Online Appendix for

Spinning a global web of EU external relations:

How the EU establishes stronger joint bodies where they matter most

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Additional information on the additive index of JB strength

The following indicators are included in our additive index of joint-body strength.

1) Does the joint body have a two-level structure?

The first indicator for our additive index is whether joint bodies have a *two-level structure*, such as a joint council and joint committee. This gives joint bodies a hierarchical setup, which increases a bureaucracy's ability to generate policies (Carpenter 2001: 22). An additional level of decision-making corresponds to a multiplication of capacities and actors focused on designing policies capable of achieving the stipulated agreement objectives.

To code this indicator, we checked whether agreements set up at least two joint bodies that espouse a hierarchical relationship. For example, the *Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Arab Republic of Egypt, of the other part* (OJ L 304, 30.9.2004, p. 38–57) sets up an **Association Council** (Art. 74–76, 80–81) and an **Association Committee** (Art. 77–79). However, a hierarchical relationship can also be established without one of the joint bodies being termed a "council." For example, the *Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part* (OJ L 11, 14.1.2017, p. 23–1079) sets up a **CETA Joint Committee** (Art. 26.1, 26.3) and numerous regular committees, such as the **Committee on Trade in Goods** (Art. 2.13, 4.7). In total, we find that 68 of 296 agreements with at least one joint body have a two-level structure.

2) Does the joint body meet at the level of ministers or senior officials?

Our second indicator is the *level of meetings*. Technical experts more readily develop a sense of community, which helps transcend state interests and facilitates cooperation (Haftel and Thompson 2006: 258–259). Still, higher-level meetings, such as among ministers, can provide "political guidance" (Gilpin 2001: 223) and allow more far-reaching decisions to take shape. Moreover, lower bureaucratic levels usually participate in the preparation of decisions notwithstanding the highest level at which they are formally taken (Merrills 2011: 9). We thus interpret the involvement of higher levels as raising a joint body's profile and allowing it to pursue a more ambitious agenda.

Whenever we find a reference foreseeing such higher-level meetings in at least one joint body, we coded this indicator present. For example, the *Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Colombia and Peru, of the other part* (OJ L 354, 21.12.2012, p. 3–2607) specifies in Art. 12(2) that the "Trade Committee shall meet at least once a year at the **level of Ministers** or the representatives that such level may designate. In addition, upon written request of a Party, the Trade Committee may meet at any time at the level of **senior officials** designated to take the necessary decisions." Another example, not including ministers, is the *Agreement in the form of exchanges of letters between the European Community and the Government of Canada concerning fisheries relations* (OJ L 340, 31.12.1993, p. 3–14), where parties agreed in Point I, lit. i to "establish a Joint Committee of **Senior Officials** to meet as necessary but at least once a year to review the operation of the Agreement and the implementation of their respective undertakings by the Parties."

We find that 37 of 46 joint councils foresee meetings at ministerial level but only 33 of 293 joint committees. A further 45 joint committees foresee higher-level meetings among senior-level officials or similar. Since we found considerable overlap between joint councils and joint committees, only 52 agreements satisfy this criterion.

3) Does the joint body have rules of procedure?

The third indicator is whether joint bodies have *rules of procedure*. Rules of procedure can leave a profound impact on decision-making by structuring "the choices and information available to its members" (Hall and Taylor 1996: 943), lowering transaction costs, and allowing joint bodies to take more actions. They, similarly, have a profound impact on the "dynamics of diplomatic encounter" (Coleman 2013: 168) and can become a crucial source of institutional evolution because rules of procedure are easier to modify than international agreements themselves (Peters 2016: 39; see also Hawkins and Jacoby 2006: 223). This can support the agency of joint bodies once set up.

This indicator is, again, usually spelled out clearly in agreements. For example, the *Agreement on scientific and technical cooperation between the European Community and the State of Israel* (OJ L 209, 19.8.1996, p. 23–32) sets up an EC-Israel Research Committee in Art. 6, noting that the "committee, which shall be composed of representatives of the Commission and of Israel, shall adopt its **rules of procedure**." In a few cases, the choice of words was a bit ambiguous. For example, the *Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam* (OJ L 136, 7.6.1996, p. 29–36) states in Art. 14: "The **organizational structures and operational regulations** of the Joint Commission will be determined and agreed upon by the two Parties." We accepted such formulations as, essentially, referring to rules of procedure.

The adopted rules of procedure are, generally, not publicly available. But we could identify about one dozen, including recent ones and others going back to the 1970s. Their contents appear fairly stable. The chairmanship, which rotates among the agreement parties, enjoys considerable agenda-setting powers. The chair fixes meeting dates, drafts provisional agendas, and prepares meeting summaries. The chair may also invite independent experts as observers. Decisions can be taken by written procedure between meetings and need the chair's signature at the end.

The rules of procedure establish the "office of Secretary to the Joint Committee," which is filled jointly by the parties and receives all written information addressed to the chair. Similarly to the EU, the institution of a rotating chair may allow chairs to influence outcomes in joint bodies, given that the restricted number of participants and regular intervals at which the chairmanship changes support diffuse reciprocity among parties (Tallberg 2010: 246–247). Irrespective of the chair's ability to shape decisions, formal rules of procedure spell out important aspects of decision making and reduce the transaction costs of negotiations, thereby allowing joint bodies to generate more actions. A total of 223 of 296 joint bodies have rules of procedure, which makes it the most common trait of *JB strength*.

4) Can the joint body take decisions in at least one instance?
5) Can the joint body amend agreements?
6) Is the joint body formally empowered to create sub-bodies?

Joint bodies can also be delegated authority to take decisions, which is an important dimension of international institutions (e.g., Haftel and Thompson 2006; Hooghe and Marks 2015). This delegation is particularly consequential inside the EU because it usually amounts to a transfer of power from the Council (and EP) to the Commission (Gastinger and Dür 2021). Limited transfers of authority, like issuing recommendations or just providing a forum for negotiations, can already be considered a form of delegation (Abbott *et al.* 2000: 416–417; Haftel and Thompson 2006: 260–261). Still, we set the bar higher because all joint bodies reach this watermark.

Our fourth indicator therefore is whether joint bodies can *take decisions* in at least one instance. To code this indicator, we have identified every time a joint body is mentioned in any article, including in annexes and protocols. For example, Art. 160 of the *Agreement establishing an association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Chile, of the other part* (OJ L 352, 30.12.2002, p. 3–1450) provides for the Association Committee to adopt a decision to reciprocally extend liberalization of the public procurement

market, if either side adopts a deeper agreement with any other third party.[1] An example of a joint body empowered my an agreement's annex or protocol to take decisions is Art. 5 of the protocol to the *Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Guinea-Bissau for the period 16 June 2007 to 15 June 2011* (OJ L 342, 27.12.2007, p. 5–37), which specifies that "fishing opportunities provided for in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 shall be **decided** by mutual agreement between the two Parties **in the Joint Committee** provided for in Article 10 of the Agreement." A final example is the possibility of joint bodies to end formal dispute resolution with a binding decision. An example here is Art. 129 of the *Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of the other part* (OJ L 108, 29.4.2010, p. 3–354), which specifies that the EU or Montenegro "shall refer to the Stabilisation and Association Council any dispute relating to the application or interpretation of this Agreement. … The **Stabilisation and Association Council may settle the dispute by** means of **a binding decision**." Interestingly, also, in Art. 130 the EU and Montenegro agreed that "[a]s long as the dispute is not resolved, it shall be discussed **at every meeting** of the Stabilisation and Association Council." We find that in 170 agreements a joint body is empowered to take decisions in at least one instance.

Moreover, we coded, fifth, whether joint bodies are empowered to *amend agreements*. This power is primarily confined to annexes or protocols but can also extend to the body of the agreement. The *Agreement between the European Union and Georgia on protection of geographical indications of agricultural products and foodstuff* (OJ L 93, 30.3.2012, p. 3–140) specifies in Art. 11 that the "**Joint Committee** shall … be responsible for: (a) **amending Article 2(1) and (2)**, as regards the references to the law applicable in the Contracting Parties," allowing a sort of dynamic alignment with new regulations. An example of joint bodies amending annexes is the Joint Committee of the *Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Swiss Confederation, of the other, on the free movement of persons* (*OJ L 114, 30.4.2002, p. 6–72*). Art. 18 of that agreement states that if "a Contracting Party wishes to have this Agreement revised, it shall submit a **proposal to** … **the Joint Committee**. Amendments to … Annexes II and III … shall be adopted by **decision** of the Joint Committee and may **enter into force immediately** after that decision." In fact, Switzerland entered a unilateral declaration at the end that it will propose to the Joint Committee to include architects' diplomas awarded by Swiss universities to Annex III, granting Swiss architects easier access to the Single Market. This illustrates that agreement parties continue negotiations in joint bodies, since Switzerland surely tried to

[1] The exact wording of Art. 16 is: „If either Party should offer in the future a third party additional advantages with regard to access to their respective procurement markets beyond what has been agreed under this Title, it shall agree to enter into negotiations with the other Party with a view to extending these advantages to it on a reciprocal basis **by means of a decision of the Association Committee**."

include architects already during the initial negotiations. Overall, we find 118 agreements where joint bodies can amend the agreement or its annexes in at least one instance.

Sixth, we included whether joint bodies are empowered to *create sub-bodies*. This enables them to enhance their decision-making capacities and exercise authority in increasingly specific areas. This power is usually spelled out directly in the institutional provisions setting up the joint body. For example, the *Voluntary Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of the Congo on forest law enforcement, governance and trade in timber and derived products to the European Union* (OJ L 92, 6.4.2011, p. 127–238) states in Art. 19 that the "Joint Implementation Committee … **may set up working groups or other subsidiary bodies** for areas of work requiring specific expertise." This enables joint bodies to enhance their decision-making capacities and exercise authority in increasingly specific areas. A total of 112 agreements affords joint bodies such open-ended powers to create additional organizational layers.

7) Does the joint body meet at least annually?

The frequency of interactions is a softer, yet not less consequential, dimension of joint body strength. Wallace and Singer (1970: 246) saw in regular meetings "one of the most crucial innovations" brought about by international organizations. The literature on intergovernmental networks also underlines the significance of "direct bureaucratic contacts" (Keohane and Nye 1974: 42). Repeated interactions, even absent binding decisions, may lead to "focal points" in the discussions around which actor expectations converge (Krasner 1982). We, seventh, thus include the *frequency* of joint body meetings.

We seek to identify joint bodies where it is explicitly specified that meetings should take place at least annually. Again, this is usually stipulated unambiguously directly in the institutional provisions. For example, Art. 14 of the *Agreement between the European Community and the United States of America on sanitary measures to protect public and animal health in trade in live animals and animal products* (OJ L 118, 21.4.1998, p. 3–63) stipulates that the "Joint Management Committee … shall **meet within one year of the entry into force** of this Agreement **and at least annually thereafter**." We also accepted here formulations that did not contain "at least" explicitly, such as Art. 11 of the *Agreement between the European Community and the United States of America on precursors and chemical substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances* (OJ L 164, 21.6.1997, p. 24–34) specifying that the "Joint Follow-up Group shall … **normally meet once a year**, date, place and programme being fixed by mutual agreement." 166 agreements in our dataset foresee annual meetings within joint bodies.

8) Is the joint body mentioned in at least three articles outside the institutional provisions?

Eighth, and finally, we include how often joint bodies are *mentioned* in agreements. Every time a joint body is mentioned, even if only for the sake of exchanging information, the officials of both sides need to interact with each other. If joint bodies are mentioned in at least three articles outside the institutional provisions, we count this indicator present. Since three is the median value, this number splits our sample roughly in half and 143 agreements are coded 1 on this indicator.

Table A1: Frequency table for indicators in the additive index of *JB strength*

Indicator	No	Yes
Two-level structure	228	68
Level of meetings	244	52
Rules of procedure	73	223
Decision	126	170
Amend agreement	178	118
Create sub-bodies	184	112
Frequency (meet annually)	130	166
Mentions	153	143

Figure A1: Distribution of the dependent variable (*JB strength*; additive index)



Figure A2: Correlation matrix, indicators in additive index



Table A2: Overview of all variables included in the dataset

NAME	DESCRIPTION	SOURCE
id	Unique identification number of the international agreement in the Treaties Office Database (TOD) of the European External Action Service (EEAS).	TOD
year	Year in which the international agreement was concluded.	TOD
title	Title of the international agreement.	TOD
continent	Continent of the agreement third party.	Arel-Bundock *et al.* (2018)
JB	Binary variable whether the international agreement includes at least one joint body.	Manually coded
jb_strength	Score of the international agreement on our additive index of JB strength.	Manually coded
lsa	Score of the international agreement on JB strength using latent semantic analysis.	Authors' computation
JB.two.or.more.types	Binary variable whether the joint body has a two-level structure.	Manually coded
JB.level	Binary variable whether the joint body meets at least at the level of senior officials.	Manually coded
JB.RoP	Binary variable whether the joint body operates under formal rules of procedure.	Manually coded
JB.decisions	Binary variable whether the joint body can take a decision it at least one instance.	Manually coded
JB.amend	Binary variable whether the joint body can amend the agreement in at least one instance.	Manually coded
JB.subbodies	Binary variable whether the joint body can establish additional sub-bodies.	Manually coded
JB.frequency	Binary variable whether the joint body meets at least annually.	Manually coded
JB.mentions	Binary variable whether the joint body is mentioned in at least three different articles of the international agreement.	Manually coded

(table continued on following page)

Table A2: Overview of all variables included in the dataset (cont.)

NAME	DESCRIPTION	SOURCE
number_countries	Number of non-EU countries signatories to the international agreement.	TOD
plurilateral	Binary variable whether the agreement is concluded with more than one third country.	Authors' computation
pop_sum	Sum of the total population of all third countries party to the agreement.	World Bank
gdp_max	Gross domestic product (GDP) of the largest third country party to the agreement.	World Bank
gdppc_mean	Mean of the per capita GDP among all third countries party to the agreement.	World Bank
fh_max	Political rights indicator with inverted scores (higher values indicate more democratic countries).	Freedom House (2020)
distance	Great-circle distance between Brussels and the closest third-country capital.	Weidmann and Gleditsch (2010)
indefinite	Binary variable whether the international agreement is concluded for an unlimited period of time or renewed automatically.	Manually coded
pages	Number of pages of the international agreement.	Authors' computation
association.agreement	Binary variable whether the international agreement is an association agreement.	TOD
framework.agreement	Binary variable whether the international agreement is a framework agreement.	TOD
cooperation.agreement	Binary variable whether the international agreement is a cooperation agreement.	TOD
pa	Principal policy area to which the international agreement pertains.	Manually coded
pa.two.or.more	Binary variable whether the international agreement is an association agreement or covers two or more policy areas (inferred from the legal basis of the agreement).	TOD
jb_lag	Binary variable whether the third country already had a pre-existing joint body with the EU (coded 0 for all plurilateral agreements).	Manually coded
country1 … country77	Standard English names of all third countries party to the international agreement.	TOD

Figure A3: Number of agreements (overall and with joint bodies) over time



Figure A4: Number of agreements (overall and with joint bodies) by primary policy area



Abbreviations: FSP – Foreign and Security Policy; CCP – Common Commercial Policy; GA – General Agreement; JFS – Justice, Freedom and Security; EAEC – European Atomic Energy Community.

Figure A5: Correlation matrix, predictors



Table A3: Summary statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Median	Pctl(75)	Max
JB	547	0.54	0.50	0	0	1	1	1
JB strength	296	3.55	2.18	0.00	2.00	3.00	5.00	8.00
JB strength (LSA)	296	3.97	1.86	0.00	2.56	3.64	5.15	10.00
Population (sum, log)	547	16.32	2.31	6.91	15.15	16.24	17.72	21.04
Distance (log)	547	8.24	0.94	6.20	7.48	8.54	9.04	9.84
Broad scope	547	0.23	0.42	0	0	0	0	1
Plurilateral	547	0.05	0.22	0	0	0	0	1
GDPpc (mean, log)	544	1.89	1.50	-1.61	0.79	1.67	3.36	4.95
Democracy (min)	538	5.15	1.89	1.00	4.00	5.00	7.00	7.00
Economic policy	547	0.35	0.48	0	0	0	1	1
Foreign policy	547	0.20	0.40	0	0	0	0	1
Indefinite	547	0.80	0.40	0	1	1	1	1

Table A4: Robustness checks

	Model 3	*Model 4*	*Model 5*	*Model 6*	*Model 7*	*Model 8*
Population (sum, log)		0.240**	0.140***	0.194**	0.225***	0.169***
		(0.093)	(0.053)	(0.089)	(0.081)	(0.053)
Distance (log)	-0.863***	-0.955***	-0.732***	-0.823***	-1.120***	-0.418***
	(0.233)	(0.269)	(0.140)	(0.225)	(0.353)	(0.142)
Broad scope	2.962***	2.927***		2.962***	2.924***	2.690***
	(0.386)	(0.395)		(0.376)	(0.342)	(0.461)
Plurilateral	0.472	0.310	-0.685	0.571	0.939	0.942**
	(0.683)	(0.712)	(0.496)	(0.701)	(0.651)	(0.425)
GDPpc (mean, log)	0.098	0.348**	0.110	0.315**	0.222	0.208**
	(0.173)	(0.165)	(0.103)	(0.156)	(0.149)	(0.101)
Democracy (min)	-0.038	-0.029	-0.112	-0.050	-0.0001	-0.027
	(0.107)	(0.111)	(0.075)	(0.105)	(0.098)	(0.071)
Economic policy	2.611***	2.680***	1.222***	2.531***	2.282***	1.781***
	(0.613)	(0.631)	(0.257)	(0.597)	(0.547)	(0.325)
Foreign policy	8.160***	8.247***	2.718***	7.901***	7.212***	5.323***
	(1.656)	(1.698)	(0.695)	(1.645)	(1.523)	(1.013)
GDP (max, log)	0.238**					
	(0.092)					
EU accession		-0.363				
		(0.622)				
Pages			0.003***			
			(0.0004)			
Prior JB				0.404		
				(0.449)		
Americas					0.584	
					(0.607)	
Asia					0.749	
					(0.599)	
Europe					0.026	
					(0.682)	
Intercontinental					-1.924	
					(1.468)	
Oceania					1.121	
					(0.826)	
Framework agreement						-2.634***
						(0.879)
Cooperation agreement						-0.503
						(0.740)
Association agreement						1.580*

						(0.831)
Constant	8.977***	4.795*	7.851***	4.493**	5.720*	1.624
	(2.716)	(2.461)	(1.476)	(2.247)	(3.107)	(1.522)
Observations	538	538	538	538	538	538
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.459	0.461	0.456	0.454	0.453	0.566
Inverse Mills Ratio	-3.991***	-4.098***	-2.132***	-3.790***	-3.190***	-1.945***
	(1.196)	(1.243)	(0.256)	(1.174)	(1.046)	(0.723)

Note: the models are Heckman selection models with *JB strength* as dependent variable in the outcome equations. We only show the outcome equations. Coefficients for the year fixed effects omitted. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A5: Individual indicators included in *JB strength* as dependent variables

	Two levels	*Rules of procedure*	*Ministers*	*Decisions*	*Frequency*	*Subbodies*	*Amend*	*Mentions*
Population (sum, log)	0.034**	0.006	0.027*	0.038*	0.042**	0.038**	0.023	0.026
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Distance (log)	-0.080**	-0.155***	-0.067*	-0.128**	-0.047	-0.107**	-0.167***	-0.120***
	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.054)	(0.048)	(0.041)	(0.047)	(0.045)
Broad scope	0.646***	0.181***	0.489***	0.134	0.115	0.652***	0.258***	0.476***
	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.066)	(0.085)	(0.076)	(0.066)	(0.073)	(0.071)
Plurilateral	0.062	0.027	0.061	0.048	-0.265**	0.151	0.099	0.093
	(0.100)	(0.102)	(0.118)	(0.151)	(0.133)	(0.117)	(0.128)	(0.125)
GDPpc (mean, log)	0.054**	0.006	0.058**	0.061	0.0001	0.053*	0.098***	0.005
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.031)
Democracy (min)	-0.011	0.003	-0.014	0.002	-0.004	-0.004	-0.010	0.002
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Economic policy	0.255***	-0.025	0.219**	0.426***	0.292**	0.348***	0.406***	0.692***
	(0.095)	(0.104)	(0.105)	(0.143)	(0.131)	(0.110)	(0.125)	(0.120)
Foreign policy	0.710**	0.310	1.007***	1.178***	0.883**	1.569***	1.149***	1.348***
	(0.280)	(0.330)	(0.286)	(0.421)	(0.401)	(0.319)	(0.381)	(0.359)
Constant	-0.242	1.463***	0.036	0.566	0.539	0.664*	0.954**	0.205
	(0.330)	(0.345)	(0.385)	(0.500)	(0.444)	(0.387)	(0.428)	(0.415)
Observations	538	538	538	538	538	538	538	538
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R^2	0.470	0.186	0.467	0.128	0.136	0.497	0.208	0.353
Inverse Mills Ratio	-0.443** (0.198)	-0.176 (0.229)	-0.674*** (0.207)	-0.685** (0.298)	-0.456 (0.281)	-0.559** (0.226)	-0.474* (0.267)	-0.519** (0.253)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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