Global Dominant Party Systems Dataset (GDPS):

Data on Executive Dominance From 1900 Until 2024

Notes and details on case selection

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Contents

Introduction 3

Comparative studies that inspired case selection 3

How new cases were identified 4

List of identified cases and decisions made for each 6

Excluded cases 73

List of references 79

Introduction

This document contains detailed explanation of how cases were identified, what were the sources of data for essential components of every case (such as the start and end date and the dates of three consecutive electoral victories that established one-party dominance), what changes have been made compared to the five medium and large-N comparative studies on dominant parties and dominant party systems that the GDPS dataset builds upon, and how complex situations were handled (such as annulled elections and military interventions). Explanations were added for some cases on how the data was collected for certain variables. The document also includes a list of excluded cases at the end for which detailed explanation is provided on why these cases were excluded.

Comparative studies that inspired case selection

The medium and large-N comparative studies on dominant parties and dominant party systems that inspired the case selection for the Global Dominant Party Systems (GDPS) dataset are:

1. Templeman's (2010) comparative study of 46 cases of dominant parties across the globe, for a period from 1950 to 2006, including both authoritarian and democratic dominant parties.

2. Bogaards' (2004) study on identifying dominant parties and dominant party systems in 18 countries belonging to the region of the sub-Saharan Africa.
3. Lindberg and Jones' (2010) comparative study of dominant parties in 14 African countries (total number of countries covered is 26).
4. Anckar's (2009) study of executive dominance in 42 micro-states, covering a period from 1972 to 2006.
5. Nwokora and Pelizzo's (2014) study of the economic performance in 37 cases of dominant party democratic systems.

The data for the cases identified in these comparative works was updated so to align with the GDPS operationalization and include a period between January 1900 and July 2024 with any changes made compared to the cited works indicated for additional transparency.

How new cases were identified

To identify new cases, a list of countries with dates of independence provided in the *World Factbook* (Central Intelligence Agency, n.d.-b) was consulted, and the results of the elections for the highest executive office according to the valid constitution checked. To enter the GDPS dataset, a new case had to comply with criteria elaborated in the research note and the codebook, that is: the same party or relatively unchanged

coalition of parties holds the highest executive office in the independent country,[1] as per constitution, after at least three consecutive elections for which it is required that at least one of the elections were multi-party, contested elections. The constitutional element was added to ensure that cases of executive dominance either initiated or confirmed in elections are identified, excluding those based solely on unconstitutional assumption and consolidation of power such as coups and juntas (unless they later transformed into executive dominance confirmed by multi-party elections). What was the highest executive office during the observed time period was determined based on the Database of Political Institutions (Cruz et al., 2021) and if no data was found in this database, then the same precise rules used for coding the political system variable in the DPI database were applied to whatever constitution was effective in the given case at the given time so to determine the highest executive office. Whether elections were multi-party contested or not was determined by a reference to A Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (Skaaning et al., 2015), with minimum being L3 category which corresponds to competitive authoritarian regimes defined by Levitsky and Way (2010).

[1] An obvious exception is the case of KMT in Taiwan for which the status of independence of Taiwan can be contested. However, due to significance of the case for the development of the literature on dominant parties and party systems and its presence in some of the most important comparative works, the case of Taiwan was included in the GDPS dataset. See further explanation below, in the case selection list.

List of identified cases and decisions made for each

1. New case of executive dominance identified in **Albania**. Electoral data and the information on government formation was cross-checked with the official reports by Central Electoral Commission of Albania (Central Electoral Commission of Albania, n.d.) and electoral reports available in the IPU Parline database (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-g).

   Note: given that the Socialist Party increased its support consistently over three electoral cycles, the variable measuring electoral decline (legislative_dip) shows "999" which is not to be confused with "NA" values.

2. For **Algeria**, it is important to clarify that Templeman (2010, p. 54) originally included the case as starting in 1962 and attributed the executive dominance to the National Liberation Front (FLN). However, from 1962 to 1995 FLN won only in single-party presidential elections, while in the first contested presidential elections held in 1995 it did not participate (see Bouandel, 1997). Furthermore, the winner of the 1995 contested presidential elections was an army general, Zeroual, who was formally unaffiliated at the time and was planning to form his own party, National Democratic Rally (RND), which eventually came into existence in 1997 (Bouandel, 2003, p. 15). Therefore, as we cannot clearly attribute to the FLN at least three consecutive presidential victories out of which at least one was in contested multi-party setting, the case of FLN rule in Algeria

from 1962 until 1995 is excluded from the database and Algeria enters starting with 2009 presidential elections (see note below).

3. **Algeria** identified as a case of executive dominance starting with presidential elections in 2009 when National Liberation Front (FLN) was again supporting the winning candidate (see note above). It is important to note that before 2004 presidential elections there was a split within the ruling FLN between the "legitimists" who were aligned with the Prime Minister Benflis and the "regenerationists" who were aligned with the President Bouteflika (Szmolka, 2006, p. 50). This internal division resulted in ruling President's decision to switch parties and invest efforts into blocking the functioning of the FLN as the party structure could have helped his opponent (Bouandel, 2004, pp. 1531-1532). Therefore, I recognize that in 2004 it was the National Rally for Democracy that was the executive party. In 2009, FLN was back on the track of supporting Bouteflika, and it supported winning candidates ever since meaning that Algeria is a new case of a dominant party system in which the dominant party managed to win in contested elections (unlike during 1962-1995 period).

   Note: the candidate supported by the FLN in 2019 officially ran as independent, however, due to its support by the ruling FLN the presidential_dip records the highest drop in support for FLN as that from 2014 Presidential elections (81.53%) to 2019 Presidential elections (58.13%). For results, see news report on 2019 elections (Algeria Press Service, 2019).

4. While Anckar (2009, p. 41) does not identify **Andorra** (I) as a case of executive dominance due to his specific criteria which include observing an arbitrarily set time period (1991-2006) and a threshold for parliamentary systems which involves ruling party holding at least 3/4 of cabinet seats during at least 4/5 of the observed time (Anckar, 2009, p. 39), I do include **Andorra (I)** for a period from 1997 to 2009 since the same party (Liberal Party) formed governments after three consecutive elections and held the highest executive office. Additionally, it is also worth mentioning that in the elections for the observed time (1997, 2001, and 2005), Liberal Party also won most of the votes and seats compared to any other party contesting elections, even though this is not the requirement for being included in the GDPS database (what matters is holding highest executive office for at least three times in a row after three elections). Since Andorra is not found in the DPI2020 database, I evaluate its political system type based on the same criteria as those used by creators of the DPI2020 database (Cruz et al., 2021). Given that the norms of the 1993 Constitution of Andorra establish the parliamentary Coprincipality in which the Head of the Government is the highest executive office (Chapter 5 of the Constitution), I observe the outcomes of government formation after legislative elections and who was the holder of the position of the prime minister.

Note: the IPU Election Archive report (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2009) indicates that the 2009 turnover elections were influenced by economic issues,

mostly impacted by global financial crisis. In that sense, the indicators of party cohesion, drop in popular support and mass mobilization might have not been enough to identify crisis, hence relying on economic indicators would be useful in this case.

5. Start date for **Andorra (II)** determined based on the IPU Election Archive report (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-a). Dates for second and third victory determined based on IPU Parline database (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-g).

   Note: Both in **Andorra (I)** and **Andorra (II)**, the possibility to measure drop in popular support for the government party is hard given that those parties participated in elections as part of coalitions. The variable legislative_dip then gives the highest percentage drop in support for coalitions in which the government party took part, counted as totals at the national level. Given that Andorra has a complex mixed-independent system (Lublin, n.d.), this should also be taken into account when considering the electoral data.

6. The case of **Angola** can be considered somewhat peculiar due to the fact that there was a relatively long period between two electoral cycles that determine the holder of the highest executive office in the country. This long break occurred due to Angolan Civil War which ended in 2002, after which new constitution was adopted in 2010. In an election report by Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA), the parliamentary elections held in 2008 are treated as "second multiparty legislative elections" (de Brito, 2012, p. 6), meaning that

the 1992 elections can be taken as the first multi-party elections. Since 2010 Constitution was adopted, the President, as the holder of the highest executive office, is automatically elected from the party list during general elections (de Brito, 2012, p. 8). Therefore, I take the dates of 2012 and 2017 general elections in Angola as dates of second and third electoral victory given that they also determined the holder of the highest executive office in the country.

7. Templeman (2010, p. 54) coded **Antigua and Barbuda (I)** dominant party start date before independence, in February 1976. Based on the historical overview of elections in Antigua and Barbuda by Hillebrands and Schwehm (2005), I take as start date the date of first elections after the country achieved independence (in 1981) which is 17 April 1984. Based on the Antigua and Barbuda 1981 Constitution, I code the political system as Parliamentary. End date was determined based on electoral reports that are available at Inter-Parliamentary Union Election Archive website (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-b).

8. Start date for **Antigua and Barbuda (II)** was determined based on IPU Election Archive electoral reports (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-c). Dates for second and third victory cross-checked with IPU Parline database (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-g).

9. New case of executive dominance, **Argentina (I)**, identified in Argentina. The period from 1916 until 1930 is known as the period of "Radical governments" which were formed after competitive elections (Romero, 2013, Chapter 2), which

is also indicated by L5 category of the LIED index for the given period (Skaaning et al., 2015). Information on presidential terms in office was cross-checked with the Dynamic Analysis of the Dispute Management (DADM) Project (Mullenbach, 2024).

Note 1: even if we dismiss the Military from t+3 and take 1946 elections to be the third elections since turnover (that is 1930 military coup), the coding for party system change would still remain "transformation" given that the elections were won by the Labour Party.

Note 2: In Argentina (I), the Radical Civic Union did not experience drop in popular support during the three electoral cycle in general elections (results both for presidential and legislative elections), hence the value "999" is displayed here for both legislative_dip and presidential_dip. Data was checked with Nohlen (2005b).

10. Start and end date for **Argentina (II)** cross-checked with WhoGov database.

    Note: the dominant party candidate won more votes in each consecutive elections, hence the vale "999" is displayed for presidential_dip variable.

11. Data on prime ministers of Australia for cases **Australia (I)**, **Australia (II), Australia (III), Australia (IV), Australia (V), Australia (VI),** and **Australia (VII)** collected from the official archives (National Archives of Australia, n.d.). Information on electoral system for 1949 gathered from the short overview of the history of Australian federal electoral reform (Australian Electoral

Commission, n.d.), and for 1975 from IPU Election archives report (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f)

12. In the case of executive dominance **Austria (I)**, end date was set to be the date when the parliament was abolished in what is officially considered to be a coup d'etat (Stadt Wien, n.d.). The counting of electoral results for the purpose of determining party system change continues after the so-called "1933–1938 Dollfuß-Schuschnigg dictatorship" and "1938–1945 NS-regime in Austria" (SORA Institute, n.d.). As the new party established executive dominance as soon as first elections for the legislature were re-established after Nazi regime, the party system change outcome is coded as "alternating dominance".

13. For **Austria (II)**, data was cross-checked with research project "100 years of the Republic – 100 years of voting behavior" (SORA Institute, n.d.). Political system type determined based on DPI2020 rules applied to 1920 Constitution which was reinstated in 1945. Electoral system data collected from *Electoral system change in Europe since 1945* (ESCE) database (Pilet & Renwick, n.d.).

14. Data on executive party for the cases **Austria (III) and Austria (IV)** cross-checked with IPU election archive electoral reports (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f) and IPU Parline database reports (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f).

15. New case of executive dominance identified in Azerbaijan. Data for **Azerbaijan** was cross-checked with Blakkisrud (1999), EU Parliament election report on 2008 Presidential elections (Isler Beguin, 2008) and information available on the

official website of the President of Azerbaijan (Press Service of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, n.d.).

16. Data on executive party for **Barbados** cross-checked with IPU election archive (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f).

17. New case of executive dominance identified in Belgium, **Belgium (I)**, for the period of united Christian Social Party (CVP-PSC) rule (1958-1968). For this case it was determined that the end date is that of 1968 when the government was formed by one of the two parties that were created after a split occurred in the united Christian Social Party (CVP-PSC). The split marked the end of unity of the two wings of the CVP-PSC party, the Dutch-speaking CVP and the French-speaking PSC (Lamberts, 1997, p. 65; Wouter, 2004, p .133). Consequently, given that one of the two wings, CVP, took part in elections as individual party and managed to secure the highest executive office after three consecutive elections immediately following the 1968 split, the party system change in this case is coded as "alternating" to reflect this change in political dynamics. The decision can be contested, however, and Christian People's Party's (CVP) rule recognized as a continuation of the rule of Christian Social Party (CVP-PSC). The start and end date for the terms of office were cross-checked with the official timeline of the Prime Ministers of Belgium (FPS Chancellery of the Prime Minister, 2018).

18. Data on executive party for **Belgium (II)** cross-checked with IPU election archive (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f).

19. Data on executive party in **Belize** cross-checked with IPU election archive electoral reports (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f).

20. New case of executive dominance identified in Bolivia as **Bolivia (I)**, covering a period of Liberal Party rule (1904-1920). Data for terms of office was cross-checked with a historical overview of elections in Bolivia by Lazarte (2005). Based on Lazarte's (2005, pp. 127-128) overview of the evolution of electoral provisions in Bolivia, electoral system for the legislature was coded as "Plurality/Majority" while the electoral system for the president was coded as "Other".

21. New case of executive dominance identified in Bolivia as **Bolivia (II)**, covering a period of Revolutionary Nationalist Movement rule (1956-1964). Data for terms of office was cross-checked with a historical overview of elections in Bolivia by Lazarte (2005).

22. **Bolivia (III)** is a special case due to the fact that the fourth victory of MAS candidate, Evo Morales, was annulled (more in Nagovitch, 2020). In the case of annulled elections, I do not count any party as an executive party even though there is formally an interim president in this case. I skip annulled elections and count next regular elections for determining party system change outcome. In this case, repeated elections in 2020 gave a regular mandate to MAS which means that MAS is coded as having uninterrupted executive dominance since Morales took office in 2006. It is also important to note that the annulled 2019

presidential election does not affect Boliva's inclusion in the dataset given that the third consecutive victory of MAS was during the regular elections in 2014.

Note: For **Bolivia (III)**, the results of the annulled elections in 2019 were taken into account for calculating the peak electoral decline of the ruling dominant party even though annulled elections are not taken into account in determining start and end of executive dominance. For the purpose of determining crisis of the dominant party system, it makes sense to take into account dips in support recorded in elections that were eventually annulled as both pieces of information (dip in support and annulled elections) can be very good indicators of crisis of dominance.

23. Even though Templeman (2010, p. 54) codes **Botswana** BDP start date as the date the country became independent (1966), I move this date to the date of the first post-independence elections (1969). Electoral data cross-checked with IPU Election archive reports (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f). Additional information on the independence and elections before and after independence taken from Baumhögger (1999).

24. New case of executive dominance identified in Brazil. Data on executive party for **Brazil** cross-checked with (Nyrup & Bramwell, 2020). Dates of presidential elections cross-checked with IFES Election Guide (International Foundation for Electoral Systems - IFES, n.d.-a).

25. Case of executive dominance **Burkina Faso** identified based on Bogaards (2004, p. 180) and further updated to match the criteria of the GDPS Dataset. Several sources were compared to determine the dominant party, its first victory and the subsequent victories, as well as data on political and electoral system. These sources are: Grotz (1999), IFES Election Guide (International Foundation for Electoral Systems - IFES, n.d.-a), and WhoGov (Nyrup & Bramwell, 2020). While the first victory of Campaore's Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP) in 1991 was not in the context of multi-party elections (these elections were boycotted by genuine opposition), the following three electoral victories (1998, 2004, and 2009) were achieved in the context of contested multi-party elections and hence the case is included in the dataset. Because of three consecutive victories in multi-party elections of 1998, 2004, and 2009, the "tcmv" variable shows 1 while "year_firstmultiparty" shows 1998 instead of 1991. This can help scholars interested in various interpretations of the start date of dominant authoritarian parties. The end date for CDP is set to the date when military took over the country, that is 31 October 2014. This is taken "as-if" turnover elections and then first and second regular elections after military rule are coded for party system change. It is worth noting that Lindberg and Jones (2010, pp. 204-207) do not consider Burkina Faso as a case of dominant party system as they focus on single-party dominance that resorts around parliamentary super-majorities that exclude coalition dominance and mergers

that include the former ruling party such as the one in Burkina Faso in 1996. However, I take that merger parties, if they include former ruling/dominant parties, are continuation of these parties and do constitute cases of continued executive dominance if they persistently capture the highest executive office in the country after the elections.

26. New case of executive dominance identified in Burundi. For **Burundi**, I compare several data sources in order to determine the dominant party, the three consecutive electoral victories and the data on political and electoral system. These sources are: Basedau (1999), IFES Election Guide (International Foundation for Electoral Systems - IFES, n.d.-a), and WhoGov database (Nyrup & Bramwell, 2020). The first victory of the National Council for the Defense of Democracy — Front for the Defense of Democracy was in 2005 elections in which the party secured absolute majority of the votes in the legislature which further allowed it to secure the office of the President in the indirect elections which were held soon after the parliamentary elections. The start year was hence set to be 2005. The President of Burundi was elected directly ever since 2010 presidential elections.

27. For **Cambodia**, I correct Templeman's (2010, p. 55) initial coding (start date July 1997) and calculate three consecutive victories based on electoral reports available at the IPU Electoral archive (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f).

28. For **Cameroon**, I correct Templeman's (2010. p.54) initial coding which includes start date of January 1960. I calculate the start date as the date of first elections after the unification of East Cameroon with West Cameroon in 1961, that is 1965. Based on Cameroon's 1961 Constitution, I code the case as Presidential at the time of the first electoral victory. Based on Mehler (1999), and by applying IDEA Electoral System Design coding rules (International IDEA, n.d.), I code electoral system family as "other" and electoral system for president as "FPTP".

29. Data on the term of office for cases of executive dominance in **Canada (I), Canada (II), Canada (III), Canada (IV), Canada (V), and Canada (VI)** cross-checked with the detailed information on former governments available at the official website of the Parliament of Canada (Parliament of Canada, n.d.), IPU Election archive reports (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f), and IPU Parline database (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-g).

30. New case of executive dominance identified in Chad. For **Chad**, I compared different sources to determine what was the dominant executive party and what where its victories, as well as whether there were three consecutive victories in at least multi-party setting (i.e. competitive authoritarian regime). The sources are: Römer (1999), A Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (Skaaning et al., 2015), and IFES Election Guide (International Foundation for Electoral Systems - IFES, n.d.-b).

31. New case of executive dominance identified in Chile as **Chile (I)**, covering a period of Radical Party rule. Electoral data was cross-checked with Nohlen (2005).

32. Case of executive dominance **Chile (II)** was identified based on Nwokora and Pelizzo (2014, p. 836) and Templeman (2010, p. 55). It is worth noting that Templeman (2010, p. 55) considers Chile to be the borderline case based on his requirement that the dominant party must rule for at least 20 years (in case of Chile that is exactly 240 months). Elsewhere, Templeman clarifies that "ruling parties in the US, El Salvador, and Chile finished just shy or right at 20 years before losing power" (Templeman, 2010, p. 39). However, as I do not impose arbitrary term duration requirements, I include Chile as a case. Start date was taken to be date when President of Concetracion coalition assumed office (in 1990), while the date of first electoral victory was set to the date of elections (1989).

33. Cases of executive dominance in Colombia, **Colombia (I)** and **Colombia (II)**, identified based on a review of history of elections and a list of heads of states provided by (Jaramillo & Franco-Cuervo, 2005). Electoral system type for both cases identified based on the review of the evolution of electoral provisions in Colombia since 1853 (Jaramillo & Franco-Cuervo, 2005, pp. 299-300).

Note: to keep coding consistency, the most significant electoral decline in case of **Colombia (I)** was calculated taking into account the percentage of votes

candidates of Conservative party won together, if there were multiple candidates from the same party as it happened in 1918 elections due to intra-party conflicts (Posada-Carbó, 1997). The 1918 presidential elections might merit further investigation by scholars interested in intra-party conflicts and their effects on one-party dominance. By this logic, the most significant decline occurred in 1922 presidential elections where the candidate from the Colombian Liberal party won 38.24 percent of the votes, while the candidate of Conservative party won 61.73 percent of the votes which is 32.35 percent less compared to what both candidates of the Conservative party won in 1918 elections.

34. Case of executive dominance **Colombia (III)** identified based on Nwokora and Pelizzo (2014, p. 836).

35. New case of executive dominance identified in Croatia. For **Croatia**, several sources were compared to determine the dominant party's three consecutive electoral victories and the types of political and electoral system. These sources are: electoral reports published at IPU Parline database (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-g), WhoGov database (Nyrup & Bramwell, 2020), and International IDEA Electoral System Design database (International IDEA, n.d.).

36. Case of executive dominance **Dominica (I)** identified based on Anckar's (2009, p. 41) list of cases of executive dominance. Compared to Anckar (2009, p. 37), I do not split the case of Dominica (I) in two time periods (this split is also done by Anckar for other cases studied) but observe it as one continuous case until

the time of dominant party's first defeat in 1995 elections. By updating the electoral data with a reference to IPU Election archive reports (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f) and IPU Parline database (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-g) for post-1995 period, I also identify the case of executive dominance **Dominica (II).**

37. The cases of executive dominance **Denmark (I)** identified based on a review of Danish governments since 1848 (The Office of the Prime Minister of Denmark, n.d.), the statistics on Danish elections between 1918 and 2022 (Danmarks Statistik, n.d.-a) and the Danish Statistical Yearbooks (Danmarks Statistik, n.d.-b).[2] Even though additional cases can be identified between 1900 and 1953 given that the parliamentary system of government was effective since 1901 (Folketinget, n.d.), the decision was made to include cases only from 1953 given that the principles of parliamentary government were formally written only in 1953 Constitutional act (Folketinget, n.d.)

38. **Denmark (II), Denmark (III) and Denmark (IV)** identified based on Nwokora and Pelizzo (2014)**.** While Denmark (II) and Denmark (III) are observed by Nwokora and Pelizzo (2014, p. 836) as a single case from 1976 until 1993, I distinguish the two cases given that two different parties were holding the highest executive office for three consecutive terms. Denmark (II) was coded

[2] For documents that were available only in Danish, machine translation was used to decipher the meaning of the electoral data.

to have an end date in 1982, after the new government lead by the Conservative Party replaced the Social Democratic Government formed after 1979 elections. The decision was made given that the rule of the Conservative Party was confirmed after 1984 elections. I code the year of turnover elections in this case as 1984.

39. The start date for **Djibouti** was set to first Presidential elections after the independence, that is 1981. Templeman (2010, p. 54) originally coded Djibouti as having a start date at the date of achieving Independence, that is June 1977, while Lindberg and Jones (2010. p. 204) identify it as a case of authoritarian dominant party system starting with 1992 legislative elections. Regarding "tcmv" variable, it is worth indicating here that People's Rally for Progress (RPP) never managed to win three consecutive victories in a multi-party setting. For example, it did win 1993 and 1999 contested presidential elections, but then in 2005 their candidate was unopposed. Hence, the case of Djibouti might be interesting for those scholars focusing on three consecutive victories in a multi-party setting. For political system type and electoral system type for the legislature and the president, data was cross-checked with Thibaut (1999a).

Note: the largest difference for presidential elections was taken to be that between 2005 and 2011 elections instead of that between 1987 and 1993 given that in 1987 Djibouti was still single-party autocracy. Although in 2005 the ruling party candidate won 100% of the votes (i.e. he was unopposed), genuine opposition

was allowed to contest but eventually decided to protest participating in elections.

40. New case of executive dominance identified in Dominica as **Dominica (I)**. Data on electoral results and government formation process for the post-independence period collected from Catón (2005).

41. To determine dominant executive party and the first three consecutive electoral victories in the case of **Dominica (II)**, I relied on the following sources: IPU election archive (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f), IPU Parline database (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-g), and historical overview of elections and electoral provisions by Catón (2005).

42. In their comparative analysis, Nwokora and Pelizzo (2014, p. 836) add the case of **Dominican Republic** after the introduction of free and competitive elections in 1978 and code it as dominant from 1986 to 1996. However, by checking relevant sources Brea Franco (2005), I also identify another case of executive dominance in Dominican Republic, **Dominican Republic (I)**, under authoritarian regime in which multi-party elections were held and the ruling party secured three consecutive electoral victories under competitive authoritarian regime [this is confirmed by referring to A Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (Skaaning et al., 2015)]. By checking new election data, a new case of executive dominance in Dominican Republic, **Dominican Republic (III)** [2004-2020], was added that was not included originally by Nwokora and Pelizzo (2014).

43. New case of executive dominance identified in Ecuador. Case of executive dominance **Ecuador (I)** identified based on a review of history of elections in Ecuador by Nohlen and Pachano (2005) and the electoral data for presidential elections between 1856 and 1988 (Supreme Electoral Tribunal of Ecuador, 1989). This case covers the period known as "Radical Liberalism" (Nohlen and Pachano, 2005, p. 365) during which the Ecuadorian Radical Liberal Party was the dominant executive party. Data on executive party and elections cross-checked with Intrastate Dispute Narratives of the Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management (DADM) Project (Mullenbach, 2024), while the data on electoral system type for the election of the President and the legislature were collected from Nohlen and Pachano (2005, pp. 373-376).

Note: the largest electoral decline of the dominant Radical Liberal party in presidential elections was calculated based on those elections in which the only other party which fielded candidates (Conservative Party) won most of the votes, that is in 1916. In previous elections, it was the dominant party fielding multiple candidates alone. Source: Nohlen (2005b).

44. **Ecuador (II)** was identified as a new case, not found in Nwokora and Pelizzo (2014) nor Templeman (2010). Sources used to confirm three consecutive multiparty victories and start and end date of executive dominance: WhoGov (Nyrup & Bramwell, 2020), and IFES Election Guide (International Foundation for Electoral Systems - IFES, n.d.-a).

45. The case of **Egypt** was taken from Templeman's (2010) database. I take the precise start and end dates from WhoGov database (Nyrup & Bramwell, 2020), while for the date of first multi-party elections I take the date of 2005 presidential referendum given that in that year Egypt was first coded as competitive authoritarian (i.e. having genuine opposition contesting multi-party elections) according to A Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (Skaaning et al., 2015). However, it is also worth noting that already during president Sadat (1970-1981) "policy of limited political liberalization" (Ries, 1999, p. 331) was pursued which during Mubarak's regime lead to the establishment of the first free parliamentary elections in 1984. Despite this partial liberalization, opposition was still repressed and intimidated which resulted in their boycotting of 1990 parliamentary elections (Ries, 1999, p. 331).

Note: Regarding the coding of the party system change outcome in the case of Egypt, I take into account the 2011 revolution and subsequent transfer of power to the military council "as-if" the date of defeat of incumbent president and code the party system change variables in the following way:

t (executive party defeat) = 2011 revolution, supreme leader is the leader military council, Tantawi, hence executive party variable shows "Military"

t + 1 (first elections after defeat) = 2012 presidential elections, Freedom and Justice coded as the executive party given that its candidate, Morsi, won

t + 2 (second elections after dominant party defeat) = 2014 presidential elections in which the rule of the former army leader, El-Sisi, who took charge of the country after 2013 demonstrations was confirmed in these elections

t + 3 (third elections after dominant party defeat) = 2018 presidential elections in which El-Sisi, officially as the independent candidate, was re-elected.

Party system change outcome = transformation

46. For the case of executive dominance **El Salvador (I)**, a book on the history of politics in El Salvador between 1880 and 1940 by Ching (2014) was consulted. As the National Democratic Party was created just before 1919 presidential elections (Ching, 2014, pp. 179-180), the start date is taken to be 1919. It is interesting to note that the period from 1927 until 1931, under the rule of President Bosque, is known for democratic reforms which Ching termed "an experiment with democracy" (Ching, 2014, p. 208). The end date is taken to be that of the military coup. Since the military ruler organized two consecutive single-party elections in which he secured victories with his newly founded Pro-Patria party (Ching, 2014, p. 262-278), after which he was forced to resign which was followed by another military coup (Intrastate Dispute Narratives for El Salvador in Mullenbach, 2024) and the almost five decade long military regime (Walter & Williams, 1993, p. 40), the party system change outcome is coded as

collapse given that the political parties and the system of interactions among parties were effectively non-existent for a period that covered more than what would otherwise be three regular electoral cycles after the defeat.

47. The case of executive dominance in **El Salvador (II)** identified based on Templeman (2010, p. 55). Data updated and cross-checked with: WhoGov (Nyrup & Bramwell, 2020), IFES Election Guide (International Foundation for Electoral Systems - IFES, n.d.-a), and Krennerich (2005).

48. The case of dominant party system in **Equatorial Guinea** was identified by Lindberg and Jones (2010, p. 205) as starting after 1993 legislative elections. However, as this is the case of a presidential type of political system, I set the start date to be the date of first presidential elections after independence in which the incumbent also had a political party, that is 1989 elections. As these elections were not multi-party, I also include the date of first multi-party elections and if the party secured three consecutive multi-party victories (tcmv variable has a value of 1 here). Cross-checked with Fleischhacker (1999), and IFES Election Guide (International Foundation for Electoral Systems - IFES, n.d.-a).

Note: legislative_dip displays a notable decrease in support for the dominant authoritarian party in 2004 legislative elections which is the result of the votes being almost split between it and its allies in the form of the so-called "Democratic Opposition", while the genuine opposition party Social Democratic Rally (CPDS) barely managed to win any seats. However, this is still

an interesting finding given that in the next elections, the dominant party vote share and seat share increased significantly compared to that of its ally, Democratic Opposition. Therefore, it can still be interesting for scholars of dominant parties and party systems to examine what caused the 2004 electoral outcome and why the dominant party has to rely on other parties to achieve full dominance. More on politics in Equatorial Guinea can be found in Sá and Rodrigues Sanches (2021).

49. Unlike Templeman (2010, p. 55), I set the start date for **Ethiopia** to be the date of first parliamentary elections after the transitional period (1991-1995) and the adoption of the Constitution. Templeman originally set the start date to be the date of the 1991 coup which installed Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), however, as I calculate the start date based on forming government after elections I moved the start date to 1995. Start date and the dates of three consecutive electoral victories cross-checked with IPU Election Archive (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f).

Note: there are unfortunately no precise information on the results of 2000 legislative elections regarding the vote share of each party, so no data can be precisely estimated for legislative_dip, although it is obvious that the ruling EPRDF lost significant support in 2005 elections which are marked in the literature as most competitive in Ethiopian multi-party history (Lyons, 2010). Hence, the year is present in the dataset, but not the percentage difference.

50. Due to specificities of the French semi-presidential political system which features the process of evolving "presidentialization" of the political system since 1958 (Bachelot & Haegel, 2015), some decisions had to be made on how to code executive party in the case of **France** and how to set start and end date of the dominant executive party in this case. I follow the decision of experts behind The Database on Political Instutitions (Beck et al., 2000) and by checking 1958 Constitution code the system as Parliamentary. The 1958 elections as a start date seem reasonable both because of applying the DPI coding rules to 1958 Constitution and because the first direct elections for the President were held in 1962 (Wahl and Quermonne, 1995 in Thiébault, 2016). The end date is set to the year of presidential elections when the Gaullist dominant party (Union of Democrats for the Republic, UDR) finally lost its dominance over both the position of the head of state and head of government, while for the first, second, and third elections after the defeat I calculate legislative elections due to the consistency in coding the political system after the rules set out by experts behind the DPI database and the fact that there were episodes of cohabitation in the given period, justifying the decision to look at the position of the head of government. In any case, the party system change outcome would not change (that is, it would still be transformation no matter if presidential or legislative elections are taken for t, t+1, t+2, and t+3).

51. Start date for **Gabon** was corrected compared to Templeman (2010, p. 55) so to display March 1967 not March 1968. On 19 March 1967, presidential elections were held that confirmed the rule of Gabonese Democratic Party's (BDG) leader, Léon M'Ba (see Fleischhacker, 1999b). Electoral system type cross-checked with Fleischhacker (1999b), political system type determined based on a review of 1961 constitution in line with DPI2020 database coding rules. Data was also cross-checked with the Department Of State, The Office of Electronic Information (n.d.).

52. For **Gambia (I)**, I set as start date the date of first parliamentary elections since the achievement of independence, that is 26 May 1966 (Bendel, 1999a). Gambia was at the time a constitutional monarchy with British monarch as the head of the state (U.S. Department Of State, n.d.-a), and in 1970 it became a republic with a presidential system (see Constitution of Gambia from April 1970, Chapter V).

53. For **Gambia (II)**, data on presidential elections was collected from IFES Election Guide database (International Foundation for Electoral Systems - IFES, n.d.-a)

54. Data for **Germany** cross-checked with IPU Election archive (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f), and IPU Parline database (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-g).

55. Data for **Germany, West (I), Germany, West (II), and Germany, West (III)** cross-checked with the information provided by the Office of the Federal Chancellor (Press and Information Office of the Federal Government n.d.), and The Federal Returning Officer (n.d.).

56. **Germany, West (III)** is a somewhat peculiar case due to the fact that the executive rule started by one party in one state has been extended in a unified state by that same party. In this case, different approaches to studying party system change can be identified, ranging from those that treat the 1990 German Unification as leading to a simple merger of the two party systems to those that recognize that even in the unified Germany there exist 'West' and 'East' component of the party system (Niedermayer, 2005; Saalfeld, 2002). For the purpose of coding executive dominance in the GDPS dataset, two relevant studies are taken into account: that of Saalfeld (2002) in which its elaborated that the German Unification led to a party system merger in which the already existing party system of the West Germany was enlarged by the inclusion of one more party from the East Germany and the electorate expanded by inclusion of the electorate from the East Germany (Saalfeld, 2002, p. 101); and that of Niedermayer (2005) in which it is claimed that the merger of the two party systems in 1990 produced a 'restricted' variant of party system change [i.e. limited or low degree party system change which is below 'general' and 'transformation' outcomes according to Smith's (1989) framework] which did not alter the core

elements of the party system developed in the West Germany (Nidermayer, 2005, p. 138). Taking these arguments into consideration, executive dominance was coded as having started during the time of two separate states, in West Germany, and then continued in unified Germany after the expansion of the party system due to the Unification. However, this decision can also be contested or amended. For example, the case can be re-coded to Germany (I) which would also require re-coding previously mentioned case to Germany (II) or even excluded due to the unification event. To identify the Chancellors of West and unified Germany the official representation of the list of Federal Chancellors was used (Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, n.d.).

57. Data for **Greece** corrected compared to Nwokora and Pelizzo (2014, p. 836). They initially coded start date as 1982, however, PASOK has not formed three, but two consecutive governments after the elections in 1981 and 1985, hence I code start date from 1993 which is the date of the first out of three consecutive elections which were followed by government formation process led by PASOK. Data for executive parties cross-checked with WhoGov (Nyrup & Bramwell, 2020), and IPU Election archive (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f).

58. For **Grenada**, I compared several sources to determine the dates of executive dominance and the executive parties for t, t+1, t+2, and t+3. These sources are: election reports available at IPU Election archive (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f), official list of prime ministers of Grenada (Government of Grenada,

n.d.), and historical overview of the political and electoral system by Baukhage and Hillebrands (2005).

59. Start date for **Guinea (I)** moved from 1984 (Templeman, 2010, p. 55) to 1993. This decision was made based on review of historical and political circumstances in Guinea which indicate that the leader of a dominant party came to power in 1984 through military coup which was followed by absence of party politics until April 1992 (Brüne, 1999, pp. 447-448). Therefore, I take presidential elections held in 1993 to be the first electoral victory of the dominant Unity and Progress Party (PUP) and observe three elections after its deposition via coup in 2008 (coup is treated "as-if" date of turnover elections).

60. New case of **Guinea (II)** was identified based on a overview of electoral results (International Foundation for Electoral Systems - IFES, n.d.-a) and WhoGov database (Nyrup & Bramwell, 2020).

    Note: in both **Guinea (I)** and **Guinea (II)** the dominant parties increased over time both their vote share in presidential and legislative elections, hence the variables measuring decline in legislative and presidential elections show "999" values.

61. New case of **Guyana (I)** identified based on the overview of historical and political system by Trefs (2005), cross-checked with the reports from IPU Election archive (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f).

Note: the dominant party only increased its vote share from 1973 elections until its defeat in 1992 elections. Per Nohlen (2005a, 366-367) these are:

1973 - 70.1%

1980 - 77.7%

1985 - 78.5%

62. For **Guyana (II)**, results of elections were gathered from Nohlen (2005a), IPU Election Archives (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f) and Guyana's Electoral Commission official publications (Guyana Elections Commission, n.d.).

63. New case of **Honduras** identified based on overview of electoral results (International Foundation for Electoral Systems - IFES, n.d.-a; Nyrup & Bramwell, 2020).

64. New case of executive dominance identified in Hungary. Electoral data for **Hungary** cross-checked with IPU Election archive (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f) and IPU Parline database (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-g).

Note: the case of **Hungary** is somewhat peculiar due to changes in electoral rules over time, especially during the executive dominance of FIDESZ. The way the electoral change is calculated in this case is that for 2010 elections the results for regional lists, also called "territorial votes" (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-a), were compared to 2014 results for national party lists (although this is of course imperfect comparison). Source of data: National Election Office (n.d.).

65. For the case of executive dominance **Iceland (I)**, electoral data was collected from the official statistics database (Statistics Iceland, n.d.), while the data on prime ministers was cross-checked with the official list of prime ministers (Government of Iceland, n.d.). Data on electoral system type was collected from Renwick (n.d.) and the 1944 Constitution of Iceland.

66. For **Iceland (II)**, I changed coding of the start date compared to Nwokora and Pelizzo (2014, p. 836) who originally take the case to have started in 1980 and ended in 2009. I move the start date to 1987 elections given the fact that governments formed after 1980 and 1983 were not composed of the same coalition (1979 included Progressive Party, Independence Party, and People's Alliance and was headed by the Independence Party, while 1987 elections resulted in a coalition between Progressive and Independence Party in which Progressive Party assumed the highest executive office). Since 1987 elections and until 2009 elections, it was persistently the same party, Independence Party, assuming highest executive office after the elections, even though it rotated sometimes with its coalition partners during the term. Therefore, it is from 1987 to 2009 that I consider Iceland to be a case of executive dominance in which the same party persistently held highest executive office in coalition with other parties. The data was cross-checked with reports available at IPU Election archive (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f).

67. For **India (I)**, I move the start date from 1947 (Templeman, 2010. p. 56) to the date of the first electoral victory after independence, 1952.

68. New case of executive dominance in **India (II)** was recorded based on the results of the 2014, 2019, and 2024 elections. Data was cross-checked with electoral reports available at IPU Parline database (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-g).

69. New case of executive dominance was identified in **Indonesia**, and the start date was set for the first elections after which political parties were formally allowed to exist. Formal organization of political parties was introduced with 1969 election law (Rüland, 2004. p. 85). Since after 1957 the highest executive office in Indonesia was that of the President which was since 1973 filled through indirect elections by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) per acclamation (Rüland, 2004, p. 93), I take parliamentary elections as relevant for determining executive parties. First direct presidential elections were held on 5 July 2004 (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-e), so for a period after 2004 I focus on dates of presidential elections to determine party system change outcome.

70. Case of executive dominance **Ireland (I)** was identified that was previously not mentioned in Templeman (2010) or Nwokora and Pelizzo (2014). For this case, I set the start date to be the date of first elections after the adoption of the Constitution of Ireland in 1937. Data for executive party was cross-checked with the data published by the Government of Ireland (2018) and Gallagher (1993).

71. Case of executive dominance **Ireland (II)** was identified that was previously not mentioned in Templeman (2010) or Nwokora and Pelizzo (2014). The start and end dates confirmed by the overview of former prime ministers of Irealnd (Government of Ireland, 2018).

72. Case of executive dominance **Ireland (III)** identified based on Nwokora and Pelizzo (2014, p. 836).

73. **Israel (I)** start date moved from 1948 (originally coded as such by Templeman, 2010, p. 54) to the date of the first elections after the independence, that is elections for the Constituent Assembly which were followed by the first Government of Israel in 1949. Data for Israel (I) cross-checked with the official information on the former governments published by The National Library of Israel (n.d.), and The Knesset (The State of Israel - The Knesset, n.d.). Additionally, data was checked with Ries (2004).

74. The case of executive dominance in Israel, **Israel (II)**, identified based on the electoral reports available at IPU Election archive (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f) and IPU Parline database (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-g), as well as with data from WhoGov database (Nyrup & Bramwell, 2020). See the note on excluded cases for a clarification on what could have also been included as Israel (II) meaning that this case would then become Israel (III).

75. In the case of **Italy**, I change Templeman's (2010, p. 54) initial coding of Democrazia Christiana (DC) start date of executive dominance (December 1945)

and set it to be the date of the first post-WWII elections. Regarding the party system change outcome, my initial coding, transformation, can be contested due to the different scholarly views on party system change in Italy. For example, in the literature on party system collapse, Italy is taken as one of the rare examples of the most dramatic variant of party system change, that is party system collapse, whereby 1994 legislative elections are taken as crucial elections which marked the end of the dominant party system (Morgan, 2011, p. 29). If we adopt this view, party system change in Italy can be coded as collapse. However, as I rely on the works of Mair (1989) and Smith (1989) who underline the importance of identifying the change in the core of the party system, that is the change in the government formation process, I take that DC's inability to take the highest executive position after 1983 elections, makes 1983 elections crucial for understanding the process of party system change in this case. My view is similar to the view of scholars who argue that the roots of party system change in Italy can be traced back to the 1980s. For example, in a chapter on "The Great Transformation" In Italy, Morlino and Bardi (1994) argue that the great changes in Italian party system of 1992-1993 can only be partially explained by reference to the events from those years and require going back decades in the past to understand how the transformative processes were unleashed (Morlino & Bardi, 1994, p. 271). In the analysis of "The Decomposition of the Italian Party System (1991-1994)" Sabu and Segatti (2001, p. 167) explain that already during 1980s

there were indicators of the change of the political system. Additionally, Donovan (1992, p. 172) also identifies the change in government formula in the 1980s. The change in government formula came after 1983 elections when the *pentapartito formula* (five-party formula) was invented in which the DC for the first time had to let the other party lead the government (Wertman, 1986). Taking into consideration the change of government formula after 1983 elections, which was defined by the inability of the Christian Democrats (DC) to take the highest executive position in the country after the elections for the first time, I code 1983 elections as the turnover elections and observe the results of the government formation after the 1987, 1992, and 1994 elections which leads me to code the party system change as transformation rather than collapse.

76. For **Ivory Coast (I)**, the start date was set to be the date of the first post-Independence presidential elections in 1960. Data on executive party, political system type and electoral system type was cross-checked with Hartmann (1999) and IFES Election Guide (International Foundation for Electoral Systems - IFES, n.d.-a). Since the rule of the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire was ended in a military coup in December 1999 after which came the 10-month long transitional rule (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-d), followed by a subsequent victory in the presidential elections of the Ivorian Popular Front, I code party system outcome as transformation. However, this decision can be contested if military rule is discarded from the date of turnover elections (t) and IPF victory

taken at the date of turnover elections. That argumentation would lead to changing the coding of party system outcome to "alternation" given that the three consecutive presidential victories by the Rally of The Republicans would be taken as occurring quickly, that is not later than 1 electoral cycle after the defeat of the old dominant party (t+1. t+2, and t+3).

77. Data for **Ivory Coast (II)** cross-checked with IFES Election Guide (International Foundation for Electoral Systems - IFES, n.d.-a).

Note: in both **Ivory Coast (I)** and **Ivory Coast (II)** cases, the dominant parties only increased vote support in presidential elections over time, hence the values of "999" for presidential_dip variables.

78. New case of executive dominance in **Jamaica** identified based on the review of the history of elections and executive parties. Data was cross-checked with Wüst (2005) and IPU Election archive (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-g).

Note: the largest electoral decline was calculated based on detailed election reports provided by Electoral Commission of Jamaica (n.d.).

79. The start date for **Japan (I)** is set according to the common agreement in the literature on Japanese party system which considers 1955 to be the start date of the establishment of the "system of 55" (Klein, 2004, p. 356) which lasted until LDP's first defeat in 1993 elections. It is worth noting that LDP was created soon after 1955 elections as a merger of parties that held highest executive

position in the time period before 1955 elections: after 1952 elections (Liberal Party), and 1953 elections (Japan Democratic Party).

80. For **Japan (II)**, the decline in legislative_dip reflects the decline in votes for party lists in PR part of the electoral system

81. Up to July 2024, which is the end date for data collection for GDPS Dataset 1.0, the electoral data for **Japan (III)** indicate that LDP only increased its vote share in elections.

82. New case of executive dominance identified in **Kazakhstan** based on the review of history of elections (von Gumppenberg, 2004) and most recent election results (International Foundation for Electoral Systems - IFES, n.d.-a). Start date was set to be the date of 2005 presidential elections given that Kazakhstan has a presidential type of political system and that the first president ran twice as independent candidate (in 1991 and 1999), until his party, Otan, was formed in 1999 to contest elections.

83. The case of executive dominance in **Kenya** identified based on Templeman (2010, p. 54). Start date was moved from 1963 to 1969 given that at the time when 1963 elections were held Kenya was still not formally an independent state (independence was achieved in December 1963). It is important to note that there was an institution of the Prime Minister before independence which was the highest executive office at the time, but this institution was abolished soon after independence, with the office of the President becoming the highest

executive office in the country (D. Hartmann, 1999, p. 491). Taking this into consideration, the start date was moved to 1969 general elections when the president was for the first time formally elected since the country became independent (albeit without any competition). Then, the dates of the subsequent general elections were taken into account for coding second and third consecutive victory due to the fact that the presidential elections were organized concurrently with the parliamentary elections until 1992 (D. Hartmann, 1999, pp. 479-488).

84. **Kiribati** is a peculiar case in the literature on parties and party systems. Due to the specific combination of campaigns that focus on individual candidates and a lack of formal regulations on the organization of political parties, Kiribati is usually taken by scholars studying parties and party systems as one of the rare democracies without parties. In the study of one-party dominance, Anckar (1997, p. 248), for example, considers Kiribati as a case of a small democracy without parties. However, there are arguments in favor of treating Kiribati as a case with parties and a party system, especially since 1989 elections. Somoza (2004, p. 674) has explained in a case study of Kiribati's electoral system that even though parties do not formally exist except as loose organizations of individuals, these groups have shown over time a tendency to develop discipline in parliament. Furthermore, over time some of these groups named parties have even adopted formal constitutions and developed formal leadership (Van Trease, 1992, p. 67),

which does make them look more like typical political parties which can justify analyzing Kiribati as having a party system, at least since 1989 elections. Regarding the latter, IPU Election archive reports (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f) also track this change in political party development. In 1983 election report it is stated that there are no political parties and that all candidates ran as independents, while in 1994 report political parties appear in a report for the first time, both in the election results section and political dynamics after elections section. Additionally, according to the currently available Rules of Procedure (Maneaba ni Maungatabu, n.d.), which were last amended in 2010, there is the recognition of the leader of opposition for which it is stated that it can be the leader of the largest party in Parliament (Article 13), while in the section on the General Committes is stated that the members of committees shall be representative "of all parties and groups represented in the Maneaba" (Article 68, Section 1). Taking all into consideration, I decide to include **Kiribati (I)** as a case starting with the Protect the Manabea (MTM) 1994 electoral victory.

85. Upon further update of electoral data for Kiribati, I identify a new case of executive dominance, **Kiribati (II)**. Data cross-checked with electoral reports at IPU Parline database (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-g). See previous note for the detailed explanation on the peculiarities of the Kiribati politics.

86. While Bogaards (2004, p.180) codes **Lesotho** as dominant according to Sartori's rules already since 1993 legislative elections, I move the start date to 1998

elections given the fact that the period between 1993 and 1997 "was rocked by several military revolts and a royal coup" (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1998). Additionally, the ruling party, Basotho Congress Party (BCP), suffered a split in which the faction loyal to the ruling Prime Minister (Lesotho Congress for Democracy, LCD) won in 1998 elections. Data updated and cross-checked with: IPU Election Archive (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f), IPU Parline database (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-g), and Engel (1999).

87. For the case of executive dominance **Luxembourg (I)**, the end date was set to be the date of Nazi occupation in 1940. The party system change variables consequently reflect the fact that the turnover in power was caused by military at time *t*. Given that the successor of the pre-WWII Party of the Right formed governments as soon as the first three consecutive elections after the country was liberated, the party system change outcome is coded as interrupted dominance. Data on governments of Luxembourg for the given period were cross-checked with official publication on the former governments since 1848 (The Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, 2011), and electoral data was cross-checked with CLEA dataset (Kollman et al., 2019). Data for electoral system type was collected from the official historical overview of elections in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (Parliament of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, n.d.). Note: from 1841 until 1919 the electoral system type was the majority/plurality, and from 1919 List PR system was used.

88. For the case of executive dominance **Luxembourg (II)**, data was cross-checked with the official publication on elections in The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg between 1945 and 1989 (The Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, n.d.), and the list of prime ministers since 1848 (The Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, 2011).

89. While Nwokora and Pelizzo (2014, p. 836) identify Luxembourg as a case from 1980 to 2010, I also identify a prior case of executive dominance in Luxembourg. For **Luxembourg (III)**, I cross-check the data with official election reports for a period from 1945 to 1989 available at the Luxembourgish open data platform (The Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, n.d.) and election reports since 1974 elections provided at IPU Election archive (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f).

90. Case of executive dominance was identified in **Malawi**. Even though Malawi was ruled since independence in 1964 until 1994 general elections by President Banda and his Malawi Congress Party (MCP) (Meinhardt, 1999), this period does not satisfy minimum criteria for being included in the database first and foremost due to the fact that the President, as the holder of the highest executive office, was never elected. The first presidential elections took place in 1994 and they marked the end of Banda's authoritarian single-party rule and the beginning of a dominant party system with United Democratic Front (UDF) as the new executive party that confirmed its executive dominance in multi-party elections.

Therefore, I include Malawi for the period of UDF's executive dominance. Given that President Mutharika resigned from UDF on 5 February 2005 (U.S. Department Of State, n.d.-b), shortly after UDF secured third consecutive electoral victory, I code as end date the 5 February 2005 and the year of electoral defeat the year of 2009 elections when Mutharika won a new mandate with his new party, Democratic Progressive Party. Data for elections was cross-checked with reports available at IPU Election archive (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f) and IFES Election Guide (International Foundation for Electoral Systems - IFES, n.d.-a). Another view on this case is provided by Lindberg and Jones (2010, p. 205) who code it as 'non-dominant' given that the ruling party won less than 50% of the seats in the three consecutive legislative elections of 1994, 1999, and 2004.

91. For **Malaysia**, I shift the start date to the date of first parliamentary elections after independence in 1959, which is different compared to Templeman (2010, p. 54) who codes it since the date of independence that is, since 1957. I updated the data on executive parties up to 2024, based on WhoGov database (Nyrup & Bramwell, 2020) and IPU Parline database (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-g).

92. Case of **Malta (I)** identified based on Anckar (2009) and updated based on IPU Election archive reports (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f), while case of **Malta (II)** was identified based on Nwokora and Pelizzo (2014) and updated based on IPU Election archive (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f). Upon further research,

case of **Malta (III)** was identified and data was cross-checked between WhoGov database (Nyrup & Bramwell, 2020), IPU Parline database (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-g), and the official website of the Prime Minister of Malta (The Government of Malta, n.d.).

93. Case of **Mauritania (I)** identified based on Bogaards (2004, p. 181) and further updated based IFES Election Guide (International Foundation for Electoral Systems - IFES, n.d.-a). New electoral data reveals another case of executive dominance, **Mauritania (II)**. Data for the more recent case cross-checked with IFES Election Guide (International Foundation for Electoral Systems - IFES, n.d.-a).

94. Case of **Mauritius** after 1991 was mentioned by Anckar but only briefly as a case of dominant party "open to interpretation" (Anckar, 1997, p.252) due to the fact that the party rules in coalition, not alone. However, for the purpose of my database, Mauritius satisfies the criteria as the same party, Militant Socialist Movement (MSM), persistently held the highest executive office for at least three times a in a row, after elections. Data for Mauritius was cross-checked with historical review of elections in Mauritius (Krennerich, 1999a) and IPU election archive reports (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f).

95. In the case of **Mexico**, the question is where to set the start date of PRI's executive dominance. Templeman (2010, p. 54), for example, set the start date in December 1924, while Nwokora and Pelizzo (2014, p. 837) include Mexico in

their universe of dominant party democratic systems from 1975. I believe Greene's (2007, p. 1) argument about PRI and its predecessor parties winning every presidential election from 1929 to 2000 makes a good justification to focus on 1929 presidential elections as a start date of PRI's executive dominance. Exact date of 1929 presidential elections determined in a review of Hackett (1930).

96. The case of **Moldova** is a borderline case because of specifies of its constitutional reforms regarding the election of the President. While in 1991 and 1996 President of Moldova was elected directly by the voters in presidential elections, the norms changed so that the President became indirectly elected by Parliament from 2001 to 2016 and a 3/5 majority was required for the election, otherwise it was required that the parliament is dissolved, and new elections are held. In 2016 revision of the Constitution, direct elections for the President were re-established. The executive dominance of Moldova's Communist Party falls exactly during the period where the President was elected indirectly, hence I check the constitutional powers assigned to the President to establish what was the highest executive office in the country that is elected after the elections. In this case, what did not change since 1994 Constitution despite constitutional revisions regarding how the President is elected are the Presidential powers: they are at the level of ceremonial President typical of parliamentary systems. Chapter V of both 1994 and 2016 Constitution proclaim that the President is the protector of national sovereignty and unity and that most importantly he/she has

to sign laws adopted by the Parliament, even if he/she returns them for re-consideration (the procedure for re-adoption remains the same, hence no veto). Furthermore, even if the President can adopt decrees in special cases, these are countersigned by the Prime Minister. Hence, in this case, I code Prime Minister as the most important executive office in the country and since the same party did manage to secure the position of the PM for three times in a row, even despite the failure to elect President after the third victory, the case of Moldova enters the database. Data for executive party and dates of elections was cross-checked with IPU election archive (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f) and WhoGov database (Nyrup & Bramwell, 2020).

97. The case of **Mongolia (I)** was identified based on Templeman (2010, p. 54). Compared to Templeman (2010, p. 54), start date was shifted to the date of first legislative elections since "complete independence" (Gluchowski & Grotz, 2004, p. 482), that is, 1951 legislative elections. The first competitive elections were held in 1990 and the ruling Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MAN) managed to confirm its executive dominance two times in a row, in 1990 and 1992 legislative elections. Since the political system type changed to presidential in 1994, I code as the end date the date of new government formation after 1996 legislative elections. After 1996 legislative elections the MAN party lost the position of the Prime Minister, and having previously also lost the position of the President in 1993 elections, this constitutes the end of executive dominance.

Data was cross-checked with historical overview of elections in Mongolia (Gluchowski & Grotz, 2004), WhoGov database (Nyrup & Bramwell, 2020), and IPU election archive (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f).

98. New case of executive dominance in Mongolia was identified based on the updated electoral results. In case of **Mongolia (II)** I focus on presidential elections given that in 1994 political system changed to presidential which was captured by the DPI2020 database (Nyrup & Bramwell, 2020). Data for executive party was cross-checked with IFES Election Guide (International Foundation for Electoral Systems - IFES, n.d.-a).

99. New case of executive dominance identified in **Montenegro**. Since Montenegro is not included in the DPI2020 database, its political system was coded by applying the rules of the DPI2020 Database (Cruz et al., 2021) to the 2006 Constitution. Even though Montenegro's dominant party, Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), ruled the country since 1990 (Komar & Živković, 2016), the start date was set to be the date of the first government formed after the first elections since the country achieved independence, that is in 2006.

100. For **Mozambique**, I shift the start date from achievement of Independence in 1974 (as coded by Templeman, 2010) to the date of first direct elections for the highest executive office, that is the office of the president in 1994 (see Krennerich, 1999b, p. 656).

101. For **Namibia**, there are different approaches how to determine start dates for executive dominance. For example, Bogaards (2004, p. 181) and Lindberg and Jones (2010, p. 206) count the pre-independence elections for the constituent assembly in 1989 as the first out of three consecutive victories that established dominant party system, while Templeman (2010, p. 55) counts as the start date the date of achieving independence, that is March 1990. According to the rules I set for my database, I set the start date to be the date of first post-independence elections for the highest executive office, and in this case that is the date of general elections in 1994.

102. For the case of executive dominance **Netherlands (I)**, electoral data was cross-checked with the data on elections from 1918 until 2006 available at the Open Data portal (CBS open data StatLine) of the Central Statistics Bureau of Netherlands (Central Statistics Bureau of Netherlands, n.d.). Data on executive party cross-checked with WhoGov dataset (Nyrup & Bramwell, 2020).

103. Although Nwokora and Pelizzo (2014, p. 837) originally identified **Netherlands (II)** as continuous dominance from 1975 to 1994 and for some reason as alternating from 1975 to 2003, I correct this to reflect the fact that Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) formed governments and held the position of the Prime Minister after elections in 1977, 1980, 1982, 1986, and 1989, but not after 1994 when Labour party (PvDA) took over and changed the pattern of government formation by forming another government after subsequent 1998

elections. Given that governments were then formed by CDA again after 2002, 2003, and 2006 elections, this constitutes a case of transformation, rather than either continuous, interrupted or alternating dominance by Nwokora and Pelizzo's own standards (check their discussion of temporal aspects of dominance on page 830 and their note 7 on the operationalization of interrupted dominance on page 841). Upon updating electoral data and data on executive dominance, I also include the cases of executive dominance during Balkenende governments (2002-2010), which is **Netherlands (III)**, and executive dominance under VVD leadership (2010-2024), which is **Netherlands (IV)**.

Note: for **Netherlands (IV)**, even though the VVD was part of the government after 2023 elections, the electoral change was calculated for the period until 2023 elections since the outcome of 2023 elections was that an independent candidate took over the position of the Prime Minister. Therefore, the continuity of VVD executive dominance can be taken to have lasted until 2023.

104. Data for cases of executive dominance **New Zealand (I)** and **New Zealand (II)** was cross-checked with the list of prime ministers since 1856 with exact terms of office (New Zealand Parliament, 2023) and an overview of general elections from 1853 until 2020 (Electoral Commission New Zealand, n.d.). Data on electoral system type was cross-checked with the official government web page dedicated to elections (New Zealand Government, n.d.).

105. In their universe of democratic dominant party systems, Nwokora and Pelizzo (2014, p. 837) identify New Zealand (I), which is **New Zealand (III)** in GDPS dataset, as a case from 1975 to 1984 and New Zealand (II) as a case from 1991 to 2008. However, I change the coding for Nwokora and Pelizo's New Zealand (II), so it now includes a case of National Party executive dominance between 1990 and 1999 [which is **New Zealand (IV)** in my database], while the period of Labour Party executive dominance from 1999 to 2008 now becomes a **New Zealand (V)** case. The logic behind Nwokora and Pelizzo's decision was to join the two time periods when dominant executive parties ruled in coalition, which was not a characteristic of a case of New Zealand (I). Upon further inspection of electoral and data on government formation, I identify a new case of executive dominance in New Zealand. **New Zealand (VI)** is a case of National Party executive dominance from 2008 until 2017. Electoral and data for government formation were cross-checked with electoral reports available at IPU Election archive (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f) and IPU Parline database (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-g).

Note: for **New Zealand** cases, to determine the largest electoral decline of each dominant party, data on past elections from Electoral Commission of New Zealand (n.d.) was used.

106. Case of executive dominance **Nicaragua (I)** identified based on the review of the history of dominant party rule in Nicaragua by Vanden (1999). Dates of

elections and military coups cross-checked with Krennerich (2005b). Data for electoral system type collected from Colomer (2004, pp. 77-78) and Krennerich (2005b, pp. 483-484).

107. New case of executive dominance identified in **Nicaragua (II)**. Data cross-checked with IFES Election Guide (International Foundation for Electoral Systems - IFES, n.d.-a) and WhoGov database (Nyrup & Bramwell, 2020).

Note: in case of **Nicaragua (II)**, the dominant FSLN increased over time both vote share in presidential and legislative elections, hence "999" is displayed in corresponding variables measuring the decline of electoral support.

108. New case of executive dominance identified in Nigeria. Electoral data for **Nigeria (I)** and **Nigeria (II)** cross-checked with IFES Election Guide (International Foundation for Electoral Systems - IFES, n.d.-a) and WhoGov database (Nyrup & Bramwell, 2020).

Note: for **Nigeria (I)**, there is unfortunately missing data for several legislative elections post-2003, hence no data could be calculated for legislative electoral dip. For **Nigeria (II)**, due to lack of precise data results elsewhere, the data for presidential elections was obtained from Stears (n.d.), the data and financial company which provides various kind of data on Africa. They have aggregated the official data from Nigeria Independent Electoral Commission which otherwise do not show total votes won per candidate for 2023 elections. Data

on legislative elections (vote share in percentages) was unfortunately not found at the time of GDPS dataset creation.

109. New case of executive dominance identified in **North Macedonia** (formerly known as Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). Data was cross-checked with IPU Election archive (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.; the data was stored under previous country name), and IPU Parline database (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-g).

110. The case of executive dominance in **Norway** was identified based on Templeman (2010, p. 54), but the start the date was corrected so to include first parliamentary elections after the end of German occupation. Germany occupied Norway in 1940 and established an occupational regime which lasted until 1945 (Hetland et al., 2021). Additionally, I do not code the end of the Labour executive dominance in 1963 when a 28-day government lead by Conservatives took over, but at 1965 when Labour finally lost in elections (they managed to regain power in parliament quickly in 1963). Data on Prime Ministers since 1945 cross-checked with the official list of Norwegian Prime Ministers since 1814 (Government of Norway, 2024) and IPU Election archive election reports (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f).

111. New case of executive dominance identified in Paraguay, coded as **Paraguay (I)**. This case includes the period of six consecutive presidential electoral victories of the Liberal Party and ends on the date when Liberal Party president was deposed

in a military coup. For this case, I checked the overview of Paraguay's electoral history in Nohlen Data Book on elections in the Americas (Vol. II South America), and the detailed explanation of the political dynamics in Paraguay since 1904 provided by the Intrastate Dispute Narratives which are part of the Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management (DADM) Project (Mullenbach, 2024).

112. For the case of executive dominance in **Paraguay (II)**, a couple of explanations are necessary. First of all, the main medium to large-N comparative works on dominant parties and dominant party systems I rely on code the starting point of Colorado Party executive dominance differently. While Templeman (2010, p. 54) accepts the period of authoritarian rule since 1948, Nwokora and Pelizzo (2014, p. 837) include Colorado Party executive dominance for a more democratic period of rule, that is since 1975. However, since there were a military coup and a removal of military rule after Juan Natalicio Gonzalez from Colorado Party was elected president in 1948, with the first deposing President Gonalez in January 1949 and the other leading to the withdrawal of General Rolon from office in February (Mullenbach, 2024), I set as the start date for **Paraguay (II)** 14 May 1949 when interim President Felipe Benigno Molas was confirmed President after elections, starting the almost six decade long CP rule.

113. Based on the updated data on government formation and dates of elections for Paraguay after 2008 (International Foundation for Electoral Systems - IFES, n.d.-a), the case of executive dominance **Paruagay (III)** was identified.

114. Case of executive dominance **Peru** identified based on Nwokora and Pelizzo (2014, p. 837).

Note: the electoral dip of Fujimori's party in legislative elections was calculated taking into account the results of April 2000 general elections given that they were held prior to his resignation later that year due to a bribery scandal (resigned in November). Data was sourced from the Political Database of the Americas (Georgetown University, n.d.).

115. New case of executive dominance identified in Portugal: **Portugal (I) and Portugal (II)**. Since according to 1976 Constitution, Section 3 (also kept with 2005 revisions), the President of Portugal has the right to veto any legislation adopted by the Assembly of the Republic for which the Assembly then needs a supermajority of the votes to override the veto and since the President can both appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister, I take that the President of the Republic in this semi-presidential system is the highest executive office and check for Presidential elections. This is also confirmed by DPI2020 database which codes Portugal as "Assembly-Elected" political system type to reflect the fact that it is a semi-presidential system (see their explanation under "Chief Executive Variables" in the DPI2020 Database of Political Institutions: Changes and

Variable Definitions), and also takes the Socialist Party (PS) to be the executive party from 1987 to 2007.

116. In the case of **Russia**, Templeman (2010, p. 55) set the start date of United Russia executive dominance in 1991. As United Russia did not exist at the time, this coding would make sense if we could trace the United Russia's predecessor party back to 1991 Presidential elections. However, as the predecessor of United Russia is Unity, and Unity itself was a splinter party from Our Home is Russia (Roberts, 2011, "The Fall of Our Home is Russia, the Rise of the Unity Project"), then the starting point of United Russia executive dominance can be taken to be the 2000 Presidential elections. In 2001, Unity merged with Fatherland and All-Russia to form United Russia (Roberts, 2011, "The Creation of the All-National Party"). Although Putin was already President in January 2000, I set the start date to be the date of the presidential elections in March 2000 when his presidency was confirmed in the elections.

117. New case of executive dominance identified in **Rwanda**. Electoral data cross-checked with IFES Election Guide (International Foundation for Electoral Systems - IFES, n.d.-a).

118. For the case of **Samoa**, Templeman (2010, p. 54) set the start date to be 1988. However, based on cross-check with IPU Election archive reports for Samoa (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f) and historical overview by So'o (2004) I set

as the start date 1982 when the Human Rights Protection Party achieved its first electoral victory and formed its first government.

119. For the case of **Senegal**, there are differences between Bogaards (2004), Lindberg and Jones (2010) and Templeman (2010) in coding the start date of the Socialist Party of Senegal rule. While Bogaards (2004, p. 181) sets the start date in 1988 which corresponds to the beginning of multi-party politics in Senegal (Bendel, 1999, p. 756), Lindberg and Jones (2010, p. 206), set the start date to be the date of 1978 legislative elections. Templeman (2010, p. 54), on the other hand, sets the start date already in the year of Independence, that is 1960. I set the start date to be the date of the first presidential elections after the independence, that is in 1963, and identify what was the first electoral victory in a multi-party setting and whether three consecutive electoral victories in a multi-party setting were achieved so to allow different approaches to studying one-party dominance in Senegal.

120. New case of executive dominance identified in **Serbia**. Since Serbia is not present in the DPI2020 database (Cruz et al., 2021), its political system was coded based on the review of the 2006 Constitution. Electoral data cross-checked with electoral reports available at IPU Election archive (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f) and IPU Parline database (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-g).

Note: data for the calculation of electoral decline was sourced from the Serbian Electoral Commission (Republicka izborna komisija, n.d.).

121. The case of **Seychelles** identified based on Anckar (2009, p. 41). Data was updated based on election reports available at IFES Election Guide (International Foundation for Electoral Systems - IFES, n.d.-a). In accordance with the review of elections and the development of political system by Thibaut (1999), I set the start date to be the date of first post-independence presidential elections, held under a second post-independence constitution of 1979 (the first post-independence constitution was adopted in 1976).

122. Start date for the case of **Singapore** was set to be the date of first post-independence parliamentary elections. Data was cross-checked with Rieger (2004), IPU Election archive (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f). and IPU Parline database (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-g).

123. For **South Africa (I)**, there are different views on how to code the start date of National Party (NP) executive dominance. Nwokora and Pelizzo (2014, p. 837) set the start date in 1975, while Templeman (2010, p. 54) identifies the 1948 as the start date. I code the start date to be the date of the National Party government formed after 1948 elections. I cross-check electoral data with Engel (1999) and based on that work I also code the political and electoral system type for the first electoral victory.

124. **South Africa (II)** identified based on Nwokora and Pelizo (2014, p. 837) and Lindberg and Jones (2010, p. 207). Data updated until 2024 (including May 2024

elections) based on the election reports at IPU Parline database (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-g).

125. New case of executive dominance identified in **South Korea**. Political system type coded based on a review of 1987 Constitution, while electoral system type for 1948 elections was evaluated by reviewing a history of electoral and political system development provided by Croissant (2004). Electoral data cross-checked with Croissant (2004), IFES Election Guide (International Foundation for Electoral Systems - IFES, n.d.-a), and WhoGov database (Nyrup & Bramwell, 2020).

126. New case of executive dominance identified in **Spain**. Electoral data cross-checked with IPU Election archive reports (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f). *Note:* the electoral decline was calculated based on percentages of votes won in elections calculated in IPU Electoral Archives (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-b).

127. Case of executive dominance **Sri Lanka (I)** identified based on Nwokora and Pelizzo (2014). Since the first electoral victory of the dominant United National Party was achieved under parliamentary system in 1977, after which new constitution was adopted in 1978 giving more importance to the office of the president, I observe the results of the presidential elections for the second and the third consecutive electoral victory. Data cross-checked with a historical overview of the political system development and elections in Sri Lanka by

Wagner (2004), results of recent presidential elections by IFES Election Guide (International Foundation for Electoral Systems - IFES, n.d.-a), and WhoGov database (Nyrup & Bramwell, 2020).

Note: due to specificities of the case in light of changing norms on political system type, the most relevant elections for analyzing the end of executive dominance were presidential elections in 1994 held in November. Therefore, for the electoral decline, the legislative elections held a few months earlier (in August) were eligible for calculating largest electoral decline of the United National Party. On the other side, given that the UNP only increased its electoral support in presidential elections before its demise (from 1982 to 1988), the value for presidential_dip is "999" as according to coding rules.

128. New case of executive dominance **Sri Lanka (II)** identified based on the review of electoral results from IFES Election Guide (International Foundation for Electoral Systems - IFES, n.d.-a), and IPU Election database (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-g).

129. New cases of executive dominance identified in St. Kitts and Nevis, **St. Kitts and Nevis (I)**. In his overview of dominance in micro states, Anckar (2009, p. 41) considers St. Kitts and Nevis during the time he observes, from 1983 to 2006, not to be a case of dominance based on his criteria which involve ruling party holding at least 3/4 cabinet seats during at least 4/5 of observed period (Anckar, 2009, p. 39). However, as the People's Action Movement held the post of the

Prime Minister for three times in a row, after elections, this does constitute a case of executive dominance in my dataset. The start date for St. Kitts and Nevis (I) was shifted from 1983 (observed by Anckar) to 1984 given that those were the first parliamentary elections after the independence. Based on the updated electoral data up to 2024, the case of executive **dominance St. Kitts and Nevis (II)** was also identified.

130. New case of executive dominance identified in St. Vincent and the Grenadines, **St. Vincent and the Grenadines (I).** Similar to St. Kitts and Nevis (I), Anckar (2009, p. 41) codes St. Vincent and the Grenadines for a period 1984-2006 as non-dominant, even though the same party, New Democratic Party, held the position of the Prime Minister after four consecutive elections (1984, 1989, 1994, and 1998). Electoral data was cross-checked with Hillebrands and Trefs (2005) and the electoral reports available at IPU Election archive (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f).

131. Based on the updated electoral data for St. Vincent and the Grenadines, a new case of executive dominance was identified as **St. Vincent and the Grenadines (II)**. Data was cross-checked with the electoral reports available at IPU Election archive (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f), and IPU Parline database (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-g).

132. A case of executive dominance in **St. Lucia** identified based on Anckar (2009, p. 41). Electoral data was cross-checked with electoral reports from IPU Election

archive (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f), while the type of political and electoral system were coded based on the information available in a historical overview of elections in St. Lucia by Hillebrands and Nohlen (2005), and by applying the same rules described in IDEA Electoral System Database (International IDEA, n.d.) and DPI2020 database (Cruz et al., 2021). For the dates of three consecutive electoral victories that established executive dominance of the St. Lucia United Workers Party (UWP), I take 1982, 1987, and 1992 elections. In 1987 there were two elections, one on 6 April and second on 30 April. The repeated elections occurred since the result of the first elections did not provide for a clear majority for either of the two main parties (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1987). In the repeated elections the UWP became the winner. Therefore, I take the 30 April 1987 elections as the second consecutive electoral victory of the UWP.

Note: the largest electoral decline for UWP was calculated taking into account the difference between 1982 elections and first elections in 1987.

133. For the case of executive dominance in Sweden, it is important to note that what Nwokora and Pelizzo (2014, p. 837) code as a single case of predominant party system, that is a case of 'interrupted dominance' from 1983 to 2006, I divide into **Sweden (II)** from 1982 to 1991 and **Sweden (III)** from 1994 to 2006 for the purpose of party system change outcome analysis as it now becomes clear when the interruption occurred and what was the executive party at the time of the

turnover elections which can facilitate party system change analysis. Furthermore, upon checking historical data from Statistics Sweden (Statistics Sweden, n.d.), and the list of former governments with party identification available at the official website of Swedish Parliament (Sveriges Riksdag, 2023), I identify the case of Social Democratic executive dominance starting in 1936 which I code **Sweden (I)**.

134. For the case of **Taiwan**, it needs to be noted that the requirement of identifying cases in independent countries can be contested here. However, the case of Taiwan influenced some of the most important comparative works in the field such as Giliomee and Simkins (1999), Bogaards and Boucek (2010), Templeman (2010, 2012) and Friedman and Wong (2008), to name just a few examples. Hence, it was considered an essential part of the GDPS dataset on dominant party systems, with the important note that its status can still be contested by scholars.

135. New case of executive dominance identified in **Tajikistan** based on a review of a history of elections and the development of political system in Tajikistan (Grotz, 2004), and IFES Election Guide reports (International Foundation for Electoral Systems - IFES, n.d.-a). The start date was set to be the date of first presidential elections in which the incumbent president Rahmon was a candidate of the People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan (formed in 1994).

136. For **Tanzania**, Templeman (2010, p. 54) set the start date to be the date of independence achieved under dominant authoritarian party (April 1964), while Lindberg and Jones (2010, p. 207) identify 1995 elections as a start date for the era of the dominant party democratic system. I set the start date to be the date of the first post-independence presidential elections in September 1965 which means that I include the period of authoritarian rule, but I also identify the date of the first multi-party presidential elections (1995) and code 1 for "tcmv" variable given that the Party of the Revolution (CCM) did achieve three consecutive multi-party elections in the observed period. These first three multi-party victories were in 1995, 2000, and 2005 and they also appear in Lindberg and Jones' (2010, p. 207) list.

137. The case of executive dominance in **The Bahamas** identified based on Anckar (2009, p. 41). However, since Anckar (2009, p. 37) divided his cases of executive dominance into two time periods (1973-1989 and 1990-2006), it is not clear what is exactly the start date for the case of executive dominance in The Bahamas. Therefore, electoral reports from IPU Electoral archive (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f) were used to determine the start date which is set to be the date of the formation of first government after the first post-independence parliamentary elections (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1977).

138. A case of executive dominance has been identified in **Togo** based on Lindberg and Jones (2010, pp. 204-207), with the amendments made based on the review

of the history of elections and political system development by Stroux (1999). These amendments are related to determining the start date of executive dominance which was in this case moved from 1994 (as determined by Lindberg and Jones) to 1998 Presidential elections due to the fact that the 1990-1994 period was highly unstable, characterized by a brief episode of transitional government in 1991, suspension of the constitution, and three coups which were supposed to restore the authoritarian rule of RPT leader Eyadéma (Stroux, 1999, pp. 892-893). Since the position of the President represents the highest executive office in the country, 1998 presidential and not 1994 legislative elections (which Lindberg and Jones code) are taken to be the first out of three consecutive electoral victories.

139. The case of executive dominance in **Trinidad and Tobago (I)** identified based on Templeman (2010, p. 54) and start date moved from 1962 (achieved independence) to 1966 (first post-independence parliamentary elections).

140. The case of executive dominance in **Trinidad and Tobago (II)** identified based on Nwokora and Pelizzo (2014, p. 837) and further updated based on election reports from IPU Election archive (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f) and IPU Parline database (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-g).

141. The case of executive dominance in **Türkiye (I)** identified based on Templeman (2010, p. 54). To determine political system type, electoral system type, and the date of elections, I reviewed the official publication from the Turkish Electoral

Commission on the results of elections from 1923 to 2011 (Supreme Election Council of Republic of Türkiye, n.d.-a)[3], and two articles on the development of constitutional norms in Turkey from the establishment of the Republic in 1924 onwards (Boyunsuz, 2024; Marszałek-Kawa & Burak, 2018). Since Turkey had two constitutions that matter for the observed period of time (1924-1961), I determine based on the review of 1924 constitutional norms related to the exercise of executive power (Boyunsuz, 2024, p. 3561) that it was the President of The Republic of Turkey that held the most executive powers given that he appointed the Prime Minister and was, unlike Prime Minister, not responsible to the Parliament. Given that the executive dominance of the Democratic Party (DP), in the period of multi-party elections 1950-1960, was still in the context of 1924 Constitution, I also code the system as presidential at the time of CHP first electoral defeat in 1950 and at the time when military ousted the DP government in 1960. It was after the military rule, in 1961, that a new constitution was adopted which established a parliamentary system of government (Marszałek-Kawa & Burak, 2018, pp. 98-99).

142. The cases of executive dominance **Türkiye (II)** and **Türkiye (III)** identified based on the review of electoral data for a period between 1923 and 2011 (Supreme Election Council of Republic of Türkiye, n.d.-a), and Open Data Portal

[3] I relied on machine translation to check what was the text in the publications I was downloading referring to.

of the Supreme Election Council of the Republic of Türkiye (Supreme Election Council of Republic of Türkiye, n.d.-b).

143. In the case of **Uganda**, it is important to note that there are different views on what kind of party system, if at all, existed during the period between 1982 and 2006. Given that National Resistance Movement (NRM) implemented a ban on political parties in the mid-1980s with an aim to establish a "no-party democracy" (Carbone, 2003), it is questionable whether we can speak of a party system during the period of ban on political parties. Carbone (2003, pp. 486-487) provides a good overview of different arguments on the topic by explaining that according to some authors this constitutes a case of a three-party system and according to others this is not a case of a party system at all, but a case of single-party state. Taking into consideration Carbone's (2003, pp. 487-488) argumentation, which is based on Sartori's (1976) framework on parties and party systems, that Uganda for the observed time period is best understood as a case of the hegemonic party system, I include it in the database in the following way: I set the start date to be the date of the first presidential elections after the adoption of the new constitution in 1995 which restored the institution of Parliament and provided the legal framework for first presidential elections in 1996 (see Schmidt, 1999).

144. New case of executive dominance **United Kingdom (I)** identified based on a review of the history of elections and governments formed in the United Kingdom from 1918 until 2023 (Cracknell et al., 2023). The same source contains

detailed statistics on the elections as well as dates when governments were formed, hence facilitating data collection for this case of executive dominance in the United Kingdom.

145. Based on the overview of the history of elections and dates when governments were formed from 1918 until 2023 (Cracknell et al., 2023), additional cases of executive dominance identified in the United Kingdom: **United Kingdom (II), United Kingdom (III), United Kingdom (IV)**. Electoral and government formation data also checked with electoral reports available at the IPU Election archive (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f) and IPU Parline database (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-g).

Note: the official publication on the century of UK elections (Cracknell et al., 2023) was used to calculate electoral decline of each dominant party.

146. Case of executive dominance **United States (I)** identified based on the review of presidential elections held in the USA since 1900, available at The American Presidency Project (Woolley & Peters, n.d.).

147. Case of executive dominance in the **United States (II)** identified based on Templeman (2010, p. 55). Electoral data and data on start and end date of presidential terms cross-checked with *Zoom in on America - America's 44 Presidents* (2016) and The American Presidency Project (Woolley & Peters, n.d.).

148. New case of executive dominance **United States (III)** identified based on the review of presidential elections held in the USA since 1900, available at The American Presidency Project (Woolley & Peters, n.d.).

149. New case of executive dominance **Venezuela** identified based on a review of history of elections and political system development by Molina and Thibaut (2005), and electoral results at IFES Election Guide (International Foundation for Electoral Systems - IFES, n.d.-a).

150. New case of executive dominance **Yemen** identified based on the overview of elections and political system development by Glosemeyer (2004), election reports at IPU Election archive (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-f), and election reports at IFES Election Guide (International Foundation for Electoral Systems - IFES, n.d.-a). I set the start date to be the date of the first government formed after the first elections took place in the united Yemen (the unification occurred in 1991). Since Yemen's political system changed from "Assembly-Elected" to "Presidential" (according to the DPI2020 database) after the introduction of the direct elections for the president in 1999, I code for the first victory the date of first parliamentary elections (1997), while for the second and third consecutive term I code victories in 1999 and 2006 presidential elections. Since the situation with the executive power in the country became complicated in 2015 due to the fact that the President first resigned from the post amid civil war and then decided to withdraw that resignation (Park, 2015), after which he eventually

decided in April 2022 to transfer the powers of the Presidency to the collective body called Presidential Leadership Council (Central Intelligence Agency, n.d.-a), the coding of the end of executive dominance in this case is challenging. I decided to treat the April 2022 resignation as the end of executive dominance of the General People's Congress and leave empty the fields for the year of turnover elections and the identity of the executive party after the turnover elections.

151. The case of executive dominance in Zambia, **Zambia (I)**, identified based on Bogaards (2004) and Templeman (2010). Lindberg and Jones (2010, p. 207) admit that their coding of Zambia since 1991 as "non dominant" can be contested due to the application of their rule that dominant parties must hold at least 50% of the seats for three times in a row. I updated the data for the case of Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) executive dominance which lasted until 2011.

152. Case of executive dominance in Zambia during the rule of Patriotic Rule (PF), named **Zambia (II)**, identified based on the review of the official election results (Electoral Commission of Zambia, 2022).

153. The case of executive dominance in **Zimbabwe** identified based on Nwokora and Pelizzo (2014), Bogaards (2004), and Lindberg and Jones (2010). Given that all three provide a different start date (Nwokora and Pelizzo set the start date in 1981, Bogaards in 1985, and Lindberg and Jones in 1980), I set the start date to be the date of the formation of the first post-independence government after the

first post-independence electoral victory of Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), that is 15 July 1985 (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1985). Given that the political system changed from parliamentary to presidential soon after the first post-independence elections (Baumhögger, 1999, pp. 966-967), I put the dates of presidential elections for the second and third consecutive victory.

Note: the electoral data was gathered from IFES Election Guide (International Foundation for Electoral Systems - IFES, n.d.), IPU Election Archive (Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d.-b), Nohlen et al. (1999) and Pottie (2001). Since ZANU and ZAPU-PF did not merge until 1987 (Baumhögger, 1999, p. 965), the electoral decline takes into account the election results of the ZANU before merger and ZANU-PF after the merge of two parties.

Excluded cases

1. For **Algeria**, it is important to clarify that Templeman (2010, p. 54) originally included the case as starting in 1962 and attributed the executive dominance to National Liberation Front (FLN). However, from 1962 to 1995 FLN won only in single-party presidential elections, while in the first contested presidential elections held in 1995 it did not participate (see Bouandel, 1997). Furthermore, the winner of the 1995 contested presidential elections was an army general, Zeroual, who was formally unaffiliated at the time and was planning to form his own party, National Democratic Rally (RND), which eventually came into

existence in 1997 (Bouandel, 2003, p. 15). Therefore, as we cannot clearly attribute to the FLN at least three consecutive presidential victories out of which at least one was in contested multi-party setting, the case of FLN rule in Algeria from 1962 until 1995 is excluded from the database and Algeria enters starting with 2009 presidential elections.

2. What could be the new case of executive dominance identified in Belgium, **Belgium (I)**, was excluded based on the fact that between 1918 and 1945 the office of the Prime Minister was not the highest executive office as the King also played a role by heading the cabinet meetings (Belgian Federal Government, n.d.). It was determined that the earliest start date in accordance with the requirements of the GDPS dataset (that the highest executive office was determined based on elections, in accordance with constitutional rules) was after 1919 elections which were preceded by the Royal Decree of 25 November 1918 that established the office of the Prime Minister for the first time (Belgian Federal Government, n.d.).
3. The case of **Finland** (1978-1990), originally included by Nwokora and Pelizzo (2014, p. 836) is excluded from the GDPS dataset given that Social Democrats (SDP) managed to secure only two, but not three consecutive electoral victories and consequently formed two, not three consecutive coalitional governments. SDP formed governments after 1979 and 1983 elections, but then let National Coalition Party (KOK) take the highest executive office after 1987 elections

(check the report for 1987 Parliamentary elections in Finland at the IPU Election Archive website). Even though SDP, along with People's Party and Rural Party, was a coalition partner with KOK in this case, we cannot take it to be the case of the same coalition persistently taking highest executive office after the elections (as it was the case with Chile's Concentracion) given that 1979 and 1983 governments were centered around Social Democrats, Center Party, People's Party and Rural Party, while 1987 government was headed by a party that was not part of former coalitions and was in opposition until these elections (National Coalition Party).

4. What could have been a case of executive dominance **Greece (I)** during the rule of the National Radical Union (1952-1963) which was a direct successor to a party called Greek Rally (Kousoulas, 1967), was eventually discarded due to the 1952 constitutional rules according to which the primacy of the King in the executive arena was established, especially regarding the appointment of the Prime Minister and the right to dismiss the Ministers of the Government (Terlexis, 1971).
5. The decision to exclude what could have been the case of executive dominance in **Israel (II)** for a period from 1977 to 1992 during which Likud formed series of governments was based on the fact that the post-election developments in 1984 resulted in a grand alliance between Likud and Labor which was based on an agreement to rotate parties holding the position of the Prime Minister with

Labor starting first (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1984). This means that the government formation process after 1977, 1981, 1984 and 1988 elections was not the same: while Likud took the highest executive office after 1977 and 1981 elections (t+1 and t+2), it had to share the highest executive office after 1984 elections (t+3). However, my decision can be contested on the basis that Likud was in government during the whole period and that the agreement on the rotation in government did not interrupt its executive dominance.

6. The case of Liechtenstein can be open to interpretation. Although originally included in Templeman's (2010) dataset on 46 cases of dominant parties, Liechtenstein is excluded due to the fact that the highest executive office is not won after the elections, that is, the highest executive office belongs to the Prince of Liechtenstein who can dismiss the Prime Minister and the government (Veenendaal, 2022). Therefore, even though there would be two potential cases of executive dominance in Lichtenstein, **Lichtenstein (I)** for a period of multiple electoral victories secured by Progressive Citizens' Party (1928-1970), and **Lichtenstein (II)** for a period of multiple electoral victories by Patriotic Union (1978-1993), these cannot be taken as cases of executive dominance according to the rules of the GDPS dataset, although scholars can argue differently.
7. What could have been a new case of early executive dominance in Peru, **Peru (I)**, identified during a period that is known in the literature as *The Aristocratic*

Republic (Miller, 1982), was eventually discarded to keep the coding and data collection consistency. The case started with 1899 presidential elections and lasted until 1912 electoral defeat. During this period, it was the *Civilista Party* that held the highest executive office for four times in a row, that is after elections in 1899, 1903, 1904 and 1908. As the start date falls slightly out of determined start date of data collection for the entire dataset (January 1900), the case was excluded and partial inclusion (from 1903 until 1908) also dismissed. Nevertheless, future research might consider including this case as it can prove to be theoretically inspiring. For example, in a review of the development of the party system in Peru, Roncagliolo (2011, p. 70) notes that the party system that developed in Peru from 1895 to 1919 was the first party system in Peru and describes it as a multi-party system with a dominant party. Data on terms of office and elections was cross-checked with the historical overview of elections in Peru by Soldevilla (2005) and Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management (DADM) Project (2024).

8. Even though Lindberg and Jones (2010, p. 206) code **São Tomé and Príncipe** as 'dominant' from 1991 to 2002, based on the results of the legislative elections, I exclude this case given that Movement for the Liberation of São Tomé and Príncipe – Social Democratic Party (MLTSP-PSD) never managed to win the presidential elections in the observed period. Given that São Tomé and Príncipe at the time had a presidential type of political system (Fleischhacker, 1999c), which was kept with constitutional amendments of 2003, failures to win the

office of the president by the MLSTP-PSD means that I exclude this case from the database. The decision can be further supported by the fact that the observed period was marked by unstable governments and tensions between the two branches of the executive in which the President utilized his constitutional powers to dismiss several governments over a short period of time (Fleischhacker, 1999c, pp. 740-741).

9. What could have been a case of Conservative dominance in **Nicaragua (I)**, from 1912 until 1928, was excluded given that at the time the United States intervened directly in its domestic policy and had its troops on Nicaraguan soil thereby effectively establishing a "semi-protectorate" (Krennerich, 2005b, p. 480). The US troops started the withdrawal from Nicaragua in 1932, hence the period after 1932 is observed for the purpose of identifying potential new cases of executive dominance in Nicaragua.

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