If the exact date of government formation was unknown due to lack of verifiable data sources, then the date of elections is given. Format: YYYY – MM – DD.

end – the date when the dominant party left office and was replaced by the other party (or military junta). If the government was re-shuffled during the parliamentary term which included other party taking the highest executive office, then this will be taken as the end date only if this change was also confirmed in the subsequent elections. If the change in government during the parliamentary term is punished by the voters and the dominant party returns to power after the first elections following the change, then this is counted as continued executive dominance. Format: YYYY – MM – DD.

dominance_months – the duration of executive dominance expressed in months, applicable only in cases where both start and end date of executive dominance are known. The value is calculated based on the values of the "start" and "end" variables, according to the Excel "=DATEDIF()" formula.

origins - inspired by Templeman's (2010, 2012) foundational work on collecting data on dominant parties and identifying origins of dominant parties, this variable indicates the origins of dominant parties. It improves upon Templeman's (2010, pp. 56-57) original coding of 44 dominant parties from 1950 to 2006 with four categories to

provide a clearer framework and more transparent logic of coding. The variable should be treated as unordered categorical with the following values:

0 - Victory in multi-party contested elections in already established regimes. The requirement is that before dominant party/coalition's first electoral victory for a given time period there were elections that can be classified as at least multi-party in authoritarian regime, that is of at least L3 category according to LIED database (Skaaning et al., 2015) and that there was a different party/coalition in power at the time of those elections;

1 - Victory in elections which came after the regime was founded in which the dominant party played a key role (e.g. first post-independence elections); or after major events which changed the constitutional and political system of the country (e.g. first post-War elections, first post-Empire elections, first post-Revolution elections);

2 - Victory in elections that took place after the transition from closed autocracy to multi-party autocracy, which means that the former autocratic party confirmed its rule in contested elections it helped establish; or the dominant party won first elections soon after its leader or founder eliminated previous government via coup d'état meaning that it ruled in closed autocracy context before introducing contested elections.

Cases coded as "0" correspond to Templeman's (2010, p. 56) "Pre-Established Multi-Party Regime" category, cases coded as "1" correspond to Templeman's (2010, p. 56) "Regime founder" category, while cases coded as "2" would be Templeman's (2010, pp. 56-57) "closed autocracy" and "closed autocracy – personalist" categories. Further, cases coded as "0" would fit the "non first-mover" dominant parties (Templeman 2010, p. 25), while cases coded as "1" and "2" would fit the "first-mover" category (Templeman 2010, p. 25).

Note: if the dominant party established its rule after independence in the context of single-party state and later confirmed its executive dominance in first multi-party elections, then it is coded as "2" instead of "1" given that the first elections which helped it establish executive dominance were held after transition from closed autocracy to multi-party authoritarian regime or electoral democracy. It would be coded as "1" only if the first post-independence elections were also multi-party elections which did occur in many small island istates.

Establishment and maintenance phase. Political system, electoral system, regime characteristics, and socio-economic variables.

firstvictory_year– the year of elections after which first out of three consecutive terms was established.

secondvictory_year– the year of elections after which the second consecutive term was established.

thirdvictory_year- the year of elections after which the third consecutive term was established.

variant – indicates the variant of one-party dominance. Values are:

Single-party – same single party persistently takes the highest executive office. For presidential political system types, it is required that the president is always from the same party. For 'Assembly-Elected President' (i.e. semi-presidential systems) and 'Parliamentary' political system types, it is required that same party persistently controls the executive, with or without the majority of seats in the parliament. These two scenarios are also known in the literature as *majority single-party governments* and *minority single-party governments* (Field & Martin, 2022). For the purpose of the GDPS dataset and following Tsebelis (1995, p. 303) and Hellerberg (2002, pp. 796-797), minority single-party governments formed by the dominant party are treated as single-party governments and the variable in these cases will display "single-party." If it happened that the dominant party had to rule in coalition and hence concede some of its cabinet seats to other parties even for just a single term, the case is coded as 'mixed' (see below).

Coalition – same party takes the highest executive office, but needs coalition partners to support its government in the legislature and/or concedes some positions in the cabinet to the coalition partner(s); or the same group of parties rotate in highest executive office

as per coalition agreement. For 'Presidential' political system types, it is required that the presidents are from the same relatively unchanged coalition or alliance. An example for this scenario is a case of Chile's *Coalition of Parties for Democracy* whose members rotated in the office of the President having won all presidential elections between 1989 and 2010 which is also recognized as a case of executive dominance by Templeman (2010, p. 55) and Nwokora and Pelizzo (2014, p. 836). For 'Assembly-Elected President' (i.e. semi-presidential systems) and 'Parliamentary' political system types, it is required that for the whole observed duration the executively dominant party persistently ruled in coalition, i.e. formed cabinets with other parties and enjoyed their support in the legislature, or that members of a relatively unchanged coalition rotated in the highest executive office (be it that of the President or that of the Prime Minister).

Mixed – cases in which the executively dominant party ruled sometimes alone and sometimes in coalition, i.e. if it sometimes formed single-party cabinets and sometimes had to concede some of the cabinet positions to other parties. Cases are coded 'mixed' even if the dominant party ruled in coalition for just one term while all others terms were characterized by the existence of single-party cabinets.

Note: all cases in the dataset are coded for a variant of one-party dominance, including those for which executive dominance is still ongoing at the time of last data collection (July 2024). In the case of ongoing executive dominance, cabinet formation is observed until July 2024 and if it was persistently single-party or coalitional format it was coded

as such. While this information can be useful for some scholars who would like to identify more recent cases of executive dominance for, say, small-N comparative analysis, others might prefer to focus only on those which have a known end date which enables persistent coding. In that case, researchers can exclude ongoing cases by a simple reference to the "end" variable (empty cells in Excel or NA values in statistical software indicate the ongoing cases).

firstmultiparty_year– the year in which the dominant party for the given case won for the first time in the context of at least multi-party, contested elections under at least competitive authoritarian regime (Levitsky & Way, 2010). This is cross-checked with A Lexical Index of Democracy (Skaaning et al., 2015a) for which the minimum of L3 category is required for a given case to be considered competitive authoritarian in accordance with Levitsky and Way (2010). The L3 category corresponds to a combination of: 1) direct or indirect elections for the executive; 2) parliament which is not closed, does issues laws and is at least partly elected; and 3) the lower house (or unicameral chamber) of the legislature which is at least in part elected by voters who face more than one choice (Skaaning et al., 2015b). For democracies, this variable will always show first out of three consecutive electoral victories as they surpass the given criteria. However, for authoritarian regimes, this variable can be useful for scholars who would like to distinguish between periods of single-party rule and periods of competitive authoritarian rule as it allows for various conceptualizations of executive

dominance: either the one according to Templeman (2010) in which even period of single-party elections is allowed if its beginning or end was preceded by at least one victory in a multi-party, contested elections, or the one according to Bogaards (2004) in which all three consecutive victories must be in the context of contested elections.

tcmv (three consecutive multi-party elections) – indicates if the dominant party in the given case has secured, at any point during the observed time period, at least three consecutive electoral victories for which each election meets the criteria of being at least multi-party, contested election. Values: 1= yes; 0 = no.

The values are based on the evaluation of A Lexical Index of Democracy (Skaaning et al., 2015a) for a given case and a time period covered by the rule of the dominant party. For the 'tcmv' variable to display a value of 1 it is required that the dominant party won the highest executive office after at least three consecutive elections which were all organized under a regime that received at least L3 category for the given year of elections according to the LIED index. The L3 category of LIED index corresponds to a competetive authoritarian regime in which multiparty elections are held for both the executive and the legislature (Skaaning et al., 2015a, p. 7).

Note: in some cases, such as Burkina Faso, tcmv displays the value of 1 even though the first electoral victory of the dominant party was achieved under a single-party autocracy regime which is indicated by the variable *firstvictory_category_lied*. What this means is that the first ever electoral victory of the Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP) was

established under a single-party regime, but nevertheless the party later managed to confirm its dominance later in a series of at least three consecutive multi-party, contested elections. As scholars in the field take different approaches on how to code start date in these cases, the users are provided with information on the first victory and the first multi-party victory so they can decide on whether they will take that the start date of the dominant party rule should correspond to the date of the first government formed after the first electoral victory even though it was a single-party election (the default in the GDPS dataset), or they will focus only on a period of contested multi-party elections that were established at a later date (for which they should then consult the *firstmultiparty_year* variable in order to decide on the later start date of executive dominance).

firstvictory_male_suffrage_lied – indicates if at the time of the first elections after which the first government was formed by the dominant party "virtually all male citizens are allowed to vote" (Skaaning et al., 2015b, p. 1). Source: A Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (Skaaning et al., 2015a).

firstvictory_female_suffrage_lied - indicates if at the time of first elections after which the first government was formed by the dominant party "virtually all female citizens are allowed to vote" (Skaaning et al., 2015b, p. 2). Source: A Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (Skaaning et al., 2015a).

firstvictory_competetive_lied– indicates if the elections in which the dominant party secured its first term in office were relatively free and fair. The values are taken from the Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (Skaaning et al., 2015a), with 1 indicating competitive and 0 indicating non-competetive elections (which can still be multi-party, contested elections). The values of this variable can also be used to distinguish between electoral democracies and competitive authoritarian regimes.

firstvictory_category_lied – indicates what was the regime type in the year of elections in which the dominant party secured its first term in office, according to A Lexical Index of Democracy (Skaaning et al., 2015a). The categories are as follows:

- 0: non-electoral autocracies
- 1: one-party autocracies
- 2: multiparty autocracies without elected executive
- 3: multiparty autocracies
- 4: exclusive democracies
- 5: male democracies
- 6: electoral democracies (Skaaning et al., 2015b)

firstvictory_polsys_dpi– indicates the type of political system in the year of elections in which the dominant party secured its first term in office. The values are taken from the Database of Political Institutions 2020 (Cruz et al., 2021) and are as follows:

- Parliamentary
- Presidential
- Assembly-Elected President

In case of "Assembly-Elected President" a cross-check with constitutional norms was conducted to determine if it was the Prime Minister or the President who holds more executive powers. This was determined according to the DPI2020 database coding rules so that in cases when 1) the President can veto legislation for which the parliament needs a qualified majority to overturn the veto; and/or 2) the President can dismiss the Government, it is taken that the office of the President has more powers and consequently the outcome of presidential elections are considered for the GDPS dataset.

Note: for each case not originally included in the DPI2020 database, the data was collected by applying the original coding rules of the DPI database to the constitutional norms that were valid in the given case at the given time.

firstvictory_elecsys_idea – indicates what was the electoral system family in the given polity at the time when the dominant party secured its first electoral victory. The data is taken from IDEA Electoral System Design Database (International IDEA, n.d.-a). The values are:

- PR (proportional representation)

- Plurality/Majority
- Mixed
- Other

firstvictory_presi_idea - indicates the electoral system family for the executive office at the time when the dominant party secured its first electoral victory. The data is taken from IDEA Electoral System Design Database (International IDEA, n.d.-a). The values are:

- FPTP (first past the post, i.e. simple majority is enough for the victory)
- TRS (two round system, i.e. absolute majority is required in the first round)
- STV (single transferable vote)
- Not applicable (the highest executive office was not elected at the time)
- Other
- NA – missing data (not to be confused with "Not applicable")

firstvictory_hief – degree of ethnic fractionalization in the year of elections in which the dominant party secured its first term in office. Source: Historical Index of Ethnic Fractionalization Dataset (Drazanova, 2020). HIEF index ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating no ethnic fractionalization (each individual is a member of the same ethnic group) and 1 indicating that every individual belongs to his/her own ethnic group (Drazanova, 2020, p. 8).

firstvictory_turnout – voter turnout in the year of first electoral victory measured as a total number of votes divided by the number of voters in the voting register. Expressed in percentages. Source: Voter Turnout Database (International IDEA, n.d.-b).

firstvictory_compulsory_voting – indicates if the voting in the the elections in which the dominant party secured its first term in office was compulsory or not. Values: *Yes*, *No*. Source: Voter Turnout Database (International IDEA, n.d.-b).

thirdvictory_herfopp_dpi – the degree of opposition fragmentation in the year prior to the year of the third consecutive electoral victory of the dominant party. Opposition fragmentation is measured with Herfindahl-Hirschman Index which ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating greatest degree of fragmentation and 1 indicating no fragmentation. Source: Database of Political Institutions DPI2020 (Cruz et al., 2021).

thirdvictory_gdp2 –annual percentage GDP growth based on constant 2015 prices expressed in US dollars, two years before the elections in which the dominant party secured third consecutive term in office. Source: World Bank Open Data (World Bank, n.d.-a).

thirdvictory_gdp1 - annual percentage GDP growth based on constant 2015 prices expressed in US dollars for the year before the year of elections in which the dominant party secured third consecutive term in office. Source: World Bank Open Data (World Bank, n.d.-a).

thirdvictory_gdp - annual percentage GDP growth based on constant 2015 prices expressed in US dollars for the year of elections in which the dominant party secured third consecutive term in office. Source: World Bank Open Data (World Bank, n.d.-a).

thirdvictory_population – population size of the given independent country in the year of elections in which the dominant party secured the third consecutive term in office. Source: HYDE (2023); Gapminder (2022); UN WPP (2024) – with major processing by Our World in Data (2024).

thirdvictory_polsys_dpi - indicates the type of political system in the given case at the time of elections in which the dominant party secured its third consecutive term in office. The values are taken from the Database of Political Institutions 2020 (Cruz et al., 2021) and are as follows:

- Parliamentary
- Presidential
- Assembly-Elected President

In case of "Assembly-Elected President" a cross-check with constitutional norms was conducted to determine if it was the Prime Minister or the President who holds more executive powers. This was determined according to the DPI2020 database coding rules so that in cases when 1) the President can veto legislation for which the parliament needs a qualified majority to overturn the veto; and/or 2) the President can dismiss the

Government, it is taken that the office of the President has more powers and consequently the outcome of presidential elections are considered for the GDPS dataset.

Note: for each case not originally included in the DPI2020 database, the data was collected by applying the original coding rules of the DPI database to the constitutional norms that were valid in the given case at the given time.

thirdvictory_turnout – voter turnout for the elections in which the dominant party secured its third consecutive term in office. Expressed in percentages. Source: Voter Turnout Database (International IDEA, n.d.-b).

thirdvictory_compulsory_voting - indicates if the voting in the elections in which the dominant party secured its third consecutive term in office was compulsory or not. Values: *Yes*, *No*. Source: Voter Turnout Database (International IDEA, n.d.-b).

Crisis phase

Note: the following variables, either alone, combined with each other or combined with other variables can help identify potential crisis moments in the evolution of dominant party systems. However, in some cases they might not be enough so researchers can supplement them with other data, or they might point out to other kind of interesting developments in the system.

legislative_dip - indicates the highest degree of decrease in electoral support for a given dominant party or coalition during the whole period of uninterrupted rule (from

start to end year), measured as the highest percentage difference in election results between any two consecutive electoral cycles for the lower house/chamber of Parliament (if applicable). If the dominant party was part of coalitions, then results for those coalitions are took into account. Numerical variable, values expressed as percentages. In cases where the dominant party or coalition did not experience any decrease in popular support over time and actually increased its vote share, the value displayed is "999" which is not to be confused with missing data (coded as NA).

Example: dominant party rule extends over six consecutive electoral cycles held in years t1, t2, t3, t4, t5 and t6. The results were: t1 = 50% popular vote, t2 = 45%; t3 = 37%, t4 = 47%; t5 = 42; and t6 = 40%. The largest decline between two consecutive electoral cycles in this case is t2 - t3 = 45 - 37% = 8%, not t1 - t6 (10%). This might then indicate that something happened at the time of t3 elections, inviting further qualitative and quantitative research into the given case.

Note 1: Gradual decline over several electoral cycles is not measured as it would not fit the concept of sudden dip in support symptomatic of crisis in dominant party systems. Decline in number of seats can also be measured, but since this outcome can be affected by electoral rules, it is not provided in this version of the GDPS dataset as it might not be as good indicator as vote share in determining whether the dominant party/coalition lost popular support.

Note 2: only difference between electoral results obtained in at least formally multi-party elections are calculated. Differences between last single-party elections and first multi-party elections are not taken into account as they could introduce the issue of inflating the values and indicating obvious large declines which might not correspond to equally meaningful erosion of power (for example, decline from 100% to 60% is 40% which can appear as significant crisis of dominance while in reality the ruling party keeps absolute majority and control of the state).

legislative_dip_year – indicates the year of elections in which the highest degree of decrease in electoral support for a given dominant party or coalition during the whole period of uninterrupted rule occured, measured as the highest percentage difference in election results between any two consecutive electoral cycles for the lower house/chamber of Parliament (if applicable). Numerical variable.

presidential_dip - indicates the highest degree of decrease in electoral support for a presidential candidate of the dominant party or coalition during the whole period of uninterrupted rule (from start to end year), measured as the highest percentage difference in election results between any two consecutive electoral cycles for the President (if applicable). If there were two rounds of elections, only first rounds are compared. Numerical variable, values expressed in percentages. In cases where the dominant party or coalition did not experience any decrease in popular support over

time and actually increased its vote share consistently over time, the value displayed is "999" which is not to be confused with missing data (coded as NA).

Note 1: Gradual decline over several electoral cycles is not measured as it would not fit the concept of sudden dip in support symptomatic of crisis in dominant party systems.

Note 2: only difference between electoral results obtained in at least formally multi-party elections are calculated. Differences between last single-party elections and first multi-party elections are not taken into account as they could introduce the issue of inflating the values and indicating obvious large declines which might not correspond to equally meaningful erosion of power (for example, decline from 100% to 60% is 40% which can appear as significant crisis of dominance while in reality the ruling party easily won presidential elections and absolute control of the state).

presidential_dip_year – indicates the year of elections in which the highest degree of decrease in electoral support for a presidential candidate of a given dominant party or coalition during the whole period of uninterrupted rule occured, measured as the highest percentage difference in election results between any two consecutive electoral cycles for the President, first round (if applicable). Numerical variable.

crisis_mob – displays the highest value of V-Dem dataset "Mass mobilization" indicator during the period of uninterrupted rule (from start to end year). The indicator measures scale and frequency of mass mobilization in a given country. Original coding:

"0: There have been virtually no events.

1: There have been several small-scale events.

2: There have been many small-scale events.

3: There have been several large-scale and small-scale events.

4: There have been many large-scale and small-scale events." (Coppedge et al., 2024, p. 234)

Note 1: this indicator itself does not distinguish between mobilization for democracy and mobilization for autocracy, for which other two mobilization indicators should be used.

Note 2: in V-Dem dataset, the ordinal scale is converted to interval scale and these values appear here.

crisis_mob_year – complements the "crisis_mobilization" variable by indicating the year during which the mass mobilization variable was at its peak for a given case.

crisis_mobaut – displays the highest value of V-Dem dataset "Mobilization for autocracy" indicator during the period of uninterrupted rule (from start year to end

year). The indicator measures the frequency and scale of mass mobilization in support of autocratic aims in a given country. The original coding is as follows:

"0: There have been virtually no events.

1: There have been several small-scale events.

2: There have been many small-scale events.

3: There have been several large-scale and small-scale events.

4: There have been many large-scale and small-scale events." (Coppedge et al., 2024, p. 235)

Note: in V-Dem dataset, the ordinal scale is converted to interval scale and these values appear here.

crisis_mobaut_year – complements the crisis_mobaut variable by displaying the year in which the mobilization for autocracy reached its highest value.

crisis_mobdem - displays the highest value of V-Dem dataset "Mobilization for democracy" indicator during the period of uninterrupted rule (from start year to end year). The indicator measures the frequency and scale of mass mobilization in support of democratic aims in a given country. The original coding is as follows:

"0: There have been virtually no events.

1: There have been several small-scale events.

2: There have been many small-scale events.

3: There have been several large-scale and small-scale events.

4: There have been many large-scale and small-scale events." (Coppedge et al., 2024, p. 235)

Note: in V-Dem dataset, the ordinal scale is converted to interval scale and these values appear here.

crisis_mobdem_year – complements the crisis_mobdem variable by displaying the year in which the mobilization for democracy reached its highest value.

crisis_partycohesion – based on V-Party "Internal Cohesion" indicator, this variable shows the lowest level of party cohesion during the uninterrupted rule of the given dominant party or the leading party in dominant coalition (from start year to end year). This can be then used to evaluate if there was a crisis due to internal party disagreements and potential party splits.

V-Party Dataset original coding:

- 0: Party elites display almost complete disagreement over party strategies and many party elites have left the party.
- 1: Party elites display a high level of visible disagreement over party strategies and some of them have left the party.

- 2: Party elites display some visible disagreement over party strategies, but none of them have left the party.
- 3: Party elites display negligible visible disagreement over party strategies.
- 4: Party elites display virtually no visible disagreement over party strategies. (Lindberg et al., 2022, p. 35)

Note: V-Party applies cross–coder aggregation with Bayesian item response theory measurement model (Lindberg et al., 2022, p. 35).

crisis_partycohesion_year – complements the "crisis_partycohesion" variable and displays the year during which the given lowest level of party cohesion occurred.

Post-crisis phase: turnover elections

t_polsys_dpi- indicates the type of political system in the given case at the time of turnover elections. The values are taken from the Database of Political Institutions 2020 (Cruz et al., 2021) and are as follows:

- Parliamentary
- Presidential
- Assembly-Elected President

In case of "Assembly-Elected President" a cross-check with constitutional norms was conducted to determine if it was the Prime Minister or the President who holds more

executive powers. This was determined according to the DPI2020 database coding rules so that in cases when 1) the President can veto legislation for which the parliament needs a qualified majority to overturn the veto; and/or 2) the President can dismiss the Government, it is taken that the office of the President has more powers and consequently the outcome of presidential elections are considered for the GDPS dataset.

Note: for each case not originally included in the DPI2020 database, the data was collected by applying the original coding rules of the DPI database to the constitutional norms that were valid in the given case at the given time.

t_elecsys_idea - indicates what was the electoral system family in the given polity at the time of turnover elections. The data is taken from IDEA Electoral System Design Database (International IDEA, n.d.-a). The values are:

- PR (proportional representation)
- Plurality/Majority
- Mixed
- Other

t_presi_idea- indicates the electoral system family for the executive office at the time of turnover elections. The data is taken from IDEA Electoral System Design Database (International IDEA, n.d.-a). The values are:

- FPTP (first past the post, i.e. simple majority is enough for the victory)
- TRS (two round system, i.e. absolute majority is required in the first round)
- STV (single transferable vote)
- Not applicable (the highest executive office was not elected at the time)
- Other
- NA – missing data (not to be confused with "Not applicable")

t_turnout – voter turnout for the turnover elections. Expressed in percentages. Source: Voter Turnout Database (International IDEA, n.d.-b).

t_compulsory_voting - indicates if the voting in the turnover elections was compulsory or not. Values: *Yes*, *No*. Source: Voter Turnout Database (International IDEA, n.d.-b).

t_execparty_partyfacts– indicates what was the party that took the highest executive office after the turnover elections. Full name according to the PartyFacts Database (Döring & Regel, 2019) is provided. In case of a military coup, the variable displays a value "Military".

t_execparty_partyfacts_abb - indicates what was the party that took the highest executive office after the turnover elections. Short name according to PartyFacts Database (Döring & Regel, 2019) is provided. In case of a military coup, no abbreviation is provided.

t_execparty_partyfacts_id – provides a unique numerical identifier for the executive party that took the highest executive office after the turnover elections. This ID is taken from the PartyFacts Database (Döring & Regel, 2019) and can be used to link the GDPS dataset with the PartyFacts and V-Party (Düpont et al., 2022b) databases. In case of a military coup, no value is provided.

t_year – the year of the turnover elections (or the military coup).

t_competetive_lied– indicates if the turnover elections were relatively free and fair elections. The values are taken from the Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (Skaaning et al., 2015a), with 1 indicating competitive and 0 indicating non-competetive elections (which can still be multi-party, contested elections). The values of this variable can also be used to distinguish between electoral democracies and competitive authoritarian regimes.

t_category_lied – indicates what was the regime type in the time of the turnover elections, according to A Lexical Index of Democracy (Skaaning et al., 2015a). The categories are as follows:

- 0: non-electoral autocracies
- 1: one-party autocracies
- 2: multiparty autocracies without elected executive
- 3: multiparty autocracies

- 4: exclusive democracies
- 5: male democracies
- 6: electoral democracies (Skaaning et al., 2015b)

t_v2x_polyarchy – provides the values of the Electoral Democracy Index from V-DEM database (Coppedge et al., 2023) for the year prior to the year of turnover elections. The Electoral Democracy Index is calculated as the average of 1) the weighted average of indices measuring freedom of association, clean elections, freedom of expression, elected officials, and suffrage, and 2) the five-way multiplicative interaction between these indices (Coppedge et al., 2024, p. 47).

t_v2x_libdem – provides the values of the Liberal Democracy Index from the V-DEM database (Coppedge et al., 2023) for the year prior to the year of turnover elections. The Liberal Democracy Index is more demanding than the Electoral Democracy index in evaluating the regime as it takes into account not only the quality of electoral democracy but also the protection of individual and minority rights from the repression of the state and the tyranny of majority (Coppedge et al., 2024, p. 48).

t_v2x_corr – provides the values of the Political corruption index from the V-DEM Database (Coppedge et al., 2023) for the year prior to the year of turnover elections. Political corruption index measures overall level of corruption that covers legislative, executive, and judicial corruption (Coppedge et al., 2024, pp. 305-306). The index runs from less corrupt to more corrupt (Coppedge et al. 2024, pp. 305).

t_v2x_regime – provides the value of the Regimes of the World measure from the V-DEM Database (Coppedge et al., 2023) for the year prior to the year of the turnover elections. Ordinal scale with the following categories:

- 0: closed autocracy
- 1: electoral autocracy
- 2: electoral democracy
- 3: liberal democracy (Coppedge et al., 2024, p. 292)

t_v2x_feduni – provides the value of the Division of power index from V-DEM Database (Coppedge et al., 2023) for the year of turnover elections. Division of power index measures the autonomy of regional and local governments and runs from low to high (0-1) (Coppedge et al., 2024, p.321).

t_hief – the degree of ethnic fractionalization in the year the turnover elections. Source: Historical Index of Ethnic Fractionalization Dataset (Drazanova, 2020). HIEF index ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating no ethnic fractionalization (each individual is a member of the same ethnic group) and 1 indicating that every individual belongs to his/her own ethnic group (Drazanova, 2020, p. 8).

t_herfopp_dpi – the degree of opposition fragmentation in the year prior to the year of the turnover elections. Opposition fragmentation is measured with Herfindahl-Hirschman Index which ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating greatest degree of

fragmentation and 1 indicating no fragmentation. Source: Database of Political Institutions DPI2020 (Cruz et al., 2021).

t_gdp2 –annual percentage GDP growth based on constant 2015 prices expressed in US dollars, two years before the turnover elections. Source: World Bank Open Data (World Bank, n.d.-a).

t_gdp1 - annual percentage GDP growth based on constant 2015 prices expressed in US dollars, in the year before the year of the turnover elections. Source: World Bank Open Data (World Bank, n.d.-a).

t_gdp - annual percentage GDP growth based on constant 2015 prices expressed in US dollars, in the year of the turnover elections. Source: World Bank Open Data (World Bank, n.d.-a).

t_population – population size of the given independent country in the year of the turnover elections. Source: HYDE (2023); Gapminder (2022); UN WPP (2024) – with major processing by Our World in Data (2024).

Post-crisis phase: first elections since the turnover elections (t+1)

t1_polsys_dpi- indicates the type of political system in the given case at the time of the first elections since the turnover elections. The values are taken from the Database of Political Institutions 2020 (Cruz et al., 2021) and are as follows:

- Parliamentary
- Presidential
- Assembly-Elected President

In case of "Assembly-Elected President" a cross-check with constitutional norms was conducted to determine if it was the Prime Minister or the President who holds more executive powers. This was determined according to the DPI2020 database coding rules so that in cases when 1) the President can veto legislation for which the parliament needs a qualified majority to overturn the veto; and/or 2) the President can dismiss the Government, it is taken that the office of the President has more powers and consequently the outcome of presidential elections are considered for the GDPS dataset.

Note: for each case not originally included in the DPI2020 database, the data was collected by applying the original coding rules of the DPI database to the constitutional norms that were valid in the given case at the given time.

t1_turnout – voter turnout for the first elections since the turnover elections. Expressed in percentages. Source: Voter Turnout Database (International IDEA, n.d.-b).

t1_compulsory_voting - indicates if the voting in the first elections since the turnover elections was compulsory or not. Values: *Yes*, *No*. Source: Voter Turnout Database (International IDEA, n.d.-b).

t1_execparty_partyfacts– indicates what was the party that took the highest executive office after the first elections since the turnover elections. Full name according to the PartyFacts Database (Döring & Regel, 2019) is provided. In case of a military coup, the variable displays a value "Military".

t1_execparty_partyfacts_abb - indicates what was the party that took the highest executive office after the first elections since the turnover elections. Short name according to PartyFacts Database (Döring & Regel, 2019) is provided. In case of a military coup, no abbreviation is provided.

t1_execparty_partyfacts_id – provides a unique numerical identifier for the executive party that took the highest executive office after the first elections since the turnover elections. This ID is taken from the PartyFacts Database (Döring & Regel, 2019) and can be used to link the GDPS dataset with PartyFacts and V-Party (Düpont et al., 2022b) databases. In case of a military coup, no value is provided.

t1_year – the year of the first elections since the turnover elections (or the military coup).

t1_competetive_lied– indicates if the first elections since the turnover elections were relatively free and fair elections. The values are taken from the Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (Skaaning et al., 2015a), with 1 indicating competitive and 0 indicating non-competetive elections (which can still be multi-party, contested elections). The values of this variable can also be used to distinguish between electoral democracies and competitive authoritarian regimes.

t1_category_lied – indicates what was the regime type in the time of the first elections since turnover elections, according to A Lexical Index of Democracy (Skaaning et al., 2015a). The categories are as follows:

- 0: non-electoral autocracies
- 1: one-party autocracies
- 2: multiparty autocracies without elected executive
- 3: multiparty autocracies
- 4: exclusive democracies
- 5: male democracies
- 6: electoral democracies (Skaaning et al., 2015b)

t1_v2x_polyarchy – provides the values of the Electoral Democracy Index from V-DEM database (Coppedge et al., 2023) for the year prior to the year of the first elections since the turnover elections. The Electoral Democracy Index is calculated as the average of 1) the weighted average of indices measuring freedom of association, clean elections, freedom of expression, elected officials, and suffrage, and 2) the five-way multiplicative interaction between these indices (Coppedge et al., 2024, p. 47).

t1_v2x_libdem – provides the values of the Liberal Democracy Index from the V-DEM database (Coppedge et al., 2023) for the year prior to the year of the first elections since the turnover elections. The Liberal Democracy Index is more demanding than the Electoral Democracy index in evaluating the regime as it takes into account not only the quality of electoral democracy but also the protection of individual and minority rights from the repression of the state and the tyranny of majority (Coppedge et al., 2024, p. 48).

t1_v2x_corr – provides the values of the Political corruption index from the V-DEM Database (Coppedge et al., 2023) for the year prior to the year of the first elections since the turnover elections. Political corruption index measures overall level of corruption that covers legislative, executive, and judicial corruption (Coppedge et al., 2024, pp. 305-306). The index runs from less corrupt to more corrupt (Coppedge et al. 2024, pp. 305).

t1_v2x_regime – provides the value of the Regimes of the World measure from the V-DEM Database (Coppedge et al., 2023) for the year prior to the year of the first elections since the turnover elections. Ordinal scale with the following categories:

- 0: closed autocracy
- 1: electoral autocracy
- 2: electoral democracy
- 3: liberal democracy (Coppedge et al., 2024, p. 292)

t1_v2x_feduni – provides the value of the Division of power index from V-DEM Database (Coppedge et al., 2023) for the year of the first elections since the turnover elections. Division of power index measures the autonomy of regional and local governments and runs from low to high (0-1) (Coppedge et al., 2024, p.321).

t1_hief – the degree of ethnic fractionalization in the year of the first elections since the turnover elections. Source: Historical Index of Ethnic Fractionalization Dataset (Drazanova, 2020). HIEF index ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating no ethnic fractionalization (each individual is a member of the same ethnic group) and 1 indicating that every individual belongs to his/her own ethnic group (Drazanova, 2020, p. 8).

t1_herfopp_dpi – the degree of opposition fragmentation in the year prior to the year the first elections since the turnover elections. Opposition fragmentation is measured with Herfindahl-Hirschman Index which ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating greatest

degree of fragmentation and 1 indicating no fragmentation. Source: Database of Political Institutions DPI2020 (Cruz et al., 2021).

t1_gdp2 –annual percentage GDP growth based on constant 2015 prices expressed in US dollars, two years before the first elections since the turnover elections. Source: World Bank Open Data (World Bank, n.d.-a).

t1_gdp1 - annual percentage GDP growth based on constant 2015 prices expressed in US dollars, in the year before the year of the first elections since the turnover elections. Source: World Bank Open Data (World Bank, n.d.-a).

t1_gdp - annual percentage GDP growth based on constant 2015 prices expressed in US dollars, in the year of the first elections since the turnover elections. Source: World Bank Open Data (World Bank, n.d.-a).

t1_population – population size of the given independent country in the year of the first elections since the turnover elections. Source: HYDE (2023); Gapminder (2022); UN WPP (2024) – with major processing by Our World in Data (2024).

Post-crisis phase: second elections since the turnover elections (t+2)

t2_polsys_dpi- indicates the type of political system in the given case at the time of the second elections since the turnover elections. The values are taken from the Database of Political Institutions 2020 (Cruz et al., 2021) and are as follows:

- Parliamentary
- Presidential
- Assembly-Elected President

In case of "Assembly-Elected President" a cross-check with constitutional norms was conducted to determine if it was the Prime Minister or the President who holds more executive powers. This was determined according to the DPI2020 database coding rules so that in cases when 1) the President can veto legislation for which the parliament needs a qualified majority to overturn the veto; and/or 2) the President can dismiss the Government, it is taken that the office of the President has more powers and consequently the outcome of presidential elections are considered for the GDPS dataset.

Note: for each case not originally included in the DPI2020 database, the data was collected by applying the original coding rules of the DPI database to the constitutional norms that were valid in the given case at the given time.

t2_turnout – voter turnout for the second elections since the turnover elections. Expressed in percentages. Source: Voter Turnout Database (International IDEA, n.d.-b).

t2_compulsory_voting - indicates if the voting in the second elections since the turnover elections was compulsory or not. Values: *Yes*, *No*. Source: Voter Turnout Database (International IDEA, n.d.-b).

t2_execparty_partyfacts– indicates what was the party that took the highest executive office after the second elections since the turnover elections. Full name according to the PartyFacts Database (Döring & Regel, 2019) is provided. In case of a military coup, the variable displays a value "Military".

t2_execparty_partyfacts_abb - indicates what was the party that took the highest executive office after the second elections since the turnover elections. Short name according to PartyFacts Database (Döring & Regel, 2019) is provided. In case of a military coup, no abbreviation is provided.

t2_execparty_partyfacts_id – provides a unique numerical identifier for the executive party that took the highest executive office after the second elections since the turnover elections. This ID is taken from the PartyFacts Database (Döring & Regel, 2019) and can be used to link the GDPS dataset with PartyFacts and V-Party (Düpont et al., 2022b) databases. In case of a military coup, no value is provided.

t2_year – the year of the second elections since the turnover elections (or the military coup).

t2_competetive_lied– indicates if the second elections since the turnover elections were relatively free and fair elections. The values are taken from the Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (Skaaning et al., 2015a), with 1 indicating competitive and 0 indicating non-competetive elections (which can still be multi-party, contested elections). The values of this variable can also be used to distinguish between electoral democracies and competitive authoritarian regimes.

t2_category_lied – indicates what was the regime type in the time of the second elections since turnover elections, according to A Lexical Index of Democracy (Skaaning et al., 2015a). The categories are as follows:

- 0: non-electoral autocracies
- 1: one-party autocracies
- 2: multiparty autocracies without elected executive
- 3: multiparty autocracies
- 4: exclusive democracies
- 5: male democracies
- 6: electoral democracies (Skaaning et al., 2015b)

t2_v2x_polyarchy – provides the values of the Electoral Democracy Index from V-DEM database (Coppedge et al., 2023) for the year prior to the year of the second elections since the turnover elections. The Electoral Democracy Index is calculated as the average of 1) the weighted average of indices measuring freedom of association, clean elections, freedom of expression, elected officials, and suffrage, and 2) the five-way multiplicative interaction between these indices (Coppedge et al., 2024, p. 47).

t2_v2x_libdem – provides the values of the Liberal Democracy Index from the V-DEM database (Coppedge et al., 2023) for the year prior to the year of the second elections since the turnover elections. The Liberal Democracy Index is more demanding than the Electoral Democracy index in evaluating the regime as it takes into account not only the quality of electoral democracy but also the protection of individual and minority rights from the repression of the state and the tyranny of majority (Coppedge et al., 2024, p. 48).

t2_v2x_corr – provides the values of the Political corruption index from the V-DEM Database (Coppedge et al., 2023) for the year prior to the year of the second elections since the turnover elections. Political corruption index measures overall level of corruption that covers legislative, executive, and judicial corruption (Coppedge et al., 2024, pp. 305-306). The index runs from less corrupt to more corrupt (Coppedge et al. 2024, pp. 305).

t2_v2x_regime – provides the value of the Regimes of the World measure from the V-DEM Database (Coppedge et al., 2023) for the year prior to the year of the second elections since the turnover elections. Ordinal scale with the following categories:

- 0: closed autocracy
- 1: electoral autocracy
- 2: electoral democracy
- 3: liberal democracy (Coppedge et al., 2024, p. 292)

t2_v2x_feduni – provides the value of the Division of power index from V-DEM Database (Coppedge et al., 2023) for the year of the second elections since the turnover elections. Division of power index measures the autonomy of regional and local governments and runs from low to high (0-1) (Coppedge et al., 2024, p.321).

t2_hief – the degree of ethnic fractionalization in the year of the second elections since the turnover elections. Source: Historical Index of Ethnic Fractionalization Dataset (Drazanova, 2020). HIEF index ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating no ethnic fractionalization (each individual is a member of the same ethnic group) and 1 indicating that every individual belongs to his/her own ethnic group (Drazanova, 2020, p. 8).

t2_herfopp_dpi – the degree of opposition fragmentation in the year prior to the year the second elections since the turnover elections. Opposition fragmentation is measured with Herfindahl-Hirschman Index which ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating

greatest degree of fragmentation and 1 indicating no fragmentation. Source: Database of Political Institutions DPI2020 (Cruz et al., 2021).

t2_gdp2 –annual percentage GDP growth based on constant 2015 prices expressed in US dollars, two years before the second elections since the turnover elections. Source: World Bank Open Data (World Bank, n.d.-a).

t2_gdp1 - annual percentage GDP growth based on constant 2015 prices expressed in US dollars, in the year before the year of the second elections since the turnover elections. Source: World Bank Open Data (World Bank, n.d.-a).

t2_gdp - annual percentage GDP growth based on constant 2015 prices expressed in US dollars, in the year of the second elections since the turnover elections. Source: World Bank Open Data (World Bank, n.d.-a).

t2_population – population size of the given independent country in the year of the second elections since the turnover elections. Source: HYDE (2023); Gapminder (2022); UN WPP (2024) – with major processing by Our World in Data (2024).

Post-crisis phase: third elections since the turnover elections (t+3)

t3_polsys_dpi- indicates the type of political system in the given case at the time of the third elections since the turnover elections. The values are taken from the Database of Political Institutions 2020 (Cruz et al., 2021) and are as follows:

- Parliamentary
- Presidential
- Assembly-Elected President

In case of "Assembly-Elected President" a cross-check with constitutional norms was conducted to determine if it was the Prime Minister or the President who holds more executive powers. This was determined according to the DPI2020 database coding rules so that in cases when 1) the President can veto legislation for which the parliament needs a qualified majority to overturn the veto; and/or 2) the President can dismiss the Government, it is taken that the office of the President has more powers and consequently the outcome of presidential elections are considered for the GDPS dataset.

Note: for each case not originally included in the DPI2020 database, the data was collected by applying the original coding rules of the DPI database to the constitutional norms that were valid in the given case at the given time.

t3_turnout – voter turnout for the third elections since the turnover elections. Expressed in percentages. Source: Voter Turnout Database (International IDEA, n.d.-b).

t3_compulsory_voting - indicates if the voting in the third elections since the turnover elections was compulsory or not. Values: *Yes*, *No*. Source: Voter Turnout Database (International IDEA, n.d.-b).

t3_execparty_partyfacts– indicates what was the party that took the highest executive office after the third elections since the turnover elections. Full name according to the PartyFacts Database (Döring & Regel, 2019) is provided. In case of a military coup, the variable displays a value "Military".

t3_execparty_partyfacts_abb - indicates what was the party that took the highest executive office after the third elections since the turnover elections. Short name according to PartyFacts Database (Döring & Regel, 2019) is provided. In case of a military coup, no abbreviation is provided.

t3_execparty_partyfacts_id – provides a unique numerical identifier for the executive party that took the highest executive office after the third elections since the turnover elections. This ID is taken from the PartyFacts Database (Döring & Regel, 2019) and can be used to link the GDPS dataset with PartyFacts and V-Party (Düpont et al., 2022b) databases. In case of a military coup, no value is provided.

t3_year – the year of the third elections since the turnover elections (or the military coup).

t3_competetive_lied– indicates if the third elections since the turnover elections were relatively free and fair elections. The values are taken from the Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (Skaaning et al., 2015a), with 1 indicating competitive and 0 indicating non-competetive elections (which can still be multi-party, contested elections). The values of this variable can also be used to distinguish between electoral democracies and competitive authoritarian regimes.

t3_category_lied – indicates what was the regime type in the time of the third elections since turnover elections, according to A Lexical Index of Democracy (Skaaning et al., 2015a). The categories are as follows:

- 0: non-electoral autocracies
- 1: one-party autocracies
- 2: multiparty autocracies without elected executive
- 3: multiparty autocracies
- 4: exclusive democracies
- 5: male democracies
- 6: electoral democracies (Skaaning et al., 2015b)

t3_v2x_polyarchy – provides the values of the Electoral Democracy Index from V-DEM database (Coppedge et al., 2023) for the year prior to the year of the third elections since the turnover elections. The Electoral Democracy Index is calculated as the average of 1) the weighted average of indices measuring freedom of association, clean elections, freedom of expression, elected officials, and suffrage, and 2) the five-way multiplicative interaction between these indices (Coppedge et al., 2024, p. 47).

t3_v2x_libdem – provides the values of the Liberal Democracy Index from the V-DEM database (Coppedge et al., 2023) for the year prior to the year of the third elections since the turnover elections. The Liberal Democracy Index is more demanding than the Electoral Democracy index in evaluating the regime as it takes into account not only the quality of electoral democracy but also the protection of individual and minority rights from the repression of the state and the tyranny of majority (Coppedge et al., 2024, p. 48).

t3_v2x_corr – provides the values of the Political corruption index from the V-DEM Database (Coppedge et al., 2023) for the year prior to the year of the third elections since the turnover elections. Political corruption index measures overall level of corruption that covers legislative, executive, and judicial corruption (Coppedge et al., 2024, pp. 305-306). The index runs from less corrupt to more corrupt (Coppedge et al. 2024, pp. 305).

t3_v2x_regime – provides the value of the Regimes of the World measure from the V-DEM Database (Coppedge et al., 2023) for the year prior to the year of the third elections since the turnover elections. Ordinal scale with the following categories:

- 0: closed autocracy
- 1: electoral autocracy
- 2: electoral democracy
- 3: liberal democracy (Coppedge et al., 2024, p. 292)

t3_v2x_feduni – provides the value of the Division of power index from V-DEM Database (Coppedge et al., 2023) for the year of the third elections since the turnover elections. Division of power index measures the autonomy of regional and local governments and runs from low to high (0-1) (Coppedge et al., 2024, p.321).

t3_hief – the degree of ethnic fractionalization in the year of the third elections since the turnover elections. Source: Historical Index of Ethnic Fractionalization Dataset (Drazanova, 2020). HIEF index ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating no ethnic fractionalization (each individual is a member of the same ethnic group) and 1 indicating that every individual belongs to his/her own ethnic group (Drazanova, 2020, p. 8).

t3_herfopp_dpi – the degree of opposition fragmentation in the year prior to the year the third elections since the turnover elections. Opposition fragmentation is measured with Herfindahl-Hirschman Index which ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating greatest

degree of fragmentation and 1 indicating no fragmentation. Source: Database of Political Institutions DPI2020 (Cruz et al., 2021).

t3_gdp2 –annual percentage GDP growth based on constant 2015 prices expressed in US dollars, two years before the third elections since the turnover elections. Source: World Bank Open Data (World Bank, n.d.-a).

t3_gdp1 - annual percentage GDP growth based on constant 2015 prices expressed in US dollars, in the year before the year of the third elections since the turnover elections. Source: World Bank Open Data (World Bank, n.d.-a).

t3_gdp - annual percentage GDP growth based on constant 2015 prices expressed in US dollars, in the year of the third elections since the turnover elections. Source: World Bank Open Data (World Bank, n.d.-a).

t3_population – population size of the given independent country in the year of the third elections since the turnover elections. Source: HYDE (2023); Gapminder (2022); UN WPP (2024) – with major processing by Our World in Data (2024).

Party system change

partysystem_change – indicates the outcome of the party system change in the given case (check the coding rules further below). The values are:

- interrupted* – the same party or coalition returns to power after being out of office for only one term
- alternating* – a new party or coalition establishes three consecutive terms after the elections, as soon as the next elections after the turnover elections which saw the old dominant party or coalition leave office (that is, it holds highest executive office after elections at *t+1*, *t+2*, and *t+3*). If the new party or coalition establishes three consecutive terms after different parties rotated at *t* and *t+1*, this is not taken as a case of alternating dominance, but a new case of executive dominance which occurred after the transformation of the party system.
- transformation – no party or coalition manages to establish three consecutive terms after elections immediately after the defeat of the old dominant party or coalition, that is either after turnover elections and two subsequent elections (*t*, *t+1*, and *t+2*), or at the latest three elections after the turnover elections (elections at *t+1*, *t+2*, and *t+3*)
- collapse** – genuinely new parties, defined in accordance with Sikk (2005) as parties that have no previous electoral history and have a new label, rotate in power after turnover elections. This means that both criteria of party system collapse as suggested by Morgan (2011, p. 20) are met: 1) the decline of major parties, for which Morgan (2011, p. 26) suggests that in dominant party systems it means the decline of the dominant party itself (it is out of power); and 2) the

change of party system mechanics, which in case of dominant party systems means the end of a pattern of interactions in which the same party (or relatively unchanged coalition) keeps holding the highest executive office after at least three consecutive electoral cycles.

* concept of *interrupted dominance* suggested by Nwokora and Pelizzo (2014), concept of *alternating dominance* proposed by Nwokora and Pelizzo (2014) based on Mair (2008, p. 215). ** concept of *party system collapse* identified in the literature on party system collapse (Dietz & Myers, 2007; Morgan, 2011; Seawright, 2012).

Coding rules: Party system change outcome is determined based on the data on government formation presented by previously listed variables related to the post-crisis phase (elections at t+1, t+2, and t+3). The coding of party system change outcome is based on the theoretical insights and empirical findings from the literature on party system change (Dietz & Myers, 2007; Mair, 1990; Morgan, 2011; Nwokora & Pelizzo, 2014).

Let X, Y, and Z be the traditional parties with a history of previous electoral participation (as defined by Seawright, 2012, p. 33), and A, B, and C the genuinely new parties with no previous electoral history and a new label (Sikk, 2005). The logic of coding party system change outcome is then as presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Logic of coding the party system change outcome variable

Dominant party	Executive party at *t*	Executive party at *t+1*	Executive party at *t+2*	Executive party at *t+3*	Outcome
X	Y	X	X	X	interrupted (0)
X	Y	Y	Y	Y	alternating (1)
X	Y	X	Y	X	transformation (2)
X	A	B	A	B	collapse (3)

Note: *t* denotes turnover election, *t+1* first elections after the turnover elections, *t+2* second, *t+3* third.
Source: table is author's own work.

partysystem_change_2 – same as *partysystem_change*, but provides numerical values. This is an ordinal variable with the following values:

- 0 = interrupted dominance
- 1 = alternating dominance
- 2 = party system transformation
- 3 = party system collapse

partysystem_survival - indicates if the outcome of party system change is the survival of the dominant party system or its death. Values are:

- 0 = dominant party system died (in cases of transformation and collapse)

- 1 = dominant party system survived (in cases of interrupted and alternating dominance)

Country codes for connecting the GDPS Dataset with other datasets

countrycodes_dpi – country codes that are used by the Database of Political Institutions 2020 (Cruz et al., 2021).

countrycodes_vdem - country codes that are used by the V-DEM database (Coppedge et al., 2023).

countrycodes_lied - country codes that are used by the Lexical Index of Democracy (Skaaning et al., 2015b).

countrycodes_hief - country codes that are used by the Historical Index of Ethnic Fractionalization Dataset (Drazanova, 2020).

countrycodes_wb – country codes that are used by the World Bank in the datasets available at the World Bank Open Data website (World Bank, n.d.-b).

countrycodes_idea – country codes used by International IDEA in various databases on elections and democracy such as Electoral System Design Database, Voter Turnout Database and The Global State of Democracy Indices (GSoD Indices). Here, ISO3

country codes from the IDEA datasets are provided which can be then used to merge the GDPS dataset with the IDEA datasets.

countrycodes_owd – country codes found in various Our World in Data (Global Change Datalab & Oxford Martin Programme on Global Development, n.d.) datasets.

***V-Party and PartyFacts:** The GDPS dataset can also be linked with the V-Party (Düpont et al., 2022b) and PartyFacts (Bederke et al., n.d.) databases based on the unique numerical identifiers (party codes) that are provided by variables containing "partyfacts" in their name (e.g. *dominantparty_partyfacts_id*).

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